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Title: United States Army 25th Division Command Report, September to December 1951

Abstract: U.S. Army 25th Division Command Report, September to December 1951 in Korea includes a command report, roster of officers, background, plans, preparations, narrative of tactical operations of each regiment, and section and supporting arms, chronology, and discussion of action

Number of pages: 405

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



Command Report - 25th Infantry Division

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Sep 1951

Secret
Command Report

CSGPO-28

25th INFANTRY DIVISION

SEPTEMBER 1951

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29

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C O M M A N D R E P O R T

(CSGPO-28)

SEPTEMBER 1951

25TH UNITED STATES INFANTRY DIVISION

Attached to

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

1 through 30 September 1951

Under operational control of

IX UNITED STATES CORPS

1 through 30 September 1951

Commanded by

MAJOR GENERAL IRA P. SWIFT, USA

1 through 30 September 1951

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25th Infantry Division
September 1951

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Headquarters 25th Infantry Division
KAROGAE, Korea, CT545303
15 October 1951

Command Report No. 10 Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-28
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SECTION I

PART I

a. Background

Both friendly and enemy forces operated during the month of August from well-intrenched, relatively static lines. Each force strengthened its positions, reinforced its personnel and probed enemy positions to determine strength and dispositions.

Friendly reconnaissance and intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was heavily reinforcing his troops to north and west of the 25th Infantry Division sector. The enemy forces assumed their customary defensive attitude in well-concealed strong points in the precipitous Korean mountains. The heaviest concentration being in the high ground of hill 1062, CT6245. From these positions, as well as from several similar mountains in the Division zone, the enemy possessed excellent observation of friendly movement across most of the Division front.

Armored movement in the Division zone was limited by the hill masses running in the north-south direction and by the most extensive use by the enemy of mines yet encountered in the Korean campaign. Operations were further hindered by a series of heavy floods which washed out bridges and roads and in several instances isolated units within the Division during the early days of the month.

In contrast to previous months, the Division zone was relatively quiet during the month, however the regiments and the Turkish Armed Forces Command, supported by armor, artillery and engineers, operated from static lines against an enemy dug-in along the high ground several thousand yards to the front.

Throughout the month the Division maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. Existing bunker-type fortifications were re-built and new ones constructed; tactical and protective barbed wire, supplemented with napalm bombs, booby traps and flares were installed.

After the middle of August the line units moved from defensive positions on

limited offensives, meeting enemy forces of battalion-size fighting strong delaying actions, employing tremendous amounts of automatic weapons and mortar fire. The latter ten days of the month were spent in consolidating newly-won positions, steadily improving fortifications of the line by setting bunkers deeper and further improving protective wires and defensive fire plans.

Thorough training was conducted throughout the month to assure that all personnel, from the new replacement to the oldest soldier was completely prepared for his part in any mission assigned the Division.

b. Component Units and Commanding Officers

Unit	Commander
14th Infantry Regiment	Lt. Col. Roy V Porter, Infantry
24th Infantry Regiment	Col. Thomas D. Gillis, Infantry
27th Infantry Regiment	Lt. Col. George B. Sloan, Infantry
35th Infantry Regiment	Lt. Col. Thomas W. Woodyard Jr., Infantry
Turkish Armed Forces Command	Major Gen. Tahsin Yazici, Cavalry
25th Division Artillery	Brig. Gen. William E. Waters, USA
8th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Harry L. Yerby, Artillery
64th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. James D. Williams, Artillery
69th Field Artillery Battalion	Major Donald B. Gordon, Artillery
90th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Benjamin T. Behnken Jr., Artillery
159th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Don W. Dixon, Artillery
21st AAA AW Battalion (SP)	Lt. Col. Charles E. Henry, Artillery
89th Medium Tank Battalion	Lt. Col. William T. Hamilton Jr., Armor
65th Engineer Combat Battalion	Lt. Col. Richard L. Hennessy, CE
25th Medical Battalion	Major Charles F. Snyder Jr.

PART II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

(1) Elements Affecting the Action

(a) Effectiveness of enemy information and reconnaissance:

During the month of September there have been no definite indications as to the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance.

(b) Nature of terrain:

- (1) See Overlay, ¹Terrain Study.
- (2) See Overlay, ²Roads and Trails
- (3) See Intelligence Estimate #11 ³
- (4) In the west of the 25th Division zone the dominant terrain feature ⁴

is the hill mass 717 and 682, vicinity of CT5445, which affords the enemy excellent observation of the west and central sectors of the Division zone. In the east of the Division zone the dominant terrain feature is the hill mass 1062, vicinity of CT6445, which commands the east and central sectors of the Division zone. The major terrain feature in the center of the Division sector is the north-south valley of the HANPAN River.

(c) Conditions of weather:

The amount of precipitation occurring during the month of September was normal, with a total of 4-5 inches. The weather had little effect on military operations except for early morning fog which often hindered the actions of friendly patrols and gave the enemy freedom from air observation for as long as four hours after sunrise in some instances.

1. Inclosure 1, Appendix 1, Annex 1 to Operations Plan 30, 24 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3
2. Inclosure 2, Appendix 2, Annex 1 to Operations Plan 30, 24 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3
3. Intelligence Estimate #11, 12 Sept 1951, Book 3
4. Appendix 1, Intelligence Estimate, Operations Plan 30, 24 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3

PART II

(2) Plans and Preparations

Operations Instructions issued on 1 September directed the 14th Infantry Regiment to reconnoiter and be prepared to occupy defensive positions on best terrain in Zone A or B along Line Zebra (see overlay attached to Operations Instructions 249), on order. The 35th Infantry was directed to organize and be prepared to occupy Blocking Position Parris (see overlay) with a minimum of one (1) company reinforced with one (1) tank platoon, on order. The Turkish Armed Forces Command was to organize and be prepared to occupy Blocking Position Bronze (see overlay) with a minimum of one (1) battalion reinforced with one (1) tank platoon, on order.

A TWX from IX Corps directing that all training firing conducted in rear of front lines would be scheduled in advance was published on 1 September. The directive also stated that all units would be notified of any scheduled training firing, including units firing, times of firing, weapons, firing points, direction of fire, impact areas and danger areas; also that any unauthorized firing would be immediately investigated. Division headquarters directed strict compliance and also directed that requests for firing would be submitted to reach Division headquarters at least 24 hours in advance of any firing scheduled.

In order that the Division headquarters could make firm plans for the continued operation of the Division Signal School, each regiment, Division Artillery, and separate units were directed to make a survey of prospective signal specialists needed in order to insure the maximum efficiency in communications operations within units. Units were directed to submit the number of additional personnel they desired trained at the Signal School.

On 1 September a Training Memorandum was published which directed the Commanding Officer 35th Infantry Regiment to set up a model area to include emplacements and targets to demonstrate for personnel of the Division the effectiveness of the

5. Operations Instructions 249, Book 4, Part 1
6. Msg, 1 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
7. Ltr, Sig Spec Survey, 1 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
8. Trg Memo 22, 1 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1

57mm and 75mm Recoilless Rifles in the reduction of bunker type emplacements.

Points to be stressed in the demonstration included selection of positions, tactical disposition, accuracy of fire, types and construction of targets, range cards, camouflage, use in offense and defense, communication, and displacement.

In order to facilitate rapid reporting of locations of units in tactical operations a list of check points was published on 3 September. This system was not to preclude the use of coordinates, and the list was not to be disseminated below battalion and separate unit level.

In a letter directive on 5 September it was noted that recent inspections of Line Wyoming disclosed discrepancies as pertained to revetments, drainage, overhead cover, camouflage and unfinished emplacements. The attention of the regimental commanders and the Commanding General Turkish Armed Forces Command, Commanding Officers of the 65th Engineer Battalion, 89th Tank Battalion, and 25th Reconnaissance Company was directed to the provisions of FM 5-15, Field Fortifications, and FM 5-35, Reference Data. These commanders were also directed to take immediate action to correct the deficiencies indicated in the letter and other deficiencies as noted by unit inspecting officers.

On 5 September instructions were issued to the Commanding General Turkish Armed Forces Command and to the Commanders of the 24th and 27th Regiments that tactical wire presently laid on the MLR along Line Wyoming in zone would be expanded to include three (3) bands of double apron wire. Bands of tactical wire were to be continuous across the Division front following trace of interlocking final protective lines. In addition, machine gun positions, strong points, and all other tactical localities would be completely wired in with protective wire. Due to the shortage of standard barbed wire concertina, it was to be used only for movable barriers, and when using concertina, the triple fence was to be constructed for maximum effectiveness. Regiments and Brigade were to coordinate tie-in points.

Commanders were directed to place increased emphasis on the effective utilization of ambush patrols, primarily with the mission of capturing prisoners and gaining information of enemy dispositions and plans. The directive called

9. Ltr of Instruction, 3 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
10. Ltr, Improvement of Field Fortifications, 5 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
11. Ltr of Instruction, 5 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
12. Combat Bulletin #3, 5 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1

1-9

attention to the fact that a great deal of prior planning is necessary before an ambush patrol may be sent on its mission. The enemy's location, habits and routes of approach to friendly lines must be known, and troops must be thoroughly briefed on the terrain over which they must operate. The importance of the clarity of the mission of the patrol, the knowledge of all friendly dispositions including wire and mine field positions, and the necessity for sandtable briefings and rehearsals was emphasized. The directive also discussed the importance of selection of proper equipment, that communications should be maintained, that pyrotechnic signals should be carried for emergency use, and that items of value to the enemy and noisy equipment should not be carried. After the patrol and the ambush site were selected and the mission carefully firmed up, the importance of conducting realistic rehearsals was stressed, and wherever possible rehearsals should be conducted on ground as near identical as possible to that over which the patrol will actually operate.

13

Instructions also issued on the 5th of September announced that the Signal School at SUWON would graduate students from the Switchboard Operator's Course, Field Wireman's Course and Message Center Course on the 10th and 14th of September and that new classes would begin training on 11 and 17 September. Quotas announced were 30 students for each course, based on the survey directed on 1 September.

14

Operation Plan Bump published on 6 September assumed that the enemy had made a penetration of the MLR and holds the high ground in the vicinity of CP5737. The Division would counterattack to restore the MLR. The 24th Infantry was directed to secure the east shoulder of the penetration and support the counterattack by fire, the 35th Infantry was to counterattack, using one battalion. This battalion was to be relieved on the MLR by elements of the TAFC on order. The TAFC was to secure the west shoulder of the MLR and support the counterattack by fire, prepared to relieve the battalion of the 35th Infantry on the MLR on order. The Division Artillery was to be prepared to mass fire in support of counterattack and to seal off penetration from enemy elements. All fires were to be coordinated within the penetration area by the Commander of the 35th Infantry. (See overlay diagram for plan attached to Operation Plan 24.)

13. Ltr. Sig Spec School, 5 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1

14. Operations Plan 24, 6 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1

The 25th Reconnaissance Company was directed to conduct a reconnaissance on 7 September, utilizing the company less wheeled vehicles. (See overlay accompanying Operations Plan 256 for area to be reconnoitered.) The mission assigned was to determine and report to the Division headquarters the trafficability and capacity of roads and trails in the area, to determine cross-country trafficability of area to include rice paddies, location and condition of fords between points A and B and type traffic each will take, condition of Bridge at C, location, type, and extent of mine fields, anti-tank ditches, and other obstacles in area, and location, strength and disposition of enemy along route. The Reconnaissance Company was directed to coordinate with the TAFC and the Commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment. The 65th Engineer Combat Battalion was directed to provide one minesweeping team for the operation, the 89th Medium Tank Battalion was directed to assist in vehicle evacuation and the Division Air Section was directed to provide continuous air cover during the operation.

16

In a message dated 8 September the Regimental Commanders and the Commanding General TAFC were directed that all units intensify and extend aggressive patrols to depth necessary to maintain contact and to insure continuous surveillance of enemy activities as recent enemy offensive action coupled with other indications point toward the possible launching of a major enemy offensive in the near future.

17

The 25th Reconnaissance Company was directed to conduct reconnaissance to the vicinity of CT5743 on 8 September to determine enemy strength and dispositions, provide a screen for the 35th Infantry tank-infantry force operating in the vicinity of CT5640 and CT5642.

18

On 8 September the 25th Division issued orders to attack and seize Line Ohio, maintain the present MLR. IX Corps continues to occupy Line Wyoming. The 24th Infantry was to utilize one company, attack without delay to seize and secure Objective England (see overlay attached to Operations Order 38), maintain the present MLR, maintain patrol contact with Objective England and with the right flank of the 35th Infantry from Objective England. The 35th Infantry was to attack in zone without delay to seize and secure Line Ohio with Company C, 89th Tank Battalion and Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion attached. The Regiment

15. Operations Instructions 256, Book 4, Part 1
16. Msg, 8 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
17. Msg, 8 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 1
18. Operations Order 38, Book 4, Part 1

was to organize and occupy positions on the best terrain, coordinating with the TAFIC on the left in the vicinity of CT5245. The TAFIC was to utilize one battalion, attack in zone without delay to seize and secure Line Ohio, maintain present MLR, to organize and occupy defensive positions on best terrain, coordinate with the 35th Infantry on the right in the vicinity of CT5245, and to maintain patrol contact with the TAFIC on Line Ohio in zone. The 19th Infantry Regiment (attached from the 24th Infantry Division) was to close into a designated assembly area and prepare for offensive action on order. The Division Artillery was to support the attacking regiments and the 19th Infantry on order. The 89th Medium Tank Battalion was to be prepared for offensive action in the Division zone. The 14th Infantry Regiment was designated as Division reserve. Instructions issued on the 9th of September directed that the 24th Infantry also screen vicinity of CT5935 with one platoon to block enemy movement south and west, and the 19th Infantry was to seize Line Pivot on 9 September by attacking through the 24th Infantry sector.

20

On 9 September the TAFIC and the 35th Infantry were directed to continue attack to Line Ohio in zone.

21

Operations Instructions issued 10 September directed the 24th Infantry Regiment to utilize one infantry company and continue to secure the high ground in the vicinity of CT5942, to block enemy movement to the south and west, to utilize one platoon and screen the ridge in the vicinity of CT5942, commencing 100600 September. The 35th Infantry was to attack at the same time to secure hill 682, vicinity of CT5545, upon securing objective to screen to the north in zone, to initiate reconnaissance and be prepared to occupy patrol base (see overlay with Operations Instruction 259). The TAFIC was directed to screen north in zone, to initiate reconnaissance at once and be prepared to establish designated patrol bases, and to be prepared to move battalion to assembly area. The 19th Infantry was to attack northwest toward hill 682, 100600 September in coordination with the 35th Infantry Regiment, to screen north in zone in area east of HANJIAN River, to initiate reconnaissance at once in preparation for withdrawal to assembly area. All units were directed to capture prisoners, inflict maximum damage on the enemy, search for and evacuate friendly stragglers, wounded and deceased personnel.

19. Operations Order 39, Book 4, Part 1

20. Operations Instruction 259, Book 4, Part 1

21. Operations Instructions 259, Book 4, Part 1

Orders issued the 10th of September directed the 19th RCT to initiate thorough screening operation to Line Jersey (see overlay attached to Operations Instructions 261) in zone on order, also on order to initiate withdrawal from Line Jersey to designated assembly area (see overlay). The 24th Infantry Regiment was directed to cover withdrawal of the 19th RCT from Line Jersey with one company, and upon order to withdraw the company located in vicinity of CT5942 within MLR in zone along Line Wyoming. The 35th Infantry was, on order, to initiate a thorough screening operation to Line Jersey in zone, to establish company size patrol base vicinity of CT5542, prepared to cover withdrawal of elements of the TAFC from Line Jersey, and, on order, to initiate withdrawal, less company on patrol base, from Line Jersey to assembly areas. The TAFC was directed, on order, to initiate thorough screening operation with the 2nd Battalion to Line Jersey in zone, to establish and maintain company size patrol bases vicinity of CT5440 and CT5238, and upon order to initiate withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion less companies on patrol bases from Line Jersey to assembly area, to conduct aggressive patrolling from patrol bases to give early warning of enemy advance, determine enemy strength and disposition, and capture prisoners of war.

23

Operations Order issued on 11 September directed an attack at 120600 September to seize Line Sloan. (See overlay attached to Operations Order 39.) The 24th Infantry, less the 3rd Battalion was to attack utilizing Company A, 79th Medium Tank Battalion. The 27th Infantry with the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, attached was to attack in left of its zone 120500 and in right of zone 120730 September, coordinating advance with elements of the 2nd ROK Division on the right. Division Artillery was to prepare to mass fires of not less than three battalions in support of attack of the 27th Infantry. Attacking units had elements of the 89th Tank Battalion attached.

24

Operations Orders issued 13 September regrouped the Division along the MLR effective 14 September. The 14th Infantry Regiment relieved elements of the TAFC and 24th Infantry Regiment in zone. The 27th Infantry was to establish and maintain an OPLR along general line designated (see overlay attached to Operations Order 40).

22. Operations Instructions 261, Book 4, Part 2

23. Operations Order 39, Book 4, Part 2

24. Operations Order 40, Book 4, Part 2

The 14th Infantry was directed, in case of a withdrawal from the MLR, to take action to remove or destroy the bridge in the vicinity of CT5638 on orders from Division headquarters. This action relieved the TAFC of this responsibility.

A letter containing tactical observations of the Commanding General Eighth Army was reproduced and distributed on 12 September to all units of the Division.
26
It was directed that the contents of the publication be brought to the attention of all personnel of the Division and that corrective action be taken to ensure against recurrence of the discrepancies noted therein.

27

On 15 September the 25th Division was directed, on order, to conduct raids employing strong tank-infantry forces to overrun and capture or destroy enemy personnel and materiel. This was part of a IX Corps operation to disrupt hostile concentrations and to inflict maximum destruction on enemy personnel, materiel and fortifications. Task Force Byorum was to be prepared to conduct a raid along axis (see overlay attached to Operations Order 41). The 14th Infantry was to organize and be prepared to commit Task Force Lynx, the 27th Infantry was to organize and be prepared to commit Task Force Wolfhound. The 35th Infantry, minus one battalion, in Division reserve, was directed to form Task Force Lightning with one battalion of infantry and other supporting elements, prepared to extricate Task Force Lynx or Wolfhound. Target date was set as 19 September and detail plans for raid of Task Forces Lynx and Wolfhound were to be submitted prior to 171200 September.

On 16 September an Eighth Army message that in the event of a withdrawal from prepared defensive positions, AP and AU mine fields will be left in place was
28
published for information and compliance.

A Training Memorandum on the subject of Escape and Evasion was published on 16 September. In order to impress upon the individual soldier the importance of proper escape and evasion procedures, it was directed that a minimum of three hours instruction, including one hour of conference type instruction followed by a discussion period, would be scheduled. Training of newly-arrived replacements

- 25. Operations Instructions 263, Book 4, Part 2
- 26. Ltr, Hq 25th Div, 15 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2
- 27. Operations Order 41, Book 4, Part 2
- 28. Msg, 16 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2
- 29. Trg Memo 23, 16 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2

in E & E procedures was to be completed within 30 days after assignment and refresher training was to be conducted every six months. Regimental CIC personnel were to be used to assist in this training. An Eighth Army training memorandum was attached to the directive as a guide for preparation of instructional material.

30

It was announced on 17 September that the Division Signal Specialist School would graduate students in the Switchboard Operator's Course and Field Wireman's Course on 19 September. New classes were announced as commencing on 20 September and quotas were given to the regiments and Division Artillery for students to attend the new class.

31

A training directive published on 17 September outlined a program of instruction on the subject of Cold Injury Control. It was directed that separate unit Cold Injury Control Teams would report at Division Main CP to receive instruction from a Quartermaster Wet-Cold Training Team on 27 and 28 September. It was planned that unit teams would return to units and instruct Company Cold Injury Control personnel in the importance of the Division cold injury control program and in the measures necessary to lessen the number of casualties from cold weather.

32

A memorandum published on 17 September directed the minimum requirements for enlisted personnel of the Division relative to Atomic Energy Indoctrination. It was planned that the prescribed training would be accomplished by each commander as expeditiously as possible but in no case later than 15 October. The directive outlined the lesson plans, listed available instructor personnel and stated that the objective of the program was to indoctrinate all enlisted personnel of the command in elementary aspects of Atomic Energy Information and to dispel misinformation to which the average person has been exposed through normal reading and conversation.

33

An order regrouping the Division along Line Wyoming in sector was issued on 17 September. The 35th Infantry Regiment was directed to relieve the 27th Infantry Regiment in sector, relief to be completed by 1200 hours on the 19th. The units on the MLR and outguard bases were directed to patrol daily and nightly to the north in zone to determine enemy strength and disposition, to obtain enemy

30. Ltr, Sig Spec School, 17 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2

31. Trg Memo 24, 17 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2

32. Trg Memo 25, 17 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2

33. Operations Order 42, Book 4, Part 2

information and identification and to capture prisoners. Detailed patrol plans were to be submitted to reach Division Headquarters 72 hours in advance of patrol departure. The order directed continued improvement of the positions along the MLR. Tactical wire along the MLR was to be continuous across the Division sector and was to consist of three bands of double apron wire, the center band to be a minimum of seven feet in height. Unit commanders were directed to coordinate on tie-in points.

³⁴
Operations Order 41 was rescinded on 18 September. Orders issued on that date directed the Division to conduct raids employing strong infantry-tank forces to overrun and capture or destroy enemy personnel and materiel. This was part of IX Corps mission to conduct operations to disrupt hostile concentrations, inflict maximum destruction on enemy personnel, materiel and fortifications. Task Force Byorum was to be prepared to conduct raids along axis (see overlay attached to Operations Order 43). The order directed that Task Force Lynx and Task Force Hamilton would secure designated objectives to accomplish the Division mission, that Task Force Lightning would be prepared to assist either Task Force on order. D-Day for the operation was to be announced.

³⁵
Orders issued on the 19th of September directed that rehearsals for Division counterattack plans would be conducted by Task Force Lightning on dates as follows:

Plan Bump	22 September (See Operations Plan 29, 20 Sept) (revised)
Plan Slug	23 September (See Operations Plan 27, 19 Sept)
Plan Jolt	24 September (See Operations Plan 28, 19 Sept)
Plan Punch	25 September (See Operations Plan 26, 19 Sept)
Plan Thump	26 September (See Operations Plan 25, 19 Sept)

³⁶
Observations made by the Commanding Officer 24th Infantry Regiment as to results of operations on 15 September were published in a directive on 22 September. It was recommended that all units employing artillery or mortar concentrations on hilltop objectives use some means for signalling the last round of the concentration other than a round of WP, that units employ the ruse of throwing out the round of WP, cease fire for 4 or 5 minutes while directing small arms to simulate the attack, and then open up with a TOU from as many batteries as possible.

Task Forces Lynx and Hamilton were discontinued effective 220600 September.

34. Operations Order 43, 18 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2

35. Mag, 19 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 2

36. Combat Bulletin #4, 22 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3

A directive was issued on 20 September directing that immediate action would be taken to familiarize all personnel of the Division with the proper use of countersigns.

D-day, H-hour for Operations Order 43 was announced as 210545 September.

Operations Plans for Operation Cudgel were published on 23 September. Superceding plans for this operation were published on 24 September. The Division was directed to attack in zone to seize Line Fargo and protect the IX Corps west flank. This was part of IX Corps' mission of attacking and destroying the enemy in zone, seizing assigned objectives and Line Fargo in zone. (See overlay attached to Operations Plan 31.) Under this operation Phase I, D-1, two battalions of the TAFG were to seize hill 717, the 14th Infantry Regiment to seize hill 682 and the high ground in the vicinity, supported by tanks, which were to attack Objectives Patton and Rose by fire. Phase II, D-day, (Target date - 28 September 1951) the 27th Infantry was to seize Objectives Dean and Eddy, the 24th Infantry to seize Objective Davis. It was a movement from the defensive to an attack, then to the defensive. One problem was presented in the left flank, and this security mission was assigned to the 25th Reconnaissance Company. The 27th Infantry had Task Force Lightning attached, and maximum utilization was to be made of tank forces to attack objectives from flanks and rear. Upon occupation of Line Fargo defensive positions utilizing most favorable terrain were to be prepared. An outpost line from which to send strong patrols north in zone was to be established.

On the 24th of September it was announced that the Division Signal Specialist School would graduate students from Switchboard Operator's, Field Wireman's and Message Center Courses on 28 September. New quotas were established for new courses in the same subjects to begin on 1 October.

In order to permit new replacements to become known and effective members of their respective teams, it was directed that they be integrated into their units only while those units were in reserve. They were not to join front line units engaged in the attack, and every effort was to be made to permit new replacements to be with their assigned organization a minimum of ten days prior to commitment

- 37. Ltr, 20 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3
- 38. Mag, 20 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3
- 39. Operations Plan 30, 23 September 1951, Book 4, Part 3
- 40. Operations Plan 31, 24 September 1951, Book 4, Part 3
- 41. Ltr, Sig Spec School, 24 Sept, 1951, Book 4, Part 3
- 42. Ltr of Instruction, 25 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3

in combat.

43

Orders issued on the 26th of September directed that each individual and crew served weapon would be inspected daily by an officer. This was to include all service as well as combat units because experience had demonstrated that no echelon is free from attack.

44

The 14th Infantry Regiment was directed to relieve the 24th Infantry Regiment in sector on 1 October. The relief was to be completed by 1200 hours on that date. The 24th Infantry was directed to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of CT5224 for inactivation.

45

The 14th, 24th Regiments and the TAFIC were directed to conduct patrols daily in zone from outguard bases north to the 46 East-West grid line, to conduct patrols daily from the MLR north to a point generally on line with outguard bases in zone and to submit detailed reports of patrol activities to Division headquarters by 2300 hours daily.

46

In a directive issued on the 29th of September it was noted that in a recent instance a false report concerning an alleged infiltration by the enemy was widely disseminated throughout the command. It was directed that when a report was received concerning activities of either enemy or friendly elements that the person receiving the report should note the name, rank and unit of the individual submitting it, so that the original source may be quickly traced if additional information or verification is necessary. As rumors tend to become exaggerated as they spread, they should be traced to their source so that factual information can be verified.

47

Operations Plan Hangfire was published for planning purposes on the 30th of September. This directed the 25th Division to withdraw, on order, to Line Dallas (see overlay attached to Operations Plan 32) utilizing delaying tactics to effect maximum punishment and delay on the enemy while part of IX Corps coordinated withdrawal to occupy and defend Line Kansas. The plan directed the Division to pass through the 3rd US Division positions on Line Kansas, and assemble in the vicinity of UIJONGBU, CS2878, where the 25th Division would pass to operational control

43. Ltr of Instruction, 26 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3


44. Operations Instructions 271, Book 4, Part 3

45. Operations Instructions 270, Book 4, Part 3

46. Ltr, Source of Reports, 29 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3

47. Operations Plan 32, 30 Sep 1951, Book 4, Part 3

of the CG EUSAK. The Division was to prepare to occupy and defend Line Kansas from CT3807 to CT5804 in the event the 3rd Division was unable to occupy Line Kansas. In that event the 25th Division was to pass to operational control CG I US Corps, on IX Corps order, when Line Kansas is occupied.



SITUATION AS OF 01 SEPTEMBER 1951

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6

PART II

(3) Narrative Operations

1 The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled in the vicinity of
Sept CT4900. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of CT5309 and
1951 CT5116, respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming, and maintained an OPLR along the 41 E-W grid line. At 0600 hours, Company B, minus, departed the MLR to establish positions along the 43 E-W grid line to provide security for the 2nd Battalion preparing new fortifications forward of the MLR. At 1520 hours in the vicinity of CT6142 Company B, minus, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. At 1645 hours they disengaged and closed into the MLR by 1900 hours. At 0030 hours a platoon-size patrol from the 2nd Battalion engaged an unknown number of enemy using small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars vicinity of CT6243. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy, and at 0130 hours the patrol broke contact and closed the OPLR at 0430 hours. Elements of the 2nd Battalion established new OPLR positions vicinity of CT6241, CT6141 and CT6342, each position occupied by two rifle squads. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A platoon-size patrol from the 2nd Battalion was engaged by an unknown number of enemy vicinity of CT6640 employing small arms and automatic weapons at 2335 hours. The patrol was ordered to withdraw at 2345 hours, and closed into the MLR at 0040 hours with no further enemy contact. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838, and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved blocking positions vicinity of CT6334 to CT6437. The 3rd Battalion, minus, maintained and improved blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. Company K maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5345. One platoon of Company K departed the patrol base at 2000 hours enroute to ambush positions.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and im-

proved blocking positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion, minus, maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5535 and CT5438. Elements of the 2nd Battalion⁴⁸ maintained an OPLR.

2
Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT4900. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of CS4999 and CT5114, respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming, and maintained an OPLR between the 41 and 42 E-W grid lines. A reinforced platoon of Company A departed the MLR at 0705 hours to occupy objective vicinity of CT6143 to provide security for elements of the 2nd Battalion preparing fortifications for a new MLR. At 1400 hours the platoon was in the vicinity of CT6142 where they received 10-15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy. The patrol withdrew at 1715 hours and at 1925 hours closed into OPLR. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. Wolfhound Raiders departed the MLR at 2135 hours. At 2250 hours one squad of this patrol was forced to return to the MLR by enemy fire. The remainder of the patrol continued on mission enroute to objective vicinity of CT6941. At 2245 hours a squad-size enemy probing attack vicinity of CT6640 was beaten off by mortar and artillery fire. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained assembled vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838, and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve position vicinity of CT6230. Company E organized and maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT6236. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve position vicinity of CT5632. Company K maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5345. A platoon-size patrol of Company K departed the patrol base at 0745 hours, and at 1330 hours the patrol was on objective vicinity of CT5548 where it engaged an enemy squad with small arms fire. At 1500 hours the patrol departed the objective and closed into the patrol base at 1600 hours. At 1930 hours the Cacti Raiders departed the MLR enroute to objective vicinity of CT5846.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion, minus, maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5535 and CT5433. Elements of the 2nd Battalion maintained and OPLR as previously reported.

3
Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT5000. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of GS5099 and CT5809, respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming, and maintained an OPLR along the 41 E-W grid line. A two squad-size patrol from the 2nd Battalion arrived at objective vicinity of CT6142 at 022245 hours. At 2330 hours the patrol observed an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT5942 and CT6143 and placed artillery fire on enemy with unknown results. The patrol departed the objective at 2355 hours, closing the MLR at 0140 hours with no further enemy observation or contact. At 2345 hours, F Company outpost vicinity of CT6241 received long range machine gun and mortar fire, and at 0040 hours the outpost was surrounded by enemy. By 0140 hours, the outpost had repulsed three assaults by an estimated enemy company. At 0010 hours, G Company outpost vicinity of CT6341 received heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire and withdrew to vicinity of CT6241 at 0045 hours. By 0200 hours the enemy had broken contact and the OPLR was restored. A platoon-size patrol from the 1st Battalion departed the MLR at 0630 hours, reached objective vicinity of CT6143 by 1140 hours, and closed into the MLR at 2010 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained positions along Line Wyoming. A Wolfhound Raider patrol reached vicinity of CT6940 and CT6939 before being forced to withdraw at 022235 hours because of heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The patrol closed into the MLR by 0310 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of CT6230. Company E maintained blocking position vicinity of CT6236. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of

CT5632. I Company maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5345. A Cacti Raider patrol departed forward assembly area vicinity of CT5643 at 2100 hours and reached objective vicinity of CT5846 at 0230 hours. The patrol screened the objective, and departed at 0235 hours, closing assembly area vicinity of CT6230 at 0945 hours with no enemy contact.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5535 and CT5433, and maintained an OPLR. A company-sized patrol from the 2nd Battalion departed the MLR at 0730 hours and by 1200 hours were on objectives vicinity of CT5443, CT5242 and CT5041 with no enemy contact. The patrol departed objectives at 1630 hours and closed into the MLR at 1800 hours.

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1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT4900. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of CS5099 and CT5809, respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming and maintained an OPLR along the 41.5 E-W grid line. The 2nd Battalion adjusted the MLR extending from vicinity of CT6040 to CT6341 effective at 1730 hours. The 1st Battalion adjusted its right flank to tie-in with the 2nd Battalion vicinity of CT6341 effective at 2035 hours. A platoon-size patrol from the 2nd Battalion departed the MLR at 2030 hours. A patrol of 2 squads from the 1st Battalion departed the MLR at 2130 hours. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 1st Battalion adjusted left flank to vicinity of CT6341 to tie-in with elements of the 24th Infantry. A squad-size patrol from the 1st Battalion briefly engaged an unknown number of enemy using small arms and automatic weapons vicinity of CT6441 at 0110 hours. The patrol withdrew and closed into the MLR at 0130 hours. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A two-squad size patrol from the 3rd Battalion departed the MLR at 0300 hours and at 0525 hours engaged an estimated 10 enemy using small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenades at close range vicinity of CT6840.

At 0535 hours the patrol withdrew and closed into the MLR at 0600 hours with no further enemy contact.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of CT6230. Company E maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT6236. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. Company L maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5345. A platoon-size patrol departed Company L patrol base at 1930 hours.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5535 and CT5433, and maintained an OPLR. A patrol from the 2nd Battalion departed the MLR at 0715 hours, and by 1200 hours were on objectives vicinity of CT5443, CT5242 and CT5642 with no enemy contact. The patrol departed objectives at 1600 hours and closed into the OPLR by 1800 hours.

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Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT4900. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of GS4999 and CT5708, respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming and maintained an OPLR along the 41.5 E-W grid line as previously reported. A patrol from G Company advanced to vicinity of CT6142 at 1555 hours and received enemy mortar fire. The patrol withdrew and placed 4.2-inch mortar fire on the enemy. The patrol was ordered to withdraw to friendly lines at 1650 hours and closed into the MLR by 1850 hours. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. At 1610 hours elements of Company C vicinity of CT6740 received small arms and automatic weapons fire. Enemy fire was silenced by friendly 4.2 inch mortar fire.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838, and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking posi-

tions vicinity of CT6230. Company E maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT6236. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. Company L maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5345.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5535, CT5433 and an OPLR. A company-size patrol from the 2nd Battalion departed the MLR at 0730 hours and by 1200 hours elements of the patrol were vicinity of CT5441 and CT5440 with no enemy contact. The patrol departed objectives vicinity of CT5040, CT5242, and CT5542 at 1630 hours and closed friendly lines at 1830 hours.

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Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT4900. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of CT4999 and CT5808, respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming, and maintained an OPLR along the 41.5 E-W grid-line. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A platoon-size ambush patrol from the 1st Battalion departed the MLR at 0240 hours and at 0330 hours engaged an unknown number of enemy using small arms, automatic weapons and mortars vicinity of CT6540. The patrol withdrew at 0345 hours and placed 81mm mortar and 4.2 mortar on the enemy with unknown results. At 0410 hours the patrol closed into the MLR with no further enemy contact. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve position vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6838, CT6636, and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of CT6230. Company E maintained blocking position vicinity CT6236. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. Company I departed assembly area vicinity of CT5632 at 1315 hours and closed into patrol base at 1830 hours. Company I and Company L maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5345.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and im-

proved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion maintained blocking positions
vicinity of CT5535 and CT5433, and maintained an OPLR.

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7
Sept
1951 The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT4900. The
2nd and 3rd Battalions remained assembled vicinity of CS4999 and CT5308, respec-
tively.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained positions on Line Wyo-
ming. At 1310 hours right elements of a platoon-size patrol from Company F received
small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy squad vicinity of
CT6142. The patrol withdrew and placed mortar fire on the enemy. Left elements
of the patrol reached CT6042 at 1410 hours. Patrol was ordered to return to
friendly lines at 1730 hours and closed into the MLR at 1810 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained positions on Line Wyo-
ming. At 0055 hours, Company C received a probing attack vicinity of CT6640 by an
estimated enemy company employing small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 0115
hours the enemy withdrew. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions
vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained positions
on Line Wyoming.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of
CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in blocking posi-
tions vicinity of CT6230. Company E maintained blocking positions vicinity of
CT6236. Companies I and L maintained a patrol base on hill 717, vicinity of
CT5345, and hill 682, vicinity of CT5545. At 0025 hours hill 682 and hill 717
were attacked by an estimated enemy battalion employing small arms, automatic
weapons and mortar fire. The attack was repulsed but sporadic fire continued
throughout the period. At 0830 hours, Company K departed the assembly area vicini-
ty CT5632 to reinforce Companies I and L on patrol base. At 0955 hours, Company
K vicinity of CT5641 received small arms, and mortar fire from vicinity of hill
432, CT5642. Company F departed assembly area vicinity of CT6231 at 1530 hours
and at 1715 hours secured high ground vicinity of CT5642. At 2000 hours Company K
joined with Company F to set up a perimeter defense on high ground vicinity of
CT5642. Company I and Company L were forced to withdraw from patrol base on hill
717 and hill 682 by heavy enemy attack at 1656 hours. At the close of the period

these companies had not closed into perimeter of high ground secured by Company F and Company K.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5535, CT5433 and an OPLR. The 5th Company departed the MLR at 1625 hours and at 1800 hours occupied hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. The 6th Company departed the assembly area vicinity of CT5434 at 1300 hours and at 1720 hours secured hill 432, vicinity of CT5642.

At 0600 hours the 25th Reconnaissance Company crossed the LD vicinity of CT5639 to reconnoiter trafficability of the area along the HANTAN-CHON River north to the 48 E-W grid line. At 1125 hours lead elements in the vicinity of CT5741 were under heavy small arms fire from hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. At 1155 hours the fire ceased. At 1730 hours lead elements in the vicinity of CT5742 were ordered to withdraw to friendly lines. At 1830 hours the Company had closed into assembly area vicinity of CT5432.⁵⁴

8
Sept
1951 The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, departed blocking positions vicinity of CT5632 at 1658 hours and closed into reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837 at 1900 hours. The 2nd Battalion departed CS4999 at 1432 hours and by 1730 hours occupied blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5308.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained positions on Line Wyoming. A platoon-size patrol from Company C departed the MLR at 0730 hours and at 0943 hours were in the vicinity of CT6142 engaged with a small number of enemy using small arms and automatic weapons. At 1750 hours the patrol received a heavy volume of small arms fire. At 1755 hours the patrol placed 4.2 mortar fire on the enemy. At the same time the platoon was ordered to return and closed friendly lines at 1835 hours. Company B departed the MLR at 1515 hours to attack and secure hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. At 1650 hours the company was located at CT5942 and received small arms fire from vicinity of CT5943. At 1735 hours lead elements received heavy small arms fire and placed artillery fire on hill 351. After the artillery lifted, lead elements continued the attack and secured hill 351 at 1815 hours. The enemy withdrew to the north. The 3rd Battalion remained under opera-

tional control BUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained positions on Line Wyoming. A two-squad patrol from Company C encountered an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT6442 employing small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire at 1345 hours. The patrol retaliated with small arms and automatic weapons fire and was ordered to withdraw. The patrol closed into friendly lines at 1530 hours. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company L and elements of Company K maintained positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, departed reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838, and CT6837 at 2200 hours and closed into hill 432, vicinity of CT5642, at 2330 hours. The 2nd Battalion closed into perimeter on hill 528, vicinity of CT5443, at 2315 hours. At 1845 hours elements of Company I and Company L closed assembly area vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained positions on Line Wyoming. At 1930 hours the 5th Company secured the high ground vicinity of CT5240 to CT5241; the 6th Company secured the high ground vicinity of CT5241 to CT5340; the 7th Company secured the high ground vicinity of CT5340 to CT5250.

The 25th Reconnaissance Company departed the LD vicinity of CT5640 at 0825 hours and by 1005 hours were in the vicinity of CT5742 with no enemy contact. At 1735 hours lead elements vicinity of CT5742 attacked by fire hill 351, vicinity of CT5942, and supported the advance of Company B, 24th Infantry to secure the hill. The 25th Reconnaissance Company was ordered to return at 1830 hours and closed into assembly area vicinity of CT5432 at 1930 hours.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion occupied blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5308.

The 19th RCT was attached for operational control to the 25th Infantry Division effective 090030/1 September 1951. The 1st Battalion closed vicinity of CT5632 at 082300 September 1951, and at 0435 hours moved out to attack position. At 0840 hours the 1st Battalion crossed the LD and at 1125 hours were in the vicinity of CT5642 with no enemy contact. The 2nd Battalion closed assembly area vicinity of CT5636 at 0230 hours and crossed the LD at 0840 hours. By 1125 hours the battalion was in the vicinity of CT5943 with no enemy contact. The 3rd Battalion closed

assembly area vicinity of CT5632 at 0048 hours and at 0145 hours had moved to a forward assembly area vicinity of CT5639 preparatory to crossing the LD. The battalion crossed the LD at 0840 hours and at 1125 hours were in the vicinity of CT5641 in Regimental reserve. By 2000 hours all battalions were disposed for night defense.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained positions on Line Wyoming. Company B maintained a company perimeter on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. At 0035 hours, Company B was attacked by an estimated enemy company employing small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenades. The engagement continued until 0050 hours when the enemy withdrew. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Elements of Companies K and I maintained positions on Line Wyoming. A two-squad ambush patrol from Company A departed the MLR at 2140 hours. At 2256 hours the patrol reached vicinity of CT6441 and received heavy small arms fire. The patrol was ordered to withdraw and closed into friendly lines at 2310 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, maintained a perimeter on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642, and at 0740 hours moved out in the attack. By 1200 hours Company B was on hill 528, vicinity of CT5443, Company C was in the vicinity of CT5543 and Company A was to their rear with no enemy contact. The 2nd Battalion maintained a defense perimeter on hill 528. At 0038 hours the perimeter was probed by an estimated enemy platoon using small arms and automatic weapons. The engagement was continued until 0400 hours at which time the enemy withdrew. The battalion jumped off at 0600 hours in a fire fight with an estimated enemy battalion on hill 717 employing small arms and automatic weapons. By 1930 hours hill 717, vicinity of CT5345, was secured by the 2nd Battalion (plus company K) and the enemy withdrew to the north. The battalion tied in with elements of the Turkish Armed Forces Command on the left and prepared to defend the hill for the night. By 2000 hours, the 1st Battalion had gained the high ground vicinity of CT5544 south of hill 682 and prepared to defend it for the night. The 3rd Battalion maintained a night perimeter on hill 528, vicinity of CT5443.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion maintained a perimeter on hill 503, vicinity of

CT5240. At 0530 hours the 2nd Battalion attacked north and by 1200 hours lead elements of the battalion were on hill 446, vicinity of CT5244, from which position they supported by fire the 35th Infantry's attack on hill 717. At 1630 hours, the 2nd Battalion dug in and prepared to defend hill 466 and hill 489, vicinity of CT5144, and tied in with elements of the 35th Infantry on the right. ⁵⁶

10 Sept 1951 The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837. The 2nd Battalion occupied blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5308.

At 0710 hours the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved from positions vicinity of CT5745 to objective hill 586, vicinity of CT5546, to support the attack of the 35th Infantry on the left. At 1100 hours lead elements reached hill 586 without opposition. The 3rd Battalion moved at 0630 hours from vicinity of CT5642 and by 1100 hours were on hill 387, vicinity of CT5745, without enemy contact. The 1st and 3rd Battalions screened north in zone to the 48 E-W grid line and upon reaching the line at 1400 hours, the battalions returned to the MLR screening the area as they moved. The battalions closed into the MLR at 2215 hours and at the close of the period the 1st Battalion was assembled vicinity of CT5632 and the 3rd Battalion was assembled vicinity of CT5732. The 2nd Battalion screened north in zone to hill 259, vicinity of CT5744 and at 1400 hours moved south maintaining flank security for the regiment. The 2nd Battalion closed into the MLR at 2215 hours and at the close of the period was in assembly area vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained positions along Line Wyoming. Company B secured the high ground vicinity of CT5942 and blocked enemy movement to the south and west. A platoon-size patrol departed Company B area at 0630 hours to screen the ridge vicinity of CT5942. The patrol from Company B which had maintained blocking positions vicinity of CT5942 returned to the company position by 1800 hours. Company C relieved Company B in place at 1930 hours and Company B closed into former positions on the MLR at 1950 hours. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company I and elements of Company K maintained positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, moved out in the attack at 0610 hours from the high ground vicinity of CT5544, and by 0925 hours elements had secured hill 682, vicinity of CT5545, with no enemy contact. The 2nd Battalion with Company K attached remained on hill 717, vicinity of CT5345, with no enemy contact. By 1200 hours elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions had screened the area north of hill 717 and hill 682 to the 48 E-W grid line. At 1400 hours the battalions began screening the area moving south, and by 1900 hours the 1st Battalion (minus) had closed the MLR and was assembled vicinity of CT6331. Company B established a patrol base on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642, at 1705 hours and at that time passed to operational control of the Turkish Armed Forces Command. The 2nd Battalion had closed into the MLR and was in assembly area vicinity of CT6331 by 1900 hours. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in Regimental reserve and began closing into the MLR at 1330 hours, and by 1900 hours the battalion was in assembly area vicinity of CT5632. Company K remained attached to the 2nd Battalion.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion screened north in zone to the 46 E-W grid line and at 1400 hours began screening south. The 5th Company established a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238, at 1930 hours. One platoon of the 5th Company maintained an outpost near the bridge in the vicinity of CT5639. The 6th Company closed into assembly area vicinity of CT5534 at 1720 hours. The 7th Company established a patrol base on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440, at 1930 hours. Company B, 35th Infantry established a patrol base on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642, at 1705 hours and at that time passed to operational control of the TAFG.

11 Sept 1951 The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, passed to operational control of the 27th Infantry Regiment at 1045 hours. The 2nd Battalion occupied blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. The 3rd Battalion departed assembly area vicinity of CT5101 at 0830 hours and closed into a new assembly area vicinity of CT5626 at 1100 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 19th Infantry, closed into assembly area vicinity of CS5197 at 1215 hours and 2015 hours, respectively. The 3rd Battalion closed into assembly area vicinity of CT5100 at 1517 hours. The Regiment reverted to parent unit control effective at 2015 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on

Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. Company C maintained a patrol base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5942. A platoon-size patrol from Company C departed the patrol base at 0730 hours and at 1315 hours the patrol received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated two enemy squads. The patrol withdrew and silenced enemy fire by placing heavy mortar and artillery fire on enemy positions vicinity of CT6143 and CT6044. The patrol closed into the patrol base at 1815 hours. At 2000 hours a two-squad size ambush patrol from the 2nd Battalion departed the MLR and reached ambush position vicinity of CT6341 at 2020 hours. A platoon-size raider patrol from the 1st Battalion departed the MLR at 1955 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6739. Company I and elements of Company K maintained positions on Line Wyoming. A two-squad size patrol from the 3rd Battalion departed the MLR at 0200 hours and at 0320 hours reached vicinity of CT6840 where the patrol engaged an estimated 8 to 10 enemy employing automatic weapons, small arms and hand grenades. The patrol withdrew at 0445 hours and closed into the MLR at 0540 hours with no further enemy contact. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (attached), remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained in assembly area vicinity of CT6433. Company B remained under operational control of the TAFC. The 2nd Battalion remained in assembly area vicinity of CT6331. The 3rd Battalion remained in assembly area vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5534. The 5th Company maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5238. The 7th Company maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5440. Company B, 35th Infantry, maintained a patrol base vicinity of CT5642. At 1500 hours all patrols were ordered to withdraw from objectives vicinity of CT5443, CT5243 and CT5644. Patrols closed into patrol bases at 1730 hours.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained under operational control of the 27th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion occupied blocking positions vicinity of CT5632.

The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5626.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company C departed the patrol base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5942, at 0605 hours and by 0915 hours had secured objective hill 275, vicinity of CT6043, without enemy resistance. From 0915 hours to 0930 hours Company C received long range machine gun fire from hill 419, vicinity of CT6044, and hill 400, vicinity of CT6143, and 10 rounds of estimated 60mm mortar fire from the rear of hill 400. Friendly tank, mortar and artillery fire was placed on hills 400 and 419 and the enemy fire ceased. At 1105 hours Company C departed hill 275 for hill 400. Company C remained engaged from 1205 to 1740 hours with an estimated two enemy platoons well dug-in vicinity of CT6142-CT6143 employing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. Under friendly tank, mortar and artillery fire Company C moved to vicinity of CT6142. At 1740 hours Company C was ordered to withdraw to the MLR and closed into friendly lines at 1920 hours with no further enemy contact. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

Company A, 27th Infantry, moved out at 0540 hours and at 0620 hours were in the vicinity of CT6540 engaging an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT6541 employing small arms and automatic weapons fire from bunkers. Companies B and C maintained positions on Line Wyoming. Company G moved out at 0515 hours and at 0700 hours engaged an estimated enemy squad in the vicinity of CT6640. At 0810 hours the company had secured the objective without further resistance. At 0622 hours Company B moved into positions formerly held by Company G on Line Wyoming. Company F remained in battalion reserve vicinity of CT6539. Company I moved out at 0855 hours, and at 0920 hours received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from hill 538, vicinity of CT6841. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on the enemy. Company K jumped off at 0925 hours and at 1010 hours had secured objective vicinity of CT6740 with no enemy resistance. Company A, 89th Tank Battalion, departed the MLR at 0630 hours and by 0715 hours had made an armored feint to CT6341. At 0730 hours Company A returned to the MLR enroute to the main effort in right of regimental sector. Company C, 89th Tank Battalion, crossed the MLR at 0700 hours and at 0920 hours were in the vicinity of CT6940 to support attack of the 3rd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838, and CT6837. At 1515 hours Company A, 27th Infantry, was stopped vicinity of CT6741 by enemy well

dug in on the objective. At 1505 hours Company B passed through Company A and destroyed the enemy on objective vicinity of CT6541 and secured objective at 1615 hours. The 1st Battalion then dug in and organized positions along Line Sloan extending from vicinity of CT6341 to CT6541 where it tied in with the 2nd Battalion. Company F with Company I attacked hill 538, vicinity of CT6841, at 1330 hours and at 1630 hours Company F secured the ground vicinity of CT6741. Company G plus one platoon from Company E organized the high ground vicinity of CT6540. The 2nd Battalion dug in along Line Sloan extending from CT6541 to CT6841. The 3rd Battalion advanced against strong enemy resistance and by 1710 hours Company I had secured hill 538 with strong tank, mortar and artillery support. By 1815 hours the 2nd Battalion organized defensive positions for the night extending from vicinity of CT6841 to CT6941 where it tied in with the 2nd ROK Division. At 1915 hours Company C, 35th Infantry passed to operational control of the 27th Infantry.

The 1st Battalion (minus), 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6433. Company B remained under operational control of the TAFG; Company C passed to operational control of the 27th Infantry at 1915 hours. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6331. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5535. The 5th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. The 7th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. Company B, 35th Infantry maintained a patrol base on hill 432, vicinity of CT⁵⁹5642.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained under operational control of the 27th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion occupied blocking positions vicinity of CT5632. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5626.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A platoon-size patrol from Company A departed the MLR at 0630 hours and at 1345 hours were engaged with an estimated enemy platoon employing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire in the vicinity of CT6042. The

patrol broke contact at 1700 hours and closed into the MLR at 1815 hours with no further enemy contact. A Company G outpost was attacked by an undetermined number of enemy employing small arms fire at 0005 hours. The enemy was dispersed by artillery, mortar and small arms fire at 0025 hours. A platoon-size patrol from Company E departed the MLR at 0610 hours and at 1150 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT6142 engaged with an undetermined number of enemy employing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. At 1600 hours the patrol broke contact and returned to the MLR at 1710 hours with no further enemy contact. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

All battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained defensive positions along Line Wyoming. Between 0400 and 0600 hours, 100 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on Company B vicinity of CT6541. At 122355 hours Company F began receiving small arms and machine gun fire from an undetermined number of enemy. The firing continued until 0410 hours. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on the enemy. Company I crossed the LD at 0850 hours and secured objective vicinity of CT6842 at 1105 hours after slight enemy resistance. C Company, 35th Infantry, remained in regimental reserve vicinity of CT6839. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6636, CT6838 and CT6837.

The 1st Battalion (minus), 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6433. Company B remained under operational control of the TAFC; Company C remained under operational control of the 27th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT 6331. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion, minus, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5535. The 5th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. The 7th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. Company B, 35th Infantry, maintained a patrol base on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642.

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Sept 1951 The 14th Infantry assumed responsibility for Line Wyoming extending from CT5538 to CT5940 effective at 1330 hours. The 1st Battalion, minus, remained in assembly area vicinity of CT5836. Company A effected the relief of Company B, 35th Infantry, on patrol base hill 432, vicinity of CT5642, at 1015 hours. The 2nd Battalion re-

lieved elements of the TAFC along Line Wyoming and maintained positions extending from vicinity of CT5538 to CT5839. The 3rd Battalion, minus, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. Company L effected the relief of Company B, 24th Infantry, on patrol base hill 351, vicinity of CT5842, at 1115 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company B maintained a patrol base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842, until 1115 hours when the company was relieved in place by Company L, 14th Infantry. A platoon-size patrol from Company B departed the patrol base at 0600 hours and at 0907 hours was in the vicinity of CT6043 engaged with an estimated 20 enemy employing small arms and automatic weapons fire. By 1010 hours the enemy had withdrawn to the north and the patrol was on hill 275. A platoon-size patrol from Company G departed the MLR at 0610 hours and at 1045 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT6142 enroute to objective vicinity of CT6143. Company B patrol at 1400 hours in conjunction with Company G patrol was prevented by enemy fire from seizing the high ground vicinity of CT6142. At 1535 hours Company B patrol was ordered to return and closed into the MLR at 1655 hours. The Company G patrol at 1245 hours engaged the enemy vicinity of CT6142 and at 1400 hours Company G patrol assisted by Company B patrol attempted to seize the high ground vicinity of CT6142 but was repulsed by enemy fire. At 1535 hours the patrol was ordered to break contact and return to the MLR. The patrol closed into the MLR at 1630 hours. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

All battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. Company K observed an enemy platoon vicinity of CT6841 at 0220 hours; mortars were placed on the enemy and the enemy was dispersed by 0300 hours. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6637.

The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6230. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

All battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, adjusted positions along Line Wyoming extending from vicinity of CT5135 to CT5538. A platoon-size patrol from the 5th Company departed the patrol base vicinity of CT5440 at 0700 hours and at 1130 hours the patrol was 300 meters short of the crest of hill 528, vicinity of CT5443, where they received mortar and automatic weapons fire from the top of the hill from an estimated enemy platoon. The patrol withdrew to vicinity of CT5442

to bring the enemy under fire. The 7th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 7th Company departed the patrol base at 0700 hours and at 1130 hours were in the vicinity of CT5141 receiving sporadic small arms fire from an undetermined number of enemy vicinity of CT4142. At 1545 hours the 5th Company patrol was ordered to return from vicinity of CT5442. At 1545 hours the 7th Company patrol was ordered to return from hill 358, vicinity of CT5040. The 5th Company patrol closed the patrol base vicinity of CT5440 by 1630 hours, and the 7th Company patrol closed the patrol base vicinity of CT5238 at 1655 hours.

15 Sept 1951. The 1st Battalion (minus), 14th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT5826. Company A maintained a patrol base on hill 452, vicinity of CT5642. The 2nd Battalion, minus, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company E relieved the 1st Company, Turkish Armed Forces Command, on the patrol base vicinity of CT5440. The 3rd Battalion, minus, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. Company I maintained a patrol base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 1st Battalion Raider Platoon departed the MLR at 0600 hours to support Company F's assault on an enemy strong point vicinity of CT6142. Company F crossed the LD at 0600 hours and at 0815 hours assaulted the objective vicinity of CT6142 and were 20 feet from the crest of the hill when a strong enemy counterattack forced the company from the hill. The company withdrew in order to reorganize. At 1025 hours a rifle platoon from Company A departed the MLR to assist Company F in securing its objective. At 1200 hours Company F moved out in the attack. Assault elements of Company F, Company A and the Raider Platoon secured the objective at 1435 hours against enemy employing small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and hand grenades. At 1600 hours, elements of Company A and the Raider Platoon dug in vicinity of CT6142. Company F disengaged at 1730 hours and by 1820 hours had closed into the MLR. At 1950 hours a Company A outpost position vicinity of CT6142 was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon employing small arms and automatic weapons fire. Friendly mortar and artillery fire was placed on the enemy and the enemy withdrew at 2010 hours.

All battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions along Line

Wyoming. The Wolfhound Raider Platoon departed the MLR at 2030 hours enroute to objective vicinity of CT6742. At 2210 hours the patrol engaged the enemy with fire vicinity of CT6842. The patrol was ordered to return at 2225 hours and at 2240 hours closed into the MLR. From 2200 to 2300 hours elements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions received enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire supported by enemy mortar and artillery fire. Three groups of an estimated 100 enemy each vicinity of CT6641, CT6841 and CT6541 were observed during that period and were dispersed by friendly artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire. At 2355 hours enemy activity ceased.

The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained under operational control of the 27th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6332, CT6432 and CT6230. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5535. The 5th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440.
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The 7th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in assembly area vicinity of CT5736. Company C maintained a patrol base on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company E maintained a patrol base on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. Company I maintained a patrol base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842.

The 1st Battalion (minus), 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company B remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6139. The 1st Battalion raider platoon and one platoon of Company A maintained an OP vicinity of CT6142. At 0050 hours an estimated 50 to 60 enemy employing small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fire attacked the outpost. The attack was repulsed at 0155 hours. At 0735 hours Company C departed the MLR to attack and secure objective vicinity of CT6142. At 1000 hours objective was secured against slight enemy resistance. Raider platoon and elements of Company A closed into the MLR at 2030 hours. The 2nd Battalion, minus, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company F remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6239. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control EUSAK.

All battalions 27th Infantry maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, attached to the 27th Infantry remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6838 and CT6839.

The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6230, CT6332 and CT6232. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

The Turkish Armed Forces Command relieved elements of the 3rd Infantry Division along Line Wyoming, effective 1400 hours and assumed responsibility for the MLR extending from vicinity of CT4733 to vicinity of CT7042. An OPLR was established in positions vicinity of CT5035, CT5236 and CT5338. The 6th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5240.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in assembly area vicinity of CT5736. Company C maintained a patrol base on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. At 0030 hours an estimated enemy platoon employing small arms and automatic weapons fire engaged the patrol base. Friendly artillery and small arms fire was placed on the enemy and the enemy withdrew at 0230 hours. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company E maintained a patrol base on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. At 0040 hours an estimated 15 enemy employing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire engaged the patrol base. Friendly artillery and small arms fire was placed on the enemy and the enemy withdrew at 0125 hours. A platoon-size patrol from Company E departed the patrol base at 0800 hours and at 1300 hours reached objective vicinity of CT5442. At 1330 hours the patrol engaged an estimated 50 enemy employing small arms and automatic weapons. The enemy fire was silenced by friendly artillery, mortar and recoilless rifle fire. The patrol closed into the outguard vicinity of CT5440 at 1550 hours. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company I maintained a patrol base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. At 0245 hours an estimated enemy squad employing small arms and automatic weapons engaged the patrol base. Friendly small arms fire was placed on the enemy and the enemy broke contact at 0313 hours. The 3rd Battalion raider platoon patrol departed the MLR at 0830 hours and at 1300 hours the patrol reached objective vicinity of CT5744 where it placed mortar fire on an enemy group vicinity of CT5745. At 1350 hours the patrol departed the objective and closed into the MLR at 1500 hours. At 1935 hours Company E received

small arms and mortar fire from an estimated enemy squad vicinity of CT5340.

Friendly artillery silenced the enemy at 2025 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company C maintained and OP vicinity of CT6142. A platoon-size patrol from Company E departed the MLR at 0755 hours and at 1105 hours was in the vicinity of CT6143 receiving sporadic 82mm mortar fire. At 1410 hours the patrol received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the enemy on hill 400, vicinity of CT6143, and at 1430 hours the patrol was ordered to withdraw. The patrol closed into the MLR at 1605 hours. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

All battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, attached to the 27th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6838, CT6737 and CT6839.

The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6230, CT6332 and CT6232. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st Battalion, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5131. The 6th Company maintained a patrol base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the patrol base at 0700 hours and at 1100 hours had secured objective vicinity of CT5341, after dispersing an estimated enemy platoon on the objective with artillery fire. At 1530 hours the patrol was ordered to depart from the objective and closed into the outguard at 1800 hours. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. At 2335 hours the outpost of the 11th Company vicinity of CT5035, assisted by a platoon of the 10th Company, engaged an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT4936 with small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. The action continued at the close
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of the period.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in assembly area vicinity of CT5736. Company C maintained an outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. The Company C outguard was attacked at 0014 hours by an estimated 3 enemy squads employing small arms, hand grenades and mortars. The enemy was dispersed with friendly small arms, hand grenades and mortar at 0020 hours. At 0305 hours the outguard was again

attacked by an estimated enemy platoon employing small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenades. At 0310 hours the attack was repulsed by friendly mortar, small arms and hand grenades. Small scale attacks by 3 to 4 enemy continued throughout the night until 0610 hours. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company E maintained an outguard on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. From 0230 hours until 0410 hours Company E received sporadic automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy squad vicinity of CT5643. The Raider Platoon closed into the Company E outguard at 0105 hours and departed at 0305 hours to engage the enemy squad firing on the outguard. The platoon returned to the outguard at 0600 hours with no enemy contact. At 0630 hours lead elements of Company F departed the MLR to effect relief of Company E on the outguard and assumed responsibility at 1027 hours. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company I maintained an outguard on hill 351 vicinity of CT5842.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company C maintained an outguard vicinity of CT6142. The 1st Battalion raider platoon patrol departed the MLR at 0600 hours and by 1255 hours had advanced to vicinity of CT6042 where it placed artillery fire on enemy observed on hill 419, vicinity of CT6044, at 1405 hours. At 1420 hours the patrol withdrew and at 1437 hours the patrol was ordered to return to the MLR. The patrol closed into the MLR at 1545 hours. Company C departed the outguard position vicinity of CT6142 at 1600 hours and closed into the MLR at 1830 hours. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

All battalions, 27th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, attached to the 27th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6838.

The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6230, CT6332 and CT6232. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserved positions vicinity of CT5131. The 6th Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT 5238. A platoon size patrol from the 6th Company departed the outguard at 0700 hours and at 1130 hours were in the vicinity of CT5241. At 1330 hours the patrol placed artillery fire on an estimated enemy company vicinity of CT5243.

A platoon-size patrol from the 9th Company departed the MLR at 0700 hours and at 1330 hours in the vicinity of CT5039 placed artillery fire on enemy vicinity of CT5040 to CT4939. At 1415 hours the 9th Company patrol joined the 6th Company patrol vicinity of CT5241 and at 1600 hours both patrols were ordered to return. At 1745 hours the 6th Company patrol closed the 6th Company outguard and at 1800 hours the 9th Company patrol closed into the MLR.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. Company C maintained outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. At 182345 hours the outguard was engaged by an estimated enemy squad employing small arms fire and hand grenades. The firing ceased by 0230 hours. Company A departed the MLR at 0620 hours to relieve Company C on outguard and the relief was accomplished by 0930 hours. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company F maintained an outguard on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. At 0330 hours an estimated 6 to 8 enemy fired small arms on outguard. The outguard returned the fire and the enemy withdrew immediately. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company I maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. A platoon-size patrol from Company I departed the outguard at 0700 hours and at 0910 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT5944 where they engaged 6 enemy in a house vicinity of CT5944. 75mm fire was placed on the enemy along with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. At 1445 hours, the patrol departed vicinity of CT5944 and closed into the outguard at 1545 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company B maintained and outguard on the high ground vicinity of CT6142. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from Company G departed the MLR at 0645 hours and reached objective on hill 400, vicinity of CT6143, at 1330 hours. At 1345 hours the patrol placed artillery fire on the enemy. At 1450 hours the patrol was ordered to return to the MLR and closed into friendly lines at 1715 hours. A two-squad size ambush patrol from the 1st Battalion departed the MLR at 1830 hours and at 1955 hours engaged an estimated two enemy squads with fire vicinity of CT6043. The patrol withdrew at 2032 hours and closed into the MLR at 2048 hours.

The 1st Battalion (minus), 27th Infantry, remained on Line Wyoming until re-

relieved by elements of the 35th Infantry effective at 1625 hours, at which time it departed the MLR and closed assembly area vicinity of CT6332 at 1845 hours. Company C remained under operational control of the 35th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion was relieved in place by the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, at 0840 hours and departed the MLR at 1215 hours, closing into assembly area vicinity of CT6737 at 1357 hours. The 3rd Battalion was relieved in place by the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, at 1030 hours.

The 35th Infantry assumed responsibility for sector of Line Wyoming from CT6341 to CT7042 at 1132 hours, and all battalions maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming. At 2000 hours, a Company E outpost vicinity of CT6741 received scattered small arms from enemy vicinity of CT6741. The outpost withdrew to the MLR and artillery fire was placed on the enemy.

The 1st Battalion, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5131. The 6th Company maintained and outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the outguard at 0825 hours. At 1140 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT5341 receiving fire from an estimated enemy squad employing automatic weapons and small arms vicinity of CT5342 and an estimated enemy company employing small arms and automatic weapons vicinity of CT5442. The patrol withdrew to vicinity of CT5341 where it received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT5242. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy. At 1400 hours the patrol moved from vicinity of CT5341 toward objective vicinity of CT5241 and reached objective at 1445 hours. At 1625 hours the patrol departed the objective and closed into the outguard at 1730 hours. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. Company A maintained an outguard on hill 432, CT5642. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company F maintained an outguard on hill 430 vicinity of CT5440. A platoon-size patrol from Company F departed the outguard at 0605 hours and at 1305 hours was in the vicinity of CT5441 where it placed mortar fire on enemy on hill 528 vicinity of CT5443. The patrol disengaged at 1320 hours and closed the outguard at 1635 hours. The 3rd Battalion

maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company I maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company B maintained an outguard vicinity of CT6142. A platoon-size patrol from Company C departed the MLR at 0620 hours and at 1130 hours were in the vicinity of CT6044 receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 1250 hours the patrol withdrew to vicinity of CT6043 and placed artillery fire on the enemy. At 1300 hours the patrol attempted to seize the position but was repulsed by enemy fire. At 1320 hours the patrol was ordered to return to the MLR and at 1325 hours the patrol disengaged. The patrol closed into the MLR at 1700 hours. At 1710 hours Company A effected the relief of Company B on the outguard position. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. Company C remained under operational control of the 35th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion remained in assembly area vicinity of CT6837, CT6737 and CT6638. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of Task Force Lightning.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A squad-size patrol from the Cacti Raiders departed the MLR at 1945 hours, and dispersed a five-man enemy patrol vicinity of CT6441 at 2100 hours. The patrol continued to objective vicinity of CT6541, reached objective at 2200 hours, departed the objective with negative contact at 2330 hours, and closed into the MLR at 2350 hours.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5131. The 6th Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the outguard at 0700 hours and at 1300 hours in the vicinity of CT5241 the patrol received small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT5242. Friendly artillery fire silenced the enemy fire. The patrol received machine gun fire from hill 528 vicinity of CT5443 and disengaged at 1415 hours, closing the outguard vicinity of CT5238 at 1720 hours.

Task Force Lightning remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. Company A maintained an outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. A platoon-size patrol from Company A departed the patrol base at 0515 hours and at 1120 hours engaged an estimated enemy squad on objective vicinity of CT5644. The patrol was forced to withdraw from the objective by heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire at 1143 hours. The patrol regained the objective at 1535 hours with negative enemy resistance and at 1703 hours departed and closed into the Company A outguard at 1810 hours. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company F maintained an outguard on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. At 0140 hours an unknown number of enemy placed small arms fire on the outguard, but the enemy fire ceased when the outguard returned the fire. Company G departed the MLR at 0600 hours to relieve Company F and completed the relief at 1310 hours. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company K maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. A squad-size ambush patrol from Company K was heavily engaged with an unknown number of enemy vicinity of CT5943 at 0500 hours. By 0625 hours the patrol had broken the engagement and returned to the outguard at 0700 hours without further contact.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. Company A maintained an outguard vicinity of CT6142. A two-squad size ambush patrol from Company C was in the vicinity of CT6042 at 0045 hours where it received heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy to the immediate front. The patrol split into two groups and attempted to maneuver to the enemy's rear. The patrol was prevented from encircling the enemy by heavy enemy fire. The patrol withdrew to the base of hill 275, vicinity of CT5042, and returned to the MLR at 0700 hours. A platoon-size patrol from Company F departed the MLR at 0600 hours and at 0855 hours was in the vicinity of CT6143 receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy vicinity of CT6143. At 1035 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT6443 and it placed mortar, artillery and 57mm rifle fire on the enemy on hill 400, vicinity of CT6143. At 1300 hours the patrol was prevented from advancing forward by automatic weapons and small arms fire from hill 400 and hill 419, vicinity of CT6044. The patrol placed mortar fire on hill 400 at 1335 hours and advanced forward forcing the enemy to withdraw. At 1432 hours the patrol withdrew under enemy automatic weapons and

mortar fire. At 1620 hours the patrol was brought under enemy artillery fire, and at 1645 hours the patrol disengaged and closed into the MLR at 1800 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained in assembly areas vicinity of CT6837, CT6737, and CT6638. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of Task Force Lightning.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5131. The 6th Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the MLR at 0730 hours and at 0840 hours was in the vicinity of CT5240 where it received sporadic mortar fire. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy mortar position. The patrol attempted to advance but was halted by enemy automatic weapons and small arms fire at 0905 hours. The patrol placed automatic weapons and 3.5 rocket launcher fire on the enemy vicinity of CT5241 at 0940 hours and continued to advance at 1000 hours. By 1100 hours the patrol was still receiving sporadic mortar fire from vicinity of CT5241. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy mortar position and at 1200 hours the patrol advanced to vicinity of CT5241 with no further enemy contact. At 1545 hours the patrol reached objective vicinity of CT5243 and departed at 1610 hours. The patrol closed the company outguard at 1800 hours.

Task Force Hamilton, composed of Company A, 89th Tank Battalion, Company K, 35th Infantry, one platoon of the 21st AAA Battalion, and one platoon of the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, moved from assembly area vicinity of CT6734 at 0404 hours and crossed the LD vicinity of CT7042 at 0518 hours. At 0735 hours the Task Force in the vicinity of CT7043 was advancing slowly against automatic weapons, anti-tank, and small arms fire. At 1040 hours an air strike was placed on enemy anti-tank guns vicinity of CT7144. At 1400 hours lead tanks of Company A, 89th Tank Battalion, advanced to vicinity of CT7043 against anti-tank, artillery, mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire from entrenched enemy. At 1715 hours, the Task Force was ordered to withdraw after destroying 60 bunkers, 3 anti-tank guns, and large quantities of high explosives. The Task Force closed into assembly area vicinity of CT6634 at 2034 hours.

Lead elements of Task Force Iynx, composed of Company D, 89th Tank Battalion, the 25th Reconnaissance Company, Company B, 14th Infantry, one platoon of the 21st AAA Battalion, and one platoon of the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, crossed the LD vicinity of CT5039 at 0555 hours. The Task Force received sporadic mortar and artillery fire throughout the morning. At 1427 hours elements advanced to objective Stomp vicinity of CT5748 against artillery fire. At 1515 hours the Task Force was ordered to lay heavy fire on Stomp and return to the MLR at 1530 hours. The Task Force closed into assembly area vicinity of CT5531 at 1930 hours.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. Company A maintained an outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642, until relieved by Company C at 0945 hours. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company G maintained an outguard on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. Company K maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. A platoon-size patrol from Company K departed the patrol base at 0700 hours and at 1045 hours received 8 rounds of unknown caliber artillery fire on objective vicinity of CT5844. At 1315 hours the patrol was ordered to withdraw and at 1325 hours engaged the enemy vicinity of hill 259, CT5944, with small arms and automatic weapons in a brief fire fight. The patrol closed into the outguard at 1520 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. A reinforced platoon-sized patrol from Company B departed the MLR at 0605 hours and by 1200 hours had advanced to CT6044 without enemy contact. At 1300 hours a 1st Battalion raider patrol advanced to vicinity of CT6044 and was brought under small arms and automatic weapons fire from an entrenched enemy platoon. The patrol withdrew to join the Company B patrol vicinity of CT5944 and placed artillery on the enemy positions. At 1730 hours, the raider platoon again seized the high ground vicinity of CT6044 under supporting fire from the Company B patrol. At 1820 hours both patrols disengaged and closed the MLR at 2135 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained in assembly areas vicinity of CT6837 and CT6738. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of Task Force Lightning.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company K completed relief of elements of the 27th Infantry effective at 1345 hours and occupied positions on Line Wyoming.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5131. The 6th Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the outguard at 0745 hours and at 1110 hours were in the vicinity of CT5240 where the patrol received automatic weapons and mortar fire from an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT5241. At 1330 hours the patrol placed artillery fire on the enemy. The enemy was dispersed at 1430 hours and the patrol continued to advance. At 1610 hours the patrol reached vicinity of CT5241 with negative contact, and closed into the outguard at 1830 hours.

Task Force Lightning remained assembled vicinity of CT5632.

Task Forces Lynx and Hamilton were dissolved at 0600 hours. All units reverted to parent unit control.

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Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company C maintained an outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. The outguard received sporadic small arms and mortar fire from 222200 hours to 0330 hours from an estimated enemy squad. A platoon-size patrol from Company C departed the outguard at 0740 hours and at 1105 hours was in the vicinity of CT5443 receiving a heavy volume of small arms and mortar fire from an estimated enemy company. At 1145 hours the Company C patrol withdrew to the outguard under small arms and mortar fire. At 1317 hours the patrol departed the outguard and by 1430 hours had advanced to vicinity of CT5542 where it was brought under small arms and automatic weapons fire from hill 528, vicinity of CT5443. The patrol placed mortar fire on the enemy and at 1435 hours withdrew, closing the outguard at by 1500 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. A platoon-size patrol from Company B departed the MLR at 0630 hours and at 1132 hours were in the vicinity of CT6044 receiving small arms fire from an unknown

number of enemy on hill 419, vicinity of CT6044. 4.2-inch mortar and 81mm mortar fire was placed on the enemy. At 1410 hours the patrol reached hill 419 and received small arms fire. The patrol disengaged at 1435 hours and closed into the MLR at 1700 hours. A platoon-size patrol from Company E departed the MLR at 0630 hours and at 1148 hours was in the vicinity of CT6143 receiving sporadic small arms and mortar fire from an unknown number of enemy vicinity of CT6144. 4.2-inch mortar was placed on the enemy. At 1345 hours the patrol assaulted hill 400, vicinity of CT6143 and received small arms and hand grenades from the crest and automatic weapons fire from vicinity of CT6244. The patrol disengaged at 1430 hours and closed the MLR at 1700 hours.

Task Force Lightning was attached to the 27th Infantry and remained assembled with the 3rd Battalion vicinity of CT6331. The 1st Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6837 and CT6738.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The Cacti Raider platoon patrol departed the MLR at 222030 hours and reached objective vicinity of CT7144 at 0100 hours. The patrol observed enemy mortar firing vicinity of CT7043. Artillery fire was placed on the mortar position and the mortar was silenced. The patrol closed into the MLR at 0130 hours with no enemy contact. At 2046 hours Company C received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT7043. Friendly artillery and mortar was placed on the enemy and the enemy withdrew at 2205 hours.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5171. The 6th Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the outguard at 0700 hours and at 1100 hours was in the vicinity of CT5240 where an unknown number of enemy were observed on the high ground vicinity of CT5241. The patrol placed artillery fire on the hill. The patrol secured the hill and at 1550 hours advanced to objective vicinity of CT5242. At 1625 hours the patrol departed the objective and closed the outguard at 1725 hours.

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1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. Company C maintained an outguard on hill 432 vicinity of CT5642. At 2105 hours the outguard received small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad on the left flank. Artillery and mortar was placed on the enemy and the firing ceased at 2110 hours. A platoon-size patrol from Company C departed the outguard at 1130 hours and at 1402 hours in the vicinity of CT5542 engaged an estimated enemy company with small arms, recoilless-rifle, mortar and artillery fire. The patrol withdrew and closed into the outguard at 1535 hours. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company L maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. A platoon-size patrol from Company A departed the MLR at 0630 hours and at 1055 hours placed mortar fire on enemy entrenched on hill 400, vicinity of CT6143. At 1300 hours the patrol was brought under small arms and automatic weapons fire from hill 419, vicinity of CT6044, and hill 400. Friendly artillery and mortar fire was placed on the enemy positions. The patrol was ordered to return to friendly lines at 1300 hours and at 1315 hours the patrol disengaged. At 1410 hours the patrol closed the MLR. At 1800 hours an ambush patrol of two squads from Company A departed the MLR.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6837 and CT6738. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled with Task Force Lightning vicinity of CT6331.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. At 1450 hours elements of Company M placed recoilless rifle fire on an enemy mortar position vicinity of CT6542 with excellent results. At 1620 hours Company G placed artillery fire on an estimated 12 enemy vicinity of CT6541 with excellent results.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5131. At 1900 hours an ambush patrol of one squad from Company I departed the MLR and set up position vicinity of CT6441 at 1935 hours.

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Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A platoon-size patrol from Company E departed outguard on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440, and at 1216 hours received small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy on hill 528, vicinity of CT5443. Friendly artillery was placed on the enemy. The patrol withdrew at 1340 hours and closed into the outguard at 1435 hours. The 1st Battalion raider platoon departed the MLR at 0640 hours. At 1030 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT5644 and was ordered to reinforce the Company I patrol. Company I maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. A platoon-size patrol departed the outguard at 0615 hours; at 1030 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of CT5745 receiving small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from an estimated enemy company on hill 387, vicinity of CT5745. The patrol continued to engage the enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fire until 1530 hours when the patrol withdrew and closed into the outguard at 1700 hours. The 1st Battalion raider platoon placed artillery fire on the enemy on hill 387 at 1330 hours and disengaged at 1415 hours to continue its mission of assisting the Company I patrol. At 1435 hours the raider patrol was ordered to withdraw and at 1600 hours placed artillery fire on the enemy vicinity of CT5645. At 1655 hours the patrol moved to vicinity of CT5744. The patrol closed into the MLR at 1800 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. Company C maintained an outguard on the high ground vicinity of CT6142. A platoon-size patrol from Company G departed the MLR at 0655 hours and at 1120 hours received machine gun fire from vicinity of CT6443. At 1200 hours the patrol was receiving small arms fire from hill 454, vicinity of CT6442. At 1330 hours the Company G patrol placed mortar fire on the enemy vicinity of CT6343 and CT6442. At 1438 hours the patrol was ordered to withdraw and burn the village of KUMGONG-NI, vicinity of CT6342. The patrol burned the village and departed at 1655 hours, closing into the MLR at 1720 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6738 and CT6837. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled with Task Force Lightning vicinity of CT5531.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The Cacti Raider platoon departed the MLR at 1930 hours for a night raid.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5031. The 6th Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238, until relieved by the 2nd Company at 1400 hours. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from the 6th Company departed the outguard at 0700 hours and secured the high ground vicinity of CT5241 by 1220 hours. At 1450 hours the patrol placed artillery fire on the enemy vicinity of CT5242. At 1545 hours the patrol was ordered to return to friendly lines and closed into the MLR at 1800 hours.

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1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company B maintained an outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. A platoon-size patrol from Company B departed the outguard at 0645 hours and at 1145 hours were in the vicinity of CT5544 receiving small arms and mortar fire from an unknown number of enemy vicinity of CT5645. The patrol placed 4.2-inch mortar and artillery fire on the enemy. At 1330 hours the patrol withdrew to vicinity of CT5543. At 1535 hours the patrol placed mortar fire on the enemy on hill 404, vicinity of CT5644. The patrol closed into the outguard at 1635 hours. The 3rd Battalion raider platoon departed the Company L outguard vicinity of CT5842 at 0540 hours and by 1355 hours had advanced to vicinity of CT5946. At 1445 hours the patrol withdrew to vicinity of CT5944 under enemy mortar fire. At 1530 hours the patrol closed into the Company L outguard.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company C maintained an outguard on high ground vicinity of CT6142. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. A platoon-size patrol from Company F departed the MLR at 0600 hours and at 1005 hours were in the vicinity of CT6243 engaged in a small arms fire fight with an unknown number of enemy. Artillery was placed on the enemy. At 1400 hours the patrol was ordered to return to friendly lines and closed the MLR at 1515 hours.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6738 and CT6837. The 3rd Battalion

remained assembled with Task Force Lightning vicinity of CT5531.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company F remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6740.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5031. The 2nd Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. Platoon-size patrol from the 2nd Company departed outguard at 0700 hours and secured objective vicinity of CT5242 at 1340 hours after dispersing enemy on objective with friendly artillery fire. At 1450 hours the patrol withdrew under counterattack by enemy employing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. At 1820 hours the patrol closed into the outguard vicinity CT5238.

27
Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company B maintained an outguard on hill 432, vicinity of CT5642. A platoon-size patrol from Company B departed the outguard at 0645 hours and at 1110 hours were in the vicinity of CT5743 and received small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 1200 hours the patrol broke contact and closed into the outguard at 1545 hours. A platoon-size patrol from Company B and the White Raider platoon departed the Company E outguard, vicinity of CT5440, at 0910 hours and placed mortar fire on enemy on hill 528, vicinity of CT5443, at 1420 hours. The patrol withdrew and closed into the MLR at 1650 hours. Company I maintained an outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. A platoon-size patrol from Company I departed the outguard at 0700 hours and at 1110 hours received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the crest of hill 404, vicinity of CT5644. At 1200 hours the patrol broke contact and closed into the outguard at 1550 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. A platoon-size patrol Company E departed the MLR at 0730 hours, and at 0850 hours were in the vicinity of CT6143 receiving a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy platoon on hill 400, vicinity of CT6143. At 1255 hours the patrol placed recoilless rifle fire and 81mm mortar fire on hill 400. At 1400 hours the patrol disengaged and at 1445 hours closed into the MLR.

73. Book 4, Part 3, POR's 51, 52

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, remained assembled vicinity of CT6332. The 2nd Battalion remained assembled vicinity of CT6738 and CT6837. The 3rd Battalion remained assembled with Task Force Lightning vicinity of CT5531.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company F remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT6740.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5031. The 2nd Company maintained an outguard on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A platoon-size patrol from the 2nd Company departed the outguard at 0700 hours. At 0840 hours the patrol was in the vicinity of hill 503, CT5240, where it received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy vicinity of CT5241. The patrol placed artillery fire on the enemy dispersing them to the north. At 1140 hours the patrol received heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT5242. By 1200 hours the patrol withdrew and closed into the outguard at 1755 hours.

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The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736 and conducted small unit training. At 0800 hours a two-platoon patrol from Company B departed the company outguard vicinity of CT5642 and by 1130 hours lead elements had advanced to within 150 yards of the objective, hill 528 vicinity of CT5443, when they were engaged by the enemy employing small arms fire. Fire was returned immediately and at 1205 hours a patrol of two platoons from Company F on the ridge to the west joined in the fire fight. Enemy resistance increased with the enemy strength estimated as a reinforced platoon employing small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenades. At 1250 hours the Company B patrol was ordered to withdraw after enemy resistance prevented further advance. Company B closed into its outguard base by 1400 hours. The 2nd Battalion maintained and improved positions along Line Wyoming while Company F maintained an outguard on hill 430, vicinity of CT5440. A patrol of two platoons from Company F departed the outguard at 0800 hours to combine forces with the Company B patrol against hill 528. The patrol advanced to vicinity of CT5442, 300 yards from hill 528, where a heavy volume of small arms fire was received at 1205 hours. The patrol continued to engage the enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fire but was unable

to advance. The patrol withdrew and closed into its outguard base at 1545 hours. Casualties inflicted on the enemy by patrols from Company B and Company F totaled 3 verified KIA and 26 estimated WIA. Friendly casualties were 9 WIA. The 3rd Battalion maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming while Company K departed the MLR at 1300 hours and relieved Company I on outguard base on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. At 1445 hours the relief was completed and Company I returned to the MLR, closing at 1600 hours.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, improved positions on Line Wyoming. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from Company G advanced to within 400 yards of its objective vicinity of CT6044 against small arms fire by 1400 hours. The patrol placed artillery fire on the enemy and withdrew to friendly lines after enemy resistance prevented further advance. Company F relieved Company C on outguard base at 1115 hours. A two-squad size patrol from Company C departed the MLR at 1845 hours and became engaged with an estimated 15 enemy employing small arms fire at 2220 hours near the Company F outguard. The patrol disengaged after inflicting undetermined damage on the enemy and close into the Company F outguard base by 2400 hours.

The 27th Infantry continued as Division reserve. The 1st Battalion during hours of darkness rehearsed occupation of blocking positions and during daylight conducted small unit training. The 2nd Battalion, during daylight hours, conducted training exercises involving the battalion in assault of a fortified ridge, employing all supporting weapons. The 3rd Battalion remained attached to Task Force Lightning. Task Force Lightning rehearsed counterattack plans which assumed enemy penetration of the MLR in the vicinity of CT6641.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, improved positions along Line Wyoming. The Cacti Raider platoon departed the MLR during hours of darkness on a screening mission 1000 yards forward of the MLR. The Raiders had encountered no enemy opposition by the close of the period.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5031. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from the 9th Company placed artillery fire on an estimated enemy platoon vicinity of CT5042, killing an estimated 8 enemy. The patrol closed into the MLR prior to darkness.

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Sept
1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions improved positions on Line Wyoming. Company K maintained and outguard on hill 351, vicinity of CT5842. At 0910 hours a reinforced platoon-size patrol from Company K engaged an enemy company firing small arms and automatic weapons from entrenched positions along the crest of hill 404, vicinity of CT5644. The patrol gained a position 70 yards from the top of the hill against an increasing volume of fire and inflicted an estimated 16 KIA and 10 WIA on the enemy by small arms. At 1045 hours the patrol withdrew on order. Friendly artillery fire was placed on the enemy inflicting an additional estimated 16 enemy KIA. Total results of the action included the destruction of 250 enemy grenades and 20 lbs of TNT, and the capture of two enemy machine guns. The patrol suffered 1 KIA and 7 WIA from small arms fire.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK. A two-squad size patrol from Company C engaged an estimated 15 enemy with small arms fire vicinity of CT6042 at 282020 September 1951. The patrol withdrew to the Company F outguard vicinity of CT6142 after inflicting undetermined damage upon the enemy, and at 0430 hours closed into the MLR. The patrol suffered 1 KIA and 1 WIA. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from Company F advanced to a point 300 yards south of hill 400, vicinity of CT6143 at 0830 hours. In this position the patrol engaged enemy firing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar from hill 400 and the high ground northwest of hill 400. The patrol placed small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fire on the enemy and disengaged at 1220 hours. The patrol inflicted six known WIA and three estimated WIA on the enemy and suffered two friendly WIA in the action.

The 27th Infantry continued in Division reserve. The 1st Battalion conducted training exercises in company daylight attack. The 2nd Battalion conducted training exercises in battalion daylight assault of a fortified ridge employing all supporting weapons. The 3rd Battalion remained attached to Task Force Lightning.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, improved positions along Line Wyoming. The Cacti Raider platoon departed the MLR during hours of darkness on a screening mission 1000 yards forward of the MLR.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, improved positions

on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion improved reserve positions vicinity of CT5031. The 2nd Company maintained an outguard base on hill 372, vicinity of CT5238. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from the 2nd Company advanced to within 400 yards of hill 503, vicinity of CT5240 at 0940 hours and was brought under small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from two enemy squads entrenched on the hill. Artillery and small arms fire forced the enemy to withdraw. The patrol secured the hill at 1025 hours and at 1150 hours observed an enemy company 2000 yards north of hill 503. Artillery fire was placed on the enemy inflicting an estimated 70 enemy casualties. The remaining enemy dispersed to the north. The friendly patrol withdrew on order and closed the company outguard at 1530 hours.

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1951

The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, remained in reserve positions vicinity of CT5736 and trained in small unit tactics. Two reinforced platoons from Company A advanced to within 700 yards of its objective, hill 404 vicinity of CT5644, when it came under small arms and machine gun fire at 0930 hours from enemy entrenched on the south slope of the hill. Friendly artillery fire was placed on the hill. The patrol withdrew and closed into the outguard vicinity of CT5642 at 1030 hours. The patrol inflicted 4 KIA and 15 WIA on the enemy and suffered 1 WIA. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions improved positions on Line Wyoming. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from Company K advanced to within 500 yards of hill 387, vicinity of CT5745, and came under small arms, machine gun and mortar fire from the hill and high ground to the west. The patrol returned the fire and at 1020 hours placed artillery fire on the enemy which destroyed one machine gun, three mortars and wounded 12 enemy. The patrol withdrew and closed into the outguard before dark with no friendly casualties.

The 1st and 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming. A reinforced platoon-size patrol from Company E advanced 1200 yards forward of the MLR where at 0730 hours it engaged enemy occupying the high ground surrounding the village of YONGDAE, vicinity of CT6343. Friendly mortar and artillery fire placed by the patrol silenced enemy machine guns and mortars at 1230 hours. The patrol withdrew and closed into the MLR with no friendly casualties. The 3rd Battalion remained under operational control of EUSAK.

The 27th Infantry continued as Division reserve and conducted training.

All battalions, 35th Infantry, maintained and improved positions on Line Wyoming.


The 1st and 3rd Battalions, Turkish Armed Forces Command, improved positions on Line Wyoming. The 2nd Battalion improved reserve positions vicinity of CT50-31. The 2nd Company conducted daylight patrolling 4000 yards forward of the out-guard base with no contact reported. The 9th Company conducted daylight patrolling 4000-5000 yards forward of the MLR with no contact reported.

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SITUATION AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1951

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6

PART II.

(4) Communications

The Division Signal Office and the 25th Signal Company continued to operate, maintain and improve all communications facilities at Division CP at CHIPO-HI, CT5222. The radio section conducted classes for all operators in the operation of the Converter, M-209, a cryptographic device.

On 4 September a switching central was established in the vicinity of KUMEWA, CT6222, with direct radio relay circuits to Lightning Switch, GS5199, for the purpose of furnishing administrative circuits between the regiments and their service companies located near the 25th Quartermaster Company and 725th Ordnance Company.

When the Signal Section received information that a Division TAC CP would be established at 082000 September at CT5632, Jump teams were immediately sent forward to establish telephone, teletype, radio and message center facilities between the TAC and all major tactical units. The attachment of the 19th RCT at that time brought to six the total number of regiments being furnished tactical and administrative communication. When a new tactical CP location at CT5430 was chosen on 10 September communications were established and the new facilities in operation at the time specified.

Due to terrain features difficulty was experienced in maintaining radio communications with forward elements and the Division Commanding General in his tours of the Division sector. To solve this problem an SCR 608 was placed approximately five miles forward of Division CP on hill 577 at CT6036 and remoted into the G-2, 3 tent at the CP. A radio relay terminal was also established on hill 577 to furnish direct communications with the Lightning Switch area vicinity of CT5199.

During the period 15-18 September a ten-pair cable of wire, WD-1, was constructed overhead from Orange Test, CT5632 to Bridge Test CT6139, to be used jointly by the Division Signal Officer and the Division Artillery.

The Signal Section prepared a draft of information to be published in November in the EUSAK SIGNALS, a bulletin of signal information distributed by Eighth Army headquarters.

The following statistics indicate the Communications Center operations for the period:

Number of messenger runs

224

Number of miles traveled, mgr	6161
Total messages handled	3403
Total outgoing code groups	35,633
Total incoming code groups	123,506
Total code groups in and out	159,139
Total clear text messages	2616

PART II

(5) Supporting Arms

The month of September was highlighted by three operations.

About 2300, 6 September, the 35th Infantry Patrol Base on hills 717 and 682, occupied at that time by Companies I and L, were attacked by a large enemy force, later estimated at a regiment, following an artillery and mortar preparation. All wire and artillery radio communications were disrupted and therefore the artillery forward observers failed to function. Using radio communications over Infantry SCR300, Battery C, 64th Field Artillery Battalion and Battery A, 955th FA Battalion fired defensive fire in support of the base. Shortly after daylight 7 September it was reported that hill 682 was in enemy hands. Because of the seriousness of the situation the Division Artillery commander relaid two batteries of the 90th FA Battalion, displaced another battery of the 955th FA Battalion forward to vicinity of CT5535 at 0715 hours and at 1755 hours ordered the 64th FA Battalion (minus Battery C at that time in vicinity of KUMHWA) in general support to displace to vicinity of CT5636 in direct support of patrol base. These moves were accomplished by 1030 hours. At 1135 hours, radio communications were re-established with the Company L Forward Observer, who called for fire on hill 682. This communication stayed in until 1600 hours when it was again lost. Both Forward Observers were killed in this action on 7 September. At 1430 hours the 69th FA Battalion, which on 6 September, had moved south to participate in training exercises with the 14th Infantry was ordered to return at once to positions in vicinity of CT5933. The battalion closed in position and was laid, ready to fire at 2110 hours. Its mission was G/S reinforcing the 64th FA Battalion. At about 1600 hours the Infantry withdrew from its patrol base and reassembled on hill 433 where it was covered by the remainder of the 3rd Battalion 35th Infantry which had moved forward to insure that a route of withdrawal remained open.

On 8 September the remainder of the 955th FA Battalion was moved forward in the morning and the 69th FA Battalion was moved forward to vicinity of CT5635 at 1500 hours. The 19th Infantry of the 24th Infantry Division was ordered into the Division Sector and placed under control of the Division. Advance Parties arrived about 1600 hours. The 13th FA Battalion arrived and was put in position in vicinity of CT5839 prior to midnight. The plan directed the Division to counterattack

with the 35th Infantry, 19th Infantry, and one battalion of the TAFIC to re-take the patrol base, collect the dead, wounded and stragglers and then withdraw.

The attack jumped off on schedule on 9 September and by dark hill 717 was secured and hill 682 was partially secured. This latter objective was secured early 10 September, and early in the afternoon, all forces were ordered to withdraw.

On the 11th of September the 19th Infantry reverted to control of IX Corps and the 13th FA Battalion to control of IX Corps Artillery.

The second action of the month was the attack on 12 September to secure more favorable ground on the Division right flank. This attack was launched in conjunction with the 2nd ROK Division at 120500 September. To support this action the 64th FA Battalion was moved to positions vicinity of CT6335 with the mission of general support reinforcing the 8th FA Battalion. The attack moved per schedule and by 131500 September all objectives had been secured. The 8th FA Battalion displaced on 12 September during this action to provide better direct support of the 27th Infantry. The expected enemy reaction to this attack came about 2210 hours on 15 September when an estimated enemy battalion attacked the first and second battalions. The attack was repulsed by artillery fire with the 8th, 64th, 159th, 13th, 987th, and 90th FA Battalions firing a total of 5,187 rounds between 152210 and 160030 September on pre-arranged concentrations. Estimated enemy casualties to the front of the 27th Infantry exceeded 400.

The third action occurred on 21 September when IX Corps attacked to the north to raid enemy territory. Inasmuch as the 955th FA Battalion had been transferred to I Corps on 17 September the Division Artillery was left with only one 155mm howitzer battalion for a front in excess of 25,000 meters. This meant that medium coverage would, at very best, be very light with the capability of massing non-existent. Two tank-infantry forces, Lynx on the left and Hamilton on the right attacked at 0530 hours. The 69th FA Battalion moved into position in the vicinity of CT6839 at 1800 hours, 20 September to be in position to support Task Force Hamilton. In addition, Battery A, 90th FA Battalion moved to reinforce the 69th FA Battalion.

Task Force Lynx progressed as planned, fighting primarily in wet rice paddies and returned to the MLR at 1900 hours at which time the 69th FA Battalion and

Battery A, 90th FA Battalion had returned to normal positions. Task Force Hamilton progressed only 2500 yards before running into heavy AT fire in the vicinity of CT7145. They did not progress further in spite of four air strikes and artillery fire from the 8th, 64th, and 13th FA Battalions and two Batteries of the 90th FA Battalion, and by dark had returned to the MLR.

PART III

Intelligence (Enemy Order of Battle)

a. Estimate of Enemy Force

A change in the identification of a few enemy elements opposing the 25th Division took place during the month of September.

78
On 4 September elements of the TAFC apprehended two CCF deserters, identifying the Special Duty Regiment (Security), 26th CCF Army. On 31 August the Pw unit had relieved what was believed to be elements of the 231st Regiment, 77th Division, which had suffered heavy casualties from friendly artillery fire. It was believed that the mission of the Special Duty Regiment is to fill in defensive positions or relieve decimated units.

The identification of the 599th Regiment, 200th Division, 67th Army, in the extreme eastern sector of the 25th Division zone on 12 and 13 September provided additional verification of the relief of the 27th Army, IX Army Group by the 67th Army, XX Army Group. The unit immediately facing the extreme right flank friendly element was determined to be the 599th Regiment, 200th Division, 67th Army.

79
On 30 September a Prisoner of War Report gave an indication that the 599th Regiment might have been relieved by the 600th Regiment of the same Division on or about the 26th of September.

80
On the last day of the month a Prisoner of War Report indicated that the 229th Regiment, 77th Division, might have been relieved by the 230th Regiment of the same Division, a belief confirmed on 4 October by another PW Report.

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By the end of the month the following order of battle situation could be accepted as probably true: the 25th Infantry Division was in contact with the 26th CCF Army and elements of the 67th CCF Army. The 26th CCF Army was believed to be supported by an unknown regiment of the 1st CCF Artillery Division. On the left flank of the front, elements of the badly-mauled 233rd Regiment of the 78th Division were identified. In the central sector, the Special Duty Regiment (Security) and the 230th Regiment, 77th Division were identified. The boundary between the 78th and 77th Divisions was accepted as being the river running from CT5639 to CT6158. On the extreme right flank this Division is opposed by the 2nd Battalion,

78. Annex 2, Periodic Intelligence Report 413, Book 3.
79. PW Preliminary Investigation Report 25, 30 Sept 1951, Book 3
80. PW Preliminary Investigation Report 25, 30 Sept 1951, Book 3
81. PW Preliminary Investigation Report, 4 Oct 1951
82. Annex 1, Periodic Intelligence Report 426, 18 Sept 1951, Book 3

599th Regiment, 200th Division of the 67th Army, keeping in mind the possible relief of the 599th Regiment by the 600th Regiment on or about 26 September. The boundary line of the 26th Army and the 67th Army was accepted as extending from CT6842 to CT6743 to CT6744, then in a northern direction to CT6852.

Elements capable of being employed in the 78th CCF Division sector comprise the unlocated 232nd Regiment and the 234th Regiment, tentatively accepted in the vicinity of CT5658. In the 77th CCF Division sector, the 229th Regiment, tentatively located in the vicinity of CT6456 and the 231st Regiment, tentatively located in the vicinity of CT6254 are capable of intervention. A possible relief of the 26th Army by an unidentified unit, probably the 68th Army of the XX Army Group, may be forthcoming.

During the month the 76th CCF Division remained in 26th Army reserve in the rear of the 77th and 78th Divisions.

The estimate of the combat effectiveness of the 26th Army, the major enemy force opposing the 25th Division, continued to be low, due to friendly air strikes, artillery and ground fire. The 26th Army strength is still estimated at approximately 18,000 to 21,000 men.

The strength of the 200th Division is estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 men and the 67th Army at 20,000 to 30,000 men. A Prisoner of War Report indicated that the entire 67th Army was re-equipped with new weapons approximately six months ago at TUN-SAN, near TIENTSIN. Some of the weapons were of Russian make while others were of Chinese manufacture. The heavy machine guns were purported to be of Chinese make, having been manufactured in a former Japanese arsenal in Manchuria. The PW from the 200th Division also claimed that there were an unknown number of trucks in his Division, the majority of which were captured former Japanese and CNA vehicles. The PW observed a few Russian-made trucks. Although the truck bodies appeared old, the tires were new and the PW assumed that the old engines had been replaced, for the vehicles ran very smoothly. The prisoner stated that approximately one-half of the soldiers were new recruits having only six months of training, while the other half were regular army men.

Prisoner of War Reports during the month continued to reflect the low state of morale due to poor food, insufficient clothing, and heavy losses from UN fire power.

b. Dispositions of Enemy Units

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(1) See OB Situation Map.

(2) During the night of 7-8 September outguards of the 35th RCT on hills 717 and 682, vicinity of CT5345 and CT5545, were captured by the 227th Regiment, 76th CCF Division, a reserve element not previously committed in the 25th Division zone. After this successful attack the 227th Regiment withdrew and was replaced by the 3rd Battalion, 233rd Regiment, 78th CCF Division. It was this battalion that was forced from the two hills by the 35th RCT during the period 9-10 September, friendly forces then withdrawing to the MLR. On or about 13 September hills 717 and 682 were then occupied by the 2nd Battalion 233rd Regiment, moved in to occupy hill 682, the 2nd Battalion, 233rd Regiment then consolidating its entire strength on hill 717.

c. Nature and Effectiveness of Enemy Defenses

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During the month three innovations in the enemy's employment of mines were uncovered by the 25th Reconnaissance Company. One type of device involved the tying together of regular TNT up to 25 or more pounds in weight. These have as many as seven blasting caps adjusted for setting of the charge. Another type of mine encountered is the regular Russian box type. This however has in most cases been augmented by the placement of additional TNT around or under the mine. The amount of TNT employed thusly will vary, the greatest quantity having been 25 pounds in a rope bundle with blasting caps attached. The other practice is that of placing additional mines up to 4 or 5 in the same hole. The ideal seems to be positive destruction of the vehicle rather than minor disablement.

84. Inclosure 3, Appendix 1, Annex 1, Operation Plan 30, 24 Sept 1951, Book 4, Part 3

85. Paragraph 3d, Periodic Intelligence Report 421, 13 Sept 1951, Book 3

PART IV

Personnel

a. Division Staff Assignments

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Balish, GS was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, vice Major Charles Dempier, GS effective 17 September.

Lieutenant Colonel Abram L. Frieman, QMC was announced as Division Quartermaster vic Lieutenant Colonel John D. Copeland, QMC, rotated, effective 3 September.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Minnich, JAGD, was announced as Division Judge Advocate General, vice Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Robblee, reassigned, effective 9 September.

Major Michael F. Hochella, Arty, was announced as Division Light Aviation Officer, vice Major Donald B. Thompson, reassigned, effective 8 September.

Captain Ordie D. Taylor, Inf, was announced as Headquarters Commandant, vice Major Richard J. Hebert, rotated, effective 8 September.

b. Strength

The following authorized and actual strengths are listed for the beginning and end of the period:

	Beginning of Period		Close of Period	
Troops	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
(1) U.S.				
25th Division	18,128	23,472	18,276	24,343
(2) U.N.				
TAFC	5,105	4,684	5,105	4,948
ROK		670		629

c. Replacements

At the beginning of the period the 25th Replacement Company was located at YONGDUNG-PO, CS1456, and remained at that location for the period as it was well suited to carry out its receiving and processing functions due to its proximity to the Port of INCHON, Kimpo Air Base and the Rail Transportation Office at YONDUNG-PO.

During the month the Company processed a total of 8,232 personnel as follows:

	Off/WO	EM
Replacements	270	3,774
Hospital Returnees	18	545
Rotation Personnel	35	1,596
Reassignments FECOM	13	111

Replacements were received from the 8069th Army Unit at YONGDUNG-PO and transported to the Replacement Company by motor vehicle. Large replacement groups were marched. While no difficulties were encountered that could not be overcome, the billeting and messing facilities were overburdened on some occasions when more than 1200 persons were being processed at the same time.

Each group of enlisted replacements was given a minimum of eight hours instruction. This included General Orientation, a lecture on Supply Discipline, a lecture on Field Sanitation and Hygiene, and Combat Orientation by a platoon leader from one of the rifle companies within the Division. A representative of the Division Commander delivered an address of welcome to each group of replacements.

Hospital returnees were processed in the same manner as replacements except that the returnees were assigned to the same unit from which evacuated.

Rotation groups left as follows:

Sept	Off/WO	EM
12	0	497
23	0	504
30	35	595
Total	35	1596

d. Discipline

During the period the Judge Advocate Section processed fifty-three pre-trial investigations, however many of these cases were never brought to trial due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the accused.

The following cases were tried by courts-martial in this command:

Type	No. of Cases
General	18
Special	23
Summary	18

Of the cases mentioned above, 75 percent were results of violations of Article 86, UCMJ, (AWOL). The remaining 25 percent were variations of offenses

ranging from violations of Article 92, (namely: speeding) and of Article 134, the general article which covers offenses not listed in the other articles under the Code.

Twenty-two cases were processed by the Judge Advocate and forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final appellate review. This compares with fourteen cases forwarded the previous month.

Nineteen cases which were previously forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final appellate review were held legally sufficient, however, the sentences in respect to confinement were reduced in some cases where it seemed apparent that the accused might be of some future service to the Army.

The 25th Military Police Company, Military Police Operations, and the 25th Division POW Collecting Point operated during the period at CHIPO-RI, vicinity of C45222. Operations consisted of straggler and traffic control, the processing of Prisoners of War, and the care and maintenance of the Division Stockade, located at SEOUL.

Special patrols were organized during the month to evacuate POW's from front line units, and to handle flow of unit movements. In addition the Provost Marshal made route and area reconnaissances along all traffic arteries and in KUMHWA to assist in the evacuation of troops. Military Police escorts were furnished for movement of tanks and convoys.

Four vehicles were reported missing during the period and no vehicles were reported recovered. sixty-five Prisoners of War were processed. 119 Civil Assistance and CIC prisoners were processed. Four investigations were conducted during the period, two for theft of government property and two for theft of personal property. Military offenses included one AWOL and six violations of uniform regulations. Twenty-two traffic violations were reported, eight for speeding, four for reckless driving, nine for blackout violation, and one for violation of 50-yard distance-between-vehicles regulation. Two Korean nationals were investigated for theft of government property.

The Inspector General inspected forty-six nonappropriated funds during the period. A survey revealed that there are 174 welfare and sundry funds within the Division. The inactivation of the 24th Infantry Regiment, effective 1 October 1951, will decrease the number of funds by twenty-three.

A survey of the status of personnel eligible for rotation as of 31 August was conducted during the month and revealed that there were 65 officers and 11 warrant officers with over 55 points. There were 868 enlisted men with over 43 points in the Division. A total of 416 ERC personnel were to be phased out by 31 December.

The reasons listed for the non-rotation of eligible personnel were (1) lack of qualified replacements, (2) voluntary extension of tour for promotion purposes, or (3) personal reasons, and (4) pending court-martial charges or (5) medical treatment. All enlisted men with a high number of points have been offered rotation and those remaining did so voluntarily.

The coming winter and the desire of individuals to rotate prior to the start of cold weather, plus the publicized statement that one winter in Korea was enough for a soldier resulted in numerous inquiries to the Inspector General about rotation. It is anticipated that rotation inquiries will decrease as the Division is presently in much better condition as to rotation.

Eight complaints were received and investigated during the period of which three were considered justified. This compares with thirty-five complaints in July and fifteen in September. No particular trend can be detected through analysis of the complaints submitted during the period.

e. Burials and Graves Registration

The Division Quartermaster transferred the bodies of three officers and 135 enlisted men to the 293rd Graves Registration Unit, and Eighth Army unit in the 1st Cavalry Division zone. From this unit the bodies are shipped to PUSAN, Korea, for transshipment to the United States.

f. Civil Assistance

The policy introduced by EUSAK on 6 June prohibiting civilians north of E-W Grid Line CS97 remained in effect. The main effort of the Division Civil Assistance Section continued to be the implementation of this policy in the Division zone.

The centrally-located Division Refugee Collecting Point and Korean Clearing Station which was located at PODULGOL, CS5198, at the end of the August report period was moved back to its former location at UNCHON-NI, CP4915, on 27 September in anticipation of a change in the tactical situation. Considerable work

had to be done to put the area in shape for occupancy as most of the existing Korean structures had been razed subsequent to the movement of the Civil Assistance Section to PODUGOL.

There were no changes with regard to Civil Assistance affairs in the regimental areas. Evacuation of civilians from villages between the lines has fallen off sharply since the last report period. This has resulted from the CCF forcing all civilians between the lines to move north and from our friendly patrols bringing in groups of civilians who are attempting to move south into UN lines. Reports indicate a small number of aged and sick civilians are remaining in some villages either at their own request or because it is impossible to move them. As near as it can be determined they have sufficient food on hand to provide for their needs. In all probability these people will not be removed until such time as the area they are in comes under UN control.

The following recapitulation of the Civil Assistance activities for the period is furnished:

Refugees screened	1,330
Refugee dead buried	2
Refugees evacuated from Division zone	1,278
Orphans evacuated	1
Indigenous labor hired	1,392
Patients treated at Division Clearing Station	918
Patients evacuated to civilian hospital	69
Typhoid inoculations	762
Smallpox vaccinations	124
Cholera immunizations	762
Dusted with DDT Powder	1,714
Prostitutes evacuated	26
Communist suspects interrogated	10
Suspects turned over to CIC	4

g. Morale and Personnel Services

Rest and Recuperation to Japan Groups were processed as follows:

Sept	Total
1	493
10	398
19	500
28	479

The following figures indicate the awards and decorations for the period and the cumulative figure gives total for Korean Campaign:

	Sept	Cumulative
Congressional Medal of Honor	0	6

Distinguished Service Cross	0	84
Silver Star	23	1119
Legion of Merit	0	37
Distinguished Flying Cross	0	134
Soldier's Medal	0	26
Bronze Star Medal	20	2236
Air Medal	15	812
Commendation Ribbon	0	124

During the month of September a total of 40 Catholic religious services were conducted by the Division Chaplain and a total of 20 Protestant religious services were conducted by the Assistant Division Chaplain. Division Chaplains made 88 visits to various units during the month. The program of scheduling Citizenship and Morality lectures was continued.

There were eighteen Chaplains operating in the Division units during the month.

The following figures indicate their activities:

	No.	Attendance
Protestant Sunday Services	199	11,509
Protestant Weekly Services	49	1,853
Catholic Sunday Masses	81	7,035
Catholic Weekday Masses	115	1,962
Hospital, Aid, Clearing Station Visits	219	1,983
Interviews and Consultations		1,443
Confessions		3,539
Communions		3,739

Although the Turkish troops have two Mohammedan Chaplains assigned to the TAFIC, the Chaplains of the Division provided services for the Christians among the Turkish troops.

The Division Chaplain reported that the morale of the Division was excellent.

He attributed this condition to the following factors:

- (1) A definite increase in church attendance was noted.
- (2) Few complaints were received pertaining to mail from relatives in the United States.
- (3) Few letters of inquiry as to health and welfare pertaining to individual servicemen received.
- (4) Few complaints received pertaining to food, shelter or clothing were received.

The American Red Cross Field Director for the Division reported that the Red Cross had assisted 392 servicemen in such things as sending telegrams, writing letters, delivering personal messages such as news of a birth or death in the family. Counseling service was given to 262 servicemen. Of the total services thirty-five cases pertained to emergency leaves, sixty-one with allotment problems.

and 246 involved health and welfare reports for the serviceman or his parents.

During the period the Public Information Office sent 602 articles pertaining to publicity for personnel of the Division to newspapers of local circulation in the United States. Fifty-six general feature stories were released.

In addition to the regular duties the Public Information Office continued the project of drafting the Division's unofficial history of operations in Korea titled "Battleground Korea."

h. Medical

There was a total of forty-six helicopter evacuations of seriously-wounded patients from field medical installations. These patients were battle casualties from action ensued during the Division's patrol activities in the vicinity of the KUMHWA-CHORWON area.

The 38th Malaria Control Detachment was relieved from attachment to the Division and returned to Army control.

A training course for the Turkish Medical Officers was completed during the period. These officers had one week's training at the 8063rd Mobile Surgical Hospital as the final phase of the course, and all comments from those attending indicated that the course was successful, and that the methods of care, treatment and evacuation of the wounded in the U.S. Army would be adopted by the Turkish Armed Forces. Relations with the medical service, TAFC, have been quite successful.

A three-day training program for newly-assigned medical officers was conducted. The classes were in Field Sanitation, Medical Records, and Field Medicine.

The following is a summary of evacuations and hospitalizations occurring during the month. The cumulative figure reflects hospitalizations and evacuations since the beginning of the Korean Campaign to the end of the report period.

	Sept	Cumulative
Remaining from last report	51	
Admitted to Clearing Stations	1,781	31,387
Evacuated from Clearing Stations	1,389	22,318
Returned to duty	392	8,985
Deaths at Clearing Stations	5	38
Remaining at Clearing Stations		46

1,407 immunizations were administered during the month. Japanese "B", typhus, and smallpox immunization was given to all replacement personnel upon arrival.

There were four cases of epidemic hemorrhagic fever reported in the Division during the month. All possible preventive measures were taken to prevent further cases.

The incidence rate of new malaria cases continued to remain low. Thirty-five cases were reported during the period. The cumulative total of cases since 15 April is 167.

With the advent of winter a program on the prevention of Wet-Cold injuries was initiated under the supervision of G-3.

A total of 11,491 outpatient treatments were administered by all medical units of the Division.

Oral hygiene in the command is reported good. There were 4,270 admissions, 7,744 dental operations, 3,644 sittings, 24 full dentures, 70 partial dentures, seven bridges repaired and twenty-nine dentures repaired. All units of the Division received dental service.

The following is a breakdown of battle casualties occurring during the month. These figures do not include missing in action, killed in action, or casualties returned to duty from medical installations below the organic level of the Division Clearing Company. Cumulative total figures reflect casualties from 25 January 1951.

	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
14th Infantry Regiment	65	66
24th Infantry Regiment	148	1,586
27th Infantry Regiment	194	1,029
35th Infantry Regiment	232	921
25th Division Artillery	14	76
65th Engineer Combat Battalion	5	50
Co A, 79th Tank Battalion	0	10
25th Military Police Company	1	6
Hq 25th Infantry Division	0	1
Btry A, 25th AAA AW Battalion	0	5
25th Reconnaissance Company	1	19
77th Engineer Combat Company	0	7
25th Signal Company	0	1
21st Infantry Regiment (atchd)	27	27
19th Infantry Regiment (atchd)	20	20
Turkish Armed Forces Command	9	280
89th Tank Battalion	11	62
21st AAA AW Battalion	15	86
5th Ranger Company	0	50
8th Engineer Battalion	0	1
987th AFA Battalion	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>

Total 744 4,306

A total of 138 patients were administered psychiatric consultations during

the month. Eighty-one were returned to duty and fifty-seven were evacuated for further treatment. Fifty-two of the patients had been in Korea less than four months.

PART V

a. Logistics

On 1 September 1951, the 25th Infantry Division and attached units were occupying static defense positions along a line from CHICHON (CF5037) on the left northeast to HOEN (CF7042) on the right with the command post located vicinity of CHIPO-RI (CF5222). The Division Quartermaster and Quartermaster Class I and III supply point were located vicinity of HAGAGYE (CF5304) with Quartermaster Class II and IV supply point located vicinity of OXYIDONG (CS1050). The 725th Ordnance Company with a detachment of the 2nd Ordnance MM Company in support was located vicinity of CS5199. The Division Class V dump was located at ASP #56 vicinity of UIJONGEU (CS2878). The main supply route for the Division remained route 3 with 3a being used as the alternate MSR.

Supply remained very good with spare parts for vehicles still heading the list of critically short supply items. No special supply problems arose during the month. Due to increasing coldness, especially at night, strong emphasis was placed on the supply of winter clothing with priority being given the front line units. Winter clothing was originally set up to be issued in three phases with the first phase to be available for issue from 1 September to 1 October, the second phase from 1 October and the third phase to be available for issue to troops by 1 November. By virtue of the heavy emphasis placed on the procurement and issue of these items the first phase was issued 100% with the exception of gloves, leather, shell and gloves woolen insert by 15 September 1951. By 30 September the issue was 75% complete for phase II. By the end of the month 625 stoves, tent, M-1941, had been issued to the units with priority given to 24 hour operations. Due to the shortage of this item, and in order for the Division to remain mobile as possible, it was decided that stoves would not be issued for sleeping quarters until the weather became colder and the supply more plentiful. By the end of September the only item of winter clothing which was not on hand in supply channels or in the hands of troops was gloves, leather, shell and gloves, wool inserts. This item in sufficient quantity was expected to arrive in Division supply channels during the early part of October.

On the 10th of September, the 19th Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division

joined the 25th Infantry Division in its sector. This movement was made by means of a motor march and included the Organic Tank Company. The movement and supply of the regiment was coordinated by the G-4's of each Division and even though it was an added burden on the 25th Division Quartermaster I and III supply point, everything went smoothly and the regimental commander commented very favorably on the effectiveness of the supply of his regiment. At the end of September this regiment was still located in the 25th Division zone and was still attached for Class I and III.

During the month it became necessary, due to tactical plans, to move each supply installation from 3a to well forward on route 3. All installations had completed their movement within two days after receipt of orders and was issuing from their new areas. At the end of the month the installations were still well forward but since the tactical plan had not materialized it was contemplated that they would return to their original areas on route 3a.

b. Supply

The average supported strength of the Division for the month of September was 30,000 military personnel and 6,000 civilians. During the month the Civil Transport Corps, an organization made up of Korean Civilians and used as carriers of food and ammunition from rear areas to the front, was re-organized into the Korean Service Corps under the authority of the Korean National Guard. Before the end of the month all CTC personnel had been inducted into the Korean National Guard and the CTC closed out. This Division was assigned one regiment of KSC personnel to be used primarily for road building and carrying supplies in the forward areas.

Class I supply level is set at one day's supply in hands of troops of either "A" or "B" ration (operational rations) and one half day's supply in hands of troops of either "C" or "5 in 1" rations (combat rations). One day's supply of "B" rations and one days supply of "C" rations are maintained in reserve in the Division supply dumps.

Class II supply level is fifteen day's supply in hands of troops for expendables, and seven days supply of other items in hands of troops.

Class III supply level is one days supply in hands of troops with two days supply maintained in Division dump.

Class IV QM levels are 15 days supply in hands of troops for expendables and seven days in hands of troops for all others. Engineer Class IV is on an "as required basis."

Class V level is one basic load of all types ammunition in hands of troops with a five day supply maintained at the army supply dumps.

Status of major signal items at the close of September was as follows:

Item	Auth	OH	Received	Shortages	Min Requirements
Power Unit PE-95	12	2	0	2	2
Telegraph Terminal TH-3/TC	7	2	0	5	5
Reel Unit RL-26	16	14	0	2	2
Rec-Trans BC-1000	327	263	0	64	64

During the month the Photo Section, 25th Signal Company, processed 3,433 prints, from 563 negatives, and 1,008 aerial negatives.

The most critical items of supply were spare parts for vehicles. Hot patches for inner tubes, brake lining, brake shoes and drums being the most critical of these. These items along with OD paint are considered particularly important at this time due to the emphasis on maintenance within the Division.

Local procurement for the 25th Infantry Division is practically nil due to the non-availability of divisional type supply items on the open market.

c. Captured Enemy Materiel

During the month the following enemy materiel was captured, processed and turned into 8th Army Salvage Collecting Point.

- 58 Rifles
- 7 Carbines, Cal .30
- 16 Submachine Guns
- 4 Heavy Machine Guns
- 1 20mm Gun
- 2 60mm Mortars
- 2 82mm Mortars
- 42 Fuzes

300 lbs of assorted foreign ammunition

13 Pieces of assorted QM Supplies

d. Transportation

The movement of QM Class I and III from UIJONGBU to the divisional supply dump was excessively heavy during the month due to the regiment from the 24th Division being supported by the 25th Division. This operation averaged using ninety trucks per day during the month. A total of 282 trucks were used during the month for maintaining the supply of fortification materials within the Division. This is a high figure and was caused by the changing and improvement of Line Wyoming.

1500 replacements arrived at the Port of INCHON for the Turkish Armed Forces Command. These replacements were moved from INCHON to UIJONGBU by rail and from UIJONGBU to the TAFC area by motor convoy. The out-bound Turkish soldiers were moved by motor convoy from the TAFC area to the Port of INCHON.

During the month twenty-one transporters loaded for the most part with winter clothing was received at the railhead at YONGDONG-PO. These transporters are made of metal and use a combination type lock; they are very effective in controlling pilferage.

The main supply route for the Division, route 3, was a two-way traffic hard base road extending from UIJONGBU (CS3878) northeast to KUMHWA (CT6538). This road carried traffic for the 3rd Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division from UIJONGBU to the vicinity of CT5019. The alternate supply route was a narrow hard base road, route 3a, extending from MANSEGYO (CT4603) northeast along the Division right boundary to KUMHWA.

e. Engineer Service

The dry weather of the period, compared to the heavy rains of August gave the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion an opportunity to devote more time to improving the road net and constructing necessary bridges.

The File Bridge at CT5633 was completed on 5 September. It was at this site that great difficulty was experienced with the floating bridge during the high water encountered in August. This bridge was the first bridge of this type built in Korea by the Division Engineers.

The floating bridge at the site of the new Fife bridge was moved by Brockway trucks to a new site at CT5638 over the HANTAN River in the TAFC sector.

Several infantry-tank task forces of the Division attacked the enemy during the month with the engineers removing mines, filling anti-tank ditches and general engineering combat activities. On one task force one platoon from A Company, 65th Engineers removed 82 box mines as they swept the roads before the advancing troops. In addition the engineers laid over 1000 AP mines and removed 1100 enemy mines.

Upon instructions from the Division Commander the engineers were given the problem of designing and constructing an electrical barbed wire fence. Utilizing local electrical insulators, transformers and a standard 5KW generator, a fence was constructed in front of the infantry lines. This fence was capable of an output of 3400 volts, was 1200 yards long and capable of burning and electrocuting a person coming in contact with it. It was probably the first electrical fence in Korea and other units in the Corps area began copying the design of the fence for use in their areas.

Deviating from normal combat engineering duties, the engineers prepared certain facilities for the Division for the cold Korean winter. A winterized log bunker was designed and constructed as a model. This bunker was designed to sleep 12 to 16 men in comparative comfort and safety from enemy artillery. It was built in the side of a hill and constructed from logs, tarpaper and scrap lumber. Accordingly the engineers began building bunkers for the Infantry units and the Engineer Battalion. Also the Divisional units built bunkers under the technical supervision of the engineers with the logs and materials furnished by the battalion.

There were no acute logistical problems during the month. However, 8,600 rolls of barbed wire was issued to the infantry. The never-ending problem of sufficient trucks and heavy engineer equipment was still unsolved at the end of the period. Although constant emphasis was placed on proper maintenance of vehicles and equipment the battalion never operated with all its organic equipment. It was a constant problem to secure spare parts. The lack of trained maintenance personnel in rear area maintenance shops and the critical lack of replacement equipment made the operations difficult for the period. In order to alleviate

this situation as much as possible the battalion maintenance personnel were constantly busy trying to keep the available equipment in operating condition. Strict officer supervision of organizational maintenance and use of heavy equipment was ordered so that no equipment would become ineffective due to improper maintenance.

f. Ordnance Service

During the month the Division and attached units expended 6,868 tons of ammunition as follows:

Unit	Cal .30	Cal .50	60mm Mortar	81mm Mortar	Hand Grenades	105mm Shell	155mm Shell
14th Inf	3,297,308	345,810	7,862	4,736	3,290		
24th Inf	1,178,910	63,630	8,548	11,866	1,945		
27th Inf	1,250,732	89,930	13,134	13,196	5,126		
35th Inf	1,647,596	84,000	26,614	2,820n	3,669		
19th Inf	29,568						
T AFC	622,900	21,000	1,664	2,360	1,275		
89th Tank	712,776	87,410		66	200		
8th FA						17,502	
69th FA						9,610	
159th FA						10,966	
90th FA							30,960
987th FA						10,126	
13th FA						5,460	

The Ordnance Maintenance Detachments completed 808 vehicles, 1073 vehicular sub-assemblies, 139 artillery pieces, 3359 small arms and 494 instruments.

g. Quartermaster Service

During the month of September the Division Quartermaster Company issued the following supplies:

Class I	Issued	Average per Day
A	884,924	29,497
C	146,149	
Class III		
MoGas	1,000,002	
AvGas	19,451	

The Quartermaster Repair and Maintenance Section repaired 174 typewriters,

137 stoves, 167 lanterns, and 426 fire units for the M-1937 Range.

The Field Service Platoon laundered and dried the following articles in amounts indicated:

Trousers, HBT	24,825
Jackets, HBT	24,997
Undershirts, Ctn	7,355
Drawers, Ctn	12,893
Socks, W/C	22,065
Undershirts, Wool	272
Jackets, Field	44
Towels	724

The Purchasing and Contracting Section purchased during the period:

Scarfs, silk, white	1,000
Passes, labor	10,000
Mats, split bamboo	60
Ice, 300 lb block	2,400
Hinges	60
Hasps	36
Screws	600
Locks	6

PART VI

Chronology

- 3 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, Commanding General IX Corps visited the 27th and 35th Infantry Regiments and Division Headquarters.
- 6 September Major General Aykut, Turkish Liaison Officer, FEC, and Major General Tashin Yazici, Commanding General TAFIC visited the Division Headquarters.
- 8 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps, Colonel Gilman C. Mudgett, G-3 EUSAK, and Colonel Paschal N. Strong, Engineer, EUSAK, visited the Division CP.
- 9 September 19th Infantry Regiment attached to the 25th Division.
- 10 September Division TAC CP established at CT5430.
- 11 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps, visited the Division CP.
- 19 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps, visited the Division sector.
- 21 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX Corps, visited the Division sector.
- 23 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps and Major Gen C.D. Eddlemans, Army Member, Joint Strategic Plans, JCS, visited the Division CP.
- 25 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps, visited the Division CP.
- 27 September Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps, visited the Division CP.

PART VII

Discussion

During the month patrols, usually platoon-size operated to the north in the Division zone. The pattern of enemy resistance against these patrols was constant, consisting of heavy mortar fire as they maneuvered toward the objective and accurate automatic weapons fire from concealed positions as the patrols closed on the objective. The enemy would remain under cover until the patrol came within hand grenade distance of the objective and then would engage the patrol with small arms, automatic weapons and grenades. When the patrol succeeded in killing or in driving out the enemy, it was immediately subjected to heavy mortar fire. Although daylight patrols seldom failed to contact the enemy and encounter stiff resistance, night ambush patrols made only light enemy contact.

With the positions generally unchanged during the month, the terrain had little effect on the nature of operations. The enemy could observe the movement of any daylight patrols departing friendly lines. There could be little concealment, and in general the enemy was able to limit the advance of Division patrols to the terrain features some 3000 to 4000 meters north of the MLR. Weather during the month had no adverse effects on operations since there was little rain and the temperatures were moderate. With no damage from weather, maintenance of roads and communications presented few problems.

Operations for the month resulted in an adjusted and greatly strengthened MLR and OPLR. Daily contact was made with the enemy by patrol action up to 3000 yards north of the MLR.

During the period of this report the basic doctrine as pertains to the organization, training, technique, administration, and equipment of the infantry division and its massed supporting power was applied to all missions assigned and the results of the month's operations reveal that the basic doctrine is sound in all respects, however the following recommendations are submitted:

- (1) That a medium battalion, in addition to the organic battalion be assigned or attached to this Division's artillery. The wide front, some 30,000 meters, spreads the one organic medium battalion to a maximum. This allows no overlap of normal zones for the batteries and precludes the possibility of massing the

battalion on one target. One of the major problems existing at the end of September was the inadequacy of medium artillery coverage. In order to provide coverage over the entire sector, it was necessary to split one battery. The planned conversion of the 159th FA Battalion into a 155mm howitzer battalion will alleviate this situation provided it is left with the Division.

(2) It is recommended that an 8-inch howitzer unit be assigned to the Division. The manner in which the CGF Artillery emplaces its pieces is the main basis for this recommendation. Currently enemy artillery pieces are emplaced at ranges exceeding the 155 howitzer range. Add to this the heavy fortifications of enemy positions—log type bunkers, a destruction mission is difficult and time consuming, requiring large ammunition expenditures by the 155 howitzer.

(3) It is recommended that a more satisfactory radio be issued for use by Artillery Forward Observers. This is particularly true in the case of an observer assigned to work with an armored unit.

(4) Consideration be given to the development of a napalm mortar round, capable of entering fire trenches and covered emplacement entrances on the crests of hills.

(5) That improvements be made in the rifle grenade launcher to enable it to be employed as a pin-point weapon with accuracy similar to that of a mortar.

(6) That full utilization of the pin-point accuracy of tank fire against enemy emplacements be made by designing a high-velocity tank cannon napalm round with a delay fuze.

(7) That field expedients fogasses and illuminating devices be developed into items of issue that won't require daily servicing to replenish evaporated fuel.

General Swift in a letter directive on 15 September made the following comments:

90

"I have observed that field sanitation among front line units of this command is far below the standard I require.... The appearance of an installation generally reflects the efficiency of the unit which occupies it and the officer who commands it. Some installations within this Division reflect little credit upon units or

86. Command Report, 24th Inf Regt, Sept 1951

87. Command Report, 24th Inf Regt, Sept 1951

88. Command Report, 24th Inf Regt, Sept 1951

89. Command Report, 24th Inf Regt, Sept 1951

90. Ltr, CG 25th Div, 15 Sept 1951

commanders. Command, service, and administrative installations must present a neat and orderly appearance. I do not require the 'Garrison finish.' I do require the highest standard of neatness and efficiency consistent with the tactical situation... The battle zone offers no excuse for filth or slovenliness. Health, sanitation, and military appearance are command responsibilities."

This letter directed immediate measures to effect improvements by the provision of suitable latrines and refuse pits in tactical areas, to institute a system for police of all areas and positions daily, and to require daily inspections by an officer of all tactical and administrative areas.

During the tactical briefings held each night at 1930 hours during the period in the War Tent the Commanding General emphasized the following tactical principles:

(1) It is mandatory that Task Forces be assembled the night before an operation so that the force can be properly organized and moved out as a unit before daylight. This will remove the possibility of units shuffling around to find out exactly where they should be. A force must be organized so that it can leave in sufficient time and in proper formation. In this way it will be an effective tactical force, not a hodge-podge of disorganized elements "falling in" along the march route.

(2) Patrols must move forward to contact the enemy. Patrols which move but a short distance to sit on the forward slope of a hill are not accomplishing their mission of finding the enemy, determining his strength and dispositions, and where possible to close and destroy him using all available supporting weapons.

(3) Patrols must not be sent to the same objective at the same time on successive days. Sending different sized patrols at different times and by different routes will keep the enemy from setting up ambushes and keep him off balance.

(4) A patrol must have a thorough understanding of its mission, which is to find the enemy, determine his strength and dispositions and destroy him by close combat and/or adjusted artillery fire.

(5) Combat patrols in this situation should be large enough to provide for an artillery observer who can adjust fire on the enemy. The purpose of these combat patrols is to hurt the enemy to the maximum without hurting ourselves.

(6) Patrols must be coordinated so that they are not bumping into each other. An officer must be designated to control the operations of two or more patrols opera-


ting in the same area.

(7) Patrols must have a relief force alerted to extricate them. Normally the company sending out the patrol will be available to assist in extricating patrols which run into large enemy groups. Commanders must report such situations to permit necessary action being taken before nightfall.

(8) Units must get in the habit of reporting how much damage they did, not how much punishment they received. The punishment they received should be secondary.

(9) It is important that we keep a running log of enemy artillery fired on friendly units. We should analyze the artillery fire received to determine whether or not it is increasing in volume during a given period, and to determine if it is a single piece or a battery. If the enemy can mass artillery, we can expect him to mass his fires. We should determine whether it is adjusted and coordinated fire or whether it is sporadic and unobserved fire. This will permit us to take proper countermeasures.

(10) It is important that we look for conclusions in our reviews and study of intelligence. We must keep logs of this data and study the data in connection with the action to our front so that we can initiate countermeasures before the enemy can be effective.


IRA P. SWIFT
Major General, USA
Commanding

COMMAND



8A/FEC-51-35093

2 OCT 51

G/A Omar N. Bradley (2nd from left) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greets Major General Tahsin Yazici, Commanding General Turkish Armed Forces Command, at a conference at the 7th US Infantry Division airstrip near SANGYANG-RI, Korea. Left to right: Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps; Gen Bradley, Maj Gen Ira P. Swift, CG 25th US Inf Div; Maj Gen Yazici; Major Sunalp, Turkish Armed Forces Command.



8A/FEC-51-32696

7 SEPT 51


Maj Gen Ira P. Swift, CG 25th US Inf Div prepares to leave hqs of the 241st Turkish Regt, following visit to Regtl hqs, six miles south of KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-32698

6 SEPT 51

New Turkish Colonel who recently arrived at Hq of the 241st Turkish Regt, six miles south of KUMHWA, Korea, greets his officers and men, during ceremonies held at Regt Hqs.



8A/FEC-51-32698

6 SEPT 51

Officers of the 241st Turkish Regt confer during meeting held at Regt Hq, six miles south of KUMHWA, Korea.

PERSONNEL



8A/FEC-51-33877

21 SEPT 51


Captain and 1st Sgt interview newly arrived replacements at the 25th Sig Co, 25th US Inf Div, CHIPO-RI, Korea.



9A/FEC-51-33873

20 SEPT 51

Members of the T & T Section, 25th Sig Co, 25th US Inf Div, interview new replacements as they arrive at Co Hqs, CHIPO-RI, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-34851

14 SEPT 51

Men of the 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div attending dedication ceremonies of the opening of the Kenneth E. Brown Memorial Amphitheater, named for Captain Brown, CO, Co L, 24th Inf, killed in action.



8A/FEC-51-34850

14 SEPT 51

Chaplain (Major) John H. Handy, 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, speaking at the dedication of the Kenneth E. Brown Amphitheater.

INTELLIGENCE



8A/FEC-51-33897

12 SEPT 51

Bodies of enemy soldiers, killed by men of Co "B" 27th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, during assault against hill 520, north of KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-34260

20 AUG 51

With the aid of an interpreter, men of the 27th RCT, 25th US Inf Div, question a Korean refugee who was found wandering near the area of Co B, 27th RCT, near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-34256

12 SEPT 51

Men of Co A and Co B, 27th ECT, 25th US Inf Div, unload Communist prisoners who were captured during the battle for hill 520 near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-34844

10 SEPT 51

At UGU-DONG, Korea, a Korean woman and her family discovered behind the lines by men of the 1st Bn, 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, are evacuated in the bed of a trailer.


OPERATIONS



8A/FEC-51-33895

2 SEPT 51


Tank #28 of Co B 89th Tank Bn, attached to the 25th US Inf Div sets Korean farmhouse afire with aid of flame thrower as UN troops continue advance against the Chinese Communist Forces north of KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-33896

8 SEPT 51


Man of Co C 89th Tank Bn, attached to the 25th US Inf Div, scans area for signs of enemy forces, during his tour of guard atop tank set up at defensive position north of KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-33898

21 SEPT 51

Elements of Co D 21st AAA Bn, attached to the 25th US Inf Div, set up defensive positions northeast of KUMHWA, Korea, in preparation for assault against the Chinese Communist Forces in that area.



8A/FEC-51-33887

16 SEPT 51

From a vantage spot atop hill 604 north of KUMHWA, Korea, men of Co E, 27th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, maintain a constant watch for enemy activity.



8A/FEC-51-34867

27 SEPT 51

Officers of the 90th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, prepare to leave airstrip 1 mile north of CHIPO-RI, Korea, on artillery spotting mission over enemy lines.



8A/FEC-51-32828

3 SEPT 51


Men of the 5th Section, 69th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, prepare to fire 105mm howitzer as they continue assault against the Chinese Communist Forces at SOAM-NI, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-33893

8 SEPT 51

M-4 Tank of the 1st Platoon, Co C 89th Tank Bn, attached to the 25th US Inf Div sets up defensive position in preparation for assault against the enemy forces, during action against the Chinese Communist Forces north of KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-33894

12 SEPT 51

Men of the 3rd Platoon, Heavy Mortar Co, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, fire 4.2 mortar at enemy positions, as they provide fire support for infantrymen of the division as they attack hill 520, during assault against the Chinese Communist Forces north of KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-34848

11 SEPT 51

Near UGU-DONG, Korea, following a bitter two-day battle on hill 351, men of Co B, 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, clean their weapons.



8A/FEC-51-34258

22 SEPT 51

Co K, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, move up to relieve Co C, 27th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-31979

3 SEPT 51

Men of 2nd Platoon Battery A, 21st AAA, 25th US Inf Div reload the magazines of two 50 cal machine guns so that there will be no break in firing during training exercises near KUMHWA, Korea. The quad 50 is giving fire support to the assault platoon of Co. A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, who are engaged in taking a hill.



8A/FEC-51-32825

3 SEPT 51

Ammo bearer passes ammunition to crew member as the 5th Section, 69th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div fire 105mm howitzer during assault against the Chinese Communist Forces at SOAM-NI, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-32695

9 SEPT 51

Turkish Soldiers of the 5th Co, 241st Turkish Regt watch action against the Chinese Communist Forces from their OP, during assault against the enemy forces five miles west of KUMHWA, Korea.

TRAINING



8A/FEC-51-31971

3 SEPT 51

Men of the 3rd Platoon, Co A, 1st Bn, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, advance behind the protection of an M-4 Tank of Co B, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div, during training exercises near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-31972

3 SEPT 51


A quad 50 of the 2nd Platoon, 23rd AAA Bn Battery A, 25th US Inf Div, pours 4 constant streams of lead into enemy positions from its position behind a river bank during training exercises near KUMHWA, Korea. They are in support of the 1st Platoon, Co A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, who are engaged in taking a hill.



8A/FEC-51-31982

27 AUG 51

Men of Co G, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, fire their 60mm mortar at the enemy near KUMHWA, Korea, during training exercises.



8A/FEC-51-31983

26 AUG 51


The advance platoon of Co H, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, prepare to move up the side of a mountain toward the enemy during training exercises near KUMHWA, Korea. They were supported by mortar, machine gun, and recoilless rifle fire.



8A/FEC-51-31975

3 SEPT 51

Men of Btry A 21st AAA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, clean out empty 50 cal shells and clips from under their quad 50 and prepare for a counterattack. They have been giving supporting fire for Co A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, during training exercises near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-31977

3 SEPT 51

Tank of Co B, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div, gives supporting fire to the assault platoon of Co A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, who are attacking a hill near KUMHWA, Korea, during training exercises.



8A/FEC-51-32823

6 SEPT 51

Men of the 1st Bn, 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div prepare to fire from kneeling position, at the newly constructed firing range near their Hq, YUGONG-NI, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-31981

26 AUG 51

A white phosphorus mortar shell bursts on a nearby hill as a machine gun crew of Co H, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, pour hot lead into enemy positions during training exercises near KUMIWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-32826

6 SEPT 51

Platoon sergeant with 1st Bn, 24th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, fires carbine from prone position, at recently constructed range near their Hq, YUGONG-NI, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-34846

19 SEPT 51


For the benefit of Lt Col Waldon C. Winston CO 1st Bn, 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, RR team demonstrate their method of firing on hill 400, the previous day, without benefit of sights.



8A/FEC-51-31980

3 SEPT 51


A 57mm Recoiless Rifle crew of the 1st Plt, Co A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, fire at an enemy position during training exercises near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-31985

3 SEPT 51

Men of the 1st Plt, Co A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, go against rugged terrain as they scale an almost vertical mountain side during a training exercise near KUMHWA, Korea. Other elements of their unit cover them by keeping the enemy pinned down with a steady stream of fire.



8A/FEC-51-31973

3 SEPT 51

A rifleman of the 1st Platoon, Co A, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, fires into an enemy fox hole during a training exercise near KUMHWA, Korea.

LOGISTICS



8A/FEC-51-33884

16 SEPT 51

Near KUMHWA, Korea, a labor party climbs hill 538 loaded with supplies.



8A/FEC-51-31770

2 SEPT 51


Men of the 27th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div draw new issue of clothes at the shower unit hc of the 27th Inf Regt, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-33886

14 SEPT 51


At KUMHWA, Korea, men of the 1st Bn, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, fill sand bags for additional protection on the forward CP bunker.



8A/FEC-51-34868

28 SEP 51

Men at Hq of the Radio Repair Maint Section, 25th Sig Co, 25th US Inf Div, CHIFORI, Korea, repair P275 Power Unit and a carburetor.



8A/FEC-51-33889

14 SEPT 51

At KUMHWA, Korea, men of the 1st Bn 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, carry a log up a steep rocky trail to use in the building of the CP bunker.



8A/FEC-51-33890

14 SEPT 51

Utilizing a tile salvaged from an old native home in KUMHWA, Korea, men of the 1st Bn, 35th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, make a brace needed to hold up the heavy roof of logs, sand bags and tile of the CP bunker.



Photo showing insulators and top strand of copper wire on electric fence.



Photo showing east and west portions of electric fence.



Photo showing substructure of Pile bridge while piles were still being driven.



Photo showing completed Pile bridge at CT562338.



8A/FEC-51-34847

19 SEPT 51

Following a heavy battle on hill 400 in Korea, men of Co B, 1st Bn, 24th Regt, 25th US Inf Div, bring down the bodies of the casualties.



8A/FEC-51-34257

12 SEPT 51

Medics and litter bearers of the 25th US Inf Div bring a wounded soldier into the Bn aid station of the 27th Regt near KUMHWA, Korea.

HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 25

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED TO THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1951 AND ARE FOR DUTY UNLESS OTHER-WISE INDICATED.
THIS ROSTER AGREES WITH MORNING REPORT (WD AGO FORM 1) DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1951.

COMMANDING GENERAL:

Maj Gen	Ira P Swift	O-12205	USA	Division Commander
Brig Gen	William L Mitchell	O-12832	USA	Asst Div Commander
Capt	Otto F Buehner	O-50346	Inf	ADC to CG
1st Lt	Norman A LaPlante	O-958054	Inf	ADC to Asst CG

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Lt Col	Richard W Whitney	O-31855	GSC	Chief of Staff
Maj	James D McLanahan	O-46037	GSC	Asst Chief Of Staff
WOJG-1	William A Fanno	W-2144445	NO	Admin Asst

AG OF S, G-1:

Maj	DeNeer W Flynn	O-450277	GSC	AG of S, G-1
Maj	Harry E Apper Jr	O-1283894	GSC	Asst G-1
1st Lt	John W Mingin	O-1288776	Inf	Asst G-1
2nd Lt	Gail E Van Horn	O-980938	Inf	Asst G-1

AG OF S, G-2:

Lt Col	James H Lee	O-35428	GSC	AG of S, G-2
Maj	Malcom M Jameson	O-400182	Inf	Asst G-2
Capt	Merle D Bascom	O-1296977	GSC	Asst G-2
Capt	Herbert A Brannon	O-1031387	Armor	Asst G-2
Capt	Raymond H Gutler	O-1296822	Inf	Ops Off
Capt	Charles H Fogg	O-507611	Inf	Inter Off
Capt	Robert C Perron	O-1595756	Inf	Photo Inter
Capt	Frank R Sahn	O-1170959	GSC	Intell Staff Off Combat
1st Lt	Grant S Ficker	O-1301976	Inf	CB Specl TDY
1st Lt	William E Hardesty	O-980912	Inf	Photo Inter
1st Lt	William H Harr	O-1020499	armor	In Off Combat
1st Lt	William H McCoy Jr	O-1039778	TC	Admin Off
1st Lt	Milton M Mondor	O-1339905	Inf	Intell Staff Off Combat
1st Lt	Sylvester Rich II	O-556451	Inf	Photo Inter
1st Lt	Jay W Sterner Jr	O-2200605	Armor	Asst Oper Off
1st Lt	Arthur G Webster III	O-558476	Inf	Translation Off
1st Lt	William H Wilson	O-1334660	Inf	Inter Off
1st Lt	Ray A Woodside	O-976954	Inf	Translation Off

AG OF S, G-3:

Lt Col	Harry Balish	O-22218	GSC	AG of S, G-3
Maj	Charles E Dempier	O-1313010	GSC	Asst G-3
Maj	Donald J Baker	O-436251	Inf	TRK Off
Maj	Martin L Davis	O-336888	Inf	Intel Staff Off Combat
Maj	Michael F Hochella	O-36480	Arty	Div Lt avn Off
Maj	Max K Johnson	O-389043	Inf	Hist Editor
Maj	Paul I Skogberg	O-62134	Armor	Intell Staff Off Combat
Capt	John F Brandenburg	O-1327806	Inf	Asst G-3
Capt	George C Critchlow Jr	O-291243	armor	In Off Combat
Capt	Alysa R Eshleman	O-1311630	Inf	Asst G-3
Capt	Stanton L Fickel	O-412446	Inf	Oper & Tag Staff Off
1st Lt	Francis G Nordstrom	O-1011070	Armor	In Off Combat

AG OF S, G-4:

Lt Col	William E Coulter	O-364911	GSC	AG of S, G-4
Maj	Leroy W Mueller	O-429239	GSC	Asst G-4
Maj	Alfred M Saunders	O-1291018	GSC	Trans Staff Off
Capt	James G McKeon	O-1063113	Arty	Trans Staff Off
1st Lt	Charles E Ridings	O-949108	TC	Asst Trans Off
2nd Lt	Leroy Devine	O-995840	TC	Motor Trans Off
WOJG-1	Doyle T Walker	W-2144265	NO	Admin Asst

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

Capt	Ordie P Taylor Jr	0-1030616	Inf	Hq Commandant
------	-------------------	-----------	-----	---------------

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION:

Lt Col	Charles F Test	0-387888	AGC	Adjutant General
Maj	Charles A Smith	0-1000186	AGC	Asst Adj General
Capt	Michael G Bulbian	0-1994560	AGC	Class & Asgmt Off
Capt	Howard A Berg	0-1057354	AGC	Asst Adj General
Capt	Robert M Blanton	0-1316842	AGC	Postal Off
Capt	James M Breuklander	0-1032002	AGC	Asst Adj General
Capt	William M Nicholson	0-180017	AGC	Postal Off
1st Lt	Oren R Lyon	0-1001628	AGC	Asst Adj General
1st Lt	Marshall E Noel	0-2033665	TC	Asst Adj General
1st Lt	Holland W Starkey	0-2032910	AGC	Div Postal Off
2nd Lt	Louis E Malnarick	0-969249	AGC	Mil Pers Off
WOJG-1	Robert L Johnston	W906816	NO	Admin Asst

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SECTION:

Lt Col	Edgar R Hinnich	0-511197	JAGC	Division JA
Capt	William P Goodman	0-52007	JAGC	Asst JA
Capt	George V W Pope Jr	0-63485	JAGC	Asst JA
1st Lt	Charles L Beck	0-975962	JAGC	Asst JA
1st Lt	John C Lanham	0-63738	JAGC	Asst JA
WOJG-1	Gertez B Hope	W-2147088	NO	Admin Asst

CHAPLAIN SECTION:

Lt Col	George E Donnellon	0-29250	Ch C	Division Chaplain
Maj	Gordon L Alderman	0-479536	Ch C	Chaplain

FINANCE SECTION:

Maj	William E Slezak	0-1285511	FC	Div Finance Off
Capt	Garland H Midgett	0-1332398	FC	Asst Fin Off
1st Lt	William B Proctor Jr	0-58563	FC	Asst Fin Off
2d Lt	Donald G Loth	0-975369	FC	Asst Fin Off
WOJG-1	Eduard A Lapkas	W-2143937	NO	Asst Fin Off

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTION:

Lt Col	Royal O Munawaker	0-29391	GSC	Div Inspector General
GWO	Joseph S Cleveland	W-2113271	NO	Auditing Off
WOJG-1	John Grothe	W-2144096	NO	Auditing Off

CHEMICAL SECTION:

Capt	David D Maxwell	0-1536420	Cml C	Div Chemical Off
Capt	William E Hartman	0-1637624	Cml C	Chemical Off
1st Lt	John S Anderson Jr	0-2200520	Cml C	Chemical Off

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION:

Capt	Gale W Hibbard	0-1291819	Inf	Special Service Off
1st Lt	Frank J Koati	0-1329846	AGC	Special Service Off

SURGEON SECTION:

Lt Col	Richard H Ross	0-1765816	MC	Division Surgeon
Capt	Jack B McGoilrick	0-1919613	MC	Medical Officer
Capt	Robert R Yoder	0-952707	MC	Psychiatrist
1st Lt	Jack E Moore	0-2037920	MSG	Medical Asst
1st Lt	Denis F Sheils	0-962169	MSG	Medical Asst
WOJG-1	Jesse Yerman	W-2142785	NO	Admin Asst

PIO SECTION:

Capt	Hendrick G Stone	0-1185600	Arty	Asst PIO Off
1st Lt	Allan A David	0-1330044	Inf	Pub Rel Off

EXCHANGE SECTION:

Capt	Robert K Boler	0-1845147	Inf	Division Exchange Off
1st Lt	John W Clare	0-1305730	Inf	Asst Exchange Off

CIVIL ASSISTANCE SECTION:

Lt Col	Louis H Ressjac	0-23454	Inf	Div Civil Asst Off	
Maj	Charles E Friedman	0-423493	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	TDY
Maj	Virgil K Iedbetter	0-1824049	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
Maj	Samuel B Sinsi	0-729666	Inf	Civil Affs Off MG	
Capt	Earl A Burton	0-1330142	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
Capt	William J Falkner	0-391611	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
1st Lt	Frank F Gable	0-397138	Inf	Civil Affs Off MG	
1st Lt	Richard H Shinnick	0-1823358	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	

SPECIAL UNITS PERSONNEL:

2nd Lt	Edward M Kelley	0-994495	AGC	Personnel Officer
--------	-----------------	----------	-----	-------------------

OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1951 - FROM ORGN IND:

Col	Thomas S Gunby	0-11395	UNRC	- Turkish Brigade	DS
Lt Col	Maynard B Weaver	0-32120	UNRC	- Turkish Brigade	DS
Maj	Kenneth G Flook	0-450862	UNRC	- Turkish Brigade	DS
Capt	Thomas C Kearns	0-1110591	UNRC	- Turkish Brigade	DS

ROK PERSONNEL ON DUTY WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1951:

Capt	Park Myung Taek	12105	Finance Section
Capt	Lee Jn Woo	unk	Liaison Off G-2
1st Lt	Choi Sang Nang	60214	Liaison Off Civ Asst Sec
1st Lt	Lee Yong Shik	60373	AG Rear Liaison Off
1st Lt	Ro Myung Shik	203066	AG Rear
SFC	Han Yoon Hi	1109477	AG Rear
S Sgt	Ehin O Chul	3800972	Finance Section
Sgt	Kang Tal Soo	0365276	AG Rear
Sgt	Pak Song Hak	0365281	AG/Pers
Sgt	Roe Jae Hak	0365195	AG Rear
Sgt	Roe Jin U	0365208	Finance Section
Sgt	Sir Su Tak	0365207	Finance Section
Sgt	Yang Sun Il	0365206	Finance Section

THERE ARE 47 ROK POLICEMEN ATTACHED TO DUTY HQ REAR PERFORMING SECURITY GUARD.

THERE ARE 25 ROK POLICEMEN ATTACHED TO DUTY HQ FWD BY W/CIVIL ASSISTANCE SECTION.

BREAKDOWN OF GRADES ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN:

Maj Gen Asg-----	1	M/Sgt Asg---10	Col Atch-----	1	M/Sgt Atch-----	2
Brig Gen Asg-----	1	SFC Asg-----17	Lt Col Atch---	1	SFC Atch-----	2
Lt Col Asg-----	10	Sgt Asg-----29	Maj Atch-----	1	Sgt Atch-----	1
Maj Asg-----	18	Cpl Asg-----49	Capt Atch-----	1	Cpl Atch-----	5
Capt Asg-----	30	PFC Asg-----73	Total Atch---	4	PFC Atch-----	8
1st Lt Asg-----	28	Pvt-2 Asg---59			Pvt-2 Atch---10	
2d Lt Asg-----	5	Total Asg---237			Total Atch---28	
CWO-Asg-----	1					
WOJG Asg-----	7					
Total Asg-----	101		Negro-----	3		

AG M/R

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Master

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



Command Report - 25th Infantry Division

OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

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ITEM NO: 7
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SECURITY INFORMATION

COMMAND REPORT

(CSGPO - 28)

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION



325

OCTOBER 1951

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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COMMAND REPORT

(CSGPO-28)

OCTOBER 1951

25TH UNITED STATES INFANTRY DIVISION

Attached to

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

1 through 31 October 1951

Under operational control of

IX UNITED STATES CORPS

1 through 31 October 1951

Commanded by

MAJOR GENERAL IRA P. SWIFT, USA

1 through 31 October 1951

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Command Report
SECURITY INFORMATION
25th Infantry Division

October 1951

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION I

Part I

Introduction

(a) Background

Throughout September the 25th Infantry Division occupied and improved positions along Line Wyoming. It was the second consecutive month that both friendly and enemy forces operated from well entrenched, relatively static lines. Old weapons emplacements were rebuilt and new ones constructed. Emphasis was placed on improving revetments, over-head cover, drainage, and camouflage. Work continued to erect three bands of double apron fences along the trace of interlocking final protective fires across the Division front. In addition, machine gun emplacements, strong points, and other tactical localities were wired in with protective wire. Regiments and the Turkish Armed Forces Command coordinated and strengthened tie-in points.

Night and day patrols operated in each regimental area to keep contact with the enemy and inflict losses. Patrol bases, set up forward of the MLR, provided additional means of ensuring contact and giving early warning of enemy advance.

The major tactical operation for the month evolved around a patrol base manned by two companies of the 35th Infantry Regiment on Hill 717 (vicinity CT5345) and Hill 632 (vicinity CT5545). An attack by an enemy battalion on 7 September forced I and K Companies to withdraw from the base. Hill 717 was retaken by the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, on 9 September, supported by fire from the Turkish Armed Forces Command in the vicinity of CT5244. The 19th Infantry Regiment (attached from the 24th Infantry Division) moved on 9 September to forward assembly areas southeast of hill 632 prepared to assist the attack. On 10 September the regiment moved over Hill 387 (vicinity CT5745) and Hill 586 (vicinity CT5546) while the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, was retaking Hill 632. After Hill 632 was secured both regiments screened the area north in their zone to the 48th east-west grid line. Following this engagement, the patrol base was abandoned and a new one set up on Hill 432 (vicinity CT5642). The latter base became a responsibility of the Turkish Brigade.

Blocking positions in rear of the MLR were improved and strengthened continuously. Plans for their occupation in case of an enemy break-through were practiced frequently by units in Division reserve.

(b) Component Units and Commanding Officers

(As of 31 October)

Unit	Commander
14th Infantry Regiment	Lt. Col. Roy V. Porter, Infantry
27th Infantry Regiment	Lt. Col. George B. Sloan, Infantry
35th Infantry Regiment	Lt. Col. Thomas W. Woodyard Jr., Infantry
Turkish Armed Forces Command	Major Gen. Tahsin Yazıcı, Cavalry
25th Division Artillery	Brig. Gen. William E. Waters, USA
8th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Harry L. Yerby, Artillery
64th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Lounsbury Branson, Artillery
69th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Don W. Dixon, Artillery
90th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Roger E. Reeder, Artillery
159th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt. Col. Richard W. Gilchrist, Artillery
21st AAA AW Battalion (SP)	Lt. Col. Charles E. Henry, Artillery
89th Medium Tank Battalion	Lt. Col. William T. Hamilton Jr., Armor
65th Engineer Combat Battalion	Lt. Col. Richard L. Hennessy, CE
25th Medical Battalion	Major Charles F. Snyder Jr.

Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

(a) Elements Affecting the Action

1. Effectiveness of enemy information and reconnaissance:

During the month of October, there were no definite indications as to the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance.

2. Nature of terrain:

a. See Intelligence Estimate #13 (Book 3).

b. In the west of the 25th Division sector the dominant terrain feature is the hill mass 717, 682 (vicinity CT5445) which affords the enemy excellent observation of the west and central sectors of the Division zone. In the east of the Division zone the dominant terrain feature is the hill mass 1062 (vicinity CT6445) which commands the east and central sectors of the Division zone. The central sector of the zone is characterized by a valley drained by the HANWAN River, flowing north to south.

3. Condition of weather:

The amount of precipitation occurring during the month of October was normal. The weather had little effect on military operations except for early morning fog which often hindered friendly patrol actions, and gave the enemy freedom from air and ground observation for as long as four hours after sunrise in some instances.

Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

(b) Plans and Preparations

The general mission of the 25th Infantry Division during October 1951 remained much the same as for the previous month--defense of its sector along Line Wyoming. Plans and preparations in fulfillment of this mission were designed to:

- (1) improve tactical positions, including winterization of bunkers; (2) maintain contact with the enemy to keep him off balance, inflict casualties, capture prisoners, and destroy his materiel; and (3) conduct schools and establish training schedules to further the combat proficiency of the command. Near the end of the month the Division had the additional mission of preparing for Operation MESABI, which envisioned a general advance by IX Corps.

1 October

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 276 directed the Turkish Armed Forces Command to attack at 030600 October in its zone to seize and defend the best terrain along its line (see overlay attached to OI No. 276); establish platoon sized outguard bases in vicinity of CF4843, CT5042, and CT5242; maintain defense of Line Wyoming with elements of its reserve battalion; and maintain contact with 3rd Division on the west (left) flank and the 14th Infantry on the east (right) flank.

The 14th Infantry was to organize and defend the left of the line in its sector, commencing 030600 October and maintain company sized outguard bases on Hill 432, vicinity of CT5643, Hill 351, vicinity of CT5842, and hill vicinity of CT6142. The regiment was also to continue to maintain defensive works along Line Wyoming.

Both the TAFG and 14th Infantry were to erect three bands of double apron barbed wire fence in front of the new MLR, the center band to be a minimum of seven feet high.

These instructions were executed as planned.

4 October

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 277 relieved the 25th Reconnaissance Company from attachment for operational control to the Turkish Armed Forces Command and returned it to Division control, effective 2000 hours that date. The company was

given the mission of screening the Division left flank from vicinity of CT4840 to CT4834 during daylight to give early warning of enemy infiltration. During darkness the company was to establish a strong point in the vicinity of CT4935 to warn against enemy infiltration and prevent his movement south.

5 October

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 278 ordered the 14th Infantry to attack 8 October and seize objective Strike with one battalion reinforced with two tank companies. The attacking force was to capture prisoners, destroy enemy personnel, materiel, and installations on the objective. A battalion from the 27th Infantry, attached for operational control from 7-9 October, was to replace the attacking battalion on the MLE during the mission. These instructions were later rescinded.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 279 relieved the 56th Counterfire platoon from operational control of the 14th Infantry and attached it to the 27th Infantry, effective 6 October.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 281 directed the 14th Infantry to seize Hill 404 (C25644) on 6 October with a tank-infantry force. After destroying enemy personnel and materiel and capturing prisoners, the force was to return to friendly positions before dark. The instructions were executed as planned.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS emphasized the opportunity that existed to inflict heavy casualties and telling blows on the enemy in the present battle area. Pointing out that night withdrawals result in major casualties, loss of control, less coordinated firepower, and cause great difficulty in identifying terrain and in distinguishing between friend and foe, the letter outlined the following procedure:

(1) Complete "buttoning up" of all units prior to dark, with adjacent units located and mutual fires coordinated. Personnel should be dug in and weapons prepared to fire in an integrated plan. Wherever possible, anything that moves is considered enemy unless positively identified otherwise.

(2) Holding positions, individual and unit, with determination. This was stressed as the best way to inflict heaviest punishment on the enemy and minimize friendly losses.

(3) Accepting the fact that some penetrations may occur during the night.

(4) Beginning aggressive action with first light to eliminate infiltrators.

restore positions, and launch counterattacks.

(5) Maintaining major units intact, keeping lateral contact, and preventing loss of small units.

The letter further stated that defensive positions would be organized in depth, emplacements would be of the bunker type, defensive fires would be planned to cover the entire front with an effective band of fire, and that a minimum of three bands of double apron fence would be strung parallel to final protective lines. Also emphasized was the use of infantry, armor, artillery, and air as a team during limited attacks, patrols, and raids.

7 October

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 283 were in confirmation of oral instructions from the Commanding General on 6 October, directing the 27th Infantry to attack 7 October with a battalion sized task force along a prescribed axis in the vicinity of CT5643 (see overlay), screen objective, and return to the MLR prior to darkness. The instructions were executed as planned.

LETTER, HEADQUARTERS IX CORPS, SUBJECT: Report of Enemy Air Attacks pointed out the enemy's capability for air attack and requested details of attacks by aircraft in Division zone be submitted through intelligence channels. Two kinds of reports were indicated, a Spot report and a Follow-up report. A first indorsement by 25th Division on 9 October directed this letter to the attention of all units.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION No. 284 gave the 14th Infantry the mission of attacking objective Strike at 100600 October with one battalion, reinforced with Companies A and D of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion and two platoons of the 14th Regimental Tank Company. The task force, after destroying enemy personnel, materiel, and capturing prisoners, was to return to the MLR on completion of mission. A battalion of the 27th Infantry was attached to the 14th Infantry during 9-11 October for use on the MLR during the attack by the organic battalion. The operation was executed as planned.

13 October

OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS prescribed the following regulations in regards to patrols:

- (1) Unit commanders will take positive measures to control all patrols

forward of the MLR from an observation post or outguard base.

(2) When patrols from different companies or battalions converge on a common objective, the next higher commander will effect centralized control.

(3) Commanders sending out patrols will provide emergency forces to extricate patrols that are cut off, surrounded, or otherwise endangered.

(4) Oral progress reports on patrols will be submitted hourly to this headquarters. A final written report will be submitted on prescribed form.

14 October

COMBAT BULLETIN No. 6 described devices and expedients for combat use of napalm and other chemicals to produce casualties and provide battlefield illumination.

16 October

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 26 directed a course of instruction be conducted to ensure that all members of the command are familiar with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, understand the basic rules of warfare, and the rights and privileges to be afforded to all persons who may be victims of warfare.

19 October

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 27 pointed out the need for more thorough training in matters affecting security and directed that a minimum of two hours instruction on the subject per month be incorporated in each unit's training program. Instruction for the first month was to include one hour on "Espionage in the Korean War" and one hour on "Counterintelligence Measures." Outlines for convenience of instructors were attached to the memorandum. Subsequent security training was to re-emphasize the basic principles of security, correct observed deficiencies in military security, and present new enemy intelligence techniques.

20 October

OPERATIONS ORDER No. 44 directed the 27th Infantry to relieve elements of the 14th Infantry in the right of its zone and elements of the 35th Infantry in the left of its zone by noon of D-Day, 22 October. (See overlay attached to order.) The 27th Infantry and the 14th Infantry were to move one battalion each to an assembly area in support of the MLR. These battalions were not to be committed without approval by this headquarters.

All units concerned were to continue improvements of positions along the MLR.

conduct patrols to the north in zone, and submit overlays of fire, anti-tank, and wire defense plans. The order was executed as planned.

22 October

LETTER, CG 25th Infantry Division rescinded Training Memorandum No. 19, this Headquarters, dated 15 August, and stated that Regimental Commanders could dissolve or retain their raider platoons as desired.

23 October

TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 28 directed that training for reserve battalions emphasize practical work and contain a minimum of lecture-type instruction. Training schedules were to include (1) command inspections to ensure adequacy and serviceability of clothing and equipment; (2) rehearsal of division counterattack plans; and (3) maximum utilization of time for squad, platoon, and company exercises.

27 October

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS announced the 60th Ordnance Group had established a school to teach organizational supply procedures to personnel whose duties encompass requisitioning, storage, and issue of Ordnance Class II and IV Supplies at regimental, battalion, and separate company levels. Commanding officers at unit levels mentioned were to submit by 31 October the names of persons they desire to attend the five-day course during the period 3 December 1951 through January 1952. Quotas were to be allocated by this Headquarters.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS prescribed a course of instruction on the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles for the Turkish Armed Forces Command during the period 26-31 October. Qualified instructors were to be furnished by the 35th Infantry and the 14th Infantry. Selection of a training area and provisions for ammunition supply were made a responsibility of the TAFIC advisor. The course of instruction was given as planned.

29 October

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 292 directed the 7th Regimental Combat Team to move from its position to an assembly area (overlay) via route 3A, commencing at 300600 October and closing in assembly area prior to 301800 October. The RCT was to be prepared to relieve the 35th Infantry and elements of the 27th Infantry on the MLR 31 October. The instructions were executed as planned.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 293 directed the 7th Infantry to relieve the 35th Infantry and elements of the 27th Infantry in zone, commencing 310630 October. The relief was to be completed by 311500 October. The 27th and 35th Regiments were to move to assembly areas shown on overlay attached to the order.

The relief was completed as scheduled.

30 October

OPERATIONS ORDER No. 45 (NESABI) directed elements of the Division to seize and secure Line Duluth (see overlay to order) as part of a general advance to the same line by IX Corps. The Division was to encircle and seize objectives, destroy enemy in zone, and protect the Corps west (left) flank. D-Day was 1 November and H-Hour was 0615.

The 14th Infantry was ordered to seize and secure objectives DeSoto, Pontiac, Olds, and Line Duluth in that order. The regiment was also directed to prepare to assist the TAFC in seizing objective Packard and, after seizing objective DeSoto, to destroy by-passed enemy on Hill 528. A battalion of the 35th Infantry was attached to effect relief of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, before darkness on D-Day minus 1.

The 27th Infantry was to attack on D-Day, H-Hour, to seize objective Reo, Buick, Auburn, and Line Duluth in that order. One battalion of the 35th Infantry was to relieve the 27th Infantry on objective Reo on order. Target date for this relief was D plus 1. Its mission was to maintain contact with the 27th Infantry and to defend in zone.

The battalion of the 35th Infantry attached to the 14th Infantry on D minus 1 was to revert to parent control, in place, at 0700 hours on D-Day. Its mission was to block enemy movement to the south. The 35th Infantry had the general mission of being prepared to attack on order to destroy enemy in zone.

The Turkish Armed Forces Command was ordered to attack on D-Day, H-hour, to seize objectives Ford, Packard, Dodge, Fiat, Stutz, and Line Duluth, in that order. Coordination for movement of tank-infantry team through zone of 9th ROK Division and for movement of TAFC elements through the zone of the 14th Infantry was directed. The Turkish Command was also to prepare to assist the 14th Infantry in seizure of objective DeSoto, protect the Division west (left) flank, and to maintain contact with 9th ROK Division on that flank.

The 7th Infantry Regiment was to block and defend in place and support by fire the attack of the 35th Infantry, when committed.

Nine battalions of artillery were available to the Division for support of the attack, and the 21st AAA AW Battalion was to protect the Division Artillery. The 25th Reconnaissance Company had the mission protecting the Division west (left) flank in rear of forward elements of TAFIC.

Upon occupation of Line Duluth, all units were to prepare defense positions on the most favorable terrain. They were to establish an outpost line and send strong patrols north to maintain contact with the enemy.

Plan MESABI was postponed until 2 November by higher headquarters. The Division was later placed on a 72-hour alert for its execution.

31 October


CHANGE 2, to Plan Mesabi altered the mission of the 14th Infantry. It was now to secure objectives DeSoto, Star, and Austin. On objective Austin the regiment was to establish contact with the TAFIC and prevent the withdrawal of the enemy from the Packard-DeSoto hill mass. The regiment was then to continue its attack and seize objectives Flint, Olds, and Line Duluth.

The mission of the TAFIC was also changed. It was now to seize objectives Ford and Packard and with a tank-infantry force envelope the enemy via a route north of objective Ford and join the 14th Infantry on objective Austin. The Command was to prevent withdrawal of the enemy to the north from Ford-Packard hill mass, then continue attack to seize objectives Fiat, Stutz, and Line Duluth.

NOTE: All documents referred to in this chapter can be found in Book 4, Parts 1 and 2, of the supporting documents.



SITUATION AS OF 01 OCTOBER 1951



Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

(c) The Action

General

In addition to normal activities related to the conduct of a deliberate defense, the 25th Infantry Division continued its occupation of Line Wyoming during October by stressing offensive action and heightening its own level of combat proficiency. Offensive action was designed to keep the enemy off balance and to kill, capture, and destroy him. Combat proficiency was heightened by emphasizing training and aggressively seeking battle experience.

Action against the enemy included patrols, tank-infantry task forces, and direct, harassing, and interdictionary artillery fires on known and suspected enemy positions and routes of communication. Air strikes, coordinated by Division Artillery, added to the Division's destructive power.

Reconnaissance patrols, conducted regularly both night and day by units on the line, collected information on enemy strength, disposition, and activity. These patrols often combined a combat mission with reconnaissance by raiding enemy positions and setting up ambushes.

Combat patrols operated as far as 7,000 yards forward of friendly lines, usually under direct enemy observation. They inflicted heavy casualties with negligible losses. Patrols in the sectors of the 14th Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command operated from advanced patrol bases as well as from the MLR.

An unusually successful method by which small patrols were able to destroy or damage strong enemy positions was by moving boldly forward, forcing the enemy to fire, and then directing tank, artillery, and mortar fire on the area. The same method was used to destroy enemy emplacements by precision artillery adjustment.

Increasing in use and destructive efficiency were infantry-tank task forces, which operated almost daily during the month. These, varying in size from platoon to battalion and in composition from tank-heavy to infantry-heavy teams, operated deep into enemy territory. They destroyed personnel and positions in their path of advance and caused other enemy to disclose their positions to ever-watching mortar and artillery observers.

In spite of the characteristically unfavorable terrain and channelized routes of advance, tanks were able to move with infantry up to, and often beyond, assigned objectives, or to move part of the way and support the infantry by fire. In several instances, where tanks were immobilized by enemy fire or by bogging down in soft paddys, they continued to take part in the mission by firing as the enemy disclosed himself.

Prior route reconnaissance, combined with map and aerial photo study, proved to be a vital element in planning armored movement. Also imperative was close coordination with infantry and engineers to remove mines, neutralize antitank weapons, and provide security while disabled tanks were being retrieved. Unity of command, aided by workable and prearranged communications, was directed by Division for all infantry-tank teams.

Aside from the tactical results of the patrols and task forces, their operation from a Division point of view was motivated by a desire to avoid the threat of a defensive mental attitude, brought about by continued occupation of a static line, and to seek aggressively the kind of battle experience that would result in greater combat efficiency in the event of a major engagement. Only through training and planned battle experience could subordinate commanders develop balanced, well coordinated fighting teams.

To strengthen and improve its general disposition along Line Wyoming, the Division issued Operations Instructions No. 276. These directed the Turkish Armed Forces Command and the 14th Infantry Regiment to readjust their MLR forward, generally in line with the rest of the Division and on more commanding terrain. On 3 October, the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Infantry moved forward and assumed responsibility for a new line extending from vicinity CT5441 to vicinity of CT5840 (see overlay to POR No. 3, Book 4, Part 1). Meanwhile, the Turkish Command attacked in its zone to secure high ground on a line extending generally from vicinity of CT4741 to CT5441. In reaching this line, the 1st Battalion advanced about 3,000 yards forward of former positions under small arms and automatic weapons fire from two enemy companies on the northeast slope of Hill 412, vicinity of CT5142. Its new positions extended from vicinity of CT5141 to CT5441. While the 2nd Battalion maintained blocking positions on Hill 372, vicinity CT5238, the 3rd Battalion advanced 9,000 yards forward to high ground along a line from

vicinity of CT4741 to CT5141.

Coordinated with the last phase of I Corps' effort in the west, this operation protected the west flank of IX Corps and secured easy and protected lines of communications to all units occupying the western half of the Division sector.

A further adjustment in the line was made on 23 October when the 27th Infantry Regiment took over portions of sectors held by the 14th and 35th Infantry Regiments. This put all three regiments and the Turkish Command on line, enabling each regiment to rotate battalions in reserve for rest and training. Division directed that battalions would stay in reserve seven to ten days.

On 13 October, while IX Corps was attacking to seize Line Nomad, the Division assisted the attack of the 2d ROK Division with artillery fire and direct support by elements of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion.

Work on positions along the MLR and in all unit reserve areas continued throughout the month. Additional barbed wire was strung as it became available. Additional mines and booby traps were laid, and illuminating devices, both of the issue and locally improvised type, were set up. Constant correcting and readjustment of automatic weapons positions improved the final protective fires of all units. Improvement and readjustment of overhead protective fires were made daily.

Considerable effort by all personnel was expended on improvement of bunker type emplacements, winter warming shelters, and command post installations. Using logs cut by Division Engineers, sandbags, salvage materials, and by maximum employment of indigenous labor, the Division had itself comfortably "housed" and prepared for winter by the end of the month. Striking examples of American ingenuity could be found throughout the area as individuals and units erected bunkers for weapons, warmth and drying, motion pictures and church services, and "home" laundries. Their efforts reflected a consideration for tactical principles as well as the health, comfort, and well being of the individual soldier.

Planning for possible offensive action was continuous. Plan MESABI, which grew out of two previous offensive plans, was published 30 October. It was part of a general IX Corps advance calculated to seize the high ground east of PYONGGANG (vicinity CT5152). In essence, the plan called for a double envelopment of the hill mass dominated by Hill 717 (CT5345) by the Turkish Armed Forces Command

on the west (left) and the 14th Infantry Regiment on the east (right). The 27th Infantry Regiment was to drive straight north, by-passing the heavily entrenched forces on Hill 1062 (CT6445), to link up with the 2d ROK Division punching westward above Hill 1062 from the KUMSONG Bulge.

Great emphasis was placed [REDACTED] on the need for speed in trapping enemy forces holding these key terrain features. If allowed to withdraw to prepared positions on the ridge running east from PYONGGANG, the battle would have to be fought twice. To insure the vital juncture of the Turkish tank-infantry task force, driving around the west flank of Hill 717 along the CHORWON-PYONGGANG corridor, with the 14th Infantry Regiment, the Division gave the tank task force the specific mission of contacting the 14th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Hill 396 (CT5348).

Attachment of the 7th Infantry Regiment (Third Infantry Division) as a holding force along the old 35th Regiment line below Hill 1062 released the 35th Regiment to act as Division reserve. This reserve was to build a containing force on the left of the 7th Regiment as the 27th Regiment skirted Hill 1062. Ultimately, the 35th Regiment was to mop up the encircled enemy.

Training, designed primarily to sustain combat efficiency and an aggressive spirit in face of rapid personnel turnover and the threat of defense-mindedness, was conducted daily by all units. Front line training included practical experience in conducting night patrols and ambushes; functioning, care and cleaning of weapons; flare construction; cold injury prevention; range estimation and preparation of range cards; wire and mine laying; and personal hygiene and field sanitation.

Training schedules in company, battalion, and regimental reserve areas included escape and evasion; School of the Soldier; care and operation of the flamethrower; conduct of the defense; bayonet drill; hill climbing; adjustment of artillery fire by the individual soldier; and map reading.

Units in Division reserve were concerned chiefly with the conduct of squad, platoon, company, and battalion attack problems. Several of these problems, coordinated through Division Headquarters, were supported by small tank attachments, and with fire from M16 quad 50's. Rehearsals of moving to and occupying blocking positions in accordance with Division defense plans were frequent.

Range firing with the rifle, automatic weapons, 60mm mortar, 4.2-inch mortar, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, and the 76mm gun was scheduled throughout the month. All range areas, selected by an officer of the using unit, were required to be cleared through this headquarters to ensure that the firing did not endanger civilian or military personnel.

Upon request from the Turkish Command, this headquarters planned in coordination with the Turkish advisor a course of instruction on the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. Conducted during the last week of October, the course consisted of nomenclature, disassembly and assembly, loading, crew drill, and firing exercises. At the conclusion of the course, the Turkish Command requested a similar one be conducted during 12-17 November 1951.

A resume of tactical operations by regiment follows.

14th Infantry Regiment

The newly-formed 14th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for the 24th Regiment's sector of Line Wyoming at 010925 October. Their portion of the line extended from vicinity CT5538 to CT6341. All three battalions went into line and established outguard bases on high ground to the front of the MLR.

Although the new regiment was in daily contact with the enemy by means of patrols and tank-infantry task forces, its first opportunity to strike a telling blow against the enemy came on 10 October. In compliance with Operations Instructions No. 284, issued 7 October, Companies K and L—supported by Companies A and D of the 89th Tank Battalion, two platoons of the 14th Tank Company, and a platoon of the 21st AAA Battalion—attacked Hill 419 (vicinity CT6044) and Hill 400 (vicinity CT6143). The task force advanced against heavy small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery fire from two enemy companies occupying a maze of bunkers along the high ground. It was repulsed five times before the infantry, under cover of combined tank and artillery fire, overran the objective and forced the Chinese to withdraw in disorder. After securing the two hills, the task force destroyed all enemy defenses and withdrew to friendly lines before dark. They destroyed 115 bunkers, two mortars, one artillery piece, killed 194 and wounded 138 of the enemy.

Results of a few other patrols, listed here to indicate the type of activity typical of the period, follow:

(1) 12 October: A coordinated attack to destroy enemy and fortifications on Hill 404 (CT5644) by the Lynx White Raiders and a platoon from I Company, supported by three platoons of tanks from the 14th Tank Company, forced an estimated two platoons of enemy, reinforced, from the hill. The task force broke contact at 1500 hours and returned to friendly lines. Results of the action were 18 enemy dead, 2 wounded; 6 bunkers, 1 machine gun, and 1 60mm mortar destroyed.

(2) 17 October: A tank patrol from the 14th Tank Company crossed the MLR to vicinity of Hill 419 (vicinity CT6044) and destroyed 10 enemy bunkers by fire. The I and R Platoon departed the MLR at 1430 hours, burned a village in the vicinity of CT5942, and returned to the MLR by 1630 hours.

(3) 18 October: F Company, occupying outguard base on Hill 432 (vicinity CT6142), departed the base at 1000 hours to strike at the enemy on Hill 404 (CT5644). The patrol, supported by tanks from the 14th Tank Company, secured the objective against resistance by an estimated enemy platoon. After demolishing 17 enemy bunkers, the patrol returned to its base, leaving behind 21 enemy dead.

27th Infantry Regiment

During the larger part of the month, the 27th Regiment continued in Division reserve. On 23 October, however, the 2d Battalion relieved elements of the 14th and 35th Infantry Regiments on Line Wyoming, assuming responsibility for a sector extending from vicinity of CT6241 to vicinity of CT6541. The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, relieved elements of the 14th Regiment, occupying a sector from vicinity of CT5940 to vicinity of CT6241. The 1st Battalion remained in assembly area in vicinity of CT6231 as regimental reserve.

While still in Division reserve, the regiment conducted the largest scale attack of the month. In compliance with oral instructions from the Commanding General, later confirmed by Operations Instructions No. 283, the regiment attacked with a battalion sized task force, screened the objective, and returned to the MLR before dark. The 1st Battalion, less Company C, moved to positions forward of the MLR (vicinity CT5942) to reinforce the tank-infantry team. The team, composed of Company C and Company A, 89th Tank Battalion, advanced 7,000 yards to vicinity of CT5946. At this point it was fired upon with small arms,

automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery fire from enemy occupying high ground on three sides of them. Fire from the tank-infantry team, combined with supporting artillery fires, resulted in 380 enemy casualties. After completing the mission, the assaulting forces withdrew before dark and returned to the battalion assembly area.

On 27 October, Company B, 89th Tank Battalion, advanced 2,000 yards and placed fire on enemy bunkers on the high ground north, northeast, and northwest of grid square CT6243. After destroying 24 bunkers and inflicting an estimated 75 enemy casualties, the patrol withdrew to friendly lines.

On 29 October, Company I and Company B, 89th Tank Battalion, engaged an enemy company on the west slopes of Hill 419 (vicinity CT6044). The enemy withdrew and the patrol continued its advance to vicinity of CT5944, returning to friendly lines before dark. Fifty buildings and 28 bunkers were destroyed. Enemy dead was estimated at 15.

35th Infantry Regiment

The 35th Regiment occupied a sector on the Division east (right) flank with three battalions on line from the first of the month until 22 October, at which time two battalions of the 27th Regiment were brought into line. This enabled the 35th Regiment to move its 3d Battalion into regimental reserve. On 29 October the 3d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on the MLR. In preparation for Plan MESAHI, the regiment was relieved on line by the 7th Infantry on 31 October and moved to an assembly area in the center of the Division sector. The 1st Battalion, attached to the 14th Infantry Regiment, assumed responsibility for a sector on the MLR from the vicinity of CT5340 to CT5540.

Typical examples of patrol and task force activity for the period follow:

3 October: A tank patrol, consisting of four tanks from Company C, 89th Tank Battalion, advanced 400 yards forward of the MLR and placed 76mm and machine gun fire on enemy positions in the vicinity of CT6943. Estimated enemy casualties were 10 killed and 20 wounded.

4 October: A K Company platoon, supported by a platoon of tanks from C Company, 89th Tank Battalion, and a platoon from Battery C, 21st AAA Battalion, advanced 500 yards forward of the MLR to seize high ground in the vicinity of CT6442. Three prisoners were taken and 15 enemy killed.

Turkish Armed Forces Command

The Turkish Armed Forces Command occupied a sector on the Division west (left) flank during the entire month. Readjustment of the brigade sector forward to commanding ground on line with the rest of the Division has already been described (see General, this chapter).

The 25th Reconnaissance Company operated in the zone of the Turkish Command, screening the Division west (left) flank. The company maintained outposts and strong points, both day and night, and conducted daily patrols on the flank.

Typical examples of task force activity for the period follow:

5 October: An outpost, manned by a platoon from 11th Company in the vicinity of CT5042, was attacked during the night by an enemy company firing small arms and automatic weapons. The outpost withdrew to the MLR, and artillery was placed on the outpost position, forcing the enemy to draw back after losing 20 killed and an unknown number of wounded.

17 October: A task force, consisting of a reinforced 9th Company platoon and a platoon of tanks from 89th Tank Battalion, came under heavy enemy fire from vicinity of CT4942. Artillery and tank fire placed on the enemy at CT5043 enabled the force to continue its advance to CT4943. There it again came under heavy machine gun and mortar fire from enemy in the vicinity of CT5043. The enemy at that point was being reinforced by an additional platoon. The task force engaged the enemy and registered mortar and artillery fire on them for about two hours, after which it broke contact and returned to the MLR.

Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

(d) Communications

During the month of October 1951, the Division Signal Office and the 25th Signal Company installed, operated and maintained the following means of communication:

- (1) Telephone circuits to all divisional units.
- (2) Teletype circuits to IX Corps.
- (3) Message Center deliveries to all division units.
- (4) Radio Nets as follows:
 - (a) Command Net #1 AM (CW only).
 - (b) Command Net #2 AM (CW or voice).
 - (c) Command Net #3 FM (voice only).

1 See Radio circuits attached as inclosures #7, 14, 20, and 26.

- (5) V.H.F.
 - (a) See VHF Circuits attached as inclosures #6, 13, 19, and 25.

Division Signal Office and 25th Signal Company continued to operate, maintain and improve all communications facilities at Division Main CP, CHIPO-RI, CP5222, and Division Tac CP, CP5430.

Division Signal Specialist School closed the Field Wire Lineman, Switchboard Operator, and Message Center Clerk courses because of no further requirements within the Division. Division Signal Specialist School was moved from SUWON to vicinity CS5299 where the entire installation was placed in tents.

Telephone and Teletype Section installed new CP location for 25th Infantry Division Rear, at YONGDUNGPO, 17 October 1951.

25th Signal Company recovered, rehabilitated, and salvaged six hundred sixty-three (663) miles of wire W130, W110, W190, and W143.

The following statistics indicate the Communications Center operations for the period:

(1) Number of messenger runs made	252
(2) Number of miles traveled by messenger	6,117
(3) Total number messages handled	3,763

(4) Total outgoing code groups	41,005
(5) Total incoming code groups	150,161
(6) Total code groups handled in and out	191,166
(7) Total clear text messages	2,616

Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

(e) Supporting Arms

Chief activity of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery during October was supporting the defense of Line Wyoming. It also fired in support of two operations by Division and one by Corps. Toward the end of the month it was actively preparing for Plan MESSABI, in which the 25th Infantry Division was to play a major role.

Battery A, 90th FA Battalion, and the 8th FA Battalion moved to the vicinity of CT5736 on 3 October to support the advance of the Turkish Armed Forces Command and the 14th Infantry Regiment to new positions in line with the rest of the Division (see Chapter c, this section).

When IX Corps attacked with three divisions on 13 October to secure a line south of KUMSONG, the 25th Infantry Division participated only by fire. Division Artillery reinforced the 13th FA Battalion of the 2d ROK Division with the fires of three light batteries. This support was an "on call" mission handled through Division Artillery fire support control center. The 159th and the 64th FA Battalions were the units involved.

A readjustment of sectors placed the 27th Infantry Regiment between the 35th Infantry and 14th Infantry on 22 October. To support this move, the 8th FA Battalion returned to its former position (vicinity CT6237) on 21 October in direct support.

In preparation for Plan MESSABI, IX Corps attached the 15th FA Battalion (105 How), the 955th FA Battalion (105 How, SP), 987th Armored FA Battalion (105 How, SP), Battery A, 780th FA Battalion (8-inch How), and Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion.

Artillery readjustments for the operation, originally scheduled for 1 November, began 29 October. The 987th FA Battalion moved to the Turkish Brigade sector (vicinity CT5134). On 30 October, the 90th FA Battalion moved to the vicinity of its Battery A (CT5635); the 8th FA Battalion to the vicinity of CT5636; the 64th FA Battalion to vicinity of CT6337; Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion was closed in assembly area vicinity CT5534 and attached to

the Turkish Artillery Battalion; Battery A, 780th FA Battalion arrived from X Corps and closed in an assembly area vicinity of CT5736 after dark. On the morning of 31 October, the 955th FA Battalion closed in the Division sector vicinity of CT5439. The TAFC Battalion with Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, attached moved to attack positions in the vicinity of CT5139. After 1400 hours, the 69th FA Battalion and the 8th FA Battalion moved to forward attack positions in vicinity CT5839 and CT5738, respectively. Battery A, 987th FA Battalion, moved to vicinity CT5039.

When the attack was postponed, the 25th Division Artillery found itself at the end of the month with six light battalions, three medium battalions, one battery of 8-inch howitzers, and a company of 4.2-inch mortars—a total of 178 tubes—positioned well forward to support the Division's first full-scale offensive since June.

Upon deactivation of the 24th Infantry Division on 1 October, Headquarters, EUSAK, ordered the conversion of the 159th FA Battalion from a 105 howitzer battalion to a 155 howitzer, tractor drawn, battalion. This conversion was completed 31 October.

Status of ammunition at the end of the month was as follows:

	<u>EXPENDED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>TRANS</u>
105mm	50,242	29,287	52,639	1,526
155mm	18,456	4,313	18,712	265

The 65th Engineer Combat Battalion was employed in road and bridge maintenance during most of the month. Operations consisted of widening and improving the present road net, and constructing several important connecting roads in the Division zone. One road, called the "Sky Line Drive", was built to connect two widely separated valleys and to facilitate traffic between KUMHWA and Route 3B. Another major road was built to link Route 3B and Route 24 in the Turkish Brigade area. This road was built over a mountain and required several tons of explosives to blast a road bed. Another major road construction, called the "Lost Valley Road" was constructed by Baker Company. This road linked the "Sky Line Drive" with a road paralleling Route 6, and was also cut through the mountains.

A 120-foot M2 Treadway Bridge was constructed over the HAN River in the Turkish Brigade sector.

Part III

Intelligence

(a) Elements in Contact

During the month of October the 25th Infantry Division maintained continuous contact with the 26th CCF Army to the Division's immediate front. During the previous period, elements of the Division had contact with elements of the 67th CCF Army on the right flank. However, due to limited objective attacks by the UN forces on the 25th Division's right flank, the 67th CCF Army was badly mauled and the enemy was forced to commit reserve elements in an attempt to halt the advancing UN forces. On 24 October, the enemy committed the 231st Regiment, 77th Division, 26th CCF Army on the 25th Division's right flank, which was identified by elements of the 2d ROK Division. The strength of the 26th Army at the close of the period was estimated to be 17,600.

There were no noted changes in the organization of the 26th CCF Army during the period, but a special study was made of the Special Duty Regiment, previously identified on 04 September 1951. AOP sightings during the period disclosed no unusual enemy troop movement in the Division sector. The enemy continued to maintain a defensive attitude during the period in conjunction with a stubborn counter-reconnaissance screen. This stubborn defensive attitude indicated good combat efficiency on the part of the enemy. However, P'sW statements indicated a low state of morale within the ranks of a majority of CCF forces. This low state of morale was attributed to insufficient and poor food, cold weather, fear of UN artillery and air, and failure of the CCF to fulfill promises of air and tank support.

During the latter part of September, initial contact was made with elements of the 230th Regiment, 77th Division, 26th CCF Army. On 04 October, relief of the 229th Regiment, in contact since 31 July was accepted by the G-2 Section, 25th Infantry Division. Two battalions of the 230th Regiment were identified in contact. The 229th Regiment was believed to have been moved to rear assembly areas for regrouping and re-equipping. In the western sector of the 25th Division zone, the 232d Regiment, 78th Division, 26th CCF Army was accepted as relieving the 233d Regiment, 78th Division in place, on or about 06 October. The relief of the

233d Regiment, after having been badly mauled by elements of the 25th Division during the month of September, had been anticipated.

(b) Disposition of Enemy Units

The deployment of the enemy at the close of the period remained relatively the same as during the month of September, with the enemy still in possession of dominating terrain features to the immediate front of the 25th Division. The 232d Regiment was deployed between the CT45 - 50 north-south grid lines. The Special Duty Regiment was deployed between CT59 - 64 north-south grid lines. The 230th Regiment was deployed between the CT64 - 69 north-south grid lines. Reserves capable of intervention in the 26th CCF Army area were: 233d Regiment (unlocated), previously stated in this chapter as being relieved by the 232d Regiment on or about 06 October, and the 234th Regiment believed to be located in the vicinity of PYONGGANG in the 78th Division sector. The 229th Regiment believed to be located in the vicinity CT6456 in the 77th Division sector. (The 231st Regiment was deployed on the extreme eastern flank of the 25th Infantry Division and was identified in contact with the 2d ROK Division.) The 76th Division located northeast of PYONGGANG was considered capable of intervention in either the 77th or 78th Division sectors.

(c) Nature and Effectiveness of Enemy Defenses

The enemy did not employ armor or air against the 25th Division during the period, and there was little if any change in the employment and disposition of his artillery.

During the entire period the enemy was extremely active in construction and repair of field fortifications and continued work on these positions even though constantly harassed by our artillery and air. The enemy's positions were well constructed on dominating terrain features with excellent fields of fire in most instances, and were extremely difficult to destroy. (In addition, the enemy was reported to have used explosives in the preparation of positions.) The enemy continued emplacement of box type antitank mines in avenues of approach and in most instances these obstacles were covered by artillery and mortar fire.

Part IV

Personnel

(a) Division Staff Assignments

Captain Richard F. W. Whittemore announced as Assistant Chief of Staff on 15 October, vice Major James D. McLanachan, rotated.

Lt. Col. James A. Miller announced as Adjutant General on 26 October, vice Lt. Col. Charles F. Test, relieved.

Major Malcom M. Jameson announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, on 26 October, vice Lt. Col. James H. Lee, evacuated.

Captain Frank F. Rathbun assigned to duty with G3 as Historian on 26 October, vice Major Max K. Johnson, emergency leave.

1st Lieutenant Allan A. David announced as Public Information Officer on 30 October, vice Captain Hendrick G. Stone, evacuated.

Major Lionel E. Scott announced as Provost Marshal on 30 October, vice Lt. Col. Ralph B. Vote, Jr., rotated.

Major Virgil K. Ledbetter announced as Civil Assistance Officer, vice Major Charles E. Friedman, rotated.

(b) Strength

Strengths for the month were as follows:

	Auth	Asgd	End of Period	
			Auth	Asgd
1. U.S. Troops				
25th Inf Div	18,276	23,677	18,276	21,875
2. United Nations				
TAFK	5,105	4,948	5,105	4,920
ROK		630		658

(c) Replacements and Rotation

The rotation criteria established by Headquarters, Eighth Army, provided eligibility for officers having 45 constructive months' service or more and enlisted men having 35 constructive months' service or more. Officers who were surplus to the command were reported to Eighth Army, which granted authority to rotate those officers with 40 constructive months service or more.

The policy to rotate all personnel eligible for rotation who had spent the winter of 1950-51 in Korea, received through channels from Department of the Army, was carried out as far as was practical.

Each organization was directed to rotate two-thirds of Enlisted Reserve Corps personnel. It was also mandatory to return all enlisted men to the zone of the interior 30 days in advance of extended date of expiration of service.

The 25th Replacement Company remained at YONGDUNGPO (vicinity CS1456) throughout the month. Nearness to the Port of INCHON, Kimpo Air Base (K-14), and the Rail Transportation Office at YONGDUNGPO made this location ideal for a replacement company. The area's capacity of 900 persons was considered adequate. (This reduction from previous capacity resulted from the installation of canvas cots in the quarters of transient enlisted personnel.

The following numbers of personnel were processed through the company during October:

	Off/WO	EM
Replacements	131	1,388
Hospital Returnees	7	458
Rotation Combat Personnel	177	2,839

Replacements were received from the 55th Replacement Company, 110th Replacement Battalion at the YONGDUNGPO RTO. Usually they were transported to the Company by motor. In the case of one particularly large group, it was necessary to march the men to the Company area while their baggage was moved by trucks. The average enlisted replacement was much more heavily loaded during this period because of the heavy winter clothing issued before his departure for this theatre. Both officer and enlisted personnel were arriving without weapons. The Company issued weapons to those replacements before they were sent to assigned units.

Hospital returnees were processed in much the same manner as replacements except that they were reassigned to their former organizations.

Three groups of combat personnel were rotated:

	Off/WO	EM
1 October	35	595
12 October	40	803
16 October	49	329

(d) Discipline

A policy meeting with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in SEOUL on 13 October was attended by the Chief of the 25th Infantry Division Staff Judge Advocate Section. Primary topic of discussion at the conference was the rehabilitation of persons convicted of purely military offenses. The conference concluded that no attempt at rehabilitation could be made at division level.

The following number of cases were tried by courts-martial during the month:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
General	13
Special	5
Summary	32

Of these cases, 69.1 percent resulted from violations of Article 92 (speeding and willful disobedience), 24.5 percent from violations of Article 86 (AWOL), while the remaining cases were variations of Article 134 (a general article covering offenses not listed under other articles of the Code).

Twenty-one cases were processed by the Staff Judge Advocate and forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final appellate review. Number of cases for the previous month (September) was 22.

Ten cases that had been forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final appellate review were held legally sufficient, but the sentences in respect to confinement were reduced in some cases where it appeared the accused might be of future service to the Army.

A consolidation of activities reported by the Office of the Provost Marshal follows:

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Number</u>
Vehicles reported missing	4
Vehicles reported recovered	1
Accidents investigated	15
Stragglers	0
POW's handled and processed	47
AWOL's	7
CAC & CIC prisoners handled	608

(e) Burial and Graves Registration

The Division Quartermaster transferred the bodies of 45 enlisted men to the 293d Graves Registration Unit during October.

(f) Civil Assistance

The main effort of the Division Civil Assistance Section during October continued to be the implementation of the EUSAK policy of 6 June 1951, which prohibited civilians north of east-west grid line CS97 to Line Wyoming. As of 31 October, 5,825 civilians had been collected from within the Division zone. Of these, 4,350 were evacuated as refugees, and the remaining 1,475 were evacuated as patients through the Division Korean Clearing Station, as suspects through CIC or IPW channels, as laborers through I Corps Labor Pool, and as vagrants to the SEOUL Metropolitan Police.

Twenty-eight villages within the Division zone were searched by Civil Assistance Police. Some of the villages were reentered, and, although no civilians were found on earlier visits, evidence pointed to recent habitation. Some villages were found to hold plentiful supplies of food, and crops were partially harvested. Health and morale of civilians evacuated from such areas was good.

Although the total number of persons processed through Civil Assistance channels slightly exceeded that for September, there was a sharp decline in refugee evacuation. A summary of Civil Assistance Activities follows:

Refugees screened	1,611
Refugees evacuated from Div zone	804
Refugee dead buried	1
Communist suspects interrogated	4
Communist suspects turned over to CIC	2
Indigenous laborers handled	1,772
Patients treated	662
(KSC)	(19)
(Civilian)	(643)
Patients evacuated to hospital	41
(KSC)	(7)
(Civilian)	(34)
Dusted with DDT	1,492

Immunizations:	
Cholera	1,199
Typhus	147
Smallpox	514
Typhoid	12
Prostitutes evacuated to SEOUL Met. Police	20
Shoeshine boys to SEOUL Met. Police	55

(g) Morale and Personnel Services

Three groups of about 450 persons each spent five days' leave in Japan, including Turkish Brigade personnel, on Rest and Recuperation leave. The smaller number for October, compared to the September figure, was due to the deactivation of the 24th Infantry Regiment and the ineligibility of the 14th Infantry Regiment personnel for leave in Japan during the month.

The following tabulation gives the awards and decorations for the period and cumulative totals:

	October	Cumulative
Congressional Medal of Honor	0	6
Distinguished Service Cross	3	87
Silver Star	36	1,155
Legion of Merit	3	40
Distinguished Flying Cross	0	134
Soldier's Medal	0	26
Bronze Star Medal	27	2,263
Air Medal	0	812
Commendation Ribbon	0	124

Battlefield appointments to commissioned rank to date total 217.

During October the Division Chaplain conducted 38 Catholic religious services. Protestant chaplains attached to Division Headquarters conducted 25 Protestant services. In addition, the Chaplains at Division made 102 visits to units of the Division.

Jewish services were conducted at Division Headquarters by a visiting Corps chaplain.

There were 18 Chaplains operating in the Division during the month. A tabulation of their activities follows:

	No.	Attendance.
Protestant Sunday services	143	7,917
Protestant weekday services	25	639
Catholic Sunday Masses	70	6,718
Catholic weekday Masses	118	1,753
Hospital, aid and clearing station visits	165	1,324
Interviews and consultations		1,181
Confessions		1,752
Communions		4,624

Although the Turkish troops have two Mohammedan Chaplains assigned to them, the Chaplains of the Division provide services for the Christians among the Turkish troops.

The American Red Cross Field Director for the Division reported the Red Cross had assisted 342 servicemen on such matters as emergency leaves, health and welfare reports, and allotment problems. Counseling service was given to an additional 366 men.

The Public Information Office sent 802 publicity articles on personnel of the Division to newspapers of local circulation in the United States. Mailed to the newly organized Hometown Newspenter in St. Louis, Mo., the Stars and Stripes, and Army Times were 180 photographs.

The unofficial history of the 25th Infantry Division, to be called "Battleground: Korea", was nearing completion at the end of the month. The book is already over-subscribed and will require the printing of more copies than was originally planned.

(h) Medical Service

There was a total of 35 helicopter evacuations of seriously wounded patients from field medical installations. These patients were battle casualties from action ensued during the Division's patrol activities in the vicinity of the KUMHWA-CHOEWON area. The Division is presently being supported by the IX Corps on helicopter evacuation.

During this period a platoon of the 37th Preventive Medicine Company was attached to the Division for an indefinite period. Their function will be to conduct lectures and demonstrations necessary for the control of communicable disease. The primary job of the team at the present time is rodent control. They are visiting all units of the Division giving instructions on rodent control and laying bait whenever possible.

The following is a summary of evacuations and hospitalizations occurring during the month. The cumulative figure reflects hospitalizations and evacuations since the beginning of the Korean campaign to 1800 hours 31 October 1951.

	OCTOBER	CUMULATIVE
Remaining from last report	46	
Admitted to clearing stations	1,196	32,583
Evacuated from clearing stations	850	23,168
Returned to duty	339	9,324
Deaths at clearing stations	0	38
Remaining at clearing stations		53

A major immunization program was put into effect on 19 October 1951. The serums to be administered during the period 19 October 1951 to 19 November 1951 are smallpox, typhoid, and typhus. All other immunizations are being given as required.

There were thirty-five cases of epidemic hemorrhagic fever in the Division during the month. All possible preventive measures have been taken. The Division Preventive Medicine Officer, together with the Officer in charge of the 37th Preventive Medicine Platoon are aggressively pursuing rodent and mite control. Difficulty has been encountered in getting requisitions for rodenticides filled. This fact has been brought to the attention of the 8th Army Surgeon.

Suppressive drug therapy with chloroquine for malaria control continued being administered bi-monthly. Eighteen cases were reported during October. The cumulative total of cases since 15 April is 156.

With the advent of winter a program of the prevention of Wet-Cold injuries was initiated. A command letter was published covering all aspects and control measures of this disease. Classes have been conducted at Division level under the supervision of G-3.

A total of 15,265 outpatient treatments were administered by all medical units of the Division. These figures were compiled from the outpatient report for October 1951.

Oral hygiene in the command is good. There were 1621 admissions, 8145 dental operations, 3149 sittings, 2147 fillings, 1507 extractions, 18 full dentures, 100 partial dentures, 27 dentures repaired, and 1 bridge made.

The following is a breakdown of battle casualties occurring during the month. These figures do not include missing in action, killed in action, or casualties returned to duty from medical installations below the organic level of the Divi-

sion clearing company. Cumulative total figures reflect casualties from 25 January 1951. Figures were compiled from the daily A & D sheets of the Division clearing company.

UNIT	OCTOBER	CUMULATIVE
ASSIGNED		
14th Infantry Regt.	115	181
24th Infantry Regt	0	1586
27th Infantry Regt	35	1064
35th Infantry Regt	126	1047
25th Div Arty	7	83
65th Engr C Bn	2	52
79th Hvy Tr Bn	0	10
25th MP Co	0	6
25th Med Bn	0	1
Hq & Hq Co 25th Inf	0	1
25th AAA Wpns Bn, Btry A	0	5
25th Recon Co	0	19
77th Engr C Bn	0	7
25th Signal Co	0	1
Sub Total	287	4063
ATTACHED		
1st FOB	1	1
14th Tank Co	1	1
21st Inf Regt, 24th Div	5	32
19th Inf Regt, 24th Div	0	20
1st TAFIC	11	291
89th Med Tr Bn	13	75
21st AAA Wpns Bn	2	88
5th Ranger Co	0	50
8th Engr Bn	0	1
987th AFA	0	2
17th Regt, 24th Div	1	1
7th Inf Regt, 3rd Div	2	2
Sub Total	36	564
Total	323	4627

A total of 115 patients were administered psychiatric consultations during the month.

Part V

Logistics

(a) Logistical Situation

The Division Quartermaster and Quartermaster Class I and III supply point were located during October in the vicinity of HAGAGYE (CS5304). The Quartermaster Class II and IV supply point was located in the vicinity of ORYUDONG (CS1050). The 725th Ordnance Company, with a detachment of the 2d Ordnance MM Company in support, was located vicinity of CP4809. The Division Class V dump was located at ASP #56, vicinity of ULJONGBU (CS2878). The main supply route for the Division remained Route 3. Route 3A was used as the alternate MSR.

Supply for the most part was good, excepting the supply of vehicle parts and quartermaster expendable items. These remained in critical supply. Heavy emphasis was placed on the issue of winter clothing, spare parts, stoves, and tents.

By the end of October, all winter clothing had been issued to the troops. Mountain sleeping bags had been issued to all units. Fleece caps, parkas and shoesocks were available for issue at Quartermaster II and IV, but were not scheduled for issue until the weather became colder. Two of the items considered essential, especially for front line troops, were leather gloves with woolen inserts. These, received in Division supply during the latter part of October, were issued to the troops immediately upon receipt.

During the month, 287 hexagonal tents, and 300 Yukon stoves were received at Quartermaster II and IV for issue to organizations. The decision was made that these tents and stoves would be issued only to front line troops. A meeting was held in the office of the G-4 to discuss with an inform all organizational S-4's as to how this equipment would be utilized. Some S-4's stated that since bunkers were being built on the lines, they would like to requisition Yukon stoves for heating these bunkers. As a result of this request, some of the stoves were issued for this purpose. These stoves and tents are exceptionally good pieces of equipment and are very popular with the troops.

By the end of October, 1,363 tent stoves had been issued to organizations within the Division. Owing to the probability of moving and the fact that the weather was not too cold, it was decided that only one stove per tent would be

issued until colder weather.

Stoves were issued on the basis of one for each tent and bunker. Some difficulty was expected in maintaining a large enough level of diesel fuel, because 8th Army directed that only diesel fuel will be burned in the M-1941 stove. Prior to these orders a mixture half gasoline and half diesel fuel was burned. This made a hotter blaze, but consumed more fuel.

On 10 October, the Executive Officer of the 65th Engineer (C) Battalion reported five 2½-ton truck motors had burned out. It was first assumed that the cause was the motor oil refined by the Phipps Refining Company. Units were instructed that oil refined by that company would not be used until further notice. The 8th Army Quartermaster was notified, and a petroleum laboratory technician was requested to check the oil. One of the motors was torn down to determine the cause of the burned-out bearings, and a sample of the oil was taken to Far East Command Petroleum Laboratory. At the end of the month, no decision was rendered as to the cause of the motor failures, but notification was received that the oil had met all specifications. As a result, Phipps Oil was issued to units for normal consumption.

During the month, the 7th Regiment from the 3rd Infantry Division, 20th Battalion Combat Team (PEPTOK) and the 955th Field Artillery Battalion joined the 25th Infantry Division for operational control and Class I, III and V support. The movement of these organizations was made without the aid of Division transportation.

In preparation for Plan "Mesabi," the services were moved forward on Route 3. This was done to shorten the vehicle turn-around on ration and POL hauling.

An ASP for artillery and mortar ammunition was placed in the vicinity of CT5327. Prior to the opening of this ASP, the Division had been making a 100-mile turn-around for artillery ammunition, which required the Division to obtain permission to keep two basic loads on hand. With the opening of ASP 56-A at CT5327, the basic load was reduced to one, plus one day's expected rate of fire. Since vehicles and vehicle parts were critical, the opening of this ASP aided in reducing transportation problems.

(b) Supply

The average supported strength for the Division during October was 33,000 military personnel and 6,000 civilians. Of the 6,000 civilians, approximately 3,000 were Korean Service Corps Personnel, assigned as a regiment to a Korean National Guard Division. These civilians were used to carry food and ammunition to front line troops. This organization will be equipped with winter clothing of a distinctive type, to be procured from Japanese markets and issued through quartermaster channels. This clothing was originally due for issue by 15 November 1951, but in view of Japanese jobbers inability to produce this clothing in the quantity needed, it became necessary to issue Class X Winter Clothing for their use. Class X clothing will be made available through 8th Army Quartermaster channels. At the present time, insufficient quantities are available to equip more than half of the KSC troops.

Class I supply level was set at one day's supply in hands of troops of either "A" or "B" rations (operational rations) and one-half day's supply in hands of troops of either "C" or "5 in 1" rations (combat rations). One day's supply of "B" rations and one day's supply of "C" rations were maintained in reserve at the Division supply dump.

Class II supply level was fifteen days' supply in hands of troops for expendables and seven days supply of other items in hands of troops.

Class III supply level was one day's supply in hands of troops with two days' supply maintained in Division Dump.

Class IV QM levels were 15 days' supply in hands of troops for expendables and seven days' supply of all others. Engineer Class IV was on an "as required" basis.

Class V level was one basic load plus an expected day's rate of fire in hands of troops and a five days' supply maintained in army supply dumps.

The most critical items of supply continued to be vehicle parts, OD paint, and QM expendable items and spare parts for ranges.

There was no local procurement for the Division during the month of October.

(c) Captured Enemy Materiel

During the month the following enemy materiel was captured, processed, and turned into the 8th Army Salvage Collecting Points:

1 Rifle, Cal .30, Chinese

1 Rifle, Cal .25, Japanese

4 Gun, Submachine, Russian

(d) Transportation

The movement of QM Class I & III from UIJONGBU to the Division Supply Dump was unusually heavy during the month. Total loads of Class I being 1,025 and Class III, 1,277.

The QM II & IV office loaded 30 military transporters from the railhead at YONGDUNGPO. Combinations on these transporters in some cases were changed without proper notification of the G-4 office which caused a delay in off loading.

There was no change in main supply route of the 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division. Transportation Section of this headquarters made a road reconnaissance for a new I & III railhead in vicinity of CHORWON in order to shorten the supply route for the 25th Infantry Division. Route inspected was: west on 24 to CHORWON, south on 33A to 66, east on 66 to 19, southeast on 19 to 3, north on 3 to Division ASP 56-A CT5327, and 25th Division QM I & III, CT5224. It was recommended to IX Corps that a new route of haul should be one-way for empty trucks on 24 to CHORWON, CT4234, and one-way for loaded trucks from CHORWON area using #66 to #19 to #3. MSR #3 to remain a two-way road.

(e) Engineer Service

The 65th Engineer Combat Battalion was in direct support of the 25th Division throughout the month. A line company supported each regiment and one company was held in general reserve.

Main engineer effort was used in road construction, maintenance and improvement of 25th Division MSR's and improvement of battalion and company areas. The Battalion also did extensive work in building winterized bunkers, stockpiling logs and winterizing tents with concrete floors, to be used by 25th Division troops. This part of the Battalion operations started on 1 September at locations CT6139 and CT6434 and has been a continual operation throughout the month of October in the Division sector.

On 1 October the Battalion started the installation of 120 feet of M-2 Treadway

bridge at CT5034, completing it on 2 October. Throughout the month of October the following bridges were also constructed:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>LENGTH</u>	<u>SPANS</u>	<u>TONS</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>
1. Timber	Natural	30'	2 (8' each)	13	CT5938
2. Timber	Natural	30'	2 (10' each)	13	CT5938
3. Timber	Natural	30'	3 (10' each)	13	CT6238
4. Timber	Railroad Ties		8' (15' W) (4' clearance above water)	1	CT5841

Mine laying and clearing were common during the month of both friendly and enemy mines. The following data pertains to this work:

<u>JOB</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MINES FOUND</u>
1. Swept for mines to enter and remove disabled US Tank.	CT6741	None
2. Mineswept road and shoulders 10' out on each side.	CT6740-CT6741 (approx 900 yds)	None
3. Cleared shoulders along road.	CT6439-CT6440 (route 6 - 800 yds)	None
4. Mineswept area 200 yds long, 30 yds wide.	CT6741	9 Chinese box mines.
5. Mineswept area 200 yds long, 30 yds wide.	CT6641	7 Chinese box mines.
6. Removed enemy stockpile.	CT6638	42 Chinese box mines.
7. Removed friendly field.	CT6640 CT6640 (150' long) CT6739 (320' long)	9 M-3 6 M-3 (4 prev detonated) 12 M-3 (1 prev detonated)
8. Mineswept road (1.5 miles)	CT6043-CT5944	8 Chinese box type mines
9. Mineswept 50 yds each side of road.	CT6041-CT6043	None
10. Swept for mines in village of SANGDONG-RI.	CT5942	None
11. Swept for mines.	Grid squares: CT5137 CT5138 CT5038 CT5039	None
12. Removed booby traps.	CT5738	35
13. Swept for mines.	CT4838-CT4739	None
14. Swept 2.5 miles for mines.	CT5237-CT5538	1 mortar shell
15. Cleared friendly minefield.	CT6040-CT5840	281 - M2A1 AP mines removed.

TOTAL: 374 mines removed, 1 mortar shell, 35 booby traps.

Total rainfall for October was only .5 inches and did not have any adverse effects on existing fords, bridges or roads.

During the period, platoons of the line companies worked with task forces of the 35th and 27th Infantry Regiments, whose mission was solely mine clearing.

The Battalion built 25 miles of lateral and access roads. This figure includes both regular roads and jeep trails out through hillsides. Part of this was continued work on construction of new connecting laterals, (Webster's road) from CT5533 to CT5132, and Lost Valley road from CT5940 to CT6640. In addition to this new construction the Battalion also improved and maintained 14 miles of Division MSR's. This included widening of Chicago road from CT5634 to CT4840 for all weather, two-lane traffic.

In the month of October, ten (10) men were sent to Tank Dozer School for a nine (9) day period to learn about the operation, maintenance and use of Tank Dozers.

At the close of the period the Battalion had logs stockpiled for future bunker construction at CT5634, CT5738 and CT6433. Also, logs were stockpiled to be used in prefabricating section of corduroy road.

(f) Ordnance Service

At the beginning of October, the Division Ordnance Office was with the Division Command Post at CT5222; all other elements of the company were at CS5199, except the DAO which was at CS2878, and the Tank section which was at CT5019.

Division Ordnance supply received weapons and vehicles from the deactivated 24th Infantry Regiment. Excess ordnance materiel not required by other units in the Division was evacuated to the collection point in SEOUL.

DOSO received nine M4A3 tanks from the 21st Ordnance MM Company. These tanks were issued to the 89th Tank Battalion to fill T/O&E shortages. The Division is now at T/O&E strength in tanks.

EUSAK informed DDO on status of 155mm howitzers and M5 highspeed tractors for 159th Field Artillery Battalion. Howitzers were on a ship in PUSAN Harbor. High speed tractors had not yet arrived from Japan. Headquarters, 8046th Ordnance Group indicated that tow cables for 89th Tank Battalion were being procured locally.

DAO received authorization from I Corps to carry two basic loads of 4.2-inch mortar in the Division because of long turn-around from ASP to units.

All units of the Division received anti-freeze and each unit was supervised by a trained ordnance man for its use. This detail required 15 trained mechanics for a period of 5 days. All units, in addition to receiving instruction by memo, were instructed by the Maintenance Officer or assistant. A training program was conducted by Ordnance for approximately 35 men of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion on driver maintenance for the M5 high-speed tractor between the 20th and 23rd of October. A program of 2d echelon training was being conducted on the M5 high speed tractor for mechanics of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion.

The DAO made a reconnaissance of a new area for ASP 56-A and arranged to move a section of ammunition personnel to the site in time for opening of new ASP. DOMO contacted all the ordnance small arms teams. These teams are located at 14th, 27th, and 35th Infantry Regiments. All teams were well organized and gave continuous ordnance service.

At the end of the month DCO was with Division Command Post at CT5222; all other elements of the company were at CT4709, except DAO, which was at CT5326. The track repair section was at CT5019.

During the month the Division and attached units expended 4,942 tons of ammunition. The breakdown of this expenditure and the summary of supply activity for October, can be found in Book 12, this report.

At the end of the month analysis showed that the maintenance detachments had completed 1040 vehicles, 5975 vehicular sub-assemblies, 392 artillery pieces, 6213 small arms, and 539 instruments.

(g) Quartermaster Service

During October the Division Quartermaster Company issued the following supplies:

<u>Class I</u>	<u>No. Rations Issued</u>	<u>Average per day</u>
A	867,330	27,978
C	123,628	
<u>Class III</u>	<u>No. Gals. Issued</u>	
MoGas	1,127,560	
AvGas	22,790	

The Repair and Maintenance Section repaired 150 typewriters; 178 stoves; one burner; 157 lanterns, gasoline; and 445 fire units for the range M-1937.

The Field Service Platoon laundered and dried the following articles in amounts indicated:

Trousers	22,274
Jackets	21,971
Drawers, ctn	7,778
Drawers, wool	1,163
Undershirts, ctn	4,986
Undershirts, wool	5,131
Socks, w/c	25,115
Towels, bath, OD	365

The Purchasing and Contracting Section purchased during this period:

Nails, assorted, Engr	4,500,000
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Part VI
Chronology

- 3 October Turkish Armed Forces Command and 14th Infantry Regiment adjusted line forward in west of Division sector.
- 7 October Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.
- 8 October General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth Army, and Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.
- 10 October Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.
- 12 October Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.
- 15 October Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon and conferred with Gen. Swift.
- 18 October Major General Ernest M. Brannon, Judge Advocate General of the Army, and his assistant, Brig. Gen. James L. Herbaugh, visited the 25th Division Command Post during the afternoon. Also in the party were Col. Chester D. Silvers, Judge Advocate General, Eighth Army, and Lt. Col. Carl E. Williamson from Far East Command.
- 19 October Major General Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Commander, Eighth Army, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.
- 22 October Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tac Command Post during the day.
- 23 October 27th Infantry Regiment moved from Division reserve to Line Wyoming between 14th and 35th Infantry Regiments.
- 24 October General Swift flew to the 24th Infantry Division during the morning to confer with Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense.
- 27 October Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the day.

- 28 October General Swift flew to the 24th Infantry Division during the morning to confer with General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
- 30 October Plan **MESABI** published.
Brig. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, CG, Eighth United States Army Korea, visited the 25th Division sector during the day.
- 31 October 7th Infantry Regiment, attached for operational control from Third Infantry Division, relieved 35th Infantry Regiment on Line Wyoming.
General James A. Van Fleet, CG, Eighth Army, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the morning. Major General Washin Yazici, CG, 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command, and Brig. Gen. Tok, CG, 9th ROK Division, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.

Part VII

Discussion and Recommendations

At the beginning of October, the 25th Infantry Division occupied a sector at the apex of the United Nations' advance into Communist-held Korea. Confronting the Division was a vast hill mass dominated by Hill 1062 (vicinity CT6445) and Hill 717 (vicinity CT5345). Two valleys, both running generally in a north-south direction, led into the Division sector. The valley on the east followed the course of the NAMDAE-CHON and marked the juncture of the 25th and the 2d ROK Divisions. The second and larger valley, following the course of the PANPAN-CHON, led into the Division's center between Hill 1062 and Hill 717. The enemy was known to have concentrated strong forces on and near both hills and continued to offer strong resistance to any movement toward them.

While the Division held and improved its positions along Line Wyoming, I Corps units on its left ruptured key enemy positions and advanced to a point generally on line with the 25th Division. Elements of IX Corps on the right aimed a drive at the supply center of KUMSONG (vicinity CT7952) and established a new line roughly five miles north of the 25th Division. The Division supported the I Corps advance by moving its own left sector forward. It supported the 2d ROK Division attack on the east by fire.

Plan MESSABI, which would have advanced the Division north about five miles to a ridge running east from PYONGGANG (vicinity CT5152), envisioned a double envelopment of Hill 717 that would not only secure ground, but would trap enemy forces retreating to the north. Hill 1062 was to be by-passed at first, then encircled and screened by a reserve regiment. This operation was postponed by higher headquarters, pending the results of the cease-fire negotiations at PANMUNJOM.

While the Division maintained its defensive attitude, the Commanding General and his staff were concerned principally with three interrelated command problems:

1. Maintaining and improving the battle position.
2. Sustaining combat proficiency and the aggressive spirit in the face of rapid personnel turnover and the threat of "defensive-mindedness."
3. Planning for possible offensive action.

Combat proficiency was improved by battle experience that emphasized infantry-

artillery-tank-air team action, and by realistic training. The battle experience was obtained in patrol and task force activity that also enabled the Division to keep the enemy off balance and inflict casualties and damage. More training time was gained by moving an additional regiment on line, allowing each regiment to keep one battalion in reserve and rotate them for training.

The Commanding General continued to stress the dangers of defense-mindedness and the necessity of aggressively seeking battle experience for all units through patrol and small task force activities. At a meeting with the Regimental commanders and tank battalion commander on 21 October, he urged them through training and planned battle experience to develop well balanced fighting teams.

"Gentlemen," he said, "we will suffer casualties, but we are buying experience that ultimately will pay off in success with minimum casualties when we get into a real fight."

He emphasized that tank-infantry coordination and the proper use of armor could be learned only through experience under fire. Thorough prior planning and pre-mission communications checks greatly enhance the value of this experience and the effectiveness of every tank-infantry mission. "There must be one boss and he must have the means to control the task force he directs," he said.

During the tactical briefings held each night during the month in the War Tent, the Commanding General also emphasized these tactical principles:

1. Combat patrols should not consider that they have been in contact with the enemy until they hit resistance too strong for them to cope with. The mere observation of enemy personnel or emplacements does not constitute "contact." Only by aggressive action can the patrol hurt the enemy and gather information.

2. Patrol plans should be examined to make sure the patrol will serve some realistic purpose and not represent just another diagram on the map. The act of moving from friendly lines to a point within the enemy positions and back again has no particular value unless it has been decided ahead of time exactly what the patrol is going there for.

3. Artillery and air preparation can serve the infantry better if it is extended over a period of days according to a sound plan. This increases the chances to get more hits and do more damage. Last minute fires, intense though they may be, never clear the way for the Doughboy, and he has to spend a large

part of his time on the day of the attack waiting for his supporting arms to knock out unsuspected targets.

4. Air strikes and bombing runs should be requested in abundance. Because of the sharp ridges and deep valleys in Korea, it is almost impossible for one air strike or one bombing run to hit the target. However, out of several attempts, one is bound to do great damage.

5. In the attack, it is imperative to get behind the enemy and trap him. This saves fighting him twice. If he is allowed to get away to prepared positions farther north, two battles instead of one will have to be fought.

Operations and training in the Division through October revealed no major weaknesses in the basic doctrine of infantry and its supporting arms. However, the following comments and recommendations warrant consideration:

1. The digging of connecting trenches between positions on the MLR and from CP's, OP's, or other emplacements immediately in rear of front lines should be made standard practice. Without these trenches, friendly forces caught in intense artillery fires are unable to move without suffering heavy casualties.

2. It is recommended that a heavy artillery battery, preferably 8-inch howitzers, be made available to Division Artillery during operations in which the enemy habitually emplaces his artillery in heavy bunkers that can be destroyed only by precision adjustment with heavy artillery. Such a battery, attached to this Division for a limited period during October, was extremely effective in bunker destruction.

3. A great need is felt for some device to locate mortar positions more accurately under conditions of terrain and weather encountered in Korea. Counter-mortar radar detachments are handicapped by obsolete and ineffective equipment and by excessive ground "clutter", caused by mountainous terrain. Counterfire platoons of the infantry regiments are likewise handicapped by the mountainous terrain. The enemy takes advantage of periods of poor visibility to fire artillery. At these times the only source of counter-battery information are counterfire platoons and radar.


4. In this connection, it is believed that more personnel should receive training in crater analysis. Crater analysis during October frequently furnished valuable information concerning caliber and azimuth of hostile guns.

5. It is recommended that one bulldozer per artillery battalion be authorized by TO&E. These dozers could be used to great advantage in rapidly constructing gun pits and personnel dugouts.

6. The propelling charges used in 105mm and 155mm pieces produce an excessive amount of ash and smoke. The smoke discloses gun positions. It is believed that this is caused either by the dual grain powder or bags that seem to be treated with some sticky substance. Recommend that continued experiments be conducted to improve artillery propellents.

7. The angle dozer is more effective for road construction than the bulldozer. It is recommended that half of the dozers issued to combat battalions be angle dozers.

8. Each track of a tractor should have two king pins located in the track directly opposite each other. Should the track be thrown, the clear king pin could be removed and the track taken off. Under present method, it is very difficult to remove the track and pin if the single pin is under the rollers and the tractor cannot be moved.


IRA P. SWIFT
Major General, USA
Commanding

COMMAND FUNCTIONS



8A/FEC-51-37861

1 Oct 51

Maj Gen Ira F. Swift, CG 25th US Inf Div cuts cake during celebration held in honor of the Division's 10th Anniversary, at Div Hqs. On the General's right is Brig Gen William L. Mitchell. Lt. Col. Richard W. Whitney, Chief of Staff, is on Gen Swift's left.



8A/FEC-51-37884

2 Oct 51

Maj Gen Ira F. Swift (left) CG 25th US Inf Div, awards Silver Star Medal to 1/Sgt Joseph E. Sonnier, 24th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, during ceremonies held at Regt Hqs.

DRILL & CEREMONIES



8A/FEC-51-37873

2 Oct 51

Col Thomas Gillis (left) CO 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, and member of his staff attend ceremonies as the 24th Inf Regt is officially deactivated.



8A/FEC-51-37831

2 Oct 51


Col Thomas Gillis, CO 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, addresses men of his command for the last time, as the 24th Regt is officially deactivated.



8A/FEC-51-37826

2 Oct 51

Men case the colors during ceremonies held to officially deactivate the 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div.



8A/FEC-51-37841

2 Oct 51

Color casing ceremonies are held at hqs of the 24th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, as the Regt is officially deactivated.



Security Platoon, Hq and Hq Co, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, doubled as an "honor guard" platoon for official ceremonies. It is shown here prepared for a command inspection.


PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS



8A/FEC-51-37334

9 Oct 51


Men of the 3rd Bn, 35th RCT, 25th US Inf Div gather in war torn building to listen to orientation lecture while enjoying Little R&R (24 hours of rest) at base, KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-38204

21 Oct 51


In the SEGOK area, nine miles south of PYONGSANG, Korea, Capt. Riyazi' hokimig, CO, HQ Co, 241st Turkish Regt, Turkish Infantry Brigade, United Nations Command, displays his morning bag of presents.



3A/REC-51-37894


11 Oct 51

Soldiers of the 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th US Inf Div bring wounded soldier to the Regt collecting aid station near KUMWA, Korea.




20 Oct 51

Exterior of battalion aid station in area of 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div.



20 Oct 51


Interior of bunker-type battalion aid station in area of the 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div. The bunker provides living space for the battalion surgeon and his chief enlisted assistants as well as the consulting room.



20 Oct 51

A large bunker in 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, provides space for religious services and motion picture showings.

OPERATIONS



8A/FEC-51-37104

6 Oct 51

Southeast of PYONGGANG, Korea, on the central front, tanks of the 2nd Platoon, Co D, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div, in support of infantrymen crossfire on enemy positions.



8A/FEC-51-37115

12 Oct 51

Tanker of 2nd Platoon, Co D, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div, on the front lines in Korea, west of KUBWA and south of PYONGGANG.



8A/FEC-51-37099

6 Oct 51

On the east central front in Korea, west of KŬPŬWA and south of PYONGGANG, tanks of the 2nd Platoon, Co D, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div move out in support of infantrymen.



8A/FED-51-37093

6 Oct 51


On the central front at POEN-GOL, southeast of PYONGGANG, Korea, men of Co I, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, and a tank of the 2nd Platoon, Co D, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div embark on a rescue mission.



8A/FEC-51-37091

6 Oct 51

The village of CHIGAM-NI, Korea, on the central front, abnaze from being the center of attention as elements of the 25th US Inf Div fire on enemy positions.



8A/FEC-51-37113

12 Oct 51

A sergeant of Battery B, 21st AAA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, keeps a sharp look out for enemy activity on the front line in Korea, west of KUMMA and south of PYONGGANG, Korea.



BA/FEC-51-38238

17 Oct 51

Members of the 21st AAA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, give support with their quad 50's to a foot patrol on Hill 472, near PYONGGANG, Korea.



BA/FEC-51-37106

10 Oct 51

Deep in enemy territory south of PYONGGANG and west of HUILMA, Korea, men of the 2nd Platoon, Co D, 89th Tank Bn, 25th US Inf Div, work to remove a marooned tank.



8A/FEC-51-38255

18 Oct 51

Communications team with the 5th Co, 2nd Bn, 241st Regt, Turkish Brigade, attached to the 25th US Inf Div, follow patrol into enemy territory, near NAM-MYON, Korea.



8A/FEC-38249

21 Oct 51

Officers of the 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 241st Regt, Turkish Brigade, attached to the 25th US Inf Div, check Chinese Communists mortar positions and relay information to control station, near PYONGGANG, Korea.



8A/PEC-51-37856

9 Oct 51

Members of counterfire squad, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, move up to new positions near KUMHWA, Korea.



8A/PEC-51-38264

21 Oct 51

Men of 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 241st Regt, Turkish Brigade, attached to the 25th US Inf Div, move quietly toward their objective, during patrol into enemy held territory near PYONGGANG, Korea.



8A/PEC-51-37100

6 Oct 51

Southeast of FYONGGANG, Korea, men of Co G, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div take a much needed break after safely withdrawing from Hill 404.



8A/PEC-51-38247

25 Oct 51

Men of 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 241st Regt, Turkish Brigade, attached to the 25th US Inf Div, prepare to fire into enemy positions near FYONGGANG, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-37090

8 Oct 51

On the main line, west of KUMHWA and south of PYONGGANG, Korea, men of Co G, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, drive posts upon which to string wire for entanglements.



8A/FEC-51-32111

8 Oct 51

On the main line, west of KUMHWA and south of PYONGGANG, Korea, men of Co G, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, prepare wire entanglements.

TRAINING



GA/FEC-51-37374

4 Oct 51

A sergeant of Hqs Co, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, conducts class in operation of the flame thrower at Regt Hqs, near HWAJMA, Korea.



GA/FEC-51-37388

4 Oct 51

Instructor helps trainee as he practices using flame thrower, during class held near HWAJMA, Korea. Both men are members of Hqs Co, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div.



8A/FEC-51-37472

10 Oct 51

Soldier of the 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div demonstrates effectiveness of the 1943 1-A flamethrower, during class held at Regt Hqs, HHAEMA, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-37886

11 Oct 51

Demonstration is held at Hqs of the 25th US Inf Div, CHIPORI, Korea, to show proper clothing to be worn to fight severe cold.



8A/TEC-51-36940

24 Oct 51

Men of the 159th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, receive instructions in cooking, in field conditions, MUIHWA, Korea.

BUNKER CONSTRUCTION



BA/FEC-51-37892

11 Oct 51

General view of bunker constructed by men of the 65th Engineer Combat Bn, 25th US Inf Div for the 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, near KUMHWA, Korea.



"Home" of the I & R Platoon, 25th Infantry Regiment, 25th US Inf Div. The bunker was built by the men of the platoon between missions in support of the regiment.




20 Oct 51

Platoon bunker, built by men of the Security Platoon, Hq and Hq Co., 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div. Concrete-tile roofing was salvaged from demolished Korean houses.




Dug into the "lee" side of a steep Korean hill, this heavy Weapons Company Command Post provided both shelter and comfort.



20 Oct 51

Exterior of "chapel-theatre" in area of 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div. "Movies" were held here twice daily. An afternoon show, combined with a trip to the showers, was held for men on the line. Night shows were held for headquarters personnel. Religious services were conducted here each Sunday.




20 Oct 51

Interior of a bunker-type Battalion operations office. Constructed of logs, earth, and sandbags, this bunker was finished inside by lumber furnished by the 65th Engr Combat Bn, 25th US Inf Div.



20 Oct 51

Tables, which fold back against the wall when not in use, demonstrate ingenuity common throughout Division area in winterization program. Bunkers of this type will hold 30 to 40 men.



20 Oct 51

Interior of a typical "winter warming bunker" in Division area. Bunkers of this type were constructed in immediate rear of platoon and company areas for the purpose of warming, drying, cloths, writing letters, and general relaxation of front line troops.

PHOTO INTELLIGENCE


ON 157

HILL 488


RIDGE 472-376




Hill 488 (vicinity CT4346) as viewed from over Ridge 472-376 (vicinity CT4343) is typical of the terrain facing the Turkish Armed Forces Command on the Division west (left) flank. It lies about 4,000 meters north of the Turkish front.




View of dominant hill masses to the front of the Turkish Armed Forces Command and the 14th Infantry Regiment. The HANTAN-CHON and its valley with characteristic rice paddys can be seen in the middle ground (vicinity CT5741) of the photograph. This valley is a natural axis of north-south communication.



Closer view of hill 717 (vicinity CP5345), hill 586 (vicinity CP5546), and hill 682 (vicinity CP5545). These hills are steep, rocky, and heavily timbered. Artillery fire and UH bombing caused the scars on the ridge lines.



A view from over Hill 317 (vicinity CF6141) within the center of the 27th Infantry Regiment's line reveals the sharp ridges and steep valleys of troublesome Hill mass 400 (vicinity CF6143), which the enemy has fiercely defended. Running from center to left of the photograph is the HUKMA-IRUWANA road, a two-lane artery of travel. The road formed the north-eastern side of the so-called "Iron triangle."



Closer view of Hill 400 (vicinity C 6143). Scars on the ridge lines and hill tops caused by artillery fire and M. bombing can again be seen. The Korean practice of utilizing every available foot of hostile land for bombing is clearly pictured. These gently sloping areas, sheltered by steep slopes, have provided space for troop concentrations and command installations for both friendly and enemy forces.

Historian

HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 25

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1951 AND ARE FOR DUTY UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED. THIS ROSTER AGREES WITH MORNING REPORT (WD AGO FORM 1) DATED 31 OCTOBER 1951.

COMMANDING GENERAL:

Maj Gen	Ira P Swift	0-12205	USA	Division Commander
Brig Gen	William L Mitchell	0-12832	USA	Asst Div Commander
Capt	Otto W Huebner	0-50346	Inf	ADC to CG
1st Lt	Norman A LaFlamme	0-958054	Inf	ADC to Asst CG

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Lt Col	Richard W Whitney	0-31855	GSC	Chief of Staff
Capt	Richard F W Whittemore	0-1317854	GSC	Asst Chief of Staff
WOJG-1	William A Fenno	W-2144445	NO	Admin Asst

AC OF S, G-1:

Maj	DeNeer W Flynn	0-450277	GSC	AC of S, G-1	
Maj	Harry E Apgar Jr.	0-1283894	GSC	Asst G-1	DS
Maj	Oscar King	0-1289591	Inf	Asst G-1	
2d Lt	Gail E Van Horn	0-980938	Inf	Asst G-1	

AC OF S, G-2:

Lt Col	James H Lee	0-35428	Inf	AC of S, G-2	TDY
Maj	Malcom M Jameson	0-400182	GSC	Asst G-2	
Capt	Herbert A Brannon	0-1031387	GSC	Asst G-2	
Capt	Raymond E Cutler	0-1296842	Inf	Opns Off	
Capt	Charles H Fogg	0-507611	Inf	Inter Off	
Capt	Robert C Perron	0-1595756	Inf	Photo Inter	
Capt	Sylvester Rich II	0-556451	Inf	Photo Inter	
Capt	Frank R Sahn	0-1170959	GSC	Intell Staff Off Combat	
1st Lt	Grant S Fisher	0-1301976	Inf	OB Spec	TDY
1st Lt	William E Hardosty	0-980912	Inf	Photo Inter	
1st Lt	William H Harr	0-1020499	Armor	Ln Off Combat	DS
1st Lt	Henry T. Ikemoto	0-1899427	Inf	Inter Off	
1st Lt	William H McCoy Jr	0-1039778	TC	Admin Off	
1st Lt	Milton M Mondor	0-1339905	Inf	Intell Staff Off Combat	
1st Lt	Arthur G Webster III	0-558476	Inf	Translation Off	
1st Lt	William H Wilson	0-1334660	Inf	Inter Off	
1st Lt	Ray A Woodside	0-976954	Inf	Translation Off	

AC OF S, G-3:

Lt Col	Harry Balish	0-22218	GSC	AC of S, G-3	
Maj	Charles E Dampier	0-1313010	GSC	Asst G-3	DS
Maj	Donald J Baker	0-436251	Inf	T&E Off	DS
Maj	Martin L Davis	0-336888	GSC	Intel Staff Off Combat	DS
Maj	Michael F Hochella	0-36480	Arty	Div Lt Avn Off	
Maj	Max K Johnson	0-589043	Inf	Hist Editor	DS
Maj	Paul L Skogsberg	0-62134	Armor	Intell Staff Off Combat	
Maj	Sammal B Sinai	0-729666	Inf	Ln Off Combat	
Capt	George C Critchlow Jr	0-291243	Armor	Ln Off Combat	DS
Capt	Robert G Devlin	0-539591	Inf	Asst G-3	
Capt	Alva R Eshleman	0-1311630	Inf	Asst G-3	
Capt	Stanton L Fickel	0-412446	Inf	Oper & Tng Staff Off	TDY
Capt	Henry C Fleming Jr	0-406959	Armor	Asst G-3	
Capt	Burnett E Glidden	0-2007662	Inf	Asst G-3	
1st Lt	David A Freas	0-549617	Inf	Asst G-3	
1st Lt	Francis G Nordstrom	0-1011070	Armor	Ln Off Combat	DS

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1951 - Cont'd Page 2

AC OF S, G-4:

Lt Col	William E Coulter	0-364911	GSC	AC of S, G-4	
Maj	Leroy W Mueller	0-429229	GSC	Asst G-4	
Maj	Alfred M Saunders	0-1291018	GSC	Trans Staff Off	DS
Capt	James G McKee	0-1063183	Arty	Trans Staff Off	
1st Lt	Charles E Ridings	0-949108	TC	Trans Staff Off	
WOJG-1	Doyle T Walker	W-2144265	NO	Admin Asst	

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

Capt	Ordie F Taylor Jr	0-1030616	Inf	Hq Commandant	
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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION:

Lt Col	James A Miller	0-40018	AGC	Adjutant General	
Lt Col	Charles F Tost	0-387888	AGC	Asst Adj General	
Maj	Charles A Smith	0-1000186	AGC	Asst Adj General	
Capt	Michael G Baibian	0-1994560	AGC	Class & Asgmt Off	
Capt	Robert M Blanton	0-1316842	AGC	Div Postal Off	
Capt	James M Breuklander	0-1032002	AGC	Asst Adj General	
Capt	William M Nicholson	0-180017	AGC	Postal Off	
1st Lt	Oren R Lyon	0-1001628	AGG	Asst Adj General	
1st Lt	Louis E Malnarick	0-969249	AGG	Mil Pers Off	DS
1st Lt	Marshall E Noel	0-2033665	TC	Asst Adj General	
Capt	Oecil Kearns	0-963473	AGG	Asst Adj General	
WOJG-1	Edward J Bonnett	W-2145232	NO	Class & asgmt Off	
WOJG-1	Robert L Johnston	W-906816	NO	Admin Asst	

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SECTION:

Lt Col	Edgar R Minnich	0-51197	JAGG	Division JA	
Capt	Charles L Beck	0-975962	JAGG	Asst JA	
Capt	William F Goodman	0-62007	JAGG	Div Legal Asst Off	
Capt	George V W Pope Jr	0-63485	JAGG	Asst JA	
1st Lt	John C Ianham	0-63738	JAGG	Asst JA	
WOJG-1	Cortez B Hope	W-2147088	NO	Legal-Admin Asst	

CHAPLAIN SECTION:

Lt Col	George E Donnellon	0-29250	Ch C	Division Chaplain	
Maj	Gordon L Alderman	0-479536	Ch C	Chaplain	
Maj	Clifford H Winfordner	0-530022	Ch C	Chaplain	

FINANCE SECTION:

Maj	William E Slezak	0-1285511	FC	Div Finance Off	
Capt	Garland H Midgott	0-1332398	FC	Asst Fin Off	TDY
1st Lt	William B Proctor Jr	0-58563	FC	Asst Fin Off	DS
1st Lt	Donald G Loth	0-975369	FC	Asst Fin Off	
WOJG-1	Edward A Lapekas	W-2143937	NO	Asst Fin Off	

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTION:

Lt Col	Royal G Nunamaker	0-29391	GSC	Div Inspector General	
WOJG-1	John Grothe	W-2144996	NO	Auditing Off	

CHEMICAL SECTION:

Capt	William E Hartman	0-1637624	Cml C	Div Cml Off	
1st Lt	John S Anderson Jr	0-2200520	Cml C	Chemical Off	

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION:

Capt	Gale W Hibbard	0-1291819	Inf	Special Service Off	
1st Lt	Frank J Koski	0-1329846	AGG	Special Service Off	

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1951 - Cont'd Page 3

SURGEON SECTION:

Lt Col	Richard H Ross	0-1785816	MC	Division Surgeon	
Maj	Edward F Counts	0-935617	MC	Admin Asst to Div Surg	
Capt	Robert R Yoder	0-992707	MC	Psychiatrist	
1st Lt	Raymond O Seltzer	0-2041215	MC	Med Off Prev Med	
1st Lt	Denis F Sealls	0-562169	MSC	Medical Asst	TDY
WOJG-1	Jesse Yerman	W-2142765	NO	Admin Asst	

PIO SECTION:

1st Lt	Allen A David	0-1330044	Inf	Div PIO
Capt	Handrick G Stone	0-1185600	Army	PIO
1st Lt	Frank W Nielson	0-1330462	Inf	Asst PIO

EXCHANGE SECTION:

Capt	Robert K Bolar	0-1645147	Inf	Div Exchange Off
Capt	Thomas E Adair	0-452080	Inf	Exchange Off
1st Lt	John W Clare	0-1305730	Inf	Asst Exchange Off

CIVIL ASSISTANCE SECTION:

Maj	Charles E Friedman	0-423493	Inf	Div Civil Asst Off	DS
Maj	Virgil K Ledbetter	0-1824049	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
Capt	Earl A Burton	0-1330142	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
Capt	William J Falkner	0-391611	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	DS
Capt	Frank F Gable	0-397138	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
Capt	Henry Wilson	0-1283707	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	
1st Lt	Richard H Shinnick	0-1823358	Inf	Civil Asst Off MG	

SPECIAL UNITS PERSONNEL:

2d Lt	Edward M Kelley	0-994495	AGC	Personnel Officer	DS
WOJG	Jay M Jones	W-2147440	NO	Personnel Officer	

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH NO DUTY ASSIGNMENT:

Capt	Frank F Rathbun	0-1303027	Inf	
1st Lt	Lbo T Stikoski	0-1334763	Inf	
1st Lt	Hillard F Piotrowski	0-1543519	MC	
2d Lt	Silas G Garrett	0-968995	Inf	
WOJG	Garrison W Brooks	W-2151382	NO	

OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1951 - FROM ORGN IND:

Col	Thomas S Gunby	0-11395	UNRC	Turkish Brigade	DS
Lt Col	Maynard B Weaver	0-32120	UNRC	Turkish Brigade	DS
Maj	Kenneth G Flook	0-450862	UNRC	Turkish Brigade	DS
Capt	Thomas G Kearns	0-1110591	UNRC	Turkish Brigade	DS
WOJG	Arnett Cago	W-2151378		25th Repl Co (Oper)	Atchd

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1951 - Cont'd Page 4

ROK PERSONNEL ON DUTY WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1951:

Capt	Park Myung Tack	12105	Finance Section
Capt	Lee Jn Woo	Unk	Liaison Off G-2
1st Lt	Choi Sang Nang	60214	Liaison Off Civil Asst Sect
1st Lt	Lee Yong Shik	60373	AG Rear Liaison Off
1st Lt	Ro Myung Shik	203066	AG Rear
SFC	Han Yoon Hi	1109477	AG Rear
S. Sgt	Shin O Chul	3800972	Finance Section
Sgt	Kang Tal Soo	0365276	AG Rear
Sgt	Pak Song Hak	0365281	Special Units Personnel
Sgt	Roo Jae Hak	0365195	AG Rear
Sgt	Roe Jin U	0365208	Finance Section
Sgt	Sir Su Tak	0365207	Finance Section
Sgt	Yang Sun Il	0365206	Finance Section

THERE ARE 47 ROK POLICEMEN ATTACHED TO DUTY HQ REAR PERFORMING SECURITY GUARD.

THERE ARE 25 ROK POLICEMEN ATTACHED TO DUTY HQ FWD BY W/CIVIL ASSISTANCE SECTION.

BREAKDOWN OF GRADES ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN:

Maj Gen Asg-----	1	M/Sgt Asg---	8	Col Atch-----	1	M/Sgt Atch----	3
Brig Gen Asg-----	1	SFC Asg-----	11	Lt Col Atch---	1	SFC Atch-----	4
Lt Col Asg-----	10	Sgt Asg ----	29	Maj Atch-----	1	Sgt Atch-----	10
Maj Asg-----	20	Cpl asg-----	61	Capt atch-----	1	Cpl atch-----	9
Capt Asg-----	36	PFC Asg-----	49	WOJG atch-----	1	PFC Atch-----	9
1st Lt Asg-----	29	Pvt-2 Asg---	55	Total Atch---	5	Pvt-2 atch---	9
2d Lt Asg-----	3	Pvt-1 Asg---	1			Total atch---	44
WOJG Asg-----	10	Total asg--	214				
Total Asg-----	110			Negro-----	3		

325
Master

SECRET
Security Information

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



Command Report - 25th Infantry Division

OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED RECORDS

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 7
(cont)

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Security Information


Nov 1951

SECURITY

INFORMATION

~~Secret~~

COMMAND REPORT
 CSGPO-28
 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
 NOVEMBER 1951
 COPY 1



~~Secret~~

SECURITY

INFORMATION

Master

COMMAND REPORT

(CSGPO-28)

NOVEMBER 1951

25TH UNITED STATES INFANTRY DIVISION

Attached to

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

1 through 30 November 1951

Under operational control of

IX UNITED STATES CORPS

1 through 30 November 1951

Commanded by

MAJOR GENERAL IRA P. SWIFT, USA

1 through 30 November 1951

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25th Infantry Division

November 1951

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SECTION I

Part I

Introduction

a. Background

During October, the 25th Infantry Division continued to occupy defensive positions along its sector of Line Wyoming. In addition to normal activities related to the conduct of a deliberate defense, the Division stressed offensive action and improvement of its own level of combat proficiency. Offensive action was designed to keep the enemy off balance and to kill, capture, or destroy him. Combat proficiency was heightened by continuous training and by aggressively seeking battle experience.

Action against the enemy included patrols, tank-infantry task forces, and direct, harassing, and interdictionary artillery fires on known and suspected enemy positions.

Training, designed primarily to sustain combat proficiency and an aggressive spirit in face of rapid personnel turn-over and the threat of defense-mindedness, was conducted daily by all units. Front line training included practical experience in conducting night patrols and ambushes; functioning, care and cleaning of weapons; flare construction; cold-wet injury prevention; range estimation and preparation of range cards; wire and mine laying; and personal hygiene and field sanitation.

Training schedules in company, battalion, and regimental reserve areas included escape and evasion; School of the Soldier; care and operation of the flamethrower; conduct of defense; bayonet drill; hill climbing; adjustment of artillery fire by the individual soldier, and map reading. Units in Division reserve were concerned chiefly with the conduct of squad, platoon, company, and battalion attack problems. An adjustment in regiments disposed along the MLR enabled each regiment to hold one battalion in reserve for rest and training.

Planning for possible offensive action was continuous. Plan MESABI, which grew out of two previous offensive plans, was published 30 October. It was part of a general IX Corps advance calculated to seize the high ground east of PYONG-GANG (vicinity CT5152). In essence, the plan called for a double envelopment of

the hill mass dominated by Hill 717 (CT5345) by the Turkish Armed Forces Command on the west and the 14th Infantry Regiment on the east. The 27th Infantry Regiment was to drive straight north, by-passing the heavily entrenched forces on Hill 1062 (CT6445), to link up with the 2d ROK Division punching westward above Hill 1062 from the KUMSONG Bulge. The 35th Infantry Regiment, relieved from its position along Line WYOMING by the attachment of the 7th Infantry Regiment from the 3d Division, was in reserve, prepared on order "to mop" up the encircled enemy.

The plan, scheduled for 1 November, was postponed until 2 November by higher headquarters. The Division was later placed on a 72-hour alert for its execution.

b. Component Units and Commanding Officers

(As of 30 November)

Unit	Commander
14th Infantry Regiment	Lt Col Roy V. Porter, Infantry
27th Infantry Regiment	Col George B. Sloan, Infantry
35th Infantry Regiment	Col Thomas W. Woodyard, Jr., Infantry
Turkish Armed Forces Command	Brig Gen Namik Arguc, Cavalry
25th Division Artillery	Brig Gen William E. Waters, USA
8th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt Col Harry L. Yerby, Artillery
64th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt Col Lounsbury Braason, Artillery
69th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt Col Don W. Dixon, Artillery
90th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt Col Roger E. Reeder, Artillery
159th Field Artillery Battalion	Lt Col Richard W. Gilchrist, Artillery
21st AAA AW Battalion (SP)	Lt Col Charles E. Henry, Artillery
89th Medium Tank Battalion	Lt Col Richard L. Hennessy, CE
25th Medical Battalion	Major Charles F. Snyder, Jr., MC

Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

a. Elements Affecting the Action

1. Effectiveness of enemy information and reconnaissance:

During November, there were no definite indications as to the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance. He had, however, excellent observation of our forward elements and his knowledge of our situation must be presumed good.

2. Nature of terrain:

In the west of the 25th Division zone the dominant terrain feature is the hill mass SOBANG-SAN (CT5445), which affords the enemy excellent observation of the west and central sectors of the Division zone. In the east of the Division zone the dominant terrain feature is the hill mass OSONG-SAN (CT6445), which commands the east and central sectors of the zone. The central sector of the zone is characterized by a valley drained by the HANTAN River, flowing north to south. This valley is largely rice paddy land. These fields have not been cultivated this year. The irrigation canal on the east side of the valley forms a natural antitank barrier to the mountains on the east while the river on the west has high, steep banks and could be forded in only a few places.

3. Condition of weather:

The amount of precipitation received during the month was considered normal for November. One light snowfall occurred during the night of 25-26 November. Temperatures during the period ranged from a high of 68 degrees to a low of 15 degrees. Tank operations during the period were sometimes hampered by wet ground, resulting from alternate freezing and thawing. From the 25th to the end of the month, because of the snowfall on 25-26 November, the valleys to the front of the Division were extremely wet, and tanks could operate only on hard surfaces. Aerial observation on the enemy during the first 20 days of November was reduced since all Division light aircraft were non-operational for $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 hours each morning because heavy frost formed on the surfaces of the aircraft. The frost tended to disrupt the airfoil and a loss of lift resulted. In addition, the rough surface of the frost created an abnormal drag and added considerable weight to the aircraft. Light aircraft were non-operational for 4 days owing to poor

visibility. On two days, only two enemy sightings were obtained before the weather forced the return of the aircraft.

b. Plans and Preparations

Although the 25th Infantry Division remained on the alert to execute Plan MESABI¹ during the first few days of November, its chief mission for the month was again the defense of Line WYOMING. Briefs of the plans, orders, and instructions in fulfillment of this mission follow.

All documents referred to in this section can be found in Book 4, Parts 1 and 2, of the supporting documents of this report.

1 November

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 295 stated that Operations Order No. 45 (Plan MESABI) remained in effect. The Division was to be prepared to implement the order on 60-hour notice. These instructions also relieved units from attachment for operational control that had been made to execute Plan MESABI.

2 November

CHANGE NO. 1 to Operations Instructions No. 295 stated that Operations Order No. 45 (Plan MESABI) was indefinitely postponed. A minimum of three days' notice was to be given for execution of the order.

4 November

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Unauthorized Firing in Division Area, pointed out an increase in unauthorized and indiscriminate firing of weapons that had been noted in the Division area. The letter directed commanders of all echelons to "take immediate and positive action to discourage and prevent indiscriminate firing of weapons." Only authorized firing ranges, as cleared by this headquarters, were to be utilized for practice or test firing. The letter further directed that unauthorized firing in unit areas would be investigated by a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. A report of the investigation, including corrective action taken, was to be made to this headquarters.

5 November

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS outlined a course of instruction on the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles to be conducted for the Turkish Armed Forces Command during 12-17.

1. See Command Report, this Headquarters, for October.

November. The 35th Infantry Regiment was to furnish instructors. The TAFIC was to provide weapons, ammunition, and transportation for instructors and students. The course was conducted as planned.

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Indoctrination and Integration of Replacement Personnel, directed regimental and separate unit commanders to organize replacement training teams from their reserve battalion for the indoctrination of all replacement personnel. The teams were to be composed of combat experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

The indoctrination, which was to be held in the vicinity of the regimental or separate unit headquarters, was to last three full days. Lectures were not to exceed one hour and were to be followed by practical work. Subjects to be included were:

1. Physical conditioning (mountain climbing)
2. History of organization
3. Scouting and patrolling
4. Cold-wet weather care
5. Military security
6. Escape and evasion
7. Field fortifications
 - a. Types and use of barbed wire entanglements
 - b. Foxholes, gun emplacements, overhead cover
 - c. AT and AP mines, booby traps, trip flares, grenades
8. Enemy weapons and grenades, to include employment, functioning, and sound of weapons.
9. Chinese tactics and methods of operation

The letter set up a two-fold policy governing integration. First, replacements were to be integrated into unit to permit a minimum of ten days with the unit before being committed in combat. Second, replacements were to be integrated into their assigned company while the company or battalion was in reserve. When it was impossible to adhere to these policies, replacements were to be given a minimum of 10 days' training in rear of front line companies. They were not, in any event, to be sent on patrol or used in the attack until they had been with their assigned companies at least ten days.

6 November

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 296 directed the 35th Infantry Regiment to relieve the 7th Infantry Regiment, which had been attached for operational control from the 3d Division for Plan MESABI, on Line WYOMING (see overlay, OI No. 296, Book 4, Part 1). The relief was to begin 070630/1 November. The 7th Infantry Regiment was to move via route 3A to an assembly area in vicinity of CT4283 and revert to parent unit control upon closing the area. These instructions were executed as planned.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS ordered certain units of the Division to send a specified number of personnel to a course of instruction on organizational Ordnance supply procedures conducted by the 60th Ordnance Group. The course was originally set up by LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS, this headquarters, dated 27 October 1951 (see Book 4, Part 2, Command Report for October).

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Security of Downed Aircraft, called attention to the necessity for leaving downed aircraft undisturbed until trained salvage teams arrived. It directed personnel of this Division not to remove any part of a crashed aircraft, except to remove occupants of the plane or to clear a runway or highway. The letter also outlined steps to be taken in evacuating persons from the planes.

8 November

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Recall of Line GOLDEN Personnel, relieved all units of the Division of responsibility for securing and maintaining positions on Line GOLDEN. Division personnel engaged in such action were directed to re-join their parent organization. This letter directed the 35th Infantry Regiment to furnish one officer to supervise Korean National Police guarding Division's assigned sector on the line. The officer was to be responsible for guarding positions, barbed wire, and mine fields there. These instructions were executed as planned.

9 November

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Use of Division Light Aircraft for Administrative Purposes, stated that the limited availability of Division light aircraft required maximum coordination and economy in use. It directed commanders requiring light aircraft for administrative purposes to submit their requests

24 hours in advance to the Office of the Chief of Staff for approval. The letter prescribed a form for making requests.

LETTER, this headquarters. Subject: Voice Radio Operators Course, announced a course of instruction in voice radio operation. The course was designed to make qualified operators of men with no previous radio experience. A series of courses, each to last six days, was to begin 19 November. Unit quotas were listed with the announcement.

10 November

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS explained the growing need for communication trenches from warming bunkers to fighting bunkers and between fighting bunkers to protect men from artillery and mortar fire. It directed commanders to begin construction of such trenches to permit rapid and protected access to defensive positions even though enemy artillery preparation is falling in the area.

COMBAT BULLETIN No. 7 drew attention to new enemy tactics and information on missions of their artillery, and outlined countermeasures to combat them. A digest of this information is carried in Part VII, this report.

11 November

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 297, making reference to Operations Plan No. 32, HANGFIRE (for planning purposes only) contained the following directions:

14th Infantry Regiment and Turkish Armed Forces Command:
Reconnoiter and be prepared on order to occupy and defend Phase Line X-RAY, DALLAS, or ZEBRA in west (left) half of Division zone in event HANGFIRE was placed in effect. Also, to reconnoiter and be prepared to occupy and defend positions JOHNSON, BRAGG, PACKARD, or CHROME with one infantry battalion, reinforced with one platoon of tanks and one platoon of AAA.

27th and 35th Infantry Regiments: Reconnoiter and be prepared on order to occupy and defend Phase Lines X-RAY, DALLAS, or ZEBRA on east (right) half of Division zone in event HANGFIRE was placed in effect. Also to reconnoiter and be prepared to occupy and defend blocking positions PARRIS with an infantry battalion reinforced with tank platoon and one platoon of AAA, and blocking position SMITH with a regiment (-).

12 November

MESSAGE, relaying orders from IX Corps, announced that Operations Order No. 45 (MESABI), with changes 1 and 2, was cancelled.

16 November

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Change of Air Defense Plan, announced new designation of air raid alert conditions, as follows:

1. Blue Alert to Warning Yellow
2. Red Alert to Warning Red
3. White Alert to Warning White

18 November

LETTER, this headquarters, Subject: Apprehension of Enemy Agents, reported that prisoner of war reports indicate that enemy agents were crossing our lines to gain information and harass lines of communication. Positive measures to eliminate the passage of enemy agents were listed.

21 November

MESSAGE, relaying instructions from IX Corps, stated that the main line of resistance across the corps front would be referred to as Line MISSOURI.

28 November

STANDING OPERATION PROCEDURE FOR OPERATIONS was revised and published for compliance by all concerned. The SOP of 28 July 1951, as amended, was rescinded.

c. The Action

Following the postponement and final cancellation of Plan MESABI, which originally called for a general attack by IX Corps on 1 November, the 25th Infantry Division spent its fourth consecutive month in a stable defensive position along Line WYOMING (redesignated Line MISSOURI, 21 November).

Aggressive patrol and task force activity to maintain contact with and inflict casualties on the enemy continued. Training in all areas was continuous and progressive. A full account of the type of training and the practical "battle experience" to be derived from aggressive patrolling was given in the Command Report for October and will not be repeated here.

Two new aspects, both stemming from the tactical situation, that affected operations for November were:

1. Liquidation of Plan MESABI.
2. Tactical aspects of the Armistice negotiations.

Operation MESABI, scheduled for 1 November, was postponed 24 hours on orders

from IX Corps, 31 October. The Division remained on a 24-hour alert until 2 November. With its artillery disposed to support the offensive, logistical installations well forward, and reserve elements deployed close behind the planned line of departure, the Division was vulnerable to enemy attack. On 2 November, when the Division was ordered to be prepared to execute Plan MESABI on a 60-hour basis, the Commanding General displaced the close support artillery battalions from forward positions to more effective defensive locations. The 35th Infantry Regiment, deployed for its reserve mission in the attack, was moved to a central assembly area for greater flexibility and freedom of maneuver. Attachments and forward locations of logistical installations, however, were unchanged.

On 7 November, the 7th Infantry Regiment was relieved from attachment to the Division, requiring the 35th Infantry Regiment to return to its former positions on the east (right) of the Division sector. Division reserve was reconstituted along infiltration corridors by regimental sectors with reinforced battalion task forces in each sector.

Since Plan MESABI was not cancelled until 12 November, this deployment represented a decision by the Commanding General favoring defensive strength despite the continuous prospect of offensive action by our forces. Violent local attacks by the enemy along the entire Eighth Army front in mid November amply justified this decision.

Progress of the cease-fire talks at PANMUNJOM indicated the imminent delineation of a buffer zone based on the line of contact between friendly and enemy forces. On Eighth Army and IX Corps orders, the Division commander initiated an intensified patrol program to definitely establish this line of contact far enough in advance of presently held key positions to assure their inclusion in the United Nations zone.

On 27 November, when UN and Communist negotiators agreed upon a line of demarcation, General Mitchell, commanding the Division in the absence of General Swift, published a Letter of Instructions¹ explaining the Division's "business as usual" status. The letter, distributed down to platoon level, was in anticipation of the much publicized "cease fire line". It emphasized that hostilities had not ceased.

Upon his return to the Division, the Commanding General spelled out the

1. Book 1, this report.

tactical implications of this stage in the truce talks, emphasizing the following points:

1. Present line to be maintained.
2. No attacks except to eject the enemy from new positions threatening our present OPLR or MLR, or to rescue trapped friendly forces.
3. Daylight patrols to detect any attempt by the enemy to advance his positions and to take aggressive action whenever such encroachment should be discovered.
4. Night visiting and screening patrols to prevent surprise assault of outposts on positions on the MLR.
5. No attack by patrols against enemy positions already known and established.
6. An effort, consistent with the above, to keep casualties at a minimum.
7. Pending instructions as to the agreed line of demarcation, regimental commanders to reconnoiter tentative OPLR and MLR in conformity with an assumed line of demarcation; these positions to be prepared for occupancy when final instructions received from higher headquarters.

Patrol and task force activity for November by units of the Division follow in tabulated form. A map following the tabulation gives a clear picture of patrol objectives and line of enemy contact.

PATROL AND TASK FORCE ACTIVITY

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
1	1	F-14th	Squad	CT567425	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	2	L-14th	Squad	CT585425	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	3.	Wolfhound Raiders-- 27th Inf	Squad	CT603436	Combat	Night	No engagement
2	4	E-14th	Platoon	2500 yds fwd of out-guard at CT5542	Combat	Day	Came under s/a and AW fire from Hill 404 vic CT5644. Placed arty fire with unknown results
	5	G-14th	2 squads	CT549415	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	6-TAFC	Platoon	1500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
	10-TAFC	Plat reinf	500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
3	6	C-14th	2 squads	CT574424	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		F-14th	Platoon	2000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number en vic CT539423 employing s/a and AW. Patrol placed arty with unknown results
	7	White Raiders 14th Inf	2 squads reinf	CT570426	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	- Task Force	Plat I-27 Plat C-89 Plat B-21	4000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged en plat employing s/a from vic CT593-447. Destroyed 12 bunkers; unknown number en casualties.	
	7-TAFC	Plat reinf	1500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
	11-TAFC	Plat reinf	800 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Recd long range s/a and mortar fire from unknown number en occupying S approaches to Hill 472. Patrol silenced en fire with arty fire.	
	C-7th	Squad		Combat	Night	No engagement	
	E-7th	Squad	1000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement	
4	C-14th	Platoon	3800 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Recd s/a and mortar fire from Hill 404 vic CT56-44. Patrol placed arty fire and advanced under supporting fire of plat 14th Tk Co. Arty and tk fire destroyed 12 bunker killed 29, wounded 5.	

Map Date Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results	
4	G-14th	Platoon	3000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
8	A-27th	Squad	CT635420	Ambush	Night	No engagement	
9	Wolfhound Raiders-- 27th Inf	Platoon	Hill 400 vic CT6143	Combat	Night	At 0530 engaged 2 platoons on hill. Patrol seized hill at 0555, repulsed counterattack, and returned to friendly lines on orders. 25 en KIA, 10 WIA.	
	5-TAFC	Flat reinf	3000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
	9-TAFC	Flat reinf	2500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
	F-7th	Squad	1500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement	
5	10	B-14th	Platoon	Hill 259 vic CT5944	Combat	Day	No engagement
	11	B-14th	2 squads	CT524425	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		White Raiders-- 14th Inf	Platoon	3500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	12	F-14th	2 squads	CT574428	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	13	A-27th	2 squads	CT624425	Combat	Night	No engagement
	14	Tk-Inf	Plat I-27th Co C-89th	CT627433	Combat	Day	Engaged en plat. Placed mortar, arty, tank fire. Destroyed 12 bunkers, 1 mortar, 18 en KIA.
	15	6-TAFC	Platoon	CT526424	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number of en--casualties unknown
		10-TAFC	Platoon	1000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	16	A-7th	Squad	CT681428	Combat	Day	Engaged en squad. 1 en KIA, 1 WIA.
	17	B-7th	Squad	CT677425	Combat	Night	No engagement
	18	7th Tk Co	2 plats	CT703420	Combat	Day	Destroyed 10 bunkers, 6 en KIA, 10 WIA
6		A-14th	Platoon	3500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	19	C-14th	2 squads	CT546412	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	20	E-14th	Platoon	1200 yds fwd outguard vic CT5542	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number en using s/a and AW from Hill 404 vic CT56-44. Arty placed with unknown results

Map Date	Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
6	21	G-14th	2 squads	CT546412	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	22	Tk-Inf	Plat I-27th Co C-89th	4500 yds fwd MLR vic CT- 596448	Combat	Day	Engaged plat. Tanks destroyed 3 bunkers and silenced s/a and AW fire. Casualties unknown.
	23	2-TAFC	Plat reinf	CT499432	Combat	Day	Placed arty fire on unknown number of en. Casualties unknown.
		Battle Patrol 2nd Bn 7th Inf	Platoon	800 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
7		G-14th	Platoon	3000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Destroyed village vic CT591438; no engagement.
	25	B-14th	2 squads	CT581412	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		F-14th	Platoon	2500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	8 en KIA by arty fire
	26	C-27th	Platoon	CT640413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		1-TAFC	Platoon	2000 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		5-TAFC	Platoon	1500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
8		B-14th	Platoon	3500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	27	B-14th	2 squads	CT581413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	28	White Raiders- 14th Inf	Platoon	CT566426	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	29	G-14th	Platoon	CT5443	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number of en on Hill 528 vic CT5443 employing s/a and mortar fire. Arty placed with unknown results.
	30	F-14th	2 squads	CT553424	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	31	C-27th	3 squads	CT643423	Combat	Night	No engagement
	32	Tk-Inf	Plat I-27 Co C-89th	CT608452	Combat	Day	Placed fire on en bunkers with unknown results
		F-35th	Squad	500 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	33	Tank	Plat A-89th	CT701429	Combat	Day	Destroyed 21 bunkers
	34	3-TAFC	Platoon	CT507423	Combat	Day	Engaged squad on high ground vic CT507525. Patrol assaulted, forced en to withdraw, and seized hill vic CT507426. 6 KIA.

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
9	35	A-14th	2 squads	CT581412	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	36	G-14th	Squad	CT576416	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	37	Tk-Inf	Plat E-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	2500 yds fwd out- guard vic CT5542	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number of enemy on Hill 404 vic CT5644 for 2 hours. En casualties unknown
	38	E-14th	2 squads	CT552413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	39	C-27th	2 squads	CT643416	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	40	Tk-Inf	Plat L-27th Co C-89th	CT596465	Combat	Day	Placed tk fire on en pans. Destroyed 8, damaged 14 bunkers.
	41	G-35th	Squad reinf	CT661417	Combat	Night	No engagement
		K-35th	Squad reinf	800 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	42	2-TAFC	Plat reinf (1)	CT507424	Combat	Day	Engaged en squad, 7 en KIA, secured hill vic CT507424.
	43	2-TAFC	Plat reinf by engr (2)	CT507424	Combat	Day	Destroyed 4 bunkers hill vic CT507424.
10	44	Tk-Inf	Plat C-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	3500 yds fwd out- guard vic CT5842	Combat	Day	Tank fire destroyed 10 bunkers on Hill 387 vic CT5745.
	45	B-27th	2 squads	CT644410	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	46	E-35th	Squad	CT664423	Combat	Night	2 en KIA
	47	A-89th	Platoon	CT689432	Combat	Day	8 bunkers destroyed
		1-TAFC	Plat reinf	1200 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Placed arty fire on enemy plat on Hill 472 vic CT4943.
		5-TAFC	Plat reinf	1200 yds fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
11		B-14th	Platoon	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	Plat K-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Recd sporadic mortar and AW fire from Hill 404 (CT- 5644) and Hill 387 (CT5745) Destroyed 4 bunkers and 2 en KIA on Hill 404
		B-27th	2 squads	500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	Plat F-27th Co C-89th	2200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Destroyed 8 bunkers, 15 KIA

Map Date	Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
11	48	E-27th	Squad	CT595420	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		L-35th	Squad reinf	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		3-TAFC	Plat reinf	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged 2 squads on hill vic CT508426 forced en to withdraw.
	49	6-TAFC	Platoon	CT5142	Combat	Day	Placed arty fire with unknown results
12		L-14th	Platoon	4400 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	50	14th Tk Co	Platoon	CT565421	Combat	Day	Placed tank fire on Hill 404. 1 bunker destroyed, 4 damaged.
	51	2-TAFC	Plat reinf	CT4943	Combat	Day	Engaged 2 plats, 30 KIA, secured Hill 472.
13		A-14th	Platoon	3500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		B-27th	2 squads	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	Plat reinf	5500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged 2 plats; 15 KIA, 30 WIA
		F-35th	Squad reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	2 en WIA
		1-TAFC	Platoon	2500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
14		Tk-Inf	Plat I-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	2000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number of en on Hill 528 vic CT5443. Destroyed 8 bunkers, 3 KIA.
	52	A-27th	3 squads	CT635423	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	Plat F-27th Plat D-89th	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Destroyed 1 bunker, 4 KIA
		I-35th	Squad reinf	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	1 KIA, 1 WIA
		3-TAFC	Plat reinf	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Dispersed enemy squad
	53	6-TAFC	Plat reinf	CT525426	Combat	Day	38 KIA, 10 WIA
15	54	Tk-Inf	Plat C-27th Plat B-21st Plat C-89th	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged 2 plats Hill 454, CT6442; 12 KIA, 31 WIA.
	55	E-27th	3 squads	CT5944	Combat	Night	No engagement
		A-35th	Squad reinf	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
16	56	K-14th	Flat reinf	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged en plat on Hill 404 vic CT5644. Arty placed, 1 MG destroyed, 5 KIA
		B-27th	Squad	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	57	G-27th	Platoon	CT627427	Combat	Day	Engaged en squad vic CT627-427; 3 KIA
		K-35th	Squad	1400 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		1-TAFC	Flat reinf	3500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	58	5-TAFC	Squad reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Engaged en squad. Arty placed with unknown results.
17	59	B-14th	Platoon	CT557445	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number of enemy on Hill 682 vic CT5545. En casualties unknown.
	60	A-27th	2 squads	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	Engaged 2 en squads on Hill 454 vic CT6442. En casualties unknown.
		E-27th	Platoon	5000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		3-TAFC	Flat reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		6-TAFC	Flat reinf	900 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
18	61	C-14th	Platoon	4500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Destroyed village W of out-guard on Hill 351 vic CT5842. No engagement
		I&R-- 14th	2 squads	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Cleared 9 AT mines from valley S of Hill 598 vic CT5443 - no engagement
		I-27th	2 squads	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	62	Tk-Inf	Flat L-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	CT626436	Combat	Day	Engaged 3 en squads - 20 KIA, 16 WIA
		2-TAFC	Flat reinf	700 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		7-TAFC	Flat reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
19	63	Tk-Inf	Flat L-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	CT5443	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number enemy- 1 MG destroyed, 2 KIA
		F-27th	3 squads	2000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
19	64	Tk-Inf	3 minesweeper teams A-65th Co C-89th Tk 2 squads G-27	CT603433	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number en-- 5 emplacements destroyed, 14 KIA, 39 WIA
	65	B-35th	2 squads	CT6541	Combat	Night	Engaged en Co on Hill vic CT6541--12 KIA, 2 WIA
	66	Tk-Inf	2 plats I-35 2 plats A-89	CT6841	Combat	Day	Engaged 2 plat on Hill 538 vic CT6841--destroyed 25 bunkers, 3 MG's, 43 KIA, 38 WIA
		5-TAFC	Plat reinf	1300 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
20	67	Tk-Inf	Plat F-14th 2 plats 14th Tk Co	CT5644	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number en on Hill 682 vic CT5545. Seized Hill 404 vic CT5644. En casualties unknown
	68	Tk-Inf	3 minesweeper teams A-65th C-89th Tk Plat G-27th	CT6143	Combat	Day	Engaged en plat vic CT616437 4 KIA, 35 WIA, 2 mortars destroyed
		K-27th	2 squads	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	69	C-35th	Squad reinf	CT660415	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	70	3-TAFC	Plat reinf	CT507426	Combat	Day	Engaged reinf squad - 14 KIA
		6-TAFC	Plat reinf	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
21	71	Tk-Inf	Plat K-14th Plat 14th Tk Co	Hill 528 vic CT5443	Combat	Day	Engaged en squad - 1 KIA
		Tk-Inf	3 minesweeper teams A-65th Co C-89th Tk Plat E-27th	CT593450	Combat	Day	No engagement
		I-27th	3 squads	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	Engaged 2 squads--casualties unknown
		L-35th	2 squads reinf	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		2-TAFC	Plat reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	72	10-TAFC	Plat reinf	CT524426	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number en-- casualties unknown
22		G-14th	Platoon	3800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	3 minesweeper teams A-65th Plat C-89th 2 squads E-27	5000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement



Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
22	73	I-27th	2 squads	CT643423	Combat	Night	Engaged en squad--casualties unknown
		B-35th	2 squads	300 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	74	C-35th	Squad reinf	Hill 598 vic CT6541	Combat	Night	Engaged reinf plat. Casualties unknown.
		F-35th	2 squads	500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		1-TAFC	Plat reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		11-TAFC	Plat reing	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
23		K-14th	Platoon	1800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	3 minesweeper teams A-65th Plat C-89th Plat F-27th	3500 meters	Combat	Day	No engagement
		L-27th	2 squads	1800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
	75	E-35th	2 squads	CT690430	Combat	Night	No engagement
24		E-14th	Platoon	4200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		L-27th	2 squads	CT642420	Combat	Night	Engaged plat--casualties unknown
		Raiders 27th	Plat reinf by plat C-89th Tk	4100 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		B-35th	Squad	600 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	Destroyed 3 en pans.
		E-35th	2 squads reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		G-35th	Squad reinf	500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		2-TAFC	Plat reinf	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		10-TAFC	Plat reinf	1100 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
25	76	I-14th	Platoon	Hill 528 vic CT5443	Combat	Day	Engaged plat vic CT553-449 and squad Hill 528--en casualties unknown
	77	Tk-Inf	Plat B-27 Plat C-89	CT627434	Combat	Day	Engaged squad--casualties unknown
	78	L-27th	2 squads	CT627435	Combat	Night	Engaged squad--casualties Unknown

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
25		A-35th	Squad	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		1-TAFC	Plat reinf	1400 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		11-TAFC	Plat reinf	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
26		F-14th	Plat reinf by 2 plats Co B-89th	3700 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	Plat A-27th 2 plats Co C-89th	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		L-27th	2 squads	1800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
79		E-35th	3 squads	CT691426	Combat	Night	No engagement
80		3-TAFC	Plat reinf	CT506427	Combat	Day	Engaged en squad--casualties unknown
27	81	Tk-Inf	Plat B-14th Plat B-89th	CT540427	Combat	Day	Engaged unknown number en--casualties unknown
	82	Tk-Inf	Plat C-27th Plat C-89th	CT598442	Combat	Day	Engaged en on Hill 419 vic CT6044. Casualties unknown.
		L-27th	2 squads	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		C-35th	2 squads reinf	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		Tk-Inf	2 squads E-35th Plat 35th Tk Co	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	83	9-TAFC	Plat reinf by plat 25th Recon Co	CT525423	Combat	Day	Engaged 2 squads-- 10 KIA
28		G-14th	Plat reinf	4400 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		K-27th	Squad	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		2-TAFC	Plat reinf	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
29		A-14th	Platoon	3500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		B-27th	2 squads	3000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		K-27th	Squad	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
29		F-35th	Squad	1100 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		10-TAFC	Plat reinf	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
30		E-14th	Platoon	3300 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		A-27th	Platoon	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		K-27th	Squad	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		G-35th	Squad	1200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		1-TAFC	Plat reinf	1500 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement

NOTE: Numbers indicate Patrols described in preceding tabulation.

PATROL AND TASK FORCE ACTIVITY



d. Communications

During November the Division Signal Office and the 25th Signal Company were charged with the responsibility of installing, operating and maintaining the following means of communications for the 25th Infantry Division:

- (1) Telephone circuits to all Divisional units
- (2) Teletype circuits to IX Corps
- (3) Message Center deliveries to all Divisional units
- (4) Radio Nets-as follows:
 - (a) Command Net #1 AM (CW only)
 - (b) Command Net #2 AM (CW or voice)
 - (c) Command Net #3 FM (voice only)

1 See Radio circuits attached as inclosures 3, 8, 14, 20, 26.¹

(5) V.H.F.

Division Signal Office and 25th Signal Company continued to operate, maintain, and improve all communications facilities at Division Main CP, Chipori, Korea, and Division Tac CP, vicinity CT5430.

25th Division Signal Specialist School began a new six day course in Voice Radio Operation. This course is designed to make qualified voice radio operators of men with no radio communications experience.

Signal Company CP was moved from location vicinity CT5632 to Chipori, Korea, CT524224.

Winterization for all Signal Installations was provided.

The problems and solution of a Defensive Wire Communications Network were presented at Orange Test on 19 November 1951, by Lt Col George D. Shaffer, Division Signal Officer, in an orientation course for all Divisional, Regimental, and Battalion Communication Officers. An "SOP for Defensive Wire Network", prepared by the Division Signal Office, was distributed to all present. An additional conference was conducted for TAFC personnel by Major Jack N. Cole, Assistant Division Signal Officer. Officers and construction NCO's of 25th Signal Company were oriented by the DSO.

During November the Photo Section exposed 645 R.I.O. shots and developed and printed 5,309 prints. Fourteen film packs of combat photographs were forwarded to

1. Book 15, supporting documents, this report.

EUSAK. Fifty-seven sheets of color film were developed.

25th Signal Company recovered, rehabilitated, and salvaged 892 miles of wire W-130, W-110, W-190 and W-143.

Communication Center statistics are as outlined below for November 1951:

(1) Number of messenger runs made	233
(2) Number of miles traveled by messenger	6,384
(3) Total number of messages handled	3,079
(4) Total outgoing code groups	34,053
(5) Total incoming code groups	137,888
(6) Total code groups handled in and out	171,941
(7) Total clear text messages	2,372

e. Supporting Arms

No major defensive or offensive actions were undertaken in November. The changes in disposition of the artillery during the month were made as a result of the redistribution of force which took place when Operation MESABI was postponed and later cancelled.

On 1 November the Turkish Artillery Battalion displaced to a new position in the vicinity of CT5543. On 6 November the 955th FA Bn (155mm How) was released from 25th Infantry Division control and attached to I Corps. On 7 November, the 7th Infantry Regiment was relieved on Line MISSOURI by the 35th Infantry Regiment and reverted to control of its parent unit. The 64th FA Bn, in direct support of the 35th Infantry Regiment occupied positions in the vicinity of CT6635. The 15th FA Bn reverted in place to control of the 92nd AFA Battalion Group (15th FA), on 8 November. The 92nd AFA Bn Group retained the mission of G/S IX Corps, reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division and the 2nd ROK Division. The 8th FA Bn occupied positions in vicinity CT6237 on 7 November 1951.

The 159th FA Bn completed conversion from 105mm How to 155mm How on 31 October 1951 and was assigned to 8th Army effective 10 November 1951. On 25 November the 159th FA Bn was released from 25th Infantry Division control and attached to I Corps.

"C" Battery, 92nd AFA Bn occupied position in the vicinity of CT6235 on 26 November. This battery displaced to partially compensate for the fire capabili-

ties lost when the 159th FA Bn left the Division.

The 21st AAA (AW) Battalion, pursuant to authority contained in letter, Department of the Army, AGAO-I 322 (26 September) G-1 M, dated 10 October 1951, subject "Change of Status of Certain Units", was assigned as an organic unit of the 25th Infantry Division effective 10 November 1951. During November the battalion conducted field firing at the EUSAK AA range at INCHON. The Battalion displaced from CT5121 to CT6033 on 23 November 1951 to enable it to carry out its mission of Rear Area Defense Command (RADC) more effectively.

One battery each from the 987th AFA Bn and 69th FA Bn and two batteries from the 90th FA Bn displaced to forward positions each day to engage targets at longer range, to cover patrols and to give the firing batteries training in displacing from and occupying positions. Other training conducted during November included firing of small arms and rocket launchers under battalion control.

Two hundred rounds of propaganda leaflets #200, Chinese, were fired at the enemy in the Division Sector on 11 November 1951 in coordination with a psychological warfare broadcast. Ten rounds of propaganda leaflet (wet and cold) were fired at the GCF forces in the 14th Infantry Regimental sector on 20 November, following a psychological warfare broadcast.

The 250th Ordnance Ballistics Technical Service Detachment completed calibration tests on all howitzers of the Division Artillery during the first part of November. Other activities during November consisted of routine missions in support of the Division MLR. Night harassing fires amounted to approximately 1600 rounds for the period 1700-0600 hours daily. These fires were intensified just after dusk each evening, around midnight and before dawn as a result of PW information which indicated that the enemy was outside of his field fortifications at these times.

Some difficulty in the operation of liaison planes was encountered on clear, cold mornings. The planes were unable to take off because of frosted wings. This difficulty was partially overcome through use of wing covers improvised from shelter halves. One set of tailored wing covers obtained from 8th Army Quartermaster solved the frost problem and wing covers in the process of manufacture

for all the Division light planes. One light plane belonging to the Turkish Artillery Battalion was crash landed without casualties at CT5147 and suffered damage to one wing.

Artillery fires during the periods of poor visibility are still of doubtful accuracy because of a lack of metro messages. A critical requirement exists for metro information during periods of poor visibility.

At the end of the period, Division Artillery continues in support of Line MISSOURI. Ammunition expenditures have been reduced to 1/3 of the Available Supply Rate (ASR) for periods of poor visibility and 1/2 of the ASR for periods of good visibility. The ASR's at present are 45 rounds/105mm How/Day. 35 rounds/155mm How/Day. 50 rounds/155mm Gun/Day and 45 rounds/8 inch How/Day. The reduced rates are a guide only to assist in increasing ammunition stocks for the resumption of offensive action in the event the Armistice negotiations fail. Ammunition is not limited on remunerative targets or fires in support of the Infantry.

Part III

Intelligence

a. Elements in Contact

During the month of November the 25th Infantry Division maintained continuous contact with the 26th CCF Army composed of the 76th, 77th and 78th Divisions. The strength of the 26th CCF Army was estimated initially at 17,600 men. Continuing reports received indicated a flow of replacements to enemy units. Accordingly, the estimated strength at the end of November was 19,500. Reports of prisoners indicated that some of the replacements had received little training in tactics and weapons. The enemy's tenacious defense of well constructed positions against the probes of friendly patrols, however, was evidence that his state of preparedness was adequate to support his defensive role. There were no indications of a critical shortage of supplies. The enemy issued winter clothing to his troops and the supply of food and ammunition appeared to be adequate. In view of these factors and the low rate of desertion, the enemy's combat efficiency was considered excellent and his morale good.

b. Disposition of Enemy Units

During early and mid-November, elements of the 77th and 78th Divisions maintained contact with the 25th Infantry Division. The 232nd Regiment, 78th Division was deployed between the CT 50 - 57 N-S grid lines. Two battalions of the Special Duty Regiment, 26th CCF Army, were deployed between the CT 59 - 64 N-S grid lines. Two battalions of the 230th Regiment, 77th Division, were identified as being deployed between the CT 64 - 69 N-S grid lines.

With these units identified in contact and the organization of the 26th CCF Army known, the enemy's reserves, capable of intervention were determined. The entire 76th Division was capable of intervention in any location of the enemy's choosing. The 233d and 234th Regiments, 78th Division were capable of intervention in the 78th Division zone. One battalion of the Special Duty Regiment, 26th Army, and one battalion of the 230th Regiment, 77th Division, were capable of intervention within respective zones. The 229th Regiment, 77th Division, was in division reserve and the 231st Regiment was committed on the extreme right flank of the 25th Infantry Division, in contact with the 2nd ROK Division.

With the capture of 2 PaW on 27 November, identifying the 3d Battalion, 228th Regiment, 76th Division, the relief of the 232d Regiment, 78th Division, was tentatively accepted. The enemy's disposition in the western section of the 25th Division front was changed to conform with the tentative acceptance of this relief, to show the 228th Regiment, 76th Division, deployed between the CT 50 - 57 N-S grid lines.

The 77th and 78th Divisions of the 26th CCF Army have been in contact since on or about 12 June. The 78th Division has suffered casualties far more heavily than has the 77th Division and that enemy unit has been well in need of a relief. It is highly probable, in view of the relief of the 232d Regiment by the 228th Regiment, that the enemy has also effected a relief of the entire 78th Division by the 76th Division.

The enemy did not employ armor, air or special weapons against the Division during November. His artillery was estimated at 40 pieces and was generally disposed in depth. His artillery and mortar fires were primarily harassing in nature, or were placed in apparently preplanned concentrations on the routes of friendly patrols.

c. Nature and Effectiveness of Enemy Defenses

Primary enemy defenses in the Division zone were a system of field fortifications consisting of well constructed bunkers mutually supporting in most instances, and connected by communications trenches. The bunkers were normally covered with several layers of logs and dirt, and were extremely difficult to destroy with artillery fire. In several cases, eight-inch artillery pieces were used to destroy bunkers and a direct hit was necessary. The enemy has organized the dominating terrain features surrounding the hill masses OSONG-SAN, CT6445, and SOBANG-SAN, CT5345, and on the hill mass extending east from the town of PYONGGANG, CT5152. Although the fortifications around SOBANG-SAN and OSANG-SAN have been constantly pounded by artillery and air, the enemy has been continually repairing damaged bunkers and has been observed building new ones as well. From these fortifications the enemy has stubbornly resisted efforts of patrols to penetrate his forward positions, and has launched several local attacks from those positions, returning to them usually before dawn.

The enemy has not depended upon natural obstacles in the Division zone, but has made extensive use of box type anti-tank mines, which he has emplaced in virtually every logical avenue of approach for tanks. No report was made of the enemy using demolitions as part of his defenses during the period. He has, however, boobytrapped some abandoned bunkers, using hand grenades and 60mm mortar shells.

d. Enemy Artillery

During the month of November the Division Artillery was positioned to support the defense of Line MISSOURI with emphasis on counterbattery - counter mortar programs.

Air OP's continued to be the best source of information on enemy batteries as well as general enemy activity. Actual sightings of enemy batteries by Air OP's was aided by counterfire and counter mortar radar plots. Crater analysis and shelling reports furnished considerable information as to location of artillery areas and caliber of artillery being used by the CCF.

The enemy continued to place the bulk of his artillery with the exception of light mountain guns, north of the 50 E-W grid line. Two light artillery pieces were located and destroyed in positions in the CT6144 and CT6843 grid squares approximately 3500 and 1500 yards respectively from the MLR. In order to provide coverage of the artillery areas located near the 50 E-W line, one or two batteries of the 90th FA Bn occupied daytime positions well forward immediately behind the MLR.

During the period the enemy displayed a tendency to return his artillery to old positions that had been destroyed by our counterbattery fire. This was not caused by limited good artillery positions in as much as he continued to place his pieces in some positions on the crests of hills.

Enemy artillery was difficult to locate unless active, because of the type of positions constructed. Most positions are well dug in and covered with logs and earth, making it impossible to determine the presence of artillery unless it is active. Active batteries were attacked first with area fire and then with precision destruction on individual pieces using attached or reinforcing heavy artillery. On two occasions the enemy removed one artillery piece from position while precision destruction was being conducted on another piece of the battery.

No counterbattery missions were conducted by enemy artillery during the month. Most enemy shellings appeared to be unobserved harassing type using one or two guns. Effective observed fires were placed on friendly patrols. On one occasion time fire was used by enemy artillery on one of our tank-supported patrols.

Determination of the location of enemy active mortars was very unsatisfactory. Air OP's have proved to be not very effective at picking up mortar locations. Countermortar Radar Detachments provided the best information on mortar locations but at best are poorly equipped. These Radar Detachments were handicapped by frequent mechanical failures.

Enemy artillery identified during the period were 75mm, 76mm, and 105mm weapons. Enemy mortars identified were 60mm, 82mm and a few 120mm.

Part IV

Personnel

a. Division and Unit Staff Assignments ¹

Major Joseph R. Kinzie announced as TI&E Officer vice Major Max K. Johnson, emergency leave, 1 November 1951.

Captain Frank F. Rathbun announced as Historian vice Major Donald J. Baker, rotated, 1 November 1951.

Captain William H. Bellingham announced as S1, 27th Inf Regt vice Major Edgar N. Glotsbach, rotated, 3 November 1951.

Captain William C. Coggins Jr. announced as S4, 35th Inf Regt vice Major Robert R. Gregorin, rotated, 3 November 1951.

Captain Kenneth M. Kone announced as S1, 35th Inf Regt vice Major Richard F. Heske, rotated, 3 November 1951.

Major Henry D. Walding announced as S3, 89th Tank Bn vice Major Raymond M. Biggsby, rotated, 4 November 1951.

Major Arnold H. Aschenbeck announced as S4, Hq Div Arty vice Major Raymond Driskill, rotated, 4 November 1951.

Lt Col Ralph I. Williams announced as S3, Div Arty vice Lt Col Thomas E. Watson Jr., rotated, 4 November 1951.

Captain Mack M. George announced as Temp S3, 35th Inf Regt vice Captain Martin P. Alexander, rotated, 12 November 1951.

William F. Martin announced as S1, 64th FA vice Captain Edgar L. Fazenbaker, rotated, 13 November 1951.

Captain John P. Valentine announced as Ex Off Med Bn vice Major Richard T. Weatherall, rotated, 26 November 1951.

Major Edward F. Counts Jr., announced as Div Surgeon vice Lt Col Richard H. Ross, rotated, 26 November 1951.

Major Robert G. Byrne announced as S3, 27th Inf Regt vice Captain Norman H. Wampler, rotated, 28 November 1951.

Captain James M. Vail announced as S4, 27th Inf Regt vice Major Robert D. Glaser, rotated, 3 November 1951.

1. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.

b. Strength¹

Strengths for the month were as follows:

	<u>Beginning of Period</u>		<u>End of Period</u>	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
1. US Troops				
25th Inf Div	18,176	21,888	18,176	20,361
2. United Nations				
TAFIC	5,105	4,919	5,105	6,728
BOK	658			641

c. Replacement and Rotation²

A total of 55 officers and 98 enlisted men were received during the month.

The Division maintained its required 10 percent overstrength during the month.

The rotation criteria established by Headquarters Eighth Army, provided eligibility for those officers having 45 constructive months service or more and those enlisted men with 35 constructive months service or more. However, officers who were surplus to the command were reported to Headquarters Eighth Army, who granted authority to rotate those officers reported with 40 constructive months service or more.

Policy was received through channels from Department of Army, and carried out by this command to rotate, insofar as practical, all personnel eligible for rotation who had spent the winter of 1950-51 in Korea.

Each organization was directed to rotate two-thirds of ERC personnel present. It was also mandatory to return all enlisted men to the zone of interior 30 days in advance of extended date of expiration of term of service.

d. Discipline³

During the period, the following number of cases were tried by courts-martial in this command.

1. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.
2. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.
3. For further details, see Book 11, supporting documents, this report.

<u>Type of Court-Martial</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
1. General	8
2. Special	13
3. Summary	41

Of the cases mentioned above, 69.1 percent were results of violations of Article 92 (namely: speeding and willful disobedience) and 24.5 percent of violations of Article 86 (AWOL), while the remaining cases were variations of violations of Article 134, the general article which covers offenses not listed by the other articles under the Code.

During the period nine cases were processed by this section and forwarded to The Judge Advocate General for final appellate review. The amount processed and forwarded during the preceding calendar month was twenty-one.

Twenty-seven cases having been forwarded to The Judge Advocate General for final appellate review were held legally sufficient, however, the sentences in respect to confinement were in some cases reduced where it seemed apparent that the accused might be of some future service to the Army.

A consolidation of activities reported by the Office of the Provost Marshal¹ follows:

Vehicles Reported Missing	7
Vehicles Reported Recovered	6
Accidents Investigated	25
Stragglers	5
POWs handled and processed	16
AWOL's	1
CAC & CIC prisoners handled	226

e. Burial and Graves Registration

The Division Quartermaster transferred the bodies of 6 enlisted men to the 293d Graves Registration Unit during November.

f. Civil Assistance²

The main effort of the Civil Assistance Section was directed toward implementing the policy introduced by EUSAK on 6 June 1951, which prohibits civilians to

1. For further details, see Book 18, supporting documents, this report.
2. For further details, see Book 17, supporting documents, this report.

move north of EW grid line CS97 or to remain in the Division area between this grid line and the present MLR.

The Refugee Collecting Point, located at UNCHON-NI, CT492153, and operated under the supervision of the Division Civil Assistance Officer, handled the processing of all refugees found within the Division boundaries. Processing included CIC screening, DDT dusting, administering cholera and typhus inoculations and furnishing immunization records, medical care of sick and injured, and transporting to Corps Collecting Point for evacuation to areas specified by UNGAC for relocation. All refugees evacuated during 1-28 November were moved via RTO to PYONGTAEK. On 28 November the UNGAC relocation center was moved to SACHON, which is a 4-day journey by rail from the present loading point. This has necessitated the preparation and issue of 4-day rice ration to each refugee prior to removal from the Division Refugee Collecting Point.

The greater number of those persons evacuated through refugee channels had been previously evacuated from the Division zone. The number of persons coming through the lines from North Korea has continued to decline. There has been a decline in total number of refugees handled since last report. This is attributed to the lowering temperature, and it is expected that movement from rear areas will further decrease as the weather grows colder.

A program to immunize all indigenous civilian labor and KSC personnel was completed on 20 November 1951. Each employee was administered two doses each of cholera and typhus vaccine and was furnished an immunization record.

Korean service Corps was maintained at near full strength during the month. Indigenous labor other than KSC was reduced from a strength of 2,335 to 1,272.

The Division Korean Clearing Station, staffed by indigenous professional personnel and supervised by Civil Assistance Officer at the Refugee Collecting Point, aided in the immunization program mentioned above, and administered to the medical needs of civilians processed through Civil Assistance Channels. Number of patients treated at the Clearing Station has declined sharply since last report.

A summary of Civil Assistance activities follows:

Refugees screened	1,077
Refugees evacuated from Division zone	408

Refugee dead buried	0
CCF dead buried	0
NK dead buried	0
Orphans evacuated	0
Communist suspects turned over to CIC	5
Communist suspects interrogated	23
Indigenous laborers hired	0
Indigenous laborers handled	578
Patients treated	358
Civilian	358
KSC	0
Patients evacuated to hospital	3
Civilian	2
KSC	1
Immunizations:	
Cholera	6,418
Typhus	6,418
Smallpox	51
Typhoid	0
Dusted with DDT powder	654
Prostitutes evacuated to SEOUL Met. Police	24
Shoeshine boys evacuated to SEOUL Met. Police	27

g. Morale and Personnel Service¹

Four groups of 500 persons each spent five days' leave in Japan on Rest and Recuperation. A special R and R group in addition to those groups departed for Japan on 30 November.

The following tabulation gives the awards and decorations for the period and cumulative totals:

	November	Cumulative
Congressional Medal of Honor	0	6
Distinguished Service Cross	0	87
Silver Star	25	112
Legion of Merit	0	40
Distinguished Flying Cross	0	194
Soldier's Medal	0	26
Bronze Star Medal	68	2,331
Air Medal	18	830

1. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.

The Division Chaplain¹ conducted 42 Catholic Masses for the personnel of the Division and 30 Rosary Devotions. Protestant Chaplains assigned to Division Headquarters conducted 32 Protestant services. Jewish services were conducted at Division Headquarters by a visiting chaplain from IX Corps. In addition, Division Chaplains made 106 visits to various units of the Division.

Fifteen Chaplains, other than the two in Division Headquarters were serving in other units of the Division. Tabulation of total religious services follows:

Protestant Sunday Services	142
Protestant Weekday Services	46
Catholic Sunday Masses	67
Catholic Weekday Masses	120
Jewish Services	4

Although the Turkish troops have two Mohammedan Chaplains assigned to them, Chaplains of the Division provided services for the Christians among them.

The American Red Cross Field Director reported that assistance was given to 346 servicemen on such matters as emergency leave, health and welfare reports, and allotment problems. Counseling service was given to an additional 190 men. The following comfort and welfare items were distributed throughout the Division:

Books, pocket size	950	Razors	115
Magazines	500	Wash cloths	190
Razor blades, pkgs	400	Tooth brushes	450
Envelopes	50,000	Pocket combs	400
Stationery	70,000	Sewing kits	40
Corn cob pipes	240	Cards, decks	190

The Public Information Office reported November as the most productive month in its history. A total of 1,881 stories were sent for release to hometown newspapers throughout the United States. This is almost double the number of releases for any previous month and is believed to be a record for Eighth Army. In addition, 63 feature articles were sent to Army Times and Stars and Stripes.

The expected date of publication of the unofficial history of the 25th Infantry Division, now in the hands of the printer in Japan, is February 1952. Some delay is being caused by the additional number of readings of galley proofs that

1. For further details, see Book 7, supporting documents, this report.

is required, owing to the inability of Japanese typesetters to understand English.

h. Medical Services¹

Eighteen helicopter evacuations of seriously wounded patients were made from field medical installations. These patients were battle casualties from action ensued during Division patrol activities in the vicinity of the KUMHWA-CHORWON area. The Division was supported by IX Corps on helicopter evacuations.

One platoon of the 37th Preventive Medicine Company remained attached. The team gave lectures and demonstrations involving the use of DDT and rodenticides. They prepared and distributed rodent bait to the rodent control teams of all Divisional units.

Colonel Peterson, the Far East Command Psychiatrist, visited this Division and conferred with the Division Psychiatrist. He indicated that the 25th Infantry Division had the lowest rate of psychiatric cases in EUSAK.

A command letter was initiated by the Surgeon's Office on the "Prevention of Carbon Monoxide Poisoning." This was deemed necessary because several cases of carbon monoxide poisoning had been reported. These cases were caused from exhaust fumes from petroleum burning engines and stoves where there was an absence of adequate ventilation.

Two representatives of the 6th Army Medical Depot, at YONGDONG-PO, visited this office to check on the adequacy of medical supplies being received by the Division. They were informed that no complaints had been received from Division medical installations or medical supply and that all comments from battalion and regimental surgeons had been favorable. They also inquired about the service of the Mobile Optical units that are available to the Division. As far as can be determined, all cases referred to the units have been promptly and efficiently taken care of.

The Division Surgeon had a conference with the Division Commander regarding the control of rodents in the Division area. This conference was prompted by the marked increase in the number of medical evacuations resulting from fevers attributed to rodent carriers. The conference was completely successful and the following program was published as a command letter thus ensuring the support of all commanders:

1. For further details, see Book 16, supporting documents, this report.

a. A course of instruction in rodent control procedure was conducted under the direction of the Division Surgeon at 1330 hours, 12 November 1951, at the 65th Engineer Battalion CP. Instructions were conducted by members of the Division Preventive Medicine Detachment.

b. A rodent control team consisting of one officer and two non-commissioned officers was designated by each regiment, each infantry battalion, each separate battalion and company. These teams attended the course of instruction that was held 12 November 1951.

c. Upon completion of this course of instruction (1 hour), each team was responsible for instructing subordinate units in rodent control. These teams were further required to inspect all tactical and administrative areas continually to recommend corrective action and to determine effectiveness of the program. Units were provided all assistance possible to ensure application of rodenticides as early as possible.

Physical examinations for officers and warrant officers, as required by current directives were begun in this Division on 15 November 1951. A central examining point was established at the Clearing Company, 25th Medical Battalion, with sufficient equipment and personnel to examine twenty-five officers an hour. The examinations are now about 90% complete.

A wet-cold injury survey team consisting of four officers arrived in the Division for the purpose of interviewing 1,000 men and drawing 200 blood samples for study. Prepared questionnaires were used by the team to get information necessary for cold injury research.

The Division Preventive Medicine Officer attended a meeting of the Preventive Medicine Section EUSAK on 29 November. At this time, a discussion was held of the various problems arising at Division level, including wet-cold injuries, epidemic hemorrhagic fever, rodent and louse control, sanitation in cold weather, and improvement of the method of reporting undue incidence of disease.

The following is a summary of evacuations and hospitalizations occurring during the month. The cumulative figure reflects hospitalizations and evacuations since the beginning of the Korean campaign to 1800 hours 30 November 1951. These figures were compiled from the A & D sheets of the Division clearing company.

	November	Cumulative
Remaining from last report	53	
Admitted to clearing stations	1,071	33,654
Evacuated from clearing stations	708	23,876
Returned to duty	376	9,700
Deaths at clearing stations	1	39
Remaining at clearing stations		39

The Division surgeon maintained close liaison with all unit surgeons and made periodic visits to all medical installations within the Division. He assisted unit surgeons with their immediate problems.

The major immunization program put into effect on 19 October 1951 has been completed. Routine immunizations for replacements continue.

During the month of November, 41 patients were evacuated from Division Clearing Stations with a tentative diagnosis of Epidemic Hemorrhagic fever. On the basis of past experience, there is usually a lag of several weeks before actual confirmation of the cases comes from rear echelon installations. Thus far, 20 of the November cases have been confirmed by further study at such installations and it is to be expected that more of the cases will be confirmed by subsequent information.

A breakdown of cases by week in November indicates a steady decrease in the incidence of the disease. There were 13 cases reported the first week of the month, 12 cases the second week, 10 the third week, and 6 the fourth week. This indicates that the disease had already reached its peak by the first week of the month.

To date the 25th Infantry Division has had 68 confirmed cases of Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever and an additional 33 patients who have been evacuated from the Division Clearing Stations with a diagnosis of Medical observation for Hemorrhagic Fever.

Current information concerning Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever tends to substantiate the previous impression that the disease is identical with that described by the Japanese as "Songo" or "Manchurian" Fever. From their descriptions, it is to be expected that the disease would reach its highest incidence during October and November, and it is hoped, from current trends, that the incidence will decrease

even more markedly during subsequent weeks.

As regards to the etiology of Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever the same rodents and mites incriminated by the Japanese as the carriers of the disease have been found in the area. It is hoped that the rodent control program now in effect has had, and will continue to have, a favorable effect on the disease incidence.

Suppressive drug therapy with chloroquine continued being administered bi-monthly for malaria control. Only 8 new cases were reported during November.

There were six cases of frostbite during the month. Five of these were first degree and occurred during the last week of November. Most of these were attributed to inadequacy of winter clothing issued at that time. Since then, all troops have been issued adequate amounts of winter clothing. In addition, a clothing exchange system has been set up by Division Quartermaster to insure that each soldier is equipped with the proper size of each item of clothing. A questionnaire form has been prepared which is to be completed on all cases of wet-cold injuries. It is hoped that information derived from the questionnaires will enable the easy recognition of inadequacies in the cold weather equipment of training of troops.

The incidence of gastrointestinal diseases during the month was negligible. Only 13 cases were reported for the entire Division.

There was an increase in the incidence of upper respiratory diseases during the month, but not in alarming proportions. It was the type of gradual rise which is bound to occur at this time of the year. Forty-nine upper respiratory infections were severe enough to warrant hospitalization at the clearing stations.

Eleven cases of infectious hepatitis were reported in the Division. Six of these occurred during the first week, three during the second week, and only one each in the last two weeks of the month.

A breakdown of the incidence of venereal disease follows:

Syphilis	Gonorrhea	Chancroid
28	87	22

The health of the command is considered excellent.

For a complete breakdown of all diseases, see inclosure 4, Book 16, this report.

A total of 11,737 outpatient treatments were administered by all medical units of the Division.

Oral hygiene in the command is good. There were 2,525 admissions, 3,008 dental operations, 2,419 sittings, 857 fillings, 639 extractions, 17 full dentures, 58 partial dentures, 434 dentures repaired.

The following is a breakdown of battle casualties occurring during the month. These figures do not include missing in action, killed in action, or casualties returned to duty from medical installations below the organic level of the Division clearing company. Figures were compiled from the daily A & D sheets of the Division clearing company.

UNIT	NOVEMBER
Assigned	
14th Infantry Regt	22
27th Infantry Regt	61
35th Infantry Regt	40
65th Engr C Bn	5
89th Tank Bn	9
64th FA Bn	1
90th FA Bn	1
159th FA Bn	1
Sub Total	140
Attached	
15th FA Bn, 3rd Div	1
1st FOB	3
1st TAFC	1
7th Inf Regt, 3rd Div	3
Sub Total	8
Total	148

A total of 85 patients were administered psychiatric consultation during the month.

Part V

Logistics

a. Logistical Situation

On 1 November 1951 the 25th Infantry Division and attached units were in defense positions along a line from CT479415 on the left northeast to CT699423 on the right with the Command Post located at CHIPO-RI (CT521221). The Division Quartermaster and Quartermaster Class I and III supply point were located vicinity CT527244 with quartermaster Class II and IV supply point located vicinity ORYUDONG (CS100502). The 725th Ordnance Company with a detachment of the 21st Ordnance MM Company in support was located vicinity CT478098. The Division Class V dump was located at ASP #56 vicinity ULJONGBU with ASP #56-A, for artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition, located vicinity CT533271. The main supply route for the Division remained route 3 with 3a being used as the alternate main supply route.

Supply for the most part was very good with the exception of vehicle parts, Quartermaster expendable items, stove parts, and sand bags. During the period special emphasis was placed on the issuance of remaining items of phase III winter clothing, tentage and stoves for winter housing.

By the end of the period, issue of remaining winter clothing items had been completed to personnel of front line units with the exception of those personnel requiring special sizes or fittings. To equip the front line personnel with shoe pacs, it became necessary to withdraw certain sizes from service units. To facilitate the fitting and exchange of winter clothing items, an advance Class II and IV supply point was opened at the Division Quartermaster Class I and III supply point (CT527244). This supply point was stocked with winter clothing items of various sizes and became the Division Collecting and Exchange point for these items. In the latter stages of completion of issue, personnel were brought to this exchange point for fitting. It is anticipated that the arrival early in December of the remaining needed sizes of shoe pac by airlift from Japan will permit the re-issue of withdrawn items to service units which will complete the issue to all personnel.

During the month 200 tents, hexagonal and 200 stoves, Yukon were issued to units. Tent winterization kits for tents, squad, were received and issued to

each regiment for use by reserve battalions.

At the end of the month a total of 2,882 stoves, tent had been issued on the basis of two each for operational squad tents and one each for tents used as quarters and for other type tents. Upon receipt of burners for stoves, tent, now on hand at Quartermaster II and IV, it is contemplated that the issue of the additional stoves will be made.

Early in the month a temporary shortage developed in the supply of diesel oil. The result was use of a mixture of gasoline and diesel oil as fuel for tent stoves. After an operating level had been established for the requirements of diesel oil, this situation was alleviated.

To shorten the haul and to facilitate the issuance of fortification materials, a forward engineer dump was opened vicinity CP565350. This dump was initially stocked with 3,500 rolls of barbed wire with the appropriate number of pickets and all the sand bags and trip flares in stock. This dump since then has stocked items as determined by the tactical situation.

The 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 955th Field Artillery Battalion were released from operational control and Class I, III and V support this Division during the month. One hundred and fifty organic cargo vehicles of this Division were used to move these units to their new locations.

Camouflage clothing for winter operation (overwhites) was received by Division Quartermaster and a partial issue was made to Divisional units. Issue will be completed early in December.

Distinctive winter clothing for Korean Service Corps personnel did not arrive from the manufacturers in Japan during the month as anticipated, and authority was granted by EUSAK for the issuance of Class "X" clothing in lieu. No Class "X" clothing was available for issue by the Division Quartermaster and a limited quantity was obtained from the EUSAK Supply Point number 31 at SEOUL.

Extra security measures were taken by all service installations during the month because of the reported increase in guerrilla activities in certain sectors of the Division area.

The traditional Thanksgiving dinner was served to all Divisional troops. Paper plates and cups for this meal were procured in Japan and distributed by the Division Quartermaster.

The Division gasoline (MOGAS) reserve became dangerously low on 28 November because of increased consumption and the failure of daily train to arrive at railhead. By late afternoon, arrangements were made to draw from Army reserve at UIJONGBU and all available organic transportation was diverted to Class III hauling. By drawing from Army reserve and upon arrival of daily train on 29 November, the Divisional reserve was brought back up to the authorized two days' supply. To insure that the reserve will not be depleted again, arrangements were made with G-4, IX Corps to furnish transportation for Class III hauling thereby leaving organic division transportation available for Class I movement. Reason for requesting Corps aid on transportation is the length of haul (7 1/2 miles round trip) from railhead to Division QM Class I and III distribution point.

In an effort to shorten the distance from railhead to division distribution points, a survey was made to determine the feasibility of moving the Division Class I & III railhead from UIJONGBU (CS285785) to CHORWON (CT430350). Road net to this location is in good shape but it was recommended that railhead not be moved because the CHORWON area can still be reached by enemy artillery.

b. Supply

The average supported strength for the Division during the month of November was 32,000 military and 8,000 civilians. Of these 8,000 civilians, about 3,700 are Korean Service Corps personnel assigned as a regiment to a Korean National Guard Division. These Korean Service Corps personnel were used as carriers for front line units.

Class I supply level is set at 1 day's supply in hands of troops of either "A" or "B" (operational) rations and one-half day's supply in hands of troops of either "C" or "5 in 1" (combat) rations. One day's supply of "B" rations and 1 day's supply of "C" rations are maintained in reserve at the Division supply dump.

Class II supply level is 15 days' supply in hands of troops for expendables and 7 days' supply of other items in hands of troops.

Class III supply level is 1 day's supply in hands of troops with 2 days' supply maintained in Division dump.

Class IV QM levels are 15 days' supply in hands of troops for expendables and 7 days' supply of all others. Engineer Class IV is on an "as required basis."

Class V level is one basic load plus an expected day's rate of fire in hands of troops with a 5 days' supply maintained in Army Supply dumps.

The most critical items of supply are vehicle parts, Quartermaster expendable items, stove parts, and sandbags.

There was \$2,014.31 spent on local procurement during the month of November.

c. Captured Enemy Materiel

During the month the following enemy materiel was captured, processed and evacuated to the EUSAK Salvage Collecting Point:

3 each rifle, automatic, Czechoslovakian

2 each rifle, 31 caliber, Russian

d. Transportation

1,260 truck loads of Quartermaster Class I and 2,040 loads of Quartermaster Class III were moved from the UIJONGBU railhead to Division Distribution points.

QM II and IV off-loaded thirty-four military transporters at the Class II and IV railhead at YONGDUNG-PO.

There was no change in the main supply route of the 25th Division.

Eighteen hundred replacements arrived at port of INCHON for the Turkish Armed Forces Command. These replacements were moved from INCHON to UIJONGBU by rail and from UIJONGBU to the TAFC area by motor convoy.

The first snow of the winter season fell on 25 November. Some slowdown in traffic was experienced but no roads were closed.

A vehicle regulating point was established at UIJONGBU to insure that all Division vehicles that travel north from UIJONGBU are carrying full loads. If necessary, vehicles are diverted to Class I and III railhead or to other pick-up points to achieve maximum utilization of vehicle on each trip.

e. Engineer Service¹

The S-4 Section of the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion remained in the same location for the entire month, vicinity CT530026. The Bridge Platoon continued to support the supply section with mess and transportation. Aside from issuing a nominal supply of fortification materials for all assigned and attached units,

1. Command Report, 65th Engr C Bn, November 1951.

the major effort was to provide materials for winterizing tents, bunkers, gun emplacements, and foxholes. In order to better support proposed operations with fortification and bridging materials, a forward dump was established in the vicinity of CT327556. As in previous months, the Division was assigned to I Corps for logistic support. For particular operations, IX Corps Engineers Section gave considerable assistance for engineer supply. The IX Corps Engineer Dump at Kapyong maintains a limited stock of a wide variety of items. They are able to give assistance in almost any emergency. The I Corps Dump stocks bridging and fortifications only. The average number of engineer troops supported with all classes of supply was approximately 1150. The entire strength supported with Class II and IV engineer supplies was approximately 34,000, including over 6,000 members of the Turkish Armed Forces Command. No prisoners or civilians were supported during the period.

Sandbags, lumber, nails, acetylene, and trip flares were on the critical list during the month. Because of the unavailability of certain items, the 25th Division Purchasing and Contracting Officer purchased 10,000 pounds of assorted nails, and 14 dozen hinges from Korean sources. Twelve tent kits were received during the period along with two tropical shell huts for semi-permanent type construction.

f. Ordnance Service¹

At the beginning of the month of November, the 25th Division Ordnance Office was located with the 25th Infantry Division Command Post at CT525226, and all other elements of the 725th Ordnance Maintenance Company were located at CT478098, except the DAO which was located at CT537266 and the track repair section which was at CT505191.

ASP 56A was opened for operation at 1600 hours on the 2d of November at CT537266. At first only artillery and mortar ammunition were stocked. By the 30th of November, however, fragmentation grenades, chemical ammunition, small arms ammunition, and rockets were added to stocks for issue.

Anti-freeze for the protection of water cooled machine guns was issued to all infantry regiments on 7 November. The DOMO discussed installation of anti-freeze with the Service and Recovery Officer, with the result that the small arms teams attached to the infantry regiments installed the anti-freeze in all water cooled

1. Book 12, supporting documents, this report.

machine guns.

The 159th Field Artillery Battalion completed the change-over from 105mm howitzers to 155mm howitzers on the 7th of November. The last two M-5 high speed tractors were issued to complete the issue of new equipment.

On the 7th of November the DAO received an allocation from the I Corps Ordnance Officer on 81mm mortar ammunition amounting to 8 rounds of light and 5 rounds of heavy shell per tube per day, beginning at 1800 hours on the 5th of November and ending at 1800 hours on the 10th of November.

The DAO contacted the G-3 of the 25th Infantry Division on the 10th of November for an allocation of 81mm mortar ammunition from IX Corps. A special allocation was procured of 200 rounds of 8 inch green bag charges for the 780th Field Artillery Battalion, A Battery.

The DAO received the available supply rate on 105mm and 155mm howitzer ammunition on the 10th of November from IX Corps, allowing 45 rounds per tube per day for 105mm and 35 round per day for 155mm ammunition.

g. Quartermaster Service

During November the Division Quartermaster Company issued the following supplies.

<u>Class I</u>	<u>No. Rations Issued</u>	<u>Average per day</u>
A	931,867	31,062
C	84,891	
<u>Class III</u>	<u>No. Gals. Issued</u>	
MoGAS	1,391,117	
AvGAS	24,850	

Part VI
Chronology

- 2 November Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the morning.
- 5 November Danny Kay, Monica Lewis and their cast, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post for lunch and later entertained front line troops.
- 7 November Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tac Command Post during the morning.
- 8 November General Mathew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, Far East Command, and Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post.
- 13 November Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the afternoon.
- 16 November Major General Tashin Yazici, Commanding General, 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post for lunch.
- 17 November Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps, and Major General Yu, Deputy Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Army, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post after attending General Yazici's farewell ceremonies.
- 24 November Mr. Alben Barkley, Vice President, United States of America; General Mathew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, Far East Command; General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth Army and Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division area during the day. The 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command furnished the honor guard for the occasion.
- 30 November Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, CG, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the day.

Part VII

Discussion and Recommendations

1. General

Relative quiet prevailed along the Division front during November. Staff and command functions revolved chiefly around three major problems:

- a. Liquidation of Plan MESABI.
- b. Tactical aspects of the cease-fire negotiations.
- c. Winterization and cold-wet weather supply and survival.

The first two of these problems are discussed under Part II of this report.

2. Winterization

The first snow on 23 November and the freezing temperatures that followed found the Division well prepared. Warming bunkers for all front line units were already complete. The Division Ordnance Officer had expedited winterization of all vehicles as soon as anti-freeze and winter lubricants became available on 18 October. Vehicles were winterized under direct supervision of Ordnance teams. Essential vehicles were already equipped with tire chains by the time of the first snow. Division Engineer units had anticipated icy road conditions by piling emergency gravel at critical spots.

Drawing of Phase III winter clothing was left optional with regimental commanders until the first snow, at which time it was made mandatory. Having stockpiled equipment and prepared for its issue well in advance, the Division was able to issue Phase III items in 36 hours. Certain difficulties, principally in sizing, delayed completion of the issue to some service units to 60 hours. In many instances, reconditioned parkas had shrunk so that liners no longer fitted, and, in some cases, reconditioned shoe pairs were not paired.

More careful packing at the source would obviate these causes of delay.

3. Cold-Wet Weather Tips

Cold-wet weather tips, consolidated from comments submitted by members of this command who had served in Korea last winter, were published on 1 November for the benefit of new men. Some of the tips, representing practical knowledge not already covered in Army publications on the subject, are condensed and reproduced here as recommendations.

a. TROOPS

Cut a hole into wall of foxhole, approximately 1' x 1' x 1', to hold hot stones

or embers for warming hands during cold weather. This device will retain heat for five or six hours.

Warm "C" rations before eating and mix with water to keep warm and maintain digestive efficiency during cold season. This will help prevent sluggish bowel action.

Cover foxhole floor with pliant brush, straw, or other covering to keep sleeping bag off ground at night and shoes dry during waking hours.

Wear combat boots while driving vehicle when the floorboard is warmed by engine heat. Change to shoe pac in the colder evenings and nighttime. This prevents sweating and subsequent freezing of the feet and also insures daily changing of footgear.

Carry candy bars or other compact sources of quick food energy to provide energy and caloric heat.

Apply brushless shaving cream to hands before immersion into gasoline or oil, and after washing during cold weather. This combats chapping and cracking.

Place extra socks inside sleeping bag close to the body at night to keep them dry and warm.

Use safety pins from ammo bandoliers to pin socks by heels to one of the inner garments in the hollow in front of the shoulders, one pair on each side. This allows the foot to fold down along the sock top. It provides extra insulation for the wearer and insures safekeeping.

Use the space around the loose blouse of trousers at boot tops to store extra socks. This method will keep socks dry, warm, and readily accessible when needed for a change. Blousing must be done on the outside of the footgear, using rubber bands or the fasteners on field trousers to keep the trousers snug against the boot without reducing circulation.

b. Weapons

Test-fire all automatic weapons carried on patrols during freezing weather before the patrol leaves the MLR.

Manipulate the traversing and elevating mechanism on howitzers and smaller weapons through their entire arcs frequently to insure that no moving parts have frozen.

Arrange wiring that will allow aiming stake lights to be turned on and off from gun emplacement. This conserves battery power of aiming stake devices during cold

weather, when battery life is shortest.

Cover lenses and moving parts of sights and optical instruments with plastic covering available in "C" rations. This covering will combat freezing and clouding of the equipment.

Place wooden blocks or insulating material such as straw under each leg of crew-served weapons in stationary positions. This keeps the legs from freezing to the ground.

Break up frozen ground before placing mortar base plate, or place thick layers of cushioning material underneath to absorb shock. Initial recoil can make the base plate bounce out of place or even crack it.

Place mortars and other weapons subject to heavy recoil with particular care for accurate alignment during cold weather. Cold metal is easily damaged by strains of unequally distributed shocks.

Clean mortars and other crew-served weapons in the open during cold weather. Change of temperature brought about by taking weapons inside warm shelter to clean will cause condensation. This results in freezing and rust when weapon is taken back outside.

Build small wooden bases for aiming stakes during freezing weather to eliminate driving stakes into hard ground.

Remove all excess oil from both individual and crew-served weapons during cold weather to prevent freezing and sluggish action of moving parts.

c. Equipment

Empty water from trailers into small cans that can be stored inside mess tent during freezing weather.

Place field burners in kitchen tents with flame valve open to prevent freezing.

String communications wire overhead when ground surfaces are frozen. This eliminates danger of wire being broken by vehicles or troops against the unyielding ground, and saves digging needed for burying them.

Protect field phone sets as much as possible during cold weather to conserve batteries.

Dig an emplacement for field switchboards approximately three feet deep and with sufficient room for switchboard operator and a stove. Facilities should be large enough to allow warming of wire crews.

Improvise straps to keep gun-covers closed during movements in freezing weather. Zippers often freeze in cold-wet weather.

d. Food Handling

Construct a trough or pan to hold marmite can inserts, and dig a slit trench for a fire to heat the water in the can holding the marmite can. This prevents chilling of food containers used to feed troops not under shelter.

Keep a fire burning under the coffee container while serving outdoors to troops.

Provide a can of hot water to dip mess gear into prior to serving meals. Water will quickly warm the kits, reduce chilling of food.

Provide wind-breaks or cover for cooking and heating of mess water. Cooking in an exposed position is extremely slow, and food is often under-cooked.

e. Vehicles

Place wooden blocks, straw, or other thick material under wheels or tracks of vehicles parked in soft, wet ground.

Start all vehicle engines at least once in every 12 hour period.

Keep gas tanks full. Check and drain fuel filter daily.

Pump foot brakes gently for at least one-quarter of a mile after crossing streams or any immersion in water. This prevents freezing of brakes when vehicle is parked.

Park vehicles with brakes released and all wheels securely blocked to prevent movement of vehicle. Parking vehicles with brakes set is apt to result in binding brakes during freezing weather.

4. New Enemy Tactics

According to a IX Corps Periodic Intelligence Report,¹ the CCF has reversed its previous tactical doctrine of employing "human waves" to overwhelm UN positions. These massed attacks suffered extremely heavy casualties from UN artillery. They were also indecisive because our superior mobility allowed us to disengage too rapidly. The new objective of the CCF, according to the report, will be to destroy UN manpower through piecemeal engagements, concentrating on the destruction of small UN infantry units.

A captured enemy document dated 12 September 1951 revealed that CCF artillery

1. IX Corps PIR dated 7 November 1951.

has a three-fold mission: make breaches for infantry penetration; neutralize enemy artillery; and lay down creeping barrages. Usually the CCF use one battery to make a breach, while using two batteries to neutralize enemy artillery and fire the creeping barrage.

In recent actions the enemy has followed a general four-point attack pattern:

a. Probes nightly with increasing force until 24 to 48 hours before the main attack to locate UN positions and determine least protected avenues of approach.

b. Places artillery fire on friendly positions for one to two hours. This fire may precede or accompany the main attack.

c. Uses frontal attack to make and exploit penetrations; attempts simultaneous envelopment to cut off withdrawing forces.

d. Calls off attacks at or before daylight and withdraws.

To minimize the effects of these new enemy tactics and inflict the greatest number of casualties this Division recommends and has published certain counter-measures.

a. Provide overhead cover for all positions and connecting trenches to permit troops to reach their defensive positions.

b. Protect automatic weapons with covering forces.

c. Prepare all-around defensive positions for patrol bases.

d. Withdraw only during daylight. (Night withdrawals result in confusion and heavy casualties.)

e. Protect radio communications against enemy artillery fire.

f. Use as many trip flares and antipersonnel mines in front of positions as possible.

g. Protect withdrawal routes.

h. Set up a greater number of strong outposts.

i. Patrol extensively during daylight hours until contact is made.

j. Use Division light aircraft to the utmost to locate enemy concentrations.

k. Coordinate ground patrols with air OPs.

l. React quickly to surprise attack by effective use of all weapons against enemy. Strengthen weakened points as soon as possible.

As we have no exact way of telling when and where the enemy will attack, this

Headquarters has instructed its units in defensive situations to:

- a. Tighten security.
- b. Reconnoiter extensively and aggressively during the day.
- c. Resist attacks by prompt use of all weapons and defensive measures.

5. Intelligence

Interrogation of Prisoners of War has been hampered in this Division because of a lack of qualified Mandarin Chinese-English linguists. Interrogation of prisoners has been accomplished through the use of indigenous interpreters who speak only Chinese and Korean or Japanese. U.S. Army interrogators speak in Japanese to the interpreters, who in turn question the prisoners in Chinese. Replies are translated back from Chinese through Japanese into English. This double translation results in a loss of time in dissemination of tactical information, and greatly increases the chances of errors or misunderstandings. In addition, few of the indigenous interpreters have had any previous military experience. They had to be given considerable training in military terminology, basic infantry tactics, and characteristics of weapons.

It is recommended that U.S. personnel who are fluent in Mandarin Chinese be made available to divisions in the field. It is further recommended that U.S. interrogator personnel at all levels be thoroughly trained in enemy tactics and equipment before arrival in a combat zone.

The experience of this Division has proved the desirability of having a G-2 (Air) officer, whose primary duties consist of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information obtained through aerial reconnaissance accomplished by Army Light Aviation. During November, the G-2 (Air) officer, located at the Division air strip, carried out such duties as briefing and debriefing all pilots and observers before and after each flight. By keeping constantly informed of the friendly situation and the EEI, the G-2 (Air) officer was able to acquaint the pilots and observers with the locations of friendly units, daily patrols, specific area to be covered and items of information needed at a particular time.

By means of a thorough "de-briefing" of pilots and observers immediately following their return from a flight, the G-2 (Air) officer collected much information concerning the movements and activities of the enemy, and the status of his defenses and administrative installations. He made frequent aerial observation


flights to keep thoroughly familiar with the the terrain and enemy situation along the Division front. With an intimate knowledge of these important factors, he was able to properly evaluate and interpret information obtained, and to quickly note any activity of the enemy that is a departure from normal. As a result the Division Commander and the AC of S, G-2 were furnished a more complete and current picture of the enemy situation upon which to base their estimates, than would otherwise have been the case.

It is recommended that an additional officer, qualified as Staff Intelligence Officer and as Aerial Observer be authorized as Division G-2 (Air) on the tables of organization.

6. Decorations Policy

A continuing problem for this Command has been the maintenance of high standards and consistency in awarding decorations. To assure careful scrutiny of each recommendation, the Chief of Staff appointed the Executive Officer of each regiment, the Tank Battalion Commander, the Engineer Battalion Commander and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Commander to the Award and Decorations Board. Despite the obviously mature judgment of these officers, great difficulty has arisen in deciding upon meritorious awards, particularly the BSM (M). Divided voting and inconsistency have been common. This situation arises from the absence of clear-cut criteria as to what constitutes service meriting an award. Too often the manner in which the recommendation is prepared becomes the deciding factor. Leadership and responsibility involved are not necessarily characteristic of meritorious service, yet often the failure of an individual to win promotion or the commonplace nature of job assignment tend to prejudice opportunity for recognition.

It is concluded that the form prescribed for submission of recommendations should require a statement from the recommending officer to the effect that within his command, the recommended individual distinguished himself over and above all others in similar job-assignments. Such a statement, responsibly made, would be decisive in nearly every case.


IRA P. SWIFT
Major General, USA
Commanding

COMMAND



8A/FEC-51-41244

17 Nov 51

Ceremonies held at Headquarters of the Turkish Brigade near Kumhwa, Korea, as Maj Gen Tahsin Yazici, former Commander, relinquished his command to Brig Gen Namik Arguc. (L to R) Colonel Thomas S. Gunby, Chief, Turkish Advisory Group; Capt Ishan Gurkon, Turkish interpreter; Maj Gen You Jae lung, Korean liaison officer; Col Nuri Pamir, assistant commander Turkish Brigade; Brig Gen Arguc; Maj Gen Vahit Aykor, Turkish Liaison Chief; Maj Gen Yazici; Maj Gen Ira P. Swift, CG 25th US Inf Div; Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX US Corps; and Brig Gen William E. Waters, CG 25th Div Arty.



8A/FEC-51-41246

17 Nov 51

(L to R) Maj Gen Vahit Aykor, Turkish Liaison Chief; Maj Gen Tahsin Yazici, former Commander Turkish Brigade in Korea; Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG IX Corps; Capt Ishan Gurkon, Turkish interpreter; and Maj Gen Ira P. Swift, CG 25th Inf Div, inspect honor guard of the Turkish Brigade during ceremonies held in honor of Maj Gen Yazici, near Kumhwa, Korea. Gen Yazici, who relinquishes his command to Brig Gen Namik Arguc, is returning to his homeland.



8A/FEC-51-41245

17 Nov 51


Maj Gen Tahsin Yazici, former commander Turkish Brigade in Korea, makes his farewell address to men of his command during ceremonies held at Brigade Hq near Kumhwa, Korea. Maj Gen Yazici is returning to his homeland in the near future.



8A/FEC-51-41241

17 Nov 51

Brig Gen Namik Arguc, newly appointed commander Turkish Brigade in Korea, addresses men of the brigade during farewell ceremonies held near Kumhwa in honor of Maj Gen Tahsin Yazici, former Brigade Commander.



8A/FEC-51-41240

17 Nov 51

Members of the Turkish Brigade Honor Guard pass under archway during ceremonies held in honor of Maj Gen Fahsin Yazici, former Commander Turkish Brigade in Korea, who is returning to his homeland in the near future.


PERSONNEL



8A/FEC-51-40920

6 Nov 51

Mail clerks with Co I, 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, sort out mail for men of the company near Kumhwa, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41221

16 Nov 51

Members of the 25th US Inf Div Band play a salute to Maj Gen Tahsin Yazici, former commander Turkish Brigade and Brig Gen Namik Arguc, newly appointed commander, during ceremonies held south of Fyonggang, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40454-C

4 Nov 51

During church services held at reserve area near Chojon-ni, Korea, man of Co F, 35th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, receives Communion from Catholic Chaplain Capt Joseph A. Flynn.



8A/FEC-t1-40457-C

4 Nov 51

Catholic Chsplain, Capt Joseph A, Flynn, 35th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, raises the chalice during church service held at rest area near Chojon-ni, Korea.

OPERATIONS



8A/FEC-51-41679

20 Nov 51

Members of the 1st Section, Battery A, 780th FA Battalion, attached to 25th Infantry Division, fire 8-inch howitzer at enemy positions. These howitzers have proved invaluable in blasting Chinese bunkers, which are usually built of heavy timbers and covered with several feet of earth.



8A/FEC-51-42875-C

25 Nov 51


Soldiers of Battery B, 937th FA Bn, Eighth US Army, supporting the 25th Inf Div, fire "Long Toms" as they blast enemy held positions during night fire mission held during heavy snowfall, at Munemi, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41239

16 Nov 51

Riflemen of the 7th Co, 241st Turkish Regt, keep a sharp lookout for signs of enemy troops from their hillside post near Hill 530, south of Pyonggang, Korea. This emplacement, constructed of heavy logs and sandbags, is typical of the positions across the Division sector of Line MISSOURI. It affords cover from enemy fire and gives considerable protection from the weather.



8A/FEC-51-40211

3 Nov 51

Bunker under construction in 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment. This bunker is typical of the winter warming bunkers constructed immediately in rear of front line positions. Providing both protection and comfort, these bunkers serve a variety of purposes. In them men can dry clothing, clean equipment, write letters, receive front line training, or be briefed before going out on a patrol or attack.



8A/FEC-51-41825

23 Nov 51


Soldiers of Co F, 14th Inf Regt, string wire around their position on the west central front, southeast of Pyonggang, Korea, during a light snowfall.



8A/FEC-51-42369

18 Nov 51

Soldiers of the 69th FA Bn, 25th Inf Div, man their 155mm howitzers to blast enemy-held positions near Choryong-ni, Korea.



Interior of bunker built by soldiers of 69th FA Battalion to house their fire direction center. In bunkers of this type, men can work in comfort and with maximum efficiency, regardless of the weather.



8A/FEC-51-41230

16 Nov 51


Machine gun crew of 6th Co, 241st Turkish Regt, prepares to lay down protective fire for members of patrol as they return from mission into enemy territory, northeast of Chorwon, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40701

1 Nov 51

man of Btry B, 21st AAA Bn checks his .50 cal machine gun as the battalion prepares for assault against the Chinese Communist forces near K'ima-wa, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41223

14 Nov 51

Crew members of half track of the 241st Turkish Regt fire 37mm and twin 50's, as they blast enemy held positions during assault against the Chinese Communist forces near hill 530, northeast of Chorwon, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41336

12 Nov 51

Northeast of Chorwon, Korea, men of Battery A, 987th FA Bn, 25th Inf Div, fire their howitzer on enemy positions in support of the Turkish Brigade of the UN Command.



8A/FEC-51-41334

17 Nov 51


Men of Battery A, 987th FA Bn, IX Corps, attached to the 25th Inf Div, race to their gun on the west central front, southeast of Pyonggang, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40680

10 Nov 51

Forward observer with Btry A, 69th FA Bn, 25th Inf Div, operates spotting scope as he views results of artillery assault on enemy positions, southeast of Pyonggang, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40686

10 Nov 51

From his forward OP southeast of Pyonggang, Korea, artillery liaison officer, Hqs 69th FA Bn, 25th Inf Div, directs artillery fire in support of infantrymen of the division as assault against the Chinese Communist forces continues in that area.

TRAINING



8A/FEC-51-41237

16 Nov 51

Members of patrol from 7th Co. 241st Turkish Regt. make their way cautiously up hillside northeast of Chorwon, Korea, as they move out to attack their objective.



8A/FEC-51-41324

13 Nov 51

During training exercises near the west central front, southeast of Pyongsang, Korea, men of the Raider Platoon of the 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, move up a hill in a dispersed formation.



8A/FEC-51-40462-C

8 Nov 51


Man of Heavy Mortar Co, 35th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, drops a 4.2 mortar round down tube, as men of the 35th Inf Regt continue assault against the Chinese Communist Forces, two miles northwest of Kumhwa, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40683

11 Nov 51

Men of the 3rd Platoon, Co C, 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, set up barbed wire entanglement around their outpost, southeast of Pyongang, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41326

13 Nov 51

During a training problem near the west central front, southeast of Pyonggang, Korea, man of raider Platoon, 1st Bn, 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, takes cover with his Thompson sub-machine gun ready for action.



8A/FEC-51-41323

13 Nov 51

During a training exercise near the west central front, southeast of Pyonggang, Korea, man of raider Platoon, 14th Regt, 25th Inf Div, crouches with his Thompson sub-machine gun ready after a smoke grenade explodes near his position.



8A/FEC-51-41329

13 Nov 51

During training exercises near the west central front, southeast of P'yongsang, Korea, ~~man~~ of the Raider Platoon, 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, moves up a hill firing his BAR at the "enemy."



8A/FEC-51-41249

17 Nov 51

Men of the 241st Turkish Regt receive instructions on operation of American 75mm recoilless rifle during class held at Regt Hqs, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41248

17 Nov 51

Men of the 241st Turkish Regt receive instructions on operation of American 75mm recoilless rifle during class held at Regt Hqs, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40455-C

5 Nov 51

During class held at rest area near the village of Chojon-ni, Korea, men of Co H 35th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div gives demonstration on operation of the .30 cal water cooled machine gun. Demonstration is given for benefit of new replacements of the regiment.

S E R V I C E S



8A/FEC-51-40932

6 Nov 51

Men of 25th Inf Div models new winter clothing issued to men at the fighting front during clothing demonstration held at Div Hqs.



8A/FEC-51-41219

14 Nov 51

Crew members of half track of the 241st Turkish Regt clean their 37mm and twin 50's during break in action against the Chinese Communist forces near hill 530, northeast of Chorwon, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40703

13 Nov 51


Men of Co G, 27th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, receive their daily issue of clean socks at their hqs near Kumhwa, Korea. Clean socks are issued daily to the men during the cold weather to prevent trench foot.



8A/FEC-51-41328

15 Nov 51

Near the west central front, southeast of Fyonggang, Korea, Lt Col Larry Leidenheimer, CO 1st Bn, 14th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, proudly displays the hot water heater in his quarters. Through ammunition cases that were welded to a 55-gal drum, the heat from the stove pipe keeps a constant supply of warm water ready for use in his shower, built right into his log and sand bag bunker.



8A/FEC-51-40681

13 Nov 51


Clam shovel scoops up another bucket of top soil, as men of the 65th Engr C Bn, 25th Inf Div, work to repair road washed out by torrential rains, southeast of Pyongyang, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40700

13 Nov 51

Man of 1st Plat, Co G, 27th Inf Regt, 25th Inf Div, uses GI can opener as he prepares his noonday chow at his hqs, near Kumhwa, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-41338

18 Nov 51

Near the west central front, southeast of Pyongyang, Korea, men of the construction section, 25th Signal Company, 25th Inf Div, work to string a cable circuit.

A BRIDGE IS BUILT




FIGURE 1

The timber trestle bridge is one of the Army's standard fixed bridges. Being simple in construction details, easily erected, and economical in timber consumption, it has seen wide use in Korea. In regard to nomenclature, it is divided into two main parts — the substructure and the superstructure. The substructure consists of abutments, footings, end dams, and trestle bents. Superstructure includes the stringers, flooring, curbs, and handrails.



FIGURE 2

In determining site for this bridge, men of the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion of the 25th Infantry Division made a detailed reconnaissance to determine condition of stream banks, character of soil, and depth and velocity of stream.



FIGURE 3

The site selected here had previously been prepared for use as a ford. Loose stone dams helped control the depth and flow of the water.



FIGURE 4

First phase in construction is the building of approaches...



FIGURE 5

... and retaining walls for abutments.



FIGURE 6

Log crib piers, filled with soil, increase bearing capacity where the bottom is soft and muddy, sandy and shifting, or where the depth or anticipated depth of the water is too great.



FIGURE 7

Here the Engineers place footings and sill, needed to spread the load over an area sufficient to prevent excessive settlement. A carpenter's level is used to level footings.



FIGURE 8

Stringers are hand placed, supported at one end by the abutment sill and at the other end by the trestle bent.



FIGURE 9

Heights of trestle bents are determined by a transit. A center line (barely discernable in lower foreground of Figure 7) maintains bridge alignment.



FIGURE 10

Bridge flooring consists of decking placed at right angles to the center line and ...



FIGURE 11

... the tread, laid parallel to the center line. The tread can be easily replaced after excessive wear. Also prominent in this photograph is the Engineer driving drift pins, which hold the curbing in place.




FIGURE 12

The curbing, shown in the preceding photograph, is raised from the bridge deck by a string of separated blocks. This allows free run-off of water.



FIGURE 13

Handrails, added as a safety feature, complete the bridge. It is a one-lane, class 35 bridge, having a clear roadway width of 12 feet, six inches.



FIGURE 14

Throughout construction, Engineers use many power tools to speed up their work. Included are the air-operated skil-saw...



FIGURE 15

... the electric drill...



FIGURE 16

... the portable chain saw, and ...



FIGURE 17

... the D-7 dozer, reliable workhorse used in construction of approaches and abutment fills.

325
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

Command Report - 25th Infantry Division



OPERATIONS BRANCH A.G.O.

CLASSIFIED RECORDS

AGO MICROFILM
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
Dec 1951

SECURITY

INFORMATION

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**COMMAND REPORT
(CSGPO-28)**



22

325

**25TH U S INFANTRY DIVISION
DECEMBER 1951**

SECRET

SECURITY

INFORMATION

COPY NO. 1

Master

COMMAND REPORT

(CS&FC-28)
~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFO

DECEMBER 1951

25TH UNITED STATES INFANTRY DIVISION

Attached to

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

1 through 31 December 1951

Under operational control of

LX UNITED STATES CORPS

1 through 31 December 1951

Commanded by

MAJOR GENERAL IRA P. SWIFT, USA

1 through 31 December 1951

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFO

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25th Infantry Division

December 1951

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SECTION I

Part I

Introduction

a. Background

In November, following the postponement and final cancellation of Plan MESABI, the 25th Infantry Division spent its fourth consecutive month in a stable defensive position along Line WYOMING (redesignated Line MISSOURI 20 November). Aggressive patrol and task force activity to maintain contact with and inflict casualties on the enemy continued. Training in all areas was continuous and progressive.

The two major considerations for November were:

1. Liquidation of Plan MESABI.
2. Tactical aspects of the armistice negotiations.

Plan MESABI, which originally called for a general attack by IX US Corps on 1 November, was postponed 24 hours. The Division remained on a 24-hour alert until 2 November, at which time it was ordered to be prepared to execute Plan MESABI on a 60-hour basis. The plan was cancelled 12 November.

Progress of the cease-fire talks at PANMUNJOM indicated the immediate delineation of a buffer zone based on the line of contact between friendly and enemy forces. The Division Commander initiated an intensified patrol program to definitely establish this line of contact far enough in advance of presently held key positions to assure their inclusion in the United Nations zone.

On 27 November, after UN and Communists negotiators agreed on a line of demarcation, this Headquarters published a Letter of Instructions to all subordinate units, explaining that hostilities had not ceased and that patrol and task force activity against enemy positions would continue.

b. Component Units and Commanding Officers

(As of 31 December 1951)

Unit	Commander
14th Infantry Regiment (attached 2d US Div for opm control 18 Dec 51)	Lt Col Richard W. Whitney, Infantry
27th Infantry Regiment (attached 2d Logistical Command for opm control and logistical support 29 Dec 51)	Lt Col Norman B. Edwards, Infantry

35th Infantry Regiment

Turkish Armed Forces Command

25th Division Artillery

8th Field Artillery Battalion

64th Field Artillery Battalion

69th Field Artillery Battalion

90th Field Artillery Battalion

21st AAA AW Battalion (SP)

89th Medium Tank Battalion

65th Engineer Combat Battalion

25th Medical Battalion

Lt Col Sidney C. Baker, Jr., Infantry

Brig Gen Namik Arguc, Cavalry

Brig Gen William E. Waters, USA

Lt Col Harry L. Yerby, Artillery

Lt Col Lounsbury Branson, Artillery

Lt Col Don W. Dixon, Artillery

Lt Col Roger E. Reeder, Artillery

Lt Col James L. Crane, Artillery

Major Brooks O. Norman, Armor

Lt Col Richard L. Hennessy, CE

Major Charles F. Snyder, Jr., MC

Part II

Narrative of Tactical Operations

a. Elements Affecting the Action

1. Effectiveness of enemy information and reconnaissance:

During the period 1-18 December, there were no definite indications as to the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance. However, he had excellent observation of our forward elements and his knowledge of our situation was presumed to be good.

2. Nature of terrain:

In the west of the 25th Division zone, the dominant terrain feature was the hill mass SOBANG-SAN (CT5445) which afforded the enemy excellent observation of the west and central sectors of the Division zone. In the east of the Division zone, the dominant terrain feature was the hill mass OSONG-SAN (CT6445) which commanded the east and central sectors of the zone. The central sector of the zone was characterized by a valley drained by the HANTAN River, flowing north to south. This valley was largely rice paddy land. These fields had not been cultivated this year. The irrigation canal on the east side of the valley formed a natural anti-tank barrier to the mountains on the east, while the river on the west had high, steep banks and could be forded in only a few places.

3. Condition of weather:

Visibility was generally excellent during the month of December. During the early morning hours, however, ground fog hampered air and ground observation. Temperatures varied from a high of 46 degrees Fahrenheit to a low of 15 degrees.

The weather conditions were favorable for our defense. In general, the aerial observation was excellent, owing to good flying weather. Snow-covered terrain aided the aerial observer in detecting enemy movement. The snow made camouflage more difficult. As the enemy's movements were subject to air and ground observation, he was forced to exercise extreme caution in exposing himself. These sightings assisted the AC of S, G-2 in his study of the enemy's capabilities and activities. On five days during the month, light aircraft were non-operational due to poor visibility.

b. Plans and Preparations

The mission of the 25th Infantry Division changed during December from defense of a sector of Line MISSOURI, which it had occupied for the past four months, to IX US Corps reserve on 18 December. Plans and operations for the month were thus centered around three major problems:

- a. Occupation of Line MISSOURI and development of Line ICELAND (1-18 Dec).
- b. Relief and movement to KAPYONG, vicinity CS6987 (15-20 Dec).
- c. Redeployment to fulfill reserve missions directed by IX Corps and Eighth Army (18-31 Dec).

All documents referred to in this section can be found in Book 4, Part 1 and 2, of the supporting documents of this report.

1 December

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS outlined policies for operations during the 30-day period of armistice negotiations ending 27 December 1951. Emphasizing the necessity for each soldier to know that hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed, the Letter stated that Division missions were:

- a. To maintain present positions.
- b. To regain key terrain lost to the enemy.
- c. To plan a main line of resistance based upon the demilitarized zone that could be strongly defended or used as a jump-off line.
- d. To maintain positions along Line WYOMING on a second priority basis.

The Division was to: (1) conduct security patrolling and ground and air reconnaissance; (2) disrupt enemy formations by fire; (3) continue development of Line MISSOURI; (4) continue preparation of gun and individual positions that would afford maximum protection and shelter against the weather; (5) restrict attacks by infantry and armored elements to counterattacks to regain key terrain, attacks to drive enemy back to his present OPLR, and attacks to rescue friendly elements; and (6) to reconnoiter by air to maximum extent.

The letter further outlined policies regarding expenditure of ammunition, training, morale, vehicle maintenance, and handling of civilians.

2 December

TRAINING MEMORANDUM NO. 29 directed completion of minimum training requirements for all Division personnel in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological War-

fare. The object of this training was to acquaint all personnel with elementary aspects of CBR Warfare and to dispel effects of misinformation the average person has acquired through reading and conversation. Units were instructed to make maximum use of CBR personnel who had completed the course of instruction at the Far East Command Chemical School.

4 December

LETTER, to all units called attention to an attack made on 3 December by three hostile jet aircraft and stated that the enemy was able to use jet aircraft against any portion of the UN front and bombers and propeller-driven fighters over any part of Korea. Units were directed to alert all personnel to these possibilities and to insure that all active and passive air defense measures contained in SOP for Operations, this Headquarters, 28 November 1951, were enforced.

11 December

OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE NO. 1 directed units of the Division to organize and prepare defensive positions on best terrain in sector along Line ICELAND (see overlay to OD #1). Units were to construct continuous bands of tactical wire, coordinate tie-in points, and prepare counterattack plans.

This directive was issued so that defensible positions would be ready for occupation in case a truce materialized and the demarcation line of 27 November became effective.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 46 announced that IX Corps would regroup along Line MISSOURI, with the 2d Infantry Division relieving the 25th Infantry Division. IX Corps orders for this relief had specified that one regiment, supported by one light field artillery battalion and an engineer company, would be attached to the relieving unit. The Corps order placed the 27th Infantry Regiment under Corps operational control near HWACHON (vicinity CS8717), placed the 25th Division Artillery (-) plus the TAFIC Field Artillery Battalion under operational control IX Corps Artillery; and the remainder of the Division in Corps reserve near KAPYONG (vicinity CS6987).

Division chose the 14th Infantry Regiment for attachment to the 2d Division because of its relative short time in combat and, more important, the accessibility of its sector. The latter consideration simplified the continuing responsibility of the 25th Infantry Division for logistical support in Class II and IV supplies.

The Order directed the 27th Infantry Regiment to move to HWACHON on 18 December, after being relieved by the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d US Infantry Division, prior to that time.

The 35th Infantry Regiment was directed to move one company to IX US Corps Headquarters (CS920982) to relieve elements of 2d US Infantry Division providing security for IX US Corps command post. The relief was made 14 December.

The Turkish Armed Forces Command was directed to move to new area (vicinity CS7498) on 20 December after being relieved by the 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d US Infantry Division. The TAFIC was also to relieve elements of the 2d US Infantry Division and provide security for VHF stations (vicinity CT777010) and Hill 1468 (CT6805) with one squad at each place before noon of 16 December.

Units replaced one another on the line according to the order without incident, and the two-way motor marches, beginning on the 15th and ending on the 20th, were accomplished without incident, despite the limited road net.

12 December

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO. 2 directed the 35th Infantry Regiment to relieve the Eighth Army Special Provisional Battalion at the SANGDONG tungsten mine (vicinity DS853122) with one infantry battalion on 22 December. The infantry battalion, upon relief of the Provisional Battalion, was to be attached to the 32d Engineer Construction Group for logistical support. The Provisional Battalion was to be relieved from attachment to 25th Replacement Company and attached to 35th Infantry Regiment for administration and supply.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM NO. 30, based on a four-week training cycle, was published to provide uniform and progressive training to ensure proficiency and effectiveness in combat. It stressed the necessity for realistic training, holding lectures to a minimum, and provided for twice-weekly night exercises. Officer and NCO schools were stressed. Lessons learned in combat were to be used as a basis for both offensive and defensive training.

13 December

OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 33 (HANGFIRE), rescinding Operations Plan No. 32 of 30 September 1951 and Operations Instructions No. 297 of 11 November 1951, outlined action of Division units in the event a major enemy offensive forces IX US Corps to execute a coordinated withdrawal to Line KANSAS (see overlay accompanying Plan).

14 December

OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 34 specified action of Divisional units in the event an enemy penetration forces IX US Corps to withdraw from present positions and defend along Line WYOMING (see overlay attached to Plan).

OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 35 specified action of Division units in the event a major enemy offensive and penetration forced the IX US Corps to occupy blocking positions on Line DALLAS (see overlay attached to Plan). The plan included instructions for counterattacks to recapture Line WYOMING.

LETTER, this Headquarters, SUBJECT: Security and Personnel Control, presented the important aspects of security and personnel control that were expected to confront unit commanders while the Division remained in reserve. The letter outlined responsibility of commanders, explained the extent of their jurisdiction regarding civilians in their areas, and described those civilians authorized to be in various areas. Positive measures to insure security were directed.

19 December

LETTER, this Headquarters, SUBJECT: Inspection and Maintenance of Line KANSAS and Reserve Defensive Positions, assigned responsibility for inspecting and maintaining Line KANSAS and reserve positions to commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces Command, 25th Division Artillery, and the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion.

20 December

TRAINING DIRECTIVE NO. 3 announced that the Commanding General would inspect units of this Division (less the 14th Infantry Regiment and Division Artillery) during 27 December to 16 January 1952. He was to be assisted by the Inspector General, Signal, Ordnance, and Quartermaster teams. Purpose of the inspection was to determine:

- a. Completeness and state of repair of all items of issue, both individual and organizational.
- b. Completeness and accuracy of company records.
- c. Sanitation and living conditions.
- d. Corrective action needed to eliminate deficiencies.

LETTER, this Headquarters, to all units directed that active and passive air defense measures as prescribed in SOP for Operations, this Headquarters, would be complied with. Specific instructions were included for preparation of fox holes

and slit trenches and mounting of automatic weapons on vehicles.

LETTER, this Headquarters, SUBJECT: Defense of Rear Areas, provided a standing operating procedure for security of installations and units within the Division's present zone of responsibility against air and airborne attack, enemy patrols, guerrillas, snipers, sabotage, and other enemy activity.

21 December

LETTER, this Headquarters, SUBJECT: Firing of Weapons in Rear Area, directed all units of the Division to schedule range firing in advance. Commanders were made responsible for the elimination of indiscriminate firing in their areas.

23 December

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 47 directed the 27th Infantry Regiment to move by motor to the Port of INCHON on 26-27 December for further movement by water to KOJE-DO. Upon arrival at INCHON, the Regiment was to be attached to Commanding General, 2d Logistical Command. The 35th Infantry Regiment was directed to move to vicinity of HWACHON (CTB717) on 26 December to relieve the 27th Infantry Regiment before its move to INCHON. The mission of the 27th Infantry Regiment on KOJE-DO was to provide security for the United Nations Prisoners of War Camp.

c. The Action

1. General

After more than five months of active defense along its sector of the I and IX US Corps fronts, the 25th Infantry Division (minus the 14th Infantry Regiment) reverted to IX Corps reserve on 18 December 1951. On that date its new command post near KAPYONG (vicinity CS6987) became operational. Responsibility for its sector of Line MISSOURI passed to Commanding General, 2d US Infantry Division. The remainder of the month was occupied in redeployment to fulfill reserve missions directed by IX US Corps and Eighth Army.

2. Line MISSOURI

Division activity on Line MISSOURI during 1-18 December was confined to patrol skirmishes. Division units patrolled in accordance with the "business as usual" letter¹ published by this Headquarters 27 November and with Letter of Instruction, this Headquarters, dated 1 December (see Plans and Preparation). In essence, both

1. See Command Report, this Headquarters, for November

of these documents emphasized that hostilities would not cease until an armistice was signed, but that battle activity would be limited to holding present lines and preventing the enemy from moving forward from his present positions.

The only significant attack by the enemy during the period was launched in the Turkish Armed Forces Command sector. At about 1930 hours on 14 December, an estimated enemy company attacked the "7" Company outpost (vicinity CT489432). The "7" Company platoon on the outpost, aided by heavy artillery and mortar concentrations, successfully fought off the Chinese, who had surrounded the position and were attempting to breach the protective wire.

By 2005 hours all communications with the outpost had been severed. Action continued fiercely until 2100 hours, at which time enemy fire diminished.

The "7" Company MLR and the left flank of the "6" Company MLR received long range small arms and automatic weapons fire during the action from an estimated two enemy companies deployed in the vicinity of CT484426 and CT494425. Friendly small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery fire silenced the enemy. Radio communication with the outpost was restored by 2100 hours.

The reserve platoon of the "7" Company left the MLR at 2400 hours and, after a brief fire fight, reached the outpost at 0055 hours. The enemy was reported to be withdrawing at 0110 hours. At 0130 hours an estimated enemy company again attacked the "7" Company outpost, but was repulsed by 0155 hours. At 0830 hours the "2" Company left the MLR, screened the area around the "7" Company outpost and counted 90 enemy dead. An additional 100 enemy were estimated killed. The "2" Company returned to the MLR at 1800 hours with no enemy contact.

3. Combat Lesson

This successful defense of an outpost against a numerically superior attacking force during the hours of darkness gave additional proof of the soundness of this Division's policy to hold ground at all costs, especially at night, and to withdraw only during daylight hours. The Commanding General has published and repeatedly emphasized to his subordinate commanders that night withdrawals result only in confusion and heavy casualties.

The determination of the Turkish platoon leader to defend the outpost, even though surrounded and without communication with the MLR, saved his men from the casualties they would have sustained trying to break through the enemy cordon

in the dark. The planned fires of his riflemen and automatic weapons, supported by artillery and mortars from the MLR, inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the enemy.

The action further proved: (1) the importance of well planned mortar and artillery concentrations; and (2) the necessity for riflemen to hold their fire until the enemy is close to their positions. A search of the area surrounding the outpost on the day following the attack revealed that most of the enemy dead were killed as they attempted to move through areas covered by close-in protective fires. The others were killed by small arms and automatic weapons as they approached the protective wire.

4. Line ICELAND

In addition to improving positions on Line MISSOURI, this Headquarters was greatly concerned with selecting a defensible position, Line ICELAND, for occupation in case a truce materialized and the demarcation line of 27 November became effective.

In the west (left) half of the Division sector, the contemplated demilitarized zone dictated coincidence of Line ICELAND with Line WYOMING, an earlier defense line. Defense works along this line were intact for the most part, and with some rehabilitation, would form a strong position. On the east (right), however, the boundary of the buffer zone denied this Division the dominating summit of Hill 604 (vicinity CT6639) above KUMHWA. For this reason, Line ICELAND was drawn in a sharp, south-sweeping loop from the railroad at YUGONG-NI (CT597408) over Hill 495 and behind the NAMDAE River (see overlay to OD #1, Book 4, Part 1). This left the communications center of KUMHWA forward of the MLR. The precariousness of any line forward of KUMHWA that did not include Hill 604 forced the decision to dig in below it.

Regimental commanders laid out Line ICELAND on the ground in detail. It was approved on personal inspection by the Commanding General. Work on the line began 11 December and continued until the Division was relieved.

5. Movement into Reserve

Relief of the Division by the 2d US Infantry Division was originally scheduled for 17-20 December. However, the limited availability of trucks and restricted road net dictated a revision of this schedule. The commanding generals of both

divisions agreed the relief should begin on the 15th to permit motor movement of one regiment per day. Their decision was approved by CG, IX US Corps.

Administrative details involved in planning the move included: (1) scheduling of motor marches precisely so that units bound in different directions would not meet in defiles or other narrow parts of the roadway; (2) obtaining trucks to motorize both infantry divisions--solved by pooling the organic vehicles of each division and procuring additional trucks from IX US Corps transportation truck battalion; and (3) movement of units to loading points so as to coincide with motor march schedules.

Tactical aspects of the move involved (1) relief of front line units during hours of darkness to prevent detection by the enemy; (2) increased patrolling and other counterintelligence activity during the days just before the move; and (3) making the tactical aspects of the relief harmonize with the administrative necessity for precise motor march schedules.

That both administrative and tactical planning was sound was evidenced by the fact relief was made without confusion or hostile reaction, and the motor marches were accomplished on schedule without incident.

6. Regimental Assignments

The 27th Infantry Regiment closed in the HWACHON (CTS717) area 18 December and relieved the 38th Infantry Regiment, 2d US Infantry Division, as Corps reserve. The 27th Infantry was alerted on 22 December for movement to KOJE-DO to provide security for the United Nations Prisoner of War Camp on that island. As subsequent orders from Eighth Army required the first increment of troops and equipment to arrive at INCHON for embarkation 27 December, the 35th Infantry Regiment was moved from KAPYONG to HWACHON, taking over the Corps reserve mission. Thus, operationally, all three US regiments were lost to the Division.

Coincident with this relief, the Division furnished one battalion to relieve the Eighth Army Provisional Battalion guarding the tungsten mines in the SANGDONG area, approximately 115 kilometers from the new command post at KAPYONG.¹ The 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, was selected for this mission. The 3d Battalion moved from KAPYONG 20 December and assumed responsibility for its new mission 220600/I December.

1. In compliance with Letter of Instructions Hq, Eighth Army, dtd 06 Dec 51 and Operations Directive No. 2, this Hq, dtd 12 Dec 51.

During the period 22-23 Dec 51, the Provisional Battalion, once the 3d Battalion of the now-inactive 24th Infantry Regiment, moved to the vicinity of KAPYONG. By 27 December the 900-odd officers and men of the Provisional Battalion were re-assigned or rotated, its books were clear, and all battalion equipment was in the hands of Division supply services.

7. Area Improvements

Units still remaining under Division control began immediate improvements of the reserve areas. Roads were graded, filled, and widened. Leaves and trash were removed and a major portion of the area covered with fine sand. A program of building semi-permanent installations such as offices, mess halls and living quarters was initiated. All improvements were being made to provide a clean and attractive reserve area, equipped with adequate semi-permanent facilities, for use of divisions ordered into Corps reserve and for use as a semi-permanent camp for an occupation division in the event of an armistice.

Division missions at the end of the month included: (1) the revamping of counterattack plans to fit the greatly reduced combat force of the Division; (2) implementing a training program designed to heighten the combat effectiveness of the Division; and (3) planning for a command inspection of all Division units.

8. Patrol Activity

A tabulation of patrol activity for the period 1-18 December follows.

PATROL AND TASK FORCE ACTIVITY

Map Date Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results	
1	B/14th	Squad reinf	800 meters fwd out- guard Hill 432 vic CT5542	Combat	Night	No engagement	
	C/14th	Platoon	2000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
	C/27th	Squad	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement	
	Raiders 27th	Squad	1400 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
	L/35th	Squad	800 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement	
	11/TAFB	Platoon	2000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement	
2	1	C/14th	2 squads	CT547412	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		F/14th	Platoon	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		C/27th	Platoon	4000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		B/27th	Squad	1000 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
		G/27th	2 squads	1300 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
		F/35th	2 squads	700 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Night	No engagement
3	2	B/14th	Platoon	CT502437	Combat	Day	No engagement
	3.	L/14th	2 squads	CT592432	Combat	Night	No engagement
	4	A/27th	Squad	CT598443	Combat	Day	No engagement
	5	A/27th	Squad	CT603423	Combat	Night	No engagement
	6	F/27th	2 squads	CT628428	Combat	Day	No engagement
	7	I/35th	2 squads	CT663417	Combat	Night	No engagement
	8	9/TAFB	Platoon	CT525422	Combat	Day	No engagement
	4	9	A/14th	2 squads	CT539415	Ambush	Night
10		L/14th	Platoon	CT587443	Combat	Day	No engagement
11		C/27th	Platoon	CT593447	Combat	Day	No engagement
12		C/27th	Squad	CT610419	Combat	Night	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
4	13	E/27th	2 squads	CT634424	Combat	Day	Recd s/a fire from Hill 354 vic CT6442. Enemy fire silenced by mortar and .50 MG fire
	14	E/35th	Squad	CT688438	Combat	Day	No engagement
	15	K/35th	2 squads	CT670423	Combat	Night	No engagement
	16	2/TAFIC	Platoon	CT499431	Combat	Day	No engagement
5	17	A/14th	Platoon	CT545426	Combat	Day	No engagement
	18	I/14th	2 squads	CT578432	Combat	Night	No engagement
	19	B/27th	2 squads	CT597440	Combat	Day	Recd 10 rds 60mm mortar fire. No casualties.
	20	A/27th	Squad	CT602428	Combat	Night	No engagement
	21	G/27th	2 squads	CT635426	Combat	Day	No engagement
	22	A/35th	2 squads	CT688435	Combat	Night	No engagement
	23	10/TAFIC	Platoon	CT518420	Combat	Day	No engagement
6	24	B/14th	Squad	CT550427	Combat	Night	No engagement
	25	I/14th	Platoon	CT562439	Combat	Day	No engagement
	26	A/27th	Plat reinf	CT593445	Combat	Day	Recd mortar and s/a fire from Hill 259 vic CT5944. Patrol placed arty fire.
	27	Tank Force	2 plats C/89th 1 mine-sweeper team A/65th	CT594446	Combat	Day	Destroyed enemy bunkers and emplacements on Hill 259.
	28	B/27th	Squad	CT610418	Combat	Night	No engagement
	29	F/27th	2 squads	CT623428	Combat	Day	Recd s/a fire from est enemy squad vic CT626434. Patrol placed s/a, AW and mortar fire.
	30	B/35th	2 squads	CT678424	Combat	Night	Recd fire from est 2 enemy plats vic CT678424. Arty and mortar fire placed— 3 en KIA.
	31	7/TAFIC	Platoon	CT486434	Combat	Day	No engagement
7	32	G/14th	Platoon	CT518420	Combat	Day	No engagement
	33	K/14th	2 squads	CT585428	Combat	Night	No engagement
	34	Tk-Inf	Plat C/27 Plat C/89	CT593447	Combat	Day	Recd 5 rds mortar fire vic CT594444.
	35	G/27th	Squad	CT633423	Combat	Day	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
7	36	E/27th	2 squads	CT610429	Combat	Night	No engagement
	37	I/35th	Squad	CT669418	Combat	Night	No engagement
	38	11/TAFB	Platoon	CT518420	Combat	Day	No engagement
8	39	C/14th	Squad	CT546421	Combat	Night	No engagement
	40	K/14th	Platoon	CT584447	Combat	Day	No engagement
	41	G/27th	2 squads	CT623428	Combat	Day	No engagement
	42	K/27th	Squad	CT601427	Combat	Night	No engagement
	43	Raiders	Platoon 27th	CT593448	Combat	Day	No engagement
	44	C/35th	3 squads	CT688435	Combat	Night	No engagement
	45	5/TAFB	Platoon	CT508422	Combat	Day	Patrol observed en squad vic CT502426 and placed arty fire. Enemy was dispersed.
9	46	B/14th	Platoon	CT561436	Combat	Day	No engagement
	47	L/14th	2 squads	CT580410	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	48	F/27th	2 squads	CT625426	Combat	Day	Patrol recd MG fire from vic CT644444 and 2 rds est 60mm mortar fire.
	49	Tr-Inf	2 squads K/27 2 plats C/89	CT593446 (Hill 259)	Combat	Day	Patrol secured objective. En withdrew from Hill 259 to village vic CT592449. Arty fire placed on village. Patrol recd AW fire from vic CT606442 and CT603446.
	50	K/27th	Squad	CT603428	Combat	Night	No engagement
	51	I/35th	Squad	CT665417	Combat	Night	No engagement
	52	9/TAFB	Platoon	CT527419	Combat	Day	No engagement
10	53	E/14th	2 squads	CT540416	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	54	L/14th	Platoon	CT585444	Combat	Day	No engagement
	55	K/14th	2 squads	CT585440	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	56	E/27th	2 squads	CT633424	Combat	Day	Patrol recd s/a fire from est plat vic CT634422, CT634426 and CT632426. 8 en KIA. Patrol directed mortar and arty fire on village vic CT634424.
	57	I/27th	2 squads	CT598442	Combat	Day	No engagement
	58	L/27th	Squad	CT610418	Combat	Night	No engagement
	59	A/35th	3 squads	CT679426	Combat	Night	Patrol recd s/a fire from vic CT677427.
	60	6/TAFB	Platoon	CT500431	Combat	Day	No engagement



Date	Map No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
11	61	F/14th	Platoon	CT559442	Combat	Day	No engagement
	62	F/14th	2 squads	CT670424	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	63	G/14th	2 squads	CT550413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	64	I/14th	2 squads	CT575415	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	65	L/14th	2 squads	CT577435	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	66	G/27th	2 squads	CT643413	Combat	Day	No engagement
	67	K/27th	2 squads	CT597436	Combat	Day	No engagement
	68	A/35th	3 squads	CT679426	Combat	Night	Recd s/a fire from vic CT678425. Patrol placed arty and s/a fire. Engaged unknown number of enemy vic CT681426.
	69	F/35th	2 squads	CT670424	Combat	Night	No engagement
	70	6/TAFIC	Squad	CT497425	Ambush	Night	No engagement
12	71	F/14th	2 squads	CT553425	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	72	I/14th	Platoon	CT562442	Combat	Day	Recd 10 rds of 60mm mortar
	73	K/14th	2 squads	CT576432	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	74	F/27th	2 squads	CT629429	Combat	Day	No engagement
	75	K/27th	Squad	CT603429	Combat	Night	No engagement
	76	Tk-Inf	Flat I/27 2 plats G/89	CT595448	Combat	Day	Recd s/a, mortar and bazooka fire from vic CT602-446. Patrol placed arty and mortar fire.
	77	L/27th	squad	CT609419	Combat	Night	No engagement
	78	A/35th	Squad	CT678425	Combat	Night	Engaged unknown number enemy vic CT678425.
	79	7/TAFIC	Platoon	CT488444	Combat	Day	Patrol observed 4 enemy on Hill 472 vic CT498440 and 10 enemy vic CT494443.
	80	10/TAFIC	Squad	CT517409	Ambush	Night	No engagement
13	81	E/14th	Platoon	CT552428	Combat	Day	Recd s/a and AW fire from Hill 528 vic CT5443. Patrol placed mortar and arty fire.
	82	E/14th	2 squads	CT546427	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	83	I/14th	2 squads	CT585430	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	84	Tk-Inf	Flat E/27 3 plats G/89	CT628434	Combat	Day	Observed 15-20 enemy vic CT626434. Mortar and arty fire placed and est 5 enemy KIA. One tank was damaged by enemy mine vic CT624430.
	85	L/27th	Platoon	CT598438	Combat	Day	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
13	86	F/35th	Squad	CT671421	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	87	G/35th	Squad	CT652415	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	88	6/TAFC	Squad	CT499423	Ambush	Night	No engagement
14	89	G/14th	2 squads	CT552426	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	90	K/14th	Platoon	CT572437	Combat	Day	Recd 12 rds 60mm mortar fire vic CT559446.
	91	G/27th	2 squads	CT632422	Combat	Day	Recd s/a fire vic CT638426.
	92	E/27th	3 squads	CT643412	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	93	K/27th	Squad	CT601430	Combat	Night	No engagement
	94	Tk-Inf	2 plats K/27 2 plats C/89	CT595446	Combat	Day	Recd 30 rds 60mm mortar fire vic CT594447. Recd heavy s/a and AW fire from vic Hill 458 (CT608464) and 30-35 rds 105mm arty fire from vic CT593463.
	95	Raiders 27th	Platoon	CT629436	Combat	Night	Engaged unknown number of enemy vic CT628436.
	96	B/35th	Squad	CT681421	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	97	E/35th	Squad	CT677413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	98	F/35th	Squad	CT665417	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	99	5/TAFC	Platoon	CT507428	Combat	Day	Engaged est en plat vic CT507428 with AW, s/a and mortar fire. Recd 70-80 rds 82mm mortar fire.
	100	9/TAFC	Squad	CT525413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
15	101	A/14th	2 squads	CT587439	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	102	E/14th	Platoon	CT573438	Combat	Day	Recd 14 rds 60mm mortar fire.
	103	Tk-Inf	Plat F/27 3 plats C/89	CT635426	Combat	Day	Recd s/a fire vic CT632419.
	104	G/27th	Platoon	CT651416	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	105	K/27th	2 squads	CT601429	Combat	Night	No engagement
	106	I/27th	Squad	CT598440	Combat	Day	Destroyed 10 houses--no engagement
	107	I/27th	Platoon	CT619429	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	108	E/35th	Squad	CT674417	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	109	G/35th	Squad	CT651411	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	110	5/TAFC	Squad	CT604421	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	111	9/TAFC	Platoon	CT523420	Combat	Day	No engagement

Date	Map Ref No.	Unit	Composition	Objective	Type	Time	Results
16	112	E/9th Squad		CT652416	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	113	F/9th Squad		CT669416	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	114	I/9th Squad		CT681421	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	115	K/9th Squad		CT687430	Ambush	Night	No engagement
		A/14th Platoon		4200 meters fwd MLR	Combat	Day	No engagement
	116	B/14th 2 squads		CT567438	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	117	C/14th Squad		CT574414	Combat	Day	No engagement
	118	L/14th Platoon		CT540429	Combat	Day	No engagement
	119	E/27th 2 squads		CT646413	Combat	Day	No engagement
	120	F/27th Platoon		CT628418	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	121	E/27th 2 squads		CT646413	Combat	Day	No engagement
	122	F/27th Platoon		CT628418	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	123	K/27th Platoon		CT591446	Combat	Day	Observed est en squad on Hill 259 vic CT592448.
	124	I/27th Platoon		CT593446	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	125	G/TAFIC Platoon		CT496429	Combat	Day	Engaged est en squad vic CT495435 employing s/a and AW fire. Recd 100 rds 82mm mortar fire during engagement.
	126	I1/TAFIC Squad		CT511402	Ambush	Night	No engagement
17	127	F/9th Squad		CT661414	Ambush	Night	Recd s/a fire from unknown number of en vic CT661418.
	128	G/9th Squad		CT671415	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	129	I/9th Squad		CT675418	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	130	L/9th Squad		CT685435	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	131	G/14th Platoon		CT560441	Combat	Day	Recd 29rds 60mm mortar fire vic CT564435.
	132	E/14th 2 squads		CT550413	Ambush	Night	No engagement
	133	F/27th 2 squads		CT625427	Combat	Day	Recd 2 rds est 60mm mortar fire. Observed 6 en vic CT625447.
	134	5/TAFIC Squad		CT509421	Ambush	Night	No engagement

PATROL AND TASK FORCE ACTIVITY

(Note: Map reference number refers to patrols described in preceding tabulation.)



d. Communications

During December, the Division Signal Office and the 25th Signal Company were charged with the responsibility of installing, operating and maintaining the following means of communications for the 25th Infantry Division, Korea.

- (1) Telephone circuits to all divisional units.
- (2) Teletype circuits to IX Corps.
- (3) Message Center deliveries to all divisional units.
- (4) Radio Nets as follows:
 - (a) Command Net #1 AM (CW only)
 - (b) Command Net #2 AM (CW or voice)
 - (c) Command Net #3 FM (Voice only)

¹ See Radio circuits attached as inclosures #5, 10, 13, 15.

- (5) V.H.F.

(a) See VHF Circuits attached as inclosures #4, 11, 12, 14.²

Prior to the 25th Infantry Division's move into reserve location (vicinity CS6888), the Division Signal Office and 25th Signal Company continued to operate, maintain, and improve all communications facilities at Division Main CP, CHIPORI, Korea (CT524224), and Division Tac CP (CT5430). Following the move, a continuing effort was made by all personnel to establish a communications system of the same standard maintained in the former 25th Infantry Division sector.

Signal Company CP was moved from location CT524224 to reserve location vicinity CS6888.

The 25th Infantry Division Signal Specialist School was officially closed 29 December 1951.

An inspection tour of signal installations of the 3rd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, whose present mission is the safeguarding of the SANGDONG Mining Area, was begun in December. The purpose of this inspection was to survey communication facilities and determine communication requirements.

The 25th Signal Company recovered, rehabilitated, and salvaged 898 miles of wire W-130, W-110, W-190, W-143, and WD-1.

Communication Center statistics are as outlined below for December 1951:

1. Book 15, supporting documents, this report.
2. Book 15, supporting documents, this report.

(1) Number of messenger runs made	216
(2) Number of miles traveled by messenger	6,302
(3) Total number of messages handled	2,306
(4) Total outgoing code groups	30,590
(5) Total incoming code groups	114,924
(6) Total code groups handled in and out	145,514
(7) Total clear text messages	1,689

e. Supporting Arms

The division artillery at the end of November was in position to support Line MISSOURI.

On 2 December the Turkish Armed Forces Command Artillery Battalion (CT526378) was strafed and rocketed by a flight of four F-51 fighter bombers. Damage consisted of 2 WIA, 1 KIA, 2 trucks, 1 CP tent and 1 howitzer damaged. Investigation showed that air identification panels were properly displayed and error was admitted by the air force pilots.

Verbal orders from CG IX US Corps and CG 25th Infantry Division early in December directed that preliminary planning be initiated to cover the relief of the 25th Infantry Division in zone by the 2d Infantry Division. 25th Infantry Division Artillery (-) was to revert to operational control of IX Corps Artillery effecting a mutual exchange of positions and assuming the missions of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery, G/S IX Corps reinforcing fires 6th ROK and 24th US Divisions.

On 6 December 1951, the CG 25th Infantry Division Artillery and the CO 2d Infantry Division Artillery agreed on a tentative plan for accomplishing the relief of their artillery units. Between 6 December 1951 and 11 December 1951, 2d Division Artillery and 25th Division Artillery commanders and staff officers firmed details of the relief plan during informal visits to each other's headquarters.

Platoon, Battery C, 21st AAA AN Bn relieved elements of 82d AAA Bn 14 December, assuming the mission of protecting IX Corps CP.

The advance party of 25th Division Artillery departed for new area vicinity CTB63428 16 December, arriving at 1330 hours. Four sections of Battery C, 21st

AAA AW Bn relieved elements of the 82d AAA AW Bn and assumed the mission of protecting bridges at CT9116, CT6105, CS8894 and CS8390.

The 8th FA Bn, relieved by 37th FA Bn (2d Division Artillery), moved from CT628-371 17 December and closed into new area vicinity CT855426 at 1536 hours. 90th FA Bn (- Battery A), relieved by 12th FA Bn (- Battery B), 2d Division Artillery, moved from CT567359 and closed into new area CT8743 at 1250 hours.

Battery A, 90th FA Bn, relieved by Battery B, 12th FA Bn moved from CT5635 into new area CT8743 closing at 1625 hours, 18 December. 2d Division Artillery and 25th Division Artillery exchanged control of artillery zone of responsibility at 0800 hours. 69th FA Bn, 987 AFA Bn, TAFCArtillery Bn (Co B 2d Chemical Mortar Bn atchd) passed to operational control 2d Division Artillery as of 0800 hours. 64th FA Bn passed to operational control 92d AFA Bn Group as of 0800 hours. Hq & Hq Battery, 25th Division Artillery moved to new area CT8643, closing at 1430 hours. 21st AAA Bn (-) moved from CT6033, closing into new area CT8542 at 1536 hours. 25th Division Artillery Air Section moved from CT5224 to new air strip CT8324, closing and coming under operational control of IX Corps Artillery at 1330 hours.

On 20 December 1951, Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn relieved from attachment TAFCArtillery Battalion passed to operational control 2d Division Artillery. TAFCArtillery Battalion CT526378 returned to operational control 25th Division Artillery, moved to new position CT904442 at 1300 hours.

The period 20-24 December was spent in organizing unit position areas. Other activities during the remainder of the month consisted of firing reinforcing fires in support of 6th ROK Division and the 24th US Infantry Division. Scheduled training covering 20 hours per week was commenced on 26 December to improve the performance of artillery operations and to develop key personnel for replacement of anticipated losses. On 28 December 1951, Battalion Commanders inspected Line KANSAS positions to determine the work necessary to reconstruct them.

On 31 December 1951, 25th Division Artillery was organized for combat as follows:

8th FA Bn

G/S IX Corps and reinforcing 24th US
and 6th ROK Divisions

69th FA Bn (Btry A, 21st AAA Bn
atcd) attached to 2d Inf Div

D/S 14th Infantry

64th FA Bn (1 Platoon Btry D,

21st AAA Bn atchd) attached

928 AFA Bn Group

90th FA Bn

TAFIC Artillery Bn

21st AAA AW (-)

Btry C, 21st AAA Bn

G/S IX Corps and reinforcing 2d US
and 2d ROK Divisions

G/S IX Corps and reinforcing 24th US
and 6th ROK Divisions

G/S IX Corps and reinforcing 24th US
Division and 6th ROK Division

Protect Division Artillery

Protect IX Corps Bridges and installations

Part III

Intelligence

a. Elements in Contact

During the period 1-18 December 1951, the 25th Infantry Division maintained contact with two divisions of the 26th CCF Army, specifically, the 77th Division, supported by the Special Duty Regiment 26th CCF Army, and the 76th Division. Owing to the lack of information from prisoners (seven Pw captured during the entire period of contact), the disposition of the 26th Army was somewhat vague. However, documentary evidence did assist in the determination of the enemy's disposition. Previously the 228th Regiment, 76th Division, had been tentatively accepted in the western zone defending the SOBANG-SAN hill mass. On 8 December, a document found on the body of a dead CCF soldier in the vicinity of CT489432 identified the 9th Company, 228th Regiment. Based on the capture of this document and the statements of Pw captured late in November, the relief of the 78th Division by the 76th Division and the deployment of the 228th Regiment, 76th Division between the CT50-58 N-S grid lines, was accepted. Hills 717 and 682 were each defended by a battalion of the 228th Regiment and the third battalion was accepted as being in reserve. In addition, the 76th Division had as a reserve, the other two organic regiments-- the 226th and 227th Regiments.

East of the HANTANCHON River, the continued presence of the Special Duty Regiment, 26th CCF Army, was confirmed by the capture of a Pw identifying the 2d Battalion, Special Duty Regiment, on 17 December in the vicinity of CT600443. The continued deployment of the 230th Regiment, 77th Division between the CT64-69 N-S grid lines was confirmed by the capture of an enemy document in the vicinity of CT681421, identifying the 3d Company, 230th Regiment. The 229th Regiment, 77th Division, was located east of the 230th Regiment. It engaged other UN forces outside of the 25th Division's zone of responsibility. The 231st Regiment, 77th Division, was in reserve. The 78th Division, having been relieved by the 76th Division in the western zone, was accepted as being in Army reserve.

The estimated strength of the 26th Army at the close of the period was 20,889. Of noteworthy interest for this period was the rate of casualties suffered by the enemy. Friendly ground and artillery units accounted for 142 verified KIA, 425 estimated KIA, 761 estimated WIA and 7 Pw.

Relatively few prisoners were captured during the period. This was attributed primarily to the stringent measures reported taken by the enemy to prevent desertions. Prisoners stated that the CGF officers and non-commissioned officers kept very close watch on every soldier. The punishment for an attempted desertion was death. The families of deserters were also punished.

b. Enemy Action

With the exception of one attack against elements of the Turkish Armed Forces Command, in an attempt to annihilate an outpost of this friendly unit, the enemy's attitude remained primarily defensive during the period. This action occurred during the hours of darkness on 14-15 December, when an estimated enemy battalion, attempted to surround and destroy a platoon of the 7th Company, TAFIC on an outpost position at CT489432. The attacking force was identified by the capture of PW and documentary evidence, as the 2nd Battalion, 226th Regiment, 76th Division. Here again, as on 8 September 1951, the enemy employed the tactics of passing a reserve unit through front line units in order to make a limited objective attack. The attack was unsuccessful. The friendly TAFIC forces killed an estimated 190 enemy, captured four prisoners and a substantial amount of enemy material.

The enemy did not employ armor, air or special weapons during the period of contact. The number and dispositions of the enemy artillery pieces remained unchanged from November. It was estimated that the enemy had forty pieces generally disposed in depth. Artillery and mortar fires were primarily harassing in nature when directed against friendly front lines. Patrols sent to reconnoiter enemy positions continued to report mortar and artillery concentrations, apparently pre-planned, falling on or near the patrol routes.

c. Enemy Defenses.

The location and nature of the enemy defensive positions were essentially the same as during November.

d. Artillery Intelligence

Air OP's continued to provide the most information concerning enemy activity

and location of profitable targets. Air OP's operated on schedule to provide at least two aircraft in the Division sector during all periods of operational weather. In addition to this observation coverage and normal Forward Observers, the Artillery with the Division operated six ground observation posts. This combination of observation agencies provided very complete coverage of the Division zone of operation as deep as 10,000 yards into enemy territory.

The enemy continued to employ his artillery and mortars in a defensive manner. The majority of enemy shellings were directed against outposts and patrols probing deep into his territory, with very few rounds reported to have fallen behind the MLR. No counterbattery was conducted by the enemy during the period. Most of the enemy shellings appeared to be unobserved, harassing missions using one or two guns. He did, however, on several occasions, demonstrate his ability to bring effective adjusted concentrations on patrols and on selected areas as a preparation in support of limited attacks.

Enemy artillery identified during the period were 75mm, 76mm and 105mm. Enemy mortars identified were 60mm, 82mm and a few 120mm.

e. Dissemination of Information

On 18 December 1951, the 25th US Infantry Division was relieved by the 2d US Infantry Division. All intelligence information compiled by the G-2 Section, 25th Infantry Division during the period 31 July - 18 December 1951 was transferred to the relieving unit. Overlays showing enemy dispositions, points of contact, trench work, mined areas, artillery positions and artillery and mortar concentration areas, together with terrain and road studies were presented to the G-2 Section, 2d US Infantry Division. With these overlays and studies, the 2d US Infantry Division was able to continue an uninterrupted evaluation of information relative to the 26th CCF Army.

Part IV

Personnel

a. Division and Unit Staff Assignments

Colonel Donald Dunford announced as Chief of Staff vice Lt Col Richard W. Whitney, 12 December 1951.

Lt Col Richard W. Whitney announced as CO, 14th Infantry Regiment vice Lt Col Roy V. Porter, PCS to ZI, 12 December 1951.

Captain Abraham W. Lake announced as S1, 3d Bn, 14th Infantry Regiment vice Captain John R. Carlson, evacuated, 12 December 1951.

Captain William J. Toumey announced as S2, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry Regiment vice Captain Joe A. Font, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Captain Randolph M. Sumerall announced as S2, 2nd Bn, 27th Infantry Regiment vice 1st Lt Dell G. Evans, rotated, 10 December 1951.

1st Lt Ralph P. Noonan announced as S4, 3d Bn, 27th Infantry Regiment vice Captain Otis R. Skinner, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Major George L. Cook announced as AC of S, G4 vice Lt Col William Coulter, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Major Brooks O. Norman announced as Bn Comdr, 89th Tank Battalion vice Lt Col William T. Hamilton Jr, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Major Henry D. Walding announced as Bn Exec Officer, 89th Tank Battalion vice Major Robert J. Jackson, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Major Charles L. Hill announced as S2, 35th Infantry Regiment vice Major John B. Amaker, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Captain Roy J. Patterson announced as S4, 1st Bn, 35th Infantry Regiment vice Lt Louis J. Devito, rotated, 10 December 1951.

Major Joseph P. McElligott announced as Exec Officer, 21st AAA Battalion vice Major Robert J. Taylor announced as S3, 21st AAA Bn vice Major David Miss, rotated.

Lt Col Bruce Barton Jones, announced as 3d Bn CO, 35th Infantry Regiment vice Lt Col Sidney C. Baker announced as CO, 35th Infantry Regiment vice Col Thomas Woodyard Jr, reassigned 28 December 1951.

Captain William M. Dolan announced as S2, 90th FA Bn, vice 1st Lt Michael J. Doyle, relieved, 26 December 1951.

Captain Thomas R. Nichols announced as S1, 90th FA Bn vice 1st Lt Werner A. Hofmann, relieved, 26 December 1951.

Lt Col Myron E. Shepler announced as Division Ord Off vice Lt Col William F. Register Jr, rotated, 20 December 1951.

Colonel John N. Green announced as Exec Officer, Div Artillery vice Colonel James L. Frink Jr, rotated, 19 December 1951.

Lt Col Norman B. Edwards announced as CO, 27th Infantry Regiment vice Colonel George B. Sloan, transferred, 20 December 1951.

Captain Frank J. Tolocka announced as S4, 3d Bn, 27th Infantry Regiment vice 1st Lt Ralph P. Noonan, relieved, 20 December 1951.

Captain Raymond G. Dunn announced as S4, 1st Bn, 14th Infantry Regiment vice 1st Lt Richard P. Ritter, rotated, 21 December 1951.

b. Strength¹

Strengths for the month were as follows:

	<u>Beginning of Period</u>		<u>End of Period</u>	
	Auth	Aagd	Auth	Aagd
1. US Troops				
25th Inf Div	18,176	20,369	14,662	15,559
2. United Nations				
TAFIC	5,105	5,099	5,105	5,068
RCE		568		415

c. Replacement and Rotation²

A total of 48 officers and 568 enlisted men ~~was~~ received during the month. The required overstrength for the Division was maintained.

Replacements were received from the 510th Replacement Company, 110th Replacement Battalion, at YONGDUNG-PO RTO and transported to the 25th Replacement Company by motor vehicle. Hospital returnees (9 officers, 330 enlisted men) were also processed through the Replacement Company, all of them being returned to their old units.

Five groups of rotation combat personnel were processed:

1. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.
2. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.

	<u>Officers and W/O</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
7 December	82	386
14 December	9	110
24 December	23	249
29 December		36
30 December	<u>11</u>	—
Total	125	701

The rotation criteria established by Eighth Army provided eligibility for officers with 45 constructive months service or more as of 31 December, and for enlisted men with 20 or more constructive months service points as of 31 August. However, officers who were surplus to the command were reported to Headquarters, Eighth Army.

d. Discipline¹

During December, the following number of cases were tried by courts martial:

<u>Type of Court</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
General	10
Special	7
Summary	40

Of those cases, 45 percent were for violations of Article 92 (speeding and willful disobedience); 20 percent were for violations of Article 85 and 86 (AWOL, desertion); and the remaining cases were violations of Article 134 (the general article).

During the month, six cases were processed by the Division Staff Judge Advocate and forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final appellate review. The number processed and forwarded during the previous month (November) was nine.

Eight cases that were forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for final appellate review were held legally sufficient.

e. Burial and Graves Registration

The Division Quartermaster transferred the bodies of eight enlisted men to the 293d Graves Registration Unit during December.

1. For further details, see Book 11, supporting documents, this report.

f. Civil Assistance¹

During the period 1-17 December, while this Division was still occupying positions on Line MISSOURI, 1226 unauthorized civilians were collected within the Division zone and delivered to the Refugee Collecting Point. Of this number 124 were evacuated as refugees and the remainder through labor or police channels. The number evacuated through refugee channels was only 30 percent of the number evacuated during the previous month. The decline was attributed to inclement weather and aggressive action by Civil Assistance police stationed along the southern boundary of the Division zone.

Pursuant to authority in TWX, I Corps, dated 9 December 1951, a program was initiated by the Division Civil Assistance Section to eliminate, with certain exceptions, indigenous civilian labor forces in favor of the Korean Service Corps.

g. Morale and Personnel Service²

Four regular groups of 500 persons were sent to Japan on rest and recuperation leave during December. In addition, two special quotas of 76 persons and one of 168 persons also departed for Japan during the month.

The following number of awards were approved during the month:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
Distinguished Service Cross	0	0
Silver Star	7	25
Bronze Star Medal (Valor)	17	52
Soldiers Medal	1	2
Bronze Star Medal (Meritorious)	55	57
Air Medal	23	0

There were no awards made by this headquarters to personnel other than US Army.

There were three Battlefield Commissions during December 1951.

Cumulative figures for Battlefield Commissions are 220.

The Division Chaplain conducted a total of 45 Catholic Masses and 11 Rosary Devotions for various units of the Division. Protestant Chaplains in this headquarters conducted 26 Protestant services.

1. For further details, see Book 17, supporting documents, this report.
2. For further details, see Book 2, supporting documents, this report.

h. Medical Services¹

1. General

A total of seven helicopter evacuations of seriously wounded patients was made from field medical installations. This low number can be attributed to the limited action at the front during the cease-fire talks and movement of the Division into reserve.

The division surgeon had a conference with the Commanding General for the purpose of having a vigorous safety program put into operation in the Division. Statistics for the past three months have indicated a very high rate of accidentally incurred injuries that could have been prevented. The Division Commander was highly receptive to the idea, and a command letter was published stressing an active safety program within the Division.²

The following is a summary of evacuations and hospitalizations occurring during the month. The cumulative figure reflects hospitalizations and evacuations since the beginning of the Korean campaign to 1800 hours 31 December 1951. These figures were compiled from the A & D sheets of the Division Clearing Company.

	<u>December</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
Remaining from last report	39	
Admitted to clearing stations	636	34,290
Evacuated from clearing stations	378	24,254
Returned to duty	292	9,992
Deaths at clearing stations	0	39
Remaining at clearing stations		5

2. Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever

During the first two weeks of December, seven patients were evacuated from Division Clearing Stations with a tentative diagnosis of Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever. Only two of these cases have been confirmed so far. There were no reported cases during the last two weeks of the month. It is assumed that the epidemic period of the disease is over. To date, the 25th Infantry Division has had one hundred and eleven confirmed cases of Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever.

3. Malaria Control

Suppressive drug therapy with chloroquine was discontinued on 8 December 1951. The incidence of new cases has been relatively few. Ten cases were reported during the month.

1. For further details, see Book 16, supporting documents, this report.
2. See Inclosure 1, Book 16, this report.

4. Wet-Cold Injuries

There were twelve cases of frostbite during the month. The breakdown of frostbite is as follows:

	<u>December</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
14th Infantry Regiment	3	4
27th Infantry Regiment	0	1
35th Infantry Regiment	3	6
65th Engineer C Battalion	0	1
25th Division Artillery	5	5
25th Quartermaster Company	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	12	18

5. Gastrointestinal Diseases

The incidence of gastrointestinal diseases during the month was negligible. Only thirteen cases were reported for the entire Division.

6. Upper Respiratory Disease

There was a decrease in the incidence of upper respiratory diseases during the month. There were thirty-four upper respiratory infections severe enough to warrant hospitalization at the clearing stations.

7. Infectious Hepatitis

In December, there were six cases of infectious hepatitis reported in the Division. Two of these occurred during the first week, one during the second week, one during the third week, and two the last week.

8. Venereal Disease

A breakdown of the incidence of venereal disease follows:

Syphilis: 15 Gonorrhea: 54 Chancroid: 18

9. Dental Service

Oral hygiene in the command is good. There were 1560 admissions, 1821 dental operations, 2916 settings, 1027 fillings, 788 extractions, 23 full dentures, 60 partial dentures, 415 dentures repaired and 48 denture splints.

10. Battle Casualties

The following is a breakdown of battle casualties occurring during the month. These figures do not include missing in action, killed in action, or casualties returned to duty from medical installations below the organic level of the Division Clearing Company. Figures were compiled from the daily A & D sheets of the Division Clearing Company.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>December</u>
14th Infantry Regiment	16
27th Infantry Regiment	6
35th Infantry Regiment	6
89th Tank Battalion	5
25th Division Artillery	<u>2</u>
Total	35

Ten persons were given psychiatric evaluations during the month.

Part V

Logistics

a. Logistical Situation

On 1 December the Division Quartermaster, Quartermaster Class I & III supply point, 725th Ordnance Company and Class V depot were located in the vicinity of the command post at CHIPO-RI (CT521221). The Quartermaster Class II & IV supply point remained at the same location, vicinity ORYUDONG (CS100502). The month saw divisional units go through a series of displacements, attachments to other divisions, assumptions of responsibilities in widely scattered areas, and moves to Corps reserve.

At the end of the month, the Division Quartermaster and Class I & III supply point was located vicinity CS695905. The 725th Ordnance Company was located vicinity CS688902. Class V support was from ASP 55A located vicinity CS8890 for units in KAPYONG area; ASP 55B located vicinity CT828213 for Division Artillery (-); and ASP 56A located vicinity CT533271 for the 14th Infantry Regiment, 64th and 69th Field Artillery Battalions. The main supply route became Route 2 from YONG-DONGPO-SEOUL northeast to road junction Routes 2 and 18, Route 18 northeast to Route 17, north on Route 17 to KAPYONG, CHUNCHON and HWACHON.

Supply for the most part was good with the exception of water trailers, vehicle parts, and Quartermaster expendable items. During the period the remainder of phase III winter clothing items were issued to all personnel. The first increment of winter housing items was received. The shortage of tent stoves was alleviated.

The winter clothing exchange point at Quartermaster Class I and III supply point was continued in operation and units were able to effect direct exchange to obtain necessary sizes. In order that replacement personnel might be properly equipped prior to arrival at front line units, the Commanding Officer of the Replacement Company and Division Quartermaster were directed to make complete issues of winter clothing and equipment at the Replacement Company.

The winter housing program was partially completed during the period. Upon moving to the reserve location, 375 additional squad tents were taken over in place from the 2d Infantry Division. These tents were the property of IX Corps and are to be used by all units utilizing this reserve location and will be left

in this area upon departure of the Division. 115 (98 complete) tropical shells and ten Quonset Huts were received during the period. Notice was received that tent winterization kits had been shipped and would arrive early in January.

The burners previously short for tent stoves were received and at the end of the month the supply of stoves was very good.

Issue of items of camouflage arctic clothing was completed to units. This issue included over-white trousers, parkas, gloves, and sunglasses.

Twelve hundred and eighty armored vests were received and issued to the Turkish Armed Forces Command.

Two thousand seven hundred and fifty-four canvas cots were received and issued to Divisional units during the month. These cots will remain in this reserve area upon departure of the Division.

A letter was distributed to units relative to policy on installation of canvas tops on vehicles. Tops and side curtains are to be installed on all vehicles except $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks (medical evacuation litter jeeps excepted). Requisitions for unit requirements will be submitted to the appropriate Ordnance Supply Officer.

An initial (partial) issue of winterization equipment for vehicles was made during the month. Equipment included personnel heaters, tops, and side curtains.

Upon relief by the 2d Infantry Division, some automatic weapons were turned over to them by this Division. These weapons were issued on a loan basis to be returned when this Division departs reserve location.

To provide housing for use as chapels and special functions, three assembly tents were produced and issued to 14th and 35th Infantry Regiments and to Division Headquarters Company.

Holiday meal was served to all personnel on Christmas Day. Forty thousand paper plates and cups were procured in Japan and issued to units for serving the Christmas and New Years Day meals.

Because of the reserve status of this Division, an issue of the new type combat boot (rubber insulated to replace the shoe pac) had not been obtained at the end of the month. Efforts were being made to obtain these boots for the 14th Infantry Regiment, because this unit is still on the line.

b. Supply

The average supported strength for the Division during the month was 31,562 military personnel and 8,432 civilians. Of these 8,432 civilians, approximately 7,039 are Korean Service Corps personnel.

Class I supply level was set at one day's supply in hands of troops of either "A" or "B" (operational) rations and one-half day's supply in hands of troops of either "C" or "5 in 1" (combat) rations. One day's supply of "B" rations and one day's supply of "C" rations are maintained in reserve at the division supply dump.

Class II supply level is fifteen days' supply in hands of troops for expendables and seven days' supply of other items in hands of troops.

Class III supply level is one day's supply in hands of troops with two days' supply maintained in division dump.

Class IV Quartermaster levels are 15 days' supply in hands of troops for expendables and seven days' supply of all others. Engineer Class IV is on an "as required" basis.

Class V level is one basic load in hands of troops with a five days' supply maintained in Army Supply dumps.

The most critical items of supply were water trailers, vehicle parts, Quartermaster expendable supplies and water cans.

There was three hundred and twenty-seven dollars and fifty cents spent on local procurement during the month of December.

c. Captured Enemy Materiel

During the month the following enemy material was captured, processed and evacuated to the EUSAK Salvage Collecting Point:

Rifle, 6.5 (Japanese)	ea. 1
Ammunition, foreign, assorted	ton 1½
Grenades, (Chinese)	ton 1/20

d. Transportation

Owing to the moves of the Division, organic transportation was taxed to the extreme throughout the month. Transfer of the 25th and 2d Infantry Divisions was

accomplished by using vehicles of each division for mutual loading. By the maximum utilization of these vehicles, requirements for vehicles from other sources were kept to the minimum. Moves of service elements were echeloned and the Division move to the KAPYONG reserve area was by major units.

Upon completion of the move to reserve area, railheads were established at KAPYONG (CS7088) for Class III and Engineer II & IV supplies and at CHUNCHON (CS-8793) for Class I supplies. Quartermaster II & IV continued to use the railhead at SOSA-RI (CS040510). The shortened distance between Quartermaster Class I & III railheads and distribution point has decreased the time requirement for transportation of supplies and as a result has reduced the need for additional vehicles.

The following major moves were coordinated by the G-4 Section during the month:

Division move by highway to KAPYONG-HWACHON area. Division Artillery (-) to 24th Infantry Division zone.

3rd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment move by highway to SANDONG with return of 8th Army Provisional Battalion to the KAPYONG area.

27th Infantry Regiment move by highway to INCHON port and move by water to PUSAN (KOJE-DO).

35th Infantry Regiment move by highway from KAPYONG area to the HWACHON area upon departure of the 27th Infantry Regiment.

Special rail movement of 325 reassigned personnel of the 8th Army Provisional Battalion from KAPYONG to PUSAN.

Air movement of advance party of the 27th Infantry Regiment from CHUNCHON to PUSAN.

The vehicle regulating point at UIJONGBU was closed on 10 December.

Highway conditions remained good during the period. Two light snowfalls occurred during the month, but no highways were blocked and normal traffic continued.

Route 17A was closed for a two-day period because of a landslide.

e. Quartermaster Service

During December the Division Quartermaster issued the following supplies:

<u>Class I</u>	<u>No. Rations Issued</u>	<u>Average per Day</u>
A	661,473	21,370
C	115,836	
<u>Class III</u>	<u>No. Gals Issued</u>	
MoGas	1,182,369	
AvGas	13,197	

Part VI

Chronology

- 2 December Brig. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey, Chief of Staff, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Sector during the day.
- 5 December Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps, and Brig. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Eighth Army, visited the 25th Infantry Division Tactical Command Post during the day.
- 6 December Brig. Gen. Orlando C. Mood, Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, Major Gen. Robert N. Young, Commanding General, 2d US Infantry Division, visited the 25th Division Tactical Command Post during the day.
- 8 December Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, Assistant Division Commander, 2d Infantry Division, moved to the 25th Infantry Division Command Post to supervise movement of the 2d Division into the 25th Division sector.
- 9 December General Swift greeted Congressman Ben F. Jensen, Congressman C. C. McGrath, Congressman H. C. Andersen, Mr. Vernon D. Northrup, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, Far East Command and General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth Army. The visiting dignitaries were touring Korea.
- 13 December Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps, visited the 25th Infantry Division area during the day.
- 17 December Major Gen. Robert N. Young, Commanding General, 2d US Infantry Division, moved to the 25th Infantry Division sector.
- 20 December During the morning, General Swift held a formation in honor of General Mitchell and presented him with the sward of Legion of Merit upon his departure to the Zone of Interior.
- 22 December Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps, visited the 25th Division Command Post during the day.
- 26 December Francis Cardinal Spellman and General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth Army, visited the 25th Division sector during the day.
- 29 December Major General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General, IX Corps, visited the 25th Infantry Division sector during the day.

Part VII

Discussion and Recommendations

1. General

The 25th Infantry Division continued to defend its sector of IX US Corps front on Line MISSOURI (vicinity CT479415 northeast to vicinity CT699423) during 1-18 December 1951. The period was characterized by patrols and task force activity designed to maintain the present line and to prevent the enemy from moving his line or outposts forward. This limited activity was to continue through the 30-day trial period of armistice negotiations. If the armistice talks were harmoniously terminated by 27 December, the Division was to occupy Line ICELAND, a defensible sector behind the provisional cease-fire border established at PANMUNJOM by UN and Communist negotiators.

The remainder of the month saw Division units go through a series of displacements, attachments to other divisions, assumption of responsibilities in widely scattered areas, and moves into IX US Corps reserve. A discussion of those activities is contained in Part 2 of this report.

Present Army tactical doctrine, operational procedures, and staff action continue to be revealed as generally sound and adaptable to operations in this theatre. However, commanders and staffs at all levels should expect and be prepared to make modifications to meet the situation. In many situations, the workable solution in Korea represents no great change, but an emphasis on some particular part of basic doctrine or procedure. A few examples of this occurring in this Command during December follow.

2. Defense of Combat Outpost

The successful defense of a combat outpost at night against a numerically superior force by a platoon of the Turkish Brigade (pages 9-10, this report) conclusively demonstrated that positions on the outpost line of resistance must be within supporting range of artillery. Artillery should be positioned so as to support the outpost, as well as carrying out its normal mission of firing final protective barrages for the MLR.

Chinese infantry, attacking an outpost at night, attempt to surround the position before launching their assault, and, because of the irregular terrain in Korea, are often able to do so. In such cases, it is much better for the outpost to hold ground, at least until daylight, instead of trying to withdraw to the MLR.

To hold their ground, the outpost must be able to call for prearranged concentrations all around its position. Men on the position can take care of enemy infantry who escape the artillery fire, but must be protected from an overwhelming onslaught.

Another salient lesson in this action is the necessity for unity of command in attempting to clear enemy from the area between the outpost and the MLR. If the enemy is known to have infiltrated between the two positions, one patrol under one commander, moving only from one direction, should be sent out. If more than one patrol goes out on a combat mission or to set up an ambush under separate commanders, confusion and disaster can be expected. Movement of the patrol must be coordinated with all units on the OPLR and the MLR.

Visiting patrols, normal in the organization of any outpost line of resistance, are indispensable against the Chinese in Korea. These patrols should operate between outpost positions and between outposts and the MLR. By moving through the low land between positions organized on key terrain, they provide early warning of enemy attempts at infiltration. Also, in case one position is hit by the enemy, one of these patrols can be used to reestablish contact or to go to the rescue of the position under attack.

3. Assembly Areas

Planning for a motor march that terminates at an embarkation point should include the establishment of an assembly area at the destination. Moving a major unit from a distant point directly to shipboard entails solution of nearly insurmountable problems. This is especially true when the march is made at night, on short notice, or over narrow, icy, mountainous roads. The chances for error, accident, and confusion are too great to warrant such a move except in emergency.

Recommend that units moving to a point for the purpose of loading aboard ship be given at least two days for preparation, and that an assembly area be set up at the embarkation point for the purpose of rest, regrouping, and inspection before boarding ship.

4. Camp Sites

When selecting an area in Korea to be used as a permanent or semi-permanent camp site, the effects of thaws and heavy rains should be borne in mind. Areas which appear dry and solid at one period may be soggy or even flooded with the next rain. The low valleys along the course of rivers are all subject to floods

over a wide area. Paddy lands, having been under continuous cultivation for centuries before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, are constructed to collect and retain water. When frozen, the paddy fields can serve temporarily as a parking or bivouac area, but before they can be used as a permanent site they must be drained and covered with coarse sand or gravel.

Poor drainage is characteristic of all areas. High ground above the paddy lands will collect water and remain soggy for days after thaws or heavy rains. Drainage ditches and a covering of sand will improve the area. Main supply routes and secondary roads need constant ditching and resurfacing with sand and gravel. Organic dump truck transportation within an Infantry Division is not sufficient to perform satisfactorily road and area maintenance required in underdeveloped countries such as Korea. It is recommended that one additional dump truck company be assigned each Infantry Division to augment the organic dump trucks now authorized.

5. Rotation of Detached Organic Aircraft

On numerous occasions it becomes necessary for higher headquarters to borrow light aircraft, organic to the division, for special missions in distant areas. Loss of the aircraft from the division creates both an operational handicap and results in less of training time for the pilots operating in coordination with ground elements.

It is recommended that planes on these separate missions be rotated at frequent intervals among several divisions.

6. SANGDONG Mining Area

An inspection of the SANGDONG mining area by the Division Commander shortly after the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, assumed the responsibility of guarding it, revealed the following weaknesses:

(a) In addition to providing security, the 3d Battalion was responsible for hauling ore from widely scattered pits to the WONJU railhead. The battalion's organic vehicles were insufficient for this task.

(b) Units of the battalion were widely separated; radio equipment in the area was antiquated and unreliable; roads were narrow, subject to blocking by landslides, and certain bridges were dangerous for heavily loaded trucks.

(c) Housing was inadequate and unsanitary. Narrow valleys offered few camp sites.

(d) Units of the battalion were too distant from medical facilities, posing serious possibilities in case of emergency.

The following remedial actions were taken:

(a) The Division Signal Officer gave top priority to establishing adequate radio communications to SANGDONG from Division, and reliable radio and telephone contact between units of the 3d Battalion.

(b) Through staff coordination between Division and Headquarters, Eighth Army, arrangements were made to provide for:


(1) Bimonthly pickup of ore by an Army transportation truck company.

(2) A labor force to load ore at WONJU.

(3) A helicopter based at WONJU for medical evacuation and for use by battalion commander for inspections of his units.

(4) Engineer support from the 32d Engineer Battalion to assist in road maintenance, bridge construction, and housing improvement.

It is recommended that infantry troops be used in operations of this kind only as a security force for they are neither trained nor equipped to load and transport mined products.


JAA P. SWIFT
Major General, USA
Commanding

COMMAND



8A/FEC-51-43074

24 Nov 51

Maj Gen Ira F Swift (left) CG 25th US Inf Div, confers with Vice President of the United States Allen W Barkley, during the Vice President's visit to Div area, CLIFFORD, Korea, on 24 November 1951.



8A/FEC-51-43125

24 Nov 51

During his inspection tour of the Korean front, US Vice President Alben W Barkley (wearing winter hat) addresses members of the Turkish Brigade, UN Command, attached to the 25th US Inf Div. Standing in his rear, from left to right are General Matthew B Ridgway, C-in-C, UN; Lt Gen William H.oge, CG, IX US Corps; Maj Gen Swift; and Gen James A Van Fleet, CG Eighth US Army.



8A/FEC-51-43073

24 Nov 51

Gen Matthew B Ridgway (center) CinC USC, arrives at the 25th US Inf Div airstrip, CHIPPO-RI, Korea, with Vice President of the United States Alben W Barkley and his party, to begin inspection tour of the Div area. Maj Gen Ira I Swift stands at right.



8A/FEC-51-43123

24 Nov 51

During his inspection tour of front line units in Korea, US Vice President Alben W. Barkley (foreground) smiles broadly, as the 25th US Inf Div Band plays "Happy Birthday". In the reviewing party are (L to R) Lt Gen William M. Hoge, CG, IX US Corps; Vice President Barkley; Gen James A. Van Fleet; and Maj Gen Ira I. Swift.



GA/119-51-43072

24 Nov 51

Vice President of the United States Alben W. Barkley (wearing winter cap) addresses troops of the Turkish Brigade during his visit to HQ of the 25th US Inf Div, C.I.F.C.-AI, Korea. Brig Gen Hamid Arpac, CG Turkish Brigade, stands at right foreground. Other officers can be seen in the background.




GA/119-51-43075

24 Nov 51

Vice In Action, Barkley answers a few questions during interview held at the 25th US Inf Div camp, C.I.F.C.-AI, Korea. Lt Gen William L. Sage, CG IX US C, looks on at center.

PERSONNEL



8A/FEC-51-43088

29 Nov 51

Near ChI.FO-RI, Korea, the early Christmas rush at APO 25 of the 25th US Inf Div gets under way.




8A/FEC-51-43079


25 Nov 51

Christmas rush at the 25th US Inf Div Hqs, ChI.FO-RI, Korea, as men of the post office section work to sort packages received for troops of the Division.


INTELLIGENCE



Chinese prisoners of war wearing winter uniform. These uniforms are made of plain, brown cotton cloth filled with cotton padding. CCF winter uniforms are not "ribbed" or "quilted" as are those of the North Korean Army. The cap is also of padded cotton. Shoes are of canvas, some of which are wool lined and some fur lined.




Side view of CCF winter uniforms. Underwear consists of drawers and undershirt of white cotton. During cold weather remnants of summer uniforms are worn as additional undergarments. At times, a CCF soldier may wear as many as three summer uniforms under his padded jacket and trousers.



Rear view of CCF winter uniforms. Men are issued overcoats, but claim they are too cumbersome to carry. In stabilized positions overcoats are used as blankets as only 2 to 5 cotton blankets per squad have been issued. Front line troops were issued winter clothing in early November. New troops coming to Korea have winter clothing, plus quilts they purchased for themselves. Some rear area troops have not been issued winter clothing, according to IIR reports.

OPERATIONS



8A/FEC-51-43809

4 DEC 51

Using communication trench as a forward observation post, men of Co 3, Turkish Brigade, view enemy positions south of HAN-HYON, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-43810

4 DEC 51

Men of Co 3, Turkish Brigade fire from communication trenches on Chinese Communist Forces south of HAN-HYON, Korea. Trenches of this kind are indispensable for movement from position to position or from front to areas in immediate rear.



8A/FEC-51-40257

1. Dec 51

Machine gun squad of platoon of the 241st Turkish Inf Regt, covers an out-going patrol from positions in front of Hill 530 near PYONGGANG, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-40208

1. Dec 51

Southeast of PYONGYANG, Korea, on the west central front, men of 1st Platoon, Co B, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, move out on a patrol mission to check enemy positions.



8A/TFC-51-43815

5 Dec 51

Man of Co B, 2nd Chemical Mortar Bn, Eighth US Army, attached to the Turkish Brigade, prepares 4.2 mortar shell for fire mission during action against the Chinese Communist Forces northeast of C. G. BONG, Korea.



8A/TFC-51-41674

13 Nov 51

Str. of six 155mm howitzers of the 69th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, blast enemy held positions as the 25th Inf Div continues assault against the Chinese Communist Forces near C. G. BONG-RI, Korea.



GA/PFC-51-41817

23 Nov 51

Cannoneer, 780th FA Bn, Eighth US Army, fires 200lb shell toward an enemy entrenchment from his position in the 25th US Inf Div sector on the west central front, north of the village Chol-SHO, G-III, Korea. These 6-inch howitzers have proved invaluable in destruction of heavy bunkers.



GA/PFC-51-42453

26 Nov 51

Near the village of MUMBA, Korea, on the west central front members of Section III of Btry B, 837th FA Bn, Eighth US Army, fire their "Long Tom" in support of the 25th US Inf Div.



8A/FEC-51-42883-C

26 Nov 51

Member of Meteorological Section, Hq Btry, 25th US DivArty, generates gas and fills weather balloon as he prepares to take daily weather data at HUNEMI, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-42884-C

26 Nov 51

Members of Meteorological Section, Hq Btry, 25th US Inf DivArty, release balloon as they record weather data at HUNEMI, Korea.

TRAINING



Crew members of a unit from 21st AAA AW Battalion cover advance of infantry with their .50 calibre machine guns in an exercise held near KUMIWA, Korea. Camouflage on the half-track indicates the kind of realism required in field training.



A patrol from 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, rehearses stream crossing on a simulated patrol. Small unit problems are emphasized in training scheduled during periods battalions occupy reserve positions.



Assistant instructor demonstrates proper method of delivering "arching fire" with calibre .45, submachine gun, M3, during a field exercise held by 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, near KUMAWA.



A 57mm recoilless rifle team practices firing at a point target from partial defilade. Range firing by Division units is a continuous and progressive process, even when the Division is occupying front line positions.



Member of heavy mortar company, 35th Infantry Regiment, sights through aiming circle, during recent firing problem conducted in battalion reserve area.



New members of 4.2-inch mortar crew practice sighting their weapon in "dry run" exercises held in company area.


SERVICES



8A/SEC-51-41819

23 Nov 51

The arrival of winter accompanied by snow and a bitter wind does not stop these linemen of the Construction Section, 25th Signal Co, 25th US Inf Div, from their job, on the west central front, southeast of PUCHANG, Korea.



8A/SEC-51-43007

25 Nov 51

Linemen with the 64th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, checks communication wires near KUMJWA, Korea.



8A/SEC-51-43133

27 Nov 51

Linemen with 64th FA Bn, 25th US Inf Div, check communication lines near KUMIWA, Korea.



8A/SEC-51-43323

6 Dec 51

Men of the Construction Section, Sig Co, Turkish Brigade, put a cable on reel unit M26-A B Co, near the village of KUSANG, Korea.



6A/FEC-51-43812

4 Dec 51

Men of the Sig Co, Turkish brigade, check communication lines at their hqs south of HAN-HIC, Korea.



6A/FEC-51-43817

27 Nov 51

Truck refueling from 55-gallon drum at 64th VA Hq near HAN-HA.




8A/FEC-51-43043

Welder with the 725th Ord Co, 25th US Inf Div, repairs truck at Co hqs near IOCHON, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-43057

Members of the 725th Ord Co, 25th US Inf Div, overhaul motor at Co hqs, near IOCHON, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-43149

Machinist with the 725th Ord Co, 25th US Inf Div, is pictured at work in work shop at Co Hqs, near PONGCHON, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-43150

Watch repairman 725th Ord Co, 25th US Inf Div, works on watch at Co Hqs near PONGCHON, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-45112


At IONCHON, Korea, personnel of the 725th Ord Co, 25th US Inf Div, hoist weapons into position.



8A/FEC-51-43821

6 Dec 51

Men of the Turkish Brigade gather at a station near the village of HULLANG, Korea, to receive their typhus vaccination.



Welder of Co A, 194th Combat Engr Bn, 19th Engr Group, Eighth US Army, welds 42-ft "I" beam to bed plate, during construction of bridge near the village of HASONG-DONG, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-43822

6 Dec 51


Men of the Turkish Brigade work to complete construction of road leading to Turkish Sig Co Hqs, near the village of KUMHANG, Korea.



8A/YEC-51-43808

4 Dec 51


Men of the Engr Co, Turkish Brigade, build new road leading to the fighting front south of NA-REO, Korea. Road building and repair is a continuous process in Korea.



8A/TEC-51-41818

Snow, rain and bitter cold make it tough for this jeep of Co F, 14th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, to progress to the front lines, on the west central front, southeast of HONGJANG, Korea.

HOUSEKEEPING



GA/230-51-3096

Men of Co. 1, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, are pictured at work in the kitchen of the regiment near NGUWA, Korea. Co. 1 claims to have the best kitchen in the Regiment.



GA/230-51-42058

Men of Co. 1, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, get on a regimental mess hall near NGUWA, Korea, before noon chow. This mess hall arrangement is typical of head-quarters mess halls. The men can be fed in a short time because of the efficiency of the kitchen staff.



SA/REC-51-42454

27 Nov 51

East of KUTIMA, Korea, on the west central front, an old range house, built of the protective wrapping paper of artillery shells, is utilized as personnel of Army C, 15th FA Bn.



SA/REC-51-42455


A bunker built of logs with holes and openings filled with cement for comfort, is utilized by personnel of Army C, 15th FA Bn, east of KUTIMA, Korea, on the west central front.



8A/FEC-51-42885-C

1 Dec 51

General view of cabins made from fibre ammo containers and line, used as HQs of the 15th PA Bn, 2d US Inf Div, then supporting the 25th US Inf Div, NOICHOK, Korea.



8A/FEC-51-43035

Cook with Co D, 35th Inf Regt, 25th US Inf Div, removes marmite can from drying rack built at Co D kitchen near KUHWA, Korea.

ROADS AND BRIDGES



8A/250-51-4065

Men of the 77th Combat Eng Bn, 25th US Inf Div, lay foundation for bridge to be constructed across the NAMDAE-CHON River, southeast of PUCHANG, Korea.



8A/250-51-4067

Members of the 77th Combat Eng Bn, 25th US Inf Div, operate hand powered saw to cut timbers for new bridge being constructed across the NAMDAE-CHON River.



Men of the 77th Combat Eng Bn, 25th US Inf Div, erect foundation for bridge to be constructed across the NADAE-C.O. River, southeast of PUMHANG, Korea.



Men of the 77th Combat Eng Bn, 25th US Inf Div, working on a bridge 400 yards from the front lines on the west central front, southeast of PUMHANG, Korea.



A huge 42-ft steel "I" beam is raised and sunning into place by a large crane, as the last piece of steel is placed in the 336-ft bridge being constructed by men of the 2d Platoon, Co A, 154th Combat Engr Bn, 19th Engr Group, Eighth US Army, near the village of HASONG-DO, S. Korea.



Members of 1st Co, 165th Combat Engr Bn, 25th US Inf Div, operate road grader as they repair road southeast of P'ONGMANG, Korea.


RESERVE AREA IMPROVEMENTS




Hqs Co street-- Men of Div Hqs and Hqs Co begin to pitch square tents shortly after arrival at new Command Post near KAP-O-G.



View of Div Hq and Hqs Co street a few days later. Fine white sand, hauled from a nearby river, improved the appearance of the area and helps stabilize the sticky soil that was characteristic of the area.




View of "1st Street" looking east, before leaves and other debris were removed and road grading was begun. The framework of the tropical shell being erected can be seen at the right.



Same view on "1st Street" after area was cleared and road graded. Proper drainage for all walks and roadways is indispensable. The completed tropical shell, now housing the G2 and G3 sections can be seen on the right.



Looking west on "2d Street" before grading and clean-up.



"2d Street" after tents were pitched and road graded and scanded.




Closer view of tropical shell in early stages of construction.



Completed row of tropical shells, showing the semi-permanent type of construction being done to prepare area for use as a regular Corps Reserve area or as location for an occupation division in case of an emergency.



Officers' mess tent (left) and enlisted mess tent (right) shortly after arrival. The area had already been graded in preparation for sand covering at time photograph was taken.



Tropic shell replaces tent for enlisted mess. Another shell for the officers' mess was being erected at time photograph was taken. Fine sand had also been hauled in to cover the area.



Motor pool area, graded for proper drainage and ready for covering of sand.



Same area after covering of sand was spread. The sand, mixing with the native soil of the area, forms a more stable surface after a few days of usage.



View of "3d Street" showing type of stone fences being built to add to area's attractiveness.



General view of 1st En, 35th Infantry Regiment near Kwachon. Muddy fields, although frozen when first occupied, require drainage and soil stabilization to avoid mire during thaws.



"Do5" Company area, 35th Infantry Regiment, near IMAC.C. after a week of work on the grounds.