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Report date: 1940-1946

Title: United States Army 4th Infantry Division

Abstract: **Item 2170:** AGF testing sheet, 4th Infantry Division, 3 June 1940-5 March 1946; **Item 2171:** Story of the 4th Infantry Division "Famous Fourth", 6 June 1944-March 1945 with illustrations; **Item 2172:** Narrative history, June 1944-March 1945; **Item 2173:** Rhineland Campaign, 26 January-9 March 1945; **Item 2174:** Miscellaneous statistical data, February 1946, reports from regiments, casualties of regiments, reactivation information for the 4th Infantry Division, maps and other information; **Item 2175:** Map showing the advance of the 4th Infantry Division from Utah Beach to Siegfried Line, 6 June-14 December 1944; **Item 2176:** Operations map, European Campaign, 6 June 1944-2 May 1945; **Item 2177:** 1943 History and General Orders; **Item 2178:** History, 5 December 1917-1 February 1944; **Item 2179, Part A:** Operations reports, June 1944, special reports, order of battle team #2 report; **Part B:** Operations report, July 1944, special report with overlays; **Part C:** Operations report, August 1944 (France), special reports with overlays; **Part D:** Operations report, September 1944 (France) and special reports; **Part E:** Operation reports, October 1944 (German border) and special reports; **Part F:** Operation reports, November 1944 and special reports; **Part G:** Operations report, December 1944 (Germany) and special reports, maps and overlays; **Part H:** Operations reports, January 1945 (Luxembourg) and special reports; **Part I:** Operations report, February 1945 (Belgium) and special reports; **Part J:** Operations report, March 1945 (Germany) and special reports; **Part K:** Operations report, April 1945 (Germany) and special reports; **Part L:** Operations report, May 1945 (Germany) and special reports; **Item 2180:** Special operations report, Invasion of France, May-June 1944; field orders, overlays, troop list, memos, report on the invasion, miscellaneous notes, regimental reports of action; **Item 2181:** Special operations report, Advance to Cherbourg, June 1944, field and fragmentary orders, overlays, miscellaneous notes and eye witness accounts; and **Item 2182:** Special operations report, Carentan-Periers sector, June 1944, field orders, memos, overlays, report of operations, interview on operations, miscellaneous notes, and order of day notes.

Number of pages: 1021

Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Microfilm collection #: D 328 Item nos. 2170-2182

Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release

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
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1 March 1947



FACT SHEET ON THE 4th INFANTRY DIVISION

SHOULDER PATCH: Inherited from the original 4th Division of World War I, the insignia is composed of four green ivy leaves attached at the stems and opening at the four corners of a square on a brown background. The word "I-ivy", as pronounced, suggests the characters used in the Roman numeral "IV".

TYPE OF DIVISION: Regular Army

NICKNAME: Ivy Division (Famous Fourth)

MOTTO: Steadfast and Loyal

HISTORY: Division was organized at Camp Greene, N. C., under Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron in 1917. It arrived in France by June 5, 1918, but the first casualties had occurred at sea on May 23, 1918, at a point near Land's End and the Isle of Wight, when the *Maldivia*, a refitted British liner, was torpedoed and sunk by German submarines and 56 men of the Division were lost. Participated in the Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns, and occupied Germany for seven months after the Armistice. On its return to the United States the Division was demobilized.

ACTIVATION DATE: 3 June 1940, Ft. Benning, Ga.

INACTIVATION DATE: 5 March 1946 at Camp Butner, N. C.

TRAINING UNDER AGF: After completing training at Fort Benning, the Division moved to Camp Gordon, Ga., on Nov. 15, 1941, and came under the Second Army's control. On March 9, 1942, the division was assigned to Army Ground Forces. In April 1943, the unit was transferred to Fort Dix, N. J. It continued training there until Sept. 1943, at which time it was sent to Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., for amphibious training. In Dec. 1943, the 4th went to Fort Jackson, S. C., and at the end of the year left AGF control. Elements began returning to U. S. in July 1945 and upon return to AGF control began to retrain at Camp Butner, N. C.

OVERSEAS TRAINING: Continuous training at Devon, England for amphibious operations. Effort was made to simulate in training the landings which were to come on the Normandy coast.

DEPARTED U. S. FOR FOREIGN DUTY: 18 January 1944 for E.F.O.

RETURNED TO U. S.: 10 July 1945

BATTLE CREDITS: (Division) Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes, Central Europe.

DATE ENTERED COMBAT: DIVISION 6 June 1944 D-Day

COMBAT DAYS (DIV): 299

SUCCESSIVE COMMANDING GENERALS: Maj. Gen. Walter E. Prosser, June to Dec. 1940; Lt. Gen. Lloyd H. Fredendall, Jan. to July, 1941; Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold Aug. and Sept., 1941; Maj. Gen. Harold K. Bull, Oct. and Nov. 1941; Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen, Dec. 1941; Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace, Jan. to June, 1942; Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton, July, 1942 to Dec. 1944; Maj. Gen. Harold H. Blakeley from Dec. 1944 to October, 1945; Maj. Gen. George P. Hays, Nov. 1945 to date of inactivation.

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COMPONENT UNITS: 8, 12 and 22d Inf. regts; 4th Ingr Combat Bn; 4th Med. Bn; 4th Gen. Tp (w/cz). Div. arty: 29, 42 and 44th FA Bns (105 how) and 20th FA Bn. (155 how). Sp Tps: 4th G. Co, 4th Eng Co, 704 Ord Co (Ls), Hq. Co, and P. Plat and Band.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFEAT OF HITLER IN EUROPE: S/Sgt marcelo Garcia, Company B, 22d Infantry Regiment, for 27 November 1944 action near Grosshan, Germany; Lt. Col. George L. Malby, Jr, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment for 20 November 1944 action in the Hurtgen Forest near Schovenhutte, Germany; 1st Lt. Bernard J. May, 8th Infantry Regiment, for 17 November 1944 action in the Hurtgen Forest near Schovenhutte, Germany; Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr, Asst. Div. CG, was awarded a medal of Honor posthumously for action on D-Day.

DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION: 3d Plat, Co A, 4th Ingr C. Bn for 6 June 44 action in France; 3d Plat, Co C, 4th Ingr C Bn. for 6 June 44 action in France; 4th Ingr C Bn. for 6 Nov - 7 Dec 44 action in Hurtgen Forest, Germany; 8th Inf for 6 June 44 action in France; 12th Inf. for 16 - 24 Dec 44 action in Germany; 22d Inf. for 26 July - 1 Aug 44 action in Normandy; 3d Bn, 22d Inf. for 6 - 9 June 44 action in France; 22d Inf 16 Nov - 4 Dec 44 action in Hurtgen Forest; 29th FA Bn. for 6 - 13 June 44 action in France; 44th FA Bn for 6 - 14 June 44 action in Normandy beachhead; 44th FA Bn. for 26 July - 2 Aug 44 action in St. Lo, France; 42d FA Bn. for 16 - 25 Dec 44 action in Luxembourg.

FOREIGN AWARDS: Awarded Belgian Fourragere for 7 - 13 September 1944 action in the St. Hubert - St. Vith area and for the battle of the Ardennes in the Scharnack - Luxembourg area. Per Belgian decree number 1394 dated 20 November 1945.

COMBAT HIGHLIGHTS: On D-Day, June 6, 1944, the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division became the first Allied unit to battle Germans on the Normandy beaches. For this achievement the regiment received a Distinguished Unit Citation. After landing the division took ground rapidly. It broke through to the vital road center of Ste. Eglise to relieve part of the 82d airborne division which had been isolated for 36 hours. By D plus 4 the Division was pushing on to Le Theil. On June 25, 1944, after taking Tourlaville, Cherbourg suburb, the Division swept to the coast. One week after starting their drive, the 4th occupied the entire city of Cherbourg except a few forts along the waterfront and in the harbor. Between July 1 and 20, the 4th was in the area around Periers, France, waiting for the tremendous Third Army smash which was to be launched. Between July 24 and Aug. 18, 1944, the 4th was in the thick of this drive across France and by the end of August had helped liberate the city of Paris. Early in Sept., 1944, the Division fought its way into Belgium and by mid-month had bitten into the Siegfried line. A 22d Infantry Regiment patrol is credited as being one of the first American units to cross the border of the Reich, filtering through German lines on Sept. 11, 1944. By Sept. 14 the 4th had breached the line in four places. During Oct. 1944, the Division inched ahead into Germany, and by December was fighting in the hell of the Hurtgen Forest. Here one regiment of the 4th claimed the destruction of five German regiments in pecking 19 days of constant attack. After Hurtgen, Luxembourg was heaven. But it didn't last. Germans began their final big attack of the war on Dec. 16, but the 4th held firm at Diekweiler and Ostweiler in Luxembourg, and helped blunt the enemy drive. On Jan. 18, 1945, the 4th crossed the Sauer River. Quickly the Division overran Puren and Vlanthen and by Jan. 21 had captured all of its objectives. Five days later the 4th moved in pursuit of fleeing Germans, now in headlong flight. By Feb. 9, 1945, the 4th had crossed the vital Prum River and two days later took Prum, Germany. Pausing long enough for other divisions to draw abreast the 4th, along with the 11th Armored Division, pushed on to cross the Kyll River at the beginning of March, 1945. A task force made a dramatic 24 hour dash which carried it more than 20 miles, capturing Adenau and Weifferscheid. By the war's end the 4th had rolled ahead well into the vital heartland of Germany. During its combat the Division

had suffered 21,550 casualties. Behind it lay distinct achievements such as the drive through the Ardennes Forest and the penetrations of the Siegfried Line. Shortly after VE Day the Division began to return to the U. S. for retraining. Before the Division could be re-deployed to the Pacific. V-J Day was announced and the division was subsequently inactivated at Camp Butner, N. C. on 5 March 1946.

DIVISION ASSOCIATION: Mr. Ben Pollack, Registrar
Natr'l Fourth "Ivy" Div. Assn.,
25 South St., Box 654
Boston 2, Mass.

END

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The Story of the 4th Infantry Division
of Famous Fourth's
6 Jun 44 - March 45

FAMOUS FOURTH

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THE STORY
OF THE 4th
INFANTRY
DIVISION



Name _____

Date Enlisted _____

Assigned to 4th _____

Training _____

Battle Actions _____

Citations _____

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The 4th Infantry Division is built around three of the oldest and most distinguished infantry regiments of the United States Army. It is heir to the history of the 4th Division in World War I. Based on these traditions, we have been building a tradition of our own, one of accomplishment of assigned missions in spite of enemy weather, fatigue or shortages of personnel or supplies. This booklet is an unfinished story. I know the story is finished, may we be able to say, "We never failed."

H. M. Bledsoe
Major General Commanding.


THE STORY OF THE 4th INFANTRY DIVISION

It will be easy to take Dickweiler," the German battalion commander told his men. "It is held by only two platoons."

He was right about the two platoons. The Fourth Infantry Division was widely dispersed along a 33-mile front in Luxembourg—a depleted company every two miles or more. But the Germans didn't take Dickweiler. They were sashed to ribbons trying.

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The defense of Luxembourg was a triumph for the fighting men of the Famous Fourth who stood their ground regardless of the odds. They took literally Gen. Barton's statement: "The best way to handle these Heinies is to fight 'em!"



Fighting 'em ever since the invasion of Europe, the Famous Fourth was the first unit to cross Normandy beaches. Battling without rest all the way to Cherbourg, the division then wheeled to punch hedgerow defenses south of Carentan. After spearheading the Normandy breakthrough, these same Joes helped thwart the German counter-thrust which tried to split Allied armies. First American unit to enter Paris, the 4th rolled through the capital, roaring across France and Belgium in pursuit of fleeing Nazis.

After blasting a gaping hole in the Schnee Eifel, the division cracked through Hurtgen Forest. It stopped the German attack in central Luxembourg, then helped drive back the enemy. Again reaching the Siegfried Line in the Schnee Eifel, the 4th pushed deep into Germany. In March, 1945, it moved south to a new zone of action.

DIVISIONAL fighting spirit is backed by a great tradition. Its three infantry regiments have been fighting outfits for generations. One of the oldest regiments in the U.S. Army, the 12th Inf., was organized in 1798, taking part in the defense of Ft. McHenry in 1812.

Double Deucers

CRACK A WALL

As lord of Europe, Hitler had boasted that American soldiers would not last more than 48 hours if they landed in France, but—

June 6, 1944, 0630: Four companies of 8th Inf. doughs felt landing craft jar to a stop on the Normandy coast, heard ramps go down with a splash, saw German pillboxes in the dunes. Then, charging through the water in a long, howling line, they stormed beach defenses.

Commanded by Col. James A. Van Fleet, the 8th, with 3rd Bn., 22nd Inf., took five forts; cleared a two-mile stretch at the southeast corner of the Cherbourg peninsula within two hours. While the remainder of the division poured ashore, the 8th, 70th Tank Bn. and 4th Engineers crashed into enemy rear positions across the flooded ground behind the beach.

Col. H.A. Tribolet's 22nd Inf. swung north along the fortified coast, blasting away at forts and pillboxes of the "impregnable" Atlantic Wall. Division Artillery followed as 12th Inf., led by Col. Russell P. "Red" Reeder, pushed northwest to fill the widening gap between the 8th and 22nd.

Gen. Barton and his three brigadier generals, Théodore

... of Mexico
... at Bull Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Wilderness, and Harbor, served in the Indian campaigns, the war with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, the Siberian expedition of 1919.

Activated in 1919, the 8th Inf., like the 12th, served in the great battles of American history, has earned modern distinction. When it marched from Ft. Bliss, Brewster in 1919, Maj. Raymond O. Barton's battalion, 8th Inf., lowered the last American flag on German soil, June 5, 1945, the 8th Inf. by Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton, Division Commander, became the first Allied unit to enter Germany in April, 1945. For its brilliant service in that campaign, the 8th received the Presidential Citation.

Organized in 1866, the 8th Inf. served in the Indian Campaigns, Cuba, Philippines and Alaska.

main line of resistance near Emondeville an all-day battle, packed with repeated attacks and counter-attacks, raged. Twice, the regiment's CP was attacked, but the Nazis eventually were routed.



Having concluded the relief of the 82nd Airborne at Ste. Mere-Eglise, the 8th made a long advance to come abreast of the 12th, extending the division's line from Emondeville west to the Merderet River. The 12nd still was locked in a deadly grapple with German fortifications.

Battling all the next day, the 8th smashed the Nazi MLR near Ecausseville. Acts of gallantry and heroism were many in the vicious fighting. Co. I charged across 100 yards of fire-swept ground; half of Co. E was cut down by ambush fire. In a final attack, 1st Bn. and Co. A, 70th Tank Bn., lifted the German line off its pivot.

While the 8th slugged through the Ecausseville line, the 12th, again ignoring its open flanks, smacked the same force it had defeated the previous day, driving the remnants to Montebourg. Meanwhile, the 12nd had buttoned up Azeville, toughest fort in the beachhead area, and shoved ahead to Château de Fontenay, home of Voltaire but now a Nazi stronghold.

By D plus four, the 12nd was pushing on to Le Theil as the 8th and 12th, hammering through desperate German defensive efforts, gained their objectives—lines southwest and northeast of Montebourg. Here, Gen. Barton ordered them to dig in and defend their gains. A

... 7th Corps were best equipped for the job. The 7th Corps were best equipped for the job. The 7th Corps were best equipped for the job. The 7th Corps were best equipped for the job.

... the 4th, 9th and 79th Inf. Divs. blazing the way, seized the port. Before daylight June 19, the 4th struck enemy forces near Montebourg. Following a barrage so close they nearly burned their faces, Joes of Co. F, 8th Inf., ripped through enemy lines to cut off the German escape route while the remainder of the regiment and the 12th berded Krauts to the "shooting gallery" Co. F had set up. Following this success, the division chased Germans 10 miles to the ring of defenses circling Cherbourg.

Meanwhile, the 12nd lunged forward from Le Theil in a long advance to take a hill between Cherbourg and its airport. The airfield, east of the city, was surrounded by the strongest fortifications on the peninsula. The 12nd proceeded to split the enemy force in half, then held out three days when it became surrounded. During this time, the 8th and 12th, in brilliant maneuvers and violent battles polished off enemy positions southeast of the city. After taking Tourlaville, Cherbourg suburb, the 12th advanced to the coast June 25. Entering Cherbourg next day, doughs mopped up the eastern section of the city while the 9th and 79th Divs. drove in from the west and south. Exactly one week after starting the drive

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from Montebourg, the Famous Fourth occupied the entire city except forts along the waterfront and in the harbor.

Then the 2nd drove in on defenses surrounding the airport where 1000 Nazis fanatically fought two days before succumbing. After a long pounding by artillery, the last harbor fort surrendered, June 29. Except for the northwest corner, the Cherbourg peninsula, pivot of the invasion, was swept clean of the enemy. Preparations for the Battle of France could go into high gear. Armored divisions and heavy artillery began arriving. Air bases were moved from England to the continent. An army capable of splitting the Wehrmacht wide open was landing in France.

Fourth Division men had fought 23 days without rest, driving ahead relentlessly until victory was won. Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, VII Corps Commander, in commending the division following the campaign, said:

If it is tribute to the devotion of the men of the division that severe losses in no way deterred their aggressive action. The division has been faithful in its honored dead. The 4th Infantry Division can rightly be proud of the great part that it played from the initial landing on Utah Beach to the very end of the Cherbourg campaign. I wish to express my tremendous admiration.



Breakthrough

BUBBLE BURSTS

This breakthrough was to be made on a sector south of Carentan. This meant clearing rugged terrain, full of marshes and swampy rivers—ground ideal for defense. Germans had dug in for a permanent stay with intrenchments in every hedgerow. To reach firm ground where armored armies could operate, it was necessary to fight through that swamp country. The job was assigned to VII Corps. The 4th was in the star role.

With only three days rest for infantrymen and none for Div Arty, the Famous Fourth—new commanders replacing those killed or wounded—launched its new campaign. The 8th now was commanded by Col. J.S. Rodwell, former Division Chief of Staff; the 14th by Col. J.S. Luckett; the 22nd by Col. R.T. Foster. Opposing forces were the 12th SS Panzer Div. and 6th Parachute Regt., both top-notch outfits.

For 10 days, the 4th experienced hedgerow fighting at its worst. A hundred yard gain on a 300-yard front often meant a full day's work for a battalion. Enemy lurked behind every hedgerow. German gunners were dug in every few yards. Forward movement brought certain fire. Yet 4th Joes went into this new, grim battle with the same unbeatable determination they had in storming the Atlantic Wall and capturing Cherbourg.

...the 2nd knocked out 20 Panthers in four days.

Germans fall back to a new defensive line along a fence road between two swamps. When the 4th took the position after battling four days, the division was relieved and moved to the St. Lo front for its next mission.

On July 21, elements of the 4th and 2nd moved forward, crowding into every field between the beach and the town. Patton's powerful Third Army was



stacked division behind division on the Cherbourg peninsula. But before this Allied might could begin

crushing the Wehrmacht, the narrow limits of the beach-head had to be broken.

The plan had three essential parts: first, VII Corps would punch a hole in German lines west of St. Lo. Through this, reserves would slice westward to the coast, getting behind and destroying enemy lines and open the way for Third Army to roll. Finally, Corps would drive straight south through Villedieu and St. Pol to block out Germans while Third Army swept into open country. The Famous Fourth was to play a vital part in the first and third phases of the plan.

The roar of heavies dropping their bombs on enemy positions signalled the beginning of the drive, July 25. The 8th moved forward at 1100. Germans, stunned by the severe pounding from the air, were disorganized and broken up into isolated groups. Plunging steadily ahead, Col. Rodwell's regiment surrounded centers of resistance for later annihilation. By nightfall, a mile and a half-deep wedge had been driven into Nazi defenses with the 8th at the point and the 9th and 30th Inf. Divs. on the flanks.

Next day, as the 8th smashed ahead, the 2nd went into action with Combat Command Rose of the 2nd Armd. Div.—a team which was to give an outstanding performance of infantry-tank coordination during the week. By noon, the Combat Command had knifed



was ordered to seize a north-south line through Villedieu, St. Pois and Mortain. Double Deucers, along with CC Rose, carried out the mission July 28.

Running into strong German forces trying desperately to build a new defense line from Tessy-sur-Vire through Percy and Villedieu to Avranches, CC Rose maneuvered and fought furious battles for five days before finally buttoning up Tessy and the area near Percy.

The remainder of the 4th was on the opposite side of Percy, keeping one jump ahead of the enemy. On Aug. 1, the 1st captured Villedieu, which von Kluge repeatedly called the key to the entire operation.

Now on the final lap, the Famous Fourth kept shoving ahead, shouldering Germans eastward into a trap forming between Third Army and the British. By Aug. 5, St. Pois and the north bank of the Sec River had fallen. Terrific artillery and mortar barrages mowed down routed defenders.

For this campaign, Gen. Collins again commended 4th Div., praising its "ability to take every objective assigned to it." Wrote the general:

I cannot let the division pass from my command without expressing my appreciation of the great contribution made by the 4th Infantry Division to the success of the VII Corps... The division has lived up to the high standard it set for itself in the initial campaign.

CLINCHING

THE *Victory* AT PARIS

WEARIED soldiers, who had rested only three days since landing two months before, now anticipated relief. But on Aug. 6, von Kluge made his desperate bid to split Allied armies by driving along the See River to Avranches. The 8th and 12nd fought fierce battles as German units penetrated their lines. Main weight of the attack fell on the 30th Div. near Mortain where three crack Panzer divisions struck. The situation became so critical by Aug. 7 that the 12th was rushed in for reinforcement.

For the next week, the 12th underwent some of the toughest combat in its history. The regiment slugged forward through artillery, mortars and screaming meemies. It was bombed by the Luftwaffe, attacked by tanks. Battalions were reduced to two or three hundred men. Joes became so tired that sheer fortitude alone kept them in the fight.

But the regiment kept pushing back the enemy. When the 12th was relieved, Aug. 12, the German counter-attack was written off as a dismal failure. The rout was on. Germans back-pedaled and didn't stop until they hit the Fatherland.

After Mortain, the 4th had its first and only real rest. No Germans were seen for 10 days; enemy artillery even







moved out of range. Alerted for an urgent mission, the division was transferred to V Corps Aug. 23.

In a driving rain, the 4th rolled along the road to Paris all that night and the next day. Although the FFI had been battling Germans for several days inside the city, the capital still was surrounded. Bringing support to the patriots, the 4th and the 2nd French Arm'd. Div. raced to clinch the victory.

The 4th bivouacked 12 miles south of the city as Germans retreated hastily across the Seine River. The 2nd set out in pursuit. That evening, 2nd French Arm'd. met strong opposition between Versailles and Paris. At midnight, the 12th was ordered to move into the city.

EARLY Aug. 25, while the 8th and 22nd crossed the Seine, the 12th advanced north on Boulevard d'Orleans, ready to take on all comers. For once, doughs found the job nearly accomplished before they arrived. On trucks, the 12th rode in triumphal procession through streets jammed from wall to wall with thousands of joyous Parisians. Third Bn. reached Notre Dame Cathedral at high noon, first Allied military unit to see the famous square for more than four years. Other battalion elements arrived as fast as they could push their way through the surging throng.

Paris was free—the biggest news the world had heard since D-Day. Gen. Barton and Gen. Blakeley represented the division when the German commander surrendered at the Gare de Montparnasse.

Moving to the north suburbs of Paris, the division cleared the city. Germans now were frantically trying

D-Day - READY AND RARING TO GO

HITLER boasted that his vaunted West Wall was impregnable. The 4th set out to prove him a liar. Where the division assaulted the barrier, east of St. Vith, strong defenses were built on a steep, thickly wooded ridge—the Schnee Eifel.

When the 12th and 22nd climbed this Sept. 14, the enemy still was disorganized from his headlong retreat. Both regiments overran pillboxes, broke through to the top of the ridge, fanning out behind the Siegfried Line.

Germans made a desperate stand. They rushed in reinforcements as the 12th and 22nd split in a twin-pronged drive. When Germans filtered into the 4th's positions from behind, the 8th was recalled from an advance farther north to fill the center gap.

The division front, now extended 11 miles, prevented further penetration without support, so the 4th was ordered to halt, dig in. After 13 weeks of continual advance, the Double Deucers settled down to hold a stabilized line. After guarding the Schnee Eifel and later the Monschau front, the 4th moved to Hurtgen Forest Nov. 5.

Of the campaign just finished, Lt. Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) L. T. Gerow, V Corps Commander wrote:

*The 4th Infantry Division has never
driven by the fact that the 4th Infantry Division has never
failed to capture its assigned objectives and has never lost
ground to the enemy. It is without reservation that I say
you have a hard fighting, smooth functioning division.*

FOR the second time, the 4th Div. had driven Germans from France and Belgium. In 1918, the Ivy Division, comprising the 39th, 47th, 48th and 50th Inf. Regts., the 15th, 16th and 77th FA Regts., and the 4th Engrs., also fought Germans in France.

The old 4th, created Dec. 5, 1917, at Camp Greene, N.C., set a remarkable record. It organized, trained, crossed the Atlantic and fought in four campaigns before the armistice was signed. It saw heavy action in the

Aisne-Marne offensive, on the Vesle, at St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne before occupying Germany for seven months.

June, 1940, when it seemed that no power on earth could stand against the Wehrmacht, the new 4th was activated. It was organized at Ft. Benning, Ga., with the 8th, 22nd and 29th Inf. Regts.; the 20th, 29th, 42nd and 44th FA Bns; the 4th Engr. Bn., and 4th Special Troops. Later, 12th Inf. replaced 29th Inf. After training at Ft. Benning, maneuvering in Louisiana and Carolina, the 4th served as the War Department's guinea pig in experiments with motorized divisions.

Gen. R.O. Barton, first Chief of Staff, returned as Division Commander in June, 1942. Under Gen. Barton's leadership, the 4th shaped up rapidly as a hard-hitting unit.

After packing up for the North African invasion in Sept. 1942, the 4th was squeezed out by shipping shortages. For the next six months, it set a record as the most frequently alerted unit in the Army. While the fighting raged in Africa and Sicily and landings were made in Italy, the division went on training at Camp Gordon, Ga. and Ft. Dix, N.J., waiting impatiently for its chance.

In Autumn, 1943, the 4th became a straight infantry division, taking its amphibious training at Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla. After two years of restless waiting, the division sailed for England, Jan. 18, 1944. At "Sunny Devon," Joe's rehearsed Normandy landings time and time again on the beach at Slapton Sands. D-Day found the 4th ready and raring to go.

Hurtgen—

"DEATH FACTORY"

HURTGEN was a cold, jungle hell—a death factory. Blocking approaches to Cologne and the Ruhr, Hurtgen was a "must" objective. The terrain was difficult enough—steep hills, thick woods, numerous creeks, poor roads. Across the front stretched belts of mines and barbed wire rigged with booby traps. Dug-in machine guns were set up to spray the entire area with interlocking fire.

Artillery, doubly dangerous in the woods because of tree bursts, was zeroed in on every conceivable objective. Weather was pure misery—constant rain, snow, near freezing temperatures. Living for days in water-filled holes, usually without blankets, troops had no escape from cold and wet.

Before the main offensive got underway, the 12th rushed south to aid a division under heavy enemy pressure. The regiment fought bitterly for eight days, attacking and counter-attacking without flank support. Although it suffered heavy casualties, the 12th returned to join the division's assault Nov. 16.

On the south flank of the offensive, the 4th attacked through the forest toward Duren. Again, its front was extended. To the left of the 12th, now commanded by



another mile gained. Germans brought up fresh regiments, counter-attacking daily. Often, companies were caught before they had a chance to get set. It took another battle to throw back stubborn Germans. After every advance, men spent hours digging holes and cutting logs to cover them. Artillery often whined, burst in the trees before shelters could be finished.

After a day and night of vicious fighting, the 22nd reached Grosshau Nov. 27, wiping out German defenders before going on to the last strip of the forest beyond the town. Still in the woods, the 8th and 12th crashed the third MLR, which was as rough as the others. The Nazis had overlooked no bet. Every approach was covered with every device of defensive warfare. Neither skill nor genius could find an easy way. It took sheer guts to win.

After three days, both regiments shattered the last line and broke through near the east edge of the forest. Then came welcome news: Relief! The 22nd moved to Luxembourg Dec. 3, followed by the 12th four days later and the 8th on Dec. 13.

Gen. Collins again paid tribute to the Famous Fourth:

The drive required a continuous display of top-notch leadership and the highest order of individual courage under the most adverse conditions. The fact that the 4th Division overcame these many difficulties and drove the enemy

Famous Fourth

LOOKS AHEAD

But it didn't last. Germans crossed the river at dawn Dec. 16, attacking the 14th and hitting division outposts from all directions. American platoons battled German battalions. Some platoons, struck from the rear, were overcome. Others withdrew, fighting their way to company areas.

That morning, Gen. Barton issued an order: "There will be no retrograde movement in this sector."

The 4th would stand and fight it out!

When a German battalion swooped down on Berdorf, lone defenders comprised a company headquarters, one rifle squad, two anti-tank squads and a four-man mortar squad. The make-shift defense took refuge in the Parc Hotel, a rifle in every other window, and withstood repeated attacks. Pulverizing German artillery blasted off the roof and part of the hotel's third floor. Doughs moved to other windows, kept firing.

Two platoons were at Dickweiler, three at Osweiler. Units in both towns were surrounded by full strength battalions. Every time Germans attacked, Jews waited until they closed in, then sprayed the Nazis with a withering fire that stopped succeeding assaults with heavy losses.

Other German units, by passing the river into the 4th's reserves. Companies with a few tanks support, boldly moved forward to take on a whole battalion. The Americans dug in for the day, and worried the Germans. This talk spread out, and supposed to be easy pickings. Instead it was giving the Nazis a terrific headache.

Transferred from their original defended positions to the front line, the 4th's tanks were the main

main breakthrough attempts, but still the enemy wasn't finished.

Withdrawing to their original starting positions, Nazis stormed Berdorf and Echternach. After completely encircling Echternach, the enemy recaptured the town. By now, the 4th had no reserves to call upon. Cooks, quartermasters, MPs—every possible man in the division—was in the line.

Gen. Barton decided to pull out of Berdorf and Lauterborn and withdraw to a solid MLR. Garrisons that had held against all odds fell back to the next line.

Germans followed: But they were too late. After attacking monotonously for three days, three battalions of the German 112th Div., already badly mauled, were wiped out. Only one German of 2nd Bn., 116th, survived the battle at Michelshof. He surrendered.

TRANSFERRED from the division Dec. 27, Gen. Barton had commanded the Famous Fourth for two and a half years, leading it with brilliant success through nine operations. Succeeding him was Brig. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley, artillery commander. Taking over Gen. Blakeley's post was Col. R.T. Guthrie.

Under Gen. Blakeley, the battle of Luxembourg was pushed to complete victory. Along with the 5th Inf. Div., which took over a portion of the front, Double Deucers seized the offensive. Germans failed to hold the little territory they had recaptured. By Jan. 1, remnants of the 112th Div. reeled backward.

Von Rundstedt's big gamble was definitely washed up.

by mid-January; the bulge was whittled down all along the line. The 4th now was sent in to cut off another chunk.

At 0300 Jan. 18, the 8th crossed the Sauer River in the winter's roughest weather. A strong north wind lashed stinging rain, sleet and snow in doughs' faces. Trucks and trailers skidded and ditched along steep, ice-covered roads. The bridging job was the toughest 4th Engrs. ever had experienced.

Surprised by the first assault, Germans were quick to retaliate. Advancing northward across the front of the Siegfried Line, the 8th took heavy flanking fire from hill-side defenders. Doggedly, 8th doughs pushed on to their objective. Farther north, the 14th overran Fuhren and took the high ground near Vlianden. By Jan. 21, the division had captured all its objectives.

In commending the 4th, Maj. Gen. M.S. Eddy, XII Corps Commander, said:

Your combat record since D-Day has been in the highest traditions of the American Army... Your execution of this mission (clearing the enemy from positions west of the Our River) was a demonstration of sound tactical planning and bold courage by a division who knew its business. Let me express my deep appreciation of your magnificent contribution to the successful operation of the XII Corps in Luxembourg.

Five days later, the Famous Fourth moved again, joining in the pursuit of Germans, now in headlong retreat from Belgium. Crossing the border in the same place it had back in September, the division recaptured

... General Winterscheidt, himself were among those falling to the 8th.

Scaling the Siegfried Line in a snow storm, the 8th closed in on the Siegfried Line from the rear to recover the Siegfried Line west of the Our River.

Team





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NARRATIVE HISTORY

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

JUNE 1940 - MARCH 1946

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
JUNE 1940 - MARCH 1946

FOREWORD

This narrative history of the 4th Infantry Division covering the period 1940 - 1946 is intended primarily as a frame work, a skeleton, on which may be hung the quantities of documentary evidence which, taken in the aggregate, form the written history of any unit. Numerous references will be found to Action after Action Reports, Staff Section Journals, and various files which have been submitted previously through appropriate channels. Detailed elaborations of any given action or period of time are readily available in this reference material.

The period of time covered extends from the reactivation of the 4th Infantry Division in June 1940 to its inactivation, currently in process, scheduled for completion 5 March 1946.

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER I

REACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

As the German offensive, World War II in Europe, gathered momentum, and the American nation began to gird itself for what hindsight tells us was inevitable battle, the 4th Infantry Division was reactivated on 1 June 1940 at Fort Benning, Georgia. No fledgling, the Fourth had behind it a long and brilliant record of World War I and carried on its color streamers for Alamein, Marne, Sargy, Ysele, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. Commanded by Brigadier General Walter E. Prosser, the 4th Infantry Division of World War II consisted initially of the 8th, 22d, and 29th Infantry Regiments, the 20th, 29th, 42d, and 44th Field Artillery Battalions, the 4th Engineer Battalion, the 4th Medical Battalion, the 4th Quartermaster Battalion, the 4th Signal Company, 4th Reconnaissance Troop, the 4th Military Police Company and 4th Headquarters Company. Not until February of 1941 was the assembly of all units of the Division at Fort Benning completed by the movement of the 22d Infantry from Fort McClellan, Alabama, and the movement of the 8th Infantry from Fort Screven, Georgia. Cadres for the four Artillery Battalions were furnished by the 83d, 17th, and 8th Field Artilleries; the remainder of the battalion strength was completed by volunteer enlistments.

In October of 1940, Brigadier General Prosser was assigned foreign service and Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall assumed command with Brigadier General Oscar W. Griswold as Assistant Division Commander.

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Meanwhile, the Division strength was being brought to the authorized figure. In three weeks of late February and early March, 5300 Selective Service men were assigned - mainly from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Fresh from reception stations, without benefit of even individual training, these selectees were initially set apart for basic drill.

First of the motorized divisions, the 4th Infantry Division was selected to pioneer in motorization, to develop tactics and techniques suitable for use by these mobile divisions. The lack of equipment proved a serious handicap, but despite the shortage of vehicles, training in motorized techniques progressed apace. Blackout marches, cross-country runs, night bivouacs, movement into and out of bivouac areas were practiced repeatedly.

In August of 1941, the 4th Infantry Division, using 1934 model Dodge and Chevrolet 1 1/2 Ton trucks, participated in the Louisiana maneuvers as a motorized unit. Constantly, new methods of controlling motor movements were tried. Commercial radios set on specific channels, military radios, panels, route markers - all were the subject of experimentation.

In August of 1941, General Fredendall assumed command of the II Army Corps, First Army, and Brigadier General Fred C. Wallace, then Division Artillery Commander, took the Division until Major General Oscar W. Griswold returned to assume command. General Griswold was assigned to command the IV Army Corps shortly thereafter and General Wallace assumed command. Late in September, the 29th Infantry Regiment was relieved from assignment to the 4th Infantry Division and the 12th Infantry Regiment was moved from Fort Dix to fill the vacancy.

Organized on an extremely temporary provisional basis, the 4th participated in the Carolina Maneuvers of 1941 again as a motorized unit. This maneuver, however, was executed with a full complement of half-track type vehicles.

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Judged a notable success, these exercises furnished excellent basis for opinions on the capabilities and limitations of motorized divisions. Teamed with the First and Second Armored Divisions, the combination of these three units produced the greatest concentration of motorized troops the U. S. Army had ever placed in the field. Strenuous, exacting, and physically difficult, the 1941 Carolina maneuvers furnished profitable experience for participating units.

In December of 1941, the 4th Infantry Division moved to what became known as the "home" of the 4th Infantry Division - Camp Gordon, Georgia. Augusta, the city nearby, greeted the new arrivals with cordial hospitality that resulted in friendships of long duration. New, well-designed, and roomy, the camp was admirably suited for a motorized unit and without delay the Division exploited these advantages. Day and night, the countryside resounded with the din of half-tracks. Vigorous training, individual and unit, was pursued.

In June of 1942, General Wallace was named to command the Fifth Service Command, and Brigadier General Raymond O. Barton, formerly Chief of Staff of the Division, was appointed to command.

In July of 1942, the Division again participated in maneuvers in the Carolinas. With some 2300 vehicles and 18000 men, the Division many times proved the value of motorized units in mobile warfare. Suddenly the Fourth was withdrawn from the maneuver, ordered to return to Camp Gordon with all possible dispatch and prepare immediately for overseas movement.

With feverish haste, the packing, crating and marking essential for movement overseas was accomplished. But this alert proved to be the first in a series of false starts. On Christmas Day, again, the Division received

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warning orders, but at the eleventh hour the move was cancelled. Finally in April, the 4th Infantry Division changed station, and, with such misgivings over being taken away from Augusta, moved to Fort Dix, New Jersey. This was thought to be the initial move toward the Port of Embarkation, but in a matter of months it became apparent that the Fourth was slated for amphibious operations. On 4 August 1944, the Division was demotorized and reorganized as the 4th Infantry Division and early in September, another permanent change of station was ordered - to Camp Gordon Johnston, Carrabelle, Florida, on the very shores of the Gulf of Mexico.

With the aid of Amphibious Engineers and under the guidance of expert instructors of the Amphibious Command, battalions, regiments, and the Division as a whole participated in amphibious exercises designed to promote familiarity with the equipment and techniques involved. Naval terminology, boat loadings, loading diagrams, landing procedures, and amphibious tactics were studied and practiced diligently. All possible realism was imparted to the problem and when the unit left Carrabelle to go to its staging area at Fort Jackson, officers and men alike felt that they were capable of adequately performing amphibious operations. A very splendid esprit existed in the Division for, justly, individuals believed that they had acquitted themselves quite creditably at Carrabelle.

At Fort Jackson, the Division began preparations for overseas movement. This time very seriously and deliberately. Equipment was crated, clothing marked, physical exams completed. Personnel was adjusted - the physically unqualified being relieved and replaced. In little more than a month, the Division entrained for Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, for final processing. Under

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strictest secrecy, final preparations were completed. Personal affairs were set in order, censorship regulations were explained, and within a week the 4th was moving to the Port of New York for embarkation. Aboard the Capetown Castle, the Franconia, and the George Washington, the Division put to sea on the morning of 18 January 1944. Sailing in convoy, the passage was uneventful. German submarines, particularly active at the time were not sighted, but the course was changed sharply because of a warning of submarines traveling on a course which would intercept the path of the convoy. On 29 January, the convoy entered the Port of Liverpool, England, and members of the 4th saw, for the first time, the devastation that the German had visited upon the English. Disembarkation, like embarkation was accomplished on 30 January with a minimum of confusion and, without delay, the 4th was on its way to stations in Devonshire, England.

NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER II

ENGLAND

The Division disembarked at Liverpool according to the then well established routine of the Port authorities and at once entrained for destinations in southern England - Devonshire. Advance parties had laid well the ground work of the reception and, with the very capable assistance of the 29th Division, organizations were met, fed, and dispatched to their billets with ordered efficiency. Vastly different from posts and camps in the United States, troops were quartered in towns with minor exceptions. This in itself constituted a problem of no mean proportion; but with the cordial cooperation of the British towns people and the rapid adjustment of the troops to the circumstances, the solution was inevitably forthcoming. Certainly there were beds for all and no one was hungry.

The billeting arrangements separated elements of the Division for the first time since its reactivation in 1940. The Division Command Post was located in Tiverton, Combat Team 8 in Honiton, Combat Team 12 in Exeter and Combat Team 22 at Newton Abbott some 45 miles from the Division Command Post. Being spread over such distances, unit commanders were of necessity allowed greater latitude than ever before.

Having been shipped overseas with individual equipment only, the Division's immediate concern was organizational equipment. Supply dumps of various classes were scattered throughout the length and breadth of England as a part of the passive defense scheme against air attack. It therefore became necessary to move truck convoys over extremely long distances to

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gather the equipment into Devonshire and distribute it to subordinate units. To the lasting credit of the Quartermaster and Ordnance units of the Division, the assignment was very competently and professionally accomplished despite the difficulties encountered in the form of a lack of trucks and long hauls. The equipment was assembled and distributed in an incredibly short time.

Two days after the arrival of troops in England, the Commanding General, together with his G-2, G-3, and G-4, met with General Bradley in London in what, unquestionably, was a historic conference; for here the plan for the invasion of France was announced and the mission of the 4th Infantry Division was assigned. General staff section chiefs were ordered to submit plans for the invasion without delay. Planning was continuous from that moment until scant days before the troops loaded for the operation.

Very earnestly and very seriously, training was instituted to prepare the Division for the successful execution of the assigned mission. In keeping with the Division commander's decisions concerning the employment of his troops, the 8th Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, were sent to the United States Assault Training Center at Braunton for very specialized training in amphibious techniques, the reduction of "hedgehog" defenses, and the tactics of fortified localities. The training at Braunton was well organized, intensive, interesting, and of immense practical value to its recipients.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the Division was undergoing hardening exercises and executing tactical problems on the moors of England. Every effort was made to impart realism to these maneuvers; supporting fires were brought down quite close to front lines and great latitude was allowed in firing over the heads of troops. Discretion and diligent prosecution of safety precautions reduced training casualties to a minimum.

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In preparation for the forthcoming invasion, the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions, the 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the 1106th Engineer Group, the 377th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion, the 87th Chemical Battalion Motorized, and the 801st and 899th Tank Destroyer Battalions were attached to the Division in England.

At the completion of the training phase at Brampton, a series of amphibious exercises was begun which, unknown to the troops, were actually rehearsals for the invasion operation. Because of its similarity to the invasion site, Slapton Sands was chosen as the maneuver area and cleared of civilians to allow the utilization of supporting fires. Despite the fact that the inundated area at Slapton was somewhat smaller than that at Utah Beach in Normandy and despite the lack of coastal fortifications, this stretch of beach near the southern tip of England on the channel was admirably suited for these exercises.

These rehearsals were prepared and conducted with all the detail and thoroughness of the actual invasion. Landing craft were assigned, assault teams were made up, loading diagrams were prepared -- all with the utmost secrecy and care. Within the restrictions imposed by security, the exercises embodied every detail that would be required in the operation against the coast of France. Troops were assembled in marshaling areas, briefed on the mission, transported to the loading hard, loaded on assigned landing craft, and sailed over a course approximating the length of the cross-channel voyage. Naval gunfire support, controlled by Shore Fire Control Parties played its role. In the final exercise, "Tiger", German E-boat action resulted in the first casualties suffered by the Division at the hands of the enemy. On the same exercise, the Division captured its first prisoner -- a German pilot who parachuted into the problem area from his disabled plane.

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Throughout this period, planning continued apace. Security of the highest order, "Top Secret Bigot" shrouded the preparations; War rooms of Division and Regiments were guarded continuously behind barbed-wire entanglements. All possible precautions were taken to preserve the secret.

The planning, the training, and the preparations for the Normandy Invasion, "Operation Neptune", were as complete, as detailed, as thorough as time, equipment and the mental capabilities of its participants would allow. Late May saw the completion of the rehearsals and the Division ready to assemble in the marshaling areas preparatory to the execution of "Neptune".

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER III
NORMANDY CAMPAIGN

On 18 May 1944, advance elements of the 4th Division began the movement to the marshalling areas in final preparation for the invasion of France and an opening of a second front in Europe. Several weeks before, the division had completed the last pre-invasion practice assault in carrying out operation "Tiger". The troops were well prepared and weather conditions were favorable for the operation.

During the month additional equipment for amphibious operations was authorized which included extra vehicles, signal equipment, flame throwers, and a special dozer blade for medium tanks. Cargo carriers, M-29, were substituted for 130 1-ton trucks in the infantry and artillery units, the purpose being to give these units a vehicle which could cross the inundated area west of Utah Beach.

In general, every conceivable preparation that could possibly be made in advance was completed during the month of May. Troops were issued all types of assault clothing, weapons, ammunition, rations, and other items that would prove a value later.

The 4th Infantry Division with units attached as follows:

1106th Engineer Group

- 1106th Engineer Headquarters and Headquarters Company
- 49th Engineer Combat Battalion
- 237th Engineer Combat Battalion
- Company B, 299th Engineer Combat Battalion
- 238th Engineer Combat Battalion
- 582nd Dump Truck Company
- 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company
- Detachment 612th Engineer Light Equipment Company
- 501st Light Pontoon Company
- 359th Combat Team reinforced

8th Armored Group

- 70th Tank Battalion (DD)
- 74th Tank Battalion

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65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
87th Chemical Battalion Motorized
Battery B, 960th Field Artillery Battalion (155 gun)
Battery A, (reinforced), 15th Field Artillery Observation Battalion
(flash and sound)
377th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (mobile)
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less two companies
801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed)
9 Naval Shore Fire Control Parties
2 Air Support Parties

and supported by:

Naval Task Force 125
1st Engineer Special Brigade
IX Tactical Air Command

began to load on assault craft at BRIDHAM, DARTMOUTH, PLYMOUTH, and TORQUAY, on 1 June 1944.

The period 2 June to 6 June 1944 was spent aboard landing craft in United Kingdom ports and enroute to the Continent. "D" day was originally planned to be 5 June 1944, but extremely bad weather and rough seas delayed the invasion until June 6th.

The mission of the 4th Infantry Division in the invasion of the Continent was to land on Beaches Tare (Green) and Umole (Red), assault UTAH BEACH at 060630B June 1944, and in conjunction with the 90th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, and 79th Infantry Division, seize CHERBOURG.

At 060630 B June 1944 the assault battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment landed on the COTENTIN PENINSULA, 1600 yards southeast of the prescribed beaches. Initially slight resistance was met, increasing as the troops drove inward. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry landed with the 8th Regiment and turned to the north-east to reduce the beach defenses to QUINEVILLE. The beach was found to be strongly defended. During the assault, radio was the only means of communication and was quite satisfactory. Elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, having landed by parachute earlier, were contacted in the 4th Division zone of action during the day. There was no enemy air activity. During the day the combat echelons of the following divisional units were landed.

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8th Infantry
12th Infantry
22nd Infantry
87th Chemical Battalion
Division Artillery: 28th, 42nd, 44th, 65th Armored Field Artillery
Battalions
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less two companies)
70th Tank Battalion
746th Tank Battalion
2 Platoons 4th Engineer Combat Battalion

By nightfall, the 4th Division had pressed the front lines to TURQUEVILLE north to ST. GERMAIN DE VARREVILLE southeast to UTAH BEACH. The German fortifications were found to be well defended.

On the 7th and 8th of June all three regiments pressed the attack overcoming strong resistance. In the drive the towns of SAINT MERE EGLISE, SAUSSETOUR, SAINT MARCOUF, RAVENOVILLE, and AZEVILLE were captured. By this time all vehicles except those that were a complete loss due to enemy artillery fire, were in running condition and in the hands of using units.

Progress continued slowly on the 9th. A special Task Force, commanded by Brigadier General HENRY A. BARBER, was formed consisting of 22nd Infantry, 70th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and was given the mission of attacking in the direction of CHAUZ DE FONTENAY-OZEVILLE to capture QUINEVILLE and the QUINEVILLE Ridge. Bad weather forestalled the use of any air support missions. During the day's advance the towns of LA LANDE and SAINT FLOXEL fell to the advancing regiments of the division.

The next two days only slight gains were made, and the Task Force was unable to seize QUINEVILLE. Elements of the division tried unsuccessfully to seize MONTEBOURG and were forced to temporarily contain the town. On the 11th of June the 359th Infantry reverted to control of the 90th Infantry Division. Active patrolling in the Division zone and into CRISBECQ was conducted during the hours of darkness.

On the 12th of June Task Force "Barber" passed through the village of OZEVILLE and continued the attack on the QUINEVILLE Ridge. The 8th and 12th Regiments fought

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bitterly to consolidate their gains and to organize the captured ground for defense.

While the division maintained and held the ground gained, Task Force "Barber" continued to attack QUINEVILLE. An attack on the 14th, supported by aerial bombardment by a force of medium bombers of the IX Tactical Air Force, was successful and the QUINEVILLE Ridge fell, partially collapsing the enemy defenses in this sector. MONTEBOURG still had not fallen and was causing a delay in the advance of the division.

Patrols from forward elements of the division continued to be active in an effort to secure as much enemy information as possible. Little or no enemy patrolling was experienced during this period. Division Mobile Reserve completed organization and remained in assembly areas near FONTENAY SUR MER.

Elements of the 22nd Infantry employing a flanking movement from the west seized the town of MONTEBOURG on the 19th of June. Combat Teams 8 and 12 during the day pushed the front lines to the general vicinity of ANNEVILLE and LA VICTOIRE, and SAINT MARTIN AUDOUVILLE. This advance placed the forward elements of the division just south of VALOGNES. The next day in a coordinated advance by all three regiments only slight resistance was encountered in the general vicinity of VALOGNES, and in most instances, advancing units were out of contact with the enemy. Before halting for the night, the troops had advanced approximately 10,000 yards cleaning out numerous pockets of resistance that were attempting to form a delaying action so that their main forces might better organize the defense of the city of CHERBOURG. This was the first day that the troops had not fought bitterly for each yard they gained.

The 4th Division again launched a coordinated three regiment attack June 21st from the vicinity of RUFOSESSE, HAU GALLIS, and LE TRILL. During the attack, the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron protected the right flank of the division by extending its patrols from QUETTERAU to the right flank. They also sent patrols into SAINT PIERRE EGLISE and BARPLEUR, near the eastern coast.

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The advance continued to forge ahead with success, and elements of the Division seized the high ground near BRETTEFEY thereby securing observation to the breakwater of CHERBOURG Harbor. The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued patrolling and reached the eastern coast of the Peninsula. The enemy defenses proved to be a defense in depth covering CHERBOURG.

On June 25th, the 8th Regiment was on the left (west), 12th Regiment in the center, and the 22nd Regiment on the right. By this time the 8th Regiment had moved to LA GLACERIE and had established contact with the 79th Division on the left. The 12th Regiment had moved through TOURLAVILLE and reached the coast. The 22nd Regiment having previously reached the coast continued mopping up pockets of resistance. Before dark that day the division boundary was changed by VII Corps to include the eastern portion of the city of CHERBOURG. In compliance with the change and following heavy artillery concentrations from Division Artillery units, the 12th Regiment moved into the eastern portion of the city.

The battle for CHERBOURG was a bitter struggle as it was the last remaining fortification on the COTENTIN PENINSULA that the German Army held. On June 27th the western half of CHERBOURG was placed in the zone of the 4th Division and was taken over by the 8th and 12th Combat Teams; the 22nd Regiment with its supporting field artillery was fighting for the GONNEVILLE airport and the ground near CAPS LEVY. FORT CENTRAL was actually the last German fortification to fall in the CHERBOURG PENINSULA and it did so following a mass concentration fired by all of the Division Artillery units.

Upon completion of the battle for the Port of CHERBOURG on 29 June 1944, the 4th Infantry Division was relieved of further activities in its zone of action by elements of the 101st Airborne Division. The entire division moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of GOUBERVILLE closing in on the 30th. During the period 30 June to 4 July 1944, reorganization, training that covered deficiencies and lessons learned in combat, and maintenance of weapons and vehicles was conducted.

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On 1 July, the 4th Division Artillery was attached to the 90th Division and moved to assembly areas from which supporting fires could be fired for the attacking echelon.

On July 4th, a gradual movement of the 4th Infantry Division to assembly areas to the south was begun in order that an attack could be launched through the lines of the 85rd Division.

On 6 July, the attack took form when the 12th Infantry launched an attack from the line of departure extending from LA BAVERIE to LE VARIMESNIL to the southwest. This attack was moving generally parallel to the CARENTAN--PERIERS ROAD. During the day the 4th Division Artillery returned to division control and fired supporting and interdictory fire in support of the 12th Infantry.

The enemy continued to defend from well-organized positions utilizing a maximum of automatic weapons. A strong defense was made possible by utilizing good fields of fire to cover the narrow corridor through which leading elements had to pass. This corridor extended from CARENTAN to PERIERS.

On 7 July, the 8th Regiment moved up on the right of the 12th Regiment and launched a coordinated attack. The advance was extremely slow and opposition was heavy. Air bombardment and artillery preparations preceded the attacks. The next day the 22nd Infantry moved from its position in reserve to a location on the left of the 8th. By the 9th of July, the division had moved to AU PRETRE and CULOT holding a line astride the CARENTAN-PERIERS Road. The attacks of both the assault regiments progressed slowly during the day against hedgerow opposition and slight but important gains were made. Casualties were mounting in this drive; the enemy was well prepared and was putting up fanatical resistance. There had been, however, no aggressive action on the part of enemy armor.

Progress continued slowly, but advances were being made; under pressure the enemy fell back. The BLEHOU Bridge was taken as were the villages of LES AUBREES and BLEHOU without enemy opposition. Patrols leading the advance crossed the

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SEVES RIVER and by the night of the 11th of July, the division had progressed to the high ground in the vicinity of RAIDS, and had mopped up the area between LONGUEVILLE and LA MAUGERIE. The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion continued its support of the division by repairing roads, sweeping mines, maintaining supply routes, and constructing by-passes in the division zone of action.

On 16 July, the 22nd Infantry moved from division reserve to a final assembly area in the vicinity of MONT-MARTIN-EN-GRAINES; the next day, upon completion of relief by the 83rd Infantry Division, the remainder of the division moved out of the line to assembly areas in the vicinity of MEAUTIS. Just prior to the relief of the division it became apparent that the enemy was fighting a stiff delaying action preparatory to withdrawal of the high ground around PERIERS where he was expected to make a determined stand.

By 18 July 1944, all divisional and attached units had been assembled within the division assembly area near MONT-MARTIN-EN-GRAINES and were there for several days to conduct care and cleaning of equipment, training to correct deficiencies, and for rest before again being committed to action.

The 22nd Infantry, 44th Field Artillery Battalion, one platoon, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and attached to the 2nd Armored Division on July 19th. The regiment moved by motor to LA MINE. It was planned during the forthcoming operation that this combat team would be motorized and work in conjunction with the 2nd Armored Division.

The remainder of the divisional units moved to new assembly areas near PSTIT-DUCRIE and DEVILLE. Here reconnaissance was carried out to forward positions in the 39th Infantry sector and preparations were made for operation "Cobra", the securing of the MARGNY--SAINT GILLES GAP

For detailed amplification of action described above, refer to:

Action After Action Report, 4th Infantry Division, June & July, 1944

Normandy Campaign - 22nd Infantry
Normandy Campaign - 12th Infantry
Normandy Campaign - 8th Infantry
Normandy Campaign - 4th Division - 16 -

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER IV
NORTHERN FRANCE

At the close of the Normandy campaign, with the beachhead finally established, operations were begun which culminated in the breakthrough at ST LO. Three infantry divisions, with the 4th Infantry Division in the center, were assigned the mission of penetrating the German lines to allow exploitation of the breakthrough by armor. During the attack CT 22 was attached to CG "A" of the 2d Armored Division and operated on the left of the 4th Infantry Division in the zone of the 30th Infantry Division.

Favorable progress was made and the penetration moved forward to LA-CHAPPELLE-EN-JUGER. A considerable amount of resistance was encountered consisting of small arms, automatic weapons and scattered artillery fire. The next day the drive continued and the division seized the ground surrounding MARIIGNY.

The division continued the attack across the TERRETTE and SOULLE RIVERS through the towns of SOULLES, LE GUISLAIN, and HAMBYE. By the 30th of July the division was on line approximately 3200 yards west of the VILLEBAUDON-PERCY ROAD facing east. Other elements, advancing south, held the ground approximately 3000 yards south of HAMBYE. On the left of the division, CG "A", 2d Armored Division, with the 22nd Infantry attached, passed through the 30th Division and made rapid progress through LE MESNIL HERMAN, LA DENISIERE, to VILLEBAUDON. The 3d Armored Division passed through the 4th Infantry Division and debouched to exploit the penetration.

Troops continued to encounter pockets by-passed by the assaulting armored

units. It was apparent that the enemy contemplated falling back to the high ground surrounding ST POIS on the southeast and east, and thence to the FORET DE SEVER where, apparently, the enemy would attempt a determined rear guard action while a general withdrawal was effected.

Combat Team 22, as a part of CC "A", 2d Armored Division, captured the town of TESSY SUR VIRE on the 1st of August, following extremely fierce yard-by-yard fighting. The following day, Combat Team 22 reverted to the control of the 4th Infantry Division and moved through PERCY to join the division now located near VILLEDIEU LES POILES. The 1st Division, fighting on the right of the 4th, had moved on south to BRECEY. The 4th Division moved rapidly south to the proximity of ST POIS where strong enemy delaying forces held up the advance until the 4th of August.

By August 5th, the 4th Infantry Division had seized the terrain surrounding ST POIS, had eliminated isolated points of resistance, and had destroyed numerous motor vehicles and foot troops retreating along roads northeast and southeast from ST. POIS. Twenty-four hours later all enemy resistance within the zone of action had been mopped up and an outpost line of resistance had been established to protect the division against enemy attacks from the east.

An enemy counterattack on 7 August threatened to penetrate the defenses of the 4th Division. The artillery of the division, fired by aerial observation, destroyed great numbers of enemy vehicles and personnel thereby blunting effectively the very determined enemy attack aimed at AVRANCHES. Upon notice of the threat of counterattack, a bridgehead was established across the SEE RIVER, and Task Force "WELBORN" was formed to establish an outpost line extending from FONTIERE to BRECEY to LE BESNERIE. In addition, maintenance of the perimeter defenses in the division zone was continued and contact was established with the 47th Infantry and CC "B", 3d Armored Division, on the western boundary. The

attack toward AVRANCHES had been a major German effort.

On 10 August, the division moved from these defensive positions near LA ROUSSEL to a new area in the vicinity of LE TEILLEUL. Upon arrival in the new zone, patrols were sent forward to the LA VARENNE RIVER and road blocks were established where necessary. Outpost lines were later extended to the south to include DESERTINES and northeast to include BARENTON. Here the division remained until August 16th. The troops not actively engaged in patrols or outposts carried out training in scouting and patrolling, gun drill, and care and cleaning of clothing and equipment.

At dawn, 17 August, the division, with attached units, moved from LE TEILLEUL approximately 40 miles east to a new assembly area at CARROUGES. Upon arrival at the new area, the units were located as follows: 8th Infantry near CARROUGES; 12th Infantry near LES VILLETES; 22d Infantry near L'OISSONNIERE; 4th Engineer Combat Battalion near LA DOUCELLE. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (mechanized) reconnoitered routes for possible division movement to the vicinity of ALENCON. While located here, the troops, as before, continued training to further improve technical and tactical techniques.

Alerted on the 23rd of August, the 4th Infantry Division, together with the 2nd French Armored Division, was ordered to move on PARIS without delay, to seize the city, and to relieve elements of the French Forces of the Interior and other resistance groups operating in the city, and to obtain crossing of the SEINE. Because of the slow advance of the 2nd French Armored, the 4th Division was assigned the armored division's mission, and, screened by the 4th Reconnaissance Troop, entered the city on 25 August -- the first American troops in PARIS. Reconnaissance units were immediately sent to the Northeast and East as far as the outskirts of PARIS, along the west bank of the SEINE RIVER to determine road and bridge conditions, and to locate enemy positions. The seizure of PARIS had

been accomplished with dispatch and a minimum of confusion, despite the extreme short notice which preceeded the attack. The liberation of PARIS unleashed mob demonstrations unparalleled in magnitude; movement of troops was vastly complicated by milling, joyous throngs, desiring to express appreciation to the Americans.

By late afternoon, the 4th Infantry Division had deployed from its assembly area, had established a bridgehead east across the SEINE RIVER, had seized roads and bridges south of PARIS, had occupied southeast PARIS, and had established defensive positions west of LONGJumeau. The division maintained defensive positions in the southeast portion of PARIS, protected bridgeheads and airdromes in and around the city, and prevented enemy infiltrations from the east.

Large motorized combat patrols preceeded the advance of all the regiments and progress was rapid, with only slight interference from the retreating Germans. Apparently, the Germans were attempting to withdraw their main lines of defense to the SIEGFRIED LINE. As before, the Germans left delaying forces and scattered groups of resistance behind to hinder the advance of the Allied forces. By the 31st of August, the division had advanced through the towns of LA MONTAGNE, CERMOY VILLERS, and LEVIGNEN, and had reached the general line PALESSE--VILLERS--COTTERET. The general withdrawal of the enemy was not protected by heavy artillery or armor; the delay in the 4th Infantry Division sector was caused primarily by destroyed bridges. During the day, the 4th Engineer Battalion moved bridging material forward prepared to support the advance of the division across the AISNE RIVER.

On the 1st of September, the division continued its rapid advance preceeded by Task Force "TAYLOR" and Task Force "REGNIER", both made up of elements of the 4th Division. The division continued across the OISE CANAL, the ROMBE CANAL, through ESSIGNY, ST. QUENTIN, and on to the vicinity of WASSIGNY. On the 3rd

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of September the division seized crossings of the CANAL DE LA SAMBRE. The following day the division closed into the area just east of LE CATEAU. Task Force "TAYLOR" had previously taken LANDRECIERS to the east and had already consolidated positions for defense.

The division moved by motor to the vicinity of FORET D'ARDENNES and secured crossings of the MEUSE RIVER on September 5th. The advance to the east continued each day. Pockets of enemy resistance were overcome, and contact with the VII Corps on the left and the 5th Armored Division on the right was maintained. Three days later, the division had advanced and secured objectives on the western edge of the LUXEMBOURG--GERMANY border. The greatest obstacles to the advance had been unfavorable terrain, destroyed bridges, and a serious shortage of gasoline.

Despite the handicaps, the division continued to move to the east through HOUFALIZE and consolidated gains on September 10th in the vicinity of BOVIGNY and VIESSALM. The following day the advance continued with division command post units moving forward to within several miles of the German border.

A patrol from the 22nd Infantry went into the town of ELCHERATH in Germany, spoke to the civilians, procured several pieces of German money, and a bottle of German soil before returning. This patrol is believed to have been the first organized Allied force to cross the German border in World War II. Other patrols from the division went forth the next day and by dark several battalions of infantry had crossed the German border and had established defenses there. The enemy had been contacted by the 8th Regiment near ST. VITH. It had become apparent that no defensive line of any great proportions would be established west of the SIEGFRIED LINE. What remained of the enemy rear guard had at this time been pulled inside the German border. A handful of troops was left behind to delay the division

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advance, as long as possible, while a major withdrawal was accomplished.

During the night of September 13th, reconnaissance patrols from the division penetrated the SIEGFRIED LINE. One patrol proceeded through BUCHET and penetrated the line almost 1000 yards to the east thereof; the other patrol hit the line approximately 800 yards northeast of BRANDSCHEID. The patrols returned with the information that the SIEGFRIED LINE was only partially defended. Upon receipt of this information the division commander ordered an attack and penetration of the Line to take place September 14th. The attack took effect and by nightfall, in spite of the increasing resistance, the division had successfully penetrated the Line in four localities to the east and northeast of BUCHET. Advance troops were more than 2000 yards past the first line of fortifications.

After the initial penetration, the division continued to fight ahead in an effort to completely breach the line. The advance was hindered by inclement weather, lack of a road net, poor visibility, thick woods, and a constantly increasing amount of artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. Elements of the 12th Regiment had penetrated as far as the KYLL RIVER, and the 22nd Regiment was engaged in fierce fighting on the south flank of the division near BRANDSCHEID.

Aggressive action to the front was halted on the 18th of September. The division was to continue to exert pressure on the enemy forces by using strong combat patrols and was to clean up and improve the positions gained. Had the necessary supplies, ammunition, and equipment been available, it is believed that the Line could have been breached and the Allied forces driven well into Germany. At this time the German armies were staggered and confused to such an extent that weeks would have been required before a defensive line could have been organized.

The enemy launched numerous counterattacks against the forward defenses, while the division held in this position. Each of the counterattacks was repulsed with only slight loss. The division remained in this relatively static position

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until 4 October 1944. During this period strong combat patrols were maintained, and daily, were sent forth to procure information regarding enemy movement and dispositions. Fortunately, the units were able to witness picture shows and take part in other forms of amusement provided. Awards and decorations were brought up to date and presented to the deserving men.

On October 4th, the 4th Division was relieved by elements of the 2nd Infantry Division and movement was initiated to a new assembly area to the north. By the 5th all units of the division were assembled in the localities of HUNNINGEN, HOLZHEIM, and MENDORF. CP's were established, an outpost line of resistance was formed to the east, and reconnaissance patrols were sent out to seek information of the enemy. On the 6th of October, Combat Teams readjusted and strengthened their positions along the OPL, relieved elements of the 120th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, and patrolled vigorously to the east and northeast. From the 7th to the 11th of October the division remained in this sector preparing plans for a coordinated attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE. Combat Teams advanced and secured favorable lines of resistance. The plan to penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE from these positions was never put into effect, as the mission of the division was later changed.

From 12 October to 22 October 1944 the division remained relatively static. Patrols were constantly on the move reconnoitering to the east to include the towns of MIESCHEID and UDENBRETH. The weather increased in severity, and the countryside was under an overcast of drizzling rain and penetrating cold. Every advantage was taken of the comforts that could be enjoyed. Showers, movies, Red Cross facilities, USO shows were set up in MURRINGEN for the benefit of units in reserve.

On the 23rd of October the division relieved the 28th Infantry Division on the latter's main line of resistance. The relief was quickly completed and the

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Combat Teams established and improved the positions to the northeast and coordinated their defensive fires.

Through the remainder of October and until the 5th of November, the 4th Infantry Division occupied a position with its front paralleling the SIEGFRIED LINE fortifications in the proximity of KRINKELT, BELGIUM. With no indication of orders for an attack, the division confined its combat activity to harassing fires and patrolling. The period was highlighted by sharp patrol clashes, considerably harassing and interdicting artillery and mortar fire, and harassing long-range machine-gun, 57mm anti-tank, and self-propelled weapons fire. The Combat Teams in reserve conducted training in demolitions and mines, and underwent physical conditioning exercises.

The 4th Division was relieved in its zone of action by the 9th Infantry Division on November 5th. Elements relieved from duty on the main line of resistance moved to temporary assembly areas near KRINKELT and prepared to initiate a movement to the north. Training for personnel not otherwise engaged was continued. As soon as the division was assembled in KRINKELT, staff planning began for the movement to ZWEIFALL, GERMANY, and strict security regulations were imposed to preserve the secrecy of the division's movement.

For detailed amplification of action described above, refer to:
Action After Action Reports, 4th Infantry Division, July, August, September, October and November, 1944.

Northern France Campaign - 22nd Infantry
Northern France Campaign - 12th Infantry
Northern France Campaign - 8th Infantry
Northern France Campaign - 4th Infantry Division

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER V

BLOODY HURTGEN

In the first week of November the 4th Division was transferred to the VII Corps and moved, with the greatest secrecy, to the vicinity of ZWEIFALL, Germany in the HURTGEN FOREST. The impending operation was to be a major offensive to secure the Corps' objective, COLOGNE and the RHINE RIVER.

The 4th Division sector lay entirely within the HURTGEN FOREST, a rugged area cut by numerous steep ravines and almost entirely wooded. In many places visibility did not exceed ten yards. Across the front were stretched belts of mines and barbed wire rigged with booby traps. Dug-in machine guns were set up to cover the entire area with interlocking fire. Artillery, doubly dangerous in the woods because of tree bursts, was accurately layed on every conceivable objective. The weather was extremely unfavorable; constant rain, snow, and near freezing temperatures were serious impediments.

Combat Team 12, the first complete unit to close in the new assembly area, was attached to the 26th Infantry Division to relieve the 109th Infantry Regiment, which was fighting from the high ground just southwest of the town of HURTGEN. This immediate commitment of the 12th Regiment, to some extent, defeated the plan for secrecy as the enemy quickly identified the unit.

The 12th Infantry, from positions near HURTGEN, was ordered to attack to the east on November 8th. This attack crossed the line of departure, and found the enemy well dug in and protected by automatic weapons, mine fields, and tactical wire. Again on the 9th and 10th of November, the 12th Regiment attacked. Each attack was preceded by artillery preparations which the enemy countered in kind.

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Casualties were extremely heavy and the regiment made only minor gains. Combat Team 12 was relieved from attachment to the 28th Infantry Division and reverted in place to the control of the 4th Division, the night of November 10th.

Between the 10th and 15th of the month, the division, and attachments, continued its preparation for the oncoming offensive. The weather continued cold and damp. Schools were held for all company grade officers in woods fighting, map reading, and the adjustment of artillery fire. Anticipation of difficulties resulted in intense work with communication teams, company aid men, litter bearers, and 81mm mortar platoons. Reconnaissance patrols were constantly probing the enemy lines to determine positions and to locate gun emplacements.

The 12th Infantry remained in actual contact with the German forces in the proximity of HURTGEN. During the six day period, the regiment attempted to consolidate the ground gained and organize a defense. Casualties from the artillery and small arms mounted by the hour. The enemy continued to counterattack the positions held by the 12th, and limited break-throughs between battalions were common. By the 15th of November the regiment had suffered almost 1,000 casualties. However, it had been able to improve its positions so that it might take part in the planned three regiment attack on the 18th.

The 4th Infantry Division launched a coordinated attack to the northeast in conjunction with the remainder of the VII Corps on November 18th. The assault through the HURTGEN FOREST had begun. By dark, the three Regimental Combat Teams, advancing abreast, had moved through heavily wooded terrain approximately 1600 yards.

As each unit dug in for the night, new orders for the next day arrived. It was almost impossible for plans to be sent forth more than twenty-four hours in advance. As reconnaissance patrols were never able to extend more than a few hundred yards in front of the lines, troop leaders rarely knew the exact disposition of hostile fire power until they actually exposed themselves. As a result,

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intermediate objectives were assigned to the regiments each night.

On the 17th the division continued its attack to the northeast towards DUREN with the three Regimental Combat Teams abreast and succeeded in securing important terrain features within its zone of action.

The following day the troops again moved ahead. Whenever possible, tanks led the way and ran down the concertina wire, destroying anti-personnel mines, and the attacking infantry followed in the tank tracks. As the advance continued, the attacking troops were held up by mines and booby traps more than from the artillery, mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire that increased throughout the day. The main north-south road through the forest was out in one sector thereby rendering it useless to the enemy. Serious difficulties of supply and evacuation greatly handicapped the advance of the Combat Teams. The few roads in the forest, because of weather conditions, were in poor condition and were heavily mined. Such conditions resulted in the loss of important armor support. By dark, two regiments had succeeded in advancing more than 1100 yards to the east and northeast.

The advance continued the next two days with all three Regimental Combat Teams striving to gain important objectives. Progress continued to be extremely slow due to the increasing number of mines, and heavy artillery and mortar concentrations. Poor road conditions necessitated the transportation of virtually all supplies to the front by hand carry. Supporting engineers worked night and day in an effort to open supply routes, repair bridges, and remove mine fields. At the end of the two day period, November 20th, the advance had not covered 1000 yards, but important strategic terrain had been seized and the enemy was being forced to withdraw.

On the 21st, the division consolidated and maintained positions previously secured. Patrols were sent forward to determine enemy positions and movements.

The delay afforded the supply units time to send additional ammunition, rations, and repaired weapons forward. Even while the division remained static, casualties increased from the incessant artillery concentrations.

The attack, on November 22, was temporarily delayed in an effort to bring armored support up to the front lines. The engineers continued to work, clearing and repairing the main supply road, but progress was slow because the work had to be done under heavy fire. The 8th Infantry fought stubbornly and against strong resistance, and finally succeeded in reaching the edge of its objective, JAGSBAUS.

The 12th Infantry initiated movement to assembly areas to the north of the new division right (south) boundary. By mid-day the regiment had cleared front lines and was within assigned areas as division reserve.

The 22nd Infantry, which was now on the right flank of the division, after a series of attacks was able to reach its assigned objectives just west and northwest of GROSSHAU. Replacements received by the regiment during the afternoon were used as a unit to assist in covering the south flank, which had become more exposed as the attack progressed to the east.

On the 24th of November the division attacked with the 8th and 12th Combat Teams abreast. The 22nd Infantry consolidated previous gains, cleared rear areas and routes forward, and secured four key trail and road junctions. The enemy defended his positions until forced to fall back to each successive, previously prepared, line of defense. It was evident that the enemy was bringing up replacements, consisting of stragglers and remnants of units almost totally destroyed. Enemy armor operated in the zone, but remained unaggressive in nature.

The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the east with three Combat Teams abreast on the 25th of November. The enemy was determined to hold to the last man in the thick woods which composed the HURTGEN FOREST. The intermittent rain rendered the thick matting of the forest and the few trails a mass of mud.

Because of this, it was almost impossible for the tanks, tank destroyers, and supply trains to keep up with the attacking infantry. The enemy continued to use all available weapons to impede the advance. Mortars, machine guns, small arms, mines, and booby traps were used extensively, and, in the GROSSHAU area, enemy self-propelled guns fired direct fire into the front lines.

The next day, 26 November, the 4th Infantry Division maintained the previously secured front line positions. The entire period was used to straighten the lines, regroup, clear the rear areas of the enemy, and secure favorable terrain in preparation for further operations. This attack was to be made in conjunction with the 8th Infantry Division and Combat Command "B" of the 5th Armored Division to seize the town of KLEINHAU and adjacent high ground.

During the period 27 to 30 November, the 12th Infantry closed the gap between the 8th and 22nd Infantry, opened roads, and established front-line contact. Patrolling was continuous by all elements to clear the few remaining enemy groups from rear areas and to seek information of enemy activities and positions. Enemy resistance in the GROSSHAU sector was extremely fierce. The enemy employed self-propelled guns and dug-in tanks.

The German infantry fought stubbornly from the houses and cellars of the town, as well as from dug-in positions in the surrounding area. This town fell to Combat Team 22 on the 29th of November, after a fanatical house to house fight. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, which had been attached to the division, encountered stiff resistance from the hill northeast of KLEINHAU, and made gains only to their line of departure.

The month of December found the 4th Division still fighting within the HURTGEN FOREST. The enemy had been pushed back yard-by-yard slightly more than 6000 yards and was now fighting for the last remaining strip of woods in the Forest. On 1 December, the 12th Infantry had taken the high ground overlooking GEY and STRAS and Combat Team 22 had reached positions from which supporting fires

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could be delivered during the attack on these towns. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion reverted to the control of the 5th Armored Division during the night 1-2 December. During the day's operation, the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop attached, continued to maintain road blocks within the division zone of action and established contact between all attacking echelons.

On December 2nd the attack made considerable advances in the northern part of the zone of action. The division pushed the enemy to the very limits of the woods and in places forced the enemy to withdraw from the forest entirely. During early morning, the enemy launched a counterattack from the vicinity of GEY and seriously threatened to surround advance elements of the division. Only by the commitment of reserve elements was this counterattack beaten off.

From the 3rd to the 5th of December, the 4th Division continued to attack toward DUREN. In so doing, numerous enemy counterattacks were repulsed and slight gains were made. Combat Team 22 was relieved on the 3rd, by Combat Team 330, 85rd Infantry Division, and moved into LUXEMBOURG to take over defensive positions.

On the 6th and 7th, the division assumed the defensive, defending its main line of resistance with three regiments abreast (the 330th Regiment was attached to the 4th Division when it relieved the 22nd Infantry). Intensive patrolling was conducted between units and to the front of the MIR. Staff planning continued for the relief of the remainder of the division by the 85rd Infantry Division.

There was very little offensive action by the 4th Division for the next week and the relief of Combat Team 8 and 12 continued. By the 13th of December, the entire 4th Division was assembled in LUXEMBOURG along the SAUER and MOSELLE RIVER line.

During the Battle of HURTGEN FOREST, the division had advanced some 8000

yards through heavy mine fields, dense woods, terrific artillery and mortar fires, and had secured a position on the edge of the forest overlooking the road centers of STRAS, GEY, and HAF HARDT controlling the roads leading to DUREN and the plains of COLOGNE. During the period November--December, the 4th Division had suffered approximately 7400 casualties.

For detailed amplification of action described above, refer to:

Action After Action Report, 4th Infantry Division, November and December, 1944.

Hurtgen Forest - 22nd Infantry
Hurtgen Forest - 12th Infantry
Hurtgen Forest - 8th Infantry
Hurtgen Forest - 4th Infantry Division

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4th INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER VI
THE ARDENNES

From the bitter and extended battle of the Hurtgen Forest the Division was sent to a quiet but sprawling sector along the west banks of the Sauer and Meselle Rivers, northeast of the city of Luxembourg. The Division was in dire need of a rest so that the battle-weary veterans of the Hurtgen might eat hot food and enjoy showers, and so that reinforcements might be added to the thin ranks of all the infantry battalions. The Luxembourg sector had been inactive for several weeks and it was thought that the Division would be able to rest in comparative peace, even though the Division was covering a frontage of 35 miles.

For one week, 8-15 December, the Division rested, consolidated its positions, and attempted to repair its Hurtgen losses. However, the situation in general that existed throughout the Division was still not favorable for a large scale action when the all-out German counter-offensive was launched on the morning of 16 December. What appeared to be only heavy patrol activity soon turned out to be a powerful German drive, an important part of the German Army's last effort to win the war. For the Germans the attack came at an opportune time, and for the Fourth Division only determination and skill could offset its disadvantages.

The German thrust was against the Division's left sector, manned by the 12th Infantry Regiment, and was aimed at seizing the City of Luxembourg, which would cut the main supply route in the area. The initial German attack penetrated the Division's defense line in three places along the Sauer River line to a depth of several thousand yards in the vicinity of the towns of Berdorf, Echternach, and in the Osweiler-Dickweiler area. Immediate steps were taken to contain the attack which was somewhat blunted by an all-out defense waged by the front-line rifle

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companies. Tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion were immediately dispatched to the 12th Regiment's sector.

On the morning of 17 December it became apparent that the full weight of the 212 Volksgrenadier Division was being thrown against the Division's left in an effort to capture LUXEMBOURG CITY as quickly as possible. The enemy extended his advance on a limited scale in the BERDORF and ECHTERNACH sectors, but was completely checked in the OSWEILER - DICKWEILER area. The enemy made no offensive move against either the 8th Infantry in the center, or the 22nd Infantry on the right.

From the 17th to the 21st of December inclusive the Germans were able to initiate only one major attack against the Division and during most of that time elements of the Division gained the initiative in local sectors in sufficient strength to keep the Germans from offering a serious threat. Throughout the period the weather remained cold and foggy with visibility limited to a few yards, which cancelled all hope of air support.

In order to protect the Division's left flank and to block the main highway to LUXEMBOURG CITY, Task Force Lockett was formed, consisting of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, 4th Recon Troops, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry, and Companies A and C of the 70th Tank Battalion. This task force was able to deny the enemy use of the road net in the MULLERTHAL area and to localize the enemy's gain on the Division's left flank.

During the first few days following the German attack the situation became obscured by confusion on both sides. At one time three companies in different sectors were encircled by the Germans who became almost desperate in attempting to gain the momentum for a breakthrough. These isolated pockets of resistance closed vital road nets to the Germans, but in turn German patrols infiltrated through the thin lines of the Division to continually harass rear OP's and to cut important supply routes. The fighting became bitter as both sides realized that this frozen ground was an important part of a big operation. One company was surrounded and bypassed in Echternach on the first day of the attack, but fought on for days although the Division

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would obviously be unable to save it. On several occasions units rushed every available man into the front lines in order to save a position. This tenacity kept the Germans from breaking the lines and saved LUXEMBOURG CITY.

Late in the day on 20 December, the 9th Armored Division, on the 4th Division's left flank, reported that the enemy had penetrated to the vicinity of Waldbillig, which threatened to offer the Division serious trouble. The next morning the German Infantry, supported by tanks and heavy artillery fire, attacked in the Division's left sector again. This time the enemy found no "soft spots" and made only a limited penetration at a very heavy cost. By evening the attack was completely stopped.

As the weather cleared on the 22nd of December the Division definitely took over the initiative, starting a coordinated attack to regain the terrain that had been previously lost and to clear the enemy from the Sauer River bridgehead. The 10th Infantry Regiment of the Fifth Division moved in on the Division's left, taking over a part of the Division's long front. The enemy attempted one attack in force during the day but was badly mauled in the attempt.

On 24 December the Fifth Infantry Division launched a coordinated attack through the Division's lines, relieving the 12th Infantry Regiment and Task Force Lockett. The Division then took over the defense of a much smaller sector in which enemy activity was almost nil. In these new positions the Division began reorganizing and re-equipping all units, particularly the 12th Infantry which for the past nine days had shouldered the brunt of the German attack toward LUXEMBOURG CITY.

Of this defensive action Lt. General George S. Patton later wrote Maj. General Raymond O. Barton, "In my opinion your most recent fight, when, with a tired and depleted division you halted the left shoulder of the German thrust into the American lines and saved the city of Luxembourg, is your most outstanding achievement."

Transferred from the Division in order to receive medical treatment in the United States, Gen. Barton turned over the command of the Division to Brig.

General Harold W. Blakeley on 2

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Until 15 January the Division maintained an active defense along the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. The threat still existed of another German breakthrough attempt at another place, and elaborate counter-attack plans were formulated. However, in the early part of January enemy activity to the Division's front became almost negligible with the exception of light rocket and artillery fire.

Although by this time the German forces were on the defense all along the line there was much of the bulge that remained to be eliminated and plans were made to swing the Fourth Division out of its inactive sector and send it into the attack toward the north. The Division was relieved by the 87th Division on 15, 16 January and took over a sector facing the south banks of the Sure and Sauer Rivers from Bettendorf to Bollendorf. Plans were immediately made for an attack to the north on 18 January in order to force a bridgehead across the Sure River.

The terrain over which the attack was launched was certainly not favorable to offensive action. In order to gain the river line it was necessary to move down the steep snow covered slopes which were well covered by fire from the Siegfried line several thousand yards to the north of the river. The initial attack was made without an artillery preparation in order to gain the element of surprise.

The Division sent the 8th Infantry across the river in two places and the initial objectives were quickly seized. Due to the heavy enemy fire and the hazardous working conditions, however, only one foot bridge was erected on 18 January. At one crossing site the assault boats of one battalion were completely destroyed by enemy artillery fire. In addition the snow and ice rendered almost all roads and trails impassable to vehicular traffic, making supply, evacuation and the movement of supporting weapons a difficult problem. While these conditions existed throughout the operation the attack was successfully pushed during the next few days, expanding the Division's bridgehead.

Using tanks, the Division captured the town of BETTENDORF on the Sure River and the high ground within its zone of action overlooking the Our River. On 20

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January the Division was able to attack with two regiments abreast as the 12th Infantry was now across the river in full force on the 8th Infantry's left. The Division was able to expand its hold by moving north to capture the towns of TANDEL and KLEINREISDORF and by seizing parts of LONGSDORF.

To the northwest the enemy put up stiff resistance in the town of FOUHREN and only after a two day fight was this town taken. However on the right LONGSDORF was completely occupied and to the north WALSORF fell with little resistance. Finally on the 23rd, FOUHREN was cleared of the enemy and held against several German counter attacks.

The Division continued to consolidate the terrain previously gained fronting on the southwest bank of the Our River from the vicinity of VEANDEN to the vicinity of BOLLENDORF. The enemy still held some strong points west of the Our River, but these were continually probed by Division patrols and adequately contained. However movement along the banks of the Our and Sauer Rivers was still greatly restricted due to the observed fire from the Siegfried line east of the Our River. Snow again began to fall further hampering operations.

During the period 25-27 January the Division actively defended the Our River line and consolidated its positions on the vital commanding ground. On the 28th the Division was relieved in this sector by the 80th Division and began moving to assembly areas in the vicinity of TROIS VIEGES.

Reference For amplification of this action refer to the following documents previously submitted:

Action after Action Reports - 4th Infantry Division.

G - 3 Periodic Reports * " " "

G - 2 Periodic Reports - " " "

Staff Section Journals - " " "

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NARRATIVE HISTORY

4th INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER VII

THE RHINELAND

In moving from the OUR RIVER line to positions slightly to the north the Division did not gain any advantage in the terrain. Streams, hills, forests and pillboxes were the terrain obstacles destined to block the path of the Fourth Division in its next move which began by passing through the 87th Division in the vicinity of Durler on 28 January. Immediate preparations were made for a jump off on the 29th to the north and northeast with two regiments abreast-- the 8th Infantry on the left and the 12th Infantry on the right. The Division battered its way ahead in successive attacks for 15 days against varying enemy opposition. At times it was the terrain and the weather that threatened to bog down the Division rather than the enemy since front lines could advance no faster than the supporting weapons and supply trains.

Initially stiff resistance was met on the south flank, and only limited progress was made despite the seizure of LOMMERSWEIDER and ELCHERATH on the first day. WEPPELER and high ground in the vicinity were cleared two days later in preparation for a coordinated attack on 1 February. On this date the Division plunged ahead four miles, an outstanding advance considering the very poor road net, made almost impassible by a cold, intermittent rain. In the attack, the towns of IHLREN, URB, WINTERSCHIED, MÜTZENICH and SCHMELLER were cleared of enemy.

Due to the apparent disorganization of the German forces the attack was pushed beyond the limits of some supporting weapons. On the left the Division moved forward to the high ground just west of RADSCHIED and OBERASCHIED, and patrols were sent forward to establish the location and strength of the enemy in the SIED-FRIED line defenses which were to the immediate front. On the right the Division

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moved to the western outskirts of BLEIALF. The attack of the Division on 3 February continued to the east and was successful in capturing the towns of HALENFELD and BUCHER while reconnaissance elements reconnoitered to the northeast as far as KOESCHIED. Final preparations were made for the assault of the SIEGFRIED defenses. At this time the 22nd Infantry, up until now in Division reserve, prepared to go into the line on the right of the 8th Infantry.

For the veterans of the Division, this section of the SIEGFRIED line was a familiar one, for the same pillboxes had been taken when the Division breached the line in mid-September. It was the same SCHNEE-KIPPEL FOREST, the same billets and the same overlays. On 4 February a heavy snow storm aided units on the left to gain complete surprise and take the first line of pillboxes in a pre-dawn attack against almost no resistance. On the following day this initial breach of the line was increased on a frontage of 3500 yards as the key town of BRANDSCHEID and the high ground overlooking SELLERICH were cleared of the enemy. The resistance at BRANDSCHEID was not broken until tank support was employed.

In order to enable the Division to carry out a coordinated attack toward the important road center of PRUM the 90th Division took over BRANDSCHEID. However, before this was effected the Germans attempted to retake the town but were driven back. As the Divisions attack swung to the east and southeast enemy artillery fire became heavier and the enemy infantry more stubborn. Nevertheless the Division continued to roll over ground pocked with small streams and steep hills. The enemy counter-attacked daily and at times fought bitterly from house to house and hill to hill. WASCHELD, OBERMUEHLEN and GONDENBRETT were taken and the Division occupied much of the high ground along the west bank of the PRUM RIVER by the evening of 8 February.

To the north the 8th Infantry captured HERMESPAD on the PRUM RIVER and later in the day sent one battalion across the river to the high ground on the east bank. On the other sectors, however, the enemy resistance stiffened and other Division elements were not able to gain the river line, exposing the left flank of the

Division to a counter attack from the vicinity of WILHELMSTH. On 11 February the Division began establishing a defensive line along the west bank of the PRUM from WATZERATH to OLZHEIM. At the same time the Germans 9th Panzer Division launched an attack against the Division's north flank elements and the 87th Division. Prior to this the Division had withdrawn its bridgehead across the PRUM in the north. It was not until the next day that the German attack was finally contained. By that afternoon the town of PRUM had been cleared of the enemy. All units were ordered to continue mopping-up operations west of the river.

For the next fifteen days the Division maintained an active defense of the river line with three regiments abreast and several times feinted attacks as diversionary measures. Although the enemy made no attempt at a large scale attack against the Division's position the Germans were far from passive. The enemy stepped up its harassing and interdiction artillery, rocket and mortar firing. In order to keep the Division off balance, the Germans attacked in company strength across the PRUM RIVER on several occasions but each time the attack was quickly repulsed.

The Division kept in contact with the enemy by continually patrolling the area to the east of the river. These patrols became deadly forays which often turned into patrol against patrol actions. On 18 February each front line battalion sent out one combat patrol as a diversion from the 90th Division attack on the 4th Division's south flank. During the period the engineers made exhaustive reconnaissances of the river line obtaining data for the crossing of the PRUM RIVER.

On the Division's north the 87th Division launched an attack on 26 February. The semi-dormant PRUM RIVER front was ready to explode and the 4th Division began its general offense on 28 February.

The initial jump off across the PRUM met little opposition on the left and KLEINLANGFELD was quickly taken while on the right the assault battalions ran into stiff resistance and several mine fields before the town of DAUSFIELD was cleared. Throughout the day the foothold on the east bank of the river was increased on a broad front. The main effort on the second day was to force a substantial bridgehead

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in the center sector in the vicinities of GONDELSHEIM, WILKERATH and ROMMERSHEIM. The enemy was fighting a stubborn defensive battle along the high ground and the woods east of the river. The Germans were making every effort to contain the bridgehead and made good use of the terrain which was unfavorable for a tank action. The approaches to all vital towns had been mined and cratered. The artillery and mortar fire was well registered on probable routes of advance. On the right, the 22nd Infantry's sector, fighting became particularly fierce as the German paratroops defended BRUHLBOHN from house to house and employed some accurate anti-tank fire to knock out five supporting tanks during the attack on 2 March. The left flank elements continued to plunge ahead, taking GONDELSHEIM and WEINSHEIM.

The Division operations on 3 March were designed to enable the Combat Command B of the 11th Armored Division to break out of the bridgehead. Early in the afternoon this break was made in the NIEDER PRUM -- WEINSHEIM area while all elements of the Division continued the attack to the east. For the next three days the Division continued its methodical advance toward the KYLL RIVER, as the towns of DUFFACH, COG, SCHWIRZHEIM, MULLENWORN and OBER BETTINGEN fell. This entire movement was coordinated with the Combat Command B. On 6 March the Division moved into position to expedite the bridgehead across the KYLL RIVER which the Combat Command had anchored. As this operation was prepared the 8th Infantry was placed into reserve.

During the night of 6-7 March the Division effected a crossing of the KYLL and pressed the attack during the day as Combat Command B was relieved in this sector. There was little resistance by enemy action as the 12th Infantry and the 22nd Infantry overran the towns of DOHN, BOESDORF, BEWINGEN and HILLESCHIED. The lack of sufficient bridging equipment slowed up the Division as much as any other factor. In reserve, Task Force Rhino was being prepared to attack through the KYLL RIVER bridgehead and, to facilitate this movement, the Division's engineers made an all-out effort to complete this bridge. Since the enemy was disorganized and reeling from the coordinated blows of the Division Task Force Rhino was sent into action before the enemy had an opportunity to regroup its forces.

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This Task Force was under the command of Brig. General James S. Redwell and consisted of the following units: 8th Infantry, 29th Field Artillery, 70th Tank Battalion, Co. A 610 TD Battalion, Company A 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A 4th Medical Battalion, 4th Reconnaissance Troop, Battery C 377th AAA Battalion and a detachment of the 4th Signal Company.

The Task Force raced ahead against light opposition and by nightfall of 8 March it had advanced some 14 miles to the vicinity of HONERATH. The rapid advance only paused during the night and by early morning, the towns of ADENAU, RODDER, and REIFFERSCHIED were captured. That same day the task force was relieved by the 6th Cavalry Group. During the entire operation of Task Force Rhino in which nearly 1500 prisoners were taken and the German defense of the entire area was completely broken, the Task Force suffered only six casualties.

With the exception of a few stragglers the Division had broken contact with the enemy for the first time in 199 days. The Division was completely relieved and prepared to initiate a movement out of the VIII Corps area to the south in the vicinity of LUREVILLE, FRANCE, for an indefinite rest before going back into the lines.

Except for the Division artillery, the Division moved by rail and motor to assembly areas near GERBEVILLER, FRANCE, during the period 11-15 March. The artillery units remained to fire supporting missions for other units returning to Division control on 20 March.

For the first time since PARIS, the men of the Division were able to rest, far from any possibility of shelling or infiltrating enemy patrols. During the day certain phases of training were carried out but most of the time was spent in rest and recreation. Although the rest was complete, it was destined to be short lived. After several alerts and many rumors, the Division began to move back to Germany on 26 March. This time it headed south into the Seventh Army sector and the last phase of the war.

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER VIII
CENTRAL EUROPE

After two false alerts for movement back to the combat zone, elements of the Division began moving toward new assembly areas in the vicinity of ELLENSTADT on 26 March. The Division had returned to German soil again and was in excellent condition to engage the enemy in the final, sweeping battle of the war. In the next five weeks the Division was destined to speed from the RHINE, across the DANUBE and deep into the German area. The action promised to be mobile and elastic and for this type action the Division had been well briefed while in the rest area. In this final phase gains were computed in miles rather than hundreds of yards. The enemy had been badly broken; the knockout blow was ready.

On 29 March the Division moved non-tactically across a heavy pontoon bridge at WORMS and the next day began to attack eastward through the elements of the 12th Armored Division and the 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group against very little resistance. With the 8th Infantry on the left and the 22d Infantry on the right the Division moved toward WÜRZBURG, meeting only slight resistance on the right. On 1 April the left sector elements moved by shuttle movement, screened by the 12th Armored Division, to objectives immediately south of WÜRZBURG.

By late in the day on 2 April the Division had cleared the wooded area of GULLENBERGER WALD, southwest of WÜRZBURG and had forced a bridgehead across the MAIN River in the vicinity of OSCHENFURT. Other elements, in conjunction

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with the 12th Armored Division, cleared the enemy from the high ground in the vicinity of KOWIGSHOFER. Although on the right the Division attack to the south and southeast was meeting increased resistance, the bridgehead established on the left was exploited when Combat Command B of the 12th Armored Division passed through the 8th Infantry.

From the OSCHENFURF bridgehead the Division attacked both north and south. The 12th Infantry and the 22d Infantry pressed the advance to the south toward BOPPENBERG while the 8th Infantry, operating with Combat Command B of the 12th Armored Division, attacked to the north. On 4 April a coordinated attack to the south met strong resistance from a unit of well entrenched SS troops, but by late in the day the line had advanced to MESSELHAUSEN. The Germans continued to fight stubbornly the next day in the wooded sector to the south of MESSELHAUSEN. An advance of five miles was made in the north, however, as units of the Division neared RANDERSACKER and WESTHEIM.

The German resistance began to crack in the south on 6 April as the Division advanced on a broad front engulfing the towns of NASSAU, HARTHAUSEN, EDELFIGEN and the high ground overlooking BAD MERGENTHEIM.

In the north the Division met no organized resistance and during the period 6-10 April the operations in this area consisted of collecting stragglers. The only casualties incurred during the time came from an air attack against the 8th Infantry's CP on 8 April.

The Division continued to attack to the south against scattered to determined enemy resistance. The attack was halted for two days along the TAUBER River, during which time long range patrols were sent out to determine the strength of the enemy in the area ahead. On 10 April the attack to the south was resumed and a general line from BARTENSTEIN to BOTTINGEN was secured.

The Division broadened its front the next day by moving the 8th Infantry into the attack on the left flank. In this sector the towns of WILLANZHEIM, TIEFEN-SPOCKHEIM and OBERBREIT were occupied without resistance. In the Division's center zone heavy artillery and small arms fire limited the gains made. One enemy tank was knocked out and only after a coordinated tank-infantry attack was the enemy dislodged from his positions. During the day the line advanced to BALDERSHEIM and the high ground southeast of QUECKBOHN.

The 324th Infantry, attached to the Fourth Division for a ten day period, took positions near NIEDERSTETTEN on the Division's right flank and repulsed an enemy counter attack on 11 April.

Employing a four regiment front, the Division continued the drive south toward the historic city of ROTHEBURG and for the next four days made daily advances up to four miles. Primarily the attacks kept to the road nets, branching out to the flanks to clear the numerous woods and enemy strong points which were established to delay the advance. Since the road nets marked the direction of attack the objectives of the units became towns instead of terrain features. Very seldom did the enemy stand to fight an all-out battle for any one place but was content to withdraw after a fair show of opposition. At times the artillery fire slowed the advance but the Division was not offered a serious threat during the entire move.

On 16 April the Division met a stubborn German force supported by heavy artillery fire in the woods north of ROTHEBURG. This force, however, was driven back by late in the day, opening the way for the attack against ROTHEBURG and the surrounding communities the next day. The Germans decided not to fight inside the town of ROTHEBURG which was quickly taken in the morning. Only sporadic resistance was encountered in the surrounding towns of RUCH, LOHRBACH, HERREWINDEN, BERTTHEIM and ENGELHARDHAUSEN. The most spectacular

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advances of the day came on the left flank when units of the 8th Infantry surged ahead six miles to OBER FELDEN and 13 miles to ANSBACH. From this point the Division stepped up its daily rate of advance, moved through towns without pausing and gained as high as 15 miles a day on a broad front. The fight became a race which was at times slowed down by the great numbers of German prisoners that had to be processed. Following ROTHENBURG the Division captured EUCHNOLD, JOCHSBERG, FREUERBROWN and HENRACH against light opposition.

A typical example of the fighting at this time took place in the center of 12th Infantry's sector on 19 April. The combat team advanced for almost two hours without meeting resistance when direct fire was received from the woods along the Regiment's immediate front. The Regiment attacked these positions and continued into the towns of MATTRINGEN and OBER-OSTHEIM, reducing the resistance by 1400. The advance then moved more rapidly as the towns of WERNITZ, WALKERSDON, GAILRAU, ERZBURG, BOTTENWEILER, WILDENHOLZ and THEUERBORN fell during the rest of the afternoon. The same type action was fought on all sectors.

On 21 April a task force was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Rodwell with the mission of further exploiting the weaknesses of the German defense. The task force consisted of the 12th Infantry combat team, 522nd Field Artillery Battalion, 70th Tank Battalion, 4th Reconnaissance Troop and the 510th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The opposition to the Task Force was slight during the first day but the hastily erected road blocks kept the Task Force from advancing beyond JAGSTZELL. After smashing an enemy force of 60 men at NEULER the Task Force moved to the vicinity of MALEN but did not enter the town since the town was supposedly well fortified. The main body of the Division continued the advance but ran into

trouble on the left flank at the town of ELLWANGEN, which reports stated was held by a force of 600, many of whom were SS troopers. It was not until the 23rd that this town was completely cleared, following a strong rear guard action. The same type rear guard action took place at AALEN but on the 24th of April Task Force Rodwell moved over the OBER KOCHEN, BROSS KOCHEN, GIEGEN route for more than 18 miles. At the same time plans were made to cross the last natural barrier, the DANUBE River, on 25 April.

By nightfall the Division had crossed the DANUBE with two Regiments - the 8th and 22d Infantry. With this operation Task Force Rodwell was dissolved. During the next two days the Division moved some 20 miles from the DANUBE bridgehead and forced a bridgehead across the LECH River. On the 28th the Division consolidated its forces and planned another crossing of the LECH for the following day. This was promptly accomplished and the Division moved across the LECH River in force and drove almost 15 miles beyond the River against almost no opposition.

The Division continued to lunge forward another 15 miles on 30 April across the AMFER, ISER, and LOISACH Rivers near WOLFRATSHAUSEN. The enemy was now completely defeated and offered no organized resistance. The war had become a matter of finding intact bridges across the numerous small rivers. For the first two days of May, the Division pressed the attack to the southeast, occupying the towns of GAUTING and BAUREHUN, GHEILING, WAAKIRCHEN, HEICHERSBERG, GUSTEIGH, MUSBACH and HOLZKIRCHEN.

During the period of 3-4 May, the 101st Airborne effected a relief of the Division as the Division moved into the occupation zone of the Third Army. The new Division command post was located at AMBERG and the Division occupied the area in the vicinity of NUERNBERG, WEISENBERG, INGALSTADT, BEGENSBURG and SULZBACH.

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On 6 May word was received from General Eisenhower's Headquarters that the German military forces had surrendered unconditionally.

REFERENCES

For amplification of this action refer to the following documents previously submitted:

- Action after Action Reports - 4th Inf Div
- G-2 Periodic Reports - 4th Inf Div
- G-3 Periodic Reports - 4th Inf Div
- Staff Section Journals - 4th Inf Div

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NARRATIVE HISTORY

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPTER IX

OCCUPATION AND REDEPLOYMENT, INACTIVATION, AND SUMMATION

The termination of organized hostilities in Europe found the 4th Infantry Division in the vicinity of AMBERG, Germany. The Division was immediately assigned areas of occupation and the subordinate units adjusted positions to more efficiently cover the zone. For a period of some 15 days, the units of the Division patrolled the zone and operated Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Camps. Late in May, the Division's occupation area was changed to the vicinity of ANSBACH where the Division remained for about four weeks. Training designed to prepare the Division for the Pacific Theatre was instituted without delay. Care and cleaning of equipment was placed on a top-priority basis at all times. The operation of Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Camps continued, involving in its operation the enforcement of strict non-fraternization policies.

While at ANSBACH, 2000 men, many of whom were key, high ranking, non-commissioned officers, were transferred to the United States for discharge because of A. S. E. scores. Another 2000 men with 85 points or more were transferred to the 99th Infantry Division and an equal number of low score personnel were transferred from the 99th to the 4th. The purpose of the transfer was to send the 4th Infantry Division to the United States with a full complement available for service in the Pacific.

In June, the Division was alerted for movement for redeployment through the United States - one of the first units to be so redeployed. Upon being relieved in place by the 1st Infantry Division, elements of the Division assembled in the vicinity of BAMBERG preparatory to movement to a port of embarkation. Motorized elements of the Division proceeded direct to Camp Old

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Gold in the vicinity of LE HARVE, France, The remainder of the Division travelled by rail in the usual antiquated box cars, passing through parts of the same countryside they had so bitterly contested a few short months before. On arrival at Camp Old Gold, equipment, other than individual, was turned in and the administration necessary for re-entering the United States was completed. Customs declarations were prepared and a final exchange of all foreign types of money was made. Records were crated in the prescribed manner; trophies and souvenirs received special attention by each individual owner who carefully wrapped his personal possession with the full conviction that his trophy was one of the most important items to go aboard ship.

In early July, the Division embarked aboard the General James Parker, the Heritage, and the Seabag bound for the United States. The voyage was a successful one and the minimum amount of sea sickness incurred. Upon arrival in New York Harbor and Hampton Roads, numerous tug-boat whistles screamed and serenaded the arrival of the Fourth Division. After a hearty reception, members of the Division were quickly processed through reception centers and entrained for home and thirty days leave.

Prior to the Division's complete reassembly at Camp Butner, N. C., the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific was announced. With the end of the war with Japan, the Division entered a period characterized by extreme uncertainty. The discharge program established by the War Department was accelerated, with the result that commands changed hands frequently. Fluctuating discharge criteria created uncertainty in the minds of all ranks as to separation dates. Rumors concerning the movement of the Division to a permanent station other than Camp Butner re-occurred regularly. Because of the very unstable personnel situation prevalent throughout, training policies changed frequently from very

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extensive training programs to very nearly no training at all. The establishment of very liberal leave policies, thereby reducing personnel present for duty, further complicated the problem.

On 1 December 1945, the Division reorganized under T/O & E 7 dated 1 June 1945. Actually the reorganization had little effect because of the extremely depleted strengths; portions of newly authorized equipment were drawn, however, and training in recoilless rifles and mortar location equipment was instituted.

Almost daily the strength of the Division dropped and the personnel turnover mounted. The maintenance of the equipment began to require a larger and larger percentage of the total strength available for duty.

INACTIVATION

By letter order, Headquarters, First Army, dated 7 February 1946, the 4th Infantry Division was ordered inactive effective 5 March 1946. Immediately the supply and administrative functions necessary for the inactivation were set in motion. Rosters of personnel available for reassignment were submitted to higher headquarters; equipment was turned in; unoccupied buildings reverted to post control. Because of transportation difficulties, the execution of orders transferring troops to other stations was delayed. As a result, the date for inactivation was set back to 12 March 1946.

After almost six years of continuous service, the 4th Infantry Division disappeared from the roll of active units. Simultaneously, the service of three of the older regiments of the Army was interrupted - the 8th, 19th and 22d Infantry Regiments.

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SUMMATION

While it is not the purpose of this brief narration to ascribe fame or glory to the 4th Infantry Division, it is believed that the actions of the 4th Infantry Division will stand alone - without bolstering. During its World War II service, the Division participated in five major campaigns: Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes, and Central Europe. During the same period, the Division sustained battle casualties totaling 1210 officers and 19987 enlisted men.

From the period 6 June 1944 through 8 May 1945, the Division expended ammunition in the following tonnages:

Artillery Ammunition	16682 tons
Infantry Ammunition	6087 tons

The Division Artillery fired a total of 421248 rounds during the war. The Division as a whole expended a total of 21769 tons of ammunition during World War II.

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NARRATIVE HISTORY

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

COMMANDERS OF WORLD WAR II

Commanders since June 1940

Brigadier General Walter E. Prosser. June 18, 1940 - October 9, 1940
Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall. October 9, 1940 - August 18, 1941
Major General Oscar W. Griswold. August 18, 1941 - October 7, 1941
Major General Fred C. Wallace. October 7, 1941 - June 30, 1942
Major General Raymond O. Barton. July 1, 1942 - September 17, 1944
Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeley September 18, 1944 - September 20, 1944
Major General Harold R. Bull September 21, 1944 - September 29, 1944
Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet September 30, 1944 - October 4, 1944
Major General Raymond O. Barton. October 5, 1944 - December 26, 1944
Major General Harold W. Blakeley December 27, 1944 - December 4, 1945
Major General George F. Hays December 5, 1945 - March 5, 1946

Assistant Commanders since June 1940

Brigadier General Oscar W. Griswold June 16, 1940 - June 17, 1941
Brigadier General James I. Mair June 17, 1941 - July 27, 1941
Brigadier General Julius O. Adler July 27, 1941 - July 28, 1941
Brigadier General Harold R. Bull July 29, 1941 - January 20, 1942
Brigadier General Wade H. Hainlip January 20, 1942 - February 7, 1942
Brigadier General Maxwell A. O'Brien. February 7, 1942 - November 20, 1943
Brigadier General Henry A. Barber, Jr. November 20, 1943 - July 14, 1944
Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. March 25, 1944 - July 12, 1944
Brigadier General George A. Taylor. July 14, 1944 - October 6, 1944
Brigadier General James S. Rodwell. October 7, 1944 - November 15, 1945
Brigadier General Charles D. W. Canham. November 16, 1945 - March 5, 1946

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

LIST OF INCLOSURES

INCLOSURE NUMBER

1	After Action Reports 4th Infantry Division	304-0.3	6241
2	Invasion of France	314-0.5.0	22679
3	The Advance to Cherbourg		22680
4	The Carantan Periers Sector		22681
5	The St Lo Breakthrough		22682
6	St Pois		22684
7	The Attack on Paris		22685
8	Action North of Paris		22685
9	The Attack into Belgium		22687
10	The First Penetration of the Siegfried Line		22688
11	The Battle of Hurtgen Forest		22689
12	The Defense of Luxembourg City		22690
13	The Second Penetration of the Siegfried at the Schnee Eifel		22691
14	Central Europe		22692
15	Germany		22693
16	G-3 Periodic Reports Aug. - Dec 1944	304-3.1	22477
17	G-3 Periodic Reports Jan. - Feb 1945		
18	G-3 Periodic Reports Feb. - March 1945		
19	G-3 Periodic Reports March - May 1945		
20	G-3 Periodic Reports Sept. - Nov 1944		

- 21 ✓ G-3 Journal Sept - Dec 1944 5453 22480
- 22 ✓ G-3 Journal Dec 44 - Jan 45
- 23 ✓ G-3 Journal Jan - Feb 1945
- 24 ✓ G-3 Journal Feb - April 1945
- 25 ✓ G-3 Journal April - June 1945
- 26 ✓ G-2 Periodic Reports July - Nov 1944 304-301 22460
- 27 ✓ G-2 Periodic Reports Dec 1944 - Jan 1945
- 28 ✓ G-2 Periodic Reports Jan - June 1945
- 29 ✓ 4th Engr (C) Bn Periodic Reports 304-ENG-C-1 22711
- 30 ✓ Notes, Overlays, Interviews, Narrative History 8th Inf Regt 304-INF-81
- 31 ✓ Notes, Overlays, Interviews, Narrative History 22d Inf Regt 304-INF-21
- 32 ✓ Action After Action Reports and Miscellaneous Notes
- 33 ✓ Action After Action Reports 4th Q. M. Co. 304-QM-C-3 (22407)
- 34 ✓ Miscellaneous Action After Action Reports
- 35 ✓ Field Orders Separate Units
- 36 ✓ Commendations, Biographical Sketches 7.6 7.19
- 37 ✓ Miscellaneous Notes, Dates and Historical Data 0.30 0.1
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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

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Richardson Campbell - 4th Infantry Division

26 Jan - 9 Mar 45

HEINLAND CAMPAIGN
January 26, 1945 - March 9, 1945

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RETURN TO THE RHINELAND

On January 28th, 1945, the 4th Infantry Division received orders to move to the vicinity of Trois Vierges, Belgium, from the area in which it was fighting northeast of Fels, Luxembourg. The movement would begin early on the morning of the 27th and would proceed as rapidly as we were relieved by the 8th and elements of the 6th Infantry Divisions. The exact assembly areas for the division's units were not specified. At 0700, the 12th Infantry Regiment moved via Mersch, Saul, Reichlange, Atert, and Bastogne closing into an assembly area at Monnet (049624). Meantime the 8th and 22d Regiments were assembling in preparation to follow. At 1800, the 8th crossed the IP and on the following morning at 0900, the 22d followed.

An estimate of the enemy situation would indicate that the enemy, having spent his offensive energy in the fierce Ardennes Offensive, was once more retreating and it was believed that he would pull his forces back into the Siegfried Line from which he would defend as bitterly as he had all during the fall and early winter. In order to carry out this plan and to inflict the greatest costs of time, men and material upon us he carried out a harassing withdrawal.

With the German's characteristic care he selected the most advantageous positions from which to defend - commanding hills, the far sides of rivers and streams, and towns. He blew bridges as he went and placed mines on the road in terrain where units would find themselves roadbound. The weather, too, was all in his favor as it was very cold and the ground was covered with ice and snow, making it difficult for advancing infantry to fight and even more difficult for motor columns to follow. The enemy had taken a licking in the Ardennes and his eastern army was now being overrun by the Russians. These two factors

caused him to speed up the withdrawal of some of his better troops. For this reason, the 4th Division found itself fighting a curious mixture of good and bad units, panzer, infantry, artillery and engineers, all fighting as infantry. Some of these troops were withdrawing in an orderly manner, others turned out to be stragglers from the units which had previously withdrawn. So hard pressed did he become later that he was compelled to use everything he had at hand.

The route over which the 4th moved to its new zone of action was certainly a familiar one, especially in the area northeast of Bastogne. In September we had attacked through the area north of Bastogne; in December the American Army had retreated in the face of the Runstedt Offensive; and now in late January we were again advancing through the same area. No wonder the roads for miles were lined with the wreckage of German and American vehicles (some of which had plainly marked iron crosses on them which bore mute testimony to the fact that the Germans had used American equipment in the battle). Over a stretch of a few miles northeast of Bastogne, more than half a hundred knocked out tanks proved that there had been more than one desperate battle in this country. It is no wonder that the roads broke down under the enormous strain of thousands of vehicles of two armies moving constantly back and forth for months as the battle line swayed from east to west and back again. The fighting, too, took place during the dead of winter - Runstedt had planned to take advantage of the worst winter conditions in his attack so that Allied air supremacy would be of no avail - he made a very excellent selection.

On these last few days of January it seemed as if the entire American Army was trying to move down the Bastogne Highway. For days and nights the highway from south of Bastogne to Trois Vierges was lined on both sides with solid streams of vehicles of the divisions moving to and from the front.

This road from Bastogne to Trois Vierges and thence to St Vith, Schonberg and later Eleialf became the VIII Corps MSR and through constant usage quickly became almost impassable in many places. Its condition became so bad that it caused the supply situation to become acute and for this reason the division's advance had to be halted in the middle of February. This campaign compares favorably with any yet fought in engineering difficulties. Throughout the period of time that this campaign was fought bridging and road repairing, problems constantly faced the division and at times the task was so great that engineers were at work for periods of days and nights straight - one company did not sleep for two days and three nights on one occasion. Had the engineers decided to build new roads sufficient to carry division traffic, they probably would not have had as many difficulties as they had using the existing net. Dozens had to be used to push aside road-blocks, destroyed vehicles, dead horses, blown bridges (railroad overpasses), as well as to plow snow from the roads. All types of mines had to be moved as well as abatis and other road-blocks of every type. Craters had to be filled. It was not merely a matter of repairing the roads in the first instance but of maintaining them and since they were very poor roads to start with, that was an exceptionally difficult task. This situation was remedied later when a railroad was brought in to Eleialf.

Field Order #67, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, ordered the 8th and 12th Regiments to attack abreast to defeat the enemy and capture the town of Brandseheid. It was thus one of the curious turns of fate that brought the division back to precisely the same battleground which it had originally fought over when it advanced to the Siegfried line four and one-half long months before.

On January 28th, the 12th Infantry relieved elements of the 34th Infantry Regiment (87th Division) in the vicinity of Burg Reuland and the 8th, the remainder of the 34th in a zone about two miles further north. Patrols went out that night to find the enemy and next morning with Company I leading, the 3d Battalion attacked in the 12th's sector. The temperature was below freezing and there was ice and snow on the ground. Part of Company I had already crossed the Our River north of Hameres and the rest was about to follow when a barrage of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire proved that the enemy was not going to let us cross so easily. The company was pinned down and received heavy casualties. After gaining permission from the 8th, the 3d Battalion (12th Infantry) moved further north into the 8th's zone and attempted to cross. This time the enemy added rifle and machine gun fire from Brussel B. Hill around 600 yards east of where Companies I and K were about to cross. It was not until mid-day of the 30th that Companies I and K were able to cross. On the left, the 8th Infantry hurled artillery on the enemy in Sommersweiler and crossed the first stream in its zone behind the artillery barrage. The 1st Battalion overran Sommersweiler.

From the very beginning of our new offensive, the regiments ran into innumerable supply difficulties and supporting engineers of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion had the problems of clearing the roads of snow and ice, of removing mines, and of constructing bridges. On one occasion the 8th Infantry used weasels to carry supplies forward to the companies, because they were the only vehicles which could cross the stream by fording and climbing over the steep banks. By 1730, January 30th the engineers had put in a bridge and that part of the local supply problem was solved.

By February 1st, the two regiments were well across the river and during the day made rapid advances without enemy resistance through several small towns. A patrol from the 12th reached Bleialf early on the morning of February 2d, later Companies K and F, reached positions just west of the town and began a fight which lasted until 1020 the next morning. Around one hundred and fifty Germans from the 761st and 752d VG Regiments defended it from the high ground just to the west. As supporting weapons the enemy employed between eight and ten machine guns, two 80mm mortars and a werfer battery. Tank fire also came from north of Bleialf and from Branscheid. The 1st and 3d Platoons of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, were to support the 2d Battalion in its attack and it was only with the greatest amount of effort that the tanks were brought forward. Road conditions were so bad that it was necessary to hook all five tanks of the 3d Platoon together to get them up a hill on the road from Chren to Gross-Langenfeld. Both platoons rallied in that town before moving to attack Bleialf on the only road available. The lead tank was destroyed by antitank fire from Bleialf as it neared the railroad overpass. After a slight withdrawal and a reorganization the tanks resumed the attack and attempted to go around the overpass which had been blown. The Germans had placed mines on the only path, and tank #5 hit one. Two tanks attempted to move cross-country and became mired in the mud. This entire operation was carried out under enemy observation and every tank was hit at least once by antitank fire. As no route could be found to get around the obstacle the platoons were ordered to withdraw under cover of darkness. By the time that they had driven back via Gross-Langenfeld, Winterpelt, Gliven and Winter-scheid to positions just west of Bleialf, the 2d Platoon had beaten them there. One of its tanks turned over in the Our River when an engineer bridge collapsed.

It was from its new position west of Bleialf that Company B was able to assist the 2d Battalion (12th Infantry) in its successful attack on the town. This experience of the Company B platoons was by no means singular; it is given merely to illustrate the difficulties which were commonly met and surmounted in the early stages of this campaign.

While the 12th was engaged in subduing the forces around Bleialf the 9th Infantry advanced rapidly overrunning Oberaschled, Buchet, Hatemfeld and clearing the ridge road (known as the Skyline Drive) preparatory to its attack on the Schnee-Eifel part of the Siegfried Line.

On several occasions both regiments had had to send units through the adjacent division's sector in order to find passable roads. On those days in which the snow-melted bodies of both American and German soldiers appeared upon the ground where they had been frozen into weird shapes after they had fallen in the winter campaigns. Hundreds of dead cattle littered the fields and destroyed vehicles lined the roads, with the carcasses of the horses that had pulled supply vehicles. Most of the small towns had been either partly or completely destroyed and the wreckage lay untouched where it fell. Human excreta was deposited in the corners of rooms where the fighting had been at such close quarters that even leaving the buildings was an invitation to death. This part of Germany (just north of where the Luxembourg, German and Belgium borders meet) is the fiercest area our troops have ever fought through.

Back in September, Company K of the 22d Infantry had attacked down the long axis of the Schnee-Eifel Ridge and had reached the northern edge of the Siegfried strongpoint - Brandschled. From the very edge of the town it had been recalled to fight further north. Since that time, Brandschled had remained definitely Jerry's. During the 3d of February, the 22d Infantry moved forward and began preparations for attacking Brandschled. At 0745,

February 5th, the 3d Battalion with Company I, a section of heavy machine guns, the 3d Platoon of Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and a platoon of Tank Destroyers on the right and Company K, a section of heavy machine guns, the 1st Platoon of Company C, and a platoon of Tank Destroyers on the left pulled the exact same maneuver it had employed before. There were eleven pillboxes to be cleared around the crossroads north of Branschied. The attack on the town began at 1253. The infantry attacked across the open ground with bayonets fixed and screaming to terrorize the enemy. They ran into a number of plaster mines and potato masher grenades buried with trip wires attached. Behind them, in front of them, and beside them moved the tanks and Tank Destroyers, giving magnificent support to the infantry's attack. The pillboxes were assaulted by the tanks and tank destroyers firing point blank and by the infantry shooting its bazookas. In two hours almost all of the town had been overrun and the enemy cleaned out. It was not the intention of the Germans to let us hold such a prize however. Had they read the 8th Corps order moving the 4th Division boundary farther north so that the 90th Division would now occupy Branschied and had they known that the 90th planned to relieve the 4th in the town early on the morning of the 6th, they could not have planned the time of their counterattack to a better time. In the darkness of the early morning, February 6th, the 1st Battalion of the 302nd Regiment (90th Division) began moving in to relieve the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. It was then that the Germans attacked with an estimated 600 men from the east, southeast and south. They practically overran the town and Company K which had set up its defenses in the eastern part of the town was split up into small units which continued to fight when surrounded. When the fight was over the 3d Battalion had captured more than 150 Germans and was in full possession of the town although Germans could be

seen to the East. Part of Company K which had been split up to defend from different pillboxes along the eastern edge of the town remained in its positions and did not return until two days later (Lieutenant Perkins returned with squad, February 8th) because it considered itself still surrounded.

The capture of the Schnee-Köpf Ridge itself was primarily the achievement of the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry. A patrol from Company C, at 0830 on February 4th followed by a patrol from Company A slipped quietly through the first row of pillboxes and radioed back to the battalion the news that there was a large number of Jerries moving up and down the main road on top of the ridge. Company A's patrol remained and maintained communication with Battalion Headquarters as the entire battalion quietly sneaked in through the line and then fanned out - Company B to the left behind the first line of boxes, Company C to the right, and Company A continued on to the main road. Under cover of darkness the three companies systematically cleared pillbox after pillbox. So quietly had the whole operation been carried out that most of the fortifications had been cleared by daylight although the entire area had not been cleared until 1600. One hundred and twenty eight surprised Germans were taken prisoner while the battalion sustained only one casualty. The entire regiment poured through the hole thus torn in the enemy's lines and went on during the next week to clear the area as far east as the Prum River. The 1st Battalion fought another battle when it attacked the town of Gundenreuth under cover of an afternoon fog. When the town was finally subdued, elements of several German divisions were captured, whereas in the Siegfried line the only organized resistance had been furnished by the 86th VG Division and the 1934 Security Battalion. The fighting continued for several more days with our troops inevitably advancing against the sometimes

weak, sometimes strong opposition of the enemy. On February 9th, Company K of the 8th Infantry captured a regiment of Germans consisting of four truck-loads and including a Major (regimental commander), two Captains, several Lieutenants, a Medical Officer, and about 80 men. That same day Companies I and L crossed the Frum River to capture Hill 627 (east of Hermspand). This hill was a commanding piece of ground and from it one could see for miles in almost any direction. The two companies fought their way to the top of the hill and for almost two days fought to retain their positions there. Supply and evacuation teams had to run a gauntlet of enemy sniper and machinegun fire. Before light on the morning of the 11th the two companies began to withdraw as ordered and soon found themselves in a very weird situation. They had chosen a route which led right through the middle of an enemy bivouac area and the men could barely make out the huddled forms against the snow background. Company L's commander decided that it was better to try to sneak through rather than try to turn back. The Germans awoke before both companies could get through and Company I was split. It was several hours before the fight had ended and the companies had returned to Hermspand.

The order to return had come in compliance with orders from VIII Corps that the division would halt its advance and dispose its forces to defend along the Frum River from Olsheim to Watzgerath. It was at this time that the supply situation had become so acute under the combination of bad weather and steadily worsening roads that Corps had ordered all of its units to take up defensive positions but to remain prepared "to resume the offensive on short notice". It was not until February 26th however that the division received orders to resume the attack on February 26th.

After patrols had reconnoitered the hill to the north of Prum and had found no enemy there, Major Kemp, battalion commander of the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, requested permission to go into the town. When it was granted, he decided to send all three rifle companies abreast; Company K on the left, Company L in the middle, Company I on the right. This was on the morning of February 12th and the fight went on from house to house until around 1300 when the town was pronounced clear. Sniper fire continued to harass anyone moving around the streets and it was discovered that the Germans were firing from the hill across the river which completely overhangs the town. Jerry was calling for artillery from his GPs up on the hill also. Around 0630 the Germans counterattacked into the town from the north by crossing the river on a foot bridge and then moving down the west bank. It lasted until late at night and the 3d Battalion was still cleaning out houses along the river on the morning of February 15th. This counterattack consisted of approximately 180 men of the 1st Company, 2d Panzer Grenadier Regiment and was made with the mission of recapturing the eastern part of Prum and establishing a bridgehead there. (G-8) These men were armed with bazookas, 3 machine guns and 2 heavy mortars.

From February 15th through February 27th the division maintained defensive positions and trained and rested its units expecting at any time to be called upon to attack. These days were characterized by very aggressive patrol action by the enemy. He sent men across the river, captured one or two of our outposts, he made demonstrations by laying down artillery and mortar barrages and firing machine guns and small arms. Our units too, made several demonstrations in order to divert the enemy's attention from the attacks of either the 87th Division on our left or the 90th Division on our right. These divisions were attacking the Siegfried Line and pushing

through to straighten their lines up to positions parallel to ours. As the enemy had shown himself to be extremely sensitive to our attacks along the area adjacent to the Bleisalf-Frum Road we continued to be especially sensitive to our patrol actions and demonstrations in that area.

On February 28th the division again resumed the offensive by jumping off across the Frum River in the face of the 8th Parachute Division. The attack began at 0515 and without artillery support as we did not want to lose the element of surprise. It was therefore carried out very quietly with the men running across improvised foot-bridges and pushing fast up the hills to the east of the river. Opposition consisted of rifle, machine pistol, and machine gun fire when the enemy detected the presence of American soldiers. Company E of the 8th Infantry was almost immediately discovered, and was hit by a large volume of small arms fire while Companies F and G pushed up on top of the hill (their objective) very quickly. Company I on the left of the 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry ran into anti-personnel minefields while the 3d Battalion of the 22d on the right ran into extensive minefields on the eastern side of the Frum River. By the end of the day two battalions of the 8th and three battalions of the 22d Infantry Regiments were well across the river and on good hill positions. For hours groups of enemy which had been bypassed or surrounded continued to fight fiercely harassing our reserve and supply troops and firing at the rear of our assault troops. The enemy were largely boys of 17 or 18 years who had been trained under the Hitler Youth Program - they were a surly lot and any captured would give no information - they merely talked about the new secret weapon that was going to defeat the Allies. All of them were paratroopers but a large number had never received "jump" training.

For the next two days the attack progressed with the infantry pushing ahead against bitterly maintained resistance. On March 2d General Blakeley decided to employ the 22d Infantry in the center of the division's zone by swinging its boundaries further north to include the town of Weinsheim and to extend the 12th's zone on the right. This was done because the heaviest resistance to the division's advance was coming from Weinsheim and the area near that town extending along the central zone. The 11th Armored Division was ordered to attack through the right half of the 4th Division's zone not later than 1200 on March 2d. It was contemplated by the Corps Commander that the 11th Armored would (after its jump-off across the Frum River and through the 4th Infantry Division's front lines) advance rapidly to the Kyll River which it would cross and attack to the east to contact the 4th Armored Division (now advancing very rapidly from the southwest) and with that division drive to the Rhine. The 4th Infantry Division would follow the 11th to clean up any pockets of resistance bypassed.

On March 3d, GCB attacked and made some gains along the Frum-Weinsheim road net. By the afternoon Goudlesheim had not fallen so the armor said that it would hold up its advance until Goudlesheim was in our hands as the enemy in that vicinity could fire at them from the flanks if they advanced further. By 1015, March 4th, the town had fallen and the division had advanced several kilometers by nightfall. On March 5th, the 11th Armored Division turned to the north to cross the Oos River and then the Kyll. When they discovered that the bridges were blown and the bridge sites were receiving small arms fire from Hill 519 to the north they stated that they would have to wait until the 22d Infantry captured Hill 519 or until darkness before they could build the bridges. The 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry was at this time engaged in a

battle royal for Queen (Hill 520). Here we find a perfect example of fanaticism on the part of the boys of the 5th Parachute Division. To the northwest Duppach had been captured by the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, to the southeast Oos was in the hands of the 1st Battalion of the 12th. The 11th Armored Division was poised behind the 12th to push across the Oos River and on to the Kyll. There were but two choices open to the Germans; to stay and fight to the death or withdraw to the other side of the Kyll River as soon as possible. They elected to stay and die and they chose Hill 520 to defend. For hours the battle raged with the 2d Battalion hurling barrage after barrage of artillery, and tank destroyer fire against the hill and firing its 81mm mortars and all eight of its leading machine guns. Whenever the barrage would cease and the infantry (of Company F) would rise to its feet and attack, at least five German machine guns would open up on them. Finally Company F fought its way over the top. As the infantry spread out in their attack and became somewhat scattered one hundred and fifty Germans attacked from a draw down the norther slope of the hill and a fierce battle ensued which lasted well into the night. Company G pushed up through Company F to knock the enemy back and at the end of the battle all three rifle companies were on the hill and the enemy had either been slain or taken prisoner. CCB of the 11th Armored attacked through the 12th Infantry and 22d Infantry, continued on reaching the Kyll River at points in the vicinity of Obr Bettingen and Ndr. Bettingen. The 5th Infantry was alerted to be prepared to form with the 70th Tank Battalion, 4th Reconnaissance Troop, 28th Field Artillery Battalion and other smaller attachments - Task Force "Rhino" if the "enemy situation warrants pursuit tactics."

As March 6th drew to a close, CCB of the 11th Armored, the 12th and 22d Regiments of the 4th Infantry Division were faced with the problem of crossing the River. The 11th pushed across first and the 22d Infantry relieved the infantry of CCB early on the morning of March 7th. After numerous attempts to cross on a bridge which had been constructed out of only half of the necessary materials (the bridge was formed by placing the middle of the bridge so that it rested on the bottom of the stream - actually this was a ford with gradual banks rather than a bridge) and to cross a ford at Dahn and other locations the armor gave it up as a bad job and reported that it would cross farther south in the 90th Division's sector where GCA had crossed. This was around noon of the 7th. Meantime both the 12th and 22d were steadily pushing ahead on the far side of the Kyll River; before midnight both Companies K and E had moved into the town of Hillesheim.

On March 6th, Task Force Rhino "took off" with one platoon of the 4th Reconnaissance Troop in the lead and followed by the 70th Tank Battalion, a couple of TD platoons, a mortar platoon and an engineer platoon. This comprised the assault unit and was commanded by Lt Col Davidson (70th Tank Battalion Commanding Officer). By 1100 this unit was across the Kyll River. The 6th Infantry followed with other attachments. Chief difficulties were in getting around the blown out railroad bridges in the vicinity of Hillesheim. After these had been bypassed the task force rode through Berndorf and wiped out a force of Germans manning a road block at Kerpens. (The message which Task Force Rhino sent back reporting this sounds like the "sub sighted - sank same" - "Head of column in Kerpens barricade near there; 10 enemy med, eliminated same". When the task force entered Udeim antitank guns from the hills east of the Ahr River fired at it and knocked one light tank. The enemy was wiped out and on march Task Force Rhino across the river, through Haffeld and

into Adenau. March 9th at an early hour Adenau was in our hands and also Reifferscheid; the 1st Battalion of the 9th was holding the hills east of Adenau and across the Adenauer River. In this attack all enemy resistance had been obliterated and Task Force Rhine had moved freely in the enemy's rear area and could easily have pushed to the Rhine had it not been recalled. It had captured an enormous supply dump - the supply dump for the German Fifth Panzer Army in it's push as part of the Rundstedt Offensive.

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Miscellaneous Statistical Data, 4th Int. Division

Feb 1946

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
CAMP BUTNER, N. C.

1 February 1946

MR
Colonel C.C. Benson
Chief of Historical Section
Army War College
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

As historian of the 4th Division I have received numerous requests in the past for stories about the 4th Division. For this reason I am mailing to you in two envelopes those stories and summaries of actions which have not already been sent to the War College. I hope that despite their miscellaneous nature they may prove valuable as a source of information as to various phases of the war in Europe.

There are:

1. A map (scale 1:500,000) showing the front lines and command posts of the division by dates from June 6, 1944 to May 3, 1945.

2. A map (scale 1:1,000,000) showing the command posts from June 6, 1944 to May 3, 1945.

11 Write-ups of individual interviews and summaries of actions divided into campaigns.

1. Miscellaneous Statistical Data	- 2 write-ups
2. Cherbourg Campaign	- 9 " "
3. Hedgerow Campaign	- 7 " "
4. Breakthrough Campaign	- 6 " "
5. Siegfried Line Campaign	- 9 " "
6. Hurtgen Forest Battle	- 3 " "
7. Battle of Luxembourg	- 1 " "
8. Rhineland Campaign	- 12 " "
9. Central European Campaign	- 5 " "

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DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

17 MAY 1946
H. S. S.
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Included with the information is a write-up by Lt. Col. L. W. Leeney (at the time battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment) of a proposed T/O for a rifle battalion. Col. Leeney had intended to send his suggestions in to the War Department but never had time to do so.

If you desire further information about the 4th Division please write to this office.

Respectfully yours,

Francis H. Fife

FRANCIS H. FIFE
1st Lt. Infantry
Historian

MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICAL INFORMATION

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Henry J. Griffin Capt. A. S.
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *21 May 46*

COMMANDERS AND STAFFS

8TH INFANTRY

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Rgtl Cndr	June 6	Col.	James A. Van Fleet	Prom to Brig Gen and Tfd
	July 3	Col.	James S. Redwall	Tfd 28 Sept 44 to 9th Inf Div
	Sept 28	Col.	Richard G. McKee	
Rgtl Exec	June 6	Lt. Col.	Fred A. Steiner	K 19 June
	June 20	Lt. Col.	Omar Bates	(Prom to Lt Col fr Maj 24 Jul)
C.O. 1st Bn	June 6	Lt. Col.	Conrad C. Simmons	K 24 June
	June 25	Lt. Col.	John H. Meyer	(Prom to Lt Col fr Maj 9 Jul)
	Sept. 11	Lt. Col.	Sybil J. Letzelter	
Exec 1st Bn	June 6	Major	John H Meyer	Assumed Cnd 1st Bn 25 June
	June 25	Capt.	Theophilus L. Moore	Opp's - Tng Staff O 1st Bn as of Sept. 11.
	Sept 11	Lt. Col.	John H. Meyer	
C.O. 2nd Bn	June 6	Lt. Col.	MacHealy, Carlton O.	SWA H July 44
	July 11	Major	Alfred G. Yarbrough	Rld 25 July, drop fr rolls as exhaustion case.
	July 25	Lt. Col.	Langdon A. Jackson	
Exec 2nd Bn	June 6	Major	Alfred G. Yarbrough	Assumed cmd 2nd Bn 11 July
	July 25	Major	George L. Mabry	Rld 5 Aug 44 Tfd to Rgtl Hq
			James W. Haley	Rld 17 Aug 44 Tfd to Rgtl Hq
			George L. Mabry	
			Strickland	W 4 Aug 44
			Collins	
Exec 3rd Bn	June 6	Major	Fred W. Collins	Assumed Cnd 3rd Bn 4 Aug

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 DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

Commanders and Staffs (cont'd)

8th Inf (cont'd)

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Exec 3rd Bn	Aug 6	Capt.	Luther C. Wheeler	Tfd to Co. I 10 Aug 44
	Aug 19	Capt	Robert C. Crisson	
C.O. Co A	June 6	Capt	Carl A. Cline	Tfd to 1st Bn 1 Aug
	Aug 1	1st Lt	Vincent E. O'Connell	Became Ex O 15 Aug
	Aug 15	Capt	Alfred C. Shaplin	
C.O. Co B	June 6	Capt	Gail B. Lee	W 12 June
		1st Lt	Sidney A. Marchand Jr.	W 7 July
	July 8	1st Lt	Clyde C. Eddinger	Dropped for exhaustion 18 Sept
	Sept 18	1st Lt	James H. Callahan	Became Ex O 27 Sept.
	Sept 27	Capt	Robert D. Moore	- -
C.O. Co C	June 6	Capt	Robert G. Crisson	W June 6
	June 16	1st Lt	Joseph L. Gude	W 22 Sept
	Sept 22	1st Lt	William B. Woodruff	- -
C.O. Co D	June 6	Capt	Joseph E. Samson	W 22 June
	June 22	1st Lt	William D. Preston	Became Ex O 18 Aug
	Aug 18	Capt	Kermit B. Hunt	- -
C.O. Co E	June 6	Capt	Howard S. Lees	W 7 June
	June 7	1st Lt	John C. Heberchek	Tfd 13 Aug
	Aug 12	Capt	Hans A. Flitbrand	
C.O. Co F	June 6	Capt	Leonard T. Schroeder	W 6 June
	June 6	Capt	John A. Kulp	MIA 7 July
	July 7	1st Lt	Benjamin W. Mills	K 7 Sept
	Sept 7	1st Lt	William V. Pierson	Became Ex O 23 Sept
	Sept 23	1st Lt	Earle H. Dooley	- -
C.O. Co G	June 6	Capt	James W. Haley	W 19 June

Commanders and Staffs (cont'd).

8th Inf (cont'd)

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
C.O. Co G (cont'd)	June 22	1st Lt	William B. Johnson	K 24 July, aptd Capt 12 Jul
	July 27	Capt	James W. Haley	Tfd 1 Aug to Hq Co 1st Bn
	Aug 1	1st Lt	Earl L. Stackhouse	- -
C.O. Co H	June 6	Capt	John F. Greenip	- -
C.O. Co I	June 6	Capt	Frederick G. Haisel	W 22 June
	June 22	1st Lt	Frederick J. Kramer	K 7 July
	July 12	1st Lt	Fred R. Brooks	W 26 July
	Aug 1	1st Lt	William M. Haraden	- -
C.O. Co K	June 6	Capt	John J. Spangler	K 7 June
	June 7	1st Lt	Lyle P. Carmony	Dropped fr rolls 1 July 44, aptd Capt 23 June.
	July 1	1st Lt	Raymond A. Noell	Became Ex O 4 July
	July 4	Capt	Lyle P. Carmony	NBC - left 23 July
	July 23	1st Lt	Raymond A. Noell	Became Ex O
	July 28	Capt	Alvin L. Johnson	- -
C.O. Co L	June 6	Capt	John G. Rockford	K 23 June
	June 23	Capt	Raymond S. Dorre	W 29 July
	July 29	Capt	Daniel H. Hill	- -
C.O. Co M	June 6	Capt	Robert D. Rap Hays	Tfd to 3rd Bn 1 July
	July 1	1st Lt	Baker S. Smith	- - (aptd Capt 12 July)

Commanders and Staffs (cont'd)

12TH INFANTRY

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Rgtl Cndr	June 6	Col.	Russell F. Reeder	SWR 11 June
	June 12	Col	James S. Lickett	- -
Rgtl Ex O	June 6	Lt Col	Joe E. Golden	- -
C.O. 1st Bn	June 6	Lt Col	Charles L. Jackson	- -
Ex O 1st Bn	June 6	Major	Gordon F. Johnson	Became C.O. 2nd Bn 7-17-44
	July 18	Capt	Dunbar Whitman	(promoted to Maj 9-10-44)
C.O. 2nd Bn	June 6	Lt Col	Dominick Montalbano	KIA 11 June
	June 12	Capt	Richard J. O'Malley	KIA 16 Jul. Promoted to Major 6-22-44.
	July 17	Major	Gorden F. Johnson	SWA 11 Aug. Promoted to Lt Col 24 July 44
	Aug 12	Lt Col	Franklin R. Sibert	- -
Ex O 2nd Bn	June 6	Capt	Richard J. O'Malley	Became CO 2nd Bn 12 Jun 44
	July 17	Capt	Robert R. Wright	Tfd to Rgtl Hq 14 Aug 44
	Aug 15	Capt	Irving Gray	- -
C.O. 3rd Bn	June 6	Lt Col	Thaddeus R. Dulin	KIA 22 June
	June 23	Capt	Kenneth R. Lindner	(Promoted to Major 7-8-44) (Promoted to Lt Col 8-23-44)
Ex O 3rd Bn	June 6	Major	Harold H. Smith	SWA 11 June
	June 12	Capt	Herman R. Rice Jr.	(Promoted to Major 7-24-44)
Co. A	June 6	Capt	John B. Holton	K 9 June
	June 13	1st Lt	Oscil M. Jackson	Killed (?)
	June 16	Capt	Glen W. Thorne	- -

Commanders and Staffs (12th Inf) Cont'd.

	Date	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Co. B	June 6	Capt	Irving Gray	W 6 June
	June 6	1st Lt	Harold W. Pearcey	(apt'd Capt 2 July)
Co. C	June 6	1st Lt	Allen H. Heidingsfelder	W 8 June
	June 8	1st Lt.	William H. Akins	Hosp'd 30 July (later Capt)
	July 30	1st Lt.	Stephen A. Maslowski	Rtd 6 Aug upon RFD Akins.
	Aug 6	Capt	William H. Akins	Hosp'd 8 Aug
	Aug 8	2nd Lt	Edgar T. Miller, Jr.	Rtd 04 Aug
	Aug 14	1st Lt	Philip W. Wittkopf	- -
Co. D	June 6	Capt	Dunbar Whitman	W 10 June
	June 10	1st Lt	Francis K. Tresslar	(now capt)
Co. E	June 6	Capt	Robert R. Wright, Jr.	Tfd to 2nd Bn 30 June
	June 30	Capt	Paul H. Dupais	NBC 25 Aug
	Aug 25	1st Lt	Martin Macdiarmid	- -
Co. F	June 6	Capt	Warren J. Clark	K 9 June
	June 9	1st Lt	Royce D. Gibson	K 9 June
	June 10	1st Lt	Cecil B. Collins	DOW 15 June
	June 15	Capt	Phineas M. Henry, Jr.	K 30 July
	July 30	1st Lt	Henry J. Prochaska	W 3 Aug
	Aug 3	2nd Lt	Theodore Smithers	W 6 Aug
	Aug 7	Capt	John L. Moore	Tfd 14 Aug
	Aug 14	2nd Lt	Paul A. Radina	W 16 Sept
	Sept 16		Adelbert R. Cagle	- -

Commanders and Staffs (12th Inf) Cont'd.

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Co. G.	June 6	Capt	Jason C. Hades	W 6 July
	July 8	Capt	John L. Moore	Tfd 7 Aug
	Aug 7	1st Lt	Robert V. Daspit	W 10 Aug
	Aug 14	2nd Lt	Frank H. Morrison	Rlvd 15 Aug
	Aug 15	Capt	Tallis J. Crocker	- -
Co. H	June 6	Capt	Tallis J. Crocker	W 12 June
	June 13	1st Lt	David E. Widman	W 5 July
	July 6	1st Lt	John W. Irvine	W 19 July
	July 20	Capt	Karl W. Enroughty	- -
Co. I	June 6	Capt	Joe H. Hammer	W Rlvd on 13 June
	30 June	Capt	Alvin J. Wilcox	Hosp'd and Rlvd 14 Aug
	Aug 14	Capt	Joe H. Hammer	Tfd to Hq 3rd Bn 23 Sept
	Sept 23	Capt	Alvin J. Wilcox	- -
Co. K	June 6	Capt	Kenneth R. Lindner	Tfd to 3rd Bn
	June 14	Capt	Raymond J. Gewinner	- -
Co. L	June 6	Capt	Herman R. Rice, Jr.	Tfd to 3rd Bn 11 June
	June 12	2nd Lt	Benjamin M. Levinger	W 14 June
	June 15	Capt	John S. Harvey	Tfd to 3rd Bn 14 Aug
	Aug 18	1st Lt	Tom Cortright	Tfd to 3rd Bn 31 Aug
	Sept 1	1st Lt	Ward T. Darnell, Jr.	- -
Co. M	June 6	Capt	Michael Mihalik	W 8 June
	June 9	1st Lt	George D. Rees	W 13 June
	June 14	2nd Lt	Earl R. Thompson	Rlvd 16 June to O.O.
	June 14	Capt	John R. McCann	Tfd 28 June
	June 29	Capt	Earl R. Thompson	- -

Commanders and Staffs (cont'd)

22ND INFANTRY

	Date	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Regtl Cndr	June 6	Col	Hervey A. Tribolet	MBC 10 June
	June 11	Col	Robert T. Foster	Tfd to Hq VII Corps 9 July
	July 10	Col	Charles T. Lanham	(Atchd to 22nd Inf 6 July)
Regtl Ex 0	June 6	Lt. Col	John F. Riggles	
G.O. 1st Bn	June 6	Lt. Col	Sewell M. Brumby	W 7 June
	June 7	Major	James E. Neal	W 12 June
	June 9	Major	John Dowdy	W evac 28 June (prom to Lt Col)
		Lt Col	Merrill	K
	June 28	Capt	George M. Goforth	W 10 July
	July 10	Major	Robert B. Latimer	Rld when Lt Col Dowdy RT Dy 4 Sep
	Sept 4	Lt Col	John Dowdy	K 16 Sept
	Sept 16	Major	Robert B. Latimer	Rld 19 Sep
	Sept 19	Capt	Clifford M. Henley	- -
Ex 0 1st Bn	June 6	Major	James E. Neal	Assumed cmd 7 June
	June 7	Capt	Morris E. Branigan	Rld 9 June
	June 9	Major	James E. Neal	W 12 June
	June 12	Capt	Oscar L. Joyner Jr.	K 22 June
	June 22 to Jul 14, no Ex 0			
	July 14	Capt	Arthur A. Lemann	Rld 24 July upon ret DI of Capt Branigan.
	July 24	Capt	Morris E. Branigan	Rld 4 Sep, tfd to Regtl Hq
	Sept 4	Major	Robert B. Latimer	Became G.O. 1st Bn 16 Sept.

Commanders and Staffs (22nd Inf) Cont'd.

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
Ex O 1st Bn (cont'd)	Sept 17	Capt	Morris E. Brautigan	Tfd to Rgtl Hq 21 Sep
	Sept 21	Capt	Thomas C. Harrison	- -
C.O. 2nd Bn	June 6	Major	Earl W. Edwards	SD to Div Hq 18 July (prom to Lt. Col)
	July 13	Major	James B. Drake	W 1 Aug.
C.O. 2nd Bn	Aug 5	Major	Glenn D. Walker	(prom to Lt Col)
Ex O 2nd Bn	June 6	Major	John Dowdy	Tfd to 1st Bn 9 June
	June 26	Major	Carl S. Ledbetter	NBC 3 July
	July 6	Capt	James B. Burnside	W 12 July
	July 19	Lt Col	Earl W. Edwards	Rld and Tfd to Rgtl Hq 16 Aug.
	Aug 13	Capt	Joseph T. Samuels	Prom to Major 7 Sept.
C.O. 3rd Bn	June 6	Lt Col	Arthur S. Teague	
Ex O 3rd Bn	June 6	Capt	George M. Goforth	Tfd to Hq 1st Bn 29 June
	June 29	Capt	Glenn D. Walker	Tfd to Hq 2nd Bn 5 Aug (prom to major 13 July 44)
	Aug 5	Capt	James C. Kemp	(prom to maj 28 Aug)
C.O. Co A	June 6	Capt	Thomas W. Shields	K 8 June
	June 8	Capt	Wyman K. Clark	W 8 July
	July 8	1st Lt	David H. Henry	K 11 July
	July 11	1st Lt	Rowell Haskett	Dropped as NBC, 17 Sep (prom to Capt 22 July)
	Sept 24	1st Lt	Louis M. Sormrude	
C.O. Co B	June 6	Capt	Aaron U. Trimble	NBC 13 June
	June 13	Capt	Thomas H. Gary	NBC 26 July

Commanders and Staffs (22nd Inf) Cont'd

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
C.O. Co B (Cont'd)	July 26	Capt	James W. McLane Jr	-
C.O. Co C	June 6	Capt	Robert B. Latimer	Prom to major
	July 2	1st Lt	Frank B. Reid	DOW 14 Sept.
	Sept 15	1st Lt	Edward W. Martin	-
C.O. Co E	June 6	Capt	James B. Burnside	Tfd to 2nd Bn Ag 14 June
	June 14	1st Lt	James M. Harris	K 14 June
	June 14	2nd Lt	Alexander P. DiDonato	K 10 July (prom 1st Lt 1 July)
	July 6	Capt	John O. French	K 9 July
	July 11	1st Lt	Hoyt C. Holcomb	W 27 July (prom to Capt 24 July)
	July 27	1st Lt	Samuel L. Nelson	W 31 July
	July 31	1st Lt	Robert M. Stadgell	NEO 6 Aug
	Aug 9	1st Lt	Merwin W. Tolles	Turned cmd over to Newcomb 9 Sept
	9 Sept	Capt	Arthur O. Newcomb	-
C.O. Co F	June 6	Capt	Harold D. Fulton	K 12 June
	June 12	1st Lt	James C. Bean	W 11 July
	July 11	1st Lt	Claude C. Phillippe	W 18 July
	18 July	1st Lt	Gerald J. Claing	-
C.O. Co G	June 6	Capt	Robert D. Russell	K 7 June
	June 7	1st Lt	James C. Jackson	W 12 July
	July 12	2nd Lt	Philip W. Taves	Tfd to 5 Co 23 July
	July 20	1st Lt	Lawson W. Magruder Jr	W 1 Aug 44
	1 Aug	1st Lt	Thomas J. Twomey	-
C.O. Co I	June 6	Capt	Joseph T. Samuels	Tfd 2nd Bn Hq 15 Aug
	Aug 11	1st Lt	Richard T. Farrell	W 14 Sept (prom Capt)

Commanders and Staffs (22nd Inf) Cont'd.

	DATE	RANK	NAME	REASON FOR SEPARATION
C.O. Co I (Cont'd)	Sept 14	1st Lt	George C. Syman	Turned cmd over to Lt Lee 25 Sept.
	26 Sept	1st Lt	William E. Lee	- -
C.O. Co K	June 6	Capt	Charles A. Earnest, III	W 10 July
	July 10	1st Lt	Jack C. Gates	W 28 July
	July 30	Capt	Charles W. Whaley	- -
C.O. Co L	June 6	Capt	Edward T. Gatto	K 10 June
	June 10	Capt	Howard C. Blazard	Tfd to Retl Hq.
	Aug 12	Capt	Ross F. Powell	W 14 Sept
	Sept 14	1st Lt	James F. Younger	- -

CASUALTIES - COMMANDERS

June 6 - September 308th Infantry

	K	W	M/A	EXAMS	NBC	Total	Ret W	Net Loss
Regimental Executive	1					1		1
Battalion Commanders	1	2		1		4		4
Rifle Co Commanders	5	11	1	1	2	20	4	16
Heavy Weapons Co C.O.'s		1				1		1

12th Infantry

	K	W	M/A	EXAMS	NBC	Total	Ret W	Net Loss
Regimental Commanders		1				1		1
Battalion Commanders	3	2				5	1	4
Battalion Executives		1				1		1
Rifle Co Commanders	5	9			3	17	2	15
Heavy Weapon Co. C.O.'s		6				6	2	4

22nd Infantry

	K	W	M/A	EXAMS	NBC	Total	Ret W	Net Loss
Battalion Commanders	2	5				7	1	6
Battalion Executives	1	1			2	4	1	3
Rifle Co Commanders	8	12			4	24		24
Heavy Weapons Co C.O.'s				?				

Casualties, June 6 to September 2, 1944

Date	8th Inf			12th Inf			22nd Inf		
	K	W	M/A	K	W	M/A	K	W	M/A
June 6.	5	60	15	1	9		7	33	
7.	30	100	15	6	42	8	9	61	59
8.	10	20	4	93	140	122	10	58	9
9.	20	50	7	30	121	100	21	25	39
10.	19	190	3	6	16	2	3	29	8
11.	10	40		3	18	1	2	30	8
12.	4	20		1	16	1			
13.	4	44		9	118	38	13	130	38
14.	5	20		2	18	2	19	62	39
15.	5	21		34	128	23	25	246	36
16.		9	1	5	40	24			
17.	2	5	3		17	15	12	55	10
18.	5	25		5	29	1	3	21	
19.	6	20	20	5	22	10		32	
20.	18	43	6	13	90	70			
21.	15	38	3	1	12	4	2	22	8
22.	31	92			124	3	42	71	30
23.	78	200		1	150	14	36	165	26
24.	5	30		15	95	25	7	33	6
25.	58	108	10	6	7	13	10	20	10
26.		7	6	24	105	11	10	27	6
27.		22		1	9	1	6	35	2
28.			6		2		15	33	1
29.									
30.									

Casualties, (Cont'd)

Date	8th Inf			12th Inf			22nd Inf		
	K	W	M/A	K	W	M/A	K	W	M/A
July 1									
2									
3						9			
4									
5	2	6		2	6	1			
6	54	213	53	5	212	7		2	
7	6	63		45	82	57		2	
8	10	32		3	27	3	8	73	6
9	9	43		2	14	14	26	101	5
10	6	40		6	33	27	39	156	16
11	4	25		8	35		24	111	6
12	2	26			10		31	109	18
13	2	9		11	46	50	5	21	14
14	11	42			27	7		13	1
15	2	21		7	35	2		7	2
16	12	36	15	15	68	5	1	1	
17		9			1	2		1	
18									
19								2	
20					1				
21	3	15						1	
22	2					1		2	
23	27	70							
24	9	31							

Casualties, (Cont'd)


Date	8th Inf			12th Inf			22nd Inf		
	K	W	M/A	K	W	M/A	K	W	M/A
Aug 13				2	11	2			1
14		9		2				1	
15									
16									
17									
18									
19					1				
20									
21									
22									
23									
24						8		14	7
25					8		4	16	
26		2			3	4		14	1
27	1	4	3			7			3
28	1	15			2	5	2	14	3
29					3				
30	5	20	4		2	3	4	24	3
31	2	1							
Sep 1									
2					6	19	11		5

REPLACEMENTS AND PRISONERSJune 6 to September 2, 1944

<u>Date</u>	<u>Replacements</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Replacements</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>
June 6			July 1		
7			7		6
8			8		47
9			9	330	5
10		85	10	840	47
11		162	11		17
12			12		21
13		98	13		5
14			14	340	10
15			15		
16			16	99	
17	236		17	212	
18		53	18	24	
19			20	5	
20		92	23	176	
21		88			
22		90	AUG 13	113	6
23		740	14	69	16
24		730	15	688	
25	1272	1463	16	248	22
26	700	2285	17	116	11
27		529	18	85	11
28		1327	19	308	10
29	383		20	18	2
30		13	21	3	

Replacements and Prisoners (cont'd)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Replacements</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>
Aug 22	25	
25		51
26	2	409
27	12	128
28	8	41
29	9	183
30	1	304
31	8	228



CHERBOURG
BREST
RENNES
NANTES

FRANCE

NETHERLANDS

GERMANY

SWITZERLAND

LA ROCHE
LES LANDES
COMMERCEMENT

SAINT MARIE
BROUEN

ANGULÊME
COGNAC

PARIS
ST. MICHAEL
SUR MER

BOULOGNE

ORLÈANS

B
C
D
E
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G

SM
V
L
N
M
P

1 January 1945

Esch, Luxembourg

2 January 1945

Esch, Luxembourg

21 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

22 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

23 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

24 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

25 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

26 December 1944
Esch, Luxembourg
Left Luxembourg, Luxembourg by motor convey at 1330
Arrived Esch, Luxembourg 1400
Distance traveled 12 miles

27 December 1944
Esch, Luxembourg

28 December 1944
Esch, Luxembourg

29 December 1944
Esch, Luxembourg

30 December 1944
Esch, Luxembourg

31 December 1944
Esch, Luxembourg

4 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

5 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

6 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

7 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

8 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

9 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Left Stavelot, Belgium by motor convoy 0930.
Arrived Luxembourg 1600.
Distance traveled 90 miles.

10 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

11 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

12 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

13 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

14 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

15 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

16 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

17 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

18 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

19 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

20 December 1944
Luxembourg, Luxembourg

18 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

19 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

20 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

21 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

22 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

23 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium Thanksgiving Dinner at Mignon Theatre

24 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

25 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

26 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

27 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

28 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

29 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

30 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

1 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

2 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

3 December 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

1 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

2 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

3 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

4 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

5 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

6 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

7 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

8 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

9 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

10 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

11 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

12 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

13 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

14 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

15 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

16 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

17 November 1944
Stavelot, Belgium

16 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

17 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

18 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

19 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

20 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

21 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

22 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

23 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

24 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

25 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

26 October 1944

Spa, Belgium

27 October 1944

Stavelot, Belgium

Left Spa, Belgium by motor convoy 1700.

Arrived Stavelot, Belgium 1730.

Distance traveled 11 miles

28 October 1944

Stavelot, Belgium

29 October 1944

Stavelot, Belgium

30 October 1944

Stavelot, Belgium

31 October 1944

Stavelot, Belgium

1 October 1944
St Vith, Belgium

2 October 1944
St Vith, Belgium

3 October 1944
St Vith, Belgium

4 October 1944
St Vith, Belgium

5 October 1944
St Vith, Belgium

6 October 1944
Spa, Belgium
Left St Vith, Belgium by motor convey 1430.
Arrived Spa, Belgium 1600
Distance traveled 51 miles
Hq billeted in Casino de Spa

7 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

8 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

9 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

10 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

11 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

12 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

13 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

14 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

15 October 1944
Spa, Belgium

15 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

16 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium
20 German prisoners turned in to Cactus PW

17 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

18 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

19 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

20 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium
5 German prisoners turned in to Cactus PW

21 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

22 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

23 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

24 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

25 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

26 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

27 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium

28 Sept 1944
St Vith, Belgium
Left St Hubert, Belgium by motor convoy 1100.
Arrived St Vith, Belgium 1530.
Distance traveled 56 miles.

29 Sept 1944
St Vith, Belgium

30 Sept 1944
St Vith, Belgium

- 1 Sept 1944
St Michel Sur Orge (10 miles south of Paris)
- 2 Sept 1944
Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France (256 miles north of Paris)
Left St Michel Sur Orge by Motor Convoy 0800.
Arrived Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France 1030.
Distance traveled 46 miles.
- 3 Sept 1944
Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France
- 4 Sept 1944
Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France
- 5 Sept 1944
Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France
- 6 Sept 1944
Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France
- 7 Sept 1944
Rimogne, France
Left Nanteuil LA Haudouin, France by motor-convoy 0800.
Arrived Rimogne, France 1600.
Distance traveled 106 miles
1 German prisoner captured at Nanteuil LA Haudouin turned in to
Cactus PW
- 8 Sept 1944
Rimogne, France
- 9 Sept 1944
Rimogne, France
- 10 Sept 1944
Rimogne, France
- 11 Sept 1944
Rimogne, France
- 12 Sept 1944
Rimogne, France
- 13 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium
Left Rimogne, France by Motor convoy 1100.
Arrived St Hubert, Belgium 1500.
Distance traveled 65 miles.
15 German prisoners turned in to Cactus PW
- 14 Sept 1944
St Hubert, Belgium
2 German prisoners turned in to Cactus PW

17 August 1944

Les Landes, France.

18 August 1944

Les Landes, France

1 German prisoner turned in to Cactus PW.

19 August 1944

Les Landes, France

20 August 1944

Champfremont, France

Left Les Landes by Motor Convoy 1800.

Arrived Champfremont 2100.

Distance traveled 45 miles.

21 August 1944

Champfremont, France

22 August 1944

Champfremont, France

23 August 1944

Champfremont, France

24 August 1944

Champfremont, France

25 August 1944

Chateaufneuf, France

Left Champfremont by Motor Convoy 1130.

Arrived Chateaufneuf 1900.

Distance traveled 102 miles.

26 August 1944

Chateaufneuf, France

27 August 1944

St Michel Sur Orge (10 miles south of Paris)

Left Chateaufneuf by motor convoy 1300.

Arrived St Michel Sur Orge 1600.

Distance traveled 80 miles.

28 August 1944

St Michel Sur Orge, France

29 August 1944

St Michel Sur Orge, France

30 August 1944

St Michel Sur Orge, France

31 August 1944

St Michel Sur Orge, France

1 August 1944
Marigny, France

2 August 1944
Marigny, France

3 August 1944
Marigny, France

4 August 1944
Marigny, France

5 August 1944
Marigny, France

6 August 1944
LA Trinite, France
Left by Motor Convoy from Marigny, France 1900.
Arrived LA Trinite 2130.
Distance traveled 28 miles
Vicinity of Mortain

7 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

8 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

9 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

10 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

11 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

12 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

13 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

14 August 1944
LA Trinite, France

15 August 1944
Les Landes, France
Left LA Trinite by motor convoy 0800.
Arrived Les Landes 1230.
Distance traveled 45 miles.

16 August 1944
Les Landes, France

17 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

18 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

19 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

20 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

21 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

22 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

23 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

24 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

25 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

26 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

27 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

28 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

29 July 1944
Blosville, Normandy, France

30 July 1944
Marigny, Normandy, France
Left by Motor Convoy from Blosville 1000. Arrived Marigny,
Normandy, France 1430. Distance traveled 23 miles.

31 July 1944
Marigny, Normandy, France

1 July 1944 Valognes, France
2 July 1944 Valognes, France
3 July 1944 Valognes, France
4 July 1944 Valognes, France
5 July 1944 Valognes, France
6 July 1944 Valognes, France
7 July 1944 Valognes, France
8 July 1944 Valognes, France
9 July 1944 Valognes, France
10 July 1944 Valognes, France
11 July 1944 Bloisville, Normandy, France
Left by Motor Convoy Valognes 0900. Arrived vicinity of Bloisville
Normandy France 1130
Distance traveled 17 miles
12 July 1944 Bloisville, Normandy, France
13 July 1944 Bloisville, Normandy, France
14 July 1944 Bloisville, Normandy, France
15 July 1944 Bloisville, Normandy, France
16 July 1944 Bloisville, Normandy, France

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

- 19 June 1944 Rear Echelon embarked LST # 510, 1630, enroute for Normandy, France.
- 20 June 1944 Enroute to Normandy, France
- 21 June 1944 Enroute to Normandy, France
- 22 June 1944 Enroute to Normandy, France
- 23 June 1944 Enroute to Normandy, France
- 24 June 1944 Debarked from LST # 510 Utah Beach. Departed for bivouac area.
- 25 June 1944 Arrived bivouac area vicinity of Huberville, Normandy, France 0650. 1 mi NW of Valognes
- 26 June 1944 Huberville, Normandy, France
- 27 June 1944 Huberville, Normandy, France
- 28 June 1944 Huberville, Normandy, France
- 29 June 1944 Huberville, Normandy, France
- 30 June 1944 Huberville, Normandy, France
2 German prisoners turned in to Jayhawk Fwd PW.

SECRET

Jake
URGENT

MSG. TO: CG, V CORPS.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOUR TROOPS ENTER PARIS WITHOUT DELAY. PAREN
CG FIRST US ARMY TO CG, V CORPS PAREN INSTRUCT CG, 2ND FRENCH ARMD
DIV TO PUSH HIS ADVANCE VIGOROUSLY. DESIRE ALSO THAT YOU HAVE 4TH
INF DIV PUSH ITS ADVANCE FROM SOUTH AND ENTER CITY WITHOUT REGARD TO
TIMING OF ENTRY OF 2ND FRENCH ARMD DIV. RESTRICTIONS ON NOT BECOMING
INVOLVED IN SERIOUS FIGHT IN CITY OF PARIS DO NOT APPLY TO ITS OUTLY
ENVIRONS.

CG, FIRST US ARMY,

/S/ R. F. AKERS JR.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
G-3 (JCS).

~~John C. Kelly~~
~~J. Kelly~~
~~J. Kelly~~

DATE OF CONTACT

LTH DIVISION

June 5-28	23 days
July 5-18	13 days
July 21 - Aug. 11	22 days
Aug. 25 - March 11 (1945)	100 days
March 13 -26 (Div. Arty. with 69rd Div.)	8 days
March 20 - May 2	35 days
Total	200 days

These 200 days are during a period of 372 days
between June 6, 1944 and May 2, 1945.

4TH DIVISION CP'S

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| # 1. Beach (450963) | AM June 6 |
| # 2. Road U5 (431946) | PM June 6 |
| # 3. Audouville-la Hubert (403959) | June 6 - 8 |
| # 4. Bewzeville-au-Plain (379990) | June 8 - 10 |
| # 5. le Bison (341012) | June 10 - 20 |
| # 6. Bois de Montebourg (287067) | 1300 to 1800 June 20 |
| # 7. la Tardiverie (238136) | June 20 - 24 |
| # 8. Bois du Coudray (Gallis) (239179) | June 24 - 28 |
| # 9. Chauteau de Tourlville (181218) | June 28 - 30 |
| #10. Gourbesville (Rest Area) (289985) | June 30 - July 5 |
| #11. Groult (Assembly Area) (319893) | July 5 - 6 |
| #12. Cantepie (350847) | July 6 - 8 |
| #13. Meautis (352818) | July 8 - 17 |
| #14. Lenauderie (Rest Area) (459815) | July 17 - 20 |
| #15. Charlemeneris (144748) | July 20 - 26 |
| #16. La Couture (434686) | July 26 - 27 |
| #17. Bas Marais (410640) | July 27 - 28 |
| #18. le Bourg (403488) | July 29 - 30 |
| #19. Chasse-Dorriere (372438) | July 30 - August 2 |
| #20. la Landerie (369349) | August 2 - 3 |
| #21. la Bektiere (418259) | August 3 - 5 |
| #22. les Loges-sur Brecey (418246) | August 5 - 9 |
| #23. Ht Traviigny (479225) | August 9 - 10 |
| #24. Buais (551975) | August 10 - 11 |
| #25. le Telleul (620987) | August 11 - 12 |
| #26. Nantrail (6381948) | August 12 - 17 |
| # 27. Rouairie (2143958) | August 17 - 23 |
| #28. Ablis | 1500 to 1700 August 24 |
| #29. Bruyere (near Arpaon) | August 24 - 25 |
| #30. Epiney-sur-Orge (024 233) | August 25 - 27 |
| #31. Bois de Vincennes, Paris (119 402) | August 27 - 28 |
| #32. Montfermeil (218 460), Paris | August 28 - 30 |
| #33. Montge (359609) | 1400 to 1700 August 30 |
| #34. Nanteuil-le Haudouin (413721) | August 30 - September 1 |
| #35. Villers - Cotterets (611852) | 0800 to 1600 September 1 |
| #36. Coevres-et-Valsery (673934) | 1700 Sept 1 to 0700 Sept 2 |
| #37. Nampcel (624092) | 0900 Sept 2 to 1300 Sept 3 |
| #38. Urvillea (815418) | 1600 Sept 3 to Sept 5 |
| #39. Tremblois (695432) | September 5 - 6 |
| #40. Hargnies (885619) | September 6 - 7 |
| #41. Woods near Graide, Belgium (115542) | September 7 - 8 |
| #42. Libin (Chateau of collaborator), Belgium (230555) | September 8 - 9 |
| #43. Woods west of St Hubert, Belgium (355601) | September 9 - 10 |
| #44. Near Givrouille, Belgium (484637) | September 10 - 11 |
| #45. Near Behe, Belgium (742818) | September 11 - 13 |
| #46. Woods east of Gruflange, Belgium (837830) | 1200 to 1700 September 13 |
| #47. Bois de St Vith, Belgium (1/2 mi. N of Schlierbach) (695875) | 1900 Sept 13 to 1400 Sept 15 |
| #48. Auw, Germany (901003) | 1400 to 1900 September 15 |
| #49. Woods South of Schenberg, Belgium (963877) | September 15 - October 4 |
| #50. Woods Southwest of Bullingen (931004) | October 4 - November 7 |
| #51. Zwigfall, Germany (955365) | November 7 - December 8 |

4TH DIVISION CP'S (Cont)

#52. Luxembourg, Luxembourg (833112)	Dec 8 - Dec 27
#53. Senningen, Luxembourg (922171)	Dec 27 - Jan 16
#54. Heffingen, Luxembourg (922314)	Jan 17 - 22
#55. Fals (La Rochette) Luxembourg (910328)	Jan 22 - 28
#56. Trions, Belgium (P-674643)	Jan 28
#57. Dirler, Belgium (811781)	Jan 28 - Feb 2
#58. Bommersweiler, Belgium (946876)	Feb 2 - 4
#59. Amselscheid, Belgium (883834)	Feb 4 - 7
#60. Bleialf, Germany (972831)	Feb 7 to March 4
#61. Prum, Germany (062794)	March 4 - 6
#62. Schwirsheim, Germany (135821)	March 6 - 13
#63. Gerbevillers (Lorraine), France (093890)	March 13 - 20
#64. Batzendorf (Alsace), France (Q-978205)	March 20 - 26
#65. Mussbach, Germany (R-310855)	March 26 - 30
#66. Heppenheim, Germany (M-650150)	March 30
#67. Beerfelden, Germany (M-895082)	March 30 - April 1
#68. Walldurn (N-180113)	April 1 - 2
#69. Tauberbischofsheim (N-533380) (N-389153)	April 2 - 3
#70. Kirchheim (N-533200)	April 3 - 13
#71. Rottingen (N-615035)	April 13 - 15
#72. Croglingen (M-660990)	April 15 - 18
#73. Rothenburg (7789)	April 18 - 20
#74. Wettringen (760760)	April 20 - 21
#75. Maria Kappel (770651)	April 21 - 22
#76. Jagstzell (728505)	April 22 - 23
#77. Huttlingen (7335)	April 23 - 24
#78. Ober Kochen (740230)	April 24 - 25
#79. Heidenheim (7811)	April 25 - 26
#80. Aislingen (009938)	April 26 - 27
#81. Horgau (178811)	April 27 - 28
#82. Gross-Aitingen (260630)	April 28 - 29
#83. Eging (Y-4058)	April 29 - 30
#84. Ober Pfaffenhofen (625478)	April 30 - May 1
#85. Wolfershausen (7530)	May 1 - 6
#86. Amberg (O-978008)	May 6 - 14
#87. Ansbach (T-0600)	May 14 -

4TH DIVISION COMMAND POSTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
June 1944		
6 (AM)	Beach	450961
6 (PM)	Road U-5	431946
6 - 8	Audouville-la-Robert	409959
8 - 10	Beauvillan-au-Plain	379990
10 - 20	la Bisson	341012
1300 - 1800, June 20	Bois du Montebourg	287067
20 - 24	La Tardivégis	296136
24 - 28	Bois du Coudray (Gallis)	239179
28 - 30	Chateau de Tourlaville	181218
June 30 - July 5	Gourbeville (Rest Area)	289985
July 5 - 6	Gréault (Assembly Area)	319893
6 - 8	Cantepis	350847
8 - 17	Meautis	352818
17 - 20	Lonanderis (Rest Area)	459815
20 - 26	Charlennesrie	144788
26 - 27	La Couture	434886
27 - 28	Bas Marais	410640
29 - 30	le Bourg	403488
July 30 - August 2	laChasse-Doriers	372438
2 - 3	la Landerie	369349
3 - 5	la Beltiere	418259
5 - 9	les Loges-sur-Breoy	418246
9 - 10	H ² Traviigny	479223
10 - 11	Buisia	351973
11 - 12	le Tilleuil	620987
12 - 17	Hautreuil	698948
17 - 23	Bouzier	2143958
1500 - 1700, August 24	Ablis	
24 - 25	Bruyeres (near Arpaçon)	
25 - 27	Epinay-sur-Orge	024233
27 - 28	Bois de Vincennes, Paris	119602
28 - 30	Montfermeil, Paris	218460
1400 - 1700, August 30	Montps	399609
August 30 - September 1	Hautreuil-la-Haudouin	413721
0800 - 1600, September 1	Villars - Cottorets	611852
1700, Sept. 1 - 0700, Sept.2	Coeuvres-et-Valsery	679934
0900, Sept. 2 - 1300, Sept.3	Nampoul	624092
1600, Sept. 3 - Sept. 5	Urwillers	813418
Sept. 5 - Sept. 6	Tresblois	695432
6 - 7	Hargnies	885619
7 - 8	Woods near Graide, Belgium	115542
8 - 9	Zibin (Chateau of collaborator)	230555
9 - 10	Woods west of St. Robert	355601
10 - 11	Near Oivroulle, Belgium	484537
11 - 13	Near Bebo, Belgium	762818
1200 - 1700, September 13	Woods east of Graeflange, Belgium	837839
1900, Sept. 13 - 1400, Sept.15	Bois de St. Vith (2 mi. N of Schlierbech)	892875
1400 - 1900, September 15	Auw, Germany	901003
September 15 - October 4	Woods S of Schenberg, Belgium	969877
October 4 - November 7	Woods SW of Bullingen, Belgium	931004
November 7 - December 8	Zweifall, Germany	955365

Ash Division Camp and Posts - Continued

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinate</u>
8 - 27	Luxembourg City, Luxembourg	853112
December 27 - January 15	Senningen, Luxembourg	922171
January 17 - 22	Meffingen, Luxembourg	922314
22 - 28	Fels (La Rochette), Luxembourg	910328
28	Trois, Belgium	F-678663
January 28 - February 2	Durley, Belgium	811781
February 2 - 4	Lommerweiler, Belgium	965876
4 - 7	Amelsbeld, Belgium	883834
February 7 - March 4	Bleialf, Germany	972831
March 4 - 6	Frum, Germany	062794
6 - 13	Schwarzbach, Germany	135821
13 - 20	Barbervillers, Lorraine, France	093890
20 - 26	Habsendorf, Alsace, France	Q-978209
26 - 30	Mussbach, Germany	R-310855
30	Heppenbach, Germany	M-690130
March 30 - April 1	Beerfelden, Germany	M-895082
April 1 - 2	Wallbörn	R-180113
2 - 3	Tamborischhofbach	M-289153
3 - 13	Kirchheim	M-533200
13 - 15	Wöttingen	M-615035
15 - 18	Craglingen	M-660990
18 - 20	Rehzenburg	7789
20 - 21	Wöttingen	760760
21 - 22	Maria Fappel	770651
22 - 23	Jagtszell	728505
23 - 24	Rehlingen	7335
24 - 25	Ober Kochen	780230
25 - 26	Baldenbach	7811
26 - 27	Aldingen	009938
27 - 28	Birgau	178811
28 - 29	Quers-Aitingen	260690
29 - 30	Elling	T- 4098
April 30 - May 1	Ober Haffenhofen	623478
May 1 - May 6	Wolfratshausen	7590
6 - 14	Amberg	Q-978008
14	Ambach	T- 0600

LHM AWW (World War I) : activation
ag: te

Date and place of activation of 4th Inf Div:

1 June 1940, at Ft Benning, Ga. - Ltr, The Inf School, file 320.2
(5-20-40) M-C-M-AGO, sub, Organization of New Units, dated 31 May 1940.

Date and place of change to motorized division:

1 October 1940 - Ft Benning, Ga. (Approximate date)

Date and place of change from motorized to infantry:

4 August 1943 - at Ft Dix, N. J. - General Orders No 42, this headquarters,
dated 3 August 1945.

Name and dates of division commanders:

Brigadier General Walter E. Prosser, 16 June 1940 to 9 October 1940.
Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall, 9 October 1940 to 18 August 1941.
Major General Oscar W. Griswold, 18 August 1941 to 7 October 1941.
Major General Fred C. Wallace, 7 October 1941 to 30 June 1942.
Major General Raymond O. Barton, 1 July 1942 to 17 September 1944.
Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeley, 18 September 1944 to 29 September 1944.
Major General Harold R. Bull, 21 September 1944 to 29 September 1944.
Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet, 30 September 1944 to 4 October 1944.
Major General Raymond O. Barton, 5 October 1944 to 26 December 1944.
Major General Harold W. Blakeley, 27 December 1944 to date.

Date and place 4th Infantry Division entered ETO:

18 January 1944 - at Liverpool, England.

Note: show CGO of old ~~World War I~~ I
with dates of command

SECRET

4th INFANTRY DIVISION

(VII Corps)

RESTRICTED

COMMANDING GENERAL

MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND G. BARTON

Age 54. Graduate, US Military Academy
1919. Commissioned in Infantry.

Served with Army of Occupation, 1919-1923.

Chief of Staff, 4th Infantry Division.

Chief of Staff, IV Corps.

Commander 4th Infantry Division since
2 July 1943.

Asst. Div. Cdr.: Brig. Gen. Henry A.
Barber, Jr.

Div. Arty. Cdr.: Brig. Gen. Harold W.
Blakeley.

Chief of Staff: Col. James G. Rodwell.

HISTORY

Regular Army Division activated 3 December
1917.

World War I. Participated in campaigns,
Aisne - Marne, St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne.
Served with 16th British Division, several
French units including Second Army. Was a
component of the Army of Occupation.
Inactivated 1919.

World War II. Reactivated 3 June 1940. Trained
in U.S., first as a Motorized Division and
upon reorganization 1943, as regular Infantry
Division. Arrived in United Kingdom, February
1944.

HEADQUARTERS

Tilston, Devonshire.

INSIGNIA

The leaves of the "Ivy Division" represent
its number, while the word "Ivy", as pro-
nounced, suggests the characters used in the
formation of the Roman numeral "IV".

Little France Division

SECRET

5000

*note changed
1/1/44
AWB*

1 June 40 - activation 4th Division.

1 August 40 - 4th Division (Motorized)

WDC 137, 1941 - 4th Motorized Division.

4 August 43 - 4th Infantry Division.

AIR MAIL

SUBJECT: Assignment of 4th Infantry Division

AG 322 (17 Oct 45
OB-I

1st Ind.

RSM/eg

War Department, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 23 October 1945.

TO: Commanding General, 4 Infantry Division, Camp Butner,
North Carolina.

The 4th Division (Motorized) was activated 1 August 1940, per AG 320 (7-10-40) M (Ret) M-C, dated 20 July 1940, and redesignated as the 4th Motorized Division per Circular No. 137, War Department, 1941. The 4th Motorized Division was redesignated as the 4th Infantry Division on 4 August 1943, per AG 322 (28 Jul 43) OB-I-~~OR~~M, 30 July 1943.

June 1940

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:



R. B. Mill
Adjutant General

M

~~GI~~
ND

195 OCT 17 22 24

DB

✓

1110

①
1110 3-22-47
1110 10/17/47
Stm

OW240

WAR V UQGB NR59 WD

FROM BLAKEKEY CG 4TH INF CPBUTNER NCAR 171930Z

TO WAR DEPT ADJ GEN OFFICE WASHDC

GRNC

REFRENGE YOUR 1ST INDORESEMENT REGARDING TWX THIS HEADQUARTERS

DATED 13 OCTOBER 1945 ADVISING 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION PLACED ON

INACTIVE LIST 21 SEPTEMBER 1921 STOP REQUEST DATES AND NAMES OF

EACH CHANGE BEGINNING WITH REACTIVATION OF THE ORGANIZATION NOW

KNOWN AS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION FOLLOWING ITS ASSIGNMENT TO

INACTIVE LIST 21 SEPTEMBER 1921 END

2006Z

1110

1110 10/17/47

3-11
Ehank

70414 Ord 500

AIR MAIL

SUBJECT: Request for Information.

AG 522 (15 Oct 45)

OB-1

1st Ind.

RSW/ejd

War Department, AGO, Washington 25, D. C.

15 October 1945

TO: Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Camp Batner, North Carolina.

1. The 4th Infantry Division, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, was placed on the inactive list after World War I, at midnight, 21 September 1921, pursuant to General Orders No. 35, War Department, 1921, and General Orders No. 18, Headquarters 4th Division, 21 September 1921.

2. The 4th Infantry Division (Motorized) was redesignated as the 4th Motorized Infantry Division by War Department Circular 157, 1941, and on 4 August 1945 redesignated the 4th Infantry Division.

3. The 12th Infantry Regiment was organized in 1861, under proclamation of the President, 4 May 1861, and confirmed by Act of Congress 29 July 1861, as a three (3) Battalion Regiment. Each Battalion was constituted a separate Regiment in 1866, with the 1st Battalion, retaining the designation of the 12th Infantry Regiment.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Adjutant General.



Historical Section
 European Theater of Operations
 APO 897 US Army

Begin with Arrival in EPO

DIVISION KEY OFFICERS

4th Div

DATE COMMANDING GENERAL DATE ASSISTANT DIVISION COMDR

2 Jul 42	MG	Raymond O. Barton	15566 BG	Henry A. Barber	2 Jul 44
18 Sep 44	BG	Harold W. Blakeley	19 Sep 44 BG	James A. VanFleet	(act)
21 Sep 44	MG	Harold R. Bull	10 Oct 44 Col	James S. Rodwell	
30 Sep 44	BG	James A. VanFleet	7 Dec 44 BG	James S. Rodwell	
5 Oct 44	MG	Raymond O. Barton	9 Jul 45 Col	George A. Taylor	
27 Dec 44	BG	H. W. Blakeley	1 Aug 45 BG	George A. Taylor	
18 MAR 45	MG	H. W. Blakeley			

ARTILLERY COMMANDER

CHIEF OF STAFF

1 FEB 44	BG	Harold W. Blakeley	1 Feb 44 Col	James S. Rodwell
28 Dec 44	Col	Richard T. Guthrie	2 Jul 44 LtCol	Richard S. Marr
			28 Jul 44 Col	Richard S. Marr

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-1

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-1

1 MAR 44	Maj	William E. Walkup	1 MAR 44 LtCol	Harry F. Hansen
1 MAR 44		LtCol Garlen R. Bryant		

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-3

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-3

1 FEB 44	LtCol	Orlando C. Troxwell Jr.	1 FEB 44 LtCol	Richard S. Marr
13 Jun 44	Maj	David B. Goodwin	2 Jul 44 Maj	Guy O. DeYoung Jr.
16 Jul 44	LtCol	David B. Goodwin	20 Oct 44 LtCol	Guy O. DeYoung Jr.
31 MAR 44	Maj	John L. Delaney	28 May 44 LtCol	Kurt G. Cressman
27 Sep 44	LtCol	John L. Delaney		
10 APR 45	LtCol	Hee W. Stone		

see reverse side

ATTACHMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS TO HIGHER UNITS

4th Div
(Unit)

OTHER (include ComZ, ComZ Sections and any other)		THEATER		ARMY GROUP		ARMY		CORPS		DATE
Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	
		Etousa				First				10 Jan 44
		Etousa				First		V		14 Jan 44
		Etousa				First		VII		2 Feb 44
		Etousa				First		VIII		15 JUN 44
		Etousa				First				
		Etousa				First				
		Etousa				First				
		Etousa				First				19 Jul 44
		Etousa		12th		First				1 AUG 44
		Etousa				First				22 AUG 44 ✓ good
		Etousa				First		VII		8 Nov 44 ✓
		Etousa				First		VIII		7 Dec 44 ✓
		Etousa				Third		XII		20 Dec 44 ✓
		Etousa				Third		VIII		31 Jan 45 ✓
		Etousa		12th	6th SEP		Seventh	reserve		10 Mar 45 ✓

(-) indicates relieved from assignment or attachment

ATTACHMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS TO HIGHER UNITS

4th Div
(Unit)

OTHER (include ComZ, ComZ Sections and any other)		THEATER		ARMY GROUP		ARMY		CORPS		DATE
Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	Asgd	Atchd	
		Etouaa			6 th		Seventh		VI	#30 23 Mar 45 ✓
		Etouaa			6th		Seventh		IX	2nd MARCH 9 Apr 45 ✓
		Etouaa			6th		Seventh		XVI XXI	3 14 Apr 45 ✓
		Etouaa			12th		Third			15 Apr 45 ✓
		Etouaa			12th		Third		III	22 May 45 ✓
		Etouaa			12th		Third		III	23 May 45 ✓
		Etouaa			12th		Third		III	10 May 45 ✓

Detached Units

Unit	Attached To	Date Detached	Date Returned
4 th Div. Army	90 th Div.	1 July	6 July
2 nd Inf. Regt.	2 ^d Americal Div.	19 July	29 Aug.
4 th Field			
1 platoon, Co. C, 4 th Eng.			
Co. C, 4 th Med.			
12 th Inf.	30 th Div.	7 Aug.	13 Aug.
4 th Field			
4 th Med. Bn., Co. B			
1 platoon, Co. B, 4 th Eng.			
1 platoon, Co. C, 634 th T.O. Bn.	40 th	10 Aug.	11 Aug.
8 th Inf.			
Co. B, 8 th Inf. (then Co. A, 4 th Med.) 29 FA Bn.			
3 ^d Bn., 8 th Inf.	2 ^d Americal	12 Aug.	14 Aug.
4 th Tank Bn.	2 ^d V. Corps	7 Sept.	12 Sept.
Co. A, 4 th Tank Bn.	V. Corps	17 Oct.	
8 th + 12 th (then 1 st)	V. Corps	25 Oct.	
and 4 th Rec. Troop Co. A, 12 th Inf.	V. Corps	25 Oct.	9 Nov.
CT 22	83 rd Div.	5 Dec.	8 Dec.
CT 22 8	"	8 Dec.	12 Dec.
4 th Cav. Rec. Troop	21 st Cav. Rec. Sqdn.	4 Dec.	12 Dec.

Detached Units

II

Unit	attached to	date attached	date released
4th Div Arty	XXI Corp	12 March	20 March
1 & 2 Bns 22d Inf	12th Cavalry	7 Apr	3 Apr
8th Inf	101st AB Div	4 May	8 May

Unit	Attached Date attached	Date Relieved
690 F.A. Bn.	30 July	
4th Cav. Recon. Group	30 July	1 Aug.
CCB (Boudinot), 3 rd Arm. Div.	"	"
188 th F. Inf. Group	"	"
2 nd Bn. 60 th Inf.	1 Aug.	
CCB - Teams 1 & 2		4 Aug.
3		5 "
Prov. Ranger Group ^(for admin, supply & communication)	11 Aug.	13 Aug.
15th Inf, 4th Arm. Division	12 Aug.	
759 th Tank Bn.	13 Aug.	20 Aug.
4 th Cav. Recon. Group		14 Aug.
25. D 87 Chem.	5 July	15 ^{July} Aug.
102 nd Cav. Recon. Group	23 Aug.	25 Aug.
898 th TD (SP) Bn.	25 Aug.	29 Oct.
186 th F.A. Bn.	25 Aug.	/
38 th Cav. Recon. Gp.	25 Aug.	25 Aug.
Co. A, 81 Chem. Bn.	27 Aug.	18 Sept.
Co. B, 81 Chem. Bn.	29 Aug.	18 Sept.
3 rd Arm. Div. Gp (less 7 th Tank Bn)	29 Aug.	/
447 Tank Bn	29 Aug.	/
801 TD Bn (1st)	30 Aug.	9 Nov (less Co. A)
190 th F.A. Bn.	30 Aug.	/
17 FOB	30 Aug.	/
Co. A, 801 TD Bn.	30 Aug.	10 Nov.

Attached Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date atchd</u>	<u>Date Relieved</u>
70 th Tank Battalion	6 June 1944	16 July
87 th Chemical Bn. (C&S)	"	840-
65 th Arm. Field Arty Bn	"	"
899 th TD Bn. (less 3 Companies)	"	"
746 th Tank Bn.	"	" June
359 th Inf. Reg.	"	11 June
Co. B, 13 th Field Ob. Bn.	8 June	"
Bat. B, 780 th F. Arty Bn.	"	"
715 th F. Arty Bn.	"	"
1 st Bn., 39 th Inf.	11 June	"
6 Arm. Group	"	11 June
Bat. B, 780 th F. Arty Bn.	14 June	"
377 AA Bn.	14 June	16 June
3 Bn., 39 th Inf.	"	15 June
801 st TD Bn.	15 June	"
24th Co. F, 24 th Law Recor. Sq.	16 June	"
24 th	"	"
183 rd F. Arty Bn.	17 June (P)	"
Co. C & D - 87 th Chem. Bn.	18 "	21 June
Co. B & D - " " "	"	24 "
951 F. Arty Bn	5 July	"
	6 July	"
<hr/>		
Bat. D, 129 th AAA Bn	10 July	15 July
4 th Recon (less Co. C) Squadron	11 July	19 July
Co. C, 634 th TD Bn. (SP)	11 July	13 July
Co. B, 87 th Chem. Bn.	"	"
70 th Tank Bn.	18 July	"
10 th Platoon, 1st Plat. Co. D	"	2 July
Co. C, 634 th TD Bn. (SP)	23 July	"
4 th Recon. Squadron	29 July	14 Aug.
BT 26 (1st Div.)	29 July	30 July

Attached Units

III

Unit	Date attached	Released Date
CCA (Tank Force B), 5 Armd. Div	1 Sept	1
Tank Force B (CCA, 5 Armd. Div)	1 Sept	1
CCA, 5 Armd. Div	1 Sept	1
1121 Eng. Group	2 Sept	1
38th Cav. Recon. & Sig.		1
102nd Cav. Recon. Co. Group	5 Sept	1
747 Inf. Bn. (less Co. D)	4 Sept	1
Co. D , 747 Tank Bn. (one company)	5 Sept	13 Sept
102nd Cav. Recon. Gp (less 38th Gp)	27 Sept	1
955th F.A. Bn.		? 5 Oct
Co. D, 70 Tank Bn.	6 Oct	13 Oct
Tpk. B, 102nd Cav. Recon. Gp	7 Oct	16 Oct
Co. C, 801st TD Bn.	22 Oct	
Co. C, 801st TD Bn.	22 Oct	30 Oct
195th Ia. (one battery)		? 23 Oct
287-987 F.A. Bn. (SP) (less 84)		? 28 Oct
803 TD Bn. (SP)	9 Nov	1
188th F.A. Group	9 Nov	1
192d F.A. Bn.	9 Nov	1
196 F.A. Bn.	9 Nov	1
951 F.A. Bn.	9 Nov	1
981 F.A. Bn.	9 Nov	1

Attached Units

IV

Unit	Date attd.	Date released
Bat. B, 285 F.A. Obsv. Bn	9 Nov	/
Co E, 87th Cav. Bn	10 Nov	/
298 Engr (Comd) Bn	10 Nov	/
24 Cav. Recon Sqdn	1 Nov	/
46 Amv. Inf Bn (CAF, 5th Armd Div)	1 Dec	/
709 Tank Bn	1 Dec	/
CT 330	3 Dec	7 Dec
24th Cav. Recon Sqdn	4 Dec	9 Dec
329 CT 329	7 Dec	11 Dec
1st H & C, 89th Cav Recon Sqdn	10 Dec	/
Co C, 52 Armd Inf Bn	10 Dec	/
422 F.A. Group	15 Dec	/
Co A, 19th Tank Bn	17 Dec	/
159 Engr (Combat) Bn	20 Dec	/
Co E, 803 TD Bn	9 Nov	2 Dec (incl 1st)
CT 10	22 Dec	27 Dec
Hq + Co ^A 91st Chm. Bn	28 Dec	/
375 + 377 ^A Regt. Inf Regt.	15 Jan	17 Jan
CT 319	25 Jan	28 Jan
Co D 618 TD Bn	4 Feb	/
99th Cav. Mortar Bn	30 Mar	/
101 Cav. Recon Group	2 Apr	7 Apr

Attached Units V

Unit	date attd	date returned
C.T. 324	10 Apr	19 Apr
101st Cav Recon Sqdn	13 Apr	19 Apr
522 F.A. Bn	21 Apr	3 May
159 F.A. Bn	1 May	1 May
101st Cav Recon Sqdn	1 May	4 May
506 Para Inf	3 May	4 May

RESTRICTED**History of Regiments Composing 4th Infantry Division****8th Infantry Regiment**

Organized 1838. Distinguished itself at Palo Alto, Monterey and Chapultepec. Fought at Antietam, Frederickburg and Gettysburg. In the Spanish war saw combat in Cuba and Philippines. Served in Indian campaigns, Alaska, Philippines, and Germany. February 7, 1923, this regiment under command of Colonel Raymond G. Barton (now G.O. 4th Div) lowered the flag at Fort Chrenbreitstein, last American post in Europe.
Hq: Honiton, Devonshire.

12th Infantry Regiment

Organized 1798. In garrison of Fort Mifflin, 1811. (occasion of the national anthem) Marched with South on Mexico City. Fought in many Civil War battles, including Bull Run, Antietam, Frederickburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Cold Harbor. Served in Indian campaigns, Spanish war, Philippine Insurrection and Siberian expedition of 1919. Among former members of the Regiment now General Officers, are Hugh A. Drum, Alexander M. Patch and Douglas MacArthur.
Hq: Exeter, Devonshire.

22nd Infantry Regiment

Organized 1866. Served in Indian campaigns, Cuba, Philippines and Alaska.
Hq: Ipswich, Devonshire

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

RESTRICTED

20 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.

1. The attached material is based upon historical data previously submitted to the Historical Section, APO. It is to be used in substantially this form and length as an abbreviated sketch of 4th Infantry Division with a brief biographical sketch of the Commanding General for presentation to His Majesty, King George VI.

2. It is requested that this material be reviewed and checked immediately and a report be made by telephone to the Historical Section, Headquarters, APO, (Agent 2423, Extension 54 or 257), indicating whether the material represents a satisfactory thumbnail sketch of the unit and its Commanding General.

*Done 1500
23 March*

For The Deputy Theater Commander:

James H. Stratton
JAMES H. STRATTON
Colonel, GSC,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff

Please teletype to Historical Section, HQ, ETOUSA, APO 887, the designation and a brief statement of Regimental or other organizations in your command which have an unusually long or outstanding history.

SECRET
5000

ENGLAND

Interview with Pfc Leon Cole
Pvt David Fogel, 4th MP Platoon.

April 30, 1945, at 30 1/2 (Kelleton), Y32071727, Devon. 1944.

Watching burning plane; been warned to look out for parachutists.
Cole on duty; Fogel lying down off duty.

Cole: I heard cloopety-clop - hob-nails on the road. I challenged, and heard him shout "Cherman! Cherman!" I flash my light, and he was standing there with his hands way up, and I mean way up. I advanced him again, then made him sit down. Fogel was lying just behind him, and as soon as he sat down, Fogel reached around and lifted his gun. Then we searched him; he pulled his jacket up around his neck, to help us. He was really glad to surrender.

He was in bad shock, trembling hard. After we had taken away everything but his tobacco, we gave him a blanket. We tried to question him, asked how many there were. "Eins? Zwei? Drei?" "Drei! Drei camaraden." We couldn't get much more out of him - couldn't make him understand. He had been walking toward the burning plane. He couldn't have landed far away - it wasn't over 20 minutes after the crash. But we haven't found the parachute.

We took him to MP Hq, and gave him some more blankets. As soon as he wrapped up and lay down in a truck, he was out in a second.

REACTIVATION OF THE FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION

On the evening of June 30, 1940, three men met in the lounge of the Officers' Club at Fort Benning, Georgia.

In civilian clothes, quietly talking in a corner, aside from the groups of chattering men and women thronging the large hall, they might have been any three officers of that peaceful post, escaping after a routine day to the usual evening at the club. But their own thoughts were far from routine, and they had not come to this club for escape.

There were many people in the world in that summer of 1940 who were trying to forget the war in Europe. But there were many who were shocked into action by the greatest military disaster in history. The French Army, supposed for a generation to be the greatest in the world, had been run over and disappeared in less than one month. A stunned America awoke to the horrifying realization that there was at that time no force in the world capable of standing against the Wehrmacht. The position of Britain, left all alone, her army shattered, looked hopeless. America could never be safe again, in a Nazi-dominated world, without an army the equal of the Wehrmacht. Yet the whole U.S. Army at that date was smaller than the force which the British lost in a few days at Dunkirk. A total of 9 divisions—about to be organized—was the extent of our forces. The Nazis had over 250 divisions. What was worse, the Nazis had a new kind of Army. Their blitzkrieg was as strange and terrible as an invasion from Mars. And we had yet to learn how to meet the blitz. We must create a vast force, great as the mighty Wehrmacht, out of our tiny army. And we must cut out a new pattern to build that Army on while we were building it.

This was the job that our military leaders saw before them in that black June of 1940. The new American Army must be enormous and it must

Reactivation of Fourth Infantry Division - (Continued)

good—good enough, when the test should come, to meet and smash the greatest military power in history, the Nazi Wehrmacht.

When France fell, there was not a division in the U.S. Army. The first step in the military program was to organize the regiments, which themselves were scattered in many small posts, into divisions. Nine divisions were created out of the units of the regular army. These were our most eggs, frightfully few to set against the might across the Atlantic.

The new divisions were numbered one to nine, and thereby they succeeded to the history and the glory of their namesakes of 1918. Thus the new 4th Division "carried on" the high traditions of the old 4th, and "resumed" its insignia of the "Ivy Leaves", although there was no continuity of organization. The regiments of the old 4th had been dissolved in 1919; while the regiments composing the new 4th were old organizations with histories of their own far antedating 1918, and not connected with the 4th Division in 1918. Thus the infantry units of the new 4th had two distinct and separate traditions of military glory to claim for their own, only a "paper division". Two infantry regiments, the 8th and the 22nd, were scattered over several states. (The third regiment, the 29th Infantry, was stationed complete at Benning, where it served the Infantry School as demonstration troops. This regiment was never in fact a part of the 4th Division. It remained under control of the Infantry School and was later replaced in the division organization by the 12th Infantry.) The remaining units of the division did not yet exist. They were to be carved out of other units or created "new". This was because the organization of the American Army in 1940 was still based on the old square division of 1918, while the new divisions were to be triangular.

Reactivation of the Fourth Infantry Division (Continued)

The triangular division, as adopted by the WD in 19__ was a fairly close copy of the German division. Its name was derived from its basic pattern of organization, viz: three primary subdivisions, plus supporting weapons, in each echelon, instead of the four subdivisions, without organic supporting weapons, of the old square division. The chain of command was shortened by cutting out the brigade. The fire power of the triangular division was far greater than that of the square division, due to increase in number and caliber of weapons, although manpower was 20% (?) less. A new level of tactical flexibility was achieved by the new organization, and the "Combat team" principle which went with it. (For comparative organization charts of "4th Div. 1918" and the "4th Div. 1940", see Appen. ___).

The triangular division has become so familiar that its features seem a matter of course today. But in 1940, this type of division was a great innovation. It was the starting-point, for our army, of a revolution—the military revolution which the Nazis started, but could not finish.

The 4th Division had its first headquarters in the "Log Cabin", an old CCC recreation hut near Harmony Church on the Columbus-Cassata road in the middle of the Benning reservation, where the few dilapidated buildings of the abandoned CCC camp were the division's first housing. The first enterprise of the division was the construction of barracks in several areas along the Columbus-Cassata highway. Farther north along the same road, the 4th had a neighbor, the 2nd Armored Division under command of Brig. Gen. George A. Patton.

At first, most of the officers were regulars, altho even in the summer of 1940 many reserve lieutenants on "Extended Active Duty" were serving with regular units. As the National Defense program gained

Reactivation of the Fourth Infantry Division (Continued)

momentum, regular officers were steadily drained away, replaced by reserves brought into the service on a semi-voluntary basis. This process went on for 2 years, until by the summer of 1942 there were only 28 (?) regular officers in the entire division.

The reserves found themselves in an ambiguous and uncertain position. Officially, they were on "Extended Active Duty" for only one year, and in theory they would return to civilian life after their year of "training", and be replaced by others. Actually, few of those brought in in 1940 had any position in civilian life to return to.

The WD tried to keep all its new employees on their toes by announcing that only half would be kept for a second year—a threat which was never carried out; only a small percentage (1/4) of officers on EAD were dropped after their first year. But all of them, until Pearl Harbor, stayed in a state of suspense.

In June, 1940, the men were still enlisted men in the proper sense—enlisted in the army for a three year term. They still had a big proportion of long-service peacetime soldiers. These were men to whom the army was simply a job, as it was to most of the reserve officers at this time. This was still the regular army, somewhat expanded. The true national army, the citizens' army, did not begin to take shape until 1941; did not come to life until Pearl Harbor.

Gen. Prosser was relieved. Brig. Gen. G.W. Griswold, ADC, commanded until _____, when Maj. Gen. Lloyd H. Fredendall assumed command.

On _____ the 4th Division became the 5th Division (Motorized). So began the 3-year detour of experiment for the Rolling Fourth. Military thought was in ferment now, wide open to everything now. Blitzkrieg dominated warfare at that time, and a substantial proportion of

Reactivation of the Fourth Infantry Division (Continued)

German divisions were reported to be motorized.

The substitution of trucks for horse-drawn guns and mule-drawn wagons had just occurred in the American army in the preceding few years. Now, following the Germans, motorized divisions were to be created, with enough organic vehicles to carry the entire division. This required the number of vehicles allotted to the regular division. The vehicles added for carrying the infantry troops at first were 2 1/2 ton trucks, then half-tracks. The difference at this time was of only academic interest—a paper change, for the division did not have the vehicles, of either sort.

But though equipment was still short, imagination was not. It pictured immense achievements of distance and speed. Gen. Frodendall declared in this early period, "A forced march for this division is over 300 miles in one day. Anything less than that is just routine." Under the example of the Blitzkrieg in 1941, there was nothing fantastic in that.

With such ideas, (but little of the equipment), the Rolling Fourth limped through the Louisiana Maneuvers of July 1941. Just before the maneuvers the Division received, in lieu of its halftracks, 2 1/2-ton trucks borrowed from the Division, and 200 ancient 1 1/2-ton reprieved from salvage. By cannibalizing one or two of these jalopies at each day's halt, the rest were kept fairly well in motion. With the conclusion of the Louisiana Maneuvers, the idea of the Motorized Division took off in high gear. Up to this point, the Rolling Fourth had been a standard division with extra vehicles to ride in. The WD now decided to try out something really different—a Motorized Division conceived as an intermediate link between an Armored Division and Infantry Division, organized and equipped differently from anything else. The 4th Division was ordered to

Reactivation of the Fourth Infantry Division (Continued)


go into an experimental condition, The Provisional Motorized Division, and test the idea out. The Division Commander was (also) authorized to make such changes in the proposed T/O sent down from the WD, as he found desirable, and thus evolve a workable Motorized Division in the course of the experiment. An exciting four months of wild change and turmoil began. Later, the members of the division had cause to regret the whole affair bitterly, but at the time it was fun such as few outfits have.

SECTION A

LONDON - PARIS

FIRST EDITION - AMS 2 ARMY/AIR STYLE

NORTH M 30 EUROPE
and part of M 31 scale 1:1,000,000



Scale 1:1,000,000

Annual change about 10' Easterly

HEIGHTS IN METRES

Scale 1:1,000,000

Annual change about 9' Easterly

HEIGHTS IN METRES

Scale 1:1,000,000

GRAPHIC SCALE

1 2 3 4 5 6

MILES 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340

Kilometres 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340

NAUTICAL MILES 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

First give the code letters denoting the exact degree of latitude and longitude immediately to the South and West of the required point. Then give in figures the distance in minutes of latitude and in minutes or hundredths of the degree from the degree projection as described. Thus if 50° N. is represented by 48 and 52 by 27 the position is 48 52 27. Similarly 5° E. is represented by 05 and 30° W. by 30. The position 50° 17' N. 8° 38' E. is ABP2.

ARDENNES 267 as shown

ARDENNES 267 as shown


NORTH M 30 EUROPE
and part of M 31
Scale 1:1,000,000

For use by
War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

BRUXELLES - FRANKFURT

FIRST EDITION: GROUND/AIR
AMS 1

NORTH M 32
and part of M 31



CONVERSION TABLE

Meters	Feet
5,000	15,000
4,000	12,000
3,000	9,000
2,000	6,000
1,000	3,000
0	0

SYMBOLS

- 4TH DIV. CPs
- CPs for second line of defense
- POST-WAR CPs

HEIGHTS IN METRES

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

Give the code letters denoting the grid square in which the point is located. Then give in figures the number of minutes of latitude and longitude of the point from the center of the grid square. Thus 50 N 10 E represents the point 50 minutes North and 10 minutes East of the center of the grid square. The point 50° 08' N 10° 25' E is represented by 50 N 10 E.





Annual change, about 9" Eastory.

Symbol	Meaning
—	Major road
- - -	Minor road
— · — · —	Track
— · —	Path
— · — · — · —	Telegraph line
— · — · — · — · —	Power line
— · — · — · — · — · —	Telephone line
— · — · — · — · — · — · —	Radio line
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Electricity line
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Water pipe
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Gas pipe
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Drainage ditch
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Canal
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Railroad
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Highway
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Other road
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Other track
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Other line
— · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · — · —	Other symbol

HEIGHTS IN METRES

Scale 1:1,000,000



SECTION A

1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

LE HAVRE

2nd Edition

NORTHERN ZONE - LAYER SYSTEM

(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE RAE CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

PARIS



STRAIT OF DOVER

THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE FRENCH LIGHT ZONE I, MED. AND NORD DE GUERRE - BLUE GRIDS.

COINTEGRATED GRID LETTERS

1	A
2	B
3	C
4	D
5	E
6	F
7	G
8	H
9	I
10	J
11	K
12	L
13	M
14	N
15	O
16	P
17	Q
18	R
19	S
20	T
21	U
22	V
23	W
24	X
25	Y
26	Z

Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the southwest corner of the coloured square. Thus the grid reference of ST. LO is V435163.




NANTES

DIJON

Annual change about 10 minutes easterly (mean)

Annual change about 10 minutes westerly (mean)


SECTION B



ERN. ONE LAYER
RESPOND TO THESE ON THE B.A.F. CONVENTION

HEIGHTS IN METRES

MÜNCHEN



SECTION C

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON




DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-858 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO. 2175

304-0
(30990)
Master
Map - Advance of 4th Inf Div from Utah Beach to
the Siegfried Line
6 Jun-14 Dec 44



**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-858 PENTAGON**

AGO MICROFILM

ITEM NO: 2176

304-0

(31071)
Masters


Omni Map - European Campaign - 4th Ind Div

6 Jan 43 - May 45

SECTION A

4th Edition

LE HAVRE 1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR) HEIGHTS IN METRES
LE HAVRE 2nd Edition NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM PARIS 1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR) HEIGHTS IN METRES
PARIS STRAIT OF DOVER



THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE FRENCH LAMBERT ZONE I RED AND NORD DE GUERRE BLUE GRIDS.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS

THE grid lines of the Lambert Zone I Red Grid are spaced 100,000 meters apart.

THE grid lines of the Nord de Guerre Blue Grid are spaced 100,000 meters apart.

JUNCTION OF GRIDS

40 km East line of Nord de Guerre Blue Grid
W. of line French Lambert Zone I Red Grid
E. of line Nord de Guerre Blue Grid

Grid references are given in kilometers East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square. Thus the grid reference ST. LO is V175163.

SHEET-REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their size and by the geographical coordinates of the South-west corner of the sheet, as shown in the examples below.

EXAMPLES

FRANKFURT
MADRID


QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

WHEN THE GLOBE IS QUARTERED BY THE MERIDIAN 180° EAST, THE QUARTERS ARE:

N.W. N.E.
S.W. S.E.

EXAMPLES

FRANKFURT
MADRID



ADJOINING SHEETS


Sheet N. 4818
Sheet N. 4819
Sheet N. 4820
Sheet N. 4821



NOTE: The elevation of the spot heights shown on this sheet are based on the mean sea level of the Bay of Biscay.

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultra violet, red and other lights.

SECTION B




SECTION C

MÜNCHEN


NOR

HEIGHTS IN METRES

HERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM




Land contour lines	Contours	Marsh	Marsh
Water	Water	Coast and lagoon lines	Coast and lagoon lines
Water reservoirs (Dike)	Water reservoirs (Dike)	Coast and lagoon lines	Coast and lagoon lines
Water reservoirs (Dike)	Water reservoirs (Dike)	Coast and lagoon lines	Coast and lagoon lines
Water reservoirs (Dike)	Water reservoirs (Dike)	Coast and lagoon lines	Coast and lagoon lines



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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2177

304-0.1

(592)
Master

History, 445 Int Div

15-43

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

AG 311.7 - GHMCP

Fort Jackson, South Carolina

8 January 1944

HISTORY OF THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

For the Period 1 January - 31 December 1943

a. Original Unit.

(1) Designation:

4th Division (triangular).

(2) Date of Organization:

1 June 1940.

(3) Place of Organization:

Fort Benning, Georgia.

(4) Authority for Organization:

AG 320.2 (5-20-40) M-C-M, AGO, 25 May 1940, subject: Organization and Movement of Units in Connection with Augmentation of the Army.

(5) Sources of Personnel:

Regular Army - 10,000
Draft - 5,000

b. Changes in Organization.

8-1-43:

Reorganization and Redesignation of the 4th Motorized Division (Auth) Letter, WD, TAGO, file AG 322 (28 July 43) OB-I-GMGCT-M, dated 30 July 1943, and verbal orders, CG, XIII Corps. See Supplement #1.

10-1-43:

Reorganization 29th, 42d and 44th Field Artillery Battalions, 4th Infantry Division (Auth) Letter, WD, file AG 322 (17 Sep 43) OB-I-GMGCT-M, dated 18 September 1943, and 1st Ind, Hq Second Army, file AG 322.012-6 (GHMCP), 28 September 1943. See Supplement #2.

2-9-43:

Reorganization 29th, 42d and 44th Field Artillery Battalions, 4th

CLASSIFICATION
REMOVED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1945
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

Incl 1

100-101
592
1945
MAY 8
Hester

Infantry Division (Auth) Letter, WD, file AG 322 (23 Nov. 43) OB-I-
 GNGCT-M, dated 25 November 1943, and 2d Ind, Hq XII Corps, file
 322 (GWMAB), dated 6 Dec 43. See Supplement #3.

c. Strength, commissioned and enlisted:

(1) At beginning of period:

O	-	854
WO	-	51
EM	-	16,720
Civ	-	4

(2) Increase during month:

(3) Decrease during month:

<u>January</u>		
O	-	60
WO	-	1
EM	-	524

<u>January</u>		
O	-	27
WO	-	4
EM	-	588

<u>February</u>		
O	-	62
WO	-	3
EM	-	125

<u>February</u>		
O	-	27
WO	-	0
EM	-	177

<u>March</u>		
O	-	15
WO	-	0
EM	-	793

<u>March</u>		
O	-	25
WO	-	1
EM	-	229

<u>April</u>		
O	-	7
WO	-	1
EM	-	83

<u>April</u>		
O	-	75
WO	-	1
EM	-	205

<u>May</u>		
O	-	10
WO	-	0
EM	-	21

<u>May</u>		
O	-	47
WO	-	1
EM	-	272

<u>June</u>		
O	-	9
WO	-	2
EM	-	40

<u>June</u>		
O	-	29
WO	-	1
EM	-	416

Incl #1
2

July

O	-	19
WO	-	0
EM	-	39

July

O	-	8
WO	-	1
EM	-	205

August

O	-	88
WO	-	4
EM	-	220

August

O	-	48
WO	-	8
EM	-	385

September

O	-	32
WO	-	0
EM	-	39

September

O	-	11
WO	-	1
EM	-	359

October

O	-	4
WO	-	0
EM	-	200

October

O	-	13
WO	-	0
EM	-	137

November

O	-	80
WO	-	4
EM	-	1040

November

O	-	20
WO	-	0
EM	-	126

December

O	-	64
WO	-	2
EM	-	745

December

O	-	55
WO	-	0
EM	-	256

At end of period:

O	-	858
WO	-	51
Civ	-	4
EM	-	16,001

(Auth) Consolidated Morning Report, 4th Inf Div

Incl #
E

d. Stations (permanent and temporary) of unit or parts thereof:

	<u>Date of Arrival</u>	<u>Date of Departure</u>
Camp Gordon, Georgia (Auth) AG 370.5-6 (GEMBG) 3-22-43)	December, 1941	1200 10 April 1943
Fort Dix, New Jersey (Auth) ACF-1tr 370.5/4 (4th Infantry Division)(R)(11 Sep 43) GEOCT, 11 Sep 43, subject: Transfer of 4th Infantry Division.	1200 10 April 1943	0800 19 September 1943
Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida (Auth) AG 370.5/6 GEMBG 11-3-43.	0800 19 Sep 1943	0800 1 December 1943
Fort Jackson, South Carolina	0800 1 December 1943	

- (1) February 8, 1943, Lt Col. Richard C. Hopkins, Division G-2, died at Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Georgia. Lt. Col. Harry F. Hansen, GSG, assumed his duties as AG of S, G-2.

March: Colonel Harry M. Henderson, O-5160, was assigned as CO of the 12th Inf.

September 6, 1943, Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeley, O-7237, USA, arrived at Fort Dix, N. J., and assumed command of the 4th Division Artillery vice Brig Gen Fay B. Prickett.

November 21, 1943, Brig Gen Henry A. Barber, Jr., O-8576, USA, was assigned to the 4th Inf Div as Asst Div Comdr, vice Brig Gen Maxwell A. O'Brien.

- (2) January: Training consisted principally of qualification or familiarization in all secondary weapons, advanced small unit training and combined training to include the division.

February: Inspections of weapons and vehicles were held by the VII Corps Ordnance and Weapons Inspection Team, and combat firing tests were conducted.

March: The movement to Fort Dix, N. J., was initiated, and the division expected to be overseas soon.

April: Training was devoted to developing skilled fighting ability and physical conditioning.

May: The program of physical conditioning and study of skilled fighting methods was continued.

June: The division marched by foot and motor to the Belle-plaine State Forest. The convoy was reviewed on the return to Fort Dix by Under Secretary of War Patterson and his staff. Training consisted of troop familiarization of tanks, tank tactics, and attack of a fortified area.

July: Lt Gen Leslie J. McNair, CG, ACF, and staff witnessed a demonstration of an attack against a fortified area by the division. Training was devoted to squad tests, intelligence schools, scouting and patrolling, first Aid instruction, and training in the use of foreign maps.

August: Training was a continuation of squad tests and technical instruction. Regimental and separate unit commanders were on TD at Camp Kilmer, N. J., in connection with 4th Div activities.

September: The division departed from Fort Dix, N. J., for Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, to undergo amphibious training. Swimming instruction was given. General Staff officers, unit commanders and detachments of officers and enlisted men attended amphibious schools at Camp Bradford, Va.

October: Lt Gen Lloyd R. Fredendall, CG, 2d Army, inspected the 4th Inf Div. A detachment attended the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders School at Fort Pierce, Fla. Lt Gen McHarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, USA; Lt Gen Morgan and Maj Gen Brownjohn, of the British General Staff, arrived for an inspection visit. Training consisted of amphibious operations.

November: A permanent change of station was made to Fort Jackson, S. C., and training emphasized physical conditioning and personal ruggedness. Upon departure from Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., the 4th Inf Div was relieved from attachment to Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet.

December: A detachment attended the AA Arty. Training and AA machine guns training school at Camp Davis, N. C. Final training consisted of meeting range qualifications and other requirements set forth in PCM.

e. Marches:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| (1) Purpose | |
| (2) Length of Daily March | No Change |
| (3) Points of March and Dates | |
| (4) Conditions | |

Decl 7

f. Campaigns.

- (1) Name
- (2) Duration
- (3) Purpose No change
- (4) Authority Ordering

g. Battles:

- (1) Name
- (2) Place
- (3) Date
- (4) Campaign No change
- (5) Forces engaged
- (6) Result

h. Commanding Generals in Important Engagements:

- (1) Engagement
- (2) Name No change

i. Losses in Action: Officers and Men

- (1) Engagement
- (2) Names
- (3) Killed
- (4) Wounded No change
- (5) Missing
- (6) Taken Prisoner

j. Former and Present Members who have distinguished themselves in Action:

- (1) Engagement
- (2) Names See Supplements #4 and #5.

k. Photographs of Personnel, Important Scenes or Events:

See Supplement #6.

Page 1
6

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS 4TH MOTORIZED DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

Fort Dix, New Jersey
3 August 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 42)

REORGANIZATION AND REDESIGNATION OF THE 4TH MOTORIZED DIVISION

1. Effective 0001, 4 August 1943, the 4th Motorized Division is redesignated the 4th Infantry Division in accordance with Table of Organization No. 7, dated 15 July 1943. The units and organizations listed below will constitute the 4th Infantry Division and will be reorganized effective 0001, 4 August 1943, under the following Tables of Organization and Equipment:

Unit	7/6 dated 15 Jul 43	7/8 dated 15 Jul 43
Hq 4th Inf Div	7-1	7-2
8th Inf	7-11	7-11-M, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19
12th Inf	7-11	7-11-M, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19
22d Inf	7-11	7-11-M, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19
4th Div Arty:	6-10	
Hq 4th Div Arty	6-10-1	6-10-M, 6-10-1
Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	6-10-1	6-10-1
Med Det, Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	6-10-M	6-10-M
20 FA Bn (155mm How Trk Dr)	6-35	6-35-M, 6-36, 6-37, 6-39
Med Det, 20 FA Bn	6-35-M	6-35-M
29 FA Bn (105mm How Trk Dr)	6-25	6-25-M, 6-26, 6-27, 6-29
Med Det, 29 FA Bn	6-25-M	6-25-M
42 FA Bn (105mm How Trk Dr)	6-25	6-25-M, 6-26, 6-27, 6-29
Med Det, 42 FA Bn	6-25-M	6-25-M
4th FA Bn (105mm How Trk Dr)	6-25	6-25-M, 6-26, 6-27, 6-29
Med Det, 4th FA Bn	6-25-M	6-25-M
4th Engr Combat Bn	5-15	5-15-M, 5-16, 5-17
4th Med Bn	8-15	8-16, 8-17, 8-18
4th Rec Bn, Mecz	2-27	2-27
Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div (& atchd Ch, Med & Band)	7-3	7-2
Hq	7-3	7-2
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	7-2	7-2
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	19-7	19-7
704th Ord I Maint Co	9-8	9-8
4th QM Co	10-17	10-17
4th Sig Co	11-7	11-7

Incl #1

OO #42, Hq 4th Mtz Div, 8-3-43. Cont'd.

2. The following units and elements of the 4th Motorized Division are redesignated effective 0001, 4 August 1943, as follows:

Present Designation	New Designation
Hq 4th Mtz Div	Hq 4th Inf Div
Hq Co, 4th Mtz Div	Hq Co, 4th Inf Div
4th LP Co	MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div
4th Engr Mtz Bn	4th Engr Combat Bn
Hq 4th Mtz Div Arty	Hq 4th Div Arty
Hq Btry, 4th Mtz Div Arty	Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty
4th Mtz (M) Bn (Less Co B-OM Gas Sup Co)	4th M Co
Co B-OM Gas Sup Co, 4th Mtz (M) Bn	200th (M) Gas Sup Co
Tr A, 4th Men Sq	4th Men Tr, Mecz
Ord Maint Bn, 4th Mtz Div	4th Ord Bn
Hq & Hq Co, Ord Maint Bn, 4th Mtz Div	*Hq & Hq Det, 4th Ord Bn

*Amended to read "Hq & Hq Det, 47th Ord Bn" by par 1, OO 45, 14 Aug 43.

3. The following units are activated effective 0001, 4 August 1943:

Hq, Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div (and atchd Ch, Med and Band)
79th Ord B Maint Co, 4th Inf Div

*4. The following organizations of the 4th Motorized Division are inactivated effective 0001, 4 August 1943:

Band, 12th Inf
Band, 22nd Inf
Co D, 4th Engr Mtz Bn

Personnel and equipment of the band, 12th Infantry, and the Band, 22d Infantry, will be utilized to organize the Band, 4th Infantry Division.

*Amended to read "The following organizations of the 4th Motorized Division are disabanded effective 0001, 4 August 1943" by par 1, OO 45, 14 August 1943.

5. The following units rendered surplus by this action are assigned to the XIII Corps, Fort Dix, New Jersey, effective 0001, 4 August 1943:

Unit	T/O	T/BA & T/R	Priority for Re-issue of Equip.
Band, 4th Inf		See 6 below	
4th Ord Bn			
*Hq & Hq Det, 4th Ord Bn	9-76 (3-31-43)	9-76 (3-31-43)	B-2-115
*Med Det, 4th Ord Bn	9-76	9-76-M	B-2-115
*204th Ord M Maint Co 4th Ord Bn	9-7 (3-1-43)	9-7 (3-1-43)	B-2-116
*205th Ord M Maint Co 4th Ord Bn	9-7	9-7	B-2-117
4th Men Sq (less Tr A)	2-25 (4-1-43) w/cl	2 (3-1-42) w/cl	B-2-118
200th (M) Gas Sup Co	10-77 (4-1-42)	10 (6-26-42) w/41	B-2-119

*4th Ord Bn is amended to read "47th Ord Bn" by par 1, OO 45, 14 Aug 43.

GO #12, Hq. 4th Div, B-3-A3, Cont'd.

6. The Band, 6th Infantry (asgd XIII Corps, Fort Dix, New Jersey) will retain its present designation and organization until further instructions from the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Army War College, Washington, D. C.

* * *
By command of Major General BARTON:

J. S. MURRELL
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Garlen R. Bryant

GARLEN R. BRYANT
Lt-Col, A. G. B.
Adjutant General

June 2,

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida

1 October 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 59

REORGANIZATION

29TH, 42D, & 44TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. Effective 1 October 1943, the following units of the 4th Infantry Division will be reorganized with Tables of Organization and Equipment as listed below:

29th Field Artillery Battalion

(T/O & E 6-196-S - Hq & Hq Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

(T/O & E 6-197-S - FA Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

(T/O & E 6-199-S - Sv Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

42d Field Artillery Battalion

(T/O & E 6-196-S - Hq & Hq Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

(T/O & E 6-197-S - FA Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

(T/O & E 6-199-S - Sv Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

44th Field Artillery Battalion

(T/O & E 6-196-S - Hq & Hq Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

(T/O & E 6-197-S - FA Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

(T/O & E 6-199-S - Sv Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, SP)

2. The medical detachments of the above-mentioned battalions will remain organized under Tables of Organization and Equipment 6-25, dated 15 July 1943.

3. An officer overstrength in grade of lieutenant and an enlisted overstrength in grade of private equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the respective table of organization strength is authorized.

a. No enlisted man will be reduced in grade as a result of this action.

4. Priority for distribution of controlled items of equipment is the same as that of the 4th Infantry Division.

a. Table of Equipment 21, dated 10 March 1943, with Change 1, only, governs in the supply of clothing and individual equipment not provided in other supply tables.

b. Other supplies and equipment will be issued in accordance with the equipment sections of applicable tables of Organization and equipment.

GO #59, Hq 4 Inf Div, 10-1-43. Cont'd.

c. Training equipment will be issued in accordance with Tables of Allowances 20, dated 10 March 1943, and Table of Allowances C, dated 1 July 1942, with Changes 1 to C, inclusive.

d. Controlled and non-controlled items of equipment will be disposed of in accordance with existing instructions.

* * *
By Command of Major General BARTON:

J. S. HOLWELL
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Garlen E. Bryant

GARLEN E. BRYANT
Lt Col, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

Ince

SUPPLEMENT NO. 3

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

Fort Jackson, South Carolina
7 December 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 70)

REORGANIZATION

29TH, 42ND AND 44TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. Effective 9 December 1943, the Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries of the following named Field Artillery Battalions, 4th Infantry Division, will be reorganized in accordance with Table of Organization and Equipment 6-26, dated 15 July 1943, with Change #1, dated 15 October 1943 (Hq & Hq Btry, Mtz, FA Bn, 105mm How, Trk-Drawn or Tractor Drawn):

29th Field Artillery Battalion
42d Field Artillery Battalion
44th Field Artillery Battalion

2. Table of Organization and Equipment 6-196-S (Hq & Hq Btry, Mtz, 105mm How, Self-propelled) is no longer applicable to the organization of the above-named field artillery battalions.

By command of Major G. M. DEL BARTOLO:

J. S. K. J. I.
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Garlen R. Bryant

GARLEN R. BRYANT
Lt. Col., A. I. C.
Adjutant General

SUPPLEMENT NO. 4

HEADQUARTERS 4TH MOTORIZED DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

Camp Gordon, Georgia
February 6, 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 7)

AWARD OF SOLDIER'S MEDAL

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Act of Congress approved July 2, 1926 (Bill 8, H.D. 1926), and authority granted by Change No 6, AR 600-45, October 28, 1942, a Soldier's Medal is awarded by the Commanding General, 4th Motorized Division, to the following named enlisted man:

Henry C. Peek (Army Serial Number 34142956), Technician Fifth Grade, Company C, 12th Infantry, United States Army. For heroism at Camp Gordon, Georgia, on January 13, 1943. A fire was discovered on the gasoline tank of a US Government vehicle, type M-3, half-track, in the motor line of Company C, 12th Infantry motor park. Technician Fifth Grade Peek was three vehicles away from the burning half-track when his attention was attracted by the driver, his clothes on fire, lying from the rear of the burning vehicle. Seeing that other men were assisting the driver, Technician Fifth Grade Peek, realizing the possible danger to approximately twenty government vehicles and disregarding the imminent danger of flames enveloping the entire half-track, or of an explosion, and with complete disregard of his own personal safety, entered the burning half-track and drove it clear of the other vehicles. The heroism and quick-thinking of Technician Fifth Grade Peek reflects great credit upon himself and the 4th Motorized Division. Residence at enlistment: McMinnville, Tennessee.

By command of Major General BARTON:

OFFICIAL:

J. S. McDWELL
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

/s/ Carlen R. Bryant

CARLEN R. BRYANT
Lt Col, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

Incl # 5

SUPPLEMENT NO. 5

HEADQUARTERS 4TH MOTORIZED DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

Fort Dix, New Jersey
April 27, 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 26)

AWARD OF SOLDIER'S MEDAL

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Act of Congress approved July 2, 1926 (Bulletin G, WD, 1926), and authority granted by Change No. 6, AR 600-15, October 28, 1912, a Soldier's Medal is awarded by the Commanding General, 4th Motorized Division, to the following named enlisted man:

Manuel L. Fernandez (Army Serial Number 34052605), Private First Class, Company "B", 22d Infantry, United States Army. For heroism displayed in rescuing a soldier from drowning in a lake at the Alexander Stevens National Park, Crawfordville, Georgia, on October 11, 1942. Seeing a soldier thrown into the water when the rowboat in which he was riding overturned, Private First Class Fernandez without regard for his own personal safety jumped into the water which was about twelve (12) feet deep and swam to the spot where the accident occurred, and succeeded in bringing the soldier to the surface of the water, placing him in a boat, and rendered artificial respiration, thereby saving his life. The heroism displayed by Private First Class Fernandez reflects great credit upon himself and the 4th Motorized Division. Residence at enlistment: 1616 12th Avenue, Tampa, Florida.

By command of Major General BARKER:

OFFICIAL:

J. S. WELLS
Colonel, General Staff Corps.
Chief of Staff

/s/ Carlen R. Bryant

CARLEN R. BRYANT
Lt Col., U. S. A.
Adjutant General

Incl # 6

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-858 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM

ITEM NO.

2178

101-0-1
(29572)
Master
History - War Inf Div
3 Dec 1917-1 Mo 14

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

HISTORY
4th Infantry Division

BH 3

3.11.44
17.11.44

Holder of an enviable World War fighting record, the 4th Infantry Division surpasses all other Allied units in having met and defeated 16 German

CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Special Op. Ct. 1944
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 25 Jan 1944

The unit began its World War training in the rain of the early housing facilities at Camp Greene, near Charlotte, training, the Division began its movement to

England was the first stop enroute to the continent, but tragedy overtook the Division on the sea voyage. First casualties due to enemy action were caused when 56 men lost their lives in the sinking of the British transport "Moldavia" which was carrying 4th Division soldiers.

Once across the Atlantic, the Division remained only a day in England before shipment to France. The unit, training with both British and French troops, was for a while upset at the loss of their Springfield rifles while training with the British. These were replaced, however, when they went into training with the French at Hesdin, France.

On 18 July 1918, the 4th Division went into battle in the Aisne-Marne offensive, which is identified with the defense of Paris. From 18 July to 22 July, the Division, operating not as a unit but in conjunction with various French units, proved its worth. Casualties were heavy.

Elements of the unit participated in the Battle of Sergy, 28 July to 1 August 1918. The 1st Battalion of the 47th Infantry distinguished itself in hand-to-hand fighting after crossing the Ource River. Again, casualties were heavy.

After the first two battles proved the Division, it operated as a full fighting unit in the battle along the Vesle River. After a bloody onslaught along the river banks from 3 to 6 August 1918, the Division received credit for being the first Allied division to cross the Vesle.

Jul 11 1918
AUG 1917
27 592

The Division also participated in the St. Mihiel offensive, being in battle from 12 to 14 September 1918.

In the Meuse-Argonne, the 4th Division particularly distinguished itself. Advancing through the strongest German fortifications, the unit became the first outfit to crack the Hindenburg Line. The 4th Engineers (today still a part of the 4th Division) constructed the main road over which supplies were brought up to the Americans in the Meuse-Argonne. It was also in this offensive that the Division established a record for unbroken duty under continuous shell and machine gun fire - a period of 24 days.

/At war's

At war's end the 4th was selected to become a part of the Third Army of Occupation, and the 2nd Battalion of the 39th Infantry had the distinction of being the first American troops to cross the Rhine River.

The Division embarked at Brest, France, on 31 July 1919, for the trip home. It was demobilized soon afterwards in the United States.

The War Department ordered the organization of the 4th Division on 3 December 1917. Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, was named Commanding General.

Approximately 21 years after the 4th Division had been demobilized, it was reactivated by the War Department. The order, issued 1 July 1940, included the streamlining of the unit to triangular division, and also selected it to pioneer in motorization of Infantry.

The Division's job was to develop new techniques and tactics, to produce a hard-hitting mobile division. It was the only fully motorized division in the United States Army. Selected to lead the outfit was Brig. Gen. Walter E. Prosser.

The Division participated in the Louisiana maneuvers, August 1941, the Carolina maneuvers, November 1941, and again in July 1942. Intensive amphibious and assault training was undertaken by the Division units - attack on fortified positions (Pt. Dix); amphibious warfare (Camp Gordon Johnson, Fla.); and in the United Kingdom, the use of combat teams was emphasized in training at the United States Army Assault Training Center.

The 4th Infantry Division arrived in the European Theater of Operations in February 1944. By the time of its arrival in the Kingdom, it had been completely reconverted from a motorized division to foot-slogging Infantry.

Inherited from the original 4th Division insignia of the World War, the shoulder patch is four ivy leaves attached at the stems, and opening at four corners of a square. Green and a dull brown are the colors.

The derivation of the divisional nickname - Ivy Division - comes from the manner in which it used to be written: "IV Division." The two letters I and V, combined to make the IW.

"Steadfast and Loyal," botanical description of the Ivy plant, was selected as the division motto.

(1)

ETOUSA
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATED MAR 022142A'44

RECD MAR 030615Z

SECRET-ROUTINE

FROM : 4TH INF DIVISION signed Barton

ACTION TO : ETOUSA

REF NO : NONE

Brief biographical sketch of CG, Asst Div Comdr,
Div Arty Comdr, and brief summation of history 4th Inf Div:

1. CG Raymond O. Barton (0-3401). B-Colo 22 Aug 89.
A-MA, Okla BS, USMA, 12. Army of Occupation 1919 to 1923. C and
GS sch, 24; GSC 2 July 24 to 30 June 28; 14 June 40. Grad: Army
War Coll, 33. General Barton has been C of S 4th Div; C of S
IV Corps; Asst Div Comdr 85th Div; and CG 4th Div as of 2 July 42.
Brig Gen, AUS, 10 Mar 42 and Major Gen AUS 8 Aug 42.

Brig Gen Harold W. Blakeley FA (0-7237). B-Mass
29 Dec 93 A-Mass Army of Occupation 1919. FA sch, Btry Officers
Course, 26, C and GS sch, 36, Grad Army War Coll 39.

Brig Gen Henry A. Barber Jr Asst Div Comdr
(0-8576). B-Okla 31 July 96, A-MA, Okla BS, USMA 17 DSC, French
Legion of Honor, French Croix de Guerre with Palm; campaigns of
Aisne-Marne, Second Battle of the Marne, Battle of the Vesle River,
and Somme Offensive. CG Officers Course, 22, C and GS sch, 35,
Inf sch, Grad Army War Coll, 37, GSC, 1 July 37 to 30 June 41;
Brig Gen AUS 24 June 1942.

Col James S Rodwell C of S (0-9663). B-NY
17 Mar 96, A-Army Campaigns of Aisne-Marne, Oise River, St Mihiel,
Meuse-Argonne, Lorraine defense, and Army of Occupation Cav sch
Tr. Officers Course, 23, Inf sch, advanced course, 31, Grad C and
GS sch, 39, Col AUS 1 Feb 42.

2. The 4th Div was activated Dec 3, 1917 at Camp
Greene, NC. Its overseas movement was completed between April
15, and June 9, 1918. The Div participated in campaigns of Aisne-
Marne, St Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and Champagne-Lorraine with battle
honors of Champagne, Meuse-Argonne, Lorraine, St Mihiel, and Aisne-
Marne. During World War I the Div served with the 16th British
Div; the 3rd, 4th, and 16th French Div; the II and VII French Corps;
and the Sixth French Army. It was a component of the Army of
Occupation and was inactivated in 1919.

REF NO NONE

S E C R E T

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PAGE TWO

SECRET-ROUTINE

REF NO NONE

3. The 4th Div was reactivated June 3, 1940 at Ft Benning Ga. It became a Mtd Div in 1941, and in 1943 it was reorganized as an Inf Div. Training has consisted of: Ft Benning, Ga-Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers; Camp Gordon, GA-VII Corps WEP tests; Ft Dix, NJ-attack of fortified areas, Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla-amphibious training; and Ft Jackson, SC preparation for overseas movement. 1 Feb 44 the 4th Inf Div arrived in the ETO. Training in the ETO has consisted of moving a composite combat team from its present location to Braumton Camp to participate in assault training at the US Assault Training Center.

ACTION : Historical Section

INFO : SGS
SRAEF
G-1
AG Mil Pers
Log
Summary
AG Records
File

REF NO NONE

SECRET-ROUTINE

ETO IN 74

ETOUSA
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

582 DATED MAR 24 1730A 44

RECD MAR 25 0525Z

SECRET-ROUTINE

FROM : HQ FIRST US ARMY from CG 4th Inf Div

ACTION TO : ETOUSA

REF NO : 2023

History of Infantry Regiments 4th Inf Div follows:

8th Infantry organized 1838 distinguished itself at Palo Alto Monterey and Chapultepec, fought at Antietam Fredericksburg and Gettysburg in the Spanish War saw combat in Cuba and Philippines, served in Indian Campaigns, Alaska, Philippines and Germany. February 27, 1923 this Regiment under Command of Colonel Raymond O. Barton, Now Major General CG 4th Inf Div lowered the flag at Fort Ehrenbreitstein, last American Post in Europe.

12th Inf organized 1798 in garrison of Fort Mifflin, Oct 1814 occasion of the National Anthem marched with Scots on Mexico City, fought in many Civil War battles including Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Wilderness and Cold Harbor.

Served in Indian Campaigns, Spanish War, Philippine Insurrection and Siberian Expedition of 1919.

Among former members of the Regiment now General Officers are Hugh A. Drum, Alexander M. Patch and Douglas MacArthur.

22nd Infantry organized 1866, served in Indian Campaigns, Cuba, Philippines and Alaska.

ACTION : Historical Sect ✓

INFO : S/GS G-1
SMAEP Summary
RUSAG AG Records

REF NO 2023

SECRET-ROUTINE

EFO IN 3876

1

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO. 2179

30-0-5

(6241)
Master

Operation Report - 4th Inf. Division

Page 44



HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

.....
.....
Units: *602*
Date: 22 July 1944
.....

AG 319.1

22 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, VII-Cerps, APO #307, U. S. Army.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation
- Section VI - Communications

C
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Y

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C3), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period: 6 June to 30 June 1944:

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel James S. Rodwell
- AC of S, G-1 - Lt Col Garlen R. Bryant
- AC of S, G-2 - Lt Col Harry F. Hanson
- AC of S, G-3 - Lt Col Orlando C. Troxel, Jr.
- AC of S, G-4 - Lt Col Richard S. Marr

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
CANCELLED
 BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 William D. Tappan 10247 AGD S-E-C-E-E-T
 DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 27 Jul 1966

MAY 8 1946

6241

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1. On 10 April 1944 this Division had complete T/E equipment. Prior to being completely equipped the division had been designated as one of the assault divisions in the invasion of the Continent. In view of the special assignment, certain items of equipment were drawn in lieu of those normally issued an infantry division. The three light field artillery battalions, the 29th, 42d, and 44th, were issued self-propelled 105mm howitzers, M-7, in lieu of the towed howitzer. Halftracks, M-2, were issued as prime movers for the 57mm AT guns. In amphibious exercises held during March and April these two items of equipment proved highly satisfactory in traversing sand and rough terrain.

2. Additional equipment for amphibious operations was authorized which included extra vehicles, signal equipment, flame throwers, and a special dozer blade for medium tanks.

3. In May 1944, Cargo Carriers, M-29, were substituted for 130-ton trucks in the infantry and artillery units. The purpose of this substitution was to give those units a vehicle which could cross the inundated area west of Utah Beach.

4. With the boat lift available to the division and attached units, it was possible, in most instances, to land approximately three-quarters of the unit vehicles in landing craft. With this portion of the organic transportation in the assault, the Division Artillery was able to carry a little less than two basic loads of artillery ammunition. The infantry units were able to carry their full basic load plus one unit of fire. Twenty-three DUKWS, attached to the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, were loaded with mortar ammunition for the 4.2", 81mm, and 80mm mortars.

5. Just prior to embarkation for the invasion of the Continent, assault jackets of a new design were issued to the three assault battalions of the 8th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. This jacket contained numerous pockets, straps, etc., and was worn in lieu of the combat park.

6. The period 2 June to 6 June 1944 was spent aboard landing craft in United Kingdom ports and enroute to the Continent.

7. The mission of the 4th Infantry Division in the invasion of the Continent was to land on Beaches Tare (Green) and Uncle (Red), assault Utah Beach at 060630Z June 1944, and in conjunction with the 90th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, and 79th Infantry Division to seize Cherbourg. This mission was accomplished by 252400Z June 1944 and subsequently the division provided the military protection of Cherbourg and prepared to resume the offensive in the South.

8. The 4th Infantry Division with units attached as follows:

1106th Engineer Group
1106th Engineer Headquarters and Headquarters
Company
49th Engineer Combat Battalion
237th Engineer Combat Battalion

Sec II - Introduction

Company B, 299th Engineer Combat Battalion

238th Engineer Combat Battalion

582d Dump Truck Company

991st Engineer Treadway-Bridge Company

Detachment 612th Engineer Light Equipment Company

501st Light Ponton Company

359th Combat Team reinforced

6th Armored Group

70th Tank Battalion (DD)

748th Tank Battalion

65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

87th Chemical Battalion Motorized

Battery B, 980th Field Artillery Battalion (165 Gun)

Battery A, (reinforced), 13th Field Artillery Observation
Battalion (Fish and Sound)

377th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (Mobile)
(Landed on 13 June 1944)

899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less two companies

801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) (Landed on 13 June 1944)

9 Naval Shore Fire Control Parties

2 Air Support Parties

and supported by:

Naval Task Force 125

1st Engineer Special Brigade

IX Tactical Air Command

began to load on assault craft at Brixham, Dartmouth, Plymouth, and Torquay, on 1 June 1944. Task Force 125 began to sail from the far shore 3 June 1944. The passage across the English Channel was completed with the loss of one (1) Battery, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, the craft transporting this unit having struck a mine off shore was sunk. All guns and equipment of the battery were lost.

[REDACTED]

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)

1. 6 June 1944. When the initial landings were made, the beach defenses from Les Dunes De Varreville to La Grande Dune were manned by the 919th Infantry Regiment, and the 191st Artillery Regiment, 709th Infantry Division. These units offered slight initial resistance, fought a delaying action and were driven inland.

2. 7 June 1944. The delaying action continued, the resistance increasing as the enemy fell back. Stubborn defense was made in the beach fortification east of the inundated area and north of the landing beaches. Ste Mere Eglise fell about midafternoon 7 June and the enemy fell back to the general line Taret De Ravonville - St Marcouf - Azoville - Le Bisson - Ste Mere Eglise. Elements of the 795th Georgian Battalion, 729th Infantry Regiment, and 1068th Infantry Regiment were identified.

3. 8 June 1944. The delay continued toward the high ground east of Montebourg with the 920, 921, and 922 Infantry Regiments, 243d Division being used to reinforce the defenses in the vicinity of Montebourg. A counterattack in the vicinity of Brondeville during the afternoon, employing infantry and some tanks was unsuccessful. The line now held by the enemy was through Crisbeq - Basse Brondeville - Magnoville.

4. 9 June 1944. Delay from prepared positions continued toward the high ground east of Montebourg. Defenses in the vicinity of Crisbeq were still held by the enemy. The 2d Battalion, 729th Infantry Regiment was definitely identified but no other reinforcements were reported. Enemy front line: Crisbeq - Vaudiville - St Floxel - Hau de la Riviere - vicinity of 3002.

5. 10 June 1944. There was little change in the situation. Delay by small groups with machine guns continued northwest of Montebourg. Strongpoints along the beaches between Pt. Hau des Dunes and Hau de Cruttes continued in enemy hands. Truck movement with some artillery gave the first indications of a regrouping of enemy forces and the possibility that some guns were being withdrawn from positions along the beaches to the north and northeast to support the present line. Elements of the Strun Battalion, AOK 7 were identified for the first time. Enemy front line was Crisbeq - Azeville - 315068 - 294047 - 288025.

6. 11 June 1944. Delay and harassing action continued but no counterattacks were experienced. Isolated strongpoints at Crisbeq and along the beaches were still held by the enemy. The 9th Battery, 101st Nebelwerfer Regiment was identified. Enemy front line: Fontenay Sur Mer - Ozeville - St Floxel - Montebourg - Lossiere - vicinity 289025.

7. 12 June 1944. Resistance decreased and during the afternoon strongpoints at Crisbeq, Ozeville, and Danquoville were vacated. Resistance at Fontenay Sur Mer remained determined. Strongpoints along the beaches northward from Gd Hau Des Dunes remain in enemy hands. The 360th Engineer Battalion was identified. Enemy front line: Fontenay Sur Mer - Les Pieffes - Dancoel - Montebourg - Lossiere - vicinity 289025.

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Sec III - Intelligence, Cont'd

8. 13 June 1944. Stubborn resistance by small groups of infantry continued, fighting from hedgerow to hedgerow. Montebourg was reoccupied by the enemy during the night of 12-13 June, and the strong pocket of enemy resistance at Fontenoy-sur-Meuse was overrun by our forces. Heated artillery fire was noted for the first time. Enemy front line: St Marcoul - vicinity 350075 - vicinity Les Fioffes - Dancel - Montebourg - Lossiers - vicinity 289025.

9. 14 June 1944. After resisting an attack of the 12th Infantry at about 151600 June, the enemy launched two counterattacks at 1800 and 2100, both of which were repulsed. During the afternoon of 14 June the attack of the 22d Infantry met little resistance. Enemy infantry appears to have withdrawn to the east side of the railroad tracks running southwest out of Montebourg and to the high ground running northwest from Montebourg. The combat team Rohrbach was identified and indicated that the elements of many units now greatly weakened, were being reformed as combat groups. Enemy front line: Bourg-de-Lestre - Rue Caubriere - Montebourg - Lossiers - vicinity 289025.

10. 15 June 1944. Montebourg is reported held by perimeter defense with approximately 100 to 200 men. Hasty positions are being prepared along the high ground north and northwest of Montebourg. Contact with the enemy was maintained with difficulty. Little or no enemy patrolling was experienced. The 649 Eastern Battalion was identified from a prisoner of war who stated that his battalion had not yet been committed to action. Enemy front line: Mouth of Sinepe River - Bourg-de-Lestre - Rue Caubriere - Montebourg - Lossiers - vicinity 289025.

11. 16 June 1944. The enemy continued to improve defenses southwest of Montebourg, but very little activity was observed in other sectors. Prisoner of War reports that the enemy was greatly disorganized after the capture of Quinzeville. Enemy front line: Mouth of Sinepe River - Bourg-de-Lestre - Rue Caubriere - Montebourg - Lossiers - vicinity 289025.

12. 17 June 1944. There was little change in the situation, with the enemy continuing to improve his defenses. Montebourg is still in enemy hands. Reports of the withdrawal of exact guns to the north and northwest were received. Units identified to date include the 91st Infantry Division, 243d Infantry Division, 709th Infantry Division, as well as many miscellaneous units. All are shown in Annex No. 2 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 10, dated 13 June 1944. Enemy front line: Mouth of Sinepe River - Bourg-de-Lestre - Rue Caubriere - Montebourg - Lossiers - vicinity 289025.

13. 18 June 1944. There still was slight activity to the front, with the preparation of hasty defenses continuing. The main line of defense appears to be along the high ground to the northeast of Montebourg, with no apparent preparations in the northwestern portion of the division sector. The 729th Infantry and approximately 300 men of AOK Battalion No. 7 with possible elements of the 2d Battalion, 931st Infantry Regiment attached, having been organized into a combat group and are organizing the defenses on the left of the division zone. Enemy front line: Mouth of Sinepe River - Bourg-de-Lestre - Rue Caubriere - Montebourg - Lossiers - vicinity 289025.

14. 19 June 1944. Defensive positions in depth on the high ground southwest of Valogues consisting of infantry and a few tanks were reported. The enemy's knowledge of our units seems to have increased. Montebourg was evacuated by the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Companies, 91st Infantry Regiment, and parachute troops, the night of 18 June. Enemy front line: Quiévillers (exclusive) Bourge de Lostre - La Bois de Montebourg - CR 273063 - Flotten - Manville.

15. 20 June 1944. Scattered elements of the 709th and 213d Divisions were withdrawing toward the North, presumably to the prepared defensive positions in the vicinity of Cherbourg. Our forces made contact with the enemy only twice for a short time, and for the most part advanced unopposed. Only scattered enemy outpost detachments were found north of the Sinope River as far as St Martin De Audoville. Enemy front line: 215168 - Hau Gallis - Sairo River.

16. 21 June 1944. Concrete and reinforced earthen emplacements were successively occupied by the enemy as his OPL withdrew to strategic defensive positions in the vicinity of Cherbourg. Continuous contact with the enemy was maintained by the division. All strongpoints along the eastern coast as far north as Quettonou were reconnoitered and found to be free of enemy. Enemy front line: St Pierre Eglise - Boisse de Blauquerville - 235215 - 220195 - 215174 - 195163.

17. 22 June 1944. The enemy now defended Fortress Cherbourg from prepared positions. Resistance was stubborn, with the enemy slowly withdrawing from one prepared position to others closer to Cherbourg. Elements of several new units were encountered, including Flak Battalions, Coast Artillery Units, and 1st Parachute Training Regiment. Some fire from heavy and medium artillery was received, indicating that some guns formerly sited for sea coast defense were moved or resighted. A considerable number of prisoners were captured from among enemy troops trying to infiltrate from East to West through the rear of the 22d Infantry area, attempting to get back within their lines. Enemy front line: St Pierre Eglise - Harceau Les Ronches - 235229 - 219205 - 224195 - 205169 - 198172 - 193165.

18. 23 June 1944. The defense of Cherbourg continued from the prepared strongpoints organized in depth. Some of these strongpoints were elaborate concrete emplacements and other wooden types. Engineers, AA personnel, Coast Artillery, and Air Corps students were reported to have been used at the front as infantry. Enemy front line: St Pierre Eglise - 265220 - 235233 - 225203 - 219198 - 200170.

19. 24 June 1944. The defense of Cherbourg from the prepared perimeter strongpoints continued. Every available man including static troops, and young parachute students were being used in the defense. Morale was low and in some cases non-employed as infantry had little other than a few weeks training. Strong resistance in the northeastern sector continued especially in the vicinity of Fort Hamburg and an airfield at 2523. Enemy front line: 235230 - 212223 - 201221 - 195220 - 189198 - 180174.

20. 25 June 1944. The enemy showed little desire for contact. Defense was from well organized artillery and AA positions which were well dug in and contained permanent concrete emplacements. The enemy surrendered when our artillery fire and automatic fire was brought on him, or when his ammunition was depleted. Enemy front line no longer existed as a line. Our front line battalions were at: 185197 to 190198 - 188175 to 183175 - 184179 to 188179 - 190175 to 196175 - 198197 to 202197 - 172234 to 171236 - 171239 - 169244 - 182245 - 198244 - to 204247 - 211245 to 214247 - 218250 - 222249 - 224228.

21. 26 June 1944. Cherbourg was entered by our forces. The enemy fought from prepared emplacements at street corners and corners of buildings. Strong defensive action also continued in the vicinity of the airport at Mauportus. Resistance was from scattered groups and many prisoners were taken. Enemy front line: 254247 - 246238 - 244244 - 162238 - 157235 - 157236.

22. 28 June 1944. Except for isolated groups in Cherbourg, forces in the forts on the harbor breakwall and isolated groups in the northeast, our forces occupy the area along the coast from the center of Cherbourg to the area in the vicinity of Pont de Barflaur. 1,101 prisoners were taken by the division on this day, bringing the total to 9705 since D-Day. No enemy front line exists.

23. 29 June 1944. Fort De L'Ouest, Fort Central, and Fort De L'Est surrendered, which left no enemy positions in the division sector. Clearing up continued and over 1,000 more prisoners were taken.

- Annex A - Order of Battle Team No. 2
- Annex B - Counterintelligence Corps, Detachment No. 10
- Annex C - Military Intelligence Interpreters Team No. 417
- Annex D - Photo Interpreters Team

Section IV - Operations

1. 6 June 1944. At 060630 B June 1944 the assault battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment supported by naval gunfire and the DD tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion landed on the Cotentin Peninsula 1500 yards southeast of the prescribed beaches (See FO No. 1). Slight resistance was met on the beaches and on the areas immediately in rear of the beaches. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry landed and turned to the northeast to reduce the beach defenses to Quineville, and found the beach strongly defended at the location of the original landing beaches. The 8th Infantry contacted elements of the 82d Airborne Division at Ste Marie Eglise and numerous elements of this division and the 101st Airborne Division were contacted in the 4th Division zone of action during the day. There was no enemy air activity. The landing schedule as originally planned was delayed due to beaching difficulties, but the combat conclusions of the following divisional units were landed.

8th Infantry
12th Infantry
22d Infantry
87th Chemical Battalion
Division Artillery; 29th, 42d, 44th, 65th Armored
Field Artillery Battalions
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Loss two companies)
70th Tank Battalion
746th Tank Battalion
2 Platoons 4th Engineer Combat Battalion

2. 7 June 1944. Three (3) infantry regiments of the division attacked at 0600 with mission to extend the beachhead and destroy the hostile forces in their zone of action. Numerous strongpoints were reduced during the day's fighting, principally held to vicinity southeast of Holboeruttee and Ste. Marie Eglise. The attack progressed to positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 2.

87th Chemical Battalion (loss Co D) attached to 8th Infantry.

Company D attached to 22d Infantry.

20th Field Artillery Battalion landed and went into position with mission of general support.

746th Tank Battalion completed landing, and Company A, less one platoon, was attached to 101st Airborne Division to support their attack during the morning and reverted to attachment 22d Infantry at 1715.

4th Engineer Combat Battalion normal combat team attachments supported the division in attack.

Company D 4th Medical Battalion established ashore.

359th Combat Team reinforced in position shown Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 2, in division reserve.

Air support was effected at 2100 on strongpoints at Beins (375008) and Hau Du Nord (389063).

Field Order No. 2 Issued at 2330.

3. 8 June 1944. Attack by all three (3) regiments launched at 0630 per Field Order No. 2, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division. The 8th and 12th Infantry progressed slowly throughout the day to position shown Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 3.

22d Infantry was counterattacked during the afternoon, but was driven approximately 1000 yards to the southeast to position shown in above-mentioned overlay.

87th Chemical Battalion (loss two companies) attached to 8th Infantry; Company A attached to 12th Infantry; Co D attached to 22d Infantry; supported the infantry attack.

Division Artillery. The Air Sections of the Division Artillery battalions were particularly effective in adjustment on hostile targets during the day. The Division Artillery consisted of organizational battalions-- 20th, 29th, 42d, and 44th Field Artillery Battalions, and attached Company B, 15th Field Observation Battalion, Battery B, 980th Field Artillery Battalion, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (loss one company), and 915th Field Artillery Battalion.

8th Armored Group attacked 1945 in zone of action of 12th Infantry. One platoon 4th Reconnaissance Troop landed prepared for reconnaissance missions.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

All seaborne elements of the 4th Infantry Division in the first three tides had landed and were in positions-see Overlay mentioned above. Air and naval bombardment requests called for continuously during the day proved effective.

4. 9 June 1944. 8th and 12th Infantry attacked at 0630 per Oral Orders, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division. Progress was continuous but slow.

3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, seized the high ground northeast of Montebourg.

22d Infantry, with 70th Tank Battalion (less Company C), Companies A and B, 89th Tank Destroyer Battalion, formed into a special task force commanded by Brigadier General Henry A. Barber, was given the mission of attacking in the zone of the 22d Infantry (Field Order No. 2) in the direction of Chau De Fontenay-Ozoivillo to capture Quinoville.

359th Infantry remained in division reserve near Baudinville, with the exception of the 1st Battalion which was moved to Aveville. Two companies of the 3d Battalion were sent to the vicinity of Saussentan to mop up pockets of enemy resistance. However, they made no contact with the enemy and returned to position at 2200.

4th Reconnaissance Troop was prepared for action 10 June 1944.

Bad weather forestalled the use of air support missions.

5. 10 June 1944. 8th and 12th Infantry attacked at 0630 per Oral Orders Headquarters 4th Infantry Division. The attack was continued throughout the day with stiff enemy resistance and both units reached their objectives prior to dark.

22d Infantry as part of task force attacked at 0630. 3d Battalion attacking in the North, direction of Ozoivillo, 2d Battalion attacking West in the direction of Chau De Fontenay, 1st Battalion in reserve. Attacks of both battalions fell short of reaching their objectives and the 2d Battalion was pulled back for reorganization and went into reserve about 1000 yards west of Chau De Fontenay.

A coordinated attack was launched at 1745 but was unsuccessful. 3d Battalion took up position 200 yards south of Ozoivillo and the 1st Battalion was brought up to a position on the right of the 3d Battalion where the unit was halted for the night.

The 359th Infantry remained in division reserve with the exception of the 1st Battalion which was attached to the 22d Infantry at 1555. No operation against the enemy.

6. 11 June 1944. The 8th Infantry received heavy artillery fire during the day and night, consolidated and organized positions gained on 10 June 1944.

12th Infantry attacked at 0730 with objective of the high ground to its immediate front and upon gaining this ground, positions were organized for defense.

The 3d Battalion 22d Infantry improved its position to the south of Ozoivillo while the 1st and 2d Battalions moved to the left of the 3d Battalion to fill in the gap between the 12th and 22d Infantry. Positions were then organized to defend.

The 359th Infantry reverted to control of 90th Infantry Division. The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, having been attached to the 4th Infantry Division, moved into positions on the north, west and south of

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

Crisbeeg to act as a containing force against this strongpoint and to relieve elements of the 22d Infantry. Active patrolling in vicinity and into Crisbeeg was conducted during the hours of darkness.

Companies A and D of the 87th Chemical Battalion assisted elements of the 4th Infantry Division by supporting fires, and Companies B and C were attached to the 101st Airborne Division.

The 6th Airborne Group plus 736th Tank Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 4th Infantry Division and the 70th Tank Battalion moved to a position at OSS3028 to act as Division reserve.

7. 12 June 1944. 8th Infantry held positions previously gained, called for artillery fire and air support missions, and successfully used air reconnaissance in front of its sector. An attack was launched at 2100 and was partially successful in an effort to seize and hold Montebourg.

12th Infantry held and organized for defense, positions gained on 11 June 1944. An attack was launched at 1600 to the northeast and the regiment occupied positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 7.

22d Infantry launched an attack at 1230 on Ozville, passed through the village at 1550, continued the attack on its objective, and occupied and organized positions by 2130. It then prepared to continue the attack per Field Order No. 4, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division 122330 June 1944.

39th Infantry occupied Crisbeeg and Danville, held positions in the vicinity of East St. Louis and forced the enemy to evacuate their defensive positions and fight a delaying action in this sector.

8. 13 June 1944. 8th Infantry held positions previously gained, and a small task force attempted to reconquer Montebourg, but after two attempts, it was ordered to contain the village in order not to expend troops unnecessarily.

12th Infantry organized defensive positions gained on 12 June 1944. 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, launched an attack at 1330 to gain the high ground by their immediate front. The regiment occupied positions indicated on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 7.

2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, launched an attack on Ozville and advanced to the northeast. 2d Battalion moved with the 12th Infantry, and launched an attack to the east to secure the high ground north of Quineville Road.

39th Infantry continued to conduct their attack against the defended strongpoints in their sector and to mop up enemy resistance.

Division artillery with 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion previously attached continued to support all infantry units in their respective zones of action.

9. 14 June 1944. 8th and 12th Infantry held and improved positions previously gained, maintained constant patrols to the front and flanks, two patrols being sent as far as Valones.

22d Infantry launched a coordinated attack in conjunction with 5d Battalion, 39th Infantry to secure the high ground northwest of Quineville and the town of Quineville. This attack was supported by aerial bombardment at 1440 hours by a force of medium bombers of the 1st Tactical Air Force and was successful, objectives being secured.

1st Battalion, 39th Infantry continued to conduct an attack against the strongpoints along the coast and to mop up enemy resistance. 2d Battalion moved to an assembly area at Dangleville, see Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 9.

Sec IV - Operations Contd

4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was active in maintaining contact between the infantry regiments.

Battery B, 980th Field Artillery Battalion and 377th Ammunition (Automatic Weapons) Battalion were attached to Division Artillery.

10. 15 June 1944. 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments continued improvement of positions previously gained and maintained patrols to front and flanks to gain enemy information. Patrols sent to Valenciennes on 14 June 1944 returned.

22d Infantry consolidated positions gained 14 June 1944 and patrolled to front and flanks.

3d Battalion, 39th Infantry was detached 4th Infantry Division at 1600 and relieved at that time by Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) who occupied positions in Quinville.

4th Engineer Combat Battalion - one Platoon Company A attached 8th Infantry, one Platoon Company B attached 12th Infantry, Company C attached 22d Infantry - erected many roadblocks south of Montebourg. This battalion continued maintenance and widening of roads in division zone of action and placed warning and anti-personnel devices north of Montebourg.

801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to 4th Infantry Artillery. Elements of Headquarters Company, A, B, and C, arrived in area.

11. 16 June 1944. 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments continued improvement of defenses and conducted patrolling to front and flanks.

22d Infantry improved their defenses and likewise continued active patrolling. 3d Battalion effected their relief by 4th Cavalry Group under cover of darkness, night 16-17 June; thence to be assembled and moved to area in Division Reserve (See Field Order No. 5, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division). Company I, 22d Infantry reinforced with one Machine Gun Platoon and one Section 81mm mortar platoon with Company F, 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron constituted 4th Infantry Division mobile Reserve.

Battery B, 980th Field Artillery Battalion reverted to VII Corps control at 161200Z June 1944.

12. 17 June 1944. 8th and 12th Infantry continued defense improvements and maintained active patrols to the front and flanks. 1st Battalion 8th Infantry was relieved by 3d Battalion 8th Infantry on the front line and moved to assembly area in vicinity Regimental Command Post.

22d Infantry was relieved by 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron during the 24 hour period, 170001-172400Z June and moved to assembly area vicinity Fontenay Sur Mer, as Division Reserve.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) completed relief of 22d Infantry during this 24-hour period, 170001-172400Z June and organized positions, initiating patrols to front and flanks. Group Headquarters 4th Cavalry Group reverted to VII Corps control 172400Z June 1944.

Division Mobile Reserve completed organization and remained in assembly area vicinity Fontenay Sur Mer.

Sec III - Operations, Contd.

13. 18 June 1944. 8th Infantry continued active patrolling to its front and flanks. Company C, 87th Medical Battalion attached 1800.

12th Infantry likewise continued patrolling in its zone of action and Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion was attached 1800.

22d Infantry remained in its assembly area during the day as Division Reserve.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron further organized its positions and actively patrolled to North and Northwest of Quineville. 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Schanized) was detached and returned to Division control at 1800.

Division Mobile Reserve was reconstituted of the following units: 70th Tank Battalion (-), Company F, 22d Infantry (X) and was relocated (See Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 13).

103d Field Artillery Battalion was attached to 4th Infantry Division and further attached Division artillery 101900Z June 1944.

14. 19 June 1944. 8th Infantry launched a coordinated attack in conjunction with 12th Infantry at 190000Z June 1944 from positions southwest of Montebourg, and by dark 16 June 1944 had secured positions as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 14.

12th Infantry launched a coordinated attack in conjunction with 8th Infantry at time mentioned above from positions northeast of Montebourg, and by dark 19 June 1944, had secured positions as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 14.

In this coordinated attack, these two (2) regiments were supported by Division artillery, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, whose fire was further supported by those of 183d Field Artillery Battalion, Companies A and B, 70th Tank Battalion and Companies C and D, 87th Chemical Battalion supported the 8th and 12th Infantry respectively.

22d Infantry, Division Reserve, performed the following tasks: 1st Battalion moved to position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 14 and initially covered the division right flank; 2d Battalion less Company F remained in former position. 3d Battalion moved into and captured Montebourg by executing flanking movement from the west of the town.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron protected Division right flank from Quineville to right flank of 12th Infantry.

The Division Mobile Reserve - 70th Tank Battalion (less Companies A and B) and Company F, 22d Infantry (X) remained in its former position.

15. 20 June 1944. 8th Infantry launched a coordinated attack in conjunction with 12th and 22d Infantry at 200530Z June from its position vicinity Valogne. By dark, 20 June, had secured positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 15.

12th Infantry launched coordinated attack in conjunction with 8th and 22d Infantry at time mentioned above from its position west of Anoville against a limited objective at Haut-Siquet (034098). 12th Infantry reverted to division reserve at this point and followed the advance of 22d Infantry to assembly area position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 15.

22d Infantry launched a coordinated attack in conjunction with other two regiments as stated above from a position on the road west of Anoville and secured the position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 15, by dark.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron protected division right flank from Quinville to the right flank of 22d Infantry. This squadron further extended its zone of reconnaissance to the west of Sinope River to continue contact with 22d Infantry during the day's attack.

70th Tank Battalion (less Companies C and D) and Company A, 12th Infantry reinforced, which then constituted Division Mobile Reserve, moved at 200100 to a position north of Montebaur, and subsequently moved to a position as shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 15. Companies C and D, 70th Tank Battalion supported the 8th and 22d Infantry respectively in their advance to positions occupied at the end of this day.

Very slight resistance was encountered in the advance from vicinity of Valognes to these positions. In most instances, advancing units were out of contact with enemy.

16. 21 June 1944. 8th Infantry with Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion attached and supported by Company C, 70th Tank Battalion continued the attack in conjunction with 12th and 22d Infantry at 11255 from positions vicinity Ruffosses with three (3) battalions abreast. By dark, 21 June, they secured the position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 16.

12th Infantry, initially Division Reserve, attacked with one (1) Battalion in vicinity of Hau Gallie at 1730 to locate enemy main line of resistance. The attack progressed to position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 16, but was stopped by artillery, mortar and small arms fire.

22d Infantry attack 1600 from its position in vicinity La Thiol with Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached and supported by Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, captured high ground vicinity 237233. The advance of 22d Infantry stopped at 2200 by order Commanding General 4th Infantry Division at position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 16.

During the attack, 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron protected the right flank of 4th Infantry Division by extending its patrols from Quotthau to right flank 22d Infantry. Also sent patrols to St Pierre Erlise and Barflour.

Division Mobile Reserve consisting of Company A, 12th Infantry reinforced, 70th Tank Battalion (less Company C and D) moved to 2250 from its assembly area in vicinity of Hau Vautier to a new assembly area shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 16.

Division Artillery with 29th, 42d and 41th Field Artillery Battalion in normal support of attacking regiments and 20th Field Artillery Battalion in general support fired counter battery and interdiction missions. 163d Field Artillery Battalion was detached this date and reverted to control of VII Corps, time 1800.

17. 22 June 1944. 8th Infantry (Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached) launched an attack at 0230B from position vicinity of O-225190 and by 2100B that day had secured the positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 17 and were patrolling to East and West. 2d Battalion 8th Infantry was in Division Reserve.

12th Infantry (Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached), attacked at 1400 and by 2100 that date had reached position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 17, 1st Battalion being in Division Reserve.

22d Infantry (Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached) attacked 1400 and captured strongpoint shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 17. 3d Battalion made little progress but 1st and 2d Battalions advanced to

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 17 and consolidated the high ground. Considerable difficulty was thereafter experienced in supplying these two (2) battalions due to snipers and machine gun fire on road leading South.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron extended its zone of reconnaissance to Barflaur and Rethoville and the eastern coast of the Peninsula. They assembled in vicinity 0-241120 to protect division right flank.

Division Mobile Reserve consisting of 70th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C), Company F, 12th Infantry reinforced, were at positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 17. Company D, 70th Tank Battalion was called upon to convey supplies to elements of 22d Infantry from Le Thiel to the extended positions of 1st and 2d Battalion 22d Infantry.

18. 25 June 1944. 8th Infantry launched an attack at 0730 from positions in vicinity of 0196165 and by 2130 had secured positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 18, and were preparing to attack at 2407300 June to the northwest.

12th Infantry attacked at 0930 from positions in vicinity of 0224195. The 3d Battalion attacked around the right flank of the 2d Battalion and succeeded in driving the enemy from the defended position near the bridge at 0224195. By 2300 the regiment had gained positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 18.

22d Infantry attacked at 0700 and succeeded in capturing all enemy strongpoints on the high ground in the vicinity of 0235228. The high ground that was captured by this regiment secured observation to the broadwater of Cherbourg Harbour. The attack was renewed at 1300, and the disposition of troops by 2300 was as shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 18.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mehannick) attached, contained enemy strongpoints in the vicinity of the airfield at 0255235. In conjunction with artillery, the reconnaissance squadron made a joint attack against the western perimeter of the airfield defenses at 0700 in order to cover the movement of elements of the 22d Infantry. Troop A was attacked by an enemy force at 2200 at 0243218. It counterattacked and the force was driven off and fifty enemy dead were counted. Company F attacked at cross-roads 0242218 to the east and drove a force of enemy beyond point 0252222 at 2300.

The Division Mobile Reserve was reconstituted at 0800 in location shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 18 with the 70th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) and Company F, 12th Infantry attached.

Companies C and D, 87th Chemical Battalion continued to support the attacks of the 12th and 22d Infantry respectively.

19. 24 June 1944. 8th Infantry attacked at 0800 from the high ground northwest of Ruffosse. The 1st Battalion secured the position it occupied and protected the left flank of the division. This battalion experienced heavy artillery fire late in the afternoon of that day. The 2d Battalion advanced with considerable opposition to positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 19. The 3d Battalion was withdrawn to a new position, reorganized, and placed in regimental reserve.

See IV - Operations, Contd

12th Infantry attacked at 0840 from positions northwest of the creek at 0218200 to 0221205, seized numerous strongpoints, and completely disorganized the enemy to their front. It is estimated that this regiment captured upwards of 700 prisoners during the day's attack.

22d Infantry consolidated the positions on the high ground it had taken and prepared the right flank of the division. The 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry was attached to the 12th Infantry, and advanced to the east from 0224214, turned to the North and drove through enemy defenses to a position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 19.

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) contained enemy strongpoints in the vicinity of the airfield at 0255235. C Troop of this squadron reconnoitered beach defenses on the northeastern extremity of the Peninsula.

Division Mobile Reserve was moved to the vicinity of the 8th Infantry and was prepared to reinforce the 8th Infantry in that sector, See Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 19.

20. 25 June 1944. The 8th Infantry consolidated its positions gained on 24th June and patrolled eastwardly to Masnil-Awjal, northwardly to La Glacierie to strongpoints vicinity of 0164212, and westwardly to establish contact with the 79th Division on the left.

The 12th Infantry attacked at 0745 from positions astride the Tourlaville road northwest. The 1st and 3d Battalions drove to the coast. The 2d Battalion, following, occupied Tourlaville and remained in regimental reserve. The left boundary of the 4th Infantry Division having been changed by VII Corps to include the eastern portion of the city of Cherbourg, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 12th Infantry, attacked at 2000 and moved westwardly into Cherbourg. During the day, this regiment seized numerous fortified localities and captured approximately 800 prisoners.

The 22d Infantry consolidated its positions on the high ground previously gained and patrolled northward toward the coast during the night of 24-26 June, and continued the mopping up of pockets of resistance in its zone of action. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry moved northwestwardly at 1230, mopped up three strongpoints, and at the end of the period held the coastal sector - See Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 20; The 2d Battalion attached to 12th Infantry drove to the coast. See Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 20.

The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, contained enemy strongpoints in the vicinity of the airfield at 0255235 and reconnoitered to the southeast. Troop C of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron reconnoitered the eastern perimeter of the airfield defenses. This squadron as reinforced was attached to the 22d Infantry as of 2522108 June 1944.

The Division Mobile Reserve remained in the 8th Infantry Command Post area until afternoon at which time Company F, 12th Infantry reinforced reverted to control of 12th Infantry and Company D, 70th Tank Battalion returned to Command Post 70th Tank Battalion.

21. 26 June 1944. The 8th Infantry consolidated the positions gained on the 24th of June, patrolled and mopped up enemy resistance within their

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Sec IV - Operations, Contd

zone of action. The regiment maintained contact with the 79th Division on its left and moved to position shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 21.

The 12th Infantry consolidated its positions, patrolled and mopped up the eastern portion of Cherbourg within their zone of action. They maintained contact with the 79th Division on the left.

Company D, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 12th Infantry as of 261000Z June and detached at 262200Z June.

22d Infantry (24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron attached) attacked at 1100 from positions astride the Tourville-Sto Pierre Eglise road eastwardly. During the day, this regiment seized numerous strongpoints in the vicinity of the airfield heretofore mentioned, and secured positions shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 21.

28. 27 June 1944. The 6th Infantry remained in position in the vicinity of La Glucerie throughout this period. The 1st Battalion 8th Infantry was attached to 22d Infantry and moved to vicinity northwest of Sto Pierre Eglise at 1100. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry moved at 1200 to the high ground northwest of Rau Gringon. At close of period, reconnaissance was being made with a view of occupancy of the western half of Cherbourg.

The 12th Infantry effected relief of the 6th and 8th Infantry Regiments of the 79th Division between 0500 and 1100 in Cherbourg. The Regiment garrisoned the eastern half of Cherbourg, established guards, and maintained order in their sector. At 1900 the zone of action of this regiment was extended to include the western half of the city of Cherbourg.

The 22d Infantry continued the attack at 1000 against fortifications south and north of the airfield and during the day successfully seized and mopped up successively strongpoints on the eastern side of the airfield and northward toward Cap Levy.

During the period, the 14th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to 22d Infantry, 29th Field Artillery was attached to 8th Infantry, 42d Field Artillery Battalion gave direct support to the 22d Infantry, and the 20th Field Artillery Battalion was in general support.

The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Company B, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, protected the eastern and western flanks of the 22d Infantry by reconnaissance along the coast toward Pointe Du Brick and westwardly toward Froinodoville.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A, attached to 8th Infantry, Company B attached to 12th Infantry as of 1600, and Company C attached to 22d Infantry, as in all operations on the preceding days supported the operations of the infantry regiments by performing demolitions, clearing mines, and maintaining roads.

The 377th Antiaircraft (Automatic Weapons) Battalion as in all operations since date of landing, with the 4th Infantry Division established positions to defend the Division Artillery and the division rear area from enemy air and tank attack.

23. 28 June 1944. 4th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 39th and 47th Infantry at 0600, thus taking over military protections of the City of Cherbourg. All Division Artillery reverted to Division Artillery control. One (1) concentration of mass fire Division Artillery fired at Fort Central in harbor of Cherbourg, at 1600. 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron reconnoitered from Barfleur to Cherbourg to ascertain whether or not the enemy occupied any of the positions in that area. Disposition of

Sec. IV - Operations, Contd

troops 2:00 as shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 23.

24. 29 June 1944. 6th and 12th Infantry Regiments patrolled and maintained order in Cherbourg.

Division Artillery fired concentration on Fort Central in Harbor of Cherbourg and the remaining units of the division moved into assembly areas as shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 24. Company C and D, 37th Chemical Battalion reverted to VII Corps control at 0900.

25. 30 June 1944. The 9th and 12th Infantry, having been relieved from all duties connected with the maintenance of order in Cherbourg by 101st Airborne Division, together with the 22d Infantry and the following Divisional and attached units:

377th Antiaircraft (Automatic Weapons) Battalion

4th Engineer Co-bat Battalion

801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Detached from 22d Airborne

Division, attached 4th Infantry Division 300745H June 1944,

4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)

70th Tank Battalion

reconnoitered routes and moved to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Gourboisville for the purpose of reorganization, maintenance and rest.

4th Division Artillery remained in its bivouac area and reconnoitered routes for contemplated move to the South at a later time.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: 6 June 1944. At H plus 2 1/2 hours a traffic control center was set up on Utah Beach. Prior to setting up this control center no vehicles were present on the beach except a few cargo carriers, LVTs, which had come ashore in LVT's. Each unit in the division was assigned an area immediately in rear of the beach to assemble vehicles for partial de-waterproofing and movement to the west over Causeway U-5 which was open for vehicular traffic. Enemy artillery fire was encountered on the beaches. Some vehicles were lost, the most serious loss being that of bulldozers which were being used to prepare beach exits and to tow stalled vehicles across the beach. In the afternoon vehicles were landed from LCT's in water up to a depth of six feet. A considerable number of vehicles failed to wade at this depth and were towed ashore by bulldozers, assembled in rear of the beach, and were put in running condition by unit mechanics.

2. 7 June 1944. Early in the day, ammunition became available in limited quantities at beach dumps. Infantry, artillery and tank units drew small amounts of mortar and artillery ammunition from dumps.

3. 8 June 1944. The remainder of the assault vehicles of this division and attachments landed. All vehicles except those that were a complete loss due to enemy artillery fire, were in running condition and in the hands of using units.

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Sec. V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd.

4. 9 June 1944. Unit distribution of rations for the infantry was initiated.

5. 10 June to 28 June 1944. The division advanced North through Montebourg, Valognes, and finally entered Chorbourg from the East. The supply during this period was normal and in sufficient quantities in most instances. Considerable signal equipment was lost, principally SCR-300 and SCR-536 radio sets. No replacements were available until the latter part of this period.

Large quantities of enemy material were captured in strongpoints and fortifications in our zone of action. When such material was in amounts greater than could be evacuated by the division, locations were reported to VII Corps for the necessary evacuation. Recovery of equipment lost by our own troops was effective and many items were returned to using units.

Motor Maintenance improved during the period. Inspections were made by teams from the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

6. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner.

Summary of Casualties Evacuated

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>
Killed in action	87	910
Died of wounds	4	119
Died of injuries	0	6
Missing in action	5	321
Seriously wounded in action	193	2883
Seriously injured in action	9	176
Slightly wounded in action	36	535
Slightly injured in action	11	120
	345	5069

Total Casualties..... 6413

7. Burial of the dead had been conducted by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade in the vicinity of Utah Beach until arrangements were made to open a Division Cemetery at St Martin (396932) and preparations were made to expedite the burials until the VII Corps Cemetery was established at Ste Lere Bglise.

8. Prisoner of War Inclosures were established at Bandierville (362988). Total number of prisoners captured 10,318.

9. During the period ending 25 June, a total of 31 officers and 1076 enlisted replacements had been received. On 25 June all the division residue reported in.

Section VI - Communications

1. During the assault, radio was the only means of communication and was quite satisfactory. The Division Command Net consisted of SCR-608-610 radios furnishing communication for the Commanding General aboard the USS Bayfield, 4th Division Headquarters aboard an LST, the Assistant Division Commanders and each Regimental Combat Team Headquarters. An emergency radio net consisting of SCR-193 was used very little. A special command net using SCR-300 sets and linking all key Division Headquarters personnel also operated very successfully. No enemy jamming or interference was encountered. A common channel on the SCR-300 was used to a small extent between 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, and 4th Infantry Division. The capture of St Martin De Varreville was announced over this net and relayed to VII Corps Headquarters on the Bayfield shortly after H-hour.

2. Late D-Day, wire was established to all combat teams and wire communication remained approximately 95% continuous throughout the campaign. Little use was made of teletype to VII Corps and no use was made of telegraph to the regimental combat teams.

3. Throughout the campaign, the Division Voice Command Net (SCR-608) was used whenever the Commanding General left the Division Command Post. Slidex was the principal encoding device used.

4. Signal training for combat proved to be sound. The use of communications, however, differed greatly from the "message writing" concept. Most messages were in the form of either telephone or radio conversations and little use was made of the converter M-209 or other manual code devices.

R. O. Barton
R. O. BARTON,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[REDACTED]

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 landed with the 4th Infantry Division on the beach of the Dunes de Varroville at 1800, 6 June 1944 and started operating at 2000, 6 June 1944.

2. The function of this Order of Battle Team has been to keep a duplicate of the G-2 situation map, to receive and process all documents, to keep a file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, and any additional information necessary, and to occasionally translate documents and perform interrogations.

3. It has been found that 65% of the information on enemy formations has come from interrogation of prisoners of war when in combat. The study of documents has accounted for a good portion of the remaining 35%.

4. The study of documents has resulted in a number of instances in uncovering information of great value to present and future operations. Maps showing the complete plans of harassing, interdiction and barrage fire in the vicinity surrounding Cherbourg, and also of the location of the chain of strong points around Cherbourg were uncovered. In addition numerous sketches of locations of artillery positions and zones of fire, of outrenched enemy formations and locations of enemy command posts were found to be of timely use to our artillery and advancing elements. Information obtained from soldiers enabled the breaking of unit field post numbers in many cases. The T/O and T/O of new units and old units such as the 101 Heavy Chemical Projector Regiment, the 709th, 249d, 91st Infantry Divisions, 1261st Army Coastal Artillery Regiment, and a number of other formations were uncovered by documentary evidence and later confirmed by prisoners of war interrogation. A large number of documents of a high strategic value were forwarded to higher echelons as soon as practicable.

5. It has been found that Order of Battle Personnel, especially in lower echelons, must be very versatile. It is not sufficient to have mastered at least one or two foreign languages and have a thorough grounding in documents. The possession of a good memory and ability to readjust to the field life are all-important and should be among the personal characteristics considered when choosing personnel for this type of work.

6. A summary of enemy units encountered in the engagement Cherbourg follows:

A. 91st Infantry Division							
UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE	IDENTIFIED	REF	
1067 Inf Regt Hq	1930					FW	Doc
1 Bn Hq						FW	
1 Co		Port L'Abbe		07 359 14 Jun	FW		
2 Co		Port L'Abbe		90 Div 13 Jun	FW		
3 Co		Port L'Abbe		90 Div 13 Jun	FW		
4 Co		Bticoville		90 Div 14 Jun	FW		

Annex A - Order of Battle Form no. 2, Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE IDENTIFIED	REF
11 Bn Hq	16001				
5 Co		(6256)	CT 505	14 Jun	PW
7 Co			90 Div	14 Jun	PW
111 Bn Hq					Doc 10603A
9 Co		Stonville	82 A/B	14 Jun	PW
11 Co		Etienville	90 Div	14 Jun	PW
13 Co		Etienville	90 Div	14 Jun	PW Corps
1058 Inf Regt Hq	1980		CT 12	28 Jun	PW
1 Bn		Sto More Eglise	CT 505	6 Jun	21 Dec 46533
1 Co		Sto More Eglise	CT 505	6 Jun	PW
2 Co		S. Montobourg	CT 12	10 Jun	PW
3 Co		Sto More Eglise	CT 505	6 Jun	PW
4 Co		(549964)	CT 505	6 Jun	PW
11 Bn					PW
6 Co					PW
7 Co		Azoville		8 Jun	PW
8 Co		Sto More Eglise	CT 505	6 Jun	PW
191 Arty Regt	2490				
5 Btry					44994
5 Btry		(34993A)	CT 505	6 Jun	PW
6 Btry					
191 Engr Bn	645		90 Div	14 Jun	PW 4502
191 Sig Bn					Doc 14025E
1 Co					Doc 14025C
2 Co					Doc 14025E
3 Co					Doc 14025E
191 AT Bn			82 A/B	19 Jun	PW
191 Flak Co		Aboville	82 A/B	19 Jun	PW

b. 243d Infantry Division - Lt General Helling - Strength 12936.

920 Inf Regt Hq	1930				PW Doc
1 Bn Hq					PW
1 Co			CT 12	15 Jun	PW
3 Co		Azoville	CT-12	8 Jun	PW
4 Co		Ozoville	CT 22	12 Jun	PW 57715
11 Bn Hq					PW
6 Co			CT 12	8 Jun	PW
6 Co			CT 12	10 Jun	PW
7 Co			90 Div	13 Jun	PW
No Third Battalion					Corps
12 Co		Vic Edmondoville	CT 359	9 Jun	PW
13 Co	130	Vic Edmondoville	CT 359	9 Jun	PW & Corps 5805
14 Co		Vic Edmondoville	CT 359	9 Jun	PW
921 Inf Regt	1950	Ne La Lande	90 Div	14 Jun	PW Doc 5921V
1 Bn Hq					Doc 59364
1 Co					Doc 59364
2 Co		Gourbesville	90 Div	13 Jun	PW 59364
3 Co					Doc 59364
4 Co	109	St Sauvoir		16 Jun	PW & Corps 59364

Annex A, Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLAC	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE	IDENTIFIED	FRN
1st Bn Hq			CT 8	10 Jun	PH	Doc 57667A
5 Co						Doc 57667B
6 Co			90 Div	14 Jun	PH	Doc 57667C
7 Co						Doc 57667D
8 Co						Doc 57667E
III Bn Hq						Doc 58526A
9 Co	120	Minervilla	90 Div	14 Jun	PH & Corps	58526B
10 Co	80	141004	90 Div	14 Jun	PH	58526C
11 Co						Doc 58526D
12 Co		Font L'Abbe	90 Div	13 Jun	PH	58526E
13 Co						Doc 57523
14 Co						Doc 56476
15 Co						Doc 56725
922 Inf Regt	1930	Azovillo	CT 22	10 Jun	PH	Doc 56839
1 Bn Hq						Doc 56943A
1 Co		3-0070 *	CT 22	15 Jun	PH	56943B
2 Co		Ozovillo	CT 22	12 Jun	PH	56943C
3 Co		Azovillo	CT 12	10 Jun	PH	56943D
4 Co		St Iovxl	CT 12	11 Jun	PH	56943E
II Bn Hq			CT 8	14 Jun	PH	Doc 58671A
5 Co			CT 8	13 Jun	PH	59571B
6 Co			CT 8	13 Jun	PH Corps	59571C
7 Co			90 Div	13 Jun	PH	59571D
8 Co	220	Vandivillo	CT 89	13 Jun	PH Corps	59571E
III Bn Hq			CT 8	13 Jun	PH	Doc 57338A
9 Co		Azovillo	CT 22	10 Jun	PH	57338B
10 Co		Azovillo	CT 22	10 Jun	PH	57338C
11 Co			CT 22	11 Jun	PH	57338D
12 Co			CT 8	13 Jun	PH	57338E
13 Co		Ozovillo	CT 22	12 Jun	PH	59123
14 Co						PH
15 Co						PH
243 Arty Regt	2400	Orlando	CT 359	17 Jun	PH	Doc 56532
1 Bn	565					Doc
2 Btry	60		CT 357	16 Jun	PH Corps	56098C
III Bn	565					Doc 59636A
4 Btry						Doc 59636B
5 Btry						Doc 59636C
6 Btry						Doc 59636D
III Bn	565		CT 12	10 Jun	PH	57289
10 Btry	110					57289E
243 Engr Bn	845	Azovillo	CT 22	8 Jun	PH	Doc 28638D
3 Co						Doc
243 Med Bn			CT 12	10 Jun	PH	57097
243 Field Ersatz Bn						PH
2 Co		Ozovillo	CT 22	12 Jun	PH	
3 Co		Azovillo	CT 22	10 Jun	PH	
243 Signal Bn	430					Doc
243 Antitank Bn	500					Doc
1st Co						Corps
2 Co						Corps

Annex A, Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE	IDENTIFIER	FPN
243 Supply Bn					Doc	
Service Bn Tross (922)		St Marcouf	CT 39	12 Jun	FW	59425
496 Ersatz Bn					Doc	
o. 709 Infantry Division, Lt Gen Von Schlieben - Strength 12935.						
729 Inf Regt	1930				FW Doc	
1 Bn Hq	730	Montaigu	CT 22	20 Jun	FW Doc	
1 Co		Lo Thoill	CT 22	20 Jun	FW	
2 Co			CT 12	14 Jun	FW	40924C
3 Co		340078	CT 22	15 Jun	FW	40924D
4 Co			CT 12	20 Jun	FW	40924E
II Bn Hq	730				Doc	
5th Co		N. Montebourg		15 Jun	FW	
6 Co			CT 6	12 Jun	FW	
7 Co			CT 12	14 Jun	FW	
8 Co		N. Montebourg	CT 12	15 Jun	FW	
III Bn Hq	730	249244	24 Jun	28 Jun	FW Doc	
9 Co		N. Montebourg	CT 12	14 Jun	FW	
10 Co			CT 8	13 Jun	FW	
11 Co		Le Mesnil	CT 12	22 Jun	FW	
12 Co			CT 12	13 Jun	FW	41725E
14 Co		189169	CT 8	23 Jun	FW Doc	
739 Inf Regtl Hq	1830	Azeville	CT 12	10 Jun	FW Doc	
1 Bn	730					
10 Co		S. Montebourg	CT 12	11 Jun	FW	
4 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	FW	
II Bn	730					
6 Co				25 Jun	Corps	43015C
7 Co		210175	CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
III Bn Hq	730	Azeville	CT 22	11 Jun	FW	43676A
9 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	11 Jun	FW Doc	43676B
10 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	11 Jun	FW	43676C
11 Co		Ozeville	CT 22		FW	43676D
12 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	11 Jun	FW	43676E
14 Co		Azeville	CT 12	10 Jun	FW	42034A
919 Inf Regtl Hq	1950	Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	FW Doc	59266
1 Bn Hq	730	Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	FW	56409A
1 Co		Lo Pt Hau Dos	CT 22	9 Jun	FW	
		Dunos				
2 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	FW	
3 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	FW	
4 Co		Lo Pt Hau Dos	CT 22	9 Jun	FW	
II Bn Hq	730	Dunos			Doc	58555A
5 Co			CT 8	14 Jun	FW	58555B
6 Co		S. Montebourg	CT 22	10 Jun	FW	58555C
7 Co			CT 12		FW	58555D
8 Co			CT 8	14 Jun	FW	58555E
III Bn Hq	730		CT 8	19 Jun	FW	57545A
9 Co		S. Montebourg	CT 8	10 Jun	FW	
11 Co		S. Vanderville	CT 12	10 Jun	FW	
12 Co		Via Joret	CT 12	10 Jun	FW	

Annex A. Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE	IDENTIFIED BY	PPN
13 Co		Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	PW Doc	59105
14 Co		Le Pt Mar Des Dunes	CT 22	8 Jun	PW Doc	58534
15 Co					Doc	58689
709 Engr Bn	045	Rufoccos	CT 12		PW Doc	44617A
1 Co			CT 8	10 Jun	PW	44617B
2 Co			CT 12	8 Jun	PW	
3 Co			CT 8	10 Jun	PW	
709 Sig Bn	430				Doc	
709 Supply Bn					Doc	
709 AT Bn	500	Azeville	CT 8	8 Jun	PW Doc	46137A
1 Co					Doc	46137B
2 Co		Azeville	CT 22	9 Jun	PW	46137C
1709 Arty Regt Hq	2490	Charbourg Rd	CT 22	22 Jun	PW Doc	
1 Bn Hq		Brattoville	CT 22	25 Jun	PW	
1 Btry		196187	CT 22	19 Jun	PW Doc	
2 Btry		Bretteville	CT 22	25 Jun	PW	
11 Bn Hq		St Germain	CT 22	25 Jun	PW	
6 Btry			CT 22	26 Jun	PW	
8 Btry 60 men (3-155mm Fr Guns) (2- 20mm guns)			CT 22	19 Jun	PW Doc	
III Bn Hq			CT 8	19 Jun	PW Doc	56635A
9 Btry 4-105mm		2523	CT 22	19 Jun	PW	56635
10 Btry 4-7.62 mm			CT 8	19 Jun	PW	56635
11 Btry 4-105mm		Gonneville	CT 22	22 Jun	PW Doc	
Flak Btry 3-37mm			CT 22	24 Jun	HQ	
795 Georgian Bn						
2 Co			CT 12	7 Jun	PW	
4 Co					Doc	13152
561 Ost Bn		176193	CT 8	24 Jun	PW	
1 Co		192135	CT 8	22 Jun	PW	
2 Co		191178	CT 8	23 Jun	PW	
3 Co		La Glacorie	CT 12	23 Jun	PW	
4 Co		189169	CT 8	23 Jun	PW	
649 Ost Bn	200				Doc	
1 Co		Ni Montebourg	CT 12	19 Jun	PW	
2 Co		Ni Montebourg	CT 12	20 Jun	PW	
3 Co		Vic Montebourg	CT 22	19 Jun	PW	29856
304 Ost Bn		La Glacorie	CT 8	24 Jun	PW	

d. Miscellaneous Units

1261 CA Regt					PW Doc	28932
1 Bn Hq					Doc	39583A
1 Btry		Ozeville	CT 22	12 Jun	PW	39583B
2 Btry					Doc	39583C
3 Btry					Doc	39583D
11 Bn Hq		Hou Gaueton	CT 22	22 Jun	PW Doc	
4 Btry		166164	CT 3	25 Jun	PW	34981
5 Btry			CT 22	22 Jun	PW	

Annex A.

Annex A, Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE IDENTIFIED	FPN
111 Bn Hq		Tourlaville	CT 22	21 Jun FW	Doc
7 Btry		Pinabel	CT 22	22 Jun FW	
9 Btry		216187	CT 8	22 Jun FW	
10 Btry		Gonneville	CT 22	21 Jun FW	
1262 CA Regt					
1 Bn					
3 Btry		St Germain	CT 22	25 Jun FW	
11 Bn Hq					
5 Btry		Bretteville	CT 22	25 Jun FW	
7 Btry					590005
17 MG Bn					Doc
360 Pioneer Bn					
2 Co		180 km Crisbecq	CT 22	12 Jun	
		(40 ca pl)			
191 Pioneer Bn (91 Div)					Doc 45023
302 Pioneer Bn			CT 22	7 Jun FW	Corps 59981
6th Front Regt					
14 Co			101 A/B	14 Jun FW	
15 Co			101 A/B	14 Jun FW	
Port Security Co			CT 8	13 Jun FW	
Referwache	550079		CT 22	14 Jun FW	
Assault Bn AOK 7 Hq (560) Hq 23			CT 8	10 Jun FW	
1 Co	75			18 Jun	Corps
2 Co	75			18 Jun	Corps
4 Co					Doc
Hvy Plat	33			18 Jun	Corps
Naval Arty Bn 260					Doc 25504
Btry St Marcouf		St Marcouf	CT 22	18 Jun FW	Doc 25504
319 AT Bn					
2 Co	525072		CT 22	13 Jun FW	
162 Flak Bn	216167		CT 8	22 Jun FW	
3 Btry	166104		CT 8	25 Jun FW	
5 Btry	215133		CT 8	23 Jun FW	
6 Btry (R.A.D. 5 Co, 172 Regt)					Doc 14945
153 Flak Bn Mixed					Doc 123728
1 Btry		St Germain	CT 22	25 Jun FW	
26 Regt "Woisnam"					
653 Flak Bn					Doc
1 Hvy Flak Btry	2523		24 Ron	26 Jun FW	
2 Btry		St Germain	CT 22	25 Jun FW	
4 Btry (RAD, 8Co 235 Regt)				21 Jun FW	Doc 31969
5 Btry	2523		24 Ron	27 Jun FW	
Feld Nachschublagar No. 52				21 Jun	Doc 15590
101 Nebelwerfer Regt 27 Rec.ots					Doc
11 Bn Hq			CT 12	23 Jun FW	12337A
4 Btry	96				Doc 12337B
5 Btry	96				Doc 12337C
6 Btry	96				Doc 12337D
111 Bn Hq			CT 6	22 Jun FW	
7 Btry		Gonneville	CT 22	21 Jun FW	

Amex A, Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	IDENTIFIED BY	DATE	IDENTIFIED	REF
8 Btry						
9 Btry		Ozoville	CT 22	11 Jun	FW	
11 Portross Bn	150 (154 Foreigners)	St Pierre Eglise	CT 22	22 Jun	FW	Doc
2 Co		St Pierre Eglise	CT 22	22 Jun	FW	Doc 19326
3 Co		St Pierre Eglise	CT 22	13 Jun	FW	
100 Pz Eng Bn	150					Doc 44590
1 Co		Les Mottiers	82 A/B	19 Jun	FW	
3 Co		" "	82 A/B	19 Jun	FW	
206 Tank Bn	30 Fr Tks	La Glacorie	CT 8	21 Jun	FW	
1 Co	12		CT 8	19 Jun	FW	Doc 17464A
2 Co	5					Doc
821 Arty Regt	abv mot		CT 22	9 Jun	FW	Doc 00716
Sig Plat				22 Jun		Doc
Supply Column				22 Jun		Doc
458 Arty Bn			CT 22	6 Jun	FW	Doc 03250
Hq Btry				22 Jun	FW	03230A
1 Btry	112.2 Guns			22 Jun	FW	Doc 03230B
2 Btry	115/2 Gun How			22 Jun	FW	Doc 03230C
3 Btry	4-15.2 gun/How			22 Jun	FW	Doc 03230D
457 Arty Bn			CT 8	10 Jun	FW	Doc 04889
Hq Btry				28 Jun		Doc 04889A
1 Btry	4-15.2 guns		CT 8	10 Jun	FW	Doc 04889B
2 Btry	4-15.2 How			22 Jun		Doc 04889C
3 Btry	4-15.2 How 100 mm			18 Jun	Corps	Doc 04889D
113 ARKO				22 Jun		Doc 31355
2 Para Tro Regt		Vie Le Thell	CT 22	22 Jun	FW	
11 Bn Hq		215185	CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
6 Co		Vigosville	CT 22	22 Jun	FW	
8 Co		Ed Cherbourg	CT 22	24 Jun	FW	
9 Co			CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
10 Co			CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
21 Co		La Glacorie	CT 8	25 Jun	FW	
24 Co		La Glacorie	CT 8	25 Jun	FW	
Luft Nachr Regt 53						
12 Co		2523	CT 22	22 Jun	FW	
15 Co		300265	24 Ren	22 Jun	FW	Doc 49416
669 Arty Regt						
II Bn Hq			CT 22	20 Jun	FW	
279 Inf Regt						
2 Co			CT 8	21 Jun	FW	
90 Flieger Regt	3000					
I Bn Hq		2525	CT 12	27 Jun	FW	
1 Co	120-150					
II Bn Hq			CT 12	21 Jun	FW	
6 Co		Vie Digosville	CT 22	22 Jun	FW	
8 Co	150	M. Rufosses	CT 8	22 Jun	FW	
30 Regt 298 Res AA Schl Bn		215188	CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
1 Btry		189169	CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
2 Btry		189169	CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
3 Btry		189169	CT 8	23 Jun	FW	
4 Btry			CT 8	25 Jun	FW	

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Annex A, Contd

UNIT	STRENGTH	PLACE	BY	DATE IDENTIFIED	FPN
955 Flak Bn					
3 Btry	349964		CT 505	6 Jun	FW L49776
835 Lt AA Bn	2523		CT 22	28 Jun	FW
Hq Btry	2523		CT 22	26 Jun	FW
1 Btry (6 Plat) 15-20mm	H. Valognes		CT 22	26 Jun	FW
2 Btry			CT 22	25 Jun	FW
3 Btry	255230		CT 22	23 Jun	FW
4 Btry	2523		CT 22	22 Jun	FW
1703 Arty Regt					
7 Btry			CT 12	22 Jun	FW
13 Landeschutzen Bn					
6 Co	Hau Cocton		CT 22	22 Jun	FW
16 Luft Nachr Co	255218		CT 22	23 Jun	FW L4864
Flug Platz No 029/XII	255230		CT 22	23 Jun	FW
1046 Heeres Flak GHQ					
AA Plat			CT 12	22 Jun	FW
927 Inf Regt					
10 Co	St Pierre Eglise 24 Ron			23 Jun	FW
91 Flieger Regt					
5 Co	255215		CT 22	24 Jun	FW
613 Co Luftwaffe	255238		CT 22	23 Jun	FW
Landeschutzen					
1058 Arty Regt					
I Bn	166134		CT 8	25 Jun	P
II Bn	166134		CT 8	25 Jun	FW
84 Fortress Unit			CT 12	24 Jun	FW
Sea Rescue Unit II 60 non (Hodics)			CT 12	24 Jun	FW
Labor Service Unit LOHR			CT 12	24 Jun	FW
Italian Labor Unit					48862
421 Labor Front Unit	215168		CT 8	23 Jun	FW
271 Labor Unit	La Giacorio		CT 12	26 Jun	FW
Marine Schlopper Gruppe	La Giacorio		CT 8	25 Jun	FW
Postungs Nachr Stab 10				25 Jun	Doc 38402
30 AA Regt Hq					L37019
1 Btry					FW
Italian Labor Bn					FW 39715
759 Russian Bn	La Giacorio		CT 8	28 Jun	FW
1175 Hvy Flak Bn	2523		CT 22	26 Jun	FW
Fliegerhorst 15/XIII Co B	2523		CT 22	26 Jun	FW
R.A.D. 8 Co, 178 Regt	2523		CT 22	26 Jun	FW
Landeschutzen 70/XI					
Inf Rifle Bn 13/XII	2523		CT 22	27 Jun	FW
7 Luft Nachr Regt, 16 Co			CT 22	27 Jun	FW
Postungsstarn Abt. Charbourg					
Co L, 4			CT 22	27 Jun	FW

Notes: FPN - Field Post Numbers
 Doc - Identified by documents

Annex A

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ANNEX B - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS, DETACHMENT 10

1. A summary of the activities of the Counterintelligence Corps, Detachment No. 10, for the period 6-30 June follows:

2. 6 June 1944. Agents of this detachment landed on the coast of France and reported to the Division Command Post for duty.

3. 7 June 1944. Enemy installations were searched at the following places: Audouville-la-Hubert, St Martin de Varreville, Foucarville, and Ravenoville. Security checks were made at the following Command Posts: 8th RCT, 12th RCT, and the 22d RCT.

4. 8 June 1944. Agents of this detachment accompanied by three agents of VII Corps, CIC Detachment, and a representative of the CAO, 4th Infantry Division, went to Ste Mere Eglise for the purpose of setting up adequate security measures regarding the civilians of that town. The mayor was seen, road controls set up, rail impoundment, etc. VII Corps CIC Detachment relieved this detachment from further duties in connection with the town of Ste Mere Eglise. Enemy installations were visited at: St Martin, Buzoville au Plain, and a 106mm field artillery battery installation in the vicinity of Buzoville au Plain.

5. 9 June 1944. The mayor of Ste Mere Eglise denounced two former Todt Organization workers, namely, Ernest Polichon, from St Martin, and Roger Ruch, from Frankville. After interrogation, these suspects admitted being former Todt workers and they were sent to VII Corps Prisoner of War Cage. An artillery installation at Foucarville was searched by members of this detachment and VII Corps CIC Detachment. Sixteen civilians were interviewed at the 22d Infantry Prisoner of War Cage. Six were released as being natives of this vicinity and non-subversive. The remaining ten were sent to the Prisoner of War Cage as being former Todt workers.

6. 10 June 1944. Seventy-three civilians in the vicinity of Havenoville were interrogated, none of whom were considered subversive. Civilians were also interrogated in the vicinity of the 44th Field Artillery Battalion and 20th Field Artillery Battalion Command Posts. Enemy installations were searched at Foucarville and Erondoville.

7. 11 June 1944. While searching a former enemy fortified position near Azoville, agents of this detachment captured four wounded German soldiers. Nation cards issued as a bonus for collaboration were found and investigation determined that these cards were issued from the Command of Ste Mere Eglise. As a result these cards were submitted to CIC Detachment, 82d Airborne Division which has jurisdiction over Ste Mere Eglise. Enemy installations were visited at Erondoville, Ravenoville and Azoville. Thirty-five civilians were interrogated in the vicinity of Havenoville, none of whom were considered suspicious characters.

8. 12 June 1944. One hundred and fifty civilians were interrogated at the Division Civilian Cage, five of whom were former Todt Organization workers were sent to VII Corps Civilian Cage for further interrogation. Enemy installations were searched at Bousoville, Basse, Euvodaville, Vaz Village, de Bodainville, Joganville and Ste Iarcouf.

9. 15 June 1944. Approximately one hundred civilians were interrogated at the Refugee Cage, most of whom were from Montebourg. Seventy-three civilians evacuated from Montebourg were interrogated in the vicinity of Neuville au Plain. These civilians volunteered much intelligence data and several denunciations were obtained. Town and military installations were checked at Ste Iarcouf, Crieboq, and Danguoville.

10. 14 June 1944. Fifty-five civilians evacuated from Chateau de Fontenay were searched at Ste Iarcouf. Seven of these refugees were found to be Todt workers from outside this area and were turned over to the CAO Eaux Detachment at Ste Mere Eglise. One, Etienne Donno, Paris, of this group was taken to the CIC Headquarters, VII Corps, for further questioning. Several denunciations were received during the day.

11. 15 June 1944. Gustavo Joseph Emile Doderan, whose name appears on the First US Army Black List, was apprehended by this detachment and turned over to CIC Detachment, VII Corps. Andrea Fortin, Chief of the Register Group in Montebourg, was located and was taken to CIC Headquarters, VII Corps for further identification by OSS. A new type anti-personnel mine was picked up at Fort Ste Iarcouf. Samples of this mine were turned over to the 4th Engineer Battalion for further study, and also a sample was turned over to CIC Detachment, VII Corps. Enemy installations were searched at Fort Ste Iarcouf, Quineville, and St Floxel.

12. 16 June 1944. M. Andre Fortin was interviewed concerning German defenses, French patriots, and German collaborationists within the Montebourg - Valognes area. Franquville Chateau, Headquarters of the Todt Workers' Organization, was searched and seven former Todt workers were interrogated.

13. 17 June 1944. Ernest D'Aldain was apprehended at Fontenay Sur Mer after being denounced by the Mayor of Quineville, as having information on French patriots. Aldain was turned over to the Civilian Cage, VII Corps. Headquarters of the 919th Infantry Regiment, German, formerly located in a quarry near le Mont de Lestre was searched. Twenty-five civilians were interrogated, seven of whom will be turned over to CAO, Ste Mere Eglise.

14. 18 June 1944. Roul and Fernand Guillot, brothers, formerly held at a civilian collecting point at Ste Mere Eglise, were today apprehended in the forward area. They asserted they were searching for food and were turned over to the civilian collecting point at Audaville la Hubert. Joseph Bougon was picked up by agents of this detachment at St Floxel for supplying civilian clothes to German soldiers. Bougon was turned over to VII Corps CIC Detachment, in accordance with their instructions. Mrs Paour and Toscan, denounced by Mrs Le Grange at Ste Mere Eglise, are being held.

15. 19 June 1944. A written denunciation from the La Grange (mentioned above) for the Pucor and Tosean, was turned over to VII Corps CIC Detachment. The Bougan today admitted that two German soldiers had been cared for at her house before being apprehended. Further, the uniforms of these Germans were found in the wine closet. Several Todt workers were turned over to the C/O at Ste Pierre Eglise.

16. 20 June 1944. Four agents of this detachment entered Montebourg at 0900 and began work in conjunction with the C/O Town Team. Headquarters of the 919th Infantry Regiment and the Todt Organization were found and searched, and approximately forty civilians were interrogated. At 1500 agents of this detachment entered Valognes and a CIC office was established in the Palais de Justice. The office of the German Stadot Kommandant, the Office of the Gohelpolizei, and the Office of the Feldjandarmere were searched.

17. 21 June 1944. M. Courot, whose name was previously submitted as being on the White List by VII Corps CIC Detachment, was interviewed by members of this detachment and was found to be willing and cooperative. Gustave Plard, denounced by M. Courot as having reported three American parachutists to the Germans, was apprehended. Clotet Jacqueline, denounced by M. Courot and four others, including members of the Cross of Lorraine, for writing and disseminating anti-allied propaganda were also picked up. The following enemy installations were searched at Valognes: 708th Infantry Division Headquarters, German underground military exchange (telephone), PT Building, Patrol Depot.

18. 22 June 1944. Gustave Plard and Clotet Jacqueline apprehended yesterday, were turned over to VII Corps Civilian Collecting Point. Sixty refugees were interrogated and proper disposition made. The following former enemy headquarters were searched: Chatou de Chiffroyast, Tamerville, and Headquarters Organization Todt at Valognes.

19. 23 June 1944. Investigation of three denounced persons in Montebourg proved negative. Sixteen Lithuanians, former Todt workers in the Valognes area, were sent to the Todt Workers Cage at Foucarville. Jean Henel, reputed leader of the Underground Resistance at Ste Pierre Eglise, was contacted by one of the units attached to this division. Agents heretofore located at Montebourg and Valognes were withdrawn and CIC coverage of those cities was turned over to CIC VII Corps.

20. 24 June 1944. Agents of this detachment accompanied by four members of the Resistance Group, and Captain Phillip Davoy, a French Liaison Officer, visited the following towns on a security check: Quetthou, St Vaast la Hougue, Barflour and Ste Pierre Eglise. At each town a C/O, Mayor, and Gendarme were contacted.

21. 25 June 1944. Jean Henel, leader of French Resistance Group, Ste Pierre Eglise, was interviewed and he volunteered various tactical information. M. Alfred le-Franier, Chief of French Resistance Group, Quetthou, and Marcel Charles, Chief of French Resistance Group, St Vaast la Hougue prepared a list of collaborators which was forwarded to VII Corps CIC Detachment. Enemy installations were inspected at St Pierre Eglise and Barflour. Mail and packages at Ste Pierre Eglise were impounded and Post Office closed.

22. 26 June 1944. The following enemy Command Posts were searched for intelligence information: Chateau Monvason, at Les Mouchols; Chateau Richmont, at Rufescos. Mlle Raymonde Dousel was found with an unusual amount of money. She was turned over to Civilian Cops, VII Corps. Agents visited Montaigu and Le Vast. At Montaigu, a conference with the Mayor was held. Civilians were interrogated and proper disposition made of undesirable.

23. 27 June 1944. A CIC office was established in Hotel Atlantique, Cherbourg. Documents found in Cherbourg were so voluminous that the Order of Battle Team from VII Corps was requested. The documents were turned over to this team for evaluation and dissemination. M. Vaslot, Chief Mechanic of the Quai de Normandie, stated that there were still 40 mines controlled by remote cable located in two rows in the Darse Transatlantique. This informant was introduced to Lieutenant Dunne, 4th Engineer Battalion, who accompanied informant to the location of the mines. All civilians at the Pasteur Hospital, Cherbourg, were checked and one, Mlle Kliese, a member of the Hitler Youth Organization, inspector for Todt Organization and German technical advisor, was apprehended and turned over to VII Corps Civilian Collecting Point. Mlle Armandine Goubet, French citizen and Mlle Kasidre, a Polish citizen were both turned over to the VII Corps, CIC Detachment, as being German collaborators and a menace to army security.

24. 28 June 1944. Thirty-seven Todt workers were turned over to the Civilian Collecting Point. Marcel Fourdant, Cherbourg, was interviewed. He is a member of the Resistance Group and stated four or five thousand Todt workers fled Cherbourg to go to Evron. Further that the pilotless airplanes (German) are being released from Boulogne. The Marine Radio Station and Pyrotechnique des Flanands in Cherbourg were examined. Rynard Schottok, German soldier apprehended in civilian clothes was released to Prisoner of War Camp. The enemy underground communication system in Cherbourg was searched. A full report of this visit and equipment noted was turned over to VII Corps for further dissemination.

25. 29 June 1944. On Order of MC of S, G-2, 4th Infantry Division, all counterintelligence records pertaining to the City of Cherbourg were turned over to CIC Detachment, No. 24, VII Corps.

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ANNEX C - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 417

1. The following statistics pertain to the activities of Military Intelligence Interpreters Team No. 417 during the period 6 June to 30 June.

Interrogated:	50 French Civilians
Interrogated:	67 German Prisoners of War
Identified:	27 Enemy Units
Identified:	36 Enemy Unit Commanders
Identified and located:	65 Enemy Fortifications
Identified and located:	52 Enemy guns, batteries and AA installations
Accidental identifications:	Tank ditches, tank wells, mined areas, hangars, barracks, military and naval offices, enemy unit headquarters, ammunition depots and plants, enemy observation posts.
Obtaining of information:	Regarding enemy Rocket gun installations, gas filters, etc.

Note: A great many other civilians were interrogated whose information proved to be more superficial; therefore are not listed. Listed number of fortifications does not include mine areas and fortifications, not clearly identified as to number or location.

2. The following activities were performed in addition to those listed above:

a. Served as interpreters for General Staff, CAO, CIC and General Courts-martial.

b. Translation of documents, assisted CIC in screening civilians, searching enemy installations for documents, interrogated foreign elements of enemy units in Russian, Lithuanian, Dutch, Polish, German and French.

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ANNEX D - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31

1. During the planning period photographs covering the assault areas were studied and the information obtained was furnished the AC of S, G-2.

2. The officer in charge and two enlisted men of this team loaded with the division forward CP personnel. One officer and two enlisted men loaded at D-2 with the 4th Division Artillery CP personnel.

3. During the operation, a defense map was used to locate and indicate enemy installations as soon as the information was obtained and such information furnished AC of S, G-2. Many of these installations were visited by members of the team. Among the installations visited were located at Crisbeag, Azoville, and Quineville. A high degree of accuracy was noted of the photo interpretations previously made of these installations.

4. The crossbow supply site at Valenciennes was also visited. It was, apparently, nearing completion and had not been used by the enemy.

5. During March the six gun 155mm coastal battery at Crisbeag was reported as being cascaded and larger guns installed. Upon visiting the location it was found to contain three 210mm coastal guns, a large range finder, and several anti-aircraft guns.

6. The battery of four 105mm guns at Azoville was shown on the overprint map with great accuracy.

7. There were very few photographs received during the period 6 June to 160 June. Some photographs were received after the area concerned was captured by our troops, while other photographs were received ten days to two weeks previous to the occupancy of areas by our troops.

8. When time permitted mosaics were made of photos covering the immediate objectives, and forwarded to units concerned.

9. It is anticipated that in the near future photo missions will be flown over the front line areas daily and photos forwarded to the units concerned. Tactical photo missions covering specific pinpoints on a scale of approximately 1:5000 should be available within five to eight hours after they are requested.

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Operation Report - 4th Infantry Division

July 44

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SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

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Auth: CG with Inf Div
Init: *[Signature]*
Date: 10 Aug 44

AG 319.1

12

10 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.
TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.
THRU : Command Channels

Section I - Authority
Section II - Introduction
Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)
Section IV - Operations
Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C8), Army Regulations 545-105 relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports" following report is submitted for period 1 July to 31 July 1944.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Marr, O15447, GSC
AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Carlen R. Bryant, O287628, GSC
AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, O286614, GSC
AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel David B. Goodwin, O21914, GSC
AC of S, G-4 - Major Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, O373431, GSC

1. On 13 June 1944 Lieutenant Colonel Orlando C. Troxel, Jr, O18487, GSC, formerly AC of S, G-3, was transferred to VII Corps.
Major David B. Goodwin, O21914, GSC (Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel 16 July 1944), formerly Asst AC of S, G-2, was assigned AC of S, G-3.

2. On 2 July 1944 Colonel James S. Rodwell, O9663, Cav, formerly Chief of Staff, assumed command of the 8th Infantry Regiment.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Marr, O15447, GSC (Promoted to Colonel 28 July 1944), formerly AC of S, G-1, was assigned Chief of Staff.
Major Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, O373431, GSC, formerly Asst AC of S, G-4, was assigned AC of S, G-2.

SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
[Signature]
ADJUTANT GENERAL

REPLICATION CHANGED TO
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WILLIAM S. [unclear]
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

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Sec II - Introduction, Contd.

3. Upon the completion of the battle for the Port of Cherbourg on 29 June 1944, the 4th Infantry Division was relieved of further activities in its zone of action by elements of the 101st Airborne Division. The entire division moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Gourbesville (T283961), closing there 30 June 1944. During the period 30 June to 4 July 1944, re-organization, training that covered deficiencies and lessons learned in combat, maintenance of weapons and vehicles was conducted.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)

1. A summary of the enemy activity in the sector of the 4th Infantry Division for the period 6 July - 31 July 1944 is as follows:

2. 6 July 1944. The enemy defended organized log and sand bag emplacements with rifle and automatic weapons. Strong defense was made possible by utilizing good fields of fire to cover the narrow corridor through which our leading elements had to pass. Two tanks were encountered by the 12th Infantry at 359605. No concentrated effort has been encountered or reported in the Division sector. No prisoners were taken by this division during the period. Prisoners of War captured by the 83d Division report that elements of the 6th Parachute Regiment are in the division sector. Enemy front lines: 357800 - 351809 - 350815 - 359808 - 337615.

3. 7 July 1944. The enemy continued to defend from well-organized positions utilizing a maximum of automatic weapons. The enemy forced the 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry to retire from positions gained under the cover of darkness. Reports indicate the appearance on the 4th Infantry Division front of elements of the Headquarters Company, the 1st Battalion, and the 15th Company, all of the 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment. There are further indications that elements of the 6th Parachute Regiment continues to oppose the 4th Infantry Division. Enemy front lines: 349797 - 345790 - 345799 - 344805 - 333612 - 336815.

4. 8 July 1944. Fighting a stubborn rear guard action, the enemy withdrew to the general line: 347732 - 344785 - 341794 - 337795 - 330791 - 329797 - 330801 - 320822 - 325839. In the attack, scattered elements of enemy resistance were by-passed by the assault wave. This necessitated the clearing out of pockets of resistance. A few tanks were heard in the 12th Infantry Regiment sector. Scattered interdiction and harassing fires were received throughout the area during this period. Additional elements of the 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment were identified in the 4th Infantry Division sector. The 13th Company of the 6th Parachute Regiment was definitely identified during the period.

5. 9 July 1944. The enemy continued to fight a stubborn delaying action in conjunction with local counterattacks which, although affording excellent coverage in his withdrawal from one prepared defensive position to another, amounted to little more than harassment as far as material effect on our troops was concerned. The enemy continued to interdict important cross roads and road junctions. Two battalions of the 8th Infantry were strafed by enemy planes just prior to darkness. No casualties were sustained. Elements of the 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion were

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identified on the 4th Infantry Division front in addition to elements of the 37 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 6th Parachute Regiment, previously identified. Enemy front line: 324790 - 329768 - 335785 - 334778 - 339776.

6. 10 July 1944. Continuing his stubborn resistance, the enemy slowly fell back to the line 325791 - 328786 - vicinity 330782 - 329799 - 325768 - 335769 - 339765. A counterattack at 328788 was repulsed with artillery and flanking fire. An ever-increasing usage of armor has been noted and during this period there were several occasions when tanks and self-propelled guns appeared. There has, however, been no aggressive action on the part of enemy armor. The same units as on 9 July were opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

7. 11 July 1944. The enemy continued to offer strong resistance by occupying the hasty defenses and well placed machine gun positions, and withdrew slowly when pressure was brought to bear. Enemy front lines: 328768 - 328783 - 332768 - 339766 - 317768. Elements of 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 6th Parachute Regiment which has been attached to the 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division have been contacted during the period. Sporadic shelling of terrain features and defensive employment of small units of armor continued. SEVEN enemy tanks reported knocked-out by bazooka teams and anti-tank guns.

8. 12 July 1944. The enemy offered strong resistance by occupying hasty defenses and utilizing well placed automatic weapons. Battery and possibly battalion concentrations of artillery fell on part of the 4th Infantry Division front. Some of this fire must have been observed because it was extremely accurate. Enemy tanks were again active throughout the period but as has been customary, no close contact was made with armor. The 10th, 11th, and 12th Companies of the Deutschland Regiment have been newly contacted on the 4th Infantry Division front. In addition, the elements of the 6th Parachute Regiment and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division are still present. Enemy front line: 316762 - 332760 - 338769 - 336766.

9. 13 July 1944. Enemy resistance continued. Sporadic artillery and mortar fire supported the heavy automatic weapon fire of the infantry. Enemy tanks and troops appeared to be attempting by demonstrations to create the impression that they are in greater strength. To this end, the ordinarily quiet enemy lines were a great deal noisier than usual. Only two prisoners were taken during the period. No new contacts with opposing units were made. Enemy front lines: 331767 - 332761 - 335758 - 315775 - 315772 - 317768.

10. 14 July 1944. No active contact with enemy was made during this period. There was a slight increase of artillery fire in rear areas. The artillery fire throughout the division area did not show a corresponding increase, but merely moved from the front to the rear areas. Units in contact: 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion and elements of 3d Battalion, 37 SS Regiment. Front lines: 320770 - 327768 - 332761 - 315775 - 318767.

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

11. 15 July 1944. Enemy withdraw with the 6th Parachute Regiment covering the retreat of the 17 SS Panzer Division, Mortar and artillery barrages supported the automatic weapon fire. There was considerable shelling of the rear areas early in this period. Enemy air activity over the 4th Infantry Division sector during the period consisted of four planes, two of which were reported hit by our antiaircraft artillery. Increasing numbers of antipersonnel and antitank mines have been found hastily installed by the retreating enemy. Enemy units in contact: Elements of the 17 SS Panzer Division, and 3d Battalion, 3d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The bulk of enemy artillery seems to be located three to four thousand yards south of Periers. Enemy front lines: 316767 - 322759 - 325755 - 330751 - 334749.

12. 16 July 1944. Contact with enemy consisted mainly of artillery barrages at front line troops. A few tanks were heard operating in front of the 4th Infantry Division, but no offensive action was taken by them. Enemy seems to be fighting a stiff delaying action preparatory to withdrawing to high ground around Periers where he may be expected to make a determined stand. Enemy units in contact: 17th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, elements of 3d Battalion, 3d SS Regiment, and remnants of the 6th Parachute Regiment. Enemy front lines: 322759 - 326756 - 323753.

13. 17 July 1944. Enemy contacts consisted of security patrols sent out by the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division while this division was waiting to be relieved by the 85d Infantry Division. Enemy units contacted: same as previous day. Enemy front lines: 331760 - 3277 - 324763.

14. 18 - 23 July 1944. No contact with the enemy. 4th Infantry Division in process of moving into position preparatory to attacking South with the mission of securing the gap Marigny (3861) - St Gilles (4561) from the South.

15. 24 July 1944. The enemy opposed the attack of the 4th Infantry Division with the 1st Company, 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on the right and the 1st Company, 14th Parachute Regiment (5th Parachute Division) on the left. Enemy started defensive fires using mortars, machine guns, and interdiction artillery barrages. This fire ceased when our bombing began and lasted throughout the attack. Enemy front lines at the end of the period: 422674 - 431668 - 434666.

16. 25 July 1944. The enemy was forced to withdraw from his well prepared emplacements north of the St Lo - Perier road and occupied hastily prepared positions on the lines 415858 - 423657. Elements from virtually all the units of the 14th Parachute Regiment were contacted. This unit was to have been relieved by the 801 Panzer Grenadier Infantry Regiment but our attack made this impossible. However, elements of the Headquarters Company, 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment were contacted. After slowing the advance of the 4th Infantry Division the enemy slowly withdrew apparently with the intention of defending the high ground in the vicinity of Marigny - St Gilles. After subjecting our bombers to fairly heavy antiaircraft fire, this fire gradually decreased and became almost nonexistent. Few enemy

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

aircraft were over this sector during 0100 to 0200 apparently on reconnaissance missions.

17. 26 July 1944. The enemy fought a poorly organized delaying action from hastily prepared positions constructed during the hours of darkness. Maximum use of automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery was made before withdrawing slowly to the South to the line 397610 - 406628 - 410628 - 411625 - 416624. Enemy units contacted: 1st and 3d Battalions, 14th Parachute Regiment, 1st Battalion, 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, possibly one company of the Antitank Battalion, 5th Parachute Division, and the 1st Battalion, 985th Infantry Regiment. Prisoners of War reported that considerable confusion existed in the enemy's retreating ranks. Enemy artillery maintained its usual harassing fire on our front lines. Aircraft and tanks of the enemy were in evidence, but no aggressive action was taken by them.

18. 27 July 1944. Enemy fought a disorganized delaying action which consisted of pockets of resistance supported by a few tanks and antitank guns most of which were dug in to defensive positions. Units in contact: 983d Infantry Regiment, 985th Infantry Regiment, 130th Armored Artillery, 901 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 13th Parachute Regiment, 942d Infantry Regiment, Panzer Lehr, Naehr Abt and 130th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. All of these enemy units relieved the 14th Parachute Regiment which was ordered out of line yesterday. Enemy artillery has dwindled and no reports of battery or battalion concentrations have been made. Enemy armor still assumed defensive roles and, although enemy aircraft was over the sector, no offensive action was taken by them. Enemy front: 391600 - 394598 - 393588 - 411586.

19. 28 - 29 July 1944. The enemy withdrew in great haste and confusion which was apparent from the great quantity of material left behind. Enemy's action consisted mainly of trying to break through the trap formed by the American VII and VIII Corps. His rear guard action was very disorganized and resistance was light. His artillery was practically abandoned as was most of his armor along the 4th Infantry Division front. Enemy aircraft appeared in increasing numbers over the division sector at night. A few bombs were dropped but little damage was done because of the difficulty of night bombing. Elements in contact came from the 275th Engineer Battalion, 243d Signal Battalion, 983d Infantry Regiment, 2d SS Panzer Regiment, 14th Parachute Regiment, 130th Armored Artillery Battalion, 17th Antiaircraft Battalion, 920th and 921st Infantry Regiments. Front lines 28 July: along railroad St. Lo to Coutances - 29 July: 345463 - 365455 - 357477 - 389464 - 394454.

20. 30 July 1944. The enemy continued to withdraw to the South by defending hastily constructed defensive positions. Enemy units in contact: "Dor Fuchrer" Regiment, 921st Infantry Regiment, 920th Infantry Regiment, 922d Infantry Regiment, 243d Engineer Battalion, 243d Signal Battalion, 243d Division Headquarters, 243d Artillery Regiment, 5th Parachute Reconnaissance Battalion, 5th Parachute Signal Battalion and 6th Parachute Regiment. Enemy aircraft were over this sector and dropped numerous flares and anti-personnel mines. Small units of tanks were employed by the enemy along the

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

entire sector. Enemy front: 3540 - 356405 - 377421 - 394421.

21. 31 July 1944. Enemy offered almost no resistance except in the 4040 grid square where scattered groups were encountered. Units in contact: 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 2d SS Panzer Division and stragglers from the 243d Division. Enemy planes bombed our rear areas during the period. Only a few scattered artillery rounds were fired by the enemy, and no tanks were encountered. Enemy line: 385373 - 386390 - 406401.

22. At the close of the period 1 July to 31 July 1944, the enemy in the 4th Infantry Division sector appears to be completely disorganized and, except for scattered pockets of resistance, seems to be directing all his efforts towards breaking contact with our attacking troops long enough to establish a main line of resistance that he can effectively organize and defend. His entire supply of local reserves has been committed and scattered. There are indications that further reinforcements from the Brittany Peninsula consisting of the remaining elements of the 343d Division may be committed in our zone of action. The 2d Parachute Division and leading elements of the 11th Panzer Division may also be expected in this area but neither have been encountered by the 4th Infantry Division or the units adjacent to this division. It is likely that the enemy will place any available reserves on a new line such as the La See River. In this event, the units with which we are now fighting may be expected to continue to fall back delaying our attack as much as possible until they can withdraw behind this new main line of resistance and be reorganized into new combat groups.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 July 1944. The 4th Division Artillery moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of Mau Gallis to vicinity T298948, and was detached from the division and attached to the 90th Infantry Division.

2. 4 July 1944. The gradual movement of the division to assembly areas to the South was begun so that an attack could be launched through the lines of the 83d Infantry Division. The 12th Infantry moved at 1100 by foot and motor to an assembly area in the vicinity of the 90th Infantry Division (T324866), closing in area at 2015. Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; one platoon, Battery B, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion; 1st Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion were attached for movement. The division command post moved from vicinity of Gourboville to vicinity of Le Breuil (T319894). The remainder of the division and attached units, less 4th Division Artillery, remained in the assembly area in the vicinity of Gourboville.

3. 5 July 1944. The 8th Infantry moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of La Lande (T272964) to an assembly area in the vicinity of Appoville (T326866) and closed there at 052220. The 12th Infantry moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of Appoville (T326866) to an assembly

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

area in the vicinity of Avers (T341843) and closed there at 052215. The 22d Infantry remained in the assembly area previously mentioned. The 4th Division Artillery moved from T283889 to T319843. Four (4) field artillery battalions continued to fire supporting and interdiction fires for the 90th Infantry Division, and moved to positions in the vicinity of Avers (T341843). One platoon of companies A, B, and C, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion were attached to the 8th, 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments respectively. Companies B and D, 87th Chemical Battalion reported to the 8th Infantry in their new assembly area at 200CB. Company D reported to the 12th Infantry in their final assembly area at 2220B. The balance of the 4th Infantry Division, less 22d Infantry, moved to a new assembly area in the vicinity of La Moulinet (T356855).

4. 6 July 1944. 8th Infantry, one platoon of Companies A and B, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, and Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of Appoville (T326868) and relieved elements of the 22d Infantry at 061200B July in area located between 34-36 N-S grid lines and north of the stream at T345810 and made preparations for a night attack. The 12th Infantry, with Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Battery A, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, launched an attack from line of departure at T352820-T360811 at 060930B July and passed through elements of the 330th Infantry in so doing. The regiment seized and secured positions shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 31. The 22d Infantry reconnoitered routes and moved by motor from its assembly area in the vicinity of Appoville (T296972) to an assembly position at T365835 and remained there as division reserve. The 3th Division Artillery, 951st Field Artillery Battalion attached, now returned to division control, and fired supporting and interdiction fire in support of the 12th Infantry attack. The right flank of the division was protected by the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) along line previously held by the 83d Reconnaissance Troop until relieved at 000600B July.

5. 7 July 1944. 8th Infantry, Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Battery A, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, and Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, attacked at 070300B July from positions at T337815-T339807. Two (2) battalions abreast crossed the inundation to secure an objective in the vicinity of T330807-T331800. Preparation was fired by the 4th Division and Corps artillery. The 1st battalion failed to cross the inundation due to heavy automatic small arms fire. The 2d Battalion crossed the inundation but at daylight found themselves to be in an untenable position and were ordered to withdraw to the line of departure. Both battalions remained in this position throughout the day. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was held in reserve at T345815, was ordered to support the attack of the 12th Infantry, and moved one reinforced rifle company to T353812 at 1400. This company assisted the advance of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry during the attack. The 12th Infantry attacked at 0630 from positions along the road at T357815-T363908 and advanced slowly against heavy opposition. At 1200 the regiment consolidated positions and prepared to renew the attack at 1400. An air bombardment and artillery preparation preceded the 1400 attack and the regiment moved forward to positions shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic

See IV - Operations, Contd

Report No. 32. During this period the 22d Infantry remained in division reserve in the vicinity of Cantopolo (T354839). The 4th Division Artillery, 951st Field Artillery Battalion, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Companies A and B, and 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, less two platoons attached, supported the attack of the 8th and 12th Infantry by fire and marked targets for aerial bombardment.

6. 8 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Battery A, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, and the 22d Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one platoon, Battery C, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, launched a coordinated attack from positions previously held at 1000. The attack was preceded by a dive bombing and a fifteen minute artillery preparation by the 4th Division Artillery. Positions were seized and secured as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 33. The 12th Infantry passed to division reserve and remained in positions seized on 7 July 1944, maintaining active patrols to the front and flanks, and establishing contact with units on the right and left.

7. 9 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, and supported by Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, launched a coordinated attack at 0600 with 2d and 3d Battalions abreast from the vicinity of T325800. The 22d Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, and supported by Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, launched a coordinated attack at 0850 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast from the vicinity of T349789. The attack of both regiments progressed during the day against hedgerow opposition and positions were seized and secured as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 34. The 12th Infantry remained in division reserve; however, the 1st Battalion was committed to action at 1415 to fill a gap that occurred between the 8th and 22d Infantry. During the attack, the 29th and 44th Field Artillery Battalions were in direct support of the 8th and 22d Infantry respectively. The 42d, 20th, and 951st Field Artillery Battalions were in general support of the attacking regiments.

8. 10 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, and supported by two platoons of medium tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, launched a coordinated attack at 0630 with the 2d Battalion, followed by the 3d Battalion, at 1000 from vicinity of cross-roads at T326798. The attack progressed during the day against constant opposition from a general line Blohon Bridge at 331784. The 12th Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, and one platoon of medium tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion in direct support, launched a coordinated attack with the 1st Battalion in conjunction with the 8th Infantry from vicinity of Los Forgos (T336799), and encountered heavy resistance from T329755 and vicinity of Los Aubrees. The 3d Battalion moved to a new assembly area as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 35. The 2d Battalion remained in previous location. The 22d Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached and, supported by one company of medium tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, launched a coordinated attack with the 8th and 12th Infantry from vicinity of

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

Los Forges and, attacking, the three regiments seized and secured positions as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 35. The 4th Division Artillery, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, and Battery D, 129th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion attached, fired concentrations and interdiction fires, supporting the attack of the division.

9. 11 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance, less Troop C, attached, supported by one company of tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, attacked at 0900 from position at T325789-328875 and occupied the towns of Los Aubrois and Blohou with no enemy opposition. Patrols crossed the Seves River and occupied the area vicinity of T300783, finding slight enemy resistance. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less Troop C, was relieved from the 8th Infantry at 2100 along the line T317795-306761, and the regiment assembled in position shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 36. The 12th Infantry, supported by one company of the 70th Tank Battalion, attacked with the 1st Battalion at 1000 in the vicinity of T330777 to mop up the area between Longuovilla la Maugerie. The mission was completed at 1600. The 2d and 3d Battalions moved to assembly area shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 35 and closed at 1900 and 1930 respectively. The 22d Infantry, supported by one company of the 70th Tank Battalion, attacked at 0900 with two battalions abreast from positions vicinity of T330763-T337763. Heavy enemy resistance was encountered throughout the entire day, and by 2200 had advanced to positions shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 36. The 4th Division Artillery supported the attack of the division, furnishing harassing and interdiction fires on the division front and marked targets for air support. Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 2100, and further attached to the 4th Division Artillery at the same time. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) remained in division reserve.

10. 12 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion, two platoons, Company G, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and one platoon, Companies A and D, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, supported the attack of the 22d Infantry with all available fire power from the regimental zone of action. The regiment remained in its former position, and patrols were initiated across the Molorette River in the vicinity of T341762. The 12th Infantry, in division reserve, assembled and moved to areas shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 37 and was prepared to follow the advance of the 22d Infantry and to protect the left flank and rear of the division. At 2145, the regiment started relieving the 22d Infantry, less 3d Battalion, in its zone of action in preparation for continuing the attack on 13 July 1944. Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached effective upon relief of the 22d Infantry, less 3d Battalion, by the 12th Infantry. The 22d Infantry launched its attack at 0915 to capture the objectives east of Forlers and encountered stiff enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, initiated a flanking movement around the southeast flank of the 2d Battalion and advanced only a short distance. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion and 4th Field Artillery Battalion were in direct support. The 42d Field Artillery

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Battalion reinforced fires of the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 20th Field Artillery Battalion was in general support, providing supporting fires on all roads in hostile territory which led into the division zone of action. The 4th Division Artillery also marked targets by smoke for air support. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less Troop C, and supported by one platoon, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, occupied the island west of Blohon with Troop A and maintained patrols along the Sovos River to prevent enemy infiltration into the division zone of action.

11. 13 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion, two platoons, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; one platoon, Companies A and C, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, as on the preceding day, supported the attack of the 12th Infantry by fire from positions in their zone of action. The 12th Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; one platoon Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, supported by 70th Tank Battalion and Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, completed the relief of the 22d Infantry, less 3d Battalion, and launched an attack at 130930. After a short advance to the southeast, the attack was halted by small arms and artillery fire, but was resumed at 131930 and little progress was made. The 22d Infantry, less 3d Battalion, upon the relief of the regiment by the 12th Infantry, moved to assembly area shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 38, and was prepared to follow the advance of the 12th Infantry and protect the left flank and rear of the division. The 3d Battalion was then attached to the 12th Infantry. The 4th Division Artillery furnished direct and general support in the same manner as during the previous day and fired interdiction missions during the night of 12 - 13 July. The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion continued its support of the division by repairing roads, sweeping mines, maintaining supply routes, and constructing by-passes in the division zone of action. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) still remained in division reserve, and 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less Troop C, continued to protect the west flank of the division by reconnaissance and patrols along the Sovos River. Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and reverted to battalion control 132400.

12. 14 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; two platoons, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; one platoon Companies A and C, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, remained in positions formerly occupied. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, relieved 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, in the zone of action of the 12th Infantry, starting 141800Z July and completing at 142130Z July. The 12th Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, and supported by 70th Tank Battalion, remained in position and prepared to attack to the South, awaiting favorable weather conditions for air support. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, was relieved of attachment to 12th Infantry upon relief by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. During the period, the 22d Infantry remained in its assembly area.

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13. 15 July 1944. The 8th Infantry, Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion, two platoons, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, one platoon, Companies A and C, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, launched an attack at 1015 in conjunction with the 12th Infantry. Upon reaching the objective at 1800, the regiment organized positions for defense as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 40. Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion reverted to VII Corps control effective at 162100. The 12th Infantry, Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, and supported by 70th Tank Battalion, launched an attack at 1015 in conjunction with the 8th Infantry, and upon reaching its objective at 2100, organized the position for defense as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 40. Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion reverted to VII Corps control effective 162100B July. The 22d Infantry remained in assembly area as division reserve. The 4th Division Artillery supported the attack of the division in its zone of action by fire and, in addition, fired interdiction and harassing missions. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) moved to positions shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 40 to protect the right flank of the division and to maintain contact with the 90th Infantry Division. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less Troop C, and Battery D, 129th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion reverted to control of VII Corps at 150600 and 162100 respectively.

14. 16 July 1944. The 8th Infantry and one platoon, Companies A and C, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached hold and improved defensive positions gained during the preceding period. Two platoons, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion were relieved of attachment to the 8th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, moved to initial assembly area shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 41. The 12th Infantry held and improved defensive positions and was relieved of defense at 162230 by 1st Battalion, 329th Infantry, and at the end of the period was moving to its initial assembly area. One platoon, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was relieved of attachment to the 12th Infantry. Cannon and Antitank Companies of the 12th Infantry remained in position to support the 1st Battalion, 329th Infantry. The 22d Infantry moved from division reserve to final assembly area in the vicinity of Mont Martin En Graines (T464810), closing there at 161430. The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion provided engineer support in the division zone of action and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Mont Martin En Graines, closing there 162145. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) continued to protect the right flank of the division by patrol until relieved by elements of the 106th Cavalry Squadron at which time it moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Mont Martin En Graines, closing there at 162200. The 70th Tank Battalion remained in its assembly area as a mobile reserve and was detached from the division as of 162400.

15. 17 July 1944. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 8th Infantry, held and further improved defensive positions until relief was effected by elements of the 4th Armored Division at 172300H. These battalions moved to initial assembly areas in the vicinity of Meautis and had not closed at the end of the period. Upon completion of relief by the 1st Battalion, 329th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 12th Infantry joined the 1st Battalion in an initial assembly area in the vicinity of Meautis

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

at 17015D. The regiment then moved from this assembly area to their final assembly area in the vicinity of Mont Martin En Graines, and closed at 171045D July. The 22d Infantry remained in assembly area previously mentioned and proceeded to conduct training to correct deficiencies noted in combat. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the 8th Infantry and at the end of the period was enroute to its final assembly area at Fourniers (T454905). The remaining units of the 4th Division Artillery moved to their respective assembly areas within the division assembly area in the vicinity of Mont Martin En Graines and closed before the end of the period. The 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company B, and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion likewise moved to the division assembly area. Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion remained at its former location (T356783).

16. 10 July 1944. Movement was completed by all battalions of the 8th Infantry from their initial assembly areas in the vicinity of Montais to their final assembly area as shown on Overlay to G-3 Periodic Report No. 45. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion which was enroute to its final assembly area at the end of the preceding period closed in its new assembly area at 180555D July. Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion moved to assembly area in the vicinity of T441817, and closed therein at 180730D. All divisional and attached units had at this point been assembled within the division assembly area and were to remain there for several days to conduct care and cleaning of equipment, training to correct deficiencies, and take advantage of lessons learned in combat and for rest before again being committed to action. The 70th Tank Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division 181200D July and moved to assembly area vicinity T450841, closing therein at 181930D July.

17. 19 July 1944. The 22d Infantry (44th Field Artillery Battalion, one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and water point section, and Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached) was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and attached to the 2d Armored Division 191245D July. Regiment moved by motor to new assembly area, crossing the IP at 1700, and arrived in its area in the vicinity of Lardin (T694740) at 192215D July. It was planned during the forthcoming operation that this combat team was to be motorized and work in conjunction with the 2d Armored Division. All other divisional units remained in their respective assembly areas during the period.

18. 20 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; 70th Tank Battalion, Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; and 37th Chemical Battalion attached) moved by motor beginning at 2000 to the vicinity of Petit-Duerlo (T427892) and prepared to pass through the 39th Infantry Regiment. The 70th Tank Battalion though attached to the 8th Infantry, did not move from its assembly area (444848) but was displaced at a later date due to congestion of roads and areas. The 4th Division Artillery (less 44th Field Artillery Battalion), 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A, and one platoon, Company C) and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), moved from their respective assembly areas to new assembly areas as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 45, and began preparation for participation in the forthcoming operation "Cobra". Other divisional and attached units remained in assembly areas heretofore mentioned.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

19. 21 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (attachments same as mentioned in paragraph 18) remained in assembly area Petit-Ducris (T427592) and carried out reconnaissance to forward positions in the 39th Infantry sector; contacted elements of 120th Infantry on the left and the 47th Infantry on the right and made further preparation to pass through 39th Infantry Regiment on D-Day, H-Hour, operation "Cobra". The 12th Infantry moved by foot and motor at 210430Z July from vicinity of Deville to new assembly area as shown on Overlay G-3 Periodic Report No. 46. This regiment was to remain in this assembly area and constitute a part of the division reserve. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) remained in its assembly area and also constituted part of the division reserve. The 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Company A); and the 70th Tank Battalion (less one platoon, Company D which was attached this date to VII Corps Headquarters), moved to new assembly areas as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 46. Movement of the division and attachments to new assembly areas was now complete and coordinated preparations got under way for the attack on D-Day, H-Hour, operation "Cobra".

20. 22 July 1944. Reconnaissance of forward positions for the 39th Infantry, necessary road repairs, and reconnaissance for all supporting fire weapons under control of the 4th Division Artillery were made for operation "Cobra".

21. 23 July 1944. During this period, further preparations were made for operation "Cobra" by all divisional and attached units. Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division, and further attached to the 8th Infantry, effective 260000Z July, and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of T433707 to begin preparations for supporting the 8th Infantry in its attack. Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detached as of 231200Z July and reverted to battalion control.

22. 24 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; 70th Tank Battalion, less one platoon, Company D, and Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached) attacked at 1300 in columns of battalions (2d Battalion leading) and passed through leading elements of the 39th Infantry in its zone of action. The 2d Battalion succeeded in advancing against heavy artillery and mortar fire to line north of St. Lo - Periers Highway (T425666-T430667). Upon division order, battalion withdrew to stream line T427671-T434666 and consolidated positions on line. The 12th Infantry and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) remained in division reserve and were prepared to follow the advances of the 8th Infantry in its zone of action. During the period, the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, with fires reinforced by those of the 32d Field Artillery Battalion, was in direct support of the 8th Infantry. The 20th Field Artillery Battalion was in general support of the attack and fired harassing and interdiction missions.

23. 25 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (Companies A and C, less one platoon, 4th Engineer-Combat Battalion; Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; 70th Tank Battalion, less one platoon of Company D; Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached), attacked at 1100, battalions abreast, (1st Battalion on the right and 3d Battalion on the left); passed through

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

leading elements of the 39th Infantry Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry in their zone of action. The 1st Battalion succeeded in advancing to La-Chapelle-En-Juger and 3d Battalion advanced to positions as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 50. Regiment consolidated its positions and outposted its area in preparation for continuation of attack at H-hour, 26 July 1944. The 12th Infantry remained in division reserve and moved to vicinity of La Pte Grandiere and was prepared to follow the advance of the 8th Infantry in its zone of action. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) also part of the division reserve, moved to vicinity T433698 and was prepared to regain contact with enemy. The 4th Division Artillery and attached units supported the advance of the division, as stated in the preceding day's operations.

24. 26 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (Company A; 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; 70th Tank Battalion, less one platoon, Company D and Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached), attacked at 0800, two battalions abreast, from vicinity of line due east of La Chapelle-En-Juger. A considerable amount of resistance was encountered generally consisting of small arms, automatic weapons and scattered artillery fires. Progress was slow until 1800 at which time the enemy resistance lessened and the 1st and 3d Battalions began to advance rapidly toward the division objective. At 1700, the 2d Battalion was committed and attacked between the 1st and 3d Battalions. At the end of the period, all battalions were located in positions as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 51, and were still continuing their advance to seize division objectives. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached to the 8th Infantry at 2100 and was prepared to move on orders of the Commanding Officer 8th Infantry. The 12th Infantry, in division reserve, moved to a position as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 51, closing at 2200. All supporting fires remained the same throughout the period.

25. 27 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (attachments the same as previous day), continued the attack that was initiated 260800R July to seize and hold the high ground on line from Carantilly (T337580) to Quibou (T416580) along the Soigne River to the East in division zone of action. Stiff resistance by small arms, automatic weapons and artillery fires was encountered until early afternoon at which time resistance slackened. All battalions were located as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 52, and were preparing to hold and improve their positions. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, in division reserve near Lamelsil-Arsy (T412626), attacked at 1550 to clear the woods at T365596. The 2d Battalion attacked at 1600 in direction of St Benoit (T390607) from the South. At the end of the period, both battalions held positions as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 52. The 4th Division Artillery, in addition to furnishing direct and general support, fired supporting mission for the advance of the 3d Armored Division during the period.

26. 28 July 1944. The 8th Infantry (no change in attachments), from positions in vicinity of La Gilbert (T418596) attacked, two battalions abreast, at 0700 to clear the road between 381860-384583 of enemy resistance. The objective was reached at 1100 and orders issued to move South to an area near Notre-Dame-Des-Canilly. Company I, reinforced, acted as right flank guard on the march. From positions near La Cauviere, the 12th Infantry attacked with two battalions to finish clearing the

See IV - Operations, Contd.

woods in the vicinity of T382800. Field Order No. 12, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, 281600Z July, ordered the regiment to move by specified route to areas shown on Overlay accompanying Field Order No. 12. Head of the column passed the IP at 1900. Artillery fire on the 4th Infantry Division front was restricted due to movement of friendly armor in division zone of action. However, two missions were fired for the 3d Armored Division. The 29th and 42d Field Artillery Battalions were attached to the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments respectively as direct support, while general support was furnished by the 20th and 951st Field Artillery Battalions. The latter is now attached to the 4th Infantry Division.

27. 29 July 1944. CT 8 completed the move per Field Order No. 12, and at 0600, Company I supported the attack of the 41st Infantry on Pont Brocard during the day. The 1st and 2d Battalions took up defensive positions along the road Netrou-Dano-Los-Cenilly - CR T341475 - Point on road (T357453) to prevent the enemy from retreating from the northwest. A number of small enemy groups were encountered within the zone moving to the southeast; prisoners were captured and other enemy forces contained. CT 12 completed its movement to new area per Field Order No. 12. Regiment attacked at 0900, two battalions abreast, to secure the road between Labourg and Inauptuis. Objectives were reached at 1100 without opposition. The 2d Battalion cleaned out opposition in Labourg during the late afternoon. The 1st Battalion moved without opposition to high ground in the vicinity of T385448. Employment of the 4th Division Artillery remained the same as the previous period. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (mechanized) reconnoitered in the division zone of action to 40 horizontal grid line and was attached to the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at 1600. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 0900 and further attached to the 8th Infantry. Squadron reconnoitered the 8th Infantry zone of action during the day and squadron, less one troop, was detached from the 8th Infantry at 1600. Reconnaissance was conducted in the late afternoon to the South and crossings were made of Sienne River prior to dark.

28. 30 July 1944. CT 8 protected west flank of the division from Labourg to the vicinity of Pontiere (T381494) and assembled as division reserve at 1235. The 1st Battalion moved at 1900 to the vicinity of Inauptuis to be in position to guard east flank of the division against possible attack from that direction. CT 12 attacked at 1100, two battalions abreast, with 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left, to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Mancoillere. The attack was opposed by moderate small arms and mortar fire which increased in intensity as attack progressed. At the close of the period, these battalions had secured positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 55. CT 26, 1st Infantry Division, was attached to the 4th Infantry Division 262000Z July and attacked in column of battalions at 1100 to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Mosnil Bonst. At 2000 it had reached its objective and initiated mopping up operation northward to the Sienne River. The 29th and 690th Field Artillery Battalions which were attached to 8th CT, fired supporting missions for that CT and reverted to 4th Division Artillery control at 1000. The 42d Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the 12th Infantry. The 20th and 951st Field Artillery Battalions were in general support of the division. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less one troop, reconnoitered south in CT 12 and

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

CT 26's zone of action from daylight until 1100 at which time the squadron assembled in rear of the 12th Infantry. Squadron furnished contact patrols between CT 26 and CT 12 and searched out areas between the above-mentioned combat teams for isolated groups of enemy.

29. 31 July 1944. At 310001B July, the 8th Infantry Regiment (Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion and Troop A, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron attached), less one battalion, were in assembly areas southeast of Hambye (361450). The 1st Battalion was in assembly area 500 yards to the west of Iupertuis (T410469). At 1130, the 2d Battalion was ordered to move to an assembly area northeast of Percy to protect the left flank of the division, and at 1200, the regiment, less 2d Battalion, was ordered to move to the same vicinity. Field Order No. 14, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division 312000B July gave the mission of protecting the left flank and left rear of the division to the 8th Infantry. Troop A, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was detached at 1200 and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was attached at 2000. The 12th Infantry (Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached), attacked, three battalions abreast, from positions along the road 400412 and 410412 to seize objective Villodieu-Les Poisses, eastward in the division zone of action. Rapid progress was made by the 1st and 2d Battalions with comparatively little or no enemy resistance. The 3d Battalion however met strong resistance in the vicinity southeast of Percy at 405446, and failed to advance beyond that point during the day. It was withdrawn to position shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 56 at 2000. Combat Command "Boudinot", 3d Armored Division (93d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 391st and 87th Armored Field Artillery Battalions attached) proceeded from positions south of Hambye by roads to positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 56; Progress was slow due to poor stream crossings. Slight enemy resistance was encountered. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron with 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached) advanced. At 0615, Troops A and C, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) gained and maintained contact by reconnaissance between 28th, 12th and 110th Regiments. Troop B which was operating during the preceding period in zone of action of the 1st Infantry Division was assembled in reserve at squadron headquarters. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached to the 8th Infantry at 1800 after having covered the advance of the 8th Infantry toward Percy. CT 26 was detached from the 4th Infantry Division 302400B July and the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, Combat Command "Boudinot", 3d Armored Division, and 188th Field Artillery Group attached to the 4th Infantry Division 302400B July. On this last day of the month, the 4th Infantry Division (less CT 22) was still energetically pressing the attack toward the south against a disorganized enemy force.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: At the close of the battle for the Port of Cherbourg, the status of supply throughout the division was generally good. Shortages in items of a critical nature were as follows:

<u>Ordinance</u>	<u>Attd</u>	<u>Short</u>
Machine gun, Cal .50	180	21
Rifle, BAR, Cal .50	243	76
Launcher, grenade, M7	1595	307
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36"	558	34
Telescope, BC, M65	28	1
Truck, 1/2-ton	715	23
Truck, 3/4-ton, M/C	164	2
Car, armored, light, M8	13	1
Half-track, M2	90	3
<u>Signal</u>		
Radio Set, SCR-536	270	41
Telephone, EE-8	551	41
Reel Equipment, CE-11	483	148
Axis, RI-27	95	17
Wire, W-130 (miles)	379	50

2. Motor maintenance continued to improve and inspections were resumed under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

3. On 9 July 1944 the first issue of "B" rations was made. Until this time the division troops had subsisted on "C", "D", "R", and "10-in-1" packaged rations. With this issue of "B" rations all troops not actually in the line were fed hot meals.

4. On 17 July 1944 the division was again taken out of the line for a three day rest period. At this time, though additional losses had been sustained in combat, all supply services were functioning so satisfactorily that the only shortages in items of a critical nature were 593 grenade launchers, M7 and M8 trucks, 1/2-ton.

During the rest period hot showers were provided personnel of the division by First U. S. Army shower units.

5. On 20 July 1944 the division was again committed and because of limited road facilities traffic was a major problem. In order to eliminate as much movement as possible, service trains of the combat teams were instructed to move, and remain as close as possible to combat troops. In addition they were instructed to carry as much ammunition as possible in the initial movement, using all trucks available, including kitchen trucks, for this purpose.

6. On 31 July 1944 the supply situation was normal.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

7. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties Evacuated

	Officers	Enl
Killed in action	39	578
Died of wounds	3	68
Died of injuries	0	3
Missing in action	5	107
Seriously wounded in action	86	1662
Seriously injured in action	8	71
Slightly wounded in action	34	547
Slightly injured in action	4	202
	179	3253

Total Casualties..... 5432

8. Prisoner of War Inclosures were opened during the month of July on the date and location as follows:

5 July 1944 - Appeville
 27 July 1944 - near le Guislian
 30 July 1944 - near Hanbye

9. A total of 1190 German prisoners of war were taken during this period.

10. During the period from 5 July to 31 July, a total of 212 officers and 3258 enlisted men replacements were received.

11. Strengths	1 July 1944			31 July 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
STRENGTH OF DIVISION (present and absent)						
Hq 4th Inf Div	54	8	131/4	51	8	133/4
8th Inf	207	6	4157	143	5	3108/1
12th Inf	168	5	3667	171	6	3180
22d Inf	204	5	4050	172	4	3370/1
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	21	2	118	21	2	117
20th FA Bn	35	1	823	34	2	612
29th FA Bn	35	2	584/1	35	2	566
42d FA Bn	33	2	579	33	2	566
44th FA Bn	31	2	583/1	29	2	573/1
4th Engr Combat Bn	33	3	829	31	3	797
4th Med Bn	37	1	459	37	1	413
4th Ron Tr. Meez	7	0	165	6	0	159
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	4	2	85	4	2	84
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	5	1	167/8	4	1	176/8
HP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	4	0	141/8	4	0	133/7
704th Ord L Maint Co	10	1	157	9	1	149
4th QI Co	10	1	203	10	0	199
4th Sig Co	13	4	296	13	4	291
Total.....	911	46	16994	805	46	14623

Sec. V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION (Present and absent)	1 July 1944			31 July 1944		
	O	WO	E	O	WO	E
CIC Det	1	0	14	2	0	14
Order of Battle Unit #2	1	0	2	1	0	2
IPF Team #34 (8th Inf)	2	0	4	2	0	4
IPF Team #16 (12th Inf)	2	0	4	-	-	-
IPF Team #56 (22d Inf)	2	0	4	2	0	4
PI Team #51	2	0	4	2	0	4
MI Team #17	2	0	4	2	0	4
Air Support Party	1	0	8	1	0	6
Det G, 1635th Sig Photo Co	1	0	7	1	0	7
801st TD Bn	34	2	783	33	2	768
377th AAA Bn	34	3	774	35	3	759
70th Tk Bn	42	4	770	-	-	-
Total....	124	9	2378	81	5	1522
Grand Total	1035	53	19372	986	51	16198

12. During rest periods ceremonies were held for the awarding of decorations to the division's heroes.

R. O. Barton
R. O. BARTON,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 July to 31 July 1944, without any loss of personnel or additional loss of specialist equipment.

2. This team has continued to keep a duplicate of the G-2 situation map, to receive and process all documents, to keep an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities, and any additional information necessary to translate documents and perform interrogations whenever required.

3. The study of documents during the first half of this period was curtailed by the enemy's almost orderly retreat and resulting ability to evacuate his command posts. During the latter half of July, however, this study uncovered considerable information of value to present and future operations. Numerous locations of enemy command posts were obtained from captured maps, as well as routes taken by reinforcements and supplies to the enemy. Information obtained from Soldbooks and other documents enabled the breaking of unit field post numbers in many cases. This was especially true for the 130 Panzer Lehr Division. Numerous Tables of Organization were uncovered and confirmed by prisoners of war, such as the 130 Panzer Lehr Division, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 6 Para Regiment. A complete breakdown of commanders of the company was obtained in the 5 Para Division. A number of documents of a mere strategic value were forwarded to higher echelon as soon as practicable.

4. Following the policy of speedy dissemination, all information obtained from adjacent and higher units, where applicable, was immediately disseminated to lower echelons, and information supplementing the G-2 and IFW Reports was immediately forwarded to higher echelon.

5. A summary of enemy units encountered during the period 4 July to 31 July follows:

285 Infantry Division

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Means	FFW
894 Inf Regt						
15 Co			4 Div	27	Doc	
985 Inf Regt						
II Bn Hq					Doc	

353 Infantry Division

941 Inf Regt						
7 Co			4 Div	31	PW	
9 Co			4 Div	31	PW	
13 Co	90		4 Div	31	PW	
942 Inf Regt						
I Bn Hq			4 Div	31	PW	58 860
4 Co	100				Doc	
II Bn Hq		SE Harigny	CT 8	26	PW	

Annex A, Contd

355 Infantry Division - Contd						
Unit	Strength	Place	Identified		Moans	PFN
			By	Date		
11 Bn Hq						
7 Co			4 Div	31	PW	
8 Co		SE Marigny	4 Div	27	PW	
943 Inf Regt						
4 Co			CT 12	27	PW	
565 Arty Regt						
4 Btry			4 Div	31	PW	
6 Btry			4 Div	31	PW	
353 Repl Bn	700-1000	335745	CT 8	8	PW	

275 Infantry Division						
Unit	Strength	Place	Identified		Moans	PFN
			By	Date		
983 Inf Regt Hq		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	PW	
3 Co		S Notre Dame le				
		Conilly	4 Div	28/30	PW	
4 Co		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	PW	
11 Bn		"	CT 8	26	PW	Doc
5 Co		"	CT 8	26	PW	Doc
6 Co		"	4 Div	26	PW	Doc
7 Co		"	CT 8	26	PW	Doc
8 Co		"	4 Div	26	PW	Doc
111 Bn			4 Div	30		Doc
13 Co		vic Carontilly	CT 8	27/28	PW	
14 Co		SE Marigny	CT 8	27	PW	Doc
Pz Jtg Co (AF)			4 Div	27/28	PW	
984 Inf Regt						
1 Bn Hq			4 Div	31	PW	
985 Inf Regt Hq		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 37 555
1 Bn Hq		"	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 24 678A
1 Co		"	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 24 678B
2 Co		NE "	4 Div	26	PW	Doc 24 678C
3 Co		" "	4 Div	26	PW	Doc 24 678D
4 Co		SE "	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 24 678E
11 Bn Hq			4 Div	27		Doc 16 413A
5 Co			4 Div	27		Doc 16 413B
6 Co		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 16 413C
7 Co			4 Div	27		Doc 16 413D
8 Co	150		4 Div	27		Doc 16 413E
13 Co		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 45 6/2
14 Co		NE "	CT 8	26	PW	Doc 56 377
Plak Co		SE "	CT 8	26	PW	
275 Fusilier Bn						
1 Co			4 Div	31	PW	
4 Co			4 Div	20	PW	
275 Engr Bn Hq		vic Carontilly	CT 8	27/28	PW	
1 Co		"	4 Div	27/28	PW	
275 Arty Regt						
1 Btry			4 Div	28	PW	
2 Btry			4 Div	30	PW	Doc
4 Btry			4 Div	31	PW	

Annex A

275 Infantry Division - Contd

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Means	FPN
IV Bn Hq			4 Div	30	Doc	
12 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	
275 Lhd Bn						
2 Co			CT 12	28/29	PW	

266 Infantry Division

266 Arty Regt Hq			CT 12	29/30	PW	
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17 SS Pz-Gren Div "Goetz Von Berlichingen"

37 SS Pz Gr Regt			4 Div	8	PW Doc	32 208
I Bn Hq	250-300	355807	CT 12	7	PW Doc	37 044A
1 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	B
2 Co			4 Div	8	PW Doc	C
3 Co		355807	CT 12	7	PW Doc	D
4 Co	180		CT 12	8	PW Doc	E
II Bn	800		4 Div	8	PW Doc	35 272A
5 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	B
6 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	C
7 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	D
8 Co			4 Div	8	PW Doc	E
III Bn		356813	CT 8	7	PW Doc	44 181A
9 Co		356809	4 Div	4	Doc	E
10 Co		360806-366805	4 Div	4	Doc	C
11 Co	140	355807	CT 12	8	PW Doc	D
12 Co		355807	CT 12	8	PW Doc	E
13 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	36 595
14 Co	110		CT 12	9	PW Doc	42 415
15 Co			4 Div	6	Doc	32 503
16 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	32 208
33 SS Pz Gr Regt Hq			4 Div	8	PW Doc	
I Bn			4 Div	10	Doc	33 237A
6 Co			4 Div	8	PW	45 020C
17 SS Tank Bn Hq			4 Div	8	Doc	
17 SS Assault Gun Bn			4 Div	8	Doc	
17 SS Arty Regt			4 Div	8	Doc	
I Bn			4 Div	8	Doc	
17 SS AT Bn			4 Div	8	Doc	
17 SS Recon Bn	800		4 Div	9	PW Doc	38 594A
1 Co	180		4 Div	9	Doc	B
2 Co	194	Los Forgos	CT 22	9	PW Doc	C
3 Co	180	St Sainbonay	CT 22	10	PW Doc	D
4 Co	180		4 Div	9	PW Doc	E
5 Co	180		4 Div	9	PW Doc	38 594F
17 SS Flak Bn						
4 Btry			CT 12	29	PW	
17 SS Eng Bn			4 Div	9	Doc	36 380A
1 Co			4 Div		Doc	
17 SS Sig Bn			4 Div	8	Doc	

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Annex A, Contd

2 SS Pz Div "Das Reich"

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Means	FPN
3 SS Pz Gr Regt Deutschland						
9 Co		334764	CT 12	12	PW	28 688B
10 Co			CT 22	12	PW	C
11 Co	111	334757	CT 22	12	PW	D
12 Co		334757	CT 22	12	PW	E
4 SS Pz Gren Regt Der Fuhrer						
6 Co			CT 12	31	PW	
7 Co			CT 12	31	PW	11 707D
8 Co			CT 12	31	PW	
13 Co			CT 12	31	PW Doc	
2 SS Tank Regt	800					
1 Bn		S Notro Dame, 4 Div		29	PW	
1 Co		vic Carontilly CT 8		27	PW	

130 Pz Lehr Division

Div Hq			4 Div	30	Doc	33 696
Defense Co			4 Div	30	Doc	13 915
901 Pz Gr Regt	1500		4 Div	30	Doc	15 286
I Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	17 480A
1 Co			CT 8	14	PW	B
2 Co			4 Div	14	PW	C
3 Co		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	PW	D
4 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
II Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	18 452A
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
6 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
7 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
8 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
9 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	19 688B
10 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
11 Co		SE Marigny	CT 12	27	PW	04 506
902 Pz Gr Regt	1500		4 Div	30	Doc	38 778A
I Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	52 568A
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
4 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
II Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	36 930A
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
6 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
7 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
8 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
9 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	19 688 B
10 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
11 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	04 506
130 Pz Regt Lehr			4 Div	30	Doc	37 628
Pz Co (FKL)			4 Div	30	Doc	56 041
I Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	00 942
Hq Co			4 Div	30	Doc	09 942

Annex A

S-E-C-R-E-T

Annex A, Contd

130 Pz Lehr Division						
Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Locus	FR#
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	08-400
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	21-629
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	39-370
4 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	01-644
Workshop Co			4 Div	30	Doc	12-433
11 Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	20-251
Hq Co			4 Div	30	Doc	A
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
6 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
7 Co		SE Marigny	CT 12	27	FM	D
8 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
Supply Co			4 Div	30	Doc	F
Workshop Co			4 Div	30	Doc	G
180 Pz Lehr Arty Regt			4 Div	30	Doc	07-775
1 Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	12-893A
1 Btry		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	FM	Doc
2 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	C
3 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D
11 Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	10-280A
4 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	B
5 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	C
6 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D
111 Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	06-274A
7 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	B
8 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	C
9 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D
922 Arty Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	00-096A
1 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	B
2 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	C
3 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D
130 Pz Lehr Recon Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	06-324
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	58-793
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	01-645
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	27-387
4 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	42-339
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	17-192
Supply Co			4 Div	30	Doc	11-682
130 Pz AF Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	47-687
1 Co			4 Div	26 P.	Doc	A
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
130 Pz Engr Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	40-938A
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
130 Pz Sig Bn		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	FM	Doc 36-553
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
Lt Sig Cln			4 Div	30	Doc	D

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Annex A, Contd

130 Para Lehr Division - Contd

Unit	Strength	Place	By-	Date	Loans	FFH
311 AA Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	17 512A
1 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D
2 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	C
3 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D
130 Div Services			4 Div	30	Doc	30 579
1 Motor Transport Co			4 Div	30	Doc	23 730
2 Motor Transport Co			4 Div	30	Doc	41 419
3 Motor Transport Co			4 Div	30	Doc	58 951
4 Motor Transport Co			4 Div	30	Doc	45 488
5 Motor Transport Co			4 Div	30	Doc	33 798
6 Motor Transport Co			4 Div	30	Doc	30 985
Supply Co			4 Div	30	Doc	47 999
1 Workshop Co			4 Div	30	Doc	39 853
2 Workshop Co			4 Div	30	Doc	44 221
3 Workshop Co			4 Div	30	Doc	18 599
Bakery Co			4 Div	30	Doc	23 108
Butcher Co			4 Div	30	Doc	38 585
Adm Co			4 Div	30	Doc	44 492
2 AA Co			4 Div	30	Doc	39 002
1 P Unit 130			4 Div	30	Doc	04 400
4 PO 130			4 Div	30	Doc	40 076

5 Para Division

Div Hq			4 Div	30	Doc	L63 864
13 Para Regt		SE Marigny	CT 8	27	Pt Doc	L61 695
I Bn		vic Carontilly	CT 8	26/27	Pt Doc	
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
4 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
II Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
6 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
7 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
8 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
III Bn		vic Carontilly	CT 8	26/27	Pt Doc	L61 485A
9 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	B
10 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
11 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
12 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
13 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L63 943
14 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L62 081
15 Co	150		4 Div	30	Doc	L63 348
14 Para Regt		SE Marigny	CT 8	26	Pt Doc	L62 265
1 Bn			CT 8	25	Pt Doc	
1 Co	120		CT 8	25	Pt Doc	
2 Co			CT 8	25	Pt Doc	
3 Co			CT 8	25	Pt Doc	
4 Co			4 Div	25	Pt Doc	
II Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	L63 002A
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
6 Co	150		CT 8	25	Pt Doc	C

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Annex A

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Annex A, Contd

5 Para Division - Contd

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Grade	FCM
7 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
8 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	E
111 Bn			4 Div	26/27	Pl Doc	L63 523
9 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
10 Co			4 Div	25	Pl Doc	
11 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
12 Co			4 Div	25	Pl Doc	
13 Co			4 Div	25	Pl Doc	
14 Co			4 Div	19	Pl Doc	
15 Co			4 Div	25	Pl Doc	
15 Para Regt			4 Div	30	Doc	L62 223
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
4 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L53 633E
11 Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
6 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
7 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
8 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
111 Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	
9 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
10 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L21 130C
11 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
12 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
13 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
14 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
15 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
5 Para Engr Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	L63 399
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L63 022A
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	D
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	C
4 Co			4 Div	12	Pl Doc	D
5 Para Sign Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	E
1 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	L53 989
2 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	L50 034
3 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	L49 261
4 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	L50 229
5 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	L52 343
Supply Cln			4 Div	30	Doc	L51 534
5 Para At Bn			CT 8	26	Pl Doc	L49 367
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L60 068A
2 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	L
3 Co			4 Div	28	Pl Doc	B
5 Para Sig Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	C
1 Co		S Note's Dept	CT 8	29	Pl Doc	D
2 Co		"	CT 8	29	Pl Doc	B
1 Bn 5 Para Arty Regt			4 Div	30	Doc	L63 250A
1 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	B
2 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	C
3 Btry			4 Div	30	Doc	D

S-E-C-R-E-T

Annex A, Contd

5 Para Division - Contd

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Means	FFH
5 Para Div Services			4 Div	30	Doc	L60 389
12 Para Ron Bn		S Notre Dame	CT 8	29	FW Doc	
"Gortz" Bn			4 Div	28	FW	
4 Dtry			4 Div	28	FW	

243 Infantry Division

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Means	FFH
Div Hq		S Notre Dame	4 Div	29/30	FW	
920 Inf Regt						
2 Co		Marigny	CT 8	28/29	FW	
1 Bn		S Notre Dame	CT 8	29/30	FW	
1 Co		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
3 Co		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
II Bn Hq		Marigny	CT 8	28/29	FW	
8 Co		"	CT 8	28/29	FW	
13 Co		S Notre Dame	CT 8	29/30	FW	
921 Inf Regt						
1 Bn Hq		S Notre Dame	CT 8	29/30	FW	
1 Co		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
922 Inf Regt						
I Bn Hq		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
1 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
3 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
II Bn Hq		Marigny	CT 8	28/29	FW	
5 Co			4 Div	30	Doc	
6 Co		S Notre Dame	CT 8	29/30	FW Doc	
7 Co		"	CT 8	29/30	FW Doc	
243 arty Regt						
2 Dtry		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
3 Dtry		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
243 Engr Bn						
1 Co		"	CT 8	29/30	FW	
243 Sig Bn						
2 Co		Marigny	CT 8	28/29	FW	

6 Para Regiment

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified By	Date	Means	FFH
6 Para Regt Hq	2500		4 Div		Doc	L49 323
1 Co		La Hangerie	CT 22	11	FW	
3 Co			CT 12	7	FW Doc	
II Bn Hq		324757	CT 22	11	FW Doc	L55 096A
5 Co		339807	CT 8	8	FW	B
6 Co		Vic 321791	4 Div	8	FW	C
7 Co		Vic Les Abrees	CT 8	8	FW Doc	D
8 Co			CT 8	12	FW Doc	E
III Bn Hq			CT 12	8	FW Doc	
9 Co			CT 12	8	FW Doc	
10 Co			CT 22	10	FW	
11 Co			CT 8	8	FW	L50 370D
12 Co	250		CT 12	8	FW Doc	
13 Co		348608	CT 8	8	FW Doc	
14 Co			CT 12	8	FW Doc	
15 Co	200		CT 8	8	FW Doc	L62 056

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Annex A

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Annex A, Contd

6 Para Regiment - Contd

Unit	Strength	Place	Identified	Date	Means	FPN
16 Co		S Notre-Dame	CT 8	29/30	P/	
Medics			CT 12	8	P/	
Repl Co						Doc 49 323
2 Para Tng Regt						
2 Co			4 Div	10	P/	L60 913C
3 Co			4 Div	10	P/	D
4 Co		Les Forges	CT 22	10	P/	E
11 Bn Hq		vic Sainteny	CT 22	10	P/	L62 039
5 Co			4 Div	10	P/	
7 Co		317774	CT 12	11	P/	
9 Co		vic Sainteny	CT 22	10	P/	
11 Co		"	CT 22	10	P/	
12 Co			4 Div	10	P/	L63 213E

Miscellaneous Units

657 AT Bn			4 Div	8	Doc	
1 Co			4 Div	8	Doc	
RR Transp AA Bn - 955			4 Div	10	P/	
752 Eastern Bn			4 Div	30	Doc	
1041 Arty Bn		S Notre-Dame	CT 8	29/30	P/	

Note: P/ - Field Post Numbers
 Doc - Identified by documents

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ANNEX B - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS, DETACHMENT NO. 10

1. 1 - 5 July 1944. This detachment had no contact with civilian or enemy activity.

2. 6 July 1944. Civilians in the vicinity of division and regimental command posts were interrogated. It was found, however, that CIC Detachments from the 83d and 90th Divisions had previously been through this area and many of the civilians had passes issued by the CAO in Carontan.

3. 7 July 1944. A mobile patrol was sent to the villages in the division area to interview mayors and priests for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there were any strangers in the vicinity. A report had been received that soldiers dressed in civilian clothes were infiltrating our front lines with concealed radio transmitters. M. Rene Lomagnon, of Miantis, was apprehended after being denounced by two mayors and a priest. Subject was picked up at his residence which was next to one of our artillery installations.

4. 9 July 1944. In connection with the apprehension of M. Rene Lomagnon, signed statements have been turned over to VII Corps CIC Detachment. A survey of the rear areas of the division was made, but no strangers were encountered. Civilians interviewed revealed that the Germans were not allowing civilians to pass through their lines and return to this area.

5. 10 July 1944. CIC Detachment No. 18 reported that one Julliene Letourner, of Miantis, concealed German soldiers in her home and outfitted them with civilian clothes. Subject was apprehended and turned over to VII Corps CIC Detachment. After further investigation she was released. Three civilians were picked up on the highway between Carontan and Cherbourg wearing parts of German uniforms. It was recommended that public notice be given to all civilians to cease wearing any part of a German uniform inasmuch as they may be mistaken for enemy snipers and fired upon by our troops. Two civilians traveling from Caen to Cherbourg were picked up inasmuch as they had no authority to travel. They had not been challenged at any time to show proper identification card. It was recommended that control posts be set up in each major town.

6. 11 July 1944. Maurice Dauvers, of Carontan, and Auguste Jacques Drion, of Avours, were apprehended on the highway in the vicinity of Avours after curfew. They were detained until vouched for by several respectable citizens.

7. 12 July 1944. Enemy Command Post, 5th Company, 6th Parachute Regiment at 324-764 was searched but was found to be completely demolished.

8. 13 July 1944. Agents in two-man patrols made spot checks of roads in the division area. Two men and one woman were found traveling in a restricted area. They denied knowing that traveling was restricted and were held until identified.

Annex B - CIC, Contd

9. 14 July 1944. Military Police reported they detected a sound of a wireless operating in two houses in a vicinity near Auvors. A search of these buildings was made and suspect and neighbors were interrogated. Investigation proved negative. A meeting was held with the mayors of Auvors, Appoville and Meautis. Reliable French civilians were recommended for traffic control and mayors agreed to notify their citizens of the traffic restrictions.

10. 16 July 1944. Edouard Eizoric, of Cherbourg, was detained at one of the road control posts for traveling without a pass. He was delivered to VII Corps Civilian Cage.

11. 16 July 1944. Agents checked the vicinity of Lonandré, interviewed the Mayor, and advised the local civilians of travel restrictions. The 33d CIC Detachment (33d Infantry Division) was advised of control posts in the vicinity of Meautis and the civilians used for these posts were recommended to the 33d Infantry Division under whose jurisdiction the area reverted.

12. 17 - 19 July 1944. The 4th Infantry Division was placed in Army Reserve and bivouaced in the vicinity of Lonandré. Local security precautions were taken.

13. 20 July 1944. Agents checked the area and vicinity of the new division command post at le Dosert, and also searched the old division area for classified documents.

14. 21 July 1944. After contacting VII Corps CIC Detachment, this detachment was informed that while the division remained in the assembly area at le Dosert, VII Corps would be responsible for road control in this area. This detachment checked the identification cards of the local civilians as a security precaution. The Mayor and parish priest had been evacuated by the Germans and could not be contacted.

15. 22 July 1944. Agents of this detachment took advantage of the fact that the division was in an assembly area and preparing for another drive, by checking all the units regarding the disposition of obsolete classified documents and the dissemination of the password.

16. 23 - 26 July 1944. In assembly area.

17. 26 July 1944. A mobile patrol throughout the new division area was conducted. Division and regimental command posts were checked and only three civilians were encountered. They were permitted to remain in their homes.

18. 27 July 1944. Forty-five (45) civilians were screened by this detachment. One, H. Rowskin, was held over night until OSS, VII Corps could be contacted. 2d Lt Blumenthal, OSS at VII Corps Headquarters, identified the subject as being a member of the Resistor Group. One, H. Vono Moireol was picked up in the area of the 12th Infantry Regiment. Subject claimed to be an evacuee of Marigny but had no papers of identification. Fellow evacuees could not vouch for subject; hence he was

Annex D

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Annex B - CIC, Contd

placed in the division civilian cage.

19. 28 July 1944. Three road control posts were established at La Chapelle. The Mayor and the local priest were contacted and they vouched for all the local civilians. Command posts of the 985th Grenadier Regiment, in the vicinity of St. Bonoit and the 14th Parachute Regiment, in the vicinity of Carantilly, were searched and documents found were submitted to the AG or S, G-3, 4th Infantry Division.

20. 29 July 1944. Agents of this detachment made civilian identification checks at Lo Bourg, Notre Dame-le-Corilly and Soullas. M. Albert Rouland, M. Auguste Chailout, and M. Henry Rezo, all from Paris were picked up coming through our lines. They were turned over to VII Corps to be identified as Resistance Group members. Ten Russian prisoners of war (German Forced Laborers) were interrogated and evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Louis George Eudes, Andre Eudes and George Eudes (Louis and Andre are sons of George) found in the vicinity of Soullas, were detained for further investigation. These names are similar to those on the First U. S. Army Potential Subversive List. Mlle. Janine Krolezik, found on the highway with a Paris identification card, was detained for further questioning. No one in Soullas could vouch for her loyalty.

21. 30 July 1944. Louis George Eudes, Andre Eudes, George Eudes and Mlle. Janine Krolezik were evacuated to VII Corps Civilian Cage for further investigation. Evacuated command posts at 396522 and 370523 (German), were searched and documents from the 257th Artillery Regiment and the 17th Grenadier Division were found. Road controls were set up in the vicinity of Notre Dame-le-Corilly and mobile patrols were conducted on main roads within a radius of two miles of the division command post.

22. 31 July 1944. The Mayors of Mauportuis and Hambye were interviewed. Road control posts were established. M. Philippe Fischer, carrying a forged identify card and a pair of field glasses was apprehended. He could not be identified by other evacuees and presented no logical story to agents. He was turned over to the prisoner of war inclosure. Joseph Fontinat, restaurant owner from Hambye, was reported to have revealed American gun positions in the advance on the town of Hambye. Four citizens stated that the subject was a very close collaborator with the Germans. He was turned over to VII Corps CIC Detachment.

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ANNEX C - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 417

1. The following statistics pertain to the activities of Military Intelligence Interpreters Team No. 417 during the period 1 July to 31 July, inclusive.

Interrogated:	20 French civilians
Interrogated:	112 German Prisoners of War
Identified:	88 Enemy units
Identified:	65 Enemy Commanding Officers

Miscellaneous identifications: Minefields, anti-tank ditches, enemy supply and munition depots; enemy unit headquarters; Anti-aircraft installations; artillery batteries (locations and caliber); and observation posts.

Obtaining of Information: Regarding strength and organization of enemy units; their weapons, effect of Allied bombings on enemy supply lines; morale of enemy troops and of people in Germany; likewise reaction created by the attempt made on Hitler's life.

2. The following activities were performed in addition to those listed above:

Served as interpreters for CIC and General Courts-Martial.
 Translation of documents.
 Assisted CIC in screening civilians.
 Searching enemy installations for documents.
 Interrogated foreign elements of enemy units in Russian, Lithuanian, Dutch, German and French.

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ANNEX D - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM No. 31




1. The operation of the Photo Interpreters Team No. 31 during the period 1 July to 31 July 1964 consisted of the following:


making uncontrolled aces, annotating, and distributing them to the units concerned;

Posting a defense map from "Photo Interpretations".


Preparing overlays of information from aerial photos for distribution to units.

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






ATTACK ON "SUNKEN ROAD"
JULY 12





ATTACKS ON "SUNKEN ROADS"
JULY 13-14



JULY 15

 PERIERS
 GORGES
JULY 6 to 11, 1944
 (SEE ATTACHED OVERLAYS FOR JULY 12-15)
 SCALE 1:25,000
 MAPS: CARENTAN & PERIERS SHEETS





WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179 (cont)

304-0-3

(627)
Director

Open from Reports, Adj. Gen. Div.

Fig. 11

SECRET

8

G-E-C-R-E-T

.....
S-E-C-R-E-T
To: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: *10/3*
Date: 10 Sep 44
.....

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

AG 319.1

10 September 1944

Aug 44

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.

THRU : Command Channels.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

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2*

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (G3), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 August to 31 August 1944.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Harr, 015447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 0287628, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0266812, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Major John L. Delaney, 0302398, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Major Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, 0378451, GSC

1. On 14 August 1944 Lieutenant Colonel David E. Goodwin, 021914, GSC, formerly AC of S, G-3, was transferred to VII Corps.

Major John L. Delaney, 0302398, GSC, formerly Asst AC of S, G-3, was assigned AC of S, G-3.

2. The month of August began with the 4th Infantry Division continuing the breakthrough which began 25 July. During most of the month the tactical situation progressed so rapidly that the CP was never very permanent. During the month the CP was in fourteen different locations. The first being near Hambye and the last being near Mantes - no less than east of Paris, France.

11/11/44

CLASSIFICATION

CANCELLED

PROPERTY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

SECRET

REFLECTING COMMITTEE

ma

14 Feb 46

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

3. 1 August 1944. CP located near Hambye, France (375439).
4. 2 August 1944. To keep up with the front lines the CP moved to La Landerie, France (371347).
5. 3 August 1944. CP again moved to Le Beltier, France (418259)
6. 5 August 1944. CP moved to new location at les Loges-sur-Brécy, France (419248). The G-1 section concentrated its efforts to expedite the awarding of recommended decorations.
7. 6 August 1944. G-1 Periodic Report submitted to VII Corps and First United States Army by officer courier.
8. 9 August 1944. The Prisoner of War Inclosure which was in use during the first week of August was moved to 422288. It was moved as near the front as was consistent with the prevention of escape of prisoners of war.
9. 12 August 1944. In order to expedite the evacuation of prisoners of war and to keep in close contact with the infantry regiments, the Prisoner of War Inclosure was moved to 634944.
10. 13 August 1944. A ceremony was held at the 8th Infantry to present Distinguished Unit Citation Badges to the officers and enlisted men of that regiment. The 8th Infantry along with the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, formed the assault force on Beach Utah for the 4th Infantry Division, for which the Presidential citation was awarded. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, received the Distinguished Unit Citation at a ceremony held in the afternoon. The AG of S, G-1 pinned the Distinguished Unit Citation Badge on Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Teague, D292859, Inf, Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry. The 3d Platoon, Company A, and the 3d Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, also earned the Distinguished Unit Citation Badge.
11. 14 August 1944. The 20th Field Artillery Battalion held a formation at which officers and enlisted men were awarded Bronze Star Medal Ribbons for meritorious and heroic service since 6 June 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to VII Corps and First United States Army by officer courier.
12. 15 August 1944. Silver Star Medals and Air Medals were presented to the officers and enlisted men of the several Air Sections of the 4th Division Artillery at an appropriate ceremony conducted by Brigadier General Blakoley, Commanding General, 4th Division Artillery.
13. 16 August 1944. A formation was held in the Division CP consisting of one enlisted man from each company, battery, troop and detachment of the division. General and Special Staff witnessed the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to Major General Raymond O. Barton, O3401, USA, by Lieutenant General Courtney D. Hodges, Commanding General, First United States Army. General Barton was also awarded the Silver Star Medal by Major General Joseph L. Collins, Commanding General, VII Corps. Lieutenant General Hodges awarded the Distinguished Service

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Teague, 0292659, Inf, 22d Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel John C. Helborn, 018863, Inf, 70th Tank Battalion; and Major George L. Leiby, Jr, 0390036, Inf, 8th Infantry. Lt Gen Hodges presented the Silver Star Medal to approximately forty-five (45) officers and enlisted men of the division. Brigadier General Harold W. Blakely, 07237, USA; Colonel James S. Luckott, 018209, Inf, 12th Infantry; and Colonel Charles T. Lanham, 015568, Inf, 22d Infantry were among those awarded the Silver Star Medal.

The division was enjoying a hard earned rest and the regimental award of Combat Infantry Badges to officers and enlisted men who had demonstrated by exemplary conduct in combat their qualification for this badge of courage. The three regimental commanding officers were awarded the Combat Infantry Badge on Division General Orders. Awards of the Expert Infantry Badge were also made to officers and enlisted men of the regiments for satisfactory performance in combat.

13. 17 August 1944. The Division CP was on the move all day. The new location was at 143959. Prisoner of War Inclosure was moved to 122965.

14. 18 August 1944. Work was continued on awards and decorations.

15. 20 August 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to VII Corps and First United States Army by officer courier.

16. 23 August 1944. The 2th Infantry Division was attached to the V Corps. AC of S, G-1 went to Headquarters V Corps to obtain information on Corps policies on replacements.

17. 24 August 1944. The Division CP made a long move to a location near Ablis, France. Moved the same day to CP near Guissey, France (915134).

18. 25 August 1944. Division troops moved into Paris, France, one month after they initiated the breakthrough, 25 July 1944.

19. 28 August 1944. CP moved to Longjumeau, France (024235). During those days of almost constant moving, decorations and awards were made when opportunity permitted. Every effort was made to keep the work going so that deserving individuals were decorated as soon as possible.

20. 27 August 1944. CP moved to location in Zoological Park, Paris. G-1 Periodic Report submitted to V Corps and First United States Army by officer courier.

21. 29 August 1944. Representatives from G-1 Section accompanied the Commanding General to Paris to attend ceremony officially marking the liberation of the city. CP moved to new area the evening before and located at 219159.

22. 30 August 1944. Division CP moved to Nantueil, France.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)

1. A summary of the enemy activity in the sector of the 4th Infantry Division for the period 1 - 31 August 1944 is as follows:

2. 1 August 1944. Our fast-moving elements of infantry and armor found it necessary to by-pass small pockets of resistance. Several of these pockets were encountered by the 4th Infantry Division during this period. The enemy took advantage of favorable terrain and utilized small arms and antitank guns to defend this terrain. Road blocks were also erected to prohibit our passage through key arteries. Tanks were used defensively, but avoided any aggressive action which would result in an open battle with our forces. One M4C tank and one M3 tank were knocked out in our zone of action. Elements of the 863d and 243d Infantry Division were encountered at the close of the period the enemy was engaged along the line Villedieu Les Poelos - 399347 - 402379 - Percy.

3. 2 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to encounter pockets by-passed by our assaulting armored units. It was apparent that the enemy had developed a policy of trying to allow the spearhead of armor to pass, and then rallying again to delay the advance of our infantry. Usually the resistance was built around a machine gun or an antitank gun. The enemy also defended road blocks and vital terrain. Artillery for the most part was light. Some large-caliber weapons were used, however, to interdict our area. Enemy tanks operated defensively both singly and in small groups. Prisoners of war identified the 17 SS Regiment, 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and 957 Infantry Regiment on our front. At the close of the period the enemy held the line 490255 - 440278 - 439288 - 403516.

4. 3 August 1944. The enemy utilized favorable terrain to employ machine guns and antitank weapons supported by small groups who attempted to cover the withdrawal of larger enemy forces. It was apparent that the enemy contemplated falling back to the high ground surrounding St. Pois on the southeast and east, and thence to the Forêt de St. Sever where it appeared that the enemy would attempt a determined rear guard action while a general withdrawal was effected. Artillery fire was slightly heavier along the front lines. The enemy appeared to be firing his antitank and artillery weapons and his mortars, and then quickly displacing to new positions. Two tanks were knocked out by our infantry. These tanks were, as previously, employed defensively. Our units were in contact with elements of the 17 SS Division, 353 Infantry Division, 362 Infantry Division, and the 156 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Enemy front lines at the end of the period: 502230 - 493251 - 477218.

5. 4 August 1944. The enemy defended the St. Pois - 502505 - 500205 line by occupying the critical terrain around St. Pois. In order to deny the town to our troops, the roads into St. Pois were defended with tanks, machine guns, mines, and small groups of infantry. Infantry dug into the forward slopes and furnished cross fire and mortar fire in support of the main line of resistance. The ridge line which paralleled

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

the highway from Coulouvray - Boisdentre - St-Pois was held by the enemy. In attacking this line, our units encountered small arms and heavy artillery fire. One counterattack was repulsed at 496253. The following elements were encountered by our troops: 983 Infantry Regiment, 6 Parachute Regiment, 146 Armored Artillery Regiment, 675 Engineer Battalion, 857 Infantry Regiment, and the 60 Infantry Regiment.

6. 5 August 1944. The enemy launched a counterattack early in the period. This offensive was of battalion size and was adequately absorbed and repulsed by our forces. In addition, the enemy occupied and defended the critical terrain around St-Pois until about 1725 hours when a general withdrawal to the southeast was effected. During this period the 2d Battalion of the 60th Infantry Regiment moved from Sourdeval to the St-Pois front. This force appeared to be formed for a counterattack at 1200 hours. Our artillery disorganized this attack before it could be launched. Enemy artillery was generally light, but several guns of at least medium caliber were reported. Tanks continued to play defensive roles. Enemy units in contact: Elements of 156 Panzer Regiment, 60 Infantry Regiment, 116 Engineer Battalion. A JU 88 was shot down in the 4th Infantry Division sector and its crew was captured. Enemy front lines at 499247 - 501233 - 499216 - 496257.

7. 6 August 1944. Enemy front lines did not exist as such during the period. The 4th Infantry Division contacted the enemy in isolated pockets as it hopped up in the vicinity of St-Pois. The enemy employed small arms including automatic weapons and occasional light artillery. A general withdrawal from the St-Pois area was observed, with a tendency of movement towards Sourdeval (southeast of St-Pois) and towards the 1st Infantry Division sector south of St-Pois. Artillery continued light with occasional reports of medium size shells landing on prominent terrain features. Armored movement was heard during the hours of darkness, but seemed to indicate a withdrawal rather than a passing for attack. Units contacted were the 116 Panzer Division, and elements of the 984 Infantry Regiment (275 Infantry Division).

8. 7 August 1944. The enemy defended from hastily prepared positions with a concentration of resistance on hill 230 (vicinity Lingard). The chief defensive fire came from automatic and direct fire heavy weapons. Approximately 300 rounds of mortar ammunition were fired by the enemy on the vicinity of 627197 during the early morning hours. Early in the period an enemy column moved across the front of our sector going west and into position around Le Mesnil Adee. The enemy attempted to move east across our sector at 1630 hours, but was immediately destroyed by artillery fire. In this action a fairly large number of tanks and trucks were destroyed. Enemy front line was at Le Mesnil Tove - Le Mesnil Adee - Le Roussel - Hill 230 (vicinity Lingard). Units in contact were elements of the following: 116 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 84 Infantry Division, 275 Infantry Division, and Kampfgruppe Schucke.

9. 8 August 1944. The enemy concentrated his armor at Le Mesnil Tove for what a prisoner of war described as a second attempt to cut our lines of communication, and to anchor his left flank at Avranches. This

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

breakthrough was to have been exploited by elements of the "Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich", and "Deutschland" Divisions. This attempt and several subsequent attempts were disorganized and put to rout by our artillery fire, before they could gain any momentum. Artillery was light with occasional interdiction of roads during the night. Tanks were operative on our flanks but our artillery engaged and dispersed any formations which appeared in our sector. Enemy front line, 542189 - to La Guilliere. Units in contact: 116 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 24 Panzer Regiment, 84 and 275 Infantry Divisions.

10. 9 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division was not in active contact with the enemy at the end of the period. The enemy defended from positions in vicinity of La Bardelle. This position had been obtained after a night attack down the draw, La Lauchorio, Lingard, La Bardelle. The 1st and 3d companies of the 80 Panzer Grenadier Regiment finally surrendered to our 8th Infantry Regiment. Prisoners of war evacuated during the period represented the 156 Infantry Regiment, 60 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 146 Artillery Regiment, 30 Mobile Brigade, 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and 1052 Infantry Regiment. Artillery was light but interdiction and harassing fires continued in the vicinity of La Fontaine and Le Roussel. Our artillery was subjected to some light counterbattery.

11. 10 August 1944. No contact with the enemy.

12. 11 August 1944. Enemy patrols contacted our patrols along the Varonne River. There were several instances when small arms and automatic weapons fire were exchanged, and occasional light artillery fell on our front lines. Enemy front line, 701957 - 871986 - 892015 - 700006 - 704003. Although very little contact was made, patrols and civilian reports identified the 84 Infantry Division and 5 Parachute Division to our front.

13. 12 August 1944. The enemy continued to patrol the east bank of the Varonne River. It appeared as though the patrols along the Varonne River to Donfront were acting as a screening force, while larger forces withdrew to the east or dug in on the high ground east of Donfront. Several rounds of large caliber artillery fell in the 4th Infantry Division sector. There was no other report of enemy artillery action. No units were identified since actual contact was nonexistent.

14. 13 August 1944. The enemy continued to outpost the Varonne River west of Donfront. Small fire fights were experienced between patrols, but no prisoners of war were taken. Other than a few large caliber shells coming from the northeast, enemy artillery was almost inactive. Tanks were observed to our front but no contact was made.

15. 14 August 1944. The enemy continued to leave listening posts and security detachments for the purpose of defending road blocks and mine fields. In all cases these units dispersed when our reconnaissance elements closed in. A motor column was detected moving north towards Lonlay le Abbaye early in the period. Artillery fire in some force was encountered by motorized reconnaissance on the western outskirts of Donfront. One prisoner of war captured while guarding a road block was a

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

number of a detachment from the 21 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 10 SS Division. Actions by the enemy during this period indicated a withdrawal to the vicinity of the Forêt Dancaire where a possible regrouping could take place followed by a thrust at our lines, or a further withdrawal eastward.

16. 15 - 24 August 1944. No contact with the enemy.

17. 25 August 1944. The enemy opposed our attempts to cross the Seine in the vicinity of Corbeil by bringing small arms, including automatic weapon fire and 20-40mm antiaircraft fire to bear on our forces as soon as an attempted crossing was made. Towards the end of the period the enemy withdrew from the east bank of the Seine and a crossing was made without meeting determined resistance. The defense of the city of Paris itself was very light. Small pockets, chiefly snipers, were encountered within the city streets. The main obstacle to the rapid advance of the 4th Infantry Division within the city was the frenzied zeal of the populace itself, which time and again halted our columns to display its appreciation to the first Americans to enter the city. Prisoners of war and FFI reports indicated the presence of the 38 Infantry Division, 6 Parachute Division, and 190 and 192 Security Regiments in the 4th Infantry Division sector.

18. 26 August 1944. The enemy attempted to delay our clearing of the City of Paris by fighting a delaying action using small groups of infantry and tanks sheltered in buildings and behind walls. In some instances, it was apparent that the enemy would withdraw some forces, reorganize them in the extreme limits of the city, and then send them back to positions closer to the center of Paris. Actual contact was scarce but progress was rendered slow by the harassing action of snipers and security detachments. Artillery by the enemy was nonexistent, and armored action was limited to the "shoot and run" tactics previously encountered. Prisoners of war identified the following units: 11 AA Regiment, 1 and 190 Sicherungs Regiment, 1071 AA Regiment, 3 AA Regiment, and 1130 Parachute AA Regiment.

19. 27 August 1944. In the 4th Infantry Division zone of advance, numerous reports of encounters between the enemy and FFI forces were reported in the area Neuilly Plaisance - Neuilly Sur Seine. When our troops arrived in this area, however, the enemy had withdrawn to Bois de Bandy. The enemy continued to delay our advance by forming pockets of resistance along our route. In most cases, these pockets consisted of riflemen and automatic weapon teams located in buildings, alleys, and behind walls and hedges. The groups were occasionally supported by an assault gun or tank. Our troops and FFI units reported the following units on our front: 11 AA Regiment, 510 Mobile Battalion, 6 Parachute Division, 286 Infantry Division, 220 Flak Battalion, 6 Infantry Regiment, 1070 Flak Battalion. The 509 and 511 Mobile Battalions were reported by prisoners of war to be on our front. Tanks were reportedly operating singly and in groups of between three and five.

20. 28 August 1944. The enemy employed elements of the 509 and 510 Mobile Battalions, elements of the 47 Infantry Division, and elements of Panzer Lehr Division to delay our advance. In spite of scattered small arms and antitank fire from dug in positions and buildings, our advance

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

carried to the following points: Ville Pinte - La Rennouse - Rau and Clave Souilly. Numerous tanks were reported in the 4th Infantry Division zone of action, but they seemed to operate singly and in small groups. At about 1645 hours, 20 rounds of high-velocity heavy explosive landed at 212500. Other than this, enemy artillery fire was negligible. The enemy's purpose seemed to be to leave small delaying groups while larger groups were withdrawn in an attempt to sock time and means to reorganize.

21. 29 August 1944. Again enemy front lines did not exist as such. Our units were as far forward as Le Bosnil Auvit - Durmartin and Montgo. Small arms fire, antitank fire, and 20mm antiaircraft were received by our units. This fire came from widely separated defensive groups. The defensive positions used by the enemy were mostly dug in to permit good fields of fire along the main routes to the north and northeast. Tanks continued to operate in small groups. After passing Montgo, our forces encountered very little resistance to the northeast.

22. 30 August 1944. There was no evidence that the enemy attempted to establish a defensive line in the 4th Infantry Division zone of action. Our units advanced with little opposition to the general line La Montagne - Genay Villers - Levisien. The general withdrawal to the northeast and north was not protected by artillery or armor. The enemy depended on blown bridges to delay our pursuit. Prisoners of war taken were stragglers and deserters from the Glasgow Regiment (509, 510, and 511 Mobile Battalions) and 47 Infantry Division.

23. 31 August 1944. Our troops met steady delaying action by scattered infantry and antitank and artillery fire. Strongest resistance in the 4th Infantry Division zone of advance was on our left flank. Considerable fire was received late in the period from the woods southwest of Pierre Fonds - Les Rains. Our forward elements reached the general line Palesno Villers - Cottoret. The action of this period indicated that the enemy was attempting to fight a kind of rear guard action to enable his scattered forces to withdraw eastward. Intermittent 75mm artillery fire was reported during the period. Numerous small units were identified, however, those identifications did not warrant the assumption that any of these minor units were present in sufficient strength to threaten our advance. More important identifications were: 47 Infantry Division, Glasgow Regiment, 33 Panzer Regiment, 11 Panzer Regiment, 102 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 102 Artillery Regiment, 85 Armored Signal Battalion, 125 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 121 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and 309 Infantry Division.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 August 1944. From positions in the vicinity east of Percy (415414), the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, moved to the south and took up positions to prevent enemy infiltrating south of Percy. The 2d Battalion remained in assembly area one mile west of Percy until 2240 and then traveled by motor to position shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 57, at which time it was attached to CCB, 3d Armored Division. The 3d Battalion moved from assembly area one mile southwest of Percy, attacked at 2330 to the south, and by darkness had secured positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 57. The 2d Battalion was relieved from its position one mile west of Percy by the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, who were attached to the division and then to the 8th Infantry at 1300.

The 12th Infantry attacked at 0800 in column of battalions from positions as follows: 1st Battalion vicinity 393358, 2d Battalion at 398373 and 3d Battalion at 380390. The 1st and 2d Battalions covered the withdrawal of the armored elements of CCB, 3d Armored Division, prepared for movement south and then continued the attack on Villedieu-Les-Pooles. At 2200 the 5d Battalion had occupied the town with two companies; balance of the 3d Battalion blocked entrance to the town from the south and east. The 2d Battalion took up positions to prevent enemy from entering the town from the northeast and east. The 1st Battalion remained in assembly area. Positions at the end of the period are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 57.

The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) patrolled to front and flanks of the division, and at 1200 organized and reconnoitered to the town of Villedieu-Les-Pooles. The squadron advanced along axis of road Le Bourg - Villedieu-Les-Pooles and leading elements entered the town at 1800. The remainder of the squadron entered the town and reconnoitered roads to the northeast, east, south and west until relieved by the 12th Infantry. Group was detached from the 4th Infantry Division at 2400.

Combat Command "Boudinot" (CCB, 3d Armored Division), from positions near 385373 and 392357, continued at 0900 the mission of seizing the division objective by using the route in the eastern half of the division zone of action. Finding it impracticable because of enemy resistance to further the attack, CCB was disengaged and using the route to the east of Villedieu-Les-Pooles, reassembled, entered the division zone of action at 410300 and by 2230 had occupied positions as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 57. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, was attached at 2240.

The 4th Infantry Division had now seized and secured the town of Villedieu-Les-Pooles and the attached armored elements had moved to within 1 1/2 miles of the division's final objective.

2. 2 August 1944. The 8th Infantry, less two battalions, with Company B, 67th Chemical Battalion; 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized); Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 63rd Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, protected the left flank of the 4th Infantry Division until passed through by elements of the

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

9th Infantry Division at which time it assembled in the division zone of action. At 1200, 1st Battalion was attached to Combat Command "Boudinot" (CCB 3d Armored Division) and moved to vicinity shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 59. The balance of the regiment, after being assembled, moved by motor to positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 59.

The 12th Infantry, with Company E, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued the attack at 021000 August 1944, with the 1st Battalion maintaining defenses to the north, northeast and east of Villodieu-Les-Poêles, while the 2d Battalion pressed the attack forward. The 3d Battalion moved down the main road to Villodieu-Les-Poêles, clearing enemy pockets of resistance that were hindering transportation along the main route leading to that city.

The 22d Infantry was now reverted to control of the 4th Infantry Division and with attachments, one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, moved by motor to assembly areas north of Villodieu-Les-Poêles; and the 1st Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, in the city.

Combat Command "Boudinot" (CCB 3d Armored Division), 1st and 2d Battalions, 8th Infantry attached, continued to maintain positions secured 1 August. Heavy enemy small arms and mortar fire were encountered and enemy artillery was constant.

The 4th Infantry Division had succeeded in maintaining an active defense in its zone of action against enemy forces attempting to escape to the northeast. All positions secured 1 August were maintained and bettered.

3. 3 August 1944. The 8th Infantry, less two battalions, with Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Bn; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, as part of task force which included Combat Command "Boudinot", 3d Armored Division, attacked at 0800 in the night half of the division zone of action in a column of battalions, 3d Battalion leading, to prevent the debouchment of the enemy from the area northeast of the division zone of action between 510227-473233. During the afternoon of the period, the Task Force was dissolved and CT 6 assigned the mission to block the roads leading into the area 4923 and 4819. At the end of the period, the combat team was occupying positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 59.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, resumed the attack at 030600 August to clear the enemy from the division zone of action south to the road 423277-473233. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was attached in the late afternoon and the regiment assigned the mission of containing St Pels and securing the left flank of the division between 472333-501247. At the end of the period it had succeeded in securing positions shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 59. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, in Villodieu at 0215 and then moved to assembly area south of the

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

city (3931) and upon order advanced in division zone of action. The 2d Battalion at the end of the period was displacing forward to relieve the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, and in turn was being relieved of its position on the high ground vicinity 482258 by elements of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry.

The 2d Infantry with 1st platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached, initially in division reserve, was ordered in the late afternoon to maintain contact with the 12th Infantry to the south with one battalion in vicinity 4725. One battalion from vicinity 436265 was ordered to block roads to the east at 447270 and 460278, and another battalion from vicinity of 435280 to block the roads to the east and northeast at 426317, 420304 and 445285. Movement to assembly areas vicinity of Villedieu was completed; positions shown on Overlay, G-3. Periodic Report No. 59 occupied; contact by the 2d Battalion established with the 8th and 12th Infantry; and relief of 2d Battalion; 12th Infantry, by elements of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, initiated prior to the close of the period.

Combat Command "Moudjout" (OCB 3d Armored Division), with 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry attached, and as part of the Task Force heretofore mentioned, attacked in the division zone of action. Tasks Nos. 1 and 2 had advanced by the end of the period to positions shown on Overlay, G-3. Periodic Report No. 59.

During this period, elements of the 4th Infantry Division and attached units had advanced within the division zone of action; secured part of the division objective and further prevented enemy forces attempting to escape to the northeast.

4. 4 August 1944. The 2nd Infantry, with 4th Reconnaissance Troop, (Mechanized), Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attacked from positions in vicinity Le Gaultiere (435195) with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion on the left, to seize Hill 211 (505295) at 061020H August. The advance was slow; heavy enemy resistance in the form of small arms, machine guns and artillery fires was met. Four battalions of the 4th Division Artillery supported the attack and two air attacks were made on the Hill. Positions secured as of 2230 are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 60.

The 12th Infantry with one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached, attacked from positions along the road between Le Bruyere (480255) and at a point at 497237 to clear out pockets of enemy resistance on the left flank of the division and to seize Hill 252 (531233); time of attack 1045. After repeated efforts to advance, the Division Commander ordered this unit to remain in present positions. Heavy enemy fires were encountered on the left flank from the woods and high ground in the 9th Division zone of action.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion (less two platoons); Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, moved from bivouac areas in the vicinity of Villedieu to an assembly area south of

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La Marechierre (453274) and attacked to the southeast to seize St Pois (1526). The attack progressed satisfactorily with light opposition until two battalions were within 500 yards of St Pois. There heavy enemy resistance was not from the town and the high ground to the east.

Combat Command "Boudinot" with Teams Nos. 1 and 2 in positions near La Gauthiere, and Team No. 3 at Foulertis (475285), remained in these positions until 1700 when Teams Nos. 1 and 2 moved across the See River at 486190 and by a route through the 1st Infantry Division zone of action attacked Le Roussel (5517), and had seized the bridge at 531178 by 2200 at which time they were attached to the 1st Infantry Division.

5. 5 August 1944. The 8th Infantry with 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized); Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, consolidated positions on Hill 211 with the 1st and 3d Battalions. Little opposition was met. A counterattack at 1000 by the enemy resulted in the temporary loss of three anti-tank guns and three half-tracks which were regained by counterattack on the part of the 8th Infantry. Three German tanks were destroyed in this action. The 2d Battalion attacked from vicinity of La Moihore at 1530 to capture La Hesnil-Gilbert and La Housardiore. Positions at the end of the period are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 61.

The 12th Infantry with one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to consolidate and clean up pockets of resistance within its zone of action. The 1st Battalion seized Hill 329 (495255) at 1245. The 3d Battalion supported the attack of the 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, in the latter's seizure of hill in vicinity of La Cobiere (505245). The 2d Battalion supported by fire the attack of the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, in the latter's seizure of Hill 232 (500232). Throughout the day, the 12th Infantry protected the left flank of the division. Positions at the end of the day are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 61.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion (less two platoons); Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attacked at 0900 with the 3d Battalion from the vicinity of 490232 to capture Hill 232 which after heavy resistance was taken at 1700. The 1st Battalion from position 500 yards northeast of St Pois attacked at 0900 to seize woods at 503228, by passing St Pois from the south. One company from the 2d Battalion occupied St Pois from the west. Throughout the day, the 1st and 2d Battalions received determined resistance from the high ground east of St Pois. At the end of the period positions occupied are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 61. Team No. 3, Combat Command "Boudinot" (GCB 8d Armored Division) remained in vicinity of Foulertis (475285) until 0900 at which time it reverted to control of the 3d Armored Division.

The 4th Infantry Division had seized key terrain features within division objective, eliminated isolated points of resistance, and destroyed numerous motor vehicles and foot troops retreating along roads northeast and southeast from St Pois.

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6. 6 August 1944. The 8th Infantry with 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), Company B, 67th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, mopped-up small pockets of enemy resistance in zone of action. Little opposition was met. At 1200 contact was made with 22d Infantry at 516207. At 1320 all roads in the 8th Infantry sector were reported cleared for traffic. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was detached at 1600 and Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was also detached. At 1600 the 8th Infantry, less Company K, established a defensive position at 504205. At 1646 the regiment was alerted to provide one battalion on two hours' notice to reinforce elements of the 22d Infantry holding the division outpost line.

The 12th Infantry, with Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion (less two platoons); Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, mopped-up small pockets of enemy resistance within its zone of action, making contact with the 22d Infantry at 1200 vicinity 516207. At 1850 reported roads cleared for traffic from St Pois to regimental boundary vicinity 517206. At 1345, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) and one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached and the regiment ordered to establish an outpost line along the eastern edge of the division sector from 495240 to 510220; the 8th Infantry to be prepared to provide one battalion on two hours' notice; 70th Tank Battalion and Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion to be available on call of the Commanding Officer of the 22d Infantry. Positions occupied by the end of the period are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 62.

The 4th Infantry Division had now mopped-up all enemy resistance within its zone of action, and had established outpost line of resistance to protect the division from enemy attack from the east. Positions held at the end of the day are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 62.

7. 7 August 1944. The 8th Infantry closed in bivouac area at 062400D August to the south and southwest of Hill 211 (506205). As a result of the breakthrough by an enemy force in the 30th Division sector, the 2d Battalion was notified at 0545 to dispatch patrols to Sursee (496179), and the 3d Battalion was ordered to patrol between Los Fontaines (520178) - La Roussel (580173). This movement was cancelled at 0530 when it was found that the enemy was not attempting to go north of the river. At 0920 the 2d Battalion was ordered to move to the vicinity of La Roussel and movement to defensive positions in that area was completed by 1215. The 1st Battalion remained in bivouac area 1200 yards west of Hill 211. The 3d Battalion (less Company K which remained on Hill 211) established a bridgehead at Sursee to allow the passage of the 2d Armored Division over the See River. One platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion were in support of the regiment. Company F at 1015 was ordered to cross the river at La Roussel and proceed west to Sursee to investigate the enemy vehicle column which had been shelled earlier in the day. It was forced to withdraw due to heavy resistance from vicinity just south of La Roussel.

The 12th Infantry was in assembly area 2000 yards northeast of

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Breacy (4220) at 2400. Upon notice of the threat of counterattack, they were ordered to establish a bridgehead across the Sea River (434190). One company remained in position throughout the day. At 1515, CT 12, consisting of the 12th Infantry, 42d Field Artillery Battalion, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, one platoon, Company E, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, were attached to the 30th Infantry Division. Sufficient transportation was provided to carry two battalions, the 1st Battalion clearing the IP at Breacy at 2005, and the remainder of the combat team clearing at 2300.

The 22d Infantry at 062400B August were outposting a line extending from Lingard Chateau (527196) to Hill 232 (501232). Company C attacked from positions near Lingard Chateau to capture Hill 230 (527212) and reported at 1200 to have occupied the hill where they contacted the 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry attacking from the north. Company K, which occupied a position on Hill 232, was withdrawn at 1600. One platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion and one company, 4th Tank Battalion were in support.

The 4th Division Artillery fired a concentration in support of Company C, 22d Infantry and fired on enemy vehicle column consisting of approximately 30 vehicles which was spotted by the air along the road at 502166. Directed by air observation, concentrations were fired for a period of 1 1/2 hours, ending at 1700, when the air reported that all vehicles with the exception of three had been disabled.

Task Force "Wolbern", consisting of 70th Tank Battalion (less two companies); 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less one platoon); 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Reorganized); and 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one company), and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Wolbern, 70th Tank Battalion, established an outpost line which extended from Fontiere (454193) to Breacy to La Besnoirie (405275).

CT 59 consisting of 26th Field Artillery Battalion, one company, 9th Medical Battalion; one platoon, 9th Engineer Battalion, two platoons, 8th Reconnaissance Troop; one company of tanks and one company of tank destroyers was attached at 2220.

The 4th Infantry Division maintained a perimeter of defense in the division zone of action and prevented enemy infiltration from the south and east.

C. 5 August 1944. The 4th Infantry with Company B, 37th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached maintained defensive positions and prevented enemy infiltrations from the southeast. The 2d Battalion kept roads within La Noussolle open and established contact with CCD 3d Armored Division at 1400. Company E, 8th Infantry moved by truck from assembly area in vicinity west of La Baronniere, detrucked in area north of La Bardulle and remained in position La Baronniere after having been relieved by Company I, 22d Infantry at La Noussolle. Company L outposted and kept open the roads south of La Noussolle-Gilbert. Company K remained in position on Hill 211 (505205).

CT 12, consisting of the 12th Infantry, 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer

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(SP) Battalion, remained attached to the 30th Infantry Division.

The 22d Infantry maintained defensive positions until 1100 when the unit entrucked and moved to assembly areas shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 64. Company I relieved Company C on Hill 230 at 1400 and established contact with 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry. Company K occupied positions vicinity of Lingard (626198). Company L relieved Company E, 8th Infantry at La Mardolle. Contact was maintained with 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry. Positions at the end of the period are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 64.

Company C, 39th Infantry was counterattacked at 0100 and forced back approximately 100 yards. Enemy infiltration of approximately one infantry company at 1100 between Companies A and B was stopped by Company B, 6th Infantry. Units maintained contact with the enemy and with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and the 22d Infantry, and established contact with the 47th Infantry at 2000. Positions at the end of the day are shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 64.

The 4th Division Artillery, less 2d Field Artillery Battalion, fired concentrations on enemy buildup on Hill at 548185. This artillery fired on approximately 17 tanks and one company of enemy infantry along the east-west road at 543165 on request of the 39th Infantry and knocked out three tanks.

Task Force "Wolborn", same units as heretofore mentioned, maintained outpost line which extended from Pontorio (463194) to Brecoy (420200) to La Daltiero (408247) to St Laurent du Cuvos (458223) and patrolled routes and road blocks as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 64.

The 4th Infantry Division had continued maintenance of perimeter defense in division zone of action and established contact with the 47th Infantry and CGF 3d Armored Division on the western boundary.

9. 9 August 1944. The 6th Infantry, same attachments as previous day - Company B maintained defensive positions in vicinity 532194 and when relieved by Company A, in turn relieved Company I, 22d Infantry vicinity 534190 and maintained defense to prevent enemy infiltration from the east through lines of the 39th Infantry. The remainder of the 1st Battalion moved from vicinity 489207 to assembly area in the vicinity 525190. The 2d Battalion remained in position vicinity of La Roussel (531177) and kept roads open within the area and continued to protect this crossing of the See River. Company I, 6th Infantry was withdrawn from Hill 211 and joined remainder of 3d Battalion (less Company L) in an assembly area vicinity 605197.

The 12th Infantry with attachments as listed heretofore remained attached to the 30th Infantry Division.

The 22d Infantry - 1st and 2d Battalions remained in assembly areas. The 3d Battalion (less Company L) moved to assembly area vicinity of Lingard Chateau (626198), while Company L remained in position on Hill 230 maintaining contact with the 47th Infantry. The following units were attached to the 22d Infantry: Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C (less two platoons) 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and Company E, 301st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The 39th Infantry with the 26th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 15th Engineers; 9th Reconnaissance Troop (less one platoon); one company, 9th Medical Battalion; Company A, 680th Tank Destroyer Battalion;

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Company C, 746th Tank Battalion and one platoon, 9th Engineer Battalion attached, held and improved positions previously gained and prevented enemy infiltration from the east and northeast. Throughout the early hours of the period, the 1st Battalion, notably Company C, reported aggressive enemy action and artillery fires within their sector. Three times the supporting artillery fired concentrations to repel the threatened counterattacks. The Combat Team established contact with the 47th Infantry and reverted to control of the 9th Infantry Division at 091200Z August.

Task Force "Welborn", with same units as the previous day, maintained outpost line and continued patrolling routes and road blocks.

The 4th Infantry Division still continued to maintain perimeter of defense in division zone of action and began preparation for possible movement to the south.

10. 10 August 1944. The 4th Infantry, with same attachments as previous day, remained in positions in the vicinity of La Roussel (531177). Company A in position 532184; Company D 532190 and the remainder of the 1st Battalion moved to an assembly area in vicinity 525190. The 2d Battalion remained in position in the vicinity of La Roussel (531177) and continued to protect crossings of the See River. The 3d Battalion remained in an Assembly area vicinity 505197. Company G, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion detached at 1600 and joined their parent units. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion was attached as of 1600 and CT 8 was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and attached to the 9th Infantry Division at 2200.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, (less two platoons), 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Bn and Company B, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained in same positions as reported at the close of the previous day until 1600 when the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (mechanized), 44th Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and one platoon, Company G, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion were attached and ordered to move to positions as shown on Overlay, Field Order No. 19, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, at 101620Z August. Positions were secured by 2200 by infantry units and the remainder of the combat team continued to move into their respective positions at 2400.

The 4th Infantry Division moved from defensive positions at La Roussel to new division area in the vicinity of La Toilloul (6293) as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 66.

11. 11 August 1944. The 4th Infantry, with Company B, 37th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached, was detached from the 9th Infantry Division at 1400, and reverted to control of the 4th Infantry Division and was alerted for movement by truck south to assembly area in the vicinity of Desertines (6390) as division reserve. Head of column crossed IP at Cuvas (4719) at 1751. The 3d Battalion closed in assembly area at 2130. The CP opened 625899 at 2145. The remainder of CT 8 was enroute at the end of the period. One company, 901st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 2300.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, (less two platoons) 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B,

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801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached closed in respective areas as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 87 at 0050. Initiated patrols at dawn to reconnoiter area east within division zone of action to La Varenne River. The 3d Battalion relieved elements of the 137th Infantry at 1130. Regiment established road blocks, outposted lines and conducted vigorous patrolling throughout the period.

The Provisional Ranger Group, composed of the 2d Ranger Battalion, 5th Ranger Battalion, 93rd Infantry Battalion (Sep), 759th Tank Battalion (L), 19th Field Artillery Battalion (105H), and 196th Field Artillery Battalion (105H), was attached to the 4th Infantry Division for administration, supply and communications. Closed in assembly areas as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 87 at 0955.

Task Force A, composed of 70th Tank Battalion (-), Company C, 624th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion (-), 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (-), and commanded by the Commanding Officer, 70th Tank Battalion, prepared road blocks and defensive positions on the western edge of Le Feilleul (6398); maintained contact patrols and kept roads open.

The 4th Infantry Division had now occupied defensive positions and was conducting patrols in its zone of action and establishing road blocks wherever necessary.

12. 12 August 1944. The 9th Infantry, with no change in attachments, completed movement of remaining combat team elements from the 9th Infantry division zone of action to vicinity of Desortines (6390) at the beginning of the period, closing in assembly area at 0045. Road blocks and outposts were immediately established and reconnaissance initiated eastward in division zone of action. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, was detached and attached to the 2d Armored Division at 1800. One troop, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached at 2300 and enroute to the 8th Infantry area at the end of the period.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued reconnaissance to the east of division zone of action; maintained outpost lines and road blocks and conducted vigorous patrolling throughout the period; extended outpost lines to include enlarged division zone of action; and outposted to the northeast to include the town of Marenton (6806) which was occupied by Company E prior to close of the period. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was detached from the 22d Infantry at 2300. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop) plus 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), was attached to the 22d Infantry at 2300.

Task Force A, maintained road blocks and defensive positions in division zone of action.

13. 13 August 1944. The 6th Infantry, with Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; 29th Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and Troop C, 4th Cavalry Squadron attached, initiated reconnaissance eastward to La Varenne River; established road blocks and outposts. The 3d Battalion remained attached to the 2d Armored Division.

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The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company D, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Battalion, and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached, was detached from the 36th Infantry Division and reverted to 4th Infantry Division control at 1200. The combat team moved by motor from Juvigny-Le Forterb (528141) to assembly area vicinity 6094, and closed at 2125 with CP at 599948.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop) (plus 4th Reconnaissance Troop) attached, continued reconnaissance east to La Varonne River. One patrol reached Hill 201 (802950) at 0600; other patrols reconnoitered east bank of La Varonne River. Road blocks and outposted lines were maintained. One platoon, Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was detached at 0900.

The Divisional Motor Group, with units listed heretofore, was detached at 2000 with the exception that the 759th Tank Battalion (L) was reattached to the 4th Infantry Division.

Task Force A, composed of units as mentioned previously, maintained road blocks and defensive positions in the division zone of action. Company C, 634th Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was detached at 0200 and reverted to battalion control.

14. 14 August 1944. The 8th Infantry with Company E, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; 29th Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and Troop C, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron attached, continued patrols within their zone of action as far east as La Varonne River. The 739th Tank Battalion (less one company) was attached at 14001B August; Company G, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was detached at 0600; the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was detached from the 2d Armored Division as of 1200 and reverted to 8th Infantry control; and Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detached from the 8th Infantry as of 1900. At 1900 the regiment discontinued extensive patrols and closed into assembly areas as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 70.

The 12th Infantry and detachments remained in assembly areas.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company E, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop) (plus 4th Reconnaissance Troop) attached, continued reconnaissance to the east of the La Varonne River; maintained road blocks and outposted lines. Company A, 759th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached as of 0601, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop) (plus 4th Reconnaissance Troop) was detached at 0300. At 1900 extensive patrols were discontinued and units closed into assembly areas as shown on Overlay, G-3 Periodic Report No. 70.

Task Force A composed of 70th Tank Battalion (-); 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (-); Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was dissolved as of 1900 and the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron detached from the 4th Infantry Division as of 0300.

15. 15 August 1944.

The 8th Infantry with Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; 29th Field Artillery Battalion and

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759th Tank Battalion (L) (less one company) attached, remained in assembly areas, conducted maintenance, skill unit training, and continued small patrols within their sector as far east as La Mayonne River. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion reverted to the 4th Division Artillery control effective 1800.

The 12th Infantry with Company E, 4th Medical Battalion and 42d Field Artillery Battalion attached, remained in assembly areas and conducted care and cleaning of equipment and rest. The 42d Field Artillery Battalion reverted to 4th Division Artillery control effective 1800.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company A, 759th Tank Battalion (L) attached, conducted motorized patrols as far as La Varonne River within their sector.

16. 16 August 1944. The 3th Infantry, same attachments as 15 August, less 29th Field Artillery Battalion, remained in assembly areas; conducted maintenance of weapons and equipment; training in use of compass, scouting and patrolling; and familiarization firing with rocket launcher, rifle and machine guns.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained in assembly areas; conducted maintenance of weapons, vehicles and equipment; training in familiarization firing, servicing and zeroing weapons.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as 15 August, remained in assembly areas; conducted training in scouting and patrolling, gun drill, and the care and cleaning of clothing and equipment.

All other units of the division remained in assembly areas, conducting necessary training and maintenance.

17. 17 August 1944. The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; and Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, moved from vicinity of Desertine and closed in new assembly area at 1330. Engineer attachment was detached at 2000.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; and Company B, 76th Tank Battalion attached, moved from vicinity of Desertine and closed in new assembly area at 2200. The Engineer attachment was detached at 2000.

The 22d Infantry, with 4th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company C, 759th Tank Battalion attached, moved from vicinity of Barenton and closed in new assembly area at 1700. The Engineer attachment was detached at 2000.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (mechanized), beginning at 0600, reconnoitered routes for division movement from vicinity of Le Teiloul, and arriving at new assembly areas, reconnoitered to OPL line and roads in vicinity 2297. Troop closed in its new assembly area at 2000.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion placed Bailey Bridge across the La Varonne River (774931) for movement of division, checked routes for mines, and closed in new assembly area at 1300.

The 4th Infantry Division had now completed movement from vicinity of Le Teiloul to vicinity of Curromes, closing at 2100.

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18. 10 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained in assembly areas vicinity of Carrouges during the period and prepared for possible movement to the east.

8th Infantry vicinity Carrouges (U167998)

12th Infantry vicinity Los Villettes (U159975)

22d Infantry vicinity L'oissonniere (U146987)

4th Engineer-Combat Battalion vicinity La Doucelle (U122967)

4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) reconnoitered routes for possible division movement to vicinity Alencon (U355035).

19. 10 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (units and attachments same as 18 August), remained in assembly areas, conducting necessary and appropriate tactical and technical training to correct and improve techniques; familiarization with weapons; maintenance of vehicles; personnel cleanliness; cleaning of equipment and equipment fire post.

20. 20 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (units and attachments same as 19 August, except 759th Tank Battalion (L) Detachment), remained in assembly areas, continued training to further improve technical and tactical knowledge; physical conditioning; military discipline; orientation, etc. 759th Tank Battalion (L), at close of the period, enroute through Pro-on-Pail for attachment to V Corps.

21. 21 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (units and attachments same as 20 August), remained in assembly areas, continued training schedules previously inaugurated and prepared for possible movement to the east.

22. 22 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (units and attachments same as 21 August with the exceptions as noted below), completed training, alerted and prepared for movement east of Chartres.

The 4th Division Artillery and 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AV) Battalion moved at 1330 to vicinity of Chateaufort on Thyrois (2119) and were alerted to rejoin the division on its route to Chartres.

23. 23 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (units and attachments same as 22 August), alerted, prepared and started movement (division march) to east in vicinity of ablis (R6400). CT 12 and CT 22 crossed respective IP's at 1900 and were enroute at the end of the period. Other units continued limited training with emphasis on preparation for the division march the next day.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (4th Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, attached at 1400) was attached to the division at 0315, and ordered to screen the advance of the division, reporting conditions of routes and bridges for the division march.

24. 24 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (units and attachments same as 23 August) completed motor movement of approximately 145 miles without serious mishap and closed in new assembly areas in the vicinity of Arpajon (R660135).

The 8th Infantry with attachments passed the IP (Alencon) 0900, and closed 2130 vicinity of Courson-Lentoloup (R066154).

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The 12th Infantry with attachments, enroute at the beginning of the period, reached the vicinity of Senehanap (R685142), was further ordered to proceed to vicinity of Mozey (R958216) and closed therein.

The 22d Infantry with attachments, enroute at the beginning of the period to vicinity of Ablis (R347077) and upon reaching objective, was further ordered to proceed to vicinity of Brongny-Sur-Orge (S-001150), closing at 1953.

The 4th Division Artillery, less combat team attachments, crossed IP at 0710, reached and closed in new assembly area vicinity of Louville-Sur-Orge (R958156).

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, less combat team attachments, crossed the IP at 1145, closed vicinity R391116 at 2215.

The 70th Tank Battalion, less combat team attachments, crossed the IP at 1159, enroute at the end of the period.

The 201st Tank Destroyer Battalion closed in new assembly area vicinity of La Boissiere (R379121) at 1945.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, reconnoitered to the northeast and east within division assembly areas and as far as the outskirts of Paris and along the west bank of the Seine River, reporting routes, bridge conditions and the location of enemy forces.

25. 26 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division deployed from assembly areas, established bridgehead east across the Seine River north of Corboil (S1020), seized and secured roads and bridges within zone of action south of Paris, occupied the whole of southeast Paris, and established defensive positions west of Longjumeau (S000250) against enemy pocket at Palaiseau (R958276).

The 5th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, deployed from assembly areas. 1st Battalion secured bridges at S092324 and 100337 and established bridgehead on the east bank of the Seine River at those points; the 2d Battalion moved to assembly area vicinity S050240, alerted at 2030, and completed movement at 2230 to dispositions west and northwest of Longjumeau (S000250) to protect the V Corps and 4th Infantry Division CP's from possible movement of enemy from the west in vicinity of Palaiseau (R958276); 3d Battalion moved at 0800 and by 1100 completed occupation of airports at S020144, R177310, R345337, R777345 and S070292. At 2300, the 32d Infantry was ordered to send one company which, with the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, (less one company) (plus Company C, 70th Tank Battalion) attached, were to patrol to the northwest and west and establish road blocks in the vicinity of Monthlery (R976192) to prevent enemy from advancing southeast from Palaiseau (R958276) and this force was enroute at the end of the period. Company B, 87th Chemical Battalion was detached at 0600; Company A, 301st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 2200, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was attached at 2300.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached - 3d Battalion reinforced followed by 1st and 2d Battalions

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

moved by motor from assembly areas at 0600 via Longjumeau (S000251) - Athismons (S058258) - Ville Juif (S060360) and entered Paris at 1220, proceeded to Hotel de Ville at 1315 and nopped up southeast Paris of scattered snipers.

The 22d Infantry with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, moved by truck to vicinity of Corbeil (S123115) at 0600 to establish a bridgehead across the Seine River and protect the construction of a trestle bridge at S133150, reaching destination at 0800. At 0900, Company L attempted an assault of the east bank of the Seine River at S123156 but was forced to return after suffering casualties of two boats and fifteen men. At 1000, Company G attempting to secure position for trestle bridge at S088208, received heavy 20mm and 40mm flak from woods on east bank of the Seine River. The 2d Battalion brought heavy small arms and mortar fires into German positions and made observations for heavy artillery concentrations. At 1030 patrols were conducted along the Seine River from Corbeil north to Company G. At 1520, small German forces surrendered to the 2d Battalion and the enemy fire being lifted, Company G effected a crossing in rubber boats. At 1800 the 1st Battalion effected crossing and established a bridgehead on the east bank of the Seine River; and held to enable a trestle bridge to be constructed which was under construction at the end of the day at S098206. The 31 Battalion (less one company) (plus Company C, 70th Tank Battalion) was attached to the 8th Infantry at 2300 and was enroute to join the regiment in the vicinity of Monthlery. Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 2200. The 20th Field Artillery Battalion was attached at 0100.

The 4th Division Artillery, less combat team attachments - 20th Field Artillery Battalion attached to the 22d Infantry at 0100 and fired missions supporting the 22d Infantry; 186th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 8th Infantry.

The 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion fired mission in support of the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry across the Seine River at S1020, and materially aided in the crossing.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (less one troop) (plus 4th Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized) attached - 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in front of the 12th Infantry had screened the entire south of Paris and entered the city proper on Rue De Fontainebleau at 1115; proceeded to Notre Dame Cathedral at 1145; met slight resistance in conatory at S086423; seized and secured bridges across the Seine River in southeast Paris.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron which was attached to the 22d Infantry at 0300 proceeded the 22d Infantry to the Seine River at Corbeil (S1314); Troop A crossed the river to the south and proceeded north along the east bank; one platoon engaged in heavy fire fight at 1400 at S167162, and Troop C crossed the river to the south at 1500 and crossed the south edge of Forêt de Senart (S1418). The 34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was detached from the 4th Infantry Division at 2000. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was detached from the 38th Cavalry at 2300. The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group was detached from the 4th Division at 2315 and reverted to V Corps control.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

26. 26 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained defensive positions in the southeast portion of Paris, protecting bridgeheads and airdromes in and around the city, and prevented enemy infiltrations from the east within the division zone of action.

The 8th Infantry with the 28th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, Company A, 393d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company A, 301st Tank Destroyer Battalion, 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached - 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (less one company) (plus Company C, 70th Tank Battalion) joined Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry in the vicinity of Monthlery (R976192) and established patrols to the northwest and west and road blocks to prevent enemy from advancing southeast from Palaiseau (R956276). Company L, 3d Battalion in conjunction with the 4th Military Police Platoon remained in occupation of Fort located at 070354 and prepared to turn this post over to the 2d French Armored Division. The 1st Battalion continued to protect crossings of the Seine River at 8092324 and S100367 to prevent infiltration into the city from the east. The 2d and 3d Battalions sent motorized patrols in force at 0930 to cover area northwest of Palaiseau (965236). The 3d Battalion (less two companies) continued outposts of airfields occupied previous day with addition of another airfield at 935343 which was occupied and outposted. The 2d Battalion moved at 1540 to new assembly area vicinity S000254. Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached at 1800 and the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (less one company) (plus Company C, 70th Tank Battalion) was detached at 1915.

The 12th Infantry with same attachments as 25 August, continued to mop up enemy resistance in southeast Paris and at 0630 initiated movement to new assembly areas in the vicinity of Bois de Vincennes, closing at 1230, where active patrolling was initiated to the east and northeast.

The 22d Infantry with the 4th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 393d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached, less 3d Battalion (except one company), continued to protect the bridgehead across the Seine River in the vicinity of Orangis, while the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was in the process of constructing trestle bridge there. At 1345 after completion of the bridge, regiment was ordered to withdraw all units from the east bank of the river, leaving one company to protect the bridge from the west side. All units cleared by 1700. The 2d Battalion closed in assembly area vicinity R078135 at 1645 and in 1st Battalion area (R103177) at 1740. The 3d Battalion (less one company) (plus Company C, 70th Tank Battalion) reverted to 22d Infantry control at 1915.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less combat team attachments), continued construction of trestle bridge and completed same by 1200 in vicinity of Orangis, cleared mines, prepared charges, and disposed of road blocks in the city of Paris.

27. 27 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division attacked from the city of Paris to the northeast prior to the close of the day and had succeeded in securing part of the division objectives and clearing the enemy out of small towns and villages within the division zone of action.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached - All elements occupying and outposting bridges, river crossings, and Fort mentioned in activities for 26 August, rejoined regiment in new assembly area in the vicinity of Bois de Vincennes to which regiment had moved, crossing the IP at 0800 and closing at 1260. At 1400, the combat team attacked, two battalions abreast, in a northeasterly direction to secure objective vicinity 2349 and advanced against sporadic enemy resistance of small arms fire and independent action of roving tanks, and was able to secure part of the objective. The 1st Battalion encountered stiff resistance from fort located on Hill 108 (236445) and after determined effort the enemy was driven out; additional resistance was encountered from village vicinity 2346 and road junction at 245448. The 2d Battalion displaced forward on foot and closed in assembly area in woods vicinity 215480 (215480) at the end of the day.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached, remained in assembly area in the vicinity of Bois de Vincennes as division reserve. Elements of the regiment relieved the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at bridge across the Seine River at 094378 at 1000; relief of elements of the 8th Infantry guarding crossing of the Seine at 099358 and 092322 was also accomplished at 0915.

The 22d Infantry with 24th Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion and Company D, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, moved to new assembly areas vicinity of Bois de Vincennes, crossing the IP at 0800 and closing at 1230. IAR Platoon began reconnaissance to the northeast at 1200 and one company each from 1st and 2d Battalions began reconnaissance toward objective at 1500 and 1535 respectively. No resistance was encountered. Company A motorized had moved out to protect left half of Regimental objective and by 1630 positions on the left objective were being consolidated by 1st Battalion. By the end of the day, the 2d Battalion had succeeded against slight resistance in pushing forward some 500 to 600 yards short of the right half of the objective for the regiment. The 3d Battalion displaced forward to assembly area in woods vicinity 190495 and closed at 2000.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) moved from assembly area in the vicinity of Bois de Vincennes and passing reconnaissance to the northeast in the division zone of action, by 1800 had succeeded in establishing the enemy's line of resistance from 2250 west to 2051; withdrew and assembled vicinity 190493.

20. 28 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack and reached objectives, consolidating thereon.

The 8th Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 August; 1st and 2d Battalions jumped off at 0800 and moved forward with no resistance, 1st Battalion reaching 262468 at 1010 and consolidated position; 2d Battalion reached objective from 221497 and 235495 with opposition at 1310.

Sub IV - Operations, Contd

3d Battalion moved between 1st and 2d Battalions to the northeast meeting no resistance and reached objective at 247193. Contact patrols were sent to 1st and 2d Battalions and position consolidated. Some long range artillery fire received at 1950. Patrols sent to OPLR at 240520 and 265520.

The 12th Infantry, with same attachments as listed 27 August, was alerted at 1030 to move to the northeast with objectives at 2849 and 3140. The 1st Battalion remained in vicinity of Bois de Vincennes to patrol and guard bridges. The 2d and 3d Battalions moved by foot and deployed forward, meeting spasmodic resistance and at 2045 both battalions were on objective, 3d Battalion at 285490 and 2d Battalion at 305483 at which time positions were consolidated.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 August; 1st Battalion consolidated its positions at 170510-192516-192610; 2d Battalion attacked across canal at 1505 and moved to objective at 202912-217510 after meeting moderate resistance; 3d Battalion remained in assembly area at 195490. Company I established an OPLR at 200527.

29. 29 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack, reached objectives, consolidated and outposted thereon.

The 8th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 61st Chemical Battalion attached, conducted vigorous patrolling during the night covering the area along Canal de l'Ourcq, and reported same clear of enemy. The 1st Battalion moved and closed in the vicinity of Courty (2428) at 0915, and again moved to and closed in vicinity 235525 at 1550. The 2d and 3d Battalions attacked at 1000, and moved forward. The 2d Battalion reached 240534 and the 3d Battalion 260622 without enemy contact. At 1225, 3d Battalion met resistance consisting of machine guns, artillery and mortars and at 1400 both 1st and 2d Battalions met strong resistance in the vicinity of Hilly Mary (2535); overcame resistance at 1630 and reached objectives at 2230. At the end of the day, all units were consolidating and outposting respective areas.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company E, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, conducted vigorous patrolling around Claye Souilly (3050) during the night, reporting enemy north and west. The 1st Battalion moved by motor to vicinity of Le Pin (2647) closing at 0830, then attached 3d Armored Group for special mission (See below), detached at 1630 and began movement to 370571 at 1700. Reached objective at 2200 and consolidated and outposted thereon. The 2d and 3d Battalions attacked at 1010; 3d Battalion met resistance in the vicinity of Claye Souilly (3050), reached jossy (310532) at 1315 reporting enemy retreating; reached 317534 at 1410 and consolidated and outposted after reaching objective at 1725. The 2d Battalion at Charry (3658) met light resistance from retreating enemy; reached 370570 at 1410 and consolidated and outposted line after reaching objective at 1520.

The 22d Infantry with 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company G, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company D, 61st Chemical Battalion, and one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached. The 1st Battalion patrolled area from 117525 to 103532, reported enemy north and west of Vilpinte in small groups; moved toward Vilpinte (4953) at 1430, and reached there at 1700, consolidated and outposted around the town. The 2d and 3d Battalions attacked at 1000,

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

2d Battalion reached initial objective at 220520 by 1130 receiving some mortar fire, moved north at 1430 and by 1615 reached vicinity 249530. The 3d Battalion reached initial objective at Villepinte (1963) receiving small arms fire, nopped up opposition and moved to Tremblay Les-Grognoux, arriving at 1430. At 2100, all battalions had reached final objectives and consolidated and outposted thereon.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) moved at 0700 to the East and reconnoitered roads leading to the division objectives. At 1230 and 1335, enemy encountered at 357610 and 310629 respectively. Fighting resulted in the killing of many enemy and the capture of a large number of prisoners of war. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) relieved by the 747th Tank Battalion on division objective at 1635 and was ordered to reconnoiter objective of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, and areas forward which was accomplished and reported clear at 2130 at which time troop went into bivouac vicinity of Belleville (3767).

The 70th Tank Battalion assembled all units in the vicinity of Gagny (2044) throughout the night and then attacked at 1000 to seize objective in division zone of action. At 1415 Company A reached 209562; Company B, 213567, and Company C at 216558. At 1520 all three companies reached objectives and consolidated thereon; relieved by the 22d Infantry on objective and assembled vicinity 212500 at 1800.

The 3d Armored Group (less 71st Tank Battalion) joined the 4th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Maully Sur Marne (1942) at 0600; 727th Tank Battalion moved forward to 12th Infantry objective, passed the road junction at 390545 at 1430, arriving at 1515 having encountered no opposition and consolidated thereon. Alerted to move to road center (3667) at 1655, moved onto 8th Infantry objective, reaching there at 1745 with opposition and consolidated thereon.

30. 30 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the northeast, marching, consolidating, and outposting all assigned objectives.

The 6th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, conducted vigorous patrols to the front and flanks of positions held at the end of the previous day during the night of 29-30 August with no contact with the enemy except a small group of eight which wandered into Company A area at 0215 and all were killed, wounded or captured. The regiment continued the attack to the northeast at 0900, the 3d Battalion on the right; 1st Battalion on the left with motorized patrols sent by both battalions to reconnoiter flanks. The 2d Battalion, in regimental reserve, followed the 1st Battalion by fifteen minutes to protect the left flank. Regiment continued the march, meeting no opposition and by 2010 all elements had closed in areas in the vicinity of La Montagne (390775) and preparations were begun for continuance of the attack to the northeast per Field Order No. 29, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, 301800B August 1944.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, conducted vigorous patrolling to the front and flanks during the night of 29-30 August of positions held at close of the previous day and contacted no enemy in its zone of action. At 0900, the regiment attacked

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

to the northeast, 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, with the 2d Battalion on the right. The 1st Battalion was passed through by the 3d Battalion and reverted to combat team reserve and closed upon objective vicinity of Bois Du Roy (4877) by 2000, having made no contact with the enemy. Preparations were begun for continuance of the attack to the northeast per Field Order No. 23, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, 301300Z August 1944.

The 22d Infantry with the 4th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company B, 31st Chemical Battalion, one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, conducted vigorous patrolling to front and flank of positions occupied at the end of the previous day during the night of 29-30 August and no contact with the enemy was made. Combat team in division reserve staged forward on the left rear of Combat Team B within the division zone of action and protected the division left (North) flank. One battalion (motorized) remained in the vicinity of Semil-Aveit (23000) until 1230, at which time it displaced forward and rejoined the remainder of the combat team. At the close of the day, the combat team occupied positions within the zone of action in the vicinity of Erna-Ouille (3371).

The 4th Division Artillery (less combat team attachments) (plus 186th and 190th Field Artillery Battalions, 17th FCB, 693d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 377th Airmount Artillery (AW) Battalion attached), echeloned forward within close supporting distance of the division and was prepared to mass all fires on left flank of the division.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) reconnoitered to the northeast to a line between points 46400 and 63000, obtained reconnaissance to the northeast as far as 59000 and 66100, and at the close of the day assembled in the vicinity of Sully-Le-Long (395605).

The 70th Tank Battalion, less Company D, in division reserve, prepared to support Combat Team B or Combat Team 22 on call and moved forward to assembly area in the vicinity of Bois du Val (385730), closing at 1800. The Battalion, less Company D, attached 3d Armored Group at 2000. Company D, 70th Tank Battalion reconnoitered rear areas in the division zone of action to locate and reduce isolated enemy resistance but no contact was made with the enemy and at the close of the day was outposting road net Division CP, vicinity of Marteuil-Le-Haudouin (4172).

The 3d Armored Group (less 741st Tank Battalion) remained in division reserve, prepared to support CT 12 on call; moved to assembly area in the vicinity of Pery-Les-Goebries (4273).

31. 31 August 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the northeast, per Field Order No. 23, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, 301300Z August 1944.

The 3th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 31st Chemical Battalion attached, attached, advanced, in column, 2d Battalion leading, crossed the IF at 1000; passed through by CC A, 5th Armored Division Team No. 4, and continued advance behind armor at 2000. CT 8 deployed with 1st Battalion on left who engaged enemy along woods at 515918; enemy was found to be in well prepared defensive positions and at 2100, CT 8 dug in positions for the night.

The 12th Infantry with 22d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B,

Section IV - Operations, Contd.

4th Medical Battalion, and Company B, 895d Tank Destroyer (SE) Battalion attached, attacked with the 2d Battalion leading, crossed IP at 1025, passed through by Team No. 5, CG A, 5th Armored Division at 1030, and continued the advance behind armor. No resistance was met and battalions closed in assembly area vicinity 636984 at 1715.

The 22d Infantry with 11th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 895d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company B, 61st Chemical Battalion, and one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained in assembly area in the vicinity of Brinn Orville (3371). Plans were for CI 22 (motorized) to advance after the 5th Armored Division and secure bridgehead along the Aisne River, but due to limited progress of armor, CI 22 did not carry through with the mission. Entrucked at 1800 and moved to vicinity 553348, closing therein at 2110.

The 4th Division Artillery, less combat team attachments, plus 186th and 190th Field Artillery Battalions, 17th FOD, 893d Tank Destroyer (SE) Battalion, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 377th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion attached, echeloned forward within supporting distance of the combat teams and fired interdiction missions in front of the division sector.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) reconnoitered western edge of the division zone of action and moved to vicinity 507844, closing therein at 2100.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion moved bridging material forward, prepared to support the advance of the division across the Aisne River, and closed in vicinity 602351 at 2100.

The 70th Tank Battalion echeloned forward, prepared to support the 22d Infantry, and closed in assembly area vicinity 520687 at 2125. Company D relieved of mission of previous day and reverted to battalion control.

The 3d Armored Group, less 71st Tank Battalion, remained in division reserve, prepared to support CI 12 on call, and moved to vicinity 569343, closing therein at 1800.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: During the month of August movement of the 4th Infantry Division was rapid and over great distances. Movements were accomplished in large part by the employment of attached Quartermaster Truck Companies furnished by the First United States Army. The supply line was considerably lengthened when the division moved east of Paris and by the end of the month the shortage of gasoline had become critical.

2. Replacement of vehicular losses became increasingly difficult during the month. However, the First United States Army continued to replace Cargo Carriers M-29 with 1-ton trucks. At the end of the period fifty-seven Cargo Carriers M-29 were still on hand in the division.

3. Expenditure of artillery ammunition during the period fell to less than one-tenth of a unit of fire.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

4. The care and cleaning of clothing and equipment was conducted within units of the division were in assembly areas.
5. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.
6. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner.

Summary of Casualties Evacuated

	Officers	Enl
Killed in action	16	229
Died of wounds	4	20
Died of injuries	-	-
Missing in action	1	51
Seriously wounded in action	32	650
Seriously injured in action	2	43
Slightly wounded in action	23	410
Slightly injured in action	6	165
	89	1508

7. Total Casualties.....1595

7. Prisoner of War Enclosures were opened during the month as follows:

9 August 1944 - 492326
 12 August 1944 - 634974
 17 August 1944 - 122966

8. A total of 1236 German prisoners of war were taken during this period.

9. During the period from 1 August to 21 August 1944, a total of 131 officers and 2601 enlisted man replacements were received.

10. Strength: 1 August 1944 31 August 1944

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (present and absent)	O	WO	Enl	O	WO	Enl
Hq 4th Inf Div	51	3	134/1	35	3	136/59
8th Inf	150	5	3099/1	172	5	3226/1
12th Inf	170	6	3220	167	6	3299
22d Inf	171	4	3375/1	130	4	3137
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Art	21	2	117	21	2	115
20th FA Bn	34	2	614	32	2	612
29th FA Bn	33	2	555	32	2	577
12d FA Bn	32	2	565	35	2	554
41th FA Bn	29	2	577/1	32	2	562/1
4th Engr Combat Bn	31	3	792	23	3	723
4th Lsd Bn	37	1	416	55	1	415
4th Recon Tr, Mech	7	-	157	5	-	154

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

Strength:	1 August 1944		31 August 1944			
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	0	WO - EM	0	WO - EM		
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	2	84	4	2	81
IP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	4	1	176/8	4	1	176/8
704th Ord L Maint Co	4	-	131/7	-	-	130/6
4th Qi Co	9	1	149	9	1	147
4th Sig Co	10	-	197	10	-	194
4th Sig Co	13	4	290	13	4	287
Total....	816	45	14662	839	45	14584
4th CIC Det	2	-	14	4	-	12
Order of Battle Unit No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	4	3	-	4
IPW Team No. 31 (12th Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
IPW Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	2	-	4	1	-	4
AI Team No. 417	2	-	4	2	-	4
Air Support Party	1	-	6	1	-	6
Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	-	7	1	-	7
377th AAA (AI) Bn	35	3	758	35	3	745
301st TD Bn	33	2	768	32	2	756
Total....	83	5	1575	84	6	1516
Grand Total	899	50	16237	923	50	16100

R. O. Barton
 R. O. BARTON,
 Major General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 August to 31 August 1952, without any loss of personnel or additional loss of specialist equipment.

2. This team has continued to keep a duplicate of the G-2 situation map, to receive and process all documents, to keep an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, units, field post numbers, personnel, and any additional information necessary, to translate documents and perform interrogations whenever required.

3. The study of documents during this period was somewhat curtailed by lack of contact with the enemy. However, many documents clarifying the history and background of reported enemy units were uncovered and forwarded to higher echelon for more detailed study.

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ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1. 1 August 1944. While searching enemy SS billets located approximately one-half mile from La Balaine, a considerable amount of artillery and mortar shells were uncovered that had been hidden in a farmhouse. Also large quantities of gas masks and some small arms ammunition were found. This information was reported to ordnance.
2. 2 August 1944. A CIC office was set up in Villedieu los Pooles. A list of collaborators was obtained from the Chief of the Resistance Group. They had all been evacuated by the Germans. The bank and the PTT were closed and the telephone and telegraph cables cut. Enemy billets were searched. Agents of this detachment checked the identity cards and questioned civilians in the town of Fleury. Jean Baptiste Frauny approached for crossing the front lines in the vicinity of the 3th Infantry Regiment was evacuated to VII Corps Civilian Collecting Point because of his inconsistent story.
3. 3 August 1944. Five road control posts were set up to check all civilians traveling. Some three hundred civilians moving on the road were diverted to a field near La Chapelle Coelin and then were moved by truck to a school house at Villedieu. From this group three German soldiers in civilian clothes and five food workers were sent back through prisoner of war channels. Former enemy GPs in the vicinity of Le Frinot and St. Martin le Bouillien were searched and documents obtained were submitted to the AC of S, G-2, 4th Infantry Division. A written denunciation against one Edouard Croquievie, resident of St. Lo, was received from a Resistance leader in Hambye. This Croquievie collaborated with members of the PFF. This information was submitted to VII Corps CIC Detachment. A list of four collaborators in the town of Lisieux was also obtained in Hambye from M. Roger Bobino of Lisieux. It is reported that these four were members of the PFF. This information was sent to VII Corps CIC Detachment.
4. 4 August 1944. All roads entering and leaving Villedieu los Pooles were patrolled within a radius of five miles. All road control posts were checked and then the town was turned over to the VII Corps CIC Detachment. A check was made at La Chapelle Coelin regarding the loyalty of five hundred and forty refugees evacuated from this general area. Marshal Taintain, a reserve member of the French Army of Laval, was taken into custody in the town of Coillouvray Boishevatau. He had a Parisian identity card.
5. 5 August 1944. Resistance men in the towns of Coillouvray Boishevatau and Le Gast were contacted and a list of collaborators was obtained. Thirty civilians in the vicinity of the 4th Quartermaster Company CP were interrogated for security purpose.
6. 6 August 1944. Agents entered St. Pois and checked the PTT building and two other buildings known to have been used by the Germans. A meeting with the Mayor took place and food controls were set up. The

Annex D - 4th CIC Det., Contd

Gendarmier agreed to check the identity cards of all persons not recognized to be local citizens. In the vicinity of la Tienite fifty-one boxes of 81mm mortar shells and other material were discovered in an orchard. This information was submitted to the AG of S. G-2. Road controls were established in the town of Coulaucray. M. Julien Bailly, a resident of Escobres le Chesnois, a strong pro-Gorman, was apprehended and is being held pending further investigation. It was reported that the subject was forwarding information to the Gormans regarding activities of the townspeople.

7. 7 August 1944. M. Bailly was evacuated to VII Corps Civilian Cage. Statements from the Mayor, secretary to the Mayor, and post office clerk of St. Laurent-de-Cuve were obtained denouncing subject.

8. 20 August 1944. Agents checked areas of proposed new Division OP, and screened all civilians living in the area.

9. 9 August 1944. Nine civilians were picked up by agents of this detachment near the front lines. These people all had passes for the town of Soudval which was still in enemy hands. The CAO in Chorbucq had issued six of these passes and the Mayor of Toulaville had issued three of them.

10. 10 August 1944. Temporary offices were set up in Ste. Feis for the purpose of screening civilians. A search for Mrs. Erika Lachonin, a reported dangerous collaborator, was made but it was found that she had left with the Gorman troops. Dr. Robert George Guillionet of Valognes, possessing a CAO pass to travel in pursuit of his possession, was encountered in Civros traveling for purposes other than for the pursuit of his possessions. He was directed to return immediately.

11. 11 August 1944. Six road control posts were set up in the vicinity of Passais, le Fortuis and St. George de Rouille. The Mayors of St. Roch-sur-Epreme and St. Iers d'Epreme were interviewed regarding the loyalty of the people in the vicinity. Both Mayors agreed to inform their citizens that no travel would be permitted until the 13th of August. Thirty-five civilians were screened in the vicinity of Passais. Agents of this detachment apprehended Venli Ishauchov of Russian nationality, and a member of the German Army, in civilian clothes. Subject gave himself up and was sent back through prisoner of war channels. He had no identification papers.

12. 12 August 1944. Fifteen Russian and Lorraine Fedt workers were apprehended and evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Forty French civilians were screened at Buals and arrangements were made with the Mayor to set up road controls. Several persons apprehended in the vicinity of our front lines had to be detained until the front lines moved up.

13. 13 August 1944. Eight civilians were held overnight at prisoner of war cage for violating traffic and curfew regulations. Upon searching a chateau in the vicinity of La G de Hale, a signal generator used to line

Annex D - 4th CIC Det, Contd

up receiving sets and a small radio receiver were uncovered. M. and L. Richard de la Monte, owners of the chateau, admitted ownership but said the equipment had not been used since the war. The equipment was confiscated upon agreement with the owner. Investigation proved that the family is well respected in the community. Agents then screened all evacuees living in the chateau. One Gregor Obsowski, Polish, admitted having served several months in the German Army. He was apprehended and turned over to the prisoner of war cage for disposition.

14. 12 August 1944. Agents checked control posts previously established at Pascais, Le Portuis and St. Georges de Rivoire. Georgette Lair, refugee from St. Lo, living in the vicinity of Buais, was denounced as having engaged in espionage activities. Investigation revealed that the subject was a seventeen year old girl who had a German soldier for a fiance. She was released to the custody of her parents who are considered reputable people.

15. 15 August 1944. Nine Todt Workers were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. H. Reno Bigot, of Flores, was apprehended for traveling back and forth through our lines. In the vicinity of the division rear echelon several lights were observed flickering at 2300, 16 August 1944. A young French girl admitted striking two matches in her home about that time. Subject was warned this was a violation of existing regulations and to refrain from such practices.

16. 16 August 1944. All civilians screened were released.

17. 17 August 1944. Three German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended in the vicinity of La Broche sur Luce. They were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Luka Dunitz, Yugoslav citizen, denounced four days ago by the citizens of St. Mars d'Egromme, was apprehended near Torchamp and evacuated to VII Corps Civilian Cage.

18. 18 August 1944. Eugene Fordan, residence La Jolieville, was found sleeping in a barn with a German rifle and ammunition in his possession. Investigation proved subject to be of moronic mentality but not dangerous to our security. Four control posts were established in the city limits of Cerrouges. Gendarmes agreed to man those posts.

19. 19-23 August 1944. Negative report inasmuch as this detachment had no contact with enemy activity or civilians.

20. 24 August 1944. Gunter Nitechka, Berlin, eighteen years old, German paratrooper was apprehended in civilian clothes. He volunteered much tactical information before he was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. George Nikisino and Alfred Stoessle were apprehended by agents of this detachment and were evacuated to Master Interrogation Center. A German military radio with an auxiliary supply of equipment was found in their room near Cerrouges. Stoessle had asked a soldier in the 12th Infantry Regiment all sorts of questions regarding the movement of his outfit. Stoessle had 425,970 francs in his possession. Both men admitted having worked for Todt.

Annex D 4th ENG Det, Contd.

21. 25-27 August 1944. This detachment provided local security for the division. No enemy was encountered.

22. 28 August 1944. One René Chyelaes, 101 Avenue de Gravelle, St. Maurice, Seine, was reported as being a collaborator. Investigation proved subject was known to the FFI in Paris and that he was considered loyal. Heinz Lang, alias Emilie Henry Jung, a German soldier in civilian clothes and in possession of a falsified carte d' Identite, surrendered to the FFI, who in turn gave him over to agents of this detachment. Subject stated he has been in Paris since September 1942 when he deserted the German Army. Two other German soldiers in civilian clothes were interrogated and sent through regular channels for prisoners of war.

23. 29 August 1944. Francois Aralyic was apprehended cutting wire in the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion's area. Subject admitted cutting the wire but stated he thought it had been discarded by the Germans. Subject is seventy-eight years of age and townspeople all agreed he was harmless. Subject was therefore released.

24. 30 August 1944. Albert Larous, of French nationality, was apprehended while wearing an American uniform with a 4th Infantry Division insignia. He was held pending investigation. Jacques Henri Charles Corzezi, admitted member of LVR, was arrested by members of the FFI in the vicinity of Mantouille Hamouin. Subject is being held for further investigation. Fourteen civilians in the town of Mantouille Hamouin arrested by the FFI were investigated by agents of this detachment. Only four of these suspects were deemed dangerous to our security and, therefore, held. The remaining suspects were permitted to remain in their homes. This agreement was satisfactory to the chief of the Resistance Group.

25. 31 August 1944. Chateau Vez, located at Vez, which was formerly occupied by Germans, was searched by agents of this detachment. Results were negative. Albert Hreza and Jacques Henri Charles Corzeze apprehended on 30 August 1944 were delivered to First Army Civilian Care for further investigation. Area surrounding new division CP was visited and all civilians searched. Two former German officers were searched and documents found were turned over to the G.O.S., G-2, 4th Infantry Division.

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ANNEX C - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 417

1. The following statistics pertain to the activities of Military Intelligence Interpreters Team No. 417 during the period 1 August to 31 August 1944, inclusive:

Interrogated:	61 French civilians
Interrogated:	51 German Prisoners of War
Identified :	49 Enemy units
Identified :	21 Enemy officers
Miscellaneous Identifications:	Minifields, antitank ditches, enemy supply and munition depots, fortifications and defenses of Paris, artillery batteries (locations and caliber), and location of aircraft installations.

Obtaining information: Regarding strength and organization of enemy units; their weapons, enemy transportation facilities and routes followed; morale of enemy troops and casualties suffered.

2. The following activities were performed in addition to those listed above:


Served as interpreters for the Commanding General, V Corps and the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
Two members of the team served in liaison capacity to the 12th Infantry Regiment when it entered Paris.
Liaison with the FBI.
Served as interpreters for CIC and CAO.
Translation of documents.
Assisted CIC in screening civilians.
Searching enemy installations for documents.
Interrogated foreign elements of enemy units in Russian, Lithuanian, German and French.

ANNEX D - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31


1. During the period from about 1 August to 15 August 1944 very few aerial photos were received. Members of the team visited installations which had been observed in previous interpretations, and compared the actual on-the-spot appearance of the installations with aerial photographs. Among the installations visited was a radio station near Le Mans, France.
2. During the latter part of August a very limited number of photos were received. These were interpreted and the interpretations posted on a defense map. Uncontrolled mosaics were prepared and distributed to the units concerned.
3. Due to the rapid movement of operations during this period, photographs were rarely received in time to be of much value.

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SECTION A



XX 4
Aug. 10 - Aug 26, 1944
MOVEMENT FROM:
ST. PONS TO PARIS
OVERLAY SKETCH
1/250,000



SECTION B

XX
4
Aug. 10 - Aug 26, 1944
MOVEMENT FROM :
ST. PAIS TO PARIS
OVERLAY SKETCH
1/250,000

ROUEN

SEINE R.

DREUX

PARIS

Polignou

Langjumeau

Arpajon

Corbiel

GRAPHIC SCALE



WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO-MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179 (Cont)

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(621)
Histor

Operations Report, 4th Inf Div

50g 44

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: [redacted]
Date: 30 October 1944

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AG 519.1 *Changes on case made per instructions from case dated 9 Jan 45 enclosed at conclusion of this month's rpt. (M.H.E.)* 10 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Action against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports. **3**

TO : The adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU : Command Channels.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C, & D)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 1, relative to "Action against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports" the following report is submitted for period 1 September to 30 September 1944.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
ON FILED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
William K. Topf Lt LTC F&D
POWER GRADING COMMITTEE 29 March 46

Section II - Introduction

General [redacted]

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Barr, 015447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Carlton R. Bryant, 0287628, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, 0302396, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Major Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, 0373431, GSC
- Orig. Gen. Harold W. Blaney, 07237, USA commanded the division from 1 Sept 40 to 29 Sept 44, inclusive.*
- Major General Harold R. Bull, 03707, USA, commanded the division from 21 September to 29 September 1944, inclusive.

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Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet, 05847, USA, commanded the division from 30 September to 4 October 1944, inclusive.

Major John L. Delaney, 0302396, GSC, AC of S, G-3 was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 27 September 1944.

1. The beginning of September found the 4th Infantry Division moving rapidly across the open country in eastern France. The tactical situation was progressing so rapidly that it was necessary to divide the GP so that the command group could keep up with the regiments. Half of the AC of S, G-1 Section went forward with the command group; the remainder of the section stayed at the old location. The command group bivouacked at a farm estate located at 601849 for the night of 1 September 1944 and moved out early on the morning of 2 September 1944.

*Inc
Encl 1*

[redacted]

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DEC 29 1944
6241*

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

2. 2 September 1944. The congestion of vehicles on the roads slowed up the regiments so it was necessary to halt the CP in a farm located at 624090. The forward portion of the AC of S, G-1 Section set up temporarily and a guide was sent back to bring the remainder of the section forward.

Two lieutenant colonels reported to the division on detached service and were attached to the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments.

3. 3 September 1944. The Division CP moved to vicinity of St. Quentin France (796448). The move took most of the day but by late afternoon the AC of S, G-1 Section was again functioning. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to V Corps and the First United States Army by officer courier.

4. 4 September 1944. All available time was utilized to process decorations and awards. Bronze Star Ribbons were not available; therefore only General Orders and Citations could be presented. Presentation ceremonies were delayed in the expectation of receiving a sufficient quantity of ribbons.

5. 5 September 1944. The Division CP moved to 695432 and the day was utilized to get the AC of S, G-1 Section set up and functioning.

6. 10 September 1944. The Division CP moved to 663756. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to V Corps and First United States Army by officer courier. A check was made on the supply of Bronze Star Ribbons necessary for members of the division who had been awarded this decoration. The supply had not yet arrived and none were available.

The tactical situation during the past five days had been such that there was little time for administrative work since the CP was constantly moving forward. During periods of this nature, the AC of S, G-1 Section kept busy with routine work on reports and planning the procedure for obtaining replacements.

7. 11 September 1944. Regimental S-1's were contacted to ascertain the exact strength of their commands and possible need for men of specific specialties. All regiments were in good condition.

8. 12 September 1944. The Division CP moved to 738638.

9. 13 September 1944. The Division CP made two moves - the first to 842824 and the second to 893872. When the G-1 Section moved into the final area for the night it was set up and ready to function the next day.

10. 15 September 1944. The Division CP moved to Aww, Germany (006901). Because of the tactical situation, the CP moved again in the late afternoon to 961859.

11. 16 September 1944. The division was fighting in the Siegfried Line and casualties were bringing the effective strength down. Through requisitions, replacements were obtained every day. The majority of these replacements were casuals of the division returning from hospitals. These men were returned to their original companies in every case providing they were physically fit to renew their original duties.

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

12. 17 September 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to V Corps and First United States Army by the AC of S, G-1 and a check was made on replacements. It was found that there were still a number of the division's casualties in the replacement system. It was assured that these officers and men would be included on the requisition outstanding.

13. 18 September 1944. Former members of the division were received through the replacement channels. *Major General Harold R. Bull* assumed command of the division in the absence of *Major General Raymond O. Barton.*

14. 19 September 1944. Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet joined the division ~~to assume command~~ at the termination of *Major General Bull's* tour of duty.

15. 20 September 1944. Division Classification Officer consulted the AC of S, G-1 to determine the effective strength of the rifle companies of the regiments to obtain basis for further requisitions. The problem of disposing enlisted men who had been classified "Limited assignment" was getting critical. Many of the soldiers, due to wounds, were not physically fit for front line duty. A few could be absorbed in the service units; however the number returning was getting above reasonable proportions. After medical examination, if determined fit for duty, they were returned to their units and if found still physically unfit were re-evacuated.

16. 21 September 1944. The AC of S, G-1 and the Division Classification Officer kept in close contact with V Corps Replacement Battalion, and by that method replacements were transported to the units in the shortest lapse of time. By dividing the replacements according to units at the Replacement Battalion and shipping direct to their unit, it was found that the men joined their companies at least a day sooner. *Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull* assumed command of the division.

17. 22 - 29 September 1944. The division was holding its lines and activity had diminished so that accurate count of effectives was made and the deficiencies requisitioned and obtained through replacement channels.

The AC of S, G-1 contacted the Red Cross representative and acquired a group of Donut Clubmobiles which were placed with the 4th Quartermaster Company. They were operated continuously and all infantry regiments and S-4 Sections distributed doughnuts to their units.

18. 30 September 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was delivered to V Corps and First United States Army by officer courier. A representative of the AC of S, G-1 Section went to the Replacement Battalion to obtain the final group of replacements.

The Estimated Loss Report was delivered daily to V Corps by officer courier.

The month of September ended with the division at T/O strength and in excellent condition for further operations.

Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the division.

SECTION III - INTELLIGENCE (WITH ANNEXES A, B, C, & D)

1. 1 September 1944. Enemy withdrew rapidly before our columns of armor and motorized infantry. The advance was so rapid front lines and enemy unit identifications did not exist.

2. 2 September 1944. Enemy front lines still did not exist. Our leading elements, at the close of the period, were reported at O-1175, N-7743, N-8527 and O-1077. The enemy resisted our advance with road blocks, demolished bridges, and strong points occupied by infantry and generally organized in the outskirts of key towns along our routes of advance. What was believed to be four "buzz bombs" constituted the only enemy air activity during the period. One of these bombs fell in the vicinity of Lepout (698998). Although groups of from two to five tanks were reported in the division zone of action, there was no aggressive action on the part of enemy armor. Enemy units contacted were the 510 and 512 Schnellle Battalions and elements of the 348 Infantry Division.

3. 3 September 1944. Having succeeded in collecting elements of disorganized personnel withdrawing into Belgium into groups with some semblance of unity, the enemy occupied and defended hastily constructed strong points along the 4th Infantry Division axis of advance. At the end of the period our elements had reached St. Quentin (N-8048), La Vallee Maistre (O-0266), and Pommersuil (O-0476). Although the enemy was poorly organized and equipped with whatever weapons and materiel could be gathered up in his headlong withdrawal, the resistance encountered at blown bridges, road blocks, and strong points was steady and determined. Elements of numerous organizations were encountered. These elements represented the following: 47 Infantry Division, 348 Infantry Division, 276 Infantry Division, 364 Infantry Division, 275 Infantry Division, SS Division Hitler Jugend, and several other lesser units of battalion size and smaller. No aggressive action was taken by enemy aircraft and armor.

4. 4 September 1944. Scattered groups of enemy collected to defend hastily constructed strong points and attempted to prevent our forces from advancing across the Leuse River. By the end of the period, however, the 102d Cavalry, operating in conjunction with the 4th Infantry Division held the bridges at Vireux, Haybes, and Montherno. One battalion of CT 22 moved to O-7757, while CT 8 and CT 12 held the line as in the previous period. Small disorganized detachments of enemy were mopped up in the vicinity of Landréocies. Considerable confusion, many times bordering on bewilderment, caused most groups of enemy to surrender after offering very little or no resistance. No enemy aircraft were reported over the sector and enemy armor did not operate against the 4th Infantry Division. Units contacted were: 47 Infantry Division, 275 Infantry Division, 345 Infantry Division, Glacow Regiment, 11 Para LA Regiment, and several minor units of little consequence.

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Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

5. 5 September 1944. The enemy continued to collect stragglers and remnants of retreating units into small groups in an attempt to occupy hastily constructed defensive positions in order to delay our advance. Forward elements of the 4th Infantry Division reached the Meuse River and established bridgeheads with little resistance from the enemy. Our 102d Cavalry Group established the line: Virox (8589), Hargnies (9962) and Thilly (9046). Between this line and the Meuse River the 102d Cavalry met scattered pockets of resistance which engaged our units in small arms fire fights and then hastily withdrew to the east. Enemy tanks were reported in the forward areas of the 4th Infantry Division zone of action, but no action was initiated by them. Units in contact were the 47 Infantry Division, 275 Infantry Division, 348 Infantry Division, and elements of the 5 and 6 Para Divisions. Other smaller units represented the following: 18 Air Force Field Division, the "Glasgow" Regiment, and the 192 Security Regiment.

6. 6 September 1944. Enemy front lines as such were nonexistent. Increasing resistance, however, was encountered in the vicinity of Willorzie (9558) and Rionno (9659). The rear guard action of the enemy was centered around demolished bridges, road blocks, and strong points hastily set up in the outskirts of towns. Small arms and antitank guns were employed by the enemy who took the utmost advantage of the rugged terrain which was extremely favorable for fighting a delaying action. Filled trees across the roads of advance, combined with booby traps and teller mines were numerous. A characteristic among those recently encountered consisted of an infantry force mounted on eleven half-tracks supported by five light tanks. This group fought a rear guard action along the highways running east and west through Willorzie, Rionno, and Godinne. This force utilized tanks in setting up its defense and withdrew when our troops attacked in force. Enemy aircraft did not operate over the 4th Infantry Division sector during this period. In addition to numerous minor units, elements of the 191 Security Regiment, 680 Ost Battalion, 348 Infantry Division, Hitler Jugend Division, 83 Nebelwerfer Regiment, 6 Para Division, and 10 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were encountered.

7. 7 September 1944. The forward elements of the 4th Infantry Division pushed the enemy back east of the line 173488 - 280578 - 180590 - 180680 - 120680 - 100428. Strong delaying forces at all road centers and towns defended road blocks, strong points, and destroyed bridges, employing rear guard patrols mounted in tanks and armored cars together with infantry armed with small arms and antitank guns. Characteristic of enemy action was the attempted defense of Wellin (125680). Here the enemy employed about two companies motorized and on bicycles. In support of this force were four or five Mark V or Mark VI tanks, and several armored cars. This force fought bitterly until our superior numbers and support weapons forced it to withdraw to the east. Elements of the 2 Panzer Division, 9 Panzer Division, 680 Ost Battalion, and 191 Security Regiment opposed our forces in the 4th Infantry Division zone of action. No enemy aircraft were reported during the period.

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

8. 8 September 1944. Showing improvement in his coordination of defense of road blocks and strong points, the enemy continued to resist the advance of the 4th Infantry Division. At the end of the period our forces had reached the line 302774 - 301716 - 285694 - 310610 - 315582. Numerous road blocks and strong points with infantry dug in, in conjunction with improved and better coordinated artillery support all combined to form the rear guard action of the enemy. Armored patrols were maintained between those points and strategically emplaced antitank guns continually harassed the advance of our armor. As previously, however, resistance from these points ceased and a general withdrawal eastward took place when our units pressed the attack in force. Units contacted were 2 SS Division, 2 Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division, 74 Artillery Regiment, and 1151 Artillery Regiment. Enemy aircraft were not in evidence during the period.

9. 9 September 1944. The enemy employed small arms, machine guns, and in some cases antitank guns to cover road blocks and strong points usually set up on the outskirts of towns along the roads employed by the 4th Infantry Division in its advance. It was apparent that these delaying forces were fighting a stiff rear guard action, while elite troops of the 1 SS Division Adolf Hitler and other SS and Panzer units hastened their retreat about 24 hours ahead of our leading elements. At the end of the period our forces had pushed the enemy east of the line: 4480 - 4779 - 4764 - 4659 - 4548. Enemy tanks continued to operate in small groups as contact patrols between the various defense installations along our axis of advance. Armored personnel carriers were held slightly behind the enemy's front line positions and were employed to hastily withdraw the delaying forces when our attack pressed close. Enemy aircraft appeared over the sector during the period but no aggressive action was taken by them. Units in contact were elements of the Hitler Jugend Division, 2 Panzer Division, 1 SS Division Adolf Hitler, the 16, 109 and 191 Security Regiments, 74 Artillery Regiment, and 38 Antitank Battalion.

10. 10 September 1944. Road blocks, felled trees, and demolished bridges covered by small arms and antitank fire from dug-in positions designed for all-around defense continued to constitute the defensive effort of the enemy as he continued his stubborn delaying action. Enemy artillery showed a sharp increase during the period and it was evident that the rear guard action as a whole was becoming much stronger. Late in the period our forces had pushed the enemy beyond the line: 527820 - 475805 - 610755 - 590680 - 620690 - 560590 - 510580 - 530550. Armor, consisting of a few tanks and some half-tracks, was still employed primarily as a means of rapidly evacuating the troops before our determined attack. Units contacted were: 2 Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division, 2 SS Division, and 680 Ost Battalion. No air activity was reported over the division sector.

11. 11 September 1944. As in the previous period, the enemy continued his determined defense of road blocks and strong points along the 4th Infantry Division axis of advance. After defending these emplacements, fiercely employing small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank guns, the delaying force effected an orderly withdrawal when our forces attacked in strength. No armor was employed aggressively by the enemy during the period.

See III - Intelligence, Contd

Enemy planes were over the sector, but took no offensive action. Prisoners of war represented the 2 SS Division and 680 Ost Battalion. At the close of the period, CT 12 had pushed the enemy east of the line 717884 - 717860 - 722845, while CT 22 and CT 8 occupied respective assembly areas at 7782 and 7081.

12. 12 September 1944. Abandoning, for the most part, the practice of installing road blocks, the enemy resorted to a delaying action employing armored patrols along the roads and a few dug in positions occupied by infantry. It was apparent at this time that no defensive line of any great proportions would be established west of the Siegfried Line. What remained of the enemy rear guard had at this time pulled inside the German border and was hurriedly withdrawing to the security of the Siegfried defenses, leaving a handful of troops to delay our advance as long as possible while the major withdrawal was accomplished. Enemy was engaged at St. Vith (855880) and late in the period our forces had reached the line 8684 - 9086 - 9081. The only units in contact were elements of 13th Marine Battalion, and 18 Air Communications Contact Company. Three enemy aircraft appeared over the division sector and, although flares were dropped, no strafing or bombing was reported. Five enemy tanks were reported vicinity 865860.

13. 13 September 1944. A considerable increase in the size and amount of artillery supported the delaying action of enemy troops occupying hastily built dug-in positions from which they defended with small arms and anti-tank weapons. These positions appeared to be considerably stronger in the northern half of the 4th Infantry Division sector. Enemy tanks operated against our reconnaissance forces near Bullingen. Enemy planes were again over the 4th Infantry Division sector, but as usual no aggressive action was taken by them. By the end of the period our forces had pushed elements of the 2 SS Division, the 82 Supply Battalion, and 26 Marine Battalion beyond the line: 9985 - 9685 - 9682 - 9736.

14. 14 September 1944. The enemy dug in and occupied hasty emplacements west of the Siegfried line. Active patrolling with the use of tanks was employed to prevent our forces from reaching the Siegfried defenses. In the areas where the enemy had been forced back into the installations of the Siegfried line, permanent installations of reinforced concrete were manned. It was found that these pillboxes, bunkers, and gun emplacements conformed closely to those shown on the defense overprint. Many additional emplacements were encountered, however. Numerous weapons were employed by the enemy both in the pillboxes and in the hasty fortifications and heavy concentrations of small arms, machine gun, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery fire were brought to bear on our assaulting forces. Enemy artillery continued heavy both in concentration and caliber. Late in the period our forces had dislodged the enemy from the Siegfried defenses in several places and were established along the line 030870 - 029659 - 020800 - 004838 - 014835 - 990820. Units in contact were: 658 Ost Battalion, CT Gombel, 34 Light Artillery Battalion, 626 Security Battalion, SS Das Reich Division, and 454 Grenadier Ersatz Battalion.

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

15. 15 September 1944. Several enemy counterattacks, at least one of which was of battalion strength, were launched in an attempt to regain pillboxes occupied by our forces in the Siegfried line. In other places where the enemy still held the concrete emplacements, our assault on those positions was met with determined resistance from small arms, machine guns, mortars, antitank guns, and heavy artillery. Three tanks were observed in the vicinity of Hontheim, and tanks dug in were observed in the vicinity O40835. CT 22 encountered the enemy in force at O40833. CT 12 engaged the enemy at O35869, O47881, and O45895, while CT 8 encountered the enemy at Roth (O40907).

16. 16 September 1944. Enemy front lines were located along the ridge: L-O40874 - O47881 - O36883 - O38877, from O54816 along the ridge to O58855, and along the south side of the road from Sellerich to Brandscheid. The enemy defended from well dug in and camouflaged positions and from concrete emplacements housing machine guns and antitank guns. Artillery which was employed constantly consisted of heavy barrages of 88, 105, 150 and 170mm believed to be located in prepared open emplacements well behind the forward emplacements. The enemy engaged in strong active patrolling and counterattacked with up to company strength. Tanks and assault guns were employed in support of the dug in and concrete emplacements. No enemy aircraft were reported over the division sector. Units in contact were: SS Division Hitler Jugend, 2 SS Division Das Reich, 9 SS Division, 105 Train Battalion, 34 Light Artillery Battalion, 1031 Security Battalion, and 118 Infantry Training Regiment.

17. 17 September 1944. Enemy front lines were generally located: O36856 - O49881 - O65882 - O64894. Along the southern part of the division zone, the enemy front lines could only be described as "fluid". The enemy continued to defend his well prepared and concealed earthen emplacements and dug-outs in addition to concrete pillboxes and bunkers. These positions were the base for determined concentrations of rifle, machine gun, antiaircraft and bazooka fire. In addition, the front line emplacements were well supported by 150 or 170mm artillery fire. Strong patrols invaded our lines and several determined counterattacks were attempted in an attempt to regain lost pillboxes. Tank and assault guns continued to play a defensive role and no action by enemy aircraft was experienced during the period. Numerous armor units were encountered during the period, but the same units identified in the previous period continued to form the backbone of the opposition on the 4th Infantry Division front.

18. 18 September 1944. The enemy continued to employ the same effective tactics in defending his excellent positions. Between the strong points the area was not occupied but was covered by patrols. Twenty and forty millimeter antiaircraft guns were employed to supplement the regular infantry weapons and antitank guns. Artillery support continued to come from heavy artillery pieces and rockets, although the concentrations during this period were somewhat less intense. In spite of numerous patrols in force and several determined counterattacks, the enemy front lines were contained at L-O64975 - O65381 - O64894, from O30840 north to O35855. In the southern sector, the front lines remained fluid. Units contacted were: 689 Ost Battalion, Air Force School Unit, 2 SS Division, and CT Kuhn.

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19. 19 September 1944. The enemy counterattacked with forces ranging from a company to that of a battalion reinforced from the north, northeast, and southeast. All counterattacks were preceded by artillery preparations which lasted about ten minutes. It was apparent that the aim in each case was to retake the pillboxes and bunkers lost to our forces. The enemy line between 032853 to 030845 remained static. The rest of the front line generally; 045883 - 050884 - 051882 - 050882 remained fluid and was the source from which many active patrols and several counterattacks emanated. Artillery was very active during the period and very heavy concentrations of rockets were received. No aircraft or armor was employed by the enemy in the 4th Infantry Division sector. Units in contact were: CT Kuhne, CT Gombel, 2 SS-Division Das Reich, 191 Security Regiment, 2 SS-Division Das Reich, 191 Security Regiment, Air Force School Unit, and 105 Infantry Training Battalion.

20. 20 September 1944. After an attack in the vicinity of Wascheid, the 1st and 3d companies of the Deutschland Regiment withdrew and reorganized for a second attack. This attack, like the first, was also repulsed with many losses being inflicted upon the enemy. The 2d company of the Deutschland Regiment succeeded in infiltrating our lines in the vicinity 043859. Leaving a small covering detachment, this company later withdrew under the cover of darkness. The covering detachment was wiped out by our forces. Along the road from 032852 to 029841 the enemy lines remained static. Defenses along this line consisted of well dug in and camouflaged emplacements. Enemy artillery continued as before and some tanks were heard in the vicinity 048889. No aggressive action was taken by them, however. No enemy aircraft were employed over the division sector. Units in contact were the same as in the previous period.

21. 21 September 1944. Enemy front lines existed from 028846 to 039841, and at 048889, 050883, 052886, 055882, 060875, and 059870. Enemy lines throughout the remainder of the 4th Infantry Division zone of action remained fluid. The static areas of defense were covered with small arms, machine gun and anti-aircraft fire. Artillery was somewhat less intense and was mostly directed on supply routes and woods adjacent to major roads. In the areas classified as "fluid", the enemy engaged in active and determined patrolling. Where the enemy was driven out of his permanent emplacements, he hastily constructed dug-in positions which he occupied. Five tanks were reported in the vicinity 837049 but no offensive action was taken by them. Units contacted were: CT Kuhne, 105 Training Battalion, 526 Infantry Division, and 66 Security Regiment.

22. 22 September 1944. Enemy activity was observed along the line 050889 - 059882 - 058883 - and 055874. This general line appeared to be the enemy's outpost line. Enemy front lines existed from 004820 to 987916 to 030830. In CT 8 area, except for the strong point at 031843, contact with the enemy was by patrol activity alone and no front line was established. The strong point at 031843 which was well dug in had machine guns so situated as to cover all open approaches through the woods. Patrols continued active and during the hours of darkness, one of them attempted to reoccupy the pillbox vicinity 990818. This effort was repulsed with losses to the enemy. CT Kuhne, having been reinforced with men and weapons

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from 21 Festung Machine Gun Battalion, continued its strong defense in the vicinity 031845. Late in the period this force attacked with small units attempting to get in rear of our troops. All these attempts were repulsed. Interdiction and harassing fires were continued by onery artillery, and several heavy caliber mortars and rocket concentrations were directed on the front lines. The only evidence of onery armor was four tanks at 050830 and two personnel carriers vicinity 044870. No onery aircraft were reported during the period. The following units were contacted; 31 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, CT Kuhne, 18 Battalion of the Luftwaffe Field Division, and 689 Ost Battalion.

23. 23 September 1944. The onery employed strong patrols of from four to ten men in an attempt to probe our lines at various points. All oner placements were heavily defended with infantry weapons, antitank guns, and artillery. Heavy machine gun fire was received from 052887, 054888, and 057888. Artillery was light until about 1600 hours when both artillery and rocket fire showed a marked increase. Fires were mostly harassing, although one regimental, one battalion and one company CP were shelled late in the period. Units contacted were CT Kuhne, 11 Festung Battalion, 7 Festung Battalion, 31 Festung Machine Gun Battalion, 454 Genesungs Company, and elements of SS Hitler Jugend Division.

24. 24 September 1944. The onery remained for the most part on the defensive during the period and there was a notable decline in aggressiveness and patrol activity. There was, however, considerable onery movement noted in the vicinity of Hontheim, although no evidence existed that troop movement into the 4th Infantry Division zone of action was taking place. The well-emplaced positions along the line: 987716 - 004820 - 030830 - 035835 - 047846 - 055848, and along the road from 064811 through 063882 to 062884 were defended strongly with infantry weapons supported by artillery, rockets, and antiaircraft guns. Several unidentified planes flew over the division zone during the hours of darkness. Tanks were reported in the vicinity of Branschoid. Units contacted were the same as in the previous period with the exception of CT Kuhne which appeared to have withdrawn. Intermittent harassing fires were received from onery artillery. Most concentrations were of less than battery strength. Some direct fire was received from dug in assault guns.

25. 25 September 1944. The onery continued to patrol towards our right and left flanks while in the center of the line he continued to improve his defensive positions. At 040840 and 064848, the onery CPL was moved closer to our front. On the whole, onery activity showed considerable decline and although artillery was likewise lighter, one regimental CP was shelled several times during the period. Along his front lines, the onery continued to defend his dug in positions as previously. Onery front lines existed at 987816 - 004820 - 030830 - 035835 - 040840 - 047946 - to Maschoid, then north along the edge of the woods to 064848 - 062881 - 061886 - 051891. Units contacted were the same as in the previous period. Unidentified planes were over the area during the period, but they took no offensive action. One tank, believed to be a Mark VI, was observed dug in at 061896. Another tank was reported at 036835.

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26. 26 September 1944. The enemy remained on the defensive during the period and his patrols operated only in rear of his own front lines. Strong points along the enemy front appeared to be mutually supporting and tied in with patrols. Positions and fields of fire continued to be improved. Enemy front lines were the same except in front of CT 8 where they existed from 064867 south to 064864 and from Maschoid to 046846 to 035834. Artillery fire was generally light, most fires being harassing and interdictory. No tanks were encountered in the division zone of action, but a self-propelled gun was reported in the vicinity 034838. Numerous unidentified planes were over the division sector during darkness but no offensive action on their part was reported.

27. 27 September 1944. Enemy front lines showed no change during the period. Considerable enemy activity was noted in the vicinity 065880. The enemy remained on the defensive during the period and, although several patrols were observed approaching our lines during both the daylight hours and during the hours of darkness, these patrols, after being contacted by our forces, withdrew. The enemy devoted considerable attention to improving his defenses and in some cases appeared to be making his living conditions more comfortable. Very light artillery was received during the period. Fires were intermittent and directed for the most part on our routes of supply. Flak was received by our observation planes while over enemy lines, and it appeared that flak was being used as time fire over the CP of the 3d Battalion of CT 8. Numerous planes were heard over the area but as usual, no offensive action was taken by them. No enemy armor was reported during the period. Units in contact believed to be the same as previous period.

28. 28 September 1944. The enemy continued to improve his defensive positions along most of the line. Some patrols were sent forward of the enemy's line and a counterattack was instigated by him against the hill at 055835 after our troops had succeeded in pushing the enemy off this hill and occupying the high ground. This counterattack was successfully repulsed by our forces. Artillery continued light and was directed primarily against roads and trails. At least one heavy concentration of rocket and artillery fire was laid in the vicinity 968857. Antiaircraft fire was received in some intensity by our fighter-bombers operating just over the enemy line. There was evidence of armored action on the part of the enemy. The same held true with enemy aircraft. Units in contact were the same as in the previous period.

29. 29 September 1944. The enemy defenses remained the same during this period. Some patrolling was initiated and considerable improving of positions was enacted. Artillery continued light with a slight increase in fires occurring after 1600. Rocket fire was received in the vicinity 036845. A number of unidentified planes were over and it was believed that propaganda leaflets were dropped by them. Four tanks were reported moving SSW out of Branschiedel (984812). Units in contact were: 2 SS Division, 526 Infantry Division, CT Genbol, 669 Ost Battalion, CT Bongartz and 18 Fort Battalion.

30. 30 September 1944. Enemy activity during this period consisted mainly in improving positions along the line which he evidently had chosen to defend as his main line of resistance. Some enemy patrols, both combat

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and reconnaissance were operating during this period. Artillery fire was very light. A single gun interdiction was received in the vicinity 061883. Tank operation was nonexistent in the 4th Infantry Division sector. No reports were received evidencing operations by enemy aircraft in the area. Units in contact were believed to be the same as in previous periods.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to advance to the northeast to secure Corps objectives. The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, attacked per Field Order No. 29, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, to clear the enemy in eastern edge of the woods along road Brienbat (5066) - Bernouil-Sur-Aisne (5700), seize crossings over the Aisne River, build a class 40 bridge, and continue the advance. By 1800, foot elements of the 2d Battalion succeeded in crossing the river, followed by the balance of the Combat Team. By 1900, the bridge was completed. At the close of the day, units were preparing to continue the advance to the northeast the following day at the rear of Combat Command "A".

Task Force "Taylor" consisting of Task Force "Burton" (CC "A" 5th Armored Division), CT 22 (4th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion; Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion); 747th Tank Battalion and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), created per Field Order No. 29, attacked in division zone of action, meeting resistance of small arms and mortar fire at crossroads west of Coucy-Le-Chauffrique (8011) and just south of Chauny (7322). As a result of these two engagements, column was held up 2 1/2 hours. At 1530, leading elements consisting of Reconnaissance Troop, Task Force B, and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, reduced resistance and continued on original route, while remaining elements reversed their direction and proceeded east of original route and parallel to it.

Task Force "Rognier" consisting of CC "A", 5th Armored Division (less Task Force B); CT 12 (Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; 42d Field Artillery Battalion; Company B, 393d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion); and the 70th Tank Battalion (less Company A), attacked in zone of action but due to troubles encountered in traffic control and preparation and securing of river crossings, the task force was dissolved at 1400 and elements broken into two parts: (1) CC "A" (less Task Force B); (2) CT 12. The first unit was being regrouped at the end of the day and preparations were made for the continuation of the advance the following day. CT 12 secured crossings of the Aisne River and continued its advance to the northeast.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion made reconnaissance for bridge sites across Aisne River, ferried one battalion of CT 12 across the river, repaired railroad bridge (Class 40) vicinity 647996 and built a bridge (foot) across the river vicinity 574004.

2. 2 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division (reinforced) continued its advance to the north. The advance was halted at 1800 by order

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of the Commanding General, V Corps.

The 8th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, on-trucked at 0700 and followed CG "A", 5th Armored Division at 0805. Good progress was made until 1205 when leading elements were held up at 860268 by a destroyed bridge. Construction of a bridge at 863270 was started at 1500 and upon completion, head of column crossed at 1745. Progress was fair thereafter.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, continued its advance at 0730. At 1030 these units were delayed due to a destroyed bridge (650182) and trouble experienced bringing up bridging materials. The bridge was made crossable at 1600 and the head of the column crossed at 1605. Thereafter good progress was made with no resistance reported.

Task Force "Taylor" (Same units as listed 1 September) continued its advance at 0900, after bridge (038300) had been repaired. Good progress was made throughout the day against moderate resistance and head of column reached 113769 at 1600. At 1735 Task Force was ordered to halt the advance vicinity of Landreotos (1077) and protect the right flank of the division. At 1800 they were ordered to assembly area vicinity 0476.

1121st Engineer Group attached to the 4th Infantry Division 021100B September 1944, furnished engineer support in the advance of the division.

The 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AV) Battalion engaged eleven flying bombs at 0530 which were over the division area flying in a south to southwestern direction. One was heard to explode vicinity 8598983.

5. 3 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division secured positions held at the close of the previous day and secured crossings of the San Quentin Canal and Canal De-La-Sambre.

The 8th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, upon oral orders of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, plans for continuation of the attack to the north were changed and 1st and 3d Battalions advanced to positions as ordered. The 3d Battalion with one squad, 1&R Platoon; 3d Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, proceeded to Wassigny (0365) by water to open main supply route for Task Force "Taylor"; moved at 1030, advanced rapidly, and seized objective at 1545 after meeting only slight scattered enemy resistance. At 2050, Combat Team was alerted for move to the south and east.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, on orders, halted further advance to the north. The 1st Battalion secured river crossings and bridge (812475). Throughout the period, elements of the Combat Team were moved short distances to occupy and hold key terrain. At 2050 alerted to move to the south and east.

Task Force "Taylor" (Units same as listed 1 September), in two columns continued the advance against enemy resistance to proposed assembly areas. Column No. 1 reached same at 1345 and Column No. 2 at 1525; made contact, and both consolidated positions. At 1800 contact was made with the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry vicinity Wassigny (0365). At 1545, Task Force "Burton" was detached and reverted to CG "A", 5th Armored Division.

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4. 4 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained in positions, conducted patrols to its flanks and prepared for movement east.

The 8th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, remained in assembly area, conducted patrolling of its flanks and cleared area of enemy. The 70th Tank Battalion (less Company B) Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached at 1700 and Combat Team was alerted for movement east and reconnoitered routes to new area.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, attached remained in assembly area, conducted patrolling of its flanks and cleared area of enemy. Alerted for movement starting daylight 5 September and at 1700, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion were attached.

The 2d Infantry with 14th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion, and Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached remained in assembly area. By order of the Commanding General, V Corps, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (Reinforced) attached 102d Cavalry Group, began movement at 0730 and contact was completed at 1400 at Brunehaut (4437). Remainder of the Combat Team remained in position to prevent enemy infiltration from the north and west, and completed mop-up of Forêt D'Horral. At 1700 the 747th Tank Battalion (less Company D) and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion were attached and at 2145, Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion and Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion were detached. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached to assist in patrolling and mopping up within Forêt D'Horral, was detached at 2145 and attached to CT 12.

The 1121st Engineer Group constructed treadway bridge at 077721 and was alerted to reconnoiter routes for bridge sites and clear obstacles on division movement to the east.

5. 5 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division moved by motor to vicinity Forêt D'ardennes and secured crossings of the Meuse River.

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, 70th Tank Battalion (less Company B), Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, from positions held vicinity St. Quentin, moved by motor commencing 050730B September 1944 by way of Areux (0-763408) to seize and secure crossings of the Meuse River. At 1630, bridge over the Meuse River (846475) had been secured and by 1800, the Ford (778538) of the river was seized. At 1845, the Combat Team had closed in areas, 1st Battalion vicinity 7853, 2d Battalion 8260, and 3d Battalion 8344.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company D, 4th Medical Battalion, Company D, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, moved by motor from the vicinity of St. Quentin commencing 050800B September 1944 by way of Rocorci (0-693621) to seize and secure crossings of the Meuse River. By 1730, the 1st and 2d Battalions had secured crossings at 8469 and 8260 respectively.

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At 1930, the 2d Battalion was ordered to proceed to point 6962 to relieve elements of the 38th Cavalry Squadron containing forces of enemy infantry and five tanks in that vicinity. One company, 3d Battalion (reinforced) was ordered to relieve the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of the river crossing.

The 22d Infantry with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SF) Battalion, one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and 747th Tank Battalion attached (less one battalion reinforced), remained on previous mission of cleaning up small pockets of resistance in area to the north and northwest of Massigny. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry previously attached 102d Cavalry Group, reverted to division control at 2100.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group with 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (reinforced), and one company, 747th Tank Battalion attached, were attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 1517, turned over previously secured crossings of the Meuse River to elements of the 4th Infantry Division, and continued reconnaissance to the east.

6. 6 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the advance to the east, meeting and overcoming pockets of enemy resistance, and maintaining contact with the VII Corps on the left and the 5th Armored Division on the right. Shortage of gasoline and unfavorable terrain hampered the advance.

The 8th Infantry with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, 70th Tank Battalion (less Company B); Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SF) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued the advance to the east at 0800. At 1140 at point 961539 light resistance was encountered and overcome; continued to meet scattered resistance and at 1520, the 3d Battalion met heavy resistance 990545. Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 1300; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SF) Battalion was detached at 2200; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached at 1200, and the 70th Tank Battalion was detached at 0200.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SF) Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company H, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attached at 0900 on foot with 1st and 2d Battalions abreast and 3d Battalion in reserve; crossed Henillo River by foot bridges, and continued advance to the front, meeting and overcoming pockets of resistance en route. Contact was maintained with the 9th Infantry Division. Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 1300 with Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SF) Battalion detached at 2200, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion detached at 1200.

The 22d Infantry with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SF) Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 747th Tank Battalion attached (less 1st Battalion), remained in area (0476) to protect VII Corps boundary from enemy infiltration from the north and west. The 1st Battalion moved at 0600 to clear the Bois de Hazolles (9043) of enemy and prevent infiltration from the south. Steady progress was made throughout the day against light resistance.

The 102d Cavalry Group with the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron operating to the front of the 12th Infantry and the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance

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Squadron to the front of the 8th Infantry continued reconnaissance to the east, submitting information regarding routes, bridges, and enemy resistance.

7. 7 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east, eliminating small pockets of enemy resistance against increasing and stubborn rear guard action. The greatest obstacles to a steady advance, however, remained unfavorable terrain, destroyed bridges and shortage of gasoline.

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued the advance to the east at 0800, and moved consistently forward throughout the day, meeting scattered resistance. At 1700 the 1st Battalion had reached point 205558 and was held up by resistance; the 2d Battalion was meeting no resistance at point 136483. By 1930 the 1st Battalion had advanced to point 259578.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued the attack to the east at 0800. At 1000, the 3d Battalion reached 023681 and at 1400 reached 106865, meeting no resistance. At 1400 the 2d Battalion reached point 070589 and by 1935 was at crossroads 177590. At 1935 the 1st Battalion reached Chanly (153678).

The 22d Infantry with the 4th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached (less 1st Battalion, reinforced) released from mission of mopping up enemy forces and protecting VII Corps boundary at 0900, began movement east at 1000; closed in now area in the vicinity of Graide and assigned initial mission of division reserve. The 1st Battalion (reinforced) continued its attack to the east and reached road junction 100427, encountering light resistance enroute.

The 70th Tank Battalion was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and reverted to V Corps control.

8. 8 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east, secured assigned objectives, and prepared to resume the attack to the Luxembourg-German border.

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, resumed the advance to the east at 0900, and at 1000 established contact with the enemy - 1st Battalion at 270577 and 3d Battalion vicinity 150484. The regiment advanced throughout the day against a stubborn rear guard action and at 1730, the leading elements of the 1st Battalion were on their objective vicinity 314587; 3d Battalion on objective 283486 at 2030, but was forced to withdraw some 500 yards after receiving tank, antitank, and long range artillery fires. Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 1600.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer

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Combat Battalion attached, from positions 1st Battalion 203679, 2d Battalion 187586, and 3d Battalion 223720, resumed the advance at 0900 and at 1800, after encountering moderate enemy resistance, the 1st and 3d Battalions had succeeded in cutting and outposting all road nets vicinity of the left (north) half of regimental zone of action. By 1917 the 2d Battalion was approaching its objective in the vicinity of St. Hubert (3161).

The 22d Infantry with the 36th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, remained in division reserve with the additional mission of covering the right and left flanks of the division by patrols and screening for enemy pockets of resistance behind the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments. The 1st Battalion (reinforced) moved in the late afternoon from vicinity road junction 100427 to vicinity of Palisoul (1348) to protect the division's right (south) flank by patrolling.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group continued reconnaissance to the east with 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron screening in front of the 12th Infantry and the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in front of the 8th Infantry. A superior job was accomplished by the entire group in the rapid transmission of information concerning enemy concentrations and in the material assistance furnished our advancing columns in reducing small pockets of enemy resistance.

9. 9 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east, secured assigned objectives, and prepared to resume the attack on assigned objectives.

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, resumed the attack at 0900 and leading elements reached the first objective at 1200, and moved on the second objective to secure important road junctions by seizing and organizing commanding terrain in the vicinity and to protect the south flank of the division. At 1400, the 1st Battalion contacted enemy at 424916, reported bridge destroyed at 434620 and by 1800 had reached objective and assumed defensive position 465595 and 449650. By 1430, the 2d Battalion following the 1st and 3d Battalions, reached point 405740. At 1400 the 3d Battalion reached 414486 with no resistance but at 1700 was held up temporarily by machine gun fire at 415487. All battalion consolidated positions and objectives reached at the end of the day and prepared to continue the attack the following day.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion, Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attacked at 0900 and at 1045, with the 2d Battalion at 354645 and the 3d Battalion at 310740. At 1430, the 3d Battalion had reached 390790 and the 2d Battalion at 405740, continuing to advance slowly against rear guard action including numerous road blocks and a destroyed bridge. At 1800 the 3d Battalion was at 430789, the 1st Battalion in assembly area 405775, and the 2d Battalion held up at 464786 by tanks and infantry. Battalions consolidated and prepared to continue the attack the next day.

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The 22d Infantry with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained in division reserve with the additional mission of covering the right and left flanks of the division and mopping up enemy pockets of resistance. At 1200, relieved of above mission and alerted to move (motorized) on order of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division to pass through the 8th Infantry. At 1400 the 3d Battalion (motorized) passed through the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry and by 1600 leading elements had reached point 332610 with no contact with the enemy and by 1840 had reached 470640, receiving light mortar fire. At the end of the day the Combat Team remained in position preparing to resume attack the next day.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group continued reconnaissance to the east, advancing rapidly forward, reporting enemy positions and road blocks and the condition of roads and bridges. Group also reduced many small pockets of enemy within the division zone of action.

10. 10 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the advance to the east and northeast preparatory to assembling before launching a coordinated attack on the West Wall.

The 8th Infantry with same attachments as previous day, resumed the attack to the northeast at 0900. By 1000, the 1st Battalion reached vicinity 506609 and the 3d Battalion at 1050 had reached vicinity 477618 without contacting the enemy. At 1100 the 1st Battalion received machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire at vicinity 536602; while the 3d Battalion advanced to vicinity 510543 without resistance. At 1400 the 1st Battalion reached its objective at 578698 and at 1600 the 3d Battalion closed on objective. The 2d Battalion displaced forward in regimental reserve.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one company (less one platoon) 747th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, remained in position pending the arrival of CT 22 abreast. At 1220 the 1st Battalion moved to vicinity 574680. At 1345, the 3d Battalion was held up by road blocks at 476811. By 1545 the 1st and 2d Battalions reached 504813 and 478810 respectively. By 2100 positions reached were consolidated and the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of Regno was receiving heavy enemy artillery fire.

The 22d Infantry with 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, 747th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, continued the advance to the northeast at 0900, and by 1045, leading elements were meeting light resistance vicinity 520667. At 1415 the units were receiving mortar and machine gun fire from vicinity 619718. At 1640, the 1st Battalion reached 520667; 2d Battalion vicinity 594690, and the 3d Battalion vicinity 610720 with the enemy fighting a stubborn rear guard action and withdrawing to the northeast with self-propelled half-tracks and on foot. One company, 747th Tank Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division.

11. 11 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east, seizing assigned objectives. A 2d Infantry patrol crossed the German border, vicinity of Eloherath (P-894818) at 2120.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as previous day, resumed the attack at 0900 and by 1200, the 2d and 3d Battalions reached their immediate objective (P-6172). The Combat Team (motorized) moved out at 1320 to its final objective south of Bovigny (P-7092) and reached same by 1800. At 1850, one company was ordered to establish a roadblock at P-730838 and by 2025, the mission was accomplished. The 2d Battalion moved to the high ground (P-7380) to protect the right flank of the division and at the end of the day, was still enroute to this area.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments as listed 10 September, continued the advance to the east and at 0900, removing unmanned roadblock enroute, had encountered the enemy. At 1415, the 1st Battalion was temporarily halted by enemy resistance in the vicinity of P-695868; the 2d Battalion reached P-696836 and reconnoitered for crossings of the stream at P-706843, the bridge having been destroyed. The 3d Battalion was held up by small arms and mortar fire in the vicinity of P-695868 at 1630. By 2000, all battalions were forcing crossings of the Salmi River against enemy opposition.

The 22d Infantry with the same attachments as listed 10 September, continued its advance along the division's right flank at 0900 and at 1035, encountered bicycle troops and machine gun fire at P-686830. At 1215, it had advanced to P-696786 and P-710815. At 1300, the objective was reached and by 1800, the entire Combat Team had closed in its assigned area after having overcome the enemy but still maintaining contact with him by dispatching patrols to the German border.

One patrol, beginning at a point in the vicinity of P-825819, proceeded to the east along trail and at exactly 2120, crossed the border into Germany at a point located at P-894819. From this point, the patrol continued to the German village of Eloherath (P-894818); spoke to civilians and procured a cap, some German currency, and a package of German soil, prior to returning.

12. 12 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division closed all units within division assembly area; dispatched reconnoissance and combat patrols across the German border and subsequently continued its advance to the east with one Combat Team having two battalions in Germany at the close of the day.

The 8th Infantry with 28th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one company, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion (the 2d Battalion enroute at the end of the previous day) closed in assembly area vicinity Hill 520 at 0125, and remained there throughout the day. The 1st and 3d Battalions shuttled forward in the division zone of action to assembly areas vicinity of Galhausen (8585). Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion was detached.

The 12th Infantry with 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one company, less one platoon, 747th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, from positions held on the eastern bank of the Salmi River continued the advance at 0800 to the east. Intermediate objectives were secured by the 1st and 2d Battalions at 2045 and by the 3d Battalion at 2115 vicinity of St. Vith (8586).

The 22d Infantry with 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, 747th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C,

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4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, conducted vigorous patrolling during the night of 11-12 September. One patrol crossed the German border vicinity 884819 and proceeded east into the German village of Biecherath (8981). Two combat patrols were sent to the east during morning hours and at 1400 initiated movement of the entire Combat Team to intermediate objectives vicinity of Biecherath, securing same by 2030. The 70th Tank Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division upon arrival.

13. 13 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division moved forward within zone of action and seized its assigned objectives. The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, in division reserve with the 2d Battalion (motorized) moved forward to positions behind CT 12 and CT 22. The 1st Battalion closed at 1845, 3d Battalion at 1830, and the 2d Battalion at 1950. The 2d Battalion prepared to move on one hour's notice.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, sent patrols towards objective at 0800 with the main body following at 1000. By 1400 the 1st Battalion had reached objective. The 2d Battalion was in vicinity 937828; 3d Battalion vicinity 902865, with no enemy contact. The Combat Team continued the advance throughout the afternoon against light rear guard action of the enemy and by 1830 had reached their objectives and were consolidating thereon.

The 22d Infantry with 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, sent patrols towards objectives at 0800 with main body following at 1000. Objectives for the day were seized, secured and consolidated prior to dark against light resistance. One Company of the 747th Tank Battalion was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and reverted to V Corps control.

14. 14 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east against mounting resistance, successfully penetrated the defenses of the Siegfried Line in four localities and prepared to exploit those gains.

The 8th Infantry, with 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, remained in division reserve. At 1030, the 2d Battalion, then holding roadblocks in the vicinity of St Vith (P-845865), was ordered to move by motor to the vicinity of Schoenberg (P-953888) to relieve the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry from the responsibility of protecting the north flank of the division. The battalion closed in its new area at 1430. At 1530, the remainder of the command commenced movement from the vicinity of Alferstey (P-913857) to the vicinity of Kadschold, Germany (P-973858), closing at 1830. Positions were then secured for the night. Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (mechanized), and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, were attached and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was detached during the period.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B, 801st Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (mechanized) attached, dispatched patrols of platoon strength to the east during the night and succeeded in penetrating the enemy positions in the vicinity of L-005846 and L-001871. Contact with the enemy was made by both patrols. 181

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The 1st and 2d Battalions abreast moved out at 1010 and intermittent artillery and mortar fire was encountered. Vehicular movement was hampered by a virtually impassable and meager network of muddy roads; cross country movement by the heavily wooded terrain. The 2d Battalion made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of L-005848. Progress against small arms and 20mm fire was continuous and a complete penetration of the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of L-015847 was made by 1300. The 1st Battalion continued its advance against small arms fire and likewise penetrated the line. The 3d Battalion still protected the left (north) flank of the division. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was detached and attached to the 8th Infantry and Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detached and reverted to battalion control during the period.

The 22d Infantry with 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion attached, sent reconnaissance patrols during the night 13-14 September and penetrated the Siegfried Line at two points - L-007846 and P-933819. The assault began at 1130 in a column of battalions, 3d, 1st and 2d in order. The 3d Battalion reached the line by 1305 at P-999837, breached it and cut the road in rear of the first fortifications by 1350 at L-005837. This penetration was made with heavy fighting against small arms fire, mortar fire, anti-aircraft fire and 88's. Many more pillboxes were encountered than had been indicated on intelligence maps and the enemy which included SS troops, refused to surrender until wounded or blasted from his forts.

The 1st Battalion passed through the existing gap, turned north and reached its objective at 1515. The 2d Battalion likewise passed through the gap toward the east and moved rapidly against lighter resistance reaching the high ground in the vicinity of L-015845 by 2100. The existing penetration of the line in the 22d Infantry zone of action by the close of the day was more than 2000 yards wide and one battalion was more than 2000 yards past the first line of fortifications, dozens of which had been cleared of the enemy. Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was detached during the period.

The 102d Cavalry Group during the attack had been screening the left flank of the division, establishing roadblocks and repelling small enemy counterattacks.

15. 15 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east against a steadily mounting and stubborn enemy resistance, including a considerable increase in enemy artillery fire.

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized); one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, moved out at 0800 and at 1300 head of the column was stopped in the vicinity of Loshuin (0396) by heavy artillery, small arms, and machine gun fire. The 2d Battalion was stopped, the 3d Battalion turned off Roth (0491) but at 1730 this column was stopped, having encountered strongly fortified positions and heavy enemy fires of artillery, machine guns and small arms. At the end of the day, 2d and 3d Battalions disengaged themselves from the enemy under cover of darkness and moved to assembly area in the vicinity of Rabscheid (9735) in preparation for an attack to the east between CT 12 and CT 22 the following morning. The 1st Battalion remained in the vicinity of Rabscheid throughout the day.

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The 12th Infantry with 2d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, Company B, 893d Tank Battalion, Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion, one platoon, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attacked at 0800 to the east to secure the crossing of Kyll River. Immediate contact was made with the enemy and, due to strong resistance in thick woods, the advance was slow, but the advance was continued with many casualties resulting from heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. Three platoons, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion were attached at 0800 to mop up the woods to the rear, some enemy groups having infiltrated between CT 12 and CT 22.

The 22d Infantry with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 395d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company C, 705th Tank Battalion, Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, prior to the attack at 0800, received a counterattack on the left flank which was repelled but the enemy continued to infiltrate from the north and northwest all day. The 3d Battalion continued its attack on the heavily fortified town of Branscheid (9881) but progress was very slow due to the very heavy enemy resistance. The 1st and 2d Battalions continued the attack to the east but the progress was slow and impeded by heavy enemy resistance, thick woods, and poor visibility. Throughout the day, the Combat Team received heavy artillery, machine gun, mortar, and small arms fire from emplacements and surroundings.

16. 16 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack of the Siegfried Line Fortifications and had succeeded against stubborn enemy resistance and constant artillery fire in securing objectives well to the east of the outer line of defense.

The 9th Infantry with some attachments as listed 15 September, attacked to the northeast between CT 22 and CT 12 at 0730. In the early afternoon, leading elements were receiving artillery fire vicinity 040839, and by 1620, the 2d Battalion reached vicinity 042862 and the 1st Battalion 025847 against moderate artillery fire and small enemy patrols. By 1915 leading elements had succeeded in advancing some 3000 yards to the northeast. The 3d Battalion was in regimental reserve. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was detached at 1910.

The 12th Infantry with some attachments as listed 15 September, continued the attack to the northeast at 0745 in column of battalions with 3d Battalion in regimental reserve. At 0900, a pocket of the enemy infiltrated between Company D and remainder of 2d Battalion in vicinity 040875 which resulted in Company E being surrounded by 1100 with a fire fight of increased intensity ensuing. The 1st Battalion pushing from the southwest and Company L converging from the northwest broke through the enemy forces surrounding Company E and by 1310 contact had been re-established between all elements of all three battalions on a line extending northeast from 045880. Although heavy artillery fire from the enemy continued throughout the day, the battalions continued to advance to the northeast until 1800 at which time enemy's resistance slackened and Combat Team consolidated and prepared for continuation of the attack the following day.

The 22d Infantry with some attachments as listed 15 September, continued its attack with the mission of capturing the town of Branscheid (9881); 3d Battalion to the southeast astride the road met heavy opposition, small arms, artillery and automatic weapons; while the 1st Battalion advanced to the southwest encountering many pillboxes and receiving heavy artillery

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fire. By 1600, the 1st Battalion had reached its objective and was consolidating. Elements of the 3d Battalion on the right (north) side of the road had succeeded in reaching the edge of the town while those on the left (south) were held up some 500 yards southwest of the crossroad 894821 by fortifications and extensive mine fields. At the close of the day two companies in column were entering the town with the elements on the south held up by the enemy resistance.

17. 17 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division advanced at 0900 to cleanup enemy resistance and pillboxes in division zone of action against heavy enemy resistance, particularly increased intensity of artillery fire which was estimated as having doubled from the previous twenty-four hours, with the additional handicap of dense woods and inclement weather.

The 8th Infantry with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company E, 70th Tank Battalion attached, moved off at 0900 to secure favorable ground and to cleanup enemy and destroy pillboxes. The advance was hindered by inclement weather, lack of road net, poor visibility, and thick woods but the Combat Team continued to mop up within the area encountering small arms, mortar, and greatly increased enemy artillery fire. The 2d Battalion lacking any route of advance, was forced to by-pass into GT-12's zone of action to reach their objective. The 3d Battalion (motorized) remained in vicinity 007854 until 1600, when it moved forward to new assembly area. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion was detached at 1725.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion, one platoon, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attacked with the 2d and 3d Battalions at 0900 to secure favorable terrain, to cleanup woods and destroy pillboxes to the north and northeast. Battalions continued to move throughout the day, destroying pillboxes and mopping up area, but actions were greatly hampered by thick woods, inclement weather, heavy artillery, small arms, and mortar fire. The 42d Field Artillery Battalion was detached at 1725.

The 22d Infantry with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, attacked at 0900 to seize the town of Brandshoid (9880), and to continue to the east to secure high ground west of Sollerich (0281) and to protect the south flank of the division. The 3d Battalion continued its attack to the southwest astride the road against very heavy opposition, and the 1st Battalion advanced to the east, reaching point 023619 against heavy artillery. At 1600 the 1st Battalion received a heavy concentration of artillery fire and a counterattack which was repulsed. The 2d Battalion continued to the east through dense woods against heavy opposition. The 44th Field Artillery Battalion was detached at 1725.

18. 18 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to exert aggressive pressure against the enemy. Combat Teams secured favorable ground and assigned objectives prior to dark. Artillery fire decreased in intensity

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but the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry was still engaged in a fire fight with approximately 300 of the enemy which it had succeeded in surrounding prior to darkness.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued to clear the enemy from and secure favorable ground, with the 3d Battalion in reserve. The 2d Battalion moved 2000 yards west mopping up as it advanced. The 1st Battalion moved to crossroad 034855. By 1600, the 1st Battalion had surrounded the enemy at 032853 and still engaged with them at darkness. The 2d and 3d Battalions continued clearing the enemy from their areas. Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, less one platoon, was detached at 1530.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued to clear the enemy from and secure favorable ground. The 3d Battalion moved east and west to crossroad 058890, and engaged the enemy in a heavy fire fight during the day but eliminated them by 1800. The 1st and 2d Battalions moved a short distance to an assembly area, clearing up all resistances by the end of the day, and protecting the north flank of the division. Company B, 81st Chemical Battalion and one platoon, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion were detached.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued to clear the enemy from and secure favorable terrain. The 1st Battalion moved approximately 1000 yards to the north, mopping up as it advanced, and established a line from 005837 to 030830 between the two main roads running north and south in their zone of action. The 2d Battalion remained in its position and was engaged with the enemy to the east. The 3d Battalion sent patrols to the southwest into the town of Brandscheid and met enemy resistance. This battalion was subjected to mortar and artillery fire throughout the day. Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion and Company A, 81st Chemical Battalion were detached at 1530 and 1000 respectively.

Companies A and B, 81st Chemical Battalion were detached from the 4th Infantry Division and reverted to V Corps control.

19. 19 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division successfully repelled some four coordinated counterattacks launched by the enemy during the period, maintained its positions previously secured within the Siegfried Line, and continued to exert pressure upon the enemy.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached was prepared to continue exerting pressure against the enemy. At 0600 the 3d Battalion was subjected to a counterattack from the east by a force estimated as one battalion of the enemy, subsequently identified by prisoners of war as being composed of various elements of SS Elite troops. This attack was repulsed after the 3d Battalion returned in greater volume all fires of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery. The 1st Battalion continued the attack against small pocket of enemy at 033855 and by 1400, this attack developed into a heavy fire fight. At 1530 a second counterattack was received

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by the 3d Battalion from the northeast of an estimated two companies of the enemy. Elements of the 2d Battalion initiated movement to the southeast to assist in encirclement of this force and the battle continued until dark.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and Company D (less one platoon) 70th Tank attached, received a counterattack at 0830 from elements later identified as some six different companies, the majority of which were SS troops. The enemy attack was supported by artillery fire and fire from tracked vehicles which effected surprise and drove the 3d Battalion back 400 to 500 yards. The 2d Battalion initiated movement to the east to secure more favorable terrain and at 1030, 3d Battalion counterattacked to recover lost ground and continued to exert pressure throughout the day. At 1430, elements of the 1st Battalion became engaged with part of the same enemy force at 050855. Tanks were employed by this battalion and the enemy activity immediately diminished. By 1600, the attack had been repulsed on the north flank; 1st Battalion remained in same position; 3d Battalion assembled vicinity 053887; 2d Battalion moved to the east, and at 1630 secured position vicinity 055878.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, received a counter-attack from direction of Henthelm (023826) launched against the 1st Battalion. Enemy advanced northwest astride the road and battle ensued vicinity 021830. Heavy artillery fire was exchanged, enemy failed to withdraw, and fire fight continued until 1430, at which time pressure began to slacken. The 3d Battalion, observing further enemy activity to the southwest in Brandesheid (983815) called for artillery on enemy movement and pillboxes in that vicinity. Toward the close of the day, enemy activity had ceased and the regiment remained in previous positions held, no ground having been yielded.

20. 20 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to mop up enemy pockets and destroy captured pillboxes in the gap made in the Siegfried Line, readjusting and improving its positions.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued to exert pressure on the enemy and to mop up enemy pockets. The 3d Battalion throughout the morning cleaned out enemy pocket vicinity 045867, reporting same cleared by 1230. At 1550, the 2d Battalion was moving to vicinity 034854 and the 1st Battalion was preparing to assemble vicinity 037848. By the end of the day these movements were completed. The 1st and 2d Battalions prepared to make a coordinated attack upon enemy pocket at 032844 the following day at 1000, and the 3d Battalion was consolidating and outposting the main line of resistance.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and Company D (less one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached, readjusted and improved positions, mopping up enemy resistance throughout the day, with artillery fire being received from the enemy. At the close of the day, entire regiment was outposted and consolidated on its positions reporting enemy activity to the northeast.

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The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached fired on enemy at 0700, moving in from Brandschoid (9881) on to hill vicinity 983813, compelling them to withdraw by 0910. The 2d Battalion continued fire fight with enemy pocket at 032843 throughout the day. The remainder of the Combat Team continued to improve and consolidate their positions along the main line of resistance and outposted them receiving light artillery fire.

21. 21 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to eliminate pockets of enemy resistance, destroy pillboxes, and consolidate and improve their positions.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 895d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued to exert pressure on and clear the enemy from their zone of action and to establish and secure more favorable positions along the main line of resistance. Enemy, estimated at 300 to 400 troops, at 0700 attacked from L-032842 against the right flank of the regiment. At 0100, CT 8 in coordination with elements of CT 22, counterattacked and by 1725, reports from prisoners of war stated that one-half of the enemy had been eliminated. Thick underbrush, through which the enemy had cut lanes, and being well protected with machine guns and rifles, prevented the entire annihilation of this force. At 1830, the Commanding Officer of CT 8 suspended action and consolidated for the night. The 1st Battalion with Companies C, E, and F of the 2d Battalion were involved in this fire fight.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company D (less one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached continued to exert pressure on and eliminate enemy, secure and consolidate more favorable positions along the main line of resistance. Vigorous patrolling was continued to the east; at 1030 enemy was heard digging along the road L-065887; at 2130 enemy was again heard digging vicinity L-065884, and patrols saw enemy troops working on vehicles at same place. Artillery fire was directed on these areas. At the end of the day, all battalions were consolidating their positions.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, sent patrols from the 3d Battalion toward Brandschoid and they were heard digging north-east of the town. Patrol activity continued every hour between the 3d and 1st Battalions. The 1st and 2d Battalions coordinated with CT 8 to eliminate the enemy groups between the two Combat Teams. At the end of the day, battalions were consolidating positions on the main line of resistance.

22. 23 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to exert pressure against the enemy forces to the east, mopping up small pockets of resistance, and destroying enemy fortifications. The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 895d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, resumed the attack with the 1st and 2d Battalions at 0830 to eliminate small enemy salient 032843, and

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by 0945 were meeting strong resistance. Enemy had strongly entrenched during the night; succeeded in bringing up small reinforcements during the day, and using heavy caliber rocket fire and 40mm antiaircraft weapons to resist our advance. Artillery and tank support was used by the Combat Team with seemingly little effect and by 1800 resistance had not diminished. Company C was ordered to withdraw to more favorable position previously held on Hill 578 with a view to placing interdictory artillery fire on the enemy's positions during the night of 22-23 September. Vigorous patrolling was conducted throughout the day by other elements of the Combat Team and artillery and mortar fire was brought to bear upon hostile forces encountered.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company D (less one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached sent aggressive patrols to the east and northeast and placed interdictory fires upon enemy observation posts and installations located as a result of the continuous patrolling. At 1030, the 1st Battalion engaged in a fire fight vicinity 055884 and by 1130 reduced the resistance. At 1230, Company A, exerting pressure to the northeast, became engaged vicinity 047897. Several self-propelled tank destroyer guns and tanks were employed, and by 1500 the enemy forces were still in position but not aggressive. The 3d Battalion (motorized) remained vicinity 993886 as division mobile reserve.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached encountered increased enemy patrol activity in the early hours of the day in the 1st and 3d Battalion areas. Aggressive patrolling was continued by the regiment throughout the day with mortar and machine gun fires used to disperse enemy patrols.

23. 23 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to exert pressure on the enemy to the east by dispatching strong combat patrols, eliminating the small pocket of resistance in Combat Team 8's zone of action, and at the end of the day was fully consolidated on its main line of resistance.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached; 1st and 2d Battalions (reinforced) with one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached as of 0700, resumed the attack on enemy pocket of resistance vicinity L-032843, following artillery preparation at 0815. By 1023, the 2d Battalion had advanced south having contacted no enemy and had made contact with the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry at L-028639, the enemy having apparently retreated to the east during the night. By 1030, the 1st Battalion was moving to positions assigned to consolidate and outpost the main line of resistance. The 2d Battalion began moving to assembly area L-030865, and by 1830, the entire Combat Team had completed movement to positions on the main line of resistance. Throughout the day, strong combat patrols contacted enemy all along the front approximately 1500 yards from the main line of resistance and artillery, small arms, and machine gun fire was brought to bear on such enemy groups.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

(SP) Battalion, and Company D (loss one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued to exert pressure on the enemy to the east by dispatching combat patrols. At 1050, patrols moving northeast contacted enemy machine guns, infantry and two 88mm guns at L-055887, and mortars and artillery fire was directed thereon. Other patrols continued to contact the enemy all along the Combat Team front throughout the day and directed appropriate fires against such enemy groups.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, conducted aggressive patrolling to the south and southeast throughout the day. At 1800, a small enemy force was reported moving northeast out of Branschoid (P-9881); other patrols contacted various enemy groups. These groups were promptly dispersed with artillery, machine gun, and mortar fires.

24. 24 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to exert pressure on the enemy to the east and southeast by dispatching strong combat patrols to determine dispositions; activities, and prevent enemy infiltration and, if possible, to direct artillery fire on enemy installations.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, sent patrols from the 1st and 3d Battalions throughout the day and those patrols reported enemy generally along the entire front. Artillery fire was directed on enemy activity at O49843 and O45847 and rocket guns observed in Wasehoid (O83842). The 2d Battalion reconnoitered routes to the 1st and 3d Battalion areas and prepared to move, if necessary, on short notice to repel any counterattack which might threaten.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company D (loss one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached, sent strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions to the east and northeast. The former reported no enemy to the main road running north and south in zone of action; the latter reported enemy generally across the main road 800 meters to the northeast. The 3d Battalion in division reserve made reconnaissance for routes by which it might move to support elements of the division.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, sent strong combat patrols to the south and southeast and observed the enemy in the general vicinity of Hontheim and Sellerich.

25. 25 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained and improved positions previously gained within the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line; aggressively patrolled to the front, and prepared to continue the advance to the east.

The 8th Infantry with same attachments as listed 24 September, initiated strong patrols from the 1st and 3d Battalions to determine enemy front lines, flanks, dispositions, and activities, and to prevent enemy infiltration towards the west. The 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

The 12th Infantry with same attachments as listed 24 September, continued aggressive patrolling to the north and northeast by 1st and 2d Battalions to establish enemy held dispositions. Small groups of enemy infantry were encountered and dispersed. The 3d Battalion (motorized) remained in division mobile reserve.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as listed 24 September, resumed aggressive patrolling to the southeast, south and southwest, including the towns of Hontheim (L-0282), Sellerich (L-0281), and Brandscheid (P-9881). Activity of undetermined nature was noted in Brandscheid and between the first two towns mentioned above. Hontheim reported clear with majority of enemy activity in front of the 2d Battalion.

26. 26 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to improve and readjust positions secured within the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line, patrolled aggressively to the front, and prepared to continue the advance on order.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, (less one platoon) 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued extensive patrolling to the east and southeast, locating enemy positions and observation posts. Artillery was brought to bear on positions located. At 1330, the 2d Battalion began movement to relieve the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry on the main line of resistance at L-030840; and by 1730 accomplished the relief.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company D (less one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached, initiated aggressive patrolling by the 1st and 2d Battalions to the east and northeast. Enemy dispositions located were immediately fired upon by artillery and by the end of the day, enemy line was believed to extend from L-064848 south to L-066873. The 3d Battalion (motorized) with one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached remained in division reserve.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached (at 0930, the balance of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion was attached) resumed aggressive patrolling to the south, southeast and southwest; enemy activity being reported in Brandscheid (P-9881), Hontheim (L-0282) and vicinity L-006817. Artillery was fired on all targets noted. The 2d Battalion was relieved of its positions on the main line of resistance at L-0384 by the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. Relief was completed by 1730, and the 2d Battalion moved to assembly area vicinity L-015846, closing therein by 2000.

27. 27 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to improve and readjust positions secured within the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line, patrolled aggressively to the front, and prepared to continue the advance on order.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A (less one platoon), 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

Battalion attached, continued to improve present defensive positions by the use of barbed wire, road blocks, mines, and fire cover. In addition to normal security patrols, unit conducted active patrolling along the entire front.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company D (less one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion attached, sent out aggressive patrols to the east and northeast; located enemy activity at L-063880, L-064878, L-075845, and L-085885, and directed artillery fire on enemy targets. The 3d Battalion (motorized) with one platoon, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Companies B and D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, remained in division reserve.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued extensive patrolling to the south, southeast, and southwest, maintained contact with the 8th Infantry on the left and Troop A, 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the right.

The 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (less 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) was attached at 270001A September 1944. The Group, with 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, and in coordination with the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, continued to screen the north and south flanks of the division, maintaining contact with the 22d Infantry and Regimental Combat Team 110.

28. 28 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained and improved its present defensive positions and continued to exert pressure against the enemy. Constant preparations were made with a view to a coordinated attack to the northeast.

The 8th Infantry, with same attachments as listed 27 September, maintained constant patrol activity to the front. Following a concentration of artillery fire of four battalions placed on Hill 555 at 035834, one platoon of Company E moved out and occupied part of the hill, finding many enemy dead thereon. This platoon was counterattacked late in the period by enemy force supported by automatic weapons and, upon order, withdrew to their company line.

The 12th Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 September, continued patrol activity to the east and northeast, determined locations of, and directed artillery fire on enemy entrenchments both occupied and unoccupied; pillboxes, observation posts, automatic weapons and mortar emplacements, thereby neutralizing such enemy installations. The 3d Battalion (motorized) remained in division reserve.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 September, continued patrolling to the south and southeast, noted enemy activity in Brandscheid (P-9891), and in coordination with the 118th Infantry, planned an attack on that city.

29. 29 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained, improved, and readjusted present positions, continued to exert pressure against the enemy by patrolling aggressively, and at the end of the day, prepared to move to the north to designated assembly area before making another thrust at the Siegfried Line.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

The 8th Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 September, continued constant patrol activity to the east. Following an artillery concentration, a platoon of Company B again moved on to Hill 555 at L-035834, and consolidated thereon. Engineer attachment was detached at 1645.

The 12th Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 September, continued active patrolling to the east and northeast and directed artillery fire on enemy installations. The 3d Battalion, released from division reserve, moved at 1600 to relieve 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group in their positions, screening the north and northeast (left) flank of the division; completed same by 2030, and consolidated positions north and northeast of Manderfeld. One platoon, Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and Provisional Assault Gun Battery, 70th Tank Battalion were attached to the 3d Battalion at 1600. One platoon, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and one platoon, Companies B and D, 70th Tank Battalion were detached at 1640. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was attached at 1400.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as listed 27 September, continued aggressive patrolling to the south and southeast, directing artillery fire on enemy positions, road blocks and mine fields. Company F with a platoon of tank destroyers and two platoons of antitanks moved at 1815 to effect relief of Troop A, 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in their position, outposting the right (south) flank of the division, and by 2130, this relief was completed on line extending west of Winterspelt (P-9080) to the northeast of Brandscheid (P-9881). Engineer attachment was detached at 1645.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less one platoon of Company B); with one platoon, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; one platoon, Companies B and D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, moved at 1640 to assembly area vicinity P-991867 as division reserve and completed movement by 1930.

30. 30 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained, improved, and readjusted positions, continued to exert pressure against the enemy by aggressive patrolling, and made preparations to move to the north before making another thrust at the Siegfried Line.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion (less one platoon) attached, continued to send patrols east and southeast. An enemy patrol engaged one platoon, Company I, in a fire fight at 1630 at 055865 with enemy being repulsed leaving five dead; otherwise, there was very little enemy activity. Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion (less one platoon) was detached at 0915.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company D (less one platoon), 70th Tank Battalion; and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached and 1st Battalion with one platoon, Companies B and D, 70th Tank Battalion attached in division reserve, moved at 0715 by companies to assembly area to the west closing at 1020. The 2d Battalion took over defensive positions on main line of resistance previously occupied by the 1st Battalion, completing relief at 0827. The 3d Battalion with one platoon, Company B, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion and Provisional Assault Gun Battery, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued to improve its outpost positions protecting the north flank of the division.

Sac IV. Operations, Contd

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued aggressive patrolling to the south and southeast. Enemy patrol was contacted at 0300 at 975836 by Tank Destroyer unit at a road block, and after a fire fight, withdrew. At 1800, a patrol moving east to Hontheim was involved in a fire fight and was not disengaged until approximately 2200. The latter patrol estimated 80 Germans in Hontheim. Company F (reinforced) was in position outposting the right (south) flank of the division.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion with attachments as listed 29 September, was released from division reserve at 1025, and returned to normal duties supporting Combat Teams. One platoon, Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion and one platoon, Companies B and D, 70th Tank Battalion were detached at 0915.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: Movement of the division to the east continued during the first part of September. On 3 September the gasoline shortage became critical. At this time only 15 miles of gasoline were in the tanks of vehicles and in reserve. Gasoline issues to units of the division were rigidly controlled from office of the AG of S, G-4 to insure equitable distribution of gasoline received.

2. On reaching the Siegfried Line on 12 September movement of the division to the east ended. Receipt of gasoline increased at the same time and, by 20 September sufficient gasoline was on hand to fill all vehicular tanks and reserve cans.

3. During the month very few cigarettes were received. The shortage continued throughout the month.

4. Heavy rains occurred during this period. The service shoes issued the men absorbed water in spite of the use of dubbing. There was a definite need for overshoes. None were received.

5. Ammunition expenditures were relatively light and it was possible to obtain all that was required during the period.

6. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

7. Vehicular maintenance problems increased during the month. This was due primarily to the necessity of operating over muddy and deeply rutted roads and because of the percentage of stumps in bivouac areas. Vehicular replacement for all vehicles evacuated was prompt.

8. A temporary failure in the blanket and litter exchange system in rear medical installations beyond the division created an acute shortage in these critical items for a period of approximately twenty-four hours. This condition was corrected at once and definite action was effected to preclude a recurrence.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation

9. A few miscellaneous type stoves were acquired for the Division Clearing Station, easing the acute discomfort of casualty handling.

10. Evacuations: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner.

Summary of Casualties Evacuated

	Officers	EM
Killed in action	17	156
Died of wounds	5	44
Died of injuries	-	-
Missing in action	3	63
Seriously wounded in action	23	408
Seriously injured in action	2	17
Slightly wounded in action	13	363
Slightly injured in action	5	154
	70	1200

Total Casualties.....1270

11. 2 - 8 September 1944. Ambulance hauls improved during this period, since distances have not been so great.

12. 9 - 16 September 1944. Bad weather and distances have placed a strain on evolutions rearward from the clearing station, however, ambulances were at all times available since the system was augmented by additional vehicles from Army sources. No difficulties have been experienced in evacuation within the division.

13. 16 - 22 September 1944. Evacuations continued to function normally. Three platoons of the 42d Field Hospital were set up adjacent to the Division Clearing Station. This greatly facilitated the handling of seriously wounded casualties.

14. 23 - 29 September 1944. Ambulance hauls within the division were longer than normal due to the road net, however, the casualties were low and no difficulty was encountered.

15. The treatment of venereal disease (gonorrhea and syphilis) with penicillin is now in effect in accordance with Circular No. 107, Office of the Chief Surgeon, Eastern Theater of Operations, dated 25 August 1944. Gonorrhea is treated within the division. The use of penicillin greatly reduces the time heretofore required for treatment with sulfonamides.

16. Combat Exhaustion Cases
Cumulative Total From Regiments Since 6 June 1944

8th Infantry - 319
12th Infantry - 906
22d Infantry - 729

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation

Casualties Treated By Each Infantry Regiment
Cumulative Total from 6 June 1944

5th Infantry - 3930
12th Infantry - 4227
22d Infantry - 4274

17. In the rapid movement of the division and the tie up of transportation the evacuation of prisoners of war was a difficult problem. Through arrangements made with the AC of S, G-4, returning supply vehicles were utilized to bring prisoners back from the regiments to the Prisoner of War Inclosure. The V Corps furnished an escort guard to evacuate prisoners of war from the Division Prisoner of War Inclosure to the V Corps Prisoner of War Inclosure.

18. A total of 5,000 German prisoners of war were taken during this period.

19. During the period 10 September to 29 September 1944, a total of 78 officers and 1739 enlisted men replacements were received.

20. Strength:

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 September 1944			30 September 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	56	8	136/59	57	8	136/74
8th Inf	173	5	3282/1	171	2	3096/1
12th Inf	187	6	3300	159	5	3008
22d Inf	180	4	3138	154	5	3015
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	21	2	113	21	2	113
20th FA Bn	32	2	612	30	2	610
29th FA Bn	32	2	577	32	2	573
42d FA Bn	35	2	554	36	2	552
44th FA Bn	32	2	561/1	34	2	555/1
4th Engr Combat Bn	28	3	724	27	3	695
4th Lnd Bn	35	1	415	36	1	410
4th Ron Tr, Meez.	5	-	154	5	-	152
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	4	2	81	4	2	79
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	175/3	4	1	163/7
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	4	-	130/6	4	-	141/6
704th Ord L Maint Co	9	1	147	10	-	151
4th QM Co	10	-	194	10	1	209
4th Sig Co	13	4	286	13	4	284
Total.....	840	45	14579	807	42	13946

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Sec V - Supply & Evacuation

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 September 1944			30 September 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
4th CIC Det	4	-	12	4	-	10 1/2
Order of Battle Team Unit No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	3	-	4	2	-	4
IPW Team No. 51 (12th Inf)	2	-	4	-	-	-
IPW Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	1	-	4	1	-	4
PI Team No. 4176	2	-	4	2	-	4
Air Support Party	1	-	6	1	-	8
Det G, 168th Sig Photo Co	1	-	7	1	-	4
37th AAA (Av) Bn	35	3	740	36	3	757
801st TD Bn	32	2	796	32	2	744
706th Tank Bn	-	-	-	40	3	664
Total.....	84	5	1543	122	8	2205
Grand Total	824	50	16122	929	50	16151

R. O. Barton
 R. O. BARTON,
 Major General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

[REDACTED]

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 September to 30 September 1944 without any loss of personnel.

2. The team has continued to keep a duplicate of the G-2 situation map; to receive and process all documents; to keep an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities, and any additional information necessary to translate documents, perform interrogations and act as interpreters whenever necessary.

3. The study of documents during this period was particularly helpful in clarifying and confirming the organization, strength, and weapons of the large number of newly encountered General Headquarters Units and their relation, if any, with the known enemy divisions in our sector. A number of enemy battalion and company orders, as well as operational maps and sketches, were captured and processed in time to be of tactical importance. A trend toward the establishment and employment of combat teams to remedy the straggler and remnant problem, as well as the lack of sufficient troops to adequately defend this sector of the West Wall, characterized enemy resistance.

ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1. 1 September 1944. German observation post in the vicinity of Vez was searched. Four civilians considered a security menace were detained at Division Prisoner of War Cage until the division moved forward, at which time they were placed in custody of the FFI. New division CP area near Haramont was checked. The towns of Haramont and Villers-Colzets were searched. Maps and documents were uncovered in two former German offices. Maps and documents were turned over to the AC of S, G-2, for further disposition. Albert Mrous and Jacques Henri Charles-Corrose, apprehended on 30 August 1944, were delivered to First U. S. Army Civilian Cage.

2. 2 September 1944. New division CP area was searched near Couves. One Moroccan food worker was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. A former German CP was searched and classified documents concerning the 343rd German Regiment were uncovered.

3. 3 September 1944. The division CP near le Petit Cessle Fn. was searched and the surrounding towns of Corlepart and Harpoel were checked but no one was apprehended. Two former German headquarters were searched as well as the former residence of a German colonel.

4. 4 September 1944. The Division CP near Urville was searched and one lieutenant and twenty-one enlisted men of the 813th Battalion (Armenian) were apprehended in the town. These men were turned over to the Provost Marshal to be evacuated. Their morale was very low. A CIO office was established in the town of St. Quentin. Documents were found in the following buildings: Feldgendarmrie, Office of the Kommandantur, and the Gestapo Headquarters. Two agents working with the 8th Infantry Regiment worked in the town of Mezieres and searched the former headquarters of General Schridt, German Commander in this area.

5. 5 September 1944. The town of St. Quentin was searched. Many civilians were interrogated but no one was evacuated. Civilians in the vicinity of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion were checked.

6. 6 September 1944. The 4th Infantry Division was sent to an assembly area near Rinoiro. As this area had such a concentration of troops this detachment devoted much time to local security work. A former German headquarters was searched and people living in the vicinity were screened.

7. 7 September 1944. Agents checked the new CP at Marghies. Many documents, sketches, and maps were uncovered in an office formerly occupied by a German colonel. H. Leon Hoffman, Frenchman, formerly from Belvaives, was apprehended. Hoffman worked for the Germans in this area as a manager of several farms. The retreating Germans took him with them. Then subject reappeared without explanation and no one in the town would vouch for him. Oscar G. Clément, an Italian, denounced by the FFI was placed in custody of the FFI to await trial. He worked as an interpreter for the Germans.

Annex B - CIG, Contd.

8. 8 September 1944. Agents checked the vicinity of the division CP, and the towns of Our and Graide. Also the areas of the three infantry regiments were checked. The Resistance Group had already rounded up the collaborators in this area. Six or seven collaborators had been shot in the town of Graide by the Resistance Group.

9. 9 - 10 September 1944. Agents checked St. Hubert in vicinity of new CP. No collaborators or suspects were located. The following were held at the Division Cage, pending investigation: Albert Rena De Meyer (Brussels); re. Maria Verdenbeck (Brussels); Jean Rodriguez (Lubin); and Omar Castus (Lubin). The site of division CP at Lubin was checked prior to occupation. The PTT was inspected, wires were previously cut and all mail had been removed. The banker of the town was informed that the bank could not reopen until given permission by the CAO.

11. 11 September 1944. Agents checked vicinity of new division CP at Givroulle. Regarding suspects under investigation, Omar Castus, of Lubin, admitted being closely associated with the Germans but stated he was working for the Belgian Forces of the Interior. He was evacuated to Army so that his statements could be verified. De Meyer, Verdenbeck and Rodriguez were turned over to the Chief of the Maquis at Lubin for further disposition. Eva Leonie Dele-Haye and Genise Morbaerts, Liege, accused of exposing Maquis, were turned over to the Gendarmerie at St. Hubert.

12. 12 September 1944. Vicinity of new division CP at Boho was checked. An office was established in the town of Bastogne. All German offices and billets were searched and the telephone exchange was looted, the keys being turned over to the CAO town team. Agents entered Houffalize and searched the town. Charles Comet was denounced but investigation revealed he was a black market operator and, therefore, was turned over to the local police. Leo Sovrin, of Courtel, who has a spot in the SS troops, was turned over to the Maquis. M. Michel Gatos of Boho who was Burgomaster during German occupation, was deposed and is being held by the Boige White Army for trial.

13. 13 September 1944. CIG office in Bastogne was turned over to CIG, V Corps. ~~Ernst~~ ~~Reinhold~~ Russian, a prisoner of war of the Germans before escaping, was evacuated through prisoner-of-war channels.

14. 14 September 1944. The village of Grufiange, in the vicinity of the division CP, was checked. Agents also checked the town of La Roche, Belgium. The following are being held as collaborators by the Resistance Group and will be tried by the Belgian Government: Dr. Ste. Viteaux, M. Etienne, Tolange Florintin, and Mathuraux T. Florintin. It was also learned at La Roche that troops used for road blocks by the Germans were booby trapped and several citizens lost their lives while removing these road blocks.

15. 15 September 1944. Agents checked the new CP area near Schlierbach. The town of St. Vith was also entered. Former German headquarters in this town included: NSKK, Hitler Jugend, VSDAF, SA and SS. H. Hiosson, acting

Annex B - CFC, Contd

Burgemeister submitted a list of Nazi officials who had been stationed in St. Vith. This list was submitted to V Corps. Agents apprehended two soldiers in Schonberg who were home on furlough at the time.

16. 16 September 1944. Agents of this detachment checked the town of Aw. A German company had been stationed here and documents and uniforms were uncovered. The town of Radscheid was also checked. In the town of Landerfeld, one German soldier was apprehended in civilian clothes.

17. 17 September 1944. In Biesialf, the City Hall, Police Station, Home of the Mayor and Gendarmerie were searched and a list of party leaders in thirty villages was located.

18. 18 September 1944. Five German soldiers in civilian clothes were picked up throughout the division area. All were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Six Polish, one Russian, and two French Todt workers were also picked up.

19. 19 September 1944. The towns of Elcherath, Andie, Winterspeit, and Wackerath were all contacted. No one was apprehended.

20. 20 September 1944. Nine German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended throughout the day. All were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. One Polish worker was also evacuated. The following Belgians from St. Vith are being held as a possible security menace: Johann George Zeyen, Johann Franz Muller, and Leo Pankert. A special report on the above three men was submitted to V Corps. The towns of Elnerscheid and Herresbach were also checked.

21. 21 September 1944. Three German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended and sent through prisoner of war channels. Ernest Heissner, a German civilian and a Todt Worker since 1939, was apprehended at Winterscheid. He was evacuated to the rear.

22. 22 September 1944. Three German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended. Mikonides Gierzi, Ortsgruppenleiter of NSDAP in Biesialf, was apprehended and a separate report was submitted to V Corps. Six civilians in the division area considered to be a security menace are being held at the Division Cage.

23. 23 September 1944. Johann Oiten, a German of Kobscheid, claimed to have received a disability discharge from the German Army but had no such proof. He was evacuated as a prisoner of war. George Schlarmon, a German civilian of Keth, gave Germans information regarding our positions. He was apprehended and proper procedure will be taken. Julian Kozirowski, a Polish Todt Worker, was evacuated. Nine German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended, including one girl who was a member of a search-light battery.

24. 24 September 1944. The nine German soldiers mentioned above were evacuated to the rear for disposition.

Annex B - CIC, Contd

25. 25 September 1944. One Russian male civilian was apprehended leaving Hergersberg and coming through our lines. He was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. People evacuated from our front lines were screened at St. Vith before being relocated by Military Government.

26. 28 September 1944. Three brothers, former SS Troops members of the SR, were apprehended in Mandorfeld in civilian clothes. Five other soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended. Five civilians deemed dangerous to our security are being held until the division moves forward. Approximately one hundred and fifty civilians were screened in Mandorfeld as they entered the town to have their currency stamped.

27. 27 September 1944. Three soldiers in civilian clothes were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Paul Knauf of Grosslangenfeld, a party member since 1933, and political leader 1933-36 was apprehended. Evacuees from Bleialf were screened.

28. 28 September 1944. Paul Rorings of Mandorfeld was picked up on suspicion. Later the subject's wife stated he was a Gestapo Agent. Upon interrogation, subject admitted being a "V" man (Vertrauensmann). Subject also revealed the names of: Dr. Holnuth Schmidt, Agent of the Gestapo, and Major Hoonacker, Chief Agent of the Gestapo, both of Aachen. Six former German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended in the division area.

29. 29 September 1944. Six civilians were evacuated from forward areas for security reasons. One Johann Meyer, of Hainfeld, former German soldier, was apprehended.

30. 30 September 1944. Five German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended. Johann Nikolaus Hottel, Mathias Hottel and Christoff Hottel, brothers, were apprehended in their home. Mathias and Christoff are reported to be SA and SS soldiers. Guillaume Grossjean, a member of Hitler Youth, was evacuated.

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Annex B

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ANNEX C - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 417

1. The following statistics pertain to the activities of Military Intelligence Interpreters Team No. 417 during the period 1 September to 30 September 1944, inclusive:

Interrogated:	29 French and Belgian civilians
Interrogated:	129 German Prisoners of War
Identified:	97 Enemy Units
Identified:	33 Enemy Officers

Miscellaneous
Identifications:

Enemy supply depots, munition dumps, bunkers, and other West Wall fortifications; enemy observation posts; German war materiel factories; enemy anti-tank ditches, minefields, and artillery batteries (their locations and caliber).

Obtaining Information:

Regarding strength and organization of enemy units; enemy communication and transportation facilities; reinforcements; morale of enemy troops and casualties suffered.

2. The following activities were performed in addition to those listed above:

Served as interpreters for the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.

Served as interpreters for CIC and GAO.

Translation of documents

Assisted the CIC in screening civilians

Searching enemy installations for documents

Interrogated foreign elements of enemy units in Russian, Lithuanian, German, and French.

-00000-

ANNEX D - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31

1. Operations of the Photo Interpreters Team No. 31 during the period 1 September to 30 September 1944 consisted of the following:

a. Prepared uncontrolled mosaics, annotated and distributed them to units concerned.

b. A defense overprint map was maintained and overlays of intelligence from aerial photographs were distributed to the units.

2. During this period a member of this team was sent to each of the units to assist them in using aerial photographs. This proved to be a valuable aid to the S-2's concerned.

-cc0cc-

[REDACTED]
 HEADQUARTERS
 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
 APO 4, US ARMY

:Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
 :Init: 15
 :Date: 9 January 1945

AG 319.1

9 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU : Command Channels.

Amendment to Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports, AG File 319.1, dated 10 October 1944.

a. Sec II - Introduction, is amended by adding:

"Brigadier General Harold W. Blakoley, 07257, USA, commanded the division from 18 September to 20 September 1944, inclusive."

b. So much of paragraph 13, Section II as reads "Major General Harold R. Bull", is amended to read "Brigadier General Harold W. Blakoley."

c. Paragraph 14 is amended by deleting the words "to assume command at the termination of Major General Bull's tour of duty."

d. Paragraph 16 is amended by adding "Major General Harold R. Bull assumed command of the division."

e. Paragraph 18 is amended by adding "Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the division."

H. W. Blakoley
 Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

6241

O.P.D.
ETO
1281
A-505

319.1 1st Ind.
(9 Jan 45) - After Action Report
HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS, APO 305, U.S. Army, 12 January 1945.

TO: Commanding General, First U.S. Army, APO 230, U.S. Army. (Rear Echelon)

Request that amendment as indicated in basic communication be made in After Action Reports of 4th Infantry Division for month of September 1944.

For the Commanding General:

RECEIVED
1st ARMY AGO 13 JAN 1945



Sam P. ...
SAR P. ...
Major, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

319.1 (AG/TSC) 2nd Ind.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY, APO 230, 14 JAN 1945

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, APO 887.

J.M.
A. E. M.

304-3314

Incl 1

FEB 6 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM	177
ITEM NO: 2179	
(cont)	

31-0-3
(6011)
Master
Operation Report, 4th Inf Div

400

28
[REDACTED]
HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Eto.
Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Inits: CAG
Date: 10 November 1944
.....

AG 319.1

10 November 1944. 2

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU : Command Channels.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C4), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 October to 31 October 1944.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Marr, O15447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlon R. Bryant, O287628, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hanson, O286814, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, O302396, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr., O373431, GSC

Major Guy O. DeYoung, Jr., O373431, GSC, AC of S, G-4, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 20 October 1944.

1. The month of October 1944 found the 4th Infantry Division on a holding line on two portions of the German border. During periods of relative inactivity within the division, the AC of S, G-1 Section was continuously occupied. The units were able to keep a portion of their command out of the line, thereby giving the officers and men thus relieved opportunity to witness picture shows and take part in other forms of amusement provided. The stress of a driving tactical offensive was lifted and the units were able to bring their units up to date. Periodically throughout the month ceremonies were held and medals were made of the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star and Bronze Star Ribbon.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
DECLASSIFIED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
10/15/80
REVIEW COMMITTEE

Incl
ma

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

2. 1 October 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to V Corps and First United States Army.

3. 2-3 October 1944. Red Cross Clubmobile supervisor visited CP, and arrangements were made for the acquisition of several clubmobiles to provide doughnuts for the infantry soldiers. The machines were placed with the 4th Quartermaster Company where the Red Cross girls prepared the doughnuts. The reserve units were served daily.

4. 4 October 1944. CP closed out and moved to new location southwest of Bullingen, Belgium (929003)

5. 5 October 1944. Prisoner of War Inclosure moved to 922972 from its location in St. Vith, Belgium. The stability of the tactical situation confined the number of prisoners of war to those captured by patrols and those captured infiltrating through our lines. The practice, started at the beginning of the campaign, whereby the Military Police escorted prisoners from the regiments to the Prisoner of War Inclosure has been continued.

6. 6 October 1944. Movie projectors and operators were secured through the Special Service Officer and furnished to the units. The films were rotated until all personnel had an opportunity to see them. In this manner rifle units not in the lines were able to obtain enjoyment and entertainment.

7. 7 October 1944. Inactivity in the lines permitted the use of numerous other diversions. Donut Clubmobiles and GI shows with army personnel were secured and made a tour of the units.

8. 8 October 1944. G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to V Corps and First United States Army.

9. 9 October 1944. The V Corps instigated a system for training personnel which were in the replacement system. By placing both officers and enlisted men on detached service with divisions they obtained valuable training in the activities of the men in the line. The division co-operated with V Corps and on 9 October fourteen (14) officers and seventy-five (75) enlisted men were sent to the division. By placing these officers and men in the regiments according to their Military Occupational Specialty Numbers, they received firsthand training in action that their previous experiences had not included. As an example of the value of this type of training, each regiment asked to have a portion of its attached officers assigned. The majority of the officers and men felt that the 4th Infantry Division was the best outfit - a sign of gaining the necessary confidence which typifies a combat soldier.

10. 11 October 1944. Now that there was relief from the rapid moving offensives, it was possible to make arrangements to hold ceremonies to present the decorations earned by the members of the division. All pending awards were placed before the board for decision and those qualified were approved by the Commanding General.

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

11. 12 October 1944. The Commanding General at appropriate ceremonies presented Silver Stars to members of each regiment. Each regiment assembled its recipients and as large a group of spectators as was consistent with the tactical situation near the Regimental CPs where the awards were made.

12. 13-14 October 1944. Personnel of the separate and attached units were assembled in the Division CP before members of the General and Special Staff and the Commanding General presented one Distinguished Service Cross and eighteen (18) Silver Stars to the worthy individuals.

The division was allocated a quota of French awards - Croix de Guerre and Legion of Honor. The basis for these awards was as follows: To qualify for the Croix de Guerre, the act or acts should warrant the Bronze Star Medal or the Silver Star. To qualify for the Legion of Honor, the service rendered should warrant the Legion of Merit. The division recommended thirteen (13) officers for the Legion of Honor and sixty-five (65) officers and men for the Croix de Guerre. The AG of S, G-1 Section furnished extra personnel to aid the awards and decorations section in expeditious handling of the recommendations.

13. 15 October 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to the V Corps and the First United States Army.

14. 19 October 1944. Letter was received from the First United States Army authorizing an overstrength of combat officers. Each infantry regiment was authorized an overstrength of fourteen (14) officers; each artillery battalion three (3) officers; engineer battalion one (1) officer; cavalry troop, mechanized one (1) officer, and tank battalion four (4) officers. The Division Classification Officer was contacted and a requisition was submitted to the First United States Army. Where possible, the officers were asked for by name from the supply of former 4th Infantry Division officers in the replacement channel.

15. 22 October 1944. The first group of infantry riflemen left for 48 hour pass in Paris, France. The Commanding General directed that the officers and men would come from rifle companies only and would be picked according to the number of continuous combat days accrued. These men assembled at the 4th Infantry Division Rear Echelon the day before leaving for Paris and were paid, given showers, passes and final instructions. They reported to the American Express Building in Paris where billet locations and messing facilities were furnished. The trip, aside from the distinct morale building factor was an excellent opportunity for a much needed rest for the old timers of our line companies.

16. 23 October 1944. The Commanding General presented Silver Stars to officers and men of the 22d Infantry at a formation held in the Regimental CP. Among those receiving awards were Colonel Charles T. Lanham, O18568, Inf, Regimental Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel John P. Ruggles, O18596, Inf, Regimental Executive Officer.

17. 24 October 1944. In compliance with telephone conversation with AG of S, G-1, V Corps, and written instructions announcing the opening of V Corps Recreation Center at Eupen, Belgium, the division's first allotment of eight (8) officers and one hundred eighteen (118) enlisted men departed

Soc II - Introduction, Contd

so as to arrive at Eupen by 1000, 24 October 1944. The Recreation Center provided beds, meals, movies, church services, an opportunity to take baths and use the Quartermaster Laundry Service. The general consensus of opinion of those who benefited was very satisfactory.

Additional quotas to Paris were filled in the following order:

26 October 1944 - 6 officers and 67 enlisted men

28 October 1944 - 6 officers and 67 enlisted men

30 October 1944 - 6 officers and 67 enlisted men

18. 25 October 1944. Twelve (12) officers and one hundred and twenty-four (124) enlisted men were attached to the division for training. These were distributed equally to the three regiments and were handled in the same manner as outlined in paragraph 9 above.

19. 26 October 1944. Memorandum was received from the First United States Army discontinuing the G-1 Periodic Report. This report was made up as of midnight each Saturday and was forwarded to Army Headquarters by officer courier with an information copy going to V Corps.

20. 27 October 1944. Two clubmobiles were secured and sent to the 8th Infantry to furnish doughnuts to each battalion as it was relieved from the line.

Received a quota for passes to Eupen, Belgium, V Corps Recreation Center:

31 October 1944 - 15 officers and 135 enlisted men

4 November 1944 - 10 officers and 101 enlisted men

8 November 1944 - 13 officers and 137 enlisted men

21. 29-31 October 1944. During this period movies, USO shows, Red Cross Clubmobiles and GI shows were provided for the entertainment of the men. The Estimated Loss Report was submitted to V Corps daily.

Section III - Intelligence (With Amoxos A, B, & C)

1. 1 October 1944. The enemy occupied the bunker and pillboxes along the general line: 987816 - 004820 - 030830 - 036835 - 040940 - 047946 - to Waseheid, then north along woods to 064848 - 062881 - 061886 - 051891. In addition to occupying the emplacements and improving his defensive position by digging foxholes and trenches in front of the permanent installations, the enemy continued to send forth small patrols which attempted to work their way forward of the bunker line to probe our lines for the purpose of establishing the disposition of our troops. Late in the period, the enemy staged a counterattack using a reinforced platoon, supported by mortars, artillery, bazookas, and hand grenades. This thrust succeeded in dislodging our troops in the vicinity 035834. The position was, however, eventually retaken. Enemy artillery fire remained light. Eight rounds of rocket fire impacted in the vicinity 034844 and twenty rounds of estimated

See III - Intelligence, Contd

150mm landed at Roth late in the period. No aggressive action by enemy aircraft was reported. Enemy armor did not operate in the 4th Infantry Division sector during the period. Units contacted were: 11 Fortress Battalion and 464 Replacement and Training Battalion.

2. 2 October 1944. The enemy continued to improve his defensive positions along the bunker line. At every opportunity the enemy pursued his digging activities and improved the camouflage of both permanent and hasty installations along his main line of resistance. A few patrols were contacted but in each case with the exception of once those patrols hastily dispersed when fired on by our troops. In one instance a combat patrol attacked with the intention of occupying the vicinity O35834. After a short engagement, however, this group like the rest showed little desire to assault our forces and soon dispersed. A total of 32 rockets constituted the enemy's artillery effort during this period. These formed a very dispersed pattern, however, and inasmuch as the fragmentation of the rockets was not great the effective radius was limited. Unidentified planes were over the area during darkness but they took no offensive action. Two enemy tanks were observed but these did not operate against our troops. An "S" minefield was discovered in the vicinity O4598459 by a patrol of CT 8. Units contacted were: Deutschland Regiment and 669 Ost Battalion.

3. 3 October 1944. While defending from the emplacements along the Westwall the enemy utilized every opportunity to dig additional emplacements to the front of the pillboxes and bunkers in the Siegfried line. Camouflaging was employed and additional fields of fire were cleared and old ones improved. Germans occupying the hasty and permanent defenses fired on our patrols when the latter came within range and observation. Most fires received by our patrols were from small arms, automatic weapons, and machine guns. Small enemy patrols made weak thrusts at our position but all were repulsed with almost no casualties on our part. A weapon of artillery caliber employed direct fire on our positions in the vicinity O15830. This fire came from an estimated azimuth of 90°. In addition to the above, a heavy artillery barrage fell in the vicinity O15830. A concentration of 16 rockets landed in the vicinity O39868. Unidentified planes were again over the division area. Two tanks were reported at O02816. These took no aggressive action against our forces. Units in contact remained unchanged.

4. 4 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division occupied two sectors during the period. In the old sector the enemy front lines remained the same while in the new sector, there was no contact. In the old sector, the enemy continued his defense of the emplacements along the line. As in previous periods, considerable effort was made by the Germans to improve their positions by digging auxiliary entrenchments, improving fields of fire, and perfecting cover and concealment. Artillery was light and consisted mostly in harassing and interdiction fire on prominent terrain features and roadways. Neither the enemy's armor nor his aircraft made itself evident during this period. Units in contact were: 6 Fortress Battalion and the 11 Fortress Battalion.

5. 5 October 1944. In the new sector occupied by the 4th Infantry Division enemy front lines were not established during the period. Enemy troops were encountered, however, protecting a road block at O10989.

Sec III- Intelligence, Contd

In defense of this position the enemy employed small arms and machine guns in dug in emplacements. It was estimated that an enemy force of about company strength was defending this roadblock and the crossroads adjacent to it. Enemy reconnaissance patrols attempted to probe our lines at different intervals. In each case, however, the enemy offered little resistance and hastily withdrew immediately upon being engaged by our forces. There was no report of enemy artillery falling in the 4th Infantry Division's new sector. Planes were over the area during the hours of darkness. These were not, however, identified since no offensive action was taken by them. No enemy armor was seen or heard during the period. An increasing usage of land mines by the enemy was noted during the period. Prisoners of war identified a Fortress Battalion which they claimed was designated as the "V" Fortress Battalion. This was the only unit identified in the new sector thus far.

6. 6 October 1944. The enemy front lines in front of CT 8 was established as a line of outposts extending from 015996 to 029025. This outpost line served as an intermediate line of defense which was employed with the object of holding out as long as possible from these dug in positions and then falling quickly back to the permanent installations of the Siegfried Line. Usually the outpost positions defended roads and trails leading east into the Westwall. In all cases the outpost contained at least one machine gun well dug in and camouflaged and supported by rifle and automatic weapons fire from infantry troops strategically emplaced. From out of the outpost line the enemy employed reconnaissance patrols. The enemy front lines facing CT 12 and CT 22 were still not determined during the period. Estimated 105mm interdiction fire fell in the southern part of the 4th Infantry Division sector during the period. One enemy plane was observed over CT 12 at 1130. In addition, several unidentified planes were over the area during darkness. In no case was offensive action taken by any of these planes. No reports of enemy armor were made. Numerous mine fields indicated that the enemy had spent considerable time in preparing the defense of the arteries leading into the Siegfried Line. The unit previously identified as the "V" Fortress Battalion was correctly determined to be the 7 Fortress Battalion.

7. 7 October 1944. In front of CT 12 the enemy defended the crossroads in the vicinity of Losheimer Graben (040988) using heavy machine guns, 80mm mortars, and small arms, the enemy utilized dug in emplacements and cellars of buildings to stubbornly defend this crossroad. Finally after being shell- ed by artillery, Cannon Company, and 81mm mortars, the 150-200 enemy were dislodged and driven from the position by our troops. CT 8 encountered the enemy along a line estimated to extend from Neuhauf (043025) southward to the vicinity 050000. Along this line the enemy defended his dug in positions with machine guns, mortars, and direct artillery fire. In the CT 22 some of advance the enemy front lines existed from 035027 to 035035 to 042047. The enemy remained defensive during the period. Some slight offensive action in the nature of a few patrols threatened our positions but briefly. In all instances the enemy patrols were thrown back after short engagements. It was apparent during the period that the enemy's defense was somewhat stronger in the southern sector of his defensive line. Interdiction of the road junction at 005993 by estimated 105 and 155mm fire commenced at about 1000, and continued until late in the period. The outpost line of CT 8 received 105mm fire at 0745. No enemy armor was reported; likewise there were no reports

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

of enemy planes. Enemy mine fields continued to be more frequent and more elaborate. Regel mines were found for the first time in the 4th Infantry Division zone of advance.

8. 8 October 1944. The enemy occupied the defenses of the Siegfried Line opposite the 4th Infantry Division whose front lines bordered generally the north - south road from 057057 to 004976. In addition the enemy occupied a fairly strong outpost at 028016. Whereas the enemy's main line of resistance was undoubtedly the permanent defenses of the Westwall, he protected the main line of resistance from dug in emplacements which formed a sort of OPL in front of the pillboxes and bunkers in the Siegfried Line. The enemy also maintained strong patrols which, passing beyond the enemy OPL, attempted to probe our positions at various points. The enemy launched four counterattacks during the period. These attacks were made by forces of from 50-70 men and they occurred at 0630, 0745, 0800, and 1030. Two of the attacks were preceded by heavy artillery and mortar barrages. In all cases the counterattacks were repulsed and in at least one instance, the enemy received heavy casualties. In addition to the heavy barrages initiating the enemy's counterattacks at 0650 and 0745, the usual interdictory and harassing fires on roadways and junctions were experienced. There was no action on the part of enemy aircraft in the 4th Infantry Division area. Enemy mine fields continued thick as did the prevalence of fallen tree road blocks, and antitank defenses. Units contacted were the 7 Fortress Battalion and the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion.

9. 9 October 1944. The enemy remained on the defensive during this period except for a few small patrols which were driven off upon contact with our patrols and outposts. In front of the installations of the Siegfried Line and around the dug in emplacements of his OPL, the enemy devoted considerable effort to improving his fields of fire, cover, and concealment. An enemy ambush surprised and captured three officers and a staff sergeant who were reconnoitering new artillery positions in a jeep in the vicinity 053021. Also during this period one of our officers checking an outpost was captured by two enemy soldiers who started to take him back to their lines. When our artillery fell nearby they decided to take the officer back no farther but to interrogate him on the spot. After refusing to answer their questions, this officer was beat up and kicked until he became unconscious. Upon regaining his senses, this officer managed to escape to our own lines when once again friendly artillery startled his captors. Some 106mm fire landed on our front line troops but no heavy concentrations were reported. Enemy propaganda leaflets were fired into the northern part of the CE 8 sector. These leaflets were the same as those previously employed by the enemy. Although no prisoners of war were taken during the period, there was no evidence that the enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division had changed.

10. 10 October 1944. When visibility permitted, the enemy could be seen improving his positions and fields of fire all along the Siegfried Line and throughout his OPL to the front of the bunkers and pillboxes. The area about Neuhof was particularly active with considerable attention being given to digging connecting trenches between bunkers and pillboxes. Other than the above activities, the enemy remained entirely on the defensive and showed little inclination to engage our forces even with artillery.

Sec III - Intelligence, Comd

The only evidence of enemy shelling was one barrage of 88mm which was fired at 1730. An increase in anti-personnel mines was noted and it was further determined that almost all German mines were being booby trapped. Units in contact were the same as previously reported.

11. 11 October 1944. The enemy continued to improve his defensive positions in and around the Siegfried line opposite the 4th Infantry Division. An enemy patrol of about thirty men was sent out to make contact with our forces and reached the vicinity of O32008. At this point the patrol was subjected to our artillery fire after which it withdrew. Considerable heavy mortar fire fell on our front line elements but enemy artillery was not particularly heavy. About 30 rounds of 150mm and some high velocity shelling was reported. An enemy plane was over the CT 22 area at 1445; also some unidentified planes were over the division sector during the hours of darkness. In no case, however, was aggressive action taken. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained the same. Prisoners of war taken represented the 7 Fortress Battalion. Our patrols continued to encounter enemy mine fields and it was noted that in each instance where mines were removed they were equipped with an anti-lifting device.

12. 12 October 1944. When the situation permitted, the enemy continued his improvement activities in the vicinity of his Siegfried defenses. This activity was, however, somewhat less than in previous periods. CT 22 reported small arms fire coming from the vicinity of Miescheid (O71055) and it was reported that two enemy assault guns were firing from the vicinity of Giescheid (O404). The enemy was observed placing mines in the shell craters leading up to the Westwall defenses. Artillery fires were light during the period. As in previous periods no evidence of enemy armor was reported. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained the same with prisoners of war being taken from the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion. The results of our propaganda dissemination were further proven by the fact that all prisoners of war surrendered with "Safe Conduct" passes that were fired into the enemy lines during previous periods. These Germans admitted that men occupying the bunkers and pillboxes had given considerable thought to the advisability of surrender as a result of our propaganda leaflets.

13. 13 October 1944. The enemy improved his defensive position with renewed vigor during the period. More mine fields were laid and although for the most part remaining on the defensive, the enemy sent a few patrols forward to contact our lines. Artillery was light and except for an assault gun which fired from the vicinity of Miescheid, no shellings of any consequence were reported. Observation proved that the enemy engaged in mine laying activities during the hours of darkness. It was believed that small mine laying details were infiltrating our lines during the night and laying mines in areas which had previously been swept and cleared. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained unchanged with prisoners of war representing the 7 Fortress Battalion and the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion. Unidentified planes were over the area but they took no action against our troops. No enemy tanks were observed during the period.

14. 14 October 1944. An enemy patrol apparently bent on establishing the location of our front lines made contact with our outpost in the vicinity of O34016, between the hours of 0100 and 0400. Other than the

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd.

above incident, plus some activity within his own bunker line, the enemy remained wholly on the defensive. A concentration of ten rounds of artillery fell in the vicinity 031009. CT 12 reported some fire, estimated to be 105mm, coming from the direction of Giescheid (071055). At 0520 a single plane, assumed to be enemy, passed over Company B of CT 8 going east. This plane dropped one small bomb and at the same time fired machine guns and a 20mm cannon. This was the only action taken by aircraft during the period. The 276 Replacement and Training Battalion and the 7 Fortress Battalion remained opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

15. 15 October 1944. An enemy patrol of fifteen men sent out to contact our front lines and establish an outpost in the vicinity of 034015 was engaged and dispersed by our troops. Our patrols observed considerable activity in the vicinity of the Siegfried Defenses and at 1600 a group of about two hundred enemy were observed moving east across country southeast of Nouhof. Two rounds estimated to be 105mm fell in the vicinity of Honsfeld at 0105, and an additional seven rounds landed at 2220. Some harassing fire was received in CT 8's northern sector late in the period. Additional enemy mines were found and removed and it was learned that enemy troops had been warned to stay away from mined areas because they were all mined. Prisoners of war were taken from the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion and the 7 Fortress Battalion. Many unidentified planes were over the area but as usual no offensive action was taken by them. It was learned during the period that the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division which had been reported crossing the front opposite the 4th Infantry Division during the previous two days had been committed in the 1st Infantry Division (American) zone of action.

16. 16 October 1944. There was little activity on the part of the enemy during this period. No patrols were contacted by our troops and improvement of Siegfried Defenses was at a standstill. There was a considerable increase in enemy mortar shelling, principally in the CT 8 and CT 22 sectors. Beginning at 1000, enemy artillery fire increased somewhat over the previous period. Numerous single shell missions fell throughout the area occupied by CT 22. The same units opposed the 4th Infantry Division as in the previous period. No enemy aircraft were reported over the area.

17. 17 October 1944. The enemy was observed engaged in such activities as washing clothes near a pillbox at 044008, cutting trees at 044011, and generally moving about in Uenbreth. A small enemy patrol was contacted and dispersed at 035985. Some light mortars and artillery fires were received by front line elements. One of our patrols that reached Giescheid received high-velocity fire from an antitank weapon in a pillbox at 043036 and heavy machine gun fire from pillboxes located in the northern end of Uenbreth. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained unchanged. No action was taken against our forces by enemy aircraft or armor.

18. 18 October 1944. At least one enemy patrol was contacted in the vicinity 038015. This patrol was fired on and forced to withdraw. Two rounds of artillery fell in the vicinity of 023022 at 1740 and four rounds fell at 032037 at 1110. More mines were located and removed. Many of these were found booby-trapped. At 0725 the enemy using an amplifying system directed music from phonograph records towards our front line troops.

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

There was no evidence that enemy troops other than the 7 Fortress Battalion and the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion opposed the 4th Infantry Division. No enemy aircraft or tanks were reported opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

19. 19 October 1944. Enemy patrols were not active during the period. An increase in enemy mortar fire was noted by CT 8 and CT 22. At 0910 the enemy fired smoke into the vicinity 060028. At 1515 smoke was again fired into the vicinity 086022. It was believed that the enemy used this means to cover activity behind these areas. Enemy artillery fire in our zone continued light throughout the period. Several prisoners of war surrendered as a result of our propaganda broadcast delivered from the CT 8 area between 1230 and 1245. Prisoners of war indicated that the defensive zone of the 412 Replacement and Training Battalion had been extended south to include a portion of the front opposite the 4th Infantry Division. This battalion and the 7 Fortress Battalion, and the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion were opposing the 4th Infantry Division. Enemy aircraft and armor did not operate against the 4th Infantry Division during the period.

20. 20 October 1944. The enemy continued his defense of the pillbox line and engaged in improving the cover and concealment and fields of fire in front of his pillboxes and dug in emplacements. Light mortar fire was received by CT 8 in the vicinity of 034024. Smoke was again used by the enemy apparently to conceal his activities in and around the Siegfried emplacements. Mine fields were again encountered in strength. No armor was observed in front of the 4th Infantry Division zone. Enemy aircraft again failed to attack our forces. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained the same.

21. 21 October 1944. Some enemy patrolling activity took place during the period. At vicinity 032981 a patrol of CT 12 contacted an enemy patrol which, when fired upon, dispersed and ran to the rear. Within ten minutes eight rounds of 88mm direct fire fell in this area from the direction of Scheid (064965). Little activity was observed along the line of Siegfried Defenses. The shelling of our front lines with fairly heavy mortar fire continued. Four rounds of artillery impacted in the vicinity of 9901 at 1600. Eight rounds estimated to be 88mm fell in the vicinity 032981. There was no evidence of enemy aircraft or armor along the 4th Infantry Division front. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained unchanged.

22. 22 October 1944. The enemy increased his patrol activity and established more outposts during this period. Along the pillbox line and just forward of this line the enemy improved his emplacement and increased the number of mine fields. Mortar concentrations along our front lines slackened off both in intensity and frequency. No report of enemy artillery fire was received. Several unidentified planes were over the area but no aggressive action was reported. At about 1915 a single unidentified plane circled Neuhof (044028). The enemy fired two white flares from the ground and the plane left the area. A five man enemy patrol was captured at 042008 after a fire fight. At 044006 an enemy four man outpost was captured. Prisoners of war represented the 7 Fortress Battalion. There was no definite assurance that the units opposing the 4th Infantry Division had

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

changed; however, the continued absence of men from the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion amongst the prisoners of war plus the screening attempts made by the enemy in the use of smoke led us to believe that a change in the enemy's defensive set-up might be in process.

23. 23 October 1944. The enemy front now existed from F-019074 to F-053072, then south along the line of Siegfried defenses to L-050985. Outposts were maintained forward of the pillbox line to give warning of attack and to observe the activities of our troops. Light mortar fire was received during the period. Several rounds of artillery estimated to be 105mm fell in the CT 22 area from 1200 to 1800 hours. One of our patrols received two rounds of high velocity heavy explosive which probably emanated from an antitank emplacement in the vicinity of Udenbreth. There was no evidence that units opposing the 4th Infantry Division had changed, although as yet no prisoners of war were taken from the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion since 19 October.

24. 24 October 1944. The enemy line in the newly defined northern sector of the 4th Infantry Division was vague. It was believed to extend from 023082 to 037071 to 036053. From this latter point south, there was no change in the line. Small enemy forces were employed forward of the pillbox line as outposts, patrols, and work details for improving the defenses. Mortar and artillery fires were not heavy. About thirty-two rounds of rockets containing enemy propaganda leaflets were received in the CT-8 area about 1015. Several rounds estimated at 105mm fell in the CT-22 area. Three rounds of the same caliber fell at 028001 between 1800 and 1325. Prisoners of war were taken from two units newly identified in the present 4th Infantry Division zone. These units were: 454 Replacement and Training Battalion on the south flank and 412 Replacement and Training Battalion which, although previously identified by a small group which had worked its way south and thus into the northernmost line of outpost being held by our troops on 19 October, was now determined as holding the defensive line opposite our northernmost battalion in its new sector. No enemy aircraft or armor was reported opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

25. 25 October 1944. Small reconnaissance patrols were instituted by the enemy which attempted to probe forward of the Siegfried defenses and its intermediary OPL. Small arms fire was received by CT-8's forward elements during the afternoon. Mortar concentrations and some artillery was received. Enemy planes and armor did not operate against the 4th Infantry Division during the period. The 77 Training Battalion was contacted for the first time by the 4th Infantry Division.

26. 26 October 1944. The enemy continued to employ small patrols forward of the pillbox line. Harassing artillery and mortar fire fell on front line elements. Mortar fire showed a slight increase over the previous period. The enemy used an improvised booby-trap arrangement in front of CT 22. This consisted of an egg grenade fastened to the trunk of a tree about waist high. A fine black wire with a pull-type igniter furnished the firing mechanism. No enemy aircraft or armor took aggressive action against our troops.

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

27. 27 October 1944. There was less activity on the part of the enemy forward of the pillbox line. Small patrols did operate especially in the wooded area while strong outposts were maintained over most of the sector. Mortar and artillery fires continued to harass our front-line elements. Units in contact were believed to be unchanged, although no prisoners of war were taken to verify this. There was no aggressive action on the part of enemy aircraft or armor.

28. 28 October 1944. The enemy remained on the defensive and operated only a few small patrols forward of his Siegfried defenses. Artillery and mortar fires were in evidence but were lighter than in previous periods. Opposing units remained the same and enemy aircraft and tanks did not operate against our troops during the period.

29. 29 October 1944. The same method of employing patrols and outposts, while his main body occupied the pillbox line was continued by the enemy. Mortar fires remained about the same, although artillery was somewhat increased especially during the early part of the period. Prisoners of war taken from the 77 Training Battalion proved that this unit still opposed the 4th Infantry Division. As far as could be determined other opposing units remained the same. Unidentified planes were over the area but they took no offensive action. No enemy tanks were observed by our forces.

30. 30 October 1944. Defenses were improved and mines were laid by the enemy when the situation permitted. Outposts and small patrols also operated as in previous periods. Some small arms and mortar fire was received by our troops but artillery was very light. A single prisoner of war taken by CT 8 claimed he was from the 4th Fortress Battalion. He further stated that this unit had replaced the 276 Replacement and Training Battalion between 16 October and 19 October. Other than this possible change, opposing units were believed to be the same. Enemy aircraft and armor did not operate against the 4th Infantry Division.

31. 31 October 1944. Some activity was seen amongst the enemy forces in the pillbox line. Other than the above, however, the only action taken by the enemy was in the form of occasional small arms fire directed at our patrols and front lines. Enemy planes did not operate against our troops nor were there any enemy tanks reported. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained unchanged as far as could be determined.

Section IV Operations

1. 1 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued outposting and patrolling to the east within the Division zone of action, preparatory to being relieved and moving into new assembly areas to the north.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and one platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued patrol activity. At 1600, one platoon of Company E, outposted on Hill 555 (L-035834), was counterattacked by a reinforced enemy platoon and a small

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

arms and bazooka engagement ensued; by 1900, the enemy had been routed. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion was attached 302230. September 1944.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company E, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached; 1st Battalion remained in vicinity P-989884 in division mobile reserve; 2d Battalion continued consolidating and improving positions on division main line of resistance, and patrolled to the east and northeast; the 3d Battalion remained outposting the division left (north) flank. Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion; 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), and one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached and the 42d Field Artillery Battalion was attached.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued patrols to the southeast and south. Small arms fire was exchanged with enemy forces in Branscheid at 0900. Company F continued outposting to the southwest as far as Winterspelt (P-914803). Company C, 70th Tank Battalion was detached and the 44th Field Artillery Battalion was attached.

2. 2 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued patrolling to the south, southeast, and northeast, preparatory to being relieved and moving to the north in the vicinity of Humming (9700); preparations to receive the relieving units were completed and plans for moving prior to another assault against the Siegfried Line were continued.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached, continued active patrolling to the east and southeast with extensive use of artillery being directed in firing on enemy OP's, patrols, and positions encountered during the day. A reconnaissance party was dispatched to reconnoiter RCT's new assembly area vicinity P-985995.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; and the 42d Field Artillery Battalion attached; 1st Battalion remained vicinity P-989884 in division mobile reserve; 2d Battalion continued active patrolling to the east and northeast, and continued maintaining, consolidating, and outposting positions along the main line of resistance; the 3d Battalion continued its mission of outposting and screening the left (north) boundary of the division. A reconnaissance party was dispatched to the north to reconnoiter RCT's new assembly area vicinity P-9796.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 44th Field Artillery Battalion attached, continued patrolling to the south and southeast and, upon encountering enemy, directed artillery fire on such positions. Some small arms fire was exchanged with enemy in Branscheid by elements of the 3d Battalion. Company F continued outposting right (south) flank. A reconnaissance party was dispatched to the north to reconnoiter RCT's new assembly area vicinity P-965000.

3. 3 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued vigorous patrolling with all units preparatory to being relieved in present positions and plans were made to move to new assembly area to the north in

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

the vicinity of Hunningen (P-9700).

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached, continued vigorous patrolling to the east and southeast; prepared to be relieved by the 9th Infantry Regiment, and made preparations for move to new assembly area to the north. The 1st Battalion was relieved from positions on the main line of resistance, Companies A and C relieving Companies L and F, respectively; the 1st Battalion then moved to assembly area, Wischeid (P-992905), to be prepared to entruck for move to the north on 4 October.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 42d Field Artillery Battalion attached, continued vigorous patrolling to the front of the main line of resistance and made preparations to be relieved in present positions on 4 October. The 1st Battalion remained in the vicinity P-989884 in division reserve and the 3d Battalion continued outposting and screening the left (north) boundary of the division.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 44th Field Artillery Battalion attached, continued patrolling to the south and southeast with all battalions making preparations to be relieved on 4 October and plans were formulated for move to the north.

4. 4 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division was relieved of positions held within the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line by elements of the 2d Infantry Division by 1800, and initiated movement to new assembly areas to the north.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached, having been relieved by elements of the 2d Infantry Division, moved to the north; 1st Battalion established an outpost line from X-990010 south to P-988977; 2d and 3d Battalions closed in the vicinity P-9899 by 1700.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 42d Field Artillery Battalion attached; 2d and 3d Battalions relieved by elements of the 2d Infantry Division and moved by foot to new assembly areas vicinity of Holzheim (P-9795), closing therein at 1930 and 1845 respectively with small outposts established to the east; the 1st Battalion remained in former positions but prepared to initiate movement to the north at 050800 October 1944.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 44th Field Artillery Battalion attached, was relieved by elements of the 2d Infantry Division; the 1st Battalion moved by motor at 1330 to the north in the vicinity of Honsfeld (P-9699), while the 2d and 3d Battalions moved by foot to temporary assembly area in the vicinity of Buehet (P-9883), and prepared to move by motor to the north early 5 October.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion supported the movement of division units by improving roads and preparing unit assembly areas to the north, and moved to new assembly area vicinity P-959989.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) relieved by elements of the 2d Infantry Division, moved to the north in the vicinity of Madendorf (P-9793), and established contact between the 12th Infantry on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

The 4th Division Artillery, 955th Field Artillery Battalion, and two companies of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion remained in position to support the 2d Infantry Division; other units initiated movement to the north.

5. 5 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division moved remaining units to the north, improved areas, established CP's, and outposted line to the east, sending out reconnaissance patrols to seek information of the enemy, and continued preparations for future operations.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached; 1st Battalion maintained CPL from K-995010 to P-997975, and sent out strong patrols to the east to seek information of the enemy. These patrols contacted enemy along line from L-009995 to L-003976. The 2d Battalion remained in positions from P-987992 to P-982979, improving positions and maintaining contact with units on the right, left and to the front; the 3d Battalion established, maintained, and improved positions along line from K-990005 to P-983996. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion was detached at 1130 and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion was attached at the same time.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 42d Field Artillery Battalion attached; the 1st Battalion was shuttled to the north and closed in new assembly area in the vicinity P-975965 by 0930 and by 1410, the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d and 3d Battalions on OPL and occupied positions extending from P-995975 southwest to P-972940. The 2d Battalion in assembly area vicinity P-977970, and the 3d Battalion in area vicinity P-975962, carried on care and cleaning of clothing and equipment. The 42d Field Artillery Battalion was detached and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached at 1130.

The 22nd Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, and the 44th Field Artillery Battalion attached; the 1st Battalion from vicinity K-975005 moved to establish an outpost line extending from K-972028 to K-993032 to K-998801; 2d Battalion moved from vicinity of Weisert (P-9282) to the vicinity of Hummingen (K-9701), closing at 1450; the 3d Battalion moved by motor from temporary assembly area in the vicinity of Buchat (P-9885), closing in area vicinity P-956996 at 1350. The 44th Field Artillery Battalion was detached; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached at 1130.

The 4th Division Artillery completed movement of the remaining units to the north. The 955th Field Artillery Battalion was detached and reverted to V Corps control.

The 70th Tank Battalion initiated movement at 1215 to the north and closed in new area in vicinity P-947967 at 1430.

The 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion moved to vicinity P-919995, closing at 1145.

The 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion moved to and closed in area P-940996 at 1440.

The 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion moved to area P-923996, closing at 1600.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

6. 6 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division readjusted and strengthened positions along the OPL, relieving elements of the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group thereat; patrolled vigorously to the east and northeast, maintained contact with the 112th Infantry on the north and the 2d Infantry Division on the south, and at the end of the day, was prepared to attack to the east on 7 October.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached; 1st Battalion maintained OPL from F-003013 to P-997975, relieved the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, and sent patrols to determine enemy dispositions; the 2d and 3d Battalions improved positions and maintained contact with units on the right, left and to the front. Plans were formulated to attack to the northeast on 7 October 1944.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 70th Tank Battalion and Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached; 1st Battalion maintained positions on OPL to the northeast and east, and arrangements were made to maintain contact with Task Force "Deeley" at Lanzerath (L-005962) every hour. The 2d and 3d Battalions remained in assembly areas and plans were formulated to attack to the northeast on 7 October.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached; 1st Battalion maintained and reorganized positions on OPL, sent out patrols which contacted enemy at 1550 and became involved in fire fight with 30 armed enemy at F-017036, resulting in killing two Germans; at 1600 contact was established with the 112th Infantry Regiment on the north at K-998034 and arrangements were made for hourly contact by patrols; 2d and 3d Battalions remained in assembly area, plans being formulated to attack to the northeast 7 October.

Company D, 10th Tank Battalion was attached to the 70th Tank Battalion at 1800.

7. 7 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division advanced to the east and secured preliminary objectives and line of departure, preparatory to launching an assault on the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of Udenbroth (F-0405) on D-Day, H-Hour.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached; at 1000, the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, passed through OPL held by the 1st Battalion to secure preliminary objectives and by 1245 secured objectives across the main north-south road. Company I, upon reaching objective, received small arms fire from the left flank. The remainder of the 3d Battalion received mortar and artillery fire. The 1st Battalion advanced from previous OPL and established positions on regimental right (south) flank. One platoon, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion was detached and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion was attached during the day.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 70th Tank Battalion and Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached; 1st Battalion advanced to the east from OPL to seize and secure crossroads in the vicinity L-010988. By 1115, Company C became engaged in small fire fight southwest of crossroads. As the battalion advanced within small arms range of their objective, stiffer resistance was encountered from an estimated force of 200 enemy infantry defending stone houses in that vicinity. Repeated

See IV - Operations, Contd

infantry assaults supported by bazookas and tanks succeeded in routing the enemy by 1730 and mopping up operations were begun. The 3d Battalion advanced in the vicinity of positions formerly held by the 1st Battalion; the 2d Battalion displacing to the south and establishing an OPL for protection of the division right (south) flank in the vicinity of P-9997, continued contact with Task Force "Deeley", 2d Infantry Division, vicinity of L-003962. Company B, 70th Tank Battalion was detached and one platoon, Company B, and one platoon, Company D, was attached during the day.

The 22d Infantry with Company G, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion attached, advanced to the east, two battalions abreast, 2d Battalion on the left, passing through the 1st Battalion on OPL at 1000; and the 1st Battalion then relieved, advanced on the right. Steady advance was made and first contact with enemy was at 1305 vicinity F-029025 by the 1st Battalion, consisting of sniper fire and a little mortar and artillery fire. At 1340, the 1st Battalion closed on objectives with the 2d Battalion reaching their objective at 1342. Positions were immediately consolidated and contact established on the left (north) flank with elements of the 28th Infantry Division and on the right (south) flank with the 8th Infantry. One platoon, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion was detached and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, was attached during the day.

Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and moved to an area in the vicinity of Bullingen (K-947018).

8. 8 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained and improved positions on main line of resistance, dispatched patrols to the east, and continued plans for the coordinated attack against the Siegfried Line, vicinity of Hienbreth (F-0403).

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, less one platoon, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached; at 0615, 3d Battalion received heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire which was followed up by an enemy patrol of estimated platoon strength attacking in the vicinity of F-023028, but by 0715, the enemy patrol had been repulsed by artillery and small arms fire. All battalions sent patrols to the east to locate enemy positions.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company B, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued on present mission of securing the crossroads at L-010988, protecting the south (right) flank of the division, and maintaining contact with the 8th Infantry on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right. The 1st Battalion encountered enemy patrol in the vicinity of L-019982 during the morning and dispersed them. Patrols were dispatched to the southeast to seek out the enemy. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and Company D, 10th Tank Battalion were attached at 1000.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company C, less one platoon, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached; at 0615, a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire was received in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion (F-032030), followed by enemy infantry, estimated as being a platoon, attacking toward the main line of resistance.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

By 0715, the enemy had been repelled. At 0730, enemy movement was reported against the 1st Battalion vicinity F-032037 and quickly dispersed. Patrols dispatched to the east reported positions of enemy machine guns, mortar, mines, and barbed wire. Contact was maintained with the 112th Infantry on the left and the 8th Infantry on the right.

9. 9 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division sent out strong patrols to the east and southeast, maintained contact with units on both flanks, and formulated plans to seize and destroy enemy fortifications of the Siegfried Line and advance to further objectives to the east.

The 8th Infantry with same attachments as listed 8 October sent out patrols to the east and southeast to determine and report enemy dispositions and strength. Enemy patrols came into Company I sector during early morning and were dispersed.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company B, and one platoon, Company D, 20th Tank Battalion; Company D, 10th Tank Battalion; Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, reinforced with one platoon of tanks and one platoon of assault guns, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, sent patrols to the east and southeast who reported enemy between L-020990 and L-040990 and along road between L-025983 and L-021975.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as listed 8 October sent out strong patrols to the east and northeast and reported enemy at F-037037, F-034027 and F-037126. One patrol engaged in a small arms fight at F-031029.

10. 10 October 1944. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry advanced to the east on the division's right (south) flank to seize favorable terrain from which it could support the planned assault of the division on the Siegfried Line fortifications; other units conducted extensive patrolling.

The 8th Infantry with attachments as listed 8 October further improved positions secured in preparation for an attack to the east and conducted vigorous patrolling to determine enemy strength and dispositions.

The 12th Infantry with attachments as listed 9 October attacked at 0900 with the 3d Battalion (reinforced) to seize objective vicinity L-0399 in preparations for an attack to the east against the Siegfried Line fortifications and leading elements reached objective by 1030, consolidating positions throughout the balance of the day. The 1st Battalion advanced to the east to vicinity L-033990 and secured positions protecting the Regimental right (south) flank. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) outposted previous positions held by the 3d Battalion.

The 22d Infantry, with attachments as listed 8 October, conducted reconnaissance for emplacing direct fire weapons to support an attack to the east and patrolled aggressively with two patrols reaching enemy line of concrete emplacements vicinity K-044034.

11. 11 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain and improve positions, conducted active patrolling to the east and continued to prepare for the assault of the Siegfried Line vicinity of Wendenbreth (F-0403).

The 8th Infantry with same attachments as listed 8 October continued to maintain and improve positions secured on main line of resistance and conducted training in assault of fortified positions and sent patrols to the east.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

The 12th Infantry with same attachments as listed 9 October continued to maintain and improve positions secured 10 October, sent vigorous patrols to the east, and conducted training in assault of a fortified position.

The 22d Infantry, with same attachments as listed 8 October, patrolled aggressively to the east with one patrol reaching the outskirts of Udenbreth (F-0403) with little activity of the enemy being noted, and conducted training in assault of a fortified position.

The 70th Tank Battalion, less combat team attachments, in division reserve, moved from the vicinity P-9598 to vicinity of Hunningen (K-9700) closing at 1200.

12. 12 October 1944. Combat Teams sent out strong patrols to determine enemy disposition and strength; CT 8 and CT 12 changed dispositions of battalions along main line of resistance, keeping minimum of troops in line with remainder to the rear for rest, cleanup, and training. CT 12's positions remained unchanged from previous day with the exception of establishment of an outpost at L-021978.

The 8th Infantry, with attachments as listed 8 October, sent strong patrols to the east; 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion on the main line of resistance, and conducted training, cleanup, rest, etc., for units not on front lines.

The 12th Infantry with attachments as listed 9 October, sent strong patrols to the east. The 1st Battalion established an OP in vicinity of bridge at L-021978 after checking same for demolition charges and set up a road block, and conducted training in assault of fortified positions.

The 22d Infantry with attachments as listed 8 October, sent strong patrols to the east; 3d Battalion relieved the 1st and 2d Battalions on main line of resistance with the last two mentioned battalions moving to assembly areas vicinity F-013023 and F-005033 where they conducted training in assault of fortified positions.

13. 13 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued active patrolling to the east, and under battalion rotation policy, instituted training program with emphasis on tactics in assault of fortified positions, scouting and patrolling, tactics of tank-infantry coordination, use of flame-throwing tanks, and schools for determination of hostile mortar positions.

The 8th Infantry, with attachments as listed 8 October, sent reconnaissance and combat patrols to the east and under battalion rotation policy, initiated training as outlined above. Company B, 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion; Company A, less one platoon, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion reverted to control of parent battalions.

The 12th Infantry, with attachments as listed 9 October, continued reconnaissance and combat patrolling; 2d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on main line of resistance, and balance of the regiment initiated training as outlined above. One platoon, Company B, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion and Company D, 10th Tank Battalion reverted to parent battalions.

The 22d Infantry, with attachments as listed 8 October, continued active reconnaissance and combat patrols to the east; the 3d Battalion maintained positions on main line of resistance, and the 1st and 2d Battalions conducted training as outlined above.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

14. 14 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division dispatched strong combat patrols to the east and conducted training covering tactics in the assault of a fortified position, scouting and patrolling; tank-infantry coordination; use of flame-throwing tanks, and schools for determination of the location of enemy mortar positions.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached conducted active patrolling to the east to harass the enemy, capture prisoners of war, and locate enemy positions; the 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion on main line of resistance and the 1st and 3d Battalions conducted training as outlined above.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued maintaining and improving positions protecting the right flank of the Division and Corps; maintained contact with the 2d Infantry Division on the right and the 8th Infantry on the left, and sent out strong combat patrols to the east to locate and harass the enemy.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached continued active reconnaissance and combat patrols to the east to determine and harass enemy positions; maintained contact with the 12th Infantry on the left, and reserve units conducted training as ordered by the Division Commander.

15. 15 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued vigorous patrolling to the east; rotation policy of battalions on main line of resistance, and training program instituted 13 October for those troops not employed on front lines, with periods being devoted to care and cleaning of equipment, rest and recreation, cleanliness of personnel and clothing, and physical conditioning.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, sent strong patrols to the east and carried on unit training as outlined by division training directive.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued vigorous patrolling to the east, maintained contacts previously established; conducted training as outlined by Division Training Directive, and continued preparations for future operations. Company A, detached from the 1st Battalion, moved to vicinity of V Corps CP to furnish protection.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued vigorous patrolling to the east and conducted training in compliance with division training program in preparation for future operations.

16. 16 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division dispatched strong combat patrols to the east to locate and harass the enemy and continued training program for those units not actively engaged on the division front.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, maintained positions on main line of resistance; sent out strong combat patrols, and conducted training program as outlined in Division Training Directive.

The 12th Infantry, less Company A attached to the V Corps, with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached,

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

continued vigorous patrolling to the east and conducted training as directed by division program. Troop B, 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was detached at 1500.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, dispatched combat patrols to the east; the 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion on main line of resistance, and all units not engaged on front lines conducted training in compliance with Division Training Directive.

17. 17 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued patrol activity to the east, maintained main line of resistance, and conducted training for units not in contact with the enemy.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued patrols to the east; the 2d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on main line of resistance; and continued rehabilitation and training program.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, less Company A attached to the V Corps, continued patrolling to the east and conducted training for troops not employed on main line of resistance.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached continued patrolling to the east and conducted training program for troops not employed on the main line of resistance.

18. 18 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued patrolling to the east and southeast and conducted training program in preparation for future operations for units not on the main line of resistance.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached; 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, and the 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued patrolling to the east and southeast; continued rotation battalion policy on main line of resistance and training as outlined by Division Directive for units not engaged with the enemy.

19. 19 October 1944. Combat Teams continued normal patrol activity and rotation policy of Battalions, maintaining positions on main line of resistance. The 4th Division Artillery continued firing registration, close support, harassing, interdiction, counterbattery and propaganda missions; engineers continued to improve roads, remove mines, etc. Troops and personnel not actively employed on missions pertinent to their units, participated in the Division Training Program in preparation for future operations.

20. 20 October 1944. Continuation of activities and missions as listed 19 October.

21. 21 October 1944. Combat Teams, with no change in attachments, continued active patrolling to the east and southeast, maintained positions and contacts on main line of resistance, and continued the training program in preparation for future operations. The 8th Infantry prepared to relieve the 22d Infantry on main line of resistance to be effected 22 October and the 22d Infantry prepared to relieve the 28th Infantry Division. All other units of the division, not employed on missions pertinent to

Sec IV. - Operations, Contd

their organization, conducted training in preparation for future operations.

22. 22 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued aggressive patrolling to the east and southeast, maintained main line of resistance, and continued the training program. The 8th Infantry relieved the 22d Infantry and the latter prepared and initiated reconnaissance to effect relief of the 28th Infantry Division to the north.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued patrol activity to the east. The 1st Battalion maintained positions on the main line of resistance; the 2d Battalion continued the training program, and the 3d Battalion relieved the 22d Infantry on the latter's main line of resistance. Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached at 1200.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued aggressive patrolling to the east and southeast to establish ambushes and harass the enemy, maintained positions on main line of resistance, and conducted training for units not otherwise employed. Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached at 1200.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached was relieved from its positions on main line of resistance and moved to temporary assembly area vicinity F-015033 prior to effecting relief of the 28th Infantry Division in their zone of action to the north. Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached and Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached at 1200.

23. 23 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued aggressive patrolling to the east and southeast; maintained positions on main line of resistance, effecting relief of the 28th Infantry Division on the latter's main line of resistance, and conducted training in preparation for future operations.

The 8th Infantry consolidated and improved positions on the main line of resistance which had been extended to the north during the previous day; sent out patrols one of which engaged an enemy outpost during the afternoon at F-042008 and captured three prisoners of war, and conducted training for personnel not otherwise employed.

The 12th Infantry with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued aggressive patrolling to the east and southeast; maintained positions on main line of resistance and contacts on the right (south) flank, and conducted training for personnel not engaged on specific missions.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached moved from assembly area (F-010030) to the northwest to relieve elements of the 28th Infantry Division and completed same by 1330 with Regimental CP opening at new location at Roherath (K-9705). One battery of the 196th Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the 4th Division Artillery.

24. 24 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained present positions on general north-south line to immediate west of the Siegfried Line fortifications, continued aggressive patrol activity to the east and southeast and carried on training in preparation for future operations.

The 8th Infantry maintained positions on main line of resistance and continued patrolling to the east by 1st and 3d Battalions, while the

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

2d Battalion conducted training in preparation for future operations.

The 12th Infantry with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached maintained contacts on the south by the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) and maintained positions on the main line of resistance by the 2d and 3d Battalions who continued to patrol to the east. The 1st Battalion conducted training in preparation for future operations.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, improved and consolidated positions on main line of resistance by the 1st and 3d Battalions who also sent patrols to the east, maintained contact with the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group on the left (north) flank of the division, and conducted training for the 2d Battalion in preparation for future operations.

25. 25 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued combat, security and contact patrolling, maintained and improved positions facing the Siegfried Line fortifications, and continued extensive training in preparation for future operations.

The 8th Infantry, 12th Infantry, less Company A, attached to the V Corps as security guard of the CP with 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, and the 22d Infantry, with Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued combat, security and contact patrolling, battalion rotation policy on main line of resistance, and extensive training for personnel not otherwise employed. Skirmishes with enemy patrols reported by CT 12 combat patrols vicinity O37987 and O48993 and by CT 22 combat patrols at O26073 resulted in the capture of a machine gun and crew.

26. 26 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained and improved present positions facing the Siegfried Line fortifications, continued aggressive patrolling within zone of action, and conducted training within reserve units in preparation for future operations.

Combat teams with same attachments as mentioned 25 October, maintained and improved present positions facing the Siegfried Line fortifications, continued combat, contact and security patrolling, and conducted training for personnel not otherwise employed.

27. 27 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained defensive positions on main line of resistance, continued combat, contact and security patrolling, and conducted training within units whose personnel were not otherwise employed. No changes in attachments were ordered or effected and with the exception of the exchange of mortar and artillery fire, no offensive action was reported.

28. 28 October 1944. Missions and activities of all elements of the 4th Infantry Division continued the same as 27 October 1944. The 987th Field Artillery Battalion (SP), less one battery, detached from the 4th Division artillery, reverted to V Corps control.

29. 29 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained present main line of resistance, continued patrolling and rotation of units from the main line of resistance to rest and training areas, and continued planning for future operations.

The 3d Battalion relieved 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 1st and 2d Battalions continued to hold defensive positions and sent combat patrols into "No Man's Land", locate enemy fortifications and installations, and harass enemy OPL. The 3d Battalion continued training and planning for future operations.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 12th Infantry continued combat, contact and security patrolling while the 1st Battalion trained and prepared for future operations. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) remained attached to the 12th Infantry and maintained contacts on the right and left with the 8th Infantry and the 2d Infantry Division respectively.

The 22d Infantry maintained positions on the main line of resistance, continued combat, contact and security patrolling, conducted training with rifle grenades and rocket launchers and prepared for future operations.

The 893d Tank Destroyer (SP) Battalion, less Company A, attached to the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, was detached at 0600.

30. 30 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain and improve positions on the main line of resistance; sent out combat patrols who reported enemy contacts and installations; continued contact and security patrolling; conducted training for personnel not otherwise employed, and prepared for future operations.

The 8th Infantry maintained defensive positions on the main line of resistance, continued combat, contact and security patrolling, and trained and prepared for future operations.

The 12th Infantry with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, less Company A, attached to V Corps as CP security guard, continued combat, contact and security patrolling; reported contacts with enemy but there was no action as enemy promptly withdrew. Training was conducted and preparation for future operations continued.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, made additional improvements of the main line of resistance; continued combat, contact and security patrolling; reported enemy anti-personnel mine field at 02850760 and ambushed a strong enemy patrol at 029077, resulting in killing two Germans and dispersing the remainder; harassed the enemy with long range machine gun and 57mm antitank gun fire, and conducted training with emphasis on compass reading and weapons. One platoon, Company C, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detached at 1300.

31. 31 October 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained present main line of resistance, patrolled to the east within zone of action, and harassed enemy positions with artillery, direct fire antitank weapons and machine guns. Training continued for future operations.

The 8th Infantry maintained main line of resistance with the 2d and 3d Battalions sending out patrols from these battalions to locate and destroy enemy outpost, locate enemy installations and harass enemy OPL. The 1st Battalion conducted training for future operations with emphasis on rifle platoon in the attack.

The 12th Infantry with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued combat, security and contact patrolling by the 2d and 3d Battalions with the 1st Battalion rotating companies on OPL, and conducting training for future operations for personnel not otherwise employed. Company A remained attached as V Corps CP guard.

The 22d Infantry sent out patrols from the 1st Battalion to the north and northeast. Enemy positions, including Heilenthal and Hollerath, were harassed by indirect fire from 57mm antitank guns and from caliber .50 machine guns. Training was conducted for units not employed on specific missions with emphasis on woods fighting and infantry-tank coordination. Company C, less one platoon, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, remained attached and continued its mission of reinforcing antitank defenses to the north.

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Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: The static situation which developed during the latter part of September continued during the month of October. During this period the division made only one move. As a result of this inactivity, the expenditure of Class II and Class V supplies was light throughout the period with daily restricted allowances from higher headquarters on mortar and artillery ammunition.
2. During the period of inactivity and with the advent of cold weather, greater emphasis was placed on securing winter Class II and IV supplies. Additional blankets (a total of 4 per man), woolen underwear (2 suits per man), and overcoats were issued.
3. Difficulty was experienced in securing sufficient overshoes and sleeping bags. Overshoes larger than size 9 were not available. Only 5,000 sleeping bags were drawn for the division.
4. Difficulty was experienced in securing sufficient anti-freeze solution. Sufficient anti-freeze solution was obtained to protect about 10% of the vehicles of the division.
5. During the period 16 riding horses and saddles were obtained for use by the 12th Infantry Regiment.
6. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.
7. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties Evacuated

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>
Killed in action	1	38
Died of wounds	1	11
Died of injuries	-	-
Missing in action	1	14
Seriously wounded in action	5	20
Seriously injured in action	-	1
Slightly wounded in action	14	180
Slightly injured in action	2	82
	24	306

Total Casualties..... 330

8. On 5 October 1944 Prisoner of War Incolosure moved to 922972 from its location in St. Vith, Belgium. The stability of the tactical situation confined the number of prisoners of war to those captured by patrols and those captured infiltrating through our lines. The practice started at the beginning of the campaign, whereby the Military Police escorted prisoners from the regiments to Prisoner of War Incolosure has been continued.

9. The division captured 207 German prisoners of war during the period. A total of 18,691 prisoners of war have been taken to date.

Sec V - Supply & Evaluation, Contd

10. During the period 1 October to 31 October 1944, a total of 60 officers and 862 enlisted men replacements were received.

11. Strengths (Present and Absent)	1 October 1944			31 October 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	58	8	136/74	59	8	136/75
8th Inf	171	2	3091/1	164	3	3076/76
12th Inf	158	5	3016	158	5	3070/75
22d Inf	154	5	3041	162	4	3050/75
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	21	2	113	19	2	122
20th FA Bn	50	2	608	31	2	602
29th FA Bn	32	2	573	33	2	566
42d FA Bn	36	2	592	39	2	547
44th FA Bn	34	2	553/1	35	2	556
4th Engr Combat Bn	27	3	695	25	3	666
4th Med Bn	37	1	410	36	1	413
4th Ken Tr, Inez	5	-	152	6	-	145
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	4	2	79	4	2	76
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	168/7	4	1	165/7
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	4	-	141/6	4	-	140/6
704th Ord L Maint Co	10	-	151	9	-	151
4th QM Co	10	1	209	10	1	228
4th Sig Co	13	4	286	13	4	287
Total	809	42	13974	811	42	13996

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 October 1944			31 October 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
4th CIC Det	4	-	10/2	4	-	12/2
Order of Battle Team No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	3
IPW Team No. 91 (12th Inf)	-	-	4	2	-	5
IPW Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	5
PI Team No. 31	1	-	4	1	-	3
MI Team No. 417	-	-	1	2	-	4
Air Support Party	1	-	8	1	-	8
Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	-	4	1	-	4
70th Tank Bn	40	3	668	41	3	680
377th AAA (AW) Bn	36	3	757	36	3	762
801st TD Bn	32	2	743	32	2	757
Total	120	8	2205	125	8	2225
Grand Total	928	50	16179	936	50	16221

R. O. Barton
 R. O. BARTON
 Major General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

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ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 October to 31 October 1944 without any loss of personnel.

2. The team has continued to keep a duplicate of the G-2 situation map; to receive and process all documents, to keep an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities and any additional information necessary to translate documents, perform interrogations, act as interpreters whenever necessary, and edit the IPW Report of the G-2 Periodic Report.

3. The relative inactivity in this zone of action manifested itself in the lack of prisoner of war documents; however, interrogations of the prisoners of war captured were usually very complete, with a great wealth of detail obtained. A number of documents of tactical importance were processed, the information disseminated and the documents forwarded to higher echelon. As the front became more stabilized, the enemy resistance was characterized by the employment of entire battalions in place of the former combat groups. The 526th Divisional Staff, controlling these miscellaneous battalions, appeared and toward the end of the period the 347th Infantry Division was encountered with a standard divisional organization incorporating these battalions. The personnel of the units encountered were far below the standard of the regular German Army.

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ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1. 1 October 1944. Nikolaus August Paul Roerings, German civilian of Aachen, confessed enemy agent (previously reported) was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Paul Lux, of Feldwibel, German soldier found in the division area wearing civilian clothes, was also evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Counter Intelligence information gathered from letters collected from the Post Office at Aachen was checked. As a result, four German soldiers living at home in civilian clothes were apprehended and evacuated to the prisoner of war cage. Johann and Margaret Rousch, brother and sister, of Bleialf, were picked up in the vicinity of our front lines. They had moved to the woods and had been living east of the first lines of the Westwall. Subjects were sent to the refugee and detention center at St. Vith, Belgium for further questioning.

2. 2 October 1944. Agents visited the town of Bullingen, in the vicinity of new division CP area. Telegraph, telephone and Post Office buildings were visited and the mail impounded. Four German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended and evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Johann Rousch, German civilian of Bleialf, was apprehended after passing through German lines. Subject was a party member and was evacuated through prisoner of war channels for reasons of tactical security.

3. 3 October 1944. Agents visited Murringen, Hummingen, Wirtzfeld and Honsfeld. As a result of contacting burgermasters, local priests and several reputedly reliable persons, eight German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended in Murringen and turned over to the prisoner of war cage for disposition. Information was received in Bullingen to the effect that one Valentin Gillet was suspected locally of being a Nazi agent. Investigation determined that he was personal assistant of NSDAP in Bullingen from July 1941 to August 1943. He was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Johann Helms, of Buschot, was picked up in our forward area. Subject carried no identification papers and was evacuated to the detention center at St. Vith, Belgium for security detention.

4. 4 October 1944. Fifty-two German soldiers, forty-three of whom are of Belgian nationality, were found in their homes in civilian clothes. All were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. For reasons of tactical security, twenty-five civilians were evacuated from the commune of Thommen. Also agents of this detachment assisted the Military Government in the evacuation of the town of Honsfeld.

5. 5 October 1944. This detachment turned over all lists of suspects and former German soldiers in the township of St. Vith to the 2d CIC Detachment.

6. 6 October 1944. Wilhelm Beckers, deserter from the German Army, and wearing civilian clothes, was apprehended living in Hummingen, and turned over to the V Corps CIC Detachment for interrogation and disposition. Agents of this detachment screened all civilians in the towns of Hummingen and Hopscheid before they were evacuated to Malmady. Papers of identification, stating that they were innocuous, were issued to them

prior to departure. A small group of people in each town were permitted to remain to care for the livestock. Special forms were issued to these persons after they were screened and given specific instructions regarding their activities.

7. 7 October 1944. Agents of this detachment, accompanied by personnel of the 4th Signal Company, visited the following towns within the Division area in order to ascertain the condition of the commercial phone system in each locality: Murringen, Hunningen, Holsheim, Honsfeld and Bullingen. During the evacuation of Bullingen the entire population was screened, with the result that two German soldiers in civilian clothes were discovered and two civilians, Joseph Pfeiffer and Heinrich J. Vladimir, were held on suspicion. These persons were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Pfeiffer was a blockleiter and Vladimir has only been in Bullingen since 1 May 1944 and was working for a high Nazi party member.

8. 8 October 1944. Agents of this detachment assisted the Military Government in screening and evacuating two hundred and forty-five people in the villages of Heppenbach and Halenfeld. One German soldier in civilian clothes was apprehended in Halenfeld.

9. 9 October 1944. Nikolaus Simon, of Bullingen, whose name appeared on lists of NSDAP as being a Kasseler of the Party, was apprehended in the town of Welesnes. Upon being interviewed, he revealed the names of five other members. He was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Mrs. Paul Reerings, wife of Gestapo agent Paul Reerings (apprehended 1 Oct 1944) was delivered to the Master Interrogation Center.

10. 10 October 1944. Messrs. N. Diudonno and N. Seel were stopped while travelling through Bullingen. Diudonno claimed to be a member of GRA and carried on his person a permit to carry firearms and drive a car between Malmédy and St. Vith. He also possessed an armband of the service. Seel maintained that he was a butcher in Verviers. Both men were carrying large sums of money. They explained this by saying that they were to buy cattle from two men who were with them at some point east of Bullingen. It was impossible to identify Diudonno, Seel, or their two companions so they were taken to the GRA Headquarters in Malmédy.

11. 11 October 1944. Three German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended and evacuated through prisoner of war channels. All three came from the town of Valondor, Kreis Malmédy.

12. 12-19 October 1944. All of the towns in the division area had been evacuated. Patrols visited the various towns, checking identity cards and passes of civilians encountered. All were found to be in order.

13. 20 October 1944. At the request of the 205th CIC Detachment, Frau Toni Valt was investigated in the town of Bullingen and found to have been a collaborator for financial gain. The subject had previously been evacuated by this detachment and has been living in a refugee center in Malmédy.

14. 21 October 1944. Johann Juok, of Vervier, Belgium, traveled from

Vervier, to Hummingen without a Military Government pass and was found living in concealment in the home of his brother. Subject was returned to Vervier through prisoner of war channels for disposition by civil authorities.

15. 22-29 October 1944. Motor patrols throughout the division area were maintained and all civilians encountered were checked. Two women were found to have traveled more than six kilometers without a pass and they were turned over to the C&O at St. Vith, Belgium. Information obtained from local informants regarding suspected enemy agents from this area was submitted by separate memorandum to the 205th CIC Detachment, and also to the 301st CIC Detachment.

16. 30 October 1944. Edouard Collas was apprehended at 2100, 29 October 1944, in the vicinity of Roherath, Kreis Malmedy, by members of the 22d Infantry Regiment. He was in the act of infiltrating through our lines. Collas stated that he left Hellenthal in the afternoon of 29 October 1944. He allegedly left Jodraszow, Poland, on 26 September 1944 to return to Honsfeld to procure winter clothes. He had been employed as a railroad worker inside Germany, Russia, and Poland since August 1942. After lengthy interrogation, subject admitted deserting the Belgian Army and immediately proceeding to Germany where he joined the German Army on 6 April 1940. His reason for discharge was refusal on his part to sign a paper to the effect that he would obey all orders of his superiors no matter what they purported to be. He claims to have destroyed his discharge papers from the German Army during his stay in Hellenthal 28 September to 29 October 1944. He was a member of the Heimattreue Front from 1936, and a member of the NSDAP from 1940, which facts he also attempted to conceal. A separate letter accompanies subject who has been evacuated through prisoner of war channels to Military Interrogation Center.

17. 31 October 1944. Motor patrols throughout the division area were maintained and all civilians encountered were checked.

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ANNEX C - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31

1. Operations of the Photo Interpreters Team No. 31 during the period 1 October to 31 October 1944 consisted of the following:

2. Due to inclement weather, there were very few sorties flown during the period.

3. Photography of excellent quality in both obliques and verticals, dated 7 October 1944, covering the division zone of action, was distributed down to platoons in the 8th Infantry Regiment.

4. A defense map has been maintained and intelligence from aerial photographs disseminated to the units concerned.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
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(2178)
Master

Operations Report, AGO, 1st Div

Box 14

2178

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Auth: CG 4th Inf Div ;
Init: HME
Date: 10 December 1944;
.....

Eto

AG-319:1

10 December 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU : Command Channels.

WR

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

301.06

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C), Army Regulations 545-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 November to 30 November 1944.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Marr, 015447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 0287626, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, 0302396, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, 0375431, GSC

1. The 4th Infantry Division remained in its position in the vicinity of Bullingen, Belgium. Although on an active front the line consisted mainly of stationary outposts and defenses. During the month of November, a portion of the Infantry was sent on pass to Paris and to the Corps Recreation Center.

2. 1 November 1944. The division received a quota of seven officers and seventy enlisted men to go on pass to Paris, France. Arrangements were made for these officers and men to return to the Division Rear Echelon on 31 October 1944 to take baths, change to clean clothes, and obtain French money. The units sending men furnished 2 1/2 ton trucks, drivers, and fuel for the trip. One officer was placed in charge of the convoys. Upon arrival in Paris he contacted the billet GLASSERIGAN, CHANCELOPPES, Building for accommodations. At the end of the first night here the men were assembled at the entrucking point where the convoys would board for the return journey.

CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WILLIAM P. C. [Signature]
COMMITTEE 14 May 1945



Sec II - Introduction, Contd

3. 2 November 1944. Four casual officers returning from the hospital were received from the 41st Replacement Battalion and assigned to their former units. This policy of returning casualties to their original units has been adhered to continuously since this division has been in combat. It has been found to be the most satisfactory method of returning the men.

The monthly report on the number of decorations awarded for the month of October was submitted to V Corps.

4. 3 November 1944. Two officers and two enlisted men joined the division and were assigned to their former units.

5. 4 November 1944. A quota of ten officers and 101 enlisted men to attend the V Corps Recreation Center at Eupen, Belgium, was received and filled. These officers and men reported to the Recreation Center Headquarters and were assigned quarters. The Recreation Center provided showers, laundry service, movies, and church services. During the 48-hour stay the men had an opportunity to get a good nights rest, a bath, a shave and clean clothes. This was a real treat for the front line troops.

6. 5 November 1944. Five officers and fifty-five enlisted men comprised the second quota of the month to Paris. As this trip was most enjoyable, all units were anxious to obtain any quota available. The men participated enthusiastically.

The 41st Replacement Battalion which services V Corps, had during the month of October attached a group of officers and enlisted men to the division for training under combat conditions. These men were placed in rifle companies and lived under conditions similar to those of actual combat. These men were relieved from attachment and sent back to the Replacement Battalion on this date.

7. 6 November 1944. The division made preparations to withdraw from the line and move to another sector. The first elements of the Division CP moved to Zwielfall, Germany.

8. 7 November 1944. The last elements of the Division CP moved to Zwielfall, Germany.

9. 8 November 1944. The division was relieved from attachment to V Corps and attached to VII Corps. The AC of S, G-1 went to VII Corps Headquarters to pay his respects to the Corps AC of S, G-1, and to reacquaint himself with current corps policies and reports.

The 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion which has been a permanent attachment to the division through the invasion and all the fighting on the continent was relieved and the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was attached for tactical and administrative purposes.

10. 9 November 1944. The division received a letter of commendation from the Commanding General, V Corps, praising the division's fine work during its period with that corps. This commendation was reproduced and disseminated to the command.

11. 11 November 1944. In compliance with telephone conversation with AC of S, G-1, VII Corps, a list of potential Regimental and Battalion Commanders was submitted. 86

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

12. 12 November 1944. A report of all battle and nonbattle casualties by day for the period 9 to 11 November inclusive was submitted by the division clearing company. This report gave the officer casualties by name. The report was adopted as SOP and the Surgeon furnished a copy each day to the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, and the AC of S, G-1.

Sixteen casual and one replacement officer and four hundred and nine enlisted men were received from the 92d Replacement Battalion. One hundred enlisted men were also attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment for combat training.

13. 13 November 1944. Seven replacement officers were obtained from the Replacement Battalion for the 12th Infantry. The 12th Infantry was engaged in fierce fighting in the Hurtgen Forest sector. Casualties were high and it was necessary to unify all efforts to obtain necessary replacements.

14. 14 November 1944. Four Hundred and fifty replacements were received from the 92d Replacement Battalion and were assigned to the 12th Infantry Regiment. The Assistant to AC of S, G-1, of First U. S. Army visited the division to check on casualties and replacements. The hardships of fighting were intensified by the dense forest and the lack of roads. Medical aid men found it necessary to carry litter cases up to two miles over rough terrain and through extensive mine fields. The casualty rate among aid men and litter bearers was extremely high and replacements were difficult to obtain. It was necessary to use other men for this purpose and to utilize personnel from rear installations.

15. 15 November 1944. The division obtained twenty-seven Medical Department enlisted men. This was the last large shipment of medical department personnel received during the month. This was only about half the number of men needed to fill existing vacancies. Throughout the rest of the month the problem of obtaining Medical Department enlisted men remained acute. One hundred and forty-nine infantry replacements were received from the 92d Replacement Battalion and assigned to the three regiments with priority given to the 12th Infantry whose ranks were depleted by continuous bitter fighting.

A meeting of the General Staff and the Regimental Commanders was held to discuss personnel problems. It was decided the policy of returning casual replacements to their original unit would be carried out if sufficient replacement personnel were available; however, in order to maintain all three regiments at an equal level of strength, the policy was changed so that replacements would be assigned to the unit where most needed. The second point covered by the meeting was the need for officer replacements in the infantry regiments. Regimental Commanders were urged to have qualified noncommissioned officers submit applications for battlefield appointment to the rank of Second Lieutenant.

16. 16 November 1944. In an attempt to expedite the flow of replacements, the AC of S, G-1 went to First U. S. Army Headquarters to check on unfilled requisitions and the possibility of requisitioning for anticipated losses.

17. 17 November 1944. From this date on the primary problem of

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

The AC of S, G-1 Section was the requisition and delivery of replacements to the regiments. The fighting in the Hurtgen Forest was so intense and deadly that daily requisitions were necessary. Even then it became impossible to maintain the units at anything near 100 strength. Each day, in conjunction with the Division Classification Officer, a member of the AC of S, G-1 Section devoted his time to securing the replacements, assigning them to units, and transporting them from the Replacement Battalion to their respective regiments. Guides from the regiments took their men to the regimental train bivouacs where they were separated according to company assignments and taken forward. In this manner, as many as 550 men a day were processed. The replacement system, however, could not supply an adequate number of new men to replace those lost as casualties. The result was that the strength of all three regiments decreased steadily until at the end of the month all regiments were very low in fighting strength. Both battle and nonbattle casualties were extremely high. The thick woods plus continuous rain caused a great number of cases of trench foot. The majority of the replacements were not furnished with overshoes and before they could be obtained through supply channels, trench foot had taken its toll. Battle casualties were high due to the great number of mines and booby traps and to the tree bursts from German artillery and mortar fire. No one was spared. Even regimental CPls suffered casualties from artillery fire. The infantry soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division will always remember the hell of the Hurtgen Forest.

As in all tough fighting, the highest percentage of casualties suffered was among the leaders. A good soldier might start an attack as a rifleman and by the time the objective was taken find himself acting squad leader. In order to control and employ his squad he must move about among his men. The result was that he became a casualty himself in a short time. At this rate of attrition the capable men in some companies were soon gone. There then came the need for good nonsens in addition to riflemen. This critical situation was alleviated to some extent by a small shipment of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and 1st sergeants. These men were assigned to the units according to their needs. Although not enough to fill the need, these men eased the situation considerably.

During the month, work on decorations and awards was emphasized to maintain the high standard previously attained. Being confined to a quota by the 12th Army Group, the number of awards was necessarily lower. The Bronze Star Medal Ribbon became available during the month so that all recipients were presented their ribbons at appropriate ceremonies.

While the division was attached to V Corps, the Estimated Loss Report was submitted each night by TMI, and by telephone to VII Corps for the remainder of the month.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 November 1944. The enemy defended the line F-019074 - F-035072, then south along the pillbox line to I-050985. Patrol activity was relatively light. Mortar fire, however, showed an increase, and small arms fire was directed at our front lines. About 24 shellings, mostly 75mm and 105mm were reported. Units in contact were the 4th GAF Fortress

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

Battalion, 77 Training Battalion, 454 Replacement and Training Battalion, 412 Training Battalion, and 7 GAF Fortress Battalion.

2. 2 November 1944. The enemy defended his Siegfried defenses by employing patrols and dug in outposts. There was an increase in mortar fire and the continued harassing fire from small arms and automatic weapons was in evidence. Fifteen shellings by enemy artillery were reported. Units in contact showed no change.

3. 3 November 1944. In addition to the customary harassing fire from machine guns and mortars, the enemy increased his patrol activity sharply. A total of 19 shellings were reported. Units in contact remained the same.

4. 4 November 1944. Only two small enemy patrols were reported during this period as the enemy continued to defend his Siegfried defenses. Mortar fire was light. Harassing small arms fire was again directed at our front line troops. There was no change evidenced in the units opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

5. 5 November 1944. Scattered harassing small arms fire and minor patrol activity constituted the enemy action during this period. There were no shellings reported by the 4th Infantry Division units. Units in contact appeared to remain the same.

6. 6-10 November 1944. CT 12 attached to the 28th Infantry Division. The remainder of the division was in position immediately behind a protective screen in preparation for the forthcoming attack. Enemy contact forbidden.

7. 11 November 1944. Against CT 12, the enemy defended the line F-015364 - F-015362 - F-015345 - F-019351 - F-022558 - F-026359 - F-030356 - F-032362 - F-031349 - F-034544. Our advances were contested stubbornly; the enemy even counterattacking at every opportunity in strength varying from platoon to company. At least three such counterattacks were preceded by heavy artillery preparation. In addition to the formal counterattacks the enemy aggressively attempted to infiltrate our line and attack our forces from the rear. Shelling by enemy artillery was constant throughout the period. Tanks and self-propelled guns were seen mostly in the vicinity of Hurtgen. No aggressive action was taken by the enemy armor against our troops. Prisoners of war indicated the presence of the 275 Infantry Division and 20 GAF Fortress Battalion on our front. In addition the enemy appeared to have a tactical reserve composed of uncommitted elements of the 89, 272, and 275 Infantry Divisions. There was some reason to believe that the 116 Panzer Grenadier Division had some troops in reserve to our front. These forces seemed to be held back as a stray counterattacking force against any penetration that we might make to the east.

8. 12 November 1944. There appeared to be no change in the line held by the enemy during the previous period. By holding our attempts to advance practically to a standstill, and his thorough employment of mines of all kinds, barbed wire, and blocks of various nature, the enemy found little difficulty in counterattacking fiercely with infantry supported by armor. Continuous shelling by three to four batteries, ranging in caliber from light to medium, made it difficult for our forces to organize a

thrust against the enemy and at the same time kept the situation such that energetic patrolling followed by strong counterattacks could be aptly employed by the Germans. Units in contact remained the same.

9. 13 November 1944. The enemy remained relatively inactive during this period. His defense was organized along the same front lines from which patrols operated to probe our positions and to determine our positions and strength. Twenty-one shellings were reported by the 4th Infantry Division units during the period. It was estimated that there were three battalions of enemy artillery capable of firing into the sector held by CT 12. Prisoners of war were taken from the 156 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 116 Panzer Division, and 985 Regiment of the 275 Infantry Division.

10. 14 November 1944. For the most part the enemy defended his line with heavy artillery and mortar barrages. Only one other action, a single patrol, which withdrew hastily upon engagement with the 298 Engineer Combat Battalion, was reported. Armor was observed moving south from 022382, however, no aggressive action was taken by enemy armor against our troops. Units in contact showed no change.

11. 15 November 1944. The enemy defended his same front line with heavy artillery and mortar fire. A total of 35 shellings were reported by division units. The largest weapon employed was 210mm. During this period it appeared that most of the shellings were directed just behind our front lines and in the division rear areas. The enemy was obviously using this means to prevent our organizing an attack while he probed our lines with patrols in an effort to determine our dispositions and intentions. There was no indication that the units in contact had changed.

12. 16 November 1944. The enemy's front lines existed from F-016420 - F-018414 - F-019400 in front of CT 8. Before CT 22 the enemy defended the line F-006387 - F-013384 - F-019380 - F-021371. The line in front of CT 12 runs from F-023358 - F-025352 - thence southeast crossing the road at F-029360 to F-031345. The enemy fiercely resisted our advance by employing well emplaced machine guns, small arms, and concentrated barrages of 80 and 120mm mortar. Several log pillboxes with excellent fields of fire were encountered. The advances to each enemy position were well supplied with mines, both antivehicular and antipersonnel. In addition barbed wire, sometimes consisting of 3 row concertina, made any attempt to take the positions almost futile. Enemy artillery caused our units to report 28 shellings. A new unit, the 18 GAF Fortress Battalion, made its appearance for the first time. Other than this, the units opposing our forces appeared to remain unchanged.

13. 17 November 1944. In front of CT 8 the enemy defended the line F-016420 - F-023398. In CT 22's sector the enemy line ran from F-012392 - RJ, F-021384, then generally south along the road west of the north-south road to 020362. Before CT 12 the enemy's line extended from F-023358 - F-025352, then southeast crossing the road at F-029380 to F-031345. The enemy employed a well dug in position which covered the approaches through the woods along the firebreak and the few poor roads, in an attempt to check our advance. The same instances of thickly concentrated barbed wire

and mines were noted. The enemy probed our lines with patrols and in at least three instances bona fide counterattacks were received by our forces. The largest of these attempts consisted of a force of 80 men. Units in contact at this time appeared to be the 275 Replacement Battalion, 275 Fusilier Battalion, and 984 and 985 Regiments of the 275 Division. The 18 GAF Fortress Battalion was again identified through prisoners of war. Elements of the 116 Panzer Division were conspicuous by their absence.

14. 18 November 1944. CT 8 confronted the enemy along the line from F-030425 - F-038415. From this latter point south in CT 8's sector, the line has not been definitely established. In the sector of CT 22, the enemy line runs from F-025397 - F-030090 - 024373 - 017362. Against CT 12, the enemy defended the line 012350 - 020353 - 025353 - 032340. The same well prepared positions, protected by mines and wire entanglements, were utilized by the enemy in his slow withdrawal in front of our forces. In each case the withdrawal was protected by heavy mortars and artillery preparations which enabled the enemy to abandon one position and then fall back to another which had been previously prepared. A total of 35 shellings were reported. The largest concentration was thought to consist of 40 rounds. Most shelling was 105mm. In addition to the units previously encountered, the 1055 Regiment of the 89 Infantry Division was represented by prisoners of war. Once again prisoners of war were taken from the 116 Panzer Division.

15. 19 November 1944. In front of CT 8 the enemy defended the line F-029419 to F-030414. South of this point the line in CT 8's sector was not definitely ascertained. CT 22 confronted the enemy at F-025397 - F-030390 - F-030380 - F-027370 - F-018362. Before CT 12, the enemy's line ran from F-013362 - F-021351 - F-025353 - F-032340. The enemy fought from well fortified dug in emplacements, wooden bunkers, and pillboxes, in an attempt to frustrate our advance. All emplacements were well protected by wire entanglements, mines, and booby traps. Several small counterattacks were launched against CT 22. Although well planned and supported by considerable artillery, the enemy's counterattacks did not have sufficient weight to make an impression on our lines. Units in contact remained the same except for the newly identified 1031 Security Battalion which appeared to have committed about two platoons against the 4th Infantry Division.

16. 20 November 1944. The enemy front line against CT 8 was not too well defined. It appeared to run from F-025421 - F-033415. From this latter point to CT 8's southern boundary, the line was unsettled. One battalion was reported along the line from F-028399 to F-031405. CT 22 was confronting the enemy from F-025398 - F-038390 - F-037360 - F-025364 with some enemy in the vicinity of F-015375. Opposing CT 12, the enemy held the line from F-014353 - F-021351 - F-024350 - F-028348 - F-030340. The enemy continued his determined resistance from well camouflaged and thoroughly dug in positions. Antitank and antipersonnel mine fields as well as thick wire entanglements were encountered throughout the 4th Infantry Division's zone of advance. In CT 22's sector counterattacks supported by artillery, tanks, and assault guns were evidenced. In addition to units previously identified, prisoners of war indicated the presence of the 1058 Infantry Regiment of the 488 Grenadier

Division (previously 91 Infantry Division), on the 4th Infantry Division front. At this point the enemy's reserves appeared to be the uncommitted portions of the 89 Infantry Division, 275 Infantry Division, 116 Panzer Division, and some small miscellaneous units. A further reserve was available to the enemy should he choose to commit the remainder of the 488 Grenadier Division.

17. 21 November 1944. In the area of CT 8 the enemy defended the line from 025421 to 030418. In the CT 22 and CT 12 sectors, there has been no change in the enemy's line. Other than one counterattack of company size against CT 8, the enemy was satisfied to defend his line by sending forth patrols and shelling our front line elements. Either tanks or self-propelled guns were active against CT 8. Against the 4th Infantry Division the units in contact showed no change.

18. 22 November 1944. The enemy occupied the line from F-034430 - F-036420 - then south to F-035410 and the hill at F-050410. Against CT 22 the enemy's line ran from 025401 - 048390 - 048380 - 038474. The enemy continued to resist fiercely and to fall back slowly from one line of fortified positions to the next. Small arms, mortar, and artillery formed the basis for the enemy's defense with mines, barbed wire, and blocks supplementing his fire power. Enemy armor of a defensive nature, i.e., dug in with a prepared field of fire, was encountered. During the night, the 158 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was relieved in the northern sector by the 1057 Infantry Regiment. Other than this, the opposing enemy units remained the same.

19. 23 November 1944. Along the line from Hill 277 to Jagerhaus (0342) the enemy defended a sort of salient into the CT 8 sector. From Jagerhaus, the line ran to F-045423, - F-035403. In the CT 22 sector the enemy defended the line from F-025040 - F-044390 - F-050380 - F-036370. Against CT 12 the enemy defended the line from F-022373 - F-024365 - F-017355. The enemy continued to stubbornly resist our advance by combining his numerous mine fields, wire entanglements, and road blocks with effective fires from small arms, mortar, and artillery. Once our advance showed signs of slowing down, the enemy counterattacked viciously with approximately reinforced platoon strength. At least four such counterattacks were repulsed during the period. The enemy continued to employ his armor in a defensive role. Units in contact remained the same.

20. 24 November 1944. The newly organized line in front of CT 8 showed the enemy as holding the line F-043398 - F-050425 - F-049431. Before CT 22 the enemy line showed no change. In front of CT 12 the enemy line ran from F-022373 - F-039370 - F-032367 - F-030365 - F-026365 - F-023356. After using the hours of darkness for the purpose of laying more mines, constructing blocks, and digging defenses, the enemy defended his new position until forced slowly to fall back to each successively prepared line of defenses. It was evident that the enemy was bringing up replacements probably consisting of stragglers and remnants of units almost totally wiped out. These men would be put into the line under the cover of darkness and would serve to absorb the smash of our first attack during the day. Armor again operated against our forces but remained unaggressive in nature. Units opposing our forces remained

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

unchanged except for the arrival of 3d Battalion, 1056 Regiment, 89 Infantry Division. This unit arrived from Mnschau.

21. 26 November 1944. Against CT 8, the enemy defended the line from F-055429 - F-055420 in the northern part of the sector. Except for close contact at F-047404, the line in the southern part of CT 8's sector was unsettled. Before CT 22, the enemy defended from 037405 - F-038597 - F-040390 - F-052385. The enemy continued to defend from prepared positions. Against CT 8 and CT 22, the enemy's resistance was stubborn and effective. Small arms, mortars, and artillery were utilized to maximum advantage. A number of self-propelled assault guns were employed with good results against CT 22. The enemy was overrun by CT 12 in its zone of advance. The resulting confusion and ineffectiveness on the part of the Germans made it apparent that once the main line of resistance could be reached and rapidly crossed, lack of leadership, poor contact, and incompetent troops made the enemy a "pushover". In one instance during the period, a Battalion GP was overrun before its occupants were aware of the presence of our troops. Companies and platoons that knew their flanks had been enveloped failed to withdraw before they were cut off. Units in contact remained the same.

22. 26 November 1944. The exact location of the enemy's front line in front of CT 8 could not be determined. Outposts, however, were located in the vicinity of F-046401 - and F-050408, and along the firebreak north and south of F-055425. In front of CT 22 the line was not changed. Before CT 12 the enemy did not yet organize his defense sufficiently to determine his main line of resistance. The enemy centered his defensive around well dug in tanks and assault guns. Utilizing the fire-power of these weapons, and supplementing this with small arms, mortar, and artillery, the enemy presented a formidable defense. Just before dusk the enemy counterattacked in the CT 22 sector with 75-100 men and four tanks. The attack was determined and was preceded by a heavy artillery and mortar barrage. No changes of importance have been noted in the units opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

23. 27 November 1944. Before CT 8 the enemy's front line was still not determined, however, outposts were established at F-044412 - F-047413 - F-055425 - and F-046436. In the sector of CT 22 the enemy front line existed from F-042390 - F-048390 - F-051387 - F-049380 - F-048378 - F-045370. Before CT 12 the area west of the firebreak from F-048408 to F-047367 was believed clear of enemy. A small enemy outpost was thought to hold the hill F-042397. The enemy continued to build his defense around assault guns and tanks well dug in. His fields of fire for these weapons were improved and all approaches that our troops might use in an effort to neutralize these strong points were found to be thoroughly mined and booby trapped and protected by wire blocks. Considerable movement on the road between Kleinshau and Grossshau was carried on behind smoke screens effected by the enemy. At this time the presence of elements of the 3d Para Division against the unit to our north made it seem likely that a counterattacking force composed of troops from this unit might be expected against our forces. The 942 Infantry Regiment of the 365 Infantry Division was encountered for the first time on our front. Other than this new identification, opposing units remained essentially the same.

24. 28 November 1944. The enemy front line before CT 8 existed at F-055430 and F-055425. Enemy troops were also in position in the vicinity F-048433 and F-048415. In front of CT 22 the enemy front line ran from F-050390 - F-050386 - F-050377 - F-043379. CT 12 contacted the enemy in vicinity Hill 90 (F-048388). While digging new emplacements and laying mines and barbed wire, the enemy defended his line with constant artillery and mortar barrages, and effective direct fire from self-propelled assault guns. No new identifications of any significance were made during this period.

25. 29 November 1944. The enemy opposed CT 8 east of the line F-044430 - 050430; then along the forward slope to F-053423. Opposite the following line, enemy troops opposed CT 22: F-042388 to the stream at F-042380; then generally along the stream at 044377. From this point the front followed the edge of the woods to F-044375. In addition, the 3d Battalion of CT 22 held the high ground north of Grosschau from F-053389 to the Kleidhau - Grosschau road at F-055388, and along the road to 055392. Company F of CT 22 held the road on the western outskirts of Grosschau; the town itself having been cleared. The enemy continued his defense of advantageous ground and earthen emplacements by employing small arms and direct firing assault guns emplaced on high ground. In addition, considerable mortar fire and artillery impeded the advance of our troops. The usual mines, booby traps, and wire entanglements attempted to deny our forces the most opportune avenues of approach to the enemy's main line of resistance. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division showed no change.

26. 30 November 1944. In CT 8's sector the enemy defended along the line F-051434 to 051410. Opposite CT 12 the enemy was believed to hold the line F-060408 to F-063394. CT 22 was opposed along the line F-064394 - F-067391 - F-062383 - F-065375. In the northern sector our forces advanced against fox hole emplacements and bunkers constructed and reinforced with logs and earth. In the center a more hastily constructed type of emplacement was defended by the enemy. In the southern sector the enemy's defense was based on strategically emplaced assault guns and considerable mortar and artillery fire. As always, avenues of approach were heavily mined and obstructed with wire and fallen trees. The 941 Regiment of the 853 Infantry Division was contacted for the first time during this period. Other than this addition, enemy units opposed remained the same.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained its present main line of resistance, continued combat, contact, and security patrolling, harassed the enemy positions with artillery, antitank weapons and machine guns, and conducted further training for future operations.

The 8th Infantry with the 5d Battalion on the right and the 2d Battalion on the left continued to hold defensive positions on the main line of resistance and sent patrols into "No Man's Land" with the mission of capturing prisoners but they failed to encounter the enemy. The 1st Battalion supported by light tanks conducted company attack problems in the woods and emphasized training in the use of battalion supporting weapons, coordination between tanks and infantry, and reorganization against counterattack.

The 12th Infantry, with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, less Company A attached to V Corps as CP guard, continued combat and contact patrolling by the 2d and 3d Battalions without encountering the enemy. The 1st Battalion conducted training in woods fighting, coordination of tanks with Infantry, and made preparations for future operations.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C less one platoon of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued combat, contact, and security patrolling. With reserve and support elements, the regiment conducted training in woods fighting techniques and infantry-tank coordination. Combat patrols returned without contacting the enemy during the day. Some long-range harassing fire was placed on enemy positions by the artillery.

2. 2 November 1944: The 4th Infantry Division maintained its main line of resistance, sent patrols to the east, fired an artillery diversion mission for the attack of the 28th Infantry Division, and conducted further training for personnel not otherwise employed.

The 8th Infantry maintained defensive positions on the main line of resistance with the 2d and 3d Battalions; the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion beginning at 1030 and completed at 1615, combat patrolling, contacted enemy patrols, harassed them and captured two prisoners of war. Personnel not actively engaged continued the training program with emphasis on company problems of attacking in woods.

The 12th Infantry, less Company A attached to V Corps as the CP guard, and with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued combat, contact, and security patrolling. Companies within Battalions were rotated on the outpost line and the main line of resistance, and personnel not otherwise employed conducted training with emphasis on small unit problems, flame throwers, mine detection, and scouting and patrolling.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C less one platoon 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued security and contact patrolling to the front and between adjacent units. Combat patrolling was limited due to our artillery fires but one patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion encountered a stronger enemy patrol in the vicinity of O13086 and, after a short skirmish, returned without suffering casualties. Long-range caliber .50 machine gun fire and artillery was used to harass enemy positions. Personnel not actively engaged continued training with emphasis on platoon attack problems, woods fighting and mine detection.

The 4th Division Artillery fired a diversion mission in conjunction with the attack of the 28th Infantry Division in accordance with the V Corps Artillery Plan.

3. 3 November 1944: The 4th Infantry Division continued contact, security, and combat patrolling, maintained defensive positions facing the Siegfried Line, and continued further training in preparation for future operations.

The 8th Infantry continued to hold its defensive sector with the 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left. Both Battalions sent combat patrols to the front to determine the location of enemy outposts, mine fields, and to destroy or capture any enemy encountered. The outpost of Company I, 8th Infantry, was attacked in the vicinity of O32022 by an enemy patrol of twelve men but dispersed them.

The 2d Battalion conducted training with emphasis on the attack of a river line.

The 12th Infantry continued combat and contact patrolling with the 2d and 3d Battalions; the 3d Battalion outpost repulsed an enemy patrol at 0400 in the vicinity of O37008 consisting of six men. Company A remained attached to V Corps as CP security guard. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) remained attached to the regiment and maintained contacts on the right and left. Personnel not otherwise employed conducted training with emphasis on enemy mines, coordination between tanks and infantry, and log exercises.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C less one platoon, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued contact, security and combat patrolling. Patrols from the 1st Battalion engaged in skirmishes with the enemy in the vicinity of O13081 and O30076, captured one prisoner of war; then withdrew without suffering casualties. Long-range machine gun fire was used by the 1st and 3d Battalions to harass enemy positions. Reserve elements again received additional training in woods fighting, automatic weapons and demolitions.

4. 4 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained defensive positions facing the Siegfried Line, patrolled to the east, and continued training and preparations for future operations.

The 6th Infantry continued to hold its defensive sector with the 3d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left. The 2d Battalion conducted training in woods fighting and the attack of a river line. Guides from the 39th and 60th Infantry of the 9th Infantry Division, were acquainted with defensive positions on the main line of resistance in preparation for relief of CT 8 on 6 November 1944.

The 12th Infantry, with Company A still attached to V Corps as CP security guard and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, maintained contact with units on the right and left by patrols from the 2d and 3d Battalions; continued defensive positions on its main line of resistance, rotating companies from the 1st and 3d Battalions on the outpost line, and patrols were sent to the east without encountering the enemy. Personnel not otherwise employed conducted training in woods fighting and small unit problems.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C less one platoon, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued contact, security and combat patrolling, placed harassing long-range fire from machine guns and a 57mm antitank gun on enemy positions; conducted reconnaissance and made plans for relief on 5 November by elements of CT 39, 9th Infantry Division. Reconnaissance was made of the area in the vicinity of Krinkelt for contemplated new assembly areas. At 2125, a German patrol of four men tripped a security wire which lighted a flare in front of Company C's positions (O23071). Small arms fire was directed on the enemy, hits noted and the enemy was dispersed. Personnel not otherwise employed received additional training in mines and demolitions, automatic weapons, and rocket launchers.

5. 5 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division was relieved in its zone of action by the 9th Infantry Division beginning at 0900 and was completed by 1500. Elements relieved from duty on the main line of resistance moved to temporary assembly areas prior to 1600 and prepared to initiate movement to the north. Training for personnel not otherwise engaged was continued.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

The 8th Infantry was relieved beginning at 0955 by elements of the 39th and 60th Regiments, 9th Infantry Division, and completed as of 1400. Temporary assembly areas were occupied prior to the contemplated move to new assembly areas to the north.

The 12th Infantry, less Company A still attached to V Corps, was relieved from duty on the main line of resistance beginning at 1130 by CT 60, 9th Infantry Division, and was completed by 1200. Temporary assembly areas were occupied and preparations for movement to new assembly areas to the north were begun.

The 22d Infantry was relieved beginning at 0900 from duty on the main line of resistance by CT 39, 9th Infantry Division, and completed by 1330. All elements of the 22d Infantry moved to and closed in a temporary assembly area prior to 1500 and prepared for movement to the north.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was relieved from attachment to the 12th Infantry and from a contact mission on the main line of resistance. The troop moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Holzheim (K-976956), closing therein prior to 1600.

The 4th Division Artillery was relieved by the 9th Infantry Division Artillery effective at 1800.

6. 6 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued preparations for and initiated movement of some of its elements to assembly areas in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany (K-9536). The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion crossed the Division IP (RJ at K-931022) at 0800 and closed in its new assembly areas. CT 12 crossed the IP at 1810, cleared at 2100, and was still enroute at the end of the period. Company B of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detached from the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group and reverted to battalion control and Company A of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion was enroute with CT 12. Companies of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion prepared new assembly areas for the infantry regiments to which they normally give support.

7. 7 November 1944. Additional elements of the 4th Infantry Division moved to new assembly areas in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany (K-9536). Those elements not moving conducted reconnaissance of the new assembly areas and made preparations for future movements.

The 8th Infantry sent fifty (50) general purpose vehicles with reconnaissance personnel to the new assembly areas and they closed at 1920. The remainder of the 8th Infantry remained in the vicinity of Hunningen (K-9700) until 2200 at which time movement was initiated and these elements were enroute at the close of the day.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, completed movement and closed in assembly area in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany. Upon arrival, the CT was attached to the 28th Infantry Division and completed relief of the 109th Infantry Regiment at 1300. Company A was detached from the V Corps and reverted to the 12th Infantry, joining the regiment in the new assembly areas. The Antitank Company knocked out one enemy half-track in the vicinity of 054377 at 1650.

The 22d Infantry sent fifty general purpose vehicles with reconnaissance personnel to the new assembly areas and the remainder of the

personnel continued preparations for movement 8 November 1944. They remained assembled in the vicinity of Krinkelt (K-9704).

Division Headquarters CP moved at 0900 and opened the new CP at 1300 in Zweifall, Germany (K-953364). The 4th Division Artillery Headquarters moved and its CP opened in the same location.

The 20th Field Artillery Battalion moved at 0110 and closed with Headquarters at K-958366.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) crossed the IP at 0050 and closed in the vicinity of K-977345.

8. 8 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued movement of its elements to new assembly areas to the north, initiated tactical reconnaissance of the area between new positions and the front lines, and prepared for future operations. CT 12 remained attached to the 28th Infantry Division.

The 8th Infantry closed in its new assembly area at 0730 in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany (K-9556); started tactical reconnaissance of area to the new front and prepared for future operations.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained attached to the 28th Infantry Division, and reported the following: "The 1st Battalion made an attack to the east but was stopped short of its objective by enemy resistance. The battalion crossed the line of departure at 1230 to take a limited objective; Company B was stopped by machine gun fire at 012356 at 1345; Company C arrived on the line with Company B and likewise was stopped by machine gun and small arms fire at 1442. The enemy were well dug in and had tactical wire along the line with machine guns covering the wire. Positions were then consolidated for the night."

The 22d Infantry remained in the vicinity of Krinkelt (K-9704) until 2200, at which time movement was initiated to new assembly areas and elements were enroute at the end of the day. Tactical reconnaissance was conducted in rear of the present front lines of the 294th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 28th Infantry Division.

The 29th Field Artillery Battalion closed in new positions at 1225; 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion at 1200; 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company A, was alerted for movement to the 99th Infantry Division, and the 70th Tank Battalion prepared for movement on 9 November.

9. 9 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division completed movement to and closed in its new assembly areas at 1400. Personnel of combat echelons conducted reconnaissance west of the front lines in the areas of contemplated operations. CT 12 remained attached to the 28th Infantry Division.

The 8th Infantry remained in assembly areas and continued tactical reconnaissance in preparation for contemplated operations.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained attached to the 28th Infantry Division and reported the following: "The 3d Battalion fired artillery on bicycle troops at 0830; a 2d Battalion sniper picked off a German officer at 0940; Company K crossed the line of

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departure in the 3d Battalion attack at 1100, advanced 250 yards and received machine gun fire at 1110. A fire fight 400 yards across the line of departure occurred at 1144 and six prisoners of war were captured. A counterattack was repulsed at 1305 and several men from the 109th Infantry Regiment were rescued. Company I moved forward at 1305 on the left of Company K and was abreast at 1441. Company K had elements through enemy tactical wire at 1630 but was stopped by heavy enemy small arms and machine gun fires."

The 22d Infantry completed the movement begun 082200 November 1944 and closed in the new assembly area by 0930. Reconnaissance was conducted in areas of projected operations west of the road blocks maintained by the 294th Engineer Combat Battalion. The 44th Field Artillery Battalion moved with the 22d Infantry and closed at the same time in the new area.

The 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company A, was detached from the 4th Infantry Division at 1200. The 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 0800. The following additional attachments were effective as of 0800: 188th Field Artillery Group, 172d Field Artillery Battalion (4.5G), 196th Field Artillery Battalion (76FH), 951st Field Artillery Battalion (155H), 981st Field Artillery Battalion (155G), and Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion.

The 70th Tank Battalion moved to its new assembly area and closed at 1100.

10. 10 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, and continued reconnaissance and preparations for the projected attack to the northeast.

The 8th Infantry remained assembled in the vicinity of K-985365, and continued active reconnaissance in areas west of the present front lines. In anticipation of the projected attack, the following attachments to the regiment were effected: Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion; Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and one Platoon, Company A, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The 12th Infantry with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained attached to the 28th Infantry Division until 1900, at which time CT 12 reverted to 4th Infantry Division control; Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion reverted to V Corps control, and other attachments reverted to parent organizations. Preparations were made for future operations and the following new attachments to the regiment were effected: Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion, and Company B, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP). The 12th Infantry reported the following action during the period: "The 1st Battalion moved out at 0630 and attacked at 0700; advanced 100 to 200 yards, then Company F hit a mine field and was forced to withdraw to reorganize. Company B captured six prisoners of war. The 3d Battalion was counterattacked in the vicinity of O39034 at 1220 by enemy using flame throwers and the 2d Battalion was also counterattacked at 1300, the main effort coming between the two battalions. The enemy employed one company each in the two counterattacks. Thirty-eight prisoners of war were taken by the 12th Infantry and the enemy was repulsed."

The 22d Infantry remained assembled in the vicinity of K-9935 and extensive reconnaissance and preparations for impending operations was conducted in areas west of the present front lines with the following attachments effected; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, less one Platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and one Platoon, Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 0600.

The 298th Engineer Combat Battalion attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 1200 and maintained road blocks and positions formerly occupied by the 294th Engineer Combat Battalion.

11. 11 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, and continued reconnaissance in preparation for projected attack to the northeast. CI 12 continued reconnaissance and mop-up resistance in rear of present front lines within its zone of action.

The 8th Infantry with attachments as listed 10 November, remained assembled in the vicinity of K-985365 and continued reconnaissance, planning and coordination in preparation for contemplated operations to the northeast. The 2d Battalion moved to a forward assembly area (K-004403), dug in and secured itself for the night.

The 12th Infantry with attachments as listed 10 November endeavored to improve positions beginning at 0800 and efforts were made to clean enemy resistance in the rear areas of the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of 02547. Enemy pressure in this area continued throughout the day and resulted in Companies E and G being isolated. The 2d and 3d Battalion repulsed continuous strong counterattacks. The 1st Battalion attacked to reach isolated companies but was stopped by heavy machine guns, small arms and 88mm fire. At the end of the day, all units were in contact with the exception of Companies F and G. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was attached during the day to effect taking over of several road blocks prior to 0730 the next day.

The 22d Infantry with attachments effected 10 November, remained assembled in the vicinity of K-9935 and continued reconnaissance, planning, and coordination in preparation for impending operations.

12. 12 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, and continued reconnaissance and preparations for projected attack to the northeast. CI 12 continued to mop up resistance in rear of present front lines within its zone of action.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon; one Platoon, Company A and Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and one Platoon, Company A, 803d Tank Destroyer Bn (SP) attached, continued reconnaissance and preparations for contemplated attack to the northeast. The 2d Battalion completed movement to a forward assembly area in the vicinity of F-004403 and the remainder of the Combat Team remained assembled in the vicinity of K-985365.

The 13th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); one Platoon, Company C, 87th

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Chemical Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, repulsed enemy counterattacks at 0841 (Company G), 0846 (Company F), 1020 (Company F), 1413 (Companies F and G); the enemy attack at 1020 consisted of approximately 150 infantrymen and some tanks but was forced to retreat toward Hurlgen at 1205, leaving approximately 90 men with small arms and machine guns isolated behind Companies F and G, and the 1st Battalion which had previously attacked and broken through to relieve F and G Companies. At the end of the day, the enemy had cut communications and contacts between the Combat Team and the 1st Battalion and F and G Companies.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C and one Platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, less one Platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and one Platoon, Company G, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, remained assembled in the vicinity of K-9935 and continued reconnaissance and preparations for projected attack. Instructions were held for all company grade officers in the adjusting of artillery fire.

13. 13 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, and continued preparations for the projected attack to the northeast. G-12 reestablished contact between all the battalions and consolidated present front line positions.

The 8th Infantry, with attachment as listed 12 November, remained assembled; 1st and 3d Battalions in the vicinity of K-985365, and the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of F-004403. Reconnaissance and orientation for the projected attack was continued. All battalions conducted schools in adjustment of artillery fire by infantry for four officers and four noncommissioned officers per company. All units continued construction of log shelters to provide cover and protection from tree bursts.

The 12th Infantry with attachments as listed 12 November; beginning at 0750, Companies A, C, F and G, previously isolated from the remainder of their respective battalions, initiated a short withdrawal to reestablish contact and consolidate their positions. By mid-afternoon, while being harassed by small arms and artillery fire, the operation had been completed, contact on company, battalion, and regimental fronts restored and positions organized.

The 22d Infantry with attachments as listed 12 November, remained assembled in the vicinity of K-9935 and continued reconnaissance and preparation for the proposed attack. Instructions for all officers in adjustment of artillery fire was continued.

The 298th Engineer Combat Battalion maintained road blocks in the front line positions within the Division zone of action, reported sporadic artillery fire and minor skirmishes with enemy patrols.

14. 14 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, and continued adjustment of positions and preparations for projected attack to the northeast.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon, one Platoon, Company A, and Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and one Platoon, Company A, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, continued preparation, planning and coordination for proposed attack.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF); one Platoon, Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached. The 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion on the main line of resistance and upon relief the 2d Battalion moved to an area in the vicinity of F-001348, closing therein by 1700. The enemy continued to harass positions with artillery fire.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C and one Platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, less one platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and one Platoon, Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF) attached, remained assembled in the vicinity of K-9938 and continued preparations for the forthcoming attack.

The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop) was attached to the 4th Infantry Division as of 140001 November 1944.

15. 15 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, and continued preparation and coordination for the projected attack to the northeast. A light concentration (approximately 40 rounds) of artillery fire fell in the vicinity of the Division CP from 1105 - 1110 and 1200 - 1205 but no casualties resulted.

The 8th Infantry with the same attachments as listed 14 November, continued planning and coordination for proposed attack and the troops continued construction and improvement of shelters and protective covering.

The 12th Infantry with same attachments as listed 14 November; the 1st and 3d Battalions continued to improve positions, fields of fire and main supply road; four prisoners of war surrendered at forward CP of the 3d Battalion at 2100. Installations of mines and booby traps was completed and the 2d Battalion continued to reorganize in its assembly area in Combat Team reserve.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as listed 14 November, continued further planning and studying for the contemplated attack with emphasis on discussion and studying of maps and aerial photographs and coordination of all attached and supporting units.

16. 16 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division launched a coordinated attack to the northeast beginning at 1245 in the direction of Duran with three (3) Regimental Combat Teams abreast and prior to 1800, had succeeded in advancing through heavily wooded terrain approximately 1500 meters.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one platoon, one Platoon, Company A, and an Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and one Platoon, Company A, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF), attached, began movement at 0830 with the 2d Battalion and relieved Company F, 47th Infantry Regiment at 0955. The 1st Battalion moved forward to occupy the positions previously occupied by the 2d Battalion at 0830 and closed at 1050. The attack was preceded by an aerial bombardment at 1115 and H-hour was set for 1245. The 2d Battalion jumped off following the artillery preparation and under heavy mortar fire, advanced slowly, two companies abreast, Company F on the left and Company G on the right, until they reached E-017417 where they were held up by a band of

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triple concertina wire covered by small arms and mortar fires. Due to the failure of the Bangalore torpedoes to function, the battalion was ordered to prepare a defense in that position for the night.

At 1355, the 1st Battalion received orders to move two companies forward to a hill in the vicinity of P-009414 previously occupied by two assault companies of the 2d Battalion and the 3d Battalion. Forward at 1408. This attack was initiated at 1540 but had to be terminated by 1625 and coordination effected for the night.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); one platoon, Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), attached. The 2d Battalion left its assembly area at 1145 and together with the 3d Battalion, attacked one hour later. Small arms, mortar, machine gun, and artillery fires were received immediately and the advances of both battalions were impeded by extensive mine fields. Heavy opposition continued throughout the period. Company L, having been heavily shelled with mortar fire, company commander killed, and a large number of booby traps encountered, was forced back to its line of departure by 1554. In the interim, the 3d Battalion successfully negotiated the mine field confronting it and continued its advance to within 400 yards of its objective. The close of the period found the 3d Battalion still in the vicinity of its line of departure.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, less one platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, attacked at 1245 and the main opposition encountered was in the form of heavy mortar concentrations but only scattered opposition from small arms, machine gun, and artillery fires, and prior to the finish of the day's operations, considerable gains had been made over rough terrain.

While the three Regimental Combat Teams were attacking, the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less one troop, relieved the 298th Engineer Combat Battalion on various road blocks in the division sector with the exception of those in the 8th Infantry zone of action which were still under heavy machine gun fire.

17. 17 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the northeast beginning at 0800 with three Regimental Combat Teams abreast and succeeded in securing important terrain features within its zone of action.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as mentioned for the previous day, attacked in a column of battalions at 0800 with the 2d Battalion in the assault. Due to the heavy mortar fires received at H-hour, and the heavy casualties suffered in the previous day's operations, this battalion was unable to advance beyond the concertina wire previously mentioned. An attack by the 1st Battalion to their immediate front through the 2d Battalion sector was ordered for 1015 but was never initiated. Before the troops could begin passing through the gap, the enemy launched a counterattack up the draw in the vicinity of P-020410 on the right rear of Company A. This attack was repulsed and fifteen prisoners taken. The 1st Battalion was ordered to consolidate on its old position for the night. The 3d Battalion had remained in previous positions throughout the day.

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The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments as mentioned for the previous day, attacked with the 2d Battalion at 0840 and shortly encountered machine gun fire covering the mine fields. Work was continued under fire with an effort to clear the mines and booby traps in their paths of advance while numerous patrols sought alternate routes. Mortar and artillery fires were continuous and when the day's operations were finished, no gains were in evidence.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as mentioned for the previous day, was subjected during the early hours of the morning to extremely heavy artillery concentrations, casualties included the 1st and 3d Battalions' Commanders. This resulted in a delay but the attack was initiated at 0945 against heavy mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire. Of the armor supporting this battalion (one platoon of light tanks), two were knocked out by mines and those remaining were unable to proceed because of the denseness of the woods. However, by 1300 the battalion had advanced to the vicinity of F-015388 and had formed a defensive flank to the north.

At this time, the 1st and 2d Battalions were again ordered to attack. The virtually impassable terrain and the enemy infiltration in the rear of the 2d Battalion hampered the advance and after reaching dominating positions on the main north-south road, the advance was halted and positions consolidated for the night.

18. 18 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east and northeast and two Regimental Combat Teams had succeeded in advancing more than 1,000 meters over densely wooded terrain by night-fall.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon, one Platoon of Company A and Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion, and one Platoon, Company A, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF), attached; the 1st Battalion crossed its line of departure at 0915 with Company C supported by one platoon of medium tanks in the assault. The tanks led the way and ran down the concertina wire, destroying anti-personnel mines, and the attacking troops followed in the tanks' tracks without casualties to the main road in the vicinity of F-025418. Being unable to continue across the road due to steep banks, the tanks were then brought under enemy fire. The attacking infantry, however, continued its attack under cover of tank fire until they reached the vicinity of F-029418 where they were ordered to consolidate positions for the night and effect contact with Company B coming up from the rear. During this attack of the 1st Battalion, the 2d Battalion continued its reorganization without advancing, and the 3d Battalion staged Companies I and K forward to the high ground in the vicinity of F-010416 by the close of the period.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF); and one Platoon, Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion, attached; the 2d Battalion moved out at 0850 and passed through the line held by elements of the 1st Battalion at 1051. The advance was continued slowly by Company G for another hour and, although no contact with the enemy had as yet occurred, difficulties were experienced in negotiating the many mine fields encountered. As the advance progressed, the attacking troops were held up

by mines and booby traps more than from the artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire that increased throughout the day. These mine fields were encountered along the entire front and consisted mostly of teller and box mines in the roadways, S and Schu mines in the wooded areas. Companies E and F encountered small arms and machine gun fire shortly after 1600 and were unable to bring up tank support because of the nature of the terrain. At 1607, Company C effected contact with Company G while the advance of Companies E and F was stopped by the hostile fires. The positions held at this time were then consolidated, the most considerable advance having been made by Company G which had succeeded in cleaning up the area between Companies F and G.

The 22d Infantry with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C and one Platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, less one Platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, attacked at 0830 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast (1st Battalion on the left), across the main north-south road towards their objective (the high ground in the vicinity of F-027393). The 2d Battalion immediately encountered heavy machine gun and small arms fire and the 1st Battalion advanced slowly against heavy mortar and artillery fire. The 2d Battalion was held up but at 1013, Companies A and C were astride the road in the vicinity of F-024385, where artillery and small arms fire was becoming intense. As the situation developed, the 3d Battalion moved to the north to protect that flank and maintain contact between the attacking battalions. By 1345, the 1st Battalion had progressed 500 yards beyond the roadway and had secured its objective. The 2d Battalion resumed its attack at 1430 and within an hour and a half, had pressed forward some 500 yards. By 1650, the battalion had come abreast of the 1st Battalion and was upon its objective.

Serious difficulties of supply and evacuation greatly handicapped the advance of the Combat Team. The few roads in the sector, because of weather conditions, were in poor shape and were heavily mined as well as almost constantly being interdicted. Such conditions naturally resulted in the loss of important armor support.

19. 19 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack but progress was extremely slow due to the increasing number of mines, continuing poor road conditions necessitating the transportation of virtually all supplies to front line units by hand, over heavily wooded terrain.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon, Company A, Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, at 0940, the 1st Battalion endeavored to initiate an attack but was unable to advance because of heavy enemy small arms, mortar and tank fire. However, the 3d Battalion began movement at 0930 in a column of companies in order I, K, and L, in the trace of the 1st Battalion until leading elements had reached the vicinity of F-027415, at which time, they were brought under heavy fire. Companies K and L, while Company I dug in and defended, turned to the south to seize a limited objective. By 1700, Company K had secured this objective and captured 48 prisoners, while Company L advanced to the vicinity of F-021404 where positions were consolidated for the night.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and one Platoon, Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion, attached; an attack was initiated by the 2d Battalion at 0845. Continuous mortar fire was received during the day in the 2d and 3d Battalion sectors. This fire was heavy and accurate enough to make mine removal and work on the necessary stream crossings a slow and tedious process for both the Infantry and the supporting engineers. Interlocking bands of heavy machine gun fire were sighted covering the continuous mine fields which the enemy had laboriously installed in every firebreak. Numerous efforts made in various elements of the Combat Team to advance throughout the day resulted in Company F advancing a short distance and reaching a point abreast of Company G. Little other gains were reported during the day.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, and one platoon, Company D; 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, less one Platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached; supply routes to the leading battalions had not yet been opened and the 2d Battalion was not resupplied by the morning of the 19th, which necessitated postponement of the operation planned for this date. During the morning, hand carrying parties were organized from Service Company to resupply the 2d Battalion and throughout the day continuous progress was made in clearing forward routes for motor traffic. Positions were consolidated and patrols operated to the north and east, several skirmishes occurred and prisoners were taken.

At 1545, a by-passed enemy strong point opened fire on the Regimental CP's outposts with small arms and mortar fire. Company K was alerted to reinforce the CP security and was in position by 1830. Enemy mortar and artillery fire fell continuously on front line elements during the entire period.

20. 20 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east and northeast through the Hurtgen Forest in the direction of the City of Duren, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and securing important terrain features.

The 8th Infantry with the attachments mentioned under date of 19 November, attacked with the 2d and 3d Battalions at 1000. The 1st Battalion attack was again impeded by heavy artillery, mortar, and flat projectile tank fire and was not initiated until 1200, at which time Company B began the advance. The 1st Battalion covered 250 yards within its zone of action before heavy fires had stopped it in the vicinity of F-024421. An antipersonnel mine field in the vicinity of F-019406 forced the 2d Battalion to maneuver to the north. The advance was slow but continuous until Company E had reached the vicinity of F-026410, Company F, F-028412, and Company G, F-425407, where they were ordered to consolidate for the night. Heavy artillery and mortar fire prevented the 3d Battalion from continuing to the south to establish contact with the 22d Infantry, but some advances by Companies K and L were made. Supporting engineers worked on the Regimental main supply road and battalion supply roads but progress was slow because of enemy fire. Mine fields encountered in the 8th Infantry sector were still numerous as could be said in general for the entire Hurtgen Forest area.

The 12th Infantry with the attachments mentioned under date of 19 November; the attacks of the three battalions were initiated successively - 3d Battalion at 0800, the 1st Battalion at 1914 and Company E at the same time, Companies F and G being unable to move out. Elements of the 1st Battalion initially were able to advance 100 yards but by 1250, were forced back to their line of departure by extremely heavy and accurate fire. By 1300, elements of the 3d Battalion lost what little ground they had stubbornly fought for and were forced back by heavy fire on their left flank. The attack of Company E, however, continued throughout the period and was the only gain secured. This attack had progressed some 450 yards and the success can be attributed in part to the availability of the support of three tanks. Elements of the 121st Infantry Regiment of the 8th Infantry Division closed within assembly areas to the rear of the front line positions prior to the close of the period.

The 22d Infantry with the attachments as mentioned under date of 19 November; heavy concentrations of both 120mm mortars and 150mm artillery fire pounded the front line elements of the regiment during the night of 19-20 November. The 2d Battalion attacked at 0850 to take a limited objective approximately 600 yards to the east of their front lines astride the main road to Grosshau. Heavy opposition was encountered immediately in the form of artillery, mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire. It was subsequently discovered that the enemy had launched an attack at the same time which naturally resulted in a head-on clash between the two forces. The battalion forced its way forward slowly against determined resistance.

Because of the heavy fire, the 1st Battalion's attack had been delayed until 0920, but progressed rapidly and had covered some 300 yards by 1000. At 1000, the 2d Battalion had Company G on its objective and at 1017, the 1st Battalion had completed its mission. Roads were immediately blocked by mines and bazooka teams. A counterattack from the north was launched by the enemy at 1037 against the 1st Battalion. However, it came at a time when the battalion had completed consolidating its gains and the enemy was allowed to come within very close range before fire was placed upon them. The attack was repulsed with heavy casualties on the Germans and 25 prisoners of war were taken.

An enemy force which included six tanks or self-propelled guns attacked the 2d Battalion from the southeast at 1050 and Company L of the reserve battalion was ordered up as a reinforcement. The counterattack was repulsed and Company L was then attached to the 2d Battalion to cover its right flank.

By 1420, the 1st and 2d Battalions were firmly established upon their objective but heavy artillery and mortar fire continued upon them. The few muddy trails and firebreaks throughout the forest were blocked by antitank mines usually found three deep and most of them were booby trapped. The essential bridge at F-021384 had been completely demolished and the almost constant shelling of the entire Combat Team made engineer work extremely difficult. It was necessary to carry supplies by hand more than 1,000 yards to the forward battalions and armor and antitank guns were still unable to reach these units. This was generally the situation that the Combat Team found itself in at the close of the period.

21. 21 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division consolidated and maintained the positions secured at the close of the previous day's operations and continued mopping up the wooded areas flanking regimental

main lines of resistance, and all areas between front line elements.

The 8th Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned; during this period, the 1st and 2d Battalions continued to maintain their positions, while the 3d Battalion moved out at 0830 on its mission to destroy all enemy forces east and west of the road from F-019402 to F-023393. Company L advanced generally to the south, encountering only small arms fire but was forced to reduce obstacles at F-019402 and F-020402. Company I had likewise moved out to the south to remain within supporting distance of Company L. Company L encountered an enemy tank, a half-track, and an infantry force dug in in the vicinity of F-024347 but apparently struck them in flank and rapidly drove them off, capturing 29 prisoners of war. Contact was maintained with Company K and established with the 22d Infantry at 1620, thus accomplishing the assigned mission. All companies were then pulled back to an assembly area and proceeded to dig in for the night. The terrain that had been cleared of the enemy during the day was outposted by elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

The 12th Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned; the 121st Infantry Regiment of the 8th Infantry Division moved out at 0900 from assembly areas to the rear of CT 12's positions to attack through and relieve elements of the Combat Team. Company F of the 121st Infantry while attempting to pass through Companies F and G of the 12th Infantry received heavy mortar fire and six artillery concentrations. The relief of the 1st and 3d Battalions was completed by 1500 and the 2d Battalion by 1700, but withdrawal of the 12th Infantry was not initiated and plans were coordinated to accomplish this on the 22d of November.

The 22d Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned; because of the supply and evacuation difficulties and the necessity of cleaning out by-passed enemy pockets, an attack was not ordered on this date. The day was utilized in consolidating positions and opening a motor route to the leading battalions. The engineers worked continuously under fire in their efforts to open supply roads to forward elements. Heavy rains further hindered their work by decreasing the efficiency of their mine detectors. By daylight, the critical bridge at F-021384 was passable to traffic.

Patrols continued working throughout the Combat Team's sector, rounding up small groups of the enemy. At 1100, Company K again attacked the strong point just to the east of the Regimental CP, and supported by tanks and a tank destroyer, dislodged the enemy and captured 20 prisoners. At 1155, the bridge and main supply road were finally cleared and traffic was able to reach forward battalions. At 1655, Company I, supported by tanks and tank destroyers, moved to the north along the main north-south roadway with the mission of clearing the area and establishing contact with elements of CT 8. This contact was made without enemy resistance by 1655. During the period, the entire Combat Team area was shelled by heavy caliber pieces.

22. 22 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack through the Hurtgen Forest against resistance that seemed unlikely to diminish.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon, Company A, Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) and one Platoon,

Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion, attached. The attack of the regiment was delayed in an effort to bring up the supporting armor, this failing, the attack was initiated at 0930 by the 1st Battalion. Supporting fires were furnished by the 2d Battalion which were of great help to the advance of the sister unit but, at the same time, resulted in greatly increased artillery fire in their own sector. The 1st Battalion fought its way stubbornly forward against strong resistance and succeeded in reaching the edge of its objective, Jägerhaus.

At 1120, the 3d Battalion started moving along the axis of advance of the 1st Battalion. Shortly after 1300, Company I made contact with the enemy and took a number of prisoners. When leading elements had reached the vicinity of F-033424, the battalion then worked back to the southeast, effecting a partial encirclement of the enemy and resulting in the annihilation and capture of large numbers. The area to the southeast as far as the vicinity of F-032414 was then considered clear.

In the interim, Company C maneuvered to the left (north) of Company B and, in the face of heavy and continuous mortar, artillery, and small arms fire, succeeded in reaching the vicinity of F-034431. Once again, front line elements were suffering due to the great efforts required to keep supplies moving up. The engineers continued to work on clearing and repairing the main supply road but progress was slow because work had to be carried on under heavy fire.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, initiated movement to assembly areas to the north of the new division right (south) boundary. All three battalions had cleared front positions and closed within assigned areas by 1215 as division reserve.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C and one Platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, less one Platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion, and Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached. The attack plan for the day included the movement east of the 3d Battalion through, and to the north of, the 1st Battalion to an objective just short of Grosshau, the road junction at coordinates (043385). The 2d Battalion was to push straight to the east. The 1st Battalion, reverting to Combat Team reserve, was to move one company south to extend and protect the south (right) flank of the 2d Battalion.

The 1st Battalion feinted several false attacks shortly after 0800 hours and, it seemed, accomplished its mission of detracting the enemy from the attack of the 3d Battalion further to the north. Company B moved to the south at 0845 and extended the right flank of the 2d Battalion.

The 3d Battalion moved shortly after daylight and passed through the northern flank of the 1st Battalion at 0930. Enemy mortar, artillery, and small arms fire was encountered but the advance continued and several enemy machine gun positions were overrun. Contact was lost with the attacking echelons when key personnel became casualties, but by 1335, the attack had carried to a point from which the road junction at coordinates (043383) was under our direct fire. The battalion consolidated its positions so as to cut the roads leading to the junction from the west and northwest. Direct artillery fire was received from the western edge of Grosshau, which was within sight of the battalion positions.

A small enemy attack on its left flank (evidently caused by the 1st Battalion's feints to the east) was repulsed by the 2d Battalion at 0905. At 0950 the 2d Battalion attacked to the east and immediately encountered stubborn resistance including fire from two dug in self-propelled guns. Slow progress was made, aided by caliber .50 machine gun fire from tank destroyers which were able to move to within several hundred yards of the road bend at coordinates F-030375. Despite numerous casualties, this battalion continued to advance until the left flank was approximately 500 yards to the southwest of the 1st Battalion. Here positions were consolidated. Approximately 100 replacements received by the 2d Battalion during the afternoon were used as a unit to assist in covering the south flank which had become more exposed as the attack progressed to the east.

25. 23 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the northeast in the direction of Duren and despite strong resistance of small arms, machine guns, artillery, mortars, mines, booby traps, and well-defended bunkers, secured important terrain.

The 8th Infantry with the same attachments as listed under date of 22 November, attacked at 0840 with the 2d Battalion in the assault. A number of prisoners, unarmed, were taken in a short while. Once again, supply problems delayed the attack. The 3d Battalion was unable to move before 0900. A slow advance was continued by this unit in the face of small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Progress made was good and the close of operations found Companies K, L, and I in the vicinity of F-042421, F-044416, and F-037420 respectively.

The 2d Battalion was able to move to the southeast toward its objective with Companies E and F converging in the vicinity of F-037411 with Company G to their immediate rear.

Due to extremely heavy enemy fire, the 1st Battalion was unable to move forward throughout the day and at 1515 Company C was ordered to move behind Company A and effect contact with the left flank of Company I. Company B was withdrawn in order to give the men one good night's rest and get needed replacements. This closed the day's activity.

The 12th Infantry, no change from previous attachments, moved its 1st Battalion to a forward assembly area starting at 0945. Patrols from Company C were dispatched at 1000 and Company B at 1045, while at 1015, the 2d Battalion initiated an attack to the east. A mine field was encountered by the battalion in the vicinity of F-016367 at 1118, Company F negotiated this obstacle within half an hour and the battalion crossed the main north-south road at 1551. While the combat patrols from Companies B and C both reached their objectives on the high ground to the east of the roadway, the 2d Battalion was stopped short of its objective in the late afternoon by additional mines and enemy resistance. Positions were consolidated for the night with Company G coming forward in the trace of the two leading companies.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C and one platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, less one platoon, 87th Chemical Battalion; Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company C, 709th Tank Battalion attached. The orders for 23 November provided for consolidation of positions, clearing of rear areas and routes forward, and the securing of four key trail and road junctions, all within 500 yards of the front lines.

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A small task force, organized by the 1st Battalion, and consisting of a platoon of Infantry, a platoon of tanks, and a mine sweeping detachment of Engineers moved eastward at 0850 to clear the road from the 1st Battalion positions to the 3d Battalion positions. This was completed by 1330 under artillery and mortar fire, but negligible Infantry opposition, and the platoon of tanks remained to support the 3d Battalion. Additional progress was made in clearing routes forward throughout the Combat Team sector.

Enemy pressure on the northern flank of the 3d Battalion increased during the morning, but no ground was gained by the Germans. Later in the day Company I succeeded in clearing its objective (the buildings located in the vicinity of coordinates F-042388) of the enemy and taking several prisoners. Enemy mortar and artillery fire, including direct artillery fire from Groschau, continued to pound the battalion area.

By 1145 the 2d Battalion had readjusted its lines to the east so that its two assigned objectives, the trail junction at coordinates (F-035373 and F-036376), were controlled by fire. Very heavy enemy artillery fire was received in the battalion sector.

24. 24 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack through the Hurtgen Forest with two regimental combat teams abreast, CT 12 was on the right and CT 8 on the left. The attacking Combat Teams advanced slowly throughout the day against a stubborn enemy in heavily wooded terrain made more adverse due to the ever consistent intermittent rain. By the end of the period, both Combat Teams had secured their assigned objectives.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D, less one Platoon, Company A, and Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, was ordered to continue the attack in the direction of Duren by 0830. Company C began moving forward at 0747, but Company B was unable to continue forward movement until 1000 due to heavy artillery and mortar fire, as well as extremely heavy small arms fire from a well dug in enemy. The 2d Battalion with Companies E and F abreast continued to advance slowly to the southeast meeting extremely heavy machine gun and small arms fire as well as artillery and mortar fire, but by the end of the day had reached the vicinity of F-040419 having captured considerable enemy personnel, weapons and equipment. Company B continued movement to the east once it had overcome the enemy's main positions, and reached the 1st Battalion objective in the vicinity of F-045427. On the 1st Battalion's objective being taken, the 3d Battalion relieved Companies B and C who were withdrawn to the rear, Company B to area F-013414 and Company C to F-013413. Company A remained in area F-036426 throughout the day as the reserve of the 1st Battalion. The attached engineers continued clearing supply routes to battalions and the main supply road, their work being constantly impeded by heavy shelling especially along the road from F-030414 to F-037412. By 1800, the 2d Battalion had been ordered to continue the attack to its objective on the following day.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, less one Platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, continued the attack to the east at 0900 with the 3d Battalion passing through the outpost line previously held by the 1st Battalion.

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The 3d Battalion advanced rapidly and by 1102 was moving onto its objective with Company X. Company L was ordered to proceed to the objective and assist Company K in organizing and holding this important terrain feature. This movement was accomplished and the 3d Battalion objective was secured although almost constant artillery and mortar fire fell in that area. The 2d Battalion advanced against small arms and machine gun fire from enemy strong points and reached its first objective at F-023361 at 1030. By 1215 the 2d Battalion was firmly established on its objective, and by 1400 had gained contact with the 121st Infantry on the Combat Team's right flank. The 1st Battalion mopped up enemy groups in the rear areas and established contact with the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the Regimental Combat Team's north (left) flank. Attached engineers continued to clear supply routes in CF-12's zone of action of enemy road blocks, mines, and booby traps.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, plus one Platoon, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF); Company C, 709th Tank Battalion, and Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, received heavy artillery fire, including direct fire on forward units. During the early hours of the period, the fire slackened somewhat, but continued sporadically during the day. This period was used mostly to regroup, adjust, and consolidate previously secured positions. Patrols moved along the south flank of the 2d Battalion and through the area between the 1st and 3d Battalions. Engineers with infantry support rushed to open all roads and trails in the Combat Team's zone of action by clearing them of enemy road blocks, mines, and booby traps. The advance of CF 12 relieved pressure on the 2d Battalion's flank, so in view of this Company B, previously attached to the 2d Battalion, was returned to control of the 1st Battalion. Company B moved north to rejoin the 1st Battalion closing in the area of the 1st Battalion by 1450. Company A was moved to extend the flank of the 3d Battalion and maintain contact with them. Throughout the period, planning for the continuation of the attack to the east was made.

25. 25 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the east with three Combat Teams abreast against an enemy determined to hold to the last man in the thick woods which compose the Hurtgen Forest. The consistency of the intermittent rain rendered the thick matting of the forest and the few roads and trails a mass of mud which did much to hinder the advance. It was almost impossible for the tanks and tank destroyers of the units to keep up with the advancing infantry. The enemy continued to use all available weapons to impede our progress. Mortars, machine guns, many small arms, mines, and booby traps were used extensively and in the Grosshau vicinity, enemy self-propelled guns fired direct fire into our front line of advance.

The 8th Infantry with the same attachments as mentioned 24 November, the 2d Battalion attacked at 1130 to the southeast, initially encountering enemy resistance consisting of light small arms and mortar fire. At 1330, this battalion repulsed a small counterattack launched by 40 to 50 enemy infantry from the northeast, continued the advance and by 1410, had succeeded in capturing its objective at F-047407. The 3d Battalion maintained, readjusted and strengthened the positions previously secured, and patrolled to the north as far as F-042427. Company A was withdrawn to the vicinity of F-011412. Tanks and tank destroyers were

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moved into the 2d and 3d Battalions' areas while an artillery liaison plane hovered above to spot any hostile artillery or antitank guns.

The 12th Infantry with the same attachments as mentioned 24 November attacked at 0800 to secure objectives, F-042370, 038564 and 030360. Making good progress through the difficult wooded, hilly terrain against light resistance from a disorganized enemy using mostly small arms fire to impede the progress, the 2d Battalion succeeded in seizing its objective at F-025357. From that position the battalion was able to assist by fire the attack of CC "R", 5th Armored Division on Hurtgen (F-0435). Upon reaching its objective, the 2d Battalion began to consolidate the position and to mop up small pockets of by-passed enemy in rear areas. By the end of the period, contact was established by the 2d Battalion with 121st Infantry on the right and the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry on the left. The 1st Battalion moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of F-020037, closing in the new area by 1030. Patrols of the 1st Battalion were used to mop up small pockets of by-passed enemy in the woods adjacent to the regimental road net. The 3d Battalion continued to consolidate and readjust its positions previously secured, and to mop up small enemy groups in rear areas.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF); Company C, 709th Tank Battalion, and Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached. Enemy mortar and artillery fire continued throughout the area with moderate intensity during the early hours of the period.

The plan of attack for CT 22 on 25 November was to attack with the 2d and 3d Battalions. The 3d Battalion was to envelope Grosshau to the north; the 2d Battalion was to reach the edge of the woods southwest of Grosshau so that direct fire could be placed on the towns of Grosshau and Kleinbau. The attack was planned to be effected without artillery preparation in hope of surprising the enemy.

The 2d Battalion attacked at 0820, having been delayed due to the attached armor being unable to negotiate the poor roads available to them. The 3d Battalion attacked at 0745. Both battalions encountered heavy resistance immediately on attacking from small arms, mortar, and artillery fire.

By 0845 the 3d Battalion was moving onto the high ground north of Grosshau at F-048385 having taken 50 prisoners of war. At this point, the Battalion paused for reorganization before assaulting the town of Grosshau. The delay was protracted when difficulty in moving supporting tanks and tank destroyers was caused by the poor road net. Enemy artillery and mortar fire increased during the period.

The advance of the 2d Battalion was bitterly contested by the enemy, but by 1030 they were on their objective, the near edge of the woods overlooking the town of Grosshau.

At 1145 the 3d Battalion attacked across the open field leading into Grosshau from the north. The enemy reacted immediately by placing very heavy fire on the attacking elements. Enemy self-propelled guns, mortars of all calibers, and withering small arms fire stopped this attack disabling four tanks and two tank destroyers supporting the battalion's attempt to advance. Further attempts to capture the town from the north were repulsed and at 1500 the battalion dug in north of Grosshau after suffering heavy casualties.

The 1st Battalion, in regimental reserve, moved to the west following the attack of the 3d Battalion. One company had the mission of clearing the area north of the 2d Battalion of all enemy as far as the edge of Grosshau. This company moved out at 1300, and reached the road junction west of Grosshau (F-043685) where it dug in for the night. The remainder of the 1st Battalion moved to positions previously occupied by the 3d Battalion.

26. 26 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division maintained the previously secured front line positions throughout the day. Extensive patrolling was conducted during the period to mop up small enemy pockets existing in rear of front line positions, and to seek information concerning enemy lines facing the front in preparation for continuation of the attack to the east. It was necessary for GI-12 to attack with one battalion in order to straighten the main line of resistance and establish contact between all elements. The entire period was used to straighten the lines, regroup, clear the rear areas of the enemy, and secure favorable terrain in preparation for the impending attack in conjunction with the attack of the 8th Infantry Division and CC "R" of the 5th Armored Division's attack to seize the town of Kleinbau and adjacent high ground.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as listed on 24 November, maintained and continued to improve its positions, and to mop up rear areas of all by-passed enemy. Patrols from the 2d and 3d Battalions made contact at F-043415. Further contact was established by the 3d Battalion patrols contacting elements of the 4th Cavalry Group on the left flank. The 1st Battalion moved forward to relieve the 2d Battalion in position. The relief began at 1300 and was completed by 1445 with incident. The 2d Battalion moved to new assembly area in the vicinity of F-01045, closing in that area at 1500. Attached engineers continued to improve the road net within the regimental zone of action by removing enemy road blocks, mines, and booby traps.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments as listed 25 November. The 3d Battalion attacked at 0800 to seize the important terrain at F-040367. The battalion moved forward, encountering enemy small arms throughout the day. The terrain over which the 3d Battalion advance was made proved most difficult, the advance being made through heavy woods, up and down steep slopes, and through icy streams which were chest deep in some places. In order to evacuate wounded, hand carry was necessary for distances as great as a mile. Due to these conditions, the supply problem was greatly hampered. In spite of these extremely adverse conditions, the 3d Battalion reached its objective by 1630 and began consolidation in preparation to assist by fire the advance of the 8th Infantry Division on their right. Due to the difficult supply problem, Company I ran out of ammunition 100 yards short of its objective. When this occurred, Company L passed through Company I and continued on to the objective. The battalion took numerous prisoners during the day. It was reported late in the period that artillery, both direct and indirect, was falling on the 3d Battalion positions, as well as some mortar fire.

The 1st Battalion continued to mop up small groups of enemy along the roads and trails within the regimental zone of action. The battalion on completion of its mission of clearing rear areas moved to a

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new assembly area in the vicinity of F-027388. The 1st Battalion closed in a new assembly area at 1630 in preparation for a further attack to the east within a new zone of action.

The 2d Battalion maintained and improved its positions protecting the right flank of the division and corps. Preparations were made to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion when units of the 8th Infantry Division passed in front of them in the attack to the northeast.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as listed 25 November. No major attack was made on 26 November, and again the Combat Team consolidated and improved its position. Grosshau was pounded during the day by 81mm mortar heavy high explosive shells as well as our artillery fire. Some enemy infiltration on the south flank of the 2d Battalion was cleaned out during this period, and Company G moved to the east to cover the right flank of the other two 2d Battalion rifle companies.

Company C attacked to the east to clear the woods just west of Grosshau. Stubborn resistance was encountered, including small arms fire, mortar fire, and direct artillery fire. By late afternoon, the company had reached its objective and was digging in for the night. However, as the road was not cleared, no antitank guns or armor was with the company. Just before dusk an enemy counterattack of about 75 infantrymen, supported by four tanks or self-propelled guns, hit Company C and drove them back to their positions of the night before. As a result of the day's fighting, heavy casualties were sustained by Company C. A patrol from the 3d Battalion moved out shortly after dark to investigate Grosshau. The patrol on its first attempt was hit by heavy concentrations of mortar, but on its second attempt reached the outskirts of Grosshau where they remained in observation and listening. The patrol reported hearing enemy forces digging and many tracked vehicles moving in the eastern part of the above mentioned town.

27. 27 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division attacked to the east with the 22d Infantry to seize the town of Grosshau (F-0538), while other units continued to mop up enemy strong points and pockets of wandering enemy on regimental flanks and in rear areas. The town of Grosshau, as expected, proved to be heavily defended, the enemy used dug in tanks, supported by self-propelled guns, many machine guns, and small arms well dug in, as well as mines and booby traps to defend the town. Readjustments of positions and plans for the coordinated attack to the northeast were continued.

The 8th Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned, continued to maintain previously captured positions and patrolled aggressively to clear rear areas and flanks of all enemy, maintain contact between units, and to seek information of enemy lines and activities. A 1st Battalion patrol reached the vicinity of F-045404 where it encountered small arms fire of medium intensity and observed well dug in enemy positions to the south of that point. A patrol from Company C encountered the enemy in the vicinity of F-045411 where a small arms fire fight ensued. The Company C patrol captured several prisoners and killed some enemy before returning to its parent unit. Company I established an observation post at F-049450, from which point they patrolled 400 to 600 yards to the east without making contact with the enemy, but noted abandoned enemy equipment and positions. Contact patrols of the 1st and 3d

Battalions met at F-043415.

The 12th Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned; units of the 8th Infantry Division passed in front of the 2d Battalion's positions protecting the right (south) flank of Division and Corps, thus freeing the battalion and allowing its movement to an assembly area in the vicinity of F-018375. The movement was initiated at 0900 and battalion closed in new area by 1500. Company I moved out at 1500 with a mopping up mission, contacted the enemy in the vicinity of F-041370 at which point a fire fight resulted. The company took several prisoners and killed several of the enemy at this point. The 3d Battalion continued to mop up areas adjacent to their positions and directed fire on the town of Klienbau and the surrounding area (F-0537). CT 12 continued plans for a coordinated attack to the east.

The 22d Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned experienced continuous artillery and mortar fire throughout the period. Company B attacked at 0900 to retake the ground west of Grosshau over which Company C had fought the previous day. Machine gun and self-propelled artillery fires were encountered and the enemy resisted bitterly. By late morning, the attack had come to a standstill, and Company E was ordered to aid the attack by pushing to the north. The advance was continued at 1230 and by 1440, Companies B and E were on their objective on the edge of the town. Company B was attached to the 1st Battalion at this time. The position was organized, and at 1800, led by antitank guns, supporting weapons, tanks, and tank destroyers, reached this forward area.

During this period, elements of CT 12 advanced on the south of CT 22 and contact was established with that unit at 1532. Positions of CT 22 were generally improved and adjusted.

Patrols of the 3d Battalion in attempting to work to the east at 1500 encountered a very heavy thirty minute enemy artillery barrage and were unable to move.

Smoke was observed to the front of the 2d Battalion at 1645, and tracked vehicles were heard in that direction. It was thought preparations were being made for a German attack, but none developed.

After dark, a patrol from the 1st Battalion moved into Grosshau, but encountered enemy small arms fire 200 yards east of our lines and was driven back. Plans were made during the evening for an attack coordinated with elements of CT 12, who were to move to the north of CT 22.

28. 28 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division attacked with the 12th Infantry to clear the area between the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments in order to open roads and establish contact in that area. Patrolling was continuous by all elements to clear the few remaining scattered enemy elements from the rear areas, and to seek information of enemy activities and positions. The enemy resistance in the Grosshau area continued to be extremely heavy. The enemy employed many self-propelled guns, dug in tanks, and the infantry fought stubbornly from the houses and cellars of the town as well as from dug in positions in the surrounding area. The high ground to the east of Grosshau offered the enemy an ideal location for emplacing antitank and self-propelled guns. The engineers' work on the supply routes was continuous. The entire period was devoted to local attacks to better positions for a coordinated attack, to establish contact between all elements of the division and to

eliminate all remaining enemy pockets within our lines. The coordinated attack of the division was held up in order to make the attack in conjunction with the 8th Infantry Division's attack to seize Kleinhau.

The 8th Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned, continued to maintain and improve positions previously secured, conducted vigorous patrolling to the northeast and south to determine enemy dispositions and strength. Cleaning of the rear areas was continuous. Elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron moved into the area of the 1st Battalion prepared to relieve them at first light 29 November. Unit disposition remained unchanged throughout the period.

The 12th Infantry with the same attachments as previously mentioned. A considerable gap existed between the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments. Reconnaissance on 27 November indicated the enemy to be occupying positions in the vicinity of the Hill at F-048388. The 1st Battalion was committed to clear the area (F-047390 to F-047406), of all enemy and to make contact with the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments. The 2d Battalion followed the 1st Battalion to help in this mission.

The 1st Battalion attacked at 0910 becoming engaged in a fire fight immediately, with the enemy employing small arms and machine guns. This resistance was eliminated by the aggressive action of this battalion, after which they moved on to capture the hill at F-048378. Company A was left behind to occupy this captured hill while the battalion, minus Company A, advanced north along the road from F-047390 to F-047406, searching the adjacent areas for all enemy. No resistance was encountered in the attack to clear this road until late in the afternoon when a strong point of enemy at F-047399 was engaged. The 1st Battalion held up for the night at this point preparatory to continuing the attack in the morning. Company E staged forward behind the 1st Battalion to F-047395 where they remained during the night.

The 3d Battalion and the 2d Battalion, minus Company E, remained in the same positions as the previous period. The 3d Battalion continued to support the attack of CC "R", 5th Armored Division and the 22d Infantry by fire, while protecting the right (south) flank of the Division and Corps.

The 22d Infantry with same attachments as previously mentioned; at 1000, a small task force (two platoons) of the 3d Battalion attacked to the east with CT 12 to the north of the 3d Battalion positions. This attack met some small arms fire, but not the customary artillery and mortar fire. Progress was favorable and some prisoners were taken. By 1350 this task force was on its objective, the high ground at coordinates (F-049388), and was cleaning out small scattered pockets of enemy. There were indications that the high ground had been used as an artillery observation post, and one dug in artillery piece was captured.

The remainder of the Combat Team adjusted its positions, although any movement in the 1st Battalion sector was followed by an enemy mortar barrage. During the afternoon the gap between Companies E and F was covered with trip wire flares and booby traps. In accordance with orders, Company B moved west to an assembly area at 1830. Company E, which remained attached to the 1st Battalion for the night, adjusted its positions to contain Grosshau from the west.

Plans were formed and orders issued, orally, for an attack on 29 November to seize the high ground northeast of Grosshau. The advance was to be coordinated with the attack of CC "R", 5th Armored Division on the right flank south of Combat Team 22.

29. 29 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east against heavy enemy resistance, captured Grosshau (F-0538), advanced several hundred yards to the northeast; readjusted positions, continued to mop up rear areas and, at the end of the period, had completed plans to continue the attack on 30 November.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attached units as mentioned for 27 November; the 1st Battalion was relieved by elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at 0830 and, from this position, it moved to the line of departure in preparation for the attack. The attack was launched by the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, the 2d Battalion moving through the lines held by the 3d Battalion at 1000. The 1st Battalion, with Company C on the left and Company B on the right, met heavy small arms and machine gun fire shortly after beginning their advance and were held up in the vicinity of F-052424 at 1115. A slight withdrawal maneuver for the purpose of heavily shelling the enemy positions confronting them was initiated and the advance was once more resumed. This enabled Company B to reach the vicinity of F-052432 and Company C the vicinity of F-051452. The 2d Battalion in the face of small arms, machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire continued its slow but steady advance. Resistance became more determined at all points and nightfall found the 2d Battalion with Companies F and G in the vicinities of F-049430 and F-084432 respectively. The 3d Battalion had remained in regimental reserve throughout the period.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attached units as mentioned for 27 November, attacked with Company C at 0830 and met no resistance. Contact was established with elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the objective in the vicinity of F-048407 was reached by 0950. A combat patrol was then ordered to the east. Company F moved to a position on the flank of Company E and sent out combat patrols to the south and east of their lines. In the interim, the 3d Battalion was relieved in its sector and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of F-024376 and began preparation for another movement to a new assembly area. Meanwhile, a 1st Battalion patrol covered the ground and road 1000 yards southeast of F-045407 and reported no enemy. A negative report was also submitted by the two patrols from the 2d Battalion that patrolled 500 yards south of F-048399.

The 2d Infantry had no change in attachments. During the night 28-29 November moderate enemy artillery and mortar fire of an harassing nature fell in the Combat Team area. A night patrol from the 3d Battalion penetrated the enemy outpost line and worked east to the Grosshau-Gey road. The patrol mined this road at coordinates (F-054385) to deny its use to the enemy in either withdrawing from or reinforcing Grosshau.

The Combat Team's plan for 29 November was an attack by the 3d Battalion, by-passing Grosshau to the north, and seizing the high ground (coordinates F-058385) northeast of the town. The 1st Battalion was to follow the 3d Battalion, protecting the flanks of that unit. The 2d Battalion was to be prepared to take Grosshau in a frontal attack, while holding the Combat Team's right flank to the south of the town.

Ordered to attack at 1100, the 3d Battalion was delayed by heavy enemy artillery fire, and moved out at 1200. The battalion pushed to the northeast against continued heavy fire and against determined

resistance. At 1620 it was 700 yards north of its objective and ready to swing to the south. Resupply was a difficult problem and the battalion received heavy fire from Hill 92 (to its northwest). Despite the approaching darkness, the battalion was ordered to continue the attack. At 1830 the battalion had reached its objective, and the hill northeast of Grosshau was secured by 2050.

The 1st Battalion moved to the east and by 1445 occupied the original positions of the 3d Battalion. The battalion remained in those positions, prepared to assist in the capture of Grosshau.

In accordance with orders, the 2d Battalion attacked at 1250 to take Grosshau. The attacking force consisted of Companies E and F, with tank and tank destroyer support. Immediately upon jumping off, Company F (on the right flank) received a counterattack which it repulsed. Company E advanced slowly under heavy German machine gun fire. Fighting was intense and Company E had advanced only 75 yards beyond the first house in town by 1635. At dusk the battalion was ordered to continue the attack. By 1843 only three houses in the town remained in enemy hands, and resistance in Grosshau ended at 1915. During the period Company G remained in position scouring the right flank of the Combat Team.

Patrols from the 2d and 3d Battalions made contact northeast of Grosshau at 2304.

30. 30 November 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the coordinated attack to the east and northeast from positions secured in the previous day's attack against increasing stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy. Considerable gains were made by all attacking echelons. The resistance on the northern and southern parts of the division zone of action (sectors of the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments) was considerably greater than that in CT 12's zone of action. The attack of CT 12 caught the enemy off guard to some extent, therefore, this attack made better progress than those of the other two combat teams.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon, Company D and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF); and Company G, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, attacked with the 1st Battalion at 0845 and the 2d Battalion at 0900 to seize the objective at F-062432. The enemy resistance was heavy throughout the period. The enemy used many automatic weapons, firing along the final protective lines, along the mined and booby trapped fire-breaks, and trails in the eastern edge of the Hurtgen Forest. Heavy mortar fire and artillery fire of medium intensity was also encountered. A small counterattack by enemy infantry on the flank of the 1st Battalion was repulsed, and by 1200 both the 1st and 2d Battalions had succeeded in capturing the positions organized and occupied by the enemy during the night of 29-30 November 1944.

At 0930 the 3d Battalion was ordered to move and attack on the right of the regimental zone of action (also right of 1st Battalion) with its objective the vicinity of F-064423. The 3d Battalion moved forward to the vicinity of F-049414 where they became involved in a fire fight. After several attempts to overcome this resistance, the battalion was ordered to consolidate their positions for the night in preparation for the continuation of the attack on 1 December. In spite of resistance from small arms and machine gun fire, the 3d Battalion managed to reach a

Sec IV - Operations contd

position abreast of the 1st Battalion.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B and Company D, less one Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) and Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion attached, attacked with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, the 2d Battalion on the right, at 0830 and 0800 respectively, to seize the line F-062408 to F-063394. Initially, the advance was slow due to the constant danger of mines and booby traps. The 2d Battalion encountered an extensive deceptive mine field in the vicinity of F-051397 at 1030. At the same time, the 1st Battalion became involved in a fire fight with an enemy strong point in the vicinity of F-054400. By the end of the period, the 1st and 2d Battalions had succeeded in capturing the terrain very near the eastern edge of the woods on the high ground overlooking the town of Gey.

The 3d Battalion in regimental reserve moved to a new assembly area in the vicinity of F-032410, closing therein by 1545.

The 22d Infantry, with the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one Platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 709th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached. Heavy enemy mortar and artillery concentrations fell in the Combat Team sector during the night of 29-30 November. However, no enemy infantry action was noted during the night.

After an artillery preparation, the 2d and 3d Battalions attacked at approximately 1130. Initially, the 3d Battalion moved against relatively light resistance, and at 1500 was 300 yards short of its objective. The opposition stiffened and, in accordance with orders, the 3d Battalion secured for the night at 1630.

The 2d Battalion, on attacking east from Grosshau, encountered machine gun fire and increasing mortar and artillery fire. At 1335, the battalion was 300 yards beyond its line of departure and moving slowly. Armored support was requested at 1405, and subsequently four tanks and two tank destroyers were attached to the battalion. However, the 2d Battalion was unable to continue the advance and dug in for the night shortly after 1630. One Company of the 2d Battalion remained in Grosshau. Enemy mortar and artillery fire on the forward positions of the 2d Battalion (200 yards west of the woods) was intense.

The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, moving toward its line of departure, encountered enemy small arms fire at 1020 from the hill north-east of Kleinbau, supposedly secured the previous day by elements of CG "R" of the 5th Armored Division. After severe fighting across open fields, during which time over forty prisoners were taken, the battalion reached its line of departure, and at 1516 hours was at the woods (coordinates F-063377). Small additional gains were made and the battalion dug in for the night at 1630.

The 1st Battalion, in reserve, staged forward to positions in rear of the 3d Battalion.

During the day some rifle fire was received from Grosshau and some additional prisoners were subsequently taken from the basements of the town. Late in the afternoon plans were made for the resumption of the attack on 1 December.

Section V -- Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: The static condition which prevailed during October continued until the 7th of the current month. At that time the division was detached from the V Corps and moved from the Bullingen sector in Belgium to a sector generally southeast of Aachen, Germany. Here the division was re-attached to VII Corps and was committed to aggressive action east of Zweifall, Germany, in which town the Division CP was set up. Because of the lack of suitable areas, the service installations (4th Quartermaster, 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance, and 4th Signal Companies) were located approximately ten miles west of the Division CP, in the general vicinity of Hergenrath, Germany.

2. All movement in this area was considerably hampered by the extremely hilly and heavily wooded terrain, poor roads and almost continuous rain and heavy mud. In numerous instances it was necessary to hand carry rations, water and ammunition to front line troops. Cargo Carriers, M-29 (the only vehicles able to move cross-country over this terrain) were used to partially relieve this situation.

3. The expenditure of mortar and artillery ammunition increased considerably after arrival in this sector. Since the supply of this ammunition was critical, quantities available for expenditure by the division were allocated periodically by VII Corps. These allocations, in turn, were apportioned among the infantry regiments and artillery units.

4. Action was heavy throughout the period and combat losses in vehicles and weapons were considerable. Replacements were normally rapid, but at the end of the period the following critical shortages existed:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Ated</u>	<u>Short</u>
Car, Half-track, M2	90	4
Truck, 2 1/2-ton, LWB	358	4
Truck, 2 1/2-ton, Dump	27	4
Rifle, automatic, cal .30, M1918A2	258	69
Mount, tripod, MG, cal .30, M1917A1	98	22
Binoculars, M13	1276	400
Watch, wrist, 7-17 jewel	1301	512

5. Extreme difficulty was encountered in the recovery of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment from the dense woods because of the mass of trees and branches brought down by mortar and artillery fire, completely covering the ground. In addition to making the terrain almost impassable, even on foot, mines and booby traps were sown thickly throughout the division area which to date have not been cleared.

6. Quartermaster supply of Class I items continued normal throughout the month. However, shortages of various items of Class II items existed. The most important shortages were as follows:

Herringbone twill clothing, small size
Jackets, field

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd.

Overshoes, sizes 10 to 15
Water cans
Gas lanterns

7. Because of the difficulty in transporting purified water to the troops, local sources were utilized, necessitating the extensive use of Halasone Tablets. A critical shortage of this item existed throughout the period.

8. With the troops continuously exposed to rain and mud, trench foot broke out and evacuation of these cases was heavy. Issue of overshoes and additional socks was expedited. At the end of the period all men, except the more recent replacements, had been issued overshoes and the number of trench foot cases had dropped appreciably. However, the supply of overshoes in sizes 10 to 15 remained critical.

9. Because of the narrow roads and soft shoulders, traffic difficulties were experienced. This condition was partly overcome by putting into effect a traffic circulation plan limiting certain roads to one-way traffic. Work by the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, supported by the 1120th Engineer Group, on the repair and maintenance of roads and bridges was continuous.

10. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

11. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>
Killed in action	40	362
Died of wounds	2	37
Died of injuries	-	1
Missing in action	10	245
Seriously wounded in action	20	314
Seriously injured in action	-	4
Slightly wounded in action	116	2471
Slightly injured in action	18	424
	<u>205</u>	<u>3848</u>
Total Casualties.....	4053	

12. A total of 1757 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

13. During the period from 1 November to 30 November 1944, a total of 170 officers and 4754 enlisted man replacements were received.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

14. Strength; 1 November 1944 30 November 1944

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 November 1944			30 November 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	58	8	135/75	45	7	130/14
8th Inf	170	3	3081/78	155	5	2899
12th Inf	159	5	3065/75	139	4	2714
22d Inf	162	5	3050/75	141	4	2849
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	19	2	122	19	2	122
20th FA Bn	31	2	602	31	2	592
29th FA Bn	33	2	566	32	2	551
42d FA Bn	39	2	547	30	2	519
44th FA Bn	35	2	556	28	2	533
4th Engr Combat Bn	25	3	666	23	3	588
4th Med Bn	37	1	415	34	1	397
4th Ren Tr. Mocs	6	-	145	5	-	128
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	4	2	75	4	2	77
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	167/7	4	1	162/68
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	4	-	140/6	5	-	138/4
704th Ord L Maint Co	9	-	151	8	-	147
4th QM Co	10	1	227	10	1	223
4th Sig Co	13	4	288	13	4	280
Total.....	818	42	13995	724	40	15049

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION
(Present and Absent)

4th CIC Det	4	-	12/2	4	-	12/2
Order of Battle Team No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	3	2	-	3
IPW Team No. 31 (12th Inf)	2	-	5	-	-	-
IPW Team No. 414 - VII Corps (12th Inf)	-	-	-	1	-	-
IPW Team No. 44 - VII Corps (12th Inf)	-	-	-	-	-	2
IPW Team No. 36 (22d Inf)	2	-	5	2	-	5
PI Team No. 31	1	-	3	1	-	4
MI Team No. 417-G	2	-	4	2	-	5
Air Support Party	1	-	8	1	-	6
Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	-	3	1	-	4
70th Tank B	41	3	684	40	3	664
377th AAA (AV) Bn	36	3	761	36	3	757
801st TD Bn	33	2	737	-	-	-
805d TD Bn	-	-	-	38	1	597
Total.....	126	8	2227	129	7	2061
Grand Total	944	50	16225	853	47	16110

H. W. Blakeley
 H. W. BLAKELEY,
 Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1. 1 November 1944. Eleven civilians were permitted to return to the town of Hunningen in order to take care of livestock. These civilians were selected by the office of the Military Government, Malmédy. However, upon checking these people it was determined that eight of the eleven were deemed unreliable and Pro-Nazi. It was further determined that the man designated to select these individuals was one Peter Christian, formerly a Blockleiter. Personnel of the 205th CIC Detachment, Malmédy, informed this detachment that they had not been contacted nor did they know that these additional people had returned to Hunningen. These persons were all returned to Malmédy.

2. 2 November 1944. Albert Dafaaz, of Spa, Identity Card No. 23753, was stopped in the division area. He had a pass signed by John W. Mowinkel, 2d Lieutenant, 12th Army Group. This pass, however, expired 012400A November 1944. A new pass was issued the subject to return to Spa by way of Malmédy. This pass expired 022400A November 1944. It is recommended that when higher headquarters wish either civilian or military personnel to circulate in a division area, that they be identified at Division Headquarters. Passes signed by unknown military personnel cannot be honored in the vicinity of the enemy lines.

3. 3 November 1944. The following information was reported to CIC, 205th Detachment: Sgt Maj Duparques, Gendarms from St. Vith, reported that one Bertha Berens, now believed living in Trois Points, had close relations with a Feldwebel of the Feldgendarmerie during the past four years. During this time, subject was particularly friendly with Rosa Peters, who was recently arrested by the Gendarmerie. Rosa Peters had been working for a Gestapo Commissar named Romrath, attached to Gestapo Headquarters in Cologne. It has been proven by Belgian officials that Rosa Peters had sold at least twenty persons to the Gestapo and that it is believed that Bertha Berens had worked for Rosa Peters.

4. 4-6 November 1944. Motor patrols were made within the division area and all civilians encountered were found to have on their person proper passes and identity papers.

5. 7 November 1944. The Division CP was moved to the town of Zweifall. The local Burgemeister was contacted and an office was set up in the town.

6. 8 November 1944. A list of 1040 inhabitants of the town was received from the Burgemeister. Two hundred and fifty persons were screened by agents of this detachment. As this town was formerly worked over by the 9th and 28th Divisions, the possibility of additional information, either of tactical value or Counter Intelligence value was remote.

7. 9 November 1944. Agents continued the security survey started the previous day. Also security checks were made at all 4th Infantry Division CPs to ascertain that the guard system was adequate. Officers

in charge of these CP installations were reminded to be sure to identify all visiting officers prior to permitting them to obtain pertinent military information. All these CPs that were checked were located in the town of Zweifall.

8. 10 November 1944. Agents completed the survey started two days ago. Of the one thousand and forty people contacted, approximately three hundred were evacuees from other towns. There are approximately thirty former members of the Nazi Party living in the locality, but all Party leaders have fled. Fifteen former German soldiers are likewise living in the area.

9. 11 November 1944. Two former German soldiers, discharged from the German Army because of physical disability, but apparently from exterior appearances in good health, were apprehended and conducted to the Division Medical Officer. Results of both examinations verified the German Army medical discharges of these men. One man is suffering from a heart ailment, and the other from bad eyesight which will eventually result in total blindness.

One flashing light case was reported by a Security Guard, but investigation determined that a small child had carried a light upstairs in a house and there was a leak in the blackout-curtain.

10. 12 November 1944. Spot checks of civilian movement throughout the area were made. All civilians encountered were found to have proper identification and no one was apprehended. Further check was made to see that all blackout and curfew regulations were enforced.

11. 13 November 1944. Agents of this detachment made a survey of the town of Bend, Kreis Monschau. The local Burgermeister stated that the normal population is thirty-two, but there are fifty refugees in the town at present. No one was apprehended.

12. 14 November 1944. Agents of this detachment checked seven observation posts (towers) in the division area. It was determined that six of these towers are being used at the present time by our troops and, although the seventh one is not being used, there is a CP located at the base of it and it is well protected.

13. 15 November 1944. The S-2 of the 951st Field Artillery Unit detained a woman in the vicinity of one of the gun positions. Investigation revealed that the woman, Mrs. Elise Jentgens, is the owner of the property, and came to see if the area was available to grass her cows. Subject is seventy-eight years old. She was escorted to her home and placed in the custody of her son and daughter-in-law.

A flashing light case was reported but investigation proved negative.

14. 16 November 1944. A Remington Rifle '03 was found in a hay loft at 151 Sahart Strasse, Zweifall. The owner of this home, Hubert Herger, and his wife, had left for the German interior a day before the American troops arrived. Investigation revealed that Hubert Krott, a ten year old boy, claimed that he found a rifle about three weeks previous and

had left it where he found it. No further action was deemed necessary.

Mrs. Kaethe Seider, living at 141 Schart Street, Zweifall, was reported to this office as being a former member of the German Army, although she had not registered as such. Upon being questioned, subject admitted she was in the Army from March 1943 to April 1944, but had lost her discharge papers. A thorough search of the house revealed correspondence that proved she had been discharged and nothing could be found indicating subject's membership in the Nazi Party. Since definite proof of subject's discharge was obtained, further investigation is deemed unnecessary.

15. 17 November 1944. Road patrols were sent out to interrogate both civilians and soldiers. No civilians were apprehended nor were there any soldiers wandering in this area on other than official business.

16. 18 November 1944. Peter Jouhsen and Bernard Jousen, both evacuees from the town of Mausbach and presently living in Friesenrath, were picked up by personnel of the 4th Infantry Division and turned over to this office. They had violated civilian travel restrictions by walking three kilometers beyond the town limits. Both of these men had identification papers issued by the Military Government town detachment at Waltheimer, but had no authority to travel. Therefore, they were turned over to the detachment at Waltheimer for proper disposition.

17. 19 November 1944. Aloysius Kelschgens, acting Burgermeister of Bend, and Wilhelm Savelberg, of the same town, were apprehended in the town of Bend because of suspicious actions in area of military installations, and were turned over to this office. As a protective measure, it was decided to hold these men at the Division PW Cage until our troops have moved forward.

18. 20-25 November 1944. Road patrols were sent out to interrogate both civilians and soldiers. No civilians were apprehended nor were there any soldiers wandering in this area on other than official business.

19. 26 November 1944. Agents of this detachment attended each of the three religious services held for the civilian population of this town. Catholic Mass was held at 0800 and 1000 and Protestant services at 1100. No sermon was rendered at the 0800 Mass and the sermons at the other services were all confined to religious topics and nothing was said that could be construed as being detrimental to our cause.

20. 27 November 1944. Gibert Emilo, of St. Etienne Loire, a French prisoner of war of the Germans, who escaped into our lines, was questioned and stated that he had never been approached by Germans to carry out missions for them. The 207th CIC Detachment was notified of this man's presence and it was agreed that he be evacuated back through prisoner of war channels. His tactical information was of little importance because his trip was made during the hours of darkness.

21. 28 November 1944. Road patrols were sent out to interrogate both civilians and soldiers. No civilians were apprehended nor were there any soldiers wandering in this area on other than official business.

22. 29 November 1944. While patrolling highways agents of this detachment accosted Private Arthur Rinaldi, Company A, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, who was walking along the highway from the direction of the front. When questioned as to why he was walking away from his unit, the soldier stated that his company was attacked by the enemy and during the battle he became separated from his unit. Subject could not give the name of his commanding officer, nor the code name of the regiment, declaring that he was a recent replacement of two weeks age and was not with the outfit long enough to get acquainted. Subject was carrying dog tags and the soldiers' pay book and upon completion of interrogation by GIC, he was turned over to the Provost Marshal's Office for disposition.

23. 30 November 1944. The town of Grosshau (052382) was entered and a search for documents made. No papers of any importance were obtained. The town itself has suffered extreme damage with practically no building at all intact. There were no civilians whatever in the vicinity.

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ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 November to 30 November 1944.

2. The team has continued to function in close coordination with the G-2 Section in addition to its regular duties of keeping a duplicate of the G-2 Order of Battle situation map, receiving and processing all captured documents, keeping an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities and any other additional information necessary, of translating documents, performing interrogations, acting as interpreters whenever necessary and assisting in editing the IPW report of the G-2 Periodic Report.

3. Our increased activity in this new zone of action resulted in a large turnover in enemy units. As each new enemy division was committed, it would be rapidly depleted and another division committed, usually incorporating the remnants of the previous division. Such was the case with the 275 Infantry Division, elements of the 89 Infantry Division, the 91 Infantry Division, renamed the 344 Infantry Division, and last the 353 Infantry Division.

4. The interrogation of prisoners of war resulted in clearing up what might have been a rather jumbled picture of the enemy's composition and disposition. A number of documents of tactical importance were processed, the information disseminated and the documents forwarded on to higher echelon. Most notable was a well written and revealing diary by a German medical first-aid soldier. The enemy continued to employ second class troops in our sector who offered stubborn resistance, however, and gained much needed time to construct additional defenses in front of and behind the Rhine. The average German soldier, tired and weary of this long drawn out war, continues to give a wealth of tactical information.

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ANNEX C - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31

1. Operations of the Photo Interpreters Team No. 31 during the period 1 November to 30 November 1944 consisted of the following:

a. During this month a number of good sorties were received even though weather conditions were not favorable.

b. A defense map showing information and the date of information from aerial photographs was maintained. Overlays were distributed to units of the division giving information as of 7, 9, 10, and 19 November 1944.

c. Photo maps covering the division zone of action were prepared by this team and lithographed in sufficient quantity for distribution to platoons. These proved to be very useful to the front line troops.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179
(Cov 2)

48 ✓



Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div.
Unit: 23
Date: 10 January 1945

OPR
65-1

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

AG 519.1

10 January 1945.

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SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.
TO: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, DC
THRU: Command Channels.

**DOWNGRADED TO:
CLASSIFICATION REMOVED**
OF AUTHORITY OF TAG, IHS

Section I	- Authority	<u>11 Dec 45</u>	<u>MSD</u>
Section II	- Introduction	<u>Date</u>	<u>Initials</u>
Section III	- Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)		
Section IV	- Operations		
Section V	- Supply and Evacuation		

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C4), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 December to 31 December 1944.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Larr, 015447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 0287628, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, 0302390, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, 0375431, GSC

Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeley, 07237, USA, assumed command of the division on 27 December 1944.

Colonel James S. Rodwell, 09663, Cav, Assistant Division Commander, was promoted to Brigadier General, USA, 7 December 1944.

Colonel Richard T. Guthrie, 05539, FA, assumed command of the 4th Division Artillery, 28 December 1944.

1. At the beginning of this month the Division Forward CP was located at Zweisalf, Germany (K-953363), and the combat elements of the division remained engaged in bitter combat in the Hurtgen Forest, Germany.

2. 1 - 3 December 1944. The reinforcement problem was critical. The strength of the three regiments was considerably depleted. In spite of every effort to secure reinforcements, the casualty rate was in excess of new men received. Throughout the entire month the rebuilding of combat

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Sec II - Introduction, Contd

units around the newly acquired keymen was of utmost importance.

3. 4 December 1944. A directive was received from First United States Army, stating conditions under which officers and enlisted men could be returned to the United States for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery. Only individuals who had been wounded and hospitalized twice for wounds received in action were eligible. They were to be gone approximately ninety (90) days which included thirty (30) days at home for rest and recuperation. The division Adjutant General and unit Personnel Officers were notified and every effort was made to secure the names of men in this category.

4. 6 December 1944. A meeting of Regimental S-1s was called by the AC of S, G-1 to mitigate personnel problems, and to make final arrangements for the departure of officers and enlisted men on detached service to the United States. The list of six (6) officers and sixty-three (63) enlisted men eligible for detached service to the United States was prepared after comparison of lists submitted by unit S-1s. The men came from the following units:

	O	EM	
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	-	-	1 (Formerly 8th Inf)
8th Inf	-	3	17
12th Inf	-	-	20
22d Inf	-	2	19
70th Tank Bn	-	1	6
		<u>6</u>	<u>63</u>

The Commanding General awarded the Silver Star to one officer and one enlisted man of the 70th Tank Battalion.

Preparations were made for the division to move out of the Hurtgen Forest. The division was to be relieved by another unit and move into a quieter sector of the line to allow the men a rest and bring the regiments up to T/O and T/E strength. Because of the heavy casualties suffered by the infantry regiments during the Hurtgen Forest engagement, the task of bringing the division back to its fighting strength was foremost.

5. 7 December 1944. The distance the division was being moved necessitated transfer from VII Corps to VIII Corps this date.

6. 8 December 1944. Forward Division CP moved to new location in Luxembourg (P-849118).

Upon arrival in a comparatively quiet sector of the line, every effort was made to allow officers and men to take advantage of rest centers and recreation facilities provided by VIII Corps.

7. 9 December 1944. The AC of S, G-1 made preparations for officers and men to leave on pass, contacting units and giving them all information necessary to prepare selected personnel to depart. Pass quotas were obtained from VIII Corps for Paris, France; Arlon and Brussels, Belgium; and London, England. The passes to Paris and to the VIII Corps Recreation Center at Arlon were allocated to the separate and attached units according to strength. Brussels and London passes were for Field Grade

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

officers, and were utilized to provide an opportunity for Staff and Unit Commanders to rest.

8. 11 December 1944. The AC of S, G-1 Section was occupied with making arrangements for personnel to leave on pass and passing judgment on awards and decorations.

9. 12 December 1944. S-1s were contacted and instructed to make a special effort to rectify totals in Estimated Loss Reports to date, especially in the Missing in Action totals. The density of mine fields, intensity of enemy artillery fire and isolated conditions of Hurtgen Forest were responsible for drastic rise in the number of men missing in action. As the fight progressed the status of many men listed as missing had been established - a great number of them had been killed.

The AC of S, G-1 visited VIII Corps to make arrangements to secure Red Cross Clubmobiles for the division. Preliminary arrangements were also made with the Special Service Officer to open a Recreation Center in Luxembourg.

10. 14 December 1944. An additional officer was attached to the AC of S, G-1 Section to assist in the work on decorations and awards.

11. 16 December 1944. The majority of the work at this time consisted of checking to determine if officers were prepared to go on pass and processing of awards and decorations.

12. 17 December 1944. Due to a drastic change in the tactical situation, notice was received from higher headquarters that all passes would be suspended indefinitely.

13. 20 December 1944. Another change was made in the status of the division when it was relieved from First United States Army and VIII Corps and assigned to Third United States Army and XII Corps. The AC of S, G-1 visited XII Corps Headquarters to pay his respects and acquaint himself with existing policies.

Due to the seriousness of the tactical situation and the under-strength of the combat teams, sixty (60) enlisted men and one (1) officer from this headquarters were sent into the line in the CT 12 sector to aid in holding the positions which were threatened by strong enemy forces.

14. 21 - 22 - 23 December 1944. Every effort was being made at this time to obtain much needed reinforcements to bring combat teams up to fighting strength. The AC of S, G-1 visited the G-1 Section, Third United States Army to expedite the delivery of the needed reinforcements for the division.

15. 24 - 25 December 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to Third United States Army and XII Corps.

On 25 December a representative of AC of S, G-1 made a trip to First United States Army to determine if the 4th Infantry Division casualties in First United States Army reinforcement system would be sent to Third United States Army to be returned to their former organizations. It was found that the process was already in motion and that the 4th

Sec II - Introduction, Contd

Infantry Division men would be returned.

16. 27 December 1944. Major General R. G. Barkon, D3401, USA, who had commanded the division since June 1942, called a meeting of all officers and enlisted men in the CP and made known the fact he was leaving the division. Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeley, 07237, USA, Commanding General, 4th Division Artillery, assumed command.

Due to changes in the tactical setup the division CP moved to a new location at Semlingen, Luxembourg (F-922171).

17. 28 December 1944. At the direction of the Commanding General action was initiated to obtain necessary information to recommend the 12th Infantry Regiment for the Presidential Citation.

Directive was received from European Theater of Operations, United States Army, that new men coming into units would no longer be called replacements but would be known hereafter as reinforcements.

18. 29 - 30 December 1944. Upon being informed by AC of S, G-1, XII Corps, that excess Field Artillery enlisted men were to be transferred, the Field Artillery Battalion S-1s were contacted and directed to submit names of men they wished to release. A total of 200 enlisted men were transferred from the four (4) Field Artillery Battalions to the Third United States Army, Ground Force Reinforcement System.

19. 31 December 1944. The G-1 Periodic Report submitted to Third United States Army and XII Corps.

The Estimated Loss Report was telephoned nightly first to VII Corps, then VIII Corps and lastly to XII Corps, a reflection of the change necessitated by the tactical developments.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 December 1944. Before CT 8 the enemy defended along the line F-050432 - F-055427 - F-051424. From this point to F-060403 the line was not firmly established. South of this point our positions were along a line directly south of Gey at which point considerable activity was observed during the period. Against CT 22 in our southern zone the enemy opposed on a line F-064395 to F-072388. The enemy continued to employ well dug-in defensive positions combined with increased infiltration tactics wherein fairly large groups of Germans would lie concealed until our attack by-passed them. Immediately a well planned counterattack would smash at our flanks and rear. Units in contact were elements of 353 Infantry Division, 91 Infantry Division, 275 Infantry Division, and 20 GAF Battalion.

2. 2 December 1944. The enemy employed his well emplaced positions and utilized excellent fields of fire which, although covering all avenues of approach were undetectable from the attack point of view. The line of defense was F-062434 - F-066430 - F-059427 thence generally south-west to F-067407. Our troops hold the high ground west of Gey along the edge of the woods. Against CT 22 the enemy defended the line F-066395 -

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

F-072390 - F-070383 - F-065380. The enemy received reinforcements during the night so that our advances were vigorously contested by comparatively fresh troops. At 0615 a counterattack was launched by the 1st Battalion, 945 Infantry Regiment of the 353 Infantry Division. This attack was swift, coordinated, and well planned, the objective being to retake the high ground vicinity F-068385. The counterattack was eventually repulsed and the line restored. Artillery fire was moderate and was augmented by fire from self-propelled assault guns. Units in contact remained the same.

3. 3 December 1944. The enemy front as determined by captured maps and an overlay was along the line F-059437 - F-058432 - F-057428 - F-060422 - F-063423. Against CT 12 the enemy situation was extremely fluid inasmuch as the entire period was characterized in the sector by numerous counterattacks of varying size. At the close of the period the enemy held small pockets of resistance at F-065399 - F-056404 - and F-061409. Against CT 22 the enemy line remained the same. The enemy defended from camouflaged strong points in the northern sector. In the center and along the southern part of our zone the enemy continued to counterattack in approximately the same places and about the same time as in the previous period. One of these attacks launched against CT 8 was made up of men of the 2d Company, 8th Para Regiment. The attack was vigorous and was only thrown back after a lively fight. The mission of this unit was to restore the line previously held by the infantry which had been pushed back by our attacks during the previous two days. During the hours of darkness, the 2d Battalion, 991 Regiment moved from the vicinity 079407, which they had occupied since 1 December, down the road into Gey and then struck northeast with the mission of retaking the high ground west of Gey which was held by CT 12. After our outpost line had exchanged hands several times during the day, the period closed with a portion of that area still in the possession of the enemy. All other attempts by the enemy were repulsed and our line remained intact. The 8th Para Regiment of the 3d Para Division and the 991 Regiment of the 272 Infantry Division were newly contacted by the 4th Infantry Division.

4. 4 December 1944. The enemy was forced back to a line east of F-056421 by CT 8. Against CT 12, the enemy line remained unchanged; only one pocket of resistance remained at F-055401. Late in the period the enemy was reported concentrating at F-066401. In the area occupied by CT 330 which relieved CT 22, the enemy defended the line F-065395 - F-072390 - F-074385 - F-070383 - F-065380. CT 8 in attacking southwest, caught the enemy defending against an eastward thrust. In turning the enemy's right flank CT 8 succeeded in routing the 2d Battalion, 942 Infantry Regiment and the 353 Fusilier Battalion, causing many casualties to the enemy. Against CT 12 the enemy remained wholly defensive while our attack there resulted in complete restoration of that portion of our outpost line held by the enemy at the close of the previous period. Artillery fire which had been normal during the period showed an increase in the CT 12 sector towards the end of the day and early evening. Out of five enemy planes which appeared over the area, only one took offensive action when a portion of CT 12's area was strafed. One enemy aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Units in contact remained the same.

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

5. 5 December 1944. Against CT B and CT 330 the enemy line remained unchanged. CT 12 cleared all remaining pockets of resistance in its area and closed the period with front lines at F-054414 - F-060409 - F-063404 - F-055410 - F-060395. The enemy remained for the most part on the defensive being content to harass our front lines with heavy artillery and mortar fire. At 0645 an unusually heavy artillery concentration on the front lines of CT 330 was followed by a counterattack by the 2d and 3d Companies, 981 Infantry Regiment. This attempt was repulsed with losses to the enemy. Between three and five enemy aircraft operated over the division area during the period. These planes were identified as FW 190s and ME 109s. Only one bomb was dropped by these aircraft in vicinity F-017409. Units in contact remained unchanged.

6. 6 December 1944. Except for a ten man patrol which contacted CT 8, the enemy contented himself with defending the line held during the previous period. Artillery and mortar concentrations on front line elements were heavy and constant, especially during the hours of darkness. Enemy aircraft were over the area but restricted their activity to dropping several flares. No new units were identified opposing in the 4th Infantry Division sector.

7. 7 December 1944. All units of the 4th Infantry Division were engaged in closing in old zone of action and opening in new area. Contact with the enemy was entirely of a defensive nature.

8. 8 December 1944. The enemy front lines existed generally along the east bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers from L-0410 to U-9895. There was an enemy pocket west of the Sauer River east of the line L-080655 to L-120335. In addition, a stronghold of about fifty men was in the vicinity of Born (L-1229). The area in and around Wasserbillig was occupied by enemy troops. The enemy defended the above line by utilizing concrete emplacements and strategically placed dug in strong points. Most emplacements were mutually supporting. Vehicular activity was detected moving south on the Bitburg-Trier Road. An occasional round of artillery fell in CT 22's sector during the period. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division were elements of 212 Infantry Division, 777 Land Battalion, 999 Panzer Regiment, and 58 Machine Gun Battalion. A possibility of a panzer formation in the vicinity of Bitburg and Wittlich was reported by high headquarters as a force capable of intervention.

9. 9 December 1944. Enemy activity was restricted to fifteen rounds of artillery which fell at various times throughout the division area. Enemy front lines and units opposing remained unchanged.

10. 10 December 1944. The enemy continued to defend from the same positions showing little desire to engage our troops either with artillery or with patrol activity. In the southern sector at L-058132 smoke was laid down by the enemy but air observation posts reported no further action by the enemy in this sector. Units opposed remained unchanged. Enemy planes were reported at high altitude at about 2100. No action was taken by these aircraft.

11. 11 December 1944. Small exchanges of artillery were experienced during the period as the enemy continued to improve his defensive line.

12. 12 December 1944. A small amount of shelling formed the only action initiated by the enemy during this period. Units in contact remained unchanged.

13. 13 December 1944. The enemy remained defensive during the period as a small amount of harassing artillery was employed by him against road intersections and likely main supply roads.

14. 14 December 1944. The defensive attitude of the enemy was continuous and harassing. Artillery fire continued to fall on likely terrain features and road nets.

15. 15 December 1944. Some long range machine gun fire combined with the usual amount of harassing artillery fire was employed by the enemy as he continued to remain on the defensive, east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. One enemy plane dropped a bomb at L-067206. This was the only offensive action taken by enemy aircraft during the period.

16. 16 December 1944. Against CT 8 and CT 22 the enemy remained defensive. Against CT 12, the enemy crossed the Sauer River in strength and succeeded in infiltrating to the vicinity of the following towns - Berdorf (L-0037), Lauterborn (L-0334), Osweiler (L-0633), and Dickweiler (L-0932). Eohternach (L-0536) was believed completely surrounded. Deepest penetration reported was on a line L-065308 to L-076315. After a very heavy artillery preparation in the area occupied by CT 12, the enemy attacked Berdorf (L-0037) with a company of infantry armed with automatic weapons. At about the same time he attacked Lauterborn (L-0334), Dickweiler (L-0932), Osweiler (L-0633), and Eohternach (L-0536) in each case using encircling movements. At Eohternach the enemy captured one of our light machine guns and nine men at 1100, the rest of the unit was out of contact and was believed to be surrounded. An estimated 200 enemy troops cut off our force in Osweiler. At the close of the period Dickweiler was reported to have enemy on all four sides. At the same time the enemy was reported holding the high ground east and west of Berdorf.

17. 17 December 1944. Against CT 22 and CT 8 the enemy remained on the defensive east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. In CT 12's area, enemy units were in the vicinity L-063328 - L-072333 - L-075327 - and L-087330. At Scheidgen (L-008325), and Illertal (L-975330) enemy forces in contact were estimated to be about two hundred men in each place. The towns of Osweiler and Dickweiler were reported clear of enemy and communication was reestablished with our forces in those places. Eohternach remained surrounded but our troops in the town still held out. Enemy units opposing were elements of the 423 and 320 Regiments of the 212 VG Division.

18. 18 December 1944. The enemy's actions opposite CT 22 and CT 8 remained wholly defensive. The Humpach (L-0828) and Lalling (L-0625) areas received continuous harassing fire throughout the period. Against CT 12 the penetrations of the enemy were all met and contained, and in several places the enemy was driven back. The only new threat during this period came from an estimated company of enemy moving on Dickweiler from Girst. This attack was repulsed and the enemy forced to withdraw towards Girst. The enemy was also forced to withdraw in the Dickweiler

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

and Osweiler area and the two towns have been secured by our troops. The 2d Battalion of the 316 Infantry Regiment was forced out of Scheidgen and caused to withdraw northeast along the road to Echternach. In the vicinity of Mullerthal the enemy was forced to withdraw slightly back along the draw during which the original penetration was made. In the town of Echternach the enemy still kept our forces out off. Our garrison there, however, was still holding against enemy attempts to dislodge it from the town. Enemy attempts to reinforce his troops which crossed the Sauer River were almost entirely frustrated. The 987 Regiment of the 276 VG Division was contacted for the first time in the 4th Infantry Division zone of action. Other units opposed remained the same.

19. 19 December 1944. Opposite CT 8 and CT 22 enemy front lines did not change during the period. In the area occupied by CT 12 enemy front lines continued to be fluid. At the close of the period the 1st Battalion, 423 Regiment was in the outskirts of Berdorf. A force estimated to be the 2d Battalion of the 316 Regiment held Hill 329 at L-026358. Another force which was estimated to be the 987 Regiment, 276 VG Division, was in contact with our troops in the vicinity P-975334. Four hundred enemy troops in the wooded draw at L-054327 were considered to be the remainder of the 320 Regiment. The situation at Echternach was somewhat clarified and it is believed that the enemy in this vicinity was the 2d Battalion, 423 Regiment. Troops of the 999 Penal Regiment were located in the draw at L-100309. Throughout the northern part of the division's zone of action the enemy continued aggressive throughout the period although no notable progress was made by him except in the vicinity of Consdorf (995323) where the road to Berdorf was cut by patrols from the draw to the west. Three of our tanks were immobilized by bazooka fire on this road and at dark small arms fire was reported coming into Consdorf. The heaviest fighting was from Hill 329 where the enemy estimated as one battalion were reported to be well dug in. Throughout the period enemy troops were reported moving across the Sauer River from Linden (L-090368) to Steinheim (L-097363) reinforcing the enemy forces in and around Echternach. Late in the period it was reported that approximately six tanks and an unknown number of enemy troops were crossing the river and were in the vicinity of Echternach. Bridges were believed to be located at L-020390 and L-068358 and in the vicinity of Linden. A number of small boats were reported along the river in front of CT 12. Our forces holding out in Echternach were contacted during the period and resupplied.

20. 20 December 1944. The enemy remained in position east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers opposite CT 8 and CT 22. Against CT 12 the enemy occupied dug in positions at L-062329 - L-102315 - L-112324 - L-094302 - L-013317 and P-982331. A small trench was reported at L-050327. The Germans attacked in the vicinity L-045348 and were checked and thrown back. Units in contact remained the same. Some reports were received of enemy tanks being moved into the vicinity of Berdorf - Echternach.

21. 21 December 1944. In front of CT 8 and CT 22 the enemy continued to remain on the defensive east of the rivers. The enemy held a line before CT 12 which ran generally from P-958338 - P-975332 - P-996338 -

Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

L-024339 - L-017320 - L-050328 - L-059331 - L-055325 - L-100305. The enemy made several attacks in strength against our troops. At 1545 an estimated 380 enemy attacked in the vicinity of Scheidgen. This attack was contained and the enemy appeared to fan out north of the town. Two hundred enemy troops were reported moving southeast in the draw at L-008342. Our troops were engaged in very heavy fighting at L-058330 where the enemy were supported by tanks or assault guns. In the vicinity P-973338, the enemy was contained and was unable to improve his positions. Several attempts were made by the enemy to take the hill at L-023327. None were successful. Our troops in Echternach were completely cut off and there was no communication with them. Units in contact remained the same as in the previous period.

22. 22 December 1944. Enemy front lines extended generally from the vicinity of Mullerthal to the vicinity of Scheidgen to Osweiler, Dickweiler, thence southeast to the Sauer River. Throughout the rest of the division zone of action there was no change in the enemy lines. In the sector of the German penetrations the activity during the morning was very much limited but beginning at about 1330 an attack by about 400 troops was launched against Scheidgen from the north. This attack was stopped and the enemy appeared to be digging in. At about this same time troops of CT 10 passed through CT 12 and advanced with little opposition to the vicinity L-020323 and L-027323 where their right battalion made contact. At about 1540 a rifle man enemy patrol approached Osweiler. There the enemy were allowed to come in close and then killed. Units in contact were 816, 320, and 423 Regiments of the 212 VG Division, 987 Regiment of the 276 VG Division, and 999 Penal Battalion.

23. 23 December 1944. The enemy's front lines extended generally from the vicinity Waldbillig, Mullerthal, Meliohschech, Osweiler, Dickweiler, thence southeast to the vicinity of the Sauer and Moselle junction. The enemy employed his hastily constructed defenses to prevent our throwing back his penetrations. Strong patrols moved forward of this defensive line.

24. 24 December 1944. Elements of the 5th Infantry Division passed through our units in the northern sector. Throughout the remainder of the sector enemy front lines did not change. The enemy remained defensive with some small patrol activity reported in the vicinity of Mullerthal, Osweiler, and Dickweiler. Units in contact were elements of the 212 VG Division and the 999 Penal Battalion.

25. 25 December 1944. The enemy showed little aggressive activity during the period. He continued to defend his outpost line and improve his defensive positions west of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers and his main line east of the rivers. Some patrol activity was reported in CT 22's sector. At about 1030, two P-47s with yellow markings on cowling and tail strafed southwest and northwest of P-953282. Six bombs were dropped in the vicinity of Spullingen at 241930A December 1944.

26. 26 December 1944. The enemy continued his nonaggressive policy. The outpost line west of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers was maintained and improved. Planes believed to be P-47s strafed in the vicinity of Horborn and Osweiler. Units in contact remained unchanged.

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27. 27 December 1944. No aggressive ground activity was employed by the enemy but he maintained good observation posts and employed patrols in an effort to determine our strength and disposition. Artillery was light. Several planes were over the area during darkness but the only offensive action taken was the strafing of Roodt (9819). Units in contact remained the same.

28. 28 December 1944. The enemy continued to outpost west of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers while maintaining his main defensive strength on the east bank of the rivers. Friendly patrols entering Girsterklaus (L-1032) and Wasserbillig (1124) were engaged by enemy forces at these two points. Artillery was light and other than a single strafing in the vicinity L-047333 no air action was reported.

29. 29 December 1944. The outposts of the enemy were maintained west of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers while strategic strongpoints east of the rivers were occupied and improved. The enemy abandoned his defense of the Girsterklaus area and our patrols moved quite freely in that area. No aggressive action was taken on the part of enemy aircraft during this period.

30. 30 December 1944. Other than the small force holding the Wasserbillig area and likewise small patrols which operated forward of his outposts, the enemy continued to maintain his defensive strength east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Artillery fire was scattered and harassing. Two enemy planes strafed south of Olingen at 1000. Units in contact remained unchanged.

31. 31 December 1944. Enemy activity during this period was almost nonexistent. There was some light harassing artillery and a few small patrols operated slightly north of Wasserbillig. Our patrols crossing the rivers reported the enemy defenses there quite formidable. They consisted of fox holes, dug in machine emplacements, double apron barbed wire fences and numerous trenches dug into strategic ground. No offensive action was taken on the part of enemy aircraft. Units in contact remained the same.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division continued to attack to the east and northeast against heavy enemy resistance. Important terrain features were captured during the day's operations that proved vital in the planning for our attack on 2 December to secure objectives in the vicinity of F-062433, the town of Gey (F-0739), Stras (F-0739), and the high ground in the vicinity of F-070376. A total of 128 prisoners of war were taken.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, less one platoon; 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company C, 87th Chemical Battalion, attached, attacked at 0815 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, and endeavored to drive the enemy from well dug in

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

positions from which he was employing small arms and machine gun fire to the greatest advantage. By 1015, both battalions had encountered enemy mine fields, both antipersonnel and antitank, and small arms fire within the regimental sector was described as the worst that had been encountered on this front.

At 1200 the 3d Battalion was committed between the 1st and 2d Battalions and simultaneously the 2d Battalion endeavored to flank the enemy positions from the north. By 1445 the 1st and 2d Battalions had cleared most of the mine fields and reported that the enemy now seemed to be softening up somewhat. Company C had advanced to the vicinity of F-054429 at which point they were considered to be through the enemy's main line of resistance. Further advances were not evidenced by nightfall and preparations were begun for continuance of the attack on the following day.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B and Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company D, 87th Chemical Battalion, attached, moved out at 0900 to seize the line of departure from the vicinity of F-062408 to F-065394 in preparation for the attack with the 1st and 2d Battalions on Goy. Their progress was very slow throughout the day; the attacking battalions encountering many strong points and heavy artillery fire. At 1115, the 1st Battalion reported that the enemy in an estimated strength of one platoon had infiltrated from the northeast, attacked the 1st Battalion CP, and severed lines of communication but by 1330 this force was eliminated and communications restored. By 1500, the 1st and 2d Battalions succeeded in reaching the high ground overlooking Goy and were bringing up supporting weapons after eliminating several enemy strong points.

The 22d Infantry, with the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion of CC "A", 5th Armored Division; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 709th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 803 Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, moved into the attack at 0835. By 1000, the 3d Battalion had reached its objective in the vicinity of F-065393 and was proceeding to dig in. In the interim, the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry were making very slow progress against heavy resistance consisting of small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire.

At 1100, the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was ordered to withdraw to the hill in the vicinity of F-06537 to the positions they had occupied on the previous night. The 1st Battalion had been committed between the 2d and 3d Battalions with the mission of advancing and attacking southeast in front of the 2d Battalion to relieve the pressure in this vicinity.

The general advance made by the regiment was slow throughout the day and the resistance encountered was considered extremely heavy especially on the right flank, but the 1st and 3d Battalions had reached positions from which they could support by fire the attack on Goy and Stras. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was detached from the 22d Infantry and reverted to control of CC "A" of the 5th Armored Division at the close of the period.

During the day's operations, the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop) with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

attached continued to maintain road blocks within the division zone of action and maintained contact between all attacking echelons.

2. 2 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division once again continued its attack and made considerable advances in the northern part of its zone of action. The enemy continued to defend from well dug in positions which made our advance both slow and costly. In the southern part of our sector, a number of counterattacks were repulsed during the period and the majority of the time was spent in clearing the enemy from rear areas and in readjusting front lines.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as noted previously, attacked with the 2d Battalion at 0830 and with the 1st and 3d Battalions at 0900 to seize its objective in the vicinity of F-062432.

All battalions moved forward slowly throughout the day against heavy resistance consisting of many well dug in automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars. All roads and trails were reported as being thoroughly mined by the enemy. The terrain over which the Combat Team had to pass was thickly wooded and unusually rough, but by 1300 Companies A, C, and K had effected a penetration of the enemy's defenses which was immediately exploited to push these units forward. At 1600 hours, it was necessary to consolidate all gains that were made in preparation for continuation of the attack on 3 December.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attached units as previously mentioned, reported at 0830 that a counterattack by enemy infantry was being launched against Company B. At 0845, the enemy had been completely stopped in the 1st Battalion area, and his patrol that had attempted to infiltrate from the north behind Company C had been stopped by small arms fire.

At 1000 hours, the Combat Team was ordered to attack with the 2d Battalion to reach the edge of the woods in the vicinity of F-063385 and to make contact with the 22d Infantry. By 1315, the 2d Battalion had reached its objective and was consolidating. By 1700, the 1st and 2d Battalions were consolidated upon their objectives and had cleared out all infiltrating enemy from their rear areas. In the interim, the 3d Battalion had initiated movement to the vicinity of F-045395 and closed therein by 1140.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as mentioned on the previous day, less the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, reported at 0655 that it was receiving a fairly strong counterattack between the 1st and 3d Battalions. By 0845, the enemy had succeeded in lightly penetrating the front line positions and had reached the rear areas at which time the regimental reserve was committed. By 1010, Companies K and L had reestablished contact and were mopping up. The situation was reported to be well in hand and by 1300 the counterattack was considered to have been repulsed. Before darkness fell, contact had been reestablished between all units and with the 12th Infantry on the left. All enemy had been cleared from the rear areas and units were consolidating in position for the night.

3. 3 December 1944. On 3 December, the 4th Infantry Division was successful in repelling a series of counterattacks and in maintaining its positions. The supporting antiaircraft within the division zone of action brought down a large number of enemy aircraft, and Combat Team

Sec IV .. Operations, Contd

330 from the 83d Infantry Division had completed relief of the 22d Infantry by 1900.

The 8th Infantry, with no change in attachments, suffered extremely heavy concentrations of artillery fire just prior to the time scheduled for the continuation of the attack at 0900, and it was apparent that the enemy likewise had planned an attack. However, the numerous small infantry actions that took place throughout the period resulted in smashing his attempt to counterattack us, but at the same time prevented us from gaining considerable terrain.

The 8th Infantry was ordered to consolidate its present position on the most favorable terrain and to mop up the enemy forces which had infiltrated around the right flank of the 8th Infantry. The 2d Battalion was assembled in the vicinity of F-044424 and the 3d Battalion took over in their positions.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attached units, remained on the defense throughout the day. At 0850, it was reported that enemy was infiltrating around the west flank of Company B and contacting outposts of Company G. This action caused Company G to withdraw to the vicinity of F-061399, but one platoon of Company L was placed in support of Company G and the lost ground was regained. This see-saw action continued until at 1700 this unit had been forced back to the vicinity of F-060398. The balance of the regimental front line remained more or less static, and numerous prisoners of war were taken during the day.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as previously mentioned, less Company G, 709th Tank Battalion which had been detached at 022400A December 1944, remained in its defensive positions until 1150 at which time elements of the 330th Infantry Regiment initiated their relief. In the interim, the 1st Battalion successfully repulsed a counterattack which had been launched at 0930. By 1900, the entire relief had been effected and the regiment moved to its new assembly area in the vicinity of F-001399, closing therein shortly after the close of the period. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions had been replaced in line by the 1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions of the 330th Infantry Regiment respectively.

4. 4 December 1944. On 4 December, the division continued to maintain its positions and mop up pockets of enemy resistance between the infantry regiments. The 22d Infantry, having been relieved on the previous day, moved from the present division sector to new assembly areas in the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg.

The 8th Infantry, with previously attached units, attacked to the south at 1630 with elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions to clear enemy pockets of resistance between their present positions and the regimental right (south) boundary. Contact was made with the enemy in the vicinity of F-054420 at 1130, and a small arms fire fight ensued. The attack progressed to the objective in the vicinity of the boundary and the enemy pocket was successfully liquidated, yielding a few prisoners and some enemy equipment. The attacking units returned to positions formerly held and the newly cleared area was outposted by elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron prior to the close of the period. The remainder of the regimental front had remained static throughout the day.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attached units, launched an

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

attack with its 3d Battalion to the northeast to clear enemy pockets of resistance between positions then held and the regimental left (north) boundary. The attack progressed against small arms resistance throughout the period and by mid-afternoon the objectives had been reached. Company I remained in this position they had secured while the remainder of the battalion was withdrawn to an assembly area in the rear of the 1st battalion to constitute a small reserve. The terrain covered during the fight was outposted by elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

In the interim, the 1st and 2d Battalions endeavored to adjust their positions on the main line of resistance, and between 1600 and 1800 Company B was subjected to extremely intense artillery barrages which caused heavy casualties. This company was withdrawn about 200 yards for reorganization and the necessary adjustment in the line was made by elements of Companies A and C. At the close of the period, Company D of the 87th Chemical Battalion was detached and reverted to battalion control.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, accompanied by the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, initiated the movement previously mentioned beginning at 0945 at which time it passed the IF at Zweifall, Germany, enroute to new assembly areas in the vicinity of Luxembourg. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions closed at 2200, the composite battalion companies by 2300, and the remainder of the Combat Team was still enroute at the close of the day. Attachment of the entire regimental Combat Team to the 83d Infantry Division was to become effective when the final elements had closed.

CT 330 remained attached to the 4th Infantry Division during the period and improved and readjusted the former front line positions of the 22d Infantry. Sporadic artillery fire was received by front line elements but no encounter with the enemy was reported and no substantial changes in dispositions resulted.

The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued on its mission of scouting rear areas and maintaining contact between all front line elements of the division.

5, 5 December 1944. During this period, as preparations and planning continued for relief of the division in its Hurtgen Forest sector, present front lines were maintained and small groups of enemy infantry were cleared from rear areas. One enemy counterattack was repulsed by the 350th Infantry Regiment shortly after first light.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon of Company D and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, consolidated its front line positions throughout the period and maintained contact with the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the regimental left (north) flank and with elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the right. Sporadic artillery fire was received by front line elements throughout the entire period, but troop dispositions remained unchanged.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B and

Soc IV - Operations, Contd

Company H, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF) attached, adjusted front line positions on the regimental main line of resistance and continued preparations for relief of the regiment by elements of the 83d Infantry Division.

Company I advanced to the northeast during the period to clear enemy pockets of resistance from the vicinity of F-060414, and upon completion, rejoined the 3d Battalion (less Company L) in the battalion assembly area in the vicinity of F-032411. Artillery fire continued heavy in this sector throughout the period.

The 22d Infantry, with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, completed its movement to the new division zone of action in the vicinity of Luxembourg at which time the entire combat team passed to the control of the 83d Infantry Division.

The 330th Combat Team maintained and improved its front line positions throughout the day. A counterattack by an estimated 400 enemy infantry was launched shortly after first light after a heavy mortar and artillery preparation had been laid down. The assault was repulsed by Company B after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and a total of 20 prisoners of war were taken. One other enemy action occurred during the period at 1545 when a patrol of approximately 15 men attempted to turn the left (north) flank of Company B, but was repulsed and obliged to dig in in the vicinity of F-070893. All Combat Team dispositions remained unchanged despite the enemy's attempts to penetrate our positions.

6. 6 December 1944. During the period the 4th Infantry Division continued to defend its main line of resistance with three (3) regiments abreast. Intensive patrolling was conducted between units and to the front of the main line of resistance. Plans were continued for the relief of the remainder of the division by the 83d Infantry Division.

The 8th Infantry with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon of Company D and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF) attached, continued to defend its main line of resistance with the 1st and 3d Battalions on line and the 2d Battalion in Regimental Reserve. Patrols were sent out from the 1st Battalion to establish contact with the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in the vicinity of F-058421. One patrol from the 1st Battalion was sent out to determine enemy defenses and ran into occupied bunkers in the vicinity of F-059428. Through constant patrolling, the 1st and 3d Battalions maintained contact with the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the regimental and the division left (north) flank and with elements of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the right. The principal enemy action occurred when a ten man patrol advanced against the position held by the 3d Battalion at 1400 but it was driven off and no further activity was noted.

The 12th Infantry with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B and Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF) attached, continued to hold its positions on the main line of resistance and carried on preparations for the relief of the regiment by elements of the 83d Infantry Division. Light artillery fire was received throughout the day. Company B, 70th Tank Battalion was

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relieved in position by tanks from the supporting battalion of the 83d Infantry Division.

Combat Team 330 of the 83d Infantry Division maintained its position on the main line of resistance and made minor adjustments on the front. Moderate amounts of artillery fire was received throughout the day and one officer-led patrol of twenty (20) men was sent at 2330 to the vicinity of F-072377 and F-077373. This patrol was enroute at the close of the period.

In the interim, the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued to screen areas between all the divisional units and the 22d Infantry remained attached to the 83d Infantry Division in the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg.

7. 7 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division continued its defense along the division's main line of resistance with three (3) Regimental Combat Teams abreast. The relief of the 12th Infantry Regiment by the 331st Infantry Regiment of the 83d Infantry Division was completed at 1600, at which time the responsibility for this zone of action was assumed by the Commanding General of the 83d Infantry Division and effective at the same time, the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the new 4th Infantry Division zone of action fronting on the Sauer and Lieselle Rivers in the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the attachments as previously mentioned continued to defend its main line of resistance with the 1st and the 3d Battalions on line and with the 2d Battalion in Regimental Reserve. The 1st Battalion sent patrols at 0900 to the vicinity of F-053426 and the 3d Battalion dispatched one at 0930 to the vicinity of F-059437 to determine the locations of all enemy defenses. The 2d Battalion sent a reconnaissance patrol at 0900 to the vicinity of F-064424 on a similar mission but no enemy whatsoever was observed. Continuous contact was maintained with the cavalry units on the Combat Team's right and left flanks and intermittent artillery fire fell throughout the sector during the period. At 1600, the entire Combat Team passed to the control of the 83d Infantry Division in position.

The entire 12th Combat Team, composed of regimental and attached units as previously mentioned, was relieved by the 331st Infantry Regiment of the 83d Infantry Division beginning at 0800. The 3d Battalion completed its relief and closed in a temporary assembly area at 1000, the 2d Battalion at 1230, and the 1st Battalion at 1415. By 1600 the entire relief was completed, the regiment assembled, and prepared to move the following day to new regimental area in the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg.

The 22d Regimental Combat Team and all elements of the 83d Infantry Division which were still in positions along the Sauer and Lieselle Rivers passed to the control of the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division effective at 1600 and continued to defend in that sector.

Combat Team 330 of the 83d Infantry Division maintained its defensive positions throughout the day. The officer-led patrol previously mentioned reached the vicinity of F-065332, at which time twelve (12) rounds of artillery fire fell about one hundred (100) yards to their right rear causing the patrol to seek cover. Heavy mortar concentrations

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began to fall in the immediate vicinity thus, being unable to accomplish their mission, the patrol returned at 0445.

The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less one (1) troop, and with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, continued to screen the areas between the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, the 8th, 12th, and 330th Infantry Regiments. At 1600, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) was detached and the squadron reverted to the control of the 83d Infantry Division in position. Other elements of the division, including the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, less Combat Team attachments; the 70th Tank Battalion, less Combat Team attachments; the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), less Combat Team attachments, and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AA) Battalion, less supporting units, initiated movement during the day to the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg and closed in their new assembly areas.

B. 8 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division continued its movement of organic and attached units to the new division zone of action fronting along the west bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers in the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A of the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, and with one battery of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AA) Battalion in support, remained attached to the 83d Infantry Division in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, and Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, and with one battery of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AA) Battalion in support, initiated movement at 0705 from the vicinity of Gressinich (L-985426) to its new assembly area in the vicinity of Luxembourg (P-849114) and closed therein at 2130. Company E of the 12th Infantry Regiment relieved Company G of the 329th Infantry Regiment in position held by that unit in the vicinity of Echternaach (L-0535). This relief was completed at 2000 and the remainder of the regiment was conducting preparations to relieve the remainder of Combat Team 329 on the morning of 9 December.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, attached, continued to maintain its positions fronting on the Moselle Rivers and conducted active patrolling. Apart from minor road adjustments on the outpost line, troop dispositions remained unchanged throughout the day.

The 329th Infantry Regiment with Troops A and C, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; Company C, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, and Company A, 308th Medical Battalion attached, remained attached to the 4th Infantry Division. Defensive positions were maintained throughout the period and patrolling conducted to the east. Little enemy activity was reported throughout the day.

During this period, the 4th Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery completed its movement to the south and closed in the

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vicinity of Neudorf (P-8715) at 1425. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) likewise moved to new Division zone of action and was nearly closed in the vicinity of Mondorf (P-9501) at the close of the period.

9. 9 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the defense of its main line of resistance within the new sector facing on the Sauer and Moselle Rivers and active patrolling was conducted throughout the period. The relief of the 329th Infantry Regiment of the 83d Infantry Division was completed at 1420 without incident.

The relief of the 329th Infantry Regiment by the 12th Regimental Combat Team was continued at 0730 and completed by 1420, at which time the regiment began adjustment and improvement of positions taken over. The 329th Infantry Regiment assembled and planned for movement to the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with same attachments as previously mentioned, continued maintenance of its positions along the Moselle River and conducted active patrolling within its sector. At 0550, twelve (12) rounds of artillery time fire landed in the 1st Battalion's area in the vicinity of L-036154 but no damage was reported. Positions of all regimental units remained unchanged throughout the day.

10. 10 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to re-adjust positions on 10 December and conducted active patrolling within its new sector. During the period, the 329th Infantry Regiment moved from the vicinity of Junglinster (P-9324) to the VII Corps area. Enemy activity throughout the entire sector was negligible.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company B and Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion, Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), Troops B and C, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and Company C, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, attached, maintained and readjusted its positions within its sector facing the Moselle River from the vicinity of L-0040 to L-0923. Reconnaissance, security, and contact patrolling was continued. Only minor changes in the troop dispositions occurred during the day.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with units previously attached, maintained its positions on the division main line of resistance and conducted patrolling. The Regimental CP in the vicinity of Semmingen (P-9217), was closed and moved to the vicinity of Mondorf (P-9401). Activity on the part of the enemy was negligible and our troop dispositions remained unchanged.

The 329th Infantry Regiment began movement to the VII Corps area at 0515. The head of the column passed the IP at Junglinster and cleared at 0913. Troops A and C of the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company C of the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, which formerly had been attached to the 329th Infantry Regiment, passed to control of the 12th Infantry Regiment, when Combat Team 12 assumed responsibility for the former 329th Infantry Regiment's sector.

11. 11 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued throughout 11 December to readjust the boundaries and the positions of troops on the main line of resistance. Several rounds of mortar and artillery

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fire fell in the northern part of the division sector during the day. Enemy activity was negligible.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with attachments as previously mentioned maintained and readjusted its positions and conducted vigorous patrolling within its sector facing the Sauer River. Plans and reconnaissance were made in preparation for an adjustment of the boundary as Combat Team 8 was to assume responsibility for a part of the 12th Infantry sector.

Between 1400 and 1500, Company E, in the vicinity of Sothernaach (L-0535), received some small arms fire and upon retaliating with a concentration of 60mm mortar fire, our garrison received about fifty (50) rounds of 120mm mortar fire and several rounds of 130mm artillery fire in return. Meanwhile, between the hours of 1030 and 1240, the 89th Cavalary Reconnaissance Squadron received approximately thirty (30) rounds of 81mm mortar in the vicinity of L-028381, and between the hours of 1415 and 1430, nineteen (19) rounds of 81mm mortar fire were reported in the vicinity of L-030371. Dispositions of troops remained unchanged throughout the period.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with attachments previously mentioned, maintained and improved its positions and conducted patrolling. Plans and reconnaissance were made with a view to a readjustment in boundaries when Combat Team 8 arrived to relieve them in a part of the regimental sector. Little or no enemy activity of any nature was reported and the troop dispositions remained unchanged.

The 329th Infantry Regiment of the 83d Infantry Division was detached from the 4th Infantry Division and joined its parent organization upon movement from the 4th Infantry Division sector the previous day and Combat Team 8, still in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, prepared to move on 12 December to rejoin the 4th Infantry Division in the vicinity of the City of Luxembourg.

12. 12 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to occupy and defend along the west bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers within its sector with two combat teams abreast. The movement of the 8th Combat Team from the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, to its new sector was completed during the period.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, and with one battery of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion in direct support, was detached from the 83d Infantry Division and moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany, at 0800. The final elements of the column cleared the City of Luxembourg at 1935 and the combat team had closed within its new assembly area by 1950, the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of Flaxweiler (P-9919), the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of Uebersyern (P-9415), the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of Wecker (R-0222), and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion in the vicinity of Flaxweiler. Preparations were begun for the relief of elements of the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments on line on 13 December.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, no change in the attachments, maintained its positions fronting along the west bank of the Moselle River. Enemy activity was negligible but an exchange of machine gun and mortar

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fire by our troops and the enemy across the river occurred several times throughout the day.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, maintained and improved its positions fronting on the west bank of the Moselle River and continued active patrolling along the entire regimental front.

13. 13 December 1944. On 13 December, the 4th Infantry Division effected the relief of elements of the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments by the 8th Regimental Combat Team.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, including all units that had accompanied it on its move, less the assault gun platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion, completed the relief of the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment at 1950. The 1st Battalion completed the relief of the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry at 1810 and the 3d Battalion completed the relief of the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry at 1915.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, maintained its positions fronting on the river line. Forty-two (42) propaganda shells containing three types of leaflets were fired by the enemy in the town of Burschdoy at 1600.

The 3d Battalion, after having been relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry, in turn completed the relief of Company C of the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion and elements of the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, upon being relieved by elements of the 3d Battalion, in turn completed the relief of Troops B and C of the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. One platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, previously attached to the 8th Infantry, was relieved and attached to the 12th Infantry Regiment at 1200. Troops B and C of the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company C of the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, having been relieved, were detached from the 12th Infantry Regiment and reverted to control of parent organizations.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, reported that the only enemy activity during the period was one (1) flare seen a few thousand yards to the front of the 2d Battalion. Active patrolling was continued along the entire regimental front. The 2d Battalion, upon being relieved by the 3d Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment, moved to a new assembly area.

14. 14 December 1944. On 14 December, the 4th Infantry Division continued to occupy and defend its positions within its sector and searched all wooded areas in the rear for possible stray groups of the enemy.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with only Company A, 4th Medical Battalion now attached, maintained its positions and reported to have a few rounds of light artillery fall in the 1st Battalion area during the night, 15-14 December. No enemy activity whatsoever was evidenced.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with only Company D, 70th Tank Battalion and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion now attached, maintained its positions fronting on the river line and conducted patrolling within the regimental sector. Vehicular activity, estimated to be six (6) vehicles, was heard to the front of the 3d Battalion sector during the night but no other movement was noted. The regiment had been charged with the defense of Radio Luxembourg in the vicinity of Junglinster and this installation was outposted accordingly.

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The 22d Infantry Regiment with only Company C, 4th Medical Battalion now attached, maintained its positions and continued active patrolling. The 2d Battalion completed movement to its new assembly area. Very light sporadic artillery fire, consisting of one (1) round every one half hour except between the hours of 0345 and 0510 at which time five (5) rounds were received, constituted the only enemy activity during the period.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) remained in the vicinity of Mendorf (P-9501) in Division Reserve. At 1800, five (5) outposts consisting of two (2) platoons were placed with the mission of picking up stray groups of the enemy that possibly were working their way north to their own lines from the vicinity of Metz.

15. 15 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division maintained its defenses and slight adjustments in unit dispositions were effected. Outposts and searching parties were continued throughout the rear areas.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued its defense. Enemy activity was negligible.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company D, 70th Tank Battalion and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, likewise maintained its defensive positions and conducted patrolling within the regimental sector. Company B moved at 0815 with the mission of searching the rear areas from P-960340 to L-005252 but there was no evidence of any enemy in this locality. Enemy activity in the 12th Infantry Regiment sector likewise was negligible throughout the day.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained, improved and effected minor readjustments in its positions. Reconnaissance, security and contact patrols were continued and the 1st Battalion reported receiving ten (10) rounds of heavy caliber artillery fire within the area during the night, 14-15 December. The 3d Battalion reported hearing tracked vehicles and artillery fire at 0515 in the vicinity of L-017088.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion dispatched searching units to comb the woods within the division rear area and captured three enemy in the vicinity of P-806085. These men were endeavoring to make their way back to their own lines and had come from one of the Metz forts.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) meanwhile maintained previously mentioned road blocks but no enemy was reported during the period.

16. 16 December 1944. The situation in general that existed throughout the 4th Infantry Division on the morning of 16 December when the German Commander in the west, Von Runstedt, launched his large scale counteroffensive, was far from favorable. The division had been relieved after a period of hard fighting in the Hurtgen Forest, Germany, and was considerably understrengthened in all infantry battalions. At this time, three regimental combat teams were holding a front of approximately 35 miles along the west bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers in the Grand Duché of Luxembourg. Communications, because of the shortage of equipment and the large division sector, were strained to the utmost. Casualties and loss of equipment among the 4th Division Artillery battalions had not been high but, although reinforced by the 422d Field Artillery

Group, fire could not be massed. The attached 70th Tank Battalion, which likewise had taken severe punishment in the Hurtgen Forest, was at this time engaged in maintenance and the clean up of vehicles. Parts were virtually unobtainable, resulting in a number of tanks being actually nonoperational. Company B had 8 tanks, 3 of which would run; Company A had 17 completely stripped down for cleaning; Company D had 15 running tanks many of which needed minor repairs; and Company C had 8 tanks which were operational. The mortar and assault gun platoons, however, were in good condition.

Throughout the period of 16 December the division continued to defend within its zone of action, and as could normally be expected when units are so thinly spread, three penetrations to a depth of several thousand meters by enemy infantry were suffered in the vicinity of the towns of Berdorf, Echternach, and in the Osweiler - Dickweiler area.

All three regiments were contacted prior to 0600, and reports revealed that there had been some light enemy patrol activity in the 2d and 3d Battalion sectors of the 12th Infantry which was defending on the left (north) portion of the division zone of action. The usual small amounts of artillery fire had been received during the night, but shortly after first light (0630) approximately forty (40) rounds of artillery of an estimated 160mm or 170mm caliber fell in the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry sector.

The 12th Infantry's only attachment at this time was Company D, 70th Tank Battalion which was employed in the defense of Radio Luxembourg in the vicinity of Junglinster, and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion. The towns of Berdorf, Lauterborn, Alttier, Osweiler, and Dickweiler received heavy artillery preparations but the largest concentration fell in the town of Echternach. This heavy fire continued for several hours and was directed accurately in the immediate vicinities of battalion and company command posts which resulted in the complete loss of wire communication to all units below battalion level. Shortly after 0900, the enemy began to penetrate our forward positions with strong reconnaissance forces and later stronger formations of infantry. Three notable efforts were evidenced at an early hour in the vicinities of Berdorf (L-0036), Echternach (L-0535), and the towns of Osweiler (L-0632), and Dickweiler (L-0830). At 0945, Company F reported that Berdorf was being attacked by about fifteen enemy with automatic weapons, and another enemy patrol was seen in the vicinity of L-045360. Reports covering this early period, because of the lack of wire communication and the initial failure of radios, were few, and the situation remained obscure in both forward battalion sectors for several hours, and only in the late afternoon was the situation beginning to clear. Shortly after 1000, reports from forward battalions and the 422d Field Artillery Group indicated that an estimated company of enemy was attacking Berdorf and other forces were moving in on Osweiler and Echternach. Company I was reported as being surrounded in Dickweiler.

At 1100, an alert order was issued to tank companies of the 70th Tank Battalion and initially two platoons of Company D and the three operational tanks of Company B, and one platoon of Company A were ordered to move to the 12th Infantry Regimental CP. By the time this supporting armor had reached forward battalion areas, Company F, 12th Infantry had been completely surrounded in Berdorf and plans were being formulated to rescue them by mounting Company B, 12th Infantry on the three platoons of light tanks in an effort to break through to the

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surrounded troops. One platoon of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion had arrived just before this attempt was initiated and the infantry was then loaded on the medium and light tanks and the operation got underway. Elements of the 212th Volk Grenadier Division were met on the southern outskirts of Berdorf and a fire fight ensued. This continued until dark with a small measure of success as the enemy was driven out of part of the town but contact with Company F had not been restored, and this force then withdrew to a more favorable position. Concurrent with this attempt to establish contact with Company F, similar operations were started to drive through to Company E, 12th Infantry which had been encircled in Echtermach and Company G which was reported isolated in Lauterborn. Company A, 12th Infantry, mounted on other light tanks of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, pressed forward and Lauterborn was reached after a light skirmish, and the Company G supply route was opened. The advance was continued but strong resistance was met 500 yards northeast of Lauterborn. The enemy was engaged and driven back by small arms, machine gun, and 37mm fire from the light tanks. However, darkness quickly set in, thus forcing the conclusion of this effort.

In the interim, the town of Osweiler continued to be occupied by Company L and Dickweiler by Company I. Elements of Company K mounted on one platoon of tanks of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, proceeded north from Herborn to Osweiler to open this 5000 yard stretch of road and to reach Company L which was likewise reported surrounded. This mission was accomplished and the small task force then proceeded to Dickweiler to relieve elements of Company I which seemed in immediate danger of having their positions overrun. The advance was made along a road under observation by the enemy and fire was received from direct fire weapons and artillery during the 2000 yard run, but they broke into Dickweiler without loss and were just in time to frustrate an attack being made against our troops by two companies of the 213th Regiment. Thirty-seven enemy were captured and the rest of the two companies were either killed or forced to withdraw in confusion in this attack.

Companies I and L and this small task force which had reached them were then all isolated by virtue of a penetration by the enemy which had reached the vicinity of L-064305 and was moving to the southwest against Herborn (L-0528) shortly after dark. At the close of the period, plans were being made to reinforce the regiment on 17 December and to resume efforts to reestablish contact with all units. One platoon each of Companies A and B, 70th Tank Battalion had been attached to the 12th Infantry during the period.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued outposting its positions fronting on the west bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers to the right (south) of the 12th Infantry's zone of action, maintaining contact between all units. Little enemy activity was noted in this sector during the period. However, at 1930, an estimated one hundred (100) rounds of artillery fire fell in the vicinity of Company B Command Post at L-055240, and sixty (60) rounds in the vicinity of the 3d Platoon, Company H, at L-067229. One small enemy patrol contacted the 3d Platoon, Company B, in the vicinity of L-070226 at 2030, was engaged, and withdrew. All units were alerted for a possible enemy thrust from the east through this sector. Troop dispositions remained unchanged throughout the period.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached,

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continued to maintain its positions fronting on the west bank of the Moselle River throughout the period, and reported no enemy activity. During the early afternoon, the 2d Battalion was furnished transportation and alerted to be prepared to move motorized upon one hour's notice. Plans were made to employ this battalion in the zone of action of the 12th Infantry on 17 December. One company of medium tanks from the 9th Armored Division was alerted to join this battalion on the following day, and was considered as having been attached effective at 162200A December 1944.

17. 17 December 1944. On 17 December, the great German counter-offensive which had commenced on the previous day was continued with the full weight of the 212 Volksgrenadier Division being thrown against the 12th Infantry. The dogged determination of the Combat Team and all supporting units to hold what was later proven to be the southern shoulder of the offensive was the greatest contributing factor in saving the City of Luxembourg and its many important installations, both political (Radio Luxembourg) and military (Headquarters XII Army Group), from being overrun by the enemy. During the period, the enemy was able to extend his advance on Bordenf to the southwest as far as Mullertal (F-9783), and from Echternach southwest as far as Scheidgen, but his third penetration in the Osweiler - Diechweiler area was checked and heavy losses inflicted upon him.

The 12th Infantry with one platoon each of Companies A and B, and Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, and Company A, 19th Tank Battalion, attached, resumed operations at an early hour to contact all isolated elements and to reestablish former outpost lines. All troops held in spite of mass German infiltrations up to battalion strength, as deep into our lines as four (4) kilometers. All units, however small, that had been surrounded, continued to stave off the enemy and harass him to the limit of their capacity, insofar as ammunition and supplies would allow.

During the night 16-17 December, patrol efforts to reach Companies E, F, and I had failed; Company F was still encircled in Bordenf, and Company E, at daybreak was in a similar predicament in Echternach. All communications with the 3d Battalion's garrison in Osweiler and Diechweiler were completely cut off, and the three (3) medium tanks from Company B, 70th Tank Battalion were out of radio contact with their headquarters, so the situation in general at this time was vague.

Elements of Company B, reinforced by the 1st Platoon of Company A, and the 3d Platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, resumed their counterattack on Bordenf. The attack was pushed and the medium tanks drove into the town, firing at once in the buildings. It was believed that a number of the enemy occupied a large hotel which had formerly been the HQ of Company F, and the leading tank fired several rounds of 76mm ammunition into this building, upon suddenly one of the tank commanders noted a large American flag being unfurled on the roof. A cease fire order was transmitted at once and the leading tank pushed into the hotel entrance. At least sixty (60) soldiers of Company F still occupied the hotel, so the counterattack through the balance of the town was resumed, but the enemy attacked with bazookas and small arms and after one (1) tank had been disabled and with darkness beginning to set in, the position was consolidated and heavy artillery, mortar, and rocket

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concentrations continued upon our forces throughout the night.

In the interim, Companies A and G consolidated their positions in Lauterborn (L-0334) to the southwest of Bechtornach and were unable to effect contact with Company B, which continued to hold out against tremendous odds in the heart of Bechtornach. The enemy had established outposts on the ridges surrounding our positions in Lauterborn and laid down continuous mortar and artillery barrages, but one (1) lone infantryman made his way back from the besieged garrison shortly after dark and advised that all was well with them.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry had moved in the early morning to an assembly area in the vicinity of Bech (L-0128) and this battalion, supported by Company A of the 19th Tank Battalion, advanced to the north from Bech, thence east in the direction of Osweiler, and contact was established with Companies I and L of the 12th Infantry, both in that location and in Dieckweiler. Company C of the 12th Infantry, in greatly reduced strength, had pushed from the vicinity of Hornborn to the north and had nearly succeeded in closing in the Osweiler - Dieckweiler area prior to dark, but halted its advance and consolidated its position on favorable terrain between and slightly to the south of these two (2) towns, which aided materially in the attempt to stabilize our lines.

On the extreme left of the 12th Infantry's zone of action, the enemy advance from Berdorf up the Schwaize-Brnz River valley to the south in the direction of Mullerthal (P-9733) had been anticipated by the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, was ordered into the line on the high ground immediately to the south of Mullerthal. As this maneuver was being effected a Task Force, under the command of Colonel James S. Luckett, 018209, Inf, was constituted, comprising the following units: The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry; Company A, less one platoon, and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion. While the engineer battalion organized its defensive position to the south of Mullerthal, a strong force of the enemy, estimated to be of regimental strength, was noted moving south along the deep river gorge. This report later proved to be correct. It was feared that this enemy force would turn east to flank the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry's positions in Comsdorf (P-9932), which were woefully weak and undermined. Another possibility existed too, i.e., that it might continue south where again our line was weak; consequently, the mobile reserve of Task Force "Luckett", which was comprised of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and the 1st and 2d platoons of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, was moved to Colbet (P-9930); thence to positions on the left flank of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion. From right to left, our line in this sector comprised the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry, the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry, with contact on the right and left being established by the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized). The enemy moved up the draw toward Mullerthal, where they were engaged by the reconnaissance elements of the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), after which they turned to the west and were engaged by the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion of the 9th Armored Division to the west of our zone of action.

A handful of stragglers, cooks, Military Police, and one (1) medium tank, and several tank destroyers comprised our forces to meet

any threat in the Cunsdorf area. The single tank and seven (7) infantrymen formed a block in the ravine, west of Cunsdorf, and later when the mobile reserve from Task Force "Luckett" had gone into positions, it was found that a majority of the enemy had turned west, thus lessening the probability of an attack on Cunsdorf. Two (2) light tanks were pulled back from Bording to assist in outposting the town; also one (1) medium tank from Company B, 70th Tank Battalion was brought up. Late in the afternoon, enemy were noted approaching Cunsdorf along a drive northwest of the town. A handful of infantrymen and the tank from Company B were quickly thrown in to stem the tide. At dusk the threat seemed very real but, after considerable firing, the attack subsided.

When bed-down positions could be reviewed after the day's operations, it was noted that we had formed a semblance of a line opposing the penetration in the Osweiler - Diekweiler area; likewise on our left flank, the situation was beginning to clear up inasmuch as the positions held by Task Force "Luckett" in the vicinity of Mullerthal were hourly stabilized, but fear still existed in the event that the sizable enemy force known to be confronting us here would be able to turn our left flank by forcing a penetration of the lightly held line of the 9th Armored Division in the vicinity of Waldbillig. The situation in the area in the center of the enemy's attack from Bokternach towards Cunsdorf and Scheidgen was fluid.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, less the 2d Battalion attached to Task Force "Luckett", remained under an alert status, and continued to maintain the defense of its sector with the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached, less the 2d Battalion attached to the 12th Infantry, continued to maintain its positions fronting on the west bank of the Moselle River and reported little or no enemy activity during the period.

18. 18 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division successfully halted the enemy's attempts at further penetration in the 12th Infantry's zone of action, and endeavored to wrest from him the initiative by making local counterattacks. Reinforcements that had begun arriving in the vicinity of Luxembourg on the previous day were committed within our sector and these troops did much towards stabilizing our front lines.

Once again, the enemy was aided by the weather. Undoubtedly, he had waited until such a time when we would be unable to employ our superior air forces and his offensive for the third straight day was shrouded in thick fog. Our operations were resumed at an early hour, however, in an endeavor to drive the enemy from his bridgehead across the Sauer River.

To supplement normal communications between front line infantry elements, three (3) half-tracks from the 70th Tank Battalion with SCR-528 and 508 radios moved to strategic communication positions near front line operations. Another half-track with a SCR-508 was placed at a centrally located position and acted as a relay station. As a result, radio contact was maintained at all times with all tanks and since they were on line with the infantry, continuous knowledge of the situation was insured.

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The 12th Infantry. To review the action taken, it is best to consider the three (3) respective areas where the enemy had begun his penetrations. In the Osweiler - Dickweiler area, Companies I and L, reinforced with elements of the 70th Tank Battalion, one platoon of tanks from Company B, continued to maintain their positions. An attack by an estimated enemy company was launched against Company I in Dickweiler from the direction of Girst (L-0031), and upon failure of this attack to overrun our positions, the enemy contented himself by harassing the defenders at long range. The 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry was determined to open a covered route of supply to these elements and two (2) tanks of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion moved to Herborn and together with other doughboys of Company K, proceeded through Hoppach where they were subjected to heavy shelling, but succeeded in reaching a point about 200 yards south of Dickweiler, thence back again to Herborn. No prisoners were taken but the mission was a complete success as supplies were carried on this route. In the interim, the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry continued its attack with Companies E and G against an estimated enemy battalion in the vicinity of L-056327. Company F, in conjunction with Company A of the 19th Tank Battalion, attacked from the direction of Osweiler to the west against this same force. Loss of this tank company by detachment from the 4th Infantry Division necessitated its replacement by Company C of the 70th Tank Battalion, then attached to Task Force "Luckett". At 1200, this company of tanks moved to Bech. At 1300, the tank company commander reported to the Executive Officer of the 2d Battalion at their CP which was located near Geyershof. Instructions were given him and he immediately returned to get his tanks. His tank was knocked out by bazooka fire, so he mounted another and returned to Bech. Twenty-five (25) men were quickly gathered from the 176th Field Artillery Battalion and moved by truck to the vicinity of the tanks. Upon returning with the tanks toward the battalion CP, it was found that it had been surrounded by the enemy, so the artillerymen pressed forward on foot with the tanks and destroyed the enemy. The CP area was then outposted and at 1710, the tanks succeeded in escorting the CP personnel through the enemy lines to Herborn. While this action was taking place, little progress had been made by the battalion's attack and positions were consolidated for the night.

The next area to be considered is the central part of the 12th Infantry's sector, generally from Echtermach through Scheidgen. Company E continued to hold out in Echtermach and occasional radio reports came in to substantiate this. Companies A and G were still firmly entrenched in the vicinity of Lauterborn and made futile attempts to make physical contact with Company E. Task Force "Riley" from Combat Command "A" of the 10th Armored Division assisted our forces in this sector by initiating an attack at 0800. They advanced to Ilchelshof (L-0230), thence to Scheidgen where they encountered heavy enemy resistance. Leaving a force to contain the town of Scheidgen, Task Force "Riley" continued on to the northeast and passed through Companies A and G in Lauterborn and established a line approximately 500 yards southwest of Echtermach. Company E in Echtermach was contacted and supplies were sent to them. Those elements of Task Force "Riley" containing Scheidgen continued operations in conjunction with the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion. This battalion had been attached to the 4th Infantry Division and committed in the vicinity of Scheidgen, and the two (2) forces succeeded in eliminating any

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further threat of enemy penetration there. For the first time since the German counteroffensive began, it now appeared that we were beginning to stabilize our line in this area, as well as to the east in the Osweiler - Dickweiler area and to the west in the vicinity of Mullerthal.

Concurrent with the operations just mentioned, Task Force "Standish" of Combat Command "A" of the 10th Armored Division supported the 4th Infantry Division by advancing at 0800 through Comsdorf to our infantry and tanks in Berdorf. In conjunction with B and F Companies of the 12th Infantry, they attacked to the southeast toward Hill 329 (L-025357) against heavy resistance, and little progress was made although some of the enemy had been forced from strongpoints in houses.

Task Force "Luckett", still holding its positions on the high ground to the south of Mullerthal, against a strong enemy force that had attempted a deeper penetration during the previous period, consolidated its defense in the early hours of the period. Contact with the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry on the right and with elements of the 9th Armored Division on the left had been maintained, and patrols covered all roads from Comsdorf to the west as far as Waldbilling (P-9533).

It was apparent, however, that if this position was to be improved to such an extent that it might hold against a numerically superior force, better terrain would have to be secured. At 1515, the Task Force attacked with the 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion in conjunction with the attack launched by Task Force "Chamberlain" of Combat Command "A" of the 10th Armored Division. Task Force "Chamberlain" reached Mullerthal but stopped when fired upon by small arms and mortars. It was feared that the steep ravine might easily prove a tank trap so the attack was halted while elements of the 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion reached their objectives on the high ground overlooking Mullerthal. The terrain secured in this limited objective attack proved invaluable, and by intelligent terrain appreciation, our position on the high cliffs overlooking the enemy's positions was so organized as to be virtually impenetrable.

The 8th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to maintain its positions fronting on the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Active patrolling was conducted and defensive positions were improved by blocking all roads and draws leading into their positions from the north and east by the use of mines, booby traps, and improvised road blocks.

The 22d Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached, likewise continued its defensive measures and patrolled vigorously throughout the entire period. Little enemy activity was noted, but plans were continued to repel any attempted attack by the enemy in the regimental zone of action.

19. 19 December 1944. The day dawned cold and foggy with visibility limited to a very few yards. During the early morning hours, the enemy pounded our positions with heavy artillery fire, and seemed to be reinforcing his troops on the bridgehead. Troops were reported moving across the river at Minden (L-0936) to Steinheim and also in the vicinity of Behternach. Throughout the division sector, the situation was confusing, but an intelligence summary seemed to reveal that the enemy was regrouping his forces and generally hiding out in wooded areas, mostly draws.

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Although artillery fire increased during the period, no large scale attacks were launched. This can be explained in part by the fact that the enemy was having considerable difficulty in maintaining communications, and our constant artillery interdictions of his stream crossings prevented him from reinforcing his units with as much supporting armor as planned. If the situation was confusing to us, it was likewise to the enemy for, in the words of many prisoners of war: "Nobody seems to know where anybody else is!"

The 12th Infantry with the same attached units as previously mentioned and supported by elements of the 10th Armored Division, succeeded in gaining contact with some isolated units. In many cases, this contact proved to be only temporary. Nevertheless, armor and infantry teams were successful in carrying sorely needed supplies to them. Local counterattacks were continued throughout the regimental sector and our systematic elimination of small infiltrating groups resulted in the enemy making little or no headway in his attempts at a breakthrough.

As our lines were becoming more stable, better communications resulted and prompt supporting fires were delivered, where necessary, by both artillery and armor, resulting in heavy casualties upon the enemy. These casualties were later confirmed when the enemy was forced to withdraw from his bridgehead by the attack of the 5th Infantry Division within this zone of action. Large numbers of unburied enemy dead were found at that time.

By nightfall, 19 December, the situation looked much better than on the previous day as the enemy was decidedly failing in his attempts to force back this shoulder of his counteroffensive. To review some of the various and sundry engagements that took place throughout the day, the sector will again be covered from right to left beginning with the Osweiler - Dickweiler area.

Company I, reinforced, maintained its positions at Dickweiler and continued contact with Company L on their left in Osweiler. Small enemy patrols constantly harassed their positions and at 1500, Company I repulsed a small attack coming from the southeast, the same direction as the one launched the previous day. At 1500, Company G, 70th Tank Battalion moved to Osweiler where they took up defensive positions north of the town. Enemy patrols in this locale, made constant efforts to get into the town but machine gun fire frustrated all attempts. In turn, the enemy laid many concentrations of artillery and mortar fire, notably at night. Two (2) other tanks with infantry from Company K repeated their mission of the previous day in resupplying units in Dickweiler, but made no contact with the enemy, so returned to Herborn. In the interim, the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry moved into Osweiler against light opposition and made contact with Company L of the 12th Infantry. Both units consolidated their positions and were ordered to coordinate the defense of the town against any possible attack. Company G of the 12th Infantry remained on the extension of their line to the east in the vicinity of L-075314.

Company B, still firmly entrenched in Echemach even though a part of the town was held by an enemy force much larger than its own, was given permission to withdraw from the town but the commanding officer elected to remain. At 1645, he reported that six (6) enemy tanks had crossed the river and were entering the town. An order was issued at approximately 1800 by Commanding Officer, 12th Infantry, for Company B,

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to evacuate the town and at the close of the period, it was reported that they had begun to infiltrate back to our lines. This report later proved erroneous.

Companies A and G maintained their positions in the vicinity of Lauterborn and together with the 1st platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, continued to prevent enemy infiltration. Task Force "Riley", still operating in conjunction with the 12th Infantry's efforts in this vicinity, resupplied Company E in Zochernach in the early part of the morning. One (1) other team of Task Force "Riley" had secured Hill 313 (L-0233) by 1300 against stiff resistance.

The road from Consdorf to Berdorf had been cut by enemy patrols coming from the draw from the west. Three (3) of our tanks were immobilized by bazooka fire on this road while being drawn back for maintenance and supplies. One (1) tank got back with a hole in the turret, the crew of another was captured, and the crew of the third fought their way back with two (2) of their men wounded. Task Force "Standish" which was in the process of attacking to the east from Berdorf during the previous period, continued its attack and closed on one objective in the vicinity of L-005389 by 1100 and upon the second objective, Hill 329 (L-0235) at 1110. Meanwhile, the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion maintained its positions in the vicinity of Scheidgen and in the afternoon, proceeded to rout pockets of enemy as far as 2,000 yards to the south and southeast of their position. Company E of this battalion remained in the vicinity of Bech in the event of possible attack from the north and northeast.

At 1000, Task Force "Lockett" launched a coordinated attack with Task Force "Chamberlain" of CC "A", 10th Armored Division, and the heaviest resistance was encountered by Company E of the 8th Infantry, which had succeeded in reaching the vicinity of P-963340. The remainder of our forces were not as successful in their advances and the Commanding Officer of Task Force "Lockett", upon receiving orders that his mission merely consisted of denying the enemy the use of the road net in the vicinity of Mullerthal, withdrew Company E to the vicinity of P-966328, because at that time they were taking unnecessary heavy casualties. In the interim, Task Force "Chamberlain" was ordered withdrawn to the vicinity of Consdorf and upon execution of this order, all units of Task Force "Lockett" set about improving their defenses.

By the close of the period, it began to appear that the main force of the enemy attack had been spent, unless he could improve his stream crossings and bring up substantial reserves. It was apparent, however, that if we were to regain the terrain already lost, a coordinated attack would soon have to be launched.

The 8th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company C, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, continued to maintain defense of its present sector with two (2) battalions, the 1st Battalion on the right with Company A in reserve and the 3d Battalion on the left with Company I in reserve. Positions were improved by additional road blocks, mines, booby traps, and trip flares. Despite the conflagration on the Combat Team's immediate left flank, training was continued consisting of physical conditioning, company in attack problems, familiarization in use of weapons, military courtesy, and discipline for all personnel not actively engaged in the defense. Schools were conducted for officers and men.

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on mortar rep and adjustment of artillery fire.

Enemy activity in this sector during the period consisted of several small reconnaissance patrols which withdrew when fired upon. Harassing artillery fire and moderate concentrations of mortar and artillery fire was received by front line elements.

The 22d Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) attached, reported that there was no direct enemy contact on 19 December, although some enemy artillery fire fell in the Combat Team sector.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) began relief of the 3d Battalion at daylight and by 1635, this relief had been completed. The 3d Battalion moved to a new assembly area in the Schrassig-Moutfort area, closing therein at 1600, except one (1) platoon each of Companies I and K which were left behind for observation purposes until the reconnaissance troop had secured its positions. This battalion passed to Division Reserve at that time.

20. 20 December 1944. The weather had not improved over night to any extent and, although little or no rain had fallen, the fog was dense. Tenacious defense was continued throughout the day, and elements of the 80th Infantry Division moved into reserve battle positions to the rear of our front lines in the 12th Infantry sector. Most of the daylight hours were spent in small engagements as the result of our attempts to readjust positions in an effort to strengthen our lines and also as a result of the continuous probing action of the enemy. Their numerous patrols searching for soft spots were turned back in each instance with nothing to show for their efforts save casualties.

The 12th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Companies B and D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, maintained its positions in the Osweiler - Dieckweiler area where enemy patrol activity was especially notable. In the late afternoon, the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, together with two (2) tanks from Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, made an attack west of Osweiler toward the high ground to the northwest against an enemy force estimated to be about 400 strong. After an advance of about 500 to 700 yards, contact was made and positions formerly held by the enemy in a wooded dray were taken but the engagement did not continue after darkness closed in. The artillery and mortar fire steadily increased in the town of Osweiler and buildings fell under the barrages, forcing the supporting tanks to take up new positions as their cover was blasted away.

In the Behternach area meanwhile, Company E was believed to have renewed its efforts to break free from the enemy encirclement, all reports previously made that this company had attempted to infiltrate back to our lines had proven incorrect. Before withdrawing from this sector, Task Force "Riley" of Combat Command "A", 10th Armored Division, again endeavored to assist Company E in their plan of withdrawal but was unable to get through, and subsequently withdrew to an assembly area. When this had been completed, the status of Company E was unknown but it was hoped that infiltration to our lines would soon be started.

Companies B and F of the 12th Infantry, tanks from two platoons of Company D, and one tank each from Companies A and B of the 70th Tank Battalion, together with Task Force "Standish", successfully repulsed another enemy attack in the vicinity of Berdorf, and brought artillery

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fire to bear on a force of ten (10) enemy tanks, causing them to pull back. Late in the period, orders were issued for our units to withdraw to the south in the direction of Omsdorf, and at 1800 this movement was initiated and a new line established north of that town. This withdrawal was covered by a platoon of light tanks, and after the movement got underway, an ambush was encountered in which an infantry half-track was disabled and a fire fight against bazooka and small arms took place. The enemy was fought off, however, and the movement was completed. In the interim, the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion succeeded in establishing itself firmly upon Hill 313 (I-0223), thus protecting approaches to Scheidgen from the north and northeast.

Task Force "Lockett" continued to defend within its sector in the vicinity of Mullerthal and much time was spent in the construction of effective road blocks and the laying of mine fields. The artillery and mortar support made available to this Task Force was utilized to the fullest extent. As well as missions fired from the excellent observation posts, continuous harassing and interdiction fire was laid in this area continuously. The three mortars from the 70th Tank Battalion which were in position laid several hundred rounds of high explosive light and high explosive medium on a total that the enemy was observed to be using.

Contact was maintained on the right flank with elements of the 12th Infantry and on the left with the 9th Armored Division. Late in the period, the 9th Armored Division reported that a penetration of their lines had been effected in the vicinity of Waldbillig (F-9533), and that the town had fallen to the enemy. Steps were immediately taken to secure our left flank for the night.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously mentioned, maintained its defensive positions fronting on the Sauer and Moselle Rivers, and continued active patrolling throughout the period. Troop dispositions remained unchanged, and little or no enemy activity was reported. Likewise, in the 22d Infantry sector, the situation remained static. The river line was held from right to left with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) and the 1st Battalion, while the 3d Battalion was assembled in the Schraessig-Montfort area constituting the Division Reserve.

21. 21 December 1944. The enemy again became more aggressive, especially in the central part of the 12th Infantry sector in the vicinity of Omsdorf and Scheidgen. He attacked with limited armor support and employed heavy artillery fire during the afternoon of the period, and was successful in making a limited penetration of our lines in the vicinity of L-024324. It is quite possible that this attack might have developed into a major penetration had it not been for considerable reinforcements that had arrived in our sector.

The 12th Infantry, with the same units attached as in the previous period, continued to defend within its sector. At 0800, the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry continued its attack west of Osweiler against very heavy resistance to eliminate an enemy pocket in the vicinity of L-0533. At 0830, this enemy force launched a counterattack which was beaten back by our battalion, and by 1030 we had advanced about 400 yards. Numerous counterattacks with enemy infantry supported by small groups of tanks were hurled against this battalion throughout the afternoon, but

no ground was yielded. In the interim, Companies I and L had received extremely heavy artillery fire for two hours in their positions in Osweiler and Dickweiler, and Company L had been attacked at 1330 from the north and northwest. Likewise, Company I and elements of Company K resisted attacks throughout the day and gave no ground. Strong enemy pressure was still prevailing at the end of the day in the Osweiler and Dickweiler area. Enemy armor harassed positions in Osweiler after dark, but a few well aimed armor-piercing shots from three tanks of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion caused them to desist and move to a more favorable position approximately 3,000 yards northwest of Osweiler in the vicinity of Rodenhof.

Companies A and G were withdrawn from their positions in the vicinity of Lauterborn during the hours of darkness early in the period to an assembly area in the vicinity of Scheidgen. These companies were withdrawn with the view of establishing a new and more tightly knitted main line of resistance. At dawn, the Company C tanks were moved to the top of the hill just north of Consdorf where they were to remain for four days. By this time their three tanks were so badly in need of maintenance that it was impossible to move them any further.

The 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry began early in the period making local attacks on its left flank in the vicinity of R-9933 and gained some desirable terrain, although any sizable advance was halted when at 1530 the enemy launched an attack to take the town of Consdorf with at least two companies. Our tanks and the few infantrymen left waited until they were well up the hill and out into the open before they commenced fire. At least sixty (60) of the enemy were claimed to have been killed and none were able to reach our positions. By 1700, the situation was well in hand and the enemy had withdrawn into a wooded area. During this attack, at least five (5) women were seen in the group wearing small Red Cross brassards and acting as aid personnel. With field glasses and the very short range, positive identification was made by our observers.

The 159th Engineer Combat Battalion remained in its positions on the high ground in the vicinity of L-018334, L-023336, and in the town of Scheidgen. This force was attacked several times during the day, the strongest of which came in the afternoon about 1600. Two tanks from Company C, 70th Tank Battalion were sent to Scheidgen to support the engineers in their defense. Twenty (20) enemy were endeavoring to dig in near the town but were driven out just as darkness fell. During this action, the artillery and mortar fire on our troops was especially heavy.

Task Force "Luckett" continued to deny the road net in the vicinity of Illerthal and to prevent any enemy penetration from the north as well as protecting the division's left flank. The slight readjustment of positions that was initiated at the close of the previous period in order to protect this flank from the enemy who had succeeded in capturing the town of Waldbillig was continued. Task Force "Luckett" from their positions on the high ground succeeded in keeping the enemy virtually immobile by directing fire on any movement noted in the river valley and, although elements of the 9th Armored Division no longer held the town of Waldbillig, the enemy was unable to make the maximum use of this area due to our strong left flank positions.

During the afternoon, the 1st and 2d platoons of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion left Christnach, and the 1st platoon took up positions in Breitweiler and the 2d platoon at Gelbet. One tank that had been in Berdorf joined the 1st platoon and all tanks at the close of the period

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were attached to Task Force "Lockett"

The 8th Infantry whose attachments had not been changed in the early hours of the period, continued maintenance of the defensive positions within its sector, and at 1430 responsibility was assumed for the former zone of Combat Team 22 from L-0617 to L-0095. At the same time, the following attachments became effective: 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry; 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized); Company C, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer-Combat Battalion. At 2240, Company C, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was detached from the 8th Infantry and attached to the 10th Combat Team of the 5th Infantry Division.

The 22d Infantry, whose attachments had not been changed at the beginning of the period, maintained defensive positions and continued to conduct active patrolling within its sector. The 3d Battalion, which had been in Division Reserve, was ordered at 0600 to be prepared to move in support of CT 12 on one hour's notice.

At 1430, the 22d Infantry turned over control of its sector to the Commanding Officer of CT 8 and prepared to move and relieve elements of the 12th Infantry within the sector of the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry in the Osweiler - Dickweiler area. At 1515, the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry had initiated its movement and closed in the vicinity of Bech (L-0129) by 1730. The remainder of the Combat Team moved to the vicinity of Rodenbourg in preparation for relieving elements of the 12th Infantry.

Upon being relieved of responsibility for its former zone of action, the following attachments became effective at 1430: Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer-Combat Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP). This latter attachment of tank destroyers was detached and attached to the 10th Regimental Combat Team of the 5th Infantry Division at 2240. At the close of the period, the 22d Infantry was in reserve positions prepared to relieve elements of the 12th Infantry and to counterattack in conjunction with the 10th Infantry on 22 December to seize terrain previously lost to the enemy.

22. 22 December 1944. On 22 December, one week after the beginning of the German counteroffensive, saw a change in the weather and the initiative once again being taken by our forces. During this period, we were able not only to inflict severe casualties on the enemy while frustrating several of his attacks, but also started a coordinated attack to regain the terrain previously lost and clear the enemy from his bridgehead.

The 12th Infantry with Companies B, C, and D, of the 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, and the 159th Engineer-Combat Battalion, attached, continued to defend within its zone of action until 1330, at which time and in conjunction with the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division, attacked to the north with the mission of destroying the enemy. Just prior to 11-Hour, at approximately 1300, two (2) battalions of the enemy launched an attack against the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of Scheidegen. Furious fighting continued all afternoon in the vicinity of the line of departure, making it impossible for any advance to be made on our part. However, at 1430, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) enemy infantrymen, in wedge formation, advanced to the attack against the 1st Battalion.

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All our fire, including supporting tanks, tank destroyers, and heavy weapons were withheld until the enemy had closed to within 75 yards, at which time, the command "Commence Fire" was given. This force was virtually annihilated and by actual count, the enemy dead remaining on the battlefield when the smoke had cleared numbered one hundred and fifty-four (154).

Contact was established on the Right Flank with the 10th Infantry Regiment and with Task Force "Luskott" on the left. At 11:00, the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry was detached from the 12th Infantry and reverted to control of its parent unit and; just prior to the close of the period, the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion began to assemble in the vicinity of Allurier.

The 10th Infantry Regiment, Effective at 0700, the 10th Combat Team, which was comprised of the following units; 46th Field Artillery Battalion, Company B; 7th Engineer Battalion, Company C, 808th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company B, 5th Medical Battalion, became attached to the 4th Infantry Division. Movement was initiated at 0900 to the vicinity of Henshall (P-9927), and from that position, the Combat Team prepared to attack to the northeast.

At 1330, the attack previously mentioned was begun with the 2d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left, both battalions abreast, at which time elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, were passed through. Heavy resistance of artillery and small arms fire was met almost immediately and the 2d Battalion was unable to advance beyond the line of departure where fierce fighting took place throughout the remainder of the day. In the interim, the 1st Battalion meeting very little resistance was able to advance but held up until the 2d Battalion could come abreast.

The 22d Infantry, less the 1st Battalion, and with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, a detachment of tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion (comprised of tanks from several companies), and the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry attached, started movement at 1015 when the 3d Battalion left its assembly area in the vicinity of Bochi and moved to a new area in the vicinity of L-070313, closing therein at 1400.

This battalion was assigned the mission of establishing contact with the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry near Osweiler, clearing the woods to the southwest of Dickweiler, and securing a line running generally west to east from Osweiler to Dickweiler. By 1545, the 3d Battalion had completed its mission and one (1) platoon of Company K outposted the line just mentioned and at 1700, Company I was ordered to move north into Osweiler to reinforce Company L of the 12th Infantry.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, defended from positions generally around the town of Osweiler with the mission to hold present positions and to support the attack of the 10th Infantry Regiment by fire to the northwest until such time as these units might come abreast. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was received on the positions held by the 2d Battalion and likewise by those units in Osweiler and numerous attempts were made by the enemy to infiltrate small patrols into the town. At 1630, a nine (9) man patrol approached the town and was allowed to enter before fire was commenced. This patrol was then completely annihilated.

During the day, Task Force "Luskott" on the left of the division sector remained on its mission of denying the road net to the enemy in the vicinity of Mullerthal and the protection of the division's left boundary. Having noticed no aggressive action on the part of the enemy nor any.

Soc IV - Operations, Contd

activity that would indicate that he was still in position to their front, patrols were sent out at 1145 to harass him. These patrols located an enemy machine gun nest at P-979331 and encountered various groups in positions that would indicate a line being held generally across the draw to our front from P-979331 to 973333. When our patrols had withdrawn, all enemy positions were taken under fire by our artillery and mortars.

At 1615, the enemy was observed to be detrucking from two (2) trucks in the vicinity of P-974334 and this group was immediately taken under fire. Not only were they dispersed by this fire, but the majority were believed to have been killed. Contact was maintained by patrols with the 9th Armored Division on the left and with the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry on the right.

At the close of the period, it was felt that our over-all positions had been greatly strengthened as a result of the day's action and plans were formulated for the continuation of the attack on the following day. For the first time in a week, the weather which was greatly improved by mid-afternoon, permitted maximum use being made of air support.

The 8th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, maintained its positions fronting on the rivers. Active patrolling was continued throughout the day and no aggressive action by the enemy was reported. Only a few rounds of artillery fell in the entire sector.

23. 23 December 1944. On 23 December, the weather was cold and clear. The attack by the 10th Infantry Regiment was continued. This attack was supported, insofar as our own strength would permit, by elements of the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments. Carefully prepared artillery and mortar concentrations and air observation posts were successful in preventing the enemy from launching any attacks in our sector. Aircraft from the XIX Tactical Air Command, under the supervision of the Division Ammunition Supply Point Officer, bombed and strafed enemy troop concentrations to our front and succeeded in destroying a number of bridges the enemy had established across the Sauer River:

The 12th Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and D, of the 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 5th Reconnaissance Troop, attached, continued to defend and supported the attack of the 10th Infantry Regiment with fire. The enemy launched no attacks but heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire continued throughout the sector and at 1100, the 2d Battalion reported Nebelwerfer fire. The 5th Reconnaissance Troop, of which two (2) platoons were held in reserve in the vicinity of the CP, maintained contact between the 1st and 2d Battalions by patrolling between Consdorf and Scheidgen. Throughout the period, the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion remained in its assembly area.

The 22d Infantry, less the 1st Battalion, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; a detachment of tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion, the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry, and Company B, 91st Chemical Battalion, attached, supported the attack of the 10th Infantry Regiment on the west by fire throughout the day. The situation in CT 22's zone of action remained static.

A 2d Battalion combat patrol from Osweiler established contact

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

with elements of G1 10 at 1635. The antitank mine platoon, which has been previously attached to the 2d Battalion, completed laying mine fields to further the defenses of Osweiler.

Enemy activity consisted of moderate artillery fire on the 2d Battalion's rifle companies and heavy mortar-rocket barrages on Osweiler. Late in the day, plans were initiated whereby the 1st Battalion, which was still attached to the 8th Infantry, would assemble in the vicinity of Herborn to relieve the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry.

Regimental Combat Team 10 resumed its attack at 0745 with two battalions abreast, the 2d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right, and stiff resistance was met immediately, consisting of small arms, machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire. The enemy defended from positions favorably situated and well dug in. Company F made several attempts to advance up the draw to the north and at one time had succeeded in reaching the vicinity of L-030322. At each attempt, however, they were forced to withdraw to original positions to reorganize. One platoon of Company E advanced to the vicinity of L-020327 where contact was lost and the company made plans to advance the balance of the company to this platoon's position under cover of darkness. This attempt was made but was abandoned when small arms fire was encountered.

In the 1st Battalion's sector, resistance was strong on the left flank, making it impossible for Company A to advance. Company B, however, on the right reported little resistance and advanced to a position in the vicinity of L-045320, where they consolidated for the night. The 3d Battalion had remained in Regimental Reserve.

Task Force "Lockett", in position in the vicinity of Mullertal, noted very little activity on the part of the enemy during the day. Three (5) patrols were sent out during daylight hours and succeeded in further establishing the enemy positions in this vicinity. This entire sector remained quiet throughout the day with a little mortar and artillery fire being reported.

At the close of the period, plans were being formulated for the attack of the 5th Infantry Division through our lines on the left of Regimental Combat Team 10 on 24 December.

The 8th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, continued active patrolling and maintenance of its defensive positions throughout the period. Little or no aggressive action by the enemy was reported and only a few rounds of artillery fire fell in the sector throughout the period.

24. 24 December 1944. Again visibility was excellent and the skies were clear. All elements of the division contained the enemy within our zone of action until 1100, at which time the 5th Infantry Division, in conjunction with the 10th Armored Division on its left, launched a co-ordinated attack to the north through our lines. During this period, a new and greatly reduced sector was assigned the 4th Infantry Division by the XII Corps. The 2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group completed the relief of all elements of the division fronting on the Moselle River to the southwest of our new right boundary in the vicinity of Martert (L-0923). The new division left boundary which was established in the northwest of

Ssg IV - Operations, Contd

Caweller turned the responsibility of the remainder of the 12th Infantry zone of action northwest of this point over to the 5th Infantry Division as their attack passed through our lines, relieving elements of the 12th Infantry Regiment and Task Force "Lockett".

The 8th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion (reverted to Regimental control at 1700), Company A, less one platoon of the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized), attached (4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) and the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry reverted to control of the 4th Infantry Division and the 22d Infantry at 1230 and 1920, respectively). The Regimental Combat Team continued maintaining its defensive positions until all units south of the boundary previously mentioned were relieved by elements of the 2d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group. No aggressive action by the enemy was noted and only a few rounds of artillery fell in the sector throughout the period.

The 12th Infantry, less the 3d Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, maintained its defenses and by fire, supported the attack of the 5th Infantry Division. At 1645, the 12th Infantry was relieved of the responsibility of its sector by the 5th Infantry Division and movement was initiated to new assembly areas. The 1st Battalion closed in its new assembly area in the vicinity of P-973276 at 2030 and the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of P-9416 at 2230. The 3d Battalion, under the control of the 22d Infantry, maintained its present positions and made plans for being relieved by elements of the 22d Infantry on the following day.

Contact and communications with Company E, which when last reported was still in Eohternaach, had been out for several days. It was reported by prisoners of war that a strong American force still held out in the town. This gave new hope that our garrison there might yet be retrieved.

The 22d Infantry, less the 1st Battalion until 1920, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); Company B, 91st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, defended its present positions throughout the period and assumed responsibility for its new zone of action at 1100. No attacks or attempted infiltrations by the enemy were reported and the 1st Battalion, which had reverted to regimental control at 1920, moved to its new assembly area in the vicinity of Herborn, closing therein at 2045.

The 10th Regimental Combat Team continued its attack to the north in the direction of Eohternaach at 1400 at which time it reverted to the control of the 5th Infantry Division.

Task Force "Lockett" was passed through by elements of the 5th Infantry Division at 1200, and at 1945 was relieved of responsibility within its sector by the 5th Infantry Division. Effective at the same time, the Task Force was dissolved and all units therein reverted to the control of their parent organizations.

With a successful attack being launched against the enemy to the north and east, the 4th Infantry Division began planning a thorough and complete defense of its new sector.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd

25. 25 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the relief and the adjustment of units on the outpost line of resistance on Christmas Day. All units not actively employed in the day's operations, readjusted and conducted maintenance and care of equipment.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, less one platoon, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, completed the movement of those elements which had been relieved in the Task Force "Reed" sector by the 5th Infantry Division to their respective assembly areas. The 3d Battalion, with Company K on the left and with Company L on the right, defended the Regimental sector along the outpost line of resistance, while the other two (2) battalions remained assembled in depth and continued reorganization and training. The troop dispositions generally remained stable throughout the period and enemy action was negligible.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, assembled its 1st and 2d Battalions, less Company E, in the vicinity of Bourglinster (P-9023) and Schurtrange (P-9314), respectively. The 3d Battalion was relieved of its defensive positions in the vicinity of Osweiler and Dickweiler by elements of the 22d Infantry, and it moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Hunsbach (P-9315), closing therein prior to the end of the day. Immediate steps were taken within all the units of the regiment for reorganization and refitting. No further word had been received concerning Company E which was still believed to be holding out in the town of Echternach.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP). (This unit remained in general support of the 10th Infantry Regiment), Company B, 91st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon of Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, adjusted its positions. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry at 1050 and at the close of the period, the 3d Battalion was in the process of relieving the 2d Battalion of the positions held in the vicinity of Osweiler.

Enemy activity continued light in this sector due to the pressure exerted by elements of the 5th Infantry Division attacking to the north along the regimental left flank. However, the enemy continued to harass our troops with artillery and rocket barrages, the largest concentration reported being forty (40) rounds of estimated 105mm from four (4) howitzers which fell in the vicinity of L-076513 at 1050.

Elements of the division were relieved of the protection of Radio Luxembourg in the vicinity of Junglinster by the 1st platoon of Company D, 351st Engineer General Service Regiment at 1515.

26. 26 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued the relief and the adjustment of units on the division's outpost line of resistance and those not actively employed in the day's operations, reorganized and conducted maintenance and care of equipment.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the same attachments, less the tank destroyers which had been detached and reverted to the battalion's control, maintained the positions previously mentioned and continued reorganization and training within all units not actively employed.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained in the Division Reserve in the assembly areas.

See IV - Operations, Contd

heretofore mentioned. Reorganization and refitting was carried on within all units of the regiment. Contact had still not been established with Company E in Echternach by the attacking of the 5th Infantry Division.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with same attachments previously mentioned, less the tank destroyers which had been detached and reverted to the battalion's control, completed the relief of the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of Osweiler by the 3d Battalion, at which time the 2d Battalion moved to an assembly area at Berbourg where they remained throughout the period and carried on reorganization. The front line elements continued to patrol vigorously to the east and northeast within the regimental sector.

27. 27 December 1944. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division maintained its defensive positions and effected the relief of the elements of the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division on the high ground to the south of Echternach.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, maintained the defenses of its sector and continued reorganization and training. Active patrolling to the east as far as the Sauer River was conducted throughout daylight hours. The troop dispositions remained unchanged.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, remained in assembly areas previously mentioned and continued its reorganization. A patrol was dispatched, after coordinating with the 10th Infantry Regiment, to Echternach during the daylight hours. This patrol reported that they entered the town and found no sign of any human habitans. It was, therefore, assumed that Company E in its entirety had been taken prisoners of war and evacuated.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, maintained its defensive positions and beginning at 1500, effected the relief of elements of the 10th Infantry Regiment along the high ground to the south of Echternach in the vicinity of L-0433. An adjustment of boundaries effected this date, necessitated this relief which was completed as of 1800 by the 3d Battalion which in turn had been relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of Osweiler. Patrolling was continued throughout the period and the only enemy activity occurred when our patrols became engaged in fire fights with hostile patrols. Plans were continued to advance the regimental outpost line of resistance to the north and east.

28. 28 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain and improve its main line of resistance fronting on the west bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers and, at the end of the period, was moving troops in preparation for relieving elements of the 2d Infantry Regiment during the hours of darkness, 28-29 December.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Headquarters and Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, and one platoon of Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, maintained its positions and continued reorganization and training. A reinforced platoon of Company I relieved Company B, 22d Infantry of its positions in the 8th Infantry sector in the vicinity of L-095302 at 2130.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, sent advance parties to the 10th Infantry Regiment

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

sector in preparation for the relief of CT 10 during the hours of darkness, 28-29 December. The 1st Battalion was enroute to the vicinity of Echtermach and Lautenborn and the 3d Battalion was enroute to the vicinity of Bördorf at the close of the period to effect this relief.

The 22d Infantry, no change in attachments, continued its defense and conducted active patrolling within its sector. Company D, which had been relieved of its positions in the 8th Infantry Sector at 2130, moved to the vicinity of L-072312, but other troop dispositions remained unchanged.

29. 29 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its defense and assumed responsibility for its enlarged zone of action during the period. Training with the units not actively engaged on the outpost line of resistance was continued and active patrolling was constant.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Headquarters and Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, maintained its defensive positions and continued reorganization and training. Dispositions remained unchanged and patrols were sent by the 3d Battalion to the east as far as the river.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to relieve elements of the 5th Infantry Division throughout the day. The 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion of the 2d Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Bördorf, and the 3d Battalion completed the relief of the 1st Battalion of the 2d Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Echtermach.

At 0145, the 12th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for its new sector and the 1st and 3d Battalions adjusted their positions. The 2d Battalion moved during the afternoon to an assembly area in the vicinity of Alurier (P-9828), closing therein at 1705 in Regimental Reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and Company B, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, maintained its positions throughout the period. Combat and reconnaissance patrols combed the areas south and southwest of the Sauer River within the regimental sector for enemy and new outposts were established overlooking the river valley. Troop dispositions, however, remained unchanged and enemy activity was negligible.

30. 30 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued its defense along the Sauer and Moselle Rivers and continued active patrolling to the east.

The 8th Infantry, no change in attachments, continued to maintain its defenses and conducted training in demolitions and the use of flame throwers. Patrols reconnoitered the western banks of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers both in daylight and during the hours of darkness. Enemy activity was negligible and the only change in our troop dispositions were slight readjustments within the 3d Battalion on the regimental outpost line.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained its defense and made minor adjustments on the regimental outpost line. Reconnaissance patrols reconnoitered the south bank of the Sauer River within the sector but enemy activity was negligible.

Sec IV - Operations, Contd.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, maintained and improved its defensive positions facing the Sauer River. Two (2) reconnaissance patrols were able to cross the river in the vicinity of Linden during the hours of darkness, 29-30 December, but two (2) other patrols were frustrated in their attempt to cross in the vicinity of Rasport. The units not actively engaged in maintenance of the defense conducted training in demolitions and the use of flame throwers.

31. 31 December 1944. The 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain its defensive positions and conducted training for newly assigned troops. Plans were continued for all counterattack measures in the event that the enemy again choose this sector for another offensive. Several bombings and strafings during the period occurred within the division sector, the majority of which were believed to have been done by friendly aircraft.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Headquarters and Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, continued to maintain and improve its defenses facing the Sauer and Moselle Rivers with the 3d Battalion on the outpost line and the 1st and 2d Battalions assembled. At 1125, an unknown number and type of aircraft dropped high explosive and incendiary bombs in the vicinity of the Regimental CP. Roads in the immediate vicinity were badly cratered and two (2) buildings set afire as a result of this attack.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to defend within its sector facing the Sauer River. Those units not actively engaged in the maintenance of the front line positions conducted training in demolitions and the assault of a fortified position. Our patrols continued to reconnoiter the south bank of the Sauer River within the regimental sector and the only enemy activity during the period was in the nature of intermittent artillery fire.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and Company B, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, continued to maintain its defense facing the Sauer River. Those units not actively engaged in this maintenance conducted training in demolitions and the use of flame throwers. Patrols were dispatched near the close of the period to determine enemy dispositions in the vicinity of Edingen (L-1035) and Goddendorf (L-1135). Other patrols were sent to reconnoiter the west bank of the Sauer River within the regimental sector. Troop dispositions remained unchanged and the 2d Battalion was placed on an alert status and named as part of a counterattack force to be under the control of XII Corps in the event the necessity again arose.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion continued reorganization and training. Combat Teams were supported by the erection of road blocks, the laying of both antipersonnel and antitank mine fields, and by the preparation of demolitions in accordance with the division defense plan. The training in the use of demolitions and flame throwers being conducted within the infantry regiments was supervised by officers and men of this battalion.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: During the early part of the period the 4th Infantry Division was relieved and withdrawn from the Hurtgen Forest area in Germany and moved to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The movement, with the assistance of two attached Quartermaster Truck Companies, was made in three serials of Combat Team strength and took place on 4, 8, and 12 December. The movement was made in conjunction with that of the 83d Infantry Division which was then located in Luxembourg, and which was relieving the 4th Infantry Division. The 22d Infantry Regiment, the first Combat Team of the division to leave, was serviced in Luxembourg by the 83d Infantry Division and, reciprocally, the first Combat Team of the 83d Infantry Division to arrive in Hurtgen was serviced by us. On 7 December an advance element of the 4th Quartermaster Company departed for the Luxembourg sector to take over the service functions for elements of the division already there. The 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company remained in the Hurtgen area until the last of the division elements cleared in order to render any last minute maintenance or evacuation that might be necessary. The Division CP closed at Zweifall, Germany, on 8 December and opened the same day in the City of Luxembourg. The division was relieved from assignment to VII Corps and assigned to VIII Corps at 072400A December 1944.

2. In the Luxembourg area stress was placed on the care and maintenance of all equipment, with particular emphasis on ordnance weapons and vehicles, and an Ordnance Refitting Program was outlined for all division units. In addition to the organic 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company and the 2d Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, normally in support of the division, the 3424th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company was placed in support of the division, and one or more of these companies was assigned to each division unit to assist in the various phases of maintenance, repair, and general refitting of the unit.

3. The refitting program progressed satisfactorily until 17 December when the enemy counteroffensive, which was by now beginning to assume major proportions, caused our "quiet sector" to suddenly flare into action, and repair and maintenance yielded to combat activity throughout the division. However, by the end of the week the situation in the division sector had been sufficiently stabilized to permit a resumption of the original refitting plan. During this week the division was relieved from assignment to the VIII Corps and the First United States Army, and assigned to XII Corps, Third United States Army.

4. Throughout the month the supply of Class I continued normal and no difficulty was experienced in filling unit requirements for any type ration requested. The supply of Class III was also normal.

5. In Class II and IV certain serious shortages existed. Principal among these was the supply of automotive spare parts which hampered the refitting program to a considerable extent. Other Ordnance shortages at the end of the month were as follows:

Sac V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

Mortar, 60mm, M2	13
Mortar, 81mm, M1	11
Launcher, grenade, M7	497
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36"	85
Truck, 2-ton, 4x4	24
Truck, 2-ton, 6x6	11

6. In Quartermaster clothing and equipment, the most serious shortage continued to be overshoes. Although the division had been equipped 100% with this item during the previous period, a shortage was created when large numbers of reinforcements arrived without overshoes. At the end of the current period the division was short 1835 pairs of overshoes. Other critical Class II Quartermaster shortages were as follows:

Caps, combat	1100
Tent, shelter-half	1220
Cutters, wig	234
Outfit, cooking, 1 burner	812

7. With the advent of snow, which completely blanketed all the terrain by the middle of the month, a requisition was placed for 7640 snow camouflage suits. This item was not stocked by Army Engineer and had to be manufactured locally. At the end of the period 460 suits had been procured and distributed to the infantry regiments and reconnaissance troop.

8. During the period sufficient quantities of Class V supplies were available to meet all needs except antipersonnel and antitank mines, and all types of firing devices. The shortage of these items was critical.

9. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner.

Summary of Casualties

	Officers	EM
Killed in action	7	274
Died of wounds	3	73
Died of injuries	-	-
Missing in action	10	418
Seriously wounded in action	9	90
Seriously injured in action	-	-
Slightly wounded in action	48	831
Slightly injured in action	3	95
Captured	-	1
	80	1779

Total Casualties..... 1889

10. A total of 684 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

11. During the period from 1 December to 31 December 1944, a total of 183 officers and 2765 enlisted men reinforcements were received.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation, Contd

12. Strength:

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 December 1944			31 December 1944		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	45	7	130/14	46	7	128/8
6th Inf	151	5	2818	156	5	2927
12th Inf	137	4	2672	154	5	2811
22d Inf	138	4	2868	163	4	2864
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	19	2	122	17	2	120
20th FA Bn	31	2	592	32	2	587
23th FA Bn	32	2	545	33	2	543
42d FA Bn	31	2	521	34	2	510
44th FA Bn	26	2	530	30	2	527
4th Engr Combat Bn	23	3	587	26	3	548
4th Med Bn	34	1	397	35	1	389
4th Recon Tr, Mccs	5	-	127	5	-	154
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	4	2	78	2	-	7
Band, 4th Inf Div	-	-	-	2	2	60
Med Det, Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	-	-	-	2	-	11
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	163/68	4	1	157/51
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	3	-	142	4	-	141
704th Ord L Maint Co	8	-	147	9	-	148
4th QM Co	10	1	223	10	-	222
4th Sig Co	13	4	280	13	4	285
Total.....	714	40	12542	765	42	13119

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION
(Present and Absent)

4th CIC Det	4	-	12/2	4	-	10/2
Order of Battle Team No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	3	2	-	3
IPW Team No. 414 - VII Corps (12th Inf)	1	-	-	-	-	-
IPW Team No. 44 - VII Corps (12th Inf)	-	-	2	-	-	-
IPW Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	5	2	-	5
PI Team No. 31	1	-	4	1	-	4
MI Team No. 417-G	2	-	3	2	-	3
Air Support Party	1	-	6	1	-	7
Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co	1	-	4	-	-	-
Det 10B, 166th Sig Sv Co	-	-	-	-	-	3
70th Tank Bn	40	3	663	41	3	635
377th AAA (AW) Bn	36	3	768	35	3	753
803d TD Bn	38	1	61C	-	-	-
802d TD Bn (Towed)	-	-	-	33	2	709
Total.....	129	7	2574	122	8	2134
Grand Total	843	47	15016	887	50	15253

H. W. Blackley
H. W. BLACKLEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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Annex A - Order of Battle Team No. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 December to 31 December 1944.

2. The team has continued to function in close coordination with the AC of S, G-2 Section in addition to its regular duties of keeping a duplicate of the G-2 Order of Battle situation map, receiving and processing all captured documents, keeping an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities, and any other additional information necessary of translating documents, performing interrogations, acting as interpreters whenever necessary and assisting in editing the IPW report of the G-2 Periodic Report.

3. Activity in our now zone of action was virtually at a standstill until the start of the German offensive to the north. The 212 Volksgrenadier Division was apparently the southern anchorage of the German offensive and had the mission of pinning down and occupying as many American troops as possible in this area. It was a newly formed division consisting largely of ex-marine and ex-GAF personnel. With the many promises of victory made and frequent pep talks, the morale of this division was rather high. Once the offensive started, however, losses were so rapid and heavy that its morale dropped to a low level. Prisoners of war are now firmly convinced that they have failed in their mission and that the offensive is a failure.

4. The interrogation of prisoners of war continued to yield a wealth of tactical detail. Several captured maps and overlays with good tactical information were processed and the information disseminated, but on the whole there were few documents of any value processed during the period. Troops of the 212 Volksgrenadier Division were well equipped and their equipment largely new. Lack of training continued to manifest itself in the quality of German resistance in this area.

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Annex B - 4th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment

1. 1 - 2 December 1944. The detachment, less two men with each regiment, worked out of the town of Zweifall, Germany. Motor patrols were made within the division area for the purpose of checking all civilians and suspicious appearing soldiers encountered. All were found to have the proper means of identification and civilian passes were in order.

2. 3 December 1944. Agents of this detachment interrogated Christoph Stecher, Cologne-Heutz, who crossed lines in the 23d Infantry Regiment sector 2 December 1944. Subject is considered a potential line-crosser or low grade agent and has been directed to Army Interrogation Center for further questioning.

3. 4 December 1944. An underground cable located at F-002397 was reported to this office. Upon investigation by agents of this detachment no such cable could be found. Motor patrols were continued throughout the division area.

4. 5 - 6 December 1944. Motor patrols were made within the division area for the purpose of checking all civilians and suspicious appearing soldiers encountered. All were found to have the proper means of identification and civilian passes were in order.

5. 7 December 1944. Agents of this detachment took over the duties of the 83d CIC Detachment in the City of Luxembourg. As the regiments moved into position, offices were established at Mandorf, Senninger and Junglinster.

6. 8 December 1944. After the Division CP was closed at Zweifall, Germany, agents of this detachment searched the area for documents and made a final security check. In Mandorf, Luxembourg, 97 civilians were screened and in conjunction with the Civil Affairs, 4th Infantry Division, passes were issued to these people, so that they might work in their fields in the evacuated area. These passes did not give the bearers permission to enter their homes and were only valid during daylight hours. Further, the passes had to be turned in to the Gendarmerie each evening and picked up again at the Gendarmerie each morning.

7. 9 December 1944. Liaison was established with the VIII Corps and the 9th Armored Division CIC Detachments to coordinate travel control throughout the Luxembourg area. Further, the Gendarmerie in the City of Luxembourg was contacted so that there would be a complete understanding of the travel control established by our troops.

Agents of this detachment, working in conjunction with the Office of the Surote, City of Luxembourg, interviewed all persons requesting passes to travel. Arrangements were made to have an agent at the Surote Office at all times, and all cases will be investigated before permission to travel is granted.

8. 10 - 11 December 1944. A denunciation of Camillo Schumacher of Altwies by Jacob Schiltz of Ellingen proved to be based on personal grievances. 1st Sgt Selago of Cannon Company, 22d Infantry, reported the presence of enemy agent in the town of Assel. Investigation disclosed that in the translating of the incident, facts were misinterpreted. Joseph Leiton of Gostington was picked up by members of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, in the evacuated zone. Interrogation revealed that subject reentered the zone to get some personal belongings although he knew he was violating a restriction. Subject was turned over to the Luxembourg authorities.

9. 12 December 1944. Anton Dangelmaier, German, was apprehended near the village of Gostington by members of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, after he had crossed the Moselle River in an iron river boat. He did not possess any identity papers but admitted that he was formerly a member of the German Army. ~~He stated that on 22 March 1944 he had an appendectomy and since then worked in a labor battalion.~~ He said his only motive for coming to Luxembourg was to see his wife and children. Subject was placed in the prisoner of war cage pending further investigation.

10. 13 December 1944. Agents of this detachment investigated the circumstances surrounding a report made at 0400 that eight (8) enemy paratroopers were in the vicinity of Bettenburg, Luxembourg. Investigation revealed that several soldiers in uniform had asked people directions and being that it was dark the civilians feared that the soldiers might be German. However, no one who actually saw this group of soldiers ever stated that they were paratroopers, but during the transmission of the message the railroad guard in Luxembourg took it upon himself to interpret into the message that the troops were paratroopers.

A security survey was made throughout the regimental, separate, and attached units of this division to determine if the units were complying with the security requirements.

11. 14 December 1944. The 4th Signal Company reported that a break had occurred in the telephone cable between Division Headquarters and 4th Division Artillery switchboards. Civilians living in the vicinity were checked and an investigation was conducted, however, no one was apprehended.

12. 15 December 1944. Anton Dangelmaier, reported on 12 December 1944 as having crossed the Moselle River, was evacuated through prisoner of war channels to the First United States Army Interrogation Center. Investigation disclosed that his wife is living in Germany and not in Luxembourg. Subject had claimed that he came to Luxembourg to see his wife and children.

13. 16 December 1944. More than fifty (50) people apprehended for violating travel restrictions were questioned by members of this detachment. Subjects were of no counterintelligence interest and were forwarded to Luxembourg Gendarmerie for prosecution. Some of these people had been apprehended by members of the CIC Frontier Control team and others by members of this division.

14. 17 December 1944. A flashing light case was investigated in the City of Luxembourg after being reported by members of the Sorites Company, 70th Tank Battalion. As the neighborhood is thickly populated guards were unable to give the exact location of the window, however, all occupants were warned to check their blackout curtains and their names were checked with the local authorities.

A number of persons were apprehended during the day for violating travel restrictions. In each case the subject was questioned and then turned over to the Luxembourg authorities.

Louis Berger, a Belgium national, was apprehended at 151730A December 1944 in the City of Luxembourg, driving a Ceteron sedan painted olive drab color and marked with white star and also 35X MIA. Berger was dressed in an American uniform and was armed with a US Army .46 Caliber automatic. Berger claimed he was working for the AC of S, G-2, 35th Infantry Division, but had no orders attaching him to that division, nor did he have any travel orders. After going through channels, orders were received from the Third US Army CIC Detachment stating that the subject could be released and returned to the 35th Infantry Division.

The president of the Waiters' Union, City of Luxembourg was contacted in order to ascertain the names and identity of all waiters who are at present serving in local cafes and restaurants. A systematic check was started of all considered potentially subversive.

15. 18 December 1944. Joseph Georg, admitted Ortsgruppenleiter of Sonningen, was apprehended by members of this detachment attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment. Jean Pierre Kapp, Consdorf, after being denounced by a number of people from the town of Consdorf, was evacuated for security reasons. He is being held at the prisoner of war camp.

16. 19 December 1944. Jean Pierre Kapp, mentioned above, and Nicholas Kohl of Consdorf, were released from the prisoner of war camp, and turned over to the Luxembourg authorities for detention until disposition can be made by civil authorities. Both men are known to be pro-Nazi and were evacuated from Consdorf for security reasons.

A number of persons have been picked up in Luxembourg because they did not possess identity cards. The Luxembourg authorities are going to issue new cards but until that time it is necessary to have every one identified who has no pass.

Several persons were apprehended for violating travel restrictions and were turned over to the Luxembourg authorities after it was determined they were of no counterintelligence interest.

17. 20 December 1944. In conjunction with the Division Civil Affairs detachment, agents of this detachment assisted in evacuating civilians from the town of Junglinster and Consdorf, leaving only a few civilians behind to care for livestock. All persons were screened before the evacuation.

Eugen Bertrand, of Sonningen, was denounced by several persons in that town. However, investigation conducted in the City of Luxembourg revealed that the subject is a member of the Gendarmerie in good standing, and it is believed that Bertrand is the subject of some local jealousy and the case is considered closed.

Annex B - CIC, Contd

18. 21 December 1944. Four men were apprehended in the evacuated area near the town of Elvango, in our division area. They had regular Civil Affairs passes issued by G-5, 10th Armored Division to do work for the G-2 of that Division. However, this division was never notified that the men were coming into the area. The men were released after they were identified and the passes were confiscated.

One agent with an MP patrolled the City of Luxembourg to determine if there were any unauthorized persons wearing GI uniforms. Two young men wearing American uniforms were apprehended. These men had both aided our troops in the past. Arrangements were made with Civil Affairs to furnish these men with civilian clothes inasmuch as they were evacuees and had no other clothing.

19. 22 December 1944. A survey of the waiters in the City of Luxembourg was completed. Several of the waiters were interrogated and warned that the first report of any adverse information against them would mean their immediate arrest.

It has been reported through the Third US Army OSS Detachment that a Fifth Column in Luxembourg was communicating with each other by means of personal items and want-ads, lost and found items, and announcements of arrivals, for rent and for sale. Death notices, a few business ads, which will be censored, and official government and city notices only will continue to be published.

20. 23 December 1944. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop, (Mechanized) reported that a pigeon was released in the vicinity of Bous at 0030, and after circling to get its bearings, flew in the direction of the enemy lines. Investigation revealed that during the recent evacuation of that area, one resident who owned about fifty pigeons, was moved from his home. He was not permitted to take the birds and since that time they have been foraging the countryside in quest of food.

Eight (8) members of the local Miliz were apprehended near an Antiaircraft gun position. They explained they were out looking for German soldiers and entered the area occupied by the battery without knowledge of its location. They were identified, warned to be on the alert for, and keep out of the area of American installations.

21. 24 December 1944. John Jacob, Cologne, a German citizen, was apprehended in Zittig. Because of his recent return from Germany, subject was turned over to the Luxembourg authorities to be held until the troops leave the area.

Joseph George, arrested on 18 December 1944 as being a former Ortsgruppenleiter, was turned over to the Luxembourg authorities. He is disliked by the townspeople and will be held until the situation clears up in that area.

22. 25 - 26 December 1944. All counterintelligence records for the City of Luxembourg and neighboring towns taken over by XII Corps were turned over to the 212th CIC Detachment. Edmund Thane and Joseph Foitz, both of Mondorf, were placed under arrest as security menaces. Miss Elieth Thane was placed under house arrest. All three have been suspected of very closely collaborating with the Germans prior to the Americans' arrival.

The completed investigations of Edmond Thone, Joseph Foitz and Elieth Thone were turned over to the 212th CIC Detachment. The evidence gathered is not sufficient to warrant prosecution by an American Military Court, but their former acquisitions and activities with German agents is considered sufficient to categorize them as potentially dangerous to our security.

23. 27 December 1944. Eighty-eight (88) civilians, evacuees of the town of Semningon from towns in the evacuated area, were screened to further evacuation to the town of Esch.

24. 28 December 1944. The new CP area of the 4th Division Artillery was checked and all civilians were determined satisfactory security risks or also were turned over to the local union for surveillance.

25. 29 December 1944. Two (2) men were picked up in the town of ~~Wiedemans for violating curfew.~~ They were held overnight until they could be identified and cleared. After investigation they were properly warned and released.

George Koffler, a German national, was apprehended in the town of Comsdorf. He had an unofficial document in his possession which showed that he had been discharged on 11 October 1943 from the German Army. He was sent through prisoner of war channels to be detained as an enemy national.

26. 30 December 1944. Roger Schunacher, of Wasservillig, Luxembourg, was apprehended coming through our lines. He named an officer known to be in OSS and was sent back to Third Army OSS Detachment for identification. He was identified and released to the OSS Detachment.

Two men were apprehended in the evacuated area. They went to visit their home without a pass. Subjects were turned over to the Luxembourg authorities for disposition.



27. 31 December 1944. The Public Relations Officer reported to this office that he had observed a German helmet and winter cap laying along the highway in Hohenhof, Luxembourg, directly opposite a house occupied by Albert Siegen. A considerable amount of blood not yet congealed was found in both helmet and cap. Investigation disclosed that the Service Company, 2d Infantry Regiment, APO 5, US Army, had recently vacated this premise and it is believed the Service Company discarded the German equipment and due to the cold weather, the blood had not yet congealed.

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Annex C - Photo Interpreters Team No. 31

1. Due to unfavorable weather conditions during the first part of the period, no photography was flown; however, a number of good sorties were received during the latter part of the period.
2. A defense overprint was prepared to show enemy defenses as of 24 December 1944 and reproduced in sufficient quantity for division distribution.
3. Photo maps covering the present division zone of action were again prepared by this team and lithographed in sufficient quantity for distribution to platoons. This method of providing photographic cover, thus furnishing an up-to-date map of the division zone, has proven to be very practical.

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
BATTLE OF LUXEMBOURG

III. DEC. 20-24

- Our Positions P.M. Dec. 20
- Our Movements P.M. Dec. 20 & 21
- Our Movements Dec. 22 - 24
- Enemy Movements Dec. 20 & 21
- Enemy Movements Dec. 22 - 24
- (Dotted Lines - Retrograde)

Map Scale: 1/25,000

37





XX
4

BATTLE of LUXEMBOURG

I Dec. 16 and 17

- Our Dispositions Before Attack
- Our Movements Dec. 16
- Our Movements Dec. 17
- Enemy Movements Dec. 16
- Enemy Movements Dec. 17
(Dotted Lines; Retrograde)

Map: 1/25,000







BATTLE of LUXEMBOURG

III, Dec. 20-24


- Our Positions PM Dec. 20
- Our Movements PM Dec. 20 & Dec. 21
- Our Movements Dec. 22-24
- Enemy Movements Dec. 20-21
- Enemy Movements Dec. 22-24
- (Dotted Lines: Retrograde)
- Maps: 1/25,000





BATTLE of LUXEMBOURG
II. Dec. 18-19

- Our Dispositions at Beginning of Dec. 18
 - Our Movement Dec. 18
 - Enemy Movements Dec. 18
 - Enemy Movements Dec. 19-20
 - (Dotted lines: Retrograde)
- Map 1/25,000



WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179
(over)

81-0-5

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Master

Operation Report - AGO III Division

AG-25

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, 10 February 1945.
APO 4, US ARMY

RESTRICTED

AG 319

10 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.
TO: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.
THRU: Command Channels.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (c), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 January to 31 January 1945.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Larr, 015447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Gerten R. Bryant, 0287628, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry P. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, 0302396, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, 0373431, GSC

1. At the beginning of this month the Division Forward CP was located at Senningen, Luxembourg (P-322171). Combat elements of the division were engaged in holding the southern shoulder of the German counter-offensive which had been launched on 12 December 1944.

2. 1 - 2 January 1945. A quota was received authorizing three (3) officers and thirty-nine (39) enlisted men to return to the United States on detached service for a thirty (30) day furlough. The units concerned were notified and the following quotas were allotted:

- 8th Inf
- 12th Inf
- 22d Inf
- 10th Tk Bn
- 20th FA Bn

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1	9

MAY 8 1945

(624)

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

DECLASSIFIED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Walter D. Tipton, Lt Col, USA, 2508A DM
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 29 March 45

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

~~RESTRICTED~~

10 July 1945

304-03

Sec II - Introduction

	O	Em
44th FA Bn	-	1
4th Ron Tr (Iecz)	-	1
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	2
4th Med Bn	-	1
4th Sig Co	-	1
Hq 4th Inf Div	1	1
377th AAA (Afr) Bn	1	1
	3	39

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3. 3 January 1945. Two ceremonies were held at the Division CP for the presentation of Silver Stars to officers and enlisted men of the division and attached units. The presentations to the first group were made by Brigadier General James S. Rodwell, Assistant Division Commander; the latter group being presented by Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeloy, Commanding General.

A representative of the AC of S, G-1 Section in conjunction with the Division Decorations and Awards Officer initiated a recommendation for the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to the 12th Infantry Regiment.

4. 4 January 1945. The names of the officers and enlisted men to leave for furlough in the United States were submitted by units concerned. Arrangements were completed to expedite their departure.

5. 5 January 1945. A representative of the AC of S, G-1 Section continued to collect data for the unit citation by visiting the 12th Infantry Regiment to obtain factual evidence from the S-2 and S-3.

6. 6 January 1945. The AC of S, G-1, XII Corps (Colonel Veale) visited the AC of S, G-1, to discuss personnel matters.

7. 7 - 8 January 1945. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to XII Corps and Third United States Army by courier.

8. 9 January 1945. The AC of S, G-1, XII Corps, informed the AC of S, G-1 that the 4th Infantry Division was to be considered for the Fourragere (French Unit Decoration). Recommendation for this decoration was to be based on two outstanding achievements of the 4th Infantry Division since D-Day. Necessary preparations were made to procure data for proposed recommendations.

Passes, which had been curtailed during the critical period of the German counteroffensive, were resumed to permit troops to go on pass during the hours of daylight.

9. 10 January 1945. Due to the large number of recommendations for Bronze Star Medals to be processed, two representatives of the AC of S, G-1 Section assisted the Decoration and Awards Officer in this work.

10. 11 - 12 January 1945. The AC of S, G-1, XII Corps (Colonel Veale) brought additional instructions and outlined the proper procedure for submission of information for the Fourragere (French Unit Decoration), for which the division was being considered.

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11. 13 January 1945. Upon completion of preliminary work on recommendation for the French Decoration, the AC of S, G-1 personally consulted with Army and Corps G-1s to determine if any additional data was required. It was recommended by respective G-1s that the D-Day landing and the heroic stand at Luxembourg be submitted for the award.

Under the provisions of WD Circular No. 345, 23 August 1944, citations were drawn up by the AC of S, G-1, and approved by the Commanding General for award of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for period 1 January - 30 June 1944 and award of the Star to the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for period 1 July - 31 December 1944 to the 4th Medical Battalion, General Orders No. 7, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, this date, confirmed and authorized the presentation of this award.

12. 14 January 1945. The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to XII Corps and Third United States Army.

13. 15 January 1945. The 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company and the 4th Quartermaster Company were being considered for award of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.

14. 16 January 1945. A quota was received from XII Corps authorizing sixteen (16) officers and fifty-five (55) enlisted men passos of 72 hours duration in Paris, France. The quota was sub-allotted to combat elements of the division with the first group leaving 18 January 1945. This quota was to be continuous with the same number of officers and enlisted men leaving on pass every three days.

Major James W. Haley, O22244, Inf, 6th Infantry, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by Major General Lanton S. Eddy, XII Corps Commander, in a ceremony held at the Division CP, Sonningen, Luxembourg.

The recommendation for the Presidential Citation for the 12th Infantry Regiment neared completion.

15. 17 January 1945. The Division Forward CP closed and moved to new location at Heffingen, Luxembourg (P-922314).

16. 18 January 1945. The Assistant G-1, Third United States Army, (Lt Col Thomas), visited the CP and conferred with the AC of S, G-1 on personnel matters.

17. 19 January 1945. Under the provisions of WD Circular No. 345, 23 August 1944, citations were drawn up by the AC of S, G-1, and approved by the Commanding General, for award of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque, for period 1 January - 30 June 1944, and award of the Star to the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for period 1 July - 31 December 1944, to the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company and the 4th Quartermaster Company.

18. 20 January 1945. The proposed recommendation for the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to the 12th Infantry Regiment was completed and all material assembled for submission to higher headquarters.

The 6th Infantry Regiment and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion were commended by the Commanding General in Orders of the Day for their outstanding achievement in crossing the Sauer River during the recent offensive.

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See II - Introduction, Contd.

19. 21 January 1945. On data submitted by the AC of S, G-1, this headquarters, a recommendation for the award of the Oak-Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal to Major General Raymond C. Barton, 03401, USA, former Division Commander, for the period 26 June - 27 December 1944, was submitted to higher authority by Major General Lanton S. Eddy, XII Corps Commander.

A recommendation for the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to Colonel Robert H. Chance, 05616, Inf, Commanding Officer, 12th Infantry Regiment, was prepared and forwarded.

General Orders No. 11, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, this date, confirmed and authorized the presentation of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque and Star to the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company.

Major General Lanton S. Eddy, XII Corps Commander, presented the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Jackson, 021207, Inf, 12th Infantry, at a ceremony held in the Division CP, Haffington, Luxembourg.

The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to XII Corps and Third United States Army by courier.

20. 22 January 1945. The Division Forward CP closed and moved to new location at Larochette, Luxembourg (F-11327).

21. 23 - 24 January 1945. The 12th Infantry Regiment was commended by the Commanding General in Orders of the Day for outstanding performance of duty in taking the town of Pouchren, Luxembourg, and the high ground dominating the Our River.

General Orders No. 12, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, this date, confirmed and authorized the presentation of the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque and Star to the 4th Quartermaster Company.

22. 25 January 1945. A quota was received from XII Corps authorizing twenty-five (25) enlisted men to return to the United States on detached service as non-medical attendants on hospital ships and for a ten day furlough at their homes. Quota of five (5) enlisted men was given to each infantry regiment; one (1) enlisted man to each field artillery battalion; one (1) enlisted man to Headquarters Battery, 4th Division Artillery; one (1) enlisted man to the 4th Medical Battalion; one (1) enlisted man to the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one (1) enlisted man to the 70th Tank Battalion; one (1) enlisted man to the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion; and one (1) enlisted man to the 802d Tank Destroyer Battalion. The units concerned were contacted and informed of all pertinent information.

23. 26 January 1945. A ceremony for the presentation of the Silver Star to eight (8) officers and thirteen (13) enlisted men of this division was held by the Commanding General in the Division CP area, Larochette, Luxembourg.

The names of the enlisted men to act as non-medical attendants returning to the United States were received from units concerned and submitted to the Adjutant General for publication of orders.

24. 27 January 1945. In anticipation of detachment from XII Corps, the AC of S, G-1, visited the Corps G-1 to pay his respects and check on

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the status of recommendations for the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre which were submitted in October 1944.

The G-1 Periodic Report was submitted to XII Corps and Third United States Army.

25. 28 January 1945. The CP closed and moved to new location in Durler, Belgium (F-312773). The division was relieved from assignment to XII Corps and assigned to VIII Corps. The 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion was relieved from attachment to the division and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was attached.

26. 29 - 30 January 1945. VIII Corps informed this headquarters that the Paris pass quota which was authorized while in the XII Corps (sixteen (16) officers and fifty-five (55) enlisted men) was a permanent quota and the division could continue to fill it.

27. 31 January 1945. The AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps (Colonel Rignoe) visited the AC of S, G-1 and discussed various personnel problems and policies of that Corps.

Section III - Intelligence (with Annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 January 1945. The enemy defended along the east bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Except for an outpost in the vicinity of Wasserbillig which extended from 099244 to 103253, and possibly an additional small force at 115261, it was believed that there were no enemy troops west of the two rivers. The enemy reacted sharply to our patrols which crossed the rivers and employed harassing artillery fire throughout the period. Other than this, however, the enemy remained defensive. Several enemy aircraft were over the area during the hours of darkness and at least two JU 88s were observed during the day time. No offensive action was reported on the part of enemy aircraft. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division represented elements of the 212 Volk Grenadier Division and 999 Penal Regiment.

2. 2 January 1945. The enemy front lines and defensive organization remained unchanged during the period. Enemy patrol activity on both sides of the rivers increased somewhat. A friendly patrol was ambushed by about fifteen (15) Germans at 097342. Enemy patrols were engaged by artillery at 015384, 011389, and 008390. At least two (2) bombs were dropped by six (6) ME 109s at 1141. Several unidentified planes were over the area during darkness but no aggressive action was reported. Units in contact showed no change, although vehicular traffic continued brisk east of the river line.

3. 3 January 1945. Artillery fire showed a slight increase as the enemy continued to defend east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. Ibersdorf and Hinkel, previously suspected enemy strongholds west of the river line, were occupied by our forces during the period. Vehicular movement east of the river line was observed during the period. In each case this movement was engaged by artillery with good results. Enemy units opposing the

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4th Infantry Division remained unchanged.

4. 4 January 1945. The enemy continued to patrol west of the river line, while maintaining his defensive strength along the east bank of the Sauer and Moselle. A strong enemy combat patrol entered the eastern edge of Moersdorf at 0025. This force created a demonstration by shouting and firing small arms and after being subjected to our artillery fire scattered and withdrew. Enemy artillery continued harassing and interdictory. Enemy units opposing remained unchanged.

5. 5 January 1945. Strong enemy patrol activity was encountered north and northwest of Wasserbillig, but there was still no indication that the enemy had abandoned this policy of defending from his emplacements east of the river line. At 1315 considerable movement was detected in the vicinity 137336. Although the exact nature of this activity could not be determined it was believed broken up by a two battalion concentration of artillery fired into the area. An increase in enemy artillery fire was noted during the period with the largest concentration consisting of one hundred (100) rounds of combined artillery and rockets. An enemy tank was engaged by artillery and immobilized, vicinity 072363. Enemy units in contact showed no change during the period.

6. 6 January 1945. Patrols were active as the enemy attempted to probe our lines and positions west of the river line. At 101267 an enemy patrol of twenty (20) men was observed shouting and firing a machine gun into the air. After our artillery was directed at the patrol, shouts of "Heil Hitler" were heard. Additional artillery silenced the shouting. In the vicinity 082359 an enemy patrol was observed bent on relieving a German outpost west of the river line. This force was engaged by small arms fire and after suffering casualties withdrew. A fifteen (15) man enemy patrol entered Moersdorf at 1115. This force was dispersed by our artillery. Enemy units in contact showed no change.

7. 7 January 1945. The enemy remained defensive during the period except for patrols which operated in the vicinity of Moersdorf, vicinity 093248, vicinity 019248, and vicinity 095242. Enemy artillery fire continued harassing and interdictory in nature with no unusually large concentrations reported. Although enemy planes were over the area between 1830 and 1930, no action was taken by them. Units in contact were elements of 212 Volks Grenadier Division and 999 Penal Regiment.

8. 8 January 1945. Except for the usual patrol activity, the enemy remained wholly on the defensive during the period. Artillery fire showed a decrease and remained interdictory and harassing. Enemy units in contact remained the same.

9. 9 January 1945. Enemy patrols operated west of the river line during the period and there was an indication of rather extensive movement behind the pillboxes and emplacements east of the Sauer and Moselle. It was felt, however, that this activity was routine traffic and did not indicate relief or reinforcement of enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division. An enemy patrol was engaged by a friendly patrol in the vicinity 128346. At the time of this engagement our troops received fire from machine guns located vicinity 123341. It was felt that these guns also

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Sec III - Intelligence, Contd

covered the mine field from 118343 to 120334. Units opposing showed no change.

10. 10 January 1945. The enemy defended along the same line with the following locations reported by air observation post: An outpost with one machine gun, vicinity 120244; an observation post at 130286 with foxholes and a probable mortar position 300 yards southwest of this point, and an observation post at 161375 adjacent to a zig-zag trench 200 yards long, leading to the west and disappearing into the woods. Vehicular movement and noise of tracked vehicles was heard in the vicinity of Letsdorf during the period. Enemy artillery fire continued light and harassing. Units opposed remained unchanged.

11. 11 January 1945. Small patrols and harassing fire were the only enemy efforts against our positions during the period. Vehicular activity east of the river line continued brisk but as in previous instances, there were no indications that a concentration of enemy forces was being built up opposite the 4th Infantry Division. One tracked vehicle activity was detected in the movement of vehicles east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. A friendly patrol was ambushed in the vicinity of Steinheim. There was no apparent change in the units opposing the 4th Infantry Division.

12. 12 January 1945. In the vicinity of Hinkel an enemy force estimated to be about one squad supported by two machine guns attacked our outpost. Vehicular movement east of the river line was still in evidence. This movement was believed to be generally from northwest to southeast. Artillery fire was light and sporadic. Armored movement was reported in conjunction with the traffic detected east of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. It was apparent that in the CT 22 sector the enemy was making determined efforts to establish listening posts and ambush patrols west of the river line. Enemy units in contact showed no change during the period.

13. 13 January 1945. The enemy continued to employ patrols and harassing artillery to guard his defensive organization on the east bank of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. A friendly patrol entered Nassorbilling and proceeded to the junction of the Sauer-Moselle Rivers without encountering enemy opposition. No armor was encountered during the period, however, tracked vehicular activity was mixed with the generally heavy traffic which continued east of the river line. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division showed no change.

14. 14 January 1945. Enemy activity on the west side of the Sauer River was confined to small patrols and maintenance of outposts. There was a slight increase in artillery fire during the period. At 1430 two (2) enemy planes strafed in the vicinity of Herborn. One bomb was dropped in the vicinity of Scheidgen and Consdorf at 1445.

15. 15 January 1945. The use of patrols and harassing artillery was employed by the enemy to protect the approaches to the defenses on the east bank of the river line. A direct fire weapon was used against our troops in the CT 22 area. Enemy patrols were engaged at 008396 and in the town of Hinkel. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained unchanged.

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16. 16 January 1945. Except for harassing fire from artillery and machine guns, the enemy remained wholly defensive during the period. There was some indication that at least one small enemy patrol had crossed the Sauer River in the extreme northern sector in the vicinity of Bollendorf. On the rest of the division front over the customary enemy patrols were almost non-existent. Some vehicular movement was heard north and east of Eohernach. One ME-109 was observed flying northeast at 1040. No offensive action was taken by it. Units in contact remained the same.

17. 17 January 1945. Opposing the 4th Infantry Division in its new zone of action, the enemy defended along the north bank of the Sauer River from P-9142 to L-0040. The enemy occupied hasty and permanent fortifications which were well camouflaged and had excellent fields of fire. Outposts and patrols covered the north bank of the Sauer River across the entire 4th Infantry Division front. Buildings in this sector were employed by the enemy to house troops and as shelters for machine gun positions. The road north of the Sauer from Eotendorf to Kapendahl to Kleinreisdorf to Wallendorf was believed mined with antitank mines. The enemy activities during the period were of a defensive nature. Interdictory fire was received on the road between Eodornach and Emsdorf. An enemy patrol of four (4) men crossed the river in the vicinity of 930413. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division were elements of the 423 Regiment, 212 Volks Granadier Division, 915 Regiment, and 315 Volks Granadier Division.

18. 18 January 1945. After crossing the Sauer River during darkness, CT 8 by-passed enemy pockets of resistance and, although enemy front lines at the end of the period were fluid, A Company of CT 8 was at 914446 and L Company was in the vicinity 927441. Opposite CT 22 the enemy continued to defend along the north bank of the Sauer River. At first the enemy's reaction to our crossing of the Sauer was slight. When the situation became apparent to him, however, he attempted to halt our attack with weapons and troops at hand. Considerable small arms and machine gun fire was placed on the river crossing sites and later in the period an increase in artillery and mortar fire was noted at these locations. At the approach of our troops, enemy forces in Bollendorf came out of the buildings and counterattacked. This action was repulsed by our advancing troops. Enemy units in contact were elements of the 915 Regiment of the 352 Volks Granadier Division.

19. 19 January 1945. The enemy defended opposite CT 8 along the line Kleinreisdorf (940421) north to Our River, thence northwest to vicinity 920448 to 907447. There was no change in the line opposite CT 22. The enemy increased his resistance to our advance, employing small arms, artillery, and mortar fire. Several pockets of resistance continued to hold out in rear of our forward line. Heavy shelling continued in the vicinity of our bridge sites. It was determined during the period that the majority of the artillery and mortar fire was coming from emplacements behind the Siegfried Line which ran generally along the right flank of CT 8. Units in contact remained unchanged.

20. 20 January 1945. The enemy front lines existed along the Sauer River to the junction of the Sauer and Our Rivers. From this point the enemy's defense existed along the line to Hoesdorf, then to 907450. In CT 12 sector resistance was from small pockets at Longsdorf, 907459, and

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89469. The enemy resisted stubbornly from his strong points and pockets. In the town of Kleinreisdorf resistance was determined until sometime during the night when an enemy force of about one company withdrew. At Hoesdorf resistance was also heavy and the town was still in enemy hands at the close of the period. Artillery fire was heavy and constant throughout the period. Several small units were contacted by our forces during the period, however, all organized resistance was provided by elements of the 352 Volks Grenadier Division and primarily the 915 Regiment of that division.

21. 21 January 1945. Enemy front lines during the period - Fohren - 895465 - 905459 - 910457. In addition to the above line, the enemy held positions along the hill from 899463 to 905458 also a strong point at 894470. Opposite CT 8 the enemy defended along the line 910457 - Hoesdorf - junction of Our and Sauer Rivers. A small group of enemy was still on placed in the town of Hoesdorf. The enemy continued to occupy emplacements and strong points located on favorable terrain, mines, booby traps, and concentrations of artillery and mortar assisted the enemy in his defense. Three (3) enemy tanks were observed in the vicinity 905463. One of these was knocked out. From the vicinity of Bettel enemy tanks or assault guns fired on our troops. One enemy tank was reported knocked out on the road north of Randol. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained the same.

22. 22 January 1945. The enemy defended the same line with no change except in the vicinity 917447 where the enemy was forced from his strong point. Late in the period the high ground in the vicinity 875489 and 864478 was held by CT 12. Enemy small arms fire was heavy from the emplacements of the Siegfried Line. In the vicinity 917447 enemy resistance was initially strong but the positions were later overrun by our forces. The defensive line Walsdorf, Fohren, to 910469 offered considerable resistance. Two (2) enemy tanks were observed at 907467, three (3) enemy tanks were seen at 912466, and four (4) enemy tanks were reported moving from 860505 to 860520. Units in contact were the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 316 Infantry Regiment, 212 Volks Grenadier Division; 33 Engineer Battalion, 2d Panzer Division; 5th Company, 2d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and 915 Infantry Regiment.

23. 23 January 1945. Before CT 8 and CT 22 the enemy defended the same line. CT 12 attacked the defenses at Fohren and 861499 with the result that the enemy line before CT 12 was pushed east to 831503 - 895485 - 900481 - 901465 - 910457. The enemy continued to patrol west of the Our River in CT 22's sector. A force of about two hundred (200) enemy and four (4) tanks were driven from Fohren. A counterattack towards this same town was launched later in the period. This effort was repulsed. Considerable easterly movement of troops, motor transports, and horse drawn vehicles were observed. Units in contact were elements of the 352 Volks Grenadier Division, 212 Volks Grenadier Division, and 9 Volks Grenadier Division.

24. 24 January 1945. The enemy defended along the same general line as in the previous period. Enemy activity was slight except in the Fohren and Bettel areas where patrol activity was in effect. Small arms

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and mortar fire continued to come from the Siegfried line. Units in contact remained the same except for the addition of elements of the 226 Regiment of the 79 Volks Grenadier Division.

25. 25 January 1945. Enemy activity during the period was very light as the same general line was defended with small arms, mortar and artillery concentrations from behind the Siegfried Line. Two (2) enemy tanks were reported in the vicinity 908502. At 908406 a German machine gun nest was encircled by a friendly patrol which killed seven (7) enemy and captured one (1). Units in contact showed no change.

26. 26 January 1945. The enemy defended along the same line employing harassing mortar and artillery fire throughout the period. Small enemy patrols attempting to probe our lines were dispersed by artillery and small arms fire. There was no energetic attempt on the part of the enemy to regain lost ground. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained unchanged.

27. 27 January 1945. The only enemy activity during the period consisted of scattered artillery fire. Units in contact remained unchanged.

28. 28 January 1945. Although contact with enemy forces was maintained during the period, information relative to enemy activity and dispositions showed no change.

29. 29 January 1945. Enemy front lines during the period existed along the high ground east of the Our River from the hill at 893825 - 893820 - 885815 - 890807 then south and west along the river. The high ground in the vicinity 885840 north of the Our River was also occupied by the enemy. The situation in and north of Lormersweiler was unsettled. The enemy employed small delaying forces located near defilings and buildings. These forces were supported by automatic weapons and self-propelled artillery or tanks. One enemy tank was observed moving south from 895831 and another observed at 897820. An additional tank was reported at 890808. Enemy units in contact showed no change.

30. 30 January 1945. Before CT 3 the enemy was believed to hold the line along the ridge from 899815 to 898825. In CT 12's sector the enemy held the towns of Kemmeres and Elberath and the hill at 890816. Small enemy forces holding high ground east of the Our River provided little resistance to our advance. The town of Kemmeres was cleared early in the period. Later Kemmeres was also cleared. Resistance consisted mostly of small arms fire with some 120mm mortar and nebelwerfer fire falling in the CT 12 sector and near the crossing sites of the Our River. Units in contact showed no change.

31. 31 January 1945. Before CT 3 the enemy held the line from 909835 to 907844. In CT 12 sector the enemy organized positions on the high ground at 913828 and in the town of Inreim. Two enemy pillboxes were located on the southern part of CT 3's sector in the vicinity 909835. Two bunkers on the hill at 899819 were overrun by CT 12. The enemy defended high ground and towns employing small arms, mortar, and artillery fire in an effort to delay our advance. Enemy forces after being forced from Elohath, the high ground vicinity 894826, and Einzelborn, withdrew to the

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east towards Threin and Winterscheid. No action was taken by enemy armor or aircraft. At the close of the period organized resistance was under the control of the 226 Volks Grenadier Division.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 - 14 January 1945. During the first two weeks of January, the 4th Infantry Division continued to defend along the west banks of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers with three regiments abreast, the 12th, the 22d, and the 8th, from left to right. Each of these regiments in turn defended their sector with two battalions abreast and one battalion in regimental reserve.

A counterattack force, under the command of the Commanding Officer, 17th Armored Group, was constituted by the Commanding General, XII Corps in the event the enemy endeavored to launch another attack against the City of Luxembourg. Elements of the 70th Tank Battalion and one battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment were kept on an alert status as a part of this counterattack force and were to be available on call to move to any part of the Corps' sector.

In conjunction with the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, all regiments continually improved their defensive positions and in addition to maintaining an outpost line, extensive work was done on the proposed division's main line of resistance by emplacing mines, booby traps, scaffolds on bridges for demolitions, and the erection of barrier defenses.

Throughout this period, extensive patrolling, both in daylight and during the hours of darkness, was carried on by all units. Both reconnaissance and combat patrols constantly covered the river line within the division's sector and in several locations, succeeded in effecting a crossing to probe enemy positions.

An effective plan was employed of rotating battalions on the outpost lines, together with carrying on an extensive training program within all units not actively engaged in the defense. This training included instruction of the infantry by engineer officers in the use of mines, booby traps, demolitions, and flame throwers. The technique of assaulting fortified positions was reviewed and units continued training in this line under simulated conditions while actual firing of small arms, machine guns, rifle grenades, antitank rockets, and 80mm mortars was conducted on improvised ranges.

Enemy activity during the period was actually negligible, although several small engagements took place along the river line. On 4 January, an attack by eighteen (18) enemy infantrymen was made on the town of Hoersdorf (L-1128) in the 8th Infantry Regiment's sector but was successfully repulsed by our outpost in the town. Again on 13 January, the enemy attacked another outpost in the 8th Infantry Regiment's sector located in the town of Hinkel (L-1232) and in this instance was successful for three (3) officers and seventeen (17) men of the 2d Battalion were taken prisoners and evacuated across the river. Under cover of darkness, 13 - 14 January, Company G of the 22d Infantry Regiment, successfully cleared a small group of the enemy who had crossed the Sauer River and established themselves in bunkers in the vicinity of Hill 236 (L-1234). This small enemy force was destroyed and four (4) prisoners of war were taken. Artillery fire, both of medium and heavy caliber, and mortar fire continued to fall

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sporadically along the entire forward area.

2. 15 January 1945. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division continued maintaining the defense of its sector, conducted training with in those units not actively employed, continued vigorous patrolling, and made plans for the relief of the division by the 87th Infantry Division. The movement of our reserve elements to the new 4th Infantry Division's zone of action in the 5th Infantry Division's sector was initiated.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, maintained its defense along the west banks of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers with the 1st and the 2d Battalions on the outpost line, the 2d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. The 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Wecker (L-0222) until 1625, at which time it began movement to the sector of the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division. At the close of the period, this Battalion was in the process of relieving elements of the 10th Infantry Regiment, at which time it passed to the control of the 5th Infantry Division.

The 8th Infantry patrols skirmished with an enemy patrol in the vicinity of Hinkel (L-1233) at 142500Z January 1945, driving the enemy back across the river. Other enemy activity in the sector was negligible and the regiment began planning to be relieved in its sector by the 346th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector along the west bank of the Sauer River with the 2d and 1st Battalions, from left to right, on the regimental outpost line, while the 3d Battalion remained assembled in regimental reserve. Those troops not actively employed in the defense conducted training for future operations.

Our patrols combed the banks of the Sauer River within the regimental sector for possible enemy patrols. Enemy activity consisted only of small patrols during the hours of darkness and slight harassing artillery and mortar fire on our front line elements throughout the period. Our troop dispositions remained generally unchanged.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector along the west bank of the Sauer River with the 1st and 3d Battalions, from left to right, on the outpost line and with the 3d Battalion assembled in regimental reserve. The current training program continued within all units not actively employed.

Regimental patrols continued to patrol the Sauer River line within the sector and enemy activity was restricted to long range harassing machine gun fire, sporadic artillery, and mortar fire on our front line elements. At the close of the period, preparation was being made for the relief by the 347th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division. Our troop dispositions in general remained unchanged.

The 347th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of Rodembourg (R-9522) at 1600 and was attached to the 4th Infantry Division effective at this time.

The 346th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division began movement to the 4th Infantry Division sector at 2030 and was enroute to relieve the 8th Infantry during the hours of darkness, 15 - 16 January. Effective upon the arrival of this regiment within the division sector, it too was to be attached to the 4th Infantry Division.

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3. 16 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain the defense of its sector and the relief of the division by the 87th Infantry Division was continued throughout the period.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, was relieved from its defensive positions along the west banks of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers by the 346th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division. The responsibility for the 8th Infantry Regimental sector passed to the Commanding Officer of the 346th Infantry Regiment at 0945. The 8th Infantry Regiment, less the 3d Battalion which remained attached to the 5th Infantry Division, and less the 2d Battalion which remained in an assembly area in the former regimental sector, moved to its new zone of action, closing therein at 1500, at which time the entire combat team reverted to the control of the 5th Infantry Division.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector along the west bank of the Sauer River with the 2d and 1st Battalions, from left to right, on the regimental outpost line, while the 3d Battalion remained assembled in regimental reserve. Our patrols combed the banks of the Sauer River throughout the period and enemy activity was restricted to small patrols, harassing artillery and mortar fire on the front line elements. The troop dispositions remained generally unchanged.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector, with troops disposed as stated on the previous day. Active patrolling was conducted within the regimental sector and shortly after dark, relief of the regiment by the 347th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division was initiated. By 2140, the entire relief was completed and movement of the regiment to the vicinity of Savelborn (P-9335) was begun.

4. 17 January 1945. On 170900A January 1945, the 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for its new sector facing the south banks of the Sure and Sauer Rivers, Bettendorf (P-9042) to Bollendorf (L-0040). At the close of the period, preparations to attack to the north to seize a bridgehead across the Sure River on 18 January had been completed.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, relieved the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division within its sector facing the Sure River, from P-908426 to P-950423, during the hours of darkness, 18 - 17 January. At 0730, the 2d Battalion began movement from its assembly area, vicinity of Wecker (L-0322), to its new assembly area vicinity of Ermsdorf (P-9137), closing therein at 0930. At 0900, the 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for its new sector. The 8th Infantry Regiment was detached from the 5th Infantry Division and reverted to control of the 4th Infantry Division at 0900. During the period, two patrols from the 8th Infantry Regiment succeeded in crossing the Sure River on a reconnaissance mission to secure information for the projected attack. Company A of the 70th Tank Battalion was attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment at 1200.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector along the west bank of the Sauer River, as previously mentioned. At 1000, the 346th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division began the relief of the 12th Infantry

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and this was continued without incident until 2205, at which time the responsibility for the sector was assumed by the 345th Infantry.

The 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment meanwhile began movement at 1340 to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Schoenfels (P-9125), closing therein at 1715. After the relief of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 12th Infantry had been completed, movement of the balance of the regiment to an assembly area in the vicinity of Kelspelt (P-7923) was initiated, and these units were enroute at the close of the period. When the movement had been completed to the new assembly areas, the 12th Infantry was designated as Corps reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, having been relieved of its sector facing the Sauer River by the 347th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division during the hours of darkness, 16 - 17 January, continued movement to the vicinity of Savelborn, arriving in the new area by 1715. Relief of the 11th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division was completed at 2100 and at that time, the 22d Infantry assumed responsibility for its new sector facing the Sure and Sauer Rivers, from P-957430 to L-006400.

At 0900, the responsibility for the former sector of the 4th Infantry Division passed to the 87th Infantry Division and at this time, the 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for its new sector. Those units of the 87th Infantry Division, previously attached to the 4th Infantry Division, reverted to the control of their parent unit.

5. 18 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division attacked with the 8th Infantry Regiment at 0300 in conjunction with the attack of the 5th Infantry Division on the left. The attack was launched down the steep snow covered slopes of the south bank of the Sure River to secure crossings and to seize the high ground, P-915447, P-926442, and P-952427, fronting on the Our River and the Siegfried Line. The attack was launched without an artillery preparation in the hope of gaining the advantage of complete surprise. Before the enemy discovered our intentions, elements of two battalions had crossed the Sure River in two places, and were moving rapidly toward their objectives through the enemy's lines. It was later in the day, however, before all elements of the two assault battalions were able to cross the river. During the day, the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion had labored continuously under adverse terrain and weather conditions and while under fire by the enemy. Their efforts resulted only in one foot bridge being completed during the period but all foot elements of the 8th Infantry Regiment had crossed the river and two of the three regimental objectives were taken.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, attached, attacked at 0300 with two battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion on the left, the 3d Battalion on the right, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve, prepared to move on one hour's notice. The plan of attack follows:

The 1st Battalion on the left was to cross the Sure River in the vicinity of P-917427, seize a bridgehead and capture the high ground at P-915447. The 3d Battalion, on the right, was to cross the Sure River in the vicinity of P-935416, seize a bridgehead in that area, and capture the favorable terrain overlooking the Our River at P-926442. The 2d Battalion was to move when the 1st Battalion beachhead was secure,

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cross the Sure River in the 1st Battalion area, and attack east to seize the high ground at P-952427. The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and supporting Corps engineers planned to support the 8th Infantry Regiment by erecting a foot bridge, an infantry support bridge, and a treadway bridge within the regimental sector. The terrain, over which the attack was launched, was very rough, with steep slopes; the ice and snow rendered all roads and trails a glazed surface making supply, evacuation, and movement of supporting weapons a difficult problem. The ground was frozen hard causing the engineers to have to blast the approaches to bridging sites because bulldozers were unable to break the ground.

The 1st Battalion began crossing at 0300 in assault boats in the vicinity of P-917427. The enemy was surprised and before his defenses could be manned sufficiently to hinder the battalion's crossing, Company A and two platoons of Company B succeeded in crossing the river. Company A, by-passing strong points and eliminating small groups reached the battalion objective at P-915447 by 0930. Company B had difficulty in crossing due to enemy machine gun, small arms, and mortar fire making the point of crossing but succeeded with two platoons. The remainder of Company B and Company C were pinned down by heavy enemy fire from Buttendorf (P-9042) and from the high ground to the north, were unable to cross behind Company A, and remained in the vicinity of P-917424 until late in the afternoon. The two platoons of Company B that succeeded in crossing the river became engaged in a fire fight at Graf (P-9143) and remained in this vicinity throughout the remainder of the period. The engineers succeeded in erecting a foot bridge at P-925416, and under cover of darkness, Company C and the remainder of Company B moved to the vicinity of the bridge site and were preparing to cross at the end of the period to join Company A on the battalion's objective.

The 3d Battalion began crossing in assault boats in the vicinity of P-935415 at 0300 with Company L as the assault company. Company L, taking the enemy by surprise, succeeded in crossing the river. The company received only a small amount of small arms fire and, moving through the enemy's lines, reached the battalion's objective at P-926442 by 1030, where they remained throughout the day. Company I endeavored to cross behind Company L, and succeeded in getting one platoon across when enemy fire made further crossing of the river at this point virtually impossible. Company K moved to P-923413 where they crossed in rubber boats by 1215. On reaching the north bank of the river, Company K moved out into the attack to the north and drove the enemy from positions from which he was firing small arms fire on the foot bridge at P-927415. This foot bridge had been constructed under enemy fire by 0900 and due to the fire, could not be used until Company K drove all enemy from the area. Company I crossed on the foot bridge at 1620, joined the platoon which had crossed earlier in the period, eliminated a small pocket of resistance in the vicinity of P-928428 and, by the end of the period, had joined Company L on the battalion's objective. Company K remained in battalion reserve in the vicinity of P-925423.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to move forward to cross the Sure River in the vicinity of P-930413. The battalion began movement and reached the river but was unable to cross at the selected site because enemy artillery fire destroyed all boats that the battalion had planned to use. After Company K had succeeded in driving the enemy from the bridge area, this battalion crossed on the foot bridge in the order of Companies F, E, and G. By 1620, Company F had advanced to P-941423 where they held up their advance toward the objective until the remainder of the 2d Battalion had

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moved up with them. By the end of the period, the battalion had completely crossed and were reorganizing at P-952427 in preparation to continue the attack toward their objective on 19 January.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, completed movement to its new area in the vicinity of Ketspelt, closing therein at 0220.

The 2d Battalion, having been released from Corps reserve, initiated movement at 2000 to Eppeldorf (P-9239). The mission of this battalion was to be prepared to relieve elements of the 5th Infantry Division between the present 4th Infantry Division's left boundary and the proposed boundary some 3000 meters to the west. At the close of the day, the 2d Battalion was still enroute.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion, maintained its defense in the right of the division's zone of action. At 0405, the 1st and 2d Battalions furnished a demonstration in support of the 8th Infantry's attack. Enemy patrol activity was negligible but heavy artillery fire fell within the sector throughout the day.

6. 19 January 1945. On 19 January, the 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the north with the 5th Infantry and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry, capturing the town of Dettendorf and the high ground within its zone of action overlooking the Sure River. At 1630, supporting engineers completed a trestle bridge across the Sure River at P-918428, and at 1700 an infantry support bridge was completed at P-915427. Nine (9) tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion in support of the 8th Infantry crossed the river using a bridge in the 5th Infantry Division sector prior to the completion of the 4th Infantry Division bridges.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry, attached, was endeavoring to construct bridges across the Sure River at the close of the previous period. Only one (1) foot bridge had been completed and the need for supporting weapons and tanks on the bridgehead was growing as the foot elements pressed forward to their assigned objectives.

During the hours of darkness, Company C was successful in reaching positions on its objective to the left of Company A. Company B, in conjunction with Company A of the 10th Infantry, cleared all of the town of Dettendorf (P-9042) by 0950, taking approximately thirty (30) prisoners of war. Relief of elements of Company A of the 10th Infantry still in the town was completed by Company B and the evacuation of wounded civilians was begun.

In the interim Company I was successful in reaching the 3d Battalion objective and it took up positions on the left of Company L previously established there. Company K remained in position to the rear along the river line where small pockets of resistance were eliminated. No counterattacks were received by this battalion or the 1st Battalion during the period.

Meanwhile, Companies B and E continued fighting in the town of Kleinroisdorf (P-9442). This action continued throughout the day while Company G remained on the high ground to the north of the village to prevent any enemy reinforcements reaching their garrison. Late in the period, the enemy, evidently under the impression that the town was lost to our attacking infantry, began to shell their own troops heavily while many cease-fire flares were sent up in protest by the enemy in the town.

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In the afternoon, the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry moved to positions in the vicinity of P-900440, preparatory to relieving the 3d Battalion of the 10th Infantry upon its objective south of Longsdorf (P-8945). At the close of the period, the 12th Infantry Battalion was again moving forward to execute this relief.

The 12th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion and one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, remained in division reserve. The 1st Battalion moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Eppeldorf, closing therein at 1330. The remainder of the regiment, less the 3d Battalion, moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Ermsdorf (P-9137), while the 3d Battalion (less Company I) remained in an assembly area at Helmdange (P-8522). Company I continued to occupy Radio Luxembourg installations in the vicinity of Junglinster (P-9325).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector in the right portion of the division's zone of action. Enemy activity was restricted to one or two roving patrols and normal amounts of harassing artillery fire. No heavy concentrations were reported in any part of the regimental sector, and troop dispositions remained unchanged.

7. 20 January 1945. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division again continued its attack to the north; this time with the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments abreast, capturing the towns of Longsdorf (P-9045), Tandel (P-8845), and Kleinroisdorf (P-8412) within its zone of action. The high ground to the north facing the Our River was secured, and plans for its defense were begun.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, less one platoon, 91st Chemical Battalion, and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry attached, continued its attack to the north and northeast to seize the high ground overlooking the Our River. The 1st Battalion maintained the positions secured on the previous day commanding the high ground within their sector overlooking the river. In the afternoon, Company A had a small arms skirmish with a small enemy force 75 yards to their front, but no further activity developed within this sector. In the interim, the 2d Battalion had succeeded in clearing the town of Kleinroisdorf and continued to advance to secure its objective. With the exception of a few rounds of artillery received during the period, the 3d Battalion sector remained quiet and preparations for the defense of the area were continued. At 2025 supporting engineers completed a Bailey bridge across the Sure River at P-924422 in the 8th Infantry sector. The 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry was detached from the 8th Infantry at 0830 and reverted to the control of its parent unit.

The 12th Infantry, initially less the 2d Battalion, and with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon of Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached, attacked to the north during the period. The 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion of the 10th Infantry in the vicinity of Longsdorf at 0930 at which time it reverted to regimental control from attachment to the 8th Infantry, and at this same hour the 12th Infantry Regiment assumed command of its new zone of action on the left of the 8th Infantry.

The 1st Battalion attacked at 0846, passing through the 2d Battalion in the positions which it had just taken over from the 10th Infantry, and subsequently the town of Longsdorf was cleared. Just north of the

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village, the 1st Battalion encountered strong resistance which continued throughout the day. In the interim, a strong combat patrol from the 2d Battalion moved out at 1800, pushing north from the vicinity of P-893462, reported the town of Tandel (P-8945) cleared, and continued on to the north for approximately 300 yards before meeting resistance. At this point two platoons of enemy infantry were dug in along the road between Tandel and Fohren (P-8947). At this time, the 2d Battalion then moved into position in the vicinity of Tandel, remaining there throughout the remainder of the period. The 3d Battalion moved from its assembly area to the town of Eppeldorf, closing therein at 1100.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector in the right portion of the division's zone of action. Active patrolling was conducted and the only enemy activity consisted of artillery concentrations on all front line elements. The artillery that fell in the regimental zone of action was a noticeable increase from fire received on the previous day.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion continued in support of the division attack by maintaining foot bridges, trestle and Infantry support bridges across the Sure River. A Bailey Bridge in the vicinity of P-924422 was completed at 2025.

8. 21 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack to the north with the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments, capturing the town of Longsdorf (P-9045). The 12th Infantry encountered stiffening resistance in the vicinity of the town of Fohren (P-8947) and one company was forced to withdraw for reorganization.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, 91st Chemical Battalion, attached, resumed its attack to the north and northeast against the high ground overlooking the Our River. The 1st Battalion encountered stiffening resistance in the vicinity of P-914450 and employed coordinated infantry and tank fire to combat this resistance. The 3d Battalion extended its sector to the right and relieved the 2d Battalion of positions it had previously secured, at which time the 2d Battalion moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Bettendorf where it reverted to regimental reserve.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon of Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, and Company B, plus one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued the attack to the north with the 1st and 2d Battalions. Throughout the day the 2d Battalion encountered heavy artillery, small arms, and tank fire. Many casualties were sustained by Companies F and G. Company E captured and cleared enemy from the town of Longsdorf. In the interim, Company F encountered heavy resistance at the road junction in the vicinity of P-890466 and was forced to withdraw to the vicinity of P-890460 to reorganize and prepare for continuation of the attack.

The 3d Battalion having been committed passed around the left flank of the 2d Battalion through the zone of action of the 8th Infantry Division and at 2000 was in the vicinity of P-870472 where a hasty defense was organized in preparation for the continuance of the attack on the following day.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to defend within the right of the division's zone of

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action. Enemy activity within the sector was negligible and was restricted to very little patrol activity during the hours of darkness, and occasional harassing artillery fire fell within the sector throughout the day.

9. 22 January 1945. The attack was resumed again, and the 4th Infantry Division secured the town of Walsdorf against little resistance. The enemy, however, continued to hold its positions in the vicinity of Fouhren, and repulsed our efforts to capture the town.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously mentioned, continued its attack to the north and northeast. The 1st Battalion attacked at 1030, utilizing supporting armor and made good progress, capturing some advantageous terrain and taking some thirty two (32) prisoners of war. In the interim, the 3d Battalion continued to improve their defensive positions on the high ground facing the Our River while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Bettendorf.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion; Company B, Company C, one platoon of Company A and Company D, less one platoon, of the 70th Tank Battalion, attached, resumed the attack. The 1st Battalion began to push patrols down the draw to the northeast toward the Our River in the vicinity of Bettel (P-9147). The 2d Battalion in their advance encountered stiff resistance again in the vicinity of Fouhren, and resulting actions accounted for three (3) enemy tanks in this town. Company E had succeeded in advancing to the high ground directly north of the town prior to the close of the period.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion advanced rapidly against little opposition, and Company I captured and occupied the town of Walsdorf. Company K continued to advance and was in the vicinity of final objective at P-885500 at the close of the day's operations. The 2d Battalion of the 2d Infantry of the 5th Infantry Division was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and further attached to the 12th Infantry per verbal orders of the Commanding General, XII Corps, effective at 1840. This unit remained in regimental reserve and was to be employed in the event of a counterattack from the vicinity of Vianden.

The 23d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to maintain defenses within its sector. The 1st and 2d Battalions were initially employed on the outpost line, but at 1345, the 2d Battalion was relieved by the 3d Battalion and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Haller (P-9536) where it passed to regimental reserve.

10. 23 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack to the north and northeast at an early hour and succeeded in driving the enemy from the disputed town of Fouhren and in securing its objective, the high ground in the vicinity of P-883499. Several counterattacks by enemy infantry were repulsed in the zone of action of the 12th Infantry Regiment in the afternoon of the period covered.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, less one platoon, and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, of the 91st Chemical Battalion, attached, maintained the defense of its sector facing on the west bank of the Our River from P-917469 to P-957430. The outpost line was occupied by

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the 1st and 3d Battalions, from left to right, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Bettendorf. Enemy activity within the regimental sector was negligible, however, artillery and rocket concentrations of medium and heavy caliber fell sporadically in the forward areas.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion; Company B, Company C, one platoon of Company A and Company D, less one platoon, of the 70th Tank Battalion and the 3d Battalion of the 2d Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division attached, resumed its advance at 0430 when Company L began moving to the north to join Company K in the vicinity of P-881478. At an early hour, the Raider Platoon of the 1st Battalion endeavored to enter the town of Fohren from the south but fell short of accomplishing their mission when pinned down by small arms fire from the village. The 2d Battalion maneuvered to attack Fohren from the north, while the 1st Battalion continued to exert pressure from the south and at 0955, Company G was well into the town and meeting heavy opposition. This attack had been preceded by a smoke screen on the enemy's positions, and was supported by the attached armor. By 1030, the enemy had been driven out and approximately one hundred and fifty (150) infantrymen and several tanks were seen to withdraw to the east while eighteen (18) were taken prisoner.

In anticipation of a counterattack, Company G reorganized immediately. At 1350, 20 to 30 rounds of artillery fell on their positions and shortly thereafter, the enemy advanced up the draws from the east and northeast. Prompt artillery fire and tank support was furnished and the attack failed to develop. However, the enemy, dressed in snow capes as were our own troops, succeeded in taking one officer and seventeen (17) enlisted men of Company G prisoners in the confusion that resulted due to the similarity of garb. At the close of the period, the 2d Battalion was consolidating its positions and removing much captured enemy equipment from Fohren. This town apparently had been held by the remnants of a reinforced battalion.

In the interim, Company L continued its advance, by-passed Company K, and attacked to the northeast toward the high ground in the vicinity of P-883499. By 1600, the objective had been taken and an estimated company of enemy infantry had been driven off. Our casualties in this attack had been heavy as an estimated seventeen (17) were killed and twenty-three (23) wounded. At 1820, Company K, still astride the road in the vicinity of P-879496, repulsed this same enemy force which was endeavoring to cut off Company L by flanking their new positions on the high ground.

The 2d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector fronting on the Sure and Sauer Rivers with the 1st and 3d Battalions, from left to right, on the regimental outpost line. The 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Haller (P-9536).

An outpost of the 1st Battalion, in the vicinity of P-975408, was surrounded by a small enemy force between 0400 and 0500. Six (6) men were taken prisoner by the enemy and the remainder safely returned to our lines. Other enemy activity and artillery fire in this sector was negligible and troop dispositions remained unchanged.

At the close of the day's operations, a new division left boundary to become effective upon relief of elements of the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry by elements of the 5th Infantry Division by 240500A January 1945, was agreed upon by the Commanding Generals concerned and preparations for

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effecting same had begun.

11. 24 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to consolidate the terrain previously gained fronting on the southwest bank of the Our River from the vicinity of Vianden (P-902499) to the vicinity of Bollendorf (P-007400). Active patrols in the sectors of each regiment probed at the enemy's defenses remaining on the southwest bank of the Our River, and advanced our outpost line of resistance. Many new observation posts overlooking the river line and the Siegfried Line were established during the period. Plans were formulated to continue the attack to the northeast, and drive all enemy remaining west of the river from the division sector. Movement along the banks of the Sauer and Our Rivers was virtually impossible during daylight hours due to these areas being under constant observation by the enemy from the pillboxes of the Siegfried Line. Freshly fallen snow blanketed the area making any movement very easily discernible.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, 91st Chemical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector fronting on the west bank of the Our River from P-917469 to P-957430. The front lines were manned by the 1st and 3d Battalions, the 1st Battalion being on the left, originally during the period. The 2d Battalion moved from its regimental reserve area in the vicinity of Bettendorf (P-9042) and relieved the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion was relieved by 1130 and moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of Bettendorf (P-9042) as regimental reserve. Patrols reconnoitered within the regimental zone of action as far to the east as the Our River. During the hours of darkness several new observation posts were established on the forward slopes leading to the banks of the river. Enemy activity during the period was limited to harassing artillery and mortar fire on the forward elements.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon of Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion, Company B and two platoons of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued to consolidate the terrain captured within its sector fronting on the west bank of the Our River. Early in the period the 3d Battalion of the 10th Infantry relieved the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry of its sector northwest of Vianden (P-9049). At 0430 the Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division assumed responsibility of this sector northwest of Vianden. The new regimental sector faced the river from P-902498 to P-922472. The 3d Battalion, upon completion of the relief, moved into regimental reserve in the vicinity of Tandel (P-8845). The 1st and 2d Battalions made slight readjustments in their positions, and nipped up small pockets of enemy resistance. Improvement of the main line of resistance was continuous throughout the period. Enemy activity was negligible within the regimental sector and reconnaissance patrols were dispatched to the east to reconnoiter the enemy positions west of the river.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector fronting on the southwest banks of the Sauer River with the 1st and 3d Battalions from left to right on the regimental main line of resistance. The 2d Battalion remained in the vicinity of Hüller (P-9536) as regimental reserve. Work on the main line of resistance and regimental reserve line was continuous. During the hours of darkness, listening posts were maintained along the Sauer River banks, while patrols combed the regimental sector for possible enemy patrols.

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12. 25 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to readjust and consolidate its positions on the high ground overlooking the west bank of the Our River within its sector.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, less one platoon, of the 91st Chemical Battalion, attached, maintained the defense of its sector facing the west bank of the Our River from P-917469 to P-957430. The 2d and 3d Battalions remained upon the regimental outpost line while the 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Bettendorf (P-9042). Patrols reconnoitered to the east as far as the river line during the hours of darkness, but troop dispositions in general remained unchanged. Enemy activity within the sector was negligible and consisted of normal harassing artillery fire.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company A, 91st Chemical Battalion; Company B and two platoons of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, attached, continued to readjust positions facing the Our River. In the afternoon of the period, Company A advanced several hundred meters to the northwest of Longsdorf (P-9045) against light enemy resistance. Both direct and indirect artillery fire was heavy during the period of this advance, but the objective was cleared and contact was established with the 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry on the right. Enemy activity in the sector generally was negligible and consisted of skirmishes with our patrols during the hours of darkness.

The 22nd Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector with the 1st and 3d Battalions from left to right on the regimental outpost line, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Haller (P-9536). During the hours of darkness, the enemy harassed our front line positions with long range machine gun fire and light artillery fire. Other activity, however, was negligible and our troop dispositions remained unchanged.

13. 26 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division maintained its defenses overlooking the west banks of the Our and Sauer Rivers within its sector. Preparations were begun for movement of the entire division to assembly areas in the vicinity of Trois Vierges (P-7570) on 27 January. Relief of the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments by elements of the 2d Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division and the 31st Infantry Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division was completed by 2215.

The 3th Infantry, with Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector facing the west bank of the Our River from P-917469 and P-957430, with the 2d and 3d Battalions on the regimental outpost line, and the 1st Battalion in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Bettendorf (P-9042). At 1800, relief of the regiment by the 319th Infantry of the 80th Infantry Division was initiated. The 3d Battalion was relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 319th Infantry beginning at 1800 and completing at 2200. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion was relieved by elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 319th Infantry. This was accomplished by 2240. Upon completion of the relief, the 2d and 3d Battalions moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of Bettendorf and Hoestroff (P-9241) respectively while the 1st Battalion closed within its assembly area in the vicinity of Hedorrauch.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion

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attached, maintained the defense of its sector facing the west bank of the Our River from P-902500 to P-920460 with the 1st and 2d Battalions on the regimental outpost line, and the 3d Battalion in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Tandel (P-8846). At 1845, relief of the regiment by elements of the 2d Infantry Regiment and elements of the 319th Infantry Regiment was initiated. The 2d Battalion was relieved by the 3d Battalion of the 2d Infantry by 2215. In the interim, the 1st Battalion beginning at 1845 was relieved by elements of the 3d Battalion of the 319th Infantry and elements of the 3d Battalion of the 2d Infantry. This relief was completed by 2120. Upon completion, the 1st and 2d Battalions moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of Ernsdorf (P-9157) and Stogen (P-3737) respectively. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion had initiated movement and closed within its assembly area in the vicinity of Gilsdorf (P-8841).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector with the 1st and 3d Battalions from left to right on the regimental outpost line, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Haller (P-9536). Preparations were begun for relief of the regiment by the 318th Infantry Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division on the night of 27-28 January.

The 319th Regimental Combat Team was attached to the 4th Infantry Division upon closing within the division sector. Relief of the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments by this unit was carried out as stated above by the 1st and 3d Battalions. The 2d Battalion closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of Eppeldorf (P-9239) constituting the regimental reserve. Control of that portion of the division sector in which relief was made by elements of the 2d Infantry Regiment passed to the 5th Infantry Division upon completion.

14. 27 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division, with elements of the 80th Infantry Division attached, maintained its defenses overlooking the Our and Sauer Rivers within its sector. Movement was initiated to new division assembly areas in the vicinity of Trois Vierges, and relief of the 22d Infantry by elements of the 317th and 318th Infantry Regiments was completed by 2030.

The 8th Infantry, with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, one battery of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, moved from its assembly areas to the north during the period. The 2d Battalion moved with Combat Team 12 early in the morning and closed within the regimental assembly area in the vicinity of Hoffelt (P-7068) by 1515. The remainder of the combat team crossed the initial point at Hirsch (P-8288) at 1545. It closed in the same area shortly after the end of the day. Preparations were begun for the projected attack to the northeast on 29 January.

The 12th Infantry, with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, one battery of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, initiated movement to its new assembly areas at the hour mentioned above, and closed in the vicinity of Lonnert (P-6462) at 1515. Preparations were begun for the projected attack in conjunction with Combat Team 8.

The 22d Infantry, with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, one battery of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, and Company C,

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of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained the defense of its sector with the 1st and 3d Battalions on the regimental outpost line, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Haller. Relief of the entire regiment by the 318th Infantry (less one battalion) and with one battalion of the 317th Infantry attached, was begun at 1600. The 1st Battalion was relieved by the 2d Battalion of the 318th Infantry as of 1940, and the 3d Battalion by the 3d Battalion of the 318th Infantry as of 2030. The 3d Battalion of the 317th Infantry relieved the reserve battalion of the 22d Infantry in Haller by 2115. The 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 22d Infantry upon being relieved, moved to assembly areas in Hedernach, Waldbillig, and Christnach respectively, and preparations were continued for movement to new assembly areas in the vicinity of Trois Vierges on 28 January.

15. 23 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division, having been relieved within its sector in the vicinity of Durler, Luxembourg, as of 0630, continued movement to assembly areas in the vicinity of Trois Vierges, thence to the vicinity of Durler, passing through elements of the 37th Infantry Division in preparation for an attack to the northeast on 29 January.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, began movement from assembly areas in the vicinity of Hoffelt at 1200. The 1st Battalion closed in the vicinity of Alster (P-3580) by 2400, the 2d Battalion in Hespelt (P-3701), and in the interim relieved the 3d Battalion of the 347th Infantry Regiment. The 3d Battalion of the 8th Infantry, however, did not close until shortly after midnight where it was to remain as regimental reserve.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached, initiated movement from the vicinity of Lonnet (P-6462) at 1500 to relieve the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 347th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Burg-Reuland (P-3578) and the 1st Battalion closed at 1945. The 2d Battalion, however, remained in the vicinity of Monnet and prepared to move forward on the morning of 29 January. In the interim, the 3d Battalion closed in the vicinity of Bracht (P-8980) and assumed responsibility for the sector. Patrols were immediately sent forward in preparation for the projected attack.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, having been relieved by the 317th Infantry Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division, began movement from its assembly areas in the vicinity of Larochette, Luxembourg, early in the period. By 2215, the Combat Team had closed in the vicinity of Hautbellain (P-7475) where they remained in division reserve.

The 4th Division Artillery, with the light battalions attached to the infantry regiments, likewise completed movement to the new division areas where the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105R)(SP) and the 752d Field Artillery Battalion (155R) were attached for general support of the Combat Teams. All other divisional units had closed in the new areas prior to the end of the day.

16. 29 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division in a coordinated attack with the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments abreast attacked at 0630.

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Stiff resistance was met on the right (South) flank of the 12th Infantry Regiment's zone of action and limited progress was made throughout the day.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the attachments previously mentioned attacked in its zone of action at 0830 with the 2d Battalion, two companies abreast, and the 1st Battalion echeloned to the right rear, while the 3d Battalion remained in reserve. Opposition within the sector initially was light and the 2d Battalion advanced to the high ground southeast of Lomersweiler (P-8883). The 1st Battalion, following in the wake of the 2d, fought its way into the town of Lomersweiler and at the close of the day, two companies were still fighting in the village. Before daylight, all resistance had been eliminated and a number of prisoners had been taken.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with attachments as previously mentioned, attacked in conjunction with CT-8 at 0830. The initial formation was in a column of battalions with the 3d Battalion in the assault. Resistance encountered by the 3d Battalion was moderate and excellent progress was made. At the close of the day, this unit was in the newly captured town of Elcherath (P-3281). The 1st Battalion following in the wake of the 3d Battalion had closed within the town of Braecht by nightfall. The 2d Battalion's progress was retarded by heavy artillery fire coming from the south of the division's right boundary.

During the attack, the 22d Infantry with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained in division reserve in the vicinity of Haubellain.

17. 30 January 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack, clearing the towns of Lomersweiler and Hommeres. The attack, facing adverse weather and road conditions, was as much against the elements as against the enemy and very little progress was made.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, continued its fight with the 1st Battalion through the night of 29-30 January and completed the mopping up operations of Lomersweiler. Company A of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion immediately swept the road for mines from Maspelt (P-8782) to Lomersweiler. During the morning, the 1st Battalion continued its attack making little progress and leading elements reached the vicinity of P-893833 by the close of the period. Progress made by the 2d Battalion was negligible while the 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, no change in attachments, continued the attack during the night of 29-30 January. Companies I and K continued to advance and reached the reverse slope on the high ground in the vicinity of P-873826, while Company L crossed the Our River and captured the town of Hommeres by 1945. Upon the capture of the town of Auel by the 358th Infantry Regiment on the division's right flank, the road from Hommeres south to Auel was swept by Company B of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion. In the interim, the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry remained in the vicinity of Braecht and the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of Burg Reuland in regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion remained in division reserve.

18. 31 January 1945. During this period, the 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the north and northeast, clearing the towns of Elcherath (P-8961) and Weppeler (P-9084).

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The 8th Infantry Regiment with attachments as mentioned, during the early hours of the period, sent a strong combat patrol to the outskirts of the town of Urb (P-9184) and seven (7) prisoners were taken. Shortly after the first light, the 3d Battalion passed through the 1st Battalion in a column of companies and Company K advanced to and captured the town of Joppoler, while Company I secured Hill 470 (P-9033) and Company L reached the vicinity of P-908836 where heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire from pillboxes forced the company to withdraw. Plans were coordinated to move the 2d Battalion, motorized, through the 87th Infantry Division's zone of action the following day to their objective in the vicinity of P-912857.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with attachments as mentioned cleared the town of Elcherath (P-8981) with the 1st Battalion by 1005. Hill 491 (P-8981) was captured and patrols sent to reconnoiter the next objective in the vicinity of P-910820. Heavy fire, however, caused the patrol to withdraw. Preparations were begun at the close of the period to advance upon this objective during the hours of darkness.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached remained in division reserve throughout the day.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. The month of January was one of comparatively limited activity for the division, with no major operations being undertaken until the last few days of the period.

2. The supply of Classes I, III, and V items were normal throughout. In Classes II and IV certain shortages still existed. Snow suits, critically short at the opening of the period, could not be procured in sufficient quantities. In all, three thousand (3,000) suits were received during the period but the life of the locally manufactured garment was so short only twenty-one hundred (2100) remained serviceable at the end of the period.

3. Enough additional sleeping bags were received to equip all personnel of the division with that item. Two (2) blankets were turned in for each bag issued.

4. Sixty-six hundred (6600) shoes were received and these were distributed equally to the infantry regiments. Overshoes were turned in for shoes. At the end of the period all men were equipped with either overshoes or shoes.

5. Other important shortages of Class II items were as follows:

Mortar, 81mm, M1	7
Launcher, grenade, M7	144
Truck, M3-ton	30
Outfit, cooking, 1-burner	439
Tents, shelter-half	877
Cutters, wire	433

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Cup, canteen 329
 Reel equipment, CE-11 47
 Theodolite, M-47 1

6. On 27 and 28 January the division moved from the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, north to the general vicinity of Bastogne, Belgium. This move was accomplished with organic transportation augmented by six (6) Third United States Army Quartermaster Truck Companies. At this time the division was relieved from assignment to XII Corps and assigned to VIII Corps. The troops were committed immediately and were once again pushing through the Schnee Eifel towards the Siegfried Line as the period ended.

7. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

8. Evacuations: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties

	Officers	EM
Killed in action	7	150
Died of wounds	2	18
Died of injuries	-	-
Missing in action	6	74
Seriously wounded in action	6	39
Seriously injured in action	-	-
Slightly wounded in action	29	367
Slightly injured in action	1	115
Captured	-	-
	51	783

Total Casualties..... 824

9. During the month the casualty classification on 46 enlisted men was changed to captured.

10. A total of 346 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

11. During the period from 1 January to 31 January 1945, a total of 109 officers and 2351 enlisted men, reinforcements and casualties were received.

12. Strength:

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 January 1945			31 January 1945		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	48	7	128/8	47	7	130/8
8th Inf	181	6	2927	164	4	2823
12th Inf	154	5	3021	149	5	2875
22d Inf	151	4	2924	181	4	2919
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	17	2	114	18	2	112

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12. Strength: (Contd)

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1 January 1945			31 January 1945		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
20th FA Bn	32	2	499	31	2	505
29th FA Bn	32	2	545	33	2	497
42d FA Bn	32	2	509	28	2	494
44th FA Bn	30	2	527	34	2	492
4th Engr Combat Bn	26	3	545	25	3	551
4th Med Bn	35	1	398	36	1	415
4th Ken Tr, docs	5	-	134	8	-	137
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	2	-	7	2	-	7
Band, 4th Inf Div	-	2	60	-	2	61
Med Det, Sp Trs	2	-	11	2	-	12
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	157/51	4	1	152/26
Hq Platoon, 4th Inf Div	4	-	140	4	-	163
704th Ord L Maint Co	9	-	148	9	-	147
4th Cl Co	10	-	222	10	-	219
4th Sig Co	13	4	285	12	4	283
Total.....	785	42	13279	797	41	12994

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION
(Present and absent)

4th CIC Det	4	-	10/2	4	-	10/2
Order of Battle Unit No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 54 (8th Inf)	2	-	3	2	-	4
IPW Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	5	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	1	-	4	2	-	3
III Team No. 417-G	2	-	3	3	-	3
Air Support Party	1	-	7	1	-	6
3264th Sig Sv Co	-	-	3	1	-	3
70th Tank Bn	41	3	635	45	3	666
377th AAA (AK) Bn	55	3	748	36	3	734
802d TD Bn (Towed)	63	2	708	-	-	-
Total.....	112	8	2123	95	6	1435
Grand Total	897	50	15407	892	47	14429

H. W. Blakely
 H. W. BLAKELY,
 Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

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ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 January to 31 January 1945.
2. The team has continued to function in close coordination with the AC of S, G-2 Section in addition to its regular duties of keeping a duplicate of the G-2 Order of Battle situation map, receiving and processing all captured documents, keeping an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities, and any other additional information necessary, of translating documents, performing interrogations, acting as interpreters and emissaries whenever necessary and assisting in editing the IPW Report of the G-2 Periodic Report.
3. The assumption of new zones of action during the period always resulted in an increase in activity. The 212 Volks Grenadier Division apparently extended its divisional area to the northwest as evidenced by our contact with the 316 Infantry Regiment in our first new zone of action. The 915 Infantry Regiment of the 352 Volks Grenadier Division was also encountered initially but when these two regiments suffered heavy casualties, "Kampfgruppe" Wagner made its appearance to plug the gap thus created. This understrength battalion-sized combat team was a throw off of the 2 Panzer Division which was passing through on its way to a rest and refitting area.
4. In our second new zone of action the enemy was in the process of extracting his forces, fighting a strong rear guard action in an attempt to delay our advance as long as possible. The 326 Volks Grenadier Division was the main unit contacted though small elements of the 116 Panzer Division, 12 SS Panzer Division, 9 Panzer Division, a combat team of a reinforced regimental size from 2 SS Panzer Division, and 560 Volks Grenadier Division were also encountered in scattered small groups. At the close of the period the enemy was withdrawing to the shelter and security offered by the Siegfried Line. Few documents of any tactical value were processed.

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ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1. 1 January 1945. Israel Silberseisen, a civilian, was apprehended by Private First Class Mark Mann, 36235195, Company I, 8th Infantry, at 0800 in the town of Tompach, Luxembourg, just outside the Company's CP. At first the subject claimed that he was on his way to Wasserbillig to obtain some clothes, however, after an extensive interrogation at the CIC Office, he admitted that he had been sent through our lines by the Germans on an espionage mission. He was a railroad worker and had been promised a better job if he accomplished his mission.

His instructions were as follows: Subject was to travel a route starting at Wasserbillig to Lantornach, Lellig, Berbourg, Herborn, Givenich, Tompach, and then back to Wasserbillig. He was to find out especially how many armored units there were in the area, their unit numbers and strength in case of Tompach, whether or not they were fully motorized, and their locations; also the location of any other units observed. All this information was to be memorized. He also stated that he was supposed to return to the German lines on the night of 3 January, giving the password "Soedator", which was good until 1 January. Subject was delivered to Third Army Interrogation Center.

Joseph Kosseler, presently residing in Niederanven, Luxembourg, was under investigation by agents of this Detachment as being a possible security menace. Prior to the arrival of the Germans into Luxembourg, Kosseler was employed by the Radio Luxembourg as an engineer at the station transmitter located at Junglinster, however, due to disagreements with the German officials in charge of the transmitter for Radio Luxembourg at Junglinster, Kosseler in 1941, then in the employ of the Reichspost Dienst which controlled the operation of radio transmission, was transferred to Trier, Germany, where he was employed on the telephone circuits and studied the German system of construction of communication services. Subsequently, he was transferred to Erfurt and then to Berlin. Kosseler returned to Luxembourg from Germany on or about 3 December 1944 and is presently unemployed. Kosseler made application for employment with the Civil Affairs Detachment, XII Corps. The above information was turned over to the CIC Detachment at XII Corps, as most persons interviewed were inclined to have a feeling of distrust for the man although nothing definite was uncovered.

2. 2 January 1945. Bernard Joseph Nou, of Consdorf, was apprehended 011400A January 1945 in Senningen, Luxembourg, by the Military Police, 4th Infantry Division. Subject had recently been evacuated from Consdorf to Luxembourg City and was arrested because he had traveled from Luxembourg City without permission. Subject was turned over to the Luxembourg authorities for disposition.

Captain Oliver F. White, S-2, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, reported that certain Nazi uniforms had been found in a vacant house near the battalion CP. Investigation disclosed that the uniform found was nothing more than that of a member of the SA. The name inside the uniform indicated that it had been the property of one, Franz Schuler, of Bivier. The return address on the package which contained the uniform indicated that it had been sent to Schuler by one, Mathias Frost, a dealer in such articles in Bivier. The insignia of rank disclosed that Schuler was not

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of sufficient importance in the SA organization to have been arrested per se.

3. 3 January 1945. Headquarters Commandant, 4th Infantry Division, reported to this office that the security guards in vicinity of the Division CP had apprehended a man who had in his possession a .22 caliber rifle. The guards were unable to identify subject and allowed him to proceed to his home which was in the immediate vicinity of the town of Sommingen. Investigation by agents of this detachment revealed that subject has been a resident of this town for seventeen years, and is well known by all in the community. For many years subject has been in the Forest Service and, at the time of apprehension, he was heading for the surrounding woods in order to hunt. Subject was not placed under arrest.

Ernst Gentges, Chief of the Resistance in Ernster, reported that there were two men in American uniforms inquiring about the names of deserters from the German Army in the town of Ernster; that they were driving a jeep marked "CIC-Det 11-2" and one of the men was a Captain who dropped a piece of carbon paper containing the name of "Captain Higgard". Investigation is continuing.

4. 4 January 1945. A Counterintelligence Control Line was established in the 4th Infantry Division sector running from Consdorf through the following towns in Luxembourg: Zittig, Hemstal, Brouch, Boudeler, to road junction south of Wecker. Travel on or across this road not is forbidden to all civilians. A separate division order was published setting forth the division policy for manning this control line.

5. 5 January 1945. With regard to the case previously reported that "Captain Higgard" was in the division area checking on former members of the German Army, the following has been determined: Captain Higgard is a member of the 133d Engineer Combat Battalion, and is the person who sent the message in question. However, the two persons reported to be traveling in the jeep marked "CIC-Det 11-2" were members of the 5th Infantry Division CIC Detachment. They have been contacted and have confirmed this information.

Thirty-one (31) persons throughout the division area were screened at the request of the Civil Affairs Detachment. These people had all requested travel passes and of the thirty-one (31) applying, three were turned down for security reasons. The fifty (50) persons from the town of Consdorf were checked for the Civil Affairs Detachment. It is contemplated that from this group of fifty names certain people will be selected to return to the Consdorf area for the purpose of caring for the cattle.

6. 8 January 1945. Agents of this detachment patrolled the Counterintelligence Control Line in accordance with letter this headquarters, dated 4 January 1945, file AG 360,09, subject "Counterintelligence Control Line", in order to coordinate posts in the regimental areas and to rectify any difficulties that might arise. Investigation showed that the Inter-Allied Mission in Luxembourg was issuing passes permitting travel from the City of Luxembourg into areas of the 4th Infantry Division. This matter was brought to the attention of the 4th Infantry Division CAO and in the future all such passes will be countersigned by a 4th Division Civil Affairs Officer. It is further recommended to CAO that all civilians living in the vicinity of the control line be issued

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passes showing that they have permission to continue their chores in the immediate vicinity of their homes. The passes will be issued by Civil Affairs after the people are screened by CIC.

7. 7 January 1945. S-2, 20th Field Artillery Battalion, reported that Victor Frieden, Hotel Hostert, Rodt, said "Heil Hitler" in his house. Investigation revealed that subject returned from church and as he entered his home, gave a "Heil Hitler" in jest which was overheard by soldiers who detained him for questioning. Subject lived in Rodt all his life and everyone encountered cleared him. Case closed.

8. 8 January 1945. Permits to travel past certain guards on the Counterintelligence Control Line were issued to nineteen (19) persons. Arrangements were made with the Division CAO by which all passes issued to travel along the control line will be on a Civil Affairs form printed with green ink. These are the only travel permits issued in the 4th Infantry Division sector which have been printed with this color ink. In addition, each permit will be stamped with the CIC stamp. It is anticipated that about ten more passes will be necessary.

9. 9 - 12 January 1945. Agents of this detachment patrolled the Counterintelligence Line throughout the Division area. All posts were checked but no persons were apprehended. Several persons were stopped by the guards but after being screened by members of this detachment it was determined that they were bona fide residents of that area and they were released.

10. 13 January 1945. Jean Pierre Boentges was challenged by an American guard in Beidweiler at 131930A January 1945, whereupon subject, who was drunk, attempted to strike the guard with a cane he was carrying. Subject was arrested and brought to the CIC for interrogation. Subject carried as identification, Carte de Legitimation No. 451, issued at Hoesdorf, 26 September 1939, and which gave his birth as 17 July 1907, at Nooher. He stated he was employed as a farmhand by Kristoph Weidert, of Beidweiler, for whom he had gone to Junglinster at 1500 that day to obtain bread at a bakery owned by a man named Richette. Subject's story was checked after spending the night in the prisoner of war cage. He was thereupon released.

11. 14 January 1945. Franz Muller and his brother Camillo were apprehended in the vicinity of the Division CP. Subjects were carrying maps of this area which they claimed were found on the road. The maps contained no markings and both men were identified by the local militia as being residents of Luensbach and were no security menace. The men were later released.

12. 15 January 1945. The following persons were placed under house arrest as security menaces:

Mrs. Susanna Kopfler, of Wasserbillig
 Miss Irma Kopfler, of Wasserbillig
 Miss Henriette Kopfler, of Wasserbillig
 Mrs. Braun, of Grevenmacher
 Mrs. Becker, of Grevenmacher

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13. 16 January 1945. Agents of the CIC Detachment checked with Pierre Weirich, Burgermeister of the town of Heffingen. It was determined that there are approximately three hundred (300) refugees in this town. One of the residents is a deserter from the German Army, but he has registered with the local Burgermeister as ordered.

Agents of the 4th CIC Detachment contacted the 5th CIC Detachment to obtain all counterintelligence information available in the new division area. Arrangements were also made to have the Counterintelligence Control Line in this division join the Control Line of the 5th Infantry Division.

All counterintelligence information of the old division area was turned over to the 87th CIC Detachment.

14. 17 January 1945. Counterintelligence Control Line for the new area was inspected and posts selected. Points of tie-in with the 87th and the 5th Infantry Division were established.

Offices and billets of this Division Headquarters were searched for documents, maps, papers, or any other information of value which might have been left behind after the Division CP moved. Nothing of any importance was found.

The Division CP was set up in the town of Heffingen, Luxembourg. Agents checked the area of the new CP and made contact with all the town officials.

15. 18 January 1945. Three civilian requests for permits to travel more than six kilometers were investigated, approved, and returned to CAO.

Fire at 1230, destroyed the billets occupied by the Detachment and much time was lost retrieving equipment and locating new billets.

16. 19 January 1945. The towns of Christnach, Walldbillig, Haller, Bofort, Eppeldorf, Ermsdorf, Savelborn, Hiedernach, and Heffingen were visited by agents of the 4th CIC Detachment. Local Burgermeisters, Chiefs of the Union, and priests were interviewed concerning subjects of counterintelligence interest. It was found that very few suspects still remain in this area.

Eleven (11) civilian requests for permits to travel more than six kilometers were investigated, approved, and returned to the Civil Affairs Office.

17. 20 January 1945. A motor patrol inspected the Counterintelligence Control Line and all posts thereon. Quite a large number of civilians who attempted to pass one post or another were stopped by the guards and held for CIC screening. All of these civilians were screened and released. In addition, the road between Redernach and Stegen was reconnoitered for new posts to be established in that sector.

Ten travel requests were investigated for Civil Affairs and all persons approved for passes.

18. 21 January 1945. The site for the new Division CP was checked at Fels, Luxembourg. The Burgermeister, Chief of Police and Chief of the Gendarmes were interviewed concerning the counterintelligence situation of the town. It was learned that there were three hundred and fifty (350) evacuees residing there at the time. Also, twelve (12)

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former members of the Wehrmacht reside in the town. The 5th Infantry Division had been using this town as their Division CP and the 5th CIC Detachment was contacted for all their counterintelligence information.

Approximately four hundred (400) evacuees from the town of Bettendorf were screened during the evacuation of that town by the CAO. None were found to be dangerous security risks and all were evacuated to the town of Junglinster.

The following persons were placed under house arrest in the custody of the Luxembourg Police in Mersch:

Mr. and Mrs. Audrey, Christnach
Mrs. Barbara Tasch, Meffingen
Miss Anna Tasch, Meffingen

This action was taken because the above people were deemed potentially subversive and were living in the forward area.

19. 22 January 1945. The home of Gras Alfred von Obendorff, believed to be a former German Ambassador, was searched immediately after being uncovered by advancing troops. No documents considered to be of immediate tactical value were obtained. This was reported to the CIC, Third US Army for their information and further investigation.

Eight (8) requests for travel passes were investigated for Civil Affairs and all except one approved.

20. 23 January 1945. In the evacuation of the town of Tandel, some forty-seven (47) persons were screened, out of which one suspect was discovered. Investigation of this man (Johann Schwinger) developed that his brother was formerly a member of the SA, and that he himself is little above the level of a child. Subject was delivered to the Luxembourg Police with the recommendation that he be placed in a hospital for mental diseases rather than in prison.

Upon checking the Counterintelligence Control Line, it was found that the number of civilians picked up at each post appeared to have decreased. No suspects were found among those held by the guards.

21. 24 January 1945. Agents assisted in the evacuation of Longsdorf and Fuhren. Approximately thirty-five (35) people were evacuated from these two towns and placed in homes in Meffingen and vicinity. During the process of screening, Madame Joh Kramer, of Fuhren, was denounced as having given information to the Germans concerning disposition of American troops and Luxembourg personalities who had been friendly with the Americans. Sufficient evidence was not available to prosecute the subject, and she was therefore evacuated to the home of her sister in Esch where she was placed under house arrest.

22. 25 January 1945. Marcel Kohl, Luxembourg, was apprehended in the evacuated town of Kleinbourghof, Luxembourg, without a pass. At the time he was picked up he was riding in an American military vehicle. An investigation of the subject developed that he is considered to be a loyal Luxembourg citizen and that he had no knowledge of the evacuation of Kleinbourghof. Subject was later released.

Thirty-one (31) additional evacuees from the towns of Longsdorf,

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Tandel and Fahren were denounced by informants for having had traffic with the Germans during occupation. Both subjects were evacuated to Esch; there to be placed under house arrest by the Miliz.

23. 26 January 1945. Agents of the 4th CIC Detachment checked the town of Troine, Luxembourg, the contemplated site for the Division CP. The 6th Armored CIC Detachment had been set up in this town and they were contacted for whatever counterintelligence information was available.

24. 27 January 1945. Arrangements were made with the 80th CIC Detachment to turn over all the counterintelligence information gathered in the Fels sector. This included all Counterintelligence Control Line directives, lists of suspects, etc. The 80th CIC Detachment agreed to make an immediate take-over.

25. 28 January 1945. The Division CP moved from Fols to Troine and then again moved on the same day to Durlor. Following the evacuation by headquarters sections, the Division CP's located in Fols and Troine were inspected for classified documents and maps. No papers of a classified nature were found.

S-2, Division Artillery, reported to the 4th CIC Detachment that a woman housed in the artillery CP, Troine, aroused his suspicion when she was very secretive about allowing anyone to enter a room on the second floor. This woman (Frau Marcelle Frisch-Frazen) at first stated that her husband was a prisoner of the Germans, but later admitted that he was in the SS Police in Germany. She also had in her possession a sealed letter written by an anonymous person and addressed to a man in Sonningen, Luxembourg, which stated in short that someone would be informed upon regarding the cutting of American telephone wires. She was apprehended and turned over to the Gendarmerie in Bastogne. At the same time she was apprehended, two brothers (Nicols and John Huberty), being in a house adjoining the 4th Division Artillery CP, were likewise turned over to Gendarmerie in Bastogne. Both these men were of military age and had no papers of any kind in their possession which could identify them. They were strangers in Troine, though very friendly with Frau Frazen. This information was turned over to the VIII Corps CIC Detachment in Bastogne for further investigation, inasmuch as the division was moving forward at the time.

26. 29 January 1945. Agents of this detachment checked the town of Durlor and Espeler. No one was apprehended in either of the two towns. In the town of Wattermal, Belgium, agents of the 4th CIC Detachment apprehended a Herbert Elchoralt. After interrogation, subject finally admitted he was a German soldier who had deserted the German Army. Investigation revealed that subject was hidden in the home of Franz Wagner, of this village, and furnished with civilian clothes. Twelve days prior to the entry of American troops, Wagner admitted aiding subject, believing he was aiding the American cause in helping a German soldier desert the Wehrmacht.

27. 30 January 1945. Agents of this detachment checked the following towns in Belgium: Bracht, Qudlor, Lengler, and Burg-Reuland. During the screening of the town of Bracht, one Nicolaus Hansen, a German

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soldier in civilian clothes was apprehended. Hansen had papers to show that he had recently been granted a furlough. Subject was turned over to the prisoner of war cage.

28. 31 January 1945. Joseph Threis, member of the German Army, home on furlough, was apprehended in Bracht and evacuated through prisoner of war channels. Threis is a friend of Hansen, apprehended 30 January. Threis arrived in Bracht on 21 January 1945.

The CIC Detachment of the VIII Corps was contacted to establish a Counterintelligence Control Line in the Division Area. Arrangements were made to have a CIC team from the Advance Section of the Communication Zone patrol the proposed line.

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ANNEX C - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31

1. During the period 1 January to 31 January 1945, the Photo Interpreters Team No. 31 prepared photomaps of the division's zone of action near ~~Vielze (9849) and Hallsdorf (9845)~~, also of the present sector Brand - Scheid (9881) to Roth (0491).

2. Photography in quantity has not been satisfactory during the period. It has been received too late to be of any value to front line units. This situation could be greatly alleviated if the Photo Center would run additional copies of photography covering the prospective zones of action from existing negatives and not wait for photos which other units may or may not turn in.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179
(Cm 4)

300-0-3
(221)
Director
Operation Report, 4th Ed. DA
706 65

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Auth: 3d, 4th Inf Div
Init: *H. C. B.*
Date: 10 March 1945

AG 319.1

10 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU : Command Channels.

Section I - Authority
Section II - Introduction
Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, C)
Section IV - Operations
Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C4), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 February to 28 February 1945.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Inger, 015447, GSC
AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 0287623, GSC
AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, 0302396, GSC
AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr, 0375431, GSC

1. At the beginning of the month the Division Forward CP was located at Durler, Belgium (P-312779).

2. 1 February 1945. Major General *W. H. Middleton*, VIII Corps Commander, presented the Distinguished Service Cross to Colonel Charles T. Lanham, 015568, Inf, Commanding Officer, 22d Infantry Regiment, at an informal ceremony at the Division CP.

3. 2 February 1945. The CP moved to a new location at Lommersweiler, Belgium (P-881835).

A special quota of two (2) officers and twenty-one (21) enlisted men to return to the United States for thirty (30) day leaves and furloughs was received and apportioned as follows:

1
23 MAY 1945
6241
7 initials

ma
Incl 2-1

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

	O	ELI
8th Inf	-	4
12th Inf	2	4
22d Inf	-	4
70th Tk Bn	-	1
20th FA Bn	-	1
29th FA Bn	-	1
42d FA Bn	-	1
44th FA Bn	-	1
4th Med Bn	-	1
MP Plat, 4th Inf Div	-	1
4th QM Co	-	1
704th Ord L Maint Co	-	1
	2	21

4. 3 - 4 February 1945. The G-1 Periodic Report was prepared and submitted to VIII Corps and Third United States Army.

5. 5 February 1945. The CP moved to Amelschied, Belgium (P-947875).

6. 6 February 1945. The February quota of three (3) officers and thirty-nine (39) enlisted men to return to the United States for thirty (30) day leaves and furloughs was received and the following units were notified of their allotments:

	O	ELI
8th Inf	1	8
12th Inf	1	8
22d Inf	1	8
70th Tk Bn	-	2
20th FA Bn	-	2
29th FA Bn	-	2
42d FA Bn	-	2
44th FA Bn	-	2
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	1
4th Med Bn	-	1
4th Recon Tr (Mech)	-	1
4th Sig Co	-	1
610th TD Bn (SF)	-	1
	3	39

7. 7 February 1945. The CP moved to Bleialf, Germany (P-976832).

A special quota of one (1) officer and four (4) enlisted men was received from VIII Corps. This officer and enlisted men were to be returned to the United States on detached service for sixty (60) days for the purpose of touring war materiel production plants and informing workers of the vital need for their continued all out efforts. The selection of the officer and men was determined mainly on length of combat service. Other qualifications were that the officer and men be capable of speaking before an audience and presenting a picture of what the front line troops require from the home front. The infantry regiments and the 4th Division Artillery were informed and requested to submit the name of one enlisted man who met the qualifications required for this detail. The officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Kenan, O22670, Inf, 22d Infantry, was selected by the Commanding General from

a list consisting of one officer from each infantry regiment. The enlisted man selected from the 4th Division Artillery was a member of the 29th Field Artillery Battalion. This soldier was the only remaining artilleryman who fought in World War I with the 4th Infantry Division.

8. 8-9-10 February 1945. Brigadier General H. W. Blakeley, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, presented the Distinguished Service Cross to Major Howard C. Blazzard, O450239, Inf, 22d Infantry, at an informal ceremony at the Division CP.

9. 11 February 1945. At a ceremony at the CP of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (then attached), Brigadier General H. W. Blakeley presented one Distinguished Service Cross and five Silver Stars to personnel of that battalion. After this ceremony the AC of S, G-1 visited the S-1s of the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments to discuss the selection of personnel for return to the United States on leaves and furloughs.

The G-1 Periodic Report was prepared and submitted to VIII Corps and Third United States Army through message center.

10. 12 February 1945. The 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 752d Field Artillery Battalion were relieved from attachment to the division.

Personnel selected to fill the first furlough quota of two (2) officers and twenty-one (21) enlisted men for the month of February departed for Conflans, France on the trip to the United States.

11. 13-14 February 1945. A quota was obtained authorizing four (4) field grade officers 72 hour passes in London, England.

The citations for Bronze Star Medal recommendations which had been approved to date were received from the Adjutant General and were distributed to the units with the Bronze Star Medal Ribbons for presentation at appropriate ceremonies.

12. 15 February 1945. A letter was received from VIII Corps authorizing an allotment of British Awards and Decorations. The quota allotted was as follows: Distinguished Service Order - 2 (Awarded to Brigadier General and field grade officers, based on acts warranting Distinguished Service Cross or outstanding Silver Star). Military Cross - 3 (Awarded to company grade officers, based on acts warranting Distinguished Service Cross or outstanding Silver Star). Distinguished Conduct Medal - 1 (Awarded to Warrant Officers and enlisted men, based on acts warranting Distinguished Service Cross). Military Medal - 13 (Awarded to Warrant Officers and enlisted men, based on acts warranting Distinguished Service Cross or outstanding Silver Star). Units were notified and requested to submit recommendations to fill this quota.

13. 16 February 1945. Brigadier General H. W. Blakeley presented the Silver Star to Colonel Robert H. Chance, O5818, Inf, Commanding Officer, 12th Infantry, at an informal ceremony at the Division CP.

14. 17 February 1945. Another quota was received for one (1) officer and nineteen (19) enlisted men to return to the United States for thirty (30) day leave and furlough. The quota was apportioned as follows:

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

	O	EM
8th Inf		6
12th Inf	1	6
22d Inf		6
4th Ingr Combat Bn		1
	1	19

At a ceremony held in the Division CP, Bielef, Germany, Brigadier General H. W. Blakeley presented one (1) Distinguished Service Cross and twenty-six (26) Silver Stars to personnel of the division and attached units. Colonel Robert H. Chance, 05618, Inf, Commanding Officer, 12th Infantry, who has been attached, was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division. Special Orders No. 17, this headquarters, confirmed the assignment.

Brigadier General H. W. Blakeley, 07237, USA, was awarded the Legion of Merit by General Orders No. 15, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 11 February 1945.

15. 18 February 1945. Information was received from the AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps, requesting names of officers who desired to take infantry training or to attend a refresher course in infantry tactics at training camps. A negative report was submitted.

The Assistant AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps, informed the AC of S, G-1 that three (3) battlefield commissioned infantry lieutenants of the division could be sent to take an intensive three weeks' course in infantry tactics. The first course was tentatively set to begin 24 February 1945. Due to the shortage of officers, particularly infantry, a negative report was submitted.

The G-1 Periodic Report was prepared and submitted to VIII Corps and Third United States Army through message center.

The AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps, directed this headquarters to place two (2) enlisted men on detached service with Headquarters Third United States Army for the purpose of retraining as military police. The requirements were that the men have a Purple Heart and a AGOT score of 100 or more. If the men met the standards they would be transferred. The initial quota was filled by the 8th Infantry, with subsequent weekly quotas being given to the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments respectively.

16. 19 - 20 February 1945. The Assistant AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps, informed this headquarters that one (1) officer from the service elements of the division would be sent to the Infantry Training Center for retraining as an infantry officer. The Commanding General was notified and due to the overstrength of officers in the 4th Signal Company, designated that an officer be taken from that unit. First Lieutenant Richard A. Kramer, Jr, 01644600, Signal Corps, was the officer selected.

17. 21 - 22 - 23 February 1945. The AC of S, G-1, and Assistant AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps visited the CP and discussed personnel problems.

The furlough quota for the month of March was received. The division was allotted seventy-seven (77) officers and enlisted men to return to the United States on 17 March 1945.

18. 24 February 1945. VIII Corps directed this headquarters to furnish a captain, sergeant, corporal, and private to be used as a nucleus of a group being formed to originate a pass, leave and furlough policy for personnel to visit rest camps to be established on the Riviera. Due to the

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

shortage of officers, the Commanding General requested that this division furnish only the enlisted men. The S-1s of the 8th Infantry, 12th Infantry and the 20th Field Artillery Battalion were directed to submit names.

VIII Corps directed this headquarters to furnish two (2) officers and four (4) enlisted men for the purpose of training reinforcements. They were to be placed on detached service with the 17th Reinforcement Depot for a period of two weeks, reporting to the Commanding Officer, 17th Reinforcement Depot prior to 26 February 1945.

19. 25 February 1945. The G-1 Periodic Report was prepared and submitted to VIII Corps and Third United States Army.

The enlisted men selected for the Riviera detail departed for Verdun to report to the AC of S, G-1 Section, 12th Army Group.

The names of the officers and enlisted men to act as instructors at the 17th Reinforcement Depot were received from the three infantry regiments. The selection was made as follows:

	O	EM
8th Inf	1	1
12th Inf	1	2
22d Inf	-	1
	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>

20. 26 - 27 February 1945. Two (2) enlisted men from the 12th Infantry were placed on detached service with Headquarters Third United States Army in compliance with instructions to furnish two (2) enlisted men each week to be trained as potential Military Police.

21. 28 February 1945. The recommendations for British Decorations were received from units and selection of those to be forwarded was made by the Commanding General.

VIII Corps informed this headquarters that the presentation ceremony for the award of the Distinguished Service Order (British Decoration) to Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Teague, O292659, Inf, 22d Infantry, would be in Spa, Belgium, 8 March 1945. Recommendation for this award was submitted June 1944.

The United States furlough quota of seventy-seven (77) - six (6) officers and seventy-one (71) enlisted men for the month of March received 23 February 1945, was apportioned as follows:

	O	EM
8th Inf	2	16
12th Inf	1	13
22d Inf	1	14
70th Tk Bn	1	4
20th FA Bn	-	2
29th FA Bn	-	2
42d FA Bn	-	2
44th FA Bn	-	2
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	4
4th Med Bn	1	3
4th Ron Tr (Mech)	-	1
4th Sig Co	-	1
377th AAA (AI) Bn	-	3

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

	0	EMA
Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	-	1
610th TD Bn. (SP)	-	3
	6	71

The units were notified of their quotas and requested to submit rosters to this headquarters by 121200A March 1945. The officers and men were to report to the Adjutant General 161700A March 1945 equipped as set forth in European Theater of Operations, United States Army Circular No. 124, dated 24 December 1944, with all records properly indorsed.

Every third day throughout the month a total of sixteen (16) officers and fifty-five (55) enlisted men of the division and attached units departed for Paris on 72 hour passes. Transportation was furnished by different units for each trip.

The G-1 Estimated Loss Report was telephoned to VIII Corps daily.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 February 1945. The enemy was unable to set up a defensive line as our troops continued to advance, meeting only light resistance. Small arms engagements occurred as our troops cleared the towns of Dopplar (9084), Urb (9184) and Ihren (9182). No resistance was encountered as our troops cleared the towns of Matzenich (9484) and Winterscheid (9482). Units falling back before our advance were elements of 326 Engineer Battalion, 751 and 752 Regiments of the 326 Volks Grenadier Division.

2. 2 February 1945. The enemy manned hasty defenses and installations in the Siegfried Line as he defended along the line 907861 - 969355, and in the town of Bleialf (9683). Direct fire was received from installations in the vicinity of Brandscheid (9881). In all thirty-one (31) pillboxes could be observed in the vicinity of Brandscheid, however, at this time no activity could be observed around these fortifications. Enemy resistance showed a sharp increase during the period when heavy small arms fire and artillery was received as our troops attempted to take high ground south of Radscheid, and along the line 959835 - 951831 - 953825 - 950818. Two enemy tanks engaged our troops from the vicinity of the buildings at 964836 and from Brandscheid. Enemy resistance continued to be from elements of the 326 Volks Grenadier Division.

3. 3 February 1945. At the close of the period it was believed that the enemy had withdrawn into the Siegfried defenses along the line 015855 - 000835 - Brandscheid. Enemy resistance continued in Bleialf until 1020 when the town was taken. No opposition was met as the towns of Oberscheid (9885), Hatendorf (9884) and Buchet (9833) were cleared. Units in contact were elements of the 326 Volks Grenadier Division, 9 SS Panzer Division, 18 Volks Grenadier Division, 9 Werfor Brigade, and 47 Engineer Brigade.

4. 4 February 1945. Opposite CT 8 the enemy occupied hastily dug in positions from 028853 to 010838. Against CT 8 the enemy held the line 012841 - 007838 - 004830 - 002828 - 997826. Along the rest of the 4th

Infantry Division sector the enemy occupied permanent fortifications of the Siegfried line. The attack of CT 8 surprised the enemy whose troops were thrown into confusion and forced to surrender after being surrounded and engaged by small arms fire. By the end of the period most of the pillboxes in the CT 8 sector had been cleared. CT 22 at first advanced against light resistance which increased during the period. Direct fire from tanks was also received by CT 22. One enemy tank was reported on the road from 002832 to 003834 moving up and down the road firing harassing fire at our front line troops. An unknown number of tanks were reported vicinity 008820 and a self-propelled gun was detected vicinity 021827. Units opposing were elements of the 326 Volks Grenadier Division and elements of smaller units.

5. 5 February 1945. In addition to manning the permanent fortifications of the Siegfried line, the enemy defended from newly dug trenches which were connected to the concrete emplacements by ditches. The enemy resisted the advance of CT 8 to the northeast with intense small arms, mortar, artillery, and rocket fire which showed an increase towards the close of the period. The enemy displayed a poorly organized defense against CT 22. At about 1500 the town of Brandscheid was occupied by CT 22. Tanks or self-propelled guns were reported operating in the vicinity of Brandscheid. Units in contact were elements of the 326 Volks Grenadier Division, 18 Volks Grenadier Division, 409 Volks Artillery Corps, 1082 Security Battalion, and 905 Assault Gun Brigade.

6. 6 February 1945. The enemy defended from emplacements in and around the installations of the Siegfried line along the line 041875 - 045860 - 026338 - 025833 - 028830 - 027823 - 029815 - 024811 - 011802.

Against CT 8 the enemy defended particularly from crossroads employing infantry weapons supported by self-propelled guns, rockets, and mortar fire. Shortly before first light a counterattack of about four hundred (400) enemy hit elements of CT 22 in Brandscheid. This attack was repulsed and one hundred and sixty (160) prisoners of war were taken after which time CT 22 continued the attack to the east clearing Konthelm (0282), Sellerich (0181) and Herscheid (0181) against strong enemy delaying action. Tanks and assault guns were employed by the enemy at 035868 - 035824 - and Sellerich. Units opposed were elements of: 326 Volks Grenadier Division, 276 Volks Grenadier Division, 18 Volks Grenadier Division, 1082 Security Battalion, 409 Volks Artillery Corps, and 905 Assault Gun Brigade.

7. 7 February 1945. The enemy defended along the line 074045 - Gondenbrett - 047817 - 044818 - 037813 - 039802 - 032794 - 025794 - 020792. CT 8 encountered light resistance in attacking Mascheid (0564). Resistance increased considerably in the vicinity of Gondenbrett. Enemy opposition to the advance of CT 22 was light, consisting of small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, and mortar. At 1440 three (3) separate counterattacks were launched by the enemy. The first attack, consisting of tanks and infantry, came from the vicinity of Miedermehlen (0480) and advanced toward Hill 553 (0880). Initially our troops were forced from the hill but regained it late in the period. The second attack occurred at 1450 when an unknown number of enemy attacked from Steinmehlen (0279). This attack was repulsed by artillery. At 1610 an estimated company of infantry and three tanks attacked from the vicinity 045815 toward Obermehlen (0481). At the

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd)

close of the period our troops in the town had been reinforced by armor and the counterattack had been repulsed. Units in contact were elements of: 326 Volks Grenadier Division, 5 Para Division, 18 Volks Grenadier Division, and numerous small units.

8. 8 February 1945. The enemy defended from hastily constructed field fortifications, and from buildings. At the close of the period the enemy front line was along the ridge line on the west bank of the Prum River to the vicinity 052314 - 047807 - Niedermehlen - 035795 - Steinmehlen - 018793. In the northern sector the enemy offered slight resistance to the advance of CT 8, however, in the vicinity of Gondembrett a more determined stand was made. In both areas, however, the enemy was slowly forced to fall back. CT 22 received three counterattacks during the period. All three attacks were against our forces in Obermehlen. The first two which occurred at 0830 and 0910 consisted of an estimated company of infantry in each case. The third attack at 1030 was made up of tanks and infantry. All three attacks were repulsed without loss of ground. Five (5) tanks, of which four (4) were knocked out, were reported in the vicinity 044804 at 1345. An unknown number of tanks were heard in the vicinity of Weinsheim (1082) at 1700. Units opposing were elements of the 2 Panzer Division, 5 Para Division, 18 Volks Grenadier Division, 402 Volks Artillery Corps, and 326 Volks Grenadier Division.

9. 9 February 1945. At the close of the period the enemy held the line Willwerath - Weinsheim - Dausfeld - 063818 - 057808 - 047800 to the reverse slope of the hills at 039797 and 044790 - Steinmehlen. At 0620 the enemy launched an attack of company size to capture the high ground in the vicinity of Walcherath. This attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Hermspand was then taken by our troops against moderate resistance. Along the east bank of the Prum River the enemy increased his resistance with strong dug in positions supported by tanks. At 1305 the enemy counterattacked with two to three companies of infantry supported by five or six tanks. This attack came from vicinity 057807 and advanced towards 054813. The enemy also employed heavy caliber antiaircraft fire and artillery in this effort. This engagement was still going on late in the period. Against CT 12 the enemy defended Steinmehlen with an estimated two (2) companies of the 304th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. At 1630 the enemy counterattacked CT 12 in the vicinity 051798 with an estimated two hundred (200) troops. This attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Five (5) enemy tanks from the 2d Company of the 506 Tank Battalion moved northeast from Prum into the woods north of Dausfeld where they supported the infantry defense. Units opposing were elements of: 2d Panzer Division, 326 Volks Grenadier Division, 276 Volks Grenadier Division, 5 Para Division, 18 Volks Grenadier Division, 506 Panzer Battalion, and smaller units of minor importance.

10. 10 February 1945. The enemy defended the line Willwerath - Weinsheim - Dausfeld - 064317 - 069803 - 054794. From this point the enemy opposed CT 12 from the east bank of the Prum River with some enemy troops still holding out in Niederprum. At 0900 the enemy launched a counterattack in an attempt to dislodge CT 8 from the high ground northeast of Hermspand. This attack was repulsed without loss of ground. Several counterattacks were launched against CT 22. The first occurred at 1105 and came from the general direction of Prum. At 1205 an enemy counterattack hit at 053798 from a northeasterly direction. Each of these attacks were supported by about three (3).

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd.)

tanks. In each case the enemy thrust was contained without loss of ground. At 0915 elements of CT 12 assisted CT 22 in throwing back a counterattack in the vicinity 053798. At 1105 the 5th Company of the 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was dislodged from Steinhöhlen by Company A of CT 12. Company B of CT 12 moved to the high ground at 029787 driving the 7th Company of the 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment into the town of Weinsfeld. At 1830 the enemy ~~took~~ the bridge at 047779 in the face of the advance of CT 12. The railroad opposite Niederprum was reached against small arms fire and direct fire from heavy weapons. Enemy armor, for the most part in a defensive role, was observed between Prum and Weinsheim. A total of fifteen to twenty (15-20) tanks were operating in this sector. Enemy units opposed were elements of the 2d Panzer Division, 326 Volks Grenadier Division, 402 Volks Artillery Brigade, 94 Werfer Brigade, and 5 Para Division.

11. 11 February 1945. At the close of the period the enemy defended along the line Kleinlangenfeld - Willwerath - Dausfeld - thence along the east bank of the Prum River to Matzerath. Some enemy troops were still holding out in Prum at the end of the period. At 0815 the enemy counter-attacked CT 8 in the vicinity of Willwerath, using two infantry companies supported by an initial artillery preparation, tanks, and assault guns. This attack was repulsed without loss of ground. Close contact was maintained with the enemy in this sector throughout the period. The enemy was reported withdrawing from Prum during the period possibly to defend the high ground east of the town. Several armored vehicles were seen and tank fire was received in the vicinity of Hermespond. Enemy units in contact remained the same.

12. 12 February 1945. The enemy defended the line Heuendorf - Kleinlangenfeld - thence along the high ground east of the Prum River to Willwerath. From this point the enemy held the east bank of the Prum River to Matzerath. Possible enemy pockets west of the Prum River were at 078842 and in the cellars on the eastern outskirts of Prum. The enemy launched a counterattack consisting of at least three (3) companies from 100866 towards Olzheim at 2115. This attack was initially supported by heavy artillery barrages and subsequently strengthened by tank, mortar, and rocket fire. Although activity continued in this sector until 1200, during which time close contact was maintained with the enemy, our forces suffered no loss of ground. In consolidating the town of Prum, CT 22 met resistance from small isolated groups placed in cellars and behind debris formed by demolished buildings. Direct fire from enemy tanks and assault guns was received in the vicinity of Hermespond and Olzheim. Units in contact were elements of 2d Panzer Division, 9th Panzer Division, and 5 Para Division.

13. 13 February 1945. Enemy front lines were from Kleinlangenfeld - 100865 - 094849 - Willwerath, thence generally south along the high ground bordering the east bank of the Prum River to Matzerath. Except for a ten man enemy patrol which approached Hermespond from the west at 0420, the enemy remained entirely defensive in CT 8's sector. Early in the period a small counterattack by twenty-five (25) infantry approached Prum from the north. This force was repulsed with no loss of ground. One enemy tank was knocked out at 1245 in the vicinity 094824. Units in contact were elements of 2d Panzer Division and 326 Volks Grenadier Division.

Sec III - Intelligence (Cont'd)

14. 14 February 1945. The enemy defended along the same line remaining for the most part unaggressive, utilizing all available time in improving his defenses and fields of fire. A counterattack consisting of one hundred and fifty (150) men armed with bazookas, machine guns, and mortars was directed towards Frum from the north. This attack carried out by the 1st Company, 2d Panzer Division, started at 0700 when the striking force crossed the Frum River at 072804 and advanced south parallel to the Frum River. The mission of this force was to recapture the eastern part of Frum and establish a bridgehead there. The attack was repulsed with no loss of ground on the part of CT 22. Tank fire was received in Olzheim during the period. Units in contact were elements of the 5 Para Division, 2d Panzer Division, and 326 Volk Grenadier Division.

15. 15 February 1945. The enemy continued to defend the same line and sent patrols west of this line in order to probe our positions to determine strength and disposition. A twelve to fourteen (12-14) man enemy patrol was repulsed at 2205 in the vicinity 095858. At 0100 a four (4) man enemy patrol attempted to enter Hermespend. This patrol was repulsed by small arms fire. A forty (40) man enemy force tried to enter Hermespend at 0250. This patrol was routed after a short fire fight. Indications were that this force had the mission of observing the bridge at 087827. Direct fire from a tank or self-propelled gun was received from vicinity 028753. Units in contact were elements of 2d Panzer Division, 9 Panzer Division, and 5 Para Division.

16. 16 February 1945. The enemy continued to defend generally along the high ground east of the Frum River. At 1600 the enemy launched an attack of company strength from the vicinity 887823 toward Hermespend. One of our observation posts at 081791 was surrounded and cut off at about 0430. A patrol sent to investigate found that the enemy had occupied the observation post. One enemy tank was knocked out by artillery in the vicinity 082818 at 1645. Units in contact were elements of the 5 Para Division and the 2d Panzer Division.

17. 17 February 1945. The enemy defended along the same line and except for a small arms demonstration in the vicinity of Frum between 1000 and 1045 confined his action to harassing small arms fire and interdictory mortar and artillery fire. Units opposed were elements of 2d Panzer Division, 5 Para Division, 506 Tank Battalion, and 409 Volk Artillery Corps.

18. 18 February 1945. Light harassing and interdictory shelling by the enemy continued as he defended along the same line. A patrol of CT 8 reached 098360 where it received heavy machine gun fire from 098862, 100859, and 100857. Another patrol reached the vicinity 077815 and reported no contact. A patrol at 056786 reported the railroad bridge in that vicinity out. Units in contact were elements of 2d Panzer Division, 5 Para Division, 340 Volk Grenadier Division, 167 Volk Grenadier Division, and 506 Tank Battalion.

19. 19 February 1945. The enemy continued to employ harassing small arms, artillery, and mortar fire along the front lines as the defensive line east of the Frum River was maintained by him. Noise of tracked vehicles was heard on the Weinsheim - Dausfeld road between 0300 and 0400. More tracked vehicles were heard operating vicinity 074803 at 0930. Units in contact were

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd)

elements of the 340 Volks Grenadier Division, 325 Volks Grenadier Division, 2d Panzer Division, 891 March Battalion, 82 Replacement Battalion, 55 Werfer, 506 Tank Battalion, 1099 Artillery Battery, and 934 March Battalion.

20. 20 February 1945. There was no change in the enemy's defensive line. An enemy combat patrol of twenty-four (24) men reached a house vicinity 078837 at about 0100. This patrol had the mission of destroying the house and our troops therein. The enemy patrol was driven off with casualties. A small arms demonstration on the part of the enemy in the vicinity of Hermespond occurred during the early morning. Another fire demonstration was laid down by the enemy at 0600 opposite CT 22. Following this an enemy patrol was observed vicinity 068796. This group was dispersed by small arms fire. The enemy in CT 12's area, although badly disorganized, put up a stubborn fight and were finally cleared from the woods southwest of Fittenbach in the vicinity 000753. The houses at 998744 and 008765 were cleared with little resistance. Opposing units remained essentially the same.

21. 21 February 1945. The enemy defended along the same line and employed light patrol activity and light harassing artillery and mortar fire along the front lines. At 2030 a two man enemy patrol threw several hand grenades at our outpost vicinity 087834. At 1915 small arms fire was received from the hill east of the railroad station at Prum. Units opposed were elements of 340 Volks Grenadier Division, 167 Volks Grenadier Division, 53 Werfer Regiment, 1099 Artillery Battery, CT Geissel, and CT Jung.

22. 22 February 1945. Light patrol activity and light harassing rocket, mortar, and artillery fire constituted the enemy's main effort as he continued to defend east of the Prum River. At 0330 one tank was reported in the vicinity 081811. At 1055 tanks were heard moving towards Pronsfeld. Units opposed were 18 Volks Grenadier Division, 5 Para Division, and elements of other units previously identified.

23. 23 February 1945. The enemy continued on the defensive during the period with only light patrol activity and light artillery fire reported. At 0445 an enemy patrol approached Hermespond from the northeast. After firing two rounds of bazooka and some light machine gun fire, this force was dispersed with artillery. Another enemy patrol succeeded in infiltrating and cutting the wire from the observation post at 090841. The men from the observation post were missing and presumed captured. One enemy tank was observed at 083813 at 1230. At 0900 a tank in the vicinity of Dausfeld fired sixteen (16) rounds into CT 22's area. This tank was later reported by our air observation post and engaged by artillery. Units opposed were believed to be the same, although no prisoner of war identifications were available during the period.

24. 24 February 1945. No aggressive activity on the part of the enemy was reported during the period. Artillery, rocket, and mortar fire was light throughout the division sector. Small arms and direct fire weapons, however, continue to harass our front lines. Units opposed were believed the same.

25. 25 February 1945. Artillery, rocket, and mortar fire was light

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd)

during the period and no enemy patrols were reported. At 1020 a direct fire weapon was reported east of Prum firing into CT 22's sector. Enemy units opposed remained unchanged as far as could be determined. However, it was considered likely that elements of the battered Volks Grenadier units and panzer units opposing the 4th Infantry Division would withdraw at this time due to much needed reorganization.

26. 26 February 1945. Opposite CT 12 and CT 22 the enemy remained wholly defensive. Stray aggressive enemy patrols operated in the central and southern part of CT 8's sector. Artillery remained light with a slight increase towards the end of the period. The observation post at 066795 reported hearing tracked vehicles to their left front between 0950 and 1005. Considerable vehicular movement to the east tended to substantiate the belief that some elements opposite the 4th Infantry Division were being relieved.

27. 27 February 1945. The enemy continued to maintain his hastily prepared line of field fortifications with no aggressive enemy action reported. Front lines continued to receive harassing small arms fire. At this time it was believed that the 5th Para Division with a total estimated strength of one thousand (1000) men constituted the opposition in the 4th Infantry Division zone. It was expected, however, that small battle groups from units previously encountered would be contacted in our advance.

28. 28 February 1945. Enemy front lines in CT 8's sector could not be definitely established by the close of the period since numerous small groups of enemy had been by-passed early in the period. CT 8 occupied Kleinlangenfeld, woods at 105857, the road northwest of Weinsheim, and generally north and south from 099833 to 094821. Opposite CT 22 the enemy front lines were believed to exist from 086817 - 087812 - 083811 - 085801 - 073796 - 071790. The attack of CT 8 met strong small arms fire in some areas but the enemy was unable to prevent the penetration of his line and the capture of positions to the rear. Small groups of enemy by-passed during darkness continued to hold out throughout the period. Approximately five counterattacks were made against Company G vicinity 098852 commencing at 1100. All attacks were repulsed. CT 22 met determined resistance early in the period and several small counterattacks were reported in their sector. Resistance encountered by CT 8 and CT 22 consisted of heavy small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades, artillery, rocket, and mortar fire. An unknown number of enemy tanks were reported in the vicinity 094814 at 1000. Three (3) enemy tanks were observed in the vicinity 087816 at 1125. After being fired on by artillery, this armor retreated to vicinity of Weinsheim. Units opposed were elements of the 5th Para Division.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to attack to the north and northeast, advancing approximately four (4) miles during the day. The towns of Ihren, Urb, Winterscheid, Mutzenich, and Schmitter were cleared of enemy. This advance was made in spite of a very poor road net which at times was almost non-existent. A cold intermittent rain fell during the entire period.

Sec IV. - Operations (Contd)

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, attached, met considerably lighter resistance than during the previous period. Most of the enemy action consisted of small arms fire. The 3d Battalion captured the town of Urb (P-910842) and continued the attack to the northeast and captured Lutrenich (P-950848) at 2000. The 2d Battalion moved motorized through the 8th Infantry Division's sector to their objective (P-948868) at 1640. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions sent patrols out to the front in order to locate the enemy dispositions within the 8th Infantry sector.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion, Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued the attack. The 1st Battalion jumped off at 0800 to capture the town of Ihren (P-940820) and then proceeded north to their objective at P-952838. Company A proceeded on to the town of Schmeiler (P-948840) and then to their next objective (P-960837). At the close of the period, Company A was receiving small arms fire out of Bleialf (P-9683). The remainder of the 1st Battalion was closing on Company A. The 2d Battalion also jumped off at 0800, following the 1st Battalion through Ihren and then moved on to capture Winterscheid (P-9482). After Winterscheid was cleared of enemy, Company E moved to the northwest to secure a position along the road at P-954828. The remainder of the 2d Battalion closed on the position of Company E at the close of the period. Patrols from the 2d Battalion were sent to Bleialf and several thousand yards to the east of the town.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained in division reserve throughout this period.

2. 2 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to attack to the northeast. The division was able to make good gains in spite of the weather and poor road conditions. It was very difficult to maintain supply and evacuation routes, and the infantry was obliged to move forward without supporting weapons. The Division Command Post moved from Durler, Belgium to Lommersweiler, Belgium.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, was offered comparatively light and scattered resistance by the enemy. The enemy appeared to be very much disorganized. The 2d and 3d Battalions moved forward to the high ground west of Radscheid (P-9785) and Oberascheid (P-9885). Patrols were sent forward to establish the location and strength of the enemy in the Siegfried Line defenses.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack. The 2d Battalion met resistance at 0900 as they moved forward to the line of departure. The objective of the 2d Battalion was Bleialf (P-9683). At the close of the period, Company F had advanced into the northern part of the town against small arms and tank fire. Company E advanced to the southern outskirts of the town but did not enter because of the confusion that would likely result in the darkness between Companies E and F.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained in division reserve.

The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion continued to support the attack by normal engineer work. There were several bridges constructed in the division sector which facilitated the supply and evacuation problems of the

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

attacking regiments.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Hcoz) sent one platoon to reconnoiter the northeast sector of the division sector. Valuable information concerning the enemy dispositions in Kobscheid (L-0289) and Roth (L-0590) was obtained by the platoon.

3. 3 February 1945. The attack of the 4th Infantry Division continued to the east and was successful in capturing the towns of Halenfeld, Buchet, and Bleialf. Division reconnaissance elements reconnoitered to the northeast as far as Kobscheid. Preparations were continued for the assault of the Siegfried Line defenses.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack. The 3d Battalion assaulted the town of Halenfeld (P-9885) shortly after first light. At 1400 the battalion had secured the town against no resistance. Company K continued to advance to the south-east toward Buchet (P-9883). By 1600 Buchet was cleared of enemy with approximately ten (10) prisoners of war taken during this action. Elements of the 3d Battalion remaining in Halenfeld were relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment, and the entire 3d Battalion was assembled in regimental reserve in the vicinity of P-967850.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued the assault against Bleialf (P-9683) with Companies E and F, during the hours of darkness. At 0215 Company G moved to join Company F in the assault while Company E protected the right flank of the battalion. Bleialf was entirely clear of enemy at 1015. Patrols advanced to the east within the regimental sector and established contact with the 90th Infantry Division on the right and the 8th Infantry Regiment on the left.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, displaced forward to an assembly area in the vicinity of Ihrenbruck, closing at 1400. The 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment relieved elements of the 8th Infantry Regiment in Buchet. Reconnaissance and preparations were completed for the attack against the fortified town of Brandscheid.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Hcoz) was given the mission of protecting the left flank of the division and was assigned a sector within the division boundaries. The 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the Reconnaissance Troop.

4. 4 February 1945. The attack was continued to the east against the Siegfried Line defenses along the wooded ridge northeast of Brandscheid and in the Schnee Eifel. The outer defense line was penetrated with elements of the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments at the same place that the 4th Infantry Division penetrated on 14 September 1944. The 22d Infantry Regiment was now positioned to launch its attack against Brandscheid. There were one hundred and sixty-eight prisoners of war taken during the day.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Hcoz) attached, continued the attack. The 1st Battalion moved against the Siegfried Line fortifications during the hours of darkness. This attack was launched astride the road leading east from Halenfeld (P-9884), and by first light the battalion had their leading

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

elements through the line of pillboxes. A heavy snow storm covered the advance of our troops, resulting in complete surprise of the enemy. The advance was continued while the 1st Battalion fanned out to the north and south in the vicinity of the road junction at L-010845, whereupon the 2d and 3d Battalions passed through the 1st Battalion and advanced to the northeast and southeast. Resistance continued to be light throughout the period and numerous small engagements took place as the fortifications were surrounded and overrun.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained and readjusted its positions in the vicinity of Bloisalf (P-9883) and Winterscheid (P-9482). Patrols were sent out to keep in contact with the enemy even though it was not intended that the 12th Infantry Regiment would continue the advance until after Brandscheid had been captured.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, advanced with its 1st Battalion against the Siegfried Line Fortifications in a coordinated attack with the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment moved through the outer line of pillboxes and succeeded in cutting the northeast-southwest road in the vicinity of L-005837 against light resistance. The 2d and 3d Battalions echeloned forward in rear of the 1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion passed through the leading elements of the 1st Battalion and attached to the southwest astride the main road toward Brandscheid (P-8981). By 2400 the 1st Battalion had consolidated its positions along the ridge line on the right flank of the 8th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Battalion had closed in the vicinity of Buchet, and the 3d Battalion had advanced to within two hundred (200) yards of the main crossroads northeast of Brandscheid in the vicinity of P-995821.

5. 5 February 1945. The attack was renewed on 5 February against the Siegfried Line fortifications. Brandscheid was captured by the 22d Infantry, and by the close of the period the Siegfried Line had been breached on a front of approximately three (3) kilometers, the high ground overlooking Sellerich (L-005820) secured, and approximately three hundred and fifty (350) prisoners of war captured. The Division Command Post moved to Amelscheid, Belgium (P-9487).

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A, and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mech), and the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment attached, continued the attack at 0830 to the northeast astride the Siegfried Line along the Schnee Eifel. The 2d Battalion advanced approximately eight hundred (800) yards against light resistance with the 3d Battalion following in rear after it had been relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment. Eventually the 3d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion and continued the attack against increasing resistance of small areas and direct fire weapons. The crossroad at L-035868 was taken before the close of the day's fighting and positions consolidated on favorable terrain. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mech) was attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment to protect the left (north) flank of the division.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company D, less one platoon, 70th Tank Battalion attached, maintained

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and adjusted positions in the vicinity of Bleialf and Winterscheid. The 1st Battalion was attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment with the expressed mission of defense.

The 22d Infantry, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack at 0745 with the 3d Battalion against Brandscheid. The enemy at crossroad (P-995821) defended stubbornly in pillboxes and bunkers but during the afternoon this resistance was cleared up and the attack continued into Brandscheid. Initially, the fighting in town was very heavy but with the aid of supporting tanks and tank destroyers the resistance was overcome and a number of prisoners taken by the 3d Battalion. The 1st Battalion, which was following in rear of the 3d Battalion, turned to the east at the road junction (P-995821) in order to secure the high ground west of the town of Sellerich (L-026326). After the capture of Brandscheid, the 90th Infantry Division was ordered to relieve the elements of the 22d Infantry in the town in order that the 4th Infantry Division could continue the attack to the east towards the important road center of Prum. Contact was established with the relieving battalion and preliminary preparations were made to effect this relief.

6. 6 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division was ordered to continue the attack to the east after the capture of Brandscheid, which was to be taken over by the 90th Infantry Division. Before the relief of the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment could be effected, however, the enemy launched an attack against Brandscheid in an attempt to retake the town. The attack came from the east, northeast, and southeast. This attack delayed the relief of the 3d Battalion but this relief was finally completed at 1430. The 3d Battalion suffered heavy casualties but were successful in repulsing the enemy and capturing approximately two hundred (200) prisoners of war. The 2d Battalion jumped off in the attack at 1205 against light resistance and were successful in capturing Hortheim (L-0282) at 1745. The 1st Battalion jumped off in the attack at 1200 against light resistance and captured Sellerich (L-023817), Herscheid (L-020812), and the high ground at L-026815.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, maintained defensive positions with the 1st Battalion. Patrols from Company A were ordered to L-035855 and L-040840 to determine enemy dispositions. The 2d Battalion advanced without resistance approximately fifteen hundred (1500) yards to secure the high ground in the vicinity of L-044856. The 3d Battalion, in conjunction with Company F of the 346th Infantry Regiment cleared all enemy in its zone and set up a defensive position at the crossroad at L-035868. The 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry maintained a defensive position on the right flank of the 8th Infantry Regiment while the remainder of the 12th Infantry Regiment was held in division reserve.

7. 7 February 1945. The attack to the southeast in the direction of Prum was continued by the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments. Wascheid, Obermehlen and the high ground overlooking Steinmehlen were captured during the day.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, jumped off in the attack with the 1st Battalion at 0330. Initially, only light resistance was encountered and the battalion advanced toward the town of Gondobrett (L-0582). The stiff enemy resistance in the town held our troops in the outskirts at the close of the day's fighting. The 2d

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Battalion moved off at 0430 and succeeded in capturing Wascheid (L-0584) without meeting any enemy opposition. The 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve and the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry reverted to 12th Infantry control at 1200.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company D, less one platoon, of the 70th Tank Battalion attached, remained in division reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, jumped off in the attack to the southeast at 0425. Company E captured the hill at L-034816 and at 1445 received a counterattack from the vicinity of Niedermehlen which forced them to withdraw to the west approximately four hundred (400) yards. Company E immediately counterattacked and drove the enemy from the hill. During the counterattack against E Company, Company G moved forward and captured Obermehlen along with thirty (30) prisoners. At 1500, a counterattack was repulsed by Company G. The 1st Battalion advanced against light resistance to capture the high ground in the vicinity of L-034800. At 1500 the 1st Battalion repulsed a counterattack coming from the vicinity of Steinmehlen.

8. 8 February 1945. The division gained very little ground during the day, because of the increased amount of artillery, numerous small local counterattacks, and adverse weather conditions which resulted in very poor road conditions. Obermehlen, however, was captured and at the close of the period the town of Gondembrett was captured, except for a few houses containing enemy.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack with the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left. The 1st Battalion fought for the town of Gondembrett throughout the day and succeeded in clearing all of the town except for a few houses containing enemy. The 2d Battalion continued the advance and were on their objective (L-073340) by dark. The 3d Battalion staged forward and relieved the 2d Battalion which moved to Wascheid to reorganize. An increased amount of enemy artillery was reported during the latter part of the day and one battery at Hermspand was fired on by the 4th Division Artillery at 1700.

The 12th Infantry, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued to hold favorable terrain on the right flank of the 8th Infantry. The 8th Infantry relieved the 12th Infantry of the responsibility of this sector and the 12th Infantry with the 1st and 3d Battalions moved into position on the right flank of the division. The 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry was relieved by this movement at 1915. The 1st Battalion following the 3d Battalion closed into their assembly area at 1720. The 2d Battalion was held as division reserve.

The attack of the 22d Infantry Regiment (attachments as previously mentioned) with the 2d and 3d Battalions began at 1500. The 2d Battalion after repulsing several small counterattacks cleared the town of Obermehlen. Throughout the day there was a marked increase of enemy artillery fire which eventually forced the 2d Battalion to withdraw into Obermehlen from the high ground due east from the town. Although all of the enemy counterattacks were repulsed, the regiment did not gain much ground during the day.

9. 9 February 1945. The attack to the east to capture Prum and the

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bridges along the Frum River in the division sector was continued at 0730.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, received a small counterattack against the 1st Battalion. This was quickly repulsed since it consisted of only infantry with no supporting weapons. The 3d Battalion jumped off and captured Hermespend against light enemy resistance. Company K captured thirty-nine (39) prisoners, one (1) 88mm gun and a scout car in the town. During the evening, the 3d Battalion continued their advance toward the Frum River and before dark had Companies I and L across the river on the high ground. Throughout the day, fighting continued in Gondenbrett but by dark all enemy had been cleared from the town. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Hocz) moved one platoon forward to make contact with the reconnaissance troop of the 87th Infantry Division in Willerath. The town was strongly held by the enemy and at the close of the period the troop was reported to be engaged in a fire fight.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued their attack at 0730 with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast. The 1st Battalion objective was Steinmehlen which was not entirely cleared of enemy at the close of the period. The 3d Battalion on the left received a counterattack against Company L which resulted in some hard fighting. During the afternoon the 3d Battalion continued its attack and at the close of the period had reached L-047794 with an estimated two hundred (200) enemy to their front. The 2d Battalion moved forward to Herscheid.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, was unable to advance forward because of a blown bridge across the Mehlen brook which blocked the movement forward of supporting weapons. To expedite the bridge building the 2d Battalion assisted the engineers in building foot bridges. The attack began at 0835 with the 1st Battalion leading and the 3d Battalion following in column. The 3d Battalion in conjunction with the 2d Battalion attacked Wiedermehlen which was eventually captured at 1800 hours after some hard fighting. The 3d Battalion received a counterattack from Taffel at 1300 consisting of tanks and infantry. This counterattack was finally repulsed and the enemy lost several tanks in the fight.

10. 10 February 1945. There was very little ground gained by the division during the day. Enemy resistance stiffened in front of Frum and as many as fourteen tanks were reported in the town. Although the weather broke during the late afternoon, low hanging clouds over Frum made dive bombing on the tanks impossible.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, sent patrols at 0430 to L-055805 to ascertain the enemy dispositions on the left flank of the 22d Infantry. No enemy, however, was located by this patrol. During the early morning hours, the 1st Battalion closed into the town of Hermespend and prepared to capture Dansfeld. The 3d Battalion was counterattacked by enemy infantry and tanks during the morning. This counterattack was quickly repulsed with one enemy tank officially reported as destroyed. Company G was attached to the 3d Battalion because their position was considered to be vulnerable. The 2d Battalion cleared out some houses in Walcherat taking forty (40) prisoners during the operation. Companies I, L, and A spent most of the day consolidating their positions east of the Frum River and preparing for a possible counterattack from Willerath. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Hocz) continued to protect the left flank of the regiment.

The 12th Infantry, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued their advance to the southeast to seize the town of Her Frum and

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the bridges in the vicinity. The 1st Battalion succeeded in clearing Steinmehlen of enemy at 1105. During the afternoon Company C sent patrols to the Prum River and reported observing enemy inserting explosives to blow the bridge at L-046779. The 2d Battalion, less Company I, continued their advance and in the late afternoon was reported directly across the river from Ndr Prum. Company I was attached to the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry to aid in the advance on Prum. After clearing the town of Steinmehlen, Companies C and B moved to the southwest to the right (south) boundary.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the attachments as previously mentioned, continued against stiffening resistance with the 5d Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left. The 1st Battalion encountered a fortified position at L-052808 which temporarily held them up. Shortly after continuing the advance, entrenched enemy on the high ground at the crossroads (L-057808) forced the battalion to button up for the night. The 3d Battalion also encountered stiff resistance and made only small gains during the day. During the afternoon, attached tank units reported approximately fourteen (14) tanks in Prum. Also observed north of the town at L-060798 were eight (8) tanks and some fifty to sixty (50-60) enemy. Artillery including time on target was placed on these tanks and the infantry in the vicinity was thought to have been wiped out.

11. 11 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division readjusted positions throughout the period and made preparations for a defensive line along the west bank of the Prum River from Matzerath to Olshelm (Inclusive). Prior to the close of the day's fighting, the leading elements of the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment were fighting in the western outskirts of Prum.

The 8th Infantry Regiment (previous attachments remain the same) withdrew all elements of the regiment east of the Prum River beginning at 0400. By 0900, the 2d Battalion had completed relief of those elements of the 87th Infantry Division south of the new division boundary. The 1st Battalion closed into a new assembly area in the vicinity of L-043357. Beginning at 1920, the enemy, with an estimated strength of three (3) companies supported by several tanks, launched an attack against elements of the 87th Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion at Olshelm. This enemy action had not been repulsed at the close of the period.

The 12th Infantry Regiment (previous attachments remain the same) initiated a withdrawal of those elements of the regiment along the Prum River in the vicinity of Ndr Prum. The readjustment of positions was continued throughout the day. By 1845, the 1st Battalion had relieved elements of the 90th Infantry Division north of the new division right boundary in the vicinity of Matzerath. The 3d Battalion assembled in Herscheid as regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment (previous attachments remain the same) readjusted its positions by side shipping units to the left in order to assume responsibility for the new regimental sector. The 3d Battalion in the afternoon began its advance to the southeast into Prum in a column of companies. At the close of the period, all companies of the battalion were in the western portion of the town conducting a systematic search of all the buildings.

12. 12 February 1945. All enemy had been cleared from Prum by 1320. The division readjusted and improved its defensive positions along the Prum

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River.

The 8th Infantry Regiment (previous attachments the same) reported that the attack which had been launched by elements of the 9 Panzer Division was under control at 0500 and that the enemy made no penetration of our lines. The 2d and the 3d Battalions improved their defensive positions while the 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

The enemy continued harassing artillery and mortar fire and at 1900, a marked increase in this fire preceded a small counterattack launched against elements of the 87th Infantry Division on the left flank. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Weez) was detached at 1600 and reverted to division reserve.

The 12th Infantry Regiment (previous attachments remain the same) continued to readjust and improve positions with the 1st and the 2d Battalions abreast and the 3d Battalion in regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment (previous attachments remain the same) continued mopping up operations in Frum and by 1320, it was reported that the ~~town was clear of organized enemy resistance.~~ Enemy artillery, mortar and direct fire weapons continued to shell Frum throughout the day. Between 1830 and 1900, a strong enemy combat patrol attacked the 3d Battalion's outpost in the northeastern part of Frum. This attack was repulsed without casualties.

13. 13 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to improve the defensive positions along the Frum River from Watzorath to Olzheim inclusive, and rotated battalions on the present main line of resistance.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, one platoon of Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, maintained the defense of the regimental sector with the 3d Battalion on the right, the 2d Battalion on the left, and the 1st Battalion in regimental reserve. Harassing and interdictionary artillery fire fell in the regimental sector especially in the 2d Battalion area. Other enemy activity was negligible and troop dispositions generally remained unchanged. The 1st Battalion moved to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Schlausenbach (L-0183).

The 12th Infantry Regiment (previous attachments remain the same) defended on the regimental main line of resistance, initially with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2d Battalion on the left, and the 3d Battalion in regimental reserve. The 3d Battalion completed the relief of the 1st Battalion at 2130. Enemy activity consisted of harassing and interdictionary artillery fire and several small enemy patrols.

The 22d Infantry (Previous attachments remain the same) defended with the 1st and 2d Battalions on the regimental main line of resistance and the 3d Battalion continued mopping up enemy resistance in and around Frum. During the afternoon the 2d Battalion was assembled in regimental reserve in Gondenbrett. Enemy activity within the sector was restricted to harassing and interdictionary artillery fire in the front lines with an occasional patrol in the vicinity of Frum.

14. 14 February 1945. The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to defend in the assigned regimental sector. There was no aggressive action by the enemy reported during the period.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical

Battalion attached, continued to defend in its sector. Forward elements received intermittent artillery fire.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, received intermittent artillery fire on all forward elements. The 3d Battalion received an attack at 0800 consisting of approximately one (1) company of enemy which came from the northeast. Company B was moved forward to aid the 3d Battalion and they were successful in driving the enemy back across the Prum River after capturing fifteen (15) prisoners.

15. 15 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to organize and defend within its sector. Forward elements received intermittent artillery fire throughout the period.

The 8th Infantry Regiment (previous attachments the same) relieved Companies L and I with Companies A and B at 1530. Company C relieved Company K under cover of darkness. The 1st Battalion assumed responsibility for the 3d Battalion at 2130. The 3d Battalion moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Schlausenbach as regimental reserve.

The 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments (previous attachments the same) continued to organize and defend within their respective sectors.

16. 16 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to organize and defend within its sector. One attack of company strength against Company C of the 8th Infantry Regiment was repulsed at 1600. Forward elements received intermittent artillery and mortar fire throughout the period. The 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion at 2045. The 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry was in the process of relieving the 3d Battalion in Prum at the close of the period.

17. 17 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to defend within its sector facing the Prum River with three (3) regiments abreast.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, with the 1st and 2d Battalions on the line made preparations to demonstrate by fire to divert attention from the attack of the 90th Infantry Division. The 3d Battalion established a line of defense along the north flank of the regimental sector and made plans to occupy this line in event of an enemy thrust on that flank.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, continued to occupy the defensive line with the 1st and 3d Battalions. The 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained defensive positions with the 1st and 2d Battalions and elements of the Antitank Company and I & R Platoon. The usual harassing artillery fire was experienced along the front lines. At 0800 all units were alerted to probable enemy attack in Prum at 1000. At 1000 Prum was subjected to heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire exactly as prisoners had predicted. By 1055 the 2d Battalion reported that their front was again quiet except for the usual moderate amount of harassing fire.

18. 18 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to organize and defend within its sector. Each combat battalion sent a combat

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patrol out as a diversion from the attack of the 90th Infantry Division on the division's right (south) flank. The new boundary between the 4th Infantry Division and the 90th Infantry Division became effective at 2000. There was also a shifting of regimental boundaries as a result of the new right division boundary. Generally, the enemy was inactive in front of the division.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, sent a patrol from Company C to the railroad station at Wilwerath (L-092833) on a diversionary mission in conjunction with the Corps attack. During the day the 1st Battalion completed the relief of elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry in its sector making the new boundary effective at 1200. The 2d Battalion maintained its defensive position on the left flank while the 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Schlausenbach (L-019861).

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, sent a patrol from the 1st Battalion at 0330 across the river to the vicinity of L-057786. This patrol completed its demonstration and returned without any casualties. The 2d Battalion initiated reconnaissance and relieved the 1st Battalion of the 358th Infantry at 2000 even though all enemy had not been driven from the west side of the Prum River. The 1st Battalion was relieved by Company F of the 22d Infantry at 1900 and moved to Hersoheid as regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, sent a diversion patrol at 0400 from Company D to the vicinity of L-071685 and reported no enemy contact. The 1st and 2d Battalions reshuffled their positions and assumed responsibility of the new regimental sector by 1900. The 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Gondenbrett (L-058828).

19. 19 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued on a defensive mission while the remainder of VIII Corps on the right (south) flank continued the attack against the Siegfried Line. Active patrolling was conducted by the infantry regiments and ambush patrols were established on the west bank of the Prum River. Enemy artillery fire during the period was much lighter than previously experienced. The scouts and raiders of the 12th Infantry were enroute to clear the enemy from the west bank of the Prum River in the vicinity of Pronsfeld and immediately in front of Company G.

20. 20 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to organize and improve the defenses within its sector. Ambush patrols were established by the 22d Infantry during the hours of darkness but these particular patrols encountered no enemy. The 12th Infantry cleared all the enemy within its sector west of the Prum River in the vicinity of Pronsfeld. Fifty-six (56) prisoners of war were taken during the period.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained and improved their defensive positions along the Prum River on the left (north) flank of the division. A very heavy concentration of artillery was received in Olzheim during the morning. The 3d Battalion conducted reconnaissance of the 2d Battalion area in preparation for the rotation of these two units. At 2345 the relief was completed and the 2d Battalion was enroute to a rear assembly area as regimental reserve.

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The 12th Infantry Regiment, with Company B of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained and improved their defensive positions on the right (south) flank of the division. The 2d Battalion continued to mop up the area in the vicinity of Pronsfeld. Company E cleared the woods of enemy in the vicinity of L-000753 and houses at P-998744 and L-008763. Twenty-seven (27) prisoners were taken during this mopping up.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C of the 4th Medical Battalion attached, maintained and improved their defenses in the central sector of the division. An enemy demonstration was held across the river from Prum at 0615, but by 0700 this had quieted down and no further reports of enemy activity were reported.

21. 21 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division remained on the defense along the Prum River. Very little enemy activity was reported by the regiments during the day. Enemy artillery fire increased slightly during the afternoon but no heavy concentrations were reported. The three regiments continued to rehabilitate the personnel of the reserve battalions. An engineer reconnaissance patrol reported that the bridge at Pronsfeld was blown leaving a gap of approximately one hundred and twenty (120) feet.

22. 22 February 1945. The division sector remained very quiet during the period. The only enemy activity reported consisted of light artillery and mortar fire and a very small number of enemy moving on the opposite side of the Prum River. The 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry completed the relief of the 1st Battalion at 1420. All regiments conducted patrolling within their sector up to the west bank of the Prum River. All reserve battalions rehabilitated their personnel and conducted training in small unit tactics and range firing.

23. 23 February 1945. The defensive mission of the 4th Infantry Division remained the same. The engineers completed reconnaissance of the Prum River and were in the process of making a compilation of data in preparation for any future operation calling for a continuation of the attack to the east. The enemy artillery fired light harassing and interdiction fire throughout the period. One outpost from Company B of the 8th Infantry had three (3) men captured by an enemy patrol. The 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry completed the relief of the 2d Battalion at 2100, and Company L relieved Company I at 2000.

24. 24 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division remained on the defensive in the vicinity of Prum. Front line positions continue to receive light artillery and rocket fire. The 4th Division Artillery with the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AA) Battalion fired interdiction and harassing fire on enemy front line positions and crossroads in the rear areas.

25. 25 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to organize and improve a defensive position on the west banks of the Prum River. Active patrolling was conducted throughout the period. A small amount of enemy artillery fire fell on the front line positions. The 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion at 2130.

26. 26 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to defend along the Prum River. Small concentrations of artillery fire fell along

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the front line positions. The only enemy activity was reported by the 8th Infantry Regiment. An enemy combat patrol of fifteen (15) men moved in against the left platoon of Company I firing machine guns, burp guns, and rifles. By 0930, everything had been dispersed and all was quiet. At 0430, a patrol against the right flank of Company L was dispersed by small arms fire. The 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments maintained their defensive positions and reported that the enemy was unusually quiet along the entire sector.

27. 27 February 1945. Although the 4th Infantry Division mission was still defensive all regiments sent out two (2) patrols each at 0300 to contact the enemy as a diversionary demonstration for the 87th Infantry Division attack. While the 87th Infantry Division had previously attacked on 261500A February 1945, these patrols and the artillery demonstration at 0645 were still conducted for whatever value might be obtained in the way of securing prisoners and locating enemy positions. The VIII Corps issued a FIELD order during the day which required the 4th Infantry Division to launch an attack to the east on 280515A 1945. Two (2) prisoners of war were captured by the 12th Infantry Regiment patrol which crossed the Prum River in the vicinity of Watzorath.

The 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments conducted extensive reconnaissance in preparation for the attack as outlined in Field Order No. 72, this headquarters, 262400A February 1945. Elements of the 12th Infantry Regiment were relieved by the 6th Armored Division during the night of 27-28 February. The 12th Infantry Regiment in turn relieved the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Prum. As soon as the 6th Armored Division and the 22d Infantry Regiment progressed sufficiently to cover the front of the present defensive position, the 12th Infantry Regiment was to assemble in division reserve.

28. 28 February 1945. The 4th Infantry Division launched an attack to the east at 0515 across the Prum River. The towns of Kleinlangenfeld and Dausfeld were captured by the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments respectively prior to the close of the period.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Companies A and D and the Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion, Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Lecoz) attached, attacked to the east at 0515 with the 3d Battalion on the left and the 2d Battalion on the right while the 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve. The attack was launched with no initial opposition and good progress was made by the 3d Battalion. Company I after reaching the high ground east of the town of Olzheim (L-0886) was pinned down by artillery fire and remained in this position throughout the daylight hours, and prepared to exchange position farther to the south rejoining the remainder of the 3d Battalion during the hours of darkness. Company K meanwhile captured the town of Kleinlangenfeld at 1550. The 2d Battalion attacked with three (3) companies abreast and advanced slowly to the east through the wooded area east of Hormospand (L-0882), and was counterattacked by an estimated company of infantry at 1125. This attack, however, was quickly repulsed. At the close of the period, the 2d and 3d Battalions continued preparations for resumption of the attack and the 1st Battalion was in the process of moving forward.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, one (1)

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Platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained in division reserve throughout the period, the 1st Battalion having been relieved by elements of the 6th Armored Division at 272230A February 1945. In conjunction with the 22d Infantry Regiment's attack the 3d Battalion initiated a firing demonstration at approximately 0800, and during the day the 1st Battalion moved to the town of Prum preparing to relieve Company I within the town during the hours of darkness. The 2d Battalion meanwhile remained in Brandscheid (P-9881).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, attacked to the east at 0515 with two (C) battalions abreast, the 3d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right with the 2d Battalion initially assembled north of Prum in the vicinity of L-05393C. Both assault battalions met stiff resistance and encountered numerous mine fields. By 1540 Company I had succeeded in clearing the town of Bausfeld (L-0881) and the remainder of the battalion consolidated on the high ground to the northeast of the town. In the interim, the 2d Battalion established a bridgehead across the river due east of Prum and was counterattacked at 1600 but this attack was repulsed by Company B and Company F. During the afternoon of the period, the 1st Battalion moved to the east to the river line between the 2d and 3d Battalions effecting contact with both units. By the close of the period, a bridgehead was secured by the regiment approximately three and one-half ($3\frac{1}{2}$) kilometers in width and in some instances almost a kilometer in depth and preparations were begun for continuance of the attack on 1 March 1945.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the east which had begun during the preceding period. On 8 February, forward elements of the division reached the Prum River and captured the City of Prum (L-065795). At this point the advance was halted on order and the division awaited further orders to continue the attack.

2. The road net within the division and VIII Corps sector continued to deteriorate rapidly because of the sudden thaw and because of extremely heavy traffic. It was not unusual for a black-top road to become impassable within a period of twenty-four (24) hours. As one road broke down, traffic was diverted to alternate roads which became progressively worse in proportion to the amount of traffic using these routes. In some cases it was necessary to remove the rails from railroad beds and utilize these roadbeds for vehicular traffic.

3. It was necessary for vehicles of this division to use roads which had been covered with rubble from the town of St. Vith (P-856880). The number of flat tires increased to alarming proportions on vehicles which used these roads. For this reason it is believed that rubble should be used on roads only as a last resort. Traffic was held to a minimum, only

Soc V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

supply and other essential vehicles being allowed on the roads. The speed limit was reduced to fifteen (15) miles per hour for all vehicles, except 2-ton trucks. To further reduce the burden on the road network and to facilitate the supply of the division units, the division service elements were moved forward rapidly. On 13 February, the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company moved to Mutzonieh (P-950850), approximately two (2) miles to the rear of the division CP at Bleialf (P-965833). The Division Clearing Station was opened in Bleialf on 12 February. The 4th Quartermaster Company moved its Class I and III Dump to Haldinger, about two (2) miles forward of the division CP. On 16 February and on 24 February the Class II Dump was moved to the outskirts of Bleialf. Third Army Class I and III supply points were opened at the railroad station in Bleialf.

4. Because of the rapid advance of the enemy in their breakthrough of December 1944, great quantities of material of all types had been abandoned throughout the entire area. During the period, an extensive salvage program was initiated in the division area and large quantities of ammunition and equipment were recovered and either evacuated to Army dumps or used by the units, as listed below:

Quantity	Nomenclature
1	Cart, hand M3A4
18	Gun, machine, Cal .30, M1917A1
18	Gun, machine, Cal .30, M1919A4
9	Gun, machine, Cal .30, M1919A6
31	Gun, machine, Cal .50, M2 Brg. HB, flex.
3	Gun, machine, Cal .50 (water cooled)
4	Gun, sub-machine, Cal .45, M3
18	Mortar, 60-mm, M2
5	Mortar, 81-mm, M1
13	Mount, tripod, MG, Cal .30, M1917A1
6	Cradles for Mount Tripod, M1917A1
26	Mount, tripod, MG, Cal .30, M2
4	Cradles for Mount tripod, M2
38	Mount, tripod, MG, Cal .50, M3
20	Elevator, cradle, AA, Cal .50, M1
3	Mount, truck, M36
9	Rifle, auto-cal .30, Brg, M1918A2
45	Bayonet, M1
371	Carbine, US, Cal .30, M1
2	Knife, trench, M3
17	Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1
13	Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M3
1609	Rifle, US, Cal .30, M1
3	Rifle, US, Cal .30, M1903
25	Scabbard, bayonet, M7
19	Gun, 57-mm, M1
13	How, 105-mm, M2A1
6	How, 105-mm, M3
1	How, 155-mm, M1
3	Finder, range, 80-mm, M1914M1
1	Car, armored, light, M3
3	40-mm AA Guns

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

Quantity	Nomenclature
1	3" Gun, AT
4	Half-tracks
1	Armored Car, M20
2	Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton
2	Truck, 3/4-Ton
9	Truck, 1/2-Ton
<u>German Material</u>	
490	Tires
82	Inner Tubes
2	Launcher, rockets
4	Machine pistols
3	Rifles
1	Gun, AT, 75-mm
3	Mortars, 80-mm
<u>Miscellaneous Items</u>	
16	Truck loads (2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -Tons) of Inf Ammo.
1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Truck loads (2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -tons) of Arty Ammo
47	Truck loads of QM Class II Equipment

5. To assist in the salvage program, a detail of twenty (20) men from an Army Quartermaster Service Company was attached to the division. Numerous dead, both friendly and enemy, which had been left by troops formerly in the area, were also discovered. These were evacuated to the Division Graves Registration Officer who coordinated with the 106th Infantry Division on identification of the American dead.

6. Despite road conditions the flow of Class I, III and V supplies was normal throughout the month. In Class II and IV, the critical shortages were as shown below:

Item	Short
Launcher, grenade, M7	574
Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, cargo	11
Engine, for truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	6
Truck, 4-ton, wrecker	1
Engine, for truck, 1/2-ton	15
Trailer, 1/2-ton, cargo	25
Carriage, motor, 90-mm Gun, M36	5
Tires, 6.00x16, for truck, 1/2-ton	400
Tube, for tire 6:00x16	250
Tire, 7.50x20, for truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	130
Tube, for tire 7.50x20	210
Hot patches	8000
Brake lining, for truck, 1-ton, sets	400
Overshoes	128
Cup, canteen	600
Outfit, cooking, one-burner	473
Tent, shelter half	250
Kit, barber	42

Sec V. - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

* The five (5) 90-mm guns, for the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, attached to the division, were available for issue, but clearance could not be obtained to move heavy equipment of that type up over the roads.

7. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

8. Evacuations: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties

	Officers	EM
Killed in action	13	216
Died of wounds	2	38
Died of injuries	-	1
Missing in action	1	76
Seriously wounded in action	10	93
Seriously injured in action	-	2
Slightly wounded in action	46	711
Slightly injured in action	4	136
	76	1273
Total Casualties.....	1349	

9. During the month the casualty classification on seven (7) enlisted men was changed to captured.

10. A total of 2401 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

11. During the period from 1 February to 28 February 1945, a total of 103 officers and 2453 enlisted men reinforcements and casuuals were received.

12. Strength:

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	1-February 1945		28 February 1945	
	O	EM	O	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	47	128/3	49	131/7
8th Inf	164	4 2920	154	4 2820
12th Inf	151	5 2864	155	5 2920
22d Inf	181	4 2917	138	5 2846
Hq & Hq Etry, 4th Div Arty	18	2 112	18	2 111
20th FA Bn	31	2 506	31	2 497
29th FA Bn	31	2 496	30	2 484
42d FA Bn	27	2 490	32	2 494
44th FA Bn	34	2 492	33	2 492
4th Engr Combat Bn	25	3 548	25	3 535
4th Med Bn	36	1 415	35	1 405
4th Ron Tr, Deos	8	- 137	8	- 136
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	2	- 7	2	- 7
Band, 4th Inf Div	-	2 61	-	2 60
Med Det, Sp Trs	2	- 12	2	- 12

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

	1 February 1945			28 February 1945		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq C&S, 4th Inf Div	4	1	152/26	4	1	152/26
1st Plat, 4th Inf Div	4	-	183	4	-	139
704th Ord L Maint Co	9	-	147	9	-	147
4th QM Co	10	-	219	10	-	222
4th Sig Co	12	4	283	11	4	283
Total.....	796	41	13089	750	42	12893

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION
(Present and Absent)

4th CIC Det	4	-	10/2	4	-	10
Order of Battle Team No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPM Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
IPM Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	2	-	3	2	-	4
III Team No. 417-G	3	-	3	3	-	3
Air Support Party	1	-	6	1	-	6
3264th Sig Sv Co	1	-	3	-	-	-
166th Sig Photo Co	-	-	-	1	-	6
70th Tk Bn	43	3	666	40	3	659
377th AAA (AW) Bn	36	3	731	35	3	722
610th TD Bn	32	1	538	36	1	524
Total.....	127	7	1970	127	7	1924
Grand Total	923	48	15039	877	49	14817

H. W. Blakeley

H. W. BLAKELEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1.) The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 February to 28 February 1945.

2. The team has continued to function in close coordination with the AC of S, G-2 Section in addition to its regular duties of keeping a duplicate of the G-2 Order of Battle situation map, receiving and processing all captured documents, keeping an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities, and any other additional information necessary, of translating documents, performing interrogations, acting as interpreters and emissaries whenever necessary and assisting in editing the IP: report of the G-2 Periodic Report.

3. The 326 Volk Grenadier Division was the first major unit contacted in the new zone of action. It, however, rapidly broke down under pressure and the 2 Panzer Division had to be recalled from its proposed rest and refitted to plug the gap thus created. Elements of the 9 Panzer Division were contacted in the northern part of the sector also in a counterattacking role to cover a gap. Combat teams and elements of 560, 167, and 340 Volk Grenadier Divisions as well as Volk Artillery Corps, numerous March Battalions, and many other miscellaneous units that were available were committed in the attempt to stop our progress. The latter part of the period saw the newly-rejuvenated 5 Para Division providing the most stubborn resistance so far encountered in the new area. The enemy's breakdown in supply, communications, and proper artillery support are some of the major factors responsible for his continued forced withdrawals toward the Rhine. A few documents of tactical value were processed during the period.

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ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

There have been no special cases during the month of February. For the greater part of the period this detachment has been operating in the towns and areas occupied by the Germans during their counteroffensive. It is estimated that there are less than two hundred and fifty (250) civilians forward of the Division CP and the division has remained in this sector during most of the period. The people are restricted to the immediate vicinity of their homes and the troops are instructed to detain all civilians found outside of the towns and to report the matter to the CIC. A number of displaced civilians have been uncovered as a result of the above procedure and in cases where displaced civilians cannot be identified they have been evacuated to the rear as a security measure. It has been determined that most of the ardent Party members and potentially dangerous Nazis have left the area with the retreating German Army.

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ANNEX C - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 51

1. During the period the Photo-Interpreters Team No. 51 prepared uncontrolled mosaics covering the Kyll River for reproduction and distribution to the division. The increased demand for these uncontrolled mosaics is an indication of their value to the front line soldier.

2. On or about 20 February 1945, members of the team visited the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of Branscheid and compared defense overprinted uncontrolled mosaics prepared by the team, with the actual installations on the ground. It is believed that at least 95% of the defenses were correctly shown on the overprint. In some cases, personnel shelters were shown as pillboxes or casemates. Some ground shots were taken of the dragon's teeth and pillboxes in this area.

3. During this period, overlays showing additions to the existing defense overprint maps have been distributed.

4. Due to inclement weather conditions throughout the period, not very many sorties were flown, however, some very good photographs dated 24 February 1945, covering the immediate front to a considerable depth, were received.

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**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179
(Am 4)

~~SECRET~~

S-E-C-R-E-T
:Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div:
:Init: *H. J. P.*
:Date: 12 April 1945

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

AG 519.1

12 April 1945.

15

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports.
THRU : Command Channels.
TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

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INFORMATION CHANGED TO
CANCELLED
 BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 WASHINGTON - Dept of Army - 57th May 1945
 DISSEMINATING COMMITTEE

904-03

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C4), Army Regulation 34-10, effective to "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports" following report is submitted for period 1 March to 31 May 1945.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Michara S. Harr, D15447, GS
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 287625, GS
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel John L. Delaney, 0302396, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr., 0375431, GSC

1. At the beginning of the month the division forward command post was located at Bleialf, Germany (P-976852).

2. 1 March 1945. A directive was received from VIII Corps changing the Paris pass quota from sixteen (16) officers and fifty-five (55) enlisted men to fifteen (15) officers and seventy (70) enlisted men. The transportation to Paris, which up to this date had been by truck, was arranged so that train movement from Luxembourg City to Paris was available. The use of trucks was limited to movement to Luxembourg City and return. The units were notified of this change as their quotas for Paris became effective. With this increase of quota, the allotment per unit was

MAY 8 1945
6241

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Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

recalculated on a percentage basis.

3. 2 March 1945. A telephone message was received from VIII Corps directing that one (1) platoon leader (First or Second Lieutenant), one (1) squad leader (Staff Sergeant), one (1) supply sergeant (Staff Sergeant, two (2) assistant squad leaders (Sergeants), and one (1) clerk (Corporal) be transferred to the 690th Reinforcement Depot; attached unassigned, per verbal orders of the Commanding General, Third United States Army. On the decision of the Commanding General, the above quota was furnished by the 12th Infantry Regiment.

4. 3 March 1945. Colonel Charles T. Lanham, 015563, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 22d Infantry, was relieved from assignment to the 4th Infantry Division and assigned to the 104th Infantry Division as Assistant Division Commander per Paragraph 1, Special Orders No. 50, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, dated 2 March 1945.

Lieutenant Colonel John F. Ruggles, 018596, Infantry, Executive Officer, 22d Infantry, assumed command of the 22d Infantry Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Toague, 0292659, Infantry, 3d Battalion Commander, assumed the duties of Executive Officer.

One (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men from the 12th Infantry Regiment were assigned to the 6960th Reinforcement Depot and departed for the 69th Reinforcement Battalion for transportation to their new station.

Two (2) enlisted men from the 12th Infantry Regiment reported to Headquarters Third United States Army on detached service to be retrained as Military Police in compliance with a directive received from the AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps on 18 February 1945. This quota had been filled weekly since date of directive.

Decisions (Orders) were received from the French Provisional Government awarding the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre Medals to the recommended personnel of the division. The number of officers and enlisted men who received French Decorations was as follows: Legion of Honor, eight (8) officers; Croix de Guerre avec Palme, thirty-four (34) officers; Croix de Guerre avec Etoile de Vermeil, ten (10) officers; Croix de Guerre avec Etoile d'Argent, two (2) officers; Croix de Guerre avec Etoile de Bronze, one (1) officer and thirty-six (36) enlisted men.

5. 4 - 5 March 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Prun, Germany (L-063794).

The G-1 Weekly Periodic Report was prepared and submitted to the Third United States Army and VIII Corps.

Extracts were out of French Decisions for distribution to the individuals concerned.

6. 3 March 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Schwershelm, Germany (L-137821).

The recommendations for British Awards to fill the quota received from VIII Corps, 15 February 1945, were received from units with additional recommendations being submitted in anticipation of disapproval of any of

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

the recommendations. The number of officers and enlisted men recommended for British awards was as follows: Distinguished Service Order, two (2) officers; Distinguished Conduct Medal, two (2) enlisted men; Military Cross, eight (8) officers; Military Medal, eighteen (18) enlisted men.

7. 7 March 1945. Two (2) enlisted men from the 22d Infantry departed for Headquarters Third United States Army on detached service in compliance with directive from VIII Corps of 18 February 1945 to be retrained as Military Police.

An initial supply of three hundred (300) Bronze Star Medals were received from the Division Quartermaster. Distribution of these medals was made to the units on a percentage basis, with presentations made to the individuals according to the date of the General Orders, Headquarters Fourth Infantry Division, authorizing the award.

8. 8 March 1945. The AC of S, G-1, VIII Corps informed this headquarters that a ceremony for the presentation of French Decorations was to be held at Gorolstein, Germany, VIII Corps Headquarters, 11 March 1945. A list of the names of personnel who appeared on the French Orders and who were available to attend the ceremony was submitted to VIII Corps. The division band was notified to be prepared to play at this ceremony.

9. 9 March 1945. Information was received from VIII Corps that the ceremony for the presentation of the French Decorations which was to be held at Gorolstein, Germany was now to be held at Adenau, Germany, 111500A March 1945.

The AC of S, G-1, departed this station with advance party to the vicinity of Luneville, France.

10. 10 March 1945. Major General Troy H. Middleton, VIII Corps Commander, presented the Legion of Merit to Brigadier General H. W. Blakeloy, 07237, USA, Commanding General, at an informal ceremony held at the division command post.

11. 11 March 1945. The G-1 Weekly Periodic Report was prepared and submitted to the Third United States Army and VIII Corps.

A representative of the G-1 Section attended the presentation ceremony held at VIII Corps Command Post, Adenau, Germany. General Kaeltz, French Army, made the presentations of the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre avec Palmes. The medals for the individuals present for duty but not available for the ceremony were secured from the French representatives.

Information was received from VIII Corps authorizing the division to send battlefield commissioned officers to attend a three weeks' course in advanced infantry tactics. Due to the shortage of infantry officers, a negative report was submitted.

12. 12 March 1945. The names of the personnel to return to the United States on detached service for thirty (30) day leaves and furloughs were received from units of the division. After consolidation the list was forwarded to the Adjutant General for publication of orders.

13. 13 March 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Gerbeviller, France (F-093889) (Seventh Army Sector). Upon completion of this move the division was relieved from attachment to the VIII Corps and placed in Seventh Army reserve. The division remained assigned to Twelfth Army Group however.

14. 14 March 1945. The AC of S, G-1, visited Seventh Army Headquarters to pay his respects to the Army AC of S, G-1, to discuss policies and obtain data on required reports.

A representative of the AC of S, G-1 Section in conjunction with the Division Classification Officer obtained and assigned five hundred and ninety-two (592) reinforcements and returnees received from the 17th Reinforcement Depot.

The second quota for the month of March of two (2) officers and twenty-three (23) enlisted men to return to the States on detached service for thirty (30) day leaves and furloughs was received from the Third United States Army. The personnel selected by respective units of the division were to report to the Commanding Officer, 17th Reinforcement Depot, 241700A March 1945.

Seventh Army Headquarters directed this headquarters to furnish personnel to compose two (2) displaced personnel teams consisting of one (1) Commanding Officer, one (1) S-1, one (1) Mess and Supply Officer, and one (1) Medical Corps officer, per team. The three infantry regimental commanders and the Division Surgeon were notified and directed to submit names of qualified personnel.

15. 15 March 1945. Lieutenant General A. M. Patch, Jr, Commanding General, Seventh United States Army, visited the division command post.

The AC of S, G-1 visited Seventh Army Headquarters to arrange for Red Cross personnel to serve this command, and also to inquire as to the availability of motion picture projectors, beer, and other recreational facilities.

A pass policy permitting members of this command to visit towns in the vicinity of their units during hours prior to curfew was approved by the Commanding General and disseminated to all the units.

The Division Band was scheduled to tour the units of the division to present concerts and to play at dances and presentation ceremonies. The band was notified and all arrangements were completed for transportation and accommodations while on this tour.

16. 16 March 1945. A quota was received from XII Corps authorizing the award of Luxembourg decorations to eight (8) officers and seven (7) enlisted men of the division for heroic or meritorious service in the defense of that country. The quota was apportioned as follows:

	0	EM
12th Inf	3	4
8th Inf	1	1
22d Inf	-	1

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

	O	El
42d PA Bn	1	-
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	1
Hq 4th Inf Div	3	-

Brigadier General J. S. Rodwell, 09663, USA, Assistant Division Commander, was awarded the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre avec Palme by local French Royalty at an informal ceremony held at the division command post (Gerbeville, France). The AC of S, G-1, G-2, G-3, and Military Government Officer were presented the Croix de Guerre avec Palme at the same ceremony.

Forty-five hundred (4500) Combat Infantryman Badges were received from the Division Quartermaster and distributed equally among the three infantry regiments. The 8th Infantry Regiment was furnished with fifteen hundred (1500) Presidential Unit Citation Badges and the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry with five hundred (500).

At an informal ceremony held in the division command post (Gerbeville, France), the Commanding General presented two (2) Silver Stars, a Croix de Guerre and two (2) Bronze Star Medals to personnel of the division who were departing for the United States on thirty (30) days detached service.

17. 17 March 1945. A ceremony was held in the 12th Infantry Regimental Command Post at which the Commanding General presented three (3) Silver Stars to personnel of that unit.

A quota was received from Headquarters Seventh Army authorizing the division one hundred (100) officers and three hundred (300) enlisted men to visit rest centers established at Grenoble (officers) and Lyon (enlisted men), France, for a period of five (5) days. The Commanding General approved a division quota that made it possible for twenty-five (25) officers and two hundred (200) enlisted men to take advantage of these recreational facilities.

The AC of S, G-1, Seventh Army, visited the division command post to discuss personnel policies.

18. 18 March 1945. The AC of S, G-1, Seventh Army, informed this headquarters that Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Teague, 0292559, Infantry, 22d Infantry, would report to Lanchen Gladbach, Germany, located in the Ninth United States Army sector, to receive the Distinguished Service Order (British Decoration). Lieutenant Colonel Teague was informed and arrangements were made for him to attend the ceremony to be held 22 March 1945.

19. 19 March 1945. Advance information was received by telephone from the AC of S, G-1, Seventh Army, that the Presidential Unit Citation for the 22d Infantry had been approved and was being published in War Department General Orders.

One recommendation for the Fourragere (French Unit Citation) was returned from Headquarters Third United States Army, due to the limitation of quotas for this award.

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

At a ceremony held at the 22d Infantry Regimental Command Post, the Commanding General presented a Silver Star to Lieutenant Colonel George H. Goforth, O394439, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. At this same ceremony, the Commanding General announced that the 22d Infantry Regiment had been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and pinned the first Presidential Unit Citation Badge on Lieutenant Colonel John F. Ruggles, O18596, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 22d Infantry. The division was attached to VI Corps.

20. 20 March 1945. The personnel who were to be interviewed to form a nucleus for displaced personnel units, reported to the AC of S, G-5, Seventh Army.

The division command post closed and moved to Batsendorf, France.

21. 21 March 1945. Headquarters Seventh Army notified this headquarters that a quota of one hundred and fifty (150) officers and enlisted men had been allotted this division to visit a rest center established at Nancy, France. Because of the large number of officers and men away at other places of recreation, the Commanding General did not desire to accept a quota at this time.

At an informal ceremony held at the division command post, the Division Commander presented the Croix de Guerre to Captain Gordon R. Brodie, O1012305, Cavalry, 70th Tank Battalion.

Information was received from Seventh Army that the recommendation for the award of the Legion of Merit to Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, O287628, GSC, AC of S, G-1, had been approved and would appear in War Department General Orders in the near future.

22. 22 March 1945. Headquarters VI Corps directed that this headquarters submit a standing operating procedure on the manner in which the division handled reinforcements. This was prepared and forwarded.

At an informal ceremony held at the division command post, the Division Commander presented the Croix de Guerre to personnel who had not been present at the ceremony held by the VIII Corps at Adenau, Germany.

The Legion of Merit Medal was presented to Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, O287628, GSC, AC of S, G-1, by the Commanding General at an informal ceremony in the division command post (Batsendorf, France).

23. 23 March 1945. A quota was received from the Third United States Army for six (6) officers and seventy-four (74) enlisted men to return to the United States on detached service for forty-five (45) day leaves and furloughs. The personnel selected (90% from infantry lettered companies) were to report to the 17th Reinforcement Depot prior to O32400B April 1945.

At a ceremony which was held in the 8th Infantry Regimental Command Post, the Commanding General presented Silver Stars to members of that unit.

24. 24 March 1945. The Division Commander presented a Distinguished Service Cross, two (2) Silver Stars, and three (3) Air Medals to members of

S-E-C-R-E-T

Swo II - Introduction (Contd)

the 4th Division Artillery at an appropriate formation.

The citations for Bronze Star Medal recommendations which had been approved to date were received from the Adjutant General and distributed to the units with the Bronze Star Medal Ribbons for presentation at appropriate ceremonies.

The quota of six (6) officers and seventy-four (74) enlisted men to return to the United States on detached service for forty-five (45) days was apportioned as follows:

	O	EM
8th Inf	1	22
12th Inf	2	22
22d Inf	2	23
20th FA Bn	-	1
29th FA Bn	-	1
42d FA Bn	1	1
44th FA Bn	-	1
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	1
70th Tank Bn	-	2

25. 25 March 1945. The division was relieved from VI Corps and attached to XXI Corps.

26. 26 March 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Muesbach, Germany (855317).

27. 27 March 1945. Headquarters Seventh Army directed this headquarters to place the two Displaced Personnel teams on detached service with that headquarters to handle refugees at permanent camps. The following units were notified and furnished the previously selected personnel:

	O	EM
8th Inf	2	3
12th Inf	2	2
22d Inf	2	3
4th Med Bn	2	-
4th QM Co	-	4

The AC of S, G-1, visited XXI Corps and discussed personnel matters with Corps AC of S, G-1.

A directive was received from the Seventh Army that a Real Estate and Billeting Officer would be appointed by the division. The Assistant AC of S, G-1 was appointed to this duty.

28. 28 March 1945. At a meeting of the General Staff and Regimental, Separate and Attached Unit Commanders, held in the division command post, the Commanding General directed that the provisions of paragraph 2 (quoted below), Memorandum No. 13, Headquarters XXI Corps, 19 March 1945, subject, "Looting and Fraternization in Occupied Territory", would be made known to all personnel of the division and strictly adhered to:

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

"2. This directive will be read to all officers, and the contents made known to all enlisted men assigned or attached, for any purpose, to XXI Corps. All commanding officers will administer prompt and adequate punishment to individuals who commit any of the offenses discussed herein. Disciplinary action will be taken against all officers permitting or tolerating any such misconduct by personnel under their command, or failing to take disciplinary action as directed."

Displaced Persons Teams No. 1 and No. 2 assembled at this headquarters prior to departure for Seventh Army Headquarters.

29. 29 - 30 March 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Beerfelden, Germany (H-895084), crossing the Rhine River at Worms, Germany.

30. 31 March 1945. Headquarters Seventh Army informed this headquarters that the Company Commanders of D and H Companies, 8th Infantry, with one complete platoon from each of these companies, plus platoon commanders would report to Colonel Ladd, Assistant AC of S, G-1, Twelfth Army Group at Fort Ehrenbreitstein, Coblenz, Germany at 051200B April 1945, for the purpose of raising the flag which was lowered by these companies in 1923, signifying the departure of the last American occupational troops after the last war. Arrangements were completed to have above personnel present at the ceremony.

The Division Provost Marshal informed the AC of S, G-1 of a German Hospital at Hirschhorn, Germany (R-840950) containing seventy-eight (78) wounded German soldiers. This information was transmitted to XXI Corps.

The G-1 Estimated Loss Report was submitted daily to the Seventh Army with information copies being sent to the VI and XXI Corps, respectively.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 March 1945. The enemy attempted to consolidate hasty positions along the best defensive ground. Opposite CT 8 the enemy at the close of the period held the line from L-105873 - L-130835 - L-107833 - Weinsheim. In CT 22's sector the enemy front line was L-095817 - L-091808 - L-078801. Throughout the rest of the 4th Infantry Division sector there was no change in enemy lines which ran generally along the east bank of the Prum River. In opposing the attack of CT 8, the enemy launched two (2) counterattacks during the period. At 1110 an unknown number of enemy counterattacked in the vicinity 100828. Again at 1130 another counterattack was launched just north of this point. Both attempts were weak and unsuccessful. Against CT 22 the enemy remained defensive with some increase in mortar and rocket fire.

There was no aggressive action on the part of the enemy confronting CT 12. Company E of CT 12 advancing toward Nieder Prum received small arms, machine gun, and high velocity fire from the high ground northeast of Nieder Prum. Enemy artillery fire continued heavy during the period with especially heavy fire falling in the vicinity of front line positions around Olshelm, Hermespad, and Prum.

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd)

Several enemy tanks were observed in the vicinity of Weinsheim. CT 12 received high velocity fire from the draw vicinity L-057775. Enemy units in contact were elements of the 5th Para Division.

2. 2 March 1945. The enemy defended along the line L-100870 - Hill 610 (L-1087) - Hill vicinity L-114860. From this point to the vicinity L-105835 the line was undetermined. From L-105835 - Weinsheim - L-105818 - L-104813 - L-101810 - L-099805 - west along the road to L-078801. Opposite CT 12 the enemy line was from vicinity L-1080 southwest to Rommersheim with outposts in the woods vicinity L-082792 - L-083791 - L-081781 - L-071785.

The enemy achieved some success in organizing a new line of resistance before CT 8. The town of Weinsheim, on the south flank of the new main line of resistance, presented a well organized strong point supported by direct fire artillery. At 2215 an unsuccessful counterattack struck at 097827. Willwarath was cleared by our troops during the period while Weinsheim continued to be stubbornly defended. The enemy's main weapon in opposing the advance of CT 22 was a series of well dug-in machine guns. Other than resisting along the high ground in this manner the enemy used small arms, automatic weapons, rocket, artillery, and mortar fire all along the line. Elements of CT 12 advanced against a determined delaying action on the part of the enemy in their sector. Three to five (3 - 5) enemy tanks were operating in the Weinsheim area. Early in the period two (2) self-propelled guns operated in the vicinity 093785. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division consisted of remnants of the 5th Para Division.

3. 3 March 1945. In the northern part of the division sector, the enemy defended the line L-100873 - L-114860 - L-114830 - Gandelshain. Opposite CT 22 in the center of the division's sector the enemy did not defend along any clearly defined line. High ground and strong points amongst buildings and hasty fortifications were defended by the enemy in what appeared to be the beginning of a large scale rear guard action where-in the enemy seemed to be withdrawing the remnants of his forces toward the Rhine. In opposition to CT 12, fighting in the southern zone of the division sector the enemy presented a more determined defense as he resisted along the line L-097795 - L-087786 - L-093780. Open ground in the path of our advance was well covered by small arms, automatic weapons, and direct artillery fire. Artillery, other than that received from tanks and self-propelled guns, was light. Enemy armor was observed at the following points L-120822 - L-129827 - L-120833 - L-134833 and at the edge of the woods vicinity L-128832. In each case groups of from one to three (1 - 3) vehicles operating defensively fired several rounds and then withdrew.

4. 4 March 1945. Opposite CT 8 in the north, the enemy defended the line L-113869 - east of the stream to L-119862 - L-112855 - L-124847. From this latter point to the southern boundary of the division sector enemy front lines were fluid and at the close of the period could not be definitely established. CT 8, advancing towards Gandelshain met stiff resistance early in the period. At about 0330 the enemy withdrew all but a

few men from the town. The 1st Battalion of the 15th Para Regiment withdrew northeast into the woods and established a line from L-120885 to L-124847 which was defended by about three (3) companies. As a result of continuous pressure by CT 8 against this line, the enemy was forced to withdraw slowly fighting a determined rear guard action. Throughout the rest of the division sector the enemy continued his delaying action while withdrawing the bulk of his troops and equipment across the Kyll River. Enemy artillery fire was light. The direct fire encountered during the previous day was absent during this period.

The enemy continued to hamper our advance by employing numerous types of antipersonnel and antitank mines, abatis, and blown bridges. In addition to enemy units encountered during the previous period, prisoners of war were taken from the 905th Assault Gun Brigade.

5. 5 March 1945. In CT 8's sector enemy front lines could not be determined at the close of the period. Opposing CT 22, the enemy held the line L-165864 - L-170864 - L-178853 - L-188841 - L-188332. It was believed that enemy front lines before CT 12 were along the east bank of the Oos River with a strong point on the hill vicinity 190835.

The delaying forces previously encountered continued to defend the approaches to high ground and towns. Numerous employment by the enemy of antitank and antipersonnel mine fields was evidenced especially in the northern portions of the division's sector.

CT 8 advanced against light resistance in the form of outposts and thinly held strong points. In opposing CT 22 the enemy presented a more formidable defense as strong delaying forces fought from key terrain features. In this sector the enemy made liberal use of mines, booby traps, and abatis. Until 1500 the enemy employed mainly small arms in this, the center of the division's zone of advance. Shortly after 1500, however, the enemy counterattacked in the vicinity L-188840 with an estimated one hundred and fifty (150) Infantry. This counterattack supported by mortar, bazooka, and machine gun fire was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. CT 12, advancing in the southern portion of the division zone of attack, proceeded against stubborn resistance to the vicinity of Oos at which point the enemy engaged our troops with small arms and machine gun fire. Although fighting a determined delaying action at this point the Germans were forced to withdraw to the east bank of the Oos River from where, at the close of the period, they were defending fanatically. At 1500, after a period of light activity on the part of enemy artillery, a definite increase in shellings was noted. Enemy units opposing consisted of elements of the 5th Para Division and 18th Volks Grenadier Division.

6. 6 March 1945. Enemy front lines could not be determined by the end of the period as the Germans continued their withdrawal to the east. Small delaying forces were encountered by our forces at road junctions and towns. At 1340, CT 12 received small arms fire from the vicinity of Illonborn (L-2083).

The only artillery fire reported during the period came from a direct fire weapon located vicinity L-237818. No enemy armor was encountered during the period. Remnants of the 5th Para Division provided the opposition with attached units like the 905th Assault Gun Brigade and 11th Assault Gun

See III - Intelligence (Contd)

Brigade attached for support.

7. 7 March 1945. There were no enemy lines established during the period. Our troops were opposed by rear guard elements as the enemy continued to salvage what remained of the 5th Para Division in an attempt to rapidly withdraw towards the Rhine. A determined resistance was put up by the enemy along the east bank of the Kyll River, and it was not until late in the period that our troops were able to dislodge the opposition from these positions. CT 12, in advancing on Mieder Bettingen and Bawingen, received heavy mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire from across the river. The intensity of this fire prevented our troops from effecting a crossing until about 1700. After this time the enemy once again began to slowly withdraw to the east and northeast. CT 22 met resistance in the form of small forces employing numerous automatic weapons and small arms fire with an infrequent round of artillery. With the exception of fire from a 3-gun battery of estimated 105mm which fell in the vicinity of Kutenborn and at the bridge site vicinity 218880, enemy artillery continued light during the period. One enemy tank was reported in the vicinity 234890 at 1305. Remnants of the 5th Para Division split up into combat teams named after their various commanding officers provided the only resistance which could possibly be called organized.

8. 8 March 1945. Enemy front lines did not exist during the period. At the close of the period, however, our forces had pursued the enemy to the following points: Wirft (L-3797), Honerath (L-4098), L-275893, L-278885, L-285883, L-287873. Our forces advancing rapidly along the entire front met practically no organized resistance. Road blocks, blown bridges, road craters, felled trees, and mines constituted the main resistance in the path of the 4th Infantry Division's attacks. While Combat Teams 12 and 22 advanced in their sectors without contacting the enemy, Task Force "Rhino" swung quickly from across the Kyll River at Ober Bettingen along the northern flank overrunning the enemy to the town of Hoffeld (L-3497) from which point, at the close of the period, armored spearheads were continuing north to the division objective at Heifferscheid (F-3901). Although mines, blown bridges, and road blocks formed the primary obstacle in the path of Task Force "Rhino's" advance, enemy resistance in the form of ten (10) men defending a road block at Kerpen, and small arms fire west of Uxheim was met and overrun. Although numerous stragglers were picked up from various enemy organizations, the 5th Para Division was the unit probably responsible for opposing the advance of our troops in the 4th Infantry Division zone of advance.

9. 9 March 1945. There was no opposition encountered as Task Force "Rhino" proceeded to the division objectives at Reifferscheid and Adenau.

10. 10 March 1945. Division units were not employed against the enemy in such a manner as to provide information relative to enemy locations and disposition. Towards the end of the period, numerous enemy stragglers were picked up by division units moving into successive assembly areas.

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd)

11. 30 March 1945. The enemy continued to fall back in apparent confusion keeping well ahead of our forces in order to contend with only a minimum of contact with our troops. Resistance in the form of scattered rifle shots and an occasional hand grenade thrown by soldiers in civilian clothes or by bona fide civilians in a burst of anti-Allied feeling characterized the period.

12. 31 March 1945. The enemy utilized hastily prepared road blocks, mines and demolished bridges in an attempt to slow the advance of our forces. Light resistance in the form of small arms and automatic weapons fire was encountered as friendly troops entered several towns. About six (6) rounds of 45mm artillery fire were received north of Eberbach (R9096) between 1200 and 1500.

A twin motored jet-propelled plane was over Konighain (N-3415) at 1540. CT 8 reported two (2) enemy reconnaissance planes over their forward areas at 1730 and 1750. No aggressive action was reported on their part. A total of four hundred and twelve (412) prisoners of war were picked up, mostly in rear areas. This personnel represented fifty-one (51) miscellaneous organizations and no indication could be derived as to which enemy unit or units were responsible for resistance in this sector.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the east, the main effort in the center, with the objective of securing a bridgehead at Willwerath-Gondelsheim-Fleringen-Rommersheim and Hioder Prum. The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Companies A and D and Assault Gun Platoon, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF), and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mez), attached, continued the attack at 0645. The 1st Battalion sent Company B to mop up the town of Willwerath, while the remainder of the battalion continued clearing up the woods east of Willwerath. In the interim, the 3d Battalion continued mopping up the woods in their sector. Company I moved from Kleinlangenfeld southwest along the road towards Willwerath. The 2d Battalion was occupied throughout the day mopping up the woods, east of Hormespand. A very stubborn enemy was encountered throughout the regimental area and infiltrations made it necessary to continuously move through the woods and approach the small groups.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SF), attached, moved the 2d Battalion from Brandsheid to Prum and across the river to a position in the woods northeast of Hioder Prum. Plans were made to attack on 2 March to clear Nieder Prum and the high ground surrounding the town. The 2d Battalion received small arms and direct

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

artillery fire from the eastern section of Nieder Prum. The 1st Battalion had been previously assembled in Prum with the mission of relieving the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment, after they had cleared the woods east of the town of Prum of all enemy. This relief was completed by 1824, and the 12th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility of their new sector at that time. The 3d Battalion continued to maintain defensive positions on the right flank of the division zone along the west banks of the Prum River.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, continued the attack to the east at 0640. The 2d Battalion was given the mission of clearing out the woods on the east bank of the river due east of Prum. The 1st Battalion cleared the high ground in the vicinity of L-085185. The 2d Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment, effective at 1824 and then assembled in the rear of the 1st and 2d Battalions in the vicinity of L-076806.

2. 2 March 1945: The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the east at 0545 and met heavy enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire. The resistance by enemy troops throughout the day was fanatical and progress by the division was limited; however, some one hundred (100) prisoners of war were captured. Preparations were made for continuation of the attack and for Combat Command "B" of the 11th Armored Division to pass through the division front lines on 3 March.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company D and the Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Boc2), attached, attacked at 0830 to capture the town of Weinsheim with the 2d Battalion in the assault. It was impossible to employ the supporting tanks in this attack because of road conditions. The enemy had effectively blocked and cratered the better routes of approach to the village.

In the interim, the 1st Battalion moved to the south and south-east to capture Gondelsheim and encountered heavy artillery, mortar, and rocket fire. Little change occurred within the 3d Battalion's zone of action and their dispositions remained generally unchanged, however, this battalion likewise received heavy fire. Progress throughout the period was very limited and plans were made for continuation of the attack on the following day.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and one platoon of medium tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion attached, initiated an attack at approximately 0500 with the 2d Battalion to capture the town of Nieder Prum. The rifle companies did not directly assault the village but advanced and captured the high ground dominating it from the east and southeast. The 1st Battalion continued the attack to the southeast making limited progress, although resistance was not reported as heavy in its zone of action. The 3d Battalion remained in defensive positions on the high ground in the vicinity of Prum throughout the period.

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The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Companies A and C, 70th Tank Battalion; and Companies A and C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, continued the attack at 0545 under heavy enemy artillery fire. Antitank fire within the regimental zone of action was intense and accurate, and during the early hours of the attack five (5) of the supporting tanks had been put out of action. The 1st Battalion's attack on the town of Bruhlborn met fanatical resistance and the enemy put up a house to house fight before the resistance broke. Some fifty (50) prisoners of war were then taken. The 3d Battalion remained in position awaiting the fall of Weinsheim and the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve throughout the day.

5. 3 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack to the east at 0600 to establish a bridgehead for Combat Command B, of the 11th Armored Division. The towns of Mieder Prum, Rommersheim, and Weinsheim were cleared during the advance, and elements of the 11th Armored Division began passing through our forward positions at 1315.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Companies A and D and the Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mech), attached, resumed the attack at 0600 to clear enemy resistance in the wooded areas in the north of the division sector and to capture the town of Gondelsheim. Stubborn resistance was encountered by all elements throughout the day, and antitank fire encountered was extremely heavy and severe tank losses were suffered. At the close of the period, elements of the 1st Battalion were closing upon their objective, the high ground north of Gondelsheim in the vicinity of L-120833, and Company B was advancing toward the east in the direction of the town. In the interim, elements of the 3d Battalion (Company I) had extended the battalion line to the east as far as L-112847. This terrain was outposted and the company withdrew to positions previously occupied north of Willwerath in the vicinity of L-097853.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, attached, resumed the attack prior to first light when patrols from the 2d Battalion advanced to the east towards Rommersheim, and scouts and raiders from the 3d Battalion advanced into the town of Mieder Prum. Resistance encountered in Mieder Prum was negligible and the town was cleared at an early hour. The attack of the 2d Battalion towards Rommersheim progressed rapidly against sporadic resistance, and by 1500 elements of the battalion were five hundred (500) yards southwest of the town. Prior to the close of the period, Companies E and G advanced through the town and to the southeast of the town against increasing resistance.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, resumed the attack at 0600 by the 2d and 3d Battalions. The 2d Battalion advanced to the north into the wooded area west of the town of Weinsheim in the vicinity of L-090823 and opened this area to the northwest, while the 3d Battalion

See IV - Operations (Contd)

advanced into the town and reported it clear by 1030. Upon capture of the town, the 2d Battalion continued the attack, passing through the 3d Battalion to the east, while the 1st Battalion advanced southeast towards its objective, the high ground west of Fleringen in the vicinity of L-099800. Prior to the close of the period, the 1st Battalion had secured its objective and elements of the 2d Battalion advanced some one thousand (1000) meters to the south and east of Weinsheim.

4. 4 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the east and northeast and the towns of Gondelsheim and Schwirzheim were cleared during the advance.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as during the previous period, with elements of the 1st Battalion continued the attack throughout the night in an effort to clear the town of Gondelsheim (L-1282), but were unsuccessful until 1015, when under cover of a heavy smoke screen laid on the town, Company B advanced into the village while the remainder of the battalion resumed its attack to the northeast along the edge of the wooded area in the vicinity of L-120833. The 2d Battalion initially in column of companies, resumed its attack to the northeast against an estimated force of three (3) enemy companies. Opposition encountered throughout the day was extremely stiff and automatic weapons fire was heavy. Prior to the close of the period, the battalion was successful in clearing its objective in the vicinity of L-123848 and pushed on to the northeast until forced to hold up in the face of extensive mine fields covered by fire. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion adjusted its positions and continued to protect the regiment's left (north) flank.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments as during the previous period, beginning at 0300, operations were resumed by the 2d Battalion to clear the enemy from the high ground east and southeast of Rammersheim (L-0878), and at 0500 elements of the 1st Battalion initiated movement forward to Fleringen (L-1179) to relieve elements of the 11th Armored Division, while the 3d Battalion began movement forward to Rammersheim (L-0878). The 1st and 2d Battalions continued the advance to the east against light resistance and prior to the close of the period, the 1st Battalion had closed within and outposted the town of Budenheim (L-1680), while the 2d Battalion secured the high ground to the south in the vicinity of L-162786. In the interim, the 3d Battalion echeloned forward to the town of Wallersheim (L-1378), closing therein in regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as during the previous period, continued the attack to the northeast with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, after elements of the 8th Infantry had cleared the town of Gondelsheim. The 3d Battalion advanced toward its objective, the high ground vicinity of L-140835 and established contact with the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry on the left. In the interim, the 2d Battalion advanced to the northeast and cleared the town of Schwirzheim (L-1382) and continued the attack to the northeast capturing the high ground vicinity of L-150830 and L-155822 prior to the close of the period. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion echeloned forward in regimental reserve and closed within Schwirzheim by 2200.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

5. 5 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack to the east and northeast. The towns of Duppach and Oos were cleared during the advance.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP); Companies A, D, and Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion, attached, resumed the attack to the northeast at 0700 with the 2d Battalion. The enemy force previously opposing the battalion apparently having withdrawn, the only resistance encountered was enemy mine fields. By 0930, the battalion, in a column of companies, had successfully negotiated four mine fields and had encountered two more, while elements of the 3d Battalion on the left flank continued their advance toward limited regimental objectives. Throughout the day, resistance in front of both battalions was negligible, and by 1800, the high ground in the wooded areas in the vicinity of L-130873 and L-141864 had been secured and outposts were being established to the east and northeast. The 3d Battalion, less Company L, which then remained in position assembled in Olzheim (L-0886), while the 1st Battalion remained assembled in Gondelsheim (L-1282). Upon fulfillment of the assigned mission, the regiment passed into division reserve.

The 12th Infantry, same attachments as the previous day, beginning at 0700, the 1st Battalion resumed the attack to the northeast, and Company C advanced to assault the town of Oos (L-1782), while the 2d Battalion was relieved by elements of the 90th Infantry Division whereupon it assembled in regimental reserve in the town of Budenheim (L-1580) prior to the close of the period. Company C's attack on Oos met more opposition than was anticipated and the remainder of the battalion had to be employed to clear the town. By 1725, the entire battalion had cleared enemy opposition from the village, and the 3d Battalion initiated an advance to the northeast to secure the high ground in the vicinity of L-185825 which was accomplished by 1900, and patrols were immediately sent to the northeast in the direction of Mullenborn (L-199829). Upon division order, the 1st Battalion continued its advance from Oos to the east to secure a crossing of the Oos River and to take an objective, the high ground in the vicinity of L-188840, which operation was in process at the close of the period with leading elements having reached the stream in the vicinity of L-188831, where a fire fight ensued.

The 22d Infantry, with attachments the same as the previous day, attacked at 0700 with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast to clear the enemy from the town of Duppach (L-1685) and to secure the high ground in the vicinity of L-176842. By 0800 patrols had reached both objectives and became engaged in fire fights. At 1135, Company L had cleared the town of Duppach, while Companies K and I continued the attack to secure the high ground to the north and east. The attack of the 2d Battalion proceeded with less speed and Companies F and E in the vicinity of L-156844 became engaged with the enemy who had counterattacked but were repulsed. The engagement continued throughout the later hours of the afternoon and at 1645, the battalion began attacking with Companies E and G in the vicinity of L-175845. By 1900, the situation was clarified and positions were consolidated for the night. The 1st Battalion echeloned forward and closed within the village of Rutte (L-161839) in regimental reserve.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

6. 6 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the northeast, coordinating its movement with the 11th Armored Division. Little enemy resistance was encountered but the terrain and roads continued to hamper quick advances. At the close of the period, the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments were preparing to cross the Kyll River to expedite the bridgehead established by the 11th Armored Division and to relieve their armored infantry.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and the Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion, attached, assembled as division reserve in prearranged areas at 0920; 3d Battalion with Companies L and M in Olzheim, and Companies I and K in Kleinlangenfeld (L-105863); the 2d Battalion in Hermesland (L-096828, and the 1st Battalion in Gondelsheim (L-122825). The remainder of the period was used for rehabilitation of all troops and future plans were formulated for operating as a motorized task force as ordered by the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, continued the attack to the northeast. During the morning, the 1st Battalion captured the town of Roth (L-205840) and continued the advance to the northeast to effect a crossing of the Kyll River in the vicinity of Nieder Bettingen (L-225860). The 2d Battalion moved from its assembly area to the town of Roth and at the close of the period was also advancing to Nieder Bettingen to cross the Kyll River and coordinate a relief of the armored infantry of the 11th Armored Division. The 3d Battalion moved from vicinity of L-210850 and L-217825 to cross the Kyll River and at the close of the period, was reported to be along the river. Very little enemy opposition was encountered during the day as the movements were behind the 11th Armored Division which had previously pushed forward to the northeast.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached, the 1st Battalion was in regimental reserve in the town of Kellenborri (L-195850) while the 2d Battalion from the vicinity of L-205863 was pushing to the northeast to expedite the bridgehead established by the 11th Armored Division. The 3d Battalion moved to the town of Ober Bettingen (L-120803) and at the close of the period was preparing to cross the river to relieve armored infantry of the 11th Armored Division. Little opposition from the enemy was encountered throughout the day. The principal activity was the coordination of the movements behind the 11th Armored Division.

7. 7 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued their advance to the northeast, attacking with the 22d Infantry on the left and the 12th Infantry on the right. Both regiments effected a crossing of the Kyll River within their zones of action during the night of 6-7 March. Combat Command B of the 11th Armored Division, after operating within the division's zone was ordered and withdrew to the south to continue the advance through the 90th Infantry Division's sector. The 4th Infantry Division captured the towns of Dohn, Boldsdorf, Bowingen, and Hillescheid. Little enemy

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

resistance was reported but progress was impeded by lack of adequate bridging facilities across the Kyll River. At the close of the period, Task Force "Rhino" consisting of the 8th Infantry Regiment and other elements of the division, was preparing to launch their attack early 8 March.

The 8th Infantry, same attachments as the previous day, remained in division reserve, utilizing their status by rehabilitation of all troops and practice firing of all individual weapons and mortars. The regiment was preparing to continue the attack early 8 March as an integral motorized part of Task Force "Rhino".

The 12th Infantry, same attachments as the previous day, effected a crossing by the 2d Battalion of the Kyll River in the vicinity of Nieder Bettingen (L-225860) during the night 6-7 March, relieving the armored infantry of the 11th Armored Division. During the day, the 2d Battalion continued the attack and captured the town of Boldsörf (L-233865). The 1st Battalion moved rapidly across the river behind the 2d Battalion and pushed one platoon of Company C to the high ground vicinity of L-250873. The town of Dohm (L-235853) was also captured by the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion in continuing their advance to cross the Kyll River, cleared the town of Bettingen (L-235840) encountering only spotted enemy resistance. After crossing the river, the battalion fought its way to the high ground in the vicinity of L-245845 and, at the close of the period, occupied the woods running from L-243853 to L-249840.

The 22d Infantry, same attachments as the previous day, in the action of the night 6-7 March, the 3d Battalion crossed the Kyll River in the vicinity of Ober Bettingen (L-210883) and relieved elements of Combat Command B of the 11th Armored Division. The battalion received a slight counterattack after completion of the relief which was not of great strength and was quickly repulsed. The 1st Battalion continued behind the 3d Battalion and moved to their objective, the high ground in the vicinity of L-243903, and reported only light resistance. The 2d Battalion effected their crossing after the 1st Battalion and during the late afternoon was successful in sending a patrol into Hillesheim (L-243885) and during the hours of darkness, 7-8 March, Company E occupied the town without opposition. The company immediately outposted the high ground to the east securing the town. Company K was ordered to move into the town but at the close of the period, had not as yet closed therein.

A trestle bridge was constructed within the 22d Infantry sector across the Kyll River in the vicinity of L-218880. Throughout the day, Bailey bridge equipment was being brought forward and arrived at this bridge site during the night 7-8 March. Every effort was being made by the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion to complete this bridge by first light of 8 March to facilitate the movement of Task Force "Rhino".

8. 8 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack to the northeast at 0625 when the 8th Infantry, motorized as part of Task Force "Rhino", initiated the advance. Throughout the day, continuous progress was made against light opposition and prior to the close of the period, leading elements were in the vicinity of Honerath (L-4098) a gain of fourteen (14) miles.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

Task Force "Rhino" -

Brigadier General J. S. Rodwell, O9663, USA, Commanding
 Personnel Staff, Detachment 4th Infantry Division General
 Staff, and Tactical Air Liaison Party
 8th Infantry Regiment (Htz)
 29th Field Artillery Battalion
 70th Tank Battalion (less Company C)
 Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), attached
 Company A of the 4th Medical Battalion
 Company A of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, Reinforced
 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mech)
 Battery C of the 377th AAA (AW) Battalion
 Detachment of the 4th Signal Company

The elements of Task Force "Rhino" as listed above began assembling in the vicinity of L-1987 shortly after first light and at 0825, Serial No. 1 of the force initiated movement and crossed the initial point in vicinity of L-1482 and passed through front line elements of the 22d Infantry in the vicinity of Hillesheim (L-2483). Throughout the day, progress was continuous and the main opposition along the route of advance consisted of blown bridges, abatis, and other hastily erected road blocks. The first resistance was encountered by the leading elements at 1305 in the vicinity of Korpon (L-2890) where a barricade had been erected. This enemy force was eliminated in the short fire fight that ensued and the advance was continued to the northeast, and the last report received prior to 2200 placed the leading elements in the vicinity of Honorath (L-4098), some fourteen (14) miles distant from the front lines held at the beginning of the day. The second serial was in the vicinity of Hoffeld at the close of the period and was continuing in the wake of Serial No. 1.

During the operation of Task Force "Rhino", the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments, both with the same attachments as the previous day, remained abreast in the division zone of action, and readjusted their positions. The 12th Infantry echeloned forward in its zone of action and established outposts in the town of Zilsdorf (L-2887) and on the high ground to the northwest, while the 22d Infantry readjusted its positions in Hillesheim (L-2486) and on the high ground astride the road immediately to the north. No enemy activity was reported by either regiment during the hours of daylight or up to the close of the period.

9. 9 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east and northeast to secure the division's objective, the town of Reifferscheid (F-3901), throughout the night, 8-9 March.

Task Force "Rhino" consisting of units of the division as listed 8 March, continued on to the east during the night and entered the town of Adenau (L-4298) where elements of the 70th Tank Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment consolidated their positions. In the interim, elements of the 70th Tank Battalion followed by the 3d Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment moved to the north in the direction of the division objective and by 0715, the objective had been taken and sixty (60)

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

prisoners of war collected. During the night and early morning hours, the town of Honerath (L-4098), Adenau (L-4298), Redder (L-3799), and Reiffersheid had been cleared and little resistance was reported. During the entire operation of Task Force "Rhino", in its advance to the northeast from Hillesheim (L-2488), little opposition was encountered but upwards of fifteen hundred (1500) prisoners of war had been counted with losses suffered by our forces consisting of two (2) killed, four (4) wounded, and one (1) light tank knocked out.

Beginning at 0900, the 6th Cavalry Group advanced toward the 4th Infantry Division's zone of action from the northwest to Hillesheim, thence to the northeast whereupon they screened to the right and left in the sector as they advanced, and by 1830, contact was established by Commanding Officer of the 6th Cavalry Group and Commanding Officer of Task Force "Rhino", at which time responsibility for the sector passed to the 6th Cavalry Group. All elements of the task force remained in positions and began preparations for assembly and movement to the southwest early 10 March.

In the interim, the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments, same attachments as the previous day, remained in positions on the high ground in the vicinity of Hillesheim and reorganized their positions prior to assembly.

With the exception of small bands of disorganized enemy still to be apprehended within the division sector, there existed no further contact with the enemy at that time and one hundred and ninety-nine (199) days of continuous contact with the enemy was ended. The 4th Infantry Division was completely relieved and was preparing to initiate a movement out of the VIII Corps area to the South to the vicinity of Luneville, France.

10. 10 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division, after having been relieved within its zone of action by the 6th Cavalry Group, began assembly preparatory to departure from the Third United States Army sector. All elements of Task Force "Rhino" under the command of the Commanding Officer of the 8th Infantry Regiment initiated movement to the initial division assembly area in the vicinity of Schwirzheim and officially closed therein by 1700. In the interim, all other elements of the division, both organic and attached, remained in areas formerly occupied and used the time advantageously in rehabilitation.

11. 11 - 15 March 1945. Beginning on 11 March, the 4th Infantry Division with the 70th Tank Battalion, the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion began movement by rail and motor to the new division assembly areas in the vicinity of Gerbeville, France. The 4th Division Artillery, the 70th Tank Battalion, and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) all moved by motor and upon closing in the zone of action of the Seventh United States Army, passed to operational control of that Army. Foot troops of the three regimental combat teams entrained at Blisalf, Germany, and detrained at Bayon, France (Z-9586) whereupon they were shuttled to their respective billets within the new division area, while all other elements, including the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, completed the movement by motor. The final elements to complete the move were the foot troops of the 8th Infantry Regiment which

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

detained at Bayon at 1627 on 14 March. The assignment of billets and preparation for the projected division training program was continued throughout 15 March and actual training was commenced the following day.

All battalions and Headquarters Battery of the 4th Division Artillery left positions in the vicinity of Schwirshelm, Germany, on 11 March, between 0900 and 1300 under control of the Commanding Officer, 4th Division Artillery. The order of march was: The Headquarters Battery, 4th Division Artillery, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, 42d Field Artillery Battalion, 44th Field Artillery Battalion, and 20th Field Artillery Battalion. After an uneventful motor march, except for five hundred and eight (508) flat tires, the 4th Division Artillery closed in the bivouac areas along Highway 7 in the vicinity of Mersch, Luxembourg, at 2145. The following day all units resumed the march, closing into assembly areas in the vicinity of Püttelange, France, at 1745. Attached to XXI Corps Artillery with the mission of reinforcing the fire of the 68d Division Artillery, the Battalion Commanders made reconnaissance and infiltrated some guns and vehicles into positions during the daylight on 13 March. During darkness, all the battalions completed the occupation of positions and registered during the next day. The 42d and the 44th Field Artillery Battalions were given the mission of reinforcing the fire of the 861st Field Artillery Battalion. All the battalions fired a preparation at 150300A March 1945, and continued firing normal harassing fire until approximately 191600A March 1945. During this period, the 20th Field Artillery Battalion displaced to new positions in the vicinity of Eschringen, Germany, at 151700A March 1945, and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion displaced to the vicinity of Ormesheim, Germany, at 151415A March 1945. The mission of the 20th Field Artillery Battalion changed at 181100A March 1945 to reinforcing the fire of the 862d Field Artillery Battalion.

The 4th Division Artillery fired four hundred and fifty-six (456) missions during the four (4) days of firing, expending twenty-seven hundred and sixty-four (2764) rounds of 155mm Howitzer ammunition, and fifty-eight hundred and fifty (5850) rounds of 105mm Howitzer ammunition.

At approximately 191200A March 1945, orders were received detaching the 4th Division Artillery from the XXI Corps Artillery and ordering them to rejoin the 4th Infantry Division. The 4th Division Artillery moved by motor in order - The Headquarters Battery, the 29th, 42d, 20th, and 44th Field Artillery Battalions, beginning at 191815A March 1945, to assembly areas in the vicinity of Gerzeviller, France, closing into division control at 200430A March 1945.

12. 16 - 19 March 1945. An extensive training program was initiated beginning on 16 March but was interrupted when movement orders were received from Headquarters Seventh United States Army. However, during these four (4) days, range firing was conducted in all small arms and crew served weapons and problems involving the company and platoon in the attack were held. This period afforded an excellent chance for rehabilitation for all personnel and for maintenance of weapons and equipment and full advantage was taken during the time available.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

On 17 March at 1600, the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was returned to division control. At 1200 on 18 March, the 70th Tank Battalion was returned to division control and at approximately 191200A March 1945, the 4th Division Artillery reverted to division control. Movement of the 4th Division Artillery to the 4th Infantry Division assembly area in the vicinity of Gorbaviller, France, was initiated at 1815 on 19 March but movement of the 70th Tank Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was delayed and these units later joined the 4th Infantry Division in its new assembly areas in the vicinity of Haguenau, France.

13. 20 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division moved from the vicinity of Gorbaviller, France (V-094890) to the vicinity of Batzendorf, France (Q-978205) under the control of VI Corps. Advance elements passed the initial point at Baccarat (Q-2688) at 0500 and the entire division closed in the new assembly areas by 2030. The division command post closed at Gorbaviller, France, at 1400 and opened at Batzendorf, France, at the same time. All the combat team attachments reverted to control of their parent organizations at 2400, except Companies A, B, and C of the 4th Medical Battalion which remained attached to the 8th, 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments respectively. At 1730, the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) were attached to the 4th Division Artillery.

14. 21 March - 25 March 1945. During this period the 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Batzendorf, France (Q-978205). During the first three (3) days of the period, the division was kept on an alert status with one regimental combat team (CT 12) motorized with trucks furnished by the VI Corps. This combat team was prepared to move on three (3) hours notice, to be followed immediately by the remainder of the division. At 1240 on 23 March, the division was released from its alert status and the training program was continued. Consistent with facilities available and with preparations for movement on short notice, training was conducted in the firing of individual and crew served weapons which included 57mm antitank guns and 60mm mortars. Bazookas were fired and instructions given in the use of impact grenades and various other grenades.

Effective at 1200 on 25 March, the division passed to operational control of the XXI Corps and preparations were begun for movement to new assembly areas in the vicinity of Heustadt, Germany (M-2984) beginning 26 March.

15. 26 - 27 March 1945. Movement was begun by motor from the assembly area in the vicinity of Batzendorf, France, beginning at 0700. The 12th Infantry Regiment with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion and Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, moved by motor to new assembly areas in the vicinity of Ellerstadt, Germany (R-3896), closing therein by 1600. The 22d Infantry Regiment with the 44th Field Artillery, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, moved to the new assembly areas in the vicinity of Lambrécht, Germany (R-2485), closing there as of 2100. All other elements of

the division remained in the vicinity of Batzdorf, France, until 27 March when movement of the 8th Regimental Combat Team, which included the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, was completed by 1645 to the vicinity of Bad Dürkheim, Germany (R-3196). By the end of the period, all units had closed within the division assembly areas except the 70th Tank Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), both of which went into bivouac for the night in the vicinity of Hainfel, Germany (R-2673) in order to release road priority for movement of the 12th Armored Division across the Rhine.

16. 28 - 29 March 1945. On 28 March the 4th Infantry Division remained assembled in the vicinity of Houstadt, Germany, and conducted cleaning of vehicles and equipment. Movement of the tank and tank destroyer battalions to the division area was completed. On the following day, orders were received for movement of the entire division across the Rhine River utilizing the heavy pontoon bridge constructed at Worms and a trestle bridge a short distance down stream from this city. After plans had been formulated for the movement, the approaches to the lower bridge were reported out and movement of the entire division was begun over the heavy pontoon bridge at Worms. At 1730 Headquarters 4th Division Artillery crossed the division initial point at Bad Dürkheim (R-3195). The 70th Tank Battalion (less Combat Team attachments), 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Combat Team attachments), 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion (less Combat Team attachments), 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Lees), and the 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion and Company A, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion, attached, followed in order and were all enroute to the new division sector in the vicinity of Heppenheim, Germany (H-6516) at the close of the period.

17. 30 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued movement of all units to the new division assembly areas in the vicinity of Heppenheim and immediately attacked to the east within its zone passing through elements of the 12th Armored Division and the 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group. Little enemy resistance was encountered and a line just west of the Seventh United States Army bridgehead line was secured prior to the close of the period.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, closed within its assembly area in the vicinity of Heppenheim after the motor march on the night of 29 - 30 March. From this assembly area movement was begun at 1040 to the east through its new zone of action, whereupon elements of the 101st Cavalry Group were passed through and relieved. The only enemy resistance reported was a slight artillery barrage and at the close of the period, the Combat Team was prepared to continue the advance to the east.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 99th Chemical

Sec IV Operations (Contd)

Battalion, attached, remained in division reserve in its assembly area in the vicinity of Ellerstadt until shortly before the close of the period when movement was begun across the Rhine River.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached, upon closing in the forward assembly area, movement was initiated as a motorized regiment beginning at 0600 to pass through elements of the 12th Armored Division and the 101st Cavalry Group within the regimental zone of action. No enemy resistance was reported and excellent progress was made towards securing the Seventh United States Army bridgehead line.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Hooz) closed in the vicinity of Hopponheim at 0215 and was ordered to maintain contact with the 42d Infantry Division whereupon the mission was undertaken and fulfilled throughout the period.

Prior to the closing of the Division Headquarters at Hopponheim, reconnaissance was made of forward areas and the division command post, Headquarters 4th Division Artillery, the 70th Tank Battalion (less Combat Team attachments), 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and the 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion (less Combat Team attachments), again moved forward to the vicinity of Boorfelden, Germany (N-8908), closing thereof prior to the end of the period. The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Combat Team attachments), remained in the vicinity of Heppenheim where they had closed at 0045 and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion remained assembled west of the Rhine River awaiting the return of organic transportation which was being utilized to shuffle other division units.

18. 31 March 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east with two (2) Regimental combat teams abreast, the 8th on the left and the 22d on the right. Both Combat Teams advanced rapidly within their zones of action and encountered little or no enemy resistance, while the 12th Infantry Regiment remained in division reserve.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with attachments as previously mentioned, continued its attack virtually unopposed by enemy forces, but greatly hampered by the enemy's use of abatis and road blocks.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with attachments as mentioned heretofore, completed the shuttle of foot elements by 1228 and remained in division reserve throughout the period. The Combat Team was alerted for movement by motor to a forward assembly area in the vicinity of Hardheim (N-2513) early 1 April.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion, attached, continued its attack to the southeast capturing all assigned objectives with little enemy opposition and prepared to continue at daybreak 1 April. Enemy resistance within the division zone of action was completely broken and, except for hastily erected road blocks, all advances were unopposed during the period.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. Supply: The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack during the first week of the month, rapidly advancing within its sector in the vicinity of Prum, Germany (L-065796). East of the Kyll River enemy resistance disintegrated and the division reached its objective (Rifferscheid - F-3901). At this time the division was placed in reserve and assembled for movement to the Seventh United States Army area. The movement of the division from the Third United States Army area was made with organic transportation, supplemented by six (6) trains of approximately forty (40) cars each. The latter were primarily for moving the infantry troops and impedimenta. The movement was begun on 11 March and completed on 15 March.

2. On arrival in an assembly area in the vicinity of Lunoville, France, the division was attached operationally to the Seventh United States Army and remained in Army reserve, with the exception of the 4th Division Artillery, 70th Tank Battalion, and 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which were detached from the division and attached to XXI Corps for the purpose of supporting an attack in the Sarreguemines sector.

3. An intensive refitting program was begun which included bathing and the issue of clean clothing to the men, motor maintenance by all echelons, and a rigorous training program for all members of the command.

4. On 19 March the division was alerted for immediate movement to VI Corps sector in the vicinity of Hagenu, France. Six (6) truck companies were attached to the division and the move was completed the following day. In the assembly area west of Hagenu, the division was placed on a six (6) hour alert under control of VI Corps, with the 4th Division Artillery, Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions reverting from XXI Corps to 4th Infantry Division control.

4. On 26 March the division was attached to XXI Corps and assigned four (4) Quartermaster truck companies for movement to the vicinity of Noustadt, Germany. By 28 March all troops had closed into their assembly areas.

5. On 30 March the division was furnished ninety-five (95) trucks from the 42d Infantry Division and twenty-seven (27) trucks from a Quartermaster truck company for movement over the Rhine River, the crossing being made at Worms. The troops proceeded immediately to the attack and the first contact was made with the enemy since departure from the Third United States Army sector. Due to the shortage of trucks, much equipment of both the division and attached units was left behind in order to move the infantry over the river as quickly as possible. The move was made by shuttling and the last of the division crossed on 31 March. As the period closed, the division was moving rapidly eastward towards its objective in the vicinity of Hursburg, Germany.

Sec V-- Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

6. In Class I, all the various types of rations were available throughout the month; the units consuming as many "B" rations as the tactical situation permitted.

7. In Class II, certain items remained in critical short supply. On being alerted for departure from Third United States Army, the division was given priority for the supply of these items; but the following shortages remained unfilled:

Launcher, grenade, M1	366
Trailer, 3-ton, cargo	54
Truck, 3/4-ton, cargo	7
Truck, heavy wrecking, M1	1
Tires, 600x16, for truck, 1/2-ton	345
Tubes, for tire, 600x16	338
Tires, 750x20, for truck, 2 1/2-ton	80
Tubes, for tire, 750x20	187
Hot patches, boxes	200
Cold patches, boxes	400
Wheels, SP17, 10-15, for 1/2-ton truck	50
Tie rod bolts, GMC	50
Batteries, 12-volt	10

8. Class III and V supplies were adequate throughout the period.

9. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

10. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties

	Officers	EM
Killed in action	8	151
Died of wounds	1	23
Died of injuries	-	-
Missing in action	-	8
Seriously wounded in action	3	68
Seriously injured in action	-	1
Slightly wounded in action	23	417
Slightly injured in action	6	63
Captured	-	-
	41	751
Total Casualties.....	772	

11. A total of 3540 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

12. During the period from 1 March to 31 March 1945, a total of 123 officers and 1688 enlisted men reinforcements and casualties were received.

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Soc V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

13. Strength:	1 March 1945			31 March 1945		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)						
Hq 4th Inf Div	49	7	131/7	44	7	131/6
8th Inf	154	4	2805	159	4	2964
12th Inf	155	5	2913	164	5	3012
22d Inf	159	5	2840	171	5	3043
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	18	2	111	18	2	109
20th FA Bn	52	2	499	32	2	497
29th FA Bn	51	2	484	30	2	479
42d FA Bn	32	2	493	35	2	489
44th FA Bn	33	2	494	38	2	501
4th Engr Combat Bn	26	3	532	31	2	544
4th Mod Bn	35	1	405	35	1	405
4th Ron Tr (Hose)	8	-	156	9	-	156
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	2	-	7	3	-	7
Band, 4th Inf Div	-	2	60	-	2	58
Med Det, Sp Trs	2	-	12	2	-	14
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	152/26	4	1	154/29
HF Plat, 4th Inf Div	4	-	139	5	-	138
704th Ord L Maint Co	9	-	147	9	-	145
4th QM Co	10	-	222	10	-	219
4th Sig Co	11	4	283	11	4	280
Total.....	754	42	12565	810	41	13324

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION
(Present and Absent).

4th SIG Det	4	-	10	4	-	11
Order of Battle Team No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPW Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
IPW Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	2	-	4	2	-	4
MI Team No. 417-G	3	-	5	2	-	4
Air Support Party	1	-	6	-	-	-
166th Sig Photo Co	1	-	6	-	-	-
70th Tk Bn	40	3	654	43	3	686
377th AAA (AW) Bn	35	3	728	37	2	716
610th TD Bn	36	1	525	39	1	536
Total.....	127	7	1945	132	6	1987
Grand Total.....	881	49	14811	942	47	16291

H. W. Blakeley
H. W. BLAKELEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM NO. 2

1. The Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 March to 31 March 1945.

2. The team has continued to function in close coordination with the AG of S, G-2 Section in addition to its regular duties of keeping a duplicate of the G-2 Order of Battle situation map, receiving and processing all captured documents, keeping an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities, and any other additional information necessary; of translating documents, performing interrogations, acting as interpreters and emissaries whenever necessary and assisting in editing the IPW report of the G-2 Periodic Report.

3. The 5th Para Division continued to afford the major opposition until a breakthrough was effected, whereupon the usual rear area personnel were encountered. A period of rest and refitting followed in our new area and contact was reestablished in the latter part of the period with remnants of the 340th and 559th Volks Grenadier Divisions. The confusion and retreat of the enemy manifested itself in the great conglomeration of units among the prisoners of war. Many prisoners of war had been requisitioned while retreating and never knew with what unit they were fighting when captured. A number of documents of tactical and strategic value were processed during the period.

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ANNEX B - 4TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1. While checking the village of Reifferscheid, Kr. Archweiler, Bez. Koblenz on 9 March 1945, Agents John B. Corcoran and Joseph H. Kadlec were able to develop the following information:

2. Pastor Roetsch, Catholic priest in Reifferscheid since approximately 1914 and his niece, Martha Roetsch, stated that on 6 March 1945, prior to the departure of German soldiers from the area, three (3) men had been observed within a short distance of the priest's home, burying boxes, contents of which were unknown to the informants. This act was accomplished with great secrecy; outpost guards in the vicinity were dispersed and no civilians were permitted to enter the area. However, Martha Roetsch observed the entire proceedings from a second floor window in the parsonage, and described the three (3) men to be dressed in German Army uniforms. One man was known locally as First Lieutenant Tortsten and he directed the work which was accomplished by two (2) enlisted men. Lieutenant Tortsten's group consisted of twenty-four (24) men all of whom were billeted in this village since 18 February 1945. They were highly secretive in their operations, making daily trips into surrounding communities, maintaining no close contact with other Wehrmacht units stationed in Reifferscheid, and generally giving the town populace a feeling of fear, which caused them to avoid contact.

3. With the aid of a mine detector, three (3) boxes were located. On digging, the top surface of the buried wooden box was found about six (6) inches below the ground level, immediately adjoining a stone wall, near a wall bordering the village cemetery. This box was found to be 24 x 18 x 18 in size, of heavy wooden construction, lined with sheet metal and waterproofed. Its contents consisted of numerous individually wrapped packages, marked on the outside with luminous paint code letters, and was made up of igniters, TNT, matches, triangular pieces of metal presumably for use to sabotage vehicle tires, grenades and other items useful to sabotage agents. The boxes were not completely filled, but were partitioned, so that only half was full of equipment. No written instructions were included with the material.

4. One box was turned over to the Seventh Army CIC Detachment for their information. It is believed that the foregoing experience is indicative of the trend of enemy operations along sabotage and espionage lines and would tend to point to an organized program leading to future activity behind our lines.

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ANNEX C - PHOTO INTERPRETERS TEAM NO. 31

1. The photo coverage during this period was negligible. During the period 1 March to 5 March 1945, the division was in a fast moving situation and basic cover was not received until the area concerned had been passed.

2. On 10 March the unit went into a reserve status and remained in reserve throughout the month.

3. During the time that the division was in reserve, each unit was visited by the officer in charge of the team for the purpose of assisting unit S-2s in the use of Aerial Photography.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2179
(cont)

8 OCT 68
(183)
AGU 1971 FEB 20 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

: Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div:

: Init: *W.C. King*

: Date: 15 May 1945

HEADQUARTERS

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 4, US ARMY

AG 319.1

18 May 1945

3

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy Reports After/After Action Reports.

THRU : Command Channels

TO : The Adjutant General.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C4), Army Regulations 345-105, relative to "Action Against Enemy Reports After/After Action Reports", the following report is submitted for period 1 April to 30 April 1945.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Marr, O15447, GSC
- AC of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, O287628, GSC
- AC of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, O286914, GSC
- AC of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel Dee W. Stone, O165561, GSC
- AC of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Guy C. DeYoung, Jr, O373431, GSC

Brigadier General Harold W. Blakeley, O7237, USA, Division Commander, was promoted to Major General, USA, 12 April 1945.

Lieutenant Colonel Dee W. Stone, O165561, GSC, formerly Chief Military Government Officer, was assigned AC of S, G-3, 10 April 1945.

1. At the beginning of this month, the Division Forward Command Post was located at Beerfelden, Germany (M-895084) and later that day moved to Waldurn, Germany (M-180113).

2. 1 April 1945. The Division Provost Marshal reported that he had located five (5) Allied Prisoner of War Inclosures in the Division Command Post area. They contained two hundred and twenty (220) French, fifty-six

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

1945
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Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

(56) Belgians, forty-two (42) Russians, thirty-six (36) Italians, and thirty (30) Indians (British). A total of three hundred and eighty-four (384) prisoners of war. Later in the day, camps were reported in Gotzingen, Bufeheim and Buchen, Germany. These contained a total of thirty-seven (37) Belgians and twenty-three (23) French. All the camps were short of rations, so arrangements were made to furnish the necessary food.

The names of the officers and enlisted men who were to return to the United States for forty-five (45) days temporary duty were received from the units and submitted to the Adjutant General for publication of orders.

A report of personnel shortages and/or overages for the period 16 - 31 March 1945 was submitted to the Commanding General, Seventh United States Army.

The disposition of the large number of American prisoners of war being released by our advancing troops presented a problem at this time. The AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, was contacted and he stated they were to be disposed of as follows: Those imprisoned more than sixty (60) days would be evacuated through medical channels; and those less than sixty (60) days through reinforcement channels. Arrangements were made with the Provost Marshal to facilitate the evacuation of these prisoners of war.

3. 2 April 1945. The Division Command Post closed and moved to Tauberbischofsheim, Germany (N-389159).

Immediately upon arrival in the new area, the Provost Marshal reported that he had picked up fifteen (15) American prisoners of war and wanted to know what disposition to make of them. He was directed to evacuate them to the Clearing Company, 4th Medical Battalion, as they had all been prisoners more than sixty (60) days.

4. 3 April 1945. The Division Command Post closed and moved to Kirchheim, Germany (N-532195).

The AC of S, G-1, visited the Division Quartermaster to make final preparations for the departure of the five (5) officers and sixty (60) enlisted men of Companies D and H, 8th Infantry, for Fort Ehrenbreitstein, Coblenz, Germany, where they were to participate in a flag raising ceremony on 5 April 1945. These same two companies lowered the occupational flag at this fort in 1923, commemorating the departure of the last American troops from Germany.

5. 4 April 1945. A telephonic message was received from the XXI Corps that reinforcements were available at the 17th Reinforcement Depot upon immediate submission of a requisition. The Division Classification Officer was contacted, informed of the shortages, and directed to submit the requisition.

6. 5 April 1945. The AC of S, G-1, Seventh United States Army, notified this headquarters that three hundred (300) reinforcements were to be picked up at Frankenthal, Germany, as soon as possible. Arrangements were completed and the men were picked up a short time later.

Five (5) officers of the division who had left for thirty (30) days

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

temporary duty in the States on 6 December 1944, returned to the division this date.

7. 6 April 1945. A written directive was received from the Seventh United States Army, outlining the procedure to be followed in handling American soldiers who had been prisoners of war and released by allied troops.

8. 7 April 1945. Information was received from the 22d Infantry Regiment concerning twenty-eight (28) hospitals located in the town of Bad Hergentheim, Germany, which contained approximately one thousand (1000) German patients and about forty-five (45) Russians. The staffs of these hospitals consisted of eleven (11) German doctors, one (1) French and one (1) Russian doctor, plus one hundred and thirty-three (133) nurses. This important information was conveyed to the AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, immediately, in order that arrangements could be made to utilize these facilities in the event the situation warranted it.

9. 8 - 9 April 1945. A letter dated 6 March 1945 was received from the War Department authorizing the award of the Legion of Merit to Colonel Richard S. Marr, O15447, GSC, Chief of Staff. The presentation was made by the Commanding General at an informal ceremony in the Division Command Post (Kirchheim).

Colonel Bond, AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, visited the command post to discuss various personnel problems and especially to emphasize the necessity of strict enforcement of the non-fraternization policy in effect in Germany.

10. 10 April 1945. The XXI Corps Chaplain visited the command post to discuss and acquaint himself with the status of chaplains in the division.

The Military Government Officer reported a German Hospital at Stadt-Schwarzach, Germany, containing three hundred (300) patients and a staff of ninety-one (91).

11. 11 - 12 April 1945. The division was relieved from assignment to the Twelfth Army Group and the Third United States Army; was assigned to the Sixth Army Group and further assigned to the Seventh United States Army, effective 8 April 1945.

A MX was received from the Third United States Army authorizing seven (7) officers and sixty-eight (68) enlisted men forty-five (45) day leaves and furloughs in the United States. The following sub-quota was allocated to the units:

	O	EM
8th Inf Regt	2	18
12th Inf Regt	2	18
22d Inf Regt	2	18
20th FA Bn	-	1
29th FA Bn	-	1

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	O	MI
42d FA Bn	-	1
44th FA Bn	-	1
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	2
4th Recon Tr, Leez	-	1
4th Med Bn	-	1
70th Tk Bn	1	3
377th AAA (AV) Bn	-	1
610th TD Bn	-	2
	7	68

The personnel reported to the 83d Reinforcement Battalion before 182400Z April 1945 for transportation to the Zone of the Interior.

A telephonic report was made to the office of the AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, on an attempted rape case. This telephonic report was followed by a complete written investigation submitted through command channels.

In compliance with instructions received from the AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, transportation was secured and dispatched to the 21st Reinforcement Battalion at Frankenthal, Germany to pick up eighty (80) reinforcements for the division.

12. 13 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Rottingen, Germany (N-6103).

Colonel Priester, Executive G-1, Seventh United States Army, called to obtain information as to the availability for reassignment of Colonel R. G. McKee, 011217, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 0207623, GSC, AC of S, G-1. The Commanding General was advised.

13. 14 April 1945. A rape case involving an enlisted man of the division was reported to the Corps AC of S, G-1. Preliminary investigation did not uncover the offender, although a complete search was made of the locality.

A TIX from Twelfth Army Group with a 1st indorsement from Seventh United States Army was received confirming the telephone conversation with Colonel Priester on 13 April 1945, concerning the availability for reassignment of Colonel R. G. McKee and Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant. The request was returned by 2d Indorsement through the Commanding General, Seventh United States Army, stating that both officers were available for reassignment in the event of promotion, however, their reassignment was not desired at this time.

A rape case involving enlisted men from the 20th Field Artillery Battalion was reported to this headquarters by the Commanding Officer, 20th Field Artillery Battalion, and was further reported to the AC of S, G-1 Section, XXI Corps. A complete and thorough investigation was conducted and the findings were reported through command channels.

14. 15 April 1945. The Division Command Post closed into Croglingen, Germany (S-8898).

A request was received from the Corps AC of S, G-1, for the name and AD AGO Form 66-1 of one captain for Schooling and Air Ground Liaison Work.

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

The requirements were that the officer be of high calibre with a good record of combat. The 70th Tank Battalion submitted the name of Captain Irwin A. Hirsch, 0412626, Infantry (Armored), and approval was obtained from the Commanding General.

XXI Corps asked for the name of one (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man with civilian newspaper experience. The Classification Officer made a survey of the personnel of the division and found that there were none available for this assignment. A negative report was submitted to Corps.

15. 16 April 1945. The Prisoner of War Inclosure moved from Gelchshiem, Germany to Ober Schackenback, Germany (S-7989).

Major Farmer, Assistant AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, called to inquire if there was a vacancy in the division for a surgical technician in the grade of sergeant. At this time a vacancy did not exist and Corps was notified that the surgical technician could not be used in the division.

A roster of the officers and men to go home on forty-five (45) day leaves and furloughs was received from the units, consolidated, and submitted to the Adjutant General for publication of orders. The AC of S, G-4 was contacted and transportation was secured to deliver the personnel to the 83d Reinforcement Battalion.

A bi-weekly Shortages and/or Overages Report for the period 1 April - 15 April 1945, was submitted to the Seventh United States Army.

16. 17 April 1945. The location of five (5) hospitals in Rothenburg, Germany was telephoned to XXI Corps. The hospitals contained three hundred and nineteen (319) German soldier and ninety-four (94) civilian patients, and had a staff of eighty-six (86) civilian and military personnel. The food and medical supplies on hand were adequate for a two week period with the exception of perishable food, diphtheria antitoxin and insulin.

General Orders No. 59, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, dated 10 April 1945, was received authorizing the award of the Legion of Merit to Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hanson, O286614, GSC, AC of S, G-2.

Information was received from the AC of S, G-1, Seventh United States Army that there would be an opportunity in the near future to reassign Captains, First Lieutenants, and Second Lieutenants to Labor Supervision Centers. The units were requested to submit the names of any officers who could serve in this capacity and were available for reassignment. Copies of WD AGO Form 63-1 were obtained from the Adjutant General for each of the officers reported by the units and were forwarded to Seventh United States Army.

17. 18 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Rothenburg, Germany (S-7709).

The division was directed by Headquarters Seventh United States Army to furnish a Displaced Persons Team, consisting of three (3) officers (Commanding Officer, S-1 and S-4) and six (6) enlisted men (Loss Sergeant, Supply Sergeant, Cook, Clerk-typist, and two (2) Drivers). The 8th Infantry furnished the Commanding Officer and one (1) driver; 12th Infantry,

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

S-1, Clerk-typist, and Mess Sergeant; 22d Infantry, S-4 and Cook; 4th Quartermaster Company, Supply Sergeant and Driver.

A message was received from the AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, requesting the names of one (1) officer and one (1) enlisted man who had been killed in action or had distinguished themselves since the division had crossed the Rhine River. The purpose of this was to have streets named as a memorial to these individuals. The names of Second Lieutenant Donald H. Freeman, 0528772, Field Artillery, 44th Field Artillery Battalion, and Staff Sergeant Milton H. Parker, 37261835, Company I, 22d Infantry, were chosen from the division and submitted to XXI Corps.

18. 19 April 1945. In compliance with telephone call from Headquarters Seventh United States Army, arrangements were made to send five (5) battle-field appointed Second Lieutenants to a three (3) week Officers Fundamental Training Course. The 8th Infantry and 12th Infantry were directed to furnish the names of two (2) Second Lieutenants and the 22d Infantry one (1) Lieutenant. These officers were to report to the AC of S, G-1 office, this headquarters, on the morning of 27 April 1945, prepared to depart for the 2d Reinforcement Depot at Worms, Germany.

The division was directed by XXI Corps to furnish the name of one (1) Lieutenant with the following qualifications: clean cut, good looking, intelligent, who was slightly battle fatigued. First Lieutenant Doyle C. Strickland, 01303967, Infantry, 8th Infantry Regiment, was selected and sent to Headquarters Sixth Army Group for an interview with the AC of S, G-1, for a possible assignment in the Visitors Bureau of that headquarters. Lieutenant Strickland was not chosen for the assignment by Sixth Army Group. Company C, 99th Chemical Battalion, CT 324 and the 101st Cavalry Squadron were detached from the division as of 190001B April 1945.

19. 20 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Lettringen, Germany (S-7676).

The Prisoner of War Inclosure moved to Gebstattel, Germany (S-7886).

20. 21 April 1945. The Displaced Persons Team No. 3 (three (3) officers and six (6) enlisted men) with their equipment departed for Headquarters Seventh United States Army.

The Division Command Post moved to Maria Kappel, Germany (S-7765).

The AC of S, G-1 obtained a quota of three (3) officers and eighteen (18) enlisted men to attend the United States Riviera Recreation Center. Each regiment was allotted a quota of one (1) officer and six (6) enlisted men. The personnel assembled at the Cactus Rear Echelon 24 April 1945. The units were directed to furnish each man with two clean suits of wool CDs and emphasis was placed on uniformity of dress. The pass period was for seven (7) days exclusive of travel time. Rail transportation was furnished from Nancy, France to the Riviera District. This quota was secured for the purpose of determining the advisability of requesting larger quotas in the future.

Prisoner of War Inclosure moved to Stimpfach, Germany (S-7254).

A memorandum was sent to the Commanding Officers of the 8th, 12th,

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and 22d Infantry Regiments, informing them that they would appoint a Military Government Team from their unit consisting of three (3) officers and four (4) enlisted men to be ready on call from the XXI Corps. The officers were to report to the AC of S, C-5, XXI Corps, prior to 220900Z April 1945, for a one day school on their probable function:

21. 22 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Jagstzell, Germany (S-7250).

22. 23 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Huttlingen, Germany (S-7335).

The 12th Infantry Regiment reported the location of an Allied Prisoner of War Camp in Wasseralfingen, Germany (S-7332) containing approximately three hundred and fifty (350) Russian, Belgian, and Polish Prisoners of War. This information was transmitted to the XXI Corps.

The AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, informed this headquarters that a Prisoner of War Exchange Team would be attached to the division to assist in the handling of Allied Prisoners of War and displaced persons. The personnel for this team, consisting of one (1) officer and sixty (60) enlisted men, were from Battery D, 910th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion.

Prisoner of War Inclosure was located at Wasseralfingen, Germany (S-7332).

23. 24 April 1945. Four (4) hospitals located in Ellwangen, Germany were reported by the 5th Infantry Regiment. These four (4) installations contained eighteen (18) military doctors, thirty-five (35) enlisted staff and eight hundred and nineteen (819) German military patients. There was a week's supply of drugs and enough food for three (3) weeks. This information was telephoned immediately to the XXI Corps.

The 1st Platoon, Battery D, 910th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, reported in to serve the division as a Prisoner of War Exchange Team. The officer in charge was sent to the Division Military Government Officer to obtain information as to how his team could best assist in handling displaced persons.

The division received a quota of six (6) officers and sixty-five (65) enlisted men from the Seventh United States Army to return to the United States as guards on Prison Ships. Upon arrival in the United States the officers and enlisted men were to have forty-five (45) day leaves and furloughs. Personnel selected were to report to the Railway Transportation Officer in Saarbourg, Germany, prior to 281200Z April 1945, for transportation to Camp Tee Doe, near Marsailles, France. The division published orders which placed them on detached service with the 1st Casual Detachment, Headquarters Delta Base Section. This quota was allotted as follows:

	O	EL
8th Inf Regt	2	18
12th Inf Regt	2	18
22d Inf Regt	2	18

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	O	EM
20th FA Bn	-	1
29th FA Bn	-	1
42d FA Bn	-	1
44th FA Bn	-	1
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	1
4th Ren Tr, Mecz	-	1
4th Med Bn	-	1
70th Tk Bn	-	2
377th AAA (AW) Bn	-	1
610th TD Bn	-	1
	6	55

The units were notified of their quotas.

24. 25 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Ober Kochon, Germany (S-7432), temporarily and then to Heidenheim, Germany (S-7811).

The five (5) battle field appointed Second Lieutenants departed for the 8th Reinforcement Depot to attend the three week's Officers Fundamental Training Course.

A representative of the AC of S, G-1 Section inspected six (6) German military hospitals in the City of Heidenheim, Germany. They were found to contain eleven hundred and ten (1110) patients, a staff of twenty-one (21) army doctors and fifty-two (52) German aid men. The food supply was adequate for approximately one (1) week and the drug supply was adequate for six (6) days. The Provost Marshal was advised of the situation and placed guards on all of the installations. A complete report was telephoned to the Corps AC of S, G-1 Section.

The Division Provost Marshal reported that a box car containing Red Cross parcels was located on a railroad siding in the Heidenheim yards. A Military Police guard was placed on the car to prevent looting. An inventory showed the contents to be American Red Cross Food Packages #10.

25. 26 April 1945. In anticipation of the command post moving from Heidenheim the Military Government Officer of the Town Detachment was contacted and informed of the existence of the various hospital installations, the status of the food and drug supply and the fact that a guard had been mounted on all of the hospitals.

The Division Command Post moved to Aislingen, Germany (Y-5500).

A roster of the officers and enlisted men returning to the States as guards on Prison Ships was prepared and submitted to the Adjutant General for publication of orders.

The 8th Infantry Regiment reported the location of a German Military Hospital in Glott, Germany (Y-0292), containing two hundred and forty-five (245) patients, one (1) doctor and six (6) enlisted helpers. The food and drug supply on hand was adequate for two to four weeks. Military Police guards were placed on this installation.

A TIX from the XXI Corps confirmed the attachment of Battery D, 910th Antiaircraft Artillery (Air) Battalion (less), as a Prisoner of War Exchange Team.

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26. 27 April 1945. The AG of S, G-1 made a trip to the Rear Echelon to assist in the departure of the officers and enlisted men to the United States.

A hospital located in Lauingen, Germany (S-9800) was reported by the Provost Marshal. The report showed the hospital to contain thirty-nine (39) patients and three (3) aid men. The drug and food supply was adequate for an indefinite period. Guards from the Military Police Platoon were placed on the hospital.

The Division Command Post moved to Hergau, Germany (Y-1881). The 686th Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the division.

The Prisoner of War Inclosure moved to Lauingen, Germany (S-9800).

27. 28 April 1945. Because of the shortage of Military Police personnel, who were being used to guard hospital installations, Corps was contacted to obtain relief for all division Military Police guarding installations in rear of the division rear boundary.

The Provost Marshal reported a German hospital located in Ober Schonenfeld, Germany (Y-2172) to contain sixty (60) patients, two (2) doctors and eight (8) aid men. The hospital had sufficient food and drugs for two months. A guard was placed on the hospital and this information was reported to the XXI Corps.

The Division Command Post moved to Gross Aitingen, Germany (Y-2665)

A French Prisoner of War Inclosure was reported by the 12th Infantry Regiment located in Strassbourg, Germany (Y-2868). The camp contained sixty (60) French soldiers and had an adequate food supply for seven (7) days. A detail from the 910th Antiaircraft Artillery (AA) Battalion (Prisoner of War Exchange Team) took over the camp and XXI Corps was notified.

28. 29 April 1945. The Division Command Post moved to Egling, Germany (Y-4159).

The Prisoner of War Inclosure moved to Gessertshausen, Germany (Y-0207).

The 949th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the division for operations.

29. 30 April 1945. A written report was received from the 12th Infantry Regiment giving information regarding two (2) German hospitals located at Kloster St Ottilien (Y-4649) and at Greifenberg, Germany (Y-4946). These hospitals operated as a single unit and contained fifteen hundred and twenty-five (1525) German patients and ninety-seven (97) Allied patients. They were staffed by fifteen (15) medical officers and eighty-three (83) German enlisted men. The food and medical supplies were ample for a seven day period. A complete report was submitted to the XXI Corps and the Division Provost Marshal placed a guard detail on them.

The Division Command Post moved to Ober Pfaffenhofen, Germany (Y-3247).

The Prisoner of War Inclosure moved to Schmlechen, Germany (Y-0306).

Sec II -- Introduction (Contd)

The 12th Infantry Regiment submitted a written report on another German military hospital located in Percha, Germany (Y-7040). This hospital contained three hundred and two (302) inmates and a staff of twenty-five (25) soldiers. The food supply was adequate for a two (2) month period and there was a three (3) month supply of drugs. The 22d Infantry reported a German hospital located in Grunertshofen, Germany (Y-4859) containing two hundred and twenty (220) German soldier patients and staff. This hospital had a fourteen (14) day supply of food and drugs. Both of these hospitals were placed under guard and the XXI Corps was given a complete report.

The monthly Awards and Decorations Report was submitted to the XXI Corps by T&X.

During the month of April the Estimated Loss Report was submitted nightly by T&X direct to the Seventh United States Army with an information copy going to the XXI Corps. During the month the report of attached units was handled by the AC of S, G-1 office in the same manner as the division report.

During the last two weeks of the month of April there were a number of American and British soldiers who had been prisoners of war in Germany who were able to escape and report to one of the division units. These soldiers were sent directly to the office of the AC of S, G-1 where transportation was obtained to send them to the division rear echelon. There the Adjutant General made out the nominal rolls and delivered these released prisoners of war to the 21st Reinforcement Battalion for further disposition.

Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 April 1945. Although no enemy front line existed during the period, there was evidence that an estimated battalion of antiaircraft artillery and small disorganized groups of enemy would strongly defend Wurtzburg (M-5835). Enemy resistance in the 4th Infantry Division sector was light and scattered. At 0300 a friendly patrol was ambushed in the vicinity N-097007. Small arms, mortar, and antiaircraft artillery fire was received by our reconnaissance elements at M-445075. Small arms and moderate artillery fire was received in the vicinity of Heckfeld (N-3707) at 1020. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division consisted mainly of remnants of the 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Division, 352d Volks Grenadier Division, 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, and 6th SS Mountain Division.

2. 2 April 1945. Enemy front lines as such did not exist although there was increasing evidence that Wurtzburg would be defended. In the northern part of the 4th Infantry Division zone of action resistance was light and scattered, while in the southern sector increased resistance in the form of small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was evidenced. Elements of CT 8 encountered small arms resistance east of Oldingsfeld early in the period. At 1400 the 101st Cavalry net determined resistance consisting of bazooka, rocket, and mortar fire supported by direct fire from a tank or a self-propelled gun in the vicinity of Osfeld (N-5209). It was estimated that a company of

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Sec III- Intelligence (Contd)

enemy were defending in this locality. There was an increase in enemy air activity during the period. An unknown number of enemy planes bombed vicinity M-426097 at approximately 0030. Between 1700 and 1745, twelve (12) ME-109s and five (5) FW-190s bombed and strafed the Division area particularly between M-2915 and M-3515. At least four (4) enemy planes were destroyed by our antiaircraft artillery. One (1) enemy tank was reported in Oefeld at 1400. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division represented loosely thrown together remnants of antiaircraft artillery troops, training units, and security detachments.

3. 3 April 1945. In the northern part of the division sector, enemy front lines remained fluid while indications were that a possible enemy front line extended from the Main River vicinity of Marktbreit (M-7421) generally south along the railroad to the vicinity of Herrnbachtheim (M-7813), thence southwest to the vicinity of Hoppishausen (M-7381) generally west to the vicinity of Konigshofen (M-4407), then south along the east bank of the Tauber River to the vicinity of Bad Mergentheim (M-4700). Enemy resistance was about the same as encountered during the previous period with a slight increase in mortar and artillery fire. Elements of CT 8 were engaged in a fire fight at M-643224 at 1030. Other elements of CT 8 crossed the Main River vicinity of Oehsenfurt (M-6721) against light resistance. Heavy resistance consisting of small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was met by elements of CT 22 in the vicinity east of Konigshofen. At the close of the period, this resistance showed little let-up. Enemy troops in this area were wearing distinctive black uniforms and offering determined resistance. A general increase in artillery and mortar fire with a predominance of 120mm mortar, 75mm, 88mm, and 105mm artillery was reported. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division continued to show little organization and were comprised of numerous scattered remnants of minor detachments.

4. 4 April 1945. While no definite enemy front line could be defined in the 4th Infantry Division sector, at the close of the period the enemy was holding the following towns and locations: Sommerhausen (M-5255), Frickenhausen (M-7021), Doubach (M-4707), Hesselhausen (M-4810), the woods in the vicinity M-456075 and M-475085. Strongpoints were encountered at M-580090, M-575095, M-580105, M-575110, M-570109, M-567097, M-566088, M-540113 to M-525120. The enemy remained defensive throughout the period except for an estimated twenty-five (25) man raiding party led by a captain which entered Oehsenfurt at about 0230. The mission of this party was to capture prisoners and destroy vehicles. The patrol was very bold and aggressive employing automatic weapons, panzerfaust, and hand grenades with considerable effectiveness. In CT 8's sector the enemy's 12th Replacement Battalion defended the woods and high ground in the vicinity M-685233 with small arms and machine gun fire. CT 12 advanced against heavy small arms, machine gun, and bazooka fire. Resistance was stubborn and was directed from well organized strongpoints. In CT 22's sector light resistance was encountered during the early part of the period. Here the enemy employed six-barreled nebelwerfers and displayed increasing artillery and mortar fire. An approximate total of one hundred and forty-five (145)

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd.)

rounds of artillery fell in CT 22's sector during the period. At 2050 a heavy barrage of 120mm mortar fell along the front lines. A single 75mm gun was firing from the vicinity of Deubach at 1305. A single engine fighter plane strafed the vicinity of Kutzbrunn (N-4610) at 1020. Three (3) enemy planes strafed the road from N-445116 to N-443130 at 0845 and 0900. Three (3) enemy tanks and one (1) antitank gun were reported in the vicinity of Erlach (N-6925) at about 1800. Elements of the 407th Replacement and training Battalion, CT Sachs, and CT Is Lehr Battalion, and Ersatz Battalion formed the main opposition to the advance of the 4th Infantry Division during the period.

5. 5 April 1945. At the close of the period the enemy defended along a general line Theilheim (N-6650) - Westhoim (N-6729) - Popperndorf (N-7230). From this latter point the enemy front line was believed to extend to the Main River and from there south to Main River and from there south to Marktbrrett (N-7321). From this point a well defined enemy front line existed from N-700100 - N-660105 - 610105 - 595106 - 575095 - 590084 - 580080 - 577095 - 565102 - 560090 - 525090 - 512096 - 487100 - 451072 - 462076, then along the north, west and east edges of the woods at N-478065 to the woods south of Hesselhausen (N-4810). Light resistance was met as elements of CT 8 entered Kitzingen (N-7329). In this vicinity small enemy groups fired rifles and machine guns and soon fell back or surrendered. Our troops advanced to Eibelstadt (N-8327) and Lindelbach (N-6529) against scattered resistance. In CT 12 and CT 22 sectors the enemy continued a stubborn defense consisting of small arms, automatic weapons, and bazooka fire. CT 22 advanced south on the high ground east of Königshofen and met extremely stubborn resistance from an estimated one hundred and fifty (150) enemy well dug in on the reverse slope of the hill vicinity N-456070. Positions at this location were well camouflaged with natural material which blended well with the surrounding rocky terrain. Enemy artillery fire was moderate with an estimated two hundred and fifty-six (256) rounds of mortar and artillery falling in the regimental sector of CT 22 during the period. Thirty (30) rounds of light caliber artillery fell in the vicinity N-461078 from 0001 to 0600. An increase in enemy air activity was noted during the period. Between 2150 and 2205 an unknown number of enemy planes dropped fragmentation and demolition bombs about 3,000 yards southwest of Ochsenuft (N-6320). Other enemy planes were over the division sector during the period but they took no aggressive action against our troops. Three (3) enemy tanks were reported in the vicinity N-489084 at about 1400. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division were CT Sachs, VII Wehrkreis I CO School, 407th Replacement and Training Battalion, SS CT Dirnagel, CT Moritz, Tank CCS Dauberg, I.S. Lehr and Ersatz Battalion and Grenadier Ersatz Battalion 42 Bayreuth.

6. 6 April 1945. An enemy front line could not be clearly defined at the close of the period. CT 8 cleared the enemy from the area between Mursburg (N-5325), Kitzingen (N-7329), and the Main River. CT 12 advanced and cleared the area to a line extending from N-630090 to N-590073 to Nassau (N-5765) to Harthausen (N-5306). CT 22 at the close of the period held a line from N-4604 to N-4904. Light resistance was encountered by CT 8 in

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the vicinity of Randersacker (N-6131) early in the period. During the remainder of the period no contact was reported in this sector. CT 12 and CT 22 advanced to the south against small scattered pockets of enemy resistance. A marked decrease in artillery and mortar fire was noted during the period. At 052030E April 1945 an enemy four gun battery was reported in the vicinity N-477054. This battery was neutralized by counterbattery fire. A few enemy aircraft were in evidence over the division sector. No aggressive action was taken by them. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained essentially the same.

7. 7 April 1945. Enemy front lines remained fluid during the period. Dug in positions were encountered at N-481984 to N-494936 and on the hill southwest of Igersheim (N-5000). The town of Gerolshausen (S-5299), Weikersheim (N-2600), Rotteingen (N-6104) and Biberachheim (N-6404) were believed to be enemy strongpoints. In CT 8's sector, the enemy remained entirely defensive and the only contact was with scattered small groups that offered no resistance. Light resistance was met by CT 12 north of the Tauber River and at the close of the period, the enemy was stubbornly defending the south bank of the river. At 1510 elements of CT 12 received a counterattack consisting of an unestimated number of enemy employing small arms, automatic weapons, supported by 20mm antiaircraft fire. This group attacked to the north from the vicinity of Weikersheim in conjunction with additional groups of enemy which attacked from the woods vicinity N-5500 and from the hill at N-569009. This counterattack was successfully repulsed by our artillery. CT 22 advanced to the hill vicinity N-478000 where an enemy force was overrun and thirty-five (35) prisoners of war taken. By the close of the period, the enemy was holding the hill southwest of Igersheim from well dug in positions. Enemy artillery fire continued light. Between 2015 and 2100 seven (7) JU-88's strafed the division sector. Three (3) of these planes were shot down by our antiaircraft artillery. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division showed no change.

8. 8 April 1945. At the close of the period, the enemy was believed to have held a defensive line along the high ground south of the Tauber River. Elsewhere in the 4th Infantry Division sector no enemy front line aspect could be defined. Early in the period CT 22 routed the enemy from the castle at Burg Heunius (N-5000). No other enemy activity was observed in this sector although a number of stragglers were gathered up during the period. CT 12 met stubborn resistance in Rottingen (N-6103) and after a house-to-house fight, reported the town clear as of 1335. Fighting was still going on in Weikersheim (N-5600) at the close of the period. Only one concentration consisting of two (2) rounds estimated 150mm falling in the vicinity N-340054 at 1515 was reported. Several enemy planes strafed in the vicinity of Gerolshausen (N-5310) at 2100. Scattered remnants of the same disorganized enemy units opposed the 4th Infantry Division during the period. Cts Duernguel, Mueller, and Heack appeared to provide what little organized resistance the 4th Infantry Division encountered.

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9. 9 April 1945. Opposite CT 12, the enemy front lines extended along the high ground south of the Tauber River. In addition the town of Bieberbrehren (N-6404) appeared to be defended by about seventy (70) enemy. An enemy patrol attempting to reach Aufstetten (N-6406) with the mission to capture prisoners of war and to determine the strength and disposition of our troops in that vicinity was intercepted and dispersed. CT 12 cleared the towns of Elpersheim and Welkersheim. Enemy troops were contacted at the crossroads at 647050, Hill 345, vicinity N-655038, vicinity M-628030, and on the high ground vicinity S-560980. Considerable 75mm or 88mm fire from a self-propelled gun or tank fell in the area occupied by CT 12 during the period. A concentration of nine rounds medium artillery from a three gun battery fell in the vicinity N-640063 at 1300. At 1300 twelve rounds, estimated 75mm or 88mm, fell in the vicinity M-590020. Several towns along the front lines received intermittent fire during the period. Enemy aircraft were reported over the Division sector at 1320. No aggressive action was taken by them. The same enemy elements opposed the 4th Infantry Division during the period.

10. 10 April 1945. Opposite CT 12 enemy front lines extended from Haagen (S-5895) to S-594975 to Queckbrom (S-6099) to N-604010 then through the woods northeast of Bieberbrehren (N-6404). Throughout the rest of the 4th Infantry Division sector enemy front lines could not be defined. There was no aggressive action reported during the period. Laudonbach (S-5897) and Haagen were cleared late in the period. CT 22 advanced without contact until 1515 when an unknown number of enemy in dug-in positions were encountered from S-585920 to S-588910. Artillery fire was light until near the end of the period. A twelve round concentration estimated 105mm fell in the vicinity S-560904 at 1535. At the same time, several rounds of 75mm or 88mm fell in the vicinity S-574968. The vicinity S-590972 received intermittent light caliber artillery fire from the middle of the afternoon until the close of the period. Two (2) enemy artillery pieces in the vicinity S-595920 were neutralized by counterbattery fire at 1630. At 2230 enemy planes dropped flares on the high ground south of Elpersheim (S-5498) and later strafed and dropped two (2) bombs in that vicinity. Elements of CT Dourangel, Grenadier Replacement Battalion Furth I, and CT Reimwald opposed the 4th Infantry Division during the period.

11. 11 April 1945. At the close of the period, the enemy before CT 12 held the line from vicinity N-630020 to Bieberbrehren (N-6404) then east to the Gollach River, then northeast to Aub (N-6608). Against CT 22 and CT 324, no enemy front line could be defined. Strongpoints in those sectors were at Herndthausen (S-6093), Queckbrom (S-6099), S-635835, Schrozberg (S-6285), woods S-605369, Oburstetten (S-6086), and the high ground S-588915. Troops of CT 12 while being relieved by CT 22 were pinned down by small arms, automatic weapons, and 20mm antiaircraft artillery fire in the vicinity of Hill 401 (S-773957). Other elements of CT 12 received small arms and automatic weapons fire in the woods from N-600010 to N-640020. At 1910 our troops in Laudonbach (S-5897) received small arms fire from an estimated forty (40) enemy dug in southeast of the town. The advance of CT 22 was stubbornly

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resisted by enemy employing heavy small arms, automatic and direct fire weapons in dug-in strongpoints. At about 0630 enemy troops of CT Bayreuth consisting of one hundred and fifty (150) men employing small arms, supported by a small artillery concentration, counterattacked in the vicinity S-807065. At the same time another group with an estimated strength of seventy-five (75) men supported by one assault gun, counterattacked in the vicinity of Kalberbach (S-6094). Both of these attempts were eventually thrown back. Enemy artillery fire during the period consisted for the most part of light caliber with some medium caliber reported. An unknown number of enemy planes dropped one (1) 500-pound bomb and numerous antipersonnel bombs in the vicinity of Eriach (N-6823) between 2230 and 2330. Planes over Marktbreit (N-7521) dropped demolition and antipersonnel bombs during the period. Five (5) enemy tanks were reported in the vicinity S-598908. In addition to units previously reported, elements of the 212th Volksgrenadier Division opposed the 4th Infantry Division during the period.

12. 12 April 1945. The only enemy front line that could be determined at the close of the period in the 4th Infantry Division sector extended generally from N-660000 to N-660050 then east to N-690034 to N-694044 to N-694000 to N-690070 then west to the woods at N-675070 then through the woods to Aub (N-6808). At the close of the period CT 12 was clearing the town of Walkramshoffen (N-6606), Bieberehren (6404) and Klingenberg cleared during the period. CT 22's advance was stubbornly resisted by enemy in well prepared positions utilizing small arms, supported by artillery and direct fire weapons. At about 2205 the enemy counterattacked with an estimated rifle company in the vicinity of Blaufelden (S-6279). This attack was preceded by a short artillery preparation. Throughout the period lateral movement across the front of CT 324 on the part of the enemy was observed. No particular direction of movement could be determined. It was considered possible however that a reinforcement of enemy strength on the right flank was in progress. Artillery fire in CT 22's sector showed an increase during the period. An estimated two hundred (200) rounds of light caliber fell in the vicinity S-620984 between 1400 and 1800. A concentration of about fifty (50) rounds, estimated light caliber, fell in the vicinity of Neuhorn (S-6198) at 1430. At 2230 bombing and strafing by enemy planes one-half mile east of Oberborit (N-7520) was reported. Enemy planes strafed the vicinity of Ochsenfurt (N-6620) at 2250. During the hours of darkness, one (1) enemy plane strafed Willanzheim (N-8023). Two (2) tanks or self-propelled guns were reported in the vicinity S-609911 and S-608908 at 1310. In addition to units previously encountered elements of the 9th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 32d Alpine Regiment opposed the 4th Infantry Division in its sector.

13. 15 April 1945. A continuous enemy front line did not exist in the 4th Infantry Division zone of action. The enemy's forward positions were located in the woods, vicinity S-635005, Schrafselden (S-6683), Speckheim (S-6684), woods S-660870, and Schon (S-7097). CT 22 reported stubborn resistance with good artillery support until approximately 2030. Subsequent

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to that time there had been little activity with only a small amount of harassing and interdiction fire during the hours of darkness. At 2045, elements of CT 12 forced the enemy to withdraw from Craglingen (S-6699). At this point the enemy succeeded in destroying the bridge after his withdrawal. During the remainder of the period until approximately 1530, no contact was made with the enemy in this sector. At 1530, however, approximately fifty (50) enemy were engaged in the vicinity of Schon (S-7097). In this action thirty-two (32) prisoners of war were taken, six (6) enemy were wounded, and about twelve (12) killed. CT 324 advanced opposed only by harassing small arms and artillery fire, mines, and undefended rock blocks. Enemy artillery fire showed a decrease during the period. The same enemy units as encountered in the previous period opposed the 4th Infantry Division in its advance.

14. 14 April 1945. Elements of CT 12 made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Tauberscheekenbach (S-7496) and along the towns of Gieckolhausen (S-7698), Oberscheekenbach (S-7893), Chrenbach (S-7999), and Gailshofen (S-7800). Before CT 22 enemy front lines extended from S-727957 - S-700923 - S-699919 - S-689916 - S-685915 - S-684999 - S-676896 - S-669870. CT 324 reported the enemy holding a line of strongpoints from the woods vicinity S-640775 to Remertsbuhl (S-6879), woods vicinity S-650820, Schmalfelden (S-6685), and the woods, vicinity S-660860. While CT 8 reported no contact during the period, CT 12 reported the only enemy activity in their sector took place in the vicinity of Tauberscheekenbach at 1445. Troops approaching that town received small arms fire. Considerable high velocity direct fire, estimated 86mm, was received in the vicinity S-749970. The enemy employed small arms and automatic weapons fire supplemented with artillery support to delay the advance of CT 22. In approaching the wood line south and east of Ober Rimbach (S-6892) and east of Schmerbach (S-6992), advance elements encountered stiffening resistance. The enemy strenuously resisted the attack of CT 324 with small arms, rocket, artillery, and mortar fire. It was apparent that enemy defenses on our flank were more closely coordinated and somewhat stronger than in previous periods. At 1530 the enemy counterattacked with an estimated one hundred and seventy-five (175) men in the vicinity of Blaubaach (S-6377). This attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Fifteen (15) rounds of light caliber artillery fell in the vicinity of Neustett (S-7498) at 1500. Approximately one hundred and twenty (120) rounds of artillery fell in CT 22's sector during the period. Two (2) self-propelled guns were destroyed by counterbattery in the vicinity S-678890 at 1150. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained essentially the same.

15. 15 April 1945. Opposite CT 8, the enemy defended a line from S-930970 to S-919956, then along the ridge south of the railroad to Landthrum (S-8397). In CT 12's sector the enemy line ran generally from S-735949 to the woods at S-765945 to Steinsfeld (S-7954), then northeast to S-612958. Before CT 22 a clearly defined enemy line did not exist, but the enemy was entrenched from S-714920 to S-727926. In addition the woods

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vicinity S-695884 was heavily defended. In CT 324's area the enemy continued to defend a successive line of strongpoints. At the close of the period this line ran generally S-6473 - S-6578 - S-6478 - S-6779 - Wrosenbach (S-6780) - woods at S-6681 - S-6701 - S-6882 - Grosse Baronwiler (S-3783). In falling back before CT 8, the enemy maintained a strong active defense, utilizing heavy small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery fire to delay our advance. Resistance in CT 12's sector consisted of heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire with intermittent artillery. In CT 22's sector at 0200 approximately sixty (60) rounds of 120mm mortar fire fell in the vicinity S-6890. At 0945 an undetermined number of enemy were observed digging in at the northwestern part of Blumwiler (S-7192). CT 22 received considerable small arms and mortar fire from the woods vicinity S-695864 and Hill 478 (S-7089). Late in the period a counterattack of unestimated strength hit Weller from the southeast. CT 324 in its advance met resistance which, though somewhat less than during the previous period, consisted of moderate small arms, mortar and artillery fire. During the hours of darkness, the enemy harassed CT 324 with light artillery, nebelwerfer, mortar and small arms fire. In addition to units previously reported, I Alpine Regiment was encountered during the period.

18. 16 April 1945. Enemy front lines were still fluid at the end of this period, but it was known that the enemy defended the wooded hills at S-835940, S-8594, S-840955, Wildbad, (S-8695) and the railroad station at S-868968. Opposite CT 12, it was known that the enemy was defending Dottwang (S-754908) and the woods vicinity S-810905, S-820929, S-840928, and S-840932. Although there was no indication of a front line before CT 22 small groups of enemy were in contact in this sector. The enemy hold the woods at S-6984, and also Cimnhagen (S-7084), Metsholz (S-7283), Gannosfeld (S-7182), the woods at S-7081, the woods and buildings at S-7080, the woods at S-7079, the woods at S-6779, Brettheim (S-7078), Herbortshausen (S-6878), Engolhardshausen (S-6677), and the woods S-6577. The enemy continued his strong defense across the entire division zone of action, withdrawing locally under the pressure of our attack. It was noted that as our leading elements by-passed small groups of enemy these pockets resumed the fight and it was necessary that each one be attacked and eliminated separately. Stubborn resistance was encountered by CT 8 in the vicinity of Wildbad (S-8696), and S-824965. CT 12 in its advance encountered considerable small arms and automatic weapons fire in the vicinity S-812956. As a result of small arms and high velocity fire one company from CT 12 was pinned down for several hours on Hill 442. At 1550 representatives of CT 12 departed on a mission into the enemy line to negotiate surrender terms for the city of Rothenburg (S-7789). At the close of the period, no word had been received indicating the results of this mission. The enemy counterattacked strongly from the direction of the draw, vicinity S-728921 and S-760917, towards Weller (S-7292). This counterattack was later repulsed after making some headway starting at 2030. CT 22 and CT 324 encountered considerable rocket, artillery, mortar, direct fire, and small arms throughout the period. Artillery fire on the part of the enemy remained for the most part about the same. Considerable fire from direct fire weapons was received throughout

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the forward areas of the 4th Infantry Division. For the most part resistance by the enemy was initiated by elements of the Alpenland Division, the 212th Volksgrenadier Division, which incorporated CT Reimald, CT Teich, the Bayreuth Battalion, and CT Duraugel.

17. 17 April 1945. The enemy continued his strong defense of towns and woods and although there was no front line as such at the end of the period, considerable resistance was being met at Hill 422 (S-772872), Neusitz (S-8090), along the ridge running east to Geslau (S-8688), in the woods vicinity S-730815, Buch (S-7482), along the ridge line vicinity S-755860, in the woods at S-6776, Hgartshausen (S-6976), from the woods at S-710768 to S-725797, and Hausen (S-7280). In CT 8's sector the enemy broke contact during the night and withdrew to the south and southwest. Many stragglers remained behind to offer only slight resistance before surrendering. At Colmburg (S-9487) and southeast of Ober Dachstettin (S-9594) strong stands were made by the enemy. CT 12 in its advance encountered considerable small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and high velocity direct fire. As a result of small arms fire which came from three sides, one company of CT 12 was pinned down vicinity S-765877 at 1720. Although our surrender terms were rejected in the city of Rothenberg, advance elements of CT 12 attacking early in the period encountered no opposition as it moved into the city. An enemy direct fire weapon engaged our tanks as they attempted to move from Rothenberg to the southeast. A weak counterattack comprised of eighty (80) enemy was repulsed with little effort in the vicinity of Wachenburg (S-8189). Before CT 22 the enemy offered only disorganized and scattered resistance. Increasing numbers of enemy were observed surrendering after only feeble resistance in this sector. At the beginning of the period in CT 324's sector the enemy offered only slight resistance. At the beginning of the period in CT 524's sector, the enemy offered only slight resistance. Later on, however, as our attack developed, the enemy employed mortar and artillery fire against our attack and by the time leading elements of CT 324 attacked Brettheim (S-7198), the defense was stubborn and tenacious. Well coordinated artillery and small arms fire provided a strong defense of the woods at S-6776. The volume of artillery fire remained about the same as in the previous period, with a total of sixteen (16) shollings reported throughout the division sector. One enemy self-propelled gun was encountered firing and displacing to fire again along the road Colmburg (S-9487) - Leutershausen (S-9481). Mines and abatis were encountered in increasing numbers. The secondary roads vicinity of Ober-Dachstetten (S-9594) were heavily mined. The main roads south of the town were also mined. In compliance with the enemy's policy of mining heavily all entrances to towns, Hohonau (S-9791) and Colmburg (S-9487) were outstanding examples. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained the same.

18. 18 April 1945. Before CT 8 a line extended from Schillingfurts (S-9480), along the high wooded ridge to Leutershausen (S-9481). CT 324 contacted dug in enemy from S-663758 to S-685760 to S-690757 and in the woods at S-6975 and S-7175. The enemy further continued to defend most of

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the towns in the 4th Infantry Division zone of advance by collecting and organizing some of the scattered remnants of his units in our sector. The enemy likewise managed to defend a hasty line south of Berbers Creek. Along the ridge of this vicinity considerable small arms, mortar, and anti-aircraft artillery fire was directed against our leading elements. Encountering only light resistance, CT 12 cleared the towns of Housitz (S-8090) and Bollerhausen (S-8080). CT 22 reported only slight small arms resistance but considerable rocket and artillery fire during the hours of darkness. As in the previous period enemy contacted in CT 324's zone of advance did not become strong until late in the period at which time heavy resistance was encountered in attacking dug in positions from S-663758 to S-685760 to S-690757. The intensity of enemy artillery fire varied throughout the sector during the period. CT 22 reported considerable fire during the hours of darkness with a decrease during daylight hours. CT 8 and CT 12 reported some increase in artillery fire during the latter part of the period. Following a twenty (20) round concentration of estimated 75mm in the vicinity S-710860 at 2145, harassing fire was received in the same area until 2230. In addition to the enemy units previously encountered elements of the 37th SS Regiment of the 17th S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division were encountered.

19. 19 April 1945. The enemy resisted our advance along a general line which although not definitely determined could be considered to have extended from Schinbach (S-6972), through the woods vicinity S-703733, Rossburg (S-7173), Gross Ulrichshausen (S-8374), Binsowoller (S-8773), and Rodowoller (S-8773). Before CT 8 the enemy withdrew during the night to positions south of the Crailsheim (S-7062) - Ansbach (S-0662) Railroad. An attempt was made by the enemy to further withdraw his forces from Rodowoller but this column, both foot troops and vehicles, was forced back into the town by our artillery. No aggressive enemy action was reported by CT 12 in its sector throughout the period. High velocity direct fire was received, however, in the vicinity of Disbach and small arms fire came from the woods vicinity S-760749. Following a rapid advance against only slight small arms, mortar, and artillery fire, a slight increase in harassing mortar and artillery fire was received by CT 22 towards the end of the period. Enemy artillery fire remained light, with concentrations falling mostly in the vicinity of towns. Mittelstetten (S-8475), Bortenberg (S-8875), Bahnhofen (S-8874), and Wottringen (S-7676) were shelled during the period. One enemy plane over CT 8's sector at 2124 was engaged by our anti-aircraft artillery units. One tank or self-propelled gun fired on elements of CT 8 from the woods, vicinity S-864748. Two road blocks including one at S-682728 which was covered by small arms fire coming from the woods vicinity S-683724 were encountered. The same enemy units remained opposite the 4th Infantry Division during the period.

20. 20 April 1945. The only enemy front line that could be determined was from the woods vicinity S-7963 to Kuhnhard (S-8364) to Tribur (S-3564). Throughout the rest of the 4th Infantry Division sector a continuous line did not exist. Until late in the period, our advance throughout

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the division sector encountered only light resistance. Just prior to darkness a slight increase in small arms, artillery, and mortar fire was noted. Considerable traffic movement to the south and southeast indicated that the enemy had begun his attempted flight in this direction. Two (2) enemy tanks were encountered in the vicinity S-3365. One was knocked out and the other withdrew to the south. There was no change in enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division in its sector.

21. 21 April 1945. Although no enemy front line existed at the end of the period, our leading elements had advanced to the outskirts of Jagtzell (S-7350) and to S-785495 at which points they were virtually out of physical contact with the enemy. Before CT 8 the enemy continued to withdraw, leaving small isolated groups to cover the retreat of main bodies. Enemy troops armed with panzerfaust and machine pistols defended briefly from S-7503 and S-7556. At S-760560 small arms fire was received by leading elements of CT 8. CT 22 cleared the town of Crailsheim (S-7083) early in the period. Resistance at this point was in the form of small arms supported by two (2) 75mm guns and one (1) nebelwerfer which had been firing from within the town. Task Force "Rodwell", after an initial delay caused by craters, proceeded to S-712605 where the head of the column received fire from enemy infantry and possibly one enemy tank dug in on the high ground southwest of Crailsheim. After overcoming this resistance, the Task Force proceeded hampered only by numerous road blocks, abatis, cratered roads, and blown bridges. Enemy artillery fire was light and scattered and provided only negligible interference with the advance of elements of the 4th Infantry Division. One (1) jet-propelled plane bombed and strafed the forward elements of CT 8 at 2335. It was believed that remnants of the 212th Volk Grenadier Division incorporating what was left of the Alpenland Division, and the 19th Volk Grenadier Division, plus many miscellaneous combat teams provided the opposition confronting the 4th Infantry Division.

22. 22 April 1945. The defense of Ellwangen was directed from a line roughly estimated to exist along the edge of the woods from S-753435 to S-758459, thence east through the town of Littelhof (S-7244) at Ratstadt (S-7844) and from this point possible southwest to include the town of Hounheim (S-7545). The town of Eggort (S-7244) also contained enemy and presented another outpost before entering the main defenses of Ellwangen. Within the town limits of Ellwangen a castle at S-759434 was organized as a strongpoint. Elsewhere in the 4th Infantry Division sector a front line could not be defined. Indications were that the town of Aalen (S-7529) would be defended. Elements of CT 8 advanced with no real contact until they reached the edge of the woods north of Mindelbach and the outskirts of Ellwangen. At these two points the enemy began what was believed to be a last-ditch defense of the town of Ellwangen. Stubborn resistance consisting of all types of fire was continuous as soon as contact was made. Task Force "Rodwell" advanced steadily throughout the period encountering the numerous terrain obstacles experienced in the previous period. Road blocks, abatis, blown bridges, and craters, although numerous, were

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somewhat easier to overcome and by-pass than those encountered during the previous day. At Leinenfirst (S-6941) the Task Force was engaged in a short fire fight following which the enemy retreated to the southeast towards Moulter (S-7139) on bicycles. In that town leading elements of the Task Force met strong enemy resistance which resulted in some casualties and the loss of two (2) tanks. By 1630 this resistance had been overcome and the Task Force continued to move southeast out of Moulter. In addition to the many miscellaneous combat teams encountered in the previous period, prisoners were taken from the 119th Grenadier Regiment of the 553d Volksgrenadier Division and from the Alpenland Division.

23. 23 April 1945. The only enemy in contact with leading elements of the 4th Infantry Division by the close of the period were seen to withdraw south out of Aalen and into the wooded area at that point. The town of Ellwangen was completely and deliberately fortified. Extensive barbed wire obstacles were encountered along the north, east, and west edges of town. In rear of this line of obstacles, there was a complete system of communication trenches. Roads leading to Ellwangen from the north, east, and west were mined and cratered with heavy road blocks at all defiles. In addition, the surrounding area was well adapted to a strong defense, because of the high hills around the town commanding the open fields beyond. The 6th SS Replacement Battalion continued the stubborn defense of Ellwangen until 2300 at which time a withdrawal to the south started. This withdrawal continued during the early morning at which time some of the retreating elements were killed and captured in the vicinity of Westhausen (S-7954) where they encountered our troops who had outflanked the town and were commanding the logical escape routes from Ellwangen. Enemy rear guards in the town continued to engage our forces with small arms, automatic weapons, and panzerfaust until 1440 when Ellwangen was reported completely clear of enemy. Task Force "Rodwell" continued to advance through the town of Aalen against a strong delaying action by the enemy. Small arms, automatic weapons, heavy mortar, and artillery fire were received by the assaulting elements of the Task Force within the town of Aalen throughout the period until 1930, at which time organized resistance there ceased and enemy troops were observed fleeing into the woods vicinity S-705269. CT 22 continuing to advance on the right flank encountered mainly terrain obstacles such as road blocks, destroyed bridges, and craters. The only enemy defensive action in this sector consisted of several concentrations of 80mm and 120mm mortar fire which fell in the vicinity S-682288. Sporadic light shelling by enemy artillery were received in and around the town of Aalen. Elsewhere enemy artillery was negligible. High velocity direct fire from vicinity S-741320 was believed to have come from an enemy tank. The same enemy units opposed the 4th Infantry Division.

24. 24 April 1945. Early in the period CT 6 reported the town of Ellwangen completely clear with remnants of the badly battered 6th SS Replacement and Training Battalion attempting to infiltrate south in an effort to escape. Also early in the period Task Force "Rodwell" reported

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all organized resistance to have ceased in Aalen (S-7329). There were, however, two (2) enemy tanks still delivering harassing fire from the extreme southern outskirts of the town. By 2400 one (1) of these tanks had been knocked out while the other was believed to have withdrawn in conjunction with the enemy foot troops fleeing to the south. CT 22 experienced very little contact with the enemy during the daylight hours. In advancing in the right half of the division sector, this unit reported light harassing mortar fire followed by small arms fire from Steinheim. This resistance came at about 1630 and by the end of the period the town was reported clear. Task Force "Rodwell" continued to advance rapidly south of Aalen encountering in diminishing numbers road blocks, mine fields, blown bridges, and abatis. An occasional round of self-propelled gun fire was received by leading elements of the Task Force, vicinity S-835160. As leading elements entered Hohenzemmingen, they received light small arms resistance and light artillery fire. A road block vicinity S-845125 was defended by enemy bazooka fire. Inconsequential artillery fire was received during the period. In addition to scattered remnants of the same enemy organizations previously encountered the 3d SS Replacement Battalion was encountered.

25. 25 April 1945. There was no contact with the enemy as the period closed. Leading elements of the 4th Infantry Division had advanced without contacting the enemy to just north of Landenburg (T-0685), Waldkirch (T-0390), and Weisingen (T-0594). Reports were received of scattered small arms, presumably sniper fire encountered by motorized elements of the 4th Infantry Division as they advanced through towns. This was the only evidence of enemy resistance during the period. Many prisoners of war, both in and out of uniform, were taken as mopping up activities in rear areas were carried out throughout the period. At 0100 three (3) enemy tracked vehicles, possibly tanks, were reported at Heidenheim (S-7311). Enemy units retreating before the 4th Infantry Division were believed the same as previously encountered.

26. 26 April 1945. Enemy front lines did not exist and after the woods at Y-065916 and Y-072925, and the towns of Ellerbach (Y-0902) and Dismarshausen (Y-1182) were cleared our troops advanced rapidly without opposition. CT 12 met strong resistance consisting of heavy small arms and some mortar fire in the woods vicinity Y-072925 and Y-065916. West of Dismarshausen CT 8 received scattered small arms and some mortar fire. Enemy units opposing the 4th Infantry Division remained essentially the same.

27. 27 April 1945. A possible enemy front line existed along the east bank of the Lech River. Elsewhere our advance continued to the southeast against little or no enemy contact. CT 8 encountered small scattered groups of stragglers who offered only token resistance. Upon approaching the river vicinity Y-3254, heavy fire from small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery was received. The intensity of this fire increased as our troops deployed and maneuvered. CT 12 advanced to the southeast making no contact until about 1600 when elements were fired on by small arms and automatic weapons from the vicinity of Bieburg (Y-2479). Early in the period considerable artillery fire fell in CT 8's sector. At 2243

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fire was received in the eastern edge of Zusmarshausen (Y-1161) from an estimated battalion of 150mm guns. At 2300 a light barrage fell in Buch (Y-1876). Estimated 88mm fire was received in vicinity Y-220744 at 1630. Both ground and air bursts were continuous in the vicinity Y-2075 and Dietkirch (Y-2074). Enemy units opposing showed no change.

28. 28 April 1945. Generally around the bridgehead area vicinity Y-3355 the enemy opposed our attempts to advance. Elsewhere no enemy front line existed. CT 12 advanced to the southeast clearing enemy from its zone of action west of the Loch River. Resistance encountered consisted of considerable anti-aircraft fire, some mortar fire, and small arms fire. In CT 8's sector the enemy continued to harass our troops holding the bridgehead vicinity Y-3355 with small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. Small enemy patrols made contact with our front line troops in this area. Approximately seventy-five (75) rounds of artillery fell in the vicinity of Schwabstadt (Y-3154) between 2500 and 0200. About four hundred (400) rounds of 20mm flak was fired into the bridgehead area at 0930. At 0400, approximately one hundred (100) rounds mainly air bursts were received at Anhausen (Y-251758). Many miscellaneous units were represented by prisoners taken during the period. The majority of these enemy came from anti-aircraft installations.

29. 29 April 1945. At the close of the period our troops were generally along the eastern side of the railroad from Y-4550 to Y-6158. Other than this there could be no enemy contact defined. Throughout the day our troops advanced rapidly to the southeast with little or no opposition. Groups of enemy surrendered readily without a fight after offering only token resistance. Two (2) enemy planes were over the 4th Infantry Division sector at about 1730. At least one (1) of these planes was shot down by our anti-aircraft artillery. Many miscellaneous units with no organization whatsoever were represented as over one thousand (1,000) prisoners of war were taken during the day.

30. 30 April 1945. The rapid advance of our troops to the southeast continued as only scattered small arms, road blocks, and demolished bridges were encountered. Enemy troops in increasing numbers surrendered readily without a fight. The same disorganized collection of miscellaneous units, largely anti-aircraft installations, were represented as over two thousand (2,000) prisoners of war were taken during the period.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the advance to the northeast in the direction of Lursburg with the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments abreast and the 12th Infantry Regiment in division reserve. Increased resistance was encountered throughout the period, notably on the division's right flank, and march units were harassed throughout

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

the day and during the hours of darkness by enemy jet-propelled aircraft. The division's objective was reached and preparations made for support of the 12th Armored Division's attack on 2 April.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company A, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, continued the advance at first light to the northeast in the direction of Wurzburg following elements of the 12th Armored Division. A continuous shuttle movement was made throughout the day east through the 22d Infantry Regiment's zone of action and then northeast toward the regimental objective immediately south of Wurzburg. By 1300, against increasing resistance of small arms, mortar fire, and direct fire from anti-aircraft weapons, the leading elements of the combat team closed in the vicinity of the objective close behind the forward elements of the 12th Armored Division. Several attacks by jet-propelled enemy aircraft were made upon motor columns of the combat team throughout the day.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company B, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, remained in division reserve. At 0655, the entire combat team began a shuttle movement forward within the division zone of action and closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of Hardheim (N-2513) by 1930.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, advanced to the east beginning at 0600; then northeast toward the regimental objective in the vicinity of Grunsfeld (N-4514). Small arms fire and a moderate amount of artillery fire was encountered in Heokfeld (N-3707) at 1020, but this did not deter the advance. By 1305 the advance units had reached Luada (N-4209) where a heavy amount of artillery fire was encountered. During the latter hours of the period, the 2d Battalion changed their direction of attack toward the southeast and encountered stiff resistance from a large number of enemy troops holding the ridge in the vicinity of N-150110. By the close of the period, the 2d Battalion advanced as far as the village of Kurtzbronn (N-4611) where Company E took over two hundred (200) prisoners of war. In the interim, the 1st and 3d Battalions continued on to the northeast securing the regimental objective. Upon verbal orders of the Commanding General, XXI Corps, two battalions of the 22d Infantry Regiment were attached at 2250 to Combat Command "H" of the 12th Armored Division for pending operations.

2. 2 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued mopping up operations south of Wurzburg within its zone of action with the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments while the 12th Infantry Regiment remained in division reserve. Over fourteen hundred (1400) prisoners of war were captured. A bridgehead was effected across the Main River in the vicinity of Cochenfurt (N-3720) by 2245.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned resumed operations at an early hour with the 2d Battalion and one

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

company of the 1st Battalion to clear scattered enemy resistance from Gullenberger Wald, a large wooded area southwest of Wursburg. The 2d Battalion advanced through this wooded area to the northeast and by mid-afternoon had cleared enemy forces as far north as Hochberg (N-5423) while a company from the 1st Battalion completed mopping up operations in the lower portion of the wooded area. In the interim, the 1st Battalion, less one company, advanced to the southeast and relieved elements of the 12th Armored Division in the vicinity of Oehsenfurt and was later joined by the previously detached company. On fulfillment of the mission assigned to the 2d Battalion, it returned to an assembly area in the vicinity of Rottenbauer (N-6026) closing prior to dark. Shortly after darkness fell, the 1st Battalion proceeded with operations to effect a river crossing in the vicinity of Oehsenfurt and reported the mission accomplished by 2235. Company A of the 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion was detached and reverted to battalion control at 2200.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned remained assembled in division reserve in the vicinity of Hardsheim (N-2613) throughout the period. Company B of the 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion and Company B of the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion were detached and reverted to battalion control at 2200 and 1920 respectively.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned, less the 1st and 2d Battalions which were attached to the 12th Armored Division on 012250B April 1945. Dispositions of the remainder of the combat team remained unchanged throughout the period. The 1st and 2d Battalions continued their attack to the southeast in conjunction with operations of the 12th Armored Division and succeeded in clearing enemy forces from the high ground in the vicinity of Koenigshofer (N-4407) with a large number of prisoners of war being captured.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, consisting of the 101st and the 116th Squadrons, initiated movement toward the present screen line at 0730 and the 101st Squadron reached the reconnaissance line without opposition, while Troop C of the 116th Squadron met strong enemy resistance in the vicinity of Osfeld (N-5209) and was forced to withdraw to the high ground in the vicinity of Vilchband (N-5012). Elements of the squadron were reconnoitering for the east flank of the enemy positions in this vicinity at the close of the period. Company C of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) was attached at 1405.

5. 3 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the south and southeast against stiffening resistance on the right flank within the division sector. The bridgehead which had been established by the 8th Infantry Regiment was exploited by the passage of Combat Command "B" of the 12th Armored Division during the afternoon.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, moved the 2d and 3d Battalions to the south in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion's bridgehead across the Main River at Oehsenfurt (N-678207). The 2d Battalion effected a crossing at Oehsenfurt at 1500 and the 3d Battalion in the

Sec I V -- Operations (Contd)

vicinity of M-8124 at 1730. The 1st Battalion encountered some mortar and artillery fire and became engaged in a small arms fight in the wooded area east of Zeubelried (N-6923) and meanwhile, the I & R Platoon became engaged in heavy fighting in the vicinity of N-640222 where forty (40) prisoners of war were captured. During mid-afternoon, a Bailey Bridge was completed in the vicinity of Oohsenfurt and Combat Command "B" of the 12th Armored Division began crossing at 1600, passing through the 1st Battalion positions.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the 42d Field Artillery Battalion, Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached initiated movement to a new assembly area in the vicinity of Gaubuttelbrunn (N-5417). The 1st Battalion remained assembled in the vicinity of N-3012 while the 3d Battalion completed movement to the vicinity of Allersheim (N-5616) by 1600, and the 2d Battalion closed in the vicinity of Horschshelm (N-5817) by 1930.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, less the 1st and 2d Battalions attached to the 12th Armored Division, continued the attack and the 1st Battalion encountered determined resistance in the vicinity of N-455077 east of Konigshofen from enemy troops dressed in black uniforms. At 0900 the 1st and 2d Battalions were detached from the 12th Armored Division and reverted to regimental control whereupon the 2d Battalion was committed at 1115 to assist the 1st Battalion's attack in clearing the large wooded area confronting them. Resistance continued heavy and progress was slow, but at the close of the period, preparations were made to commit the 3d Battalion early on 4 April.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group with Company C of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued screening the division's right (south) flank and maintaining contact with the 63d Infantry Division operation in the VI Corps zone of action.

4. 4 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division with the 8th Infantry Regiment working in conjunction with Combat Command "B" of the 12th Armored Division, attacked to the north and east from Oohsenfurt, while a coordinated attack was launched by the 12th and the 22d Infantry Regiments to the south.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned, was subjected to a raid on the regimental command post area during the night of 3 - 4 April. The raiding force estimated at about twenty-five (25) enemy soldiers was armed with bazookas and incendiary grenades and succeeded in destroying approximately a dozen vehicles, killed one (1) enlisted man and caused a great deal of confusion within the command post. The 1st Battalion continued its attack to the northwest along the high ground overlooking the town of Erlach (N-6924) while operating in conjunction with Task Force "Field" of Combat Command "B" of the 12th Armored Division. At the close of the period, Company A and Company D organized as a rifle company were moving to the town of Erlach

Sec IV - Operations (contd)

while Company B was moving on Zembelried (N-6928). In the interim, the 2d Battalion remained in position previously occupied and the 3d Battalion closed in the area held by the 1st Battalion at the beginning of the day's operations.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion, Company B and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, less one platoon, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one platoon of Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, launched a coordinated attack with the 22d Infantry Regiment at 1300. The regiment advanced to the southwest with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right, and encountered stiff enemy resistance from enemy entrenched in wooded areas. The 1st Battalion remained in reserve and could not be committed except upon the division's order or to meet a counterattack.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the same attachments as the previous period, less the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, attacked to the south at 1300, maneuvering the 3d Battalion in the right of the regimental zone of action. Stiff resistance was encountered from SS troops which were well entrenched in high wooded areas, but during the late afternoon, the 2d Battalion was successful in occupying the town of Messelhausen (N-4810) bringing the three battalions abreast.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, with Company C of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, continued screening the division's right (south) flank and maintained contact with the 117th Cavalry Squadron operating with the 65d Infantry Division. At 0435, a raid by approximately eight to ten (8 - 10) enemy armed with pistols was directed at the command post of Troop C of the 101st Squadron but the enemy was repulsed and no damage or casualties reported.

5. 5 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack within its zone of action in conjunction with elements of the 12th Armored Division. Continued stubborn resistance was encountered by the 12th and the 22d Infantry Regiments on the division's right (south) flank, but advances were made of over eight kilometers to the northeast in the 8th Infantry Regiment's sector.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion (Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion attached), Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, attached, the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Secs) attached at 1020; continued the attack at 0800 to the northeast on conjunction with Task Force "Field" of the 12th Armored Division with the 1st Battalion following closely behind advancing armored elements. The 3d Battalion advanced to the northwest from the vicinity of Oehsonfurt in the direction of Randersacker (N-6151) and Westheim (N-6729). The armored attack in the direction of Kitzengin (N-7429) progressed rapidly and by 0950 was closing on the outskirts of the city. The 1st Battalion moved into the town while two rifle companies (C and D) mopped-up within the city. Company A crossed the Main River to the east and defended the bridge site, Company B turned to the south and cleared scattered enemy forces from the west bank of the river. Positions were consolidated

Sec IV-- Operations (Contd)

shortly after 1500. Meanwhile the attack of the 3d Battalion to the north progressed favorably and by the end of the period, all areas to the north as far as the division's left boundary in the vicinity of Randersacker had been cleared of resistance and many prisoners of war captured. The 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Oehsenfurt.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack to the south and southwest at 0730 with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast. The attack of the 3d Battalion progressed favorably and an advance of three kilometers was made to the southwest in the direction of Messelhausen. At the close of the period, the 3d Battalion attempted to establish contact with the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry Regiment on the right but an enemy force between the two units was still in position and contact could not be made by forward units. The attack of the 2d Battalion met greater resistance from the enemy infantry defending in the wooded area in the vicinity of N-5710, and after heavy fighting throughout the period, the battalion had succeeded in pushing through the woods approximately one kilometer to the south, killing an estimated one hundred (100) enemy and securing some prisoners of war. The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Ruerhausen (N-5914) throughout the period.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, continued the attack to the south with three battalions abreast, the 3d, 1st and 2d, from right to left. Initially the attack of the 3d Battalion was unopposed, but progress in the entire regimental sector was negligible. The enemy employed 150mm and 105mm artillery, 120mm and 80mm mortars, small arms, and numerous automatic weapons, and stubbornly defended his positions in the other battalion sectors. By the close of the period, the wooded areas to the south and north of Messelhausen (N-4910) had been cleared.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron consisting of the 101st and the 116th Squadrons with Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), and Battery A, 522d Field Artillery Battalion (106H) attached, screened the division's right (south) flank and maintained contact with elements of the 63d Infantry Division advancing east in the VI Corps zone of action.

6. 6 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack, conducted mopping up operations in the left portion of the division's zone of action, while attacking to the south with the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments abreast in the direction of Bad Mergentheim. Prior to the close of the period, the high ground overlooking the town had been secured by the 22d Infantry Regiment.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned continued mopping up operations within the zone of action north of Oehsenfurt. Company G advanced to the east to the town of Markreith (N-7320) and outposted the town while Company B moved south into the town of Sulzfeld (N-7226), but other troop dispositions generally remained unchanged. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Heck) continued to screen along

Sec. IV - Operations (Contd)

the regimental left (north) flank from Randersaehen (N-6231) to the east as far as Kitzingen (N-7429), but no organized enemy forces were encountered throughout the day.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned continued the attack beginning at 0630 when the 2d Battalion moved out followed by the 3d Battalion at 0650. Progress of the two battalions was continuous throughout the period against only scattered opposition and by nightfall, the 2d Battalion had advanced five kilometers to the south and cleared Hassau (N-5606) where contact was established with Troop B of the 116th Cavalry Squadron. The 3d Battalion advanced to the southeast reaching Harthausen (N-5206) with elements reaching the village of Holzbromm (N-5004).

The 22d Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as previously mentioned continued the advance to the south and determined at an early hour that resistance in the regimental zone of action had considerably diminished. The 3d Battalion continued the advance from the vicinity of Konigshofen to the southeast astride the main highway leading to Bad Mergentheim and prior to the close of the period, the leading companies had cleared the enemy from Edelfigen (N-4503). Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion advanced to the south and southwest against only light opposition and by 2300, two companies had scoured the high ground (Hill 341) overlooking the town of Bad Mergentheim from the north. In the interim, the 1st Battalion advanced to the south in the center of the regimental zone of action and mopped up the areas between the attacking elements of the 2d and the 3d Battalions, whereupon it passed into regimental reserve.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group with the same attachments as previously mentioned continued the reconnaissance mission of screening the division's right (south) flank and maintaining contact between elements of the 8th and the 12th Infantry Regiments. Prior to the close of the period, elements of the 101st Cavalry Squadron cleared the town of Riedenheim (N-6108) while elements of the 116th Cavalry Squadron had advanced to the south and cleared enemy from the formerly disputed town of Ollingen (N-6811).

7. 7 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division conducted mopping up operations in the left portion of the division's zone of action, and attacked to the southeast within the right portion of the zone of action. At the close of the day's operations, the 12th Infantry Regiment and the 22d Infantry Regiment were generally along the Tauber River after advancing against scattered to determined enemy resistance.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion (Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion attached), Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop attached, continued mopping up operations within the division's zone of action north of Oehsenfurt (N-6920). A little enemy activity was reported within the zone and no aggressive action was initiated by the regiment. The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop was detached effective 2100.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, and one Platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, less one platoon of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one platoon of Company D, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, initiated a coordinated attack at 0700 with the 1st and the 3d Battalions abreast. Scattered enemy resistance was encountered throughout the day from a well entrenched enemy employing small arms and mortar fire and, at the close of the period, the two battalions were along the Tauber River. The small towns of Igersheim (east of the river) (N-5002), Schaftersheim (N-5602), Tauberrettersheim (N-5901), and Rottingen (N-6105) were occupied while patrols reported the towns of Merkersheim (N-5600) and Bieberehren to be strongly defended. The main defenses of the enemy seemed to be within the regimental's left zone of action.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, attacked to the southeast and at an early hour the town of Bad Mergentheim (N-4700) was occupied by the 3d Battalion with only little resistance reported. The 2d Battalion attacking within the regimental left zone of action encountered scattered enemy resistance consisting mainly of small arms and mortar fire. At the close of the period, this battalion had advanced and was holding the high ground generally from N-505010 to the southeast in the vicinity of S-495990. During the afternoon, the 3d Battalion continued their advance from Bad Mergentheim and buttoned up for the night within the woods in the vicinity of S-4898. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion remained in the vicinity of Gerlachsheim (N-4310) in division reserve.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Group continued on former contact and reconnaissance mission until detached from the 4th Infantry Division and attached to the 12th Armored Division per verbal orders of the Commanding General, XXI Corps.

8. 8 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division conducted extensive patrolling within the 12th and 22d Infantry sectors generally along the Tauber River. The 8th Infantry in conjunction with the 12th Armored Division completed mopping up operations within their zone.

The 8th Infantry, with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion (Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion attached), Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued mopping up within their zone of action and while no organized enemy activity was reported, thirty-one (31) prisoners of war were captured. The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve. At approximately 072154B April 1945, enemy aircraft over the regimental area dropped two (2) 500 pound and numerous antipersonnel bombs in the Command Post area, causing some casualties in the 29th Field Artillery Battalion. During the afternoon, practice firing of individual and crew served weapons was conducted.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, less one platoon, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one platoon of Company B,

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, initiated strong patrols to the south along the Tauber River. The towns of Rottingen (N-6103) and Elpersheim (S-5498) were occupied during the day. The town of Weikersheim (N-5600) was strongly defended by a small but stubborn enemy force, but at the close of the period, Company K reported one-half of the town cleared. The relief of the 2d Battalion by the 1st Battalion was completed as of 1650, the 2d Battalion reverting to regimental control in the vicinity of Stalldorf (N-5809).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company G, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion attached, carried on extensive patrolling throughout the period within the regimental zone of action with patrols of Company F reaching as far south as the town of Apfelbach (S-5198). The town of Igersheim (N-5002) was completely cleared west of the Tauber River during the afternoon. The 1st Battalion remained in division reserve in the vicinity of Gerlachsheim (N-4310).

9. 9 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued mopping up operations throughout the entire division sector, apprehending small disorganized groups of enemy. Troop dispositions of the combat team remained generally unchanged, and active patrolling was continued within the 12th and 22d Infantry sectors to the south and east. Combat team attachments remained the same as for the previous period.

10. 10 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division attacked to the southeast with the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments abreast and secured the general line Bartenstein (N-5586) - Rottingen (N-6103) prior to the close of the period.

The 8th Infantry, with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion (Assault Gun Platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion attached), Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued mopping up operations within the regimental sector throughout the period, apprehending small disorganized groups of the enemy.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, assisted the 22d Infantry by attacking at 1000 to seize Hill 401 (N-5795) and the town of Laudonbach (N-5897). Enemy opposition throughout the period was light, and by 1900 the 3d Battalion had secured the regimental objective. Company K cleared the town of Laudonbach and Company I outposted Hill 401. Small arms fire and 75mm fire from direct fire weapons from the east and southeast were received at 1900 by Company I on the high ground.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, attacked at 0900 with the 2d Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right. One company of the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve while the 1st Battalion remained in division reserve. The regiment attacked to seize the line

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

Berkenstein (N-5586) - Niederstetten (N-5891). Patrols moved out at 0830 and both battalions advanced unopposed throughout the period, and by late afternoon had established themselves upon the regimental objective.

The 324th Infantry Regiment, with Company B, 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company C, 772d Tank Battalion; Company C, 119th Medical Battalion; Company C, 65d Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 220th Field Artillery Battalion attached, was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 1500.

11. 11 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division (reinforced) initiated a coordinated attack to the southeast and met stubborn resistance from artillery, small arms, and antiaircraft guns within the center zone of action from a determined enemy.

The 8th Infantry, with attachments as stated for the previous period, initiated an attack to the southeast, attacking at approximately 1000 hours, with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 2d Battalion on the right. Companies B and D moved with little opposition to the towns of Illauzheim (N-8023) and Tiefenstockheim (N-7821) respectively, while Company C remained in the town of Stadt Schwarzbach (N-7936). This company was to be relieved by elements of the 12th Armored Division during the night 11-12 April. The 2d Battalion continued their advance to a limited objective and, at the close of the period, were in the vicinity of Obernbreit (N-7520). During the day's operations, no organized enemy resistance was reported within the regimental sector. The 3d Battalion was in division reserve in the vicinity of Ochsensfurt (N-6720).

The 12th Infantry, with attachments as stated for the previous period, initiated an attack with the 1st Battalion at 0800 to clear the enemy from the woods in the vicinity of N-6202 and after hard fighting had cleared the enemy from the woods generally along a line N-6203 - N-6402. During the ensuing action, many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy, and one enemy tank was destroyed during the late afternoon. The 2d Battalion's main effort was initiated by Company E, and at the close of the period they were in the vicinity of Baldersheim (N-6808) with the remainder of the battalion ordered to move to the zone early on 12 April. The 3d Battalion remained in division reserve and closed in the town of Riedenheia (N-6134).

The 22d Infantry, with attachments as stated for the previous period, initiated an attack at approximately 0930, attacking with the 3d Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right within the regimental zone of action. The 3d Battalion advanced to the woods in the vicinity of N-6001 and Company I moved to the southeast, attacking the village of Quockbrom (N-6009). At the close of the period the 3d Battalion, after a slow advance under heavy small arms fire, was holding the high ground. The 1st Battalion in initiating their attack, received antiaircraft and artillery fire on the line of departure. Throughout the day the battalion was under continuous artillery and some self-propelled fire from the vicinity of Hill 400 (S-5996). Not until during the late afternoon did the companies of the 1st Battalion reach the high ground after employing a combination of infantry and tanks. The 2d Battalion remained in division

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

reserve within the 324th Infantry sector.

The 324th Infantry, with attachments as stated for the previous period, received an enemy counterattack in the vicinity of S-610825 at 0630, but this was quickly repulsed. The regimental attack was launched at 1020 and Company I occupied the town of Niederstetten (S-5891), while Companies K and L moved to the high ground in the vicinity of S-570895. The 1st Battalion cleared the woods in the vicinity of S-615940 and captured a number of prisoners of war. The 2d Battalion continued their advance between the 3d Battalion to the north and the 1st Battalion to the south and reported some artillery fire from the 22d Infantry sector to the north. At approximately 2230 in the vicinity of S-625794 an enemy counterattack of an estimated company was quickly repulsed.

12. 12 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the southeast, clearing the woods and high ground of enemy that employed small arms, artillery, flak, and self-propelled guns in their defense. The main effort was made within the 22d and 12th Infantry zones of action, and preparations were made for a continuation of the attack in order to reach limited objectives on 13 April.

The 8th Infantry, with no change in attachments, continued minor mopping up operations within its zone of action with the 1st and 2d Battalions, while the 3d Battalion remained in division reserve. No organized enemy resistance was encountered. Company C closed in Hermosheim (N-8020) at 1210 after Corps had released them from guarding Stadt Schwarzsach (N-7936).

The 12th Infantry, with no change in attachments, resumed the attack to the southeast at an early hour with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast. The 1st Battalion cleared the woods in the vicinity of N-7502, and continued the advance across the Tauber River with supporting tanks. Company C continued the advance and occupied Creglinger (S-6699), while Company A occupied the high ground in the vicinity of N-8601. The 2d Battalion in continuing their advance to the southeast cleared the woods in the vicinity of N-6706. Company G in occupying the town of Waldmannshofen (N-6806) received fire from friendly tanks in the vicinity of Aub (N-6808) but liaison was immediately established and the situation was corrected. Company F continued and occupied Soehselbach (N-6800) by the close of the period. Throughout the period, the 3d Battalion remained in division reserve.

The 22d Infantry, with no change in attachments, continued the attack at 0600 with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast. Throughout the period progress of both battalions was held to a minimum by the enemy who employed small arms, antiaircraft, and self-propelled guns. The 1st Battalion in their advance occupied the town of Wernutshausen (S-6095) and the high ground to the northeast. Within the 3d Battalion zone, Company L cleared the woods and high ground in the vicinity of S-6498. The 2d Battalion in division reserve shifted Companies E and F within the 1st Battalion zone, while Company G remained in the vicinity of N-5669 in the 324th Infantry sector.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

The 324th Infantry, with no change in attachments, readjusted companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions and preparations were made for a coordinated attack with the 22d Infantry early 13 April. The 1st Battalion continued mopping up within their zone and during the operation one hundred and forty-eight (148) prisoners of war were captured.

13. 15 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to attack to the southeast and prior to the close of the period had secured the division objective line extending from Freudenberg (S-7199) southwest to Flaufolden (S-5279).

The 8th Infantry, with attachments as previously stated, maintained positions in the vicinity of Marktbreit (N-7321) with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast within the zone of action, while the 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve. No enemy action was reported during the period and troop dispositions of the regiment in general remained unchanged, with the exception of the 3d Battalion which moved to the vicinity of Gnodstadt and the regimental command post which moved to the vicinity of Marktsteft (N-7224).

The 12th Infantry, with attachments as previously stated, resumed the attack to the southeast at 0730 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast while the 3d Battalion (less Company L) echeloned forward to the town of Reinsbrom (N-6702). The assault battalions continued their advance throughout the period against light resistance and were successful in securing the regimental objective line in the vicinity of Freudenberg (S-7199) and in capturing over two hundred and fifty (250) prisoners of war.

The 22d Infantry, with attachments as previously stated, resumed the attack to the southeast at 0730 with three battalions abreast. Enemy opposition was negligible and by the close of the period, the regimental objective line in the vicinity of Lichtel (S-6792) had been secured and contact established with the 324th Infantry on the right.

The 324th Infantry, with attachments as previously stated, resumed the attack to the southeast at 0730 in conjunction with the attack of the 2d Infantry. During the period the 3d Battalion advanced abreast of the 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry and closed upon the regimental objective line in the vicinity of Schrosberg (S-6385) by 1800. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion (less Company E) assembled in regimental reserve in the vicinity of S-53544 while Company E continued to occupy positions held at the close of the previous period.

The 101st Cavalry Squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division immediately prior to the close of the day's operations, and was ordered to assemble in present positions upon being passed through by the 8th Infantry on 14 April.

14. 14 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack and advanced approximately four to five kilometers to the southeast in the direction of Rothenburg (S-7789) along the entire division front.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion attached, began a shuttle movement at 1000 to the southeast within the new regimental zone of action following elements of the 12th Armored Division. All three battalions were shuttled forward during

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the day and by the end of the period had closed in the vicinity of Ergersheim (N-8704). Contact was established with the 12th Infantry on the right in the vicinity of N-770023 at 1815 and no enemy resistance was reported within the regimental sector until 1845 when a small counterattack was reported in the vicinity of Illesheim (N-9101). The 101st Cavalry Squadron (less Troop A), upon being passed through by elements of the 8th Infantry, assembled in the vicinity of Buchheim (N-8702).

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion; and Company D, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, initiated an attack to the southeast within the new regimental sector beginning at 0800 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast. Progress was continuous throughout the day, the 2d Battalion on the left advanced approximately eight kilometers when resistance increased on the left flank against Company C in the vicinity of Ohrenbach (S-7999). The 1st Battalion meanwhile pressed forward approximately five kilometers and secured the small communication center of Tauberschockonbach (S-7495), and the high ground to the northeast. The 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve and echeloned forward during the period to the town of Gross-Harbach (S-7599).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion attached, continued the attack to the southeast with the 1st and 3d Battalions at 0900 and initially had no contact with the enemy. Progress throughout the period was continuous but slow, and enemy opposition increased in the wooded areas later in the day. By the close of the period, advances from two to three kilometers were made along the entire regimental front. Although the 2d Battalion was to revert to regimental control upon being pinched out by the 1st Battalion, elements of Company G had to be committed late in the period against an enemy threat on the left flank of the 324th Infantry.

The 324th Infantry, with attachments as previously mentioned, attacked to the southeast with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast at 0900 and moved steadily forward throughout the day against increasing opposition of small arms, machine guns, some direct artillery and rocket fire. At the close of the operations, advances of approximately three to four kilometers had been made along the entire regimental front. To secure the regimental left flank, Company E from the reserve battalion and the A & F Platoon of the 3d Battalion took up positions northeast of Schrozberg (S-6305) on the left of the 3d Battalion.

15, 15 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack, advancing approximately two to five kilometers to the southeast in the direction of Rothenburg (S-7789) against stiffening resistance; repulsed a counterattack late in the period in the vicinity of Weiler (S-7292).

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion attached, remained in assembly area in the early part of the period to regroup, and at 1645 jumped off with the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2d Battalion on the right, followed by the 3d Battalion, with objectives in the vicinity of S-9496 and S-8696. Resistance consisting of small arms, mortar and some artillery fire

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increased as the combat team advanced to the southeast but by the close of the period, all elements were reported on their objective.

The 12th Infantry, with no change in attachments, continued the attack at 0620 with the 2d Battalion on the left, the 1st Battalion on the right, and gained from two to four kilometers against moderate resistance. The 1st Battalion encountered many antipersonnel and antitank mines, while the 2d Battalion reported receiving small arms, artillery and direct fire from the vicinity of Adelshofen (S-768962), but by the close of the period, this town had been cleared of the enemy. The 3d Battalion after being passed through by the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry, with no change in attachments, continued the attack at 0800, the 3d Battalion on the left, the 2d Battalion on the right, with the mission initially of clearing the woods in the vicinity of S-705945 and S-6887. No contact with the enemy was reported until 0945 at which time the 2d Battalion reported light resistance in the woods in the vicinity of S-660883. The 2d Battalion advance was slow but continuous throughout the period with the battalion reporting gains of approximately two to three kilometers. The 3d Battalion reported light to moderate resistance, advancing approximately three kilometers and clearing the towns of Wolfsbuch (S-730932), Weiler (S-729925) and Blumweiler (S-712920). At 2040 an undetermined number of enemy employing artillery, mortars, small arms, and automatic weapons attacked up the wooded draw from the southeast against Companies K and L in the vicinity of Weiler; communications were temporarily disrupted but by the close of the period, the counterattack was repulsed and approximately fifteen (15) prisoners of war were captured.

The 324th Infantry, with no change in attachments, maintained positions as shown at the close of the previous period and sent strong combat patrols to the southeast, clearing the towns of Lindlein (S-648825), Emmertsbühl (S-652790) and Schmalfelden (S-665830), with many prisoners of war reported captured.

16. 16 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack early in the period, advancing against moderate to heavy resistance in the direction of Rothenburg (S-7789). Many towns were cleared and numerous prisoners of war were captured. At the close of the period, all units were reported in a good position to continue the attack on Rothenburg the following day.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; 101st Cavalry Squadron, and one platoon of Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack at 0700 to destroy or capture all enemy forces in the woods in the vicinity of S-8595 and to the east. The 1st Battalion (101st Cavalry Squadron attached) advanced to the south from positions scoured the previous day, advancing from three to five kilometers against stubborn resistance of well concealed enemy in the woods. At the close of the period Ober Dachstatten (S-9594) and the woods to the west had been cleared and the high ground east of Ermetzhoff (S-9094) occupied. The 2d and 3d Battalions advanced to the right of the sector, clearing the woods against very stiff resistance, while the 3d Battalion maintained contact with the 2d Battalion of

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the 12th Infantry in the vicinity of S-833933.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, jumped off at 0600 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, and during the day cleared Gattenhof (S-785936), Hartershofen (S-8194), Schweinsdorf (S-8191), Bettwar (S-7593), and Steinbach (S-75921) against light resistance which increased to stubborn resistance as they neared Rothenburg (S-7789). At 1600 a patrol from the 1st Battalion rode into Rothenburg, flying a white flag, to ask the commander of the troops there to surrender the city. The German commander would not surrender the city, whereupon the attack was continued by both battalions. At the close of the period, the 2d Battalion reported receiving antiaircraft direct fire from the woods in the vicinity of S-815905, and estimated 105mm artillery and small arms from the vicinity of Rothenburg were reported by both battalions.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, jumped off at 0700 with two battalions abreast with the mission of clearing the woods in the vicinity of S-3988 and assisting the 12th Infantry in the capture of Rothenburg. They advanced against stiff resistance from dug in enemy and strongpoints, receiving fire from direct fire weapons, small arms, and automatic weapons along their entire front. The following towns were cleared during the period: Schwarzenbronn (S-729910), Bohmweiler (S-711904), Reuthausen (S-741908), Leusenbronn (S-736886), Ober Eichroth (S-679871), Funkstadt, and Leuzendorf (S-711856). At the close of the period, they reported receiving direct fire from the woods just west of Rothenburg and artillery and small arms fire from the vicinity of south and west of Rothenburg. The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Speilbach (S-692900).

The 324th Infantry, with attachments as previously mentioned, attacked at 0630 to the southeast on the right of the division zone, advancing approximately three kilometers against well organized enemy dug in along the edge of the woods. During the day the following towns were captured: Ehringshausen (S-691809), Wiesenbach (S-671801), Saubach (S-657803), and Emmertsbuhl (S-652790).

17. 17 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack to the southeast at first light, advancing against sporadic resistance and secured the town of Rothenburg (S-7789) together with numerous small villages. Gains of between four and five kilometers were made along the entire right portion of the division zone of action, while on the extreme left, leading elements of the 8th Infantry were reported to have advanced approximately fifteen kilometers and entered the city of Ansbach (T-0681). The day's operations netted over one thousand (1,000) prisoners of war.

The 8th Infantry, with attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack at 0700 with elements of the 12th Armored Division operating within the left portion of the regimental zone of action. While the 1st Battalion advanced to the south and southeast in the center of the section as a motorized task force, the 2d and 3d Battalions advanced against moderate

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resistance on the right flank through the wooded areas in the vicinity of S-8594 and to the southeast for ten kilometers as far as Ober-Folden (S-9288) where positions were consolidated. In the interim, the 1st Battalion task force was successful in by-passing enemy road blocks and at the close of the period was reported in the outskirts of Ansbach (T-0681), some eighteen kilometers from their line of departure.

The 12th Infantry, with attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack at first light. The 1st Battalion, Company C in the assault, moved to the south against Rothenburg (S-7789), reaching the outskirts of the city at 0630 with Companies A and B following. At 0700 the 2d Battalion moved out, initially against sporadic artillery fire which was falling along the entire regimental front, however, contact with the enemy was made at S-810605 in the heavily wooded area northeast of Rothenburg. The 1st Battalion continued the assault on Rothenburg, clearing the city by 1240 of scattered resistance, and the 2d Battalion advanced through the wooded area to the southeast in the direction of Gunsendorf (S-8588). The 3d Battalion was committed in the center of the regimental sector and advanced to the southwest against Housitz (S-8086). By the close of the period the 1st Battalion had consolidated within and outposted Rothenburg, leading elements of the 3d Battalion had cleared Neusitz, and the 1st Battalion cleared Gunsendorf as of 2115.

The 22d Infantry, with attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack at 0730 with the 1st Battalion passing through the 3d Battalion which in turn reverted to regimental reserve and remained in position throughout the day. The 1st and 2d Battalions then attacked abreast and advanced to the south against sporadic resistance of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Progress was continuous and the towns of Buch (S-7482), Lehrbach (S-7583), and Herrrinden (S-7585) between three and four kilometers from the line of departure were secured.

The 324th Infantry, with attachments as previously mentioned, continued the attack to the southeast to cut the main northeast - southwest highway through the town of Brettheim (S-7078). The enemy attempted to continue his stubborn defense within the sector and fighter-bombers were employed to bomb and strafe the towns of Brettheim and Hausen (S-7279) in order to assist the advance of the regiment. By the close of the period, both towns had been taken by the 3d Battalion while the 1st Battalion secured the village of Engelhardhausen (S-6677) on the regimental right flank. Elements of the 2d Battalion were employed to tie in with the 22d Infantry on the left, while the 4th Reconnaissance Troop established contact on the right with the 63d Reconnaissance Troop.

18. 18 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed the attack within the new division zone of action and advanced from three to nine kilometers, clearing numerous towns and villages.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, continued the attack to the southwest within the new regimental zone of action with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast. Resistance throughout the day increased late in the period as fire was received from enemy positions extending from Leutershausen (S-9481) southwest to Gallingenfurst (S-8480).

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At 1740 fighter bombers were employed to bomb and straff Leutershausen and the 2d Battalion was successful in advancing approximately six kilometers from the line of departure to the outskirts of Jochnsberg (S-9282), while the 3d Battalion advanced as far south as the wooded areas east and west of Buchwald (S-8884). Patrols of the 101st Cavalry Squadron screened between advancing units and reconnoitered to the south as far as the stream line extending east and west through the regimental sector. Further advances could not be made because of enemy opposition to the south. At the close of the period and under cover of darkness, the 3d Battalion dispatched patrols into the enemy's positions with a view of continuing the attack through the night. In the interim the 1st Battalion remained in position in the southern outskirts of Ansbach awaiting relief by elements of the 12th Armored Division.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, continued the attack within the new regimental zone of action at 0900 from positions held east of Rothenburg at the close of the previous period by the 2d and 3d Battalions. The 1st Battalion was pinched out and reverted to regimental control in the course of the day's operations. Progress was continuous throughout the day against light resistance until late in the period when mortar and heavy caliber artillery fire increased considerably as leading units approached the ridge line extending from Frankheim (S-8378) southwest to Phauerbromm (S-7573). Advances of approximately eight kilometers were made by both battalions before positions were consolidated and preparations made for an assault on the enemy's positions early on 19 April. The 1st Battalion meanwhile closed within Gobsattel (S-7986).

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, continued the attack to the south within the new regimental zone of action at approximately 0900 and advanced steadily south throughout the day against sporadic resistance to the vicinity of Renbach (S-7276) where the 1st Battalion consolidated its positions. The 324th Infantry sector passed to control of the 22d Infantry at 1900 whereupon the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 22d Infantry moved south and west to effect relief of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 324th Infantry respectively in positions held at that time. Relief of the 324th Infantry was still in progress at the close of the period. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Heez) was detached from the 324th Infantry and attached to the 22d Infantry effective 1900.

The 324th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, continued the attack to the south for approximately two kilometers until 1900 when responsibility for the regimental sector passed to control of the 22d Infantry. At this time relief of the 1st and 2d Battalions by elements of the 22d Infantry was initiated. The 3d Battalion meanwhile assembled in the vicinity of S-375793 and prepared to entruck for a new assembly area to the west to be followed by the entire regiment upon completion of the relief. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop was detached from the 324th Infantry and attached to the 22d Infantry effective 1900.

19. 19 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack within the division zone of action, and advanced from three to ten kilometers, clearing many towns and villages.

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The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion; 101st Cavalry Squadron, and Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack throughout the night to secure the high ground in the vicinity of S-800815 - S-920815 for a line of departure to continue the advance south in their sector. The 1st Battalion, reinforced, motorized, initiated movement at 0630 from the vicinity of Ansbach to the new regimental zone of action. The 2d and 3d Battalions reported very light resistance initially but encountered numerous blown bridges and overpasses which slowed their advance. Resistance consisting of small arms, mortar, and artillery fire coming from the vicinity of Bindweiler (8773) and Rodemweiler (8873) increased later in the period in the 2d and 3d Battalion sectors. The 1st Battalion advanced against very light resistance consisting mainly of road blocks. At Arrach (S-950755) an estimated company of disorganized enemy was overrun and one hundred and sixty (160) prisoners were taken. At 1400 the 101st Cavalry Squadron was detached from the 8th Infantry.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company D, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack at 0800 with the 2d and 3d Battalions and reported no active resistance until 0945 at which time they received direct fire from the woods in their sector in the vicinity of S-765770. Metzingen and Ober Oetheim were cleared against moderate resistance by 1400. The Combat Team continued the advance, capturing Werbitz, Walkersdon, Gailrau, and cleared the woods to the south, capturing Erberg, Bottenweiler, Wildenholz, and Theuerbronn. The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Gabsattel (S-790865).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion; Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop attached, initially consolidated positions in which they had relieved the 324th Infantry late in the previous period. Preparations were made to continue the advance to the south with the 2d Battalion in the left of their zone of action. During the period, the 2d Battalion advanced approximately four kilometers, clearing Kauhhard, Lunbach, Schainbach, Rosburg, and Michelbach against determined resistance consisting of Nebelwerfer, heavy mortar, artillery, and heavy small arms fire from the south. The 3d Battalion reported receiving artillery fire from the south late in the period. The 1st Battalion maintained positions on the left flank and also advanced to the south approximately three kilometers against stiff resistance, capturing Schonbronn and Gailroth. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop cleared Rotam See (6674) and maintained contact with elements of the 63d Infantry Division on the right.

The 324th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, was detached from the 4th Infantry Division at 1900 after being relieved by elements of the 22d Infantry, and cleared the 4th Infantry Division area at 1200 enroute to a new assembly area.

20. 20 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack within the division zone of action advancing ten to twelve kilometers across the entire front and clearing many towns and villages against very light

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to moderate resistance.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A and one platoon of Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast at 0700 advancing rapidly against very light opposition initially. As the attack progressed they met increasing enemy resistance in towns and along the edges of wooded areas with the enemy employing artillery, antitank, self-propelled 75mm and small arms fire. The Combat Team continued to advance against light to moderate resistance capturing many towns and villages, reporting advances of approximately twelve kilometers during the period. The 3d Battalion staged forward and late in the period were committed on the right of the 2d Battalion.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, continued the attack with the 2d and 3d Battalions at first light and advanced rapidly in their zone capturing many towns and villages with only sporadic resistance consisting of small arms, automatic weapons, and artillery fire. The 1st Battalion remained in reserve and staged forward throughout the period.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, continued the attack at 0835 with the 1st Battalion passing through elements of the 2d Battalion on the left of the regimental zone of action. After being passed through by the 1st Battalion, the 2d Battalion continued the advance on their right with the 4th Reconnaissance Troop on the right flank maintaining contact with elements of the 63d Infantry Division. The Combat Team reported very slight resistance throughout the period, making gains of from ten to twelve kilometers and capturing many towns. At 1945, the 1st Battalion reported leading elements in the outskirts of Crailsheim (S-706625) where they received nebelwerfer, antitank, and some small arms fire.

21. 21 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the attack to the south in the direction of the division objective in the vicinity of Aalon (S-7929), advancing between ten to twelve kilometers against negligible enemy resistance.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion and Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack to the south within the regimental zone of action and protected the left flank of the division. The attack was initiated with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, at an early hour, and with little or no opposition throughout the entire period. Advances of up to fifteen kilometers were made within the sector. At the close of the period, the 2d Battalion had secured and outposted the village of Stobkan (S-7747) prepared to continue at first light on 22 April, while the 3d Battalion closed within Riegelsheim (S-7853). The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Riegelbach (S-8261) throughout the period.

Task Force "Rodwell" was constituted under the command of Brigadier General James S. Rodwell and consisted of the following units: 12th Infantry (Historized), 42d Field Artillery Battalion, 622d Field Artillery Battalion, 70th Tank Battalion (less one platoon of Company D), 4th Reconnaissance

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Troop, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Beginning at 0800, this Task Force assembled in the vicinity of Schnelldorf (S-7869) and at 1030 leading elements began the advance to the south. Progress throughout the day was steady with little or no opposition but was greatly hampered by hastily erected road blocks, blown bridges, abatis, and cratered roads. By the close of the period, leading elements of the Task Force had reached the vicinity of Jagstzell (S-7250) where large craters were encountered. Work continued throughout the night to make the road passable in order to continue the advance early the next day.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack beginning at first light with the 1st and 2d Battalions assaulting the city of Crailsheim (S-7082), while the 3d Battalion advanced to the south along the regimental left boundary. By 1000, the town had been cleared with little or no opposition and the advance was halted while elements of Task Force "Rodwell" passed through to the south. During the remainder of the period, the 3d Battalion continued its advance for six kilometers and the 1st and 2d Battalions echeloned forward closing within the towns of Steinbach (S-7055) and Jagstheim (S-6957).

22. 22 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division resumed its advance to the south, the first elements moving at 0400 to secure the division objective in the vicinity of Aalen (S-7329). By the close of the period, Task Force "Rodwell" had advanced twenty kilometers to the south and was engaged with the enemy on the outskirts of the objective.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as previously stated, initiated movement beginning at 0400 when the 1st Battalion, motorized, began its advance to the south. At 0700 the 2d and 3d Battalions continued the attack and initially moved without opposition, the 3d Battalion advancing approximately seven kilometers in the right of the regimental sector and the 2d Battalion two kilometers in the left. Both battalions, upon reaching the outskirts of Ellwangen (S-7543), met determined resistance from a reported force of six hundred (600) enemy infantry, SS troops, defending the city. Repeated attempts to assault the enemy's positions resulted in failure and a coordinated attack was planned on 23 April. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion advanced unopposed, by-passing Ellwangen on the east through the 12th Armored Division zone of action, and by the close of the period was approaching the regimental objective, some ten kilometers south of the line of departure.

Forward elements of Task Force "Rodwell" in the vicinity of Jagstzell had reconnoitered satisfactory by-passes on their route of advance and continued on to the south at 0630, initially with no enemy opposition except for numerous abatis and hasty road blocks through the wooded areas. At 1230, enemy opposition was encountered in the vicinity of S-695409 which was quickly eliminated as the enemy withdrew to the south-east. Opposition again was encountered in the vicinity of Neuler (S-7039) where a fire fight took place and the enemy force of approximately sixty (60) men was entirely eliminated, all personnel being killed or captured.

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From this point the advance was continued unopposed until the enemy was again encountered on the Task Force objective in the vicinity of Aalen (S-7330). Prisoners of war reported the city defended by five hundred or six hundred (500 or 600) enemy armed with small arms and bazookas.

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the advance to the south beginning at 0700 with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve and echeloned forward to the vicinity of Roenberg (S-6749). The 1st and 3d Battalions encountered no enemy opposition in their advance and continued to the south for approximately fourteen kilometers to the vicinity of Adelmansfelden (S-6642) where positions were consolidated for the night.

23. 23 April 1945. The advance of the 4th Infantry Division to the south, clearing both Ellwangen and Aalen of enemy. All units of the division were on their objectives by the end of the period and Task Force "Rodwell" had received orders to continue the advance to the south towards the Danube River.

The attack of the 8th Infantry, with the same attachments as the previous period, continued with the 2d and 3d Battalions. The 1st Battalion out the road in the vicinity of Schwabsberg (S-7639) and also the road running southeast out of Ellwangen in the vicinity of S-7842. The advance against Ellwangen was slowed by a strong rear guard action, but the 1st Battalion was in a position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy as he withdrew to the south and southeast. Ellwangen was reported cleared at 1440. The 2d Battalion continued to mop up small pockets of enemy while the other two battalions continued their advance to the south. Approximately fifteen (15) square miles were cleared during the day including the towns of Schwabsberg, Dollsingen, Buch, and Westhausen.

Task Force "Rodwell" had coiled the complete column into Wasseralfingen north of Aalen during the night 23 - 24 April and had positioned the battalions to assault the town at 240615B April 1945. The 1st and 3d Battalions reinforced with a company of tanks for each battalion attacked Aalen from the north. The advance was continuous but slow during the entire morning. It was necessary to conduct a complete search of all buildings because by-passed enemy inflicted casualties on the follow-up troops. The 2d Battalion out all roads leading north out of Wasseralfingen. During the morning the 4th Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to make a reconnaissance for routes to an area about two miles west of Aalen. The 2d Battalion (motorized) followed along this route at 1400 and launched an attack from this direction against the town of Aalen. This flanking movement broke the enemy resistance and the three battalions quickly converged on each other and had reached their objective just prior to dark. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop continued on towards Unter Koesen when they encountered road blocks and mines. They entered the town dismounted and captured twenty-eight (28) prisoners.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments as the previous period, initiated movement at first light to the south within their zone to secure objectives in the vicinity of S-675300. The 1st Battalion, moving

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in organic transportation, encountered many road blocks, abatis, and craters. The 3d Battalion advanced eleven kilometers on foot without resistance. The 2d Battalion was shuttled forward to the objective, closing late in the period.

24. 24 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the advance to the south and by the close of the period had advanced approximately twenty kilometers. The advance was impeded by many road blocks, abatis, felled trees, booby traps, road craters, and antitank mines.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments, continued the attack to the south at 0900. The 1st Battalion followed Task Force "Rodwell" while the 2d Battalion advanced along the main highway from Aalen - Ober Kochen - Konigsbrunn. The advance down this route was slowed considerably by mines, road blocks, and demolitions. The 3d Battalion remained in regimental reserve and staged forward to Ebnat (S-79254).

Task Force "Rodwell" continued the advance at 0800, moving along the route Ober Kochen - Ebnat - Gross Kochen - Oggenhausen - Giengen. Contact was established with the 3d Infantry Division on the left flank at 1100 in the vicinity of Gross Kochen. The advance of the Task Force was subjected to small arms fire, light artillery, and mortar fire. Road blocks, cratered roads, mines, and abatis continued to slow the advance. All road blocks and abatis encountered south of Gross Kochen contained mines. Upon questioning prisoners, it was learned that engineers had constructed these obstacles while those previously encountered were the work of small groups of unorganized enemy or civilians. Two battalions of infantry were left to police Aalen and the trucks of the 522d Field Artillery Battalion were used to motorize the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was moved forward to Oggenhausen at 1930 while the Task Force closed into Giengen for the night.

The 22d Infantry with the same attachments patrolled to Essingen (S-6825) where they engaged the enemy in a small arms fight. The Combat Team resumed their advance to the south at 0900 in a column of battalions and encountered no active resistance until 1830. At this time patrols from the 3d Battalion encountered a few enemy in the vicinity of the wooded area (S-758135). At approximately the same time the 1st Battalion encountered a small group in the vicinity of the high ground south of Steinheim. At the close of the period, the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in the vicinity of the command post.

25. 25 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the southeast with little or no enemy opposition and established contact with the 12th Armored Division in the vicinity of Gundel Fingen (X-9498). At the close of the period the bulk of the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments were on the south side of the Danube River.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the attack to the south within their zone of action and established contact with elements of the 12th Armored Division northeast of Gundel Fingen (S-9498). All three battalions crossed the Danube River at Laningen and advanced to the southern edge of the bridgehead. One company remained

Sec IV - Operations (Contd):

guarding the treadway bridge at Laningen.

The 12th Infantry, with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion; Company B, 70th Tank Battalion; Company D, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued to advance to the southeast as a part of Task Force "Rodwell". Elements of the 12th Armored Division were contacted in the vicinity of Gundel Fingen. All elements of Task Force "Rodwell" were closed into this vicinity and at 1600 the Task Force was dissolved. The 2d and 3d Battalions crossed the Danube River in rear of the 8th Infantry and moved to assembly areas south of the river. The 1st Battalion at the close of the period was enroute by motor from Aalen (S-7329).

The 22d Infantry, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued the advance to the southeast within its zone, and prior to the close of the period had assembled all units on the regimental objective.

26. 26 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division attacked southeast from the Danube River bridgehead area in the vicinity of Dillingen and advanced against light and scattered opposition for approximately ten kilometers.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments, continued the attack with the 1st and 3d Battalions and advanced against light and scattered opposition for approximately ten kilometers, securing a line extending generally east from Dinkelscherben (Y-1676) when positions were consolidated for the night. At approximately 2300, 75 to 100 rounds of artillery fell in the vicinity of the regimental command post.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments, attacked to the southeast within its zone with the 2d and 3d Battalions. Initially, the 2d Battalion encountered opposition in the wooded area in the vicinity of Altenbaindt (Y-0692) while the 3d Battalion advanced behind elements of the 101st Cavalry Squadron. Company I mounted on supporting tanks closed in the vicinity of Horgau (Y-1881) towards the close of the period. The 1st Battalion meanwhile echeloned forward and closed in the vicinity of Ellerbach (Y-0992) in regimental reserve.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments, relieved the company of the 8th Infantry guarding the Danube River bridge at Laningen. The entire combat team began moving across the bridge and by dark the 2d and 3d Battalions had closed in a regimental assembly area in the vicinity of Gundrammingen (Y-9792). The 1st Battalion remained at the bridge.

27. 27 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the advance to the southeast from the Danube River and advanced up to twenty kilometers against scattered resistance. At the close of the period, two companies of the 8th Infantry were across the Lech River in the vicinity of Y-330548. A Bailey Bridge was constructed at this point.

The 8th Infantry, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion; Company A, 70th Tank Battalion; Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 4th Reconnaissance Troop attached, continued the attack at 0800 with the 2d and 3d Battalions. The 2d Battalion, after passing through elements of the 1st Battalion, advanced with no resistance to the bridge site at Y-328548 where they succeeded in crossing two companies even though the

Sec IV -- Operations. (Contd)

enemy had blown the bridge. Strong resistance was encountered in the vicinity of the bridge site and heavy artillery and mortar fire was experienced along the east bank of the river. The 3d Battalion, operating in the left of the regimental sector, advanced against no resistance and was last reported in the vicinity of Aintingen. The 1st Battalion staged forward and closed late in the period in the vicinity of Y-2663.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments, continued the attack to the southeast at 0810 with the 1st and 3d Battalions and advanced with no resistance until they reached the vicinity of Biburg (Y-2479) and Willishausen (Y-2377). At this point they received fire from an enemy strong point in the vicinity of Steppach (Y-2980). After reducing the strongpoint which contained several flak guns, they continued the advance to their objective against practically no resistance.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments, staged forward to assembly areas in order to control the main road to the west of the Division sector and to protect the autobahn in that vicinity. There was no report of enemy contact throughout the period.

28. 28 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued its advance to the southeast to the Lech River where the units consolidated positions in preparation for crossing the river early 29 April. The division area was swept for by-passed pockets of enemy and a considerable number of prisoners were taken by this operation:

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments, maintained their bridgehead across the Lech River in the vicinity of Y-3355. A good number of prisoners were taken during the period by patrols operating throughout the regimental sector. The only enemy contact reported was in the vicinity of the bridgehead where some mortar and artillery fire was experienced.

The 12th Infantry, with the same attachments, continued the advance at 0730 with the 1st and 3d Battalions to the vicinity of the Lech River within their sector. Upon securing this objective, the combat team consolidated positions in preparation for crossing the river upon completion of the bridge. The 2d Battalion staged forward to an assembly area in the vicinity of Y-2772.

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments, moved by shuttle to the southeast within the 8th Infantry zone of action to assembly areas in preparation for crossing the Lech River.

29. 29 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division crossed the Lech River, in force, and continued the advance to the southeast against practically no resistance for approximately twenty-five kilometers.

The 8th Infantry, with the same attachments (less the 4th Reconnaissance Troop, Meez), maintained their bridgehead across the Lech River in the vicinity of Y-3355 with elements of the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion, after being passed through by the 12th Infantry and 22d Infantry, moved to Augsburg (Y-3479) to relieve elements of the 3d Infantry Division on security duty. The Combat Team (less the 2d Battalion) remained in Division Reserve on the west side of the Lech River.

The 12th Infantry, with no change in attachments, crossed the Lech River in the vicinity of Y-3254 at 0800 and continued the advance to

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

the southeast for approximately twenty-five kilometers against negligible resistance. The 1st and 2d Battalions secured a general line along the western bank of the Amper River in the vicinity of Zankenhäusen (Y-5050) prior to the close of the period. The 3d Battalion, in regimental reserve, staged forward to Turkenfeld (Y-4951).

The 22d Infantry, with the same attachments (plus the 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mecz), crossed the Lech River in the vicinity of Y-3254 at 0600, advancing to the northeast and then southeast within the new regimental zone of action. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop reconnoitered for routes to the southeast and protected the left flank of the division. The Combat Team advanced approximately twenty kilometers against very scattered resistance, securing a general line along the western bank of the Amper River in the vicinity of Schongelsing (Y-6854). The 1st Battalion, in regimental reserve, echeloned forward, closing in Jesenwang (Y-5257) prior to the close of the period.

30. 30 April 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued the advance to the southeast across the Amper River, advancing approximately twenty-five kilometers. The division secured bridges intact across the Loisach and Isar Rivers in the vicinity of Wolfratshausen, taking many prisoners of war.

The 8th Infantry, with the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached at 302200E April 1945 (less the 2d Battalion reinforced), crossed the Lech River in the vicinity of Y-3254 at 0630 and echeloned forward in the 12th Infantry zone of action, closing in assembly areas in the vicinity of Moosenweis (Y-4856) - Galtendorf (Y-4452) late in the period. The 2d Battalion, plus the Cannon Company, after being relieved of the mission of guarding the Lech River bridge in the vicinity of Y-3254, moved to Augsburg with the mission of maintaining law and order.

The 12th Infantry, with no change in attachments, continued the advance to the southeast at 0600, crossing the Amper River in the vicinity of Wildenroth. Advancing against negligible resistance, the Combat Team secured bridges intact across the Loisach and Isar Rivers in the vicinity of Wolfratshausen (Y-7530) after advancing approximately twenty-five kilometers. The 1st Battalion remained in regimental reserve, closing in the vicinity of Leutstetten (Y-7043) late in the period.

The 22d Infantry, with no change in attachments, crossed the Amper River in the vicinity of Furstenfeldbruck (Y-6158) at 0800 and continued the advance to the southeast against passive resistance. The advance was halted late in the period along the Isar River line by blown bridges. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop reconnoitered for routes to the southeast and protected the left flank, establishing contact with elements of the 3d Infantry Division in the vicinity of Y-8043.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. **General:** The 4th Infantry Division's attack and pursuit of the enemy, begun in the closing days of the preceding period, continued unhalted throughout the month. A distance of approximately 250 miles was covered during this period. This rapid advance created a serious transportation - supply problem. Vehicles were required to motorize elements of the division so that they might move forward more quickly and at the same time the lines of supply were lengthening, necessitating longer trips back to the supply dumps. In addition, prisoners were being taken in ever increasing numbers and had to be evacuated to the rear.

2. **Quartermaster:** The 4th Division Quartermaster, on whom a great part of the transportation burden fell, traveled the following distances during the period for the various classes of supplies:

Class I - 2504 total mileage - 83 miles per day average
 Class II - 252 miles per week average - 1100 total mileage
 Class III - 83 miles per day average - 2492 total mileage

A total of 113 trucks were used during the month of April for transportation other than for normal supply.

The quantities of Quartermaster supplies drawn and issued in April were as follows:

Class I:

"B" ration	-	-	428,984
"10-in-1"	-	-	30,100
"C"	-	-	36,080
"D"	-	-	137,052
Total rations issued	-	-	632,216

Class II: An estimated 45 tons of clothing and Class II equipment was drawn during the period. With the coming of warm weather, certain items of winter clothing and equipment were taken up from the troops and turned in. These included overcoats and mackinaws, blankets, overshoes, knit wool caps, and mufflers.

Class III:

Gasoline	-	545,345 gallons issued
Diesel	-	1,765 gallons
10 oil	-	460 gallons
30 oil	-	6,875 gallons
50 oil	-	1,070 gallons
90 oil	-	800 gallons
GR 1	-	2,725 pounds
GR 2	-	1,513 pounds
GR 3	-	72 pounds
GR 4	-	25 pounds
Kerosene	-	550 gallons

Sec V. Supply and Evacuation (Quartermaster Contd)

During the period the Division Graves Registration Officer evacuated 275 American and 4 allied dead, and 225 German dead.

3. **Ordnance:** As was the case with the other service elements, the operating time of the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company was considerably cut down because of the numerous moves required to keep within satisfactory supporting distance of the troops. Simultaneously, the company was moving further away from the Ordnance supply points which placed a considerable burden on the supply of automotive parts. On several occasions, trips of 150 miles were made to secure necessary parts which were not always available even in the Depot Companies. In view of this shortage, cannibalization was resorted to on a greater scale during this period than in any preceding period.

Despite the increasing distances from the ammunition supply points, the supply of ammunition was generally adequate with the single exception of caliber .30 machine gun ammunition which was unavailable at one time for a period of several days.

During the month of April, the following jobs were completed by the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company: 1,521 small arms were repaired and 178 were evacuated; 122 fire control instruments were repaired and 6 were evacuated; 56 artillery pieces were repaired; 395 work orders were handled on such repairs as brake shoes, brake drums, clutches, batteries, etc.; 248 vehicles were repaired and returned to the units and 83 were evacuated to higher echelon for repair.

4. **Medical:** Other than the time lost due to the frequent movements, necessitated by the rapid advance of the division, no major difficulties were experienced by the Medical Battalion, either in supply or evacuation. Casualties were comparatively light, only 796 battle casualties being evacuated to the Clearing Company during the period. In addition 325 non-battle casualties were received and there were 820 admissions for various diseases.

However, a problem did exist in the many movements required of the field hospital platoon attached to the division. This organization has no organic transportation to move itself and no assistance was received from higher echelons for this purpose. It was only with the use of Quartermaster Company, Medical Battalion and Division Artillery trucks, when available, that the field hospital was kept within supporting distance.

5. **Engineer:** With priorities being given to Class I and III supplies after the crossing of the Rhine River, the supply of Engineer equipment became increasingly difficult, these being among the last dumps to be moved forward. Trips of from 200 to 250 miles were made to draw urgently needed items from the main dump. Even the forward Engineer pumps, which tried to keep up, were always about 50 to 60 miles to the rear. To combat this situation, local stocks were procured in cases of military necessity. Apart from the distances involved, oxygen and acetylene proved difficult to obtain during this period. The supply of both these items was insufficient.

Sec V - Supply and Evacuation (Engineer, Contd)

6. Signal and Chemical: Signal supply was normal during the period and there were no demands for Chemical supplies.

7. Captured Materiel: In its rapid movement forward the division over-ran and captured great quantities of enemy materiel. Whenever possible, captured materiel was evacuated through the appropriate supply channels. In most cases, however, the mass was too great to permit evacuation by the division and so guards were placed by the capturing unit until the installations were taken over by higher headquarters. Numerous artillery pieces which could not be evacuated because of the situation at the moment were destroyed in place by the troops.

Included in the captured materiel were 14 artillery prime movers; 32 artillery pieces of varying sizes; 20 machine guns; several thousand small arms, including a complete machine pistol assembly plant; 7 Signal dumps, including searchlight, radar and Air Corps Signal equipment; 6 Medical dumps, containing quantities of drugs and medicines and numerous fine laboratory and surgical instruments; 14 Class I installations ranging in size from single carloads to fully stocked warehouses. In addition, vast quantities of miscellaneous equipment were captured including machine shops, stocks of cloth and finished clothing, airplanes and airplane motors, both jet type and standard, airplane parts plants, stocks of ammunition and explosives, a ball bearing plant and many other items of military value.

8. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

9. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>
Killed in action	15	150
Died of wounds	-	24
Died of injuries	-	1
Missing in action	-	16
Seriously wounded in action	5	68
Seriously injured in action	-	2
Slightly wounded in action	22	504
Slightly injured in action	1	67
Captured	-	-
	<u>43</u>	<u>830</u>
Total Casualties.....	43	873

10. A total of 26,091 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

11. During the period from 1 April to 30 April 1945, a total of 52 officers and 1367 enlisted men reinforcements and casuals were received.

Sec V - Supply and Evacuation (Contd)

12. Strength: 1 April 1945 30 April 1945

STRENGTH OF DIVISION (Present and Absent)	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Hq 4th Inf Div	44	7	131/5	44	6	130/4
8th Inf	160	4	2965	166	4	2974
12th Inf	163	5	3011	161	5	2961
22d Inf	171	5	3044	159	5	3019
Hq C. Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	18	2	109	19	1	105
20th FA Bn	32	2	497	32	2	489
29th FA Bn	30	2	479	34	2	470
42d FA Bn	35	2	489	34	2	482
44th FA Bn	33	2	501	35	2	486
4th Engr Combat Bn	31	2	544	30	2	537
4th Med Bn	35	1	405	33	1	404
4th Recon Tr, Mocz	9	-	135	8	-	128
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	3	-	7	3	-	7
Dand, 4th Inf Div	-	2	58	-	2	58
Med Det, Sp Trs	2	-	14	2	-	13
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	4	1	154/29	3	1	150/31
IP Plat, 4th Inf Div	5	-	138	5	-	132
704th Ord L Maint Co	9	-	145	9	-	143
4th Q. Co	10	-	219	10	-	213
4th Sig Co	11	4	280	10	4	273
Total.....	810	41	13325	797	39	13209

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION
(Present and Absent)

4th CIC Det	4	-	12	4	-	10/1
Order of Battle Team No. 2	1	-	2	1	-	2
IPV Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
IPV Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	2	-	4	2	-	3
III Team No. 417-G	2	-	4	2	-	4
70th Tk Bn	43	3	684	40	3	663
377th AAA (AW) Bn	37	2	716	36	2	726
610th TD Bn	39	1	556	38	1	607
Total.....	132	6	1963	127	3	2023
Grand Total.....	942	47	15291	924	45	15232

H. U. Blakeley
 H. U. BLAKELEY,
 Major General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

Annex A - Order of Battle Team No. 2

1. Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 April to 30 April 1945.

2. The team has continued to function in close coordination with the AC of S, G-2 Section in addition to its regular duties of keeping a duplicate of the G-2 Order of Battle situation map, receiving and processing all captured documents, keeping an up-to-date file of all information on the enemy formations, arms, field post numbers, personalities and any other additional information necessary, of translating documents, performing interrogations, acting as interpreters and emissaries whenever necessary and assisting in editing the IPI report of the G-2 Periodic Report.

3. Our crossing of the Rhine River in force and rapid pursuit did not give the enemy time to regroup and reorganize the battered remnants of his divisions. Fleeing elements of the 352d Volk Grenadier, 17th SS Panzer Grenadier, 2d Mountain, 6th SS Mountain, and 9th Volk Grenadier Divisions were encountered initially. In the emergency thus created, all training schools, replacement battalions, training regiments, etc., in the divisional sector were subordinated to the various German commanders. Thus appeared a number of recently formed battalions from Fuerth and Bayreuth, as well as Combat Teams of battalion or regimental size such as Combat Teams Dirnagel, Sachs, Reinwald, Gaebel, etc.

4. The enemy's system of employing Combat Teams to fill gaps in the line again proved moderately successful here, largely due to the number of young enthusiastic and, at times, fanatical recruits. The 212th Volk Grenadier Division was briefly rejuvenated for the last time by absorbing a number of these Combat Teams, but was again decimated and dispersed. This moderate slowdown of our progress allowed the enemy to bring up three (3) Mountain Regiments, the I, II, and 82d. They were rapidly killed, captured or dispersed and the pursuit was on, harassed only by natural obstacles, blown bridges, and roads and occasionally defended abatis.

5. Toward the end of the period a number of SS Training Battalions, The SS Battalion Zby "Sud-West", the 5th SS Replacement and Training Battalion and the 3d SS Replacement Battalion afforded a brief fierce resistance. The complete disintegration of the German Armed Forces was illustrated in the latter part of the period by an average of 2,000 prisoners of war from 50 to 80 different units being captured daily. On the final defensive line of the supposed Redoubt, the 17th SS Division "GVD" made its appearance again in the guise of 3 Combat Teams. A captured divisional order of the 17th SS Division gave a complete breakdown of these Combat Teams and their zone of action. Few documents of tactical value were captured during the period as a result of our rapid over-running of existing enemy lines of defense. At the close of the period, German forces in the south and in the north had capitulated and only the center remained to offer any resistance.

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Annex B - 4th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment

There were no special cases during the month of April 1945. For the greater part of the period this detachment was racing across Germany and seldom working in any one town for more than twenty-four hours. For this reason it was impossible to conduct any lengthy or detailed investigations. First priority was given to the security of the tactical troops and second priority was given to the arresting of as many individuals as possible who hold high enough positions in the Nazi regime to place them in the automatic arrest category.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

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Revisor

Operations Div., AGO, 1st Fl., W.D.C.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div:

Init: *W. H. C.*

Date: 10 June 1945

AG 319.1

10 June 1945

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports after/after Action Reports.

THRU : Command Channels.

TO : The Adjutant General.

- Section I - Authority
- Section II - Introduction
- Section III - Intelligence (With Annexes A, B, & C)
- Section IV - Operations
- Section V - Supply and Evacuation

Section I - Authority

In compliance with paragraph 10 (C4), Army Regulations 345-10 relative to "Action Against Enemy, Reports after/after Action Reports" the following report is submitted for period 1 May to 31 May 1945.

Section II - Introduction

General Staff

- Chief of Staff - Colonel Richard S. Harr, 015447, GSC
- AG of S, G-1 - Lieutenant Colonel Garlen R. Bryant, 0287624, GSC
- AG of S, G-2 - Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Hansen, 0286814, GSC
- AG of S, G-3 - Lieutenant Colonel Dee W. Stone, 0165561, GSC
- AG of S, G-4 - Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Cressman, 0398632, GSC

Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Cressman, 0398632, GSC, formerly Division Quartermaster, was assigned AG of S, G-4, 29 May 1945, vice Lieutenant Colonel Guy O. DeYoung, Jr., 0375431, Infantry, transferred.

1. At the beginning of this month the division forward command post was located at Egling, Germany (Y-4169) and later that day moved to Wolfratshausen, Germany (Y-7532).

2. 1 May 1945. A report of personnel shortages and/or overages for the period 18 April to 30 April was submitted to the Commanding General, Seventh United States Army.

The Division Provost Marshal informed this headquarters of a German Tuberculosis hospital at Gauting, Germany (Y-7147) containing seven hundred and twenty-nine (729) German soldier patients, eighteen (18) patients from other countries, twenty (20) doctors, and twenty-five (25)

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CA G.L.I.
BY AUTH: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
William D. [unclear] [unclear]
READING COMMITTEE 7 May 1945

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See II - Introduction (Contd.)

aid men. A report of the location, status of food and medical supplies and the fact that the hospital was being guarded by division Military Police was submitted to the XXI Corps.

A memorandum was submitted to the AC of S, G-1, XXI Corps, giving pertinent data on three (3) German hospitals located in Gruntortshofen, Kloster St. Ottilien Greifenberg, and Percha, Germany. A report was made to the XXI Corps that the food and medical supplies were adequate at all the installations and a guard was posted by the division Provost Marshal at each hospital.

3. 2 May 1945. A telephone message was received from Headquarters Seventh United States Army, requesting the reassignment of Colonel Richard G. McKee, 011217, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Regiment. The Commanding General was advised and his decision was that Colonel McKee would be available for reassignment providing he would be promoted as a result of the change.

4. 3 May 1945. A report was received from the 12th Infantry Regiment on a German hospital located in Reichersbeuern, Germany (Y-9215) containing two hundred and eleven (211) patients and a complete staff. This was reported to the XXI Corps and the division Provost Marshal was directed to place a guard on the hospital.

A quota of four (4) officers and thirty (30) enlisted men to return to the United States as guards on prisoner of war ships was received from the Seventh United States Army. Upon arrival in the United States, the personnel were to be granted forty-five (45) day leaves or furloughs. The Commanding General was informed of the quota and the following allotments were made:

	O	EM
8th Inf Regt	1	10
12th Inf Regt	1	10
22d Inf Regt	1	10
70th Tr Bn	1	-
	4	30

This group was to be at Ludwigshafen prior to 081030B May 1945. A memorandum containing the necessary information was sent to each unit commander concerned with an information copy being sent to the Adjutant General.

5. 4 May 1945. The division was relieved from assignment to the Sixth Army Group, Seventh United States Army and XXI Corps and was assigned to the Third United States Army.

6. 5 - 6 May 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Amberg, Germany (R-0979009). The division was assigned to the III Corps this date.

7. 7 May 1945. The AC of S, G-1, Third United States Army, inquired as to the availability for reassignment to the War Department of Lieutenant Colonel Guy C. DeYoung, Jr. 0373431, GSC, AC of S, G-4. The Commanding

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

General was informed and no objection was offered.

8. 8 May 1945. A number of Allied Prisoner of War Camps were located in the division area and inquiries were made at Headquarters Third United States Army to determine who was responsible for the care and disposition of such personnel. This headquarters was informed that the division would be responsible while it remained in the area.

9. 9 May 1945. A message was received from the 4th Division Artillery inquiring as to the status of nationals of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The policy at the time was that if the nationals mentioned above had served in the German army they were to be considered as prisoners of war and if not to be considered as Displaced Personnel.

A quota was received from the III Corps authorizing this command to send three (3) officers and thirty-one (31) enlisted men to the United States Riviera Recreation Center for seven (7) day passes every week. The men were to leave every Thursday. A schedule was set up so that all units would receive an equal quota every three weeks.

A telephone call was received from the AC of S, G-1, III Corps, requesting the name of a Major, Infantry, who had combat experience as a Battalion Executive Officer or S-8. The officer selected would be placed on detached service for sixty (60) days with the United States Strategic Bomb Survey. The name of the officer was to be reported before 10 May 1945.

10. 10 May 1945. The 300th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to the division by verbal orders of the Commanding General, III Corps.

The name of Major Thomas C. Harrison, 0417374, Infantry, 22d Infantry, was reported to the AC of S, G-1, III Corps, to fill the request of 9 May 1945 for a major, Infantry, for a United States Strategic Bomb Survey assignment.

11. 11 May 1945. A quota of two (2) officers and twenty-two (22) enlisted men to fly to the Riviera Recreation Center was received from the Third United States Army. The quota was allotted as follows:

	O	E1
8th Inf Regt	1	7
12th Inf Regt	-	8
22d Inf Regt	1	7
	2	22

The personnel were scheduled to be at Erlangen, Germany at 140900B May 1945, to board air transportation for airlift to the Riviera.

12. 12 May 1945. A report on the number of officers and enlisted men in the division who were eligible for return to the United States under the provisions of Circular No. 124, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 24 December 45, as amended by letter, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, sub: "Return of Personnel to the United States for 1946, Recuperation and Recovery", dated 6 May 45, was submitted to the Third United States Army.

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

The G-1 Weekly Periodic Report was submitted to the Third United States Army with an information copy being sent to the III Corps.

13. 13 May 1945. III Corps allotted the division a quota of five (5) officers and two hundred and forty-five (245) enlisted men to return to the United States under the provisions of Circular No. 124 as amended by letter, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, subject "Return of Personnel to the United States for Rest, Recuperation and Recovery", dated 6 May 1945. The quota was sub-allotted so that all assigned and attached units of the division received an equitable number on a percentage basis, using the figures submitted 12 May 1945 as the basis for the breakdown. The units concerned were informed and requested to submit the names of eligible personnel.

14. 14 May 1945. The division command post closed and moved to Ansbach, Germany (T-062812).

15. 15 May 1945. The G-1 Annex with an Appendix, "Disbandment of Disarmed German Forces", was compiled and submitted to the Commanding General. Upon being approved it was included in Field Order No. 87, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, dated 16 May 1945.

16. 16 May 1945. The contingent of five (5) officers and two hundred and forty-five (245) enlisted men returning to the United States under the quota received 13 May, departed from this headquarters. Prior to their departure, the Commanding General spoke to them and wished them a swift voyage home and the best of luck.

A quota of three (3) officers and one hundred and forty-seven (147) enlisted men to return to the United States under the provisions of Circular No. 124, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 24 December 1944, as amended by letter, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, dated 8 May 1945, was received from Headquarters III Corps. The quota was apportioned on a percentage basis of the remaining eligible personnel from each respective unit. The units were informed of their quotas and were instructed that the men selected were to be processed so as to be prepared to report to the 53d Reinforcement Battalion, 22 May 1945.

17. 17 May 1945. A telephone call was received from Headquarters III Corps directing this command to send one (1) officer to attend a seven day school for Librarians to be held at the Universitaire Cito, 19 Boulevard Jordan, Paris. The 8th Infantry furnished the officer for this school.

Three (3) officers and thirty-one (31) enlisted men departed by motor transportation for Luxembourg and then by rail to the Riviera Recreation Center for seven day passes. This is a standing quota received from III Corps and a schedule was drawn up to give each unit an equitable number.

The Estimated Loss Report was revised by III Corps to include

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only Authorized Strength, Assigned Strength, Effective Strength, Daily Sick and Nonbattle Casualties, Cumulative Sick and Nonbattle Casualties, Reinforcements Received and Returnees Received during the past twenty-four hours. The report was to be telephoned to Headquarters III Corps daily, prior to 1600.

A telephone call from Headquarters III Corps was received directing this headquarters to furnish four (4) officers, one (1) Warrant Officer and five (5) enlisted men to be placed on detached service with Military Government Detachments, Third United States Army. One of the provisions was that a Lieutenant or noncommissioned officer of the first three grades could be substituted for the Warrant Officer, providing the one selected had administrative ability. The following units were designated to furnish this personnel:

	O	E1
8th Inf Regt	1	2
12th Inf Regt	1	1 (MCO first three grades)
22d Inf Regt	1	1
4th Div Arty	1	2
	4	6

The names of the selected personnel were to be submitted to this headquarters by 191200 May 1945. A memorandum from the AG of S, G-1, III Corps was received later in the day confirming this telephone message.

This headquarters was directed by III Corps to send two (2) officers to attend an Athletic School for a seven day period at Universitaire Cite, 19 Boulevard Jordan, Paris. The 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments were informed and the personnel were to report not later than 261400B May 1945.

18. 18 May 1945. A Prisoner of War Inclosure was established at the 22d Infantry Regiment to receive, screen, and if a prisoner of war was found to meet the necessary qualifications to discharge him. A staff comprised of German soldiers under the supervision of Allied soldiers was initiated to handle the administrative details, while the 4th CIC Detachment did the necessary initial screening and investigating. The German prisoners of war were divided into two groups (1) Those whose homes were in American Occupied Territory, who were either farmers, miners or transportation men and were eligible for discharge, and (2) Those who did not meet the above specifications who were to be confined in work camps within the division area. The 8th Infantry, 12th Infantry, and 4th Division Artillery were directed to establish work camps to handle prisoners not eligible for discharge at the present time. The prisoners of war who were to be released were kept at the 22d Infantry Cage until such time as a sufficient number for a truck or convoy load became available. Nineteen (19) officers and thirty-nine (39) enlisted men were received as the initial shipment of prisoners of war from the III Corps inclosure and were immediately processed. Since all these prisoners of war were placed in the second category, they were kept in confinement pending the opening of one of the work camps.

18. 19 May 1945. One hundred and seventy-four (174) officers and twenty-three hundred and seventy-two (2372) enlisted men prisoners of war

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were received from the III Corps Inclosure. They were processed through the 22d Infantry Cage and those who were found eligible for discharge were detained while the rest were sent to the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiment Work Camps which were opened this date.

The G-1 Weekly Periodic Report was submitted to the Third United States Army with an information copy being sent to the III Corps.

20. 20 May 1945. The rating sheets for General Officers were completed and returned to Headquarters III Corps.

21. 21 May 1945. A quota was received by telephone from Headquarters Third United States Army authorizing this command to send twenty-four (24) men (one plane load) to the Riviera Recreation Center for a seven-day pass period.

Four (4) officers and six (6) enlisted men were placed on detachment service with Headquarters Third United States Army to serve with Military Government Detachments in compliance with directive received 17 May 1945 per Special Order No. 98, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, dated 21 May 1945.

22. 22 May 1945. A quota was received from the III Corps for three (3) officers and three hundred and forty-seven (347) enlisted men to return to the United States under the provisions of Circular No. 124, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, dated 24 December 1944, as amended by letter, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, dated 6 May 1945. The same policy that had been used formerly was applied and the units concerned were informed of their quotas.

The 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion and the 300th Engineer Combat Battalion were detached from the division.

23. 23 May 1945. A telephone call was received from Headquarters Third United States Army regarding the nomination of five (5) officers, branch immaterial, with battle experience and trained in war time procedures of war department and major command headquarters. General and Special Staff officers of air, ground, and services of supply units were to be included. It was also requested that three (3) reserve officers with qualifications as above, who desired to remain in the regular Army, be nominated. The purpose of this was to provide future key staff officers. The names, qualifications, and experience of officers were to be submitted to Headquarters Third United States Army by 242400 May 1945, indicating date each officer would be available. A negative report was submitted.

24. 24 May 1945. Headquarters III Corps called this headquarters, requesting the names of one company grade officer and one enlisted man from Los Angeles or vicinity with the following qualifications: (1) 85 points or more, and (2) two or more combat decorations. The three regimental S-1s were directed to submit the names of officers and men qualified. The decorations section was requested to make a thorough check of their files for all candidates. First Lieutenant Paul R. Eschbacher, 01291610, Infantry, 12th Infantry, and Staff Sergeant Donald C. Shelters, 6584327,

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

22d Infantry, were selected for this detail.

25. 25 May 1945. A special quota for two (2) officers and twenty-two (22) enlisted men (one plane load) to visit the United States Riviera Recreation Center for seven day passes was received from III Corps. The 4th Division Artillery was given the quota and the men were to be taken to airstrip R-43 to obtain airlift to the Riviera.

26. 26 - 27 May 1945. The G-1 Weekly Periodic Report was submitted to the Third United States Army with an information copy being sent to the III Corps.

A quota of two (2) officers and twenty-two (22) enlisted men to visit the Riviera for seven day passes was received from the III Corps and was allotted as follows:

	0	21
Hq 4th Inf Div	-	2
4th Engr Combat Bn	-	10
70th Tr Bn	-	10
	2	22

They departed by truck for Murnberg and then by air to the Riviera.

The group leaving for the United States (3 officers and 347 enlisted men) assembled at this headquarters in preparation for an early departure for Murnberg, 28 May 1945. All men who had not been presented with decorations which had been published in general orders, were presented with medals at informal ceremonies.

27. 28 May 1945. The men leaving for the States left this headquarters for Murnberg and then by air to the 14th Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

28. 29 May 1945. Up to this date the only German prisoners of war being discharged were enlisted men. A telephone call was received from the AC of S, G-1, III Corps, stating that German officers up to and including Lieutenant Colonels could not be discharged provided they met the required specifications.

A telephone call from III Corps was received requesting the number of civilian employees in this command whose residence was in the continental limits of the United States and/or whose residence was in the territories of the United States. A negative report was submitted.

29. 30 - 31 May 1945. A telephone call was received from Headquarters III Corps changing the Paris pass quota from twenty (20) officers and ninety-eight (98) enlisted men to eight (8) officers and sixty-seven (67) enlisted men. The Riviera pass quota was also changed from three (3) officers and thirty-one (31) enlisted men to four (4) officers and thirty-six (36) enlisted men. Both these quotas have been standing weekly quotas and the changes would go into effect immediately.

Headquarters III Corps notified this headquarters to make arrangements to discharge one thousand (1000) German prisoners of war on 31 May 1945. The processing of German soldiers was intensified and every effort

Sec II - Introduction (Contd)

was made to discharge every eligible soldier.

During the month of May the division processed sixteen thousand two hundred and fifteen (16,215) prisoners of war (166 officers and 16,049 enlisted men). They were screened by the 4th CIC Detachment and administratively processed by the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. Thirty-three hundred and fifty-six (3356) prisoners of war (1 officer and 3355 enlisted men) met the necessary qualifications and were discharged. The remainder were sent to Work Camps in the division area. Total nondischARGEABLE German soldiers at the end of May were being held in Work Camps in the following units:

8th Inf Regt	-	2862
12th Inf Regt	-	3269
22d Inf Regt	-	1361
4th Div Arty	-	2931
1st Bn, 22d Inf	-	1915
Total		12,859

During the month of May the Estimated Loss Report was submitted daily by telephone to the III Corps. The report of attached units was handled by the AC of S, G-1 office in the same manner as the division report.

Section III - Intelligence (With annexes A, B, & C)

1. 1 May 1945. No enemy front line existed during this period and no organized resistance was encountered. Scattered groups of enemy offered token resistance with small arms fire only. Our rapid progress continued and, at the close of the period, our leading elements reached points Y-8014, Y-8713, and Z-0718. Units opposing the 4th Infantry Division were composed of numerous scattered remnants of minor detachments.

2. 2 May 1945. Elements of the 4th Infantry Division continued to advance to the east and southeast without meeting organized resistance. Enemy troops were encountered in large numbers, but surrendered without offering resistance. Prisoners of war for this period totaled over five thousand (5,000) and represented many different units.

3. 3 May 1945. No contact was made with the enemy during this period. Large numbers of enemy stragglers continued to be picked up in the division area.

4. 4-8 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division started and completed its move from Wolf - Hatzhausen to Auberg after relief by the 101st Airborne Division and the 101st Cavalry Squadron. CT 8 and CT 12 preparing for relief continued to pick up enemy stragglers in their areas. CT 8 with a security mission west of the Isar River were taking approximately two hundred (200) prisoners of war each day, miles in rear of the front lines.

Sec III - Intelligence (Contd)

5. 9 - 16 May 1945. During the period the 4th Infantry Division units continued to round up stragglers and evaders. On 11 May one enemy transport plane containing three (3) officers and enlisted men landed in the vicinity of North (Y-165). Occupants stated that they had come from the Russian front to escape the Russians. During this period the 4th Infantry Division started to move from the Amberg area to Ansbach to take over new area of occupation.

6. 16 - 31 May 1945. During this period the 4th Infantry Division assumed control of new area of occupation. Security targets and enemy installations, and the screening of civilians and prisoners of war in the area continued. Minor incidents of sabotage were noted.

Section IV - Operations

1. 1 May 1945. During the period of 30 April, the 4th Infantry Division with the 70th Tank Battalion, the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Company B, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion, the 52d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 969th Field Artillery Battalion attached, had secured positions in the zone along the Isar River and Isaruk Canal from Y-7530 to Y-2043, and captured intact the bridges across the river and the canal at Wolfratshausen (Y-7530). At 010800B May 1945, the division continued the attack to the southeast with the 12th Infantry Regiment from the bridgehead secured across the Loisach River and the Isaruk Canal against a disorganized enemy. The only crossing site intact within the division zone was at Wolfratshausen (Y-7530). During the day, the division advanced approximately ten kilometers to the southeast with the 12th Infantry Regiment on the right, secured another bridgehead across the Isar River and Isaruk Canal, and blocked to the north and west protecting the left flank of XII Corps. The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 010800B May 1945. The division command post displaced forward to Wolfratshausen (Y-7530) during the afternoon.

The 2th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion, Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion attached, shuffled forward in the division zone with the 1st and 3d Battalions, while the 2d Battalion remained in Augsburg (Y-3479) to maintain order, and for security purposes. The 1st Battalion shuffled forward from Giltendorf (Y-4452) to the vicinity of Starnberg (Y-6940), closing in the new area early in the day. The 3d Battalion shuffled forward from Moorweis (Y-4856) to the vicinity of Gauting (Y-7248) where positions were occupied from Gauting (Y-7248) southeast to the Loisach River in the vicinity of Baurbrun (Y-7942) in order to screen the left flank of the division. Although the combat team was not actively engaged with the enemy at any time during the day, many enemy stragglers were captured as they attempted retreat from Munich to the southwest.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B and Reconnaissance Company of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company B, 4th Medical Battalion

Sec IV. - Operations (Contd)

and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, attached, continued the attack at 0800 to the southeast across the bridges seized intact over the Loisaoh River in the vicinity of Y-752305 and the Isarwk Canal in the vicinity of Y-770307. Initially the regiment followed Combat Command "R" of the 12th Armored Division, which had crossed the Loisaoh River and Isarwk Canal over the 12th Infantry Regiment bridges, and had passed through the regiment at 0730. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced approximately ten kilometers against scattered to heavy resistance, the 1st Battalion reaching the vicinity of Thankrohon (Y-8026), the 3d Battalion reaching Hechenberg (Y-8521). Both battalions reported heavy resistance late in the day consisting of small arms, mortar, artillery, and antiaircraft gun fire. At 2030 the 2d Battalion moved by motor from the vicinity of Dorfen (Y-7531) to the vicinity of Ascholding (Y-6128) as regimental reserve. Late in the day the regimental command post moved to Sarvies (Y-8422).

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company B, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion; 4th Reconnaissance Troop, Company C, 4th Medical Battalion; Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) attached, crossed the Isar River and Isarwk Canal in the vicinity of Y-792373 with two (2) companies of the 2d Battalion starting at 0700. The 1st Battalion remained in the vicinity of Buchendorf (Y-7346) as regimental reserve throughout the day. The 3d Battalion maintained its positions along the west bank of the Isar River in the vicinity of Baierbrun (Y-7942). The advance of the regiment was delayed throughout the day by blown bridges within the regimental sector. Throughout the day Corps Engineers worked feverishly to reconstruct a bridge in the vicinity of Y-792373, but due to soft approaches to the bridge site and the swift current of the Isar River, the bridge was not completed at the close of the day. The bridges at Wolfbratshausen (Y-7531) were in constant use throughout the day by Combat Command "R" of the 12th Armored Division, the 101st Cavalry Squadron, and the 12th Infantry Regiment, making it impossible for the 22d Infantry Regiment to cross the Isar River and Isarwk Canal during the day.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to the division at 0900, and given the mission of crossing the Loisaoh River in the vicinity of Y-752305 and the Isarwk Canal in the vicinity of Y-770307 and securing the left flank of the division from Strassbach (Y-8141) to Bergham (Y-9430). The squadron advanced against passive resistance, roadblocks, felled trees, and poor roads to secure their objective. Patrol contact was established and maintained with elements of the 3d Infantry Division on the left in the vicinity of Arget (Y-915345) late in the day.

2. 2 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division with the same attachments as in the previous period continued the attack at an early hour to the southeast with two regimental combat teams abreast against a scattered, disorganized, frantic enemy. The fighting spirit of the enemy was broken. By the close of the day the division had reached its assigned objective in the vicinity of Y-984132 and Z-0114. So many prisoners of war were taken during the day that the progress of all units was slowed in endeavoring to handle them.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as during the

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

previous day maintained peace and order in towns, cities, and on roads in the division rear areas. The 2d Battalion continued its security mission in the city of Augsburg (Y-3479).

The 12th Infantry Regiment with the same attachments as during the previous day continued the advance to the southeast on the right of the division zone of action. With the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast, the combat team advanced approximately thirteen kilometers on the left, and six kilometers on the right, the 1st Battalion reached the vicinity of Y-9811 and the 3d Battalion advancing to the general line Groilling (Y-9114), Reichersbourn (Y-9215), Waakirchen (Y-9516). Enemy resistance was scattered consisting mostly of small arms fire, and many prisoners were taken. The 2d Battalion shuttled forward using organic transportation to an assembly area in the vicinity of Sachsboden (Y-9319), closing in the rear area as regimental reserve late in the day.

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the same attachments as in the previous period, began crossing the Isar River and Isarwerk Canal over a trestle bridge in the vicinity of Y-792373 at 1000. The crossing of the river and canal was not contested by the enemy, but progress was slow due to the soft, muddy approaches to the bridge site. No organized resistance was encountered by the advancing troops throughout the day until 1700. At this time the 4th Reconnaissance Troop was engaged by a group of dug-in enemy in the vicinity of Y-905140. The resistance offered was light, scattered, small arms fire, and the enemy was quickly overrun. At the end of the day, the 1st Battalion had advanced to the vicinity of Gustoig (Z-0014), the 3d Battalion to the vicinity of Lurbach (Z-0717), and the 2d Battalion to Holzkirchen as regimental reserve. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop reached the vicinity of Z-0115.

The 101st Cavalry Squadron with Company A, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached continued to screen the left flank of the division from Strassbach (Y-8141) to Mitt-Barching (Z-0126).

3. 3 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division, initially the same attachments as in the previous period of 2 May, remained generally in the same positions as captured the day before, and continued mopping up operations. Preparations were made to turn over the responsibility of the division sector to the 101st Airborne Division. The 101st Airborne Division began movement into the 4th Division zone of action at 1000 preparatory to relieving the units of the division. The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment was attached to the 4th Infantry Division at 2030. Although no forward advances were made by any of the division units during the day, many prisoners of war were taken. The enemy was surrendering in mass without a fight, except in a few cases of small groups of fanatical SS troops who offered some resistance with small arms fire. The enemy was completely disorganized. The 522d Field Artillery Battalion (105H) passed to the control of the 101st Airborne Division at 1000.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with no change in attachments continued to maintain peace and order in division rear areas. The 1st Battalion in Stamburg (Y-6940), 2d Battalion in Augsburg (Y-3479), and 3d Battalion in Gauting (Y-7148) with the regimental command post. The battalions

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

patrolled the roads and towns to prevent looting, and to maintain order. The thousands of liberated displaced persons, Allied prisoners of war, and German political prisoners created a menace to the security of the captured areas.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with no changes in attachments remained generally in the same areas as occupied during the previous day, and continued mopping up operations throughout the day. A large number of the German army gave themselves up during the day.

The 22d Infantry Regiment initially with the same attachments as during the previous period of 2 May continued mopping up operations with in its zone of action until relieved by elements of the 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at 1615. Upon being relieved, the entire regiment moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of Holzkirchen (Y-9627) where preparations were made to move to new regimental areas in the vicinity of Nurnberg (04200). Company B, 90th Chemical Mortar Battalion was detached from the 22d Infantry at 1600.

The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment began movement into the forward areas of the 4th Infantry Division at 1600, and closed in assembly areas in the vicinity of Husbach (Z-0618) by 2030. Upon closing in assembly areas the regiment was attached to the 4th Infantry Division. Preparations were made to relieve the 12th Infantry Regiment.

The 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron with Company A, of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, relieved the 22d Infantry Regiment with elements of the squadron, and assembled the remainder in the vicinity of Ruthen (Y-982).

4. - 4 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division was relieved of responsibility for zone of action in the Holzkirchen (Y-9627) - Bad Tolz (Y-8714) area by the 101st Airborne Division at 1200. Movement to the new division area in the vicinity of Hounarlt (T-7083) was initiated on 041000Z May 1945. The advance division command post opened at Hounarlt at 1530. Preparations were continued for the movement of the entire division to the new areas within the Third United States Army zone. The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 969th Field Artillery Battalion (155th) were detached from the 4th Infantry Division and reverted to the control of the 101st Airborne Division upon the change of responsibility for the zone of action. The 8th Infantry Regiment was attached to the 101st Airborne Division effective at 1200.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached continued its security mission within the division rear areas. The 2d Battalion was relieved by XXI Corps Troops of its responsibility for the security of Augsburg (Y-5479). Upon the completion of the relief, the battalion assembled in the Augsburg area and preparations were made for movement to the vicinity of Gauting (Y-7128) on 5 May. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion and Company A, 70th Tank Battalion were detached from the 8th Infantry Regiment during the day and reverted to the control of their parent units. The 8th Infantry Regiment was attached to the 101st Airborne Division at 1200.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached was relieved by elements of the 101st Airborne Division

Sec IV Operations (Contd)

by 1200, but remained in the areas as occupied on the previous day and made preparations for movement to new regimental areas in the vicinity of Sulzbach (O-8908). Dispositions of the regimental troops remained generally unchanged throughout the day. An advance party initiated movement to the vicinity of Neumarkt (T-7083) at 1300. The Reconnaissance Company and Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP) and Company B, 70th Tank Battalion were detached from the 12th Infantry Regiment and reverted to the control of their parent units during the day.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, began moving to the new assembly area in the vicinity of Schwabach (T-3888) at 1000. The regiment closed in its new area within the Third United States Army zone at 2130. Preparations were initiated for the relief of all Third United States Army units in the Stadtkreis of Nurnberg (O-4200), preparatory to assuming responsibility of the security of the city.

5. 5 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division with the 70th Tank Battalion, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AF) Battalion attached, continued movement into the new assigned division area: Nurnberg (T-4200) - Weissenburg (T-3652) - Ingolstadt (T-7125) - Regensburg (U-1955) (exclusive) - Sulzbach (O-8918). The division advanced command post moved to Auhorn (O-87800) Germany.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached to the 101st Airborne Division, continued to maintain peace and order in the Gauting (Y-7148) - Starnburg (Y-6940) area. Preparations were made to receive relieving units of United States XXI Corps, and to move to new assigned regimental areas within the Third United States Army zone in the vicinity of Burglengenfeld (U-1376).

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, began movement from the area east of Bad Tolz (Y-8714) to a new assigned regimental area in the Third United States Army Zone in the vicinity of Sulzbach (O-8908) at 0850. As the regimental column was passing the initial point approximately twelve (12) German trucks loaded and driven by German soldiers drove into the column to surrender. The proper processing of these prisoners delayed the movement of the regiment slightly. The move was accomplished without mishap, and the regiment was closed in the new assembly area at 2130, preparatory to assuming responsibility for the security of the assigned areas.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion, and Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, initiated reconnaissance of the Nurnberg (O-4200) area, contacted those elements of the United States 16th Armored Division, and other Third Army units in the area, and began relief of these units guarding important installations in the Army railroad city of Nurnberg. The relieving of the different units guarding installations in Nurnberg was a slow undertaking, due to the fact that reconnaissance parties had to find all of the guarded installations before the relief could be accomplished. Complete responsibility had not been assumed at the close of the day, but the relief of units was still in progress.

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6. 6 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division with same attachments as during the previous period of 5 May, continued to move division units into Zone of Occupation within the United States Third Army Area. Those units closed in their now assigned areas and continued to relieve elements of other units guarding installations within the areas, and to assume responsibility gradually for these areas of occupation. The division earned post opened at Aumerg (O-978008) at 0700, closing at old location Wolf-Ratshausen (Y-7530) at the same time, at which time the 4th Infantry Division became assigned to the Third United States Army for the second time since 6 June 1944 when the division began the battle for Nazi held Continental Europe. A teletype message signed by General Eisenhower was received during the day stating that the German military forces had signed the unconditional surrender to all Allied Forces, effective 080001B 14y 1945.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained attached to the 101st Airborne Division, was relieved of all military installations being guarded by elements of the United States XXI Corps in the Gauting (Y-7148) - Starburg (Y-8940) - Augsburg (Y-3480) area, and all battalions assembled preparatory to moving to newly assigned regimental area in the vicinity of Burglangenfeld (U-1376). The 1st and 3d Battalions continued to patrol the roads within the area. Advance parties were dispatched to the Burglangenfeld area.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached initiated reconnaissance within the new area of occupation in the Sulzbach (O-8908) area to contact other units within the area guarding installations and patrolling the sector. Plans were made to relieve all other units within the new regimental area and sectors of responsibility were assigned the battalions to which they moved.

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached continued to relieve all other units in the Nurnberg (O-4200) area of installations they were guarding, and assume responsibility for the traffic control within the important Army supply center of Nurnberg.

The 4th Infantry Division Artillery with the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AA) Battalion, 810th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 70th Tank Battalion attached, initiated movement from Bad Loitz (X-3711) area at an early hour to move to the now assigned area of responsibility in the vicinity of Bollgrues (T-7355) - Ingelstadt (T-7125) - Regensberg (U-1856) (exclusive). Division artillery less the 810th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 70th Tank Battalion closed in the new area in the vicinity of Bollgrues (T-7355) by 1800, preparatory to assuming responsibility for the assigned area.

7. 7 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division with no change in attachments, continued to move elements of the division into the zone of occupation within the Third United States Army area. Liaison was established with III Corps at Doofen (O-2773) during the period. Units who had closed previously in the Third United States Army area continued to guard installations and police the area which they had occupied. The 8th Infantry Regiment remained under the control of the 101st Airborne Division in

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

assembly areas in the vicinity of Gauting (Y-7147).

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, remained under control of the 101st Airborne Division in assembly areas, in the vicinity of Gauting in preparation to moving to the new division area in Third United States Army zone of occupation, early 8 May.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached, took over the guarding and security of displaced persons camps, captured enemy supply dumps, bridges, radio and telephone stations, and other installations within their sector of the division area of occupation in the vicinity of Sulzbach (O-8908).

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached, continued to relieve other elements of United States Forces guarding enemy supply dumps and other installations in the vicinity of Hurnburg - Schwabach (T-3885).

The 4th Infantry Division Artillery with the 70th Tank Battalion, the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion, and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, minus the 70th Tank Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion, initiated the relief of other units who were guarding displaced persons' camps, captured enemy supply dumps, and other installations in the vicinity of Boilingries (T-7355) in the southwestern sector of the division area of occupation. The 70th Tank Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved from assembly areas in the Seventh United States Army area to the new division area of occupation in the Third United States Army area closing therein at 1445.

The 4th Reconnaissance Troop moved from Saterlach (Y-9238) in the Seventh United States Army area to Linberg in the vicinity of the division command post, closing therein at 2200.

8 - 9 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division, with the same attachments as previously reported, continued to maintain law and order, and to guard installations within the division area and also made preparations to assume responsibility for additional security missions in the zone of occupation. The division was attached to III Corps and completely closed in the Third United States Army area during the period.

The 8th Infantry Regiment with Company A, 4th Medical Battalion attached, moved from the vicinity of Gauting (Y-7147) to Burglangenfeld (U-1376) within the new division area of occupation, closing therein at 1800. The regiment made plans for assuming responsibility for security of displaced persons' camps, captured enemy supply dumps, main supply routes, and bridges within their area early 9 May.

The 12th Infantry Regiment with Company B, 4th Medical Battalion attached continued to guard installations in the area immediately surrounding Sulzbach (O-8908). During the day plans were made for assuming responsibility for additional security missions the following day in the vicinity of Houstadt (O-9444) and Eschenbach (O-9437).

The 22d Infantry Regiment with Company C, 4th Medical Battalion and the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion attached continued to maintain security and control of installations within their sector of the zone of occupation, in the vicinity of Hurnburg (T-4000).

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

The 4th Division Artillery, with the 70th Tank Battalion, 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion, and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, continued guarding installations previously taken over by them in the division area of occupation. The 70th Tank Battalion and the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion relieved elements of other United States Army forces in their areas and assumed responsibility for security missions in their respective sectors.

The 4th Infantry Division rear echelon moved from the vicinity of Ober Kochen (S-8423) in the Seventh United States Army area to the location occupied by the division command post in Amberg (O-9700) during the period.

9. 9 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division with the same attachments continued to guard installations in the area, Amberg (O-9700) - Nurnberg (O-4200) - Ingolstadt (T-7125), and assumed responsibility for additional area to the north and east within the Third United States Army zone of occupation. Elements of the division were relieved of some security missions in the vicinity of Nurnberg (T-4000) by elements of the 14th Cavalry Group during the period. All elements of the division not actively engaged in occupation duties conducted maintenance of vehicles and equipment throughout the day.

The 8th Infantry Regiment, with no change in attachments, continued to guard installations in the area in the vicinity of Regensburg (U-1955) - Harnau (T-9653) - Amberg (O-0002) - Schwandorf (U-1790) - Straubing (U-5542), and assumed responsibility for security of additional territory to the north and east of that area.

The 12th Infantry Regiment, with the same attachments, continued their execution of previous security missions and assumed responsibility for guarding additional installations to the north and east in the vicinity of Houstadt (O-9444) - Eschenbach (O-3437).

The 22d Infantry Regiment, with the same attachments, continued security missions in their assigned area of occupation. Some guard outposts were relieved during the period in Nurnberg (T-4000) by elements of the 14th Cavalry Group.

The 4th Division Artillery, with the same attachments, continued to maintain law and order, and to guard installations within their area of occupation. Additional installations were secured in the same area during the period.

10. 10 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division was assigned tentative new boundaries within III Corps area of occupation. These boundaries conformed to political boundaries of the area to be occupied. In preparation for moving to the new area which included the following landkreise: Bamberg, Hochstadt A.D. Aisch, Schleinfeld, Uffenholz, Neustadt A.D. Aisch, Rothenburg, Ansbach, Pouchtwangon, Dirmolsbuhl, Gunzenhausen, Weissenburg, Elohstadt, and Hilpoltstein. Reconnaissance parties were dispatched by some units while other units made plans for reconnaissance early 11 May.

The division continued to guard all installations assigned within the division area and to execute military government functions, maintaining law and order. No changes were reported in any unit locations

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

during the period.

11. 11 - 12 - 13 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division maintained law and order and continued to guard installations such as captured enemy supply depots, main supply routes, radio and telephone stations, bridges, art collections, and displaced persons camps within the division area. Guards were placed on additional installations during the period. Further reconnaissance of the new area to be occupied was carried out by some units. On 13 May, the 300th Engineer Combat Battalion moved into the area occupied by the 4th Infantry Division Artillery.

12. 14 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division began movement to the new area, occupied by elements of III Corps and XXI Corps, at 0800. All elements of the division which were relieved by the 90th Infantry Division in the former area, and all other elements which were not essential to the maintenance of security closed in the new area prior to the close of the period. The 300th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to the division and was given the mission of maintenance in the southern half of the new division area of occupation. The division command post opened at 1400 in Ansbach and closed the command post at Aurburg at the same time. Plans were made for relief of other elements and further movement to the new area for the following period.

13. 15 - 16 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to move elements from the vicinity of Aurburg - Regensburg to the west and continued to relieve elements of the XXI Corps south of the Seventh United States Army - Third United States Army boundary. All elements maintained security of installations and made plans to receive ten thousand (10,000) prisoners of war. Final areas of occupation composed of definite political territories within the southern portion of the regional district of Oberfranken - Mittelfranken and the responsibilities for the thirteen included landkreise was ordered as follows:

The 8th Infantry Regiment to occupy and control landkreise, Bamberg and Hochstadt; the 12th Infantry Regiment with the 70th Tank Battalion attached to occupy and control landkreise, Scheinfeld, Uffenheim, Houstadt, and Rothenburg; the 22d Infantry Regiment to occupy and control landkreise, Ansbach, Fichtelwangen, and Dinkelsbühl; the 4th Infantry Division Artillery with the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion attached to occupy and control landkreise, Gunzenhausen, Weizzenburg, Eichstadt, and Hilpoltstein.

14. 17 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the new area within the regional districts of Oberfranken and Mittelfranken. Minor readjustments and reliefs were carried out within the division during the period and all nondivisional units guarding installations within the area were relieved by elements of the division.

15. 18 - 31 May 1945. The 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain law and order and to guard installations within the zone of occupation.

Sec IV - Operations (Contd)

Minor changes in installations guarded and consequent reliefs were effected throughout the division. The 800th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the division on 22 May but remained in the division area. The 577th Aircraft Artillery (AF) Battalion was detached at the same time, after having fought all the way from the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944 with the 4th Infantry Division. On 30 May the last elements of the division to be relieved in the Regensburg area, closed in the new area at 1330. During the period from 18 May to 31 May, orientation and training programs were carried out in conjunction with occupational duties, and numerous ceremonies were held by all elements of the division and attached units.

Section V - Supply and Evacuation

1. General: The forward rush of the 4th Infantry Division which had continued unabated throughout the month of April was finally halted on 2 May 1945 on orders from higher headquarters. At this time the division command post was located at Wolfershausen, Germany. On being relieved in this sector by the 101st Airborne Division, the 4th Infantry Division moved north to occupy an area generally east of Murnberg. For this move one hundred (100) trucks were allotted the division by Third United States Army, but only eighty-five (85) actually reported in.

On 14 May the division moved again, this time west of Murnberg, in the general vicinity of Ansbach, Germany. This movement was accomplished with the use of organic transportation only. The division remained in this area for the rest of the month, performing normal occupation duties and working towards the rehabilitation of all equipment.

2. Quartermaster: During the month the 4th Quartermaster Company travelled the following distances for the type of supplies indicated:

Class I	-	2,370 total mileage - Average 76.4 miles per day
Class II	-	720 total mileage - Average 180 miles per week
Class III	-	2,370 total mileage - Average 76.4 miles per day

In addition, a total of two hundred and three (203) trucks were used during the month for transportation other than normal supply.

Quantities of supplies drawn and issued during the month were as follows:

Class I:		
"B" rations	-	450,800
"10-in-1" rations	-	21,200
"C" rations	-	24,552
"K" rations	-	36,632
Total Rations Issued	-	532,652

Class II; -

The various items of Class II clothing and equipment drawn was estimated at 78 tons. This was approximately 6% of all items requisitioned.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

At the same time the Quartermaster Company continued to take up and turn in cold weather clothing and equipment such as extra blankets, coats, overshoes, stoves, etc.

Class III: -

Gasoline	-	507,235 gallons
Diesol	-	6,455 gallons
10 oil	-	190 gallons
30 oil	-	7,305 gallons
50 oil	-	1,620 gallons
90 oil	-	1,185 gallons
GR #1	-	2,875 pounds
GR #2	-	3,055 pounds
GR #4	-	104 pounds
Kerosene	-	500 gallons

Class IV - PX supplies were drawn and issued once a week for a seven day period.

During the month the Division Graves Registration Officer evacuated ten (10) American and two (2) Allied dead and thirteen (13) German dead.

3. Ordnance: On being withdrawn from the line, and especially following the cessation of hostilities on 8 May, emphasis was placed on the repair and rehabilitation of all equipment. Towards this end the 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company put two contact parties into the field for the purpose of making inspections and repairs. During the month the Ordnance Company evacuated 68 vehicles and repaired and returned to the using units 218 others. A total of 3,600 small arms, 48 artillery pieces, and 43 instruments were likewise repaired and returned to the using units.

As has heretofore been the case, the lack of parts was the greatest hindrance to the repair program. The quantity of supplies drawn in May was the lowest of any month since the Normandy invasion. At one time twenty (20) vehicles were deadlined solely because of lack of parts.

Since the division was in active contact with the enemy for only two days of the month, the expenditure of ammunition was negligible. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, all stocks of ammunition on hand above the basic load were turned in to Third United States Army ammunition supply points. At the same time a dump for enemy ammunition was established by the Ordnance Company, to which point all units evacuated enemy ammunition discovered within their respective areas.

4. Medical: No problems arose in the supply of medical equipment and expendables. Only twenty-one (21) battle casualties were evacuated to the Division Clearing Company. In addition one hundred and sixty-seven (167) injury and six hundred and twenty-one (621) disease cases were received.

5. Engineer: With the end of the war, items of Engineer Class IV supplies became almost impossible to obtain. Lumber and barbed wire for the construction of prisoner of war inclosures were greatly in demand, although the available supply was negligible. Captured stocks proved to be

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

the principal source of those items. Another difficulty existed in obtaining tools to be used in working prisoners of war.

6. Chemical Warfare and Signal: There was no demand for chemical warfare supplies during the month and signal supply was again normal.

7. Captured Materiel: The division continued to overrun and discover enemy supply installations while still in combat and after withdrawal. Included in the captured equipment were nineteen (19) 88mm guns, which were destroyed in place, quantities of radio and radar equipment, medical supply dumps, stocks of fuel and lubricants, two air fields with a total of eighteen (18) jet propelled planes in good condition and vast stores of ammunition and explosives. All this materiel was either evacuated by the division or was reported and turned over to higher headquarters.

8. Motor maintenance was conducted and inspections made under the supervision of the Division Motor Officer.

9. Evacuation: The evacuation of casualties was handled in a most expeditious manner:

Summary of Casualties

	6 June 1944			
	Month of May 1945	To 9 May 1945		
	Officers	Enl	Officers	Enl
Killed in action	-	3	263	3595
Died of wounds	-	2	39	675
Died of injuries	-	-	-	17
Missing in action	-	-	16	267
Seriously wounded in action	-	3	538	6172
Seriously injured in action	-	1	20	317
Slightly wounded in action	2	14	422	7330
Slightly injured in action	-	1	62	1600
Captured	-	-	-	14
Total Casualties.....	2	24	1210	19967
	26		21197	

10. A total of 24,931 prisoners of war were taken during this period.

11. During the period from 1 May to 31 May 1945, a total of 65 officers and 5212 enlisted men reinforcements and casualties were received.

Sec V - Supply & Evacuation (Contd)

12. Strength:	1 May 1945			31 May 1945		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
STRENGTH OF DIVISION						
(Present and Absent)						
Hq 4th Inf Div	44	6	130/4	48	4	144/10
8th Inf	168	4	2969	161	4	3286
12th Inf	161	5	2958	152	4	3301
22d Inf	159	5	3017	157	5	3348
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	19	1	106	19	1	112
20th FA Bn	32	2	490	31	1	513
29th FA Bn	34	2	469	35	2	507
42d FA Bn	34	2	482	35	2	521
44th FA Bn	35	2	486	33	2	528
4th Engr Combat Bn	50	2	574	31	2	644
4th Med Bn	33	1	404	31	1	431
4th Recon Tr, Looz	8	-	128	8	-	151
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div	3	-	7	3	-	7
Band, 4th Inf Div	-	2	58	-	2	59
1st Det, Sp Trs	2	-	13	2	-	14
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div	3	1	152/31	4	1	142/28
1st Plat, 4th Inf Div	5	-	132	5	-	113
704th Crd L Maint Co	9	-	143	9	-	143
4th Q: Co	10	-	213	9	-	200
4th Sig Co	10	4	278	10	4	290
Total	799	39	13209	783	35	14453

STRENGTH OF UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION						
(Present and Absent)						
4th CIC Det	4	-	10/1	2	-	3/15
Order of Battle Unit No. 2	1	-	2	-	-	-
IPV Team No. 34 (8th Inf)	2	-	4	3	-	3
IPV Team No. 35 (22d Inf)	2	-	4	2	-	4
PI Team No. 31	2	-	3	-	-	-
PI Team No. 417-G	2	-	4	3	-	3
70th Tk Bn	40	3	663	38	2	727
377th AAA (AF) Bn	86	2	726	-	-	-
610th TD Bn	53	1	607	40	1	611
Total	137	6	2023	88	3	1351
Grand Total	926	45	15232	871	38	15804

H. W. Blakely
 H. W. BLAKELY,
 Major General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding.

Annex A - Order of Battle Team No. 2

1. Order of Battle Team No. 2 continued to function with the 4th Infantry Division from 1 May to 28 May 1945.

2. The team continued to function in close coordination with the AG of S, G-2 Section in addition to its regular Order of Battle duties until the cessation of hostilities. Thereafter, the team was available for interpreter, interrogation and document work but remained relatively inactive until recalled to Military Intelligence Service.

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Annex B - 4th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment

1. There have been no special cases during the month of May. During this period this detachment has been in two occupational areas and the work has been routine. The emphasis has been on arresting political leaders of the NSDAP in order that the Nazi Party is completely broken up. There have been minor cases of sabotage committed by former members of the Hitler Jugend. The guilty parties have been tried by Military Government Courts and convicted.

2. During this period some sixteen thousand (16,000) German prisoners of war have been processed for discharge from the Wehrmacht. It was necessary for CIC to screen these prisoners of war on order that no members of the Waffen SS would be discharged. Prisoners who were members of the Wehrmacht and also fell in the automatic arrest category were discharged from the Wehrmacht and arrested and then interned.

3. During this occupational phase the IPW Teams and III Teams attached to the 4th Infantry Division have been working in conjunction with the 4th CIC Detachment. In addition eight (8) German speaking soldiers from various units of the division were attached to the 4th CIC Detachment on detached service.

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
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 Page 1 of 8

FO #1

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 DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE
 HQ 4TH INF DIV
 APO 4
 1944

MAPS: France, GSGS 4250, Scale: 1/50,000.
 Sheets: 51/2, 52/4, 51/6, 62/1, 62/3 & 4, 6E/5, 6E/6, 6F/2 & 6F/11

France, GfGS 4347, Scale: 1/25,000.
 Sheets: 34-18NW, 34-18W, 34-20SW, 31-21SE, 21-18NE, 31-18SE.

1. a. Army Situation - Intelligence Annex #2.

- b. (1) The VII Corps, First United States Army, supported by air and naval forces, will assault the COTENTIN PENINSULA on D-day to capture CHERBOURG (1020). V Corps, lands on left of VII Corps.
- (2) SUPPORTING TROOPS. (Annex #3, "Troop List").
- (a) NAVAL TASK FORCE 125 provides lift, protection at sea and support (Annex #8, "Naval Gunfire Support"), and will breach underwater obstacles (Annex #9, "Engineer").
- (b) LX TACTICAL AIR COMMANDO furnishes air support for VII Corps (Annex #7, "Air Support").
- (c) 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION will land at H-4 hours on D-day, seize the western exits of the inundated area between ST. MARTIN DE VARREVILLE (4099) and FOUFFEVILLE (4393) both inclusive, will secure CAERTAN (3984) and protect the south flank of the 4th Infantry Division generally along the DOUVE RIVER east of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (1994) (Annex #1, Operations Overlays Nos. 1a and 1b). Bridges north of CAERTAN at 365872, 382885, 419873, and 427876 will be destroyed; dam at 397868 will be seized and defended. Will seize STE MARIE EGLISE and the crossings of the MERDERET at 315957 and 321930. Crossings of DOUVE RIVER at 309910 and 269928 will be destroyed by 101st Airborne Division after its elements are relieved in 4th Infantry Division Sector.
- (d) 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION will land before dawn on D-day, west of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE and prevent enemy reinforcements advancing into COTENTIN PENINSULA north of ST. LO-D'OURVILLE (0989) - FRANGES MARCOUSEUX. Will destroy crossings north of LA SANGSURIERE (1889) and ST. SAUVEUR-de-FIERRE FONT (1448) and crossings of OLLONDE RIVER in vicinity of ST. LO-D'OURVILLE. Will protect south flank of 4th Infantry Division within its sector.
- (e) 1ST ENGINEER SPECIAL BRIGADE (reinforced) will support the assault landings of VII Corps; organize and operate all shore installations necessary for debarkation, supply, evacuation, and local security in order to insure expeditious movement across beaches (Annex #9, "Engineer").
- (f) 11TH AAA GROUP will furnish initial antiaircraft protection for the assault units of TASK FORCE 125 and thereafter will provide antiaircraft protection for the beach installations, airfields, and air strips.

2. a. The 4th Infantry Division, landing on beaches TARE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED) assault UTAH BEACH on D-day at H-hour and, in conjunction with the 90th Infantry Division, will seize CHERBOURG.

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- b. The objective shown on Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a, will be seized by dark D-day.
- c. The Division will be prepared to continue the advance on CHERBOURG without delay.
- d. Formations, boundaries between regiments and objectives - (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a).
- e. D-day and H-hour to be announced.
3. a. **COMBAT TEAM 8.**
 Commander - Colonel James A. Van Fleet, 8th Infantry.
- (1) Troops.
- (a) 8th Infantry.
- (b) 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, reinforced:
 Naval Shore Fire Control Party No. 9.
~~1st Platoon, Company "A", 748th Tank Battalion.~~
 Company "D", 87th Chemical Battalion.
 1st Platoon, Company "C", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion.
- (c) 29th Field Artillery Battalion.
- (d) 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
- (e) 70th Tank Battalion (less Company "D").
- (f) 87th Chemical Battalion (Motorized) (less Company "D").
- (g) 3d Platoon, Company "A", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion.
- (h) Company "A", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion.
- (i) Company "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion.
- (j) Detachment, Company "A", 4th Medical Battalion (2 personnel, 2 vehicles).
- (k) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties Nos. 1, 2 & 3.
- (l) Air Support Party.
- (m) Prisoner of War Interrogation Team No. 34.
- (n) Detachment, 4th Signal Company (9 personnel, 2 vehicles).
- (2) Mission.
- CT 8 will land on beaches TARS (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED), on a 2200 yard front (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a), assault and breach the beach defenses thereon, and seize and secure the initial objective as shown on Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a. CT 8 will be given a new mission when it shall have seized initial objective.
- (a) Initially cover the advance of remainder of the Division.
- (b) Protect the preparation of routes over causeways V-1, U-5 and T-7 from small arms fire.
- (c) Protect left flank of the Division.
- (d) Clear at least two (2) vehicular lanes across the beach per leading battalion, and prepare at least two (2) tank passageways through the sea wall per leading battalion.
- (e) Establish contact with and relieve elements of the 101st Airborne Division in the areas LAMBOUVILLE (415965) - DOLINE (382931) - FOUFFEVILLE (438932).
- (f) CT 8 will neutralize fires from LES DUNES DE VARREVILLE (4299) and ST. MARTIN DE VARREVILLE (4198) until relieved by 22d Infantry.
- (g) ~~3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, will be landed and committed to action by Commanding Officer, CT 8, in conformity with plan of attack.~~ ~~Commanding Officer, CT 22, which is for the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (reinforced) to follow right assault Battalion 8th Infantry through breaches in the sea wall, and attack to the northwest (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a) to capture QUINVILLE (5708). Revert to command CT 22 on order Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.~~
- (h) 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion will be passed to control of Commanding General 101st Airborne Division on order of Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.

(i) Detachment, Company "A", 4th Medical Battalion, detached upon landing.

b. **COMBAT TEAM 22.**

Commander - Colonel Hervey A. Tribolot, 22d Infantry.

(1) Troops.

- (a) 22d Infantry Regiment (initially, less 3d Battalion, reinforced).
- (b) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties Nos. 4 and 7.
- (c) Prisoner of War Interrogation Team No. 35.
- (d) Detachment, 4th Signal Company (9 personnel, 2 vehicles).

(2) Mission.

CT 22 will land, on beaches TARE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED) cross inundated area, capture causeway S-9, secure it from small arms fire, and seize objectives as shown on annex #1; Operations Overlay No. 1a.

- (a) 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (reinforced), will report to control 22d Infantry on order Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
- (b) Relievements of 101st Airborne Division in CT 22 zone of action.

c. **COMBAT TEAM 12.**

Commander - Colonel Russell P. Rooder, 12th Infantry.

(1) Troops.

- (a) 12th Infantry Regiment.
- (b) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties Nos. 5, 6 and 8.
- (c) Prisoner of War Interrogation Team No. 16.
- (d) Detachment, 4th Signal Company (9 personnel, 2 vehicles).

(2) Mission.

CT 12 will land, on beaches TARE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED), advance inland with two (2) battalions abreast and seize objective as shown on annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a.

- (a) 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, will pass to Division Reserve on reaching the general line: REUVILLE (378970) - TURQUEVILLE (377961). This battalion will be prepared on division order to continue the advance on the crossings of the MARDELET RIVER at CALQUIGNY LA FLÈRE (516956) and LES MARIJUX (520930).

d. **COMBAT TEAM 359 (less detachments).**

Commander - Colonel Clarke K. Pales, 359th Infantry Regiment.

Missions:

- (1) Will land on L-day on beaches TARE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED); will assemble per annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a and be prepared to move at once to the northmost to attack on right of 22d Infantry.
- (2) The Commanding Officer, 359th Infantry Regiment, will land with Headquarters CT 12 and report to Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division at 4th Infantry Division CP immediately.

e. **ENGINEERS.**

(1) Troops.

- (a) Companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion (attached to 8th Infantry).
- (b) 1st Platoon, Company "C", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (attached to 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry).
- (c) 3d Platoon, Company "A", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (attached to 8th Infantry).
- (d) 1106th Engineer Combat Group
Commander - Lieutenant Colonel T. DeP. Rogers, CG.
(1) 1106th Engineer Combat Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
(2) 48th Engineer Combat Battalion.

- (3) 237th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Companies "A" and "C"), Company "B", 299th Engineers attached.
- (4) 238th Engineer Combat Battalion.
- (5) 582d Dump Truck Company.
- (6) 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company.
- (7) Detachment, 612th Engineer Light Equipment Company.
- (e) 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less 3d Platoon Company "A" and 1st Platoon Company "C").
- (2) Mission. (Annex #9, "Engineer").
 - (a) Companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached to the 8th Infantry.
 - (b) 1st Platoon, Company "C", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached to the 3d Battalion (reinforced), 22d Infantry.
 - (c) 3d Platoon, Company "A", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached to 8th Infantry.
 - (d) 1106th Engineer Combat Group (less Companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion) (reinforced by Company "B", 299th Engineer Battalion).
 - (1) Prepare eight (8) passageways through beach obstacles for craft and vehicles (4 on TAKE (GREEN) beach and 4 on UNCLE (RED) beach). Minimum width of passageways 50 yards. Continue to widen passageways until relieved by 1st Engineer Special Brigade (reinforced) (Annex #9, "Engineer"). Responsible for all obstacles below high water mark.
 - (2) Prepare and maintain roads V-1 and U-5 across the inundation on D-day, one road to carry class 40 loads and the other class 15 loads. Maintain a class 40 lateral route between roads V-1 and U-5 east of the inundation. Clear obstacles and mines from the area east of the inundation between roads V-1 and U-5 to provide for vehicle dispersal.
 - (3) 1106th Engineer Combat Group (less 2 Companies) pass to VII Corps control upon order Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, when an engineer representing Commanding General, VII Corps, arrives to assume control or, when the combat elements 4th Infantry Division clear the inundated area, whichever occurs first.
 - (4) Companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion, will revert to 1106th Engineer Combat Group on order Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, not later than Dark of D-day.
- (e) 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less two (2) platoons). Land on beaches TAKE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED); support the advance of the 4th Infantry Division west of the inundated area.

f. FIELD ARTILLERY. (Annex #6, "Artillery").

(1) Troops

- (a) 20th Field Artillery Battalion attached to CT 8.
- (b) 86th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Attached to CT 8 until ordered by Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, to join 101st Airborne Division).
- (c) 42d Field Artillery Battalion.
- (d) 44th Field Artillery Battalion.
- (e) 20th Field Artillery Battalion.
- (f) Battery "B", 980th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm).
- (g) Battery "A" (reinforced), 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (F & S).
- (h) Naval Shore Fire Control Party No. 10.

(2) Missions.

(a) General.

Initially, the fires of all battalions will be capable of being massed in front of any part of the Division front. As attack progresses and the division front becomes extended, the bulk of fires will be capable of being massed on any part of the division front. Initial positions: East of inundated area between causeways J-9 and T-1 (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1c);

will be prepared to fire contingent missions in zone of action of 101st Airborne Division and 82d Airborne Division.

- (b) 42d Field Artillery Battalion - To land on beach UNCLE (RED). Normal direct combat team support.
- (c) 44th Field Artillery Battalion - To land on beach TANKS (GREEN). Normal direct combat team support.
- (d) 20th Field Artillery Battalion - General Support.
- (e) Battery "E", 980th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm) - General support.
- (f) Battery "A" (reinforced), 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (F & S) - General Support.

g. TANKS.

(1) Troops.

- (a) Detachment, 6th Armored Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company.
- (b) 70th Tank Battalion (LD) (less Company "D").
- (c) 746th Tank Battalion.

(2) Missions.

- (a) Detachment, 6th Armored Group Headquarters - attached to Headquarters 4th Infantry Division.
- (b) 70th Tank Battalion (LD) (less Company "D") - attached to CP 8 for assault on beach TANKS (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED). (Annex #9, "Engineer").
- (c) Company "D", 70th Tank Battalion, to staging area (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1c), prepared to pass to 101st Airborne Division on order Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
- (d) 746th Tank Battalion (less 1st Platoon, Company "A") - Upon landing, move to staging area. Prepare to capture objective shown on Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a, as soon as able to cross inundated area.
- (e) Company "C", 746th Tank Battalion, to be detached on 4th Infantry Division order for movement to 82d Airborne Division.
- (f) 1st Platoon, Company "A", 746th Tank Battalion, upon landing, attached to the 3d Battalion (reinforced), 22d Infantry (Annex #1; Operations Overlay No. 1a).
- (g) Company "D", 746th Tank Battalion, move by the most suitable route to staging area (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1c). Commanding Officer will report to Command Post, 4th Infantry Division, for orders.

h. CAVALRY (Mechanized).

(1) Troops.

- (a) 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) - Commander: Captain Louis W. Goodrich, 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized).

(2) Mission.

Reconnoiter division zone of advance (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a), main effort west of MURKIN RIVER. (Particular attention to approach of hostile forces from west of HERBERT RIVER, north of ST. SAUVAGE LA VICOMTE (inclusive) - (1994).

- (a) Prepare for destruction and protect crossings over MADERET RIVER vicinity ST. COLOMBE at (200987) and (197990). Crossings will be destroyed only as a last resort to prevent their capture by superior enemy forces.
- (b) Establish contact with 82d Airborne Division.
- i. 377th AAA BN BATTALION (M) will land on D+4 days. Attached to 4th Infantry Division artillery.
- j. 801st TD BATTALION (T) will land on D+6 days. Attached to 4th Infantry Division artillery.
- k. SERVICE ELEMENTS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION.
- (1) Troops.
- (a) 4th Medical Battalion.
- (b) 4th Quartermaster Company.
- (c) 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company.
- (d) 1st Platoon, 603d Quartermaster Company (GK).
- (2) Mission. (Annex #4, "Administrative Order").
- x. GENERAL.
- (1) The assault on TAKE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED) beaches will be pushed at all costs.
- (2) Leading wave of assault craft will land exactly at H-hour.
- (3) All assault elements of the 4th Infantry Division will make every effort to locate, contact and assist personnel of the 101st Airborne Division in respective zones of action. Fires will be controlled to avoid firing on troops of 101st Airborne Division. 4th Infantry Division troops east of inundated area will not call for artillery, air nor naval fires in the area, POUPPEVILLE (438932) - ST. MARTIN DE VAUHEVILLE (409980) - ST. MARIE EGLISE (348964) - CHEF DU PORT (330936) except on permission from 101st Airborne Division or Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
- (4) All units of the 4th Infantry Division will be especially alert to effect early and positive mutual recognition of elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Annex #5, Signal Communication)
- (5) Elements of the 101st Airborne Division, north of boundary between divisions (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a) will be promptly relieved by CT Commanders, 4th Infantry Division, in their respective zone of action. Relief of 101st Airborne Division elements along MADERET RIVER on 4th Infantry Division order.
- (6) Contacts made with 101st Airborne Division and 82d Airborne Division will be reported by time and place to headquarters 4th Infantry Division without delay.
- (7) All troops, when briefed, will be informed of employment of friendly airborne troops.
- (8) All units will report to division headquarters by the fastest means of communication available, the time and place of beach landing.
- (9) On landing, all elements in rear of assault battalions will move rapidly into staging areas shown on Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1c, and debouch rapidly across inundated area. Infantry, including airborne, cross inundated area without regard to availability of roads. Units and vehicles held up east of inundated area will be ordered out by Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division, according to tactical requirements west of inundated area. Priority:
- ammunition for CT 8
Tanks
4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
Armored artillery
Light artillery
Infantry Vehicles

- (10) all combat elements push reconnaissance forward and to flanks.
- (11) antitank protection will be organized in depth within all units.
- (12) Gaps between CT's will be actively patrolled. adjoining CT's and Division Headquarters will be notified of penetrations by hostile platoons or larger or any size mechanized patrols or bodies.
- (13) Vehicles returning from front will evacuate wounded.
- (14) Contact from right to left.
- (15) Unit reports submitted to reach Division CP at 2000 daily by regiments and separate units assigned or attached to the 4th Infantry Division.
- (16) All CP's will be plainly marked. When CP's of regiments and separate battalions are displaced, guides will be posted to direct messengers and other personnel to new location.
- (17) All elements on seizing objectives will be prepared to continue the advance on CHIRBOUK without delay.
- (18) Watches will be synchronized prior to embarkation and checked with accurate ship time, if available, prior to landing.
- (19) Division Beach Control posts will be located on beaches TARS (GRSN) and UNCL (R&L). In addition, a central Beach Control Post will be established by AC of S, G-4, in conjunction with 531st Engineer Regiment and Navy Beach Battalion in the vicinity of beach exit of road T-7 to coordinate supply, give information and instructions to debarking troops, control movement of troops and vehicles to assembly areas and to coordinate movement of craft to beach on call.
- (20) Units will furnish guides for all following elements of their commands. These guides will report to the Central Beach Control Post for information and instructions.
- (21) Division orders will not be taken forward of Regimental Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN. (See Annex #4, "Administrative Order").

5. a. axis of signal Communication (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a).

Units will break radio silence prior to the opening of naval bombardment (H-40 minutes) only upon order of the Commanding General, VII Corps.

b. 4th Infantry Division Command Post afloat USS BAYFIELD.

Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, will establish an advance CP ashore initially on beach near boundary between beaches TARS (GRSN) and UNCL (R&L).

4th Infantry Division Command Post ashore (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a).

Command Posts CT 8, CT 22, CT 12, CT 359, and 6th Armored Group (Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 1a). Report when opened.

Other Command Posts to be reported.

R. O. Barton
R. O. BARTON,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

TOP SECRET BIGOT

INLAND STAGING AND ARTY POSITIONING AREAS

ASSIGNMENT OF INLAND STAGING AREAS

UNIT	AREAS
389TH INF (ADV ELEMENTS)	50
22D INF VEHICLES	51
06 "D" 740TH TK BN	52
4TH ENGR U BN	53
12TH INF VEHICLES	54
4TH BN TR (HEVZ)	55
748TH TK BN (-)	56
PLAT, TR "B", 4TH CAV	57
8TH INF VEHICLES	58
704TH TK BN	59
1106TH ENGR CP	60

ASSIGNMENT OF BEACH STAGING AREAS

UNIT	AREAS
22D INF (ADV ELEMENTS)	A P Q R
12TH INF (VEHICLES)	S C D E
4TH BN TR (HEVZ)	F
ARTY POS AREAS	
20th FA Bn, 20th FA Bn, 45th FA Bn	
15th FA Bn (FA2), 1st FA Bn, 500th FA Bn	G H I J
40TH ENGR BN	K
108TH ENGR BN	L
401st TR CO	M
VEHICLE, 22D INF & 06 "D" 4TH MED BN	N O P Q
VEHICLE, 12TH INF & 06 "D" 4TH MED BN	R S T U
VEHICLE, 8TH INF & 06 "A" 4TH MED BN	V W X Y
350TH ENGR BN	Z
06 "D" 740TH TK BN	
70TH TR BN MAINTENANCE	
1ST ENGR BN MAINT	
4TH ENGR BN	
PLAT, TR "B", 4TH CAV	
HQ 06 "D" PLAT, 4TH INF DIV	
4TH ENGR BN	
4TH ENGR BN	
101ST AIRBORNE DIV	
4TH MED BN (LESS 06 "A" & "D")	
06 "D", 43TH TK BN	
4TH QM	
704TH TR BN MAINT	


NOTE: VEHICLES OF 06 "D" BN AND 06 "A" BN TO BE ASSIGNED TO UNITS TO WHOM ATTACHED.

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ANNEX 1 TO FO #1
 OPERATIONS OVERVIEW
 MAP: FRANCE GSG 4347
 SCALE 1/25000
 SHEETS - 34/15/11, 34/15/12, 34/15/13, 34/15/14, 34/15/15, 34/15/16, 34/15/17, 34/15/18, 34/15/19, 34/15/20, 34/15/21, 34/15/22, 34/15/23, 34/15/24, 34/15/25, 34/15/26, 34/15/27, 34/15/28, 34/15/29, 34/15/30, 34/15/31, 34/15/32, 34/15/33, 34/15/34, 34/15/35, 34/15/36, 34/15/37, 34/15/38, 34/15/39, 34/15/40, 34/15/41, 34/15/42, 34/15/43, 34/15/44, 34/15/45, 34/15/46, 34/15/47, 34/15/48, 34/15/49, 34/15/50, 34/15/51, 34/15/52, 34/15/53, 34/15/54, 34/15/55, 34/15/56, 34/15/57, 34/15/58, 34/15/59, 34/15/60, 34/15/61, 34/15/62, 34/15/63, 34/15/64, 34/15/65, 34/15/66, 34/15/67, 34/15/68, 34/15/69, 34/15/70, 34/15/71, 34/15/72, 34/15/73, 34/15/74, 34/15/75, 34/15/76, 34/15/77, 34/15/78, 34/15/79, 34/15/80, 34/15/81, 34/15/82, 34/15/83, 34/15/84, 34/15/85, 34/15/86, 34/15/87, 34/15/88, 34/15/89, 34/15/90, 34/15/91, 34/15/92, 34/15/93, 34/15/94, 34/15/95, 34/15/96, 34/15/97, 34/15/98, 34/15/99, 34/15/100

TROXEL 913

TOP SECRET BIGOT




NEPTUNE TOP SECRET
B/1017



TR 4th IN. DIV
 ADD #4
 MAP 1544
 ANNEX #1 TO T-1
 CORRECTION #1 TO ORIELA #2
 SUPPLEMENTARY RECORDS
 MAP GSCS 4250 REANCE
 SHEETS Nos 502, 514, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

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
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 12 MAY 1944
 APO #4
 ANNEX No 1 To FO #1
 OPERATION OVERLAY 1B
 SUPPORTING TROOPS
 MAP GSSS 4250 FRANCE
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
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GRAPHIC SCALE






HQ 4th Inf Div
 APO 4
 12 MAY 1944
 Annex 1 To Field Order No 1
 OPERATION OVERLAY 1A
 MAP GSGS 4250 FRANCE
 SHEETS NOS. 58/2, 58/3, 58/6, 6E/1, 6E/3, 6E/4, 6E/5, 6E/6
 58/2 6E/1

SCALE 1/50,000
 LEGEND:
 © CONTACT PATROLS

NOTE:
 8th INF PREPARED TO
 RECEIVE THE FRONT REGT
 AND 746th TR BN
 ON DIV ORDER.

TROYEL
 8-3
 BARTON

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HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, US ARMY
14 May 1944

Page No. 1 of 3 pages.
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ANNEX #2)

P. O. #1)

INTELLIGENCE

MAPS: France, GSGS, 2738, scale 1/250,000, Sheets 3A & 8; GSGS, 4249, scale 1/100,000, Sheets 5E & 6E.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

See Annex #2a.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. (Period prior to D-day to 2400, D / 1).

- a. By what means and what strength will the enemy oppose movement of Force "U" to the beach and its initial assault.
- b. Where, how, and in what strength will the enemy oppose our crossing the inundated area west of UTAH Beach.
- c. What are locations, strengths, and dispositions of enemy reserves on the COTENTIN PENINSULA.
- d. When, where, and in what strength can the enemy bring additional reserves into the COTENTIN PENINSULA north of the line DOUVE RIVER--PRAIRIES MARCAIGUSES--ST. LO D'OURVILLE.
- e. Where, how, and in what strength are enemy fortifications.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.a. General.

Regiments are responsible for reconnaissance within their own Zone of Action. (See Operations Overlay).

b. Air Reconnaissance Missions. (9th Air Support Command through First Army).

(1) Planned aerial reconnaissance missions D-day and D / 1 have been approved as follows: (See Annex #2d).

Mission 1-B: Surveillance of towns and road strips at 1000 and 1800 on D-day and at noon on D / 1 cross East coast--thence North of VALOGNES--BRICQUEBEC--thence Southeast over ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE--160951--130950--103943--ST. MAURICE (066967)--BARNEVILLE--thence North of LES FIEUX.

Mission 2-B: Surveillance of towns and road strips on D-day at 0800 and 1900 on D / 1 at first light, noon, and dusk--VALOGNES, ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE, DOUVE RIVER, CARENTAN.

Mission 3-B: Surveillance of towns and road strips on D-day at 1400 and 2000 and on D / 1 at first light plus 2 hours and at 1400--VALOGNES, BRICQUEBEC, BARNEVILLE, ST. LO D'OURVILLE, LA HAYE DU PUTTS, BISSAY, COUNANCES, GRANVILLE.

(2) Surveillance outlined above is designed to obtain quick and timely information of assembly and movement of enemy reserves. Reports should include type of unit, i. e., armored, foot troops, artillery, etc., direction and speed of movement, time and place observed, also type of activity at any crossings of DOUVE RIVER.

- 1 - RESTRICTED

Annex 2 to FO 1, Hq 4 Inf Div, 14 May 44. Cont'd.

Page No. 2 of 3 pages.

(3) Six (6) request missions daily beginning on D-day will be available to VII Corps. Units will submit requests for missions through Division G-2.

(4) It has been requested that pilots flying tactical reconnaissance missions will report results by VHF to ASP net.

c. Photo Reconnaissance Missions.

See annex #2e.

d. Ground Reconnaissance Missions.

(1) Infantry Regiments. Normal reconnaissance within Zone of Action with particular attention to new enemy strong points behind inundated area. Enemy reserves and enemy anti-aircraft strength vicinity of CROSS BOW SITES.

(2) 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mecz). (See Paragraph 3. h. (2), Field Order #1). Will, in zone of reconnaissance, report the following:

(a) Location, size, disposition, composition, and identification of all enemy troops encountered.

(b) Presence of mines, demolitions, obstacles, and road blocks along roads of advance.

(c) In absence of positive information, negative reports will be made every half hour beginning on the hour.

e. Division Engineer.

Will collect and distribute information on roads, bridges, and obstacles in the target area, to include inundations, mines, and demolitions.

f. Chemical.

(1) General. During all phases of operations on the continent, it is most important that any negative or positive information which will give a clue to enemy gas intentions will be forwarded to Division CP at highest priority.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

a. Prisoners of War.

(1) WD, RMG Form No. 1 (FW Tag) will be used whenever available. If not available, the senior NCO of the Prisoner escort will be furnished a memorandum stating place, time, circumstances of capture, and capturing unit.

(2) Enemy air force personnel will not be interrogated by the capturing ground force unit, but will be turned over to the nearest ASF or A-2 for questioning.

b. Captured Documents.

Every attempt will be made to forward personal documents, such as letters, diaries, notebooks, etc., directly with prisoners of war so that these may be readily available to interrogators at all levels. Documents other than personal documents will be collected and forwarded to G-2 with circumstances pertaining to capture, i. e., time, place, etc.

5. MAPS.

Battle Map: France, 1/50,000, GSGS, 4250.

6. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

See letter, this headquarters, "Counter Intelligence Measures For ensuing Exercise", dated 9 May 1944.

Annex 2 to FO 1, Hq 4 Inf Div, 14 May 44. Cont'd.

Page No. 3 of 3 pages.

b. In Operation Zone.

To maintain the secrecy of our forces from enemy espionage, sabotage, and from subversive activity on the part of hostile civilian individuals and groups is a counter intelligence mission.

7. REPORTS.a. Periodic Reports.

All units will render daily periodic report covering the 24-hour period ending 1600, to reach Division CP not later than 1800.

b. Special Reports.

(1) Units in contact with the enemy will submit a brief summary of the enemy situation by telephone or other rapid means at least every six (6) hours. (0400, 1000, 1600 and 2200). Division artillery, at the same hours, will submit a summary of hostile battery locations and other pertinent information collected by its agencies.

(2) PWI team reports from teams attached to infantry regiments will be submitted covering interrogations during the 24-hour period ending at 2400. They will reach the Division CP not later than 0130. These reports will include summary of prisoners taken, and unit identifications learned.

8. INFORMATION CENTER.

VII Corps G-2 will maintain an information center at CR 382932 (GSGS, 4347, Sheet 31/18 NE, 1/25,000) beginning on D + 1, until relieved by First Army.

BARTON

Hansen
HANSEN
G-2

Inlosures:

- annex #2a to FO 1 - Summary of Enemy Situation
- annex #2b to FO 1 - Order of Battle, with Overlay
- annex #2c to FO 1 - Tactical Study of the Terrain and Weather
- annex #2d to FO 1 - Aerial Reconnaissance
- annex #2e to FO 1 - Photo Reconnaissance

Distributions: w/Field Order

RESTRICTED

HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, U S Army
15 May 1944

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Page No. 1 of 5 pages.

ANNEX #2a)
to
F. O. # 1)

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

1. a. COTENTIN PENINSULA GARRISON.

The COTENTIN PENINSULA is garrisoned mainly by the 709th Infantry Division on the coast, with the 243d Infantry Division in local reserve. These troops, together with the 716th and 352d Infantry Divisions, constitute the 84th Corps with headquarters at ST. LO. Corps troops are estimated as at least one battalion of heavy artillery, one battalion of medium artillery, possibly self-propelled, one battalion of Nebelwerfers (self-propelled rocket launchers), a "Schnelle" Brigade (bicycle and self-propelled artillery troops), a flak battalion, an antitank battalion, and a company of tanks. In addition, there are railway artillery units (CHERBOURG and CARTERET), naval and GAF units, and at least seventy-four 88 mm dual purpose guns on the entire CHERBOURG PENINSULA.

A major change that has taken place during the past three months has been the upgrading of the 709th and other 700-class formerly static divisions. These divisions are now believed to be triangular with three battalions of artillery, additional horse-drawn transportation, and some additional motor transport. The 243d and 352d Infantry Divisions continue to improve under the same upgrading process, while Corps troops improve in training. About 10,000 Todt Organization workers on the Peninsula are engaged in construction and other lines of communication functions.

b. Mobile Reserves.

There are in France and the Low Countries an estimated sixty divisions of which approximately twelve may be considered as mobile reserves. Immediately available to the CHERBOURG PENINSULA are the 21st, SS GOETZ VON-BERLICHINGEN, and SS HITLER JUGEND Panzer Divisions, of which the latter two are believed to be first class. Farther away but available are the 2d Panzer, 179th Panzer Training, 3d Parachute, and 84th and 85th Infantry Divisions. Of these divisions the 2d Panzer is being reconstituted after its return from Russia; the 179th Panzer Training is believed being upgraded to a field panzer division; the 3d Parachute Division, with the addition of transport, is rated as top flight infantry; while the 84th and 85th Infantry Divisions are believed to be reconstituted from battered units from Russia and are considered medium quality infantry divisions.

In addition, elements of the SS ADOLF HITLER Panzer Division have been reported in the west (France, Holland and Belgium). The 273d Panzer Training in the BORDEAUX area and the 155th Panzer Training Division in the NIMES area are being upgraded to field Panzer status. SS Panzer Division LAS REICH, now in the vicinity of TOULOUSE, is believed to be first-class, but not fully reequipped.

Known GHQ troops available in the West for reinforcement of the NEPTUNE area are:

- Five (5) Heavy Tank Battalions
- Two (2) Armored Self-propelled Artillery Regiments
- Two (2) Nebelwerfer Regiments
- Two (2) Schnelle Brigades
- One or more Mobile Heavy artillery Regiments

c. Political Situation.

The survival of the Nazi regime dictates the prevention of invasion of Germany, which, in turn, means determined resistance to our landings in France. Politically, the German hope for victory has dwindled into desire for stalemate.

and only by a deadlock does the Nazi believe he can maintain his position. In order to bring about a stalemate the invasion force must be met with such force that it is entirely repelled or is so costly in men and material that political pressure in the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN will force a compromise with Germany.

The political situation among the Normans resembles conditions elsewhere in France--a dislike directed against the Germans and their Vichy puppets. The large majority of the Normans belong to the group of active or passive Resisters who oppose the Nazi and Vichy; a small group is Collaborationist; and a smaller group is indifferent. The overall political situation in Normandy favors the British-American-French liberating forces, particularly de Gaulle. The Resisters in Normandy, with the exception of a few more courageous ones, will probably delay action until they are certain the invasion will be successful, and the continuance of their support will be dependant on the immediate aid given them by the Allies. There may be a temporary fight for power among the various resistance groups which may create a major problem for the invading forces.

Evacuation in Normandy has reached about 12% with heavier population decline in coastal and port areas. The civilian population of CHERBOURG has declined from 30,000 to 10,000. In a zone of five to fifteen miles inland from the coast, free access is forbidden. Todt Organization workers, railway personnel, and others working for the Germans are, however, allowed to enter the zone upon proper identification. The zone in which our landings will be made has been partially evacuated since 1941. The Germans have established a military administrative system which functions side by side with the German Army Group West. Strict supervision of the French is maintained by means of a thorough system of area and sub-area administrative headquarters.

d. Obstacles. (See overprinted defense map to be issued).

Underwater obstacles continue to appear on the assault beaches, and it is believed that the enemy will complete lines of hedgehogs, Element "C" tetrahedron, or wooden stakes, just below high water, at the mean water line, and at the low water line. It is estimated that these obstacles will be maintained against sea damage and continually strengthened. Photography shows that in some cases these obstacles are mined, and a line of unidentified objects, possibly mines, has appeared to the seaward of single rows of hedgehogs and between double rows of hedgehogs in the vicinity of LES DUNES DE VARREVILLE.

Mines half submerged at low water 400 - 500 yards offshore have been reported in the UTAH area.

Anti-air landing obstacles have appeared in the low lying ground North and East of CARANTAN and the area bounded roughly by CAP LEVY CRASVILLE, QUETTEOU and the northeast coast of the COTENTIN. The obstacles consist of ditches and posts, irregularly staggered with an average spacing between posts of 50 yards. A flat open upland one mile south of BEAUMONT HAGUE has been trenched as a precaution against air landings.

Inundations behind the UTAH beaches continue to be maintained at an average depth of 3 to 4 feet with possible drop-offs up to 7 feet at ditches or streams.

e. Air.

Status of German Air Force in Western Europe as of 30 April 1944:
(Includes Western France, Eastern France and Belgium, Holland, North Germany
--North of 49°--Denmark and Norway)

Single engine Fighters	865
Twin engine Fighters	735
Fighter Bombers	30
Long Range Bombers	425
Reconnaissance	165

It should be noted that the enemy has been husbanding his long range bomber strength. It is estimated that the GAF are holding this weapon in reserve.

Annex 2a to FO 1, Hq 4 Inf Div, 15 May 44. Cont'd. Page No. 3 of 5 pages.

for use against shipping at invasion time. Sea-mining by aircraft of embarkation points and ferry routes is to be expected.

f. Secret Weapons.

Secret or novel weapons may be expected. Among these are the pilotless torpedo-carrying planes and heavy rockets. Inflammable liquids may be ignited on the surface of the inundations and possibly on the surface of the sea. The use of chemical warfare is a capability but there are no indications to date of its initiation.

g. Naval Forces.

It is estimated that the total number of light surface vessels likely to be used by the enemy against the assault is approximately as follows:

5 - 6 Destroyers
50 - 60 E-Boats
25 - 30 Minesweepers (M-class)
9 - 11 Torpedo Boats
50 - 60 R-Boats (Minesweepers)
150 - 200 Submarines
60 Miscellaneous local small craft.

In addition, the possibility of the heavy units of the German Fleet being able to evade the covering force and reach the Channel must not be discounted.

2. a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The enemy is capable of interfering with the assembly of our shipping and our embarkation by use of his heavy bombers (up to 300 planes at night) and by use of his long range rockets.

(2) The enemy is capable of interfering with our approach to the assault area by use of his coastal and railway guns, and by use of his air and naval forces.

(3) The enemy is capable of a rigid defense of the beaches, manning the crust of coastal fortifications and obstacles with the 709th Division, 17th Machine Gun Battalion, and various army and naval coast artillery and flank battalions.

(4) The enemy is capable of reinforcing the 709th Division in the assault area with the 243d Division, located in the LA HAYS LU PUIES--ST. LO area, and with the 352d Division located in the ST. LO--VIRE area by increasing the depth of his fortifications. This would constitute defense in depth of his coastal zone.

(5) The enemy is capable of attacking piecemeal our left flank in the vicinity of STE. MERE ECLISE by H-2, with a motorized battalion of infantry and artillery, and a battalion of the 919th Regiment and elements of the 243d Division, if the latter are not engaged in manning fortifications or engaged by the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions.

(6) The enemy is capable of delaying our advance by defending the low ridge north of MONTEBOURG with approximately two reinforced regimental combat teams mainly the 729th and 919th Infantry Regiments in hastily prepared positions.

(7) The enemy is capable of a strong defense in prepared positions on the plateau south of CHERBOURG with total forces approximately eight battalions of infantry as follows: Two battalions of 729th Infantry Regiment, one battalion of Naval troops, one battalion of the 729th Infantry Regiment from STE PIERRE ECLISE, CAF troops, and remnants of the 729th and 919th Infantry Regiments from the MONTEBOURG area. Artillery support for this defense will consist of 12 batteries of 155-mm guns, 2 batteries of 88-mm guns, and approximately 3 battalions of light artillery from the CHERBOURG--QUETTEROU area.

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The initial probable line of resistance will be on the slopes two or three miles North of VALOGNES, where a force of approximately five battalions may entrench to delay our advance before falling back to the prepared positions and bunkers on the plateau 4 to 5 miles south of CHERBOURG.

(8) The enemy is capable of reinforcing the garrison at CHERBOURG and establishing himself on the high ground south of CHERBOURG by sending part of his mobile reserve on the axis ABRANCHES-COUTANCES-VALOGNES.

(9) The enemy is capable of reinforcing the CHERBOURG garrison on D-day with airborne troops.

(10) The enemy is capable of landing troops on the high ground in the vicinity of La HAYS DU PUTS.

(11) The enemy is capable of using chemicals on the beach and subsequent to the assault.

(12) The enemy, after estimating the probable target areas, is capable of launching a full scale coordinated counterattack with motorized and armored units at any time after D+3.

b. Conclusions.

(1) The exercise of capabilities (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are of the highest probability.

(2) The exercise of capability (8) is regarded of high probability since logically our buildup cannot be as rapid as the enemy's until a port is secured. One or two divisions may well attempt to move through AVRANCHES-COUTANCES to VALOGNES for this purpose.

(3) The exercise of capabilities (9) and (10) is possible and of a fairly high order of probability. On D+1, 2,430 men could be lifted in Western Europe.

(4) The exercise of capability (1) is dependent on the effect of our bombing and fighter defense and the technical perfection of the enemy's secret weapons.

(5) The exercise of capability (12), which is a coordinated counter-attack, is regarded of less probability than piecemeal counterattack, initially.

(6) The exercise of capability (11) is problematical.

c. Discussion.

(1) By the disposition of the German divisions in the west, it is believed that the scheme of enemy maneuver is a rigid defense of the beachline backed up by mobile and powerful armored and motorized reserves. The consequences of successful invasion are dire enough to the Nazi to compel him to make an all-out effort to crush an assault on the Atlantic Wall. All available troops, land, naval and air, will be thrown into the assault areas, even at the expense of Atlantic coast sectors which will be stripped of reserves. His reinforcements are independent of the weather, unlike those of the assaulting forces, and unless delayed by air action and sabotage we cannot hope to equal his buildup even with fair weather. Moreover, his supply situation is assured by well diversified dumps with an estimated two months' supply of gasoline and rations and a year's supply of ammunition. It is believed that he will attack piecemeal wherever the assaulting forces are making progress with the hope of preventing them from gaining sufficient territory to establish landing strips. Although numerically superior in the air, we suffer greatly from the disadvantage of approximately 125 miles between fighter airfields and the assault area, and the large number of airfields available to the enemy.

Of the 1800 possible sorties over the NEPTUNE area, 150 fighter-bombers and 100 bomber missions may be expected against the beaches in the first

TOP SECRET BIGOT

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twenty-four hours. 350 long range bomber missions may be expected on shipping while the balance of the 1800 sorties, approximately 1200, will be fighter cover and fighter sweeps against our air. By D + 5 the number of enemy sorties is expected to decline to 1000 sorties per day if a Mediterranean assault is made. If a Mediterranean assault is not made, it will be D + 8 before that figure is reached.

c. Attacks by light surface naval forces are more likely to be made on ships in passage than on shipping offshore and they are likely to be confined to night or reduced visibility. Offshore raids by naval torpedo boats are, however, always a possibility when concentration of shipping presents a good target.

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Annex 2a to FO 1, Hq 4 Inf Div, 15 May 44. Cont'd. Page No. 5 of 5 pages.

twenty-four hours. 350 long range bomber missions may be expected on shipping while the balance of the 1800 sorties, approximately 1200, will be fighter cover and fighter sweeps against our air. By D+5 the number of enemy sorties is expected to decline to 1600 sorties per day if a Mediterranean assault is made. If a Mediterranean assault is not made, it will be D+8 before that figure is reached.

c. Attacks by light surface naval forces are more likely to be made on ships in passage than for shipping offshore and they are likely to be confined to night or reduced visibility. Offshore raids by naval torpedo boats are, however, always a possibility when concentration of shipping presents a good target.

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AFO 4, US Army
15 May 1944

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ANNEX #2b)
to
F. O. # 1)

ORDER OF BATTLE1. 709TH INFANTRY DIVISION. (Type: 3 Regiment, L. S.)

Division was formed in April 1941, for coastal defense. It was in the BRITANNY PENINSULA from November 1941 to early 1943 when it moved to the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. Personnel was originally of the older group, but may now have a contingent of younger battle-experienced men. It has a fairly large percentage of foreigners, mostly Georgians, Czechs, Alsations and Austrians. In October 1943, a third regiment of Georgian troops was added to the original composition, the 729th and 739th Infantry Regiments, in an effort to bring the division up to strength. A recent definite identification of the 919th Infantry Regiment in this area leads to the possibility that this regiment may be the third regiment and the Georgian Regiment merely a number of attached battalions. The 919th Infantry Regiment apparently became an independent regiment when its division, the 242d Infantry Division, left for the south of France.

The 729th Infantry Regiment defends the eastern side of the Peninsula from CAP LEVY, on the North, to LA GRAND VIEY, on the South by manning the coastal fortifications on the beaches. Covering the same area but immediately to the rear, from CARENTAN to CHERBOURG, the 919th Infantry Regiment is in position. To what extent this regiment is sharing the beach defenses with the 729th Infantry Regiment is not clear at this time. These regiments are supported by the Division Artillery with an additional Battalion of artillery in support of the beach defenses.

2. 243d INFANTRY DIVISION. (Type: 3 Regiment, L. S.)

This Division was formed in autumn 1943 in the REDON-VALINCES area where it remained until January 1944, when it moved into its present area. It may contain a cadre of veterans from the remnants of the 223d Division destroyed in Russia. The Division is composed of the 920th, 921st, and 922d Infantry Regiments supported by possibly a Regiment of Motorized Artillery. An additional Divisional Battalion of Russians may be found. Its role is probably to reinforce the 709th Infantry Division in depth and to man some of the beach fortifications on the West Coast.

3. 30 (?) LOBILE BRIGADE (SCHNELLE). (Type: 2 Regiment, Offensive.)

This Brigade was formed toward the end of 1943. Its composition is largely bicycle troops with self-propelled guns and antitank guns. A unit of this type may have two regiments of three to four battalions each, each battalion having two companies of bicycle troops, a 75-mm self-propelled company and a 75-mm antitank company.

4. 716TH INFANTRY DIVISION. (Type: 3 Regiment, L. S.)

This Division was formed in April 1941, for Coastal defense. It is supposed to contain about 40 % foreigners; Poles, Czechs and Georgians. There may be two Divisional Russian Battalions attached to the Division. The Division is composed of the 726th and 736th Infantry Regiments, and one possibly Georgian Regiment; also the 656th Artillery Regiment.

5. 17TH MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

This battalion is reported at CARENTAN. It is believed that the personnel and the weapons of this battalion are parceled out to the units occupying the beach strongpoints.

6. ROCKET BATTALION OF REBELWAFERS.

An armored battalion of rocket projectors (Rebelwafers) of 64 to 72 75-mm self-propelled vehicles are attached to Corps troops located at ST. LO.

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Annex 2b to FO 1, Hq 4 Inf Div, 15 May 44. Cont'd. Page No. 2 of 6 pages.

The weapons and personnel of this unit may be parceled out over the PENINSULA.

7. **STRENGTH.** Besides the Divisional troops the Peninsula is garrisoned with the following troops:

a. North of the line CARENTAN--CARTERET.

- 3,000 Marine and Naval personnel (mostly in the CHERBOURG area)
- 5,000 AA personnel (Dispersed with AA installations throughout the Peninsula)
- 2,000 CA personnel (Manning coast artillery batteries; mostly on the Northern coast)
- 1,000 Airfield personnel
- 10,000 Organization "Tod" personnel. (This construction personnel may be put into the fighting lines if necessary)
- 5,000 Unidentified personnel
- 24,000

b. South of the line CARENTAN--CARTERET.

- 3,500 Corps troops (Mainly around ST LO; a large number administrative)
- 1,000 CA personnel
- 1,000 AA personnel
- 6,000 Unidentified personnel
- 11,500

8. **ARTILLERY.**

The following is a list of the medium and heavy artillery according to location and size:

a. Area GRANDCAMP--ISIGNY.

ST. PIERRE DU MONT (599954)	74 -	75-mm or 105-mm LCB u/c
GRANDCAMP (542936)	6 -	155-mm G (832 Army Coastal Bn)
	72 -	4 775-mm G H
MAISY (533918)	4 -	155-mm G
(521915)	4 -	75-mm G H
GEFOSSÉS (494906)	2 -	155-mm G
	76 -	75-mm G H
(505917)	2 -	105-mm G H

b. Area ISIGNY--CARENTAN.

12 - 88-mm or 105-mm AA/AT G
 72 - 280-mm Railway guns
 Some Mobile AA units

c. CARENTAN--MONTAUBOURG--ST. VAAST AREA.

LE GHD VÉY (446915)	2 -	75-mm G H
ST. MARTIN DE VAKREVILLE (441981)	2 -	155-mm G
(405980)	4 -	155-mm H
AZEVILLE (359023)	4 -	108-mm G H
(563017)	4 -	G u/c
CRISBECQ (368044)	6 -	155-mm G
(368041)	6 -	88-mm G
OZEVILLE (343067)	? 4 -	105-mm GH
COMMUNE (352012)	? 4 "	G Btry u/g
CHATEAU DE COURCY (361056)	-	LCB u/c
LESTRE (342102)	4 -	105 G H
MORSALINES (354139)	6 -	155-mm G
LA FOSSE (339138)	4 -	105-mm G H

d. NORTHWEST OF VALOGNES AREA.

Approximately 70 AA guns

e. QUETTEHOU AREA.

COIMBOY	(323174)	? 4	-	150-mm H u
TRONQUET	(341174)	? 4	- ?	150-mm H u
LA FISSETERIE	(343192)	4	-	150-mm G H? u
QUETTEHOU	(364168)	4	-	105-GH?
HAMEAU VALLETTE	(336197)	4	-	105-GH? u
QUETTEHOU	(363174)	? 4	-	105-mm GH u
QUETTEHOU	(358186)	4	-	150-mm? H u
ILE DE TATHOU	(418) 60	3	-	75-mm GH
LA FERNELLE	(366200)	4	- ?	170-mm G
LICKMONT	(378204)	4	-	150-mm H
LA FROIDE RUE	(398204)	4	- ?	LCB u/c u
BARFLEUR	(394228)	4	-	170-mm ?

f. ST. PIERRE EGLISE AREA.

GATEVILLE	(392277)	6	-	155-mm G (375th Army Coastal Bn)
P.L. DE NEVILLE	(354291)	3	-	150-mm G (260 Navy Coastal Bn)
LES SENS	(305278)	4	-	105-mm G H
VAROUVILLE	(329267)	6	- ?	105-mm GH
ST. PIERRE EGLISE		14	- 18	Heavy AA guns
		10	-	75-mm G H

g. CHERBOURG AREA.

VAL BOUROIN	(258279)	4	-	105-mm G H
CHERLEVILLE	(259267)		-	LBC u/c
DIGOSVILLE	(205220)	4	-	105-mm ?
LE CAPELAIN	(189238)	4	-	164-mm? G
FORT DES FLAMANDS	(173245)	2	-	75-mm ? GH
ARSENAL	(128253)		-	LBC
LES LANDES	(246264)	4	-	170-mm ? G (260 Navy Coastal Bn)
FERMANVILLE	(265267)	4	-	210 or 240 G (260 Navy Coastal Bn)
	(265267)	6	-	88-mm G
EQUEURDEVILLE	(112249)	8	-	155-mm ? G
FT. CHAVAGNAC	(111256)	4	- ?	100-mm G
LA RIVIERE	(080263)	4	-	150-mm ? G
MACQUEVILLE	(070267)	4	-	Casemated G u/c
GRUCHY	(031281)		-	LBC u/c
CHERBOURG	(123247)	? 4	-	280-mm Railway G ? (turntables only)
S of CHERBOURG		75	-	88-mm AA AT G

h. CAP DE LA HAGUE AREA.

LES BAS	(937325)	4	-	105-mm ?
AUDERVILLE	(916324)	6	-	105-mm G
BRANVILLE	(016247)		-	LBC u/c
HIVILLE	(993223)	4	-	150-mm ?

i. WEST COAST.

CAP DE FLAMANVILLE	(948123)	4	-	Casemated G Btry
LES FLEUX	(049033)	? 2	-	75 or 105-mm ?
BRICQUEBECQ	(122066)	4	-	75 or 105?
CARTERET	(050947)	2	- ?	240-mm RR G (turntables only)
	(995043)	4	-	150-mm ? G ? only

NOTE: Legend: GH - Gun Howitzers u - Unoccupied
 H - Howitzers † - Possible or unconfirmed
 G - Gun LCB - Light Casemate Battery
 u/o - Under Construction MCB - Medium Casemate Battery
 LCB - Light Battery Coastal

9. MOBILE RESERVES AND RATE OF REINFORCEMENT.

a. D-day.

(1) 352d Infantry Division. (Type: 3 Regiment, Field)

ST. LO--VIRE area; Headquarters CANISY. New Division thought to contain the 914th, 915th, 916th Infantry Regiments of the two battalion type. It may have a cadre of veterans of the 383d Division badly mauled in Russia. It probably has a Russian Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion attached.

Road distance to CARENTAN: Approximately 45 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 4 1/2 hours after order to move.

(2) 30 (?) MOBILE BRIGADE. (Schnelle).

COUTANCES--ST. LO--CERENCES area; Headquarters COUTANCES.

Road distance to CARENTAN: Approximately 50 miles.
 ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE: Approximately 55 miles

Arrival of leading elements: 5 hours after order to move.

(3) 21st Panzer Division.

FONTAISON--AVRANCHES--FOUGERES--FLOERHEL--PLELAN. Headquarters: REHNES.

Considered full strength with considerable non-German elements. The Division may have an assault gun battalion and an additional AA/AT Regiment attached.

Road distance to CARENTAN: Approximately 90 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 10 hours after the order to move.

(4) SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend.

BERNAY--EVREUX--DREUX--ARCONTAN. Headquarters: ?

Newly formed division containing personnel below 20 years of age. This division contains some foreign elements, namely Poles and Lithuanians but these are in a minority. Cadre are veterans from Russia. It is thought to contain the 12 SS Panzer Regiment, the 25 and 26 SS Motorized Infantry Regiments and the 12 SS artillery Regiment. Thought to be completely up to strength.

Road distance to CARENTAN: Approximately 140 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 11 hours after order to move.

(5) 179th Panzer Training Division.

Headquarters: MANRES.

This division moved recently from the REHNES area. It has received new tank shipments and is now believed to be able to furnish two tank battalions of fairly good tanks.

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 CARENTAN:

Road distance to / approximately 155 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 15 hours after order to move.

(6) 3d Parachute Division.

HUELGOAT--CHATEAUNEUF--Le PAOU area.

/ totalling

Two regiments / six battalions of 8,000 men in this area. If these regiments are dropped by parachute they could arrive on D-day. If they are employed as infantry, however, they would arrive on D / 2.

b. D / 1.

17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division--"GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN"

THOUARS--FOITIERE area. Headquarters: THOUARS.

This is one of the youngest SS Divisions, but may have drafts from the experienced SS Wiking incorporated. This division may possibly have three tank battalions instead of two and an attached assault Gun Battalion.

Rail distance FLERS--LEZIDON: 170-215 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 40 hours.

Road distance to PERLES--CARENTAN: 200 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 27 - 30 hours.

c. D / 2.

(1) 353d Infantry Division.

RODARX--St. BRICUC area. Headquarters: HUELGOAT (?)

This three-regiment six-battalion division holds a small coastal sector, but may be mainly held as a mobile reserve.

Road distance to PERLES--CARENTAN: 170 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 60 hours.

Rail distance to FOLLIGNY--VIRE: 190 - 215 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 39 hours.

(2) 2d Panzer Division.

Headquarters: AMIENS.

This Division is considered up to full strength. It has had considerable battle experience in Russia where it was badly mauled. It is now being reconstituted, and has received recent tank shipments.

Road distance to CAEN: 200 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 17 hours after order.

Rail distance to LISIEUX: 125 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: 24 hours.

(3) 273d Panzer Training Division.

Headquarters: BORDENNE.

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The strength of this training unit is estimated at a regiment of tanks, half old and half new models, totalling 160 tanks. The personnel includes Austrians.

d. D/3.

(1) 2d SS Panzer Division--"DESS REICH".

Probably in the TOULOUSE area.

This is one of the most competent of the SS Divisions. The division suffered heavy losses in Russia and now is reforming. It is not considered up to strength.

Distance to PERIERS--CARSTAN: 230 miles.

Arrival of leading elements: Approximately 72 hours.

(2) 155th Panzer Training Division.

Headquarters: NICES.

The strength of this division is estimated at one Regiment of tanks, old French and German models and new Mark V or VI tanks, totalling 120 tanks.

Distance to C RENNAN: 480 miles.


Arrival of leading elements: Approximately 72 hours.

(3) Small units affecting the defense of the area;

210th Assault Gun Battalion in or near RENNES.

190th Tank Battalion in ST. LO. May be GHQ Tiger tank unit.

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AFC 4, US ARMY
14 May 1944

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ANNEX #2c)

F. O. #1)

TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN AND WEATHER

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the terrain and weather of the COTENTIN PENINSULA as it affects the 4th Infantry Division plan of operations.

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA.

a. Drainage System.

The principal rivers are the DIVETTE in the NORTH at CHERBOURG, the SAIRE in the NORTHEAST, the SINOPE on the east coast at QUINEVILLE, the MERDERET in the EAST central section, the DOUVE in the WEST central section, and the TAUTS in the SOUTHERN section near CARENTAN. The DOUVE RIVER drains the major portion of the COTENTIN PENINSULA flowing SOUTH and EAST to the BANCs DU GRANDE VEY. The central and SOUTHEASTERN portion of the PENINSULA contains many small tributaries and drainage canals.

b. Ridge System.

The northern region of the COTENTIN PENINSULA consists of a semi-circle of high ground which backs the CHERBOURG area and which extends westward to the high granite ledge of the CAP de la HAGUE PENINSULA and eastward to the rolling plateau of BARFLEUR. Its irregular coast line is characterized by numerous inlets, bays, and high cliffs. The steep-sided hills in the region rise to an elevation of 500 feet in which there are frequent bare rock outcroppings and flat bottomed valleys. The semi-circle of high ground drops off sharply to the coastal basin in which the city of CHERBOURG is located, and almost as abruptly on the east and south to a low rolling plain.

The southeast section of COTENTIN between VALOGNES and CARENTAN consists of a low marshy coastal plain which extends inland to the lowlying hills bordering the west coast. Along the east coast is a border of lowlying meadow land several miles wide which is now partially inundated. Elevations in the area rise to approximately 150 feet. Settlements consist of scattered buildings along the coast road and in small villages on the landward side of the marsh. Across the neck of the peninsula lies the plain of CARENTAN extending toward LESSAY. This plain is flat and marshy and liable to extensive flooding. Toward the west coast the country of this region becomes undulating in character and contains numerous isolated hills, of which the principal are in the area around LA HAYE du PUIIS.

The rivers DOUVE, MERDERET and their tributaries are sluggish and meandering, flowing through broad valleys. The valleys of the DIVETTE and the TROTEBEC and smaller streams are steep-sloped and wooded. The valley of the SAIRE is a very fertile cultivated strip.

Hedged pastures and mixed agriculture with many small orchards are common in this entire area. Around the upper DOUVE and northwest of VALOGNES the country is almost one continuous orchard, principally apple and cherry trees. The high elevations are occupied by patches of forests of rough pasture land.

c. Routes.

- (1) General. An excellent network of good roads is available.

RESTRICTED

however, for extremely heavy traffic, covers the entire area. These roads have been extensively developed to serve rural-marketing type of traffic, and not for heavy industrial loads, for which there is little need in the area. Four main first class arteries traverse the area from North to South of the PENINSULA: one from CHERBOURG to CARENTAN, East to Paris, one from CHERBOURG to BRICQUEBEC to LA HAYS DU PUIITS, and one road from CHERBOURG via LES FIEUX and BARNEVILLE to LA HAYS DU PUIITS. There is a good coastal road which runs from BARFLEUR through QUETHOU to CARENTAN. The first class and the secondary roads are usually of macadam or tarvia surface, and the tertiary roads are usually surfaced with water bound macadam, granite chips or gravel.

(2) Classification. The main roads are at least twenty feet wide, with grades not exceeding seven percent except for short distances. The bridge along these roads will generally carry a class 40 load, and the surfacing is adequate for divisional loads. The secondary roads are generally two-way roads with tar or water bound macadam surfaces also capable of carrying divisional loads, but some of the bridges may require reinforcement. Secondary and tertiary roads are often steep for short distances, especially where leaving a stream valley, and sharp turns are not uncommon.

(3) Condition. Most of the roads in the area were well maintained until the outbreak of the war in 1939. Since then, only the priority routes, for enemy military needs have had first class maintenance. In view of short ages in manpower and surfacing materials, maintenance of other roads has probably been seriously neglected. All of the roads are apt to have a high camber with deep ditches. The edges of the metalled surfaces are often thin.

(4) Critical Points. The extensive water meadow and swamp area at the base of the COTENTIN PENINSULA limits ingress and egress to the main highways running along the East and West coasts. The limited areas where these roads traverse or skirt the flooded areas are critical and provide an easily defended line. Wherever the highways pass through the main towns of the area, narrow city streets usually constitute bottlenecks for through traffic.

(5) Railroads. There is one main double track railroad line running from CHERBOURG to CARENTAN. There are single track standard gauge lines spurring from this line to ST. LERE-EGLISE, QUETHOU, BARFLEUR, LA HAYS DU PUIITS, BARNEVILLE, and BRICQUEBEC. The principal lines have a maximum gradient of one percent. All standard gauge lines can handle a maximum axle load of approximately sixteen long tons.

d. General Nature of the Terrain. This area is located at the transition between the chalk plateau of the PARIS BASIN and the rugged hilly bocage-type country of western NORMANDY and BRITAINY. The rolling lowland areas near the coast are moderately fertile and devoted to orchards, pasturage, and cultivation. The river bottom, including some drained water meadows, which, with undrained swampland, are known as "maroageuses", are extremely fertile and are in cultivation or pasturage. The hilly country to the southwest and northwest is of the bocage type, with steep hills, gorges, and poor pastures intermingled with heathland and wooded areas. The hilly north area of COTENTIN PENINSULA is based on hard and crystalline rock with a thin unfertile gritty soil, with some sandstone, limestone, and conglomerates to the east which weather to a more fertile and easily worked soil. The northern and western areas are rugged with open relief and rocky cliffs. The western part of the PENINSULA is composed of sandstone with a thin soil. The eastern region is composed of soft clays and alluvia with a deep, often marshy soil of the maroageuse type.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

a. Ports. There are three ports on the COTENTIN PENINSULA; CHERBOURG, ST. VAAST LA HAUGUE, and CARENTAN. Of these Ports only CHERBOURG can berth ocean-going vessels of draft greater than 20 feet at all stages of the tide.

Annex 2c to FO-1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 14 May 44. Cont'd. Page No. 3 of 6 pages.

b. Waterways. Waterways play a minor role in the transportation and communication system.

(1) RIVER DOUVE. The RIVER DOUVE is connected by the lock and dam of LA BARQUETTE (388669), to the CARENTAN CHANNEL. This allows tidal water to flow up the DOUVE, under careful control, in order to maintain the depth of water upstream at a minimum of 3 feet 3 inches. Thus the river is navigable for 18 ton barges, 55 to 59 feet long by 12 feet wide as far upstream as ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (1994). Between LA BARQUETTE and ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE there are no locks and the rise in the bed of the river is therefore slight. The width varies from 50 to 100 feet. LA BARQUETTE lock and dam form the main control point. This consists of a lock 125 feet wide against the right bank. From this lock extending across to the left bank there is a dam formed by a footbridge with 6 sluices under it. Subsidiary control points are the locks at HAUT DYCK (401860) and CARENTAN (401848) which link the BASSIN A FLOT with the DOUVE and LAUTE CANAL respectively. If the LA BARQUETTE locks and dam were destroyed the RIVER DOUVE would be tidal as far as L' ISLE MARIE (3291) and the water level affected as far upstream as EPIEVILLE (2892). In this case flooding would be more erratic, greater in winter but unlikely in summer. This river passes through an extensive swamp and water meadow area which precludes access to the PENINSULA except along established viaduct routes on the east and a narrow strip along the west coast. The banks are generally low, backed by low meadows crisscrossed with drainage ditches. Photographs show that banks are 4 feet high in the areas (3886) and (3687). Between BEUZEVILLE BASTILLE (3091) and ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE, the banks are higher, generally 6 to 8 feet. From the sea to ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (1994) the RIVER DOUVE is a tank obstacle. The limited number of crossings over it makes it a good defensive line.

c. Obstacles.

(1) General. Because of many small streams with marshy bottomland, the presence of inundatable area, the prevalence of ditched roads and hedged fields, and cliffs or steep escarpments at or near the shoreline, movement in this area is difficult. In those localities where shore obstacles are surmountable, and particularly in the southeast coastal region, the area immediately inland is relatively open, although some low hedges and orchards occur. At the junction of the RIVERS DOUVE and LADEDET in the south midlands to CARENTAN and thence generally east of CARENTAN to the sea is a swampy course which constitutes a major obstacle.

(2) Rivers as Obstacles. All streams in this area flow in relatively deep narrow valleys in their upper reaches, are rather deeply entrenched in their middle reaches, and broaden out into flat bottom lands and water meadows near their mouths. Where the streams traverse the granite ridges near their sources, they have narrow, twisting, canyon-type valleys. Movement along these valleys will be largely restricted to the valley roads. The rivers themselves are not generally sufficiently wide to present insurmountable or difficult obstacles, but the swamplands of their lower reaches, especially when inundated, restrict movement to established routes.

(3) Inundated Areas. An extensive area in the eastern portion of the PENINSULA from BANCS DU GRAND VEY north to QUINEVILLE (375080) parallel to the beach has been subjected to shallow flooding of the type that is especially obstructive to movement. This flooding is controlled by artificial barriers which block seven or eight stream exits about fifty yards to the rear of the beach. The result is a wide, marshy or shallow flooded area which is difficult to bridge, and travel is restricted to established routes (causeways) which can easily be obstructed by blocks or demolitions. This has also caused the flooding or complete saturation of the soil for a width of approximately two miles inland. These causeways clear the flooded area by approximately one foot in elevation, but increasing the stream obstructions would flood the roads, although probably not sufficiently deep to preclude their use. Travel off the established routes will be impracticable except for foot troops. Reduction of the barriers would result in lowering the flooded waters, but the open country would probably remain semi-saturated for a long period of time.

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Annex 2c to FO 1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 14 May 44. Cont'd. Page 4 of 6 pages.

(a) There is an extensive flooded area along the lower reaches of the DOUVE RIVER where natural flooding is supplemented by extensive swamps and marécageuse. This area effectively isolates the COTENTIN PENINSULA, movement along the east side being effectively blocked except for one or two viaduct roads. This presents a serious obstruction to travel in and out of the PENINSULA, and a defensive line either to the north or south could be relatively easily defended. Flood levels may be artificially controlled by the partial blocking of the sluices and locks at LA BARQUETTE, just above CARENTAN. The roads and railroads traversing the area have a clearance of about three feet above flood level.

d. Concealment and Cover.

(1) Concealment and cover is only fair in the north and eastern coastal regions, but is excellent in the major portion of the area to the south and west, where the bocage type country abounds, with its rugged terrain, hedgerows, and predominance of woodland. Even on the poor soil which supports only heath type vegetation, small trees and copses are present in sufficient quantities to provide good cover. Near the villages, the stone houses and walls provide some cover even in the coastal lowland areas. The roads are usually so closely hedged that maneuvering off the road for cover is difficult. In addition, the roads are frequently sunk below the level of the surrounding countryside, or so deeply ditched that deployment is severely handicapped. However, motor columns on roads may be vulnerable because of the many ditches and embankments to prevent their being pulled off the road.

(2) (a) With the frequency of wooded areas and hedges, and the uniform type of country, satisfactory camouflage should be accomplished rather easily.

(b) The farm patchwork effect varies in coloring with the season of the year, being brown earth color in winter; light green in spring and summer; and yellow brown in fall. The texture also varies with the season, as well as with the type crops grown.

(c) The trees and hedges are generally green in summer, and gray in winter. Forests of deciduous oak and beech on the upland areas are light green in summer and bare in winter. The many apple and cherry orchards are blotches of pink and white in the spring, and at all times present the usual checkerboard pattern, with the exception that some are in various states of decadence, destroying to some extent the typical pattern.

e. Observation. For the major portion of the area, observation is poor because of the predominance of high hawthorn on hedges, orchards or checkerboard woodland sections, narrow curving stream valleys with steep sides, sand dunes and the broken, rocky and wooded nature of the country in the south central area. Observation is good only along the shore in the northeastern sector where bluffs provide vantage points. However, the enemy holds the high ground thus enabling better observation.

f. Fields of Fire past the beach areas are not favorable except in the areas of inundation past the sand dunes along UTAH BEACH and in the lower reaches of the DOUVE RIVER in the MARECAGEUSES area. Although the terrain in these areas is generally flat the fields of fire will be somewhat obstructed by the many hedgerows and beach hedges. Fields of fire in the North and western portion of the PENINSULA are obstructed by narrow curving streams and valleys.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES.

a. CARENTAN - LA BARQUETTE area.

Annex 20 to FO 1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 14 May 44. Cont'd. Page 5 of 6 pages.

This area controls the water level in the swampy areas along the DOUVE and MERDET RIVERS. It is also the key point in the east for passage into or out of the PENINSULA.

- b. Inundated areas of the DOUVE, especially behind the east coast.
- c. The low ridge running east of VALOGNES and north of MONTEBOURG.
- d. The communication center of VALOGNES.
- e. The high ground between VALOGNES and CHARBOURG.
- f. High ground between ST. LO D'OURVILLE and ST. SAUVEUR DE PIERRE PONT. Through this area passes the only other land route along which troops could be moved into or out of the PENINSULA.
- g. Inundated areas between QUINEVILLE and POUPEVILLE.

These seriously restrict the exploitation of an initial landing along the coast proper by channelizing the advance from the beachhead and the supply routes through it; they facilitate onmy defense and counteraction.

h. VALOGNES.

A key rail and road center in the middle of the PENINSULA.

1. In addition, the two spurs of high ground at (1620) and (1921) while not critical, provide possible terrestrial observation of CHARBOURG.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN.

The terrain requires that the areas CARENTAN - LA BARQUETTE and ST. LO D'OURVILLE - ST. SAUVEUR DE PIERRE PONT be quickly seized and held to isolate the peninsula. Special measures must be taken to move troops and supplies rapidly over or around the inundated area between QUINEVILLE and POUPEVILLE during the initial stages of the operation. Thereafter, the physical conformation of the PENINSULA provides two advantageous routes of advance, following ridgelines, from the beachhead area to CHARBOURG, one to the northwest via VALOGNES directly across the PENINSULA and one to the north and west nearer the coast line.

The many small hedged and banked fields, pastures and orchards which dominate this terrain favor the defense. In these compartments, automatic weapons in the hands of a determined defender, aided by mined approaches can force deployment of much larger forces. Night operations will be hampered by a lack of landmarks and the general "chopped up" nature of the terrain. From the moment troops touchdown until they reach the heights which engulf CHARBOURG they are fighting uphill.

6. WEATHER CONDITIONS.

a. General. Climatic conditions on the COTENTIN PENINSULA are variable, good and bad weather being experienced during all seasons, however the climate of this region may be described as moist and temperate. Gales occur on the average of 25 - 30 days a year in this part of the channel coast while quiet spells are rare and are generally forerunners of bad weather conditions. Under disturbed conditions, moist southwesterly winds often bring low clouds and sea fog. The period of greatest cloud and fog is during late autumn and winter. The prevailing winds are southwesterly.

b. RAIN.

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Annex 2c to FO 1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 14 May 44. Cont'd. Page 6 of 6 pages.

There is no marked rainy season on the COSENTIN PENINSULA. Annual rainfall is 30 - 40 inches with 126 - 175 rainy days during the year. The ground is likely to be soft after prolonged rainy periods, especially in the low-lying areas. During May, June, and July less rainfall, fewer rainy days, and cooler temperatures are experienced than, for the same period, at Norfolk, Va.

c. FOG.

Fogs are common in the area particularly in autumn and winter. Sea fog may occur in all seasons but is more prevalent in summer. Land fogs never occur when the wind exceeds six knots. CHARBOURG averages 14 days of fog a year.

d. CLOUDS.

The frequency of low clouds inland increases with height of the ground. Seventy-five per cent of the time cloud level is 4,000 feet, or lower.

e. TEMPERATURES.

The following are the maximum and minimum temperatures recorded during the period 1926 - 1935:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
May	78	36
June	80	46
July	84	46

TOP SECRET
BIGOT

NESTUNE

D-DAY 0800 DAWN
1900 MOON
DUSK

D-DAY 0800 DAWN
1900 MOON
DUSK

D-DAY 1400 FIRST LIGHT
2000 DUSK

D-DAY 0800 DAWN
1900 MOON
DUSK

RECONNAISSANCE

MIS-1015

MINNY 1000

H44 40 1000

MARKS 1000

SHE-FAB 1000

SCALE 1:250,000

COPY NO. 20

2B

176

300

3A7

1A


NOTE

() DENOTES AREAS PHOTO-
FLASHED NIGHTLY,
WEATHER PERMITTING

3B

RECONNAISSANCE

TOP SECRET
BIGOT



ANNEX 2e TO

TOP SECRET BIGOT
NEPTUNE

FO #1

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE
MISSIONS


HQ. 4TH INF. DIV. APO #

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


ANNEX 2e TO
FO #1

FLOWN TODAY
SONCAL OR IF
PROBE SLOW

TOP SECRET BIGOT

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TOP - SECRET - BIGOT

NEPTUNE

Copy No. 20 of 125 Copies

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

: : : : :
: TOP SECRET :
: Auth: CG Inf Div :
: Initials: AS :
: Date: 12 MAY 1944 :
: : : : :

12 May 1944

ANNEX NO. 3 TO FIELD ORDER NO. 1.

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

TROOP LIST

RESTRICTED

TOP - SECRET - BIGOT

TROOP LIST4TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND ATTACHED UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>
<u>4TH INF DIV</u>		
Hq 4th Inf Div	218	50
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div		
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div		
(atchd Ch, Med, & Band)		
8th Inf		
1st Bn	968	59
2d Bn	976	66
3d Bn	835	55
Hq & Serv Elements	607	111
12th Inf		
1st Bn	848	51
2d Bn	848	51
3d Bn	848	51
Hq & Serv Elements	590	112
22d Inf		
1st Bn	825	62
2d Bn	818	62
3d Bn	844	65
Hq & Serv Elements	721	117
Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty	120	34
20th FA Bn	498	108
29th FA Bn	475	105
42d FA Bn	488	106
44th FA Bn	512	116
4th Engr Combat Bn	656	94
4th Med Bn	464	84
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div	104	18
704th Ord L Maint Co	170	43
4th QM Co	208	87
4th Ren Tr, Mecc	129	38
4th Sig Co	230	55
<u>TOTAL 4TH INF DIV</u>	<u>14,000</u>	<u>1800</u>

TOP - SECRET - BIGOT

TROOP LIST (Cont'd)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>
6th Armd Gp		
Hq & Hq Co	37	7
65th Armd FA Bn	451	125
70th Tank Bn DD (less Co D)	530	125
746th Tank Bn	493	126
87th Cml Bn (Mts)	425	64
Cos A & C 237th Engr Combat Bn	283	4
1106th Engr Gp		
Hq & Hq Co	80	19
49th Engr Combat Bn	515	48
237th Engr Combat Bn (less Cos A & C)	16	8
Co B, 299th Engr Combat Bn	113	0
238th Engr Combat Bn	515	48
582d Engr Dump Trk Co	115	52
991st Engr Treadway Bridge Co	115	57
Det 612th Engr L Equipment Co	21	9
Btry A, (reinforced) 13th FA Obsn Bn (F & S)	197	29
Btry B, 980th FA Bn	100	20
1st Platoon, 603d QM Co (GR)	* (26)	(3)
Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co	9	3
CIC Det	* (16)	(4)
Order of Battle Unit #2	* (6)	(2)
IPW Team #34	* (6)	(3)
IPW Team #16	* (6)	(4)
IPW Team #35	* (6)	(3)
PI Team #31	* (6)	(2)
MI Team #417	* (6)	(2)
Two (2) Air Support Parties	* (8)	(3)
Ten (10) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties	*(105)	(10)
Five (5) Navy Liaison Officers	* (5)	(5)
TOTAL ATTACHED UNITS	4015	744

Note: * - Figures in parenthesis have been included in totals of units to which attached.

TOP - SECRET - BIGOT

COMPOSITION OF FORCES

CT 8

8th Inf
3d Bn 22d Inf (reinforced)
Naval Shore Fire Control Party No. 9
1st Platoon Co A 746th Tank Bn
Co D 87th Cml Bn (Mtz)
1st Platoon Co C, 4th Engr Combat Bn
29th FA Bn
65th Armd FA Bn
70th Tank Bn DD (less Co D)
87th Cml Bn (Mtz) (less Co D)
Co A, 237th Engr Combat Bn
Co C, 237th Engr Combat Bn
Det Co A, 4th Med Bn
Three (3) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties (Nos 1, 2, & 3).
One (1) Air Support Party
IPW Team #34
Det 4th Sig Co
3d Platoon, Co A, 4th Engr Combat Bn

CT 12

12th Inf
Three (3) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties (Nos 5, 6, & 8).
Det 4th Sig Co
IPW Team #16

CT 22

22d Inf (initially less 3d Bn, reinforced, atchd 8th Inf)
Two (2) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties (Nos 4 & 7).
IPW Team #35
Det 4th Sig Co

DIVISION TROOPS

Hq 4th Inf Div
Det G, 165th Sig Photo Co
CIC Det
MI Team #417
Order of Battle Unit #2
PI Team #31
One (1) Air Support Party
Hq Co, 4th Inf Div
Hq Sp Trs, 4th Inf Div
MP Platoon, 4th Inf Div

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COMPOSITION OF FORCES (Cont'd)

DIVISION TROOPS (Cont'd)

Hq & Hq Btry, 4th Div Arty
20th FA Bn
42d FA Bn
44th FA Bn
4th Engr Combat Bn
(less: 1st Platoon Co C, atchd to 3d Bn, 22d Inf)
3d Platoon Co A, atchd to 8th Inf)
4th Med Bn
(less Det Co A, atchd to 8th Inf)
4th Rcn Tr, Mccs
4th QM Co
1st Platoon 603d QM Co (GR) atchd to 4th QM Co
704th Ord L Maint Co
4th Sig Co
Ten (1) Naval Shore Fire Control Parties
1 - atchd to 8th Inf
2 - atchd to 8th Inf
3 - atchd to 8th Inf
4 - atchd to 22d Inf
5 - atchd to 12th Inf
6 - atchd to 12th Inf
7 - atchd to 22d Inf
8 - atchd to 12th Inf
9 - atchd to 22d Inf
10 - atchd to Hq, 4th Div Arty
Btry B, 980th FA Bn
Btry A, (reinforced) 13th FA Oben Bn (F & S)
1106th Engr Combat Gp
49th Engr Combat Bn
237th Engr Combat Gp (less Cos A & C atchd to 8th Inf)
Co B, 299th Engr Combat Bn
238th Engr Combat Bn
582d Engr Dump Trk Co
991st Engr Treadway Bridge Co
Det 612th Engr L Equipment Co
6th Armi Gp
Hq & Hq Co
746th Tank Bn (less 1st Platoon Co A atchd to 3d Bn 22d Inf)

BARTON
CG

Bryant

BRYANT
G-1

TOP - SECRET - BIGOT

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>Officer, Section or Unit</u>	<u>Copy Nos.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Copy Nos.</u>
CG	1	6th Armd Gp	56
Asst Div Comdr	2	70th Tank Bn	57
" " "	3	746th Tank Bn	58
C/S	4	377th AAA (AW) Bn	59
G-1	5	65th Armd FA Bn	60
G-2	6-8	801st TD Bn	61
G-3	9-13	87th Cnl Bn (Mts)	62
G-4	14-15	1106th Engr Gp	63-66
AG	16-17	VII Corps Hq	67-76
IG	18	Gp 2 11th Amph	77-81
Surf	19	1st Inf Div	82
GWS	20-21	101st A/B Div	83-84
Sig O	22	82d A/B Div	85-86
QM O	23-24	29th Inf Div	87
Ord O	25-26	90th Inf Div	88-89
CAO	27	CT 359	90-91
Air Support O	28	9th Air Tactical Comd	92
8th Inf	29-33	1st ESB	93-96
12th Inf	34-38	Btry "A" 13th FOB	97
22d Inf	39-43	Btry "B" 980th FA Bn	98
Hq & Hq Btry 4th Div Arty	44-45	Div Ln O	99-101
20th FA Bn	46	Top Secret Control Office for	
29th FA Bn	47	further distribution	102-124
42d FA Bn	48	File	125
44th FA Bn	49		
4th Engr Combat Bn	50		
4th Med Bn	51		
4th Sig Co	52		
4th Ron Tr, Meccs	53		
Hq Sp Trs 4th Inf Div	54		
MP Platoon 4th Inf Div	55		

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TOP - SECRET - BIGOT

TOP SECRET - BIGOT

NEPTUNE

SECRET

Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div.

Initials: *M/L*

Date: 16 May 1944.

Copy 20 of 125
Page 1 of 7 pages.

HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, US ARMY
15 May 1944

ANNEX #4 to FC #1

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

1. Supply.

a. Rations.

(1) Each individual will carry one (1) type "K" and one (1) type "D" ration. These rations are not to be consumed until after landing.

(2) One (1) type "Q" ration per individual will be carried on unit transportation.

(3) Two (2) rations will be carried in Q train for division and attached troops.

(4) Men aboard ships will be rationed through the Navy. Packaged or canned rations will be available aboard LCT's and LCI(L)'s.

(5) The CO of troops aboard each ship and craft will supply the necessary cooks and KP's to supplement Navy personnel for feeding troops. cooks and KP's aboard LPA's and LSI(L)'s will not debark with assault troops but will land subsequently and join unit trains.

b. Water.

(1) All individuals will land with full canteen of water.

(2) Reserve supply consisting of one (1) gallon per man will be carried in 5-gallon cans on unit transportation. This constitutes initial water supply ashore.

(3) Water purification units will be established on shore. Water available from this source D / 1.

(4) All water for consumption by troops will be chlorinated or Halazone tablets will be used for purification of water which cannot be chlorinated.

c. Gasoline.

(1) All vehicles will land with full vehicular tanks, except motorcycles (which will be filled to not more than one-third capacity), and in addition will carry reserves specified below:

Trucks, 1-ton and 3/4-ton, C & R. - Two 5-gallon cans.

Other trucks 3/4-ton to truck, 1 1/2-ton - Five 5-gallon cans.

Trucks, 2 1/2-ton - Ten 5-gallon cans.

(2) All other wheeled vehicles will be loaded with sufficient gasoline for 150 operational miles, in addition to their filled gasoline tanks.

(3) In addition to the above reserve each vehicle, 3/4-ton or over, will carry one (1) additional 5-gallon can of gasoline. These cans will be removed from vehicles in beach assembly areas and assembled in dumps, the location of which will be reported to the A. C. of S. G-4, at 4th Infantry Division Beach Headquarters. This gasoline is for the exclusive use of full-track vehicles supplementing reserves brought in by units themselves.

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Annex #1 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 1944. (Cont'd).

(4) The maximum quantity of gasoline for half-track and full-track vehicles will be carried within the capacity of vehicles for which lift has been provided. This includes one complete oil change. These quantities may be carried on either these particular vehicles themselves or on accompanying organizational vehicles.

(5) Reserves on vehicles will constitute initial supply. Only emergency issues for vehicular use, and issues for power plants, will be made from beach dumps.

(6) Division Quartermaster will carry a reserves of 2,000 gallons on quartermaster train.

(7) When division gasoline DP is established, gasoline will be issued by exchange of empty cans or upon informal requisition.

(8) All gasoline and lubricants, except emergency issues, will be drawn through Division Quartermaster.

d. Ammunition.

(1) Ammunition to be carried by units;

(a) Basic load of ammunition will be carried by all units.

(b) All units will carry one (1) bandolier of ammunition in addition to ammunition in belt.

(c) Medium and heavy artillery will carry, in addition to basic load, five (5) U/F of primers and one (1) U/F of fuzes.

(d) Engineer; Electric and non-electric blasting caps sufficient for four (4) days' operations.

(e) Ammunition to be fired afloat - Requisitions have already been submitted for this ammunition. Copies of these requisitions will be furnished craft commanders who will check at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to loading with Area Ordnance Officer in the marshalling area to insure that this ammunition is delivered to them at the hard at the time of loading.

(2) Resupply of ammunition on Far-Shore.

(a) Initial dumps will be located in beach areas immediately behind both beaches and are expected to open by H + 16; for exact location contact 4th Infantry Division Beach Headquarters.

(b) Units will normally draw Class V supplies from ASP's upon presentation of transportation orders signed by the unit Munitions Officer or S-4, and bearing substantially the following certificate: "I certify that the items are (1) *required to refill this unit to its proper basic load, replacing ammunition expended in combat, or, (2) *being drawn in anticipation of future expenditures." *(Strike out one).

(c) Engineer explosives will be stacked in Ordnance Ammunition Supply Points. Transportation orders for Engineer Class V items must be approved by the Corps Engineer.

(d) Flame thrower refills and servicing will be available late D-day, vicinity Ordnance beach dumps. Empty nitrogen and hydrogen bottles and empty 5-gallon fuel cans, must be returned to dump to obtain refills.

(e) Toxic chemicals: No unit will receive, store, or expend any toxic or irritant agents in any form without specific authority. This authority will originate with the Supreme Command.

2. Evacuation.

a. Casualties.

(1) Afloat: Navy medical personnel will provide for treatment and hospitalization of all sick and wounded.

Annex A to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 1944, (Cont'd).

(2) Evacuation after landing;

(a) By units to beach installations of Navy and subsequently to Clearing Companies of 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

(b) Any and all type vehicles returning to the beach will be used for evacuation as needed.

b. Vehicles and Weapons -- Through normal channels to 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company. Information to Division Ordnance Officer.

c. Burials.

(1) In accordance with Memorandum No. 9, this headquarters, subject, "Graves Registration Procedure in Combat", dated 4 May 1944.

(2) Burials at designated cemeteries only.

(3) 1st Engineer Special Brigade will establish temporary cemeteries within their area for burial of casualties in beach area, and is charged with the responsibility for burial of all dead within the beach maintenance area.

(4) 4th Infantry Division cemetery will be established at EMONDEVILLE 3302, time to be announced.

d. Salvage.

(1) All salvage will be through normal supply channels.

(2) Waterproofing materials will be conserved to the maximum, depending on the tactical situation.

(3) Flame throwers used and discarded on the beach will be salvaged by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade and returned to chemical dumps in the beach maintenance area to be repaired and reissued. Flame throwers, kits, fuel filling, kits, service, and basic fillings of the Corps Engineer combat battalions not used on the beach will be turned into the CWS dump or depot for re-issuance to assault units on call. These flame throwers will form the only reserve stock for future operations.

(4) Contaminated Salvage. No contaminated salvage of any type will be mixed with uncontaminated salvage. Contaminated salvage will be marked to avoid casualties among handling details.

e. Captured Material.

(1) Captured material will be evacuated by supply agencies concerned. When such material exceeds the capacities of division agencies, report will be made to higher headquarters.

(2) Captured enemy stocks of gasoline will not be used until tested and authorized for use by Army Quartermaster Petroleum Testing Laboratory. Each captured dummy will be placed under guard by the capturing unit and its location reported to Division Quartermaster.

(3) (a) Captured chemical material thought to have intelligence value will be reported through G-2 channels for disposition.

(b) Captured chemical material having no intelligence value will be evacuated with other salvage to unit Class I dumps.

(c) No captured enemy chemical material will be destroyed except in cases of emergency or on authority of the Chemical Officer.

(4) Captured Engineer construction or fortification material may be utilized for immediate emergency use. Surplus material will be reported to Corps Engineer.

(5) Captured Ordnance material will be evacuated in the same manner and through the same channels as U. S. Ordnance material. Particular attention will be given to the evacuation of sighting equipment and optical instruments and the preservation of all accessories vital to the performance of the item. It is especially important that sighting and fire control equipment be plainly marked as to the weapon to which it applies.

(6) Enemy mines which have been removed from positions will not be salvaged. They will be piled in open fields for later disposition by Ordnance or Engineer personnel.

Annex #4 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 1944, (cont'd.)

3. Traffic.

- a. Vehicles will be driven on right side of the road on the continent.
- b. Reception and Assembly of Troops.

Each unit will send sufficient guides for all vehicles and personnel landing subsequent to assault phase to the 4th Infantry Division Beach Headquarters. These guides will arrive one (1) hour prior to scheduled landing and will assist in the direction of detachments to assembly areas (see Operations Overlay 1-a to FO #1, NEPTUNE) or to such other areas as may be designated at time of reporting. An agent familiar with the location and arrangement of each unit so assembled will immediately return to 4th Infantry Division Beach Headquarters.

c. Traffic Control.

(1) A central traffic control station will be established by the 4th Infantry Division Provost Marshal in conjunction with the Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, in vicinity of 4th Infantry Division Beach Headquarters.

(2) Officer traffic control posts will be established at main beach exits and at critical crossings as situation develops.

(3) Priority of movement in beach area will be established by ADC, 4th Infantry Division, who will be located in the vicinity of 4th Infantry Beach Headquarters. Units will not move from beach assembly areas without specific authority.

d. Main Supply Routes. See Circulation Overlay, Appendix No. 1, Annex #4 to FO #1, NEPTUNE.

d. Restrictions.

(1) Blackout marker lamps only will be used until establishment of Corps light line.

(2) Service tail and service stop lights will remain disconnected.

f. Roads and Bridges.

(1) Priority of Construction and Repair.

First - D-day one (1) Class 40 and one (1) Class 10 across inundated area; D + 1 one (1) each additional Class 40 and Class 10 across inundated area.

Second - Routes designated as Class 70.

Third - Routes designated as Class 40.

Fourth - Routes designated as Class 10.

Fifth - All others.

(2) Road Construction.

(a) Only essential roads will be constructed. Width and quality of surface will be a minimum consistent with anticipated use. Full use will be made of road matting and local ballast material.

(b) No permanent type roads will be constructed. Existing roads may be widened by dozers.

(3) Road Maintenance.

(a) Road craters will be filled, brought to, and maintained at, existing grade. Craters in paved roads will be finished as soon as practicable with a Telford Macadam type stone surface utilizing local materials. No tar will be available for patching. Maintenance of patches will be continuous to eliminate depressions.

(b) The road classification will be the same as the weakest bridge on the route and will be posted at the entrance to the road.

Annex #4 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 1944, (Cont'd).

(c) Detours and one-way routes will be marked at the entrance to the road.

- (4) Bridge Construction.

(a) Assault bridging operations will utilize foot bridges, improvised treadway bridges on rubber rafts, infantry assault rafts, and steel treadway bridges. M-3 and heavy ponton bridge will not be available until D + 15.

(b) Assault bridges will be withdrawn, reconditioned, and stored in dumps or on transportation at the earliest practicable time. They will be replaced with Bailey or wooden trestle bridge.

(c) Maximum use will be made of culverts in the replacement of short-span bridges. Due consideration will be given to replacing the previously existing conduit area.

(d) Wooden trestle bridges will be used where practicable for spans up to 40 ft.

(e) Bailey bridges will be used for all spans in excess of 40 feet. They will be constructed for Class 40 loads initially.

- (5) Bridge Maintenance.

(a) Liberal use of signs will be made to control speed and spacing of traffic. Where a critical bridge is involved, sentries will be posted for this purpose. End posts of bridges will be painted white.

(b) "Chutes" will be erected at the entrance to assault bridges. They will be painted white for night operation.

(c) All bridges will be posted with load classification signs.

(d) Alignment and grade of trestle bridges will be carefully maintained.

(e) Approaches to all bridges will be carefully constructed to reduce impact on the bridge.

(f) Assault-type bridges will be tread-planked if they are to remain in use for over forty-eight hours.

- g. Prisoners of War.

(1) Collecting point initially on each beach.

(2) Evacuation.

(a) Initially by units to division. Normal evacuation by division will be established as soon as practicable.

(b) Maximum use will be made of empty vehicles returning to supply points to transport prisoners to the rear. Loading will be at the rate of ten (10) men per truck-ton.

(c) Wounded prisoners of war will be evacuated in the same manner as friendly wounded.

h. War Criminals. (See Circular No. 60, Headquarters First United States Army, dated 5 May 1944).

(1) War criminals will be delivered to the nearest Provost Marshal. Unless members of the capturing unit personally familiar with the circumstances of capture accompany the war criminal, a brief signed report will be forwarded by the capturing unit to be delivered to the unit Provost Marshal with the war criminals.

(2) War criminal personnel will be kept segregated from prisoners of war and will be evacuated separately.

- i. Civil Affairs.

(1) The Civil Affairs Officer will post proclamations and ordinances and secure the cooperation of the local political administration. Under supervision of G-2 (CIC) the Civil Affairs Officer will administer the disposition and

Annex #4 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 1944, Cont'd.

appointment of officials, reporting to G-2 (CIC) the names of officials and employees retained in service.

(2) The Civil Affairs Officer, under supervision of G-2 (CIC), will make contact with "Resistance" groups, securing their cooperation.

(3) Under supervision of G-1, the Provost Marshal assisted by the Civil Affairs Staff will control the movement of the civilian population and designate the location of transit areas for the detention of same.

(4) CT and subordinate commanders will take such action in their areas as may be required to prevent the civil population from impeding military operations until the local administration is capable of exercising the necessary control.

4. Personnel.

a. Uniform. As prescribed in "Supply Administrative Instructions Prior to Mounting". This headquarters, dated 9 May 1944.

b. Stragglers.

(1) Initially -- Beach.

(2) Collecting points -- Beach exits.

(3) In cases where disciplinary action appears to be warranted, a report of the circumstances under which the straggler was collected will be delivered with him to the organization to which he is returned.

c. Mail. Normal delivery until briefing, after which mail will be suspended until D+3, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

d. Reports and Returns.

(1) G-1 Periodic Reports -- Submitted daily as of 2400 to reach Division CP, Forward Echelon, by 0400 the following morning.

(2) Casualty Report.

(a) Casualty Reports will be given special handling through D/5 as outlined in Top-Secret letter, this headquarters, file AG 704, subject, "Special Handling of Casualty Reports", dated 6 May 1944.

(b) Subsequent to D/5 casualties will be reported as outlined in Circular No. 46, Headquarters First United States Army, dated 22 April 1944, and instructions issued by this headquarters.

(3) Estimated Loss Report -- To be submitted as of 2400 daily to reach this headquarters by 0400 following day.

(4) Ordnance.

(a) A report of major items lost in combat or from other causes will be made by all units to Division Ordnance Officer daily by 0900 as of 0800. Items will be classified in the following manner:

1. "Lost in combat" (Only items totally destroyed, lost to the enemy or missing).

2. "Lost from other causes" (Only items damaged to the extent that they are unacceptable for direct exchange).

3. "Evacuated, not replaced" (Only items accepted for exchange, but not replaced by reason of non-availability).

(b) Units will use every effort to insure that reports are accurate, that duplication or repetition is eliminated, and that all items recovered are reported.

(c) Expenditure reports for all ammunition will be submitted daily as of 0600, to arrive at division not later than 0900.

Annex #4 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf. Div, 15 May 1944, (Cont'd).

(5) Medical -- As prescribed in Secret Memorandum No. 27, Headquarters VII Corps, dated 12 May 1944, subject, "Preparation of Medical Reports and Returns".

a. Replacements.

- (1) 2,000 available D / 3. (From overstrength)
- (2) 500 available D / 4. (From overstrength)
- (3) Requisitions -- On call.

5. Miscellaneous.

a. 4th Infantry Division CP.

- (1) Afloat -- USS BAYFIELD.
- (2) Ashore -- See FO #1.

b. Fire Prevention and Firefighting. Organizations will inaugurate measures designed to utilize all available means for preventing and combating fire.

a. Bomb Disposal.

(1) Naval mines of all types will be cleared by Naval Forces as soon as can be conveniently arranged after discovery. The Naval Force is responsible for the beaching and removal of obstacles which are under water at the time removal is required. Army and Navy will be prepared to render mutual assistance.

(2) Any unexploded naval rockets found on the beach, either buried or unburied, will be a hazard to wheeled or track vehicles and should be plainly marked and reported to Engineer Special Brigade for disposal.

(3) Except as indicated above, disposal of UXB is an Ordnance function and is the responsibility of the commander in whose area of control the incident occurs. Bomb disposal squads will be attached, or made available to appropriate Ordnance officers for this purpose. Units will report unexploded aerial bombs and rockets wherever found by the fastest means to the Ordnance Officer of the next higher echelon. Report will specify exact location in terms of a definite distance on a given azimuth bearing from an easily recognizable terrain feature, and will indicate whether the presence of the UXB is hampering operations or endangering important facilities. Units are responsible for marking location and establishing suitable safety precautions. Bomb disposal squads initially attached to Engineer Special Brigade will remain with those brigades until Communication Zone is established.

(4) Priorities for Bomb Removal.

1. Endangering hospitals.
2. Within Command Posts.
3. Blocking MSR's.
4. On beaches and beach exits.
5. Endangering communications facilities.
6. In tactical positions.
7. Others.

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

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2 Appendices:

Appendix #1 - Circulation and Administrative Installation Overlay.

Appendix #2 - Vehicle Dispersion. (Not issued. Information contained in Operations Overlay 1c - "Unit Staging Areas and Assembly Areas").

Distribution: With FO.



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 : Date: 15 May 1944. :

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 Page 1 of 3 pages.

ANNEX #5 to FO #1

HQ 4TH INF DIV
 AFO 4, US ARMY
 15 May 1944

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. a. Annex #1 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, and Appendix #2, Annex #5 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div.
 - b. Areas of Signal Communications:
 - (1) 4th Inf Div: USS BAYFIELD - ST MARTIN DE VARRIVILLE - BANDIENVILLE - MONTEBOURG - VALOGNES
 - (2) VII Corps : USS BAYFIELD - LOUTHES - STE MERE EGLISE - MONTEBOURG - VALOGNES
 - (3) CT 8, CT 12, CT 22 - Annex #1, Operations Overlay #1a.
 - c. Initial Command Posts ashore:

VII Corps: Vicinity of LOUTHES

4th Inf Div: Vicinity of ST MARTIN DE VARRIVILLE

90th Inf Div: Vicinity of BOURG DE LESIRE

9th Inf Div: Vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEMOU (1398)

82d A/B Div: Vicinity of LA FORET (147955)

101st A/B Div: Vicinity of LES FORGES
2. a. Communication elements of the 4th Inf Div and attached units will install, operate and maintain the communications system required to support the operation.
 - b. Division wire teams will be detached from the Regimental Combat Teams upon landing and team chiefs will report to the Division Signal Officer or his representative on the beach. Division wire will be committed only on order of the Commanding General or his representative ashore.
 - c. Reference - Appendix #1 to Annex #5 - 4th Inf Div Radio Nets Afloat.
 - d. Reference - Standing Operating Procedure - Communications, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, dated 7 April 1944.
3. a. Radio Communication:
 - (1) Radio Silence will be maintained in the marshalling areas.
 - (2) Radio Silence may be broken prior to the opening of naval bombardment (H-40 minutes) only upon order of the Commanding General, VII Corps.
 - (3) Radio Silence will be broken prior to H-hour by the two Airborne Divisions.
 - (4) At or after H-hour radio silence may be broken by unit commanders within approximately twelve (12) miles to seaward of beaches unless otherwise prohibited.
 - (5) Division CW Command Net will be monitored beginning H-24 hours. Regimental and separate unit commanders will set the time for monitoring in their units.
 - (6) Radio nets will be established in accordance with Appendix #1, Annex #5.
 - (7) 4th Signal Co will furnish operators for radio sets in the 4th Inf Div nets aboard the USS BAYFIELD.
 - b. Wire Communications:
 - (1) Solid wire communications will be installed and will be the principal means of communications.
 - (2) Maximum use of telegraph will be made.
 - c. Codes and Ciphers:
 - (1) The Prearranged Message Code and Slidex will be the principal means for encoding messages.
 - (2) Clear text and code groups will not be mixed together in the Prearranged Message Code. Clear text may be mixed with code groups in the Slidex.

Annex #5 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 44 (cont'd)

Page 2 of 3 pages.

- (3) Locations may be encoded in either the Prearranged-Message Code or Slidex.
- (4) The capture of ST MARTIN DE VARREVILLE will be reported by fastest means to this headquarters by the code word "AFF". This message will be authenticated.
- d. Special Communication and Identification Signals with Airborne Divisions:
- (1) Channel #33 on SCR 300 will be monitored continuously after landing by 4th Inf Div Hq, all HQT's and their battalion Headquarters until contact is established with elements of the 101st A/B Div. Mutual recognition code word will be "ORANGE". Elements of the 82d A/B Div may also report into this net. Authentication is not required unless requested.
- (2) Recognition Code:
- | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|
| Hq, 4th Inf Div | Orange 1 | 101st A/B Div | Orange 26 |
| Hq, CT 8 | Orange 2 | 502d Front Regt | Orange 14 |
| CT 8, 1st Bn | Orange 3 | 1st Bn | Orange 15 |
| CT 8, 2d Bn | Orange 4 | 2d Bn | Orange 16 |
| CT 8, 3d Bn | Orange 5 | 3d Bn | Orange 17 |
| Hq, CT 12 | Orange 6 | 506th Front Regt | Orange 18 |
| CT 12, 1st Bn | Orange 7 | 1st Bn | Orange 19 |
| CT 12, 2d Bn | Orange 8 | 2d Bn | Orange 20 |
| CT 12, 3d Bn | Orange 9 | 3d Bn | Orange 21 |
| Hq, CT 22 | Orange 10 | 501st Front Regt | Orange 22 |
| CT 22, 1st Bn | Orange 11 | 1st Bn | Orange 23 |
| CT 22, 2d Bn | Orange 12 | 2d Bn | Orange 24 |
| CT 22, 3d Bn | Orange 13 | 3d Bn | Orange 25 |
- (3) Hq, 4th Div Artillery will establish radio contact Hq, 101st A/B Div Artillery.
- (4) Elements of the 101st A/B Div may report into the liaison SCR-300 radio nets between companies of the 87th Chemical Bn (Mtz) and their respective assault battalions using the "ORANGE" Recognition Code and proper authentication for identification to call for mortar fire. Requests for mortar fire by 101st A/B Div may also be transmitted over the "ORANGE" Recognition Net.
- (5) Visual Signals - Par 5.
- e. Visual Signals:
- (1) SMCICO Pyrotechnic
- | | | |
|------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| ORANGE OR YELLOW | Single Yellow
Star (AN-44) | "CHECK FIRE ON THIS AREA"
(Friendly Troops) |
| RED | | "START OR RESUME SUPPORTING TANK OR HEAVY WEAPONS FIRE AGAINST THIS POINT" |
| VIOLET | | "CHECK AREA FOR DEMOLITION CHARGE" |
- (2) Panel: Any orange display by panel (AF-50-A), flag, or cloth means - "I am friendly".
- (3) Lights: Three (3) dots or three (3) dashes using Signal Lamp SE-11 or flashlight means - "I am friendly".
- (4) References: 4th Inf Div S.O.I., Item 15-3.

4. a. Annex #4 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div.

b. Complete units of Signal Equipment (including spare tubes and batteries of radio sets) will be carried, completely waterproofed. Three (3) days supply of selected and expendable items and spare parts will be carried by the 4th Signal Co. Fifteen (15) days expendable items will be carried by all units. Unit replacement of major items such as switchboards and radio sets will be available at the Division Signal Dump, 4th Signal Co bivouac area.

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Annex #5 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 May 44, cont'd)

Page 3 of 3 pages.

- c. Canvas on radio-equipped vehicles may be left up for protection against spray and weather.
 - d. ~~Waterproofing of all signal equipment will be complete to include probability of submersion. This includes radio sets to be operated afloat.~~
5. a. See SOL Index #1 - (Special) and Index #1 - 11.
b. Division Signal Officer with Commanding General's Party; then at the 4th Inf Div Co.

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2 Appendices:


- Appendix #1 - 4th Infantry Division Radio Nets afloat
- Appendix #2 - Communication Information on Far Shore

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AR 200.11 to ANNEX 75 to PO 11

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION RADIO NETS AFLOAT



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"S" - Indicates 4th Sig Co Set
 "A" - Indicates 4th Div Arty Set
 "C" - Indicates VII Corps Set

SECRET

Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
 Init: *GA*
 Date: 15 May 1944

APPENDIX #2 to ANNA-X-75 to PQ #1

Page 1 of 2 pages.

COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF P.E. SECT

1. Existing wire facilities

a. Buried Cable - (1) ST. LO - CARMIAN - MONTESOURG - VALOGNES -
 CHERBOURG

(2) CHERBOURG to ST. FINEUX EGLE

(3) CHERBOURG to BEAUBOURG-MAUGU

b. Open wire - In general, open wire will follow roads and railways. Exchanges in the principal towns will be the distribution center for both cable and open wire lines.

c. Civil exchanges - In 1930 the rural automatic exchange was introduced generally in the Departments of CALVADOS, ORNE and MANCHE, and partly into the department of MAYENNE. The department of ILLE-et-VILAINE had not adopted the system, except for the ST. MALO peninsula. COLRAGNIS Centrale TELEPHONES ET TELEGRAMMES apparatus was used throughout.

(1) German telephone exchanges are reported to exist at the following places:

(a) On the coast east of QUILLIMOU, at HAPPAU de MANVILLE.

(b) Near MORS-LINAS. Two large concrete structures, with underground cables leading to them.

(c) CHERBOURG. The army exchange is in a building immediately south of Grandboulevard, near ST. BRIGIDE.

(d) CHERBOURG ARSENAL. One army exchange north of the transformer station and the apprentice school, in an underground shelter with an entrance at the north side; and another in a building immediately east of the RUE du MIDI. These are stated to be connected to St. MALO, ST. LO, VILLEDIEU, FALIE, CAP LÉVY, AUBERVILLE, and other small towns. The main operational circuits are run on a wooden framework along the continuation of the RUE Val De Saix, the highway which goes east to B.A.F.L.S.K. Rubber covered cable is used.

2. Power Stations

a. Power stations are located in CHERBOURG, LA ROCHE, KARRES, VEZINS and ST. MALO with the switching and transformer stations at ST. LO, PLANCOET, VILANCHES and ROUGERES. The transmission voltages in this section are 30 KV and 60 KV.

b. Voltage in towns:

Town	AC or DC	Phase	Voltage
BAVEUX	AC	3	120/210
KARRES	AC	3	115/200
ST. MALO	DC	-	220
VILANCHES	AC	3	125/215
CHERBOURG	AC	3	110/190
COULOGNE	AC	3	115/200
GRANVILLE	AC	3	125/220
ST. LO	DC	-	230
THORIGNY-SUR-VIÈRE	DC	-	130

3. Communications in Subsequent Phases

a. Higher headquarters will provide radio, wire, pigeons and boat messenger service to the United Kingdom.

4. Pigeon Communication

a. Lofts will be established on the south coast of England for cross channel pigeon communication. Messages dispatched by pigeon except those of immediate tactical importance will be encoded. Secret or confidential messages will not be sent by pigeon unless other means are not available.

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Appendix #2 to Annex #5 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 15 Apr 44 (Cont'd)

Page 2 of 2 pages.

Birds should be released in pairs with one bird carrying the original and the other carrying the duplicate copy. Pigeons should not be released after dark. Approximate time required: 60 miles - 75 minutes.

5. Use of existing wire facilities

a. Underground cables will not be cut or interrupted in any way except at terminal points.

b. Open wire in the forward areas running in the direction of the enemy will not be abandoned on the same pole with circuits in use. One span will be cut out on the enemy side of the terminal pole, short circuited and grounded.

c. Precautions

Signal wire construction personnel will be issued mine detectors for clearing roads in the forward areas. Commanders will ensure that sufficient communication personnel are trained in the use of the mine detector and lifting of mines. Previous operations have shown that open wire leads are sometimes heavily mined around the base of the pole and under the lead between the poles. Booby traps have also been attached to hanging wires, and inside plant facilities of telephone exchanges may be booby-trapped.

6. Time

The official time for the operation will be that which is currently in use in the United Kingdom. These times are: British double summer time, which is two (2) hours fast on Greenwich Mean/Civil time and is designated by the letter "B", and British summer time, which is one hour fast on Greenwich Mean/Civil time and is designated by the letter "A". Announcement of the time-table to be used will be made by operational memorandum issued by the Supreme Commander.

7. Captured Signal Equipment

Captured signal equipment will be sent through supply channels back to the Army Signal Depot unless orders to the contrary are issued in specific cases.

ANNEX #6 to FO #1

Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div

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Date: 17 May 1944

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HQ 4th INF DIV

Page 1 of 3 Pages

APO 4, US ARMY

FIELD ARTILLERY

MARS: FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div.

1. a. Annex #2 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div.
 b. Paragraph 1b and Paragraphs 2 and 3, FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div and Annexes 7 and 8. This headquarters will establish liaison with 101st A/B Div Arty before embarkation in U.K.

2. a. Paragraph 3f (2) FO #1, 4th Inf Div.
 b. 4th Div Arty be prepared to support 82d A/B Div, on call, with such fires as may be practicable.

Troops:

65th Armd FA Bn (attached CT 8. Pass to control 101st A/B Div on orders CG, 4th Inf Div)

29th FA Bn (attached CT 8)

42d FA Bn

44th FA Bn

20th FA Bn

Detachment, 13th FOB

Btry B, 980th FA Bn

980th FA Bn (-Btry B) (attached on landing D/s)

377th AAA (AW) Bn (40mm) (Land D/s)

901st TD Bn (T) (Land D/s)

3. a. Detachment, 13th FOB prepare to establish sound and flash bases for continuation of attack toward VALOGNES (2408). Especial attention to hostile batteries vicinity of QUETZOU (3717).

b. Btry B, 980th FA Bn occupy position to fire in direction of VALOGNES (2408). Minimum range MONTBOURG (3105).

c. 980th FA Bn (less Btry B) proceed to assembly area vicinity of MONTBOURG.

d. 377th AAA (AW) Bn (40mm) proceed to assembly area vicinity of MONTBOURG. Relations between AA units and Air Support Command in accordance with Operation Memorandum "Control of AA Fire", FUSA (to be distributed).

e. 801st TD Bn (T) proceed to assembly area vicinity of MONTBOURG.

f. Other units see par 3f (2), FO #1, 4th Inf Div.

x. (1) 105mm self-propelled howitzers of the 4th Inf Div (including attached 65th Armd FA Bn) will approach the beach in their prescribed positions in waves. They will fire on targets of opportunity on call from artillery FO's or by direct laying on order of the senior artillery officer in the craft.

(2) antiaircraft fire aloft - all caliber 50 mm MG's, 37mm and 40mm AA guns which are loaded on open decks of landing craft and which can be tactically sited will be prepared to fire on board ship enroute. The senior artillery commander aboard will determine by personal liaison with the captain of the craft whether he desires supporting fires in event of air or surface attack and will conform to his wishes. Traversing stops will be improvised; material to improvise will be loaded.

(3) Firing in area FOURVILLIS (4393) - ST MARIN LE VAREVILLIS (4198) - STS MARIE EGLISE (3596) - CHEF DU FONT (3393) only on call of troops west of inundation or on order CG, 4th Inf Div. See par 3x (3) FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div.

(4) Units landing in 2d tide or thereafter will send officer from first elements ashore promptly to Div Arty CP for orders.

(Annex #6 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 17 May 44, cont'd)

Page 2 of 3 Pages

(5) Positions:

a. Initially, East of inundated area. (See Annex 1, overlay 1c, FO #1, 4th Inf Div) In areas east of seawall in the order from North to South, 44th FA Bn, 29th FA Bn, 42d FA Bn, 65th Armd FA Bn. Beach areas West of seawall for alternate positions or initial assembly areas as follows:

29th FA Bn	20th FA Bn	K
65th Armd FA Bn	Btry B, 980th FA Bn	C
44th FA Bn	Div, 13th FCB	C
42d FA Bn	K	

b. Inland, see Annex 1, overlay 1c, FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, areas allotted as follows:

44th FA Bn	Area vicinity (330985)
42d FA Bn	Area vicinity (380987)
20th FA Bn	Area vicinity (400987)

29th FA Bn - Area vicinity (405970) to be occupied on order CG, 4th Div Arty if 29th FA Bn returns to division control D day.

No battery position will be within 800 yards of a causeway exit.

(6) If units desire to displace, they will request authority from this headquarters minimum of one (1) hour prior to desired time of displacement.

(7) Firing chart 1/25000 map. Survey, phase I SOP until further orders. Check points from Corps overlay (to be issued).

(8) All battalions register vicinity of Le Ham (279015) from inland positions. Each light battalion also register zone of supported infantry regiment. 42d FA Bn to prepare to register 20th FA Bn vicinity of Le Ham by night high burst after dark E Day.

(9) Declination of instruments:

Instruments declinated at Okhampton add 37 mils to constant of each instrument. Instruments declinated other points apply difference between map declination constant of point (corrected to date) and that of Zone of action. (6266 mils).

(10) Air Sections:

a. Div Arty and battalion air sections (each less one plane and pilot) and air section Btry B, 980th FA Bn move by truck under unit control. Report to Div Arty Air Officer vicinity 413-8690. He will coordinate organization of air strip and assembly of airplanes.

b. Planes and pilots excepted above, senior pilot in command, with B-4 bags, gas masks, no field equipment, maximum of 30 lbs baggage, move by air, on call, from Beauvoir Field to vicinity 413-8690, or elsewhere if ordered.

(11) Essential elements of information:

a. Where is 2d A/E Div?

b. Are hostile armored forces moving into the area North of line CARLTON (3984) - LA, HYE LU FUTURE (3864)?

c. What artillery emplacements in area QUINVILLE (3707) - QUINCY are occupied and active?

d. What field artillery is opposing us? Location?

e. Where are hostile artillery OP's?

f. Are M1 gun emplacements vicinity CARLTON and CARLTON (0094) occupied?

4. Ammunition:

a. Basic load plus additional primers, fuzes, and ammunition per paragraph 4a Supply Administrative Instructions prior to mounting, Hq 4th Inf Div, dated 9 May 1944. Basic load ammunition will not be expended afloat.

b. Units scheduled to land prior to D+6 will requisition additional ammunition for defense afloat as follows:

44th FA Bn (M) excluding 50 cal MGs	- 2 U/F per Bn
50 cal MG's of other units except 4th Bns (SF)	- 5 U/F
50 cal MG's of FA units	- 3 U/F

TOP SECRET - BIGOT

(Annex #6 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 17 May 44 cont'd)

Page 3 of 3 Pages.

c. Additional artillery ammunition for firing afloat, to be loaded at embarkation hard: 29th FA Bn, 65th Armd FA Bn, 42d FA Bn, 44th FA Bn - 15 rds 105mm shell HE, per gun. This ammunition, if not expended afloat, will be taken ashore as an overlead if conditions permit.

5. a. (1) Radio Communication, See Div SOI. Listening watch on Div arty nets from H-5 hours. Nets open H-40 minutes.

(2) 4th Div Arty will maintain wire head within 1000 yards of front lines along division axis of communication.

(3) Orange-colored flags and smoke will be used between 4th Inf Div and 101st Avn Div to identify friendly troops and prevent firing into each other.

(4) Reports of front lines to this CP on the even hour.

b. Div Arty CP, see Annex 1, overlay 1a, FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div. Others to be reported by fastest available means.

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SECRET
 Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div.
 Init: *CCS*
 Date: 22 May 1944

Copy 20 of 125
 Page 1 of 3 pages

HQ 4TH INF DIV
 AFO 4, US ARMY
 22 May 1944

ANNEX #7 to FO #1

AIR SUPPORT

MAPS: Franco, GCS 4250, 1/60,000; Sheets 5E/2, 6A/1, 6A/4, 5A/6, 6A/3 & 4, 6E/5, 6A/6

1. AIR SUPPORT - GENERAL.

- a. RAF Bomber Command and U. S. Strategic Air Forces will furnish strategic and tactical support for the operation.
- b. RAF Air Defense of Great Britain will furnish tactical support for the operation, provide for the defense of installations in Great Britain and Air/Sea Rescue.
- c. RAF Coastal Command will furnish:
 - (1) anti-U-boat and anti-surface vessel operations in the approaches to the continent.
 - (2) anti-shipping blows by day and night outside the battle area.
- d. Ninth US Air Force will furnish the First US Army tactical support. The initial support will consist of:
 - (1) Air reconnaissance support. (See annex #2, Intelligence).
 - (2) Bombing support after H-hour, D-day.
- e. Bombing support prior to H-hour, D-day will be furnished by elements of the USAF and RAF and will be coordinated by headquarters VII Corps Artillery in the VII Corps sector. Certain of these elements will be employed for bombing support after H-hour, D-day on "Turn around". (When aircraft have completed a prearranged bombardment mission, they return to base, re-fuel, reload and are then available on request for subsequent missions--this is termed "Turn around").

2. AIR SUPPORT (BOMBING AND/OR STRAFING) AVAILABLE FOR REQUEST MISSIONS.

- a. Certain elements of the heavy and medium bombing missions employed in pre-H-hour bombing, will be available on request on "Turn around". Determination of the type of bombardment aircraft, i.e., heavy, medium or fighter-bomber, to be used against a certain target will be decided by joint army-air headquarters at USKIBS, depending upon nature of target to be attacked.
 - (1) heavy bombers after 4 1/6 hours.
 - (2) medium-bombers after 4 1/4 hours.
- b. IX Tactical Air Command will furnish the following air support missions to units of VII Corps on request through air support parties:
 - (1) One (1) squadron of fighter-bombers will be on "air alert" over Utah Beach during the assault (exact times and availability to units of the 4th Infantry Division to be announced).
 - (2) Up to twenty-four (24) group missions by two (2) groups of P-38's and four (4) groups of P-47's have been allotted for close support of the First US Army on D-day. The Ninth Air Force is prepared to operate all fighter-bomber groups on the scale of four (4) group sorties per day.
 - (3) Numbers, types and scheduled times of aircraft on alert will be published when available as an appendix to this annex.

Annex #7 to FO #1, Hq. 4th Inf Div, 22 May 44 (Cont'd)
Page 2 of 3 Pages.

3. PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING REQUESTS AND MISSIONS.

- a. Requests for air support will be transmitted direct to the Army-Air Headquarters at UXBRIDGE, BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, ENGLAND, by air support parties with Headquarters 4th Infantry Division or CT 8. Units other than CT 8 will make requests for direct support to G-3 Air, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, over the division command net or by telephone when such becomes available. Requests will include the following information:
- (1) Location of target by code number and/or coordinates.
 - (2) Description of target.
 - (3) Time and time limits of bombardment.
 - (4) Whether or not unit is able to mark target.
- Upon receipt of reply from Army-Air Headquarters, acceptance or refusal of request will be sent by G-3 Air to unit initiating request, giving estimated time of arrival over target or reason for refusal.
- b. Delay time between request and arrival of aircraft in the target area (for aircraft based in UK) at present is estimated as follows:

	Maximum	Minimum
Fighter Bombers	3 hours	1 1/2 hours
Light Bombers	3 hours	2 hours

These figures are subject to change.

- c. Requests for special missions, listed below, will be made through Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, using the command net.
- (1) Smoke screens.
 - (2) Artillery fire adjustment.
 - (3) Marking of objectives by smoke by air forces.
 - (4) Troop Carrier Command Missions (reinforcements or resupply by air).

4. BOMBLINES.

- a. Bomblines for the period 2200 hours, D-1 to H+6 hours D-day:
- (1) See Appendix 1 & 2 of Annex #7 to FO #1, Bomblines (Overlay).
 - (2) (a) Bomblines for this period may be changed by the establishment of a local bomblines by the requesting headquarters. Radius of this bomblines from center of target must be reported to Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, together with other information in requests from units (See Par. 3.a., above). The temporary bomblines will then be coordinated through Headquarters VII Corps before any bombardment request can be forwarded to UXBRIDGE, or any planes called in from 'Air Alert'. ASP officer with CT 8 will, when requesting bombardment of any target within the limits of the general bomblines, likewise coordinate the local bomblines through Headquarters 4th Infantry Division before any message is sent to UXBRIDGE or to planes on 'Air Alert'.
 - (b) Normally, only fighters, fighter-bombers, and light bombers will attack targets on the friendly side of the general bomblines.

5. EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE TROOPS.

- a. All individuals will be briefed carefully on the operations of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to prevent fire on friendly Airborne Troops and Troop Carriers. Briefing will include:
- (1) Scheduled times and landing areas of parachute and glider elements of the above divisions.

Annex #7 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 22 May 44 (cont'd)

- (2) That circumstances may result in wide dispersion of these troops.
- (3) That a common countersign and parole will be used by all troops (including airborne); and that, in addition, airborne troops are thoroughly familiar with the usual modes of ground to ground recognition between patrols or units.
- (4) That it may be necessary to reinforce and/or supply these units by transport airglades, with or without gliders.

6. RECOGNITION.

- a. Recognition markings on vehicles will not be obscured prior to or during operations on the Continent, except when vehicles are completely camouflaged.
- b. Troops will employ yellow smoke, yellow flares or personnel indicators (yellow cellulose triangles or fluorescent panels) when a friendly aircraft signals a succession of white or yellow lights. Yellow smoke, yellow flares, and personnel indicators will not be used for any other purpose except to indicate friendly troops.

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


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2 Inclosures:

- Appendix #1 - Overlay, Bomblines - 4th Inf Div - 101st
A/S DIV.
Appendix #2 - Overlay, Bomblines - 52nd A/S Div.

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TOP SECRET BIGOT NEPTUNE



HQ 4th INF DIV
APO #4
22 MAY 1944
APPENDIX #1 TO ANNEX #7 TO FO #1
OVERLAY SHOWING BOMB LINE, 4th INF DIV & 10th A/B DIV
MAP FRANCE GSGS 4250 SCALE 1/50,000
SHEETS: 5E/2, 6E/1, 5E/4, 5E/6, 6E/3#4, 6E/5, 6E/6

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TOP SECRET BIGOT NEPTUNE

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2200 D-1 TO H+6
BOMB LINE

AREA TO BE OCCUPIED BY 82 A/B DIV AFTER
2300 HRS D-1 THEREAFTER ALL AIR ATTACKS IN
THIS AREA MUST BE COORDINATED WITH 82 A/B DIV




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HQ 40TH AF DIV
APO # 4
22 MAY 1944
APPENDIX # 2 TO ANNEX # 7 TO FORM # 2
OVERLAY SHOWING BOMB LINES
82 A/B DIV
MAP FRANCE GSGS 4250
SHEET NOS. 58/4, 58/6, 65/34, 65/7
SCALE 1/50,000

[Signature] BARTON
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 Init: OCV
 Dates: 21 May 1944

ANNEX #8 to FO #1

HQ 4TH INF DIV
 APO 4, US ARMY
 21 MAY 1944

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 Page 1 of 3 Pages

NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT

MAPS: France GSGS 4250, 1:50,000, Sheets 6E2, 6E3, & 4, 6E6.

1. a. Task Force 125, US Navy will provide naval fire support for the assault and advance inland to the limit of range of support guns beginning at H-40 minutes on D-day in order to assist the assault of the 4th Infantry Division, and to support the advance inland by direct and indirect fire methods. Battery neutralization may begin at H-300 minutes if deemed necessary by the Navy.
 - b. Task Force 125.
 - (1) Bombardment Group.

(a) Fire Support Unit One.	
TUSCALOOSA	(CA) (FLAG SHIP)
QUINCY	(CA)
NEVADA	(BB)
EMERUS	(BH)
ELAG. PRINCE	(CL)
MOTHAM, TYLER	(2PF)
(b) Fire Support Unit Two.	
HAWKINS	(CA)
INTERPRISE	(CL)
SUMMA	(PG)
(c) Fire Support Unit Three.	
MOHSON, FITCH, FORREST, CORKY.	(4DD)
(d) Fire Support Unit Four.	
HEANDON, SHURICK	(2DD)
(e) Fire Support Unit Five.	
BUTLER, GARDI	(2DD)
(a) Support Craft Unit One.	
LCG(L) 5, 6, 7, 893	(4LCG(L))
(b) Support Craft Unit Two.	
LCT(k) 368, 425, 439, 448, 481	(5LCT(R))
(c) Support Craft Unit Three.	
LCS(S) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	
9, 10, 11, 12.	(12LCS(S))
(d) Support Craft Unit Four.	
LCF 18, 22, 27, 31	(4LCF)
(e) Support Craft Unit Five.	
LCT(A) 2282, 2301, 2309, 2310,	
2402, 2454, 2478, 2488	(8LCT(A))
2. a. Bombardment Group will silence and destroy all enemy shore batteries and defenses which threaten ships or craft connected with the landing.
 - (1) Beginning at H-40 minutes, enemy batteries will be taken under fire.
 - (2) If counter-battery fire is required prior to H-40 minutes, the schedule as listed in appendix 2 will be followed.
 - (3) A beach drenching fire will commence at H-40 minutes in accordance with appendix 4.
 - (4) Close supporting fires in accordance with appendix 5.
- b. Support Craft Group will deliver close-in supporting fire of positions near beach as follows:
 - (1) LCG(L)s engage beach targets (See appendix 4). Targets of opportunity will be taken under fire. Upon landing of troops, fire is scheduled to lift. Targets of opportunity on the flanks will be engaged to support the advance of assault troops.

Annex (8 to FO #1), Hq 4th Inf Div, 21 May 44 (Cont'd)

Page 2 of 3 Pages.

- (2) LCT(R)s will take position 3500 yards from targets listed in Appendix 4. LCT(R)s will clear boat lanes, reload, and report to Commander of Assault Forces for orders.
 - (3) LCS(S)s will deliver rocket fire on targets (See Appendix 4) from a point 100 yards in front of the leading assault wave. When reloaded, they will further support the attack by machine gun fire and rockets firing to the front and flanks of the assault troops.
 - (4) LCFs will proceed towards beach on flanks of LCT(R)s and will take up a position in the beach area to provide anti-aircraft protection for the beachhead and support of the advancing troops.
 - (5) LCT(A)s containing tanks of 70th Tank Battalion will deliver fire on the landing area and on targets of opportunity during the passage to the beach. Tanks will not fire over the heads of leading waves after 4-5 minutes but may fire on targets to the flank if they can do so without endangering friendly troops.
- c. Shore Fire Control Parties attached to infantry battalions will operate as outlined in Appendix 5. Six (6) Shore Fire Control Parties from the 4th Infantry Division will be attached to the 90th Infantry Division on L4/2 upon order of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
- x. (1) Use British military (LAMBETH) and MORD DE GUERRE grid system printed on 1:50,000 map charts furnished.
 - (2) Shore Fire Control Parties will normally obtain fire support from Fire Support Ships guarding their assigned frequency, as outlined in Appendix 5. If major caliber fire is required by a party other than the one normally assigned to a heavy ship, it will be requested through the Commander Bombardment Group via common frequency. After Division Artillery Headquarters is established requests for such fire will be routed to Commander Bombardment Group via Division Artillery Headquarters. In an emergency any shore Fire Control Party may contact any ship. All Fire Support Ships will report to Commander Bombardment Group, and Commander Force "U", when communications have been established with designated Shore Fire Control Parties.
 - (3) Shore Fire Control Parties will inform Fire Support Ships of position of own front lines, type of target, and type of fire required.
 - (4) Prior to opening fire, enemy searchlights will not be taken under fire unless own ships are actually being endangered thereby. If own troops are known to be in the immediate vicinity, searchlights will be fired upon only on call by Shore Fire Control Parties.
 - (5) Destroyers delivering close supporting fire will be prepared to use white phosphorous projectiles against enemy batteries inland or on the flanks.
 - (6) Fire Support Ships may engage targets in the sector or responsibility of Force "U" on call from their shore Fire Control Parties, but Commander Bombardment Group and Commander Force "U" must be informed prior to opening fire.
 - (7) Schedule of fire as per Appendices 3 and 4. In general, coast defense batteries with concrete casemates or turrets will be engaged primarily with armor piercing projectiles, all other types of targets with high capacity.
 - (8) Ships engaging in beach neutralization and close support fire will consider standing buildings as targets. The enemy will have utilized all suitable locations to cover strong points. Responsibilities for targets of opportunity along beach are included in Appendix 4.
 - (9) Unless otherwise directed, Fire support Ships will leave their assigned stations in time to reach night anchorage by sunset. Ships will notify Shore Fire Control Party concerned when leaving station.
 - (10) Pyrotechnic signals to be used are as follows:
 - (a) Black smoke signal, used only by assault wave, means "Lift Fire from Assault Beach to Predetermined Targets" in accordance with Appendix 4.

Annex #8 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 22 May 44 (Cont'd)

Page 3 of 3 Pages.

- (b) In addition to the signal mentioned in (a) above, the Naval Shore Fire Control Parties with the assault battalions will notify by common bombardment frequencies the action to 'Shift Fire' from assault beach to predetermined targets.
- (11) (a) Communications as outlined for S.F.C.P.'s in appendix 5.
 (b) (1) Commander Bombardment Group in LUSC-1005A.
 (2) Commander Support Craft Group in LCH-209.


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- Appendix #1 - Target Number Overlay.
 Appendix #2 - Battery Neutralization Plan "Zebra".
 Appendix #3 - Bombardment Plan Distinct Targets.
 Appendix #4 - Beach Neutralization and Close Support Plan.
 Appendix #5 - Shore Fire Control Party Procedure.

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GRAPHIC SCALE





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Top Secret Papers Destroyed

1 June Cy 11, Spnd Map Dist Plan, 4th Div, 16 May

Wm T. Fajlh

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
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BEACH "U"


BEACH "T"



ANALYSIS OF LANDING DIAGRAM

TYPE	AVAILABLE		ASSIGNED IN SHEET 1		ASSIGNED IN SHEET 2	
	GROSS	NET	NET	CONTINGENT	NET	CONTINGENT
LST	30	28			28	2
LCI(L)	45	40	40	5		
LCH	2	2	2			
LOTA	8	8	8			3
LCVP	118	118	118			
LCM, 3	81	81	81			
LCT(4)	36	30	30	6		
LCT(5)	61	52	52	9		
LCT(6)	55	47	44	3	3	4

LEGEND




Numbers are army Craft Serial Numbers
Sheet 2 of 2 sheets

COPY NUMBER 322 OF 650



TO



THIS AREA TO BE OCCUPIED BY THE 2ND DIV
 82ND AIRBORNE DIV AT HOURS SHOWN ON BOMBLINE
 ALL AIR ATTACKS WITHIN THIS AREA MUST BE
 COORDINATED WITH THESE UNITS

BOMBLINE IS EASTERN LIMIT
 OF INUNDATION BETWEEN
 POINTS A&B

BOMB LINE FROM
 DROPTIME TO H-2 MIN



HQ 1ST INF DIV
 APO
 30 MAY 1944
 APPENDIX 1 TO ANEX 1 TO FO #1
 (CORRECTED COPY)
 OVERLAY SHOWING BOMBLINE
 4TH INF DIV, 32ND AIR DIV & 101ST AIR DIV
 MAP RANGE 9895 4250 SCALE 1/50000
 SHEET NOS. 502, 503, 504, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510
 COPY DATED 22 MAY 1944 TO BE DESTROYED

BARTON

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Page 1 of 2 pages

HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, US ARMY
21 May 1944

APPENDIX #2 to ANNEX #8 to FO #1

BATTERY NEUTRALIZATION PLAN "OSBR"

1. ASSUMPTIONS (NAVAL).

- a. That minesweepers or other friendly craft are taken under fire by enemy shore batteries before regular bombardment stations have been assumed.
- b. That own craft are actually being endangered and require assistance.
- c. That detection of our approach appears certain and therefore that the need for withholding fire no longer exists.
- d. That neither air spot nor shore fire control spot is available.
- e. That enemy batteries which are firing cannot be identified.

2. This naval plan requires ships to fire on targets according to the table below. It is based on the times ships will come into range of the longer range guns on shore.

3. This plan will be placed into effect by Naval signal.

4. a. H minus 300 to H minus 180.

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
NEVADA	1a
TUSCALOOSA	8a
QUINCY	8
HAWKINS	1

b. H minus 180 to H minus 120.

EREBUS	8
BLACK PRINCE	8a
TUSCALOOSA	1A
QUINCY	4
NEVADA	3
HAWKINS	1
STARBUCK	5

c. H minus 120 to H minus 40 and continuing.

EREBUS	8, 8a
BLACK PRINCE	12, 18
TUSCALOOSA	1a, 7a
QUINCY	4, 17
NEVADA	3, 9
HAWKINS	1, 5
FITCH (If in range)	14, 14
CORRY	13a, 14a

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appendix #2 to annex #8 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 21 May 44 (cont'd)

5. If air spot does not materialize after 4 minus 40, ships will continue firing in accordance with Par 4 (c) above. No provisions have been made for the remaining ships of Fire Support Group as they are scheduled to be engaged in beach neutralization in accordance with appendix 4 to annex #8 to FO #1, this headquarters.

6. When this plan is in use, the Navy is controlling their fire so as to search an area around the coordinate location of the target using best navigational fix to solve problems. The Navy is not using ac in this plan as neutralization is all that is expected.

BOMBARDMENT PLAN - DISTANT TARGETS

FIRING UNIT	GROUP	1		2		3		4		5		6		7 to 24	
		H/40	H/5	H/50	H/50	H/95	H/95	H/140	H/140	H/185	H/185	H/230	45 min. each		
		Coords	TarNo	Coords	TarNo	Coords	TarNo	Coords	TarNo	Coords	TarNo	Coords	TarNo	Coords	TarNo
EREBUS	6	391230	8A	372198	7A	265268	2								
		391275	8	378204	12	246265	7								
TUSCALOOSA	7	365200	1A	361080	14A	368043	3								
		372198	7A	368043	3	360022	9								
QUINCY	8	355138	4	351056	13A										
		339138	17	353040	26										
FITCH	16	341102	15	341102	15										
		341057	14	341057	14										
HAWKINS	18	533918	5	533918	5										
		527915	16	527915	16										
NEVADA	20	368043	3	360022	9										
		360022	9	353040	26										
TUSCALOOSA	6														
HELENA	8														
CLINTON	7														
BLACK PRINCE	16	**		**											
NEVADA	18														
EREBUS	20														

Be prepared to assume FITCH assignment on signal if necessary.

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Appendix #4 to Annex #8 to FC #1

Page 1 of 3 Pages

BEACH NEUTRALIZATION AND CLOSE SUPPORT PLAN

1. To cover the landing and support the early stages of the advance of the first waves the following schedule of defense neutralization, beach droning, and close support fire has been arranged by ships of the Bombardment Group.

2. QUINCY and NEVADA are to discontinue air spot controlled firing for 10 minutes to comply with this schedule.

3. At H minus 40 beach droning fire is to commence according to schedule below:

TIME	SHIP	BATTERY	EVEN	TARGET	ROUNDS PER MINUTE	
H-40	NEVADA	BB	5"	COLLEGE FIRE	66	16
H-40	QUINCY	CA	5"	COLLEGE FIRE	70	16
H-40	SHUBRICK	DD	5"	COLLEGE FIRE	68	8
H-40	HOBSON	DD	5"	COLLEGE FIRE	70, 72	8
H-40	ENTERPRISE	CL	6"	COLLEGE FIRE	62	8
H-15	NEVADA	BB	14"	COLLEGE FIRE	Beach Wall	10
H-15	QUINCY	CA	8"	COLLEGE FIRE	70, 72	9
H-5	NEVADA		14"	CEASE FIRE (See Appendix #1)		
H-5	QUINCY		8"	CEASE FIRE (See Appendix #1)		
BLACK SMOKE SIGNAL	NEVADA		5"	SHIFT TO	76	8
BLACK SMOKE SIGNAL	QUINCY		5"	SHIFT TO	78	8
BLACK SMOKE SIGNAL	SHUBRICK		5"	SHIFT TO	62	8
BLACK SMOKE SIGNAL	HOBSON		5"	SHIFT TO	74	8
BLACK SMOKE SIGNAL	ENTERPRISE		6"	SHIFT TO	60	8
H/25	SHUBRICK		5"	SHIFT TO	60	8
H/25	ENTERPRISE		6"	SHIFT TO	58	6
H/30	ALL SHIPS			Cease neutralization fire, return to designated targets of Appendix #5; HOBSON and SHUBRICK await call from assigned Shore Fire Control Party. Other ships proceed as in following paragraphs.		

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Appendix #4 to Annex #8 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 21 May 44 (Cont'd)
Page 2 of 3 Pages.

Destroyers rendering close support are to be alert for changes in schedule that would leave own troops endangered by enemy or own fire. Shore Fire Control Parties will establish communications immediately upon landing. Destroyers are going to set fuzes for firing range to produce some impact and some air bursts. All other ships are set for impact bursts.

4. At H minus 40, HERNDON, CORY, and FITCH, are going to commence beach neutralization and target of opportunity fire as follows:

SHIP	TARGETS	ROUNDS PER MINUTE
HERNDON	34, 36, 38, 40, 42.	8
CORY	80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94.	8
FITCH	96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114.	8

At H-hour they are discontinuing fire except at targets of opportunity in sight or on call from Shore Fire Control Party.

5. BLACK PRINCE at H minus 40 is going to:

- Commence fire to destroy installation (target 18) on ILE DE TATHOU
- Observe beach area from targets 122 to 134 inclusive, and take under fire any targets of opportunity.
- Use observed fire.

6. SOEMBA at H minus 40 is going to:

- Commence direct fire at targets 30, and 32.
- Attempt to protect Ranger Party attacking POINTE DU HOS.
- Use observed fire.

7. LCG's are going to approach beach as closely as possible delivering fire ahead to beach area targets 56, 58, 60, 62, 74, 76, 78, 80, and then proceed along designated flanks abreast troop advance and take under fire any targets of opportunity. Fire may be commenced at any time after H minus 40.

LCT(R)'s when at proper range and when leading wave is 700 yards from sea wall are going to fire entire load of rockets on strong points as follows:

CRAFT	TARGET
LCT(R) 368	60
LCT(R) 425	62
LCT(R) 439	66
LCT(R) 448	70
LCT(R) 481	74

LCS(S) are going to approach beach until in range of sea wall and deliver rocket fire on beach area between targets 58 and 76, firing after LCT(R)'s and when troops are 800 yards from sea wall. Target assignments as follows:

CRAFT	TARGET
LCS(S) 1	58
LCS(S) 2 & 3	60
LCS(S) 4 & 5	62
LCS(S) 6 & 7	66
LCS(S) 8 & 9	70
LCS(S) 10 & 11	74
LCS(S) 12	76

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Appendix A to Annex C to FO-11, Hq 4th Inf Div, 21 May 44 (Cont'd)

Page 3 of 3 Pages.

LCS(S)'s are going to support landing wave with machine gun fire at sea wall defense until YELLOW STAR PYROTECHNIC signal "LIFT FIRE" is given, taking care to fire clear of own troops. After yellow star signal, or when troops are endangered, they are going to shift machine gun fire to flanks and cover advance of troops by firing at targets of opportunity.

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
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HQ 4TH INF DIV
AIC 4, US ARMY
21 May 1941.

APPENDIX 78 to AREA 78 to FO #1.

SIGNAL FIRE CONTROL BATTAL PROCEDURE

1. SCHEDULED DIAGRAM OF ASSIGNMENT OF SPECT'S TO FIRE SUPPORT SITES



LEGEND
 ----- 284 CHANNELS
 _____ 609 CHANNELS

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appendix #6 to annex #8 to FO #1, HQ 4th Inf Div, 21 May 41 (cont'd)

2. Common bombardment waves.

a. 32.2 Mcs (frequency modulated) guarded by all Naval Gunfire Spotters, all Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers, and all Fire Support Ships.

b. 4355 Mcs (amplitude modulated) guarded by all regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers, the 2nd Division Artillery H.C.L.O., and all Fire Support Ships.

c. A schedule of frequencies in use by the Fire Support Ships and shore Fire Control Parties of UTAH Assault Force will be found in Table A of this appendix.

3. All ships are to be prepared to establish communications with any one of the Shore Fire Control Parties and to give fire support to that Party if so directed by Commander Bombardment Group. Numbers and frequencies of shore Fire Control Parties are permanently assigned. Call signs for the Fire Support Ships and Shore Fire Control Parties of UTAH Assault Force are given in Table A of this appendix.

4. The Naval Gunfire Spotter will go ashore in an early wave and will immediately establish voice communications with the assigned Fire Support ship using SC# 609, while the ship uses SC# 608; the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer with the Shore Fire Control Party ashore soon after the Naval Gunfire Spotter and immediately establishes communications by key with the assigned Fire Support ship using SC# 284. If the voice communications between the Fire Support ship and Naval Gunfire Spotter are satisfactory, the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer with key communications will assume a standby condition until the voice communications fail, at which time the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer will relay communication between ship and spotter.

5. The Commander Bombardment Group is going to guard the A.M. and F.S. common bombardment frequencies continuously. If a shore Control Party requires gunfire support in addition to that of the assigned ship(s) or requires gunfire support of larger caliber than that assigned, it will request such support from Commander Bombardment Group in FUSCALOOSA on the appropriate common bombardment frequency. Commander Bombardment Group is going to direct additional support as practicable. The shore Fire Control Party will be informed on the appropriate common bombardment frequency as to the ship assigned for support.

6. Fire Support ships are going to guard their assigned Shore Fire Control frequencies continuously after H-hour. Calls for support from the Shore Fire Control Parties of the 101st Airborne Division (501st, 502nd, and 506th Airborne Regiments) prior to H minus 40 will be made to the UTAH Assault Force Commander who alone will make the decision as to whether support will be given. The attention of Fire Support ships has been directed to the use of portable equipment by the shore Fire Control Parties; therefore, ship's receivers are going to search on both sides of the assigned A.M. frequency to receive the Shore Fire Control Party. Ship's radio operators have been instructed to match the speed of the shore Fire Control Party operators.

7. The A.M. assault signal book is the normal system to be used for bombardment communication. In addition, Shore Fire Control Parties will carry SLIDEX for coding and authentication when greater security is desired.

TABLE A

S.F.C.F.	with	Call	Frequency		Ship	Ship Call
Unit	Sign	Sign	FM	AM		Sign
1st Bn 8		POL	33.0	4270	HERNDON	NRH
					NEVADA	DVN
2d Bn 8		DMK	29.6	4185	SHUBRICK*	BHS
					ENTERPRISE	NTR
3d Bn 8		GUS	32.6	4797	SHUBRICK*	BHS
					CHERADI	RHG
1st Bn 22		BJV	30.2	4240	CORRY	RCR
2d Bn 22		JRM	30.5	4850	PITCHE	TIF
3d Bn 22		PNK	27.2	3900	HOBSON	BOH
					BUTLER	LTP
1st Bn 12		MVI	34.6	5717	EREBUS	SBR
2d Bn 12		SOR	33.4	5195	BLACK PRINCE	CLB
3d Bn 12		NGW	31.7	5060	TUSCALOOSA	SUT
501st		FVS	31.2		QUINCY	CNQ
		TIO, QAD				
502d		BWL	33.0	4270	NEVADA	DVN
		NOP, DSA				
506th		LGP	34.2		HAWKINS	RHJ
		K3B, QVS				
Common						
(See par			32.2	4355	ALL-SHIPS	
2a. & 2b						
this apper;						
dix						
359 RCT		DAC	33.8	5717	EREBUS	SBR
358 RCT		AFW	33.4	5195	BLACKPRINCE	CLB
Naval Li						
io with						
4th Div						
Arty Hq		BPE	32.2	4355		
29th FA Bn		REF	32.2	4355		
44th FA Bn		JAX	32.2	4355		
42d FA Bn		KQD	32.2	4355		

*2d Bn 8th supported by SHUBRICK until H / 85; from H / 85 SHUBRICK supports 3d Bn 8th.

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HQ 4TH INF DIV
 APO 4, US ARMY
 15 MAY 1944

ANNEX #9 to FO #1

ENGINEER ANNEK

1. Purpose:-- The purpose of this order is to coordinate and integrate all engineer operations on UTAH BEACH that pertain directly to the 4th Infantry Division.

2. Troops:

a. Assault Engineers:

(1) Attached to J2-8:

Company "A", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion
 Company "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion
 3d Platoon, Company "A", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion.

(2) Attached to 3d Battalion 22d Infantry:

1st Platoon, Company "C", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion.

b. 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

c. 1106th Engineer Combat Group:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1106th Engineer Combat Group.

(2) Beach Obstacle Task Force (Major Herschel S. Linn, Commanding):

237th Engineer Combat Battalion (less two (2) Companies)
 Company "B", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion.

Eleven (11) Heavy Combat Demolition Units

Detachment, (four (4) tankdozers with composite crews)

612th Engineer Light Equipment Company

Detachment, (four (4) tankdozers with composite crews)

70th Tank Battalion.

(3) 49th Engineer Combat Battalion.

(4) 238th Engineer Combat Battalion.

(5) 582d Engineer Dump Truck Company.

(6) 391st Engineer Roadway Bridge Company.

(7) Detachment, 612th Engineer Light Equipment Company.

(8) 2d Platoon, 3891st Quartermaster Truck Company.

d. 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less two (2) platoons).

3. Assault Engineers:

a. Phasing:

(1) Companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion (each less one (1) platoon), land at H+30 minutes with the assault battalions of CT-8. The two (2) remaining platoons land at H+37 minutes.

(2) 3d Platoon, Company "A", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion lands at H+95 minutes with 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

(3) 1st Platoon, Company "C", 4th Engineer Combat Battalion lands at H+85 minutes with 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry.

b. Mission: The mission of these assault engineers is to overcome obstacles to the advance of the infantry above the high water mark. A minimum of four (4) gaps in the seawall on the front of the 8th Infantry will be made.

- c. Operations: Each platoon will be equipped with thirty-six (36) Bangalore torpedoes for gapping wire entanglements; one thousand (1,000) lbs of explosive for breaching the seawall, three (3) mine detectors, and limited quantities of pioneer tools and gap marking equipment.
- d. Reversion: Companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion, will revert to the 1106th Engineer Combat Group on order of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, but not later than dark on D-day.

4. 1st Engineer Special Brigade:

- a. Phasing: The first elements of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade land at H+60 minutes and H+105 minutes, i.e., subsequent to the assault engineers and prior to the 1106th Engineer Combat Group.
- b. Mission: The mission of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade is to support the landing of the VII Corps in the UTAH area beginning on D-day by organizing and operating all shore installations necessary for debarkation, supply, evacuation, and local security in order to insure expeditious movement across the beaches.
- c. Operations: The first elements of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade to land will clear from the TALE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED) beaches east of the seawall all obstacles to the exploitation of exit roads U-5, T-3 and T-7, and will clear a lateral route between Roads T-7 and U-5 for the passage of vehicles of the 1106th Engineer Combat Group. Clearing of the area north of Road U-5 between the inundation and the sea in time for its use as a vehicle dispersion area for the 4th Infantry Division is likewise a task assigned to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. Location of supply and evacuation installations to be operated by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade on D+1 are given in Annex #4 to FO #1, "Administrative Order".

5. 1106th Engineer Combat Group:

- a. Phasing:
- (1) The Beach Obstacles Task Force (see paragraph 2.c.(2), above) lands at H+17 minutes. The tankdozers land at H+15 minutes.
 - (2) A reconnaissance party lands at H+60 minutes.
 - (3) The remainder of the 1106th Engineer Combat Group (two (2) combat battalions, one (1) dump truck company, one (1) tread-way bridge company, and a detachment of a light equipment company) lands from H+175 minutes to H+200 minutes.
- b. Missions: The 1106th Engineer Combat Group, attached to the 4th Infantry Division until such time as the bulk of the division and its supporting units have advanced across the inundated areas, has been assigned the missions of:
- (1) Preparing eight (8) passageways, at least fifty (50) yards wide, through the beach obstacles below high water for craft and vehicles (four (4) on TALE (GREEN) beach and four (4) on UNCLE (RED) beach).
 - (2) Conditioning of roads V-1 and U-5, across the inundation, on D-day, one road to carry Class 40 loads and the other to carry Class 10 loads.
 - (3) Conditioning a Class 40 lateral route between Roads V-1 and U-5, east of the inundation.
 - (4) Clearing obstacles and mines from the area east of the inundation between Roads V-1 and U-5 to provide for vehicle dispersal in this area.
 - (5) Later missions under VII Corps control have been assigned to the 1106th Engineer Combat Group.

c. Operations:

- (1) The Beach Obstacles Task Force will prepare the eight (8) passageways through all obstacles below high water mark. This will be done by combined use of explosives, tankdozers and mine detectors. It will continue to widen the passageways until relieved by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.
- (2) The two (2) combat battalions arriving at H+175 minutes and H+200 minutes will land, one on TARE (GREEN) Beach and the other on CHCLE (RED) Beach. To each will be attached detachments of the Treadway Bridge Company, the Dump Truck Company, and the Light Equipment Company. All vehicles will be rushed across the beach to the seawall and will then proceed south to assembly areas near the eastern exits of Roads V-1 and U-5 (See Annex #1, Operations Overlay No. 10). Necessary reorganization of working parties, vehicles and equipment, as indicated by reconnaissance, will be accomplished in these areas. Present plans provide for one (1) battalion to condition the Class 40 road, one (1) battalion to condition the Class 10 road. One (1) company, when available, will clear the parking area between Roads V-1 and U-5.

d. Reversions:

- (1) The 1106th Engineer Combat Group (less companies "A" and "C", 237th Engineer Combat Battalion) reverts to VII Corps either upon completion of one (1) Class 40 and one (1) Class 10 road across the inundated area, or upon the passage of the major portion of the combat teams of the 4th Infantry Division across the inundated area, whichever event occurs first. Elements will not be withdrawn from the vicinity of the inundated area.
- (2) Detachment (four (4) tankdozers), 70th Tank Battalion, reverts to control of CT-8 on landing.

6. 4th Engineer Combat Battalion (less two (2) platoons):

- a. Phasing: The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion lands from LST's on call during the 1st and 2d tides.
- b. Mission: The 4th Engineer Combat Battalion has the mission of supporting the attack of the 4th Infantry Division by engineer work subsequent to its passage over the inundated areas.
- c. Operations: At least one (1) route in the zone of each RCT beyond the inundated area will be opened by the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion. Plans will be prepared to open routes as follows:
 - (1) CR (432929) - CR (421939) - RAVENOVILLE.
RJ (351075)
 - (2) CR (421938) - MARIE DU MONT - LE BOUT DE LA VILLE - STE MERE EGLISE - RJ (309959) - ORGLANDES - CR (238987) - CR (222003) - LA CROIX DES AUNAIS (193024) - YVETOT BOGAGE (218060) - CR (211069)
 - (3) STE MERE EGLISE - MONTEBOURG - VALOGNES.

7. Combat Missions: All combat engineers will be prepared to assemble for combat on two (2) hours notice.

8. Water Supply: One (1) gallon per man will be carried in five (5) gallon cans on unit transportation for use on D-day and D+1 day. Water supply for the 4th Infantry Division beyond the inundated area will be provided by the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion. Water from portable units will be available on D+1 day.

9. Engineer Supply:

- a. All engineer elements carry with them sufficient engineer supplies for the accomplishment of their assigned D-day tasks except that sixty-four (64) tons of road and bridge material for use by the 1106th Engineer Combat Group must come in as "dead" load (i.e., not in vehicles or carried by personnel) and must be unloaded over the beach by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.
- b. Requests for all classes of engineer supply, including Class V (Explosives, Antitank mines, etc) will be submitted to S-4, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion. Normally requisitioning units will be required to furnish transportation to haul all supplies requested.

10. Map Supply: All units arriving prior to D+6 will be supplied with maps by the First United States Army, prior to departure from the UNITED KINGDOM. A small reserve will be carried by the 4th Division Engineer Section of Division Headquarters and by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. Requests for additional maps will be submitted to G of S, G-2, 4th Infantry Division.

11. Camouflage: Unit camouflage.

12. Communication and Liaison: Close contact will be maintained between all engineer elements and Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

13. Reconnaissance: Early and reliable engineer reconnaissance is vital to the successful exploitation of the initial attack. A Reconnaissance Party of the 1106th Engineer Combat Group, landing with the first element of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, will reconnoiter Routes V-1, U-5, T-7, T-3 and S-9 and determine which routes can be developed earliest and where supplies, equipment, and working parties are needed. Results of this reconnaissance will be made available to the senior officer of the 4th Infantry Division ashore and to the Commanding Officer, 1106th Engineer Combat Group at H+175 minutes.

BARTON

James
PROCEL

TOP SECRET - BIGOT

REFURNS

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:Date: 28 May 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
APO 4, US ARMY
28 MAY 1944

AMMUNITION #1)
to)
FO #1 (12 MAY 44)

Changes and additions are hereby confirmed and made a part of FO #1, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, 12 May 1944. Instructions contained in the paragraphs listed below will be substituted in FO #1 and annexes thereto.

MAP Reference: Map Sheet 6F/11 to read 6F/1.

Par. 1. b. (2) (c).

The 101st Airborne Division (less certain glider elements) will land by parachute and glider in suitable areas east and south of TROUVILLE (3796) commencing about H-5 hours on D-day with the principal mission of assisting the subsequent landing of the 4th Infantry Division by seizing the western margin of the inundated greenback of ULM BEACH between ST. MARTIN-DE-V. REVILLE (4098) and FOUFFEVILLE (4193), both inclusive.

The 101st Airborne Division will seize and hold the crossings of the CANAL DU PORT northwest of BREVEDS (1783) and a small bridgehead east thereof. It will also seize and hold the dam at 3966. It will seize and destroy the bridges southeast of ST. COME DE LOET (3687) on the lower DOUVE and GROLT rivers.

Par. 1. b. (2) (d).

The 82nd Airborne Division will land by parachute and glider at H-4 hours on D-day astride the REEDERSY river with one regiment east thereof. It will capture ST. MERE EGLISE (3196) and the strong point southwest of BEUZEVILLE AU FLAIN (3793) making contact with the 101st Airborne Division at that place. It will seize and hold the crossings of the REEDERSY at 315957, at 321930, and will destroy the crossings of the DOUVE east of BEUZEVILLE CASTILLE (3001) and south of FORT L'AMBE (2793).

The 82nd Airborne Division will destroy the crossings of the DOUVE at NEHOU (1998) and ST. SAUVAGEUR-LE VISOITE (1998), unless already destroyed by bombing, and will protect the south and east flanks of the VII Corps along the DOUVE River south and east of TERE DE BEUVAL (1900).

Par. 2. a. The 4th Infantry Division, landing on Beaches TARE (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED) assault ULM BEACH on D-day at H-hour, and, in conjunction with the 90th Infantry Division (to arrive beginning D-day), 9th Infantry Division (to begin arriving D+4), and 79th Infantry Division (to begin arriving D+8), will seize CHERBOURG.

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Amendment #1 to FO #1 - (12 May 44) (cont'd)

Par. 3. c. (2) Missions:

(a) CF 12 will land on Beaches T, R, S (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED) advance inland with two (2) battalions abreast, and seize objective as shown in Annex #1 (Operations Overlay #1a).

(b) CF 12 will secure the crossing over the HENDERSON RIVER at LA FORT BRUNY (304926).

(2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, is released to 12th Infantry control).

(c) CF 12 will relieve elements of 82d Airborne Division within their zone of action.

Par. 3. d. (1) Combat Team 359 (less 2d Battalion) (less detachments);
Commander: Col. Clark K. Fales, 359th Infantry Regiment.

Missions:

will land on D-day on Beaches T, R, S (GREEN) and UNCLE (RED), will assemble per Annex #1, (Operations Overlay #1a), in Division Reserve to be employed on right of division except in emergency.

Commanding Officer, 359th Infantry, will land with vehicles of 359th Infantry in Lave #8 and report to the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division at 4th Infantry Division CP immediately.

Par. 3. e. (1) (a) 8. 501st Light Pontoon Company.

Par. 3. e. (2) (d) 746th Tank Battalion (less Company "C" and one (1) Platoon Company "A"), upon crossing inundated area, proceed to vicinity of TURJEVILLE (377962) prepared to support the infantry attack to the north and northwest.

Par. 3. e. (2) (e) Company "C", 746th Tank Battalion (reinforced) will follow 746th Tank Battalion across inundated area, will be detached, and join 82d Airborne Division at place to be specified by Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division.

Par. 3. h. (2) Missions: Will reconnoiter within Division zone of action as far as line per Operations Overlay #1a, with priority to hostile movement from the west and from the direction of VILONGS.

Par. 3. x. (3) all assault elements of the 4th Infantry Division will make every effort to locate, contact, and assist personnel of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions in respective zones of action. Fires will be controlled to avoid firing on troops of the Airborne Divisions. 4th Infantry Division troops east of inundated area will not call for artillery, air, or naval fires in the zones of action of Airborne Divisions except on permission from the commander concerned or Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.

Par. 3. x. (4) all units of the 4th Infantry Division will be especially alert to push early and positive mutual recognition of elements of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions (Annex #5, Signal Communications).

Par. 3. x. (10) all combat elements will push reconnaissance forward and to the flanks. Commanding terrain gained by patrols will be quickly occupied by additional troops.

Par. 3. x. (15) Unit reports submitted to each Division CP at 0300 daily by regiments and separate units assigned or attached to 4th Infantry Division.

Par. 3. x. (22) Commanders, on committing reserves, will at once constitute a new reserve from their own resources.

TOP SECRET - BIGOT

Amendment #1 to FO #1 (12 May 44) (Cont'd)

Page 3 of 3 Pages.

Par. 3. x. (23) Violet smoke will be displayed by engineers only two minutes before major explosions on the beaches.

Par. 3. x. (24) The area shown in red and marked L 2 "7" on "Corrected Copy of Operations Overlay No. 10 and Annex No. 1 to FO #1, is a glider landing zone for 82d A/B Division. This area will not be used for an assembly area or for installations on D-day or D+1.

Par. 5. a. D-lets, "Units will break radio silence prior to the opening of naval bombardment at H-10 minutes", and substitute therefor, "Units will break radio silence only upon order of the Commanding General, VII Corps".

Annex A to FO #1, Signal Communications

Par. 3. a. Radio communication.

(1) Radio silence will be maintained in the marshalling areas.
(2) Radio silence will be broken prior to H-hour by the 82nd and 101st A/B Divisions.

(3) Artillery units may break radio silence at H-10 minutes.
(4) Radio silence will be broken at H-15 minutes to establish nets within approximately twelve (12) miles to seaward of beaches unless otherwise prohibited.

(5) About H-120 minutes radio silence may be broken for a short transmission from the VII Corps LSH to the DD tanks, using the Pre-arranged Message Code Group "HYE" meaning, "Tanks will not be disturbed". Reply will be "file". DD tanks may break radio silence at H-90 minutes.

(6) Division CW Command Net will be monitored beginning H-24 hours. Regimental and separate unit commanders will set the time for monitoring in their units.

(7) Radio nets will be established in accordance with Appendix 1, Annex B.

(8) 4th Signal Co will furnish operations for radio sets in the 4th Inf Div nets aboard the USS Bayfield.

Par. 3c(1) Channel #33 on SCR-300 will be monitored continuously after landing by 4th Inf Div Hq, all RCPTs and their Battalion Headquarters until contact is established with elements of the 101st and 82d A/B Divisions. Mutual recognition code word will be "ORANGE". The Recognition Code listed below will be used with the 101st A/B Div. The code word "ORANGE" together with authentication will be used with the 82nd A/B Div.

Par. 3d(3) Hq, 4th Div Artillery, will establish radio contact with Hq, 101st A/B Div Artillery, Hq 82nd A/B Div Artillery, and with the 66th Arm'd Pk Battalion.

BARTON

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G-3

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NEPTUNE

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HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, US ARMY
25 May 1944

AMENDMENT #1)
TO ANNEX #2 :
TO P.O. #1)

INTELLIGENCE

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Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: [Signature]
Date: 25 May 1944.

1. With reference to Annex 3 to FO #1, dated 14 May 1944, the following changes are made.

a. In paragraph 3 b, change "9th Air Support Command" to "Ninth Tactical Air Command".

b. Paragraph 8, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

8. Corps G-2 will maintain information center alongside of the Corps Traffic Headquarters at EJ 406922 (3363 4347, Sheet 24/18 NW, 1/25,000), beginning on D+1, to remain on duty until First Army takes over beach maintenance. Units coming ashore may obtain information on countersigns and the current tactical situation by inquiring at this information center.

[Signature]
HANSEN
G-2

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HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, US ARMY
29 May 1944

Amendment #2 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 12 May 1944.

1. Annex #6 to FO #1.

Field Artillery

add: Par. 3. c. (12) "The following procedure for the marking of air targets by colored artillery smoke will govern:

- a. From H/2 hours on D Day to last light on D/3, targets will be marked with RED smoke only.
- b. From first light D/4 to last light D/6, targets will be marked with VIOLET smoke only.
- c. The specific color of smoke that is being used to indicate air targets in par a. and b. above will not be used for any other purpose by artillery units during the periods shown.
- d. The use of colored smoke to mark a bombline in conjunction with the above method of indicating a target is optional".

2. Annex #7 to FO #1.

Air Support

add: Par. 7. "The following procedure for the marking of air targets by colored artillery smoke will govern:

- a. From H/2 hours on D Day to last light on D/3, targets will be marked with RED smoke only.
- b. From first light D/4 to last light D/6, targets will be marked with VIOLET smoke only.
- c. The specific color of smoke that is being used to indicate air targets in par a. and b. above will not be used for any other purpose by artillery units during the periods shown.
- d. The use of colored smoke to mark a bombline in conjunction with the above method of indicating a target is optional".

3. Appendix #2 to Annex #8 to FO #1.

Battery Neutralization Plan "Zebra"

Par. 4.c., next to last line, should read:

"FIQH"

14, 15"

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 Date: 30 May 1944

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HQ 4TH INF DIV
 AFO 4, US ARMY
 30-May 1944.

AMENDMENT #5 to FO #1, HQ 4TH INF DIV, 12 May 1944.

FO #1

1. Add the following to first paragraph to Par 1. b. (2) (c): "~~Will protect the south flank of the 4th Infantry Division~~"

2. Add Par 1. b. (2) (c): "Detachment 4th Cavalry Group Lt. Col. Edward G. Dunn, Commanding.

1. Will land on the TRES ST. MARCOUF at H-2 hours on D-day to capture and destroy any enemy installations thereon.
2. Upon relief by Detachment 535th AA Artillery late on D-day, will land on UTAH Beach and proceed to VII Corps CP to provide local guard.

3. Par 3. a. (2): The following sentence will be deleted: "CT's will be given a new mission when it shall have seized initial objective", and substituted therefor: "Will be prepared to push to west of BERDRET RIVER within zone of action of 82d Airborne Division preparatory to offensive operation(s) to northwest".

ANNEX #5 to FO #1, SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

4. Par 1. c.: Delete "VII Corps vicinity of LOUTRES", and substitute therefor: "VII Corps ashore with 4th Infantry Division ST. MARTIN DE V. REVILLE after 1800 D-day".

Correct: 9th Infantry Division to read - Vicinity of ROUVILLE (2599).
 Add: 79th Infantry Division - Vicinity of LES LAIDES (2502)

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HQ 4TH INF DIV
APO 4, US ARMY
31 MAY 1944

Amendment #4 to FO #1, Hq 4th Inf Div, 12 May 1944.

FO #1

1. Par. 3. e. (2) (d) (2) will be deleted and the following substituted therefor, "Prepare and maintain two (2) roads across the inundation on D-day, one (1) road to carry Class 40 loads and the other Class 10 loads. Maintain a Class 40 lateral route between the above mentioned roads east of the inundation. Clear obstacles and mines from the area east of the inundation to provide for vehicle dispersal between the two (2) roads prepared as described above."

2. Par. 3. e. (2) (d) (3) will be deleted and the following substituted therefor, "Upon completion of the mission (Par. (2) above), the 1106th Engineer Combat Group will undertake the work prescribed in Annex #2 to FO #3, VII Corps, Engineer Field Order, Par. 3. b."

Annex #9 to FO #1, Engineer Annex

3. Par. 5. b. (2) will be deleted and the following substituted therefor, "Conditioning of two (2) roads across the inundation on D-day, one road to carry Class 40 loads and the other Class 10 loads".

4. Par. 5. b. (3) will be deleted and the following substituted therefor, "Conditioning of Class 40 lateral route east of the inundation between the two (2) roads mentioned in (2) above".

5. Par. 5. b. (4). "Clearing obstacles and mines from the area east of inundation between the two (2) roads mentioned in (2) above to provide for vehicle dispersal in this area."

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: W. H. S.
Date: 28 May 1944

28 May 1944

SUBJECT: Postponement of D-day.

TO: See Distribution.

1. The following instructions apply in the event of any postponement of D-day which may be:

- a. From day to day over a period of three (3) days.
- b. ~~For fourteen (14) days.~~
- c. For twenty-eight (28) days.
- d. For fourteen (14) or twenty-eight (28) days, again followed by day to day postponement as in a. above.

2. In the event of a day to day postponement, the following procedure will govern:

- a. Troops will remain embarked on LSI, APA, and LST. Troops in LCI(L) and LCT still secured alongside quays may be disembarked, and distributed into adjacent accommodations. Troops in LCI(L) not secured alongside quays may also be disembarked if conditions permit. Those in LCT not alongside quays will not be disembarked.
- b. In the event it is impossible to disembark, all troops from craft lying alongside quays, priority will be given to those who have been embarked the longest.
- c. Before disembarkation, all officers and enlisted men will note carefully the location and number of their craft.
- d. All troops disembarked will remain in craft loads and no interchange of personnel will take place.
- e. Throughout the period troops are ashore, the officer in charge of troops of each craft will be responsible for the discipline of and security arrangements for his own craft load. No contact with unbriefed troops (other than sealed static staffs) or civilians will be permitted.
- f. No vehicles will be disembarked.

3. In the event of a fourteen (14) day postponement, the following procedure will govern:

- a. All troops less essential vehicle maintenance parties and guards will be disembarked.
- b. No vehicles will be disembarked.
- c. Troops will return to marshalling camps but will remain in craft loads.
- d. No contact with unbriefed troops (other than sealed static staffs) or civilians will be permitted. On arriving in marshalling camps, troops will remain sealed.

- 1 -

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4. In the event of a twenty-eight (28) day postponement, the same procedure will govern as for a fourteen (14) day postponement, except that troops may be assembled into units on order of the Corps Commander.

By Command of Major General BARTON:

Marvin H. Schmale

MARVIN H. SCHMALE,
1st Lt, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

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Engr O	13	4th Sig Co	37
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:Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div :
:Init: *M.H. eJ* :
:Date: 30 May 1944 :

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

AG 381

30 May 1944

SUBJECT: Location of 4th Infantry Division Command Post.

TO: Regimental and Separate Unit Commanders.

The initial established Command Post of the 4th Infantry Division will
be at Area: 402978 - 412631 - 414973 - 407674 - 406571 - 404970 - 402375.

By Command of Major General BARTON:

Marvin H. Schuecke
MARVIN H. SCHUECKE,
1st Lt, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

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OPERATIONS OVERLOOK
ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS XTH DISTRICT
SRS SOS ATO
AUTH: CO, XIX DIS
INIT: s/CIK
DATE: 30 May 1944

AGO 174
30 May 1944

SUBJECT: "L" Day.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Reference is made to Annex No. 2 (Force "U" & "B") to Field Order No. 1 this Headquarters, 13-4.
2. "L" Day is announced as 1 June 1944.

By order of Colonel WYMAN:

s/C. I. KILLAM
t/C. T. KILLAM,
Major, A.C.D.,
Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus

* * * * *
1-CC, 4th Inf Div.
* * * * *

Reproduced Hq 4th Inf Div.

AG 581 1st Inf

HQ 4TH INF DIV, AGO 4, U S ARMY, 30 May 1944.

TO: Regimental, Separate and Attached Unit Commanders.

For information and necessary action.

By command of Major General BARTON:

Marvin H. Schuelke

MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt., A. C. D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

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:Auth: CG 4th Inf Div:
:Initials: W. H. S.
:Date: 11 May 1944

11 May 1944

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

PART II

AFTER MOUNTING

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PART II

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS AFTER MOUNTING

SECTION I - Personnel.

1. Requisitions.
2. Flow of Replacements.
3. Evacuation Policy.
4. Promotion of Officers.
5. Demotion of Officers.
6. Reclassification of Officers.

SECTION II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities.

1. Army Exchange Activities.
2. American Red Cross Activities.
3. Reports and Returns.
4. Postal.
5. Finance Procedure.
6. Discipline.
7. Prisoners of War and Civilian Suspects.
8. Allied Prisoners in Enemy Hands.
9. Burials and Graves Registration.
10. Awards and Decorations.

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div.
Init: *YML*
Date: 17 May 1944

AG 300.4

17 May 1944

Subject: Amendment of Personnel Administrative Instructions
Part II, After Mounting, dated 11 May 1944.

To: Regimental, Separate and Attached Unit Commanders.

So much of paragraph 5b (1), Section II, of letter, subject as above, as provides for a twenty dollar (\$20.00) partial payment, is amended to provide a ten dollar (\$10.00) partial payment only to all individuals.

By command of Major General BARTON,

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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1 AC of S, G-3	6	1 MP Plat, 4th Inf Div	44
1 AC of S, G-4	7	1 704th Ord L Maint Co	45
2 AG	8 - 9	1 4th QM Co	46
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1 Cml O	11	1 6th Armd Cp Hq & Hq Co	48
1 Engr O	12	1 70th Tank Bn	49
1 Fin O	13	1 748th Tank Bn	50
1 Hq Comdt	14	1 377th AAA (AV) Bn	51
1 IG	15	1 65th Armd FA Bn	52
1 JA	16	1 801st TD Bn	53
1 Ord O	17	1 87th Cml Bn (Pz)	54
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PART II

SECTION I - PERSONNEL

1. Requisitions for Replacements.

a. Normal Requisitioning.

- (1) Normal requisitioning will be resumed on D plus 9 to allow time for flow of normally requisitioned replacements to begin at D plus 14.
- (2) Armored vehicle crews will be requisitioned as individuals.

2. Flow of Replacements.

a. Equipment. All replacements will be forwarded from replacement depots with complete individual equipment and weapons.

b. Individuals Returning from Hospitals. Individuals discharged from hospitals as physically qualified for duty with units to which previously assigned will be returned to their units as follows:

- (1) Combat Exhaustion Cases. From hospitals on the Continent by medical transportation direct to Rear Echelon, 4th Infantry Division, thence to units in the most expeditious manner possible. From hospitals in the UK through replacement channels to their own units without regard to requisition. Units will carry such returned personnel overstrength until absorbed.
- (2) All other cases. Through normal replacement channels except when the location of the hospital permits the direct return of discharged personnel to their units through Rear Echelon, 4th Infantry Division.

3. Evacuation Policy. On D Day and until hospital accommodation is adequate for retention of casualties, all casualties (except non-transportation) will be evacuated from the Continent to the UK. As soon as hospital accommodation on the Continent is adequate, all cases requiring not more than seven (7) days treatment will be retained on the Continent and as the build-up of hospitals permits, this period will be extended to fifteen (15) days, thirty (30) days and ultimately to such longer period as may be subsequently decided.

4. Promotion of Officers.

- a. Other than Battlefield. Promotions of officers, other than battlefield, will be processed in accordance with the provisions of Circular No. 4, Headquarters First United States Army, 9 November 1943, as amended, and AR 605-12, 3 February 1944.

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(Part II - Section I - Personnel, continued).

b. Battlefield Promotions.

- (1) All officers who have unquestionably demonstrated, in actual combat, their fitness for promotion to a higher grade may be recommended at any time, without regard to time in grade, provided that a position vacancy exists in accordance with Tables of Organization or Allotment for the unit. No officer will be promoted more than one grade at a time.
- (2) Commanders may recommend second lieutenants who have demonstrated, in combat, their fitness for promotion to first lieutenant without regard to position vacancies in that grade, provided the resultant number of first lieutenants will not exceed the total number of lieutenants (first and second) authorized by Tables of Organization.
- (3) Recommendations for battlefield promotions or appointments will be forwarded through command channels on the form shown in Appendix 1, "Prescribed Form for Recommendations for Battlefield Promotions".

c. Appointments as Officers in the AUS.

- (1) Warrant officers or enlisted men who have demonstrated their fitness for appointment in actual combat and who are otherwise qualified therefor may be recommended at any time for appointments as second lieutenants in the AUS provided that the total number of positions for lieutenants within the unit will not be exceeded.

d. Posthumous Promotions. Recommendations for posthumous promotions will not be submitted.5. Demotions.a. Demotion as a Result of Reclassification Proceedings. Officers may be demoted as a result of reclassification proceedings.b. Demotion of an Officer Unfitted for his Current Temporary Grade.

- (1) The temporary AUS grade of an officer other than a general officer may be terminated without reclassification proceedings when, in the opinion of a general officer, he is obviously unfitted for the temporary grade he holds, but is desirable or acceptable in a lower grade in the recommending general officer's command. This method of demotion is not a disciplinary measure, or a substitute for disciplinary action.

Action under this provision is not applicable to those cases in which the current grade of the officer concerned is a permanent grade in the Regular Army, National Guard, or Officers Reserve Corps.

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(Part II - Section I - Personnel, continued).

Demotion from permanent grade in the National Guard or Officers Reserve Corps involves relief from active duty and reappointment in an appropriate lower grade. This may be accomplished by reclassification proceedings. Reclassification board and convening authority may recommend discharge or retirement of a Regular Army officer under the provisions of the Act of July 1941 (55 Stat. 605).

- (2) Demotion of an officer, who holds no permanent commission, from a temporary grade in the AUS involves a complete separation from service and reappointment in an appropriate lower grade.
- (3) Recommendations for demotions of officers under these provisions will be addressed to the Commanding General, First United States Army. They will be accompanied by a special efficiency report and a copy of WD AGO Form 56-1 of the officer concerned. The recommendations, together with the efficiency report, must be transmitted to the officer concerned for comment and such explanation as he desires to make prior to being forwarded to this headquarters.
- (4) Each recommendation for demotion will contain the following information:
 - (a) Name, branch, and serial number of the officer concerned.
 - (b) Permanent grade in the Regular Army, National Guard, or Officers Reserve Corps, or a statement that the officer holds no such appointment.
 - (c) A statement supported by detailed recital of the evidence:
 - that the officer is obviously unfitted for his temporary grade,
 - that the officer is desirable or acceptable in a lower grade in the command of the general officer who initiates the recommendation, or in the command of a higher general officer through whom such recommendation is routed,
 - that, in the event action results in complete separation of an officer from the service, the officer concerned has indicated his willingness to accept appointment in an appropriate lower grade.
 - that the demotion requested is not punishment in lieu of action under court martial procedure or under the provisions of AW 104.

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(Part II - Section I - Personnel, continued).

c. Demotion for Reasons of Morale and Example.

- (1) When an officer in contact with the enemy, or when such contact is considered imminent, fails to perform satisfactorily the duties of his temporary grade under such circumstances that morale and example require demotion by the most expeditious means possible, his demotion may be requested by written communication to this headquarters.
- (2) This procedure will be used only when the failure occurs under such circumstances as to affect seriously the morale of others, or materially influence others from the proper performance of their duties. This method of demotion is not a disciplinary procedure or a substitute for disciplinary action.

Action under these provisions is not applicable to those cases in which the current grade of the officer concerned is a permanent grade in the Regular Army, National Guard, or Officers Reserve Corps. See sub-paragraph b, (1) above.

- (3) Each such request for demotion will contain the following information:

- (a) Name, branch and serial number of the officer concerned.

- (b) Present temporary grade will be identified as AUS.

- (c) Permanent grade in the Regular Army, National Guard, or Officers Reserve Corps, or a statement that the officer holds no such appointment.

- (d) A statement, supported by detailed recital of the evidence:

that the officer has failed to perform satisfactorily the duties of his present temporary grade;

that such failure occurred under such circumstances that morale and example require demotion by the most expeditious means possible;

that the demotion requested is not punishment in lieu of action under court martial procedure or under the provisions of AW 104;

that the conditions and circumstances are such that Army Regulations governing reclassification of officers would not be equally effective and desirable;

that, in the event action results in complete separation of the officer from the service, the officer concerned has indicated his willingness to accept reappointment in an appropriate lower grade.

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(Part II - Section I - Personnel, continued).

6. Reclassification of Officers.

- a. Unit Procedure. Under the provisions of Section I, Circular No. 95, Headquarters ETOUSA, 6 December 1943, First United States Army will, upon receipt of the recommendation for the reclassification of an officer, immediately issue orders transferring such officer to the Reclassification Center, ETOUSA.

Under this procedure the commander recommending reclassification of an officer will comply with paragraph 7 b, (1), (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f), C 1, AR 605-230, 5 November 1943, and Circular No. 280, War Department, 1943, before forwarding the recommendation to this headquarters.

SECTION II - MORALE, WELFARE AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

1. Army Exchange Activities.

a. Procedures on the Continent.

- (1) Gratuitous issue of semi-necessary items will be made by the Quartermaster to all troops until D plus 30.
- (2) Beginning on D plus 30 unit exchanges will be reestablished. The progressive rate of reduction of gratuitous issues by the Quartermaster will be in inverse ratio to such reestablishment. Units actively engaged in combat will always receive gratuitous issue of semi-necessary items from the Quartermaster.

2. American Red Cross Activities.

- a. Field Service. Established practice will be maintained on the Continent. All field service personnel attached to units will accompany such units to the Continent, together with their usual equipment and supply.

- (1) Field groups will be moved to the Continent as soon as the situation permits.
- (2) Field groups will not, except as specifically authorized by the Army Commander, assist Civil Affairs detachments in civilian relief operations.

3. Reports and Returns. (as required).

a. Casualty Report.

- (1) Reference: Circular No. 46, Headquarters ETOUSA, 22 April 1944, Casualty Reporting.

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(Part II - Section II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

- (2) Casualties will be reported in accordance with reference cited in sub-paragraph (1), above, and detailed administrative instructions to be issued by this headquarters and Headquarters First United States Army.
- (3) Casualties reports will be given special handling, as outlined in through D plus 5 Top Secret letter, this headquarters, file AG 704, sub, "Special Handling of Casualty Reports", dated 6 May 1944.
- b. Estimated Loss Report. An estimated loss report, listing by categories and numbers the killed, captured, missing and wounded and the total effective strength, will be submitted direct to this headquarters daily as of the previous midnight. (See Appendix 2 for proper form).
- c. Clearing Station Report. (Nominal List). S.O.P.
- d. Report of War Criminal Apprehension.
Reference: Circular No. 60, Headquarters First United States Army, 5 May 1944, "Prisoners of War and Civilian Suspects".
- e. Special Reports.
 - (1) Morale. Normally covered in G-1 Periodic Reports, but special reports will be submitted when required by matters of importance or unusual conditions.
 - (2) Civilian Population. Normally covered in G-1 Periodic Reports, but special reports will be submitted when warranted by unusual events or developments incident to control and administration.

4. Postal.

a. Policy.

- (1) Facilities for reception and dispatch of letter mail, packages, airmail, V-Mail, cablegrams, telegrams, and postal money orders will be established on the Continent as early as practicable. Exact dates will be announced by the Commanding General, First United States Army, in administrative orders.
- (2) Delivery and dispatch of surface letter mail on the Continent will start D plus 3; package mail D plus 10. Commanders of units in the assault and follow-up will include postal personnel in the earliest practicable shipment with this objective in view.

b. Incoming Mail.

- (1) Incoming mail which is accumulated in Postal Regulating Sections and Base Post Offices after the departure of the unit will be moved to the Continent as directed by the Commanding General, First United States

TOP SECRET

(Part II - Section III - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

Army, (D plus 3) under the supervision of the Postal Regulating Section or the Post Postal Officer.

- (2) Collection of mail from Postal Regulating Sections (and subsequently from railheads) on the Continent will be by unit transportation.
- (3) Undeliverable mail addressed to personnel who become casualties within this theater will be indorsed as indicated below by the unit commander or officer designated to certify the status of the addressee, and returned to the APO serving the unit, for disposition (Circular No. 273, War Department, 1943).
 - (a) Mail addressed to casualties whose status is "killed in action", "accidentally killed", "died in hospital", or "dead" will be indorsed "Deceased".
 - (b) Mail addressed to casualties whose status is "missing", "missing in action", "captured by the enemy" or "prisoner of war" will be indorsed "Missing".
 - (c) Parcel mail will be indorsed with the additional entry "Return to sender without charge by authority of the Third Assistant Postmaster General".
- (4) Mail for patients will be forwarded to fixed hospitals by the patient's organization as soon as this organization has received notification of the patient's location.

c. Outgoing Mail.

- (1) All correspondence and packages will be routed through Army Postal Service channels and will be subject to censorship.
- (2) Delivery of outgoing mail will be delivered to Postal Regulating Sections by unit transportation.

5. Finance Procedures.a. Fiscal.

- (1) Neither dollar nor sterling currency will be legal tender on the Continent. All personnel will be prohibited from accepting British or American currency. Personnel violating this order will be subject to trial by courts-martial.
- (2) All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions and all exports and imports of currency by any member of the armed forces is prohibited except as permitted under regulations as may be issued from time to time by authority of the Commanding General, ETOUSA.

(Part II - Section II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

b. Regular Payments.

- (1) Enlisted Men. Enlisted men will receive partial payments until further notice. Payrolls will be made up for twenty (\$20.00) dollar payments to all individuals who have sufficient accrued pay, and for ten (\$10.00) dollar payments for those who do not have sufficient accrued pay for the twenty (\$20.00) dollar payment; and will be submitted to the Finance Office one week in advance of the time payment is desired, if practicable. Payments can be made on shorter notice if necessary, providing too many units do not desire payments at the same time.
- (2) Officers. Officers' vouchers will be handled as usual, except that when partial payments are made in lieu of regular payments, each personnel officer will be responsible that the data concerning the payment is entered on the reverse of each officers' pay data card.
- (3) Currency. The smaller denominations of the authorized currency may not initially be available in sufficient quantities. In this case, agent officers will have to make change as they pay, by getting the smaller denominations as change from the men as they pay them.

c. Special Funds.

- (1) Army Exchange Funds. All receipts from sales at Army Exchanges will be deposited with the Finance Officer. The Exchange Officer will receive the original and one copy of Form No. 1044, and will forward the original to the Theater Exchange Officer.
- (2) Postal Funds.
 - (a) Postal money order funds will be turned in to the Finance Officer who will issue Form No. 38 and make remittance by PTA.
 - (b) Funds received from sale of stamps will also be turned in to the Finance Officer who will issue the original and one copy of Form No. 1044 to the Postal Officer. The original will be sent by the Postal Officer to the Postal Finance Officer.
- (3) Special Service Funds.
 - (a) WD Form No. 6 will be used in accounting for all secret or confidential expenditures, or those the details of which cannot be disclosed without jeopardizing the mission or being prejudicial to the public interest. If it becomes necessary to use this form, full instructions will be issued by the Finance Officer. All expenditures must be supported by receipts, certificates or other documents fully substantiating and explaining the expenditures.

TOP SECRET

(Part II - Section II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

- (b) All other expenditures will be handled according to existing procedure.
- (4) Enemy Funds. All enemy funds captured or otherwise coming into the possession of any personnel of US or attached allied forces will be promptly remitted without deduction to the nearest Finance Disbursing Officer, with full information as to the source from which these funds were received.
- (5) Funds of Deceased Military Personnel. All funds found on deceased military personnel, whether American or Allied, will be turned in to the nearest US Finance Office, together with all identifying information.

d. Other Payments.

- (1) Payment for Supplies, Services and Civilian Labor.
 - (a) Full instructions are contained in "ETO Procurement Regulations" and "ETO Labor Regulations".
 - (b) Purchasing and Contracting Officers will be appointed by this headquarters by individual special orders in conformity with Section III c, Procurement Regulations. They will also be appointed Class "A" Agents to the Division Finance Officer. Agents will be authorized to secure an advance of funds not to exceed \$1,000.00.
 - (c) Insofar as practicable, all local procurements will be paid for on a cash basis.
 - (d) Where procurements are made on other than a cash basis, the Finance Officer designated to make payment will normally be the nearest static finance officer, unless payment may be effected immediately, in which case the Division Finance Officer may be designated.
- (2) Advances of Funds to Civil Affairs Officers. Civil Affairs Officers in need of funds during the early stages of the operation and later in emergency situations, may secure such funds from the Division Finance Officer. The Civil Affairs Officer will present a properly completed Advance Voucher, approved by an authorized officer, to the Finance Officer. The form will be prepared in triplicate; original and duplicate to the Finance Officer, triplicate to the Civil Affairs Officer.

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(Part II - Section II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

6. Discipline.

a. Policy. Commanders will impress upon each individual in their respective commands that the conduct of the individual will influence the immediate and post-war attitude of the liberated countries toward his own. Each member of this command will so conduct himself as to reflect credit on his service and nation. His attitude toward and his relations with civilians of liberated countries will be such as to inspire respect for and confidence in our Army and our Government. Any tendency toward "rowdiness", braggadocho, or "snow-off" will be curbed by associates, by superiors, or by police. Punitive action, if required, will be prompt.

b. Enforcement.

- (1) Military, Naval and Air Force police of all forces of the Allied Expeditionary Forces are authorized and empowered by the Supreme Allied Commander to maintain order, enforce authority, and make arrests within the area of his (SHAEF) command on the Continent without regard to nationality of the personnel concerned or the service to which they belong. Commanders will publish the provisions of this order to all members of their respective commands.
- (2) Whenever practicable, arrests will be effected by police of the same nationality as the offender. Whenever it is necessary for the military police of one ally to arrest an offender belonging to forces of another ally, the offender will be turned over to the nearest organization (Army, Navy, or RAF, as the case may be) of the ally to whose forces the offender belongs, together with a report of the circumstances.

c. Courts-Martial Jurisdiction.

- (1) To conserve personnel, summary and special courts-martial jurisdiction will be centralized in each command. The number of courts-appointed will be held to a minimum.
- (2) By mutual arrangement an officer empowered to appoint courts-martial may exercise his court-martial jurisdiction over any individual or unit, of another command, placed under him for the purpose by the commanding officer empowered to exercise similar court-martial jurisdiction over such individual or unit.

d. Disposition of General Prisoners.

- (1) Sentences of confinement of general prisoners whose dishonorable discharge has been suspended will normally be served in a disciplinary training center on the Continent, when established.

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(Part II - Section II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

(2) Pending the establishment of a disciplinary training center the following procedure will be followed:

- (a) The Army Provost Marshal will provide facilities for the detention of general prisoners.
- (b) Normally, general prisoners sentenced to confinement in excess of twelve (12) months or whose dishonorable discharge is to be executed will be transferred to the US or to a disciplinary training center in the UK.
- (c) Officers exercising general court-martial jurisdiction will designate as the place of confinement a penitentiary in the US, a disciplinary training center in the UK or the Army stockade, in accordance with existing directives and subparagraph (b), above.

7. Prisoners of War and Civilian Suspects. Reference Circular No. 60, Headquarters First US Army, dated 5 May 1944.

a. Evacuation Policy.

- (1) In the early stages of the operation (i.e., before Prisoner of War camps are established on the Continent) all prisoners of war will be sent back to the enclosures to be established in beach areas or army service areas.
- (2) Evacuation of prisoners will not interfere with the circulation, movement or tactical employment of our own troops.
- (3) Civilian suspects requiring restraint will be segregated from prisoners of war during evacuation, processing and confinement.

b. Treatment and Care. Commanders concerned are responsible that treatment and care of all prisoners of war conforms to all provisions of FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (including provisions of Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929) and interpretations thereof issued by higher headquarters. Property rights of prisoners of war will be fully respected.

8. Allied Prisoners in Enemy Hands. The Army Commander will issue instructions based on forthcoming policies to be announced by SHAEP.

9. Burials and Graves Registration. Reference Circular No. 55, Headquarters First United States Army, 28 April 1944 "Army Burial and Graves Registration in Combat", and Memorandum No. 9, this headquarters, 4 May 1944.

10. Awards and Decorations.

a. Policy: Reference letter, this headquarters, "Award of Decorations", file AG 200.6, 17 April 1944.

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(Part II - Section II - Morale, Welfare and Religious Activities, continued).

By command of Major General BARTON:

J. S. RODWELL,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt., W. G. B.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

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TOP SECRET

PRESCRIBED FORM FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS

The following letter form is prescribed for all recommendations for battlefield promotions submitted to this headquarters;

(Unit)

(Address)

(Date)

SUBJECT: Battlefield Promotion of Officer.

TO: Commanding General, First U. S. Army, APO 330 (Thru Chamela).

1. Under the provisions of WD Circular No. 157, and No. 185, 1943, and existing policies of Headquarters ETOUSA and Headquarters First U. S. Army, it is recommended that the following officer, having clearly demonstrated his fitness for promotion by outstanding performance in actual combat, be promoted as indicated.

a. _____
(First Name) (Middle Initial) (Last Name) (ASN)

b. _____
(Grade held AUS) (Date of Order) (Grade to which recommended)

c. _____
(Duty Assignment) (T/O Number)

2. This officer has clearly demonstrated his fitness for promotion to the recommended grade by outstanding performance in actual combat as follows: (Detailed statement of periods, assigned duties and manner of performance in actual combat will be made).

3. A position vacancy exists in accordance with approved Tables of Organization or allotment for this unit, and the filling of such vacancy by the promotion of this officer, together with all previous recommendations and requisitions not acted upon, will not operate to exceed the number of position vacancies that are authorized to be filled by promotions under Tables of Organization No. _____, or allotment _____.

*4. By promotion of this officer the ratio of assigned officers (including those on unfilled requisitions) in the grade to the authorized number of

APPENDIX #1 to Plan II -
Personnel Administrative
Instructions after Mounting.

- 1 -
(over)

RESTRICTED

this grade will not exceed the ratio of the total assigned strength of all grades to the authorized strength and in no case will exceed 90% of the authorized allotment in this grade.

*Applies to positions vacancies of field officers only of organizations on an allotment basis. Delete when inapplicable.

(Signature) (OO or Chief of Section)

(Typed Name)

(Commanding (Grade and Branch))

1st Ind.

To:

1. Approved.

2. A position vacancy exists in accordance with approved tables of organization or allotment for this unit, and the filling of such vacancy by the promotion of this officer together with all previous recommendations not acted upon, will not operate to exceed the number of position vacancies that are authorized to be filled by promotion.

3. The 201 file of this officer (does) (does not)* contain any record of reclassification proceedings having been instituted in his case. It (does) (does not)* contain a record of court-martial proceedings having been instituted in his case.

(Signature)

(Typed Name)

Commanding (Branch)

*Cross out one not applicable.

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ESTIMATED LOSS REPORT

Unit Reporting _____

Period covered: 2400 _____ TO 2400 _____

Previous Effective Strength _____

Plus Replacements Received _____

TOTAL _____

Less Estimated losses for period:

Killed _____

Captured _____

Missing _____

Wounded _____

Estimated total effective strength - TOTAL _____

Signature

APPENDIX #2 to Plan II -
Personnel Administrative Instructions
after Mounting.

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TOP SECRET BIGOT

HEADQUARTERS VII CORPS
APO 307 U. S. Army

TOP SECRET:
:AUTH: CG-VII Corps:
:INIT: CJB
:DATE: 22 May 1944:
.....

22 May 1944

SUBJECT: Preservation of Enemy Installations and Material.

TO: See Distribution.

1. In order to permit the rapid development of the build-up in the NEPTUNE Area, it is considered essential to preserve certain installations from damage or destruction. It is directed that instructions be issued to insure that this is carried out to the greatest possible extent subject to immediate military necessity.

2. A general list of installations which are to be preserved for our own use is given in Appendix "A". It is also necessary to preserve stocks of enemy war material and certain headquarters and buildings containing valuable intelligence information. Bridges, especially rail bridges, which have escaped destruction by the enemy or which have not been demolished as part of the deliberate OVERLORD plan to delay enemy reserves, are to be preserved from damage or destruction.

3. A detailed list of specific installations which are considered of utmost importance is given in Appendix "B".

By command of Major General COLLINS:

s/C. J. Brucken
t/C. J. BRUCKEN,
2nd Lt., AGD.,
Asst Adj Gen.

2 incls:

- #1 - Appendix "A"
- #2 - Appendix "B"

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Reproduced Hq 4th Inf Div, 25 May 1944.

AG-600.3 1st Ind

HQ 4TH INF DIV, APO 4, U S ARMY, 25 May 1944. TO: Regimental, Separate and Attached Unit Commanders.

For information and compliance.

By command of Major General BARTON

RESTRICTED

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt., A. G. D.,
Asst Adj Gen.

Page 1 of 2 pages.

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4th QM Co	46
4th Sig Co	47
8th Armd Gp	48
65th Armd FA Bn	49
70th Tank Bn	50
746th Tank Bn	51
1106th Engr Gp	52-61
801st TD Bn	62
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Btry A, 13th FA Bn	65
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APPENDIX "A"

PRESERVATION OF ENEMY INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL

GENERAL LIST OF INSTALLATIONS

Abattoirs
Armament and Small Arms Works
Bakeries and Food factories
Breweries and Mineral Water Factories
Bottle plants
Dumps of signal equipment
Electrical Engineering works
Foundries
Garages with repair facilities
Hospitals and any buildings suitable for
Hospitals (e.g. Converts, Schools, Churches)
Industrial and agricultural Machine Works
Mairies and Labour Exchanges
Motor and Mechanical engineering works
Medical stores and Dispensaries
Oxygen and Acetylene Plants and Welding
Repair Workshops
ALL PUBLIC UTILITIES (Gas, Water, light, Sewage,
Transport)
Printing Presses
Police Stations and Prisons
Post Offices
Sheetmetal and Tinplate Works
Tinsmiths and Coppersmiths Workshops
Tank repair workshops
Warehouses of all kinds.

Incl. #1

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APPENDIX "B"

PRESERVATION OF ENEMY INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL

DETAILED LIST OF SPECIFIC INSTALLATIONS

<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>PLACE NAME</u>	<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>MAP REF</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	ALENCON	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	3438	
2	ARGENTAN	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	268180	
3	ARROMANCHES	RADAR Station	T-855864	In particular prevent unnecessary damage after the assault
4	BERNAY	Tunnel	7878	
5	CAEN	Two petrol tanks with blast walls	02.683	
6	CAEN	Underground Petrol Depot in wood	950650	
7	CAEN	Gold Storage (Magasins Alimentaires de Normandie)		
8	CAEN	Abattoir (Rue de la Gare)		
9	CAEN	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	045675	
10	CAEN	Barrage across river between Electric Power Station and Railway Station	044680	
11	CAEN	Railway and Dock facilities	0367-0669	
12	CHERBOURG	Control Point for demolitions	0 132227	Quarry at 30 slit unit to be given this task
13	CHERBOURG	Railway Workshops and locomotive Depot	142210	
14	CHERBOURG OCTEVILLE	German Naval Headquarters	0 132224	30 slit unit to be given this task

Incl: #2

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(APPENDIS "B" - Cont'd)

SERIAL NO.	PLACE NAME	INSTALLATION	MAP REF	REMARKS
15	DOL	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	983017	
16	DOUVRES	RADAR Station	U 005800	
17	FOUGERES	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	383733	
18	GRANDVILLE	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	126347	
19	LISEUX	Tunnel	4885	
20	LISON	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	528753	
21	MEZIDON	Railway Workshops and Locomotive Depot	225553	
22	NOYERS	Seven petrol tanks at Station	879628	
23	OUISTREHAM	New and old Lock gates and ancillary structures	118789	
24	OUISTREHAM	Petrol tanks	104761	
25	OUISTREHAM	Abattoir - SOUTH of water tower		
26	POINTE DE LA PERCEE	RADAR Station	T-622937	In particular prevent necessary damage after the assault.
27	PORT EN BESSLIN	Moles, Piers, Lock gates, Quays and Inner Basin	75 87	

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HEADQUARTERS VII CORPS
APO 307 U.S. ARMY

TOP - SECRET
AUTH: CG VII Corps
INIT: PMAI
DATE: 21 May 1944

SUBJECT: Special Units Operating in Target Area.

21 May 1944

TO : See Distribution.

1. It is desired that troops of your command be informed at time of briefing that the following special units will be operating in the target area:

a. 30 RN Assault Unit (Royal Marine Commando) 130 Officers and men.

Identification. May have an overall pass issued by SHAEF with photograph - not yet decided. In any case will have an identification card w/photo and will be dressed as follows: British Battle Dress - new type British steel helmet resembling a crash helmet - Shoulder patches on both sleeves consisting of black square patch with figures 30 in light blue.

b. U.S. Navy Ron. Party. (60 Officers and men)

Identification. Will wear green twill combat dress or protective clothing, regulation steel helmet. The insignia at top of sleeve near shoulder will consist of "U.S. Navy" - stenciled. Non-commissioned rate marks, (chevrons) will be stenciled on sleeves. Officers will wear insignia of rank on collar and have insignia of rank stenciled on helmets.

c. Naval Intelligence Officers.

Now attached to Corps and Divisions. Same as b for officers above except that they will wear Corps or Division patch in addition to "U.S. Navy" stenciled below the patch.

d. Employment of A/B Troops.

(1) All individuals will be briefed carefully on the operations of the 82d A/B and 101st A/B Divisions to prevent fire on friendly Airborne Troops and Troop carriers. Briefing will include:

(a) Scheduled times and landing of parachute and glider elements of the above Divisions in the CONTENTIN Peninsula which are:

1. Parachutists prior to H-Hour.

2. Glider borne troops at dawn and dusk on D-Day.

3. Glider borne supplies will be brought in on the night of D-1, D-Day and the Night of D-Day, D+1.

(b) That circumstances may result in wide dispersion of these troops.

- 1 -

TOP - SECRET
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TOP SECRET
BIGOT

(c) That a common countersign will be used by all troops (including airborne); and that, in addition, airborne troops are thoroughly familiar with the usual means of ground to ground recognition. The Airborne Divisions are authorized to use a secret challenge prior to H-Hour. (SOI, VII Corps, 17 May 1944, and VII Corps SOI-14 Special.)

(d) That it may be necessary to reinforce and/or supply these units by transport airplanes, with or without gliders.

2. As additional data on identification of units outlined in 1a and b, is received, it will be furnished you.

By command of Major General COLLINS:

/s/ C. J. Brucken
/s/ C. J. BROCKEN
1st Lt., A. G. D.
Asst. Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Reproduced Hq 4th Inf Div, 25 May 1944.

AG 381

1st Inf

(21 May 44)

HQ 4TH INF DIV, APO 4, US Army, 25 May 1944. To: Regimental, Separate, and Attached Unit Commanders.

For information and necessary action.

By command of Major General BARTON:

Marvin H. Schuele
MARVIN H. SCHUELE,
1st Lt., A. G. D.,
Asst Adj Gen.

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TOP SECRET
Date: 26 May 1944
Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: M.H.S.

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4 U.S. ARMY

AC 245.2

SUBJECT: Aircraft Recognition.

TO : Regimental, Separate and ATC class Unit Commanders.

1. Attached herewith Operations Memorandum Number 7, Headquarters First United States Army, APO 330, dated 17 May 1944.

2. All assault troops when briefed on Operation MERTUNE will be thoroughly indoctrinated with the markings of Allied aircraft as shown on attached Operations Memorandum.

By command of Major General BARTON:

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt., A.C.P.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Inclosure:
Operations Memo No 4, FUSA.

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4th Sig Co.	102
6th Armd Gp	103
65th Armd FA Bn	104-108
70th Tank Bn	109-114
746th Tank Bn	115-119
1106th Engr Gp	120-125
801st TD Bn	126-129
377th AAA (AV) Bn	130-133
87th Cml Bn (tz)	134-138
Btry A, 18th FOB	139
Btry B, 880th FA Bn	140
359th CT	141-150

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

Date: 22 May 1944

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY

Auth: CG, First Army

AFO 230

Initials: *RM*

Page No. 1 of 7 pages.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

22 May 1944

NUMBER 27

Reg No: 9-22-5

AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION - DISTINCTIVE MARKING OF AIRCRAFT

(NOTE: The information contained in this Operations Memorandum will be disseminated to all assault troops when briefed on continental operations, and to all troops during issue of orders prior to embarkation up to D plus 3. General distribution will be effected subsequent to D Day, at which time the classification is reduced to SECRET.)

1. GENERAL: Effective D Day, and continuing until altered, United States and British aircraft will carry the distinctive markings described in par. 2 below, in order that they may be more easily recognized by friendly naval, field, and air forces. The distinctive markings are in addition to the following U.S. and British national markings which remain in effect.

- a. U. S. Army Air Force - a white star on a horizontal white bar.
- b. Royal Air Force - a red, white, and blue roundel.

2. DISTINCTIVE MARKINGS:

a. All United States and British aircraft except four engine bombers, air transports, gliders, night fighters, and sea planes will be marked with alternate parallel black and white stripes:

- (1) On upper and lower wing surfaces, and
- (2) Encircling the fuselage, forward of the leading edge of the tail plane.

b. Single engine aircraft:


- (1) Upper and lower wing surfaces will be painted with five (5) alternate parallel black and white stripes, each eighteen (18) inches wide, parallel to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, arranged in order from center outward: - white, black, white, black, white, ending six (6) inches inboard of the national markings.
- (2) Fuselages will be painted with five alternate parallel black and white stripes, each eighteen (18) inches wide, completely encircling the fuselage, extending forward from a point eighteen (18) inches from the leading edge of the tail plane, in order white, black, white, black, white.

- 1 - (over)

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
(3) Sketch of markings:



E. Twin-engine aircraft:

- (1) Upper and lower wing surfaces will be painted with five alternate parallel black and white stripes, each twenty-four (24) inches wide, parallel to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, arranged in order outward from the engine nacelles: - white, black, white, black, white.
- (2) Fuselages will be painted with five alternate parallel black and white stripes, each twenty-four (24) inches wide, completely encircling the fuselage, extending forward from a point eighteen (18) inches from the leading edge of the tail plane, in the order white, black, white, black, white.

(3) Sketch of markings:



5 alternate black and white stripes, each 24 inches wide, to start outboard of engine nacelles.

5 alternate black and white stripes; each 24 inches wide, encircling fuselage.

d. Four engine aircraft and glider tugs:

Wings and fuselages will be marked as for twin engine aircraft with the wing stripes extending outward of the outer engine nacelles, in the order white, black, white, black, white.

g. Stripes will not be printed over national markings. Wing stripes will extend from the leading edge to the trailing edge of wings, but will not cover special equipment such as deicer boots.

3. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MARKED:

a. The following types of U.S. and British aircraft will carry the distinctive markings described in par. 2 above:

<u>U.S. Aircraft</u>	<u>British Aircraft</u>
----------------------	-------------------------

(1) Fighters and Fighter-Bombers, to include:

Single Engine:	Thunderbolt (P-47)*	Typhoon*
	Mustang (P-51)*	Hurricane II D*
		Spitfire*
Twin Engine:	Lightning (P-38)*	Mosquito*
		Beaufighter

(Note: The Lightning and Mosquito are also employed as unarmed Tac Recce and Photo Recce aircraft.)

- 3 - (over)

TOP SECRET

RESTRICTED

(2) Light and Medium bombers (Twin Engine), to include:

Boston (A-20)*	Mosquito*
Marauder (B-26)*	Wellington
Mitchell (B-25)*	

(3) Troop Carriers, to include:

Twin Engine:	Skytrain (C-47)*	Dakota*
Four Engines:	Skymaster (C-54)	York

(4) Liaison and Air O.P., to include:

Piper Cub (L-4H)*	Auster*
Stinson Sentinel	Fire Fly
(L-5)*	Barracuda

(5) Glider Tugs (Twin Engine), to include:

Skytrain (C-47)*	Albion
	Halifax

(6) Coastal Command, air-sea rescue, and disembarked Fleet Air Arm aircraft:

Single Engine:		Walrus
Twin Engine:	Catalina	Catalina
Four Engine:		Sunderland

*Indicates most important types, which may be expected to operate at altitudes between 500 and 3000 feet over friendly troops.

b. The following types of U. S. and British aircraft will NOT carry the distinctive markings:

(1) Four engine bombers, to include:

Fortress (B-17)	Lancaster
Liberator (B-24)	Stirling

(2) Air Transports, to include:

Cessna (UC-78)	Argus
----------------	-------

(3) Gliders, to include:

Waco (CG-4)	Horsa
	Hamilcar

(4) Night fighters, to include:

Havoc (P-70)

Nighthawk
Boafighter II

(5) Seaplanes:

4. AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION:

a. Friendly Aircraft:

(1) All troops will be advised of the above described distinctive markings and the fact that they are placed on aircraft as an aid to recognition.

(2) Air sentries, or air guards, and antiaircraft machine gun crews of all field force units must be able to recognize by appearance, as well as by distinctive markings, all aircraft marked with an asterisk in par. 3a above, and all gliders listed in par. 3b (3) above.

(3) In addition to aircraft referred to in par. 4a(2) above, AAA personnel must be able to recognize by appearance, as well as by distinctive markings, all aircraft listed in par. 3 above.

b. Enemy aircraft:

(1) Air sentries, or air guards, and antiaircraft machine gun crews of all field force units must be able to recognize by appearance the following German aircraft which may be expected to attack field force units and installations:

(a) Single Engine: FW 190, Me 109 (E, F, & G)

(b) Twin Engine: Me 410, Ju 88, Ju 188, He 177,
Do 217B2, Do 217K2

(c) Three Engine: Ju 52

(d) Four Engine: Ju 290

(e) Gliders: Gotha 242, Gotha 244, DFS-230

(2) In addition to aircraft listed in par. 4b(1) above, AAA personnel must be able to recognize, by appearance, the following aircraft:

(a) Twin Engine: Me 110, He 129, He 111, FW 189

(b) Miscellaneous: Me 323, FW 200K

(c) Seaplanes: Arado 196, BV 136.

5. Operation Memorandum Number 2, Hq. First U. S. Army, 29 December 1943, and any instructions in conflict with the above are rescinded.

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

S. A. Mackenzie
S. A. Mackenzie
Captain, A.G.D.
Asst. Adjutant General.

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CG, 3 Armd Div	253	1291-1465	32 Sig Constn Bn	655	3565-3570
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CG, 29 Inf Div	29	1741-1900	47 Ord Bn	230	3584-3589
CG, 30 Inf Div	30	1901-2075	48 " "	230	3590-3599
CG, 82 A/B Div	469	2076-2290	83 " "	230	3600-3606
CG, 99 Inf Div	125	2291-2415	84 " "	230	3607-3620
CG, 101 A/B Div	472	2416-2600	86 " "	230	3621-3628
CG, 1 Engr Spec Brig	230	2601-2745	99 Inf Bn	230	3630-3635
CG, 5 Engr Spec Brig	230	2746-2820	100 Ord Amm Bn	230	3636-3643
CG, 6 " " "	230	2821-2910	162 QM Bn	230	3644-3649
CG, 32 F.A. Brig	230	2911-2983	177 Ord Bn	230	3650-3661
CG, 47 AAA Brig	654	2984-3024	211 QM Gas Sup Bn	230	3662-3668
CG, 49 AAA Brig	230	3025-3209	310 Ord Bn	230	3669-3676
CG, 47 QM Gp	230	3210-3255	507 MP Bn	230	3677-3678
CG, 52 Ord Gp	230	3256-3258	509 MP Bn	230	3678-3684
CG, 224 Ord Gp	230	3259-3305	518 MP Bn	230	3685-3688
CG, 471 QM Trk Co.	230	3306-3336	602 Engr Camfig Bn	230	3689-3694
CG, 476 QM Gp	230	3337-3352	654 Engr Topo Bn	230	3695-3700
CG, 1103 Engr C Gp	230	3353-3377	987 F.A. Bn	230	3701-3706
CG, 1105 " " "	230	3378-3394	11 Port Co. Det B	230	3707

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Page 1 of 1 page.

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

.....
TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: *W. H. S.*
Date: 31 May 1944
.....

AG 373.2

Subject: Aircraft Recognition.

ToRegimental, Separate and Attached Unit Commanders.

Attached herewith for your information Amendment No 1 to Operations Memorandum Number 27, Headquarters First United States Army, APO 230, dated 29 May 1944.

By command of Major General BARTON:

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Inclosure:

Amend 1 to Operations Memo #27, FUSA.

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AC of S, G-1	6	4th SSG Co	102
AC of S, G-2	7	6th Armd Cp	103
AC of S, G-3	8	65th Armd FA Bn	104-108
AC of S, G-4	9	70th Tank Bn	106-114
AG	10	748th Tank Bn	115-119
CAO	11	1106th Engr Gp	120-125
Cml O	12	801st TD Bn	126-129
Hq Comdt	13	877th AAA (A) Bn	130-133
IG	14	87th Cml Bn	134-138
PII	15	Btry A, 13th FOB	139
Surf	16	Btry B, 980th FA Bn	140
8th Inf	17-31	359th CT	141-150
12th Inf	32-46		
22d Inf	47-61		
20th FA Bn	62-67		
29th FA Bn	68-73		
42d FA Bn	74-79		
44th FA Bn	80-85		
4th Engr C Bn	86-91		

- 1 - RESTRICTED
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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 230

Auth: CG, First Army
Initials: *[Signature]*
Date: 29 May 1944

Page No. 1 of 3 pages.

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO)
OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 27)

29 May 1944

2-29-5

AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION - DISTINCTIVE MARKING OF AIRCRAFT

(NOTE: Classification is reduced to SECRET effective D Day)

1. Par 2, DISTINCTIVE MARKINGS:

Add par b(4). Field Artillery and Liaison aircraft (Piper Cub L-4B and Stinson Sentinel L-5) are to be marked in the same manner as described in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) above, except that stripes are to be eight inches wide;

- (a) Wing markings end six inches inboard of national markings;
- (b) Fuselage markings begin eight inches forward of leading edge of the tail plane.

2. Par 3, TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MARKED:

Add par 3b(6) All aircraft of MAJ. Bomber Command, which will continue to carry their standard camouflage.

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

[Signature]
S. A. MacIntyre
Captain A. G. E.
Asst. Adjutant General

1478

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CG, 1 Inf Div	1	826-950	CO, 518 MP Bn	230	3685-3688
CG, 2 Inf Div	2	951-1100	CO, 602 Engr Camflg Bn	230	3689-3694
CG, 2 Armd Div	252	1101-1290	CO, 654 Engr Topo Bn	230	3695-3700
CG, 3 Armd Div	253	1291-1465	CO, 987 FA Bn	230	3701-3706
CG, 4 Inf Div	4	1466-1615	CO, 11 Port Co Det B	230	3707
CG, 9 Inf Div	125	1616-1740	CO, 14 Cml Maint Co	230	3708
CG, 29 Inf Div	29	1741-1900	CO, 60 Cml Co	230	3709
CG, 30 Inf Div	30	1901-2075	CO, 79 Cml Smoke GenCo	230	3710
CG, 82 A/B Div	469	2076-2290	CO, 80 Cml Smoke GenCo	649	3711
CG, 90 Inf Div	125	2291-2415	CO, 84 Cml Smoke Co	230	3712
CG, 101 A/B Div	472	2416-2600	CO, 87 QM Rlhd Co	230	3713
CG, 1 Engr Spec Brig	230	2601-2745	CO, 89 QM Rlhd Co	230	3714
CG, 5 Engr Spec Brig	230	2746-2820	CO, 153 Liaison Sq	595	3715
CG, 6 Engr Spec Brig	230	2821-2910	CO, 161 Cml Co	230	3716
CG, 32 FA Brig	230	2911-2983	CO, 165 Sig Photo Co	230	3717
CG, 47 AAA Brig	654	2984-3024	CO, 175 Sig Repair Co	230	3718
CG, 49 AAA Brig	230	3025-3209	CO, 215 Sig Depot Co	230	3719
CG, 47 QM Gp	230	3210-3255	CO, 216 QM Salv Rep Co	507	3720
CG, 52 Ord Gp	230	3256-3258	CO, 224 QM Salv Rep Co	649	3721
CG, 224 Ord Gp	230	3259-3305	CO, 233 QM Salv CollCo	230	3722
CG, 471 QM Trk Co	230	3306-3336	CO, 235 QM Salv CollCo	230	3723
CG, 476 QM Gp	230	3337-3352	CO, 274 Ord Maint Co	230	3724
CG, 1103 Engr C Gp	230	3353-3377	CO, 277 Ord Maint Co	230	3725
CG, 1105 Engr C Gp	230	3378-3394	CO, 279 QM Refrig Co	507	3726
CG, 1109 Engr C Gp	3050	3395-3430	CO, 294 QM Salv Rep Co	813	3727
CG, 1111 Engr C Gp	230	3431-3458	CO, 345 QM Depot SupCo	230	3728
CG, 1113 Engr C Gp	230	3459-3490	CO, 348 QM Depot SupCo	152	3729
CG, 1st Engr Sp. Brig Gp	308	3491-3550	CO, 428 MP Escort GdCo	513	3730
CG, 17 Sign Opns Bn	230	3551-3557	CO, 437 MP Escort GdCo	513	3731
CG, 25 Ord Bn	230	3558-3564	CO, 456 QM Ldry Co	160	3732
CG, 32 Sig Constn Bn	655	3565-3570	CO, 465 Engr Depot Co	230	3733
CG, 35 Sig Constn Bn	230	3571-3576	CO, 472 MP Escort GdCo	513	3734
CG, 40 Sig Bn	230	3577-3583	CO, 482 MP Escort GdCo	513	3735
CG, 47 Ord Bn	230	3584-3589	CO, 501 QM Rlhd Co	230	3736
CG, 48 Ord Bn	230	3590-3599	CO, 503 QM Car Co	230	3737
CG, 83 Ord Bn	230	3600-3606	CO, 506 QM Car Co	230	3738
CG, 84 Ord Bn	230	3607-3620	CO, 552 MP Escort GdCo	513	3739
CG, 86 Ord Bn	230	3621-3629	CO, 553 QM Rlhd Co	230	3740
CG, 99 Inf Bn	230	3630-3635	CO, 553 MP Escort GdCo	513	3741
CG, 100 Ord Amm. Bn	230	3636-3643	CO, 554 QM Rlhd Co	651	3742
CG, 162 QM Bn	230	3644-3649	CO, 560 QM Rlhd Co	584	3743
CG, 177 Ord Bn	230	3650-3661	CO, 579 QM Ldry Co	518	3744
CG, 211 QM Gas Sup Bn	230	3662-3668	CO, 581 QM Sales Co	505	3745

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 230

SECRET
Auth: CG, First Army
Initials: *192*
Date: 24 May 1944
K-791

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

24 May 1944

NUMBER 30

MOVEMENT OF UNITS AND DETACHMENTS
FROM BEACHES TO INITIAL DESTINATIONS INLAND

1. General.

The delineation of responsibilities and the procedure for initiating and handling movements of all units of the First Army will vary according to successive phases of the operation. These phases and the procedure in each will be as follows:

a. Phase I - From time of initial landings on D Day until setting up of First Army Troop Movements Section and Traffic Headquarters.

During this phase all movements of units, both Corps and Army, will be a function of respective assault Corps.

b. Phase II - From time of establishment of First Army Troop Movements Section and Traffic Headquarters until Corps rear boundaries are set. During this phase all movements will be controlled by First Army, as follows:

(1) Decision to move units will be based on recommendations by G-3, based upon tactical considerations. Decisions to move administrative units will be based upon recommendations from G-4. These decisions will be communicated through G-3 Troop Movements Section to Traffic Headquarters for execution.

(2) Traffic Headquarters, upon receipt of the above information from G-3 Troop Movements Section, will schedule, execute and control such movements, coordinating with all other affected traffic control agencies.

The responsibility of First Army will extend from the beaches inclusive to the Division rear boundaries. First Army will directly coordinate all initial movements from the beach areas of both Corps and Army units. To facilitate this, Corps will furnish Army Troop Movements Section with initial destination of each of their units. Corps will provide own guide system for their units. For any other movements desired by Corps, other than initial movements from beaches, Corps will make necessary plans and coordinate direct with Army Traffic Headquarters for clearances on movements.

c. Phase III - From time Corps rear boundaries are set until Army rear boundary is set.

During this phase all movements forward of Corps rear boundaries become a function of respective Corps; those from the Corps rear boundaries to the beaches inclusive remain a function of Army. For initial movements from beach areas Corps will continue to furnish destinations of their respective units to Army G-3 Movements Section, and to operate necessary guide system.

d. Phase IV - After Army rear boundary is set.

All movements between Corps rear boundaries and Army rear boundary will be a function of Army, operating under Circular 36, Hq. First Army, dated 22 March 1944. In rear of Army it will be a function of the Communication Zone. Army and Corps will continue to operate guide system from beaches for respective Army and Corps units and detachments.

1 (over)
S-E-C-R-E-T

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Operations Memo No. 30, Hq First Army, 24 May 1944 (cont'd)

2. Vehicle Cards:

Each vehicle before embarking will have a blank card of approximately 12 inches by 8 inches attached to its radiator grill. The responsibility for procuring and attaching such cards rests with the unit commander. Cards are not available from normal supply sources but will be improvised from materials on hand. These cards will be marked in the transit areas to show the road junction at which the convoy, en route to its destination, leaves the main lateral highway.

3. Function of Troop Movements Section, G-3.

a. Based on daily information received from BUCO through the Amphibious Section, First U.S. Army, by dispatch boat and radio, furnish Army G-4, Corps, ADSEC and IX Air Force with daily list showing the following information, relative to units to land: List index number, unit serial number, beach, day and tide.

b. Obtain from Army G-4, Corps, ADSEC and IX Air Force, the desired destination of units shown on above list.

c. Furnish Army Traffic Headquarters with daily list containing the following information relative to units to land: beach, day and tide, number of personnel and vehicles, destination.

d. Issue necessary emergency priority instructions to Traffic Headquarters.

4. Functions of Army Traffic Headquarters.

a. Establish a Traffic Sub-Headquarters in each Beach Maintenance Area located near respective Traffic Headquarters of 1st Engineer Special Brigade and Engineer Special Brigade Group. Each Traffic Sub-Headquarters will issue necessary instructions to Liaison Parties regarding movement of units for which they are responsible; this will include information as to what transit area a unit is in, route from transit area to the main lateral highway, time of departure, instructions for marking of vehicle cards on radiator grills, routes to destination.

b. Assign letter designations to road junctions leading from the main lateral highway to destinations inland.

c. Furnish Troop Movements Section a consolidated report of units clearing transit areas, every six hours, starting at midnight.

5. Functions of Liaison Party and Guides.

a. The procedure for getting a unit to its proper destination from the beach area is based on traffic regulation and control and the use of liaison parties and guides. Traffic regulation and control are provided to facilitate the movement of traffic and to assist a unit to get to its destination, but it in no way relieves liaison parties and guides of the basic responsibility of getting units to their proper destination.

b. Army Special Staff Sections, Corps, Advance Section Communication Zone and IX Air Force will furnish, on call, liaison parties at each Army Traffic Sub-Headquarters established adjacent to the Traffic Headquarters of Engineer Special Brigade Group and 1st Engineer Special Brigade in respective Beach Maintenance Areas. These Liaison Parties should be kept as small as possible but should consist of a minimum of 2 officers and 2 enlisted men.

Operations Memo No. 30, Hq First Army, 24 May 1944 (cont'd)

Liaison Parties will be responsible for insuring the arrival of necessary unit and detachment guides, their briefing, their dispatch to transit areas, their further instruction at transit areas, and the movements of units and detachments from Transit Areas to destinations, in accordance with instructions received at each Army Traffic Sub-Headquarters.

c. Qualified guides, officers where practicable, will be provided on the following basis:

(1) Vehicles:

One guide per 25 vehicles or part thereof.

(2) Personnel:

One guide per battalion, comparable, or smaller unit provided unit is destined for one bivouac area. If unit is destined for more than one bivouac area, one guide will be provided to each area.

d. Liaison Parties will require all guides to report to Traffic Sub-Headquarters, in their respective Beach Maintenance Area, at least three hours prior to landing tide, to receive necessary instructions. It will be the responsibility of Liaison Parties to see that each guide is furnished with the necessary 1/50000 map for the movement of his unit or detachment. A small reserve of maps will be kept on hand at each Traffic Sub-Headquarters.

e. Liaison Parties and guides are responsible for providing their own rations.

6. Functions of 1st Engineer Special Brigade and Engineer Special Brigade Group.

a. Establish a Traffic Headquarters in each Beach Maintenance Area. This Headquarters will establish and maintain communications with its respective transit areas. It will notify Army Traffic Sub-Headquarters of the units logged in at the transit areas, giving unit designations, number of vehicles and personnel, and transit area designations. It will also notify Army Traffic Sub-Headquarters every six hours, beginning at midnight, of units which have cleared the transit areas, giving unit designations, number of vehicles and personnel, and time units cleared transit areas.

b. Furnish necessary personnel at each transit area to properly administer it. Transit areas will perform the following functions: log incoming units; route them to locations within the transit area; dispatch them from transit areas as prescribed by Army Traffic Sub-Headquarters; notify respective Engineer Traffic Headquarters of arrival of units in its transit area giving unit designations, time of arrival and number of vehicles and personnel.

c. Signpost and provide Military Police along exit routes from transit areas to the main lateral highway.

d. Movement of units from beaches to transit areas will be the responsibility of Engineer Special Brigades.

7. Functions of Traffic Control (PM):

a. Establish the necessary TRP's and TCP's as directed by Traffic Control Plan.

b. Furnish escorts for emergency priority moves.

c. Notify Army Traffic Sub-Headquarters of any road blocks or routings.

d. Provide emergency Michelin marking when necessary on routes leading from the main lateral highway to general area of destinations.

Operations Memo No. 30, Hq First Army, 24 May 1944 (cont'd)

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL

J. BOCHYCORIO
J. BOCHYCORIO,
Major, A. G. D.
Asst. Adjutant General.

V. B. KWAN,
Brigadier General, U. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

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
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
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GRAPHIC SCALE



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


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
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JUNE 8



and turned back after advance to this position the second day

strongest force by 200

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
Heavy damage and losses w/ glider landings

50% or less effective

80% captured



Bridges blown up by air bombardment


CARENTAN




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MAPS LA HAYE-DU-PUITS	
6E/5	
VALOGNES	
6E/3 ⁴	

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 4
 JUNE 9, 1944 2200
 MAPS: LA HAYE-DU-PUITS
 6 E/5
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 6 E/3 AND 4

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
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
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
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


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
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4th Div

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


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(Badly depleted and disorganized)

XX 4
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VALOGNES
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


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

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

Positions at dawn
June 12

Historical Section
4th Div




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
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VII



June 12, 1944



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NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF OPERATION

BEACHHEAD

After midnight the transports began to slow down until at last they were barely creeping along following the minesweepers. About 2:00 AM the ships dropped anchor. We were across the channel. So far we had met no opposition from the Germans. But now we were anchored eight miles from an enemy coast line, where Hitler swore that any Allied troops who landed would not live to the end of the day. What plans did the Germans have for destroying us? Did they know yet that we had come? It was not long till the latter question was answered; the western sky blazed with searchlights and heavy flak which kept going up and grew in violence. That would be Jerry's greeting to our airborne landing. The fighting had started.

The 4th Division's turn was next. But we had five hours yet to sweat out before the first waves hit the beach. Those were tense hours. On the USS Dickman and _____ the 1st and 2nd Bns 8th Inf., the first two battalions to land, had an early breakfast and then, an hour and a half before dawn, began loading in landing boats. On each transport, eight LOVP's were swung on davits beside the rail, four more came to the shipside and tied up at the foot of the landing nets. There was a rough sea that morning and the boats far down on the black surface of the water were jumping and bouncing dangerously. Weapons, ammunition, radios, all the equipment of the initial landing, had to be lowered to those boats in total darkness, and the men in full equipment had to climb down the nets. Here training paid off, and the disembarkation went with the smoothness of a drill; not a man was lost. Before the first traces of dawn appeared, all the LOVP's of the early waves had loaded, pulled away from the ships, and were cruising in circles, waiting for H-hour.

All this time our planes were pounding the beach; the distant thump of the bombs could be heard on the ships and in the circling boats. It was a good sound. It went on, through the dawn and the gathering daylight. Then at 5:30 the Naval barrage thundered down on the beach. The battleships Nevada and Enterprise, five cruisers, and eight destroyers turned their guns on the Heine defenses. At the same time, the twenty LOVP's of the first wave swung into line and headed for shore.

In the first wave were the four beach-assault companies -- B, C, E and F, 8th Inf. These companies had been reorganized for the landing into assault sections of

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The company contained four assault sections. Each section occupied one boat, while the company's fifth boat carried

The twenty boats carrying the four beach-assault companies moved at full speed toward shore. Close behind and on the flanks ran naval support craft, small fighting boats armed with machine guns and rockets. Out in front naval crews were already at work removing mines and underwater obstacles. Farther ahead, a line of bursting shells on the horizon marked the beach where our naval barrage was falling. There was little enemy fire in reply. As the first wave drew closer to shore, a few rocket salvos and an occasional 88 shell splashed in the water, missing all our boats. One naval patrol boat was hit; Co G passed it turned upside down. But nothing could lower the spirits of the 4th Division men now. This was action at last. This was what they had been waiting for two years. They were raring to go, and it was sure to be a tough job for anyone to stop them.

The boats of the first wave changed formation from columns forming a line which stretched a mile from flank to flank. They roared on toward the vacant beach, closing in on the naval barrage until they were within 500 yards of the line of bursting shells. Then on a smoke signal sent up by company commanders the barrage lifted. Seconds later the boats touched down about 200 yards from shore, in waist-deep water. Companies E and F hit exactly at H-hour 6:50. E and G's boats had fallen a little behind, touched down ten minutes later. As the ramps dropped, the men jumped out yelling like Indians; some, carrying the Indian act all the way, had faces smeared with paint and hair cut like Mohawk warriors. The assault companies struggled through the 200 yards of water toward the beach, waving rifles and shouting

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"We're on French soil, goddamn, we're on French soil!"

The day had not started the way the Germans intended it to. They had planned to destroy us on the water, or, failing that, to completely annihilate us on the beach. They had made elaborate preparations for receiving us. They had mined the water, the beach and the dunes. They had a lot of doodlebugs, automatic tankettes carrying 300 pounds of TNT, parked in holes in the dunes with runways sloping down to the beach; these gadgets were supposed to be launched at the right moment to charge down to the water and explode among our troops wading in. ~~The beach was to be heavily covered by the fire of machine guns and 88's.~~ The bulk of these weapons were grouped in fortified strongpoints spaced every 500 to 1000 yards along the coast, there being five in the two-mile stretch taken by the assault battalions of the 4th Division. (See map of the landing beach.) The strongpoints contained both concrete pillboxes and open emplacements, with machine guns, AT and AA guns, 88's and other weapons, protected by trenches, minefields and barbed wire. ^

with They were supported by artillery and screaming mimis from many inland positions; prepared artillery concentrations covered the water's edge, the beaches and the area just behind the dunes. Farther north were large forts with 150 mm. and 210 mm. guns capable of firing far out to sea.

As an additional precaution, to make sure of holding us on the beach until they could wipe us out, the Heinies had created a big swamp just in from the shore. By damming the drainage ditches in that ^{flat} country, they had flooded an area one to two miles wide down the whole length of the coast. There were but few roads across this flooded area, by defending the exits of which the enemy expected to hem us in on the beach and slaughter us there.

The Allied Command understood this scheme of the Heinies and ^{made} the play to beat it.

The 101st Airborne Division landed before daylight and seized the exits of the causeway on the inland side of the swamp. The 82nd Airborne Division landed farther west and took the town of Ste. Mere Eglise which controlled the main roads leading toward the landing beach, which threw a wrench into the movement of German reinforcements.

By the time the 4th Division landed, the Germans were terribly confused. Units had lost

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contact with each other and with higher headquarters. The German Supreme Command did not know all day what was happening. The beach garrisons in front of the landing knew nothing except that they were cut off from the land and attacked from the sea. Stunned by the terrific bombardment, they had no time to recover their senses before they were overrun by a long line of howling soldiers coming up out of the sea. Some of the strongpoints never got a chance to fire. Some machine guns and a couple of 88's fired on the first wave crossing the beach, but were soon knocked out. The doodlebugs were never launched; they stayed in their holes until our engineers removed them. Everything was moving too fast, and the Krauts on the beach didn't have the guts to take it all. They folded as the assault battalions hit them.

All the vast work of the Atlantic Wall, which the Heinies had been building for two years, lasted hardly two hours. Before 9:00 the 1st and 2nd Battalions 8th Infantry had destroyed all resistance on a two-mile stretch of the beach. By that time, the 3rd Battalion of the 8th, as well as the 3rd Battalion 22nd and the 70th Tank Battalion, had landed. CT 8 and the tanks crossed the flooded area on three roads and drove to the west, slashing through the scattered and unorganized enemy resistance. At the same time the 3rd Battalion 22nd began an attack northward along the coast, knocking out pillboxes one by one.

When the other two battalions of the 22nd landed they had to wade two miles across the swamp because the roads were jammed with other traffic. The water, waist deep in most places, was full of holes and ditches where men disappeared over their heads. The enemy on both sides kept firing machine guns across the water. It was a slow difficult march, taking all afternoon; but when it was completed, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 22nd continued to advance northward until dark.

OT 12 landed in the afternoon and moved at once into line between the 8th and 22nd.

While the combat elements were pushing inland the rest of the division and attached troops were steadily landing. Wave after wave the small boats, LCT's and LST's hit the beach with the regularity of breakers. The Germans, partially recovering in the late morning from their confusion, began to shell the beach. For the rest of the day, that beach was the hottest spot on the peninsula, and there were four signal fires in the middle and later waves. The

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(Chapter 2) - Beachhead (Cont'd) - Pt. 2.

whole of Battery B 1 29th ~~71/444~~ Field Artillery was lost in one blow when their LOT hit a mine. But neither mines nor shells delayed the landing. All afternoon and evening a steady stream of vehicles poured inland over the middle causeway (U5). And while the Germans kept pounding the beach all day, the dumbkopfs never dropped a round ^{on} that vital road.

When the score was counted that night, the 4th Division had established a front 4 to 6 miles inland, which with the points occupied by the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, gave VII Corps a powerful position for further operations. All the combat elements of the Division, except the 20th Field Artillery ¹, were ashore, in addition to great numbers of service troops. Many supporting elements of the airborne divisions also landed over the 4th Division beach. On this day the 4th successfully accomplished one of the most important missions ever assigned a U.S. division.

Two other Allied beachheads were established simultaneously, east of the VII Corps. The American V Corps (1st and 29th Divisions) landed near Bayeux and the British near Caen. The Nazis realized the terrible danger to them of the Allied landings. Hitler issued orders that day to Rundstedt and Rommel that the beachheads must be annihilated not later than that night.* Even Hitler never spoke emptier words than those. The German commanders knew that such a thing was utterly impossible. They had a somewhat more practical plan. If they could delay us long enough to rush in their reserves and build a strong defensive line, they would confine us on narrow beachheads, as they had done once before at Anzio, and let us rot there. The way this would have worked on the VII Corps beachhead can be seen on the map.

*Official Journal German Seventh Army.

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D-day (Cont'd) - Pg. #2.

surrounded. OT 8 had gotten within a mile and a half of them on the east and south, but between the 8th and the town, three or four German Bns were entrenched from Turqueville to Coqueris. These enemy forces must be wiped out, the 507th relieved, and our hold on Ste. Mere Eglise made secure, before the Division could go on to its objective. That was OT 8's job for D plus 1 day.

D + 1 Day - June 7

OT 8 attacked with all three Bns against the enemy ^{who stood} positions between them and Ste. Mere Eglise. The 1st Bn captured Turqueville and the whole enemy Bn which was defending it, the 2nd cleaned out ~~the~~ Escoquensauville, while the 3rd in a fierce fight destroyed the Germans ~~at~~ ^{at} Coqueris and Fairville. While these fights were going on, the Germans had gotten together a strong force including quite a number of tanks, and made a desperate attack against the 507th ⁱⁿ trying to retake Ste. Mere Eglise before OT 8 could get to it. An officer of the 507th ⁱⁿ succeeded in getting through to the 4th Division with a request for assistance, especially against the German tanks. General Barton ^{sent} Co B, 747th Tank Bn and Companies A and B 80th Tank Bn to aid the parachutists. These units got thru to Ste. Mere Eglise, engaged and defeated the Panzers, and helped to drive the Germans back to the north.

By the time this fight was over, the Bns of the 8th had finished their battles and moved up to a line just north of the town. The Germans who had just tried to recapture Ste. Mere Eglise were now in position just northwest of the town, right in front of the 8th Inf. The town was not secure while the enemy remained there, and Col MacNeely ^(and Co B 8th Inf) decided to get them out before dark. MacNeely's ^{battalion} in cooperation with a ^{battalion} of the 507th ⁱⁿ which was next to them, made an attack from front and flank and just before dark rolled up the enemy ⁱⁿ line and drove them away to the north. This attack finished the job on Ste. Mere Eglise. It was now completely ours.

While OT 8 was taking out the interference at Ste. Mere Eglise, OT 12 advanced rapidly straight toward the Division objective. The Germans had a fortified strongpoint near Beuseville, and were also defending the villages of Beuseville, Bardienville, and Heuville-du-Plain. Here the Heinies thought they could hold ^{for} the 12th long enough to strengthen their main position farther back. Instead, the 12th captured the strongpoint and all three villages by

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10:15. The regiment pushed on without delay to the north. The Germans fought all the way to delay the advance, but before dark OT 12 had gotten across the creek which runs from Ass-ville past Neuville-Au-Plain to the Merderet River. That creek would have furnished the enemy a good defensive line, right across the corridor he needed to hold, if he had gotten there in time. Now it was too late for ~~him to use that line~~ ^{that}.

In two days OT 12 had covered two-thirds of the distance from the beach to Montebourg. As a result, the regiment's right flank was wide open, for it was two miles farther north than the 8th. So I had to be pushed out to the west in an isolated position to guard that exposed flank. There was danger in the 12th's position, as the next day showed. But by ~~the~~ their bold advance, they had ~~knocked~~ ^{knocked} a serious hole in the enemy's defensive plan.

It was OT 22 which drew the roughest going on D / 1. In their sector was the whole of the fortified zone. OT 22 had only two ^{battalions} with which to attack this strong area, ~~for the 3rd Battalion was busy on the beach.~~ ^(The 3rd Battalion was busy on the beach.) ~~It had the important and difficult job of knocking out the fortifications along the beach.~~ ^{knocking out the fortifications along the beach.} ~~After this, the 28th struck without delay against the powerful strong point at Crisbeeq and~~

~~the 1st and 2nd Bns marched rapidly up the west side of the flooded area. The enemy hardly ^{tried} to interfere with ^{the} advance, only 1000 ^{men} were ready for the attack on Crisbeeq and Assville.~~ ^{the 1st and 2nd Bns marched rapidly up the west side of the flooded area. The enemy hardly tried to interfere with the advance, only 1000 men were ready for the attack on Crisbeeq and Assville.} The Navy gave ~~them~~ both a heavy pounding, than the two ^{battalions} closed in.

The 1st Bn advanced to the edge of the Crisbeeq fortifications without serious resistance. Then the Germans ~~hit the Bn with everything~~ ^{started throwing everything they had}. Safe behind their six-foot-thick concrete walls, the Heinies called down ~~their~~ ^{their} artillery, mortars, and Nebelwerfers right on the strongpoint. The Doughboys, hugging the ground outside, took a terrific pasting from this fire as well as from the many machine guns in the fortifications. At the end of an hour the ^{battalion} was badly shot up, and had lost many of its leaders, including the Bn Commander. Then the enemy counter-attacked. The ^{battalion} did not have the forces left to meet this counter-attack. Captain Tom Shields of Co A, who was now in command of the Bn, realized that there was no chance of taking Crisbeeq that day, that the only result of staying there would be worse losses. He ordered a withdrawal, and the Bn made a difficult retreat of over a mile.

One platoon lost its way during the withdrawal and went out to the beach which at that point was ~~held~~ ^{held} by the enemy. ~~The platoon was ^{far from losing its nerve in that dangerous situation} ~~held~~ ^{far from losing its nerve in that dangerous situation}~~

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D # 1 (Cont'd) - Pk.

^{captured} ~~Assured~~ 113 prisoners, marched them back to the ^{battalion} ~~the~~ after dark. During the night the 1st ^{battalion} ~~the~~ got further revenge. The Germans had followed the ^{battalion} ~~the~~ in its withdrawal, and after dark they made another counter-attack. There was a hot fight for awhile, ^{until} ~~and~~ our artillery observers ^{bracketed} ~~blasted~~ down a naval barrage that caught the enemy squarely, and ~~was~~ ^{persuaded them to pull out. Then} ~~talked with them back up~~ the barrage walked with them back up the road. ~~the next~~. Next day, over 50 Heinies were found dead along that road.

The story of the 2nd ^{battalion's} ~~the~~ attack on Aseville was very much ~~like~~ like the attack of the 1st on Crisbeeq. The thick concrete structures which could not be blown, terrific enemy artillery fire, and finally a counter-attack, gave the 2nd ^{battalion} ~~the~~ a rough day and ^{finally forced it} ~~forced it~~ ^{like the 1st} ~~to~~ withdraw ^{to the line of departure.} ~~to the line of departure.~~

Meanwhile the 3rd ^{battalion} ~~the~~ of the 22nd ^{continued its slow work of} ~~continued its slow work of~~ ^{the beach} ~~the~~ beach knocking out pillboxes. This operation developed into a grim routine. Each pillbox would first be given a pounding by Naval guns, then a mortar barrage and TD's ^{would close} ~~would~~ button it up while the infantry worked their way around behind it, wading through the waist deep water of the inundation under Heinie machine gun and artillery fire. Finally the infantry ^{and the Navy had} ~~took~~ their choice of ^{digging} ~~digging~~ ^{inside or coming out with their hands up.} Then the Navy would open up on the next pillbox and the whole act would be repeated. It was slow going but sure. When Teague's ^{battalion} ~~the~~ finished with a pillbox, it was permanently finished. The 3rd ~~Bn~~ ^{was} gradually freeing the landing beach from the enemy stranglehold.

D # 2 Day - June 8

^{By this the third} ~~the~~ decisive battle for the beachhead was shaping up. The advance of OF 12 on the previous day had deprived Jerry of one good line of defense. He ~~of~~ choose another a little farther back, still anchored on Aseville and Crisbeeq. Look again at the map. Start from the strong-point at Aseville, and move west thru the strung-out village of Aseville, go on west thru the orchards and scattered houses to the villages of Emoudeville and Basse-Emoudeville, which straggle westward another 1000 yards. At the Montebourg highway turn north a little thru two more hamlets, and swing west again to Ecoussenville. In front of Ecoussenville is a creek with plenty of flat boggy ground on both sides; ^{There} ~~is~~ follow that creek down to the marshes of the Marderet River. ~~is~~ is a good line of ^{RESISTANCE} ~~resistance~~ ^{that} ~~that~~ the Germans thought so, and there

they determined to make their stand.

The Krauts were not ready to fight this battle as they would have liked to fight it. We were moving too fast for them. But they could not afford to give up any more ground. Some of their reinforcements had now reached the front; more were on the way. A Sturm ^{unit} on bicycles had arrived the night before, and was rushed into position in front of OT 12, to help hold the line at Esmondville.

At 5:30 July 8 the 42nd FA and the Navy opened up on Esmondville, hammered it terrifically for an hour. At 6:30 the 1st and 3rd Bns 12th Inf moved forward. They knocked out the enemy outposts and advanced a 1000 yards to a road running across the front about 700 yards south and east of Esmondville. There they hit the enemy's main line of resistance.

The 1st Bn came under fire from two sides. The enemy at Azeville, on the 1st Bn's left flank, had machine guns laid right across the line of advance. When Companies A and B tried to move ahead, they were mowed down. (Jerry's fortifications were serving their purpose of anchoring his line. These machine gunners in Azeville would have been knocked out by the 22nd Inf, if they had not been protected by the fortified strongpoint behind them) To get that fire off the flank of the 12th, Co B 359th Inf ^{which was on loan to the 12th} ~~was sent~~ was sent over toward Azeville to occupy the attention of the Heinies there. The 1st Bn pushed on. Co C moved into the orchard in the fork of the road half way between Esmondville and Azeville.

The Germans put down a heavy arty barrage in the orchard and Co C caught hell. ^{The 3rd Battalion was moving} ~~was moving~~ ^{making forward with only two companies.} Co I was off near the Montebourg highway, guarding against a counter-attack from that open flank. Companies K and L went thru the enemy's first line, reached the edge of Esmondville. ^{hit} ~~was~~ ^{was} the Germans' main center of resistance. It was a place they had to hold. When Co K reached the orchards just south of the town, the Germans hit them with an ^{artillery} ~~arty~~ barrage which continued for ^{five or a half hour} ~~some time~~. The men were unable to move from the little cover they had in the ditches. ^{hit}

No 7 While Co K was thus pinned down, Co L pushed into the village, cleaned it out as far as the church. ^{though} ~~the~~ Krauts came back in as soon ~~as~~ ^{as} K had passed and went on into a large field north of the town. They ~~were~~ ^{were} in front and completely surrounded.

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Then the German army hit them. It was bad; but behind it was much worse. Captain Rice therefore moved his company forward another field to get out of the heaviest shelling.

So far, the Germans ^{could feel that they} were doing fairly well. Except for Co L getting thru and behind them, they were holding their ^{main} positions. At this point Col Reeder sent in the 2nd ^{Battalion} Bn on the left flank to take Basse Emondeville and clear up the difficult position the 3rd ^{Battalion} Bn was in. For the rest of the afternoon the 2nd Bn fought thru the same furious resistance and heavy fire as the others had met.

It was no delaying action the Germans were fighting here. They threw everything they had in ^{to} the effort to hold this position. When the 1st Bn advanced closer to Emondeville, they were violently counterattacked by the ^{Battalion} 1st Sturm Bn - Lt Savoy, forward observer, stood up with Lt Col Jackson, 1st Bn commander, under heavy enemy fire, to direct our ^{artillery} ~~attack~~. The 42nd ^{Battalion} PA Bn laid down a heavy and accurate fire which smashed the counterattack. Then the doughboys advanced against the ^{Sturm troopers} ~~Sturm Bn~~ and drove them back.

The ~~1st~~ counterattacked on the other flank too, toward the regimental OP at Saussetour. There was nothing on the west to keep the enemy from coming in on the rear of the 12th except Co I, which was out as an isolated flank guard. To get better protection, the regimental OP moved forward closer to the front, to the same ^{crossroad} ~~place~~ where Co C had been so badly ^{right up} shot up earlier in the day. The Germans attacked again from the west and got ^{to} the new OP. Messengers, clerks, and radio operators grabbed their carbines and ~~stopped the counter-~~ ~~attack~~ went out to get their quota of ferries. They stopped the counterattack.

The Germans were praying for night and reinforcements. Both came too late. Before dark the 2nd ^{Battalion} Bn had taken Basse-Emondeville and joined up with Co L. On the other side the 1st Bn, after crushing the German counterattack, got forward to the road which runs east from Emondeville. The enemy still held the village but they were almost surrounded in it. What was worse, they had practically lost their creek ^{Sturm Battalion} ~~Sturm Bn~~ which was shot to pieces. Next day, there were three or four hundred bicycles scattered from Amville to the Mantebourg highway, some wrecked, some perfectly good. For the rest of the Cherbourg campaign 4th Division messengers and French civilians were riding all over the country on German bicycles. The ^{village also had been hard hit} enemy ~~was~~ ~~also~~ ~~hit~~ by the 4th ~~Division~~ ^{artillery} ~~artillery~~ battery work.

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map. VII Corps had landed in a pocket of land ^{at} the corner of the Oberbois Peninsula. The pocket is bounded on the south and west by two swampy rivers, the Douve and Marderet and on the east by the flooded area ~~which stretches the length of the coast~~ ^{behind} the beach. On the northwest side, toward Oberbourg, the pocket lies open. But this open mouth was partially blocked by a fortified zone. At Griseboq, Azeville, Ozeville, Fontenay-sur-Mer, and Quineville were powerful strongpoints with heavy concrete fortifications and plenty of supporting works. ~~This fortified zone formed a strong anchor for a defensive line.~~

From Azeville to the Marderet River is less than four miles. Here was a narrow bottleneck for the Germans to defend, *with the fortified zone furnishing a strong anchor for the line.* Before the ~~morning~~ ^{first day was over,} the Krauts were working ^{feverishly} vigorously, rushing up troops by rail, truck, bicycle, and feet to block that gap. What they needed was time—time to bring their troops in, to build a line of defense, a four mile line which ^{shall stop} ~~will prevent~~ the Allied advance before it was well started.

The mission of the 4th Division ^{on D+1 day} was to go thru the bottleneck before the Germans could block it. The Division must above all make speed—must advance without delay, regardless of the cost, to its objective around Montebourg and Quineville. This line was necessary to secure the beachhead which VII Corps had to have before it could make the next move. On the swift advance of the 4th Division the success of the whole campaign depended.

To gain time for organizing their defense, the Germans needed the road center of Ste. Marie Eglise. This had been foreseen by the Allied Command, and the ^{Airborne Regiment} 503rd AB Regt (of the 82nd ^{Division} ~~AB Div~~) dropped near that town and seized it early D-day. ~~This prevented the Germans from using several of the main roads approaching the landing beach and was of great help to the 4th Division on the next day.~~ ^{through still holding the town area} That night the 503rd ~~AB Regt~~ ^{AB Regt} ~~held the town area~~

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2 of 2 (Cont'd) - Pk.

~~June 1~~ ^{June 1} was a bloody day for the 12th, but they had won ^a victory of the highest importance. For the Germans there was no consolation. Their casualties were terrific and they had lost a most critical position.

While the 12th was fighting the battle at Esmondville, ~~OT 8~~ advanced from its position north of Ste. Marie-Eglise. Enemy army and delaying forces did their best to interfere with the advance, but by night the 8th had come up abreast of the 12th. Thus ~~the~~ the front was swung around to a east-west line from the coast to the Merisart River. But the hinge on which the front had swung did not budge. A second attack ~~was~~ made on Aserville and Orisbees by the 1st and 2nd ^{Battalions 2nd Infantry} ~~regiments~~ ran into the same difficulties as on the previous day, ^{and} these two Bns were driven back a second time to their LD. This gave the enemy one more chance to hold a line which would freeze the beachhead in a narrow space. Tomorrow ~~we~~ would settle that issue.

2-3 - June 2

The enemy was still off balance. He had not recovered his balance since the initial landing because ~~we~~ ^{we} had never stopped pushing him. He was not in condition to fight a decisive battle now but he had no choice: today he must make the supreme effort to stop the expansion ~~of~~ of our beachhead. Some more reinforcements had reached him by now. The Sturm Bn AOK7, a crack unit, had come in and gone into position between Esauzeville and the Montebourg highway. This was ~~master~~ ^{the} unit to the ^{left} that OT 12 had beaten up so badly yesterday. If we had only given them time these two ^{storm battalions} ~~regiments~~ and other units which were following would undoubtedly have worked up a powerful defense. As things went all the Germans could do was try to plug up each break the best they could with what was nearest.

The Heintzes' defeat yesterday at Esmondville was the worst problem they had at the moment. When the 12th halted for the night, ^{the} ~~the~~ village was ^{the} ~~the~~ nearly surrounded for the enemy's broken units to try to hold it. During the night they withdrew from Esmondville and pulled their center back about a 1000 yards to the little village of Joganville. This gave them a line that followed generally along the creek from the Merisart River to Joganville, then ~~the~~ ^{the} swung ~~westward~~ south to Aserville.

D 43 (Cont'd) - Pr.

whof 4th Division in front of
General Barton now had the main ~~4th Div~~ *in position* to ~~that line~~ *struck* attack together, and on the morning of June 9 he ~~had the~~ *with all three regiments,* Each OT played a critical part in ~~the~~ *the* attack; ~~it~~ *it* would be impossible to say that any one of them had a greater effect on the results. ~~It was the fact that all three succeeded which ended forever the enemy's hope of making this landing another Anzio.~~

OT 22 concentrated its attention on the strongpoint ~~at~~ *at* Agenville. As the line now ran Agenville was a salient sticking into our lines, like a knife planted in the back of the 12th. It would be hard to move forward to the Division objective with that danger behind the 12th.

Since Oriaboeq was farther north and nearer the coast, it could be bypassed for the present. The situation on the beach was also well in hand ~~at~~ *at* now, ~~the 2nd Div had~~ *the 2nd Div had* ~~having pushed~~ *having pushed* ~~with~~ *with* the landing beach freed

~~from close-in pressure.~~ *from close-in pressure.* Co K ~~was~~ *was* left to go ahead with the slow job of taking the beach forts, ~~and the rest of the 3rd BN was~~ *while* pulled inland ~~to give the mission of taking Agenville.~~ *and given the mission of taking Agenville.* ~~The 1st and 2nd Bns~~ *while* ~~after~~ *after* ~~two~~ *two* ~~days~~ *days* ~~of~~ *of* ~~reorganizing,~~ *reorganizing,* ~~so~~ *so* ~~the~~ *the* ~~2nd~~ *2nd* ~~Division~~ *Division* ~~was~~ *was* ~~given~~ *given* the mission of taking Agenville on June 11.

which had opened up ~~The position of the Germans at Agenville had been weakened by the advance of CT 12,~~ *which had opened up* ~~the advance of CT 12 to Scaeverville had weakened the position of the Germans at Agenville~~ *weakening* ~~their west flank. Col Teague took advantage of this. He moved his~~ *weakening* ~~around to~~ *around to* ~~the southwest of Agenville, and sent Co L~~ *around to* ~~with~~ *with* ~~the~~ *the* ~~1st~~ *1st* ~~and~~ *and* ~~2nd~~ *2nd* ~~Bns~~ *Bns* ~~into~~ *into* the village from the west. This maneuver would take out the enemy reserves which on the two previous days had counter-attacked at the critical moment and driven back the ~~2nd BN.~~ *2nd BN.* At the same time Co I moved against the fortifications from the right rear (southeast).

The supporting ~~Co I closed in on the fort under cover of the fire of the 42nd FA Bn.~~ *The supporting* ~~The platoon of~~ *The platoon of* ~~tank platoons got into trouble with mines, and only one tank was with Co I when they~~ *tank platoons got into trouble with mines, and only one tank was with Co I when they* ~~reached the fort.~~ *reached the fort.* ~~had~~ *had* ~~only~~ *only* ~~one~~ *one* ~~tank~~ *tank* ~~with~~ *with* ~~Co~~ *Co* ~~I~~ *I* ~~when~~ *when* ~~they~~ *they* ~~reached~~ *reached* ~~the~~ *the* ~~fort.~~ *fort.* ~~Coming~~ *Coming* ~~in~~ *in* ~~from~~ *from* ~~the~~ *the* ~~rear,~~ *rear,* ~~Co~~ *Co* ~~I~~ *I* ~~had~~ *had* ~~the~~ *the* ~~advantage~~ *advantage* ~~of~~ *of* ~~hedgerows~~ *hedgerows* ~~for~~ *for* ~~cover;~~ *cover;* ~~in~~ *in* ~~front~~ *in* ~~the~~ *front* ~~Germans~~ *the* ~~had~~ *had* ~~removed~~ *removed* ~~all~~ *all* ~~the~~ *the* ~~hedgerows,~~ *hedgerows,* ~~but~~ *but* ~~they~~ *they* ~~had~~ *had* ~~left~~ *left* ~~them~~ *them* ~~in~~ *in* ~~the~~ *the* ~~rear,~~ *rear,* ~~and~~ *and* ~~with~~ *with* ~~the~~ *the* ~~intention~~ *intention* ~~of~~ *of* ~~using~~ *using* ~~them~~ *them* ~~for~~ *for* ~~the~~ *the* ~~movement~~ *movement* ~~of~~ *of* ~~their~~ *their* ~~own~~ *own* ~~reserves.~~ *reserves.* ~~The~~ *The* ~~direction~~ *direction* ~~of~~ *of* ~~approach~~ *of* ~~had~~ *had* ~~another~~ *another* ~~advantage.~~ *advantage.* The center of this strongpoint consisted of

four big concrete emplacements with walls of reinforced concrete four to six feet thick, each mounting a 150 mm. gun. These four main emplacements were in a north-south line, astride the

road running west from Aserville, with their guns facing the sea. They were surrounded by smaller pillboxes, open weapons pits, entrenchments, barbed wire, and mine fields. An approach from the front exposed the attacking troops to the fire of all the weapons in the strongpoint. The way Co I came in, from the southwest, they protect main emplacement was in the way of fire of ~~the~~ most of the machine guns, while the big guns could not turn in that direction at all. Thus Co I was protected by the fort itself from most of the fort's fire.

Co I closed in on the three pillboxes at the south end of the strongpoint and quickly blew them. No time was spent in lifting muzzles; ~~they~~ ^{we found through} a path ~~was~~ ^{was} the field and the assault sections ~~walked~~ ^{crossed} there in single file without losing a man. Co L by this time was attacking the village from the other side, and before the Germans were sure what was happening Co I was in position behind a hedgerow only a 100 yards from the southernmost of the big fortifications.

Captain Samuels immediately had a bazooka and his one tank go to work on the emplacement. But the concrete walls were much too thick for the AP shells to do any damage ~~to~~ ^{the concrete} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ a foot or so, but the wall was six feet thick. Capt Samuels then sent an assault team around behind to attack the back door. The section worked its way across the open field, under German machine gun fire. They attacked the door twice with flame throwers and pole charges, then tried a ~~40~~ forty pound satchel charge. They used up all the explosive the company had on that one door, but did not damage it.

Co I had about shot its wad. But there was another flame thrower which had not yet been used. Pvt Ralph G. Riley, flame thrower man, was sent in for the final try. All alone he dashed and ran across the open field to a shell hole. When he tried to operate his flame thrower it failed to function. He lighted it with a match. Riley emptied the flame thrower ~~at~~ the base of the door, then ducked it and ran back to the company. He made it safely but he had a bullet hole thru his canteen and another thru his gas mask.

For a few minutes it appeared that Riley's flame thrower had done no more good than the other efforts. Then the ammunition inside the emplacement began exploding, the burning oil had flowed thru the crack at the bottom of the door and set it on fire. This proved to be the last straw for the Germans. A few minutes later they ran up the white flag.

and the commanding officer came out and surrendered the entire strongpoint with 169 prisoners. It had all happened in about two hours. About the same time Co L finished cleaning out the village and the whole Azeville position was ours. ✓

The 3rd Bn immediately renewed the advance and gained another mile and a half before dark.

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OT 12 advanced ~~at~~ ^{that} morning ~~and~~ ^{and} found Esmondville empty. The Germans had pulled out during the night. The 12th ~~cleaned~~ ^{overtook them at} Joganville before they could ~~organize~~ ^{fully} and the 2nd ~~Battalion~~ ^{Battalion} cleaned out that village and pushed on to the northwest. The Germans had not been given time to ~~regroup~~ ^{regroup} from their defeat at Esmondville the day before. They were ~~beating desperately~~ ^{beating desperately} but they did not have a chance. A company of the ~~8th~~ ^{Keyser Sturm Battalion} which had been defeated the previous day, held up in the Chateau Daudinville. This was an old Norman castle with stone walls four feet thick in the ~~middle~~ ^{middle} of a large bare courtyard surrounded by a high stone wall. The Germans could have made this a strong fortress if they had had time, but time was just what ~~they were given~~ ^{they were given} them the least of. The ~~12th~~ ^{12th} supported by tanks assaulted and took the Chateau and destroyed the ~~remnants of the crack Nazi Battalion~~ ^{last remnant of that crack Nazi Battalion}.

The day was not yet over and OT 12 made the most of the hole they had torn in the enemy's lines. The 1st ~~Battalion~~ ^{Battalion} drove on rapidly for another mile and a half, almost to St Flozel. This put them so far out in front that Col. Reeder sent in the 3rd ~~Battalion~~ ^{Battalion} to fill the gap between the 1st and 2nd, ~~this formation~~ ^{this formation} that night ~~OT 12 had~~ ^{OT 12 had} a long line facing Montebourg, ~~with only a mile east of the~~ ^{with only a mile east of the} ~~OT 12's right flank was still wide open,~~ ^{OT 12's right flank was still wide open,} for although OT 22 had made a good advance that day, ~~OT 12, not waiting for anything,~~ ^{OT 12, not waiting for anything,} had kept its lead.

There was no comfort for the Germans anywhere on this day, for OT 8 ~~also~~ ^{handed them a} ~~bad beating in spite of violent resistance,~~ ^{bad beating in spite of violent resistance,} ~~OT 12's attack~~ ^{OT 12's attack} a main line of resistance on which the ~~entire day started~~ ^{entire day started} the 8th was ~~forcing the enemy's line~~ ^{forcing the enemy's line} in a place where ~~they had been working~~ ^{they had been working} for perhaps two days. They had a lot of ~~OT 8's~~ ^{OT 8's} ~~and rebel-~~ ^{and rebel-} ~~bers~~ ^{bers} ~~as soon as our artillery preparation began,~~ ^{as soon as our artillery preparation began,} the ~~8th's~~ ^{8th's} ~~replied with artillery,~~ ^{replied with artillery,} ~~88's~~ ^{88's} ~~and machine guns.~~ ^{and machine guns.} The 8th had a good many casualties ~~before the attack even began.~~ ^{before the attack even began.} The 1st ~~Battalion,~~ ^{Battalion,} which ~~was on the right,~~ ^{was on the right,} next to the highway, ~~was hit by a~~ ^{was hit by a} ~~shell of machine gun and rifle fire~~ ^{shell of machine gun and rifle fire} in addition to the ~~artillery~~ ^{artillery} ~~and were pinned to the ground.~~ ^{and were pinned to the ground.} ~~All morning the 8th's fire continued,~~ ^{All morning the 8th's fire continued,} so heavy that the 1st Battalion was ~~unable to move off the line of departure.~~ ^{unable to move off the line of departure.}

On the left flank the 3rd ~~Battalion~~ ^{Battalion} had ~~simply~~ ^{simply} ~~troubled~~ ^{troubled} the assault companies, I and L, ~~in front of Co L,~~ ^{in front of Co L,} was a huge concrete building originally intended to house a dirigible of the French Navy. Now the Germans were using it as a ~~fort~~ ^{fort}. Their strong positions in this hangar and the smaller buildings surrounding it, and the heavy fire they put down across

^{But} The Germans had a machinegun at the bend of ~~the creek~~ ^{the trail,} on the left, enfilading ~~the line.~~ ^{the trail.}
The 2nd Platoon moved against that gun and knocked it out with hand grenades. ^{This platoon then}
tried to go on across ~~the creek~~ ^{around the bend} and across the creek, but were stopped by strong ~~German positions.~~ ^{German positions.}
~~Platoon was unable to get thru.~~

~~Co. B's position~~ ^{which soon became the battle spot} ~~turned into one of the hottest spots that have ever been~~
~~Co. B was in a hot spot.~~
~~The enemy's 88's, mortars, and artil were laid on so perfectly.~~ ^{them} The shells hit the top
of the hedgerow or the trees and covered the whole length of the trail with firing fragments,
cutting down the men as they ~~were~~ ^{crouched} in a firing line behind the hedgerow.
Men taking in the firing line behind the hedgerow were knocked out one after another ~~where~~
~~they were.~~ ^{the company} When ~~the~~ finally withdrew from that inferno they left 40 or 50 dead ~~men~~ ^{laid out in}
~~along that trail~~ ^{in an orderly retreat} ~~along the trail.~~ ^{laid out in}
a regular line along the trail.

It was now certain that there was no gap in the enemy's center. He had the whole
~~the~~ ^{position carefully organized} ~~position~~ and was defending it furiously. ^{The line was first}
~~definitely~~ ^{broken on the left when the 3rd Battalion captured}
~~the street leading to the hanger.~~ ^{the street leading to the hanger by the 3rd Battalion's}
~~the hanger.~~ ^{the hanger.} ~~Co. I's penetration~~ ^{which enabled the battalion commander,}
~~that morning had put them behind the hanger.~~ ^{Col. Strickland, 3rd Bn. Commando,}
~~Col. Strickland,~~
~~to work a pincers on the enemy's strongpoint.~~ He had Co I turn around and attack
the buildings north of the hanger. With that assistance, L was able to cross the creek,
close with the Germans in the hanger, and annihilate them. That smashed the Heinig line on
the left.

~~Soon afterward, the 1st Battalion broke through on the right. With Company A~~
~~on the right the 1st Bn. broke thru near the end of the bridge.~~ ^{the 1st Bn. broke thru}
~~10th Tank Bn. was brought up and~~ ^{the 10th Tank Battalion leading, and General Roosevelt and Col. Van Fleet at the head of}
~~the 1st Battalion, the attack went straight up the road, crossed the creek and cleared~~
~~the enemy out of all his positions east of Ecausseville. That left the village thus~~
~~quarters surrounded.~~ ^{During the night the} ~~During the night the~~ ^{German} pulled out of ^{Ecausseville} ~~the~~ and fell back

to the north.

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D 4 - June 10

Giving the defeated Germans no chance to reorganize, OT 8 drove ahead in the morning toward Montebourg. The 1st Bn again ran into ^{the Sturm Battalion} ~~Sturm Battalion~~ ACK 7 and gave them another beating. The regiment swung around to the west, staying south of Montebourg, and hit the enemy again near the village of Eroudville. The Germans put up a strong defense of this village and the tanks went into the town five times shooting up centers of resistance, while the 1st and 2nd Bns of the 8th fought from house to house. Before this battle was finished the Sturm Battalion, which had not yet had enough, made one more counter-attack against the ~~1st Bn~~ ^{8th} ~~1st Bn~~. The Germans fought desperately and at one time that afternoon the 1st ^{Battalion} ~~Bn~~ of the 8th ~~had to turn out every man in the battalion who could be spared from other duties~~ ^{to reinforce the front line companies.} ~~After the 1st Battalion had taken everything the frantic Germans~~ ^{could dish out, then G-2 attacked and broke the enemy units.} ~~This was the last and last fight between the 1st Battalion and the German Battalion AOK 7, finished off that crack Nazi unit, which was so badly smashed that it was reorganized as a company.~~ ^{was so badly smashed that it was reduced to the strength of about one company.}

With the capture of Eroudville and the final defeat of the Sturm ~~Battalion~~ ^{Battalion} ACK 7, ~~OT 8 had now completed~~ ^{OT 8 had now completed} its beachhead mission. The regiment was ~~100%~~ ^{100%} holding the high ground along the road running southwest from Montebourg, while the defeated Germans, ~~now powerless to catch their~~ ^{who for the first time were allowed} breath, formed a defensive line along the railroad.

On the other side of Montebourg OT 12 had done equally well. The Germans in that sector had been so badly mauled ~~on the two previous days~~ ^{on the two previous days}, that they were unable to prevent ~~the 12th's advance to the hills northeast of Montebourg, where the regiment dug in,~~ ^{the 12th's advance to the hills northeast of Montebourg, where the regiment dug in,}

Between the 8th and 12th stood the town of Montebourg, which was still held by the enemy. General Barton had ordered the regiments to ~~win~~ ^{win} the ground on both sides, but they ~~could not~~ ^{could not} do it. Since ~~it was not necessary to the accomplishment of the Division's mission to take Montebourg~~ ^{it was not necessary to the accomplishment of the Division's mission to take Montebourg} at that time, and ~~it would have been a useless loss of life to have gotten into it~~ ^{it would have been a useless loss of life to have gotten into it}, General Barton ordered the regiments to ~~stay out of the town.~~ ^{stay out of the town.} The Germans were allowed to keep it ~~until June 9,~~ ^{until June 9,} while our artillery and mortars gave them hell, ~~and then they were driven out with artillery and mortars.~~ ^{and then they were driven out with artillery and mortars.} When the 9th Division finally ~~occupied Montebourg~~ ^{occupied Montebourg}, it was ~~completely destroyed~~ ^{completely destroyed} as a result of the heavy ~~bombing~~ ^{bombing}.

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It is ironic that the first headlines given to the 4th Division in American newspapers was the erroneous news that we had taken Montebourg on June 15. (Actually on that day a small detachment of the 8th Inf occupied two blocks on the southern edge of the town.) But although the newspapers were wrong about the capture of Montebourg on that date, they were not wrong about the importance of what the 4th Division had accomplished. We did not need ^{the town of} Montebourg. What we did need ~~the town of Montebourg~~ ^{was} a line on each side of Montebourg. This line, which was taken and held by the 4th Division, protected the beachhead from enemy interference while VII Corps went ahead with the next step in the campaign, ~~that is, to~~ ^{to} drive across the bottom of the Ocherbourg Peninsula to the west coast, ~~thus~~ ^{cutting off} Ocherbourg completely ~~and~~ ^{and making} its capture certain. On the capture of Ocherbourg in turn, the ~~entire~~ ^{the} Battle of France depended.

^{After} ~~the~~ ^{On June 10,} while the 4th Division was completing the last stage of its advance to the Montebourg line, VII Corps began the attack to the west, sending the 90th Division across the Merderet River. A week later, when the 9th and 79th Divisions had been landed, this attack was suddenly expanded into a three division drive which was brilliantly successful and in two ⁷ days smashed across to the west coast and sealed the fate of Ocherbourg.

But while the 4th Division in five days of hard driving attack, had accomplished the essential mission of securing the beachhead line, the whole job was not yet done. The fortified zone in the west of the Division's sector was still holding out. The Fortress of Azeville had been taken, but the enemy was still resisting in the strongpoints at Orisbeq and Ozeville, Fontenay-sur-Mer, Quineville, and the Beach fortifications between Orisbeq and Quineville. Only hard and costly fighting could clean the enemy out of those positions and this fighting fell to OT 22. For the next week, while OT 8 and OT 12 held the Montebourg line, OT 22 continued attacking.

On June 11th 3rd Bn 22nd attacked the strong fort at Ozeville. Co L took a bad beating in this attack and added its name to the companies of the 4th Division which have paid the heavy price of assault on strong German positions. L was so severely reduced that the attack could not be completed, and that night the enemy remained in possession of Ozeville. This left the 12th Inf, which was over a hill ~~in the north~~ ^{in the north} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~ordered to withdraw~~ ^{ordered to withdraw}

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in an exposed position. The 12th was ordered to withdraw nearly a mile in order to strengthen the front, since now the first mission of the 4th Division was to protect the north flank of the beachhead against any possible move which the enemy might make.

Next day June 12, the 1st and 5th Bns 22nd assaulted and captured Ozerville, while OT 12 again advanced and retook the hills northwest of Montebourg from which they had withdrawn the previous day. The 22nd received welcome assistance in the job of reducing the other German fortifications from the 39th Inf (9th Div) which was attached to the 4th Division for a few days. This attachment made it possible to reduce the sector of OT 22 to a fair size for one regiment; the 39th took over the attack on Orisbeeg, Fentony-sur-Mer, and the beach ~~fortifications~~ fortifications in front of them, while the 22nd attacked the three hills west of Quineville. This success furnished the Germans resistance in the whole beachhead area. On June 12 and 13 the Germans had to give up their precious fortifications except Quineville itself. On the 14th after a beautiful air bombardment, Quineville was taken.

The occupation of the beachhead was now complete. While the 4th Division held its line protecting the north flank, and the 101st Airborne held the south flank, 7th Corps was able to throw all the rest of its forces into the drive to the west which cut off the peninsula. The first combat mission of the 4th Infantry Division had been completed with brilliant success.

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Extracts from Telephone Journal of Seventh Army

From the Seventh Army files captured by the Polish Counter Division further revelations of the inner workings of the Higher Command in the WEST have become available. A telephone journal meticulously listing all conversations held by the Commander and the Chief of Staff of Seventh Army with both lower and higher formations has given a remarkable insight to the problems that faced the enemy staff and the steps taken to meet them. Herewith are some extracts from the aforementioned journal. Remarks in brackets did NOT appear in original text.

6 June 44

0925 Chief of General Staff, Seventh Army to General MARCKS, Commander of LXXXIV Corps.

General MARCKS urgently requests mobile reserves for the WEST of OERN, since 21 Panzer Division is committed to the right of the ORNE. He would like to have 12 SS Panzer Division.

1059 Chief of Staff reports situation to Chief of Staff Western Command

Chief of Staff, Western Command (RUNDSTEDT's HQ) emphasizes the desire of Supreme Command (HITLER) to have the enemy in the bridgehead annihilated by the evening of 6 June, since there exists a danger of additional sea and airborne landings for support. In accordance with an order by General JODL, all units will be diverted to the point of penetration in CALVADOS. The beach-head there must be cleaned up by NOT later than tonight.

The Chief of the General Staff declares that such would be impossible. The Commander of Army Group 'B' (ROMMEL) states that 21 Panzer Division must attack immediately regardless of whether reinforcements arrive or NOT. The Supreme Command has ordered that the bad weather conditions of the night of 6/7 June be utilized for the bringing up of reserves.

2240 Commander of Seventh Army (Genobst DOLLMAN) reports to Field Marshal ROMMEL.

Seventh Army HQ has repeatedly requested air support at RIVA BELLIA without success. Field Marshal ROMMEL answers that Air Force units are just on the point of changing location.

2400 Chief of Staff of Army to Commanders 21 Panzer Division and 716 Infantry Division.

716 Infantry Division is still defending itself at strong points. Communications between division, regimental and battalion command posts, however, no longer exist, so that nothing is known as to the number of strong points still holding out or of those liquidated.... The Chief of General gives the order that the counter-attack of 7 June must reach the coast without fail, since the strongpoint defenders expect it of us.

0640 Chief of Staff to Army Group

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An English operational order has been received from the War Office. Contents will be transmitted by telegraph.

0810 Chief of Staff Army Group 'B' to Seventh Army

An urgent demand for information on the situation by order of Field Marshal ROMMEL, since the report telegraphed this morning has NOT yet come through.

- (a) Extracts are given from the operation order of VII American Corps, according to which the following units are committed:

On the right: VII American Corps with four divisions.

Mission: To attack Northward from the Carentan-Carville bridgehead and to take Cherbourg from the land side.

On the left: V English Corps with four English divisions and two American divisions in the Calvados sector.

Mission: to take Bayeux and join up with the American VII Corps at Carville.

- (b) Our own Situation: Bayeux in the enemy hands... Attack by 1 SS Panzer Corps, because of the situation in the air, was not possible until this morning. Direction of the attack: North and NW. of Caen, in the direction of the coast. Field Marshal Rommel interrupts and orders 1 SS Panzer Corps to initiate a point of main effort on the left as quickly as possible, using all three divisions.

0830 Chief of General Staff to Marshal Rommel

The western coast of Cotentin is clear of the enemy and as a consequence the necessity arises to direct 2 Parachute Corps either towards Bayeux or Cherbourg. Field Marshal Rommel orders that the right wing of 2 Parachute Corps, with two divisions, be advanced first of all, toward St. Lo. On enquiry, the Chief of General Staff makes it known that there still exists no communications with the headquarters of 2 Parachute Corps and the divisions, so that nothing is known as to the present location of the Corps units. The Corps has been ordered to set up radio communications with Seventh Army Headquarters immediately. The establishment of communications appears to have been delayed by air attacks, particularly in the Avranches area.

9 June 44

1730 Conversation of Field Marshal Rommel, in Army Hq, with the Commanding General and Chief of Staff.

- (1) The Chief of Staff acquaints those present with the situation as just reported by the Commanding General LXXXIV Corps on the Cotentin Peninsula. The essential point is that the enemy has not succeeded, until now, in effecting a junction with the Carentan bridgehead, by means of his attack on the coast to the west. 6 Parachute Regiment, which has fought better than expected,

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has been given the order to hold Cherbourg to the last man.

- (2) Field Marshal Rommel orders that the enemy must be prevented at all costs from:
 - (a) Getting the fortress of Cherbourg, and harbour, in his hands.
 - (b) Establishing the connection between both bridgeheads; that west of the Orne and west of the Vire.
- (3) The Chief of Staff expresses the opinion that the enemy, because of the increased resistance south of Montebourg, will commit more airborne troops in order to take possession of Cherbourg rapidly. Field Marshal Rommel does not share this opinion, since the Supreme Command expects a large landing on the Channel Coast within the next few days, and therefore the enemy will not have more airborne troops available.
- (4) As to future operations, the Commanding General, Seventh Army, is of the opinion that he will only go over to the attack when 2 Parachute Corps is ready for commitment and when the attack can be coordinated with the counter-attack of 1 SS Panzer Corps. Field Marshal Rommel concurred with this opinion. However, the defence of Cherbourg is to be conducted independently and started immediately, with the greatest vigor.

2400 General Marcks acquaints the Chief of Staff with the unfavorable development at the Ste Mere Eglise bridgehead.

The enemy has broken out, both to the west, across the inundated land and also in a northerly direction toward Montebourg. In the west he has reached Pont l'Abbe. In the north he has crossed the road Montebourg - Quineville. The Commanding General, LXXXIV Corps, believes that tomorrow will be the decisive day for the battle of the Cherbourg Fortress. He has given strict instructions that the line reached this evening must be held at all costs. General Marcks makes the following demands:

- (1) Exceptional reinforcement of our own airforce, to combat the enemy superiority.
- (2) Likewise, the sending in of a large amount of anti-tank weapons.

He maintains that the units brought up have been most inadequately equipped, and that, particularly the "stove-pipes" (Bazookas), etc, are effective against enemy tanks only at a few metres range....

10 June 44

1100 General Meindl, Commander 2 Parachute Corps reports to Chief of Staff.

- 3 Parachute Division must be brought forward piece-meal, because of

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lack of fuel. At the present time one regiment is located approximately east of St Lo. The main body of the division is still in Brittany.

77 Infantry Division is, in the opinion of General Meindl, with its advanced elements already in the area of Valognes, and the remainder in the region of Avranches.

1245 Commander, LXXXIV Corps, talks to the Chief of Staff.

The advance units of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, are stuck in the St Lo area because of lack of fuel.

The Chief of Staff underlines the fact that it is not only a question of preventing a junction of the two enemy groups in the area of Bayeux and Carntan, but the main task is that of preventing the enemy from cutting off the Cotentin Peninsula by a further advance to the west and S.W.

Hq LXXXIV Corps add their intentions thereto. The object is not merely preventing the enemy from taking possession of roadways, but to destroy and wipe out the enemy.

1700 Chief of Staff informs Army Group 'B'

Panzer Gruppe West has sustained enemy attack and is now engaged in local counter-attacks. It is evident, from reports, that Panzer Gruppe West has been prevented from carrying out its basic mission. He points out that according to existing orders, traffic regulations in combat are governed by O in C, West. It has been shown, however, that this can be done properly and effectively only by Seventh Army.

Chief of Staff Army Group 'B', presents the views of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Hitler) ... that there should be neither a withdrawal, fighting to the rear, nor disengagements rearward to a new line of resistance, but that every man will fight and fall, where he stands ...

2350 Chief of Staff to QMG

Orders given to draw off 65% of the anti-tank close defence weapons (Panzerfaust and Panzer schreck), from 265 and 266 and the remaining elements of 275 Infantry Divisions, as well as 5 Parachute Division. These weapons are to be sent, at once, to the St Lo area, (Camp Michel) and put at the disposition of LXXXIV Corps.

11 June 44

0920 General Narcks LXXXIV Corps to Chief of Staff Seventh Army

He asks when 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division will be ready for commitment, since the situation on the right flank is critical. 352 Infantry Division now has a very small combat value; gaps between them and their right flank neighbour become constantly larger. Communications with this division no longer exist.

0920 Chief Staff informs Army Group 'B'

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Nothing is known as to whether the enemy has effected a ~~union~~ across the Vire. The Panzer Gruppe West has been knocked out by a direct bomb hit on its Headquarters; Command has been given to 1 SS Panzer Corps ... road traffic must be dictatorially governed, directly by Seventh Army through the employment of road commanders.

7

CHERBOURG CAMPAIGN

Enemy Front Line Positions (Per official
reports of G-2, 4th Infantry Division),
June 8 - 26, 1944

- June 8. Crisbecq -- Basse Emondeville--Lagneville.
9. " -- Vaudville--St Floxel--Hau-de-La-Riviere--3002.
10. " -- Azeville--315068--294047--288024.
11. Fonethaysur Mer--Ozeville--St Floxel--Montebourg--Bossiere--289025
12. Fonethaysur Mer--Les Fiefes--Dancel--Montebourg--Lossiere--289025
13. St Marcouf--305075--Les Fiefes--Dancel--Montebourg--Lossiere--289025
14. Bourg de Lestre--rue Caubriere--Montebourg--Lossiere--289025
15. to 18.
19. Bourg de Lestre--Bois de Montebourg--CR270063--Lotten--L'Anville
20. 215168--Hau Gallis--Saire River
21. St Pierre Eglise--Bois de Hauguev--235215--20195--215174--195168.
22. St Barregeuse--Hau Les Ronches--235229--219205--224193--205169--198172--
193165
23. St Pierre Eglise--205220--235233--225203--219195--00170
24. 235230--212223--201221--195220--189198--180174
26. 54247--246238--244244--162238--157233--157236

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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

ORDER OF THE DAY:

29 August 1944

NUMBER 25:

COMMENDATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE

577th AAA (AW) Battalion

The 377th AAA (AW) Battalion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division on 8 March 1944 and followed the division in the invasion of the continent, arriving in France on 13 June 1944.

They immediately joined the division and under the direct supervision of the 4th Division Artillery, were given the mission of protecting the division from enemy aircraft. Under the extremely capable guidance of Lt Col George V. Fisher, battalion commander, the members of the 377th AAA (AW) Battalion performed their duties in an outstanding manner and by their ceaseless efforts gave the division excellent protection from hostile aircraft. By most skillful employment of their weapons they have succeeded to date, in destroying five enemy aircraft and one enemy aircraft probably destroyed.

At one point in the Normandy campaign, when the situation called for immediate action against enemy ground troops, the 377th AAA (AW) Battalion was called upon to employ their anti-aircraft weapons against enemy foot troops deployed behind hedge rows. Sensing the situation, the commander of the battalion made the necessary adjustments and succeeded in bringing the enemy under fire. By performing this extremely difficult maneuver the advance of our ground troops was materially aided.

The division commander takes extreme pleasure in commending each officer and enlisted man of the 377th AAA (AW) Battalion for outstanding performance of duty and for the superb spirit of teamwork and cooperation they have displayed in their association with the 4th Infantry Division.

By command of Major General BARTON:

RICHARD S. MARR,
Colonel, General Staff Section,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Bertral Lenhardt
BERTRAL LENHARDT,
1st Lt. AGD,
Asst Adj. General.

DISTRIBUTION:

A, D, & E.

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

ORDER OF THE DAY:

31 August 1944

NUMBER 26:

COMMENDATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE

4TH MEDICAL BATTALION

The 4th Medical Battalion landed on the shores of France on 6 June 1944. Each collecting company was attached to a Regimental Combat Team and the clearing company followed directly behind the assault waves.

The 4th Medical Battalion was the first medical unit to land on this particular beach and consequently had the tremendous and difficult task of handling not only division casualties but also the casualties of other allied forces engaged in the action. In spite of extremely heavy enemy fire the personnel of the 4th Medical Battalion performed heroic service on D-Day in handling a great number of casualties. By the efficient manner in which they succeeded in treating and evacuating these casualties, many lives were undoubtedly saved.

In subsequent engagements in which the division participated, the 4th Medical Battalion has rendered outstanding service and in so doing many of its members have paid the supreme sacrifice and many others have been seriously wounded. For conspicuous acts of gallantry and bravery many individuals of the 4th Medical Battalion have received high awards.

The division commander takes extreme pleasure in commending the officers and men of the 4th Medical Battalion for outstanding service and for their ceaseless devotion to duty.

By command of Major General BARTON:

RICHARD S. MARH,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Bertram Lenhardt
BERTRAM LENHARDT,
1st Lt. AGD,
Asst Adj General.

DISTRIBUTION:

A, D, & E.

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

Cont 0

ORDER OF THE DAY:

NUMBER 28)

10 September 1944

COMMENDATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE

4TH QUARTERMASTER COMPANY

Leading elements of the 4th Quartermaster Company landed in France on 6 June 1944 and the remainder of the company arrived on 7 June 1944. Since that time the 4th Quartermaster Company has maintained an unbroken flow of supplies to the division and its attached units and in so doing has achieved an admirable record of service.

The 4th Quartermaster Company has performed its basic task of supplying the rations, fuel, clothing and equipment needed by the division, in a superior manner. In addition, personnel and equipment of the company have been frequently called upon to transport troops in tactical operations, when the situation so demanded. At various times, when replacements were badly needed, the 4th Quartermaster Company succeeded in transporting large numbers of these replacements to their proper units, in a swift and most efficient manner.

In order to provide swift and complete service, the 4th Quartermaster Company has at all times maintained stocks of supplies greater in excess of the amounts contemplated that an installation of their type should normally handle. Despite the handicap of limited personnel and transport, these large stocks were maintained and handled without undue loss of mobility, to the great benefit of the units served. In maintaining the flow of supplies, it was often necessary to transport supplies up to distances of 350 miles, necessitating long and arduous hours of driving without sleep or rest.

In performing its duties under combat conditions, the 4th Quartermaster Company has suffered casualties and some of its equipment has been destroyed due to intensive enemy action. However, in spite of the constant threat of additional enemy action, the personnel of the company have continued to perform their duties in a superior manner.

The division commander takes extreme pleasure in commending each member of the 4th Quartermaster Company for outstanding service and tireless devotion to duty which they have displayed in the successful accomplishment of each and every mission.

By command of Major General BARTON:

OFFICIAL:

Bertram Lenhardt
BERTRAM LENHARDT,
1st Lt., AGD,
Asst Adj General.

RICHARD S. MARR,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff

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L, D & E.

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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

D-DAY OPERATION

The first troops ashore were Companies E and F, 8th Lst. They hit the beaches at H-Hour 0630. Companies B and C were about 15 minutes late landing at approximately 0645. The actual landing was 2300 yards south of the point planned. A change was made at the last minute because the fire was so heavy on the planned landing beaches. The assault elements had no notice of this change and for a few minutes after landing were confused. This included officers and men. Extremely detailed plans had been made prescribing the initial objective of each assault section and all officers had studied the maps very carefully for identification land marks. The most obvious land mark was the road. The planned beaches were approximately astride road T7. The actual landing was approximately astride U5. All units on first landing supposed the road that they saw ^{was} T7 and started trying to place the German strong points in relation to it. When they could not find the forts where they were supposed to be they began looking for land marks. The old windmill was very useful - fortunately it was still standing. Several of the officers knowing that this windmill should be on their left were able to see it far away on the right and thus were able to orient themselves.

Due to the change in landing position, the original detailed plans were worthless and all the assault elements had to attack positions nearest to them. These impromptu plans worked with complete success and ~~no~~ ^{little} confusion. The two battalions of the 8th cleaned up the strong points on the actual landing beach and then diverged ^{to the} ~~west~~ to the north as far as la Percherie the ~~second~~ ^{road} south to the Pouppeville road.

Opposition was slight. Apparently the German garrisons were completely cowed by the preparatory bombardment and most of the strongpoints gave up as soon as the troops closed on them. Apparently some of the forts did not even fire. Casualties on the beach were inconceivable. 1st Bn captured the strongpoint at the end of road U5 at ~~0645~~ ^H plus 25.

About two to three hours were required in eliminating the beach defenses and in reorganizing for the advance inland. The movement across the causeway met only scattered light resistance - occasional fire from positions on the west side of the inundation. These German positions were scattered along the edge of the marsh. The causeway roads proper were ^{wholly} ~~under~~ under our control due to the action of 101st Div along the western ends of the causeways.

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It was between 1000 and 1030 when the 1st and 2nd Bns of the 22nd began landing. According to the plan these units were to march inland on road 89. However enemy strongpoints still unreduced covered the entrance to this road, T7 and U5 were very congested. Accordingly the 1st Bn of the 22nd marched thru the swamps to the northwest for some two miles. This journey took them around seven hours. The water was generally about waist deep but was full of ditches and holes so that men frequently dropped into water over their heads. The enemy was firing across the swamps from beach positions to the north and the men sometimes had to duck completely under water on account of the machine gun fire. They reached road 89 near St Martin de Varroville. ^{At} ~~near~~ the 1st Bn of the 22nd crossed road T7 and the next road to the north they passed thru rear elements of the 1st Bn 8th Inf. Before the 1st of the 22nd had all gotten across these roads the bulk of the 12th Inf marched inland on the roads so that practically the whole of the 1st Bn of the 22nd had to cross other columns on these two causeways.

Vehicles were arriving in large numbers by about 0900. The original traffic plan counted on the use of two roads, T7 and U5. There was also an extremely detailed contingent plan for moving all vehicles into assembly areas east of the inundation in case the causeways were blocked. This entire plan was worthless because of the change in location of landing. T7 could not be used by vehicles because enemy beach positions to the north were too close to it. Until the middle of the afternoon all vehicles had to move on road U5. Fortunately ^{there} ~~was~~ was no obstruction on this road except a small bridge at 437953 which had been blown by the enemy. This demolished bridge was covered by an A-7 gun and the first tank to reach the bridge was knocked out. This was before 1000. The other tanks silenced the gun, pushed the disabled tank into the swamp, and ferried the creek. 1106th Engr Gp had a bridge in operation by about 1130. Meanwhile a great many vehicles had accumulated and due to the breakdown of the original traffic plan they were pushed into any assembly areas. From 1100 until 1600 or 1700 all the fields between the dunes, and the inundation, road U5, and V1 were jammed with vehicles. During this entire time, the Germans were shelling the beach rather heavily but fortunately they never dropped a round into the parking areas. Considerable losses were suffered on the beach and in the boats by and in landing from about 1000 on. Battery B (?)

29th FA was lost complete when the LVT blew up - presumably hit a mine. Only a portion of the men were picked up.

Meanwhile the single artery US was jammed with vehicles almost bumper to bumper, in addition to foot troops, which between 1100 and 1300, were marching the whole length of the road alongside of the vehicles. It was supposed at first at division CP that the jam on the road was due to the blown bridge; actually the bridge was in use before the road was full of vehicles. About 1130, General Barton became concerned about a tank threat to the 8th Inf which had no A-T guns with it. He gave orders that the road should be cleared for the 8th Inf A-T guns if other vehicles had to be pushed into the swamp. Due to the breakdown of the traffic plan, vehicles of all sorts were getting on the road almost at will. The jam was due to a long series of trivial acts of carelessness and stupidity: Two engineer work parties had parked vehicles on the road and unloaded pontoon equipment at two points in the middle of the causeway. These were required to move their vehicles beyond the inundation and push their materials off the road into the edge of the water. An AA half-track had taken up position on the road about midway of the inundation, ^{which} ~~was sent forward beyond the inundation~~ A Signal truck was moving slowly laying wire. The road being narrow and practically without shoulders in most places, large vehicles had difficulty in passing. Two tanks and at least one 2½ ton truck in attempting to pass obstructions ran partly off the road and were stuck in the swamp. Their crews then held up all traffic for considerable time while they maneuvered other vehicles into position to tow them out. In the case of one 2½ ^{ton} truck which was following ^a vehicle towing an A-T gun, the gun was uncoupled, the towing vehicle maneuvered during a period of 10 or 15 minutes into position to tow out the stuck truck and then still longer maneuvered to pass these vehicles so that the gun could be picked up again. There were two or three MP's on duty on the causeway but these were quite insufficient to prevent these jams at every point where they occurred.

^{the following} The 2nd Bn 8th Inf passed through Pouppeville about noon receiving only scant fire. ^{The following} route shown on overlay, meeting only occasionally scattered resistance to GR 369932. They organized a all-around defense on this hilltop.

The 3rd Bn of the 8th following route shown had a stiff fight at Germain where they found dugouts, underground shelters, ^{armed by 20mm B&T and smaller weapons.} After a fire

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-3-

"D-Day Operations" (Cont'd.) Part 1

fight the battalion closed in and the Germans broke and ran. The 3rd Bn slaughtered them. There were about 50 enemy dead left on the field and a 100 prisoners taken. The 3rd Bn of the 8th bivouaced confronting the high ground south of St. Mere Eglise under the circumstances related in 82nd Division notes. Co K was sent a mile to the west and a platoon of K reached Chef-de-Pont. The 1st Bn of the 8th met no serious resistance until they reached Neuville quite late in the day. The enemy here were cleared out and the battalion then turned south where they came under fire from a strong German garrison at Turqueville. There was a fire fight for a while which got nowhere before dark. The battalion dug-in along the road 300 yards east of Turqueville.

The 3rd Bn of the 22nd advanced about two kilometers up the beach beyond road T7 reducing one fort and clearing up mines and a number of automatic weapons. The 1st and 2nd Bns of the 22nd did not reach St. Martin de Varreville until late afternoon. They moved as far as St. Germain de Varreville without meeting any appreciable resistance and there bivouaced.

The 12th Inf, which landed after noon, marched in without opposition other than occasional sniper fire and bivouaced southeast of Neauville.

The assistant division commander, General Barber, with elements of the GP landed approximately 0930, established temporary GP just back of the dune on road T7. General Barton ^{Dui CP.} landed about 1000. Moved forward just before dark to Audouville la Hubert.

Artillery (?)

That night the reserves consisted of: 3rd Bn, 12th Inf, regimental reserves; one battalion 329th Inf (?), division reserve to be committed only in emergency; and tanks.

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OPERATIONS D PLUS 1

Primary objective of the 8th Inf ^{THE DIVISION} was to establish firm contact with the 82nd, contact with 101st having already been ^{secured} procured on D-Day. Between the 8th and the 82nd the Germans were holding Takueville, Ecoqueuseville, and the hill a mile south of St. Mere Eglise. These three points were attacked by the three battalions of the 8th on the morning of D plus 1.

On the right 1st Bn attacked in the morning and took Takueville, which was held by a battalion of Georgians, at 1500. These troops had kept up a stiff fight and there was street fighting before the town was taken. However, they were not inclined to fight to the death and most of them surrendered. About 285 prisoners were taken and a considerable number of German vehicles, both motor and animal drawn. The vehicles were important assistance in the next move of the battalion. The battalion then moved to a position about one mile north of St. Mere Eglise where they dug in for the night.

The 2nd Bn moved north, took ^{near} Ecoqueville, then turned west and encountered strong resistance at RJ 365951 and along the trail to the southwest. After a hard fight they drove thru this position and about 600 to 800 yards farther west again ran into an enemy and considerable hostile artillery fire. After elimination of this resistance, in conjunction with the attack of the 3rd Bn on the left, the 2nd Bn continued the march to the culvert just south of St. Mere Eglise. This portion of the road was under such violent artillery fire that Colonel MacNealy moved the battalion around the eastern edge of the town, receiving considerable artillery fire in this movement. Battalion swung back to the highway in the northern portion of the town. Here they found themselves in the midst of two battalions of the 505th A/B Inf. who had been in the town since the preceding morning. They immediately became hotly engaged with Germans in the hamlet of Sigueville. Colonel MacNealy arranged with the commander of the battalion of the 505th on his right to make a joint attack on their own responsibility. In the fading light they had a sharp battle in which the enemy right was completely enveloped so that with the supporting tank fire the American force was able to destroy or capture a total of the enemy numbering about 300. In this attack the two battalions were both on the wrong side of the regimental boundary. After the attack they exchanged positions.

RESTRICTED

8th Infantry (Cont'd.)

Meanwhile the 3rd Bn had attacked north astride the highway and had a severe fight on the hill and the village of Coquerie and Fauville. This was pointed out by the regimental commander and executive as perhaps the hardest fight the 8th had during the first three days. The 3rd Bn at the end of the day moved through the town and went into line between the 1st and 2nd Bns.

- 12th Infantry -

With the 1st Bn on the right, the 2nd on the left, and the 3rd in reserve, the 12th advanced northwest. The 1st Bn took the enemy strongpoint southwest of Bezeville, and the group of houses just southwest of Banlieuville which contained several machine gun nests. The 2nd Bn advanced to Neuville-au-Plain where they had a sharp fight. This action as well as the fight of the 1st Bn at Banlieuville were completed about 1015. The advance was then shifted to the north and continued for 1200 yards against enemy delaying action. Co I was sent on a flank mission generally up the Montebourg highway. The advance was stopped by a strong enemy position along the line la Episson-Azeville. There was now a gap between the 1st and 2nd Bns. while Co. I, off to the left, was isolated and under severe attack with close-in fighting. Colonel Reeder, Regimental Commander, sent the 3rd Bn into the gap between the 1st and 2nd and withdrew his 2nd Bn into reserve.

- 22nd Infantry -

The 1st and 2nd Bns. advanced rapidly against slight resistance and by 1000 had reached the line Bas Village de Dodainville-trail just southeast of Azeville. Directly in front of these two battalions were the powerful forts of Crisbecq and Azeville. Immediate attacks were launched against both, 1st Bn. against Crisbecq, 2nd Bn. against Azeville. The 2nd Bn. attacked the heavy fortifications for several hours without success, then were counter-attacked and driven back to their line of departure with considerable loss.

Meanwhile the 1st Bn. continued its rapid advance to the north and by 1100 had taken St. Marcouf, the Germans falling back except for a few snipers. The advance continued with A and B with rifle company organization leading, H on the right, and C, which was organized

RESTRICTED
- 2 -

- 2nd Infantry (Cont'd.) -

in assault sections, following, up to the edge of the fortification. The organization and equipment of this battalion in preparations for the attack were not adequate to take a fort of this type. The leading companies were subjected to extremely heavy artillery fire and had severe losses. They reached the fort about 1500 and before 1600 the attack was disorganized and the Germans launched a counter-attack on the left flank. The battalion commander had been wounded, the executive had not yet reached the front, and the order for withdrawal was given by Captain Tom Shields of Co. A. Losses and disorganization increased during the withdrawal, one platoon of Co. A on the left flank was missing after the withdrawal presumably captured, while another mixed platoon lost its way, wandered all the way to the beach where it captured 113 prisoners and eventually rejoined the battalion late at night. The battalion first withdrew to St. Marcouf but being seriously disorganized withdrew further to a line 300 yards south of Bas Village de Dedainville. After darkness the Germans counter-attacked this position but were routed by a very accurate naval barrage.

Meanwhile the 3rd Bn had gained about 2,000 yards on the beach capturing two more ports and was now considerably to the rear. This battalion was supported by a company of 4.2 mortars, a company of TD's, a platoon of tanks, and heavy naval fire. The successive efforts were attacked systematically - first a naval bombardment, then point-blank fire by the tanks, TD's, and 57 mm. AA guns, while the infantry maneuvered inland to the rear of the pillbox under cover of a mortar barrage. As the battalion progressed northward the maneuver of the infantry became more difficult ^{since} ~~the~~ the strip of land between the beach and the ~~irradiation was under water~~ ^{was covered down north} and the troops had to wade waist deep in order to get behind the fortification. The enemy usually let our men wade up to point-blank range before firing a shot, then opened with all their automatic weapons and mowed them down. They also brought down heavy artillery fire from forts farther north. All the forts were connected by underground telephone cables so that they were able to maintain extremely accurate artillery fire.

RESTRICTED

OPERATIONS D PLUS 2

8TH INFANTRY

8th Inf resumed the advance at 0700 in column of battalions, 1st, 3rd, 2nd. The enemy opposed the advance from the beginning putting down artillery fire on Co. B which was leading at the IP and frequently ^{during the advance} throughout the day. There was no direct contact with enemy infantry until Neuville-au-Plain. This town had been taken twice before, by the ^{3rd of} 82nd Div on D-Day and ^{by} I Co of the 12th Inf on D plus 1 but it was now again held by a German force. Companies A and B had a sharp skirmish in the town. Two 88's were destroyed and two of our tanks knocked out. Here the battalion was again under artillery fire. Capture of the town was completed about 1900.

The advance was resumed against the persistent enemy delaying action. Companies A and B were again engaged with German infantry in Laval and in Froyville. Throughout this portion of the advance there was a good deal of trouble with enemy snipers as well as intermittent artillery fire. Froyville was taken about 1900. The advance continued changing direction to the north for another mile with three companies abreast - C, A, B (right to left). Just south of the road (see overlay) they met strong enemy resistance and dug in for the night.

Meanwhile the 3rd Bn having moved out at 0700 behind the 1st, soon afterward swung west and moved through Grainville where they had a fight with a small enemy force. The battalion continued to the north for a 1000 yards where they were stopped by enemy in the houses at Magneville. Companies I and L were leading; I on the right. L was stopped along the road (see overlay) while I fought its way through the houses to an orchard on the south bank of the creek. Here I was isolated and under heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire from three sides, especially across the flat ground to the northeast. Repeated efforts of Co L and the Battalion CP to move forward were stopped by the heavy fire. Near the end of the day Co I was pulled back in line with L and the battalion dug in for the night. Throughout the night the battalion was under very heavy fire and had a good many casualties. The supply road became known as 88 Avenue and the road in front of the position, 88 Lane.

It was along this line that the Germans made a determined effort to hold. Their main line of resistance was just north of the creek or canal with its chief strongpoints at the

RESTRICTED

8th Inf. (Cont'd.)

hangar and the village of Ecoussville. The entire north bank of the stream was strongly entrenched with a large number of machine guns, a number of 88's, and was heavily supported by artillery, mortars, and neubelweifers. All these weapons had good fields of fire and the artillery had been carefully registered in on routes of approach south of the stream as the entire regiment learned in the next day's fighting. The troops holding this position had been reinforced by the Sturm Battalion AOK7 which had arrived during the day on bicycles. The enemy MLB was extended to the east through Basse Ecoudeville and Ecoudeville and anchored at Azeville.

The 2nd Bn had been in reserve all day and bivouaced that night 800 yards south of Freeville.

12th INFANTRY

On the night of June 7th-8th, the 12th Inf was ⁱⁿ contact with the enemy outposts along the line Le Buisson-rod to Azeville, 1st Bn on the right, 3rd Bn on the left, 2nd in reserve. Co I on a flank guard mission in the vicinity of the Montebourg highway was isolated. Beginning at 0530 a naval barrage was placed on Ecoudeville and at 0630 the 1st and 3rd Bns. attacked. They encountered an enemy defensive line along the trail 700 yards south of Ecoudeville. The 1st Bn was pinned down by heavy fire from the front and right flank. Machine guns in the village of Azeville gave a great deal of trouble. The 3rd Bn attacking with L on the right and K on the left broke through the first enemy line but was stopped again in the orchards just south of Ecoudeville. K was pinned down in the orchard for 5 1/2 hours under continuous artillery fire. L again advanced, fought its way through the center of the town, and moved on to a hedgerow 600 yards northwest of the village. Here they were isolated and under considerable fire. But the fire in their rear was heavier so they moved forward one more field to the trail.

Co K and the 1st Bn were still pinned down south and southeast of the village. The 2nd Bn was committed on the left flank. This battalion, after a violent fight, occupied Basse Ecoudeville and established a line for the night about 300 yards north of the village. Capt. Lindner of L Co attached himself to the 2nd Bn, and swung his line back into extension of the

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12th Inf. (Cont'd.)

2nd Battalion's line.

Meanwhile the 1st Bn had been counter-attacked by a bicycle storm battalion. With all companies committed they were being hard pressed and division attached Co B 359th Inf to the regiment for a reserve. Meantime Co I had been fighting a withdrawal from the left flank. About 1400 the regimental CP at Saussetour was threatened by enemy attack from the west. The CP was only partly covered by Co I and it was necessary for the regimental executive to organize a hasty defense with CP personnel which repulsed the attack.

That night the enemy withdrew from Epondeville to the next line in the vicinity of Jeganville. The 3rd Bn less L was assembled south of Basse Epondeville while the 2nd and 1st Bns held their line just north of the villages and along the road to the east.

The 12th had suffered very heavily casualties in this battle but the enemy casualties were greater. The bicycle battalion was knocked to pieces by the end of the day and left several hundred bicycles, many of them serviceable, scattered throughout the battle area.

22nd INFANTRY

After the costly failure of the attacks on Crisbecq and Azeville on June 7th, the regimental commander, Colonel Harvey A. Tribolst, desired a reserve before renewing the attack and on the morning of June 8th he ordered the 3rd Bn to leave Co K reinforced on the beach and move the rest of the battalion to assembly area near Ravenoville. The company of 4.2 mortars, a heavy machine gun platoon, the A-F platoon, and half of the naval shore fire control party were left with Co K which continued the attack on the beach fortification. The remainder of the battalion assembled just south of Ravenoville shortly after noon.

About 1000 the 1st and 2nd Bns again advanced on the fortifications supported by heavy naval and artillery barrages. The 1st Bn again had a fight for St Marcouf which the Germans had recaptured during the night. Formation for attack by the 1st Bn was the same as on the previous day - Companies A and B, being rifle companies, leading, while Co C, organized and equipped for assault, followed. At 1330 there was a 20 minute preparation of naval, mortar, and artillery fires followed by a moving barrage which the companies followed at 200 yards. The edge of the fortifications was reached with very few losses. Then Companies A and B

12th Inf. (Cont'd.)

took position on the flank while C advanced through the center and blew 4 small pillboxes and damaged the first of the large emplacements. This exhausted their explosives. C had some bayonet fighting in the trenches. Meanwhile the battalion was under a violent enemy barrage from artillery, Nebabrekkers, and other forts. A and B were particularly hard hit, A losing the company commander and two other officers. C lost three officers and Major Neale, the battalion executive, who was in command, was wounded. At about the same time ~~that~~ ^{that} after Major Neale was wounded the Germans counter-attacked the left flank from the same direction as on the previous day. Battalion was badly shot up, had lost the majority of its officers, ^{and} most of its heavy weapons, and had exhausted its explosives. The enemy pressure on the left appeared serious and Major Neale gave the order for withdrawal. The withdrawal was almost a duplicate of that ~~one~~ ^{of} the previous day and the battalion was reformed in the orchards north of Bas Village de Doudeville. Many men had become separated during withdrawal and on the first check in the new position the battalion showed less than half strength. Morale was low and it seemed to officers and men that night that the whole invasion was a dreadful failure. A considerable number of men found their way back to their units during the night and the next morning it was estimated that the final losses in the two attacks on Crisbecq were almost fifty percent.

Meantime the 2nd Battalion's attack on Aneville had also failed and they had been driven back by a counter-attack in the afternoon as on the previous day.

The only bright spot of the day for the 22nd Inf was the capture of the beach fort at Taret-de-Ravenoville. German prisoners had revealed that morale in that fort was low; they stated that the commanding officer had lined up 18 of his men and threatened to shoot them for an attempt to surrender, also that this commander who was the only officer in the fort had been killed by the naval bombardment. Lt. Col. Arthur S. Teague, commanding the 3rd Bn, obtained permission to exploit this situation. About 1700 after a heavy naval bombardment of the fort the 3rd Bn less K closed in on it via the road from Ravenoville. The entire garrison of 82 men walked out and surrendered. Colonel Teague and some of his men spent the night in the fortification. The telephone rang repeatedly - the Germans were evidently trying to contact the garrison. ~~Later they shelled the fort heavily without disturbing the Americans inside.~~

Operations D 43

8th Infantry

The 1st and 3rd Bns. attacked at 1000 after a heavy artillery and mortar preparation which included WP. The Germans answered promptly and especially A and C, the front line companies of the 1st Bn, were under heavy artillery fire from 0930 on. The Germans had a strong defensive position and the 1st Bn was stopped on the LD. "They jumped up and jumped right down again," said machine gun Sergeant of Co. B. At 1400 the Germans counterattacked and Co. C was driven back 300 yards to the next hedgerow. Companies A and B held their ground. The Bn CP withdrew 300 yards.

Meanwhile the 3rd Bn jumped off at 1000 under heavy enemy artillery and machine gun fire and advanced as far as the stream. The stream was some three feet deep and too wide to jump and Co L was stopped and pinned down on the south side opposite the hangar.

In front of Co I on the north side of the stream was a flat open field about 500 yards across. The enemy was well entrenched around this field particularly near the hangar and other buildings, and along the hedgerow on the northeast side. The field was covered by machine gun and rifle fire in these positions. Co I crossed the creek, charged across the field (this was a charge in the open made with speed and not a infiltration along the hedgerow). There was no supporting fire in this action. The riflemen used some assault fire but for the most part they crossed at a dead run. In this attack the 2nd platoon with light machine guns was on the right, 3rd platoon on the left, and the 1st platoon with the 60 mm. mortars and the company CP followed. Within 10 minutes the entire company had crossed the field into the orchards north of the hangar. Here they were stopped by fire from the houses to the north which were held by the Germans in strength.

Co I was now completely surrounded. A portion of the right platoon was also separated from the rest of the company in the orchards just north of the corner of the field where they were pinned down by heavy fire. The German entrenchments along the hedgerow on the northeast side of the field had been a surprise. The company commander now moved a machine gun and a 60 mm. mortar into position to infilade this line. The fire from these positions was partly suppressed but after about two hours Co I withdrew from the orchards to the line of the road restoring contact with the detachment of the 1st Bn.

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I was ordered to assist L in the capture of the hangar. The firing line was formed on the north of the buildings and I pushed in from that direction while L crossed the creek and in close-in fighting captured the hangar area. Co I then moved back to its former position in the orchards, L coming in line on the left. Here they dug in for the night. The position was surrounded on three sides and the main enemy strongpoint in the village of Ecausseville was still intact. To cover this exposed flank Co K was put in position in the orchards just north of the open field.

Co I had lost 37 men during the day most of them during the charge across the open fields also one machine gun and one mortar. During the night they were in constant contact with the Germans in the houses just north of their lines. An outpost of ten men was placed in a position so close that they could hear the movements of the Germans and exchanged grenades with them throughout the night.

Battalion CP was still south of the creek. Several attempts were made to move it across but each time they came under such heavy fire that the CP remained south of the creek for the night. Lt. Maguire, assistant S-3, organized a patrol after dark to supply the companies. This patrol had to fight to get forward and reduce two machine guns in the course of its mission. Enemy fire on both sides of the stream continued heavily all night.

Meanwhile the 1st Bn had broken through on the opposite flank. At 1900 1st Bn followed two platoons of tanks of Co A, 70th Tank Bn, up the road. The advance was ^{led} ~~supported~~ by the regimental commander Colonel James A. Van Fleet and the assistant division commander Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt. After crossing the stream the tanks swung through the fields to the northwest. On the way they machine-gunned the houses at the bend in the road then stepped in the fields north of Ecausseville and fired into the village for 10 or 15 minutes. Then MG's opened up on them and the tanks turned back to the east to rejoin the infantry (in their position north of the village the tanks had gotten in behind the MG positions which Col. MacNealy found next day).

When the tanks got back to the houses at the bend of the road they found that they were pinned down on the other side by fire from the enemy in the houses. They then charged into this position from the rear ~~into~~ ^{REINSTATED} into the houses. This broke the

and the infantry occupied the position taking about a 100 prisoners. This was about 2100. The position was taken by Co A which had led the battalion advance. By 2130 battalion dug in for the night just northeast of Ecousevillers. During the night the enemy evacuated the village and fell back to positions farther north.

At about noon the regimental commander finding both his flanks held up had attempted to break the position in the center. Reports had been received that Ecousevillers was clear of the enemy. The 2nd Bn was ordered to move straight to the north and occupy the village. At about 1400 battalion moved out, Co E leading with two platoons abreast astride the trail, scouts well out in front. There were no supporting fires since Ecousevillers was understood to be clear. The advance continued without opposition until the scouts were within 200 yards of the stream and the leading platoons had just reached the trail paralleling the stream. At this point the enemy opened violent surprise fire with artillery, mortars, and machine guns. The leading platoons piled into the lateral trail taking shelter behind the hedgerows. However the German artillery was accurately registered on this position. Either they used time fire or their shells produced airbursts from striking the trees which thickly lined both sides of the trail. Casualties in E Co were very heavy. When the action was over the trail was lined with dead at intervals of three or four yards. A large percent had been killed by the airbursts just as they lay in the firing line.

One German machine gun position at the bend of the trail on the southwest was infiltrating the line. The 2nd platoon moved to the left and knocked out this position with hand grenades. They continued around the bend of the trail for a 100 yards and then were stopped by entrenched German positions next to the orchard. In the effort to avoid the fire which was also falling on the route of advance the entire company had pushed into the lateral trail. The company commander, Lt. John C. Rebarshak, found one of his mortars setting up at the trail junction right in the firing line. He immediately ordered the mortar back to a hedgerow 250 yards to the rear. Before the crew could move, a direct hit destroyed the mortar and killed several of the crew. The attached platoon of heavy machine guns had gone in position in the firing line, two of them were knocked out.

Lt. Rebarshak had moved to the right searching for a position of the 1st platoon which

disappeared, in that direction. 14 men under Lt. Strickland, commander of the Weapons platoon, had continued to move to the right to get out of the fire. In so doing they approached the lines of the 1st Bn. and were fired on by tanks and riflemen. Fortunately there was a piece of escape parachute in the group with which they were able to stop the friendly fire against them. They then joined the 1st Bn and fought with it for two days.

When Lt. Rebarshak, having failed to find this right flank group, returned to the company he found them withdrawing. The explanation was that an order to withdraw had come "from the rear." About 400 yards farther back Lt. Rebarshak rallied what was left of the company and put them in position behind a hedgerow. He now had only 70 men and no other officers. Between 50 and 60 men and 2 officers were casualties and one officer and 14 men were missing. The company had lost all its mortars and half its machine guns.

Lt. Rebarshak, after reestablishing his line in rear, went back to the front. He found 3 or 4 of his men still unwounded who had remained on the position despite the withdrawal of the rest of the company. They had dug slit trenches for the wounded, covered them with rain coats and were remaining to take care of them.

Sometime after 1500 Co E was ordered to withdraw on line with Co B. About 1730 the company was further withdrawn to the 2nd Bn assembly area where it reorganized.

12TH INFANTRY

The 12th Inf resumed the attack and had a series of hard fights at Jaganville and other positions farther north. The strongest enemy position was at Chateau de Dautinville. This is a large rambling Norman structure with heavy masonry in the middle of a large bare courtyard surrounded by a stone wall. The 1st and 2nd Bns supported by six tanks of the 76th Td Bn took this position from elements of the German bicycle battalion which had been at Mantebourg the previous day. The 1st and 2nd Bns suffered heavy casualties.

The 1st Bn continued its advance to a line just southeast of St Floreal which was strongly held by the enemy. The 2nd Bn was stopped about 500 yards north of the chateau and the reserve 3rd Bn went into line in the center to fill the gap.

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The 1st and 2nd Bns were badly disorganized by the previous two days unsuccessful attacks on the forts at Crisbeeq and Anzeville. On June 9th the 3rd Bn less Co K was given the mission of taking Anzeville while Crisbeeq was left alone. For details of this attack see attached account.

About 1500 the village and the fort had been taken and the battalion immediately resumed the advance to the northwest with I on the right and L on the left. A little before dark they reached the CR west of Chateau de Fontenay. Here, as well as at the chateau, the enemy had strong positions. Co I was facing a high stone wall which they were unable to cross, while movement to the right around the wall was prevented by heavy fire from the chateau. On the left L advanced to a position about 300 yards north of the CR. Here they were surrounded and suffering serious casualties from the heavy enemy fire. There was a gap of about a mile and a half between Co L and the 12th Inf while all the territory to the east and north was strongly held by the Germans. After dark Co L was withdrawn into line with I where battalion dug in for the night.

The 2nd and 1st Bns were moved into assembly areas south of the 3rd, putting the regiment in column of battalions. The 1st Bn 399th Inf in division reserve was to the left rear of the 22nd. The right flank of the 22nd was also open to the strong German positions at Crisbeeq and Chateau de Fontenay. To screen this flank a strong outpost was established after dark consisting of Co G, 22nd Inf, Co G, 4th Engrs, and four ID's, commanded by Major Huston M. Betty. This force maintained contact with the German outposts for the next two days. Three times they pulled back for aerial bombardment of Crisbeeq and St. Marcouf. On the first two occasions the bombardment did not occur and Major Betty's troops had to fight their way to the outpost line.

On the morning of June 9th Co G, 4th Engrs, had taken over the captured fort at Thuret de Ravenoville from 3rd Bn 22nd Inf and blown the emplacements after which the position was abandoned. The two forts just south of it were still holding out but the third one to the south surrendered to Co K that day.

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OPERATIONS II & A

1st Infantry

1st Bn jumped off at 0730 after an artillery operation (preparation), A on the right B on the left, C in reserve. They again met remnants of the bicycle battalion at Neu de la Riviere where there was a sharp fight. The advance was continued and by 1130 the leading companies had reached a line about 900 yards east of the objective which was the Montebourg-le-Haut highway where they were stopped by heavy resistance. Co C was echeloned to the right rear to cover against Montebourg. About 1500 the Germans counterattacked. Co C was thrown into line but the enemy pressure continued to increase. Our line was forced back several hundred yards. All available men in the battalion were sent forward to reinforce the front line companies. Finally an attack by Co C broke the enemy counterattack. A defensive position was organized about 400 to 600 yards east of the highway with Co C again facing north toward Montebourg.

The advance on this day had begun with the tank company carrying infantry out in front. As the tanks approached the stream east of Erousseville they were fired on. They dropped the infantry and moved on up the road several hundred yards knocking out three A-T guns. One of these was a 50 mm. SP which one of our tanks met suddenly at point-blank range. Both fired at the same time. The German gun was knocked out.

After Co B was stopped in front of Erousseville the tanks went into the village five times shooting it up. Each time when the infantry tried to follow they were pinned down by fire, then the tanks would go back again. Each time some Germans came out and surrendered to the tanks. In one case about 50 surrendered and were being marched down the road when Germans still in the houses opened on them with machine guns and machine pistols cutting down all but 15 or 20. During these forays the Germans in the houses fired on the tanks with machine pistols and threw hand grenades at them.

The 2nd Bn bypassed Erousseville on the west and advanced northwest in the center of the regimental sector. This battalion took the southern portion of Erousseville while the 1st Bn was taking the northern part. At 1900 a new attack was launched across the highway into the orchards just beyond the village. This attack was stopped by heavy enemy fire. The Germans were entrenched along the railroad and the stream for several hundred yards east of it. 2nd

Cont. of 1st - 2nd Inf. (cont'd.) P. 2.

2nd Bn fought here until dark and then pulled back to positions on the higher ground east of the highway.

The 3rd Bn swung to the east of the ^{of houses} ground which had stopped them the previous night and swung east around the houses but were stopped again along the trail running north from the hamlet. Battalion remained on this line for the rest of the day. They were under heavy artillery fire some of which appeared to be from the vicinity of Montebourg station.

12TH INFANTRY

12th Inf attacked with the 1st and 2nd Bns, 1st on the right supported by a company of tanks, toward an objective on the highway just northeast of Montebourg. The 2nd Bn ran into the edge of Montebourg which was strongly defended with numerous A-T guns and machine guns. 2nd Bn attacked several houses on the northeast edge of the town but the thick stone walls resisted all their fire. Division orders were to contain the town but stay out of it. The second battalion turned slightly toward the north so as to bypass the town.

Meanwhile the 1st Bn had passed by on the right of the 2nd and reached the hilltop northeast of Montebourg with elements north of the highway. The 3rd had been committed on the right flank and finished the day about 500 yards south of the highway, to the right rear of the 1st.

22ND INFANTRY

The 3rd Bn (still less C & K) attacked and broke through the position at the CR. The advance continued as far as the M a 1000 yards south of Osville. They remained in this position for the rest of the 10th. They were under heavy fire from the fortifications in front and from the flanks, both of which were open.

The 2nd Bn from a ID along the paved road attacked at 0630 the Chateau de Fontenay with F on the left, G on the right, and H behind G. During the advance F especially received heavy small arms fire from the left flank. G reached the park southwest of the chateau while F passed north of the buildings and reached the field on the east. As they came into this position the Germans opened surprisingly heavy fire and two platoons were pinned down in the field under cross grazing machine gun fire. The company commander of F, Captain Harry D. Pullen, was killed at this point. E was now committed in the center and advanced

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about to the buildings.

It was now about noon. At this time word was received that an air bombardment of the ^{company} ~~company~~ ~~system~~ was scheduled between 1200 and 1400 that day. Orders were that all/should withdraw immediately. The reason for the withdrawal became known and the movement became about a ~~feet~~ ^{feet}. The company commander of K rallied his men and reformed the line which covered the withdrawal of the rest of the battalion. After the withdrawal it was discovered that 70 men of P and K companies were missing. This was the detachment that got to the east of the ~~division~~ ^{division}. The order for withdrawal had not reached them and it is doubtful if they could have withdrawn. Only one of these men ever returned alive, an aid man who was found among the prisoners at Cherbourg. The graves of a number of the others are at St. Mary's Chapel including Captain Falken, the company commander.

The 1st Bn less Co C advanced behind the 3rd then swung to the right to contain the fortified stronghold at Pointe aux Mers.

Co K was still facing the two beach forts. They were heavily bombarded several times without apparent effect.

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OPERATION D-1

8TH INFANTRY

The 3rd Bn moved out in column of companies, K, I, L. The Germans withdrew before them as far as the creek. Here the enemy made a stand and the 3rd Bn attacked at 1000 with I on the right, K on the left, and the stream as an LD. The enemy laid a very heavy artillery barrage on the orchards as the company moved through them. The Germans were still firing from the vicinity of the station. The station was out of the division sector and the battalion continued its advance to the northwest as far as the highway. Late in the afternoon a new attack was made across the highway which got about half way to the railroad. Here they met strongly entrenched enemy positions and heavy fire. At dark the battalion was withdrawn just west of the highway.

The 1st and 2nd Bns remained on their positions of the previous night. The entire regiment was now on its objective and the position was organized for defense. This position was held until the night of June 18th.

12TH INFANTRY

The 12th Inf refused the advance and secured the high ground just north of the highway. The regiment was now on its objective but it was out of contact on both flanks. On their left rear was Montebourg which was strongly held by the enemy. To their right rear the fortifications at Osவில் were still holding out. The regiment was ordered to withdraw from its advanced position and fall back to a line along the Montebourg-St. Floreal road.

22ND INFANTRY

The 3rd Bn (still less K) attacked the Osவில் fort. Co L made the assault with I covering the right rear. Throughout the attack L suffered severe casualties from the heavy fire and they were counterattacked and driven back. L had now suffered 139 casualties since landing and had only one officer and three NCOs. The remnant of the company was placed under the command of the heavy weapons company commander. The battalion withdrew to the positions of the previous night.

On this day Co K took beach forts 78 and 80. During the previous two days of unsuccessful assaults the company had continued to lose prisoners who slipped out to surrender. Some of the prisoners informed Captain Ernest, the company commander, that whenever he placed

heavy fire on one of the forts the garrison retired through a communicating tunnel to the other. Captain Ernest now fired 50 rounds of 37 mm. on Fort 78 then suddenly switched the fire to number 80 and fired 80 rounds on it. Some of the shells went completely through the turrets and out on the other side. In one place a hole was dug completely through the concrete. Both forts thereupon surrendered and 93 prisoners were taken, half of the garrison had been killed. One of the German officers refused to reveal the location of mines surrounding the fort whereupon Captain Ernest forced him to march through the water-filled tank ditch. Apparently it was not mined. This completed the clearing of the beach as far as Taret de Ravenneville and that night Company K rejoined the battalion.

The 2nd Bn that day was sent to the left of the 3rd Bn to cover the gap between it and the 12th Inf. The 1st Bn less Co C continued to contain Fort Fontenay-sur-Mer and Co C remained on its outpost mission south of Orisbecq.

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OPERATIONS D. 4. 6

12TH INFANTRY

12th Inf was ordered to again advance north of the Montebourg-Quineville highway to a line Montebourg-Fiaffedanoul. The attack was launched at 1600 with the 2nd Bn on the right, the 3rd Bn on the left. The 2nd Bn after a long advance encountered a group of pillboxes around two stone quarries near Fiaffedanoul. These pillboxes faced east and northeast. Captain O'Malley now commanding the 2nd Bn attacked to the southeast after an artillery preparation. The attack was supported by tanks. Co E commanded by Lt. Thompson closed on the pillboxes and attacked some with hand grenades down the ventilators. During the assault the Germans throw in a counterattack, supported by three tanks, from the northeast. Co B was sent to reinforce the 2nd Bn and one platoon of B, commanded by Lt. Peary, attacked the German right flank. The counterattack was repulsed and the position captured. The 3rd Bn against heavy resistance took the hilltop near Fiaffedanoul. Co A established a combat outpost about a 1000 yards north of Montebourg.

This advance again placed the 12th Inf in an exposed position but it covered the flank of the 22nd Inf in the attack on Quineville ridge.

22ND INFANTRY

The 39th Inf now had been attached to the 4th Division and on the morning of June 12th took over the sector from Chateau de Fontenay and Fontenay-sur-Mer eastward. This released the 1st Bn of the 22nd.

Another attack was made on Oeuville by the 1st and 3rd Bns, while the 2nd Bn covered the gap on the left flank. Co K made the main assault from the southwest corner of the fort with L on the left and I on the right while the 1st Bn attacked just east of the fort.

The attack was to have been preceded by an air bombardment and the battalions had moved back a 1000 yards. However the bombardment did not occur and after the time for it had passed the battalions pulled up again to the LD. An artillery and mortar barrage was substituted for the air bombardment and 2,000 rounds of 81 mm. ammunition were fired in three hours. Two assault sections of Co K closed in on the emplacement while I and L broke into the position and engaged in a good deal of bayonet fighting. A white flag was displayed on one fort and Lt. Desjardet a platoon leader of Co K climbed up on a pillbox to stop his men from firing.

OMMA, D-4-6 - 22nd Inf. (2nd Lt.) Pte. 72.

He was shot dead and the company went mad. They rushed in with grenades and bayonets and largely exterminated the garrison.

The 1st Bn of the 39th Inf occupied Quai de Fontenay and Oriskany, which, according to reports of the 22nd Inf, had by that time been abandoned by the Germans. 1st Bn of the 39th Inf then advanced across the sunkenys against the beach fortifications. 2nd Bn of the 39th Inf took Fontenay-sur-Mer and the strongpoint just east of it and advanced to the edge of the inundation.

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OPERATIONS 2 17

The 6th and 12th Inf continued to hold their positions.

1st Bn of the 22nd advanced about a 1000 yards to the north to position just south of the middle crest of the Quinsville ridge. The 3rd Bn moved north until it was on the forward slopes, then was ordered to sidestep to the east to a position on the right of the 1st Bn. Col. Tugde made this move by extending one company to the right then passing the next one behind it and extending it further to the right, then the next company behind the first two. 12 men were lost during this movement. The 2nd Bn made a wide swing thru the 12th Inf wester to the Montebourg-Quinsville highway just east of Rieferscheid.

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OPERATIONS D 4 8

Orders were for the 22nd Inf to capture the Quinsville ridge then move east and take Quinsville. The scheme of maneuver of the 22nd Inf was for the 3rd and 1st battalions to attack north and take the hilltop in front of them while the 2nd Bn attacked east and captured the western crest. After seizure of the ridge 3rd Bn was to take Quinsville. The attack was launched about 1100 after an artillery preparation and under cover of tank fire from the ridge to the south. All three hills were secured shortly after noon. There was comparatively little fire from the enemy positions during this attack.

Shortly after 1300 Quinsville was bombarded by 36 - A20's. It was a beautiful example of accurate serial bombardment. At 1600 elements of the 39th Inf moved into Quinsville from the west and captured the town after a short fight. That night Co L 22nd Inf took over the town from the 39th Inf which was relieved from attachment to the 4th Division.

The next two days the 22nd Inf held the line of the Edsape river and then were relieved by the 4th Cavalry Squadron.

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GENERAL

The Division had now reached its objective which was the beachhead defense line. In the original plan this had been the D-Day objective but this was not true in the revised plan in which some two weeks were allowed for the capture of Cherbourg. 4th Division held this line from June 16th through 18th while the remainder of the Corps made the drive to the West which cut off the Cherbourg peninsula. During this period the enemy lines opposing us were strongly held and the front line particularly of the 6th and the 12th was hot. However the enemy never attempted a counterattack.

On June 16th the division overstrength began arriving and a small number of them reached their units that day. The entire overstrength had joined the units before the beginning of the next offensive.

Almost without exception infantry attacks in the first phase of the combat were supported by the division artillery. Additional information on the participation of the artillery will be supplied by the 4th Division at a later date.

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MONTEBOURG

D 4 A - As the 8th and 12th Inf approached Montebourg, Gen Barton ordered them to stay out of the town, contain it and by-pass it. The Division was spread over a wide front (7 miles following the trace of the front) had no reserves except the 4th Engr Bn, 4th Rem Troop, tanks of the 70th Tk Bn which were in the rear for maintenance, and two battalions of the 359th Inf which were available to the Division for emergency only. The 90th Division was attacking west, away from the 4th Div. The 9th Division was just beginning to land. General Barton, considering a strong counterattack likely, did not want to get involved in street fighting. Accordingly, the 8th passed west of Montebourg, the 12th to the east.

D 4 5 - 4th Engr Bn established road blocks on the highway south of Montebourg, and took defensive position to cover the gap between the 8th and 12th against enemy debouchement from Montebourg.

D 4 6 - Position of the Division was eased by attachment of the 39th Inf. Corps reserves were ample since the bulk of the 9th Div was now ashore. Reports of patrols indicated that Montebourg was lightly held by the enemy. Gen. Barton decided to seize the town if it could be done cheaply. The 8th Inf was ordered in the late afternoon to reduce the salient created by the southeastern projection of Montebourg along the hwy, and if feasible to occupy the town with a small force.

8th Inf created a small task force, as follows:

- Lt. Col. Fred A. Steiner, Exec. C. 8th Inf, Comdg.
- Co. G 8th Inf.
- Co. G 8th Inf.
- Plat Co H 8th Inf.
- Plat Co A 4th Engr Bn
- Plat 87th Mortar Bn (4x2)
- AT Co 8th Inf.
- Det TD's.

supported by 29th FA Bn and Cannon Co 8th Inf.

The TD detachment did not arrive in time for tank attack that evening. The remainder of Col. Steiner's force moved through outpost of 4th Engr Bn west of the St Mere Eglise hwy and south of the creek, with G leading and G escheloned to left rear. Several machine guns outside the city were reduced. The advance was made under heavy fire, and on reaching the edge of the city Co G was pinned down. The whole town was blazing, having been heavily

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Montebourg (Cont'd.) Pt. 2

shelled with HE and WP, and anyone who moved on the streets was sharply silhouetted. Patrols sent into the town operated with difficulty, but it appeared that most of the Germans had moved out of the center of the town and were holding around the edges.

It was now dark. Co C was withdrawn from the edge of the city, covered by Co G, and a defensive line was established for the night.

At 0700, D / 7, the attack was resumed with the rifle companies astride the highway and the TD's between. The southeastern salient of the town was occupied as far as the creek. Here the TD's came under SS fire and withdrew without orders. The attack was then halted along the stream line and exits from the city were mined. This was the operation which was reported in the press as the capture of Montebourg.

Reports of patrols operating in the town in the following days indicated that it was held by a German battalion with a probable strength of about 200. Col. Steiner's force held its lines around the town for three days, under frequent enemy shelling. It lost a total of about 50 men and 5 officers. Patrolling was particularly costly.

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August 13th
1918

The drive of VII Corps across the peninsula had been completed, and the 4th Division was ordered to attack toward Cherbourg at 0300 June 19, on the right flank of the Corps, the 79th Division being in the center and the 9th Division on the left. Corps prescribed a night attack, without artillery preparation, with the limited objective of the high ground north and west of Montebourg, and resumption of advance after daylight. Corps also prescribed the LD for the night attack as the railroad, although patrols of both the 8th and 12th Inf reported that line strongly held by the enemy. In fact all four assault battalions had to fight several hours for the LD.

8th Infantry

The 8th Inf attacked with the 2nd Bn on the right, 1st on the left, 3rd in reserve. The 2nd Bn attacked in column of companies, F, E, G, and set its own LD on the bay, which was crossed at 0250. Since artillery was prohibited, a preparation was fired by all the 81 mm mortars of the regt. and a company of 4.2 mortars, using HE and WP, followed by a moving barrage from the 81's. The leading platoons of Co F, following the barrage so close "it burned their faces," walked through the enemy lines without being fired on except occasionally and without noticing the entrenchments in the darkness. They then moved on to the objective 1000 yards northwest of Montebourg without incident. There the company commander, Lt. John A. Kulp, discovered that he had 45 men with him. About daylight, hearing the battalion having a heavy fight behind him, ^{he} realized for the first time that he was behind ^{the} enemy main body.

Lt. Rebarchek, commanding Co E, on reaching the sunken trail just west of the highway found that a number of his men had stopped in the trail. He also found there a platoon of Co F which had lost contact and whose commander was uncertain what to do. Lt. Rebarchek gave him assistance and sent him on his way, then collected his own leading platoon and moved forward at their head thinking the rest of his company was following. These two platoons also walked through the enemy lines without serious opposition. This group crossed the Montebourg-Valognes highway a little farther west than had Lt. Kulp and ran into an enemy position astride the highway which contained two 88's, two 30-mm's, and two or three machine guns. Lt. Rebarchek took command of both platoons and ~~attacked and~~ destroyed this enemy force, then moved on to the objective where they joined the rest of Co F.

August 19th (Cont'd.) - 8th Inf. - Pg. 52.

10:14

Meanwhile the battalion commander had received word of a break in the column and had gone forward. When he reached the sunken trail he ^{heard} the Germans yelling, thought at first they wanted to surrender. Instead they were giving the alarm. They opened fire on the rear platoons of Co E and stopped them. It was now beginning to get light and the enemy put up a strong defense holding the remainder of the 2nd Bn on the line of the sunken trail. The Germans had a large number of deep entrenchments throughout the area between the sunken trail and the railroad. In one place there was a steep bank six or eight feet high the foot of which was lined with foxholes.

Battalion found it impossible to advance through the machine gun fire and they were unable to reach the enemy machine guns with mortars. Captain Mabry, Bn 8-3, personally supervised the laying of one 60 mm. mortar but the highest angle that could be ^{put} on the mortar did not get down to the deep German positions. Colonel MacNealy, after several hours fighting in the trail, obtained a platoon of tanks and with this support circled around to the north through the edge of Montebourg and took the German positions in the rear. The enemy withdrew pursued by the 2nd Bn. The fleeing enemy were driven back on Co F's position. At the same time the 12th Inf advanced on the right and the 1st Bn of the 8th on the left, were also pressing the Germans in to a line of retreat which was blocked by Co F.

When Lt Kulp and Lt Rebarahok first saw the Germans approaching them from the rear they thought they were being counterattacked. They had already established an all-around defense and this company shot down a large number of the fleeing enemy. Some of them were shot in the back as they moved backward facing the pursuing troops.

The 1st Bn attacked at 0900 with Co B on the right, A on the left, and also met opposition on the LD. About daylight two platoons of Co B had crossed the railroad and reached Lesieres without meeting much opposition but they then returned and rejoined the battalion. Co C had now been placed in the line and B reverted to reserve. The Bn was still held up in front of the railroad.

At 1020 a platoon of tanks arrived and an attack was launched about 1100. By 1200 the Bn had broken through the enemy line on the railroad and continued the advance reaching La Victoire that night.

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JUNE

The 2nd Bn meanwhile had advanced to the vicinity of Amville and the 3rd Bn which had followed without fighting went into position between the 1st and 2nd Bns.

12TH INFANTRY

The 12th Inf attacked at 0900, the 3rd Bn ^{on} the right, with Hill 119 as its first objective, 1st Bn on the left and Hill 100 as its first objective. For two hours regimental CP was out of contact with the leading battalions. By dawn it was discovered that both battalions had been held up short of the railroad. After daylight the first battalion supported by Co A, 70th Tk Bn, broke the enemy line and the tanks followed by Co F captured Hill 100 about 1000.

The 3rd Bn had also been pinned down in front of the railroad. ^{The} Regimental commander, Lt Col Luckett ordered the 3rd Bn to wait for the tanks before making another attack. After completion of their mission with the 1st Bn, the tank Company joined the 3rd Bn and an attack was made, which, by 1610, had taken Hill 119.

During the six hours that the 1st Bn had been holding Hill 100 they were subjected to heavy artillery and nebelwerfer fire including oil-filled shells.

The 2nd Bn was now committed on the right flank to pass to the north of the 3rd Bn and take the second Hill 119 (1500 yards southeast of Amville). Little opposition was encountered. The attack started at 1800 and by 1855 the hill had been occupied, the 2nd Bn moved on to the vicinity of Amville. The 3rd Bn moved up on the right of the 2nd and a line was established for the night just north and east of Amville.

22ND INFANTRY

3rd Bn of the 22nd Inf occupied Montaubourg after the other two regiments had passed it. They found the town had been evacuated by the enemy. About 300 of the civilian population emerged from cellars after the Americans entered although the town had been under heavy shelling for more than a week and was completely burned out.

The 1st and 2nd Bns of the 22nd moved north to positions on the right flank of the 12th Inf. No opposition encountered.

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JUNE 20TH

During the three days June 16th to 18th, the Germans had withdrawn all their forces which were trapped in the northern part of the peninsula, into the defenses surrounding Cherbourg. These defenses formed an arc generally 5 to 6 miles out from the port, extending somewhat further east to include the airport and the fortifications north of it. In the 4th Division sector, the first line of defense was behind the Bois de Roucou, the Bois du Coudray and the Bois de Blanquerville.

8TH INFANTRY

The 8th Inf resumed the advance at 0930 (?) June 20th with the 2nd and 3rd Bns. The 1st Bn remained in position facing Valognes and at 0930 sent a patrol of infantry and two tanks to investigate the city. At 1030 the patrol reported this city free of enemy but all routes thru it blocked by rubble from air bombardment. Col. Van Fleet ordered one platoon of Co A to go thru Valognes while the rest of the battalion advanced on routes east of the city. The other battalions, having found their advance unopposed, had already been ordered to get on the roads and move rapidly.

About 2100 the 1st Bn encountered enemy outposts about 1200 yards southeast of Ruffosses. This resistance was eliminated by a tank and infantry attack, then the Bn halted for the night since the 3rd and 2nd Bns had encountered serious resistance. Patrols were sent thru the Bois de Roucou and found the woods free of the enemy but reported a large enemy installation just northwest of it.

The 3rd Bn in the center of the regimental sector made an unopposed march until near the end of the day they met strong opposition in Ruffosses. The Bn was subjected to very heavy artillery fire in the attack on Ruffosses but took the town before dark and established a line for the night just east of the woods.

The 2nd Bn on the right of the regiment advanced without opposition except one brush by the advance guard with a small enemy party north of Saussemouil, until they came up the slope northwest of Ruffosses. Here they came under fire from positions at CR 148 and others farther north. It was now nearly dark and the Bn dug in along the road 600 yards east of CR 148.

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The 2nd Bn had been ordered to occupy Valognes but after the complete German withdrawal

June 20th - 12th Inf - Pt. 4 - Pt. 2.

was verified the orders were changed and the whole regiment advanced to the high ground between Saussensuil and Bois du Coudray, in division reserve.

22ND INFANTRY

Advancing in column of Bns, 1-2-3, the 22nd reached the area just east of Bois du Theil near the end of the day. The 1st Bn was ordered to take position on the forward slope just south of Lassaire creek. Bn dug in here under direct observation and heavy fire from the high ground to the north and suffered severe losses. 2nd and 3rd Bns bivouaced one and two kilometers respectively farther south.

The right flank of the division was covered by the 24th Cav Squadron.

JUNE 21ST

5TH INFANTRY

1st and 3rd Bns advanced west thru the woods at Boudou at 1100. After some fighting in the woods the two Bns advanced astride the trail running southeast from QR 178, 3rd Bn on the right. At QR 178 was a large unfinished German installation apparently a Buss-Bomb site. There were a large number of concrete dugouts northwest of the QR while all the surrounding houses were strongly defended. A number of MG's were in position near the QR. Both Bns were held up for the rest of the day, in front of this position. In the late afternoon the 3rd Bn swung to the right thru the woods bypassing the German strongpoint and advanced about 800 yards with I on the right, L on the left, and K in reserve. They were stopped by enemy defenses along the trail (see overlay) and dug in for the night.

The 2nd Bn had driven thru the enemy line north of QR 148 (for details see attached account) and reestablished contact with the right flank of the 3rd Bn. The 2nd and 3rd Bns were now cut off from supply since the enemy still held QR 148 and QR 178 and there were no practicable routes between.

12TH INFANTRY

12th was committed at 1600 in the center of the division sector and on June 21st advanced into the Bois du Coudray encountering slight resistance in the woods. The 2nd Bn reached the bridge which had been blown on the northwestern side of the woods where they were stopped by a strong enemy position on the west side of the stream. The 3rd Bn bivouaced in the east center of the woods while the 1st Bn in division reserve was one kilometer farther south.

June 21st - 22nd Inf - Cont'd. - Pg. 23

22ND INFANTRY

22nd Inf was ordered to make a long advance ~~and~~ ^{to} take the hill a mile west of the airport to cut the road between Cherbourg and the airport. 1st and 3rd Bns, 1st on the right, advanced thru scattered resistance and captured the hill. This was a strongly fortified position containing a radio tower and was the center of communication for the fortified area to the west and northwest. The Corps commander attached great importance to the position and gave special congratulation to the division on accomplishment of this mission.

These two Bns were now ^{isolated} ~~isolated~~. Germans in considerable force but apparently unorganized infiltrated across their rear continually during the next four days and nights. Communication during this period was uncertain. Sometimes a single man would succeed moving between the forward and rear elements without difficulty, at other times a considerable party would be stopped completely. On the night of the 21st the 3rd Bn brought its supply vehicles forward under escort of a platoon of tanks while the 1st Bn, which had no tanks, was unable to get thru. On the morning of June 22nd the tanks were assigned to the 1st Bn ~~with~~ and led a supply party of jeeps and 2 1/2 ton trucks with 22 men. The enemy allowed the tanks to go thru ^{but} and opened machine gun fire from ambush on the supply vehicles. Every driver of a truck or jeep was a casualty and the supply column had to withdraw. Later in the day a limited quantity of supplies was carried forward by tying them on the backs of tanks.

During the next three days the 1st and 3rd Bns could be supplied only by use of tank escort. On one occasion the tank commander took the wrong road and the column was ambushed on the narrow trail between high hedges. They lost two light tanks, three half-tracks, three 57 mm. guns, and several jeeps. At the conclusion of the campaign these vehicles were recovered. The Germans had blown the 57's but had not damaged the half-track motors; they had simply fired 57 shells thru the bodies.

On the 22nd the GP groups of the 1st and the 3rd Bns were escorted forward by a detachment from the 2nd Bn.

JUNE 22ND

22ND INFANTRY

At 1030 the Germans counter-attacked the 1st Bn. Our artillery fire was brought down on them and Companies A and B held their ground. About 1230 the counter-attack had been driven

RESTRICTED

back. At 1550 Bn attacked, with C on the right, B on the left, and made slight gains to a position just west of CR 178.

The 3rd Bn resumed the advance at 0630 with Co I on the right, L on the left, and K in reserve. The attack had been delayed one hour because of the lack of communications for supporting fire and failure of tanks to arrive at the scheduled hour. The advance continued for about 500 yards and then the Bn encountered a highly organized strongpoint. (See overlay) The Germans had set lanes of fire with notches in the hedgerows cleared of trees and bushes. These lanes were concealed so that they were not obvious from the front. The enemy held their fire until the attacking troops were a perfect target then opened up and inflicted heavy casualties. Co I moved around to the right flank into the woods. The Germans placed a heavy artillery barrage on the woods and the tree bursts produced a terrific effect, heavy shells bursting in the trees about ten feet above ground. Co I lost 54 men in this barrage. The entire Bn lost eleven officers and 148 men during the day.

In the afternoon a new attack was organized with a platoon of tanks which broke into the German strongpoint whereupon the enemy withdrew. The Bn dug in for the night just north of the strongpoint.

Co F turned back toward the rear and in a brilliant action completely destroyed the enemy force at CR 148 and positions north thereof. Co F with a strength of 90 men captured 244 prisoners and killed some 50 without suffering a single casualty (for details see attached account). Co G was on a detached mission covering the left rear of the regiment. The remainder of the 2nd Bn was in regimental reserve.

12TH INFANTRY

The 2nd Bn was still unable to cross the stream north of the Bois du Coudray. To avoid the heavy enemy artillery fire the Bn drew back slightly to the left rear. The regimental commander decided to attack with the 3rd Bn thru the north end of the woods and circle around and outflank the enemy position which was blocking the 2nd Bn. (For details of this action see attached account).

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22 JUN 1945

The 1st and 3rd Bns continued to hold their position on Hill 155 while the 2nd Bn took

position to cover the line of communication.

JUNE 23RD

5TH INFANTRY

About 0400 the Germans made a counter-attack against Co A. Heavy artillery concentration was placed on the enemy and the counter-attack was repulsed by daylight. At 0700, again a half hour artillery preparation and at 0730 the Bn attacked, A on the right, B on the left. The attack stalled in the first 15 minutes. About 0800 tanks were brought up and additional artillery fires were prepared. The advance continued slowly against strong resistance and by 1100 it gained about a 1000 yards. About 1730 the 81st mm. mortar platoon was attack and driven back abandoning their equipment. A detachment of Bn Hq was sent to the left flank to stop the enemy advance and about 1820 the 4.2 mortars put down a smoke screen under cover of which a patrol recovered the mortars. By 2000 the Bn had reached the edge of the woods but were unable to take the main enemy strongpoint in the vicinity of the CR. At dark the Bn withdrew about 300 yards and dug in for the night.

The 3rd Bn attacked at 0630, L on the right, K on the left, supported by two platoons of tanks. This attack had been scheduled for 0730 but the tanks were late. Meanwhile the enemy was forming for attack on the other side of the woods. Apparently they were in position and just about to attack when the 3rd Bn's assault hit them. As the American tanks and infantry moved thru the woods and down into the draw they found the Germans laying head to heels in the ditches and along the hedgerows. For a few minutes there was a wild melee with shooting in all directions. Then the enemy, completely surprised and caught in the open by our tanks, were routed. The Bn drove thru the fleeing Germans and killed a large number. Many of the enemy lay still in the ditches playing dead and were killed or captured by the reserve company. The remnant of the enemy force withdrew up the draw to the west and the 3rd Bn advanced for another 600 yards where they were again stopped by a strong enemy position 400 yards to the north.

This concluded the action of the 3rd Bn in the Cherbourg campaign. Next day the 2nd Bn passed thru the 3rd and advanced to the regimental objective.

The 2nd Bn was in reserve.

The 3rd Bn completed its maneuver by **RELOCATED** the opposition in front of the 2nd Bn

June 23rd - 12th Inf. Cont'd. - Pg. 44

by attacking west and then south (for details see the attached account).

The enemy position was knocked out in the late afternoon whereupon the 2nd Bn crossed the stream and mopped up while the 3rd Bn turned about and advanced about 1/2 a 1000 yards up the road towards Cherbourg. About 2015 the advance was resumed and just before dark the Bn captured Hill 140 (for details see attached account).

The 2nd and 1st Bns spent the night astride the road behind the 3rd.

22ND INFANTRY

There was no material change in the position of the 22nd Inf this day.

JUNE 24TH

8TH INF

[About 1130 a dive bombing attack was made on the enemy strongpoint, 29 bombs out of 24 falling on the target while one bomb was dropped some 1000 yards in rear of our lines.]
At 1645 the 1st Bn, following the 2nd Bn, attacked, B on the right, C on the left, accompanied by tanks. By 1230 the main enemy position at the CR had been taken and the tanks were withdrawn for use with the 2nd Bn. By the end of the day the entire hill had been mopped up and the 1st Bn had organized its position. Some 70 prisoners were taken.

2nd Bn with Co E on the right, G on the left, F following G, captured a strong enemy position (see overlay). (For details see attached account).

The 8th Inf had now occupied its objective and was pinched out.

12TH INFANTRY

The 2nd Bn on the 24th occupied the high ground a mile southeast of Turlenville. Here they captured a large concrete fortification and 300 prisoners in a half hour. This position commanded a road into Cherbourg and from it the whole city was visible.

The 3rd Bn held its position on Hill 140 all day. In the morning Co K was detached for an expedition against Digosville. Co K captured this position (see attached account) and held it until relieved by 2nd Bn 22nd Inf and then rejoined its Bn.

In the evening the 3rd Bn received orders to move forward to EJ 123. At this point they joined 9 tanks about 2230. The assault companies placed 5 to 7 men on each of the 9 tanks of Co B, 70th Tank Bn, which then moved out on the main highway to Turlenville with the rest of the assault companies marching alongside. The march was unopposed and the western part of Turlenville was occupied that night. The tanks were posted on all the roads and the Bn

organized an all-around defense. About 0200 the tanks were relieved and went to the rear.

22ND INFANTRY

2nd Bn moved to the left and took over Digeville from the 12th Inf. 1st and 3rd Bns continued to hold Hill 155. They were still having difficulty with German infiltration in the rear and Co I was moved south to Pinobel to protect the line of communication.

JUNE 25TH

12th and 22nd Inf were ordered to send strong patrols north to the coast which was the 4th Division's final objective at that time.

12TH INFANTRY

Orders were issued at 0530: 1st Bn to attack north down the nose east of Fourlville. 2nd Bn to move down to Fourlville. 3rd Bn to clear area between Fourlville and Cherbourg down to the sea.

1st Bn attacked at 0930, toward the large fort north of Fourlville. From a distance two white flags could be seen above the fort. As the leading companies entered a wooded draw just in front of the objective they were fired on from the fort by mortars and 20 mm., and six men were wounded. The white flags still waved over the fort. The Bn commander, Major Gordon F. Johnson, brought up tanks and by his unaided voice directed the formation for attack. At 1330, after several hours fighting, the garrison of 400 surrendered. The fort contained three eight-inch guns, several 88's, and many 20 mm.'s and mortars.

3rd Bn was ordered to move to a position just south of Bourbourg and from there patrol to the coast from the city limits to Pointe des Creves. The plan was for Co I to go down the main highway then turn north at the next CR and meet Co K which would go on to this road from the north. With this road as a LD the Bn would then advance northwest to the coast. ~~#####~~ Actually Co I missed the turn, marched a mile farther down the highway into the edge of Cherbourg and circled back by the coastal road, finally meeting patrols of K just west of Bourbourg. No opposition was encountered during this move.

In the early afternoon the boundary between the 4th and 79th Divisions was altered so as to assign to the 4th Division the western portion of the city as far as Rue Etienne Delet.

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At 1800 orders were issued to enter the city at 2000, 2nd Bn on the bay, 3rd Bn on its right, while the 1st Bn was to reduce the fortifications behind the sea-wall west of Fort des Flanands. The 2nd Bn crossed the railroad about 2000 and at 2017 was 500 yards beyond the railroad, still advancing. Scattered fire was received from small groups of enemy in houses, a barrage of oil-filled Nebelwerfer rockets fell behind the battalion, but losses were light.

The 3rd Bn was delayed by mines, but crossed the railroad at 2035. The 3rd Bn had Co I on the left marching on Rue Carnot, Co K along the Boulevard Maritime. The 1st Bn was to pass behind the 3rd and occupy the water-front.

The march progressed without difficulty to the corner of Boulevard Maritime and Rue Jules Ferry. Here Co K came under heavy fire from beach defenses. Ahead of them the Boulevard Maritime was wide open to all the fire from the beach. After Co K had been held at this point ~~for~~ for sometime they were ordered to turn south and follow Co I.

Both Bns, on reaching Rue Etienne Dolez saw undefended streets in front of them and continued the advance to Rue de la Bretonniere which was in the 79th Division's sector. On this line the 12th Inf stopped its advance and the remainder of the city was occupied by the 79th and 9th Divisions.

By 2230 the 2nd and 3rd Bns had reached Rue de la Bretonniere and were consolidating positions for the night.

The 1st Bn was assisted by a woman member of the British espionage, who gave detailed descriptions of the fortifications which were the objective of the battalion. She warned that the attack should not be attempted with infantry alone, since the Germans in concrete dugouts were 12 meters underground. An attack was planned with tanks, but as darkness approached the tanks had to be released. Major Johnson then arranged an infantry attack behind a 155 mm. artillery barrage. The battalion in column - B, A, E - moved into the city down Rue Carnot (or Boulevard Maritime), under rifle and machine gun fire from the flank. Opposite the strong-point the battalion halted and formed line facing north.

The first artillery concentration fell at 2324 exactly on the designated line, one blank in front of the troops, and blew up an enemy ammunition dump. The second concentration moved

June 24th - 12th Inf. Cont'd. - Pr. #9.

forward 100 yards and the third a hundred yards farther, setting fire to buildings in the area. The final concentration was delivered at 2334 and at 2340. Cos. A and G moved forward, meeting no opposition for the first 500 yards. They were stopped by machine gun fire from concrete pillboxes.

Co C moved in and placed two successive pole charges in the aperture of the pillbox with no results. Rocket launchers were also used without effect. The enemy kept sending up flares and fired on everyone who moved, including aid-guns. At 0230 June 26th the attack was suspended, and the assault companies dug in where they were while the reserve company was brought up close in rear.

Major Johnson notified the regimental commander of the situation and requested tanks. These arrived at 0550 and the attack was immediately renewed. As the tanks reached the strongpoint the enemy came out and surrendered. 341 prisoners were taken, including 8 officers. Co B 4th Engr Bn immediately swept the area for mines and destroyed all guns, while the battalion withdrew to its bivouac area in the city.

During the night 25-26 June the Germans were busy destroying installations. It was difficult to tell at the time which explosions were their demolitions and which were our artillery fire. Early in the night Fort des Flamands went up in flames, followed a little later by the Amco Aircraft Works, the Gare Maritime, Fort de Chavaignes, and other buildings.

In the morning of June 26 elements of the 79th Div made contact with the 2nd and 3rd Bns 12th Infantry, and the eastern half of the city was completely cleared of resistance.

22ND INFANTRY

3rd Bn of the 22nd advanced northwest to Pointedshen. No resistance was encountered but it was necessary to conduct a house to house search to capture all the Germans who were hiding. That night the 3rd Bn returned to Hill 154.

JUNE 26TH

8th and 12th Inf moved in to Cherbourg.

The 22nd Inf opened an attack on the airport, the 1st Bn on the right, 2nd in the center and 3rd on the left. Despite the callous **RESTRICTED** in the city a German force of about

June 26th - Cont'd. - Sig.

a 1000 men in the fortifications surrounding the airport fought stubbornly for two more days. Instructions previously issued by the German commander had designated the airport as center of last ditch resistance all German soldiers who might be separated from their units were directed to make their way to the airport. The prisoners finally taken in this area had a high percentage of young Nazis. This sector was the most highly fortified area in the peninsula.

On the 26th the 1st Bn took a series of fortified positions south of the airport, captured Gonneville and reached a position on the east side of the airport by night. The 2nd Bn occupied the west side of the airport while the 3rd Bn occupied Maupertus and the defenses on the north side of the field.

JUNE 27TH

The 1st and 3rd Bns of the 22nd advanced north against the remaining fortifications.

Fort Hamburg and advance gun positions on Caplevi resisted strongly all day. At 2330 the commander of Fort Hamburg, Major Kauppers, formally surrendered. Col. Teague had Major Kauppers point out on the map where his lines were and the next morning all German troops in the area totaling 990 marched out and surrendered. At Col Teague's direction Major Kaupfer had German troops lift the mines on the roads.

The surrender of the Fort Hamburg area ended all resistance on the peninsula except the northwestern tip which was in the 9th Division's sector and four forts in the harbor - Ft. Pelee on the island of that name, and forts East, Central, and West on the island which covers the mouth of the harbor.

On the afternoon of June 28th after tank destroyers had fired for sometime at Ft Pelee Col Jackson and Major Johnson of the 3rd Bn of the 12th Inf walked out on the seawall with a white flag and after shouting negotiations across the 100 yards gap obtained an agreement to surrender. However the Germans were afraid to cross to the mainland in boats an account of mines and also for fear the other German forts would fire on them. The German garrison finally crossed at midnight.

During the 28th Ferts East, Central and West were bombarded from the air and shelled by 155 mm. guns. In the afternoon Captain Thomas of Co A, 12th Inf, with one squad, crossed

June 21st - 1944 - No. 511

to the island in a French sailboat and obtained the surrender of the prisoners. There had been only three German casualties from the bombardment of the forts one of whom was a Lt. Col. and the other was a ^{the Japanese Commander of the Chabing Forts} ~~first lieutenant~~, a fact which probably contributed to the quick surrender of the forts.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE


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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: <u>2181</u>

2-660

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(22680)
Special Ops Rpt, The Advance to Chertown, Va. Inf Div
Jan 44

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THE ADVANCE TO CHERBOURG

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CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *AGP*

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Inc. No. 3

*2268
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FIELD ≠ FRAGMENTARY ORDERS

38

DEFENSE POSITION


HQ 4TH INF DIV
LE BISSON
115000 JUNE 44

Fig 43

MAPS: FRANCE 6363. Scale: 1/25,000.
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION will occupy and defend
high ground between LE BISSON, RONDEBOURG, OREVILLE
OP's to be reported.

BARTON

RECEIVED
115000 JUNE 44



28
09

LINE TO BE SECURED
DARK 13 JUNE

12 22

12
111
8

22
111
39


12 22

4TH BN TR
RECONNOITER SOUTH
TO THIS LINE

90 + A

02
36

GRAPHIC SCALE



670
HQ 4TH INF DIV
LE BISSON
161900B June 44

FO #6

MAPS: France GSGS, Scale: 1/25,000.

1. No change in Enemy situation.
2. The 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (less 4th Reconnaissance Squadron and Company "F" 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) and 4th Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized, attached will relieve the 3d Battalion 22d Infantry (less one Company) in the present position. Relief will be effected under cover of darkness, night of 16-17 June.
Boundaries - See Overlay.

3. a. 4th Infantry Division Mobile Reserve - Commander to be designated by CO, 22d Infantry:

1 Rifle Company 22d Infantry (reinforced with one MG Platoon and one Sec 81mm Mortar)
Company "F" 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron

Will move to Area "A" (See Overlay) beginning at 162330 June 1944. Be prepared to move on one hours notice to reinforce the front line units 4th Infantry Division. Eight (8) 2 1/2-ton trucks will be available on one (1) hours notice at CR 353056 FONTENAY SUR MER.

- b. 3d Battalion 22d Infantry (less 2 Rifle Companies, 1 MG Plat, 1 Sec 81mm Mortar), upon relief by elements 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (less) will assemble as Division Reserve at Area "B" (See Overlay) prepared to repel counterattack on any part of the Division front. One Rifle Company attached to the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group will remain in present position.
- c. 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (less 4th Cavalry Squadron, and Company "F" 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) with 4th Reconnaissance Troop and one Company 3d Battalion 22d Infantry attached, relieves 3d Battalion 22d Infantry (less) beginning 162330B June. Occupy present positions 3d Battalion 22d Infantry and protect the division right flank. See Overlay.
- d. Company "C" 4th Engineer Combat Battalion detached 22d Infantry 162400B June. Revert to 4th Engineer Combat Battalion control.
- e. 4th Reconnaissance Troop detached 22d Infantry 162300B June attached 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group 162300B June.

RESTRICTED

FO #5, Hq 4th Inf Div, 161900B June 44(contin'd)

x. CO 22d Infantry responsible for relief.

22d Infantry will furnish guides for 4th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Group (less) at CR 353056 (FONTENAY
SUR MERE) at 162000B June.

4. G-4 will furnish necessary transportation for Division
Mobile Reserve. Road priority after 162400 June to
Division Mobile Reserve.

5. Telephone communication will be installed to CO Division
Mobile Reserve.

BARTON

DELANEY
Actg G-3

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OBJ. 12TH + 22ND INF - COAST

16
21

79 x 4

OBV
8TH INF

8

12

25

1. 8TH INF TO ADVANCE IN COLUMN OF BNS-
2. ON REACHING OBJECTIVE 8TH INF WILL ASSIST BY FIRE ADVANCE OF 12TH INF

ONE BN. 12TH INF. TO BE AVAILABLE AS DIV RES. ON CALL, UNTIL 8TH INF REACHES OBJ.

HQ 4TH INF DIV
220700B JUNE 1944
OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
VERBAL ORDERS OF CG 4TH INF DIV
MAP FRANCE GSGS 1/25,000

BARTON

ORAL INSTRUCTIONS: 60110
 H-hour 1400 JUN 22
 Bombing begins H-80
 Own front line (front boundary with 712) will be marked with white smoke every 100 yds. H-85
 Front line will yellow smoke H-95



GENERAL ORDERS

Issued June 26, 1944 (1900 hours)

8TH INFANTRY

One battalion with Co. A, 801 Tank Destroyer Battalion, will move via route to the high ground southeast of Cherbourg to begin at 271200 the reduction and elimination of any remaining enemy resistance. Dispositions will be reported.

12TH INFANTRY

Take over and occupy area. Battalion disposed--two abreast facing west. Prepare to continue the assault. Relieve 313th and 314th Infantry Regiments at 270800; complete the relief by 271100. Preserve order; maintain discipline; reduce hostile enemy and civilian disturbances. CAG, PH, CLC will be available to the CO of the 12th Inf.

22ND INFANTRY

No change. Continue the attack to the east and northeast prior to 0830.

70TH TANK BATTALION

Remain in your present location and be prepared to move on two hours notice.

CHANGE #1.

Attached to one battalion of the 8th Inf. will be Co. A, 4th Engineers.

(This order recorded by Captain Hugh G. Martin,
Division Headquarters.)

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HC 412 INF DIV
RD 6-27-44
271008 JUNE 44



CHEKBOUK

ROOSEVELT

8th Inf

amended

completed by 2812008 June 44



CHERBOURG CAMPAIGN

Field Order -- Oral -- General Barton

June 28, 1944
(1400 hours)

8th Infantry assaulted the beaches, made the hole, and drove on in.

12th Infantry made several classic advances on the road to Cherbourg, outstanding.

22nd Infantry has fought every day to June 27th against continuous tough positions.

Plan is for several days rest for the Division after which it will be sent up as reserve for the VIII corps.

The 22nd will have absolute rest in place, then it will carry on as the other two regiments.

The rifle companies now have up to 70% new men and officers. Suggest that some of the good men from AT, Cn, Heavy Weapons, and Hq. Companies be transferred to the rifle companies to strengthen them.

"We don't have the infantry we brought over, we have virtually a new infantry."
Insist upon discipline, officer consciousness, saluting. Old timers must transmit to new men the discipline and traditions.

This time we are going up against static troops, who will sit on a position and wait to be taken. This means we can't do a lot of things we have done. This time we will not be timid, but we will be prudent. Plan never to go in without 1/3 to 2/3 reserve, normally.

Anti-tank defense must be better--sited better, alert observation.

The enemy will have better artillery next time--infantry must take hostile artillery observers.

RESTRICTED

Cherbourg Campaign, Field Order, Oneal, Gen Barton, (cont'd)

enemy observation.

Outposts ~~must~~ be better.

Shell rep's should be sent in in the correct form.

Bypassing crossroads and roads under int erdiction.

Study enemy's shelling habits.

Tanks cannot move on paved roads near the front.

3 (three) hours from alert to action for a company.

5 (five) hours from alert to action for a battalion.

They must have time for movement.

The Cavalry must be drawn in at night.

Communications are better than ever before. Everyone must be alert to avoid breaking wire--is broken it should be repaired. 130 wire is no good and not available. We want only 110 wire.

The Germans apparently have no short range direction finders--keep radios outside of CP, but use them.

QM - most units prefer not to have impregnable--slight difference.

Enemy has used our AT guns against us. We should destroy. Failure to destroy vehicles this time helped, since we recaptured them.

We learn again the necessity of leaning against our artillery barrage. Teach it to new officers.

One company of TD's to move at once to race track for fire on forts. Attached to 12th Infantry.



Care for dead promptly.

Prisoners not to be robbed--drastic disciplinary action. Don't march prisoners in rear with hands up.

Officers called for by name when asleep should not be waked.

Company and battalion commanders must not be scared andatoon leaders.

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4TH INF DIV
CHAS DE TOURNAI
200000 JUNE 48

Scale: 1/25,000 and 1/50,000.

1. To arrive

2. 4TH INF DIV, LESS DIV ARTY, WITH 40TH TR BN, COLTF TO BE
ASSEMBLED AT 1400. DIV ARTY, WITH 40TH TR BN, WILL MOVE BY TRUCK TO ASSEMBLY AREA
(SEE OVERLAY #1) TO JUNE, CLOSING PRIOR TO 2300H.

3. COLUMN "A":
COLUMN COMMANDER - C.O. 8TH INF
TROOPS - 8TH INF
ROUTE "A" - SEE OVERLAY #2
IP - SEE OVERLAY #2
HEAD OF COLUMN PASS IP - 1400.

4. COLUMN "B":
COLUMN COMMANDER - C.O. 14TH INF
TROOPS AND ORDER OF MARCH:
14TH INF
DIV HQ TRS
ROUTE "B" - SEE OVERLAY #2
IP - SEE OVERLAY #2
HEAD OF COLUMN PASS IP - 1400.

5. COLUMN "C":
COLUMN COMMANDER - C.O. 22D INF
TROOPS - 22D INF
ROUTE "C" - SEE OVERLAY #2
IP - SEE OVERLAY #2
HEAD OF COLUMN PASS IP - 1400.

6. COLUMN "D":
COLUMN COMMANDER - C.O. 70TH TR BN
ROUTE "D" - SEE OVERLAY #2
IP - SEE OVERLAY #2
CONTROL POINT "X" TO BE CLEARED BY 1400.

7. 40TH AAA (AW) BN
TO MOVE BY INFILTRATION TO PERIMETER OF ASSEMBLY AREA
TO ESTABLISH AA DEFENSES.
WILL CLOSE INTO POSITIONS BY 1400. SEE OVERLAY #2.

8. ASSEMBLY AREA AND ROUTES TO BE RECONNOITERED PRIOR TO MOVE.
COLUMNS TO BE MARKED BY GUIDES. COLUMN COMMANDER OF COLUMN
"B" TO BE FURNISHED THIRTY (30) MP'S FROM MP PLAT DIV HQ.
CONTROL POINTS TO BE ESTABLISHED BY PROVOST MARSHAL.
D. RATE OF MARCH - 25 MPH.
E. MINIMUM DISTANCE BETWEEN VEHICLES - 75 YARDS
F. RADIO SILENCE DURING MARCH & WHILE IN NEW LOCATION.
G. DIV SERVICE ELEMENTS REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION UNTIL FURTHER
ORDERS.
H. UNITS TO REPORT TO THIS HQ TIME OF CLOSING INTO AREA,
FALLOUTS AND ACCIDENTS.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS: INF REGTS TO BE FURNISHED NINETY
SIX (96) TRUCKS EACH, FOR MOVEMENT.

10. DIV CP - VIC COURBESVILLE
UNIT CP'S TO BE REPORTED WHEN ESTABLISHED.



Per [unclear] AA defenses
to be established
by [unclear]

LEGEND
IP - INTERMEDIATE POSITION

OVERLAY #2

24

THE GREAT PRINCE 1900



Backus

1900

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6



7
HEADQUARTERS 4TH DIVISION
vic La Tardivierie
211200 June 1944

Dictated Field Order

22nd Infantry will attack at 1600 with not to exceed two companies reinforced by one company tanks and Company D 87th Chemical Battalion will cut road at 242231, push patrols to sea.

12th Infantry will attack with not less than a reinforced battalion at 1700 to develop enemy MLR.

Recorded by Maj. H.M. Betty

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POSITION OVERLAYS

D 22

24


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
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
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2.0



GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6



RESTRICTED

510
20



28 7 0815
19 JUNE 11

(5)

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES

1

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RESTRICTION



247 DAYS
13 JUNE 59



GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES

1



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

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

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6



RESTRICTED





Field notes June 25
2100

Look with 100x
June 26

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

CHERBOURG CAMPAIGN

Note on Battle for Cherbourg.

June 24, 1944

At 1100 P-47's dropped 24 1,000 lb. bombs on strongpoint around (180175) in front of the 1st Bn, 8th Infantry; 23 bombs hit the target. Immediately the enemy troops came out of the fortifications and started running across the fields, where they were slaughtered by mortar fire. The strongpoint, which had been a tough nut on the previous day, was taken without further trouble.

Violet smoke fired by artillery had been used to mark the target for the plane. It was planned to fire violet smoke on the next strongpoint, June 25th as a bluff.

About 1800, Lt. Col. Simons was killed by a direct hit on his fox-hole. Lt. Col. Merrill was killed. Score: 6 Battalion commanders out of 10 lost, 4 of them killed (?).

12th Infantry advanced rapidly today. 12th already had lost regimental commander and three battalion commanders, and lost a fourth battalion commander today.

A counter-attack launched against the 8th Infantry shortly before 1800 was repulsed by use of tanks and all division artillery. (The 8th called, as counterattack developed and Col. Simons was killed and asked for increased artillery fire. Objectives were raided. General Barton was present at the time and he grabbed the phone. "This is Barton. I want all of the artillery I've got to fire on....." In a few minutes all of the artillery came down. The counter attack was repulsed.

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7

CHERBOURG CAMPAIGN

CAPTURE OF CHERBOURG

Cherbourg was taken on the 25th and 26th. By dark June 25, 12th Infantry had occupied eastern end of town up to Division boundary. 79th Division had taken the city within its zone, with exception of a few groups still holding out near waterfront and the canal. 9th Division had cleaned out its sector of the city.

The advance thru the city was rapid, since the remaining defenders had no heart left for the fight. Resistance was light, and operations were largely mopping up (?). The 12th Infantry entering the city in its sector at 2000, quickly reached its boundary and sent patrols on a thousand yards into the 79th sector. This led to jurisdictional objection, and the Executive officer 314th Inf. took post on the boundary to see that the 12th did no more trespassing. On the 26th, the remaining enemy groups were rounded up. Total prisoners in the Cherbourg campaign:

4th Division, 79th, 9th. By the end of the day, all enemy resistance in the Cherbourg peninsula was extinguished except for the airport--Bonneviller--Laupterus area, Fts in harbor, and resistance NW of city (9th Div).

At 1000(?) 26th, 22nd Inf launched an attack on the airport area. By night the three bns had reached the W, W, and S, edges of the airfield, having met a good deal of stubborn resistance. On the 27th, the 3rd Bn 8th Inf took over the fort (147221). (103 casualties on June 26). The airport had been taken by noon, but but strong points to north continued to fight. Attack renewed on June 27. Young Nazi bitter-enders fought. At 2330 June 27, German Colonel commanding surrendered. On 28th, 9th attacked to clean out resistance in West. Harbor Fts were attacked with Artillery and TD's. The Pelee gave up AM June 28. At 1600 June 27th a little ceremony was held in Cherbourg, with a guard of honor made up of a platoon from each division, 4th, 9th, and 79th, and the three division commanders. General Collins presented to the mayor of Cherbourg a bunch of roses made from American

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Capture of Cherbourg (cont'd)

parachutes. (Color of the blue was off, being a sea green).

It was a typically American scene, perhaps typical of Frenchmen as well as Americans. Several hundred American soldiers and officers were standing on the streets and in balconies around the square. These free soldiers far outnumbered the men in ranks, and outnumbered too the few civilians, for Cherbourg was almost emptied of its population. General Collins arrived in an M8, dismounted without ceremony, and greeted the mayor on the steps of the haggard Hotel de Ville. A large group of generals, staff officers and a few French officials were clustered around. Overhead floated the British, French and American flags (in that order). A block away to the left, the equestrian statue of Napoleon, his hand stretched imperiously toward the sea, was still surrounded by German barbed wire. Beyond were the wrecked buildings of the harbor and the Gare Maritime. Around the square the buildings were shattered, empty and unkempt. A few civilians leaned out of the windows of the Mairie.

The mayor made a brief speech, less than an even shorter one. Then General Collins read a five minute speech in Excellent French, concluding with "Vive la France." Not satisfied with the vigor with which he pronounced these words he repeated in a shout "Vive la France!" The small crowd gave its wholehearted applause. General Collins presented to the mayor the parachute flag with its pale green blue, which was promptly displayed above and on the other flags for a few minutes.

The band struck up a lively march. A young Frenchman across the square sprang into a lively Apache dance. The crowd closed around him, applauding. Those farther away ran toward this center of interest. Then from all over the square the French men and women were running faster and more excitedly. American soldiers were shocked. The band and the dance stopped, the crowd dissolved. These people craved excitement and they had not had it.

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Capture of Cherbourg (cont'd)

Generals and officials retired inside to further the celebration, the band played one more march and moved off. The crowd hung around a while, then gradually drifted away.

- 3 -

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS 4TH ENGINEER COMBAT BN
APO #4 U.S. ARMY

25 July 1944

SUBJECT: Eye-Witness Account.

1. The following is an eye-witness account as given by S/Sgt. Duncan W. Fields, Headquarters & Service Company, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion.

"At about 0700, 15 June 1944, Sgt. Jones, T/5 DePalo, a runner and myself went on a reconnaissance to see if we could locate a spot to set up a good OP. We were going towards Montebourg when we came upon an old three-story building. I climbed up a ladder to a window and went in. I went up to the top floor and looked out and could see all of Montebourg. A sniper took a shot at me then. We decided this was a good place to set up the OP. From this OP I could see the big church steeple and in it a German with binoculars and some sort of range finding equipment. I told T/5 DePalo to go back to Captain Lucas and tell him we had located a German OP. I went out then to look for this sniper that was shooting at me and I met it. Parker who was also looking for this sniper, as he was shooting at his platoon. I then started walking towards Montebourg when he fired at me again. I saw him up in a tree. I fired at him but don't know whether I hit him or not. He came out of the tree and ran towards Montebourg. I chased him but then a machine gun opened up on me so I came back. When I went back to the OP, T/5 DePalo had come back so I borrowed his M1 and told him I was going out after the machine gun. I was going down the road, when it opened up on me again, so I ducked down behind a hedgerow. Previous to this I met an officer from the Tank Corps and we both went towards Montebourg. The machine gun opened up on both of us and we ducked behind the hedgerow. I ran along the hedgerow and when I got about 50 yards down I stuck my helmet up and they fired at it. I then went down a little further and this officer followed me. We then jumped up and fired upon the machine gun. I hit one of the Germans and the other one ran. I don't know whether I hit him or not. I then went up to about 300 yards from Montebourg and saw the Germans booby-trapping all the windows in the houses and blocking the roads and also saw them storing ammunition in a corner building. They were bringing it in, in little carts and wheel-barrow. I saw an .88 by the bridge on the right side of the road and another on the left side. I also saw them setting up two mortars on a little road off to the side. I started firing at the Germans bringing the ammunition up to the corner house. They scattered all over the place. I then went back to the OP and called Captain Lucas and told him what I had seen. A short time later an officer from the 29th Field Artillery came up and asked me what I had seen. I then pointed out to him on his map as he did not think it was necessary to go towards Montebourg any further. At this time the Germans started to shell us with their mortars. The officer from the 29th F.A. set up his telephone and made a call back to his battery. The artillery opened up and they knocked large holes in the church steeple, wiped out the corner building with all the ammunition, knocked out the mortars and also one .88. He said he didn't want to shell the other .88 as there were too many civilian around. A short time later an officer from the Infantry came up and asked me what I had seen. I told him about the .88 still remaining and what the artillery had knocked out. When I went back to the OP I started to investigate the building and in one of the rooms, in the wall, I found a practically brand new radio. It was a large one that still had the wrapping on, but was broke open at the speaker and dials. It was fitted into the wall so that the wallpaper could conceal it."

RESTRICTED

Duncan W. Fields

DUNCAN W. FIELDS
S/Sgt., H. & S. Co., 4th Eng.
Combat Bn.

22680

NOTES ON CHERBOURG CAMPAIGN

June 22, 1944 (1500 hours) Bombardment and strafing by P-38, P-47, P-51, Spitfires and Typhoon continued from 1240 to 1400. Some of it against the VII American Corps. Planes strafed American vehicles on the roads. An ammunition truck near Sizueval was set afire by strafing, explosions continuing for an hour, with casualties resulting. Lt. Wilby, 8th Infantry, was attacked on the road and escaped the bullets by a few feet. CP's of the 8th Infantry, 4th Division, and VII Corps were strafed. 4th Division artillery positions were bombed, and numerous bombs were dropped throughout our area. Capt. Lou Piset and Capt. Hugh G. Martin were just in process of reassuring a nervous French cure and his family that the planes passing above were Allied and would drop no bombs there when a bomb exploded nearby, shattering all the windows in the house, followed by strafing. The French family listened to no more assurances but took to their ~~own~~ trench.

B-26's came over at 1400 from the south, and bombed Cherbourg. Bombing continued until 1500. The attack by the 8th began at 1430, after repelling a counterattack.

Pilot Captain Charles stated that, coming from West, they saw first bomb line beautifully, did not see any on our side; shape of bomb line on our map was a surprise to him.

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HEADQUARTERS 4TH ENGINEER COMBAT BN

APO #4

U S Army

25 July 1944

SUBJECT: Eye-Witness Account.

1. The following is an eye-witness account as given by Captain William G. Short, Commanding Company "C", 4th Engineer Combat Bn.

"On 21 June 1944, while on a road reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of LE THIEL, Lt. George Williams, T/5 Leo Bisson, jeep driver, and myself, approached an intersection and encountered an enemy anti-tank gun (47), which opened fire on the jeep and occupants. I immediately gave the order to dismount and take cover. In the confusion T/5 Bisson left the vehicle in gear and the motor running. The vehicle continued on down the road towards the enemy who kept firing at it. Lt. Williams without hesitation started chasing the vehicle which had stalled some distance down the road. At this time the enemy took full advantage of the situation and fired five or six rounds. Upon reaching the vehicle he had difficulty starting it. When he finally succeeded in starting the vehicle, Lt. Williams was faced with the difficult problem - which way to go? To go forward meant running into the enemy lines... to the rear meant running into the "beaten zone" of enemy fire, which was falling directly behind the vehicle. Upon weighing and balancing the odds, Lt. Williams decided that putting the vehicle in reverse was his best move. Fortunately Lt. Williams' judgment didn't fail him in as much as the enemy raised their elevation and the succeeding shells kept falling further to the rear and away from the vehicle."

/s/ William G. Short
/t/ WILLIAM G. SHORT
Capt., 4th Engr. Combat Bn.
Commanding Co. "C"

RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 2182

304-0.3.0

(22681)

Special Operations Div, The Adjutant General's Office, AGO Inf Div

Section

Jul 44



MR

THE CARINTAN PERIERS SECTOR

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
CANCELLED
 BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
P. P. McCall
 DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 24 May 46

345-0.3.0



U
1-10-4

22081
Shuster

FIELD ORDERS + MEMORANDUMS

SECRET

HQ 4 INF DIV
Vicinity Le BREUIL
5 July 44.

ANNEX #2:
to
FO #1

RESTRICTED
INTELLIGENCE

MAPS: GSGS 4347, France, Scale 1/25,000

CANCELLED

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Enemy front line: See overlay.

b. Enemy Reserves:

(1) The 266th Division in the vicinity of PERIERS is believed to be available to the enemy LXXXIV Corps as a reserve division.

(2) The 277th Division may be in the rear areas to be used as a reserve for either the enemy LXXXIV Corps or the II Parachute Corps. An infantry division, probably the 277th Division was located near TOULOUSE on 29 June.

(3) There may be one or two unidentified infantry divisions in Army reserve.

No Panzer Divisions have been identified as opposing the VII Corps, however, the Panzer units in front of the British may be withdrawn and moved to this sector.

The German Seventh Army is continuing its concentration of scattered troops with the probable intention of preventing allied exploitation of the established beachhead and the advance south to the line GOUTANCES - ST LO - CAEN.

Enemy units in the US VIII Corps sector may be forced into the US VII Corps sector around GORGES.

Organization of the Ground.

No antitank ditches have been located within the VII Corps sector.

Permanent fortifications are not believed to exist in the VII Corps sector, however, emplacements of sandbags and logs exist.

(3) Prepared positions in depth for infantry and automatic weapons are undoubtedly present.

(4) Road junctions and bridges are protected by machine guns and subject to interdiction by artillery.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Will the enemy make a major stand North of the TAUTE RIVER?

CLASSIFIED
CANCELLED
BY SAVER OF THE ADVISOR
10 May 44 (Per 1102)
10 May 44 (Per 1102)

RESTRICTED
SECRET

22681
Master

6

SECRET

- b. Where and in what strength will the enemy oppose our crossings of the TAUTS RIVER?
- c. What reserves are available initially, particularly armor, to oppose our crossings of the TAUTS RIVER?

3. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.

- a. The CIC Detachment of the 4th Infantry Division will supervise counter intelligence activities.
- b. Two (2) men from the CIC Detachment will be attached to each infantry regiment. These men will operate with the IPW Teams under the supervision of the Division CIC Detachment Commander.
- c. See letter, Subject: "Security of Front Lines and Forward Areas", Headquarters 4th Infantry Division dated 4 July 1944.

4. REPORTS.

- a. An IPW-2 periodic report will be submitted by Regiments, Division Arty, Reconnaissance Troop, and Attached Battalions, at 1800 covering the previous twenty-four (24) hour period. This report will reach this headquarters by 2000.
- b. Spot reports of enemy activity will be made by telephone to this headquarters.
- c. Daily IPW reports will be submitted to this headquarters for the twenty-four (24) hour period beginning at 1800.


1 - In. Overlay

Hansen
HANSEN
G-2

DISTRIBUTION

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| VII Corps | IPW Teams (5) |
| 3 Armd Div | MII Team |
| 9th Inf Div | OB Team |
| 83d Inf Div | PI Team |
| 90th Inf Div | G-2 File |
| 8th Inf | 4 Sig Co |
| 12th Inf | |
| 22d Inf | |
| Div Arty (5) | |
| 4th Engr Bn | |
| 4th Med Bn | |
| 4th Ron Tr | |
| 70th Tk Bn | |
| C of S | |
| G-1 | |
| G-3 | |
| G-4 | |
| Chief Liaison Officer | |
| Engr Officer | |
| CIC Detachment | |

99



AS ON THE DAY
OF THE
OPERATION

- DATE: 1950.08.02. Scale: 1/25,000.
- NO CHANGE.
 - SEE THE DIV HEADQUARTERS 1 JULY 44 BY ROUTE AND MOTOR TO BE MARKED BY OVERLAY. MOTOR ELEMENTS OF 2ND (2) BATTALIONS ARE TO BE MARKED.
 - ROUTE "A" - SEE OVERLAY
IP - SEE OVERLAY
HEAD OF COLUMN FARE IP - 8-HOUR.
 - ROUTE "B" - SEE OVERLAY
IP - SEE OVERLAY
HEAD OF COLUMN FARE IP - 8-HOUR.
 - ROUTE "C" - SEE OVERLAY
IP - SEE OVERLAY
HEAD OF COLUMN FARE IP - 8-HOUR.
 - ROUTE "D" - SEE OVERLAY
IP - SEE OVERLAY
HEAD OF COLUMN FOLLOW MOTOR ELEMENTS COLUMN "S".
 - (1) FOOT ELEMENTS FOLLOW MOTOR ELEMENTS IN COLUMNS. FOOT ELEMENTS OF COLUMN "S" (2ND INF) TO FOLLOW FOOT ELEMENTS COLUMN "A" (12TH INF). MOTOR ELEMENTS COLUMN "S" (2ND INF) TO FOLLOW MOTOR ELEMENTS COLUMN "A" (12TH INF).
 - ASSEMBLY AREAS AND ROUTES TO BE RECONNOITRED BEGINNING 0500H ON 1 JULY AND COMPLETED PRIOR TO 0800H ON 1 JULY.
 - 2ND AND 12TH INF TO MARK ROUTES BY GUIDES. 2ND INF TO FURNISH HQ DATA NUMBER OF GUIDES PERSONNEL TO 12TH INF BY 0800H ON 1 JULY.
 - MAXIMUM SPEED - 20-25 MPH. MINIMUM DISTANCE BETWEEN VEHICLES - MINIMUM FIVE (5) YARDS.
 - DEVIATION SERVICE - VEHICLES REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS.
 - UNITS REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS TIME OF CLOSING IN AREA, FALL-OUTS AND ACCIDENTS.
 - SLAT TRENCHES TO BE DUG ON ARRIVAL AT LOCATIONS.
 - 8-HOUR - TO BE ANNOUNCED.
 - ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS - NO CHANGE.
 - DIV CP - VICTORY 315890.
UNIT OPIS - TO BE REFORCED
RADIO BATTERIES DURING MARCH AND IN USE LOCATION
MIL FIELD WIRE PRESENT LOCATION TO BE COLLECTED.



GOODWIN
0-3

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED
POINT

1050(-)
1042(-)
177
1049(-)
1894
1894(-)
1894
1895

RESTRICTED
VI X VII

CT 12

37
84
83

265

317(p)
353 X 1755

HQ - 4th INF DIV VIC LE BREUIL
051900 B JULY 44
MAP REF - G565 4347 SCALE 25,000
OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
ANNEX NO. 2 TO FC NOT


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
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
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




- NO CHANGE, 2200, SCALE: 1/25,000.
1. NO CHANGE.
 2. 4TH INF DIV, REINFORCED, SUPPORTED BY TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, RESUMES THE ATTACK 1200Z JULY 44 TO CAPTURE OBJECTIVES EAST OF PERIMETER - PER OVERLAY.
 MAIN EFFORT OF DIVISION BY 2ND INF. ALL RESOURCES OF DIV WILL SUPPORT 2ND INF.
 BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES - PER OVERLAY.
 LINE OF DEPARTURE - PRESENT FRONT LINES.
 3. A. 22D INF (200 "B" 87TH CML BN, 1 PLAT CO "C" 801ST TD BN ATTACHED, SUPPORTED BY 70TH TR BN) WILL ATTACK PER PLAN CO 22D INF TO SEIZE OBJECTIVES - PER OVERLAY.
 B. 8TH INF (200 "B" 87TH CML BN, 2 PLATS CO "C" 801ST TD BN, 1 PLAT CO "A" & "B" 87TH AAA (AW) BN ATTACHED) WILL SUPPORT 22D INF WITH ALL AVAILABLE FIRE POWER FROM 2 OF A, PER OVERLAY. 8TH INF WILL PROTECT RIGHT FLANK 4TH INF DIV AND BE PREPARED TO MAKE CROSSING OF MOLETOOTE RIVER VICINITY 2242 WITH NOT LESS THAN ONE BATTALION; CROSSING TO BE MADE ON DIV ORDER.
 C. 12TH INF - IN DIV RESERVE - TO FOLLOW ADVANCE OF 22D INF GENERALLY ON ITS LEFT TO PROTECT THE LEFT FLANK AND REAR OF DIV. BATTALIONS TO ADVANCE BY BOUNDS ON DIV ORDER.
 D. DIV ARTY - 20TH FA BN - DIRECT SUPPORT
 42D FA BN - GENERAL SUPPORT; REINFORCE FIRES
 44TH FA BN - DIRECT SUPPORT
 50TH FA BN - GENERAL SUPPORT
 57TH AAA (AW) BN - DIV ARTY CONTROL
 60TH TR BN - DIV ARTY CONTROL
 62ND TR BN (SP) BN - DIV ARTY CONTROL
 63RD TR BN (SP) BN - DIV ARTY CONTROL
 ALL BATTERY WILL SUPPORT THE ADVANCE OF THE DIVISION. BULK OF FIRES TO BE AVAILABLE AT ALL TIMES TO SUPPORT ADVANCE OF 22D INF. TO BE PREPARED AT ALL TIMES TO DELIVER COUNTER BATTERY FIRES IN FRONT OF 8TH INF. CO 4TH DIV ARTY TO PROVIDE AT AND AS ORDERED FOR DIV TO PROVIDE DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORTING FIRES ON ALL ROADS IN HOSTILE TERRITORY WHICH LEAD INTO DIV 2 OF A.
 4. 1ST BRG 2 BN - SUPPORT ADVANCE 4TH INF DIV. INITIALLY MAIN EFFORT TO SUPPORT 22D INF FOLLOWED BY SUPPORT OF 8TH AND 12TH INF. 1 PLAT SUPPORT 4TH CAV RON SQ.
 5. 4TH CAV RON SQ (LESS TROOP "C", SUPPORTED BY 1 PLATOON 4TH INGR BN) - WILL GUARDY "ISLAND" WEST OF BISHOU WITH NOT LESS THAN ONE TROOP WILL MAINTAIN PATROLS ALONG SEVES RIVER TO PREVENT ENEMY INFILTRATION INTO DIV 2 OF A - SEE OVERLAY.
 6. 4TH DIV TR (ARMS) - INITIALLY DIV RESERVE PRESENT LOC (1) ON. TO BE REAR TO REAR THE FOLLOWING:
 (1) REAR CONTACT WITH ENEMY IN 2 OF A 22D INF IN CASE CONTACT IS LOST.
 (2) REAR CONTACT IN REAR OF 22D INF FOR POSSIBLE CROSSINGS OF TAUTE RIVER.
 7. 70TH TR BN - SUPPORT 22D INF.
 8. ON DISPLAY OF WHITE FLAGS BY ENEMY, PAROLEE WITHIN ENEMY LINES WILL NOT BE ENTERED UPON. IMMEDIATE SURRENDER WILL BE DEMAND AND IF NOT FORTHCOMING, THE ATTACK WILL BE RESUMED AT ONCE.
 9. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS - NO CHANGE.
 10. DIV OP - NO CHANGE.
 UNIT OPS TO BE COORDINATED.
 DIRECT LINE COMMUNICATIONS TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN 8TH AND 22D INF.
 AXIS OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATION - SEE OVERLAY.




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


HQ 4th INF DIV
 LA BISSON
 16 JUNE 1944
 OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY FOFS
 MAP FRANCE 1/25000

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 DELANEY
 5/3
 BARTON

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OF LOGS...
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VII
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VII

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W O

HQ 4TH INF DIV
Lt BRISILL (319895)
052200B JULY 44

FO #8

MAPS: France, GSGS, Scale: 1/25,000.

1. a. Enemy situation - Annex #2, Intelligence.
b. 83d Inf Div attacks on the left, 90th Inf Div attacks on the right - See overlay.
2. 4th Inf Div attacks in column of regiments at H-hour, 6 July to capture objectives shown on overlay.
Boundaries - See overlay.
Line of Departure - Front line 83d Inf Div in 4th Inf Div zone of action.
3. a. 12th Inf, Co "D", 87th Cml Bn, and 1 Plat Btry "B", 377th AAA (AW) Bn attached. Will relieve elements of 83d Inf Div in 4th Inf Div zone of action during hours of darkness 5-6 July. Will attack at H-hour, 6 July to seize objectives, per overlay. 12th Inf will be prepared to continue attack to south, per overlay, on Division order.
b. 8th Inf, Co "B", 87th Cml Bn, and 1 Plat Btry "A" 377th AAA (AW) Bn attached. Attacking in zone north of CARANTAN-FAKERS Road, will clean up pockets of resistance on right of 12th Inf; will capture objective, per overlay, in order to protect right flank of Division.
c. 22nd Inf, 1 Plat Btry "C", 377th AAA (AW) Bn attached. Follow 12th Inf by bounds, protect left flank of Division and seize objectives, per overlay. 22nd Inf prepared to attack on Division order to south across TAUTS RIVAK in zone of action, per overlay.
- d. Division Artillery:
 - (1) 29th FA Bn - General support; reinforce fires 42nd FA Bn.
 - (2) 42nd FA Bn - Direct support 12th Inf.
 - (3) 44th FA Bn - General support.
 - (4) 20th FA Bn - General support.
 - (5) 951st FA Bn - General support.
 - (6) 377th AAA (AW) Bn (less 1 Plat Btry "A" atchd 8th Inf; 1 Plat Btry "B" atchd 12th Inf; 1 Plat Btry "C" atchd 22nd Inf) - Division artillery control.
 - (7) 801st TD Bn, - Division artillery control.
 - (8) Artillery will be echeloned forward rapidly to insure bulk of fire capable of being placed well ahead and to the flanks of leading infantry units. Particular attention to breaking counterattacks, stopping tank attacks, interdiction and harassing fire.
 - (9) CG, Div arty, charged with AA and AT defense of Division.

RESTRICTED

- e. 4th Sqr C Bns Will support the advance of the Division. Particular attention to stream crossings, mine removal, and camouflage along main routes of advance. Will prepare and mark bypasses for interdicted roads and crossroads. Keep available assault boats on call from CO 22nd Inf. Keep crossing over stream at BAUFIs open.
- f. 70th Tk Bn - Division reserve. Will have available on call one (1) company for the support of each infantry regiment.
- g. 4th Recon Tr. (Mech) - Initially Division reserve vicinity Div CP.
- x. (1) Once the attack has commenced, momentum will be maintained.
(2) All units, both combat and service, will be so disposed that all times they are capable of repelling tank attacks and/or counterattacks from any direction.
(3) All antitank weapons of the Division will be sited to repel tank attack. Antitank defenses will be in depth.
(4) Contact from right to left.
(5) Yellow smoke to be used in marking hedgerow targets for AA guns attached infantry regiments.
(6) H-hour to be announced.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS:

4th Inf Co 261983
704th Ord L Maint Co 273982
Clearing Sta 283971

- 5. Div CP - 319895.
Unit CP's to be reported.
Radio silence until H-hour.

Goodwin
GOODWIN
G-3

BARTON

F

VERBAL ORDERS 2230 6 JULY 1944

The Following Verbal Orders Were Issued To The Liaison Officers Of The Three Infantry Regiments:

The VII Corp will attack 7-JULY. The 4th Infantry division and the 83rd Infantry Division will lead the attack. The 4th Inf. Div. will be on the right.

The 4th Infantry Division will attack and capture objectives (See FO) the line of departure--Present front lines. The Attack will be proceeded by an artillery barrage starting at 0545 7 July, the artillery will cease firing at 0600 7 July, and commence again at 0615 by a succession of artillery barrages.

Starting at 0600 the air corps will bomb targets (See overlay on Liaison Operations Map) the air corps will cease bombing at 0645.

The 12th Infantry and 45th Infantry will attack at 0400 7 July. The 8th Infantry will attack at 0300 to get to their line of departure before 0630, (See Liaison Map.)

Attached and supporting unit -- No change.

Target No. 3 on overlay will NOT be bombed

All combat elements will "stand to" beginning at dawn to repel any counter-attack.

RESTRICTED

7 JULY 1944

The following orders were issued from the Hq 4th Inf Div
2000 7 July 1944

The 22nd Inf Reg with the following attachments:
Co. D 87th Chem Bn
Co C 8th TD Bn
1. Plat Btry C 377 AA Bn.
70 th Tank Bn less one company

Will be prepared to initiate movement on one hours notice from their present location to a position in the zone of the 83 th Inf Div from which the 22nd Inf Reg will attack to capture successively objectives per Overlay

340 P 05
355793

Line of Departure to be announced

1000 8 July

Time of attack to be announced

Upon seizure of objectives the 22nd will continue the attack to the south

Area "A" is to be secured until the 8th Inf Reg arrives in the *** sector

Air missions will be available weather permitting

Recon and Liaison will be initiated at once with the 329 Inf Reg


Particular attention will be made to countering mortar fire with artillery covering large areas

Attachments to be made on order from this headquarters.

B.


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
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4 X 83

C. 90 22 1/2 214

Handwritten notes, possibly a list or report, located on the right side of the page. The text is mostly illegible due to the image quality.



7

VERBAL ORDERS

Issued 12 July, 1944

- I. No change.
- II. 4th Division resumes attack 130930 July. Boundaries and objectives, no change.
- b. 12th Infantry relieves the 22nd Infantry (less the 3rd Bn), beginning 122145Z July.
- Co. D, 87th Chemical Battalion, and one platoon Co. C, 801st TD Battalion, are detached from the 22nd Infantry and are attached to the 12th Infantry. Boundaries and objectives of the 22nd Infantry to revert to the 12th Infantry.
- c. 22nd Infantry (less 3rd Battalion) reverts to Division reserve in position to be selected by CO 22nd Infantry in vicinity of Saintewy.
- d. 8th Infantry (Co. B, 87th Chemical Bn., 2 platoons Co. D, 801st TD Bn. attached) to support advance of the 12th Infantry by fire.
- e. One platoon Battery A and Battery D, 377th AA Bn revert to Div Arty at 121900Z
- f. Div Arty - no change in attachments.
- g. 70th Tank Battalion - will support the advance of the 12th Infantry.
- h. 4th Reconnaissance Squadron - no change.
- i. 4th Engineer Battalion - no change.
- j. 4th Reconnaissance Troop - no change.
- X. German tanks will be completely destroyed so as to make recovery or future use by Germans impossible; this will be done before they are reported to have been destroyed.

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
VERBAL ORDERS

Issued by CG 4th Inf Div, 1200
hours, 13 July 1944

- I. No Change.
- II. 4th Division (reinforced), supported by 9th Tactical Air Force, continues the attack at H hour 14 July 1944 to seize an objective east of Percers. The main effort will be on the left.
- III. a. 12th Infantry (reinforced) attacks per plan of the CO 12th Infantry.
b. 8th Infantry (reinforced) supports by fire the attack of the 12th Infantry.
c. 22nd Infantry (less 3rd Bn) will remain in division reserve in its present location.
d. Div Arty (reinforced) supports the attack of the Division and provides AA and AT protection.
e. 4th Engineer Battalion - no change.
f. 4th Cavalry Squadron - no change.
g. 4th Reconnaissance Troop - no change.
i. (1). Attachments to the 8th and 12th Infantries and Div Arty - no change.
(2). H hour to be at completion of bombing mission which will be signaled by beginning of artillery penetration. H hour not earlier than 0930.
(3). Yellow panels and/or yellow smoke to be displayed only if attacked by friendly planes.
- IV. No Change.
- V. No change.

(Notes by Lt. Col. Goodwin, G-3, 4th Div.)

RESTRICTED



BY THE 1ST BATT
 10-10-50

1. ALL INFORMATION...
2. ALL INFORMATION...
3. ALL INFORMATION...
4. ALL INFORMATION...
5. ALL INFORMATION...
6. ALL INFORMATION...
7. ALL INFORMATION...
8. ALL INFORMATION...
9. ALL INFORMATION...
10. ALL INFORMATION...



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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

SECRET
Auth: CG, 4th Inf Div
Init: *7/14/44*
Date: 18 July 1944

AG 353

SUBJECT: Training to Be Conducted During Period 17-24 July 1944.

TO : Regimental, Separate and attached Unit Commanders.

1. 4th Infantry Division will use the period, 17-24 July 1944, to:
 - a. Prepare each individual by training, recreation, and re-equipment to be physically and mentally equipped to enter combat anew.
 - b. Effect teamwork between units and elements of units by applying techniques learnt in the recent battle experiences.
2. The following subjects will be included:
 - a. Scouting and patrolling. Recent battle experiences prove that detailed reconnaissance is imperative and that the present techniques of scouting and patrolling can be improved upon.
 - b. Close-in fighting with particular attention to bayonet and hand grenade training will be emphasized.
 - c. Battle techniques will be improved upon in the light of recent experiences. Classes will be conducted to disseminate information of successful uses of supporting weapons and teamwork between units.
 - d. Local security.
 - e. Battlefield intelligence.
 - (1) Aggressive patrolling to obtain exact enemy dispositions and identifications.
 - (2) The use of observation posts and reconnaissance patrols to secure enemy information and to corroborate existing information.
 - (3) The employment of visiting patrols and reconnaissance platoons to expedite enemy information reaching higher headquarters.
 - f. Communications.
 - (1) Proper laying of field wire by the "deliberate" method to insure constant communications.
 - (2) Use of the Slidex and Rearranged Code.
 - g. Instruction will be conducted in the correct methods of laying and reporting hasty and deliberate mine fields.
 - h. Provision will be made to insure personal cleanliness and cleaning of equipment. Vehicle and weapons maintenance will be stressed. Attention is invited to letter, Hq FUSA, dated 5 July 1944, Subject, "Equipment Over and Above Authorized Allowances".
3. General.
 - a. Unit training schedules will be submitted to this headquarters by 191200H July 1944.
 - b. Disciplinary training will be continued with particular emphasis on saluting. Periods of close order drill will be scheduled.

By Command of Major General BARTON:

RESTRICTED

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt, AGD,
Assistant Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
A, D, and E.

RESTRICTED

704TH INF BN
VIC LEHNERIE
201620B July 1946

ADM O #4.

1. SUPPLY.

a. Class I.

(1) Rations.

- (a) Infantry units will be issued "X" rations necessary to bring reserve up to two (2) rations of this type. This is to be carried in the unit in addition to the "A" ration now on hand.
- (b) All other units will carry a reserve of two (2) "10-in-1" rations in addition to the "B" ration.

(2) Water.

VII Corps water DP's located at 452756 and 453704 available to division, now open.

b. Class III.

All vehicular tanks and T/E 5-gallon cans will be filled immediately.

c. Class V.

(1) Issues will be made from ASP 704 located at 478747. Location and opening of ASP 705 to be announced.

(2) Units will be informed daily the authorized expenditure for artillery and mortar ammunition.

(3) Ammunition on hand in excess of basic load is not authorized. Ammunition of any type in excess of basic load possession of units will be expended before additional ammunition of that type is drawn.

(4) DaO located at 470745.

2. EVACUATION.

a. To Clearing Company located at 450701.

b. Vehicles.

To 704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company located at 446754.

4. SERVICE TROOPS AND TRAINS.

704th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company - 446754

4th Quartermaster Company - 445757

Division Rear Echelon - 385927

Clearing Company, 4th Medical Battalion - 438754

Division Signal Supply - 447753

b. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Traffic circulation will be held to a minimum. All traffic outside of unit boundaries except on official business is prohibited.

b. Officers' Sales Store will remain open until 211800Z July. Location to be announced.

c. Other administrative matters - no change.

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G-4.

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AUTH: CG 4TH INF DIV ;
INIT :
DATE: 20 July 1944 ;

HQ 4TH INF DIV
VIC. LA HAUDRIE
201620B JULY 44

FO #11.

MAPS: GSGS, France, Scale: 1/50,000.

1. a. The enemy continues on the defensive and has withdrawn to a position South of the FERRERS-ST LO Road, during the past few days. Necessity has forced a policy of piecemeal commitment of Reserves which makes a full scale or coordinated tactical counterattack in connection with the contemplated breakthrough improbable. The enemy corps does not appear to have any local reserves but there are three Divisions and one Kampfgruppe moving towards the Heptune area.
Air activity has increased and the 9th Infantry Division reported twenty enemy planes over their sector at 201400H. Artillery fire has shown a marked increase. Small groups of tanks have been reported operating to the front of the Division sector.
Order of battle notes, headquarters 4th Infantry Division, dated 20 July 1944 contain a description of enemy units in front of the 9th Infantry Division. Enemy units identified in front of the 9th Infantry Division are: elements of the 37th SS Grenadier Regiment, elements of the 14th Parachute Regiment, elements of the 13th Parachute Regiment, elements of the 901st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 130 SS Reconnaissance Battalion, elements of the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, elements of the 9th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 2d SS Engineer Battalion, and the 2d Battalion of the 5th Parachute Regiment.
- b. First United States Army attacks with Corps abreast. VII Corps attacks with 9th Inf Div on the right, 4th Inf Div in center, 30th Inf Div on the left (See Overlay). Information and missions of adjacent units will be given orally.
2. 4th Inf Div attacks at H-hour on D-day to secure initial objective (See Overlay) and will protect the gaps LAIRIGNY (3861) - ST GILLES (4361) from the south.
Air Support (See Air Support Annex).
Line of Departure - See Overlay.
D-day and H-hour to be announced.
3. a. 8th Inf (Co "A" 4th and Co "B" 37th Inf Div, Co "C" 901st TD Bn, and 70th Tn Bn attached), passing through the 39th Inf, will attack in zone of action, per overlay; drive through barbed wire and seize objective; Co "A" will protect the gaps LAIRIGNY-ST GILLES from hostile operations from the south. Will cross line of departure, see overlay, and proceed without halting at a rate of 100 yards per 3 minutes so that at H plus 15 minutes (end of dive bombing), leading elements will be 500 yards from the FERRERS-ST LO

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RESTRICTED

FD-111, Hq 4th Inf Div, 20 July 44 (cont'd)

road and will then continue the advance without halt, taking advantage of the artillery, tank and mortar support following the dive bombing.

- b. 39th Inf attached to 4th Inf Div for the purpose of holding the line. Will hold along the general line of departure. A covering force will be left along the FALCKS-STALO Road, such force to be withdrawn just in time for safety due to the bombing (for agreement with CG 9th Inf Div). 39th Inf reports to control of 9th Inf Div on passage through lines of the 8th Inf.
- c. 12th Inf - Division Reserve, per overley, will stage forward promptly on Division Order, to protect the MARIKAY-STOILDES gap in conjunction with 8th Inf.

- d. Artillery:
 - 29th FA Bn - Normal support 8th Inf.
 - 42nd FA Bn - Reinforce fires of 29th FA Bn.
 - 20th FA Bn - General support.
 - 801st TD Bn (less Co "A") - Attached Division Artillery.
 - 377th AAA (AW) Bn - Attached to Division Artillery.
 Artillery will be prepared to breakup enemy counterattacks and to fire counterbattery fires.

- e. 4th Motor C Bn (less Co "A" and 1st Plat Co "C") - Support the advance of the Division.

- f. 4th Recon Tr (Mech) - Division Reserve, present location.

- x. (1) Contact will be maintained by 8th Inf with 30th Inf Div.
- (2) All troops will clear the route of the 3rd Army Division as soon as initial objective is taken.
- (3) Commanders, or a responsible staff officer, will be available at unit radios (CG Net) at all times as important messages will be transmitted by this means.
- (4) The attack of troops will be timed so as to be able to continue the advance under cover of the air and artillery support provided.
- (5) Enemy forces encountered by the attacking troops will be contained and bypassed until initial objectives are secured.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS: See Administrative Order attached.

5. Division CP - See Overley.
Unit CP's to be reported.

BARTON

GOODWIN
G-3

2 ANNEXES:

- Annex #1 - Administrative Order
- Annex #2 - Air Support (To be issued)

- 2 -
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

200 YDS NORTH OF
LD ROAD PERIERS - STLO

ROUTE 3RD ARMY DIV



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THE 4TH INF DIV
VIA LE HODERIE (1700)
MAPS 1:50,000
SCALE 1:25,000
OVERLAY TO ACCURACY

F #11
BARTON
DELANEY
1957 153



POSITION OVERLAYS






July 7
1970

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B ⊠ 8

⊠ 4

POSITIONS
JULY 8 (2400)

⊠ 2 ⊠ 8

⊠ 12

⊠ 3 ⊠ 22

d.p. LOCATIONS

⊠ 4	-	354820
⊠ 8	-	348822
⊠ 12	-	353822
⊠ 22	-	367819

L ⊠ 8

K ⊠ 8

⊠ 22

⊠ 22

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⊠ 330

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JULY 8 1971

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES

1

2


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ATTACK TO
BE MADE
JULY 8, 1944
AT 1000



GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES

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
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
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GRAPHIC SCALE




INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6



July 10
2400

RESTRICTED



July 13 - July 14
5400

2228

3228

1222

2212

1212

1228

3222

22212

32212

2229

2230

3/4 (1-2) 1/20 (pts of July 14-15)

RESTRICTED

4

July 13 -

12

36


75
6

GRAPHIC SCALE




INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6

DATA FILE



CT 379 RELIEVES

THE LIF DIV IS RECEIVING
CT 72 MOVES TO WOOD
STARTING AT 1045 16 JULY



88

89

830

INTERVIEWS

had made good use of the time afforded them for the winter

A little South of Pertuis the ground begins to rise and the possibilities of mobile warfare improve. ~~Now the main requirement was to break the enemy in the swampy area~~ ^{the front} and get into the higher ground to the South. This was easy when the ~~main~~ ^{main} line of contact was in the first week of the campaign by giving us security in our rear during the campaign for Cherbourg. Now that that campaign was completed the tables were turned and the Germans would take the maximum use of this territory to prevent or delay further advances.

Apparently the High Command desired to tackle the difficult country rather than the strongest German forces in undertaking the next offensive and undertook to break thru the whole swampy area with 2 divisions which were backed up by powerful forces designed to break thru and destroy the Germans after the swamplands were passed. The VII Corps was given the part of the marsh lands from just East of Carantan to Marecageuse de Gorges, the VIII Corps from there to the coast. The VIII Corps attacked with the 79th Division along the coast, the 90th on its left hitting West side of the Marecageuse de Gorges, while the 82nd Airborne in the center had the limited objective of taking La Hays de Puite. The VIII Corps had the 8th Division.

The VII Corps, on this occasion the most powerful Corps on the front, committed the 83rd Division, now going into combat for the first time, to drive thru the narrow swamp infested bottleneck between the Marecageuse de Gorges and the broad swamps South of Carantan. In reserve it held the battle seasoned 4th and 9th Divisions and the 3rd Armored Division. The plan was for the 83rd and 90th Divisions to advance rapidly around the Marecageuse de Gorges until they had secured ground South of it as a base of attack for the 4th Division. The 4th would then send the 8th Infantry thru the 90th, the 12th Infantry thru the 83rd to converge on Eplestere from two sides thus opening the way to the dry ground to the South. The VII Corps would then strike with the 9th and 3rd Armored for a real breakthrough.

This attack did not work out as planned.

Both the 83rd and the 90th found the enemy resistance intense and well dug in. Evi-

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everywhere. The whole position was organized in much greater depth than the trench system of the last war and in between the larger defensive lines across the bottlenecks were scattered thousands of other entrenchments from which he could continue to delay the attackers between his main lines.

Against these tremendous the 83rd and 90th Divisions were completely unable to make the rapid advance which had been desired. The 83rd after 4 days of attack had advanced a $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to a mile-and-a-half and then had come up against the really strong German position. On the other side of the Mareeageuse de Gordes the 90th Division had advanced a little farther. They also had run into a main line of resistance and by July 5th were having as slow going as the 83rd. Days were slipping away and every one gave the enemy more time to prepare more defenses farther back. The VII Corps' plan of holding out its powerful mass of 3 divisions for a knockout blow farther South had to be changed and it was decided to commit the 4th Division along side the 83rd for the bitter job of hacking thru the swamplands. When the 4th also was held to the slow rate of advance hedgerow by hedgerow, the 9th and also the 8th Divisions had to be committed also. This was the powerful force originally intended for a great breakthrough expended in the preliminary job of getting thru the first obstacles. The breakthrough would have to be set forward to a later date.

The 4th Division's operations in this abominable country are in three phases representing three successive schemes for dealing with the problem. The first effort on July 6th and 7th was to go thru in column of regiments, the 12th leading. The extremely narrow front of the division seemed clearly to indicate such a solution. On June 6th at 0930 the 12th Inf passed thru elements of the 83rd Division astride the Carentan-Pierres Highway 3 miles Southwest of Carentan then attacking Southwest into the division's sector between the highway and the Mareeageuse de Gorges. This attack was preceded by a powerful barrage. The 12th advanced about 400 yards at the maximum beyond the 83rd's front then ran into the powerful obstacle of one of the Germans main defensive positions. After being halted, shot up, and worn out in pushing against this position, they were

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counter-attacked. The counter-attack was thrown back but the 12th gained no more that day. The first round had gone to the enemy.

General Barton had no intention of repeating the second time the same effort which had failed once. Unfortunately it was not possible to maneuver into new ground for the next try; the Heinies had us inescapably canalized in this one bottleneck. However, for the attack of the 7th two new things were added. Renewed attack by the 12th on 7th was to be preceded by the most powerful artillery and air barrage yet delivered in the western part of the Normandy theater. Beginning at midnight heavy shelling pounded the enemy thru most of the night. At 0545 all the division and Corps artillery

^A opened up. Tremendous barrage was laid on the narrow sector in front of the 12th. At 0600 heavy air bombardment was to have followed the artillery but the weather this time favored the enemy and the planes were unable to come out. The artillery therefore resumed shelling at a somewhat slower rate at 0600 and continued until 0645. Altogether tens of explosive were poured on to the enemy in an area of during that one hour. At 0630 the 12th attacked.

The tremendous bombardment had had its effect but terrible little compared to the weight of explosives used. The 12th captured the area which had held it up yesterday and the 2nd Bn leading advanced about 500 yards further to the west where they were stopped by another powerful fortified area. The 3rd came down behind the 2nd and around on its left, pushed a 100 yards or so ahead, and it was stopped. The 1st Bn was then committed on the left of the 3rd without gaining any more ground. On this second day we had scored but the score was very small and its cost had been great.

Meanwhile the other additional operations of the 7th had ended in failure. In an effort to outflank the strong opposition in front of the 12th the 8th which was occupying the little peninsula 3481 was to make a night attack at 0300 across 300 yards of swamp to their west, seize the little peninsula 3381 as an LD, and at 0630 attack to the south. The 1st and 2nd Bns followed along the little trail about 200 yards east of the

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water's edge where from about 0230 to 0300 they were under heavy enemy fire. Co C alone lost 20 men in this barrage. After a 15 minute preparation the 1st and 2nd Bns moved into the water. To maintain direction 4.2 mortars fired white phosphorus shells along the battalions' boundaries and on the objective. Men had to wade thru water that was sometimes ankle deep and sometimes shoulder deep. The enemy let them come on until 50 yards from land then opened a violent fire with machine guns, mortars, and at least two 88's. Despite this fire both battalions gained the shore. The 1st Bn on the north that initially attacked, Companies A and B. These companies were kept within the battalion boundary by the white phosphorus guide shells and suffered severe ~~disorganization~~ disorganization and mixing of units as they splashed and stumbled thru the mud and water in the darkness. This confusion became worse when the enemy opened their furious fire. In order to anchor his right flank the battalion commander then sent the second and third platoons of Co C across to the right of the other two companies and at the same time directed the first platoon of Co C to form a line along the LD to cover a possible withdrawal. These two platoons also succeeded in crossing the water and the entire 1st Bn less one platoon reached the edge of the orchard. Here they were pinned down by the heavy enemy fire and were hopelessly disorganized and mixed. Many of the new recruits were in combat for the first time. Most of the platoons and squads had been reorganized - leaders and men were strange to each other and the men once separated from their squad did not know where to go or what to do. Communication between battalion and its companies had failed probably due to the confusion. There was no prospect of taking the strongly held enemy position with that disorganized mass of men and a withdrawal was decided on. It was necessary to send the order by patrol from the first platoon of Co C. The water was still under heavy fire from the enemy, especially along the east side of the peninsula. A smoke screen was placed on this enemy position to cover the withdrawal but Lt Schneider, Co C, did not consider it sufficient for his patrol to make it across and asked for the screen to be reinforced. When this was done the patrol got across without loss and shortly afterward the bulk of the 1st Bn recrossed the water under cover of the smoke. Many men who were separated from their units

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failed to get back with the battalion but most of these made their way back afterward by infiltration.

The 2nd Bn, a little farther south, had had a similar experience, though Major Yarbrough, then Bn Executive, states that disorganization in the crossing was not too serious and the battalion was still fairly well in hand. However the 2nd Bn was equally unable to capture the strong enemy positions and it withdrew with the 1st. Major Yarbrough says that most of their casualties were suffered during the withdrawal. However it is doubtful if he could distinguish between the men lost while under fire on the forward position and those hit after the withdrawal commenced. The 8th Inf lost men in this abortive attack.

The results of these two bitter days for the division were men and officers lost and a net gain of about one square kilometer. A new effort must be made and the possible variations of attack were slight. The one change which could be made now was to give up the idea of advance in depth formation, attack with two regiments abreast despite the narrowness of the corridor. Again the enemy had forced us to use up our forces in order to get thru this obstacle of the marsh country.

The second phase of the division attack in this area was a straight push with the full strength of the division employed to get thru thus leaving no strong reserve for exploitation beyond the obstacles. The order for July 8th directed the 12th Inf, now used up, to secure the line - the small stream 200 to 400 yards in its front - and there hold on. This stream was another powerfully fortified line. The attack would be taken over by the 22nd and the 8th. The 22nd would move east of the highway into the 63rd Division sector and attack around the left flank of the 12th to flank out the defenses along the stream line. The 8th Inf would likewise come around the right flank of the 12th with the 3rd Bn, which had not been involved in the costly effort of the previous day, pushing on to the southwest to secure the neck of the next peninsula in front, while the 2nd Bn swung around to the west and north to take in rear the peninsula which had thrown the regiment back . The 1st Bn of the 8th remained to renew

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the frontal pressure against this latter peninsula. The 22nd Inf was powerfully supported by a company of 4.2 mortars (Co D, 87th), a T/D Co (Co C, 801st), a platoon of 40mm Anti Aircraft (1st Platoon, Btry C, 377th), and the 70th Tank Bn less one company. 8th Inf was supported by

The attack was again preceded by heavy artillery barrage.

The attack jumped off as planned at 1000 and the 22nd after bitter fighting by the 1st and 2nd Bns got thru the creek line and 800 to a 1000 yards beyond where they were once more held up by strong positions. The 3rd Bn of the 8th advanced several hundred yards

The 2nd Bn found peninsula to the north apparently evacuated by the enemy during the night, (?)

The 1st Bn of the 8th after waiting out a huge smoke screen over the area of yesterday's unsuccessful attack crossed without loss to find the enemy gone (?) Another day of extremely slow and costly advance.

The attack was resumed with the same formation on July 9th except that the 12th Inf was ordered to recommit one battalion in the center to occupy the small peninsula of Les Forges. Jackson's 1st Bn took over this task while the 1st Bn of the 22nd swung down to the south close behind the 2nd Bn of the 22nd. These 3 Bns on the left of the division occupied another square kilometer bringing them to a line just south and west of Saintery & Les Forges. Here they were up against another of the enemy's numerous main lines of resistance filling all the ground from Saintery and Les Forges back to the creek west and south.

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On the other end of this line just south of Raffoville (/) the 2nd and 3rd Bns of the 8th were fighting bitterly. 2nd Bn on the right flank had 2 companies along the dirt road running southeast from Raffoville in the vicinity of the orchards at 328791. In front of them the Germans had heavily fortified all the area between the dirt road and the paved road 300 yards to the south. A frontal push was getting them no-where. An attempt to go down the north-south paved road (327794-323789) was abandoned because the road was very heavily mined. The battalion commander then attempted to get his right flank company which was just south of Raffoville across the neck of inundation but the German fortifications had such perfect fields of fire over these water surfaces that that attack failed. The 2nd Bn was held inescapably to its frontal attack. The 3rd Bn on the left eventually broke this line by the use of tanks driving thru they turned west behind the German lines. As usual the Germans thus outflanked withdrew from this position. However they were in ~~the~~ serious danger of being cut off since the 3rd Bn was pushing across their rear, the 2nd was now driving thru their west flank and one company of the 2nd was now able to cross the neck of inundation and get still further to their west. In this situation the Germans gained time for withdrawal by a successful trick. At point 329786 a German officer came out with a white flag and wanted to negotiate for surrender. He refused to come across to our lines and company officers of the 3rd Bn went forward to talk to him. While they were parlaying ~~one~~ one of our artillery concentrations came down on the area and the negotiations were interrupted while the participants hit the ditches. After the barrage was over the conference was resumed. Eventually the German officer surrendered himself and 2 men. General Barton immediately issued orders that there would be no more ~~parlaying~~ parlaying with the enemy and in no case would our officers go forward to meet the Germans in regard to surrender. Any of the enemy wishing to surrender would come across to our lines and simply surrender.

After this strong German position has been broken the enemy withdrew westward still fighting delaying/ ^(trap worked on Germans at the bridge) action pursued by all three battalions of the 8th; the 1st Bn had now moved south thru the sector of the 12th, crossed the stream on the south of this peninsula near Les Aubrees and pushed west thru the southern half of the peninsula.

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On the 11th the 8th Infantry completed occupation of the les Aubrees peninsula, remnants of the enemy withdrawing to the small island west of it. The 22nd Inf and the 1st Bn of the 12th renewing their attack broke thru the enemy line along the stream running west from Saintney, and the 22nd pushed on a 1000 yards to the next position. At la Maguerrie and the little sunken road running southwest, 500 yards southwest of la Maguerrie they bumped into the toughest line yet. Sunken road had been very powerfully fortified. The 1st Bn of the 12th had more successful going and by itself on the 11th cleaned out the little peninsula west of la Maguerrie. After 6 days of fighting the division had now cleared out the mass of peninsulas and swamps to a depth of 3 or 4 miles but was now again bottlenecked worse than ever. On the west the 8th Inf looked across the Seve River to the small island where they had left the remnants of the German force confronting them and they could see some of the enemy in the houses just across the demolished bridge. This was not a feasible place to attack and movement there would only ~~lead~~ ^{carry} us out of our secto away from our objective. To the south the 8th Inf had a swamp more than a kilometer across in any direction. The 1st Bn of the 12th had completed occupation of Loungeville peninsula which was completely surrounded by swampy ground. On the left flank of the division along the Periers highway the 22nd was held up by the extremely strong German defenses barring the only practicable corridor leading to Periers. On the left of the 22nd the 83rd Division was now a little behind. While dry ground did extend southward along the division boundary for about two miles, an attack in this direction would only come up against the swamps along the Taute River. It was imperative to break thru the enemy defenses and move on down the highway thru Periers. At a Command conference at 2000, July 11th, the situation was thoroughly thrashed out. Colonel Lenham, commanding the 22nd Inf, described the strength of the German positions in his front where the sunken road was protected with large numbers of machine guns, mortars, and tanks dug in. He planned to pull his 1st and 3rd Bns away from this line to his left and attack south to outflank that line. ~~This plan was not~~ ^{approved} and the following was ordered for the division attack on the 11th.

Ref withdrawal of 1st Bn, night of June 8.

Col. Foster, C.O. 22nd Inf, was relieved July 9. It is reported by another officer that Foster's successor, Col. C.T. Lanham, said July 12, "withdrawing in this regiment has got to stop. That's what Foster was relieved for."

Maj. ~~Gofer~~ ^{1st Bn} was wounded July 10.

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The 4th Ren squadron would relieve the 8th Inf in the les Aubrees peninsula and the 8th would relieve Jackson's battalion in the Longueville peninsula. The 22nd would attack the enemy's fortified line astride the highway with the support of all the firepower in the division.

In reply to the objections regarding the strength of the enemy position, General Barton said that the Germans are staying in there with just the guts of their soldiers. We outnumber them 10 to 1 in the infantry, 50 to 1 in the artillery, and an infinite number in the air. He wanted the unit commanders, especially regimental commanders, to convey to their men ~~that~~ that we have got to fight for our country just as hard as the Germans are fighting for theirs. He said that the attack would be a coordinated uncoordinated attack as he would show.

All the division artillery and reinforcing artillery was to fire in front of the 22nd while the 8th Inf from their positions in the peninsula infiltrating the German line would use all their firepower to assist the 22nd. The entire 70th Tank Bn would be attached to the 22nd. General Barton asked Colonel Lenham how many tanks he would need. "I need a battalion", Colonel Lenham said. General Barton answered, "You can have it. That is all I've got." The Germans had been making use of their limited artillery in a clever way. Moving them up one road leading toward the front they would fire a few rounds then pull out, come around up another road, fire a few rounds and so on. General Barton directed our artillery to concentrate heavily on all roads leading toward our sector to break up this game of the Germans. At the same time he planned to use our Tank Destroyers in the same manner against the enemy.

The attack was launched on July 12th, according to plan. The artillery delivered the first concentration on the first of the six phase lines at H-Hour 0915. The 2nd and 3rd ^{phase} ~~phase~~ lines were fired at 1215. No need developed for firing the fourth, fifth and sixth phase lines since the attack failed. The night of the 12th the enemy still held all his positions barring our progress.

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There was still no other solution but to go thru this bottleneck. The order for the

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13th was to try again the same plan with another team. The 12th Inf to relieve the 22nd for this attack. Meanwhile the 8th was looking forward to the possibility that if this second attack failed the 8th Inf might be required to cross the stream to its west and get on to the two peninsulas ~~lying~~ lying north of the Periers highway. This would be a difficult operation as the first experience of the 8th with this sort of crossing had proved. The 90th Division, while making better progress on July 11th and 12th, were still well to the north of this area. The Corps boundary had now been changed so as to follow the Seves River thus relieving the 4th Division of responsibility for the islands and peninsulas on the west side of that river. But even when the 90th Division should have captured those areas the Germans could still defend the two peninsulas between the Seves and Holerotte Rivers in the same murderous manner as they have been using in this type of terrain. Thus a full week of attack was concluded. It has been a bitter week of pure grime for the infantry. This is none of the dash and movement of the June campaign. Only the slow bloody endless fighting for hedgerow after hedgerow. Casualties probably have been no heavier than during the June fighting but the lack of progress, the frequent attacks repelled by the enemy, and especially the relentless accumulation of casualties, combined to produce a very depressing effect. A small cadre of officers and men from the original landing who were still with the infantry battalions and companies have been steadily knocked out during this week. The 2nd Bn of the 8th which had been outstanding for survival of its key personnel during the June campaign had now lost Colonel MacNeely, as well as Captain Kemp, Lieutenant Deoley, and Lieutenant Williams of the old officers of Co F who had won so many fine victories in the Cherbourg peninsula. The 1st Bn of the 8th had its new commander, Lt. Colonel. only a day and a half before he went down. The infantry tired as Major Yarbrough said, "as soon as one of us sits down he falls asleep or drops into a stupor." This war at its worst for corrosive effect on the spirit.

But despite all these depressing effects, the troops, new as most of them are, go back in again and yet again thru the interminable enemy entrenchments in murderous fire

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to drive them out of each successive position. Another good success, a breakthrough, and a little movement and spirits will go up again.

44
The enemy as has accomplished his mission unsuccessfully during this week. His stubborn delaying actions have held the 4th Division to a maximum advance of 4 miles, in 7 seven days of hard fighting. A total area of _____ occupied. We have destroyed very few of his forces; for the most part they have succeeded in withdrawing from one position to the next behind it. During most of the fighting they have even carried their dead back with them. Except for the heavy destruction poured on them south of the bridge (323777) we have found very few German dead. We have taken few prisoners. They are numbered now in dozens instead of thousands. This is due at least in part to the type of troops the enemy is using here. We are not fighting the foreign element on the 4th Division front but are opposed mainly by SS units composed of youthful Germans mostly 17 to 21, Hitler youth who are still fanatically Nazi, determined to fight at all costs and still convinced that Germany will win. The 90th Division reports much larger numbers of prisoners including many older men. It is evident that the enemy although using comparatively small forces to fight this delaying action has employed some of his very best quality. Replacements for the units opposing us are largely Luftwaffe men - student pilots - now in the line as infantry.

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Continuation of the Summery Garentan-Periers Campaign.

The attack on July 13th by the 3rd Bn of the 22nd and 2nd and 3rd Bns of the 12th under the command of Commanding Officer, 12th Inf, was preceded by another tremendous artillery barrage. This attack again was stopped without advance. The attack was also supported by fire from all supporting weapons of the 8th Inf which infilled the enemy's front from across the bog to the west. Again on the 14th the attack was repeated and again failed.

On the night of July 14th 3rd Bn of the 8th relieved the 3rd of the 22nd and another attack was made July 15th at 1030. An air bombardment was scheduled at 0800 but due to weather conditions was postponed but after it still could not be flown this mission was called off. Other targets were then given to the air for 1100 but there was no time to brief the crews so this was abandoned and other targets still farther to the rear were given for 1200. However it proved not feasible to fly these missions so in the end there was no air support. There was a 15 minute artillery ^{preparation} at 1015; attack at 1030. This attack broke thru and by 1100 E of the 8th was almost on the objective with both battalions of the 12th only slightly behind. The 2nd Bn of the 8th crossed the bog from the north and struck the enemy's left flank. The objective was secured and lines were held about 500 yards northeast of Raids by the 8th Inf, the 12th extending the line to make contact with the 329th. The 331st on the left of the 329th extended the line to the Taute River at 345740. The two divisions now had reached a continuous line across the corridor between the Taute River and the Holerotte River facing south-west but still six to eight kilometers short of Periers.

On July 16th the 22nd Inf moved in the morning to new assembly areas in the vicinity of la Haudepie. On the night of July 16th the 12th Inf ^{was relieved} by elements of the 83rd Division and at 0900 on the 17th the 12th moved out to the new area. The 8th was scheduled to be relieved on the 18th by the 4th Armored Division.

Thus the position which had held up the division for 5 days was at last broken before the 4th passed this sector on to other units. This undoubtedly was one of the

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Summary Carentan-Periers Campaign (Cont'd).

toughest positions we encountered but it can only be speculated how much of the delay was due to the exhaustion of the troops, the severe casualties, many of the units being only about half strength on this position, and the desperate shortage of experienced leaders

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Command Conference

Recorded by

MAJOR BETTY

2000 11 JULY 1944

The first thing Colonel Lenham talked about was what was in front of him. There was a sunken road protected with machine guns, tanks and mortars. He claimed the 1st & 3rd he couldn't go thru there (Road 330764-332760). He planned to pull his 2 battalions around and outflank them from the left.

The division would resume attack at 0915 to capture objective EAST of Periers. General stated that the Germans have used mobile artillery on roads coming into our defense sector and that the artillery would concentrate on all roads leading to our sector. The Germans would come up the road, fire a few rounds, go back and around to another point and fire a few more rounds.

General Barton made the statement the Germans are staying in there with just the guts of their soldiers. We outnumber them 10 to 1 in the infantry, 50 to 1 in the artillery, and an infinite number in the air. He wanted the unit commanders and regimental commanders to convey to the men that we have got to fight for our country just as hard as the Germans are fighting for theirs. He also said the attack he planned to give these unit commanders is a coordinated uncoordinated attack as he would show them later. General plans to use our T/D's in the same way and use our artillery to break up their game. General Barton asked Colonel Lenham how many tanks he needed. "I need a battalion" Colonel Lenham said. General Barton said "You can have it".

Fire to be controlled by 6 phase lines. 2nd and 3rd were fired at 1215. ^{1st} was fired at H-Hour. All available firepower - T/D's, AA, and Cannon Company - was used by the 8th Infantry on the front line of the 2nd

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
10.1.68 Lt. Col. J. H. ...

22681

7

HEDGEROW CAMPAIGN

Interview with Major Jay L. King, S-3,
87th Chemical Battalion, July 6, 1944

Company D, 87th Chemical Bn. had positions along hedgerows 4 to 6 feet high, with trees on top. Mortars were placed just in front, 10 yards or less, of hedgerow. Men had all slit trenches along near side of hedgerows, also radio and telegraph and ammunition supply. Mortars in orchard and grainfield (3 ft high) so well camouflaged that they can only be spotted by aiming stakes. Whenever a fire mission required number of men and ammunition only go over hedge to mortars.

About 1400 July 6 mission - fired 1st round for regiment in two minutes after call.

Pos. 348822. At 3200 laying. Concent. in 3480 (1500 yards S.) Could support 12th ahead or to west flank for long distance.

July 15th

Co B, 87th Chemical, fired 1069 rounds white phosphorus maintaining a 1500 (?) yard smoke screen pretty nearly 5 hours. Fired it in support of the 8th Infantry. Aided the 8th Infantry in securing their objectives. The 8th Inf. reported that they found numerous enemy dead who showed signs of white phosphorus burns. They had no way of knowing whether the casualties were caused by white phosphorus burns. Time of smoke screen estimated about 1030 to 1530.

Date July 15th.

Weather cool, muggy high, overcast, wind very slight. Conditions very favorable.

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7

DAILY OPERATIONS

June 30th. Division's stay in Cherbourg area was cut short. Moved to Assembly Area Gourbesville - Orlandes - Renouf - Amfreville. Here awaited orders.

July 3rd. 0500 to 0545 heavy artillery barrage to the Southwest was heard. 0600 to 0730 continuing sporadic artillery fire. The drive was on. At 1200 the 4th Division was placed on the alert to move on two hours notice to Assembly Areas (Overlay).

July 4th. 1200, 12th Infantry marched South.

July 5th. 1100, 12th Infantry moved across the river at Baunte and the 8th Infantry moved up in place of the 12th.

July 6th. About noon Division CP moved across the river. On account of heavy shelling of the Baunte bridge and crossroads a mile Southeast, the move was made by a wide circuit thru Carentan. The advance of the 90th and 82nd Divisions had been much slower than planned and they had not come near seizing the departure lines for 4th Division attack. Hence the plan was changed and the 12th Infantry committed on a narrow front between the 83rd and the Mare-Cageuses de Gorges. 12th Infantry crossed LD (360815 - 370805) at 0930. After 400 yards advance, the 12th was counter-attacked and gained no more that day. At 1300 the 3rd battalion of the 8th relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 331st Infantry in the Peninsula 3481.

July 7th. Attack ordered to be preceded by artillery barrage 0545 to 0600 followed by air bombardment 0600 to 0645 with a succession of artillery barrages after 0615. Actually there was extremely heavy shelling by our artillery throughout most of the night. Enemy artillery replied to some extent to about 0300.

> 0545 to 0600 our artillery fired the most tremendous barrage yet heard. Due to bad weather there was no air bombardment and the artillery, after a few seconds pause at 0600, resumed fire at slow rate until 0645. Meanwhile the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 8th Infantry and 331st Infantry Battalion for an attack across

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Daily Operations (cont'd)

the marsh against the enemy strong point on peninsula 3381. Account given by 1st Lt. Harold F Schneider (Chicago) about this attack: 1st and 2nd Battalions formed up on the road 338816-340813; from about 1:30 to 03:00 a heavy barrage fell on this road, especially RJ 338815. Company C lost 20 men. 1st and 2nd battalions attacked at 0330 after a 15 minute preparation. According to plan this was to have been a preparation by nine artillery battalions, infantry crossing the swamp ~~XXXXXX~~ during the barrage, and signaling for it to lift; thereafter, artillery was to search forward 100 yards every five minutes. After the strong point was taken it was to be boxed in with artillery and mortars. Actually only the preparation was fired. 1st Battalion had A and B in assault. Troops slogged across the muddy flat without opposition until 50 yards from land, then the Germans opened violent fire with machine guns, mortars, and two 88's (333809-335009). Two platoons of Company C were now committed on the ~~left~~ right flank while the 1st platoon of C was ordered to form a line along the ID to cover any withdrawal. All the assault units in the 1st Battalion reached land and advanced as far as the edge of the orchard where they were pinned down about 0400. All units were now hopelessly disorganized and mixed. In addition to the difficulties of a night attack, the loss of control in the darkness, and the disorganizing effect of new recruits. Many had never been in combat before, had had very limited training--some less than 13 weeks--and squads and platoon had been drastically reorganized after the last campaign and had had little time to shake down. Most officers, non-coms, and men were new to their present assignment and many men did not know who to follow. From all these factors the attack was so disorganized by the time it reached the orchard that further advance against the fierce resistance was impossible. Communication was out probably due to the confusion. A smoke screen was laid on the enemy sun positions (335809) and 1st platoon Company C was ordered to send patrols to carry an order for withdrawal. A ~~somebody~~ considered the smoke screen insufficient

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for his patrols to make it across and asked for it to be reinforced. This was done, patrols crossed safely without losing a man. This was about 0530. A large part of the assault troops withdrew under cover of the smoke. The remainder got back by infiltration. After the withdrawal losses looked extremely high (about 200 of the 1st Battalion). This was largely due to the disorganization and later many of the men were found.

Foots ↓ Lt Schneider says Company C now has no man who landed D-Day who is not at least a sergeant. Many of the replacements have never been under overhead artillery fire and lose their heads when they first experience it in battle. If a leader stays at the head of his unit, half his men at the rear become mixed with other units; if he stays at the rear, his advance stops.

Meanwhile the 12th division continuing a slow and difficult advance and by night of the 7th had reached a line (345802-349792), an advance of a mile and a quarter in two days. Later in the afternoon the 3rd Battalion had been ordered through between the other two and had reached a line about 200 yards farther forward. The enemy had made good use of the time allowed him to prepare this area for defense. The many swampy spots gave frequent narrow necks which had been strongly fortified. Large numbers of dugouts had been skillfully built in the hedgerows usually with entrance in the side of the hedgerow, then dug out underneath - impossible to see until right on them. Intrenchments and fox holes were dug in under cover of the hedgerows with excellent protection against air bursts. The whole area has been made into a succession of powerful delaying positions at very close intervals. Practically every hedgerow had to be attacked under well laid enemy fire. Artillery preparations do little damage to the enemy since he waits them out in his highly effective shelters. The fact that all rifle companies have 75 to 80 percent replacements also slows down operations.

July 8th - Attack was resumed at 0600. The 12th having reached the line of

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the creek was up against another strong defensive line. They were ordered to hold while the 8th attacked on their right and the 22nd on their left. The 8th attacked with two battalions, the third to advance southwest, the second to turn West and take in rear the fortified Peninsula which yesterday had knocked them back. The 22nd attacked with 1st and 2nd battalions and passed between the 12th and 329th.

By night the 22nd had gained another 100 yards, the 3rd of the 8th 200, while the 2nd battalion had occupied its Peninsula without losses (?). The A.2 mortar with the 8th (Co R. 870) fired a huge smoke screen as preparation for this advance but the infantry did not advance until after the screen was over. Company R of the 8th was sent in to occupy the strong point of ~~the Peninsula~~ which had given so much trouble on the 9th.

July 8th. 2nd Battalion of the 8th ran into another strong defensive line generally along the road 333789-Sainteny. Little progress today. The 22nd was held up 500 yards northeast of Sainteny. In the afternoon the 1st Battalion was sent (1st Inf) in between the 8th and 22nd with a limited objective -- the Peninsula southwest of forces, while the 1st of the 2nd pulled over to the left.

First German prisoner captured by 22nd in this campaign is 19 years old, Hitler youth, two years in army, member of SS unit. His morale high, believes his unit has offensive mission, that we (Americans) are in desperate position, Germans have recaptured Cherbourg, story of Russian capture of Vilna is our propaganda, that Germans will drive us off continent, then defeat us in air. Germany will win yet. Germans here, no foreign elements appearing. However, 8th's prisoners indicate that SS troops have been mixed thru regular army units. This may lead to friction.

July 10th. The 22nd made a rapid advance as far as the creek south of les Forges. Here another strong position delayed them for several hours. About 1500 the 1st Battalion had forced a crossing and turned to the West while the 2nd Battalion continued to the southwest. On this morning the 8th was delayed by an apparent ruse - a German officer

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came out at 329786, wanted to talk about surrendering. The Company officers went into a parley with him. While talking, our artillery opened fire as planned on this area. The negotiators hit the ditches. After the barrage the parley was resumed. The German would not go back to our CP. Eventually he surrendered himself and two men. The attack had been delayed _____ hours. Colonel Rodwell and General Barton immediately issued orders that there would be no more parleying. An enemy who wished to surrender will simply surrender. In the afternoon the 8th met strong resistance and made no progress. At 2305 3rd Battalion of the 8th entered les Aubres, the 1st Battalion of the 12th on its extreme right flank found an enemy well dug in and called for artillery fire on positions and brought up some of the tanks and flushed out the Germans. Had good machine gun positions covering the enemy. Germans started running around 1800 and we have been firing ever since - a very hot fire - so hot in fact that an officer remarked "a cup of coffee could be heated on the machine gun barrels." Our men want to attack early in the morning so that we can go out and count the dead Jerries. By 2000 1st Battalion of the 22nd was fighting on its objective, 2nd and 3rd battalions were still a little behind. (Narrative by Major Swink) Some accurate G-2ing - 8th was squeezing enemy toward bridge §21779). From a radio message in clear which Corps intercepted we knew that Germans there had orders to cross the bridge and attack to the east. Air OP (20th FA) saw a number of them start moving. General Barton gave artillery limiting line 325782 - 326776 - 323776 - 320777 - and ordered a concentration in that area south of the bridge. He ordered 1st Battalion of the 22nd to put out a flank protection at 325770. When the artillery fired, Germans tried to escape down draw to the south and the 1st Battalion of the 12th was in position to mow them down with machine guns and tanks as above. The 42nd Infantry first misunderstood this plan, thought that the enemy was moving down the road into les Forges and that the threat was to the rear. 3rd Battalion of the 12th actually was moving into les

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Forges from the northeast. There was the possibility of serious confusion wrecking the plan. Major Swink reported this misunderstanding to General Barton who immediately phoned the 22nd and straightened them out and the plan was executed perfectly.

July 11th. By 1300 the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 8th had reached West end of Peninsula ~~30781~~ 3078. The enemy falling back rapidly before them retreated across the stream to the island. Bridge at 307789 ~~is~~ put. Some German soldiers observed in houses (305789). Tanks will be brought up to fire on the houses, then the 8th will send patrols to the island. Present plan is for the 4th ACR squadron to relieve the 8th in this peninsula and carry out operations on two small islands and possibly the far shore of the swam within the Corps sector.

12th Infantry continuing attack in the next peninsula to the South. After they have completed occupation the 12th will be relieved by a battalion of the 8th while another battalion of the 8th moves on to the highway at 327768 preparatory to continuing attack on division's right flank. 8th will cross by the ford at 321778.

3rd battalion of the 22nd after capturing strongly fortified position 332761 about noon is continuing advance against heavy resistance. Correction: Obj 1 not captured, 22nd held up in front of this position all day ~~11th~~ 11th, also 12th.

July 12th. No advance, 22nd stuck in front of powerful defenses. ~~24th Recn~~ ^{24th Recn} island found an enemy, established ~~at 307789~~ and strongly entrenched, roads mined. ~~24th Recn~~ 8th Inf thinks may be ordered to take peninsula on their west if 1st fails to break line on its front. Trying to get information on subject.

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OPERATIONS 4TH DIVISION BETWEEN CARENTAN AND PERIERES
JULY 6 TO 15

After the fall of Cherbourg, the 4th Division received little time to rest and reorganise. The troops spent one or two days in the city, ^{then} and the Division was ordered south, arriving in assembly areas south of Bourbeville and Orglandes on June 30. Here the Division remained four to five days waiting to go back into the line on the new drive to the south. Three days were devoted to reorganising the infantry companies and to training.

Reorganization and training were seriously needed. The Division had had about 5400 casualties since landing, nearly all infantry. Several rifle companies had less than 50 men left of the 176 that they had brought ashore on D-Day. Co A 22nd Inf had only 39 old men; Co B only 43. Co C, 8th Inf, by July 10 (after three days of combat in the new campaign) did not have a single D-Day man left who was not at least a sergeant. About 4400 infantry replacements had been received since June 13th, in addition to the division overstrength. Most of the replacements, having had only their basic training at home, lacked some essentials of combat training. Many who were supplied as specialists in certain subjects or weapons, had had little training, sometimes none at all, in those specialties. The situation was made more difficult by the shortage of experienced leaders. Only five of the original rifle company commanders remained, while five rifle companies had lost two or three commanders during the three weeks fighting in the Cherbourg Peninsula. Losses of platoon leaders and non-commissioned officers had been equally severe.

General Barten said at the close of the Cherbourg campaign, "we no longer have the Division we brought ashore. In the infantry we have practically a new division." The General had hoped for a rest period long enough to reorganise and train his new division but the situation did not permit. To make the best of what we had, General Barten recommended to the regimental commanders that they transfer officers and non-commissioned officers to the rifle companies from other units of the regiment, where losses had been less severe, and thus distribute the available leadership as ^{equally} as possible. Many of the infantry officers on the division staff had already been sent back to the line and several more were now sent back.

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Training and reorganization was cut short on July 3 when the Division was placed on alert to move to the front on two hours notice beginning at noon July 3. At 1200 July 4 the 12th Inf marched out for assembly areas south of the Douve River, and a day later the rest of the Division followed.

The offensive which was already under way was designed as a breakthrough. VIII Corps, with the sector from the coast to the Marecageuse de Gorges, had the 79th and the 90th Divisions in the line, the 8th in reserve. VII Corps, having a narrow corridor of dry land three miles wide between the Marecageuse de Gorges and the Haute River, initially committed only the 83rd Division, holding the 4th, 9th, and 3rd Armored Divisions in reserve. The original plan was for the 90th and 83rd Divisions to advance on each side of the Marecageuse de Gorges, past the wide part of the marsh. When they reached the vicinity of Gorges and Sainteny, respectively, the 4th Division would attack through both of them, with one CT on each side of the marsh, and seize Periers. Then the breakthrough would be extended by the 9th Division and the 3rd Armored, to encircle the Germans on the west coast.

The terrain was an obstacle to this plan. Before the VII Corps lay a section about 12 miles square, south of Carentan, which is full of marshes. The dry land in this section is cut up into little peninsulas and islands flanked by swampy ground, creating numerous bottle-necks a mile or so wide. ^{This} Swampy region had served us for three weeks by securing our rear during the advance on Cherbourg. Now it was the Germans' turn to take advantage of it. They had made good use of the three weeks they had had to fortify the sector.

The Germans had put in a defensive line across each narrow neck down the length of the corridor from Carentan to Periers, with plenty of delaying positions between the main lines. All the hedgerows in the defended areas were lined with dugouts, covered foxholes, and weapon emplacements. Cut into the hedgerows from the back, with only a narrow fire slot cut thru the front near the base of the hedgerows, these entrenchments were hard to locate even at close range, harder to knock out. Weapons of the defense included 88's, 40 mm. and 20 mm. AA guns, bazookas, mortars, and enormous numbers of machine guns. At many places on the main defensive lines there were dug-in machine guns at the rate of four or five per hundred

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yards. The fire plans had been systematically and carefully laid out, and every plot of ground was well covered by fire from concealed and protected positions, every weapon was covered by flanking fire from others. ~~W/XXX/~~ All the fields and stream beds were flat and generally smooth as lawns, affording practically no cover or defilade except along the hedgerows. The hedgerows were very effective A-T obstacles.

The German troops defending these positions were much superior to those that we have encountered in the Cherbourg Peninsula, ^{They included} including the 17th SS Panzer Division and the 6th Parachute Regiment. Their personnel at this time was almost entirely German, mostly in their early 20's. They were fanatical Nazis, who in almost all cases fought to the last. Their morale was comparatively high and judging from the few prisoners we took during this operation they were convinced that the tide had turned and they were about to drive us back into the sea.

At 0600 July 3 the 83rd and 90th Divisions jumped off following a heavy preparation by the artillery of two Corps. The attack bogged down at the very beginning. In three days, with severe losses, the 83rd Division gained about a mile on its right, practically nothing on its left along the Periers highway. The 90th also went very slowly. By July 5 it was apparent that those two divisions would not succeed in securing the intended LD for the 4th Division. VII Corps then committed the 4th on the left of the 83rd. The 4th still had the mission of taking Periers.

In ten days of combat in this sector the 4th Division advanced four miles on a front varying from one to two miles and suffered about 2400 casualties.

The advance took place in three stages, corresponding to the three enemy MLR's encountered. The first of these lines along the creek just north of Maisentrie was taken by the 12th Inf July 6 and 7. The next, extending east and southeast from Raffoville, was broken by the 8th and 22nd Inf July 8 to 10. The ~~3~~ third German line, running southeast from la Maugorie, held up ^{the} whole division for five days. Not until September 15 was the enemy on this position pushed back a few hundred yards.

The sector assigned to the 4th Div extended from the M. recagnaise de Gorges to a few hun-

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dred yards east of the Carantan-Periers highway. At the point where the 83rd Division's front line stood on July 5, an inlet of the marsh reached almost to the highway, narrowing the division front to less than a 1000 yards. The first attack was therefore made in column of regiments, 12th leading, and the 12th attacked in column of battalions, ^{2nd} second leading. This Bn immediately met strong resistance and after 700 to a 1000 yards was brought to a complete stop. There followed a two day battle within an area less than a 1000 yards square. (Detailed account of this action attached). By the end of the day July 7 the 2nd Bn 12th had captured the strongpoint and the other two Bns passed by on its left and secured a line along the next creek.

Meanwhile due to the strength of the resistance and the very slight progress of the 12th Inf on July 6, division had attempted a flanking move with the 8th Inf. The 8th had already relieved the 83rd on the little peninsula northwest of la Moisantrie. On the west side of this peninsula is a strip of bottom land 300 to 500 yards wide which is subject to short flooding, though at this time it was not inundated. This ground is perfectly flat and bare as a table top. On the other side of this bottom is a point of land on which the enemy, as it turned out, was strongly entrenched. (See attached sketch of the defenses of this area which was prepared by the 4th Div Engineer after the position was occupied). The plan was for the 8th Inf to cross the flat ground and seize the enemy strongpoint under cover of darkness on the morning of July 7, then move south and take the Moisantrie position from the rear.

1st and 2nd Bns of the 8th attacked at 0900 after a 15 minute preparation. The Germans opened violent fire when the assault elements had almost reached their positions, which pinned our troops down and inflicted heavy losses. (See detailed account of this action attached). About daylight both Bns were withdrawn, again suffering heavy losses during the movement.

After the 2nd Bn of the 12th broke the Moisantrie position, the enemy withdrew from the point which the 8th had tried to take, and on the morning of July 8 that position was occupied without opposition.

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The division front was now considerably wider and General Barten decided to renew the attack with two regiments. At 1000 July 8 the 8th Inf passed thru the right flank of the 12th, ^{and then} ~~with~~ 22nd Inf went around its left flank.

The 8th attacked with the 3rd Bn leading, followed by the 2nd; the 1st Bn had been left to ~~occupy~~ ^{take} the point of land which had been unsuccessfully attacked on the previous morning. The 3rd Bn advanced a few hundred yards beyond the 12th Infantry's position and then encountered a very strongly entrenched enemy line running eastward from Baffeville. The 3rd Bn attacked this line twice on July 8 and 9, the 2nd and 3rd Bns together attacked twice more on the 9th and 10th, then had to beat off a strong counterattack the afternoon of the 10th. At 1700 July 10 a fifth attack supported by tanks caught the enemy, by a stroke of luck, at the moment when his counterattack had been repulsed. As a result the defending force was routed, surrounded, and completely destroyed. (See detailed account of this action attached).

Reverting to the 22nd Inf July 8, the regimental scheme of maneuver was for the 2nd Bn to pass thru elements of the 83rd Div on the left flank of the 12th Inf, penetrate the enemy lines southwest of Oulet and advance southwest on the left of the highway to la Maugerie. The 1st Bn was to move thru the breach in the enemy lines behind the 2nd Bn then swing west across the front of the 12th Inf to Neuville and make contact with the 8th Inf. At 0645 July 8 there was a 15 minute air bombardment of enemy positions 500 to a 1000 yards in front. This was followed by a 15 minute artillery preparation. At 0915 the 2nd Bn jumped off. The 329th Inf had already withdrawn from this sector before the 22nd arrived but the 2nd Bn had no trouble reaching the LD. Enemy outposts were met along the road. (See overlay). The German covering force withdrew slowly before the advance of the 2nd Bn and failed to blow the bridge across the creek southwest of Oulet. But for this fact, the advance would have been stopped at the creek line which was marshy and backed by a wooded hedgerow - impassable for any vehicles.

The advance continued with Companies F and G leading, astride the road which parallels the highway on the southeast. About 600 yards southwest of the creek the 2nd Bn was stopped by strong defenses which were ~~located~~ ^{part of} the hostile MLR which was

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holding up the 8th Inf. The 1st Bn, which had crossed the creek behind the 2nd Bn in the late afternoon, was also stepped on the same line and failed to take the houses at Neuville that night. At 2100 the Bns were ordered to halt and organize for the night.

About 2130 a counterattack supported by three Mark V's hit the 2nd Bn. It was repulsed after the loss of one field (See account of this action attached). The 2nd Bn received very heavy artillery, mortar, and automatic fire throughout the night.

The 1st Bn, leaving one company in front of Neuville, was pulled back to the right rear of the 2nd Bn which, during that night, occupied a salient. The 33rd Inf was to its left *near. 1st Bn 12th Inf was committed to fill the gap between 2nd & 8th, created by withdrawal of 1st Bn 2nd.*

July 9 the 22nd Inf resumed the attack with the 1st Bn on the right of the highway, 2nd Bn on the left. *1st Bn 12th Inf advanced on right of 2nd.* The 2nd Bn started the attack astride the road to Sainteny with E on the right of the road, G on the left. E was to take the orchards in front of it and then seize Les Ferges. The 2nd Bn was supported by eight medium tanks and also by the cannon company and the 4.2 mortars company which was attached to the 22nd Inf, but the 1st Bn had priority on the fires of the two latter. The 2nd Bn's main fire support came from ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~1st~~ ^{the} artillery and its own 81 mm. mortars which fired 2500 rounds during the day.

The attack jumped off at 0600 July 9 and proceeded slowly hedgerow by hedgerow, the Germans fighting a stubborn delaying action, and keeping the attacking troops under heavy artillery and mortar fire all day. By the end of the afternoon Gc E occupied Les Ferges after a heavy artillery barrage which ~~thoroughly~~ ^{thoroughly} wrecked it, while Gc F was committed on the left flank to assist the 33rd in taking Sainteny.

By night both Bns had reached a line generally along ^{road running} the northwest from Sainteny. ~~The right flank of the 1st Bn was now exposed since the 8th Inf was still held up on the left.~~ ~~will be done.~~ The 1st Bn 12th Inf was ~~committed~~ on the right of the 22nd.

1st and 2nd Bns of the 22nd and 1st Bn 12th resumed the attack at 0630 July 10, the Germans again fighting a strong delaying action from hedgerow to hedgerow. About 500 yards south of the creek the enemy made a determined stand and the 2nd Bn was stepped with heavy losses. Gc G, on the left, was so ~~busy~~ ^{busy} that it was relieved by F the reserve company. Gc E had lost all its officers and about 1200, Lt Hoyt C Helcomb, Executive of Gc G,

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was sent to command Co E. About the same time the 1st Bn came up abreast ^{on the right} of the 2nd. The 3rd Bn was committed on the left of the 2nd. Co E was then able to advance about 400 yards farther and then the 2nd Bn halted for the night on the line shown on overlay. The 1st Bn continued the advance as far as Maugeris while the 3rd Bn came across the front of the 2nd and came into line with the 1st.

Meanwhile the 8th Inf and the 1st Bn of the 12th were about a mile farther north. It was not until the end of this day that these units destroyed the German force in the Raffeville action.

During the advance July 8 to 10 the 1st and 2nd Bns 22nd encountered considerable numbers of Mark V tanks. This was the first time that the 4th Div had had such contact with heavy German tanks. Pvt Hicks 2nd Bn 22nd made a spectacular record by knocking out three Mark V's with the basecra in three days. The first of these is described in the account of the counterattack July 8. On July 9 Hicks got another Mark V. On July 10 he worked his way up to the corner of a hedgerow within five or 10 yards of a German tank. Standing behind a tree he fired three basecra rounds. He was so close that the explosion scorched his face. This tank was disabled and the crew abandoned it and escaped.

Lt Col Teague, commanding the 3rd Bn 22nd was so impressed with the morale value of these basecra tank encounters, the first the division had had, that he had the story of Pvt Hicks actions disseminated throughout his Bn. Col Teague said that he had been worried about the tanks since we had already learned that the Germans had strong tank forces in our front at this time. But once confidence in the basecra had been established, Col Teague's men ~~had~~ became so aggressive that in the next few days they were actually pursuing tanks with basecra (this spirit developed throughout the whole division in the next few weeks).

Pvt Hicks was killed July 12.

July 11 the 8th Inf mopped up the l'ée Aubreec peninsula. The 1st Bn of the 12th cleared out the peninsula north and west of la Maugeris. This Bn jumped off at 0900 and advanced rapidly to Lengueville. Here the Germans made a brief stand with the support of dug-in tanks. This position was taken after an artillery barrage and Bn turned south, the Germans

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delaying from hedgerow to hedgerow. By 2300 1st Bn of the 12th made contact with the 1st of the 22nd near Maugerie.

Orders of the 22nd Inf for July 11 were for the 1st Bn to seize Maugerie, while the 3rd occupied the high ground near Raids by envelopment from the east. This Bn advanced only 200 or 300 yards when it was stopped by strong enemy positions. The 2nd Bn was brought in on the left of the 3rd but was held in front of the same enemy line. 1st Bn took Maugerie but could advance no further. The day ended with all three Bns of the 22nd stopped in front of what proved to be the strongest defensive line encountered during this operation. This line extended entirely across the division sector from the southern reaches of the Marecausse de Georges to the boundary of the 83rd Div and [it is believed] on across the 83rd's sector to the swamps of the Haute River. It completely barred the only practicable route to Periers.

A command conference was held at 4th Div Hq at 2000 July 11. Col Lanham, CO 22nd Inf described the strength of the German positions in front of him. It was based on the sunken road which runs southeast from Maugerie, a lane with weeded hedgerows higher than a man's head, which was fortified with the usual large numbers of dug-in machine guns, mortars, and other weapons and ~~also~~ further defended by strong forces of Mark V tanks which moved back and forth from one position to another in the trail. Out in front of this trail for several hundred yards were the usual elaborate hedgerow defenses. Col Lanham said he could not get thru that position and proposed to pull his entire regiment back and outflank the position from the south thru the 83rd's sector. Gen Barten disapproved this plan and ordered an attack on July 12 as follows:

The 8th Inf would be relieved in the Les Aubrees peninsula by the 4th Bn Squadron and would move down to the Lengueville peninsula relieving the 1st Bn of the 12th. The 8th would take positions southwest of La Maugerie from which they could infiltrate the enemy lines. The 22nd would attack the German position with the support of all the fire power in the division - all the division artillery and reinforcing artillery together with all the fire of the 8th Inf from the position on the west flank. The entire 70th Tank Bn was attached to the 22nd. Division artillery was ordered to use tank destroyers in the same way as the Germans had been using their self-propelled guns - running up ~~the~~ ~~road~~ ~~leading~~ toward the enemy, fire a few

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rounds, then get out and come up another approach. At the same time our artillery would fire interdiction on all roads leading toward our lines to break up the same game on the part of the Germans.

In reply to ^{objections} ~~objections~~ about the strength of the enemy position Gen Barten made comments substantially as follows: The Germans are staying in there just by the guts of their soldiers. We outnumber them 10 to 1 in infantry, 50 to 1 in artillery, and an infinite number in the air. He wanted unit commanders, especially infantry, to get it over to their men that we have got to fight for our country just as hard as the Germans are fighting for theirs.

The artillery fire plan called for concentrations on six successive phase lines, the first to be fired at 0915. Actually the 2nd and 3rd phases were fired at 1215 and the other three were not fired at all since the attack did not progress far enough to need them.

The 22nd attacked at 0915 behind the artillery preparation with the 3rd Bn on the right, 2nd on the left, the 1st having been withdrawn to reserve in the left rear of the 2nd Bn. The left flank would be exposed during this attack since the 3rd's lines were somewhat behind ours.

The 2nd Bn, following the artillery preparation, which they say was the heaviest supporting barrage they have ever had, advanced 200 or 300 yards and then were stopped by the first enemy lines. The 2nd Bn was supported by 9 tanks, including one light and one tankless. The tanks came under severe fire early in the attack, two were knocked out, and the rest withdrew.

~~W~~ In places troops of the 2nd Bn engaged in hand to hand fighting. This was the only case in this campaign when they were able to inflict serious casualties on the enemy with small arms fire. But the artillery had not had much effect considering the heavy volume of the fire. Through this campaign we never saw many German dead. In most cases this signified only that the Germans were very careful to remove their dead at night, but in this case the attack closing in directly behind the heavy barrage should have seen the full results of the fire. In fact they saw ~~us~~ very ~~many~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~enemy~~ ~~was~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~killed~~ ~~by~~ ~~our~~ ~~artillery~~.

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Thruout the day's fighting our troops were never more than 50 to 75 yards from the enemy. The Germans were well concealed and were all wearing camouflage suits. Our men could not locate the Germans even at such close range, but they saw ^{the enemy} ~~every~~ every move we made and laid down extremely accurate fire. It was impossible for a man to lift his head over a hedgerow. The Germans had 8 or 10 tanks in front of the 2nd Bn, which moved back and forth thru the sunken trail firing from various positions. The high hedgerows of this trail completely concealed these tanks, which were able to fire thru camouflaged hatches in the top of the hedgerow. Their ^{80's} firing HE were very successful against our troops. From time to time some of the tanks went down the road to the south and came back up the road on our left flank where they infiltrated our lines. It seemed that these tanks deliberately made all the noise they could, frequently sounding their sirens - perhaps an effort to terrerize our troops.

Co F, which was on the right of the Bn, never succeeded in getting thru the orchard. Co G, on extreme left flank, pushed on several hundred yards to the CR, but they were unable to break into the sunken trail. Lt James O Jackson, Cmdg Co G, took a patrol of 15 men and moving up to the hedgerow threw grenades into the trail. At this point the Germans put down a heavy mortar barrage on G's advance elements. Lt Jackson was wounded and casualties were heavy in the company which became ~~completely~~ ^{completely} disorganized. 1st Sgt William Kenyon, seeing that the company was wavering, rallied 15 men and took over a section of the front, telling the Lt., "you can forget this part of the front. I've taken it over and am ~~going~~ ^{going} to hold it." The German mortar barrage moved on thru the other companies and the Bn lost about 50 men.

The survivors of Co G were now withdrawn into line with F. The Bn was severely depleted, only 17 officers remained in the entire Bn. Co F had three officers and about 75 men, G two officers and 50 men, and E, which was in reserve, only one officer and 70 men. The Bn was hastily reorganized and Co E was broken up, 20 men being sent to reinforce F and the remainder added to G. The 1st Bn 22nd had already been dispatched on a move to envelope the enemy from the east but this Bn had been stopped a little ^{east of the left flank} ~~southwest of the~~ ~~position~~. The left flank of the 2nd Bn was now exposed and in the absence of any Bn or regimental reserve, regiment requested assistance from the 12th Inf ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ~~left~~ ~~flank~~ of the 2nd Bn. A company of

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Summary of A&A Day between German & Poitiers July 6 to 15 (cont'd) - Pt 2/3

the 3rd Bn 12th was alerted for this mission but it did not become necessary to engage it.

The 3rd Bn^{22nd} had likewise failed to advance. The day ended with all enemy positions intact.

In the five days fighting July 8 to 12 the 22nd Inf had suffered 729 casualties, including one Bn Commander, one Bn Executive, and five Rifle Company Commanders. The disorganization of some of the companies was severe. Co G had only five non-coms left who had been with the company more than two weeks. Four of these according to the 1st Sgt were battle exhaustion cases and would not have been tolerated as non-coms if there had been any one else available. Due to the lack of effective non-coms, the Co commander and 1st Sgt had to go around and butt every individual man out of his hole when under fire, only to have him hide again as soon as they have passed.

At 0900 July 13 the 22nd less the 3rd Bn was relieved by the 2nd and 3rd Bns, 12th Inf; 3rd Bn 22nd remained in place and was attached to the 12th Inf. A new attack was ordered for July 13 by the 12th Inf reinforced, with the same plan of supporting fires as on the previous day. The attack was launched at 1400 with the 3rd Bn 22nd and 2nd and 3rd Bns 12th in line and the 1st Bn 12th in reserve. The attack continued until 2100 with ^{out} making any progress. The 12th reported that the Germans had the best organized defensive fires that they have ever encountered. Another attack was made July 14 by the same Bns with the same fire support and again failed to gain any ground. About 1800 July 14 the 3rd Bn 8th relieved the 3rd Bn 22nd and another attack was planned for the next day by the 8th and 12th Inf.

Throughout the four days action on this position, our troops for the first time had a great deal of contact with German tanks. These were apparently all Mark V's though often reported as Mark VI's because the high velocity gun with extremely long barrel is mistaken by many officers and men for an 88. These German tanks all had a half inch of concrete poured on their front armor and they used ^{camouflage} ~~superbly~~ ^{superbly}. With chicken wire attached all around the tank and the barrel of the gun, and garlished with foliage, the tanks would halt at previously prepared firing positions behind hedgerows and would be completely concealed. The tanks covered each other very effectively. When our men would find a tank and attempt to advance toward it, that tank would remain silent while another on the flank, which they had not seen, would take them under cross fire. ^{The tanks} They used a great deal of HE against our troops.

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The front armor of the Mark V's ^{is} usually impenetrable by any infantry weapon. Most of the Mark V's which were knocked out were hit in the rear or on the forward portion of the left side. This is considered the most vulnerable place, as there is only about an inch of armor and a shell that goes in there gets the driver. A number of knockouts have also been scored by hits in the tracks or at the base of the turret.

According to prisoners, the Germans had brought about a 100 Mark V tanks from Russia to the Periers front and that 40 of them were operating in the 4th Div sector. This large force of Mark V's operating in the sunken trail where they were completely protected from our fire, prevented us from getting into the German position with our tanks. This was a most serious difficulty. Thruout this campaign against the highly organized hedgerow defenses, our supporting tanks were a decisive factor in successful attacks on main defensive lines.

However, our infantry had considerable success in encounters with Mark V tanks. Col Teague, 3rd Bn 22nd, had been a little worried about his boys going in for the first time against large forces of German tanks. He was greatly encouraged by the record of the 2nd Bn 22nd July 6 to 10, especially that of Pvt High who got three Mark V's with a bazooka, and he used this for propaganda in his own Bn. When the 22nd was committed, the first thing that Col Teague heard over the radio was, "Give me a bazooka, youder comes a tank." The troops took to chasing tanks. On one occasion three bazooka teams chased two German tanks into the 83rd Division's sector. The spirit of the unit became so strong that Col Teague had to stop some of his platoon leaders and company commanders from going off in person on tank chases.

During the four days they were in front of the sunken road position, the 3rd Bn 22nd knocked out 7 Mark V tanks and three self-propelled guns. Of these, three were gotten by 57's and six by bazookas. The other one was stopped by a bazooka which hit its sprockets and then was destroyed by combined fire of both weapons. Col Teague quoted the story of one of his men who got a Mark V with a bazooka. "Colonel, that was a great big son-of-a-bitch. It looked like a whole road full of tank. It kept coming on and it looked like it was going to destroy the whole world. I took three shots and that son-of-a-bitch didn't stop." He paused here and the colonel asked **RESTRICTED** "If you around behind and took one shot. He stopped."

Officers and NCO's of Co G 22nd Inf made the following observations on infantry advances thru hedgerow defenses. An entire company is needed to take an average size field and two companies to take a large field. There is no way to tell on which hedgerow or on which side the Germans will be, hence there is no way to tell which approach is best. The Germans usually have machine guns and mortars ~~if~~ sighted in corners to sweep the length of the hedgerow, ^{as well as} for cross fire sweeping the open fields. The Germans usually have guns infiltrating the hedge lines but we still think it preferable to move along them. We never use skirmish lines. The best formation is small columns advancing along both sides of several parallel hedgerows. The first column to reach the next lateral hedgerow then flanks out the enemy and assist the advance of the others.

Plans for the attack July 15 ~~14~~ included air bombardment. The first mission was scheduled for 0800 but due to weather conditions it was postponed and finally called off. Rather than postpone the attack, which was scheduled for 1030, other targets farther in the rear were given to the air for bombing at 1100. This did not allow sufficient time for briefing the crews so these missions were cancelled and other targets still farther to the rear were selected for bombing at 1200. But by now it was too late to arrange these missions and there was no air support that day. There was a 15 minute artillery and mortar preparation at 1015 ^{There is a 5-hour smoke screen, 1830 to 1830, on a 1500 yard front (1069 and 42 WP fired).} and the attack jumped off at 1030. The 12th Inf on the left, with its 2nd and 3rd Bns in line, broke thru the sunken road and split the enemy position. 2nd Bn of the 12th reached a point 400 yards south of the road and held it for twenty hours. 3rd Bn of the 8th on the right also broke thru, and beyond the sunken road advanced rapidly for nearly a 1000 yards to the top of the slight hill northeast of Raids, approximately in line with the 12th Inf. This advance was assisted by the 2nd Bn of the 8th which came down from the north across the neck of bog against the enemy's left flank. The Bns dug in along this line and the 83rd Div (831st and 829th Inf) advanced on the left and extended the line to the Taute River. The enemy had been pushed back but they were still in front of us and defending strongly. Position of Co F 12th Inf after this day's advance was so exposed that no one was able to get forward to them until dark and then only by crawling. All the forward elements of both regiments were pinned down by heavy fire. ~~Enemy fire was still very effective.~~

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During the ten days July 6 to 15 the three infantry regiments together had approximately 2300 casualties, including three Bn Commanders and nine Rifle Co Commanders. It is probable that we inflicted anywhere near such heavy losses on the enemy. The division took only 158 prisoners in the whole ten days (contrasted with more than 10,000 captured by the 4th Div in three weeks on the Cherbourg Peninsula). Very few enemy dead were seen during this advance, except after the rout in the les Aubrees Peninsula, and it appears that comparatively few of the enemy were killed by all our artillery fire. Although the division took several strong positions, none of the defending forces were destroyed except the Bn in the les Aubrees Peninsula. The Germans were merely pushed back and were still holding a strong defensive line at the conclusion of the operation July 15th. It is apparent that the Germans defended in this area with small forces compared to the two divisions attacking and that they waged a highly successful delaying action.

On the morning of July 16 the 22nd Inf moved to assembly area in the vicinity of le ~~Mont~~ Huesterie, near St Jean de Days. On the night of July 16th the 12th Inf was relieved by elements of the 63rd Div and the next morning moved to ^{the} new area. While the 12th was awaiting relief on July 16, Major Richard J. O'Malley, commander of 2nd Bn, one of the outstanding Bn commanders of the division, was killed by an enemy sniper. As a salute, Major O'Malley, three volleys were fired into the enemy positions by all the division artillery and all the mortars of the 12th Inf.

On the night of July 18 the 8th Inf was relieved by the 4th AD and the next morning the 8th rejoined the 4th Div. This terminated the bitterest campaign in which this division has been engaged.

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MISC. NOTES

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

18 July 1944

ORDER OF THE DAY

NUMBER 3

COMENDATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE

AIR SECTIONS, 4TH DIVISION ARTILLERY

During the period 7 June to 17 July, the Air Sections, Headquarters Battery, 4th Division Artillery, 20th Field Artillery Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Battalion and 44th Field Artillery Battalion were actively engaged in missions against the enemy. Of the ten planes allotted to these sections, five were flown from England to France and five were transported by sea and landed across the beach in trucks. Flying long hours and under all conditions of weather and enemy activity, the pilots and observers of these sections contributed in a notable degree to the complete defeat of the German forces in the Chabouze Peninsula, and to the later driving south of the enemy from the vicinity of Carcassonne. During the period 6 June to noon, 14 June the Division Artillery, reinforced, performed the counter-battery and distant interdiction missions normally handled by Corps and Army artillery, in addition to its aerial support missions. In carrying out these additional missions, pilots normally flew over enemy positions regardless of anti-aircraft fire and enemy airplanes. Many gunners and fire of attached units were adjusted in addition to those of the Division Artillery. Two planes were shot down and two pilots seriously wounded. Three other planes were damaged in landing or taking off from small, rough fields.

The pilots, observers and mechanics who contributed to the outstanding record of these Air Sections are commended for superior performance of duty under hazardous and difficult conditions.

By command of Major General BARTON:

H. C. WALK,
Lt Col, AGC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Marvin H. Schuelke

MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
1st Lt. AGD,
Assistant Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

16 August 1944

ORDER OF THE DAY:

NUMBER 19:

COMMENDATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE

Battery "B", 29th Field Artillery Battalion

On 13 July 1944, the 4th Infantry Division occupied the ground approximately 1000 yards North of Raids, Normandy. The attack of the Division had been held up by a hostile force entrenched and supported by mortars and self-propelled direct fire guns. This position was enhanced by a sunken road which ran parallel to the lines and afforded a protected avenue for movement. At 1730 hours "B" Battery, 29th Field Artillery Battalion was ordered to occupy a position which would be on a prolonged line from this road, register all four guns on a different point on the road and place enfilade fire on these points from 1900 to 1930. It was believed this would deny the enemy this protected avenue. To accomplish this mission, the battery necessarily occupied a position within range of hostile small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. Between 1730 and 1900 hours the reconnaissance was made, the unit moved approximately 2000 yards, occupied the position, and completed registration. Between 1900 and 1930 hours 156 rounds were fired upon the road. Our infantry successfully assaulted the objective, then withdrew to a more advantageous position for the night. By 2010 hours the Battery had returned to its initial position.

The rapidity, orderliness, and accuracy with which the Battery performed reflects highly upon the mutual cooperation of all officers and men of the organization. Each officer and enlisted man is commended for his outstanding performance of duty.

By command of Major General BARTON:

R. S. WARR,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff,

OFFICIAL:

Marvin H. Schuelke
MARVIN H. SCHUELKE,
Captain, AGD,
Assistant Adjutant General.

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Chapman

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

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Date: 1 July 1944

HQ 4TH INF DIV
VIC GOURBESVILLE

0112005 July 1944

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. The enemy forces opposing the First United States Army consist of LXXIV Corps and the II Parachute Corps. On the left flank the LXXIV Corps with elements of the 77th, 213d and 91st Infantry Divisions and the 266th Infantry Division and the 17th Ss Panzer Grenadier Division in the line. The II Parachute Corps is believed to contain the 275th Infantry Division, 243d Infantry Division and the 3d Parachute Division.

2. Order of Battle.

a. 266th Infantry Division

Commander - Major General DUVERT

Composition - 894th, 895, 896th Infantry Regiments. The 800th NORTH CAUCASIAN Battalion may be attached.

History - The Division was formed in the summer 1943 and the staff was provided from the 403d Line of Communication Division which was previously on the Russian front. The Division was first identified in SAILTANY in August 1943, with headquarters in OULSAL. No German troops are reported to be from Reserve Class II, which stands for "partly trained and over 35 years of age".

Notes - The 894th and 895th regiments were identified by prisoners of war and documents on 14 June. Prisoners of war reported that the Division moved from SAILTANY to the CHERBOURG PENINSULA by trucks and bicycle and the approximate strength is 12,000. The Division is considered to be in the same category as the divisions we have encountered to date, second rate in both personnel and equipment.

b. 266th Infantry Division

Commander - Unknown

Composition - 897th, 898th, 899th Infantry Regiments and the 266th Artillery Regiment. There are probably two Russian and one Georgian battalions attached.

History - This is a static division and was reported to be moving to the base of the CHERBOURG PENINSULA around RAVVILLS on 27 June 1944. The division is new and very little is known about it. It was considered to be one of the coastal holding divisions and therefore will not contain first rate personnel or equipment. The estimated strength is between 9,000 and 11,000.

c. 275th Infantry Division

Commander - Lt General SCHMIDT

Composition - 983d, 984th, 985th Infantry Regiments (985th is not certain). The Division probably has some Russian or Georgian Battalion attached.

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S E C R E T

(275th Inf Div Cont'd)

- History** - The division was formed or possibly reformed as the division may have previously existed, in the period December 1943 to January 1944. It is believed to incorporate cadres from previously existing divisions. The division was stationed in BRITANNY (REDON - YANVES sector) since February 1944, with headquarters in REDON. The troops are supposedly very young and the division is one of the new divisions probably of the same type and caliber as the 91st Infantry Division. The strength is estimated to be between 9,000 and 12,000.
- d. 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. "GOETZ VON BERLIG INGEN".
- Commander** - SS Brig Fuehrer and Gen D. Taffen 38, former Ostendorf
- Composition** - 37th Panzer Grenadier Regiment "H. MUSLER", 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiment "FICK", 17th SS Tank Bn, 17th Assault Bn, Artillery Regiment.
- History** - The division was formed in Germany and transferred to FRANCE in the MOULINS - FOUILLANS area in December 1943 to complete organization. PW reports indicate that 50% of the personnel is very young (17 to 18). The division may have troops from SS Divisions stationed in Russia and Italy. In April the strength was reported to be around 18,000. There are a number of foreigners in the division and the morale is not as high as usually reported for SS divisions. The division has been fighting since shortly after D-Day and suffered considerable losses. The Assault Gun Battalion has thirty-five to forty 7.5cm guns on Mark III chassis. The tank battalion is new and may contain 60 tanks including a large percentage of "Panther" or "Tiger" tanks.
- e. 3d Parachute Division
- Commander** - Unknown
- Composition** - 19th Parachute Rifle Regiment, 8th and 9th Rifle (Not confirmed). The remaining units of this division are not known but it is likely that its organization is similar to that of an Infantry Division.
- History** - The Division started forming in France prior to December 1943 and is reported to be trained in the infantry role for counterattack purposes. It is reported to be located on the BRETAGNE PENINSULA but may have moved to the base of the CARBONNE PENINSULA to delay our advance. The personnel is reported to be young and the morale high. This division must be considered a good infantry division with good equipment and an estimated strength between 12,000 and 14,000.
- f. 353d Infantry Division
- Commander** - Unknown (Gen Major or Gen Lt PAUL K. HILANN)
- Composition** - 941st, 942d, and 943 Infantry Regiments, 353 Artillery Regiment, 353d March Battalion, 353d Cst Battalion, 353d Fusilier Battalion.
- History** - This division began forming early in the summer of 1943 and probably contains a large cadre from one or more divisions. Its strength is estimated between 10,000 to 12,000.

S E C R E T

5. Miscellaneous Units.

- (1) Some remnants of the badly battered 77th, 91st, 213d and 352 Infantry Divisions which have been opposing us since D-Day may be encountered. All of these can not amount to much and will probably withdraw or surrender if their positions become untenable.
- (2) Some GHQ units mainly Corps troops used in a supporting role for the various Combat Teams may be encountered. Of these the largest and most important unit that is likely to be encountered is the 30th Mobile Brigade.
- Commander - Col VCN RUZZS.
- Composition - The 508th, 509th, 518th and 519th Mobile Battalions are said to be in this Brigade. The battalion strength is reported to be approximately 350 men who are said to be armed with rocket launchers, 7.62mm Russian AT guns, 88mm AT guns and artillery. The number 30 has not definitely been established and the 518th is the only mobile battalion identified in this area to date.
- (3) The 6th Parachute Regiment and the 439th Ost Bn (800 men) have been identified as opposing the First United States Army sector.

Jerry Hansen
 HARRY P. HANSEN
 Lt Col, G. S. C., 25
 A. C. of S, G-2.

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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 4, US ARMY

ORDER OF THE DAY:

16 July 1944

NUMBER

2

COMMENDATION FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE
RECONNAISSANCE PATROL, 4TH INFANTRY

On 15 July 1944 a reconnaissance patrol of 1st Lieutenant David L. Peck, 01293883, Tec 5 Marvel Kahl, 36167163, Pfc Joseph A. Connel, 33367436, and Pfc Ralph W. Malone, Jr., 33726896, was sent to an island in the vicinity of ST GERMAIN-SUR SEVES to obtain information relative to enemy defenses, location of weapons, main line of resistance and to obtain other information which would lead to the destruction of the enemy by our forces.

Between the hours of 0230 and 0430 the patrol operated behind the enemy lines, obtaining information relative to the location of tanks, anti-tank guns and machine gun nests. During this time enemy troops discovered the presence of the patrol and the patrol was forced to disperse. The ensuing action resulted in hand to hand combat for the members of the patrol.

By OCM 15 July 44 the information obtained had been relayed to the Regimental S-2. The officer and enlisted men of the patrol are commended and will be awarded the Bronze Star Medal.

By command of Major General BARTON:

R. S. MARR,
Lt Col, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Marvin H. Schuele
MARVIN H. SCHUELE,
1st Lt, AGD,
Assistant Adjutant General.

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
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GERMAN DEFENSIVE POSITION

● CML 0 ●

NOTES: ACCOMPANY LAYOUT OF GERMAN DEFENSIVE POSITION

- Fields are numbered later for reference.
- OP in field #16 was in a tank turret, with leader looking over visibility excellent.
- Line connecting foxholes to communication trench approx. two feet deep.
- Plenty of quantities of cartridge cases, machine gun belts and boxes, and machine guns themselves were found. Machine guns were in positions. At these sites, fields of fire were found to be excellent. Guns from positions #11 through #14 could deliver swiveling fire. Positions in fields 7 and 14 could only cover their respective fields and probably were used after the enemy had been driven from his prepared position. Some of the machine gun positions shown could have been for machine pistol. No machine gun positions were noted in fields 2A and 6; however, machine pistols could have been used here.
- No evidence of mortar positions were found, although a mortar was found in the SW corner of field #16.
- Only 7.5 or shell cases and tracks indicate mobile gun was shown. Five empty shell cases were found in field #1, eleven in SW corner of field #3, four near center of field #3 and two in field #13.
- In addition to using foxhole positions along forward edge of fields facing stream, enemy used the ditch immediately bordering the marsh area. It is believed that, for the most part, enemy riflemen stayed up and down in this ditch without digging any positions. A few places were found along this ditch where a crew served weapon may have been employed. A bazooka was found in the ditch in front of field #1.
- At the time this position was attacked, it is believed that marshy area was covered with 2 to 3 feet of water. Water in ditches would have been about five feet deep.
- Anti-personnel mine field was about 75 yards long (both unknown) and one mine examined consisted of a 3 kg. composition block, its D235 pressure igniter screwed into the face of block. The safety pin had not been removed. Mine had not been buried, but hidden in tall grass.



LEGEND

- 1-C. One or two man foxholes
- 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100-101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118-119-120-121-122-123-124-125-126-127-128-129-130-131-132-133-134-135-136-137-138-139-140-141-142-143-144-145-146-147-148-149-150-151-152-153-154-155-156-157-158-159-160-161-162-163-164-165-166-167-168-169-170-171-172-173-174-175-176-177-178-179-180-181-182-183-184-185-186-187-188-189-190-191-192-193-194-195-196-197-198-199-200-201-202-203-204-205-206-207-208-209-210-211-212-213-214-215-216-217-218-219-220-221-222-223-224-225-226-227-228-229-230-231-232-233-234-235-236-237-238-239-240-241-242-243-244-245-246-247-248-249-250-251-252-253-254-255-256-257-258-259-260-261-262-263-264-265-266-267-268-269-270-271-272-273-274-275-276-277-278-279-280-281-282-283-284-285-286-287-288-289-290-291-292-293-294-295-296-297-298-299-300-301-302-303-304-305-306-307-308-309-310-311-312-313-314-315-316-317-318-319-320-321-322-323-324-325-326-327-328-329-330-331-332-333-334-335-336-337-338-339-340-341-342-343-344-345-346-347-348-349-350-351-352-353-354-355-356-357-358-359-360-361-362-363-364-365-366-367-368-369-370-371-372-373-374-375-376-377-378-379-380-381-382-383-384-385-386-387-388-389-390-391-392-393-394-395-396-397-398-399-400-401-402-403-404-405-406-407-408-409-410-411-412-413-414-415-416-417-418-419-420-421-422-423-424-425-426-427-428-429-430-431-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439-440-441-442-443-444-445-446-447-448-449-450-451-452-453-454-455-456-457-458-459-460-461-462-463-464-465-466-467-468-469-470-471-472-473-474-475-476-477-478-479-480-481-482-483-484-485-486-487-488-489-490-491-492-493-494-495-496-497-498-499-500-501-502-503-504-505-506-507-508-509-510-511-512-513-514-515-516-517-518-519-520-521-522-523-524-525-526-527-528-529-530-531-532-533-534-535-536-537-538-539-540-541-542-543-544-545-546-547-548-549-550-551-552-553-554-555-556-557-558-559-560-561-562-563-564-565-566-567-568-569-570-571-572-573-574-575-576-577-578-579-580-581-582-583-584-585-586-587-588-589-590-591-592-593-594-595-596-597-598-599-600-601-602-603-604-605-606-607-608-609-610-611-612-613-614-615-616-617-618-619-620-621-622-623-624-625-626-627-628-629-630-631-632-633-634-635-636-637-638-639-640-641-642-643-644-645-646-647-648-649-650-651-652-653-654-655-656-657-658-659-660-661-662-663-664-665-666-667-668-669-670-671-672-673-674-675-676-677-678-679-680-681-682-683-684-685-686-687-688-689-690-691-692-693-694-695-696-697-698-699-700-701-702-703-704-705-706-707-708-709-710-711-712-713-714-715-716-717-718-719-720-721-722-723-724-725-726-727-728-729-730-731-732-733-734-735-736-737-738-739-740-741-742-743-744-745-746-747-748-749-750-751-752-753-754-755-756-757-758-759-760-761-762-763-764-765-766-767-768-769-770-771-772-773-774-775-776-777-778-779-780-781-782-783-784-785-786-787-788-789-790-791-792-793-794-795-796-797-798-799-800-801-802-803-804-805-806-807-808-809-810-811-812-813-814-815-816-817-818-819-820-821-822-823-824-825-826-827-828-829-830-831-832-833-834-835-836-837-838-839-840-841-842-843-844-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852-853-854-855-856-857-858-859-860-861-862-863-864-865-866-867-868-869-870-871-872-873-874-875-876-877-878-879-880-881-882-883-884-885-886-887-888-889-890-891-892-893-894-895-896-897-898-899-900-901-902-903-904-905-906-907-908-909-910-911-912-913-914-915-916-917-918-919-920-921-922-923-924-925-926-927-928-929-930-931-932-933-934-935-936-937-938-939-940-941-942-943-944-945-946-947-948-949-950-951-952-953-954-955-956-957-958-959-960-961-962-963-964-965-966-967-968-969-970-971-972-973-974-975-976-977-978-979-980-981-982-983-984-985-986-987-988-989-990-991-992-993-994-995-996-997-998-999-1000

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