

**G Troop Vanguard
To
Liberate Santo Tomas:**

**100-Mile Flying Column to
Manila**

1st Cavalry Division 1-3 February 1945

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Sixth Field Army



XIV Corps



1st Cavalry Division



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Author Note

This narrative centers on the World War II combat experiences of Captain Walter J. Landry Jr. as commander of G Troop, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division in the 1-3 February 1945 “Flying Column” mission to Manila. Research in 2023-2024 of contemporary period sources and vantage points of official U.S. Army reports and recorded personal observations differed occasionally in information. Tactical events appear in a logical sequence determined by the authors and as recollected in accounts by Captain Landry and his Lieutenant Barrow. The authors focused on describing Captain Landry’s tactical decisions and actions in the context of what was known by him in rapidly evolving tactical situations. Any inaccuracy in sequence and action details is unintentional. Photograph images are cropped and montaged to illustrate interesting aspects of the 1st Cavalry Division and G Troop’s mission in 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Regiment. Illustrations by Jon Moilanen are superimposed on maps to accent tactical actions and control measures. Robert Landry is the son Walter Landry. We have no known conflict of interest to declare.

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Disclaimer: This narrative presents information surrounding a personal story of World War II combat leadership at the tactical level of conflict. The scope of this narrative surveys the 1st Cavalry Division Pacific campaigns (1944-1945) in the Admiralties and Leyte-Samar with a concentration during the division's Luzon campaign and "Flying Column" mission in February 1945.

Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or any other U.S. government activity.

PREFACE

A nine-year old boy Robert remembered a special moment at Christmas in 1961 when his father gave him a book entitled *From Pearl Harbor to Okinawa, The War in the Pacific: 1941-1945* by Bruce Bliven. The book was written for young readers as informative military history. Robert's father Walter Landry, recently retired as a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, began to chuckle as he paged through the book. He pointed to a passage in the book on the February 1945 liberation of the civilian internees at Santo Tomas University in Manila. The narrative stated that just prior to American soldiers breaking into the internment camp, the internees heard the roar of a tank engine and a shout, "Where's the front gate?"

"That was me as the G Troop commander" as Walter Landry described what occurred during the 1st Cavalry Division's "Flying Column" three-day 100-mile penetration to Manila and his role as a rifle troop commander during the combat operation. The division's official history more accurately quoted this question shouted over the noise of battle as, "Where the *hell* is the front gate?" Robert Landry recalls his father was always relatively soft spoken, but when needed, could crank up the volume and employ what he called his parade ground voice.

Walter Landry's recollections of his combat missions in the Pacific Theater were always sharp and detailed. He was immensely proud of the 1st Cavalry Division's accomplishments. He believed that it was no accident that 2nd Squadron/8th Cavalry was the vanguard to the division's unprecedented advance to Manila. He felt that even though the division no longer had its horses and had reorganized into a unique infantry division, it demonstrated all the requisite skills to fight and patrol dismounted, while retaining the cavalry ethos of initiative, mobility, and shock action.

Landry always declared that his G Troop soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers were the best in the Army. No better example was on the Flying Column's third night when he and his troop's lead elements arrived at the Santo Tomas University's front gate while the troop's trail elements were engaged in a bloody meeting engagement several blocks away at Far Eastern University. When all officers of this troop element were wounded and the first sergeant was killed, Sergeant John Gallagher took personal command, repelled three Japanese counterattacks, cared for casualties, and rejoined G Troop and 2d Squadron at Santo Tomas. For his leadership and heroism, Sergeant Gallagher was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. "My father always stated Gallagher was the finest soldier with whom he ever served."

As a young man who witnessed the events leading up to U.S. entry into World War II, Walter Landry's character and military inclination became evident. While still in high school he joined a horse cavalry unit of the Massachusetts Army National Guard. He contemplated going to Canada and joining its army, but his father convinced him to slow down. "Son, wait. We will find ourselves in the war soon enough. Enlist in our Army."

He requested discharge from his National Guard unit and enlisted in the Regular Army's 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Fort Meade, Maryland. Promoted soon after to Corporal, his leaders encouraged him to apply for the recently inaugurated Cavalry Officer Candidate School (OCS). He took the OCS examination while participating in the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941 and attended the second course conducted at Fort Riley,

Kansas (the first course was for senior non-commissioned officers). In December 1941 he graduated from OCS and was commissioned a Cavalry Second Lieutenant just after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

He had the good fortune to be sent to the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas and was assigned to 2nd Squadron/8th Cavalry Regiment. He did receive one unexpected temporary “cadre” assignment to Camp Hale, Colorado to help organize the early phase of forming the 10th Mountain Division. However, the War Department eliminated the Reconnaissance Troop from this division’s organization and he returned to his squadron in the 1st Cavalry Division where he continued to serve as a horse-mounted machinegun platoon leader.

Training for overseas deployment and patrolling the U.S. southern border seasoned the 1st Cavalry Division throughout 1942 and into 1943. The reorganization of the 1st Cavalry Division as an infantry division in 1943 was one of many U.S. Army decisions to meet wartime requirements of worldwide commitments. The division’s members always considered themselves a dismounted cavalry division as they retained their original four regiment structure and cavalry lineage.

The 1st Cavalry Division arrived in Australia to prepare for combat in the Pacific. In 1944, Landry experienced combat in the Admiralty Islands north of New Guinea and afterwards in Leyte-Samar of the Philippine archipelago. The Luzon campaign in the February 1945 setting for now Captain Walter Landry as G Troop commander and vanguard for the 1st Cavalry Division’s “Flying Column” to Manila and liberation of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp.

I was that nine-year-old boy who received the World War II book on that Christmas long ago. So, with all that said, I am deeply indebted to my friend Colonel Jon Moilanen, U.S. Army Retired, for enthusiastically researching and taking the lead role of recounting this unique combat mission and my father’s experiences in command during the Flying Column. The 1st Cavalry Division rescued 3,700 U.S. and Allied civilian internees, and a contingent of captured U.S. military nurses, just prior to the horrific urban fighting to liberate Manila. We trust our focused battle analysis and first-person reflections of my father Captain Walter Landry and his Lieutenant Thomas Barrow provide Army leaders an appreciation of decisive action leading in combat amidst the vagaries and uncompromising rigors of war.

Robert H. Landry



G Troop Vanguard to Liberate Santo Tomas: Flying Column 100 Miles to Manila 1st Cavalry Division 1-3 February 1945

by Jon H. Moilanen and Robert H. Landry

Introduction: Leadership in Combat

Captain Walter Landry, commander of G Troop, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry, viewed the Luzon coastline from a ship offshore at Lingayen Gulf on **27 January 1945**. Having just arrived from combat missions on Leyte and Samar, the 1st Cavalry Division was disembarking at San Fabian as a reinforcing infantry division to U.S. Sixth Army already in combat on Luzon.

As Landry landed ashore with his G Troop, he entered his third combat campaign in less than one year. At the time, he had no way of foreknowing his key role about to occur in a unique combat mission of 1st Cavalry Division. Within hours, he and his troop would be part of the division's attack with two squadron task forces and a provisional reconnaissance squadron leading the division to penetrate over 100 miles through Japanese defenses into Manila.

The objective to liberate about 3700 U.S. and Allied civilian internees at Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure the Philippine Presidential Palace was unprecedented in daring and scope. This narrative centers on personal recollections of Captain Landry and his Lieutenant Thomas Barrow on G Troop's actions during the division's "flying column" in the XIV (US) Corps area of operations during 1 to 3 February 1945.

Captain Landry's combat leadership during this mission is highly recognized in the 1st Cavalry Division history of World War II. "The brilliant leadership of Captain Walter J. Landry of Dorchester, Mass., as commanding officer of G Troop which spearheaded the 8th Cavalry's drive was to a large degree responsible for the success of the dash through the enemy lines into Manila."¹

The operational setting of the Luzon campaign in late January 1945 framed a no-notice tactical mission assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division as some of its units were still arriving from the Lingayen bridgehead to its division assembly area. The order directly from General MacArthur was clear: Conduct a 100-mile penetration of Japanese defenses to liberate thousands of internees in Manila at the Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure the Philippine Presidential Palace. He stated other objectives for orientation such as the Legislative Building. Intelligence estimates expected a stout defense at points throughout the axis of advance and into Manila. Mission execution commenced in combat less than 36 hours later.

This narrative describes several fundamental leadership issues for battle analysis such as terrain and weather, enemy forces, sensitivity of time and speed to accomplish the mission, and the recurring critical task of securing bridges over unfordable rivers to maintain momentum of the deep penetration. The penetration 100 miles into enemy-held terrain by task-organized ground forces is unparalleled in Pacific campaigns. A battle analysis section follows this historical narrative of the Flying Column 100 Miles to Manila with a focus on combat leadership in decisiveness, orders, and actions to accomplish a mission within a higher commander's intent.



Figure Intro 1. 1st Cavalry Division Combat Operations in Southwest Pacific Area

Note. The sequence of combat operations for 1st Cavalry Division included several major combat campaigns in the Southwest Pacific Area. The Admiralties combat mission preceded division combat operations on the islands of Leyte and Samar in the Philippine Archipelago. While major combat operations of Sixth Army continued on Leyte, the 1st Cavalry Division became one of several reinforcing divisions of the ongoing Sixth Army Luzon campaign. After the unconditional surrender of Japan in August 1945, the 1st Cavalry Division deployed in late August to participate in occupation duty of Japan and was the first U.S. Army division to enter Tokyo. The Chief of U.S. Army Military History states 1st Cavalry Division World War II campaign participation as: New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, Leyte (with arrowhead), and Luzon.

Landry's First Combat: The Admiralties 1944

Walter Landry experienced his first combat as a lieutenant commanding G Troop, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry in the Admiralties—an island group north of New Guinea.² A February 1944 brigade-size reconnaissance-in-force to Los Negros Island expanded to include both brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division by early March. Amphibious landings on nearby Manus Island included the 8th Cavalry Regiment. Close quarters infantry combat was the norm engaging prepared Japanese defenses in coastal mangrove lagoons, dense jungle forest, and rugged mountainous terrain segmented by wide streams and narrow jungle paths.³ In mid-April 1944, Landry, a combat experienced leader, was promoted to captain in command of G Troop.⁴




Figure Intro 2. 8th Cavalry Regiment Combat on Manus island

Note. 1. The 1st Cavalry Division assaulted Los Negros on 29 February with its 1st Brigade. 2. The 2d Brigade arrived 9 March on Los Negros and assaulted Manus Island at Lugos on 15 March with 8th Cavalry in the assault wave and 7th Cavalry in reserve. 3. 1/8th Cavalry oriented its attack along the coast toward Lorengau. 4. 2/8th Cavalry oriented into the rugged jungle interior to conduct a flanking movement

toward Lorengau and prevent possible Japanese evasion from Lorengau into the mountainous area and jungle. 2d Squadron encountered camouflaged bunkers, mortar fire, sporadic snipers, antitank and antipersonnel mines. Armor and engineer bulldozer support aided progress along the tortuous track. 5. On 18 March, 2d Squadron attacked across the Lorengau River to seize Lorengau. G Troop assaulted on the squadron's right flank. After securing Lorengau, stubborn combat continued southward against prepared Japanese defenses on ridges in restrictive jungle terrain. Progress was slow and deliberate. 8th Cavalry participated in major combat actions on Manus Island and followed that success from March to May with 1st Squadron patrolling a large area south of Lorengau. 6. 2d Squadron patrolled aggressively east to the Loni Passage area that separates Manus Island from Los Negros to eliminate small Japanese groups and stragglers.

This 1st Cavalry Division mission was one of several Allied offensive actions to isolate Japanese concentrations on islands of its Southwest Pacific defensive perimeter. Securing designated islands allowed the Allies to establish forward air bases for continued amphibious assaults in the Southwest Pacific area of operations. Artillery, armor, naval gunfire, and aviation bombing coordination supported the division's landings and combat power capabilities. By late May, the 8th Cavalry had participated in reconnaissance, numerous meeting engagements, assaults, perimeter defense, and combat patrols on Manus Island. Aggressive patrolling continued on Manus Island to clear Japanese remnants until the end of the campaign.⁵

Advance to Leyte and Samar 1944-1945

In mid-September 1944, the division's two brigades assembled on Los Negros from their base camps to prepare for embarkation while the division artillery staged from their island base camp. The 1st Cavalry Division departed the Admiralties on 12 October. On 20 October, 1st Cavalry Division landed ashore on Leyte Island of the Philippine archipelago as a division in the X (US) Corps.

Leyte was a crucial campaign of Allied naval, air, and army forces with land divisions, corps, and armies combatting throughout the island and on Samar that resulted in the irreversible defeat of Japanese forces on the Allied approaches to the Japanese homeland.

For the 8th Cavalry, this campaign included combat operations on Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar. Initially the X (US) Corps reserve during the corps landing, the 8th Cavalry returned to 1st Cavalry Division control and conducted combat missions in the northeastern area of Leyte. 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry moved westward through mountainous jungle terrain and into the Leyte Valley oriented on Lukay and San Miguel. 1st Squadron/8th Cavalry eventually crossed the straits separating Luzon and Samar to conduct combat operations on Samar.

As 2d Squadron maneuvered westward on Leyte through the San Miguel mountainous and jungle region, continuous patrolling and combat engagements with Japanese was the norm until reaching the northern coastline near Barugo. Recurring patrols and combat in "incessant rain, fog, mud kept the troops wet and uncomfortable for weeks at a time" and required leader and trooper resilience.⁶

Aggressive patrolling included cutting tracks through dense jungle. Reconnaissance patrols penetrated behind Japanese defenses to provide valuable intelligence while combat patrols sought contact, encountered meeting engagements, and conducted ambushes. The infantry operated closely as combined arms with artillery, aviation support, and armor when tactical conditions allowed. 1st Cavalry Division seized the Barugo area of the northern Leyte coastline and established defensive positions to oppose possible Japanese landings. 2/8th Cavalry then advanced, as one of several rifle squadrons, toward San Mateo-Carigara. Meanwhile, other 8th Cavalry operations on Samar's west coast continued northward. Although the Leyte campaign ended officially in late December, elements of 8th Cavalry were still conducting combat and reconnaissance patrols on Samar as of 3 January 1945.⁷ Other division units were combat patrolling in Leyte Valley until 16 January when loading began for departure to Luzon 24 January.⁸




Figure Intro 3. 1st Cavalry Division Area of Operations on Leyte-Samar

Note. In *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, Volume 1, after reaching Carigara [2 November], the 1st Cavalry Division with 24th Division attached units, continued southwest from the Jaro-Carigara road into the Mt. Badian central mountain region. "The mountainous terrain and torrential rains, combined with well-planned and fierce Japanese counterattacks, made progress exceedingly difficult. Even after the 112th Cavalry was added to the division on 14 November, the advance through the wild, hilly country against an unyielding enemy remained slow and arduous, and continued into December." (p. 230). Blue axes are general orientation of 8th Cavalry Regiment units.




Figure Intro 4. 8th Cavalry Regiment Operations on Leyte and Samar

Note. Photograph images (Figure Intro 4) display the initial 1st Cavalry Division area of operation in X (US) Corps area of Leyte-Samar campaign and focus on 8th Cavalry axes. Photographs show cavalry troopers advancing as a regimental command post in mountainous jungle. Cannon's *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (pp. 150-151, 173, 180-181, 235-238) notes subsequent 1st Cavalry Division (+) actions after securing Carigara and the nearby coastal region. Sixth Army continued attacks in the north central mountain area from Leyte Valley and Ormoc Valley. 1st Cavalry Division extensive combat patrolling in November and into late December defeated numerous enemy defenses. The division faced exceptional logistics challenges throughout this period to support its units stretched along a wide zone of action in mountainous terrain with weather severely limiting trafficability. Anderson's *Leyte 17 October 1944-1 July 1945* (p.38) summarized: "Even before the fighting on Leyte ended, MacArthur's forces had moved on to invade Luzon and the rest of the Philippines, thereby consolidating their hold on this former Japanese bastion and completing a final major step toward Japan itself."

1st Cavalry Division to Manila

January 1945 signaled another year in world war. G Troop 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry would prepare to embark in three weeks with 1st Cavalry Division for combat on Luzon. G Troop leaders and troopers had proven themselves in the Admiralties and Leyte-Samar missions as a team of proven combat veterans.

Amphibious assault landings on Luzon by General Krueger's Sixth Army on **9 January** 1945, with support of U.S. and Allied naval and air forces, were initially unopposed in seizing a Lingayen Gulf beachhead.⁹ The attack, ordered by General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) headquarters, progressed southward into the Central Plain to establish a base of operations for land, naval, and aviation operations; seize the Central Plain-Manila area; and establish control over the remainder of Luzon.¹⁰ Inherent to these missions was "attack to destroy all hostile forces" within the areas of operation.¹¹ Mission conditions expanded quickly and required additional follow-up reinforcements to Sixth Army.




Figure 1. Luzon Offensive 9 January-4 February 1945

Note. U.S. Sixth Army plans the invasion of Luzon with landing at Lingayen Gulf by I Corps and XIV Corps. In addition to his initial four assault divisions, General Krueger has a floating reserve of one infantry division, an

armored group, an infantry regimental combat team, and a ranger battalion. As combat operations develop, Sixth Army receives additional four infantry divisions and one infantry regimental combat team. General MacArthur directs General Eichelberger U.S. Eighth Army to conduct a supporting attack toward Manila. 1st Cavalry division is a reinforcing division. The box graphic in Figure 1 is the general area of the Cavalry Division mission to penetrate 100 miles to Manila and liberate Santo Tomas and secure the Presidential Palace.

Enemy Situation

Japan knew control of the Philippine Islands was vital to control of resources in the East Indies and Southeast Asia. Defense of the Philippines was a major war effort in 1943-1944 for Japan's land, air, and naval forces. Japan's senior military leaders envisioned defeating Allied advances in the archipelago with campaigns of attrition to improve Japan's strategic position in the world war.¹²

Japanese mobile defenses were planned on Luzon to force commitment of U.S. divisions for as long as possible and slow Allied approaches to the Japanese homeland. However, Allied air, sea, and ground combat of the Leyte campaign shattered Japanese capabilities. On Luzon, ineffective Japanese command and control relationships weakened operational preparation and logistic organization to counter the Allied offensive. Notwithstanding, Japanese forces defended Luzon with defiant "understrength, underfed, and under-equipped ground combat forces."¹³

The Japanese concept to defend and delay in hilly-mountainous areas, included use of marshy lowlands, and major rivers and tributaries as natural and reinforced obstacles.¹⁴ With wide rivers, deep fords, and steep riverbanks of the Central Plain, many bridges were destroyed or prepared for destruction. Many Japanese defenses areas were reinforced with no intention of unit withdrawal.

Sixth Army Expands the Beachhead

The corps and divisions of Sixth Army maneuvered southward during January to expand the Army bridgehead. U.S. advances did not initially encounter coordinated enemy defenses with several exceptions. Japanese defenses stiffened along the Central Plain and mountains east and west of lowland approaches to Manila. Japanese piecemeal counterattacks were company-size or less and at times included some armor support.¹⁵

Sixth Army's I Corps and XIV Corps remained concerned about the extended eastern flank and their estimates of substantial enemy formations in eastern mountains capable of major counterattacks.¹⁶ Sixth Army planned to position its 25th Division and 13th Armored Group in its eastern zone for response to possible counterattacks from the mountain range east of the Central Plain.

As one of the reinforcing infantry divisions to Sixth Army, 1st Cavalry Division deployed from the beachhead toward Urdaneta and continued to an assembly area near Guimba during **28-30 January** in the I Corps zone as a Sixth Army reserve.¹⁷ 1st Cavalry Division was attached to XIV Corps on **31 January**.

General MacArthur directed U.S. Eighth Army to land forces southwest of Manila in mid-January and attack northward towards Manila. This axis was augmented by a regimental-size airborne insertion in late January. This two-pronged operational advance aimed to seize central Luzon as the hub of logistics support for ongoing and future U.S. combat operations, create additional maneuver space for initial and follow-on U.S. forces, and disrupt Japanese coordination of defenses in the Philippine archipelago.¹⁸

With possession of the central area of Luzon including Manila and Manila Bay, Allied forces would be able to dominate the entire island of Luzon.¹⁹ Cooperation among the Army, Army Air Forces, Navy, Marine Corps, Philippine guerilla forces and resistance, and Allies effectively massed effects of joint and combined land, sea, and air capabilities against a determined enemy.




Figure 2. 1st Cavalry Division Moves Inland from Sixth Army Beachhead Lingayen Gulf

Note. Sixth Army, attacks 9 January to establish beachhead. 1st Cavalry Division starts ashore 27 January and assembles on Sixth Army northern flank as a reserve and probable mobile striking force. 1st Cavalry Division attacks 00:01 1 February to penetrate into Manila in order to liberate Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure the Presidential Malacañan Palace. By late 3 February, the 100-mile penetration achieves its division objectives.

MacArthur and his SWPA staff downplayed General Krueger's intelligence estimates of Luzon enemy capabilities and regularly prodded Sixth Army for rapid maneuver to secure Manila.²⁰ Natural terrain and man-made defenses slowed some southward axes of attack but XIV Corps gained access to main roadways in the Central Plain.

Coordination for adequate east flank protection remained an issue for Sixth Army and its corps.²¹ Krueger analyzed the evolving tactical and logistics situation across his Army frontage with first entry of U.S. forces into Manila appearing probable from the north by XIV Corps.²²

With U.S. forces converging on the Philippine capitol, Japanese defensive intentions for Manila remained uncertain. Sixth Army's I Corps continued operations northeast of XIV Corps in rugged mountainous terrain as XIV Corps continued movement southward on the Central Plain.

Eighth Army's XI Corps landings from the west and southwest of Manila came under Sixth Army command in late January and early February after their landing concentrations were onshore.²³ These reinforcements bolstered security to Krueger's west flank and supported penetration of XIV Corps toward Manila. Luzon would eventually become the largest land campaign of the Pacific war employing elements of two U.S. field army headquarters, several corps, ten divisions, and five independent regiments.²⁴

Prisoner of War Massacre

In December 1944, reports alleged massacre of U.S. prisoners of war (PWs) at a PW camp near Puerto Princesa on the island of Palawan. The Japanese camp commander had been ordered to “annihilate” all prisoners. About 150 PWs were herded into log and earth-covered air raid trenches about five feet deep, with a small access opening at one end. Suddenly, Japanese guards poured aviation fuel into the shelters as other guards threw torches igniting the fuel. The confined trenches became flaming death traps. PWs attempting to exit the trenches were shot or machinegunned as other guards threw grenades into the trench entrances.²⁵ A few PWs who escaped the trenches were hunted down and shot or bayoneted to death.




Figure 3. U.S. Army Recovers PW Remains at Palawan Massacre Site

Note. Brutal conditions existed at the PW Camp even before the massacre of U.S. soldiers by the Japanese. Once U.S. forces secured the PW camp, air raid trenches were uncovered and opened to recover remains of U.S. soldiers murdered by their captors. Figure 3 images show the U.S. Army recovery mission for remains.

By early January 1945, six PW escapees found by guerrillas were conveyed to MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area headquarters.²⁶ With reports of the Palawan massacre verified, MacArthur directed missions to quickly liberate PWs and internees in ongoing Allied operations on Luzon.²⁷

Raid to Rescue PWs and Civilian Internees

Filipino guerrillas reported “between 300 and 500 American and Allied prisoners of war (PWs) and civilian internees were being held in a Japanese stockade at Pangatian, just east of Cabanatuan.” Recent intelligence reports indicated that if the Japanese identified a rescue attempt, they “would undoubtedly massacre” PWs and internees.²⁸ Sixth Army quickly organized a raid by U.S. Army Rangers, an Alamo Scout special reconnaissance unit, and Filipino guerillas to liberate the PWs and internees located approximately 25 miles inside enemy lines. Guerrillas were key to success. By evening of 30 January, detailed reconnaissance, deception, infiltration, and combined support resulted in success to liberate these PWs and internees.

1st Cavalry Division to Sixth Army

A Sixth Army field order annex dated 26 January listed 1st Cavalry Division, offshore as one of its reinforcing divisions, with a troop list that added the 112th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and 947th Field Artillery Battalion with towed 155-milimeter howitzers. Other units on the 1st Cavalry Division troop list were a chemical mortar battalion, one ordnance medium maintenance company, one quartermaster truck company, and a support aircraft party. The list also included two portable surgical hospitals. The 1st Cavalry Division was less its 603d Tank Troop. Sixth Army directed its 13th Armored Group to assemble its 44th Tank Battalion (-) at Guimba.²⁹ The tank battalion (-) was attached to the division at Guimba.

The 1st Cavalry Division, with the attached 112th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), started moving inland **27 January** from the beachhead through Urdaneta and continued southeast to an assembly area near Guimba in the I Corps area of operations. The *1st Cavalry Division History in World War II* notes that other attachments at various times of the war included U.S. Naval Construction Battalion (Sea Bee) expertise.³⁰

1st Cavalry Division moves from beachhead through Urdaneta to assembly area at Guimba in I Corps zone as Sixth Army reserve.

1st Cavalry Division is attached to XIV Corps.

Mission: Liberate Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure Malacañan Palace in Manila.




Figure 4. 1st Cavalry Division Assembly Area at Guimba

As Sixth Army continued its offensive, XIV Corps was to also protect the Sixth Army flank and “push aggressively to the southward, moving with its left [flank] on 1 February 1945, secure crossings over the PAMPANGA RIVER within the zone of action of the Corps; secure a corps frontline trace inclusive of CABANATUAN; and be prepared promptly to continue the advance to capture MANILA.”³¹

Wartime Reorganization of 1st Cavalry Division

1st Cavalry Division was a unique U.S. infantry division in World War II. Dismounted as a horse cavalry division in 1943 and reorganized as an infantry division, the division retained two brigade headquarters and unit designations of cavalry lineage. Each brigade commanded two cavalry (infantry) regiments. The 5th, 7th, 8th, and 12th Cavalry Regiments each commanded two cavalry (rifle) squadrons.

The reference term “rifle” designated the 1st Cavalry Division squadrons and troops as infantry. This division organization was significantly different from a U.S. Army standard infantry division with its three regiments each comprised of three infantry battalions.³²




Figure 5. 1st Cavalry Division Assigned and Attached Units, 31 January 1945

Note. The division diagram (Figure 5) portrays the 1st Cavalry Division array of assigned and attached units as of 31 January 1945 for the Santo Tomas mission.³³ Task organization for combat, combat support, and combat service support for the “flying column” occurred at Guimba with these units per 1st Cavalry Division Field Order 23.

Division organization comprised a headquarters, two brigade headquarters, four cavalry regiments with two rifle squadrons per regiment, division artillery, and division support and service structure. 1st Cavalry Division task organized its mission with two rifle squadrons (2d Squadron/8th Cavalry and 2d Squadron/5th Cavalry) as motorized-mechanized “flying columns.” (Figure 8) displays the 2/8 Cavalry task organization. 2/5 Cavalry had a similar task organization. A provisional reconnaissance squadron (PRC) comprised 44th Tank Battalion headquarters with its light (Stuart) tank Company D and the division’s 302d Reconnaissance Troop of three reconnaissance platoons. Each reconnaissance platoon had one Greyhound armored car section and one scout section with ¼-ton wheeled vehicles with a .30 caliber machinegun. The Greyhound could mount a 37-mm gun and a caliber .30 or caliber .50 machinegun. Greyhounds were also used in a command and control configuration. Company D/44th Tank Battalion comprised 17 Stuart tanks mounted a 37-mm gun and caliber .30 machine gun.

Division artillery had its four organic 105-mm towed howitzer battalions augmented with one 155-mm towed howitzer battalion. The regimental weapons troops had 81-mm mortars and machineguns of .30 and .50 calibers.

Other attachments to 1st Cavalry Division included one 76.2-mm tank destroyer battalion (-), one chemical (4.2-in) mortar battalion, one additional engineer battalion, one engineer heavy pontoon company, one amphibious tractor company, one additional ordnance company, one quartermaster truck company to augment the quartermaster battalion, and two portable surgical hospitals. One unit listed in the task organization as GRU was probably a graves registration unit. An army division would typically have one platoon attached from a graves registration company.

1st Cavalry Division also had U.S. naval construction battalion (Sea Bee) expertise. Sixth Army coordinated for a USMC air liaison party (ALP) of three teams to support aerial reconnaissance and combat air support. Both brigade headquarters had one support aircraft party (SAP). U.S. Army Air Force support was also available.

The 1st Cavalry Division fought as infantry under special tables of organization and equipment that authorized its strength at approximately 11,000 men, around 4,000 less than an infantry division. Attachments offset much of the manning disparity per mission task organizations while some comparative capability shortfalls still existed. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery transitioned from 75-mm to 105-mm towed howitzer battalions. Special allowances of heavy weapons and other infantry-type equipment compensated 1st Cavalry Division for its lack of a 155-mm howitzer field artillery battalion. One 155-mm towed howitzer battalion was eventually attached to the division.³⁴

The “rifle” squadron fought typically as dismounted infantry while retaining cavalry lineage. The 1st Cavalry Division squadron was smaller than a standard infantry battalion.³⁵ A rifle squadron comprised a headquarters for command, control, and support; three rifle troops; and one weapons troop.

Other attachments augmented combat power based on mission requirements. As the 1st Cavalry Division prepared for combat in its reserve assembly area, this unique combat mission would require capabilities of mobility, speed, and shock effect as motorized infantry with aerial and motorized reconnaissance, towed artillery and antitank weapons, and armor units.

Mission: Go to Manila—Liberate Internees

The 1st Cavalry Division, with the attached 112th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), landed ashore and moved inland to an assembly area near Guimba in the I Corps area of operations. Sixth Army planned for 1st Cavalry Division and attached 112th RCT, with addition of the 44th Tank Battalion less its C Company, as a “strong mobile striking force” in the advance on Manila.³⁶

Sixth Army directed its I Corps and XIV Corps in a coordinated advance while being alert for possible major counterattacks from its east and west flanks. During a personal ground reconnaissance in the XIV Corps zone on **30 January**, General MacArthur sent a message to Kreuger strongly dissatisfied with the pace and speed of the Sixth Army general attack toward Manila. Later that day, MacArthur met Major General Verne

Mudge, commander of 1st Cavalry Division. MacArthur directed Mudge to "Go to Manila, go around the Nips, bounce off the Nips, but go to Manila."³⁷

The 1st Cavalry Division historical report of the Luzon campaign adds detail of MacArthur's mission to Mudge in this face-to-face meeting: "Advance, attack, destroy Japs and enter Manila; seize Santo Tomas and Malacañan Palace; free internees, and do it pronto."³⁸ This division mission came to be known as the "Flying Column" to Manila.




Figure 6. 1st Cavalry Division Flying Column Concept

MacArthur's oral directive established the 1st Cavalry Division mission to what would be an audacious penetration 100 miles into enemy territory to liberate U.S. and Allied civilian internees at Santo Tomas University, now an internment camp in Manila, and secure the Philippine presidential Malacañan Palace.

A Sixth Army warning order to XIV Corps initiated coordination for 1st Cavalry Division and expeditious plans of a division flying column penetration into Manila by 3 February.

General Mudge briefed division senior leaders and by **evening 30 January** directed task organization of three serials that would later be known as the division's "flying column." This column was comprised of two task-organized rifle squadrons: 2d Squadron of the 8th Cavalry Regiment (2/8th Cavalry) and 2d Squadron of the 5th Cavalry Regiment (2/5th Cavalry), reinforced with armor, towed artillery, and support units. A Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron, formed under the 44th Tank Battalion (-) headquarters with one light tank company and 302d Reconnaissance Troop, became the third serial of the division mobile column.

The Flying Column

The flying column started task-organizing with units still arriving at Guimba from the Lingayen beach area. The division artillery historical report notes that its lead motor column arrived in the division assembly area at Guimba about 08:00 30 January after an all-night road march with trail tractor elements arriving by **late afternoon on 30 January**.³⁹ Logistic elements continued to arrive afterwards.

1st Cavalry Division was still concentrating at Guimba about 35 miles southeast of the Lingayen base area when Sixth Army published a field order **near midnight 30 January** that attached the 1st Cavalry Division, less the 112th RCT, to XIV Corps as of **00:01 31 January**. This field order formalized a series of oral orders earlier during 30 January. 112th RCT remained a Sixth Army reserve. The 1st Cavalry Division did not have its 603d Tank Troop during the landing at Lingayen Gulf and the Santo Tomas mission.⁴⁰ The 44th Tank Battalion, minus Company C, was attached to 1st Cavalry Division.

1st Cavalry Division continued rapidly task-organizing into a flying column as the XIV Corps main effort for a rapid advance into Manila. A commander's update meeting during the **morning of 31 January** preceded a division field order published by General Mudge later that night. The pace of plans and operations accelerated at the approach of **midnight 31 January**.

As the flying column was being task-organized at Guimba, division personnel strength remained less than authorized. Few replacements had arrived in the division since entering combat on the island jungle and mountainous terrain of Leyte in October 1944.⁴¹ The division's Leyte-Samar combat operations ended officially on 25 December 1944; however, 1/8th Cavalry and elements of the Reconnaissance Troop were still patrolling into early January 1945. With minimal recovery time for personnel and materiel readiness, the 1st Cavalry Division prepared to embark on ships only weeks later headed to combat on Luzon.⁴²

1st Cavalry Division task-organized two reinforced cavalry rifle squadrons as motorized infantry. Each squadron task force received attachments of a medium (Sherman) tank company, a 105-mm towed howitzer battery, and other support elements. Motor transportation for each rifle squadron's troopers (infantrymen) was a challenge to muster. Wheeled vehicles were an ad hoc collection of ¼-ton, ¾-ton, and 2 ½-ton trucks from organic and attached units.⁴³ Artillery prime-mover tractors were also used.

The division's "flying column" was comprised of three serials. The 2/8th Cavalry commanded the lead task force. 2/5th Cavalry commanded the other task force following 2/8th Cavalry. The third serial Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron, organized under the 44th Tank Battalion (-) headquarters had only its D Company as a light (Stuart) tank company and the division's 302d Reconnaissance Troop.⁴⁴ The reconnaissance troop was wheel-mounted in ¼-ton trucks and Greyhound armored scout cars. The 44th Tank Battalion's C Company was already detached to a different infantry division, and Company A and B were attached to the two cavalry rifle squadrons of the flying column.⁴⁵

The remaining combat units of the 1st Cavalry Division provided dismounted screening of the division's east flank along the main route during the penetration. Air support of the United States Marine Corps

provided invaluable aerial reconnaissance and early warning of Japanese threats as the flying columns oriented on penetration toward Manila.

USMC Air-Ground Combat Support

The XIV Corps order directed the 1st Cavalry Division to also protect the corps east flank and conduct "vigorous reconnaissance to the east."⁴⁶ This task exceeded division dismounted capabilities to concurrently penetrate enemy defenses and secure its line of communications and follow-on support as the flying columns surged along a 100-mile route.

Sixth Army coordinated close air support with the U.S. Marine Corps for its Douglas Dauntless dive bombers of Military Aircraft Group (MAG)-24 and MAG-32 and U.S. Army Air Forces 308th Bombardment Wing.⁴⁷ MAG close air support had been refined earlier during Marine Corps operations in the Solomon Islands for immediate mission execution. The USMC assured continuous dawn to dusk aerial screening and close air support in advance, in zone, and to the flanks of division columns.




Figure 7. USMC Pilots Meet with 1st Cavalry Division Troopers

Note. (L) Flight of USMC Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers preparing to depart on a mission. (C) Douglas Dauntless dive bomber on a screening-bombing mission. (R) USMC pilot visiting 1st Cavalry Division troopers in front lines. The Scout Bomber Douglas (SBD) Dauntless provided effective close air support for reconnaissance and screen mission protection to the flying columns, division main body and support serials, and to strafe-bomb when requested by the flying column.

The USMC Air Liaison Party (ALP) deployed three teams to 1st Cavalry Division with immediate direct radio coordination for USMC air support, report on enemy locations and forces, guide and observe aircraft attack on targets, and adjust bombing or strafing of targets. The ALP was comprised of two ¼-ton radio jeeps and one radio truck with a towed trailer-generator. Brigadier General Chase had one ALP team with his command group. Brigadier General Hoffman, the other brigade commander, had one ALP team, and Major General Mudge as division commander had the third ALP team traveling with his command element.⁴⁸

The ALP was highly effective with the 1st Cavalry Division air support coordinator in relaying information and reconnaissance situational updates in real-time between planes overhead and senior unit commanders on the ground. Communication was direct between the ALPs and SBDs to ensure immediate intelligence and air mission support. General Chase kept his ALP beside him during the flying column movement. He remarked that "he had never seen such able, close, and accurate air support as the Marine fliers." Division artillery also had light observation airplanes for coordination. General Mudge stated similar compliments: "On our drive to Manila, I depended solely on the Marines to protect my left flank against possible Japanese counterattack. The job that they turned in speaks for itself. I can say without reservation that the Marine dive bombers are one of the most flexible outfits that I have seen in this war...The Marine dive bombers of the First

Wing have kept the enemy on the run. They have kept him underground and have enabled troops to move up with fewer casualties and with greater speed.”⁴⁹

Flying Column: 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Regiment




Figure 8. 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Task Force in Flying Column

Note. The squadron and troop symbols in (Figure 5), are adapted with Army symbology from Field Manual 1-02.2 *Military Symbols* (2024), to identify a dismounted infantry “rifle squadron”/“rifle troop” with two “wheels” under the infantry icon in the frame to indicate mounted wheel mobility for the flying column mission.⁵⁰

Attachments to 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Regiment included: one reconnaissance platoon, one antitank Platoon (37mm), and one section of caliber .50 machineguns from 8th Regiment weapons troop. Other attachments were 1st Platoon of Troop C, 8th Engineer Squadron; 1st Platoon of Troop B, 1st Medical Squadron; a maintenance section from 8th Cavalry Regiment service troop to supplement 2d Squadron logistics support; Company B, 44th Tank Battalion with Sherman medium tanks; and, Battery B, 61st Field Artillery Battalion with towed 105-mm howitzers.⁵¹

G Troop is the Vanguard

By **early evening 30 January**, the division was rapidly preparing for movement on 31 January. All units were organizing for mobile self-contained operations. Division artillery streamlined units as “all equipment not essential for combat was left behind” at Guimba. A division oral field order with unit commanders during **early afternoon 31 January** discussed tactical plans in progress with formation of two “flying squadrons” each with a company of tanks and a battery of towed field artillery attached.⁵² Marshalling and prioritizing motor transport throughout the division and higher headquarters attachments provided

motorized mobility for dismounted infantry of the two task-organized flying column rifle squadrons. The 1st Cavalry Division main body planned to follow and support its flying columns on one main route with a contingency of two routes given terrain, weather, and tactical situation as the mission evolved.

1st Cavalry Division initiated evening movement **31 January** with lead elements of flying columns departing Guimba toward Cabanatuan and Pampanga River crossings. By **21:30**, elements of the flying column cleared Guimba moving forward with attached artillery batteries.⁵³ 2/8th Cavalry acted as the lead task force of the flying column on a route separate from 2/5th Cavalry. G Troop, with reconnaissance elements and a tank platoon, occupied their position in the forward assembly area. Order of march in the squadron during the flying column mission would rotate among the rifle troops during the penetration.

Mission

The mission was grand in concept. The division flying column would penetrate over 100 miles into enemy territory to liberate internees at Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure the Presidential Palace, and secure critical points along the routes to facilitate the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division. The flying column mission was planned as a three-day operation to secure its objectives in Manila. Speed and pace were emphasized, notwithstanding enemy contact. Intact usable bridges were to be considered essential terrain while fords across major rivers posed primary concerns in maintaining momentum.

The flying columns would cross the Pampanga River near Cabanatuan. 2/8th Cavalry would cross at two ford sites south of Cabanatuan while 2/5th Cavalry would cross at Cabanatuan. As 2/8th Cavalry crossed the Pampanga and moved south on Route 5, 2/5th Cavalry would follow from Cabanatuan, with the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron following 2/5th Cavalry. Brigadier General Chase's command group would initially accompany 2/5th Cavalry. The division main body and support elements would follow the flying columns as routes merged on Route 52 into Manila.

Note. Mission execution would adapt to terrain and weather conditions, obstacles natural and man-made, and Japanese resistance. Adjustments to decisions, directional movements, time expectations, and combat and support actions would occur in each flying column. Terrain and weather, bridges, and the enemy contact would influence both the 2/8th Cavalry and 2/5th Cavalry flying column as they advanced southward on Route 5 toward Route 64 or Route 65. 2/8th Cavalry, as the vanguard flying column, would fight through several enemy contacts at Bailuag, Gapan, and several villages from Santa Maria eastward on Route 64 and its intersection with Route 52. 2/5th Cavalry would advance south on Route 5 and head southeast on Route 65 along the Angat River until the village of Angat. Enemy actions and other conditions caused use of an alternate route to Santa Maria and intersection with Route 64 and Route 52. Both flying columns sped southward toward Manila.

Enemy Situation and Terrain

The divisions of XIV Corps were encountering mixed intensity of enemy contact as the corps advanced southward down the Central Plain. Security of corps lines of communication were tenuous from the beach area and along a 50-mile or longer length to corps front line advances.⁵⁴ Japanese defenses were increasing on the corps western flank with possibility of counterattacks. Intelligence advised large enemy concentrations existed in the XIV Corps eastern flank area that probably included armored troops.⁵⁵ After corps-division reconnaissance confirmed no Japanese significant capabilities massing in the Cabanatuan area, Sixth Army continued its general attack southward **31 January**.

Similar uncertainty existed in how determined the Japanese would defend Manila. Unknown to U.S. forces at the time, Japanese forces in Manila received contradictory mission guidance during January. The senior Japanese area army commander ordered evacuation of the capitol area to occupy defensible terrain in the surrounding mountainous areas. Conflicting chains of command in multiple Japanese army, naval, and aviation organizations added to ineffective communications, command, and control. Some subordinate

military commanders, although unauthorized, rescinded evacuation orders and continued to fortify the capitol and port with extensive defenses in depth.⁵⁶ City defenses were most substantial in the core urban network of major concrete buildings, Intramuros walled city-fort, and Pasig river line to port areas. Meanwhile, other units continued movement from the capital to defensive areas outside Manila.

G Troop in the 100-Mile Penetration

The expanding Sixth Army area of operations stressed capabilities of units in contact with the enemy to concurrently protect their expanding lines of communication and flanks. Given access to the main road network of the Central Plain, XIV Corps remained concerned about possible Japanese counterattacks from its east flank on routes planned for the 1st Cavalry Division flying column.

The XIV Corps order directed 1st Cavalry Division to seize along a line from Cabanatuan on the Pampanga River and maintain contact with the 37th Division on its west flank to Plaridel on the Angat River in the general advance toward Manila. The 1st Cavalry Division would commence its attack one minute after midnight with two squadrons task forces abreast. 2/5th Cavalry staged north of Cabanatuan and 2/8th Cavalry positioned south of Cabanatuan near two ford sites across the Pampanga River.




Figure 9. Task Organization: G Troop, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry

Note. G Troop was comprised of a headquarters section, three rifle platoons, and one weapons platoon. Reconnaissance elements moved initially with G Troop. The infantrymen of the four platoons and headquarters were wheel-mounted during the flying column in ¼-ton, ¾-ton, or 2½-ton wheeled vehicles. The weapons platoon manned caliber .30 light machineguns and may have also had caliber .50 heavy machine guns.

Firepower in addition to machineguns included weaponry in rifle platoons of rifles, carbines, and Browning Automatic rifles (BAR) firepower.⁵⁷ Man-portable antitank rocket launchers were present. The five Sherman tanks of the platoon had a 75-mm cannon and a bow-glacier caliber .30 machinegun. Some tanks added a pedestal-mounted machinegun on the turret top.

The headquarters section provided command and control, troop logistics and medical support, and received required refueling and maintenance support for wheeled vehicles and tank platoon. Truck-mounted caliber .50 machineguns and other weapons may have been present in the squadron during the flying column.

G Troop Ford Crossing

2/8th Cavalry's task was to force two ford crossing of the Pampanga River south of Cabanatuan. The squadron's main effort ford crossing was just south of Cabanatuan with a secondary ford crossing site farther southwest of the squadron main effort. In the approach march to the Pampanga, G Troop with reconnaissance elements led the 2d Squadron column toward the Pampanga. G Troop turned south near San Felipe onto dirt tracks to its assigned secondary ford site at San Jose.⁵⁸ The remainder of the 2d Squadron task force continued to its main crossing site just south of Cabanatuan.

Speed the Watchword

The 8th Cavalry regimental commander's order to 2d Squadron stressed to commanders that speed was essential. He emphasized, "Any unit finding itself cut off or separated should remain on the axis of advance and head for the objective."⁵⁹ Other division units received the same requirement for momentum forward as fast as conditions would allow. The 2/8th Cavalry commander, 28-year old Lieutenant Colonel Connor, knew that "Speed was the watchword" as vanguard of the division's flying columns.⁶⁰

2d Squadron arrived at its assembly area northwest of San Felipe **about 22:00 31 January** and conducted final readiness checks for the attack. Listening and observation posts along the Pampanga River continued to report enemy patrols at 2d Squadron's main effort ford and no identified enemy at the ford that G Troop would cross.⁶¹ Everyone waited in tense quiet expectation.

The ford site for G Troop had crossing limitations but provided an option of surprise and an alternate crossing site if combat slowed the main effort crossing.⁶² 2/8th Cavalry was to converge from both ford sites at an assembly point south of Cabanatuan along Route 5. Rapid mounted movement south would lead the division flying column toward Manila.




Figure 10. 2/8th Cavalry Ford Crossings of the Pampanga River

Note. The 2/8th cavalry general area and assembly areas in **Figures 11, 15, and 16** are based on tactical sketches in Captain Thomas Barrow's (1948) Armor Officer Advanced Course monograph of personal experiences in G Troop during the flying column of 1-3 February 1945. Captain Walter Landry and G Troop moved south as the vanguard of the 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry column. Ford sites, assembly area, and G Troop

cross-country route are general estimate comparisons with analyses of terrain on 1:50,000 scale maps produced in 1944 by the U.S. Army Map Service and descriptions by Landry.

One Minute After Midnight

Cabanatuan: Across the Pampanga

At one minute after midnight, **00:01 1 February**, the flying column attacked without artillery preparation with two squadron task forces abreast on separate axes of advance. The 2/8th flying column main effort crossed at a ford on the Pampanga River southeast of Cabanatuan. G Troop crossed the Pampanga as the squadron vanguard with reconnaissance elements and one Sherman tank platoon. Near San Felipe, G Troop had turned south to its assigned ford at San Jose while the remainder of the 2d Squadron task force continued eastward to a crossing site southwest of Cabanatuan. The squadron main body received light Japanese resistance and mortar fire during its crossing into the early morning.




Figure 11. G Troop (-) Moves to Santa Rosa

G Troop encountered poor river bottom conditions so unsatisfactory that no more than half of G Troop's vehicles were across the river after several hours. Fortunately, no enemy appeared at Landry's crossing point.

North of Cabanatuan, 2/5th Cavalry forded dismounted and secured crossings of the Pampanga near the Valdefuente Bridge by **06:45**. The column seized the bridge area; however, the Japanese had a destroyed a bridge section that required engineers to repair the gap before any feasible vehicle use. Demolitions were removed from the bridge.

Japanese units at Cabanatuan conducted a stout defense that caused 1st Cavalry Division to employ additional combat units **all day 1 February and into the night** to secure the main route southward through Cabanatuan on Route 5.⁶³ General Chase and his command group were behind 2/5 Cavalry on the northern axis.

With the approach of daylight 1 February, Captain Landry knew his G Troop fording efforts at San Jose were progressing too slowly when speed and momentum forward were essential to the mission. Landry decided he and his vehicles already south of the river would linkup with the squadron at the designated assembly area along Route 5 south of Cabanatuan. He directed Lieutenant Barrow and G Troop elements still not across the San Jose ford to rejoin 2d Squadron and cross the Pampanga at the squadron's main ford site.

Most of 2/8th Cavalry's main body main was across the Pampanga river by **09:00**. When the 2d Squadron closed into its assembly point along Route 5 south of Cabanatuan about **10:00**, Landry and his G Troop were not present. When G Troop's rearward element crossed at the main ford site and linked up with the 2d Squadron about **11:30**, Lieutenant Barrow reported to Lieutenant Colonel Connor that Captain Landry and his forward element had crossed the river and continued south to the designated squadron assembly area on Route 5. Patrols sent to locate Landry learned from local Filipinos that U.S. soldiers in vehicles had passed through the squadron rendezvous area about **08:30**.

2/8th Cavalry secured the Route 5 area south of Cabanatuan and prepared for linkup with 2/5 Cavalry and General Chase. However, ongoing combat at Cabanatuan prevented the flying column linkup as planned. Later, the 2/8th Cavalry main column halted temporarily near Santa Rosa later in the morning.

Securing Route 5 and the area at Cabanatuan from Japanese defenders required more time than anticipated. Combat slowed movement southward on Route 5 by the 2/5th Cavalry column. General Mudge directed the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron to cross the Pampanga south of Cabanatuan.

By **18:00** 1 February, 2/5th Cavalry remained near the bridge site seized earlier in the day as other units of the 5th Cavalry and 8th Cavalry were in Cabanatuan clearing enemy resistance and opening access to Route 5.⁶⁴

Santa Rosa

By **early morning 1 February**, Landry thought he had missed 2/8th Cavalry at the linkup point south of Cabanatuan. Landry continued cross-country south and halted near a small village of Santa Rosa along Route 5. Tanks initially with his element had departed from Landry when a small bridge would not support their weight. Arriving at Santa Rosa, he "outposted the site against no opposition."⁶⁵ His radios were inoperative due to being waterlogged during the ford crossing of the Pampanga River.

Note. The G Troop (-) route in Figure 11 is an estimate based on Captain Landry's comments of traveling cross-country after fording the Pampanga River ford to linkup with 2/8 Cavalry along Route 5.

Knowing the mission emphasis on speed southward and concerned that the squadron task force must be already on the road headed toward Manila, Landry conducted a commander reconnaissance farther south of Santa Rosa along Route 5. Finding no enemy during his reconnaissance, he decided that action forward was better than waiting at Santa Rosa. Landry ordered his troop element onto Route 5 and again moved quickly south. The Peñaranda River Bridge at Gapan was about 15 kilometers south on Route 5.

G Troop (-) halts at Santa Rosa while CPT Landry conducts commander's reconnaissance south on Route 5.

Landry returns to Santa Rosa and leads G Troop (-) south on Route 5.

G Troop (-) approaches Gapan and bridge over Peñaranda River with no enemy contact.

The bridge appears intact and G Troop (-) continues rapidly over bridge.




Figure 12. G Troop (-) Crosses the Peñaranda Bridge at Gapan

Gapan

Landry and his two platoons motored rapidly across the bridge over the Peñaranda River at Gapan. Surprise was evident as Landry approached the bridge. He recalled, "As we crossed the bridge, the only foes we saw...were Japanese bridge guards...We 'took care of them and kept rolling'."⁶⁶

Passing without enemy contact through the village of San Miguel and roadside huts along the route, Landry continued south until reaching the village of Baliuag on the Angat River. G Troop (-) traveled about 40 kilometers after passing Gapan.




Figure 13. G Troop (–) Enemy Contact at Baliuag

Baliuag

Landry's comment "I had gone quite far enough without support" was an understatement as they engaged an estimated company-size Japanese force "in and about the town" of Baliuag.⁶⁷ Recognizing he was in front of the squadron column and had no radio contact with his squadron commander, Landry sent one of his sergeants northward in a vehicle to report his situation and location to 2d Squadron. Landry's messenger found Lieutenant Colonel Connor and 2d Squadron halted near Santa Rosa about **11:30**. Out of radio contact with Landry, Connor coordinated for a liaison plane to search southward for Landry's element.⁶⁸ The airplane found Landry about **13:40** as G Troop (-) was exchanging fires with Japanese soldiers at Baliuag. The plane relayed orders for Landry to break contact and withdraw north.

Peñaranda Bridge at Gapan

General Mudge, flying forward in a light observation airplane, landed on the road at 2d Squadron's temporary halt near Santa Rosa and received Lieutenant Colonel Connor's update.⁶⁹ The tactical situation remained fluid with the bridge at Gapan being an essential objective to secure for rapid movement of the two flying columns and the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division. The Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron forded the Pampanga River south of Cabanatuan as the third serial of the division's flying column.⁷⁰

General Mudge sent the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron with its Stuart light tanks of Company D, 44th Tank Battalion and elements of the 302d Reconnaissance Troop past 2d Squadron's temporary halt near Santa Rosa to secure the bridge over the Peñaranda River.⁷¹ With the Japanese now fully alert to U.S. forces along Route 5, a firefight erupted at the bridge when the tanks arrived at the bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Ross, the 44th Tank Battalion commander, was killed. The reconnaissance troop commander took command of the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron.⁷² Other casualties increased as the tank company soldiers and reconnaissance troopers were unable to seize the Gapan bridge.

Lieutenant Colonel Connor directed the G Troop element with him at Santa Rosa, reinforced with two tanks, to head south immediately to support the ongoing firefight at the Gapan bridge site. The light tank company and reconnaissance troop were about to withdraw from the firefight about **16:00** when the northern element of G Troop arrived to reinforce the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron at Gapan.

While G Troop's Lieutenant Barrow assaulted the bridge area from the north, Captain Landry's element assaulted the bridge area almost simultaneously from the south. This two-pronged attack, supporting the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron of light tanks and reconnaissance vehicles, cleared remaining Japanese soldiers from the area and secured the bridge across the Peñaranda River.⁷³

With the bridge in flying column possession, Mudge ordered the acting commander of the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron to secure the Gapan bridge site until both squadron flying columns of 2/8th Cavalry and 2/5th Cavalry passed through Gapan, and then report for continued forward movement. The 2/5th Cavalry column was still well north of 2/8th Cavalry located near Santa Rosa.

Back to Baliuag

Captain Landry, with his G Troop now reunited at Gapan, was directed to move south again on Route 5 as a screening force for 2d Squadron and secure a bivouac area near Baliuag. Landry selected a squadron assembly area site northeast of Baliuag near Sabang north of the Angat River.⁷⁴ The division commander's oral order about **18:00 1 February** directed reconnaissance to the Angat River during the night with the intention to cross the river in the Baliuag area north of Plaridel.⁷⁵ During the evening of 1 February with combat at Cabanatuan slowing the division forward momentum, General Mudge placed Brigadier General Chase in command of the three flying column serials.⁷⁶




Figure 14. G Troop Assaults Gapan Bridge from Two Directions

Note. D Company/44th Tank Battalion (-) was a light (Stuart) tank company. Riflemen arriving at Gapan with this tank company were from the division's 302d Reconnaissance Troop. The two medium (Sherman) tanks with Barrow and G Troop (-) riflemen moving to support from the north, and G Troop (-) riflemen with Landry arriving from the south, dismounted their ¼-ton vehicles and joined the armor and infantry attack. G Troop was instrumental in 1st Cavalry Division seizing the Gapan Bridge.

First 24 Hours in Review

The 1st Cavalry Division zone oriented south toward Manila along Route 5.⁷⁷ The lead elements of the division's flying column had progressed almost 50 miles from its assembly area at Guimba toward Manila. G Troop was the vanguard of the division flying column.

Enemy forces along the route were generally surprised at the appearance of U.S. forces and their responses were uncoordinated. Having secured crossings over the Pampanga River northwest of Cabanatuan early on 1 February, fighting at Cabanatuan slowed 2/5th Cavalry and the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron commanded by 44th Tank Battalion (-) until the division reinforced that attack axis with additional units to clear the Cabanatuan main route southward. Just as critical for rapid onward movement south on Route 5 was control of the Gapan bridge for the flying column serials and remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division.

2/8th Cavalry proceeded south on Route 5 to take advantage of the original success that the G Troop commander's initiative achieved in propelling the attack as far south as Baliuag. The possibility of major counterattacks remained a concern along the corps and division east flank. Intelligence estimates still indicated "large enemy concentrations existed in the area and included armored troops."⁷⁸ While focused on rapid division momentum towards Manila, the 1st Cavalry Division commander also protected the eastern XIV Corps flank and his own expanding line of communications support behind his flying columns.

XIV Corps directed the 1st Cavalry Division and 37th Infantry Division to advance rapidly in assigned zones toward Manila and maintain contact at Arayat and Plaridel. Regular physical contact along an extended length of inter-division boundary was not possible due to the massive Candaba Swamp separating the two divisions until Route 5 connected with Route 3 at Plaridel. The 37th Division zone included the Angat River bridges and riverbanks at Plaridel. Southeast of Plaridel, the 37th Division boundary paralleled the railroad line with the rail tracks in the 37th Division zone.

Day Two: Fords, Bridges, and Time

2/8th Cavalry column arrived at the assembly area north of Baliuag about **01:00 2 February** and set into a tight defensive perimeter. Actions to refuel, conduct weapons and vehicle maintenance, and redistribute ammunition continued throughout the hours of darkness. Readiness actions continued in the early hours of daylight.⁷⁹ Sleep was already a rare commodity. Fatigue was present in everyone in the column.

Early **morning 2 February**, 2/8th Cavalry moved from the assembly area in an order of march: F Troop, Headquarters, G Troop, Trains, and E Troop. The artillery moved at the head of the trains. H Troop and tanks with each rifle troop were prepared to support the advance guard of the squadron. Prior to **09:00**, the column approached Sabang just northeast of Baliuag. F Troop moved dismounted through Baliuag and confirmed the enemy had abandoned the village during the night. G Troop, mounted in its vehicles, took the lead position of the squadron column and moved southward to Plaridel.⁸⁰

Throughout **1 February**, the 37th Division regiments attacked southward toward Manila. Maneuver was constrained in the 37th Division zone due to the coastal Pampanga-Angat-Meycauyan-Balucan delta basin comprised of multiple rivers and tributaries. The eastern terrain presented challenges too. Trafficable mounted axes all focused on Route 3. Soldiers of its 1st Battalion/148th Infantry Regiment moved southeast in zone along the interdivision boundary through varied terrain and dense foliage toward Plaridel. 1st/148th Infantry encountered a battalion-size Japanese defense north of Plaridel about **17:00 1 February** and fought throughout the night and into 2 February at Plaridel. Engagements at Plaridel continued into 3 February.

G Troop Attack by Fire near Plaridel

By **midmorning 2 February**, G Troop moved about three miles southwest along the north bank of the Angat River to where Route 5 crossed the Angat river at Plaridel. As G Troop arrived near the river and confirmed the bridges destroyed, Japanese fire erupted from the opposite bank of the river. Lieutenant Colonel Connor directed G Troop to conduct a "demonstration by fire" while F Troop conducted

The Sixth Army after action report, *Report of the Luzon campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*, states “by 2400 I [India], 2 February 1945, the [1st Cavalry] division had established contact with elements of the 37th Division at Plaridel and, continuing southeast, had secured Santa Maria (14,000 yards south southeast of Plaridel).”⁸⁵ This report appears inaccurate in one detail. 2/8th Cavalry attacked about dawn 3 February and seized Santa Maria to continue its advance.⁸⁶




Figure 16. The Long Road to Santa Clara

By **15:45 2 February**, the Japanese main defense crumbled in Plaridel. However, 1/148th Infantry assigned its reinforced Company A to remain at Plaridel to clear Japanese remnants and secure the river crossing

area while 1/148th Infantry (-) continued its attack southward oriented along Route 3 and the railroad line to Manila.⁸⁷ Just **before dawn on 3 February**, remaining Japanese units in Plaridel broke contact and withdrew as firefights continued until the 37th Division secured the Plaridel area. Farther south in zone, firefights continued as infantry regiments defeated or bypassed additional defenses and maneuvered southeastward oriented on Route 3 to Manila.⁸⁸

*Note. The Report After Action, Operations of the 37th Infantry Division, Luzon P.I. 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945, states that on 3 February "first contact with the 1st Cavalry Division...was made at Plaridel when elements of an armored column passed through Co A of the 148th Inf, which had just eliminated the enemy positions at that point."*⁸⁹ The accuracy of this date is questionable. The destroyed bridges over the Angat near Plaridel prevented any 1st Cavalry Division units from crossing the river or to be in Plaridel. First contact between the divisions occurred on 2 February.

G Troop Linkup with 37th Division at San Juan

When the 2/8th Cavalry column completed ford crossing the Angat River near Santa Barbera about **14:00**, movement continued south on a poor secondary route until reaching the village of San Juan on Route 3. 2/8th Cavalry had progressed slowly due to difficult fording of the Angat River and extremely poor trafficability of the undeveloped roads. The squadron halted near San Juan to refuel vehicles and prepare for a night movement farther to the east.⁹⁰ G Troop rejoined the squadron column.

About **16:00 2 February**, G Troop encountered flank elements of the 37th Division's 2/148th Infantry Regiment near San Juan moving south on Route 3. While checking G Troop's outpost position, his troopers told Captain Landry they "saw a couple of what looked like green uniforms down the road a bit." Landry investigated and linked up with an eastern-most flank unit of the 37th Division. Landry exchanged local situational awareness with the infantry platoon leader and both officers returned to their respective unit missions.⁹¹

Santa Cruz

Route 3 at San Juan was in the 37th Division area of operation. With no feasible route in zone farther south of San Juan for 2/8th Cavalry, the squadron retraced its route northward and onto an undeveloped track through a village of Santol to an intersection at Pandi, a village farther to the east. A southward turn at Pandi brought the column slowly to Santa Cruz about **21:00** with G Troop in the vanguard, followed by Headquarters, F Troop, H Troop, squadron trains, and E Troop.⁹²

Earlier on 2 February, the 2/5th Cavalry column forded the Angat River and moved eastward on Route 65. Several roadblocks slowed progress but successive Japanese defenses were cleared with dismounted attacks and artillery support. A substantial defense blocked the column at a terrain chokepoint northeast of the Angat village. An all-night engagement finally seized Angat located northwest of Norzagaray.⁹³

One account posed that this Route 64 approach was intended to be a feint in order to identify any actions of a major Japanese counterattack into the 1st Cavalry Division and corps flank.⁹⁴ With a small bridge near Angat that could not accept the weight of tanks, 30-foot banks preventing any ford, and indications of additional defenses in the Norzagaray area, the 2/5th Cavalry used an alternate route moving southwest to Santa Maria for access to Route 64 and eastward movement to intersect with Route 52 toward Manila.

Santa Clara

The route of 2/8th Cavalry on "circuitous, third-class roads" was bracketed by large rice fields. Poor trafficability significantly slowed the squadron task force on its single-file single-track night movement. G Troop led the squadron southward through Santa Cruz **about midnight 2 February** to a slightly improved road toward Santa Clara.⁹⁵

In Santa Clara, Filipino civilians informed Landry that a large unknown number of Japanese soldiers occupied the neighboring village of Santa Maria and its bridge crossing site of the Santa Maria River. How many enemy soldiers were present at Santa Maria was unknown. A dismounted patrol from G Troop moved toward Santa Maria to conduct reconnaissance and confirm Japanese presence in the village.

Day Two in Review

1st Cavalry Division progress on 2 February “Day Two” of the attack was significantly different from the 50-mile dash of the previous day. G Troop was engaged in the firefight to seize the bridge at Gapan over the Peñaranda River and the attack by fire demonstration against Japanese at Plaridel. For 2/8th Cavalry, the assembly area near Sabang to refuel and refit was a brief nighttime pause before G Troop engaged in its daylight firefight demonstration at Plaridel as the squadron forded the Angat River.

The squadron halted at San Juan and then had to double-back over dirt tracks to reach Santa Cruz before midnight and continue slowly on a slightly improved track to Santa Clara. Filipino civilians indicated Japanese were in Santa Maria would defend or delay along Route 64.

The 44th Tank Battalion (-) serial, with its one light tank company and 302d Reconnaissance Troop elements, secured the Gapan Bridge until the 2/5th Cavalry serial passed through this critical choke point. 2/5th Cavalry was moving east along Route 65 and by early evening was near the village of Angat. Periodic combat with Japanese defenses, terrain, and intelligence from Filipino guerrillas convinced the 2/5th Cavalry commander to adjust his route south toward Santa Maria and eastward to Route 52. The 1st Cavalry Division main body would follow this column’s route. General Chase at Baliuag assessed 2/5th Cavalry and 2/8th Cavalry progress and decided by early 3 February to follow 2/8th cavalry toward Santa Maria.⁹⁶

The two days of penetration confirmed essential tasks of securing intact bridges over rivers or practical fords through major rivers. Rapid onward movement hinged on bridges over the Pampanga River at Cabanatuan and Peñaranda River at Gapan. Fording the Angat River northwest of Plaridel, 1st Cavalry Division knew from aerial reconnaissance of the division route that the bridge over the Tuliahan River at Novaliches was intact and probably defended. Manila was only 15 miles to the south.

Day Three: Liberate Santo Tomas

Santa Maria

As the patrol from 2/8th Cavalry’s G Troop approached Santa Maria **about 02:00 3 February**, a challenge in Japanese from the darkness was followed by small arms fire wounding several G Troop patrol members. The G Troop returned fires with small arms, mortars, and machineguns.⁹⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Connor prepared 2d Squadron to assault Santa Maria at **daylight 3 February**. Landry remembered, “Before dawn my G Troop and E Troop fixed bayonets. The units dismounted about one-quarter mile from the Japanese positions...just before dawn.” Using the predawn darkness as concealment and “without a sound, without any preparatory fires, we crossed the fields.” Troops E and F assaulted across open ground with Troops G and H providing supporting fires. Surprise was complete as the two troops burst into and through the enemy positions.⁹⁸

The 2d Squadron quickly routed the Japanese defenders. With supporting fires, the troops assaulted with “bayonet, rifle, and grenade” that resulted in Japanese soldiers dispersing eastward out of the village area.

Reconnaissance elements moved through Santa Maria and confirmed the bridge over the Santa Maria River was destroyed. Reconnaissance found a ford on the Santa Maria River about one thousand yards southwest of the village. The squadron pushed eastward and completed clearing the Santa Maria ford **about noon**.⁹⁹ Landry’s comment indicated the momentum of the column: “We then ‘hit the road’ and

moved on.”¹⁰⁰ More Japanese were expected along this route as it connected with the main Japanese route between Manila and mountain defenses to the east and north.




Figure 17. Assault on Santa Maria and Ford of Santa Maria River

Note. The *1st Cavalry Division History in World War II* notes use of USMC MAG-32 dive bombers as a ruse near Santa Maria. As “2d Squadron/8th Cavalry found an enemy battalion well entrenched on ground commanding the road and the river valley,” dive bombers conducted several strafing passes without firing a shot due the proximity of flying column troopers close to the Japanese defenses. The aerial ruse “enabled the squadron “to slug its way into the defensive position and route the occupants.”¹⁰¹ The 2/8th Cavalry column continued its movement eastward.¹⁰²

The Air Annex to the *Historical Report of the 1st Cavalry Division 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*, records after crossing the Santa Maria River “20mm and MG [machinegun] fire from an estimated battalion entrenched along both sides of the road” engaged the column. The “simulated strafing passes” by SBDs dispersed the Japanese defenders.¹⁰³

Santo Nino

As the 2d Squadron column completed crossing the Santa Maria ford, the Reconnaissance Platoon continued eastward on the dirt road. Japanese defensive fires from Santo Nino forced the Reconnaissance Platoon to halt. F Troop sped forward with its attached tanks, forded the Santa Maria River, and dispersed the Japanese defenders at Santo Nino.

The one dirt road traversed terrain with elevated road banks with rice fields to each side. Village huts periodically dotted the roadside with trees and thick scrub brush along the edges of the roadway.

G Troop reinforced forward momentum: “We occasionally dismounted to fight on foot when there was an indication of opposition, but for the most part the squadron as a whole kept rolling...The lead unit might dismount briefly, engage with the rifle and machinegun, but quickly remount and roll on.”¹⁰⁴

In this instance, the lead troop dismounted and launched a tank-infantry assault to destroy a Japanese defense of about 30 Japanese soldiers at Santo Nino. The column continued east toward Muzon with F Troop in the lead. G Troop was close behind the lead troop and elements of the squadron headquarters.




Figure 18. "Hot Corner" Firefight 3 February

Note. A sketch for Muzon through Novaliches, rather than a map illustration, is due to a "missing" digitized (1944) map sheet NOVALICHES: Sheet 3455 III. A reference catalog link of digitized maps erroneously links Sheet 3455 II MOUNT IRID as east of MEYCAUCAN Sheet 3355 II. The Novaliches map sheet is listed in the reference list of sheets but is not in the digital files used in this research.

Muzon Firefight

Lead elements of 2d Squadron column observed Japanese trucks and soldiers ahead at Muzon. F Troop dismounted and immediately conducted an assault into Muzon with accurate support fires from its tank platoon. The assault left about 20 to 30 Japanese soldiers dead along the road among 15 destroyed Japanese trucks as 2d Squadron continued forward. Enemy survivors scattered from Muzon and evaded into the countryside.¹⁰⁵ The Reconnaissance Platoon was detailed to complete destruction of enemy equipment in Muzon as the squadron column continued movement eastward toward the intersection with Route 52.

A Filipino guerilla officer accompanying 2d Squadron cautioned Lieutenant Colonel Connor that the Japanese would defend Route 52 as a main route supporting forces between Manila and the eastern mountain area of Japanese defenses.¹⁰⁶ The guerilla was correct in his warning.

The "Hot Corner"

As F Troop approached the Route 64-52 road junction, lead vehicles were pummeled with 20-mm cannon, machinegun, and small arms fire. Troopers dismounted and attacked with firepower support of its attached tank platoon. The volume of enemy fire confirmed an enemy force of considerable strength.

When the entire 2d Squadron column halted due to the firefight confronting F Troop, "intense fire was received from both sides of the road for the length of the column." Other squadron troopers dismounted and jumped into roadside ditches. When G Troop dismounted and returned small arms and machinegun fires, the enemy had to be driven out of the ditches before the troopers could occupy roadside positions and continue fighting through the hasty engagement area. An intense 20-minute firefight ended with 2d Squadron securing the intersection.¹⁰⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Connor ordered E Troop to protect this critical intersection and to remain there until relieved by 2/5th Cavalry. 2/8th Cavalry (-) mounted its vehicles and continued southward toward Novaliches. Aerial reconnaissance reports by USMC dive bombers confirmed that the bridge at Novaliches was still intact over the Tuliahan River.¹⁰⁸ An Army artillery officer in a light observation airplane reported similar intelligence observing the 1st Cavalry Division route into Manila.

Farther to the north, the 2/5th Cavalry column moved southeast on a separate axis of Route 65. After an all-night firefight during 1-2 February, 2/5th Cavalry seized Angat. With no indication of a major Japanese counterattack from the Norzagaray area, the 2/5th Cavalry column changed its route of march southwest back toward Santa Maria to Route 64. Slowed by fords at several streams, the squadron forded the Santa Maria River about midafternoon and continued toward the Route 64-52 road junction. Sporadic meeting engagements with Japanese elements occurred as the squadron raced to close the gap with the General Chase's command group. This column and Chase's command group were at times only about one-half hour behind the 2/8th Cavalry column.¹⁰⁹

Tuliahan Bridge at Novaliches

The 2/8th Cavalry column moved quickly south on Route 52 expecting more enemy along the route but met no other enemy contact until the column approached Novaliches **by early afternoon**. The column arrived at Novaliches and its bridge over the Tuliahan River south of the village. The bridge was intact.

Receiving fire from a roadblock at the bridge and flanks of the roadway near the bridge, troopers of F Troop dismounted and maneuvered toward the bridge. Demolitions were observed on the bridge with a lit fuse. A U.S. Naval demolitions expert with the flying column ran forward during the firefight and remove fuses about to detonate the explosives at the bridge.¹¹⁰

After about a one-hour firefight in Novaliches, the 2/8th Cavalry column seized the bridge and continued speedy movement southwest on Route 52 toward the urban outskirts of Manila. Later, General Chase's

command group and the 2/5th Cavalry column also crossed the bridge at Novaliches and continued its momentum seeking to linkup with 2/8th Cavalry. E Troop of 2/8th Cavalry joined the 2/5th Cavalry column as this follow-on column passed the intersection of Route 64 and 53. Intact and secured bridges were vital to the rapid movement of 1st Cavalry Division flying columns and the division's main body in its time-sensitive mission.

The 2/8th Cavalry column, as the division's vanguard, kept moving the entire distance from Novaliches into Manila receiving light intermittent Japanese fires from the flanks of the road but did not encounter any deliberate defenses. F Troop was lead troop followed closely by G Troop in the 2d Squadron column. The flying column returned fire with tank guns, truck-mounted machineguns, and individual weapons as the tanks and trucks sped south.




Figure 19. Tuliahan Bridge at Novaliches and “On to Manila”

During this series of running firefights, the flying column encountered two small Japanese truck convoys packed with Japanese soldiers heading opposite of 2d Squadron. A column observer noted, “These troops may have been on their way out to stop our column; however, they never had a chance to put up a fight as they were virtually annihilated in their vehicles by our tank and machine gun fire.”¹¹¹ General Chase directed Lieutenant Colonel Connor via radio to keep moving quickly into Manila and to Santo Tomas.¹¹²

In another meeting engagement by G Troop, Captain Landry recalled that a Japanese truck column pulled up to an intersection and a couple of individuals dismounted, possibly officers, to discuss some issue. “We rolled by and took each and every vehicle under fire...Every one of our vehicles took a hand [in the drive-by meeting engagement] and there were very few [Japanese] survivors.”¹¹³

On to Manila

The 2/8th Cavalry column continued to encounter sporadic enemy gunfire as it raced south and through the next village of Talipapa about **18:00**. The column continued rapidly southward on Route 52 with tanks, as well as truck-mounted machineguns and rifle fire engaging any Japanese firing on the column. 2/8th Cavalry crossed into the northeastern Manila suburb of Grace Park and its airfield about 30 minutes later.




Figure 20. Manila Northern Suburbs and Urban Density

Note. The image (Figure 20) is an extract of map sheet Manila North, series S901, Army Map Service (1945) at scale 1:12,500. 2/8th Cavalry enters Manila minus one rifle troop when E Troop (+) was detached to secure the Route 64-Route 52 intersection. E Troop (+) would rejoin 2/8th Cavalry when 2/5th Cavalry closed at Santo Tomas late evening 3 February. H Troop as the weapons troop is in the squadron column. F Troop (+) was detached from the column once 2/8th Cavalry entered Manila to seize the Malacañan Palace. G Troop (+) entered Manila in the squadron column. However, rearward elements of G Troop were contained at Far Eastern University for several hours in an engagement area. G Troop (-) was the only rifle troop in the squadron column when 2/8th Cavalry seized the Santo Tomas Internment Camp.

The airfield hangers were already on fire set by the Japanese. Japanese small arms fire continued to harass the column along the Grace Park roadways.¹¹⁴ Unit reports mark entry into the Manila suburb as **18:35**.¹¹⁵ Captain Landry remembered his G Troop engaging sporadic Japanese rifle fire along the roadsides near the Japanese airfield at Grace Park and through the group of cemeteries to its south.

The 1st Cavalry Division after action report and division history of the Manila flying column includes a sketch of the 2/8th Cavalry route at Grace Park and through the group of cemeteries. Multiple routes used by the 1st Cavalry Division through the cemeteries converge into one route on Route 52 as the column continued towards the urban density of north Manila.¹¹⁶ Landry commented on orientation of his G Troop about this time that his troop may have emerged south from the cemeteries at Rizal Avenue of Route 3.¹¹⁷

After the flying column moved through the area of extensive cemeteries and periodic fires from Japanese forces, the column kept oriented along Route 52. Landry estimated that G Troop encountered about 100 enemy soldiers in the cemeteries complex. South of the cemetery complex, 2/8th Cavalry confronted a dense grid of streets and avenues in a confusing maze of one-story or two-story wood or concrete buildings. The enemy situation and defenses remained unknown.




Figure 21. The Racetrack Pause and Guerilla Linkup

Note. The 2/8th Cavalry flying column and division may have used multiple roads near the Grace Park airfield and series of cemeteries, oriented primarily on Route 52, as they entered the suburban neighborhoods of northern Manila. The sketch in Figure 21 at (L) is from the division's unit history, *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*, published in 1947. Route 3 (Rizal Avenue) was in the 37th Division area of operations. However, at the time of 1st Cavalry Division entrance to Manila, no 37th Division units had reached that far south as of evening 3 February.

Relief of Santo Tomas Internment Camp

Having run a gauntlet of several “rolling firefights” behind them, the 2/8th Cavalry flying column continued moving into Manila. The street network boulevards and streets presented a daunting decision. Little existed in street signage due to previous Japanese actions. Local civilians were absent from the streets to ask directions or orient the column directly toward Santo Tomas. The possibility of significant Japanese combat forces ready to ambush the column remained everyone’s concern.

The column came to a halt south of the cemeteries near the racetrack in Manila to confirm a direct route to Santo Tomas. Although Route 52 led directly into the urban center, lengths of the Route 52 had at least four different street titles on maps. With his G Troop, “We pulled up and spent probably three-fourths of an hour ‘there on tenterhooks’....We at the time were sitting in the midst of a city that was absolutely quiet and apparently devoid of people.”¹¹⁸

Santo Tomas was the primary objective but Landry recalled no one was particularly sure where the university was even though the maps they had were “pretty good.” He thought the squadron column may be waiting for guides or to confirm the location of one of B Company’s tank platoons.¹¹⁹ The commander of B Company, 44th Tank Battalion was attempting to locate one of his tank platoons with which he had lost communication. The tank platoon had somehow become separated in the city from the column. Landry waited stationary with no situational update from squadron headquarters.¹²⁰ Everyone’s anxiety increased as location and capabilities of the enemy in Manila remained uncertain.

About this time, two Filipinos approached the 2/8th Cavalry column and offered their assistance as guides. Lieutenant Colonel Connor questioned the two Filipinos. Once Connor was satisfied with their identity, Captain Colayco as a resistance leader and Filipino underground newspaperman, and another resistance member Lieutenant Guytingco, guided the squadron down boulevards and streets to the main gate of Santo Tomas University.¹²¹ Connor had an additional mission objective to achieve more than just the liberation of Santo Tomas internees. He was to secure the Malacañan Palace.

Malacañan Palace

With Filipino guides to assist the squadron column movement to Santo Tomas University, F Troop and one tank platoon were detached from the column to seize the Malacañan Palace complex. This motorized troop and medium (Sherman) tank platoon moved quickly on side streets toward the north bank of the Pasig River to the Presidential Palace grounds. The 2/8th Cavalry column was now without two of its three rifle troops. E Troop (+) was still north with 2/5 Cavalry moving south toward Manila and F Troop (+) was enroute to the presidential complex on the north bank of the Pasig River.

F Troop (+) seized Malacañan Palace after sporadic fire from Japanese soldiers enroute and near the site. The troop organized a defensive perimeter at the palace that repelled Japanese soldiers attempting to regain the palace grounds during the night of 3 February. At daylight 4 February, F Troop remained in control of Malacañan Palace and 40 Japanese soldiers lay dead in the immediate area.¹²²

2/8 Cavalry Column Surge to Santo Tomas

The 2/8th Cavalry column started to surge from the Manila racetrack area to Santo Tomas. Captain Landry was unaware that F Troop had been detached from the column to seize Malacañan Palace. G Troop moved quickly in the surge south. As G Troop sped forward on darkened avenues, Landry recalled, “I was following the tank tracks clearly visible on the tarmac” and assumed the tracks were from F Troop’s tanks as the squadron continued to Santo Tomas.¹²³ At some point, F Troop had turned off the avenue onto another street toward the Malacañan Palace. Landry was “following at top speed” and missed turning toward Santo Tomas as he continued south on the main avenue.¹²⁴ Route 52 was Andalucia Avenue in this part of northern

urban Manila and became Quezon Avenue farther south when it passed between Bilibid Prison and the Far Eastern University. Quezon Avenue led directly to the Quezon Bridge over the Pasig River.




Figure 22. Objectives: Santo Tomas and Malacañan Palace

The squadron column now included G Troop (+) and H Troop as the weapons troop, squadron headquarters, Battery B of the 61st Artillery, and the squadron trains service and support element with medical support. Although the squadron column appeared a sizable force, Lieutenant Colonel Connor knew that the column lacked a substantial number of infantrymen as they moved towards Santo Tomas.

When Landry recognized an old Spanish tower silhouetted near the Bilibid Prison, he recognized that he had overshot a street turn toward Santo Tomas and “decided to go right around Old Bilibid” prison and reenter the 2d Squadron column headed towards Santo Tomas.¹²⁵

G Troop into a “Hornet’s Nest”

As G Troop approached the intersection of Andalucia Avenue and Azcarraga Avenue, Landry remembered the moment: “*I thundered into a hornet’s nest!*”¹²⁶ The Bilibid Prison wall was on his right and a large concrete three-story building to his left. Landry saw a Japanese sentry at the main entrance archway of that building just as the avenue erupted in machinegun and rifle fire and periodic rounds from an antitank gun.¹²⁷ The Far Eastern University building had been turned into a strongpoint to prevent access to Quezon Bridge on the Pasig River. Landry kept his lead element moving and turned west onto Azcarraga Avenue where G Troop met a Japanese convoy of one small sedan followed by three or four trucks. The meeting engagement was momentary. G Troop fired their weapons into the sedan and trucks as they sped past. Landry was surprised to see no Japanese presence at the front entrance of Bilibid Prison.

As Landry and his forward elements of G Troop turned north into a street parallel to the west wall of Bilibid Prison, trail elements of G Troop were caught in an intense firefight with Japanese defenders as it passed between Bilibid Prison and the Far Eastern University (FEU). The lead element with Landry and one rifle platoon were able to speed through the kill zone. Japanese fires from FEU halted other forward movement of follow-on G Troop vehicles. Other elements in the column jammed to a halt. The firefight prevented G Troop vehicles from maneuvering out of the kill zone. G Troop troopers dismounted and fought along the urban streetway.




Figure 23. "Hornet's Nest" at Far Eastern University

G Troop suffered significant leader and trooper casualties to machineguns, small arms, 20-mm cannon and 47-mm gun fire.¹²⁸ Within the first ten minutes of the G Troop firefight, three officers were seriously wounded. Several senior sergeants were casualties and the first sergeant was killed.¹²⁹ Officers continued leading the firefight until wounds prevented their effective command and control. One G Troop sergeant squad leader took command for approximately two hours. He recovered and distributed sorely needed ammunition to troopers in the firefight, personally destroyed an enemy machinegun position, and led the G Troop group until soldiers were able to disengage and withdraw from the firefight. The sergeant's leadership repelled three counterattacks on his group's position.¹³⁰ The determined defense at FEU resulted in 175 dead Japanese soldiers later found at and near the building. Unfortunately, G Troop losses were ten killed and twenty wounded—the most significant G Troop combat losses during the 2/8th Cavalry flying column.¹³¹

While some of the 2/8th Cavalry column arrived at Santo Tomas, other vehicle "drivers began jamming Quezon Boulevard to the rear" and farther north on Andalucia Avenue.¹³² With G Troop's elements fighting to get out of the kill zone at the Far Eastern University, the avenue was a scene of dead and wounded, and congested with vehicles attempting to turn around to withdraw from or avoid the kill zone.

Less than an hour later, General Chase and lead elements of 2/5th Cavalry arrived at the congestion of the FEU firefight. They had sped into the Manila suburbs confronting multiple firefights. Chase recalled, "My part of the column had much the same experience. It was dark with fires and explosions breaking out on all sides, much sniping and firing at every street corner, and even a Japanese counterattack on our

column....We were all jammed up in the street and very vulnerable; we had to move.” Eventually disengaging from the FEU firefight, a guerilla guided Chase’s column “by a round-about route of a few blocks through alleys to our destination, Santo Tomas University....We were able to move our whole organization in the college [Santo Tomas] compound **about midnight**.”¹³³

Objective: Santo Tomas

Note. The Santo Tomas narrative continues with Captain Landry’s recollection of his troop commander and temporary squadron executive officer duties in the seizure, defense, and related 2/8th Cavalry actions at the Santo Tomas Internee Camp. Lieutenant Barrow adds his recollections as acting G Troop commander when Landry was appointed as acting squadron executive officer at the front gate of Santo Tomas.

Lead elements of G Troop with Landry had sped through a gauntlet of Japanese fires from the Far Eastern University building. While the rearward platoon elements of G troop were fighting dismounted at Far Eastern University, Captain Landry’s element emerged north from the westside of Bilibid Prison. He saw follow-on elements of the 2d Squadron column moving across the street he was on as they headed toward Espana Avenue and the main gate of Santo Tomas. Landry wedged his G Troop element into the column of mainly support and service vehicles.

Lead elements of the 2/8th Cavalry flying column arrived **about 19:30** at the Santo Tomas main gate.¹³⁴ The situation was uncertain outside the Santo Tomas grounds. The Japanese guard force was surprised at the flying column arrival. Meanwhile, F Troop (+) was enroute to secure Malacañan Palace at the Pasig River.

Lieutenant Barrow recalled G Troop infantrymen in the column now consisted of only one rifle platoon and some members of the troop command group. While lead elements in the squadron column halted on Espana Avenue near the main gate of Santo Tomas, other elements farther back along the avenue included H Troop, towed artillery of Battery B, one tank platoon, and the squadron trains.¹³⁵ Conditions remained tense in the long stationary squadron column, sounds of a firefight nearby, and uncertainty of Japanese capabilities inside and outside of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp.

With Captain Landry’s G Troop element now stationary in the squadron column, he dismounted and “went forward to find the squadron commander.”¹³⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Connor, his squadron executive officer Major Steve Gerhart, and the Filipino guides were discussing how to enter Santo Tomas with its high walls and large gated entry. Landry recalled the moment he arrived near the head of the flying column and yelling “Where the hell is the front gate?” (R. Landry. personal communication, September 27, 2023). Captain Landry found Lieutenant Colonel Connor at the main gate near the lead tank.

As the column prepared to breach the Santo Tomas gate, a grenade tossed over the main gate wall by a Japanese guard exploded and wounded Connor and severely wounded Captain Colayco, the senior Filipino guide, who later died of his wounds. 1st Cavalry Division history indicates this occurred about **20:50**.¹³⁷

As Connor was being treated for his wound, Connor appointed Gerhart as acting squadron commander and Landry as acting squadron executive officer for the squadron column.¹³⁸ Landry, now with squadron level duties, appointed Lieutenant Barrow to acting command of G Troop.¹³⁹

Crash the Main Gate Wall

A Sherman tank was called forward and smashed through the gate wall and into the university grounds.¹⁴⁰ Once inside the main entrance, an internee remembered the mechanical sound of the tank as it moved slowly up the main entrance road toward the main administrative building. Gerhart and Landry, with several troopers, walked along the side of the tank toward the main building. One internee recalled the tension of silence. “The rumble stopped. Dead silence at the gates. Dead silence in the building. Full darkness now, and not a light showing this side of a glare on the horizon.”¹⁴¹

With silence throughout the darkened camp, the lead Sherman tank was ordered to turn on his headlights. An internee with white pants and shirt appeared “crossing the plaza in front of the great main building illuminated by the tank headlights.” The Japanese camp commander had directed this internee-translator, Mr. Ernest Stanley, to demand safe passage of his guard force and him from Santo Tomas to Japanese defensive lines. This was the first awareness of internees being held hostage in the Education Building. Landry told Mr. Stanley to inform the Japanese commander, “I wanted him [Japanese camp commander] to know that our immediate action would be to isolate the guard unit, and permit no one to leave the camp area.”¹⁴²




Figure 24. Objective Santo Tomas

The tank headlights also illuminated two Japanese officers near the entrance to the main building and they immediately surrendered.¹⁴³ The officers were “fully uniformed, well set with their helmets...sabers hooked up, and they seemed to be ‘lost’—They didn’t really know what was happening.”¹⁴⁴

A third Japanese officer exited the building and approached Gerhart and Landry. Gerhart saw the Japanese officer reach into his pouch for a grenade and shot him before he could throw the grenade.¹⁴⁵ When the Japanese officer fell to the ground, a group of internees poured into the courtyard to kick and pummel their previous captor. In addition to his gunshot wound, the Japanese officer acquired a neck slash during the beating. Startled by the internee actions, Landry speculated that this officer must have been particularly cruel during internee captivity. The officer was later carried inside a building and died of his injuries.

Many internees were suspicious of what was occurring even though clandestine messages into the camp during previous days, weeks, and months indicated Allied forces were advancing in the Philippines and were on Luzon. When internees understood that liberation was happening, apprehension turned to joy and relief. Internees emerged from buildings to shout and yell while other internees assisted squadron troopers identifying Japanese soldier presence in the camp. Earlier that afternoon, Chase requested his ALP to have USMC airplanes fly over Santo Tomas. Pilots reported, “the compound was intact, that there were lots of people waving at them, but that there were many big fires breaking out all over the city.”¹⁴⁶

Establish a Defensive Perimeter

Major Gerhart as acting squadron commander and Captain Landry in executive officer duties had multiple actions to coordinate and control: clear and secure the extensive internee camp property and perimeter, determine how to seize whatever Japanese guard force occupied the camp, safeguard groups of internees

as they emerged from buildings and varied areas of the camp, and prepare for arrival of the follow-on column and support with General Chase. Darkness masked the many ongoing actions of securing the camp.

Captain Landry, as acting squadron executive officer, was concentrating on whether or not the Japanese guard force inside the camp might be preparing to fight. Simultaneously, Landry was establishing a defensive perimeter in the extensive walled compound of Santo Tomas. Troopers, tankers, artillerymen, and support soldiers became “infantry riflemen” and were emplaced throughout the Santo Tomas grounds to establish defensive positions.

As defenses were being established, internees provided Gerhart and Landry additional information about organizational areas of the internment camp, Japanese camp commander and guard force treatment of internees, and that internees were being held hostage in the Education Building just northeast of the main administration building.

The Education Building was quickly surrounded. Firing into the building ceased when internee hostages shouted from building windows alerting the troopers of their location. A tense stalemate continued during the dilemma in nighttime darkness and uncertainty of Japanese intentions.




Figure 25. Defend Santo Tomas and Contain Enemy in Education Building

Landry was emplacing and checking squadron soldiers across the large university campus area in ad hoc defensive positions. “I was most concerned with our ability to set up a defensive perimeter around the entire perimeter” if attacked by other Japanese forces inside Manila. He also knew elements of his G Troop were committed in a firefight near Bilibid Prison. At the time, the 2d Squadron column presence in Santo Tomas was only about 200 flying column members.¹⁴⁷

As the 2d Squadron column of vehicles closed into the Santo Tomas grounds, an additional hundred or more troopers were available for positioning the defensive perimeter. “We expected probes...and maybe even full-scale attack at any time.”¹⁴⁸ With very few squadron “riflemen” inside Santo Tomas, everyone in the column understood the immediate mission and adapted to defensive tasks as riflemen and emplacement of weapons systems.

The B Battery captain and his lieutenant were commended for organizing their weapons and artillerymen into the defense of Santo Tomas. The captain commanding H Troop, his lieutenant, and a staff sergeant were also commended for the weapons troop defenses inside Santo Tomas.¹⁴⁹ Tanks and antitank weapons were positioned to respond to contingencies along the camp perimeter and entrances.

Internee Hostage Negotiations

The Japanese internment camp commander, a lieutenant colonel, and about 70 of his soldiers held over 270 hostages, mostly women and children internees, inside the Education Building. He demanded safe passage of himself and his soldiers to Japanese defensive lines in the Manila suburb to the south.

As the 2/8th Cavalry column waited for the arrival of the other flying column and General Chase, outposting the Santo Tomas grounds continued as a thinly stretched defense. Concurrently, Landry felt the exhilaration of the internees after their years of captivity. “This was the happiest bunch of people you have ever seen in your life.”¹⁵⁰ However, the appearance of internees confirmed the entire internee population was suffering from dire physical effects of malnutrition and debilitating mental conditions.

General Chase Arrives with the 2/5th Cavalry Column

The flying column of 2/5th Cavalry and General Chase’s command group raced into Manila by **mid-evening**. The momentum of the lead flying column had closed on the halted elements of G Troop near the Far Eastern University building. Although complicated in breaking contact in a direct firefight and negotiating a congested urban street network in darkness, the column and elements of G Troop were able to eventually disengage from the Eastern University combat and arrive at Santo Tomas. By **23:30**, General Chase, 2/5th Cavalry, and 2/8th Cavalry were concentrating at Santo Tomas.¹⁵¹

Given fighting at the Andalucia-Quezon and Azcarraga intersection at Far Eastern University, mounting friendly force casualties, and uncertainty of Japanese combat power, actions, and counteractions, General Chase decided to consolidate his columns in the Santo Tomas site. After midnight and into the **wee hours of 4 February**, the two columns consolidated a defensive position inside the Santo Tomas grounds.¹⁵²

When General Chase was informed of the hostage situation inside Santo Tomas, he appointed his Chief of Staff Colonel Brady as negotiator with the Japanese camp commander. While Brady initiated negotiations with the Japanese commander, Gerhart and Landry continued defensive actions in Santo Tomas and were establishing communication with F Troop (+) defending the Malacañan Palace. Major Gerhart and Captain Landry performed exceptional leadership duties in Santo Tomas. Fortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Connor’s wound from grenade shrapnel was not life-threatening and he remained in command of 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry.

Day Three in Review

The G Troop patrol reconnaissance of Santa Maria in the wee hours of 3 February followed by the 2d Squadron’s dawn assault initiated a series of assaults and running firefights through villages to the main route intersection of Route 64-52 labeled in 1st Cavalry Division accounts as the “Hot Corner.” Momentum continued in seizing the Tuliahan Bridge south of Novaliches where heroic actions prevented demolition of the bridge by the Japanese. 2/8th Cavalry success energized a quickened tempo toward Manila.

Light enemy gunfire harassed the flying column into the suburbs of northern Manila. After a temporary pause on city streets near the racetrack, the 2/8th Cavalry column surged forward again as Filipinos guided the column to Santo Tomas. One rifle troop, F Troop (+), was detached to seize the other objective of Malacañan Place at the Pasig River.

Darkness and the previous three days of near continuous march movements and periodic combat increased the tension of what Japanese forces would be encountered in the final several kilometers before reaching Santo Tomas. Santo Tomas was seized and secured with minimal combat; however, the unexpected hostage-taking of internees by the Japanese camp commander added to 2/8th Cavalry challenges in securing the former university compound.

Most of G Troop was engaged with Japanese forces between Bilibid Prison and the Far Eastern University building. When General Chase and the 2/5th Cavalry column arrived near Santo Tomas, combat was ongoing at the Far Eastern University building, one reinforced rifle troop was defending the Presidential Palace grounds next to the Pasig River, a hostage crisis complicated liberation of all Santo Tomas internees, and uncertain enemy capability or intention in the hours ahead overshadowed the immediate tasks ahead. Consolidating the 2/5th Cavalry column with the 2/8th Cavalry column in Santo Tomas was appropriate as everyone in the flying column looked forward to arrival of the main body of 1st Cavalry Division.

Tuliahán River Bridge Destroyed

During the **early morning of 4 February**, General Chase learned that the Japanese had destroyed the bridge over the Tuliahán River at Novaliches earlier that morning. This severed any ground support with 1st Cavalry Division reinforcements not already at Santo Tomas in the two task forces of his flying column. Chase was informed that bridge repair and southward division movement to linkup with the Santo Tomas force was expected to take at least 24 hours.

Seize Quezon Bridge

Late on the **afternoon of 4 February**, Major General Griswold, XIV Corps commander, ordered 1st Cavalry Division to seize the Quezon Bridge on the Pasig River. General Mudge ordered General Chase to seize the bridge as the only intact bridge remaining over the Pasig River. Chase tasked 2/5th Cavalry. The attack that evening maneuvered from Santo Tomas through urban blocks that channelized any approach to the bridge. Intense Japanese fire from defenses along the Quezon-Azcarraga intersection, and a substantial defense and roadblock on Quezon Avenue of steel stakes in the pavement, truck body barricades, mines, and barbed wire entanglements, defeated the squadron attack to seize the Quezon Bridge. Chase knew that 37th Division units were approaching from west of Santo Tomas but had no physical contact with its units during the urban neighborhood firefights near the Bilibid Prison.

2/5th Cavalry withdrew under heavy fire during the **night of 4 February** and regrouped at Santo Tomas. Aware other U.S. forces were also approaching the Quezon Bridge from the north and northwest, Japanese defenders destroyed the bridge as the last standing bridge over the Pasig River.¹⁵³ General Chase continued local patrolling from the defensive perimeter at Santo Tomas. The rifle troop at Malacañan Palace maintained their defense of the presidential complex. The 2/5th Cavalry engagement near Quezon Avenue confirmed elaborate Japanese defenses in the core urban area of Manila.¹⁵⁴

Legislative Building

The *1st Cavalry Division in World War II* history states a "third objective of the flying column was the Legislative Building on the south side of the Pasig River...a part of Troop G, 8th Cavalry, set out for the Legislative Building."¹⁵⁵ This statement about G Troop appears inaccurate. No evidence exists this task was assigned to G Troop or 2/8th Cavalry. The Legislative Building was located south of the Quezon Bridge on a boulevard facing the Intramuros.

Note. Captain Landry states a different series of actions as G troop approached the Santo Tomas area. In Landry's recollections (2005), he does not mention the Legislative Building as an assigned G Troop (+) objective. G Troop (+) was in the squadron column behind F Troop (+) moving rapidly toward Santo Tomas. When F Troop (+) detached from the column and moved toward Malacañan Palace, G Troop (+) was the one remaining rifle troop in the squadron column. A decision to detach G Troop and its attached tank platoon from the 2d Squadron column as it approached Santo Tomas makes no tactical sense as the sole reinforced rifle troop in the column. Detaching G Troop to attack south would have left Lieutenant Colonel Connor with no rifle troop as he approached Santo Tomas.

In *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, “The ‘flying column’ proceeded down Rizal Avenue to Santo Tomas University, meanwhile diverting one troop of cavalry and a platoon of tanks to Malacañan Palace....reached against sporadic rifle fire from across the Pasig River but only Filipino police guards and attendants were found to occupy the building.”¹⁵⁶ There is no mention of another unit tasked to cross the Pasig River and seize the Legislative Building.




Figure 26. Quezon Bridge and Legislative Building

Note. The illustration in Figure 26 indicates most of Manila was still in Japanese control 4 February when 2/5th Cavalry attacked toward Quezon Bridge. Japanese strongpoints and heavily defended areas increased resistance as the 1st Cavalry Division and 37th Division approached the Pasig River during 4-7 February. Japanese defenses would be even more substantial along the Pasig River trace within the city to the Intramuros and Manila Bay port area.

Bilibid Prison PWs and Internees

To the west of Santo Tomas, 37th Division lead units approached Bilibid Prison from the northwest. They entered the prison grounds **about 20:00 4 February** and discovered about 800 Allied and U.S. prisoners of war and over 500 civilian internees abandoned by the Japanese inside the prison.¹⁵⁷ The 37th Division's 2/148th Infantry and General Chases' 2/5th Cavalry were eventually fighting within several blocks of each other but were not in physical contact with each other. Urban street fighting in daylight or darkness against unknown enemy strength, and knowledge of nearby friendly forces not in direct coordination created challenging tactical decisions. Captain Landry noted that 2/8th Cavalry trucks from Santo Tomas later supported evacuation of the liberated prisoners and internees from Bilibid Prison and their eventual movement to Grace Park.¹⁵⁸

Meanwhile farther north at Novaliches, reconstructing the Tuliahan River bridge took all day 4 February and into 5 February before 1st Cavalry Division main body units crossed bridging at the unfordable river and headed towards Manila. Several division units assembled at Grace Park in northern Manila by **18:00 5 February** as other 1st Cavalry Division combat and support elements continued to arrive into Manila oriented on Route 52.¹⁵⁹ A truck column finally arrived at Santo Tomas during the **evening of 5 February** with sorely needed ammunition, rations, and other supplies.¹⁶⁰

Santo Tomas Internee Care and Comfort

The cheering of internees that Landry experienced quickly shifted to the reality that thousands of men, women, and children were in states of severe malnutrition and other critical illnesses. After years of captivity, some internees had been at the camp since the earliest months of the war. One internee recorded his concern that liberation may not arrive soon enough. Hope of rescue was also "a race—with starvation."¹⁶¹ Troopers viewed the starving internees. One internee recalled, "Their [internee] bodies were...wasted by hunger. The youths were pale and gangling and the old people were feeble and sick with diseases and malnutrition."¹⁶² The situation was dire.



Figure 27. Internee Malnutrition at Santo Tomas

Periodic food and sundries from relief organizations, local Manila citizens, and illegal market bartering had become more difficult for internees by 1944 when the Japanese enacted additional restrictions and severe punishments for infractions. By February 1945, internees were receiving only 700 to 800 calories a day with less than 20 grams being protein.¹⁶³ The Japanese commander knew of the dire health conditions. In

late January 1945, the head of the internee medical board was sentenced to 20 days in jail because he refused to change his death certificate diagnoses as “death from starvation or malnutrition.”¹⁶⁴

In the initial hours of 2/8th Cavalry occupying Santo Tomas, troopers shared what meager field K-rations they had remaining from their original combat load when they deployed from Guimba on 31 January. Even with caution that military field rations should be eaten in small portions initially, many internees became sick after eating high-calorie items after the extended period of near-starvation diet.

Care and comfort in the initial days of liberation at Santo Tomas strained the capabilities of Chase’s flying column and internee medical personnel. U.S. Army nurse internees and civilian medical doctors performed admirably in their years of captivity at Santo Tomas with limited facilities and care capabilities. They continued to provide medical support as wounded and dying soldiers arrived from nearby fighting near Santo Tomas and the Pasig River line. Additional medical support arrived with the 1st Cavalry Division main body.

Hostage Release and G Troop Escort

Negotiations with the Japanese commander continued throughout the night of 4 February. Prior to **daylight 5 February**, General Chase approved safe passage to the Japanese commander and his group of soldiers to an area south of Santo Tomas in Manila. Other matters included what weapons the Japanese would be allowed to carry with them if provided with safe passage. An agreement allowed each Japanese soldier and officer to carry a personal weapon and individual equipment.



Figure 28. G Troop Escort of Japanese Soldiers to Release Point

Note. Lieutenant Thomas Barrow, acting commander of G Troop, is walking to the right of the Japanese commander in the (L) photograph. G troop provided an armed escort to a release point and returned to Santo Tomas without enemy contact.

The U.S. escort from Santo Tomas to a release point was provided by G Troop and its acting commander, Lieutenant Barrow.¹⁶⁵ The Japanese were very concerned that Filipino guerrillas would kill them even though no guerrillas had appeared in the immediate area besides the guides that led the flying column to Santo Tomas through the urban street maze. The *1st Cavalry Division in World War II* history erroneously states that E Troop conducted the escort duty.

Early **morning 5 February**, Colonel Brady and the internee-translator, Ernest Stanley, met the Japanese commander and group outside the Education Building. Lieutenant Barrow and a G Troop armed escort formed on each side of the Japanese group and marched south out of the Santo Tomas grounds. Even as they departed, disagreement existed between the Colonel Brady and the Japanese commander on where the release point would occur.

As Brady conveyed a point of release, the Japanese commander disagreed and wanted a point farther into the Manila neighborhood. Some distance to the south of Santo Tomas, “At a given point, G Troop stopped. Colonel Brady stopped and Stanley stopped” and the Japanese commander marched onward. The Japanese soldiers [later identified as Formosan conscript soldiers] were nearing panic and were kept in formation with the flat of a Japanese officer’s saber. The negotiated agreement was accomplished without any further incident as the enemy group disappeared into the urban landscape of buildings.¹⁶⁶

The G Troop escort led by Lieutenant Barrow, Colonel Brady, and Ernest Stanley returned to Santo Tomas without incident. There was no interruption of this escort of Japanese soldiers by Filipino guerrillas, resistance members, or the local population.



Figure 29. Preventive Maintenance, Sleep, and Preparation for Combat

Note. The immediate euphoria was a unique experience for civilian and soldier throughout the Santo Tomas grounds. Nonetheless, members of the flying column worked to recover from the previous days of nonstop operations and periodic combat while temporarily gaining much-needed recuperation. Besides enjoying relief and liberation of the U.S. and Allied internees, troopers and soldiers at Santo Tomas maintained their weapons and equipment and slept exhausted when and where they could—at times, next to their vehicle. Preparation for combat was ever-present knowing additional missions were soon to come. 1st Cavalry Division missions for 2/8th Cavalry included other areas in Manila and expanded combat operations to the east and southeast coast of Luzon in the coming weeks and months of war.

During **5 and 6 February**, 2/8th Cavalry was consolidating its units at Malacañan Palace and conducting combat and security patrols in the immediate area near the Pasig River. U.S. artillery units arrived in Santo Tomas to support ongoing ground combat in Manila. Japanese artillery landed irregularly into Santo Tomas and the palace area wounding or killing several former internees and soldiers.¹⁶⁷

During a **7 February** front line visit of the ongoing battle for Manila, General MacArthur visited Santo Tomas, Malacañan Palace, and several other sites. Other leaders accompanied MacArthur such as XIV Corps commander Major General Griswold, 1st Cavalry Division commander Major General Mudge, and Brigadier General Chase as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division’s “Flying Column.”

Senior Allied military leaders also visited the former internees at Santo Tomas. 1st Cavalry Division continued to provide support to the internees at Santo Tomas until 7 February when XIV Corps assigned responsibility for this area to the 37th Division in Manila.¹⁶⁸



Figure 30. Internees Celebrate Liberation at Santo Tomas

Note. Former internees are thrilled as soldiers and civilians celebrate the liberation of Santo Tomas which for some former internees was several years of captivity. Note Australian flag held (R) by a former internee. Children talk with tankers atop a Sherman tank (L). Civilians enjoy their freedom.

Epilogue

After securing Santo Tomas and Malacañan Palace, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry continued combat operations in the eastern-southeastern Manila areas. Subsequent combat missions during February to late June oriented farther east to the vicinity of Pasig, Taytay, Antipolo, and eventually into the Santa Maria Valley. 8th Cavalry combat operations continued on Luzon in the Batangas and Tayabas regions. Captain Landry recalled “we were continually in action from the time we left” the Guimba assembly area, and “went right on and fought for another six months.”¹⁶⁹




Figure 31. Walter Landry and Fellow 8th Cavalry Officer Santa Maria Valley, Luzon

Note. The photograph of Walter Landry (L) and a fellow officer (R) is pen-marked by Landry as “Luzon P.I. May 1945” with “Me” and “Steve.” The officer identified as “Steve” may be Steve Gerhart, 2/8th Cavalry executive officer during Santo Tomas. By May 1945, 8th Cavalry was operating in the Santa Maria River Valley in the 2d Cavalry Brigade advance to Infanta on Lamon Bay. Troopers (R) are H Troop, 2/8th Cavalry near the Sawmill battle site on the 7th Cavalry and 8th Cavalry Regiment approaches to Infanta.

During the approaches to Antipolo in February, Landry was wounded by fragmentation from indirect artillery. His second wound was a gunshot in the leg. After medical evacuation and treatment, he returned for duty with 2/8th Cavalry. Captain Landry was assigned as 2d Squadron executive officer in early June.¹⁷⁰

By the end of June, 1st Cavalry Division units were concentrating in vicinity of Lucena for a period of rest, rehabilitation, and replacement operations. Patrolling continued until the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire. In recognition of his outstanding leadership, Landry, as a captain, was selected to command 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry in July 1945.¹⁷¹ Major Gerhart was no longer in 2d Squadron and Lieutenant Colonel Connor had been reassigned to a planning staff for the invasion of Japan.



Figure 32. An Infantryman's War: Patrol, Maintain Contact, and Defeat the Enemy

Note. A troop commander (L) in 8th Cavalry provides a tactical situation update. Patrolling was continuous to maintain or make contact and defeat or destroy Japanese defenses and remnant groups of Japanese soldiers. Local guerrillas often supported 1st Cavalry Division operations. Even after the official end of the Luzon campaign on 30 June 1945, 1st Cavalry Division combat patrols continued in the Lucena region.

Among the 8th Cavalry Regiment troopers and leaders recognized for valor in the 1st Cavalry Division "Flying Column" mission, Landry was awarded the Silver Star for valor during his G Troop commandership in the mission to liberate U.S. and Allied internees, and a group of U.S. Army nurses. His Silver Star award citation spotlights the hectic days of early February during the 100-mile penetration to Santo Tomas.¹⁷²

Captain Walter J. Landry, Cavalry, United States Army, for gallantry in action at Luzon Island, Philippine Islands, from 31 January 1945 to 3 February 1945. When the "Flying Column" left for the dash to Manila on 31 January 1945, Captain Landry was in command of the lead troop of the task force. Although the route lay in enemy held territory, he led the column with the utmost skill and efficiency. Three times he led his troop against the enemy attempting to halt the column's progress and smashed determined attempts at Santa Maria, the Angat River crossing, and at Muzon. His personal courage, initiative, and active leadership prevented the enemy from restraining the squadron at these points and resulted in the successful entry into Manila to the complete surprise of the Japanese garrison there. At Santo Tomas Internment Camp, the task force's main objective, Captain Landry acting as [Squadron] Executive Officer, constantly exposed to accurate enemy sniper and machinegun fire, performed outstanding service in reducing the confusion incidental to the release of internees. Captain Landry's dashing and skillful leadership throughout the difficult drive on Manila, his forcefulness and initiative in overcoming the obstacles encountered, and his absolute calm in the face of unparalleled confusion, were determining factors in the essential attainment of the "Flying Column's" mission.

In addition to the Silver Star Medal recognizing his valor and leadership actions during the “Flying Column,” he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with “V” device for valor with one Oak Leaf Cluster on his Bronze Star to acknowledge a second medal award. Landry was wounded twice in combat and awarded the Purple Heart with One Leaf Cluster.¹⁷³

Captain Landry, commanding 2/8th Cavalry, departed Luzon with the 1st Cavalry Division on 25 August 1945 for the occupation landing in Japan. Arriving in Yokohama on 2 September 1945, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Tokyo on 8 September as the first U.S. Army division to enter the Japanese capital. Landry was promoted to major in December 1945 during occupation duty in Japan in an order published by MacArthur’s General Headquarters for the Allied powers.¹⁷⁴

Walter J. Landry Jr. retired from military service as a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel. He enlisted in the U.S. Army as a cavalryman and was commissioned a Cavalry Second Lieutenant in 1941. He served as a machinegun platoon leader in the 1st Cavalry Division, deployed to the World War II Pacific Theater as a cavalry-infantryman, commanded G Troop in combat, and was acting squadron executive officer of 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Regiment during a period of the “Flying Column” mission to liberate the Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure the Malacañan Palace. Landry excelled in duties as rifle troop commander, squadron executive officer, and rifle squadron commander of 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry.

After World War II and duty in Japan, Landry served in Germany in the U.S. Army Constabulary; commanded 509th Tank Battalion at Fort Knox, Kentucky; performed advisor duty in the Republic of South Vietnam; and completed his military service in 1961 as an Army advisor to the 102d Armored Cavalry Regiment of the New Jersey National Guard.¹⁷⁵



Figure 33. Cavalry and Armor Branch Insignia, Combat Infantryman Badge, Silver Star

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Landry was proud of his service as a horse cavalryman, noncommissioned officer, and company and field grade commissioned officer in the 1st Cavalry Division. He participated in the wartime reorganization of the division from horse-mounted cavalry to an infantry division, fought as an infantry officer—he preferred “dismounted cavalry officer”—earned the Combat Infantryman Badge,

and retired as an Armor officer.¹⁷⁶ He enjoyed a successful civilian career, citizenship in his local community, and family life. Lieutenant Colonel Landry died peacefully in 2013. Gone but never forgotten.

Postscript

This account of World War II *leadership in combat* emerged from an exceptional personal story centered on Captain Walter J. Landry Jr. as G Troop commander, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry. As vanguard of the division's "Flying Column" to penetrate 100 miles into enemy defenses, the 1st Cavalry Division liberated the Santo Tomas Internment Camp in Manila on 3 February 1945.

During a simple conversation between two friends, Bob Landry mentioned to Jon Moilanen that his father served at Fort Bliss in the 1st Cavalry Division in the pre-World War II era, its reorganization in 1943 from horse-mounted cavalry to an infantry division, and combat missions throughout the division's Pacific campaigns. Walter Landry's leadership in the "Flying Column" to Manila captured our attention. We recognized the value of studying Walter Landry's account of this World War II combat mission and conducting a battle analysis for examination of Landry's command decisions, actions, and leadership. Putting aside our reminiscences as armored cavalry officers at Fort Bliss in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment during the 1980s and our subsequent duties as tactics instructors at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, we decided to center a narrative on decisive action in combat.

The first demand in war is decisive action. Commanders inspire confidence in their subordinates by their decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage over the enemy....Leading troops in combat, regardless of the echelon of command, calls for cool and thoughtful leaders with a strong feeling of the great responsibility imposed upon them.

U.S. War Department. Field Service Regulations. FM 100-5. *Operations*. (15 June 1944)

Researching contemporary context of the Luzon campaign included the U.S. Army's Center of Military History, *Triumph in the Philippines*, and official documents such as the after-action reports of U.S. Sixth Army, XIV Corps, 1st Cavalry Division, 37th Infantry Division, and the *1st Cavalry Division in World War II* history (1947). Each account provides a particular perspective of command decisions, tactics, and combat operations. An invaluable first-person account is the audio-video recording (2005) of Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army Retired) Walter J. Landry Jr. as G Troop commander and squadron executive officer of 2/8th Cavalry. Thomas Barrow, one of Landry's G Troop lieutenants and acting G Troop commander at Santo Tomas, presents his Flying Column experiences in an Armor Advanced Officers Class monograph (1948).



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Battle Analysis Observations and Lessons Learned

How Do We Learn?

Battle analysis methodology guides a study of important aspects during a historical engagement, battle, or campaign. Current U.S. Army use identifies key observations or lessons learned that can be applied in contemporary and future military operations. Basic structure of battle analysis is:

- Define a topic and evaluate sources for accurate records and presentation of information.
- Review context of situational conditions and interpersonal-intraorganizational aspects.
- Describe critical actions in the tactical and operational surroundings.
- Assess the significance of leader decisions and actions affecting mission outcome.

Various aspects of tactical analysis can include U.S. Army macro-tenets of operations such as agility, convergence, endurance, and depth. Army principles of war and doctrinal imperatives complement any battle analysis study of a particular action.¹⁷⁷ Depending on the level of detail desired, critique can study what tactics or techniques were applied to a particular action or how effectively procedures were followed. Analysis of leadership and military decisionmaking are fundamental to any study of combat.

Who-What-Where-When...and Why?

Battle analysis, premised with accurate combat information and personal expertise, interprets and informs how decisions and actions occurred. The “who, what, where, when” lead to understanding the “why” of a particular result. Whether actions are successful or not in accomplishing a mission, interrelating the elements of these “Five W’s” with candid discussion and analysis can provide insight, with an optimum aim of wisdom in professional intellect and improved military performance of tactics and techniques.¹⁷⁸

Selective areas of examination can reflect on: (1) examples of command leadership in tactical combat; (2) tactics employed during the mission; (3) and in this mission, leader competencies and attributes exhibited by Captain Walter Landry of G Troop, 2/8th Cavalry and other leaders in combat command.

Topics and themes for battle analysis and professional discussion include but are not limited to as follows:

- Tailored organization for combat of the 1st Cavalry Division “Flying Column.”
- Joint Air-Ground Mission Support.
- Art of Command in Combat.
- Leadership Competencies and Attributes.
- Role of the Noncommissioned Officer
- Army Doctrine of World War II and Current U.S. Army Operations.
- Tactics and Techniques.
- Training Readiness Continuum.
- Mobility-Firepower-Shock Effect of Combined Arms.
- Unit Operational Readiness and Limitations prior to Mission Execution.
- Unit Health-Welfare and Morale of Leaders and Troopers in Combat.
- Special Mission Tasks.

Leadership and Command in Combat

U.S. Army doctrine, in the World War II era, presented a clear description of leadership and command.¹⁷⁹

Leading troops in combat, regardless of the echelon of command, calls for cool and thoughtful leaders with a strong feeling of the great responsibility imposed upon them. They must be resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, energetic and insistent in execution, and unperturbed by the fluctuations of combat.¹⁸⁰

U.S. Army Field Regulation 100-5, *Operations*. (1941)

Current Army doctrine describes an “ideal Army leader serves as a role model through strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, and moral character. An Army leader is able and willing to act decisively, within superior leaders’ intent and purpose, and in the organization’s best interests.”¹⁸¹

Captain Landry learned and demonstrated keen direct leadership as he progressed from enlistment as a cavalry trooper, to noncommissioned officer and commission as a cavalry lieutenant in December 1941. Horse-mounted machinegun platoon leadership prepared Landry for his command in combat, initially as a lieutenant. He continued to command G Troop as a captain throughout its Pacific campaigns.

Given demonstrated direct leadership excellence, Landry was assigned as executive officer of 2d Squadron in June.¹⁸² In July 1945, as a captain, Landry was placed in command of 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry. His leading by personal example displayed professional character and personal intellect in actions focused on accomplishing the unit mission and intent while considering welfare of his troopers.¹⁸³ He also understood the overarching purpose of the mission that focused his actions to assess risk, be decisive, and lead effectively during the continually evolving tactical situations of combat. He was promoted to major in December 1945.

Landry demonstrated these leadership ideals in his era of World War II combat and acted within his squadron and regimental commander’s guidance and intent. He knew that 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry was the vanguard of the entire 1st Cavalry Division’s flying column. As the mission progressed, Landry found himself as the “tip of the spear” in the flying column to Santo Tomas.

Communicating mission purpose and the “why” of expected results to his lieutenants and senior sergeants, Landry promoted a unity of effort, even when wounds or death caused gaps in his troop. Sergeants in G Troop ascended to take command in crises of combat or lead other mission tasks with a clear purpose and intent.¹⁸⁴

Tactical and Operational Context

The operational setting of the Luzon campaign in January 1945 framed a no-notice tactical mission assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division. Units were still arriving from the Lingayen bridgehead to its division assembly area when ordered to conduct a 100-mile penetration to liberate thousands of internees in Manila at the Santo Tomas Internment Camp and secure the Philippine Presidential Palace.

This narrative describes several fundamental issues for battle analysis such as terrain and weather, enemy forces, sensitivity of time and speed to accomplish the mission, and the recurring critical task of securing bridges over unfordable rivers to maintain momentum of the deep penetration. The penetration 100 miles into enemy-held terrain by task-organized ground forces was unprecedented in Pacific campaigns.

The enemy situation was expected to be a stout defense at points throughout the narrow axis of advance and into Manila. Mission execution commenced within hours of the commanding general’s oral order.

Capabilities of the Japanese were a substantial robust threat. Intelligence estimates expected major counterattacks. Deliberate defenses were confronted as U.S. forces progressed down the Central Plain.

Previous battles indicated a willingness of the Japanese to fight to the death with surrender not an option. Recent atrocities by Japanese leaders and soldiers mass murdering prisoners of war intensified the urgency to liberate prisoners of war and civilian internees in the combat area of operations.

The change in U.S. task organization of a unique dismounted cavalry infantry division into a mission of motorized and mechanized “flying columns” was an exceptional improvisation. The 1st Cavalry Division was an experienced combat unit with leaders who had operated together within the division, brigade, squadron, and troop echelons of commands. Leaders and troopers knew and trusted each other during prior training in the United States and Australia, and recent combat operations in the Southwest Pacific.

Battle Analysis

Battle analysis of this combat narrative centers on fundamentals of leadership in tactical command. Actions within 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry, and its G Troop in particular, spotlight key decisions and successful outcomes during the flying column to Santo Tomas. Learning can also occur when less than successful.

Analysis of leadership in combat can use topic areas as displayed in Figure 34. However, this list is only a guide to appreciate a focus on mission and commander’s intent and the meaning of “objective” as a prime principle of war.

The art of command has numerous aspects to consider. Leadership considerations in the tenets of analysis display essential elements of professional knowledge, skill competencies, and model prudent understanding to intuit and guide decisionmaking and decisive action. Tactical experience and professional expertise in conducting tactics and techniques in the 100-mile penetration realized the value of mobility, firepower, and shock effect in combat operations.

After Action Review

After action review (AAR) is a formal or informal process to improve understanding and learning as a complement to aims of battle analysis. Used in training and operational-tactical missions, techniques of review are a guided professional discussion soon after an event to enable participants to discover for themselves what happened during an action and how to sustain or improve performance to an Army standard.

An experienced individual, leader, or soldier, facilitates a discussion to guide immediate inquiry on critical decisions, actions, and outcomes during an operation. AAR fundamentals offer a way to learn from experience. Analysis provides value-added immediacy after a training event or operational-tactical mission. In conducting a focused review soon after an event, considerations to employ include:

- Focus initially on the situational context of the mission and commander’s intent.
- Incorporate first-person accounts of soldiers and leaders in mission task actions.
- Examine leader and team competencies and attributes with open-ended questions.
- Review unit operational readiness impacts at the start of the mission.
- Determine strengths and weaknesses in individual and team performance.
- Identify effective ways to improve/sustain individual-leader-unit performance standards.
- Link performance to subsequent training readiness tasks and future mission task success.




Figure 34. Tenets of Analysis: Leadership in Combat

Mission and Commander's Intent

Comparing World War II U.S. Army doctrine and current Army doctrine (2023-2024) affirms an essential continuum of mission focus and understanding how mission success supports the objective of a senior commander. Leaders effectively communicate mission and commander's intent and confirm understanding by subordinates to execute the concept of the operation, develop the tactical situation, and act decisively in uncertain conditions.¹⁸⁵

Mission Statement: A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why.¹⁸⁶

Commander's Intent: A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.¹⁸⁷

Objective

The U.S. army entered World War II with mission statement doctrine containing concise elements of "what, when, how, and where" for the force as a whole. A commander's "orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity; short sentences are easily understood. Clarity is more important than technique."¹⁸⁸ The intent of "why" is not stated specifically in a World War II era format but would be amplified in the concept of the operation and expected results of mission accomplishment.

When time was limited between mission assignment to mission execution, a commander would present an oral order, preferably face-to-face to confirm understanding of success with his subordinate commanders and leaders. The principle of objective, clearly stated by the commander with confirmed understanding by subordinates, focuses all capabilities to achieving the purpose of the mission and enhancing the impact of mission success on the higher commander's overarching operations.¹⁸⁹

ART of COMMAND and LEADERSHIP

After providing for the issuance of orders, the commander places himself where he can best control the course of action and exert his leadership....During the decisive phase of battle, the place of the commander is near the critical point of action.¹⁹⁰

Captain Landry was with his lead platoons crossing the ford of the Pampanga River south of Cabanatuan. His forward presence and on-site assessment confirmed that deep water and poor river bottom stability was unacceptably slowing the momentum of his troop. He directed his troop elements not already across the river to use the squadron's primary ford crossing while his two lead platoons continued forward to the squadron assembly area on the axis of advance.¹⁹¹

This decisive act to continue rapid movement along his route created conditions for other critical decisions and actions that enhanced the entire three-day momentum of the entire 1st Cavalry Division's "flying column" to its objectives in Manila. Landry's leadership continued during key actions on the objective at Santo Tomas and subsequent mission tasks.

Disciplined Initiative and Decisive Action

The first demand in war is decisive action. Commanders inspire confidence in their subordinates by their decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage over the enemy.¹⁹²

Captain Landry clearly understood his squadron and regimental commander's emphasis and intent. Landry knew any unit finding itself cut off or separated from the main body should remain focused on the objective and attack forward as fast as conditions would allow.

"In some situations, action may be necessary which is beyond the scope of the leader's authority or contrary to his orders...when the urgency warrants it, takes action himself and reports his actions to his superior as soon as possible."¹⁹³ Landry used initiative, experience, and intuition to decide and act.¹⁹⁴

Prudent Risk Acceptance and Sound Judgement

The commander must take calculated risks.¹⁹⁵ The unexpected is always a test of leadership. The ability to grasp the facts in a situation quickly and to initiate prompt intelligent action is invaluable.¹⁹⁶

Landry's radios were still inoperative from deep water inundation during his Pampanga ford crossing. He knew the squadron concept of the operation and emphasis on speed of movement in this offensive mission. He moved south onto Route 5 and stopped temporarily at the village of Santa Rosa and conducted a leader reconnaissance farther south of Santa Rosa along Route 5.

His training convinced him to accept situational real-time analysis, tactical intuition, and prudent risk assessment—and to act decisively in support of the squadron mission and intent. Finding no enemy during his leader reconnaissance, he continued southward as vanguard on the squadron's axis of advance and reported his situation as soon as practicable.¹⁹⁷

Competence and Confidence

Commanders inspire confidence in their subordinates by their decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage over the enemy...The morale of a unit is that of its leader.¹⁹⁸

U.S. Army doctrine in 1941 poses that "inculcated with a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in their unit, and a feeling of mutual obligation to their comrades in the group, [leaders and troopers] can dominate the demoralizing influences of battle."¹⁹⁹

Landry encountered contact on the route with Japanese guards at Gapan Bridge over the Peñaranda River. Without stopping at Gapan, his small element continued rapid movement on Route 5 south through San Miguel until he approached the village of Baliuag.

Contact with an estimated company-size Japanese unit at Baliuag convinced Landry to halt. Knowing he was now well ahead of the squadron column and with his radios still inoperative, Landry sent a mounted messenger north to locate his squadron commander and report his reconnaissance status.

His command actions exemplified prudent risk acceptance, sound judgement, and disciplined initiative with decisive action. His experience and expertise convinced Landry that rapid attack enhances success.²⁰⁰

Adaptive Mental Agility

Mental agility: A flexibility of assessing and analyzing conditions that allow a leader to anticipate and adapt effectively to uncertain or changing situations; think through second- and third-order effects; and develop, evaluate, and implement a decision to successful action.²⁰¹

Landry adapted quickly to changing conditions in the tactical situations of the penetration. Throughout the three-day mission and afterwards, he faced numerous issues without a guaranteed way to succeed. His military experience and tactical expertise provided a balanced and prudent decisionmaking process. Both attributes allowed him to respond to varied environmental cues and situational indications, determine priorities of need or response, and correctly discern an acceptable course of action. Doctrine stated, "Leading troops in combat, regardless of the echelon of command, calls for cool and thoughtful leaders

with a strong feeling of the great responsibility imposed upon them. They must be resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, energetic and insistent in execution, and unperturbed by the fluctuations of combat.”²⁰²

Command decisions embraced a series of complex mission tasks in a compressed timeframe, and leader determination countered the debilitating effects of physical and mental fatigue of continuous combat operations. Key decisions often required independent decision and action without higher command approval. Landry prioritized tasks within a hierarchy of importance to accomplish the troop and column mission. His agility and flexibility of adaptive thought were clearly demonstrated with effective actions when projected no-notice into squadron executive officer duties as his squadron commander was wounded by grenade fragments at the Santo Tomas main gate.

DOCTRINE and TRAINING

Captain Landry, grounded in cavalry and infantry doctrine and training, was confident and competent in tactics during this 100-mile penetration. His training and experiences in cavalry prepared him to organize, train, and operate mounted, dismounted, or in combined mounted and dismounted actions. As a cavalryman, he knew Army doctrine stated combat as the primary mission of cavalry.²⁰³ The 1st Cavalry Division transition from horse cavalry into infantry in 1943 retained principles of battlefield mobility, mounted or dismounted, as a key combat power multiplier.²⁰⁴

Mobility, Firepower, and Shock Effect

The value and characteristics of armor as a complement to the motorized flying column accented the mobility of the entire column, the firepower of its multiple weaponry, and the shock effect of its combined capabilities amplified by surprise and mass.²⁰⁵

When the Provisional Reconnaissance Squadron was engaged in close combat at the Gapan Bridge, mounted infantry and Sherman tank elements of G Troop attacked the Japanese position at the bridge from the north as other G Troop elements attacked from the south. In reinforcing the tankers in light tanks and reconnaissance troopers already fighting at the bridge site, the combined combat power quickly defeated resistance and cleared the route for the squadron flying column.

A series of “rolling firefights” occurred as the flying column moved through Talipapa and continued into the northern Manila suburban area. The column of tanks and wheeled vehicles returned fire when fired upon as well as firing on suspected Japanese positions. The 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry column crossed into the northeastern suburb of Grace Park and airfield receiving Japanese small arms fire and continued to receive harassing fires along the Grace Park roadways and group of Manila cemeteries. Mobility and firepower produced a shock effect on Japanese throughout the flying column axis of advance.

Landry knew cavalry was best employed in a war of movement, especially for surprise thrusts into enemy territory for reconnaissance, screening, guarding, or covering other forces. Swift and decisive action were anticipated norms.²⁰⁶ Surprise is an important feature in tactical operations optimized by properly timed and directed mobility in operations. A doctrinal tenet of the era stated, “surprise attacks delivered simultaneously against the hostile flanks and rear from two or more different directions increase greatly the chances of success.”²⁰⁷

At Landry’s G Troop tactical echelon, the assaults from two directions simultaneously on the Japanese position at Gapan quickly defeated bridge defenses. The squadron continued momentum of the flying column southward toward Manila.

The 1st Cavalry Division concept of the operation applied doctrine of “launching simultaneously two or more powerful attacks [a multiple penetration] against weak localities on the hostile front.” A complementary aspect conducted effectively was, “When the penetrating attacks have advanced far

enough to permit...the penetrating attacks are united into a single main attack.²⁰⁸ Penetrating on two avenues of approach, each with a rifle squadron task force, created flexible options for maneuver as tactical situations evolved for rapid movement to the division objectives.

TACTICS

Tactics is the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other...Techniques and procedures are established patterns or processes that can be applied repeatedly with little judgment to various circumstances. Together, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with the fundamentals to develop solutions to tactical problems.²⁰⁹

Tactical Experience: Knowledge, Skills, and Fieldcraft

The situations that confront a commander in war are of infinite variety. In spite of the most careful planning and anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are common occurrences in battle. A commander must school himself to regard these events as commonplace and not permit them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission.²¹⁰

Experience for Landry was grounded in cavalry doctrine, training, and missions. He easily applied his tactical knowledge, skills, and experience as he transitioned to an infantryman. Numerous tactics and techniques were employed effectively during conduct and achievement of his Santo Tomas mission.

Within a three-day period, Landry and his troop conducted multiple mission tasks: reconnaissance and security patrols, dismounted and mounted assaults, supporting fire to attacks, a demonstration of attack by fire to deceive a defending Japanese force, combined combat action with tanks and motorized infantry, mounted “rolling firefights” in rural and urban areas, and fighting through a meeting engagement kill zone.

Actions to seize and secure the objective of Santo Tomas Internment Camp included establishing a defensive perimeter of the Santo Tomas grounds. Concurrently, flying column forces contained a Japanese force holding internee hostages within the objective area. Once hostage release negotiations agreed on a means of Japanese movement to their own defensive lines, G Troop provided a dismounted armed security escort for the Japanese contingent to a release point in Manila. The route transited urban streets still in general control of Japanese defenders. The possibility of entering an ad hoc or deliberate Japanese engagement area was ever-present.

With Santo Tomas secure, the flying column provided what care and comfort they could to the newly liberated Allied and U.S. internees. Once released from the Santo Tomas mission, combat operations continued through areas of Manila and to the east coast of Luzon. Examples of mission tasks are as follows:

Raid

Raid: An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal.²¹¹

Sixth Army units and local guerillas achieved the Pangatian raid mission and withdrawal with situational intelligence, coordinated planning by U.S. Army soldiers, Army Air Force airmen, and Filipino guerrillas. Effective tactics applied elements of surprise. Surprise is produced through measures which either deny information to the enemy, or positively deceive him, as to dispositions, movements, and plans...Surprise can use fire or movement in variations of means and methods, accented in combat by rapid execution. Surprise finds the enemy in a state of mental, moral, or physical unpreparedness. Every effort should be made to deny him time to take effective countermeasures.²¹²

Penetration

In a penetration the main attack passes through some portion of the area occupied by the enemy's main forces and is directed on an objective in his rear.²¹³

Liberating internees at Santo Tomas and securing the Malacañan Palace were objectives of the flying column penetration. Momentum, aided by surprise through Japanese defenses, was essential to timely mission accomplishment. Penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.²¹⁴

Landry used mobility and surprise to tactical advantage as he passed through Gapan the first time, and applied similar actions when he attacked Japanese elements at Gapan from the south that were blocking follow-on flying column elements at the Peñaranda River bridge. Subsequent firefights along Route 64 and 52 demonstrated the value of mobility, firepower, and the shock effect on the enemy.

Reconnaissance

Constant reconnaissance is conducted to permit the commander to make appropriate dispositions for security, movement, and combat.²¹⁵

Landry's leader reconnaissance south of Santa Rosa convinced him to continue south along Route 5 with his advance troop element. His decision to continue forward set conditions for the 1 February deep penetration of approximately 50 miles as the flying column vanguard and division's flying columns subsequent advance to the Manila objectives.

Screen

Screen: A type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force.²¹⁶

After G Troop consolidated as a unit after the firefight at Gapan, Landry was directed to screen forward of the 2d Squadron column to Baliuag and secure a squadron assembly area for nighttime refueling and actions to continue the penetration. The squadron commander chose Landry to lead as he and his troop had already traveled the avenue of approach, appreciated the local terrain, and recognized areas suitable for possible Japanese defensive action.

Attack by Fire

Attack by Fire : A tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy force without closing with the enemy to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive that enemy.²¹⁷ Demonstration: In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary.²¹⁸

The morning of 3 February, G Troop was vanguard troop moving toward Plaridel on the Angat River when Japanese fire erupted from across the river. Landry conducted an effective demonstration attack by fire from the north riverbank at Plaridel while the 2d Squadron forded the Angat River farther north.

Dismounted Assault

Attack: A type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.²¹⁹

Recurring dismounted attacks from Santa Maria and through the "Hot Corner" were required to clear the route of advance for the 2d Squadron. The deliberate assault to seize Santa Maria, based on patrol

intelligence, massed firepower of all available weaponry to support the dismounted assault, secure the route, and immediately push mounted reconnaissance forward to the Santa Maria River bridge site.

Assault and Support by Fire

Support by Fire: A tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force.²²⁰

The squadron attack on Santa Maria was a coordinated action of dismounted infiltration and assault with massed supporting fires of tanks and weaponry of the rifle troops and weapons troop. The squadron dawn assault on Santa Maria quickly routed Japanese defenders. Dismounted assaults later at Muzon, the “Hot Corner,” and the Tuliahan Bridge briefly slowed the flying column advance but the column regained momentum with combined arms combat power. Brief halts in combat transitioned rapidly after clearing the route to the Tuliahan River bridge and continuing rapidly to the outskirts of Manila.

Meeting Engagement

Meeting Engagement: A combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place.²²¹

The meeting engagement of G Troop near Santo Tomas at the Far Eastern University resulted in significant leader and trooper casualties when much of the troop was fixed in the kill zone of the Japanese strongpoint. Fortunately, Landry was able to lead elements of G Troop through the kill zone and avoid the gauntlet of strongpoint fires to rejoin the squadron column at Santo Tomas. Disengaging trail elements of G Troop from the Far Eastern University kill zone required several hours of close combat and reinforcements from the follow-on flying column.

Speed and surprise were principal advantages throughout the flying column’s movements. However, when G Troop missed turning at an intersection in a confusing street matrix, the troop entered a deadly ambush and firefight from a fortified Japanese defensive position at the Far Eastern University strongpoint.

Perimeter Defense

Defense Design: A strategy for defense based on a compiled list of defensive tasks required [to create a cohesive plan] to defend against a specific threat or support specific mission operations.²²²

The task to seize Santo Tomas occurred with minimal exchange of weapon fires with a brief exception of initial fires at the Education Building. Securing and clearing the internment camp was another challenge. The large complex contained numerous buildings, internee shanties, fenced areas, and varied degrees of vegetation that limited visibility, especially during the night hours of occupying the internment camp. Establishing a defensive perimeter was further complicated by the limited number of infantrymen initially in the 2/8th Cavalry column. The expanding number of well-meaning internees created a control issue as they emerged from buildings to greet the troopers as they fanned out to secure the property perimeter.

Landry, as acting 2/8th Cavalry executive officer, directed multiple actions in darkness to establish an adequate defensive perimeter, tailor how column units were distributed in positions within the internment camp, and prepare to receive the follow-on flying column of General Chase and the 2/5th Cavalry task force. During the late evening hours of 3 February and wee hours of 4 February, the remainder of G Troop arrived at Santo Tomas from the Far Eastern University firefight and was integrated into the defense.

Special Mission Tasks

Internee Care and Comfort

The flying column provided liberated internees what care and comfort readily available when it arrived at Santo Tomas. With the destroyed bridge at Novaliches preventing any 1st Cavalry Division linkup and reinforcements for about 48 hours, materiel support was limited to field K-rations and minimal medical support the column had as they arrived to augment the internee medical doctors and Army nurses.

Landry coordinated support actions with the acting 2d Squadron commander, Major Steve Gerhart. The other flying column conducted similar support actions when it arrived at Santo Tomas with General Chase. Internee excitement of liberation quickly expanded to friendly discussions and a degree of psychological relief among column members and internee men, women, and children. Troopers later enjoyed the ability to allow children to crawl on vehicles and equipment and answer questions from children and adults about what had occurred during the past years of internment.

Contain Enemy in Hostage Situation

While most of the internees were now free to walk within the camp, negotiations with the Japanese commander continued throughout 4 February and into the early hours of 5 February. Troopers continued to contain the Japanese inside the Education Building in an uneasy negotiation. Meanwhile, the enemy situation outside the Santo Tomas perimeter wall remained uncertain. The recent knowledge that U.S. prisoners of war had been massacred on Palawan underpinned a tense situation. Flying column leaders and troopers learned later of the ongoing massacre of Filipino civilians in Manila by the Japanese defenders. Japanese forces started neighborhood fires and gunfire increased near Santo Tomas.

Enemy Group Security Escort

General Chase's representative confirmed a commitment, approved by General Chase, of internee release in return for a security escort of the Japanese camp commander and his soldiers to Japanese defensive lines. G Troop provided the armed security cordon that escorted the Japanese group from the Education Building to their defensive lines in the Manila suburb. Lieutenant Barrow, as acting G Troop commander, accomplished this escort mission task and the escort returned to Santo Tomas with no incidents. Soon after, G troop would be patrolling, making contact with the enemy, and clearing areas in Manila suburbs.

Professional Expertise

The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle. The ability to select objectives whose attainment contributes most decisively and quickly to the defeat of the hostile armed forces is one attribute of the able commander. Simple and direct plans and methods with prompt and thorough execution are often decisive in the attainment of success...Through offensive action a commander exercises his initiative, preserves his freedom of action, and imposes his will on the enemy.²²³

Experience and Decisionmaking

For Captain Landry, lessons learned and expertise evolved as a continuum from a pre-war USA environment anticipating entry to a world war, declaration of war, and participation in Southwest Pacific campaigns. Starting with training and drills as a cavalryman, to large pre-war maneuvers and small unit patrols along the Texas border, expectation that war was looming in the immediate U.S. future quickly became reality on December 7, 1941. As a newly commissioned officer in wartime preparations and readiness actions, reorganization of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1943 from horse cavalry to infantry, he deployed with the division to Australia and more training in the Southwest Pacific theater of operations.

During the 1st Cavalry Division's first combat in the Admiralties, Landry experienced jungle warfare and its challenges in the "foot-by-foot" progression of combat with the enemy. The next division operations on Leyte and Samar in late 1944 included dismounted patrols and assaults in jungle and mountainous terrain, and at times combined armor and infantry operations. Landry, 25 years of age, had learned much in his previous cavalry years in the Army and was a seasoned infantry officer combat veteran.

As Captain Landry came ashore in Lingayen Gulf in January 1945, he was about to apply his hard-earned platoon leader and rifle troop commander knowledge, skills, and expertise. His practical experiences of tactics and fieldcraft were learning episodes in combat. "Good morale and a sense of unity in a command cannot be improvised; they must be thoroughly planned and systematically promoted. They are born of just and fair treatment, a constant concern for the soldier's welfare, thorough training in basic duties, comradeship among men and pride in self, organization, and country."²²⁴

Landry would confront uncertain situational conditions, face a committed and capable enemy, and lead his troop to accomplish missions. He learned command authority and responsibility in the crucible of combat. He saw and felt the emotional and physical effects of and on his troopers, subordinate leaders, and himself from wounds, psychological trauma, fatigue, and deaths.²²⁵ The G Troop meeting engagement at the Far Eastern University in Manila was particularly traumatic.

Resilience, Empathy, and Morale.

In the training of the individual soldier, the essential considerations are to integrate individuals into a group and to establish for that group a high standard of military conduct and performance of duty without destroying the initiative of the individual....Troops are strongly influenced by the example and conduct of their leaders...a bold and determined leader will carry his troops with him no matter how difficult the enterprise. Mutual confidence between the leader and his men is the surest basis of discipline.²²⁶

Command can be a "lonely place" on the battlefield but is often necessary as a commander executes his responsibilities of achieving assigned missions while considering the welfare and readiness of his subordinate leaders and troopers. A commander's prime responsibility is to accomplish the mission assigned him by his senior commander. A companion responsibility is the care and welfare of his troopers recognizing that combat places every unit member at risk in order to achieve a mission.

Landry ensured his wounded were provided medical attention and those killed in action were recovered from the site of the Far Eastern University firefight. He reflected on his wounded and killed in action at that time and reflected years later: "We made it a point to recover our own dead...they were all brought to Santo Tomas." As he identified his troopers killed in action, he recalled, "It's difficult to look on the face of any of your men who have been killed. It was a powerful experience for me...I had been with these men in every fight they had been in."²²⁷

Captain Landry learned that unit success in combat is a composite of actions by individuals and small unit leaders and teams committed to a common purpose and outcome. Training, discipline, camaraderie in peace and war, and group morale to succeed reinforced leadership success in combat.

Leadership in Combat

The infantry fights by combining firepower, movement and maneuver, and shock action. Combining fires and maneuver, the infantry closes with an enemy, defeats an enemy's combat power, and achieves unit missions. Effective movement place infantry in a position of advantage against an enemy to optimize effects of fires and

maneuver, and when required, to suppress, assault, and destroy an enemy. Shock action disrupts an enemy's ability to prevent its destruction in close combat.

Combined arms amplifies the collective close combat power of infantry, howitzer and mortar artillery, armor, and aviation. "No one arm wins battles. The combined action of all arms and services is essential to success" was obvious in this World War II account and continues true in the current era of military operations.²²⁸

This narrative focused on G Troop of 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry during the 100-mile "Flying Column" of the 1st Cavalry Division to Santo Tomas and Malacañan Palace in Manila in February 1945. Recollections of G Troop commander Captain Walter J. Landry are central to this account of tactical command leadership. His Lieutenant Thomas Barrow, placed in temporary command of G Troop when Landry was elevated to acting squadron executive officer during the Santo Tomas mission, demonstrated similar exemplars of professional excellence and leader decisionmaking during critical actions in combat.

The actions of Landry and Barrow, at one point in battle the only remaining commissioned officers in G Troop during the Santo Tomas mission, exemplified the highest standards of leadership and command. Their actions displayed "cool and thoughtful leaders with a strong feeling of the great responsibility imposed upon them." Their examples of leadership in combat were critical to "inspire confidence in their subordinates by their decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage over the enemy. The first demand in war is decisive action."²²⁹



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Endnotes

For Purposes of Military History Information and Education

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- ¹ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 131). Note. Wright was the 1st Cavalry Division Historian in 1947 and credits book information details in time, location, and actions from many leaders including Lieutenant Colonel Connor (2/8th Cavalry), Lieutenant Colonel Lobit (2/5th Cavalry), and Major General Chase among many other leaders in the 1st Cavalry Division. Chase was a brigadier general in the “flying column” mission.
- ² R. L. Landry. (personal communication to Moilanen, J. H. (17 May 2024). S.O. #19. Headquarters, 8th Cavalry, 20 February 1944.
- ³ Wright. *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. (pp. 15, 24, 26, 28, 30-33, 35-36).
- ⁴ R. L. Landry. (personal communication to Moilanen, J. H. (17 May 2024). S.O. #107. Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFEF).
- ⁵ U.S. Army Center of Military History. (1990) *The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division (29 February-18 May 1944)*. (CMH 100-3.) Washington, D. C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [First printed by the Historical Division, War Department, for the American Forces in Action Series. 1946.] (pp. 1, 3, 76-77, 81-82, 84, 98-99, 115, 142-143, and 148). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/www/admiralties/admiralties-fm.htm>
- ⁶ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 71, 75, 78-81, 89-90, 96-97, 99-100.)
- ⁷ Anderson, C. (2019). *Leyte: 17 October 1944-1 July 1945*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 14 and 18). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-27/index.html> See, Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 78, 79, and 99). See, *1st Cavalry Division Historical Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Leyte-Samar 26 September 1944 to 16 January 1945* (6 March 1945) states that 8th Cavalry Regiment was still patrolling on Samar as of 3 January 1945. (p.7).
- ⁸ 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. (p. 13). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division.
- ⁹ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 27). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ¹⁰ U.S. Sixth Army. *Report of the Luzon Campaign*. (p. 1).
- ¹¹ U.S. Sixth Army. *Report of the Luzon Campaign*. (p. 6).
- ¹² Andrade, Dale. (1996). *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. (CMH Pub 72-28). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 4). Retrieved from [Luzon | U.S. Army Center of Military History](https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html)
- ¹³ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 88 and 90). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹⁴ Holzimmer, K. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (pp. 209-210).
- ¹⁵ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 27). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ¹⁶ Holzimmer, K. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (pp. 220-221).
- ¹⁷ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 27). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ¹⁸ Andrade, Dale. (1996). *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. (CMH Pub 72-28). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 7-11). Retrieved from [Luzon | U.S. Army Center of Military History](https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html). Note. Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, Commanding General, U.S. Sixth Army. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA).
- ¹⁹ Andrade. *Luzon*. (pp. 7-8).
- ²⁰ Holzimmer, K. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (p. 213).
- ²¹ MacArthur, D. (1964). *Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. (p.242). See, Holzimmer, K. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (pp. 220-221).
- ²² Holzimmer, K. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (p.217). Note. Krueger assessed the ability and pace of the advance on Manila that depended on “reconstruction of many destroyed bridges, some very large ones, rehabilitation of the roads and the Manila-Dagupan Railroad. Shortages of vital bridge material, lack of locomotive[s], and limited rolling stock complicated matters.”

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- ²³ Holzimmer. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (p.221). See, *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific. Volume I*. Chapter IX. The Mindora and Luzon Operations. (pp. 267-275). [Facsimile Reprint, 1994. (CMH Pub 13-3.)] See, map illustration of Sixth Army and Eighth Army landings and command and control timelines on Luzon and the advances to Manila. Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ch09.htm>
- ²⁴ Andrade, Dale. (1996). *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. (CMH Pub 72-28). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 7-11). Retrieved from [Luzon | U.S. Army Center of Military History](https://www.history.army.mil/luzon/).
- ²⁵ National World War II Museum. (20 July 2022). "Dispose of Them": Massacre of American POWs in the Philippines. New Orleans, LA: The National World War II Museum. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/dispose-them-massacre-american-pows-philippines> See, National World War II Museum. (25 July 2022). *Call for Action and Liberation in the Philippines*. New Orleans, LA: The National World War II Museum. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/call-action-and-liberation-philippines>
- ²⁶ National World War II Museum. (22 July 2022). *Survival, Resistance, and Escape on Palawan*. New Orleans, LA.: The National World War II Museum. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/survival-resistance-and-escape-palawan>
- ²⁷ National World War II Museum. (25 July 2022). *Call for Action and Liberation*. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/call-action-and-liberation-philippines>
- ²⁸ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 31). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ²⁹ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign*. (pp. 26 and 148).
- ³⁰ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 240).
- ³¹ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 148). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ³² Hammond, J. *U.S. Divisions of World War II*. Retrieved from <https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/u-s-divisions-of-world-war-ii/> Note. This article details evolution of U.S. Army division structure-organization of World War II.
- ³³ 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Organization for Combat per Field Order 23, dated 31 January 1945. (pp. 15-16). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. The task organization displays division headquarters, two brigade combat teams, one division reconnaissance squadron (provisional), division artillery, other division assigned units, and attached units. Note. Available onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-11809.
- ³⁴ Stubbs, M. & Connor, S. (1969). *Armor-Cavalry. Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History. (p.72). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/Lineage/arcav/arcav.htm>
- ³⁵ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 240). Note. 1st Cavalry Division retained an organization of two brigade headquarters with two cavalry regiment headquarters per brigade in World War II.
- ³⁶ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 26). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ³⁷ Andrade, Dale. (1996). *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. (CMH Pub 72-28). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. In (p. 11). Retrieved from [Luzon | U.S. Army Center of Military History](https://www.history.army.mil/luzon/) Note 1. In General Chase's autobiography, *Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase*. Houston: Pacesetter Press-Gulf Publishing. (p. 80), Chase recalled MacArthur's meeting with Mudge on 30 January. Chase states, "As I stood there he [MacArthur] told General Mudge, our commander, 'Go to Manila! Go around the Nips, bounce off the Nips, but go to Manila! Free the internees at Santo Tomas! Take Malacan Palace! Take the Legislative Building!'" Note 2. The authors research for this monograph found no evidence that G Troop, 2/8 Cavalry was ever assigned a mission task to reach the Legislative Building in the penetration to Manila and liberation of Santo Tomas.
- ³⁸ 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. (p. 1). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. Note. Available for review onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-11809.
- ³⁹ 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. (10 July 1945). *Historical Report First Cavalry Division Artillery Luzon Campaign 1945*. (p. 9). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. Note. Available for review onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-13297.
- ⁴⁰ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 148). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ⁴¹ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 215). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>

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- ⁴² 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. (p. 9). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. Note. Available for review onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-11809.
- ⁴³ *The Philippines: Back to Where It Began*. Retrieved 5 July 2023 from [The Philippines: Back to Where It Began - The Infantry's Armor: The U.S. Army's Separate Tank Battalions in World War II \(erenow.net\)](#) Note. This report provides insights to the tactical challenges facing the separate battalion headquarters and its tank companies in the Pacific campaigns. The manner of detaching tank companies from tank battalions to divisions often left the battalion headquarters with minimal combat power to influence a mission. In the 1st Cavalry Division "flying column" in the 44th Battalion (-) serial, the battalion headquarters retained only its Company D as a light tank (Stuart) company with its Company A and B (Sherman) each detached to a squadron task force and Company C (Sherman) already detached to a different division.
- ⁴⁴ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 215). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁴⁵ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 5). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁴⁶ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. APO 453: Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. (p. 80). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>
- ⁴⁷ Holzimmer, K. (2007). *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. (p. 220).
- ⁴⁸ Holland, R. (2011). *100 Miles to Freedom: The Epic Story of the Rescue of Santo Tomas and the Liberation of Manila: 1943-1945*. New York: Turner Publishing. (pp. 40-44). Note. This book is a personal account as a member in the USMC Air Liaison Party (ALP) in support of the 1st Cavalry Division flying column.
- ⁴⁹ Garand, G. & Strowbridge T. *History of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II: Western Pacific Operations*. Chapter 3. The Luzon Operation. Quantico, VA: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. (pp. 339, 342-347). Retrieved from <https://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/IV/USMC-IV-IV-3.html>
- ⁵⁰ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 1-02.2. (28 February 2024). *Military Symbols*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40326-FM_1-02.2-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ⁵¹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (pp. 4-5). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁵² 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. *Historical Report First Cavalry Division Artillery Luzon Campaign 1945*. (pp. 9-10). 1st Cavalry Division: Location Undesignated. Note. Available for review onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-13297.
- ⁵³ *Historical Report First Cavalry Division Artillery*. (p. 9). Note. "Flying Column to Manila" (n.d. but after August 1945.) The unknown author and apparent first-person account of this unpublished four-page typed paper provides flying column details that differ from an article, "We Were First in Manila" by McGraw, R. and Bent, F. in the July-August 1945 edition of *The Cavalry Journal*. A copy of this unknown author's paper resides in position and personal collection of Walter Landry's son Robert Landry. G Troop was vanguard of 2/8th Cavalry column toward the Pampanga River.
- ⁵⁴ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 187-188). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁵⁵ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. . APO 453: Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps (p. 80). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>
- ⁵⁶ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 92-94, 96). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁵⁷ U.S. Army Rifle Company (1942-43). See [U.S. Army Rifle Company \(1942-1943\) \(battleorder.org\)](#) and <https://www.battleorder.org/usa-riflecoy-1942>. The infantry rifle company evolved in capabilities during WW II. At the "rifle troop" echelon, the light machine guns and light mortars of its weapons platoon could receive additional firepower of unit automatic weapons and machineguns and medium mortar fire from the rifle squadron weapons platoon.
- ⁵⁸ "Flying Column to Manila." (n.d. after August 1945 est.) Note. A copy of this unknown author's paper resides in position and personal collection of Walter Landry's son Robert Landry. See endnote #48.

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- ⁵⁹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 6). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁶⁰ 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. (p. 3). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. Note. Available onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-11809.
- ⁶¹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 7). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁶² Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. (pp. 6-7).
- ⁶³ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. APO 453: Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. (p. 80). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363> See, Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 126 and 128). See, Miller, E. Chase's Flying Columns. *World War II Quarterly*: Summer 2022. (p. 30). <https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/publications/wwii-quarterly/>
- ⁶⁴ XIV (U.S.) Corps. *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. (p. 80).
- ⁶⁵ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 04:23-07:33; 10:17-10:39). Note. This set of diskettes record LTC Landry (USA Retired) recollections as a captain commanding G Troop, 2/8 Cavalry in the 1st Cavalry Division "Flying Column" 1-3 February 1945. His son Robert H. Landry possesses a copy of the diskette set with only the names Gopal and Bunn on the diskettes. The diskette title used in this monograph focuses on Captain Walter Landry as G Troop Commander; therefore, *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*.
- ⁶⁶ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander*. (Disc 1. 09:26-09:55).
- ⁶⁷ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). *Recollections of G Troop Commander*. (Disc 1. 09:55-10:16).
- ⁶⁸ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (pp. 7-8).
- ⁶⁹ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] Landry, Walter J. [Interviewee]. (29 June 2005). (Disc 1. 11:50-12:29).
- ⁷⁰ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 216). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁷¹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 80). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁷² Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 216). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁷³ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 9). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁷⁴ Barrow. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. (p. 10).
- ⁷⁵ 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. *Historical Report First Cavalry Division Artillery Luzon Campaign 1945*. (pp. 9-10). 1st Cavalry Division: Location Undesignated. Note. Available for review onsite in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-13297.
- ⁷⁶ Chase, W. (1975). *Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase*. Houston: Pacesetter Press-Gulf Publishing. (p. 83). Note. General Chase states in his autobiography, "Late in the evening of February 1 at Cabanatuan, General

Mudge relieved me of responsibility for the main body of my 1st Cavalry Brigade and placed me in command of the three mobile units, the 'flying column,' really a motorized task force."

- ⁷⁷ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (pp. 30-32). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ⁷⁸ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. APO 453: Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. (p. 80).
- ⁷⁹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 10). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁸⁰ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. (p. 10). See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 216).
- ⁸¹ Barrow. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. (p. 10).
- ⁸² Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 10).
- ⁸³ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 127-128).
- ⁸⁴ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. APO 453: Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. (p. 82). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>
- ⁸⁵ U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 33). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>
- ⁸⁶ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 13). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf> Note. Barrow states that G Troop and H Troop provided supporting fires in the assault with E and F Troops conducting the assault. See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 219).
- ⁸⁷ Frankel, S. (1949). *The 37th Infantry Division in World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press (pp. 239-240).
- ⁸⁸ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. APO 453. (p. 82). See, Frankel, S. *The 37th Infantry Division in World War II*. (1948). Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press. (pp. 239-242). Note. 1/148th Infantry Regiment made contact with Japanese outposts about 17:00 1 February that led to heavy contact near Plaridel that night and all day and night 2 February. The Japanese broke contact at Plaridel before dawn 3 February. One U.S. company (+) remained at Plaridel to clear Plaridel of enemy while the 148th Regiment continued south oriented on Route 3. During the night of 2 February, 37th Division units arrived at San Juan. Barrow in *Breakthrough to Manila* states that G Troop made physical contact with a unit of the 37th Division at San Juan about 16:00 on 2 February. See, 37th Infantry Division. *Report After Action. Operations of the 37th Division. Luzon, P.I. 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945*. (10 September 1945). APO 37: San Francisco, CA. (pp. 35-37). Note. "First contact with the 1st Cavalry Division" stated as 3 February at Plaridel appears to in error as Landry made first physical contact with a 37th Division unit the afternoon of 2 February near San Juan.
- ⁸⁹ 37th Infantry Division. *Report After Action. Operations of the 37th Division. Luzon, P.I. 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945*. (10 September 1945). San Francisco, CA. APO 37. (p. 37).
- ⁹⁰ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 11). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁹¹ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 27:33-28:31). See, Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 11). See, 37th Infantry Division. *Report After Action. Operations of the 37th Division. Luzon, P.I. 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945*. (10 September 1945). APO 37: San Francisco, CA. (p. 37).

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- ⁹² Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Disc 1. 27:33-28:31]. Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. (p. 11). See, 37th Infantry Division. *Report After Action. Operations of the 37th Division. Luzon*. (p. 37).
- ⁹³ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 127-128).
- ⁹⁴ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 216-217). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁹⁵ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (pp. 11-13). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf> See, U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. The Engineer. Volume IV. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 6). The Central Plains “area is almost completely devoid of wooded areas except for fruit and shade trees around villages and farms and bamboo thickets found along the roads and streams....As a whole is under extensive cultivation, the greater part of the cultivated area being planted in rice.” On weather, “During January and February only 1 to 2 inches of rainfall per month could be expected and considerably less in March and April. On the other hand, within the alluvial portions of the Central Plains area dust was a serious problem, both on roads and airdromes.” See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 217). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ⁹⁶ Chase, W. (1975). *Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase*. Houston: Pacesetter Press-Gulf Publishing. (p. 85).
- ⁹⁷ Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (pp. 11-13). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ⁹⁸ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 19:57-21:23; 24:21-27:20). See, Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 13).
- ⁹⁹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 13). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf> Note. Barrow states that G Troop and H Troop provided supporting fires in the assault with E and F Troops conducting the dismounted assault. See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 219).
- ¹⁰⁰ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 21:15-21:21).
- ¹⁰¹ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 128).
- ¹⁰² Holland, R. *100 Miles to Freedom: The Epic Story of the Rescue of Santo Tomas and the Liberation of Manila*. (2011). New York: Turner Publishing. (p. 58). Note. Holland, was as a USMC radioman and driver in the Air Liaison Party with BG Hoffman, the other brigadier general and brigade commander in 1st Cavalry Division. Hoffman requested the ALP to call in a dive bomber strike on a battalion-size unit near Santa Maria. With closeness to friendly troops to the enemy, the dive bombers made several low-level runs without firing any weapons or dropping any bombs. The Japanese unit “scattered in all directions.” Brigadier General Chase had one ALP team in his command group as he followed 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry.
- ¹⁰³ 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). Air Annex to *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. (p. 3). Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. Note. Available for review on site in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #N-11809.
- ¹⁰⁴ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). (29 June 2005). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 32:52-33:15).

- ¹⁰⁵ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (pp. 13-14). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ¹⁰⁶ Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. (p. 12).
- ¹⁰⁷ Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. (p. 11).
- ¹⁰⁸ Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. (pp. 12 and 15).
- ¹⁰⁹ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 217-219). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹¹⁰ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 15). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf> See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 220).
- ¹¹¹ Barrow. *Breakthrough to Manila*. (pp. 15-16).
- ¹¹² Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 220). <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹¹³ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 34:00-34:44).
- ¹¹⁴ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [(Disc 1. 37:07-37:31).
- ¹¹⁵ U.S. Sixth Army. *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Volume I. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 34). Sixth Army records 18:35 as entry to Manila. XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. APO 453. (p. 80A). *Note*. Sketch No. 16 after p. 80 displays 18:35 as 2/8 Cavalry entry to Manila.
- ¹¹⁶ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 137).
- ¹¹⁷ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 38:36-39:02).
- ¹¹⁸ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [(Disc 1. 39:17-39:37 and 40:22-40:35).
- ¹¹⁹ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 1. 38:26-38:5 and 39:03-40:57).
- ¹²⁰ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 1 of 3. 39:21-40:11).
- ¹²¹ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 128). *Note*. When World War II erupted in 1941 in the Philippines, Colayco fought in early Philippine Luzon engagements. He had been a University of Santo Tomas faculty member and became a guerilla intelligence officer reestablishing the Allied Intelligence Bureau in October 1942, becoming Chief of its 7th Manila Unit. He also published an underground paper, *Freedom*. Captain Colayco was a member of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFEE) during his WW II service and sacrifice. Retrieved from [77th anniversary of UST's liberation as an internment camp, Battle of Manila commemorated - University of Santo Tomas](#)
- ¹²² Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. (pp. 128 and 130). See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. CMH Pub 5-10-1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 252). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹²³ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 1. 41:56-42:55).
- ¹²⁴ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 1. 40:58-43:17 and Disc 2 of 3: 00:14-01:48).

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- ¹²⁵ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2. 00:38-01:42).
- ¹²⁶ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2. 00:20:22-01:42).
- ¹²⁷ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2. 00:43-01:16). See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 252). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹²⁸ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2 of 3. 36:54-37:43).
- ¹²⁹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 16). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf> Landry, Walter J. [Interviewee]. (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video recording]. (Disc 2. 37:01-37:52).
- ¹³⁰ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 130).
- ¹³¹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 16). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ¹³² Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 252). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹³³ Chase, W. (1975). *Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase*. Houston: Pacesetter Press-Gulf Publishing. (p. 87).
- ¹³⁴ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 220). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹³⁵ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 16). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ¹³⁶ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 2. 01:48-01:3:11 and 16:43-17:34). Note. As a young boy, Robert Landry recalled his father talking about the moment he arrived at the head of the flying column to find LTC Connor and then yelling a "Where the hell is the front gate?" See Wright, *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. p. 125]. The 1st Cavalry Division history indicates this occurred about 20:50 on 3 February.
- ¹³⁷ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 125).
- ¹³⁸ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 2. 3:11-4:51).
- ¹³⁹ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2. 29:59-30:04).
- ¹⁴⁰ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 17). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ¹⁴¹ Cogan, F. (2000). *Captured: The Japanese Internment of American Civilians in the Philippines, 1941-1945*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. (p. 269). See, Landry, Walter J. [Interviewee]. (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video recording]. 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held at the MacArthur Memorial Norfolk, VA.: MacArthur Memorial and Library. (Disc 2. 4:10-4:57).
- ¹⁴² Landry, W. (17 January 2006). [Letter to Mr. Maurice Francis] Letter from Lt. Col. Walter J. Landry, 1st Cavalry Division. Retrieved from http://ithascome.bravehost.com/Landry_Letter.html

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- ¹⁴³ Wilkinson, R. (2014). *Surviving a Japanese Internment Camp: Life and Liberation at Santo Tomas, Manila in World War II*. Jefferson: McFarland. (p. II).
- ¹⁴⁴ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 2. 4:58-5:26).
- ¹⁴⁵ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2. 19:38-20:59).
- ¹⁴⁶ Chase, W. (1975). *Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase*. Houston: Pacesetter Press-Gulf Publishing. (pp. 86-87).
- ¹⁴⁷ Landry, W. (17 January 2006). (Letter to Mr. Maurice Francis). Letter from Lt. Col. Walter J. Landry, 1st Cavalry Division. Retrieved from http://ithascome.bravehost.com/Landry_Letter.html
- ¹⁴⁸ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 2. 23:16-23:27 and 25:46-26:33).
- ¹⁴⁹ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 131).
- ¹⁵⁰ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 2. 11:26-11:45).
- ¹⁵¹ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 130). See, Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 17). See, Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (p. 252). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹⁵² Chase, W. (1975). *Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase*. Houston: Pacesetter Press-Gulf Publishing. (p. 87). Note. General Chase states, "My part of the column had much the same experience. [2/8th cavalry had experienced sniping and brief meeting engagements entering Manila. G Troop (-) 2/8th Cavalry was pinned in a kill zone near Far Eastern University.] It was dark with fires and explosions breaking out on all sides, much sniping and firing at every street corner, and even a Japanese counterattack on our column." Soon after, moving south on the main street into Manila, [Chase states 'Quezon Boulevard,' however, this part of the main street had a different title until just north of the bridge], "We were all jammed up in the street and very vulnerable; we had to move." A guerilla guided his column "by a round about route of a few blocks through alleys [Chase and 2/5th Cavalry commander LTC Lobit "walked along with the guide at the head of our troops.] to our destination, Santo Tomas University."
- ¹⁵³ Andrade, D. (1996). *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. (CMH Pub 72-28). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 7-11). Retrieved from [Luzon | U.S. Army Center of Military History](http://history.army.mil/html/books/005/72-28/index.html)
- ¹⁵⁴ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 252-254). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹⁵⁵ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 130).
- ¹⁵⁶ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). (1994). *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1*. Chapter IX. The Mindora and Luzon Operations. (CMH Pub 13-3). (p. 273.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [Johnson, H. (1966). Foreword. The *Reports of General MacArthur* include two volumes published by the Department of the Army in four books reproduced exactly as they were printed by General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in 1950, except for the addition of this foreword and indexes. Nelson, H. (1994). Foreword. The U.S. Army Chief of Military history republished General MacArthur's reports as presented in the 1966 publication to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II.] Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/013/13-3/index.html>
- ¹⁵⁷ Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. CMH Pub 5-10-1. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. (pp. 252-254). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html>
- ¹⁵⁸ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-

-
- year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 3. 15:46-16:35).
- ¹⁵⁹ XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. APO 453: Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. (p. 85).
- ¹⁶⁰ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 132).
- ¹⁶¹ Cogan, F. (2000). *Captured: The Japanese Internment of American Civilians in the Philippines, 1941-1945*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. (p. 268).
- ¹⁶² Cogan. *Captured: The Japanese Internment*. (p. 204).
- ¹⁶³ Cogan. *Captured: The Japanese Internment*. (p. 269).
- ¹⁶⁴ Vaughn, E. (1985). *The Ordeal of Elizabeth Vaughn*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. (p. 300).
- ¹⁶⁵ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 2 of 3. 29:50-33:42).
- ¹⁶⁶ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. (Disc 2 of 3. 31:05-33:42).
- ¹⁶⁷ Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 133-134). [Wright records that “more than thirty persons were killed and nearly one hundred were injured in the vicinity” at Santo Tomas].
- ¹⁶⁸ Wright. *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. (p. 134).
- ¹⁶⁹ Gopal, Lou. (Producer/Director), & Bunn, Michelle. (Producer). Landry, Walter J. (Interviewee). (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video interview of Walter J. Landry during the 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held in conjunction with the MacArthur Memorial and Archives-Library in Norfolk, VA.] (Disc 3. 00:41-00:52 and 02:31-02:35).
- ¹⁷⁰ R. L. Landry. (personal communication to Moilanen, J. H. (17 May 2024). Captain Walter Landry was assigned as squadron executive officer, 2/8th Cavalry on 4 June 1945 per S.O. #51, Headquarters, 8th Cavalry Regiment.
- ¹⁷¹ R. L. Landry. (personal communication to Moilanen, J. H. (17 May 2024). Walter Landry was assigned to command 2/8th Cavalry on 28 July 1945 per S.O. #80, Headquarters, 8th Cavalry.
- ¹⁷² 1st Cavalry Division. General Orders No. 78. Section I. *Awards of the Silver Star*. (13 May 1945). APO 201: Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division.
- ¹⁷³ *Obituary. Walter J. Landry*. (2013). Retrieved from <https://www.currentobituary.com/obit/132877>
- ¹⁷⁴ R. L. Landry. (personal communication to Moilanen, J. H. (17 May 2024). Robert Landry recalled his father Walter Landry stating this promotion order was probably the last field grade promotion list that General MacArthur authorized as a Supreme Commander (S.O. #185. General Headquarters, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) even though the U.S. War Department was pulling back promotion authority to the War Department. According to Walter Landry’s recollection, General MacArthur published this order to promote captains who were commanding battalions and squadrons during the war.
- ¹⁷⁵ *Obituary. Walter J. Landry*. Retrieved from <https://www.currentobituary.com/obit/132877>
- ¹⁷⁶ Cavalry and Armor Insignia. [USAARMS Pam 360-2 This is Armor.pdf \(army.mil\)](https://www.usarmy.com/360-2/This%20is%20Armor.pdf) See, Combat Infantryman Badge. <https://www.sonsoflibertymuseum.org/combat-infantrymans-badge.cfm> See, Infantry Crossed Rifles Insignia. [The History behind the US Infantry cross rifle insignia A Symbol of Va – Bodega Post](https://www.history.com/stories/infantry-crossed-rifles-insignia)
- ¹⁷⁷ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (1 October 2022). *Operations*. (Ch. 3 and 8, Appendix A). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ¹⁷⁸ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 17-10. *Armored Force Field Manual: Tactics And Techniques*. (Chapter 1: Section 1. para. 2a, b, d; para. 5a, c, e, f, g.; and, Chapter 2). Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/Fm17-10> Note. See also, Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁷⁹ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. (para. 111.) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁸⁰ Field Manual 100-5. *Operations*. (21 May 1941). (para. 102). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁸¹ U.S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22 C1. (25 November 2019). *Army Leadership and the Profession*. (p. vii). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18529-ADP_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf

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- ¹⁸² U.S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 C1. *Army Leadership and the Profession*. (para. 1-124). Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18529-ADP_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf
- ¹⁸³ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 6-22. (1 November 2022). *Developing Leaders*. (para. 4-70). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36735-FM_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf
- ¹⁸⁴ U.S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22 C1. (25 November 2019). *Army Leadership and the Profession*. (para. 5-2—5-5). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18529-ADP_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf
- ¹⁸⁵ U.S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0. (31 July 2019). *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. (para. 1-51 and 1-52). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34403-ADP_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf
- ¹⁸⁶ U.S. Department of the Army. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 50). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40321-FM_1-02.1-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ¹⁸⁷ U.S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0. (31 July 2019). *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. (p. 1-14, 1-45, and Glossary-2). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34403-ADP_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf Note. Mission command is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decisionmaking and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports the Army's operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.
- ¹⁸⁸ U.S. War Department. Staff Officer's Field Manual (FM) 101-5. (19 August 1940). *The Staff and Combat Order* (p. 43). Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/FM101-5-nsia> See also, U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (21 May 1941). Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department. para. 151, p.31. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁸⁹ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-0. (1 October 2022). *Operations*. (para. A-4). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ¹⁹⁰ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 111, 140 and 142). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁹¹ Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 7). Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Armorpapers/ASTUP/A-F/BarrowThomas%20A.pdf>
- ¹⁹² Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. (para. 111). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁹³ U.S. War Department. Field Manual (FM) 22-5. (February 1946). *Leadership Courtesy and Drill*. Section II. Qualities of the Leader. (para 4c). Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department. Retrieved from <https://www.artofmanliness.com/career-wealth/leadership/wwii-wisdom-qualities-responsibilities-true-leader/>
- ¹⁹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army. (1 October 2022). Field Manual (FM) 3-0. *Operations*. (para. 8-4). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ¹⁹⁵ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 111 and 129). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁹⁶ U.S. War Department. Field Manual (FM) 22-5. (February 1946). *Leadership Courtesy and Drill*. (para. 4a). Section II. Qualities of the Leader. Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department. Retrieved from <https://www.artofmanliness.com/career-wealth/leadership/wwii-wisdom-qualities-responsibilities-true-leader/>
- ¹⁹⁷ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 111 and 122). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ¹⁹⁸ Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. (para. 111). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>

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- ¹⁹⁹ Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. (para. 99). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²⁰⁰ U.S. War Department. Field Manual (FM) 7-5. *Infantry Field Manual. Organization and Tactics of Infantry*. (1 October 1940). The Rifle Battalion. (para. 189). Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/Fm7-5/page/n9/mode/2up>
- ²⁰¹ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 6-22. (1 November 2022). *Developing Leaders*. (para. 4-36 to 4-39). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36735-FM_6-22-000-WEB-1.pdf
- ²⁰² U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 99). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²⁰³ U.S. War Department. Cavalry Field Manual (FM) 2-15. (8 April 1941) (C2, 18 August 1942). *Employment of Cavalry*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. (Ch. 1, para. 5a). Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/Fm2-15/page/n3/mode/2up>
- ²⁰⁴ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 36-37, 111, and 117). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²⁰⁵ U.S. War Department. Armored Force Field Manual (FM) 17-10. (17 March 1942). *Tactics and Technique*. (Chapter I. Section 1, para. 3). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM17-10.PDF>
- ²⁰⁶ U.S. War Department. Cavalry Field Manual (FM) 2-15. (8 April 1941) (C2, 18 August 1942). *Employment of Cavalry*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. (Ch. 1, para. 1 and 5). Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/Fm2-15/page/n3/mode/2up>
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- ²⁰⁸ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 468 and 472). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²⁰⁹ U.S. Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90. (31 July 2019). *Offense and Defense*. (para. 1-1 and 1-2). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34828-ADP_3-90-000-WEB-1.pdf
- ²¹⁰ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 111 and 126). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 62). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40321-FM_1-02.1-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ²¹² U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 111 and 117). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²¹³ Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. (para. 111 and 468). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 58). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40321-FM_1-02.1-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ²¹⁵ U.S. War Department. Infantry Field Manual (FM) 7-5. (1 October 1940). *Organization and Tactics of the Infantry Battalion*. (para. 59). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/Fm7-5/page/n35/mode/2u>
- ²¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 67). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40321-FM_1-02.1-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ²¹⁷ U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 6).
- ²¹⁸ U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 23).

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- ²¹⁹ U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 6).
- ²²⁰ U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (pp. 5 and 73).
- ²²¹ U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 49).
- ²²² U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 22).
- ²²³ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. (para. 112-113 and 115). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>.
- ²²⁴ Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Operations*. (para. 110). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²²⁵ U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1. (28 February 2024). *Operational Terms*. (p. 5). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. [Three interrelated aspects of the art of tactics in current U.S. Army doctrine: (1) understand the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions, (2) make decisions effectively under conditions of uncertainty and confronted with a thinking and adaptive enemy, and (3) appreciate the effects of combat on Soldiers to accomplishing the mission while simultaneously considering how to best reinforce the physical and psychological elements of combat power in a unit.] Retrieved from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN40321-FM_1-02.1-000-WEB-2.pdf
- ²²⁶ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (21 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. (para. 98 and 103). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²²⁷ Landry, Walter J. [Interviewee]. (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in the Flying Column to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video recording]. 60-year reunion of Santo Thomas internees held at the MacArthur Memorial Norfolk, VA.: MacArthur Memorial and Library. (Disc 2. 38:45-39:37).
- ²²⁸ U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. (22 May 1941). *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. (para. 25 and 28). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>
- ²²⁹ Field Manual 100-5. (15 June 1944). *Operations*. (para. 102, 111). Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html>

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APPENDIX A

Key Research Sources

For Purposes of Military History Information and Education

Landry, Walter J. Audio-Visual Recording (2005):

Landry, Walter J. [Interviewee]. (29 June 2005). *Recollections of G Troop Commander in Penetration to Santo Tomas*. [Audio-video recording]. Recorded in conjunction with a 60-year reunion of Santo Tomas internees held at the MacArthur Memorial Norfolk, VA.: MacArthur Memorial and Library. [Note. The audio-visual recording (Disc and transcription of 1 of 3; 2 of 3; 3 of 3) is LTC Walter J. Landry Jr. (USA Retired) reflecting on his command of G Troop, 2/8 Cavalry during the 1st Cavalry Division "Flying Column" 1-3 February 1945. The audio-video recordings and transcript are in possession of his son Robert Landry.]

Barrow, Thomas. Monograph (1948):

Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. Retrieved from <https://www.moore.army.mil/Library/Armorpapers/> Captain Barrow recounts his experience as a lieutenant in G Troop 2/8 Cavalry during the "Flying Column 1-3 February 1945. The monograph includes his sketches of the route and assembly areas occupied during the three day penetration From Guimba to Manila.

World War II U.S. Official Army and U.S. Marine Corps History and Army Unit Records:

U.S. Army. 1st Cavalry Division. (12 July 1945). *Historical Report 1st Cavalry Division in the Luzon Campaign 27 January 1945-30 June 1945*. Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division. [Available in paper copy at U.S. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. See archive document #11809.] [MG Hoffman was the 1st Cavalry Division after MG Mudge and before MG Chase.]

U.S. Army. 37th Division. (10 September 1945). *Report After Action. Operations of the 37th Division: Luzon, P.I. 1 November 1944 to 30 June 1945 (M-1 Operation)*. San Francisco, CA. APO 37: 37th Division Headquarters. [Note. The 37th Division after action report differs in some details from 1st Cavalry Division accounts of where and when first physical contact was established between the two divisions along their mutual boundary in the vicinity of Plaridel to San Juan.]

U.S. Army. XIV Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>

U.S. Army. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945. Volume I*. U.S. Sixth Army. Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307>

Anderson, C. (2019). *Leyte: 17 October 1944-1 July 1945*. (CMH Pub 72-27). Washington, D. C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-27/index.html>

- Andrade, D. (1996). *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. (CMH Pub 72-28). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [Luzon | U.S. Army Center of Military History](#)
- Cannon, M. (1993). *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-9-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-9-1/index.html>
- Garand, G. and Strowbridge, T. (1971). *History of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II: Western Pacific Operations*. Chapter 3. The Luzon Operation. Quantico, VA: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Retrieved from <https://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/IV/USMC-IV-IV-3.html>
- Smith, R. (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. (CMH Pub 5-10-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Military History. [Originally published: Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1963]. Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/index.html> See also, <https://archive.org/details/triumphinphilipp00smit>
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). (1994). *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1*. (CMH Pub 13-3.) [Reproduced exactly by U.S. Army as they were printed by General MacArthur's SCAP General Headquarters in Tokyo in 1950, except for the addition of a foreword and indexes with foreword by Johnson, H. (1966) and a facsimile reprint with foreword by Nelson, H. (1994). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History.] Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/013/13-3/index.html>
- U.S. Army. Center of Military History. (1990). *The Admiralties. Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division: 29 February - 18 May 1944*. (CMH Pub 100-3). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [This publication was first printed by the Historical Division, War Department, for the American Forces in Action series in 1946.] Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/admiralties/admiralties-fm.htm>
- U.S. War Department. Field Manual 100-5. *Operations*. (21 May 1941). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM100-5/index.html> [This e-site is a Military Classic Reprint by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press (1992) at Fort Leavenworth, KS.]
- Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. [Wright was the Division Historian in 1947 and credits information "time, fact, and location" details from many members of the 1st Cavalry Division to include Lieutenant Colonel Haskett L. Connor, Lieutenant Colonel Willaim E. Lobit, Brigadier General Hugh F. T. Hoffman, and Major General William C. Chase. p. viii.]

Maps: See Appendix B.

Note. U.S. Army. Army Map Service (AMS). (1944) Map Series S 712. Scale 1:50,000. [Terrain representation extends from Santo Domingo and Cabanatuan areas with continuation southward in the

1st Cavalry Division “flying column” axes of advance to North Manila and Santo Tomas Internment Camp (STIC) and Malacañan Palace.] [Retrieval e-links listed per map sheets. See Appendix B.]

U.S. Army. Army Map Service (AMS). (1945). MANILA NORTH. Map Series S 901. Scale 1:12,500. [Terrain of North Manila, Santo Tomas Internment Camp.] Retrieved from https://www.reddit.com/r/Philippines/comments/9nquqp/map_of_manila_north_1945

U.S. Army. Army Map Service (AMS). (1945). MANILA SOUTH. Map Series S 901. Scale 1:12,500. [Terrain of South Manila and south of Pasig River to Manila Bay shoreline.] Retrieved from https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/philippines_city_plans/txu-pclmaps-oclc-6610553-manila_south.jpg

City of Manila. Map. Scale 1:37,000. (September 1945). Chief Engineer, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC): Base Map Plant No.1.

Supplemental Resources:

Holland, R. (2011). *100 Miles to Freedom: The Epic Story of the Rescue of Santo Tomas and the Liberation of Manila*. New York: Turner Publishing.

The following UTube videotapes provide a visual context to this World War II era with presentations of combat against a Pacific enemy, and what the U.S. public would eventually be able to see in approved news releases of Allied victory as well the tragedy, death, and the destruction of war.

UTube. *Victims of Circumstance-Santo Tomas Internment Camp*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w09r1PwHqmk>

UTube. *1945-03-01 Santo Tomas Prisoners Liberated*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IBX6a5SJBLc>

UTube. *History in Scale: The Liberation of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp*. (February 3, 1945). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uROoetq_aRY

UTube. *#AlliesForFreedom: Battle of Manila and the Liberation of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUX4JtFQJl0>

UTube. *Liberation of Prisoners from UST 1945*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cMHjL0rFZs>

UTube. *HD Historic Archival Stock Footage WWII Liberation of Manila*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Flj7qlyHojA>

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APPENDIX B

Online Map Reference Sites: Series S 712 (1945)

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634583/view> Note. This Australian .gov-site allows simple navigation among map sheets to North-South-East-West. U of Texas e-site is useful for selected map sheets.

SANTO DOMINGO: Sheet 3357 I

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634583/view>

CABANATUAN: Sheet 3357 II

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634583/view>

GAPAN: Sheet 3356 I

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634547/view>

SAN MIGUEL: Sheet 3356 II [This map sheet retrieved from University of Texas collection]

txu-pclmaps-oclc-6528802-san-miguel.jpg (4282×4790) (utexas.edu)

BALIUAG: Sheet 3355 I

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634482/view>

NORZAGARY: Sheet 3455 IV [This SHEET is due east of BALIUAG sheet]

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512635326/view>

MEYCAUAYAN: Sheet 3355 II

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634505/view>

NOVALICHES: Sheet 3455 III * Australian Digital Reference **MISSING SHEET 3455 III**

MANILA: Sheet 3354 I

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512634449/view>

TAYTAY: Sheet 3454 IV

<https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-512635284/view>

Appendix B

Map Sheet Schematic of Army Map Service: Series S 712 (1944)

Scale 1:50,000 for Santo Tomas-Manila Raid

Santo Domingo Sheet 3357 I	
Cabanatuan Sheet 3357 II	
Gapan Sheet 3356 I	
San Miguel Sheet 3356 II	
Baliuag Sheet 3355 I	Norzagaray Sheet 3455 IV
Meycauayan Sheet 3355 II	<div style="border: 1px dashed black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> Novaliches MISSING </div>
Manila Sheet 3354 I	Taytay Sheet 3454 IV

Note. Map sheet for NOVALICHES 3455 III is NOT in digital map files found during research for this paper.

The MOUNT IRID map sheet (3455 II) has been erroneously e-linked as Novaliches sheet location in Australian .gov research e-site. See p. B-1 for link.



APPENDIX C

Figure Illustrations

For Purposes of Military History Information and Education

Title Image on p.1:

Photograph of Captain Walter Landry

Photograph provided with permission from personal family album of Robert Landry.

U.S. Army 8th Cavalry Distinctive Unit Insignia

8th Cavalry Regiment Distinctive Unit Insignia and Coat of Arms. <https://1cda.org/history/dui-8c/>

1st Cavalry Division Shoulder Insignia

The 1st Cavalry Division Association e-site hosts a series of informative topics on the 1st Cavalry Division such as the "1st Cavalry Division Shoulder Insignia." <https://1cda.org/history/division-insignia/>

Introduction Figure Illustrations:

1. 1st Cavalry Division Combat Operations in Southwest Pacific Area

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). (1994). *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1*. (CMH Pub 13-3). (p. 2.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [Johnson, H. (1966). Foreword. The *Reports of General MacArthur* include two volumes being published by the Department of the Army in four books reproduced exactly as they were printed by General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in 1950, except for the addition of this foreword and indexes. Nelson, H. (1994). Foreword. The Chief of Military history republished General MacArthur's reports as presented in the 1966 publication to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II.] Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/013/13-3/index.html>

2. 8th Cavalry Regiment Combat on Manus Island

U.S. Army. Center of Military History. (1990). *The Admiralties. Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division: 29 February - 18 May 1944*. (CMH Pub 100-3). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [This publication was first printed by the Historical Division, War Department, for the American Forces in Action series in 1946.] (pp. 8, 9, 77, 78, and 95.) Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/admiralties/admiralties-fm.htm>

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). (1994). *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1*. (CMH Pub 13-3). (p. 139.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [Johnson, H. (1966). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/013/13-3/index.html>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

3. 1st Cavalry Division Area of Operations on Leyte-Samar

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). (1994). *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1*. (CMH Pub 13-3). (pp. 2 and 245.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/013/13-3/index.html>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

4. 8th Cavalry Regiment Operations on Leyte and Samar

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). (1994). *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH Pub 13-3). (p. 201.) Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/html/books/013/13-3/index.html>

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 105, 111).

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

1st Cavalry Division to Manila Figure Illustrations:

1. Luzon Offensive 9 January-4 February 1945

U.S. Army. Center of Military History. (1990). *The Admiralties. Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division: 29 February - 18 May 1944*. (CMH Pub 100-3). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. [This publication was first printed by the Historical Division, War Department, for the American Forces in Action series in 1946.] Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/admiralties/admiralties-fm.htm>

U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945. Volume IV. The Engineer*. U.S. Sixth Army. (p. 5). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307> Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

2. 1st Cavalry Division Moves Inland from Sixth Army Beachhead Lingayen Gulf

U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Combat Notes. Volume 10*. U.S. Sixth Army. (Sketch No.2).

XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. APO 453. (p. 80A). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

3. U.S. Army Recovers PW Remains at Palawan Massacre Site

National World War II Museum. (20 July 2022). *"Dispose of Them": Massacre of American POWs in the Philippines*. New Orleans, LA: The National World War II Museum. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/dispose-them-massacre-american-pows-philippines>

National World War II Museum. (22 July 2022). *Survival, Resistance, and Escape on Palawan*. New Orleans, LA.: The National World War II Museum. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/survival-resistance-and-escape-palawan>

National World War II Museum. (25 July 2022). *Call for Action and Liberation in the Philippines*. New Orleans, LA: The National World War II Museum. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/call-action-and-liberation-philippines>

4. 1st Cavalry Division Assembly Area at Guimba

XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. APO 453. (p. 80A). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

5. 1st Cavalry Division Assigned and Attached Units, 31 January 1945

Organization, American Cavalry Division, Cavalry Regiment. Table of Organization 2-11. (30 September 1944). Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/Jon/Downloads/p15040coll6_4499.pdf

Rottman, G. (2009). *World War II U.S. Cavalry Units: Pacific Theater*. (2009). New York: Osprey Publishing. (pp. 39-40 and 52-61). [A footnote at p. 40 indicates that during the period of the 1st Cavalry Division's flying column mission in February 1945, the 61st FA Battalion was 105-mm towed howitzer by TD-9 dozer-tractors; 82d FA Battalion was 105-mm towed howitzer by ¾-ton trucks; 99th FA Battalion was 105-mm towed howitzer by ¾-ton trucks; 271st FA Battalion was 105-mm towed howitzer by TD-9 dozer-tractors; and, the 947th FA Battalion, attached and then assigned to the division, was 155-mm towed howitzer.]. Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/Lineage/arcav/arcav.htm>. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/world-war-ii-us-cavalry-units-pacific-theater>

Stubs, M. and Connor, S. (1969). *Armor Cavalry. Army Lineage Series. Part I. Regular Army and Army Reserve*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History. (p. 72). Retrieved from <https://history.army.mil/books/Lineage/arcav/arcav.htm>

U.S. Army Medium Tank Company (1943-45). (n.d.). Retrieved from https://static.wixstatic.com/media/a137e0_1a9e03d4b773499aae3788237ccdea1~mv2.png

U.S. Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Luzon Campaign 9 January 1945-30 June 1945. Volume I*. (pp. 31). See also, Annex 1 to Field Order 45 dated 20:00 INDIA 26 January 1945. (pp. 31 and 148). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307> [1st Cavalry Division (Reinforced) troop list for landing at Lingayen Gulf was as follows: 1st Cavalry Division (less 603d Tank Company), 112th Cavalry [Infantry Regimental Combat Team] Regiment, 947th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm, Howitzer), 85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, 19th Port Surgical Hospital, 27th Port Surgical Hospital, 3498th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, 384th Quartermaster Truck Company, 13th Support Aircraft Party. Sixth Army directed the 13th Armored Group to assemble the 44th Tank Battalion (less C Company) in the Guimba area and coordinate the movement with the Commanding General of I Corps. The I Corps was to "promptly assemble" the 1st Cavalry Division (Reinforced) in the Guimba area for use by the Commanding General, Sixth Army as a Sixth Army reserve.] The 44th Tank Battalion (less C Company) would be attached to 1st Cavalry Division at Guimba.

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 126, 241).

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

6. 1st Cavalry Division Flying Column Concept

U.S. Army Air Force. *Luzon Island*. Map. Scale: 1:1,000,000. (No. C-40). WW II. (April 1944). Retrieved from <https://storiestovoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Luzon-US-Army-1944-768x1032.png>

U.S. Army Sixth Army. (1945). *Report of the Engineer. Floating Bridge Installations, Lingayen to Manila. January-February 1945*. (Map No. 44). Retrieved from <https://i.pinimg.com/originals/bf/05/f9/bf05f98bf9b658730c19812f6ba70f4e.jpg>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

7. USMC Pilots Meet with 1st Cavalry Division Troopers

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 181).

Kristy, B. *Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless*. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.usmcmuseum.com/douglas-sbd-3-dauntless.html> See also, Dauntless Dive Bomber. Retrieved from https://images.saymedia-content.com/.image/t_share/MTc2MjY5NDQ0NjMxMjQxOTAx/the-douglas-sbd-dauntless.jpg

8. 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry Task Force in Flying Column

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 126).

Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (pp. 4-5).

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

9. Task Organization: G Troop, 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry

Organization, American Cavalry Division. Cavalry Regiment. Table of Organization 2-11. (30 September 1944.) Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org › digital › api › collection › p15040coll6 › id › 4499 › download>

Detailed Organization, American Cavalry Division. Cavalry Rifle Troop, Regiment Horse. Table of Organization 2-17. (1 April 1942). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p15040coll6/id/4271/download>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen. [See note to Figure 7. G Troop had one medium tank (Sherman) platoon attached to the troop during the flying column mission.].

10. 2/8th Cavalry Ford Crossings of the Pampanga River

See Appendix B. SANTO DOMINGO and CABANATUAN map sheets.

Barrow, T. (1948). *Breakthrough to Manila*. Military Monograph: Armor Officer Advanced Officers Class #1. Fort Knox, KY: US. Army Armor School. Armor Officer Advanced Course. (p. 6.) [Additional detail is in “Flying Column to Manila” (n.d. but after August 1945 estimate) as the unknown author of this four-page typed paper provides flying column details that differ from an article, “We Were First in Manila” by McGraw, R. and Bent, F. in the July-August 1945 edition of *The Cavalry Journal*.]

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 129).

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

11. G Troop (-) Moves to Santa Rosa

See Appendix B. CABANATUAN map sheet.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

12. G Troop (-) Crosses the Peñaranda River at Gapan

See Appendix B. CABANATUAN and GAPAN map sheets.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

13. G Troop (-) Enemy Contact at Baliuag

See Appendix B. GAPAN and BALIUAG map sheets.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

14. G Troop Assaults Gapan Bridge from Two Directions

See Appendix B. GAPAN and BALIUAG map sheets.

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 158 and 180).

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

15. G Troop Attack by Fire at Plaridel as 2/8th Cavalry Fords Angat River

See Appendix B. BALIUAG map sheet.

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 160).

Smith, H. (1948). *The Operations of the 148th Infantry Regiment. (37th Infantry Division) at Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands. 9 January-3 March 1945*. Fort Benning, GA: Advanced Infantry Officer Course 1947-1948. Retrieved from <https://mcoecbamcoepwprd01.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/DonovanPapers/wwii/STUP2/S->

[Z/SmithHeraldH%20LTC.pdf](#) [This AIOC monograph is based on Smith's personal experience as a regimental intelligence officer. The detailed account provides an informative perspective of the 148th Regiment operating on the west flank of the 1st Cavalry Division and 2d Squadron/8th Cavalry during the flying column mission. Combat actions from the mutual division boundary north of Plaridel to south of San Juan by the 148th are of interest to the G Troop 2/8th Cavalry 2 and 3 February narrative. Other areas of interest are the 148th Regiment entry into Manila 4-5 February 1945.]

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

16. The Long Road to Santa Clara

See Appendix B. BALIUAG and MEYCAUCAN map sheets.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

17. Assault on Santa Maria and Ford of Santa Maria River

See Appendix B. BALIUAG and MEYCAUCAN map sheets.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

18. "Hot Corner" Firefight 3 February

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 158).

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed in sketch by Jon Moilanen.

19. Tuliahan Bridge at Novaliches and "On to Manila"

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 162).

8th [Cavalry Regiment] Troops Enter Manila, Luzon (Feb 1945). [The image cites U.S. Army Signal Corps photograph, Gift of Donald E. Mittelstaedt, from the collection of the National WWII Museum.]. Retrieved from <https://www.ww2online.org/image/8th-cavalry-regiment-troops-enter-manila-philippines-5-february-1945>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed in sketch by Jon Moilanen.

20. Manila Northern Suburbs and Urban Density

See Appendix B. MANILA NORTH map sheet.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

21. The Racetrack Pause and Guerrilla Linkup

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 137 and 171).

City of Manila. (September 1945). Map. Scale 1:37,000. Chief Engineer, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC): Base Map Plant No.1.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

22. Objectives: Santo Tomas and Malacañan Palace

The Present Past. 70th Anniversary of the Battle of Manila. (n.d.). [The multiple images include WW II photographs at WW II Malacañan Palace]. *The Official Gazette: Official Gazette of the Republic of Philippines*. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/battle-of-manila/the-present-past/>

#AlliesForFreedom: Battle of Manila and the Liberation of the Santo Tomas Internment Camp. (n.d.). [Image of Santo Tomas main building and perimeter wall]. (1:02-1:03) (2020) Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUX4JtFQJl0>

Malacañang Palace. (looking north). (13 July 1936). War Department. U.S. Army Air Forces. U.S. National Archives @ John Tewell. Retrieved from <https://www.flickr.com/photos/johntewell/26236741458/in/photostream>

City of Manila. (September 1945). Map. 1:37,000. Chief Engineer, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC): Base Map Plant No.1.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

23. “Hornet’s Nest” at Far Eastern University

XIV (U.S.) Corps. (29 July 1945). *Historical Report. XIV Corps M-1 Operation*. Headquarters, Office of the Commanding General, XIV Corps. APO 453. Bilibad Prison and Far eastern University. (Sketch No. 18). (p. 88). Retrieved from <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3363>

Bilibad Prison. Aerial Photograph.(n.d.). [looking southeast].Retrieved from https://c1.staticflickr.com/7/6089/6058065261_aab1d54f24_b.jpg

Manila, The Philippines, 1945. Far eastern university and Quezon Boulevard, showing American... (n.d.). [photograph looking south]. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved from <https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C41301>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

24. Objective Santo Tomas

Santo Tomas University prisoners of war internment camp housing, February 1945. U.S. [Army] Air Force Photos, U.S. National Archives @ John Tewell. Retrieved from https://live.staticflickr.com/4683/38755991224_ed0c985b7d_b.jpg

City of Manila. (September 1945). Map. 1:37,000. Chief Engineer, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC): Base Map Plant No.1.

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

25. Defend Santo Tomas and Contain Enemy in Education Building

Santo Tomas Internment Camp. (n.d.) [Aerial view looking to north with camp area designations]. Retrieved from <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/168040629819693015/>

Education Building. Santo Tomas. (14 March 1945). [education building located east of main building]. Retrieved from <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/wwii--168040629818992084/>

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 170).

8th [Cavalry Regiment] Troops Enter Manila, Luzon (Feb 1945). [The image cites U.S. Army Signal Corps photograph, Gift of Donald E. Mittelstaedt, from the collection of the National WWII Museum]. Retrieved from <https://www.ww2online.org/image/8th-cavalry-regiment-troops-enter-manila-philippines-5-february-1945>

Liberation of Santo Tomas And A Unique WWII Sight. (n.d.). [image at video time 1:03]. Retrieved from Pinoy History Buff https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uROoetq_aRY&t=12s

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

26. Quezon Bridge and Legislative Building

City of Manila. (September 1945). Map. Scale 1:37,000. Chief Engineer, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC): Base Map Plant No.1.

Intramuros, Manila before World War II. c.a. 1930. Interesting Photos... (n.d.). [aerial photo looking to northeast]. Retrieved from <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/344947652682376906/>

Rubio, P. (12 April 2013). *Old Legislative Building (National Museum of the Philippines)*. *Arcitectura Manila*. Retrieved from <https://arquitecturamanila.blogspot.com/2013/04/old-legislative-building-national.html>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

27. Internee Malnutrition at Santo Tomas

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 166).

Santo Tomas Internees Liberated 70 Years Ago. Manila Nostalgia. (6 February 2015). [The presentation includes several photographs of the internment camp grounds, internees, and facilities]. Retrieved from <http://www.lougopal.com/manila/?p=2795>

American tank crew listen to Bernard Herzog who was just liberated from the camp of Santo Tomas, 1944. (February 1945). The “1944” post in title of photograph title is incorrect.] Retrieved from <https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/bernard-herzog-liberated-philippines-1944/>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

28. G Troop Escort of Japanese Soldiers to Release Point

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II.* Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 169).

Santo Tomas Internees Liberated 70 Years Ago. Manila Nostalgia. (6 February 2015). [Several photographs of the internment camp grounds, internees, and facilities; G Troop escorts Japanese commander and camp soldiers to release point in Manila]. Retrieved from <http://www.lougopal.com/manila/?p=2795>

Drawings, symbols, phrases, and control measures superimposed by Jon Moilanen.

29. Preventive Maintenance, Sleep, and Preparation for Combat

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II.* Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (p. 167).

30. Internees Celebrate Liberation at Santo Tomas

Internees Celebrate Liberation at Santo Tomas. (n.d. but probably between 7 to mid-February 1945). Australian War Memorial. Retrieved from <https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/awm-media/collection/P00082.045/screen/4131812.JPG>

Conquering U.S. tank crews show off their machines to excited liberated internees at Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines, Feb. 1945. Retrieved from <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/537828380475499403/>

31. Walter J. Landry (L) and Fellow 8th Cavalry Officer (R) May 1945 on Luzon

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II.* Tokyo: Toppan Printing. Sketch (pp. 150, 152-155); Photo (p. 137).

Photograph of “Me” and “Steve” provided with permission from personal family album of Robert Landry.

32. An Infantryman’s War: Patrol and Maintain Contact with the Enemy

Wright, B. (1947). *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II.* Tokyo: Toppan Printing. (pp. 182 and 193).

33. Cavalry Branch Insignia, Combat Infantryman Badge, Armor Branch Insignia, Silver Star

Cavalry Branch Insignia. Retrieved from <https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/OCOA/content/References%20and%20Guides/USAARMS%20Pam%20360-2%20This%20is%20Armor.pdf?8DEC2021>

Combat Infantryman Badge. Retrieved from <https://327infantry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/combat-infantry-badge-first-award.png> See also, <https://www.vva77.org/combat.htm>

Armor Branch Insignia. Retrieved from <https://www.moore.army.mil/Armor/OCOA/content/References%20and%20Guides/USAARMS%20Pam%20360-2%20This%20is%20Armor.pdf?8DEC2021>

Silver Star. Retrieved from <https://valor.defense.gov/description-of-awards/>

34. Tenets of Analysis: Leadership in Combat

Illustration by Jon Moilanen

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Distance Comparison: Southwest Pacific Area with Continental USA



D-1

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