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**Report date:** 1943-1944

**Title:** Reports of Action, 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalions

**Organization:** United States Army

**Abstract:** **Item 1077, Part A:** 1<sup>st</sup> Ranger Battalion. Report of action, 9-29 September 1943 (Italy), field orders; **Part B:** Report of action, 22 June – 5 February 1944 (Italy), casualties, field orders, annexes, journal February – 22 June and overlays. Supplementary microfilm reel D-187; **Item 1078:** 2<sup>nd</sup> Ranger Battalion, narrative history for 1944 (France, Luxembourg, Germany); **Item 1079, Part A:** 3<sup>rd</sup> Ranger Battalion report of action, 10-18 July 1943 (Sicily); **Part B:** Report of action, 19-23 July 1943 (Sicily); **Part C:** Report of action, 1-31 August 1943 (Sicily); **Item 1080, Part A:** 4<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalion, report of action 10-12 July (Sicily); **Part B:** Report of action, 9-29 September 1943 (Italy) **Part C:** Report of action, 22-31 January 1944 (Italy); **Part D:** 4<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalion, report of action, 1-29 February 1944 (Italy) includes overlays; **Part E:** report of action, 1-25 March 1944 (Italy) includes overlays; **Item 1081:** 5<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalion, after action report, 6-10 June 1944 (France); and **Part B:** Unit journal, June 1944 (France).

**Number of pages:** 276 p.

**Notes:** From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Microfilm collection. Call #: D 327, Items 1077-1080.

**Classification:** Unclassified; Approved for public release





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*Log 18121441*  
*Out 1/17/44*

HEADQUARTERS 1ST RANGER BATTALION  
APO #464, U. S. Army

15 November 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Action.

TO : The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by paragraph 10, AR 545-105, for the period from September 9, 1943 to September 29, 1943.

2. With the mission of capturing and securing the high ground at Mount St Angelo, the First Ranger Battalion, as a part of the Ranger Force, landed at Malori, Italy, at 0355, 9 September 1943. The landing was unopposed, the objective was reached at 0800 hours, after meeting and overcoming enemy reconnaissance parties, this included the destruction of one armored vehicle. The Battalion was disposed with Companies A, D, E, & F in position as indicated on Battalion F.O. #1, (attached) with Company C in Battalion Reserve. At 1700 hours Companies A & B were attached to the 3rd Ranger Battalion, and Company D was committed to reinforce Companies D, E, & F. The Battalion remained in these positions until 18 September 43 when they were relieved by 2nd Bn, 325th Glider Infantry. During this entire period the Battalion was under constant enemy artillery fire, and withstood sever enemy infantry attacks. At 1800 hours on the 20th of September 43, Companies G & D were attached to 1st Bn, 143rd Inf as mobile reserve. At 0300 hours on the 21st September 43, Company C, supported by Company D, took the high ground at 51.2-35.9 (Italy 1/50,000, sheet 135 IV) after a skirmish with the enemy. At 2000 hours 28 September 43, Companies C & D were relieved by Company F. Companies A, B, C, D, & E, moved to objectives per Ranger Force F.O. #1 (attached). Objectives gained without contact with the enemy, Battalions mission of outposting Forno, Italy, continued.

3. During the period covered by this report fifteen (15) enemy prisoners were captured.

4. Casualties sustained during the period of 9 September

INBN-1-023

CLASSIFICATION  
**CANCELLED**  
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
*M. J. ...*  
DOWN GRADING COMPLETE *7 August 6*

*10 MAR 1944*  
*1325*  
*...*

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Headquarters, 1st Ranger Bn, 15 Nov 1943. (Cont'd)  
to 29 September 1943, are as follows:

### KILLED IN ACTION

Pfc	BROCK, Vernon L, 38278699,	12 Sept 43
T/5	JONES, James B, 14142059,	14 Sept 43
T/5	WITT, Brownie, 34497310,	14 Sept 43
Pvt	DANLOVITCH, Dan W, 6584675,	14 Sept 43
Pvt	SHANAHAN, James A, 16096925,	14 Sept 43
Sgt	JOHNSON, John J, 33104392,	18 Sept 43
Pfc	LINDSAY, William C, 37211923,	21 Sept 43
1stLt.	SACHLEBEN, Phillip, 01783766,	27 Sept 43
Pfc	HESTER, Morris E, 35618149,	27 Sept 43

### DIED OF WOUNDS

Pfc	SURRATT, Robert C, 7027703,	15 Sept 43
Pvt	BEARDEN, Otis J, 13043850,	15 Sept 43
Pfc	ROWLEY, Charles L, 33396922,	18 Sept 43
Sgt	BUNDE, Carl R, 16035508,	21 Sept 43
Pfc	PASCIVAN, Jacob J, 32204732,	21 Sept 43
Pvt	RIEGER, John E, 32551475,	21 Sept 43

### WOUNDED IN ACTION

Sgt	GONWAY, John F, 33070405,	9 Sept 43
Cpl	ARNOLD, William J, 32204732,	12 Sept 43
S/Sgt	HOFFHINES, John E, 35036813,	13 Sept 43
Pfc	BROWN, Delbert E, 38272730,	13 Sept 43
Pfc	ELLIOTT, William J, 19203233,	13 Sept 43
Pfc	JONES, Robert E, 35544750,	13 Sept 43
T/5	KNOBLOCH, Frank (NMI), 15382239,	14 Sept 43
Pfc	ALLEN, Robert G, 36422173,	14 Sept 43
Pfc	MUOIO, John R, 31167220,	14 Sept 43
Pvt	YENZER, Ronald K, 20704884,	14 Sept 43
Sgt	GRAY, James E, 34098176,	15 Sept 43
Sgt	JOHNSON, Everett L, 37004796,	15 Sept 43
Pfc	THOMPSON, Herbert R, 16005089,	15 Sept 43
Pvt	ANGLIN, Julius D, 34684611,	15 Sept 43
T/5Gr	ELIAS, Paul (NMI), 12147565,	17 Sept 43
T/5Gr	SVATON, Arnold E, 6288755,	18 Sept 43
Pfc	GERKINS, Eugene E, 13102994,	18 Sept 43
Pvt	BLACKBURN, William H, 33319705,	18 Sept 43
T/5	THIVIERGE, Leo P, 31245125,	22 Sept 43
Pfc	JUSTICE, Ashley S, 15057230,	22 Sept 43
Pvt	RIEDEL, William, 20839162,	22 Sept 43
Sgt	YARBORO, Jessie P, 34111639,	24 Sept 43
Pfc	SAVAGE, Walter T, 31184309,	24 Sept 43
1stLt.	ANDERSON, Donald O, 01821803,	27 Sept 43
2ndLt.	STEEN, James P, 01295912,	27 Sept 43
S/Sgt	JOHNSON, Donald G, 20712862,	27 Sept 43

- 2 -  
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Headquarters, 1st Ranger Bn, 15 Nov 1943.

WOUNDED IN ACTION, NOT HOSPITALIZED

Capt FARWELL, Stanley T, 0398370,  
2ndLt KRISTINICH, George H, 01310608,  
Sgt BOLTON, Floyd H, 20707871,  
T/5 LAMAR, Francis E, 37445259,  
Pfc BROWN, Delbert, 38272730,  
Pfc GORSKI, John L, 32576429,  
Pfc THORNTON, Frank, 34350402,  
Pvt BAKA, Raymond F, 16108266,  
Pvt BOBANICH, Joseph A, 35627253,  
Pvt McDONALD, Forrest H, 33411840,  
Pvt KERRIDGE, Kenneth, 32585576,

*William O. Darby*  
WILLIAM O. DARBY  
Lt Col, 1st Ranger Bn,  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST RANGER BATTALION  
ARO #464, U. S. Army

/rvl

2 September 1943

Field Order  
Number 1.

Maps: Italy, 1/50,000, sheet 185-II and III, and sheet  
197-IV.  
Italy, 1/100,000, sheet 185 and sheet 197.

1. a. Intelligence annex, aerial photographs and defense over-prints to be issued.
  - b. I. See copy X Corps Operation Order # 1 for operation "Avalanche South".  
II. 1st Ranger Bn. as part of RANGER FORCE lands on left flank of X corps. Troops to our immediate right, 2 and 41 Commando (British).
2. a. Mission of 1st RANGER Bn. is to land at H plus 15 on Z beach, clear road MAIORI-VACCARO, occupy positions along high ground from 540355 to 557346 from which observation can be had on Route #16 from CAVA to NOCERA, and be prepared to advance on the town of FAGANI on order of FORCE commander.
3. a. 1st RANGER Bn, less Company "C" lands at H plus 15, crossing beach as quickly as possible and effecting any necessary re-organization immediately inland of the beach.  
b. Company "F" will be prepared to move out as the advance guard of the Bn. along the road MAIORI-VACCARO on order from the Bn. C.O.  
c. Remainder of Bn, less Company "C" will follow the advance of Company "F" in the order "E", "D", "B", "A".  
d. At a point S.E. of 540355 the Bn. will move to the high

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST RANGER BATTALION  
APO #464, U. S. Army

/rvl

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Headquarters, 1st Ranger Bn, 2 Sept 43. (Cont'd)

ground between 540355 and 557346 and occupy same.

- e. I. Contact with FORCE Hq. by 193 and 609 radio.
- II. Contact with 3rd Bn. on our left maintained by them.
- III. Contact between companies left to right.
- IV. Password. To be announced.
- V. Recognition signals. All individuals down to and including section leaders will carry flashlights with red lenses, flashing the Morse code letter "R" as a request for, or answer to a call for recognition.
- VI. Success signals. To be used only on order Force Commander.
- VII. Yellow smoke signals will be used for air-ground

recognition.

VIII. Loading. See administrative annex #1 and boat loading plan Field order #1, Headquarters RANGER FORCE, 1 Sept, 1943.

IX. Bn C.P. with advance party.

4. a. See Administrative annex #1 attached.

b. See Medical Annex Attached.

5. a. Bn, Hq. lands with Companies "D", "E", "F" at H plus 15 and follows axis of advance of Company "A".

b. Intercommunication between companies and Bn, Hq. normal.

c. Signal Annex attached.

By Order of Lieutenant Colonel DABY:

*William E. Martin*  
WILLIAM E. MARTIN  
Major, 1st Ranger Bn,  
Executive Officer

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Ref. Maps: Italy 1/100,000 Sheet 185

1) INFORMATION

ENEMY

Latest information will be issued in the form of a situation report before operations commence.

2) OWN TFS

PHASE I

a) 46 Div is attacking to capture CAVA de TERNINI pass and to establish a bridgehead at its northern end, commencing night 22/25 Sept.

b) 56 Div are advancing on axis rd SALERNO-SANSERVERINO with limited objectives.

PHASE II

7 Armd Div is passing through 46 Div on their final objective or earlier if ordered and securing the gap into the naples plain N. E. of VESUVIUS.

TFS UNDER CMD:

23 Armd Bde and its attached Tps.

INTENTION

RANGER FORCE will :-

3) a) Secure a bridgehead S. EGIDIO 505368- high ground at MASS GIORDONOSSA 495364 - high ground 496352.

b) Operate against the enemy in the area S. MAURO 5340-NOGERA-SCAFATI to prevent his withdrawing WEST through the NOGERA defile 5438 - 5236.

METHOD:

4) The operation will be carried out in two phases.

PHASE I

MISSIONS

5) a) 1) 1st Ranger Bn will assemble in the area 520350 during the late afternoon 23rd Sept.

2) 1st Ranger Bn will attack and occupy the following

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positions LOOP IN ROAD and KNOLL 511368 - BEND IN ROAD on SPUR 503363 - BRIDGE N.E. of SALA 502354 - HIGH GROUND by BEND IN ROAD 508353

3) LINE of advance for this attack will be along the road CHIUNZI 5235 - SALA 5035.

4) ZERO 2000 Hrs 23rd Sept unless otherwise ordered.

5) Det 36 Engineers will accompany 1st Ranger Bn for removal of mines and early recce for repair of bridge at 502354.

b) 1) 3rd Ranger Bn will assemble in the area 517345 during the late afternoon 23rd Sept.

2) 3rd Ranger Bn will attack and occupy the following positions MASS GIORDONOSSA 493363 - RIDGE 496351 - SALA 5035-AREA about SPUR 500350.

3) Line of advance through 4th Ranger Bn about high ground 515345 and thence down reentrant to SALA.

4) ZERO 2000 hrs 23rd Sept unless otherwise ordered.

c) 1) 1st Bn 143 Inf will assemble in area about 523355 during evening 23rd Sept.

2) 1st Bn 143 Inf will attack and occupy S. EGIDIO 503368 and will then operate toward S. LORENZO 5037.

3) Line of advance for this attack will be from assembly area to bend in stream 516363 and thence N. W. round spur to S. EGIDIO.

4) ZERO 2200 hrs 23rd Sept unless otherwise ordered.

d) One Coy 504 Paratroop Bn will seize high ground about spur 523367 and will protect the right flank of 1st Bn 143 Inf.

e) a) O. G. 325 Glider Inf Regt will dispose his force to protect the right flank of the attack along the high ground in squares 5534 - 5436.

b) O. G. 325 Glider Inf Regt will hold one Bn at the alert ready to move out on call to strengthen forward positions.

f) 4th Ranger Bn will remain in present positions and assist the advance of 1st and 3rd Ranger Bns.

g) 1st Bn 143 Inf, 1st Ranger and 3rd Ranger Bns will patrol the gaps between each other on capture of their objectives.

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- 6) 4.2" Mortars will continue normal activity but will be prepared to give close support to forward Bns. at daylight.
- 7) A RTY will continue normal activity but O.C. F.A. will arrange for the following:
- a) Btys A & C, 155 F.A. Bn, to support the attack in the arc between PAGANI and S. ANTONIO.
  - b) Btry A 133 F.A. Bn to support the attack in the NOCERA area.
  - c) Remainder FA for close support on all the front.
  - d) To issue a list of concentration references.

PHASE II

8) Engineers will move down as soon as possible under orders of FORGE commander to repair bridge at 502354. For this purpose their vehicles will be marshalled at the head of the column on the road CHIUNZI - MAIORI. They will be protected by four half tracked 3" guns.

9) One TP L.A.A. from 23rd Armd Bde will move down behind engineers for protection of the bridge at 502354. Their vehicles will be marshalled immediately behind the half tracked vehicles mentioned in para 8 above.

10) a) 23rd Armd Bde will pass through the bridgehead under orders of O.C. force and operate as per subpara (b) to para 3.

b) The Reece squadron will move first followed by two tps six pounder A/T guns.

11) ROAD DISCIPLINE

a) No vehicles other than jeeps or staff cars will be allowed to move down the road from CHIUNZI to MAIORI after 1200 hrs 23rd Sept.

b) One way traffic from S. to North will be established on the MAIORI - CHIUNZI after 1200 hrs 23rd except for jeeps or staff cars on emergency operational roles.

c) Provost Det (CMP) att 23rd Armd Bde will be responsible for picqueting the road MAIORI - CHIUNZI.

12) AMMUNITION and SUPPLIES

All necessary ammunition and supplies for the operation will be in unit areas by 1200 hrs 23 Sept.

13) MEDICAL

a) A collecting post will be established near Force C.P. at

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MOST SECRET

522353. Evacuation from there to the F.D.S. will be by jeep. Ambulances will not be used on the road MAIORI - CHIUNZI until the 23rd Armd Bde have moved forward.

## 14) SECURITY

all copies of this order will be destroyed prior to the actual commencement of operations.

## INTERCOMMUNICATION

15) Force C.P. at HOUSE 522353.

16) Line communication will be laid behind the advance of 1st Bn 143 Inf, 1st and 3rd Ranger Bns.

## RECOGNITION SIGNALS

- 17) a) Two red mortar flares - 46 Div on COSTA PJANA 618332  
b) Two white mortar flares - 46 Div astride GAVA Rd.  
c) Three green mortar flares - 46 Div on Spur S. ARCANGELO 5832  
d) Three red mortar flares - 46 Div on Spur 602338  
e) The letter "R" flashed by lamp signal from the road CAVA 6032 to PAGANI indicates the advance of 7th Armd Div and will be reported immediately to FORCE HQ and all Arty O.P.'s. This signal will be acknowledged by lamp or signal by an Arty O.P. to be designated later by the O.C. FORCE.

f) The flashing of the letter "R" by any method will be the recognition signal for all friendly tps.

T.O.S. -

A.C.K.

*Signed:*

*G. F. Watson*

*Major for*

*O. C. Ranger Force*

## DISTRIBUTION:

- NO  
1 1st Ranger Bn.  
2 3rd Ranger Bn.  
3 4th Ranger Bn.  
4 325 Glider Inf.  
5 504th Parachute Inf.  
6 36th Engineers  
7&8 F.A. Officer (2)  
9 83rd Chem Wpns Bn.  
10, 11 23rd Armd Bde (2)  
12, 13, 14 Spare (2)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON



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WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

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U.I. (UNCLASSIFIED)  
By Authority of the Secretary of Defense  
By Lawrence L. Clayton, Colonel, USAF  
Document, Departmental Committee,  
Date:

100-115  
(100)  
Index

Report of Action - 1st Air Group, 1st AF, 1951

28 Jan - 5 500 M

1087

JMBN-1-03

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
By the Office of the Secretary of War  
Lieutenant J. M. B. [unclear]  
Colonel, Adjutant General, AGO  
Dated 20 JAN 1947  
LTC

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:  
**SECRET**  
AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
*Supplemental to all 2*  
CLASSIFICATION COMMITTEE 16 JAN 1946

*125-100*  
*1/25/47*

*20*

REPORT OF ACTION  
For period  
22 Jan 1944 - 5 Feb 1944

On receipt of FO #19, Hq VI Corps, dated 15 Jan 44, Ranger Force, consisting of Hq 1st, 3rd, and 4th Ranger Bns., with 83rd Cml Bn, 809th Para Inf Bn., and Co H, 36th Engr C Regt attached, was given the mission of landing 0200A, D day at ANZIO (F 8517), and in following priority: (1) seize port facilities in ANZIO and protect them from sabotage; (2) destroy any existing defense batteries vic ANZIO; (3) clear beach area between ANZIO and NETTUNO; (4) secure and establish beachhead; (5) contact 1st Inf Div (Br) on left, 3rd Inf Div on right, 504th Para Inf Regt on north. On contact 3rd Inf Div on right, Ranger Force to be atchd 3rd Inf Div.

(See FO #19, Hq VI Corps attached as Appendix A)

Ships assigned to lift the Force were the HMS "Royal Ulsterman", "Princess Beatrix", Winchester Castle", LST #410, LCT #542, LCT #551. (See Naval Orders, SNOL, dated 18 Jan 44, copy attached as Appendix B)

Loading was accomplished at Baia, Italy on 20 Jan 44, as per loading plan attached to FO #1, Hq Rngr Force, dated 17 Jan 44. (Copy attached as Appendix C)

21 Jan 44 - Sailed from Pozzuoli Bay. At 2230 troops were formed for disembarkation. At midnight ships anchored and craft were lowered for first flight. Landing craft rendezvoused with guide boats; two SC craft and first flight got under way. After first flight left, the two LSI mediums and LST #410 moved forward to the inshore anchorage. Lights were seen from the shore, which appeared to be automobiles. The rocket ship, which was scheduled to fire from H - 10 to H - 9, failed to fire for reasons shown in attached report of SNOL attached as Appendix D. First flight consisting of Force Hq, 1st Ranger Bn (less Co A), 4th Ranger Bn (less Co B), and two engineer detachments consisting each of 1 Officer and 8 EM of Co B 36th Eng C Regt touched down almost exactly at H hour, 0200A and made an entirely unopposed landing. The troops move rapidly across the beach and moved to gain an initial beach-head on which reorganization could be made. With the first wave, the two detachments of engineers landed to establish beach lights and clear the beach of wire and mines and to reconnoiter for exits. During the movement to initial phase line blue, 1st Bn encountered two enemy soldiers on the road leading off the east limit of the beach and killed them. 4th Bn ran into no resistance until arriving at the line of the railroad (see Photo Map, ANZIO-NEPTUNO, attached Appendix E), when they ran into fire from a MG and other small arms coming from a point north of the railroad opposite the foot bridge. (See photo map).

In the meantime, Force CP had been established in the Casino, shown on Photo Map and communications were set up by SCR 300 to the Force representative on board the "ULSTER MONARCH". Communication with the 1st and 4th Bns was initially by SCR 536A. Communication with the fleet kept the Force Commander informed as to the progress of the unloading (see log attached as Appendix M).

Landing continued without incident, with the first wave of DUKWS landing the 4.2 mortars and the 83rd Cml Bn at 0300A. With them landed a detachment of Co H, 36th Eng with three 57 mm AT guns. During the run to the beach, one of the DUKWS had motor trouble and shipped so much water that it was abandoned. This DUKW was later found by an LCA and towed ashore and the AT guns placed in position. The AT guns had to be hauled to positions by hand and it was found necessary to demolish a road block at the eastern end of the beach to permit passage. Communication with VI Corps was established at 0328A. Resistance at this time was very slight and scattered. An armored vehicle was reported to be operating in the 1st Bn area. This car was later captured, the occupants killed, and the vehicle was found to be a wheeled personnel carrier.

At 0345A the second flight of LCA's landed the 3rd Bn, less one company, and Company F of the 1st Bn. The Bn CO was made familiar with the situation and sent on his mission. At 0445A two companies reinforced of the 509th Para Bn. and Company F, 4th Bn., landed.

21 Jan 44 Cont'd - The 4th En company moved to join its En. while the two companies of the 509th moved to assembly areas. Also landed at this time were the remaining men of the engineers. Reserve ammunition, baggage and miscellaneous parties were landed at about 0600A. At 0620A the second flight of BUKWS arrived with additional ammunition and personnel of the 83rd Cml En.

By 0800A, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Ranger Bns were established on the second phase line. The port and town had been found to be unoccupied and clear, although the entire main quay of the port was found to be heavily mined. Work was progressing to de-mine the beach and port and make the port ready to receive LST's and LST's. Resistance was still scattered and enemy found with no uniform defense pattern. 3rd En overran and reduced a battery of four guns, about 100mm, at west end of Anzio (see Photo Map). 4th En had overcome the resistance at the foot bridge and had moved to the far (north) side of the railroad. 1st En was still running into small enemy parties forward of the woods at point 4 (see Photo Map).

At 0815A the 509th was ordered to move out toward Nettuno as planned (See FO #1 attached as Appendix C). The port area was at this time under artillery fire from an undetermined point north of town. Tanks, number unknown, were reported to be moving south on the Albano-Anzio road and troops were alerted. A message was received at 1018A that the 509th had reached Nettuno and had come across only small scattered parties of enemy. Other enemy had retreated to the north of town. Contact with 7th Inf, 3rd Div was made at F 880-203. By noon 32 German prisoners had been taken, 9 enemy vehicles and 18 prisoners who claimed to be Russians who had been impressed as laborers. An estimated 40 enemy had been killed.

During the afternoon all units moved forward to Ranger beachhead (see overlay with FO #19, 1st, VI Corps, attached as Appendix A). Both LCT's and LST's pulled into the harbor for unloading at about 1630A. Contact was made with 1st Inf Div (British) though Scots Guards by 2nd En on left. Shelling of the town and port area continued through the night. Security patrols produced negative results. Our positions at the close of the day are shown on map (attached as Appendix F).

23 Jan 44 - At about 1300A received instructions to move north to take up positions as shown on map (attached as Appendix G), to relieve the 2nd En, 7th Inf. The move was completed without incident. Contact was made on the left with the Scots Guards and on the right with the 7th Inf by patrol. Outpost line was established as shown and patrols sent to the line of the next east-west road.



24 Jan 44 - During the morning the 509th En was moved from their reserve location to a position on the right of 1st En with the mission of filling the gap between Force and 7th Inf on our right. (see appendix B) There was increased enemy activity in the way of patrols and artillery fire. The village of Carroceto was found to be occupied by an enemy force estimated one company reinforced with three or four tanks. Tanks or SP guns were observed operating on the roads just to the northeast of Carroceto. Bridge at F 918288 was found to be blown and enemy were working in area F 9231 believed mining. An enemy patrol of about 15 were encountered in Padiglione, F 920286. In the early evening, report was received that the enemy was dropping parachutists forward of our positions. It was later determined that an enemy plane, which had been hit over Anzio, had discharged its crew by chute. Instructions received from 3rd Div to be prepared to move forward at daylight to cover the flank of the British 1st Div in their advance on Carroceto. 4th En and 509th En were alerted to move out so as to be at our outpost line by dawn. A platoon of the 601st TD was attached to support the attack. Objective is shown in the map attached as Appendix H.

25 Jan 44 - 4th and 509th Ens moved out as expected meeting small resistance from houses along road at about F 892310 and north of Padiglione at about F 920293. Enemy SP guns continued to operate along ANZIO-ALBANO road north of Carroceto and on the roads to the east thereof. 1st and 3rd Ens passed to reserve. 3rd En displaced forward so as to furnish fire support. It was found necessary to extend our right in order to maintain contact with the unit on our right and three companies of the 1st En were sent off to accomplish same. Contact was had with the Scots Guards on our left by patrol to F 877313 and with 3rd En, 7th Inf at CR at F 915283. Outpost line was to the northeast and patrols maintained to the line of the next road to the northeast.

26 Jan 44 - Positions along the line of the creek were improved. The remainder of 1st En was moved to a better reserve location in vicinity F 892285. Force CP was moved to new location at F 902883. 3rd En shifted location slightly to the right to avoid congestion resulting from movement into the area of British artillery. German counterattack at Carroceto spilled over into 4th En area but our lines remained firm. Artillery landing in the area still seemed to be SP. Patrols located small enemy parties in houses at F 910320 and F 907332. Enemy air activity showed an increase today; adjacent areas being bombed and strafed in addition to activity vicinity of beaches, and port. We received Operation Instructions #1, Hq 3rd Div, which directed that an IIR be established across the front we then held, generally along the line of the stream. The position was to be prepared defensively as a base for further operation. The memo included instructions as to the mining.



and wiring of the position and stressed siting of MG and mortars. At about 2200A orders were received from Hq, 3rd Div to move forward at dawn to the line of the road from Carroceto to F 902338 to F 916325. 4th Bn and 509th Bn were alerted as to the above. 1st Bn instructed to pass to reserve. 3rd Bn was instructed to move out at dawn to new location. Objectives and boundaries are shown on map attached as Appendix I. During this day half tracks and T's engaged targets several miles to the north without being able to observe results.

27 Jan 44. By noon the 3rd, 4th and 509th had reached their objectives. Opposition was received from most of the houses along the road. The enemy used the houses as strongpoints and had emplaced MG in and in the vicinity. A good deal of small arms fire was encountered at RJ at F 892335 and at 902338. Enemy artillery was sporadic. Our #2 mortars engaged targets along the roads to our front and in the woods at F 895340. Contact between units had been established and outpost line placed about 300 yards to the front. A misunderstanding as to division boundaries resulted in the disposition of two of our battalions in British area. Main enemy activity still seemed to be directed at the British astride the Anzio-Albano road and the factory area at Carroceto came in for heavy shelling. The 1st Bn was ordered to prepare the MLR along the stream bed in accordance with Div instructions. Engineer assistance was obtained and a heavy weapons company, Co H, 179th Inf, attached to go into positions along the MLR.

28 Jan 44. During the morning enemy activity was increased. Many small parties were observed operating along our front. Enemy artillery fired a good deal of high burst over us. Orders received from 3rd Div at about 1600A that a British reconnaissance unit would relieve us in our sector during the night and that we were to move to assembly area vicinity F 970195. 509th Bn and Co H, 179th Inf were relieved from attachment. Relief and movement to assembly area was accomplished during the night without incident.

29 Jan 44. - FO #3, Hq 3rd Div, received for attack on Cisterna di Littoria (copy attached as Appendix J). FO #2, Hq, Ranger Force, issued (copy attached as Appendix K). Mission of the Force was to move rapidly by infiltration, seize Cisterna di Littoria and destroy enemy forces therein, hold Cisterna area until relieved. All units moved out from assembly area to line of departure about 2000A. At midnight, Battalion Commanders with radios and Force CO met at RJ at F 994260 for check of communications.

30 Jan 44. - All units jumped off according to schedule. Force CP was initially established in house at F 997266. Communication was established with 3rd Div and with 4th Bn by wire and radio. It had been previously arranged with 1st and 3rd Bns that radio silence would not be broken till the line G 006293 to G 032298 had been crossed.

The 4th En soon ran into determined resistance from houses, farm buildings and from dug-in emplacements in vicinity of RJ at F 998269 and by dawn was still held up short of RJ at G 003280 and no contact had been made with the 1st and 3rd Ena. It was discovered that a road block existed at RJ 998269, made by two damaged peeps and an Italian truck. The block was removed on the arrival of six to eight medium tanks which took up positions along road in vicinity of CP.

At about 0700, communication was established with 1st En by SCR 610. CO 1st En reported that he was located about 800 yards south of Cisterna and that three SP guns were giving a good deal of trouble. He also reported that 3rd En was located just east of him, that he was wounded and that CO 3rd En had been killed. He reported that progress was being made toward town. Communication was then lost for a brief period.

Half tracks and TD were ordered to move north along the road to attempt to break up enemy holding up 4th En. Vehicles moved out but were halted by mine field at G 003280 and a track and TD lost. Other vehicles were withdrawn to positions from which supporting fire could be given 4th En.

4.2 mortars had in the meantime been brought up and were engaging targets to the front.

Communication with 1st En was reestablished at about 0800A and report received that the force was fighting to gain a foothold in the outskirts of town in the vicinity of the railroad station. Artillery concentrations were requested and fired on the northern and western parts of town. Fire was discontinued since observation was reported impossible.

At about noon report was received that the force had been badly shot up and was surrounded. Enemy tanks and SP guns were causing great damage.

Last communication with the two battalions was had shortly after noon when it was reported that troops had been scattered and were being taken prisoner in small groups.

The attack of the 4th En north along the road continued with very little progress. (See Map attached as Appendix L.

31 Jan 44 - During the morning the attack of the 4th En was coordinated with that of the 3rd En., 15th Inf, and junction made with that group at about noon. In the afternoon, the 1st En 15th Inf passed through our 4th Bn, at which time it took up mission of guarding line of communication along road Conca-Cisterna.

1 Feb 44 to 4 Feb 44 - Remained in positions.

5 Feb 44 - Moved to reserve position vicinity F 575200.

83rd Cml Bn was relieved from attachment on 1 Feb and attached to 15th Div. On 1 Feb, 4th Bn was relieved from attached and attached to 504th Para Inf Regt.

It was later determined from interrogation of prisoners captured vicinity of Cisterna that our attack on Cisterna was expected by the enemy and that a paratroop regiment newly arrived in the area had been moved to defensive positions south of town. The PW claimed that the infiltration movement of the 1st and 3rd Bns had been detected on crossing the road G 006293 to G 032298 and that the destruction of the two units was accomplished by closing in from all sides of the triangle of roads south of Cisterna. The PW stated that some troops had made their way into town and did not know anything further of them.

~~SECRET~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
FIRST RANGER BATTALION  
A.P.O. 464, U.S. ARMY

31 March, 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

(1) The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by paragraph 10, AR 345-105, for the period of 22 Jan. 1944 to 5 Feb. 1944.

(2) With the mission of landing on the right half of yellow beach, destroy Coast Defenses and other enemy installations within its sector and establishing a beachhead as shown on attached overlay, as per FO #19, Hq. VI Corps dated 15 Jan. 1944, as a part of the Ranger Force, loading was accomplished at Baia, Italy on 20 Jan. 1944 as per loading plan attached to FO #1, Hq. Ranger Force, dated 17 Jan. 1944.

21 Jan 1944. Sailed from Pozzuoli Bay, Morale of the men was excellent. No unusual incidents on the trip.

22 Jan. 1944. At 2230 troops formed for disembarkation. At 2400 ship anchored, and first flight got under way at 2405.

The first flight consisting of companies A B C D E and Hq. touched down at 0200 AM, 8 hour, and made an entirely unopposed landing. The troops moved rapidly across the beach, which was mined, and moved to gain an initial beachhead so the reorganization could be made. In movement to initial phase line (see overlay) Co. E encountered two enemy soldiers, on the road leading off the east limit of the beach and killed them.

About 0225 hours the First Ranger Battalion CP was established at 84175, and communication was established with the Ranger Force. At 0250 hours a wheeled personnel carrier operating at 864175 was captured, and the two occupants killed.

At 0349A Company F landed, and their CO was made familiar with the situation and sent on his mission to help Co. D make a road block at 864175 to insure security from the flanks.

By 0800A hours our second phase line was established and our new Battalion CP was located at 859174. Resistance in establishing our second phase line was very slight and scattered, and no uniform defense pattern of the enemy was found. Only small enemy parties were found forward of the woods. Shelling of the town and BM Area continued through the night.

23 Jan. 1944. Received instructions at 1305A, from Ranger Force to move north and establish a defense line. This move was completed without incidents. Our Battalion CP was located at 85181. Contact was made with the English on our left and the 500th Para Inf. Battalion on our right. Reconnaissance parties were sent forward to the line, the next east-west road.

24 Jan. 1944. Enemy patrols increased and Companies C D E and F moved to their right to fill in the gap between us and the 500th Para Inf. Battalion. During this entire period the Battalion was under constant enemy artillery fire, and withstood five attacks by enemy patrols. A patrol from Co. A found out that the village of Carroceto was occupied by one enemy company reinforced with three or four tanks. Tanks were also observed on the roads northeast of Carroceto. Enemy was reported by our patrol mining area F9251.

~~DOWNGRADED TO  
SECRET~~

~~BY AGREEMENT OF THE~~

16 July 46

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

132.5  
(Handwritten initials)

25 Jan. 1944. Received instructions from Ranger Force to be prepared to move forward to cover the flank of the British First Div. on their advance on Carroceto. Companies B E and F were sent to maintain contact with the British. Contact was made at F877513.

26 Jan. 1944. Remainder of the Battalion was moved to a better reserve location and a new CP location was at F892285. Constant artillery fire landing in area was reported coming from SP Guns. Co. B sent patrols and found enemy in houses at F 910320. Battalion was alerted by Ranger Force to establish a MLR across the front we then held.

27 Jan. 44. Battalion remained in reserve while other units moved out at dawn to establish MLR. At 1500 hours Battalion with Co. H 179th Inf. attached moved out to establish MLR along the stream bed. (see overlay) The Battalions new CP was located at 695801. Battalion was under constant artillery fire during the night.

28 Jan 1944 Many enemy attacks were made but all were repulsed. Enemy fired High Burst Artillery over our area after their attacks were repulsed. Receiving orders from Ranger Force that we would be relieved in our sector during the night by British Reconnaissance Unit, and that we were to move to assembly area F970196. Movement to assembly area was accomplished under artillery fire.

29 Jan. 1944 Received orders from Ranger Force to move rapidly by infiltration and seize Cisterna di Littoria and hold area until relieved at 2000L. Battalion moved out from assembly area to line of departure without incident. Morale of men was excellent. Midnight, Major Dobson, Battalion Commander, with radios met Col. Darby at RJ at F894260 to check communications. It was arranged that radio silence would not be broken till line G032298 had been crossed.

30 Jan, 1944. At 0700 Battalion established communication with Ranger Force. Battalion CP was located about 800 yds south of Cisterna di Littoria. Receiving heavy fire from enemy artillery. At 0800A Battalion fought their way to Railroad Station on the outskirts of town and established communication with Ranger Force, and requested artillery concentrations on the town. The First Ranger Battalion was taken under heavy fire from enemy strong points, with supporting automatic weapons, artillery and tanks.

1 Feb. 1944 to 5 Feb. 1944 Remained in position with Ranger Force. Battalion came back to Lucrino by LCI's. No unusual incidents on the trip.

(3) During period covered by this report 33 prisoners were captured by the First Ranger Battalion

## FIRST RANGER BATTALION

A F O 464 U S ARMY

CASUALTY LIST FOR THE PERIOD OF 22 Jan. 1944 to 5 Feb. 1944

## MISSING IN ACTION

Alloway, Norman	0-1315411	2nd Lt.	Co. A
Alvarado, Mateo F	39848567	Pvt	Co. C
Anglin, Julius D	34684611	Pfc	Co. E
Arnett, George W.	16085032	Cpl	Co. A
Atkins, Raymond M	36445492	Pfc	Co. F
Bakeman, Jr. Charles D	15382179	Cpl	Co. F
Beaman, Doyle S	39120084	T/5	Co. B
Bell, Warren N	33510414	Pvt	Co. E
Bergstrom, Dennis A	20713402	S/Sgt	Hq Co.
Bero, Joseph (NMI)	36662039	Pvt	Co. B
Bierbaum, Kenneth W	8669888	S/Sgt	Co. B
Birchfield, Odis L	34596551	Pfc	Co. A
Blizniak, Edward J	36737362	Pvt	Co. E
Bloyer, James G	36732560	Pvt	Co. A
Blum, Gilbert T	12066393	Pvt	Hq Co.
Bobanich, Joseph A	35627253	Pvt	Co. D
Bolka, Joseph S	33451239	Pvt	Co. B
Bond, William R	0-1012717	Capt	Co. A
Bonislawski, Stephen (NMI)	32827346	Pvt	Co. B
Borg, Darrel O	39203630	Pfc	Co. A
Bortz, Sr. Gerald S	35581983	Pfc	Hq Co.
Brennan, Jr. James F	31309063	Pfc	Co. F
Brodeur, John A	31243289	T/5	Co. E
Brown, John T	34800558	Pvt	Co. D
Brown, George W	34707603	Pvt	Co. B
Brown, Paul F	11009715	Pvt	Co. C
Browning, David B	12062429	Cpl	Co. B
Burns, Phillip W	20537675	Pvt	Co. B
Buddenhagen, Russell T	37493273	T/5	Co. A
Burgess, Willis C	34486117	Pvt	Co. D
Burton, Charles L	35579720	Pfc	Hq Co.
Butler, Henry T Jr.	31280728	Pvt	Hq Co.
Butler, Walter H	6994920	S/Sgt	Hq Co.
Cabales, Robert D	32806351	Pvt	Co. B
Carr, Donald F	32551197	Pvt	Co. B
Carrier, Jr. Carlo (NMI)	31292649	Pfc	Co. D
Casey, James F	10605002	Pfc	Co. D
Castle, Gene (NMI)	15058054	S/Sgt	Co. C
Cavanaugh, James J	36359460	Pfc	Co. B
Chinigo, Frank P	32914065	Pvt	Co. B
Choate, Charles R	39534033	T/4	Co. B
Clark, Donald R	17132267	Pvt	Co. B
Clark, Earl J	33441008	Pfc	Co. C
Cline, George M	37560550	Pvt	Co. B
Cline, Howard F	32267305	Sgt	Co. B
Cline, Roy G	53650103	Pvt	Co. B
Gochran, Clay (NMI)	36414464	Sgt	Co. F
Goldbert, Paul E	38101095	S/Sgt	Co. A
Collins, William C	12035916	Pvt	Co. A
Conrin, Thomas F	20707743	T/5	Hq Co.
Cool, William C	0-466837	1st Lt.	Co. E
Coon, Lysle	20707011	Pfc	Co. C
Cooney, James D	0-2055825	2nd Lt.	Co. C
Cooperstein, Samuel (NMI)	81033979	Sgt	Co. E
Corven, Henri J.	32771809	Pfc	Co. E
Coulombe, Armand J.	31312475	Pfc	Co. B
Countryman, Robert L.	35219787	Pvt.	Co. D
Cowan, Joseph T.	36778992	Pvt.	Co. B
Cox, Kenneth D	35702958	Pvt.	Co. C
Crews, Elbert	35897517	Pvt.	Co. B
Cummings, Robert E	33432410	Pvt.	Co. B
Crus, Alfonso J	38270316	Pvt.	Co. E
Cunningham, Frank C.	19164229	Pfc	Co. A
Curay, Frank P	31590477	T/5	Co. E
Daily, Charles E	35536677	Pvt.	Co. E
Dallas, William E.	36583030	Pvt.	Co. D
Dalton, Jack E	39682489	Pvt.	Co. B
Daly, Edward (NMI)	12091058	Pfc	Hq. Co.
Darling, Alvin C	33437429	Pvt.	Co. C
Davidson, Edward E	1-199805	Pvt.	Hq. Co.
Davis, Lyle H.	37561186	Pvt.	Co. A
Day, Lazer	39913396	Pvt.	Co. B
De Groot, Dwayne P	34573553	Pfc.	Hq. Co.

3



MISSING IN ACTION  
(continued)

Dembeck, Ziegfried F	32692102	Cpl	Co. E
Dennison, Donald V	31320115	Pfc	Co. E
Dervine, Daniel J	12219487	Pfc	Hq. Co.
Dew, James R	0-2055154	2nd Lt	Co. A
Dimarco, Angelo J	12098181	Pfc	Co. E
Dinsen, Zelly J	32834590	Pfc	Co. E
Dionno, Edwin H	31328738	Pfc	Co. C
Ditri, Theodore V	32772093	Pfc	Co. E
Dobson, John W	0-21851	Maj	Hq. Co.
Dolan, James T	6153204	Cpl	Co. E
Donato, Joseph D	35749599	Pvt	Co. D
Dotson, Houston (NMI)	6897506	Cpl	Co. C
Dowd, Robert J	15096843	Pvt	Co. A
Downnick, Tony (NMI)	33478942	T/5	Co. E
Doyle, Samuel F	31267855	Pfc	Co. E
Dusseau, Robert R	36864347	Cpl	Co. C
East John A	37174475	Sgt	Co. F
Edelman, Baron R	35659682	Pvt	Co. C
Ehalt, Robert E	32173099	1st/Sgt	Co. E
Elder, Jack C	35629402	Pvt	Co. A
Elias, Paul (NMI)	12147561	T/5	Co. F
Fauber, Jr. William C	35701059	Cpl	Co. D
Ferrante, Leo J	32876090	Pvt	Co. F
Fey, Louis J	35173682	Pvt	Co. B
Fields, Daniel F	36629210	Pvt	Co. C
Finn, William J	20228470	T/5	Co. B
Fitzgerald, James W	36812151	Pvt	Co. B
Fowler, James C	0-147124	1st Lt.	Co. F
Frank, Martin J	37350381	Sgt	Co. F
Frey, Quentin F	33624655	Pvt	Co. A
Freyholtz, Vernon F	37160900	Sgt	Co. E
Friedman, Murray (NMI)	12157029	T/5	Co. E
Friedman, Abraham (NMI)	32908539	Pvt	Co. E
Frye, Jr. Clarence C	3505563	Pvt	Co. B
Fultz, William F	33503012	Pvt	Co. E
Fusiara, John F	32830216	Pvt	Co. B
Gabriel, Martin J	20704701	Sgt	Co. A
Gagne, Vernon F	51220527	T/5	Co. A
Garrett, Dalmer J	33274543	Pfc	Co. A
Gault, Floyd K	35608874	Pfc	Co. F
Gauvey, John C	6639517	Pvt	Co. B
Geisler, Wilfred G	36578770	Pvt	Co. B
Gelchion, Robert A	32745948	Pvt	Co. C
Generalski, Alex F	36662142	Pvt	Co. C
Giannopoulos, John J	33441113	Pfc	Co. C
Gibson, Theodore (NMI)	35659554	Pvt	Co. E
Gilbert, Lawrence R	31178635	T/5	Co. F
Gillette, Robert L	12067076	Cpl	Co. A
Glass, Louis (NMI)	32508854	Pfc	Hq. Co.
Gonzales, Pete C	37544045	Pvt	Co. E
Graver, Charles L	33508063	T/5	Co. C
Gray, Glenn W	16133888	Sgt	Co. A
Greenland, Dale E	35002284	T/5	Hq. Co.
Grogg, Francis J	32544431	Sgt.	Co. E
Hall, Herbert E	32685004	T/5	Co. D
Hallezuck, Stephen (NMI)	21419484	Pvt.	Co. D
Hankins, Harold	20837701	S/Sgt.	Co. F
Hahn, James L	20816004	Pvt.	Co. D
Hardin, John F	37959837	Pvt.	Co. E
Harn, Lonnie R.	36547657	Pvt.	Co. E
Harris, Walter L	33328082	Pfc	Co. B
Heugh, Richard F	12061117	Sgt.	Hq. Co.
Heiser, Robert F.	37049930	Sgt.	Co. A
Hendrickson, Robert S.	20709126	S/Sgt.	Co. D
Hengeler, Eugene J J	37229002	T/5	Co. F
Herbold, William L	34967187	Pfc	Co. D
Herron, Lester D	35627526	Cpl.	Co. A
Hill, James G	33218589	Pfc.	Co. C
Hill, John E	37810234	Pfc.	Co. C
Himsel, George J. Jr.	32205692	Pfc	Hq. Co.
Hirschert, Harold C	37018352	Pvt.	Co. C
Hixenbaugh, Verl V	35391676	T/4	Co. C
Hogan, Robert E.	31483285	Pvt.	Co. D
Holtzman, Maurice (NMI)	32862723	Pfc.	Co. E
Hood, Charles R.	0-492078	1st Lt.	Hq. Co.
Hooks, Junior Alfonso L	34805487	Pvt.	Co. D
Hopkinson, James F	36587656	Pfc.	Co. C
Hornung, Phillip F	36442353	Pfc	Co. F

(4)

MISSING IN ACTION  
(continued)

Horton, Jr. James M	75559435	Pvt	Co. D
Hunsacker, Lynn M	0-1393891	2nd Lt.	Co. B
Hunter, James C	1302435	Cpl	Co. A
Hurtado, Ampemio L	36206432	T/4	Co. A
Hyatt, Lloyd C	37026584	1st/Sgt	Co. C
Hyatt, Wayne E	13002131	Sgt	Co. C
Jackson, Cecil H	33403396	Pvt	Co. D
Jawor, John W	36654082	Pvt	Co. A
Jenkins, Jr. Vernon M	33159132	Pfc	Co. E
Johnson, Charles R	35107733	Pvt	Co. D
Johnson, Gilmer L	0-1817018	2nd Lt.	Co. F
Johnson, Howard (NMI)	16151719	T/5	Co. B
Jones, Hugh J Jr.	0-1030182	2nd Lt.	Co. D
Jones, James V	36003289	Cpl	Co. C
Jones, Robert E	35544730	Pfc	Co. F
Jones, Webb J	34664606	Pvt	Co. E
Keenan, Paul S	35202788	Sgt	Co. C
Kelley, John F	31309045	Pvt	Co. B
Kendrick, Collins W Jr.	0-501411	1st Lt.	Co. C
Keough, Raymond J	31291186	Pvt	Co. D
Key, James M	6988898	T/4	Hq Co.
Kirkman, Edward (NMI)	37403077	T/5	Hq Co.
Kittle, Jr. William M	37476663	Pvt	Hq Co.
Kliegel, Edward J	37596864	Cpl	Co. D
Klien, Peter J	33599641	Pvt	Co. B
Kluczynski, Alphonse S	36126399	Sgt	Co. C
Kosco, Mike (NMI)	33848923	Pfc	Co. A
Kraft, LeRoy A	16000164	Pvt	Co. A
Kriesel, Arthur G.	39885498	Pvt	Co. D
Krzysztofak, Walter J	36610165	Pvt	Hq Co.
Kubenic, John (NMI)	33403375	Pvt	Co. D
Kufler, Julian D	32551808	Cpl	Co. C
Lakowicz, Michael (NMI)	31287697	Pvt	Co. F
La Mar, Francis E	37445259	Sgt	Co. B
Lamb, Oliver (NMI)	24536506	Pvt	Co. C
Lampo, Robert (NMI)	6951558	Sgt	Co. E
Landis, Joseph J	35608968	Pvt	Co. D
Lange, John E	35570546	Pfc	Co. A
Lange, Albert L	36564074	Cpl	Co. B
Langel, Kurt A	32758164	Pvt	Co. D
Langona, Paul (NMI)	32100498	S/Sgt	Co. B
La Rocca, Joseph D	31331477	Pvt	Co. C
Laurent, Ferdinand A	32866399	Pfc	Co. B
Lavoie, Roger E	31266662	Pvt	Hq Co.
Laxton, James E	6948418	Pvt	Co. C
Laycoax, Russell E	36735147	Pvt	Co. D
Leopard, Albert T	31331181	T/5	Co. D
Lergberg, Norbert E	16152376	Pvt	Co. B
Linde, George R	16156897	Pvt	Co. D
Lipan, Leon J	36562572	Pvt	Co. E
Lisobig, Neal G	33427277	Pvt	Co. F
Long, Leonard H	33441010	Pfc	Co. C
Loucks, Welter J	36655735	Pvt	Co. C
Lozeau, Richard W	39604708	Pvt	Co. C
Luckhurst, Judson B	7237091	Pvt.	Co. F
Ludwig, Alfred L	38476278	T/4	Co. B
Luton, Jr. James B.	30237547	Pvt.	Co. F
Lyons, Jr. Arthur L	31264225	Pfc	Co. F
McCabe, William R	32590112	Pvt.	Co. C
McCarthy, Eugene B	36723115	Cpl.	Co. E
McCormick, Robert C	32551254	Pvt	Hq. Co.
McDonough, Patrick J	31240785	Pvt	Co. C
McDonald, Robert L.	35706214	Pvt.	Co. C
McElroy, Robert L.	36570109	Cpl.	Co. E
McFarland, Robert K	36779091	Cpl.	Co. C
McLeod, Arch M	36770550	Pfc.	Co. C
McWilliams, Harold L.	36776991	Pvt.	Co. E
Mages, Tom R	0-1299917	1st Lt.	Co. D
Makepeace, Jr. Ralph L	36875810	Pfc.	Co. C
Maly, Robert G	31342410	Pvt.	Co. C
Mahgun, Joseph A	36723279	Pvt.	Co. D
Maholes, James P	36544569	Pvt.	Co. D
Marcini, Dante (NMI)	31307859	Pvt.	Co. C
Markhan, Kenneth M	34397600	Cpl.	Co. F
Marshall, John L	14004551	Pvt.	Co. F
Mascari, Thomas M	65570634	Pvt.	Co. A
Mattivi, Frank (NMI)	20704721	1st Sgt.	Co. F
Meeco, Arlo (NMI)	35891539	T/5	Co. D
McEhan, Francis E.	37891889	Pvt.	Co. E

5  
SECRET



MISSING IN ACTION  
(Continued)

Mellon, Robert D	35421200	Pvt	Co. E
Mielcarski, Edwin A	35527389	Pfc	Co. C
Mikel, John W	35411200	Pfc	Co. F
Milewski, Teddy P	35411200	Pfc	Co. E
Miller, Albertus H	35411200	Pvt	Co. C
Miller, Beverley E	0-1211849	Capt	Co. E
Miller, Thomas E Jr	0-1211849	1st Lt.	Co. C
Minnchin, Brooks F	33831520	Pvt	Co. E
Minnella, Irving A	33831520	Pfc	Co. A
Monarque, Louis E	33831520	Pvt	Co. A
Moran, Joseph A	33831520	Pvt	Co. A
Morastl, Victor A	33831520	Pfc	Co. F
Morat, Darroll W	33831520	T/5	Co. E
Moslow, Leslie (MM)	32261788	Pvt	Co. D
Murillo, Willie G	33831520	Pvt	Co. E
Nabois, Thomas R	33711051	Pvt	Co. F
Naidigh, Douglas F	35435412	Pvt	Co. C
Ness, Charles	35435412	Pfc	Hq. Co.
Nichols, Para E	35435412	Pvt	Co. A
Nimmo, George (MM)	33259304	Pvt	Co. D
Niznansky, Bert L	368113620	Cpl	Co. C
Null, Francis M	12058460	Pvt	Co. B
O'Connor, William F	36716719	Pvt	Co. C
O'Dell, Ray A	35751509	Pvt	Co. D
O'Rourke, Daniel J	32875905	Pvt	Co. A
Osborne, Charles F	32753534	Pvt	Co. E
Padilla, Elmer J	18060050	Pvt	Hq. Co.
Pandure, Ralph A	32600513	Pvt	Co. D
Pascoe, Edward A	37719337	Pvt	Co. E
Patterson, Archie C	37400112	Pvt	Co. F
Paxton, Leon S	35714888	T/5	Co. B
Payne, Gerald M	35174014	Pvt	Co. D
Perlmutter, Harold (MM)	20258972	Pvt	Co. E
Perry, Lawrence J	37511554	Pfc	Co. F
Pettit, Alfred J	32710995	Pfc	Co. D
Petty, Clarence A	35131872	S/Sgt	Co. A
Phelps, Thomas E	33553221	Pvt	Lt. Co.
Pilgrim, Roy C	6953198	Pvt	Co. F
Piscitello, Archie R	32358338	Pfc	Co. C
Place, Kenneth J	33010208	T/5	Co. D
Plowe, Thomas W	33103358	Pvt	Co. B
Plubinski, Edward E	6150585	Pfc	Co. F
Porter, Charles R	35174008	Pvt	Co. D
Post, Arthur C	37518430	Pfc	Co. D
Provost, William I	36599211	Pvt	Co. E
Puchov, Jr, Lucas F	34629679	Pvt	Co. F
Quirk, Robert R	32773213	Pvt	Co. D
Ramos, Albert (MM)	39110640	Cvt	Co. B
Rasch, Elmer (MM)	36252438	Sgt	Co. B
Retail, Wendell T	35062257	Pvt	Co. B
Redman, James (MM)	13167680	Pvt	Co. B
Reeder, Eugene F	33503115	Pvt	Co. A
Rettinghaus, Bernard J	35481063	Pfc	Co. F
Ricc, Herbert J	32758774	Pfc	Co. C
Richard, Clarence J	41250713	T/5	Hq. Co.
Richardson, Earl D	34725119	Pvt.	Co. C
Richardson, George J	36739172	Pvt.	Co. C
Riffle, Elmer L	36411217	T/5	Co. F
Ries, Donald H	36390411	T/5	Co. A
Romo, George H	34152230	Sgt.	Co. D
Roberts, Charles D	38033870	Cpl.	Co. C
Robertson, William J	613346	Pvt.	Co. E
Ribison, Cloyd T	18107801	Cpl.	Co. D
Rivers, Jr, Hollis G	14091611	Pvt.	Co. D
Rollins, Richard E	38513888	Pfc.	Co. E
Romero, Frank (MM)	38281405	T/5	Co. C
Roth, Edwin (MM)	14081903	Pvt.	Hq. Co.
Roufay, Albert E	33287111	Pfc.	Co. C
Ryan, Frederick J	64393701	Capt.	Hq. Co.
Sadoski, Raymond T	1110288	Pfc.	Co. F
Sancr, Willie L	34315216	T/5	Co. F
Sandborn, Harold C	18156121	Pvt.	Co. A
Sandin, William G	0888515	Pvt.	Co. C
Santarelli, George	33111742	Pvt.	Co. E
Salter, Harry J	13097099	Sgt.	Co. B
Sawyer, Osborne W	33202124	Pvt.	Co. F
Sawyer, Thomas L	35801005	Pvt.	Co. F
Schenkel, Lawrence G	13311001	T/5	Hq. Co.

SECRET

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MISSING IN ACTION  
(Continued)

Schermerhorn, Warren	217351	Pvt	Hq Co.
Schmuck, Joseph F	32817174	Pfc	Co. D
Schneider, Harold C	36251312	Pvt	Co. B
Schrader, Arthur C	36-13025	S/ Sgt	Co. F
Schunemann, Gustave	31288238	Pfc	Co. F
See, John C	20115117	Pvt	Co. C
Scillers, Dick	30725071	Sgt	Co. C
Scmo, Paul T	33566233	T/5	Co. F
Shamonsky, Edward J	33341019	Pvt	Co. F
Shaffer, George	33630762	Pvt	Co. C
Shippy, Henry C	19043782	Pvt	Hq Co.
Shiray, Ernest I	35598351	T/4	Co. E
Shunstrom, Charles M	0-452096	Capt	Hq Co.
Sidore, Paul (NMI)	32779063	Pvt	Co. D
Simons, Donald	13157626	Pfc	Co. A
Simons, Gerald C	0-1286020	1st Lt.	Co. B
Simpson, Richard C	35462964	Pvt	Co. B
Sischo, Glen C	16176552	Pvt	Co. A
Skarberg, Charles G	31331932	T/5	Co. A
Smith, James H	32737036	Pvt	Co. A
Sommers, Virgil C	35405223	T/5	Co. D
Stafford, Jack L	6385006	Sgt	Co. D
Steigler, Willis E	36060796	Pfc	Co. C
Stevens, Dale C	20636117	Cpl	Co. B
Stewart, Ronald D	36192869	T/5	Co. D
Strauss, Jr. Fred (NMI)	32801240	T/5	Co. A
Sweitzer, John J	13052043	Pvt	Co. C
Syring, Wallace J N	36297113	Cpl	Co. E
Taylor, Alpha O Jr.	6992321	Sgt	Co. F
Teel, Patrick A	0-1304633	1st Lt.	Co. D
Theil, Robert (NMI)	36387090	Cpl	Co. A
Thomas, Lynn D	39198403	Pfc	Co. A
Thornbury, Arson (NMI)	35645989	Pvt	Co. F
Thurman, George W	14079991	Sgt	Co. A
Tickle, Firam W	33651375	Pvt	Co. C
Tittle, Dale (NMI)	35754026	Pvt	Co. F
Tucker, Louis O	36483157	Pvt	Co. B
Tucker, Sabuel (NMI)	36415673	T/5	Co. F
Van Horn, Roy A	37542919	Pfc	Co. A
Van Schryuer, Perry	0-1291358	1st Lt.	Co. F
Walker, James F	32870164	Pvt	Co. D
Wandolowski, John C	36628123	Pvt	Co. E
Warner, Elroy L	35154532	Pvt	Co. D
Wary, Charles R	33482631	Pvt	Co. F
Waterman, Charles J	33107237	T/5	Co. B
Watson, James M	33525846	Pvt	Co. B
Watson, Martin R	11033539	T/5	Co. E
Watt, Jr. Robert M	0-463964	2nd Lt.	Co. Hq.
Welborn, Carl E	36444188	Sgt	Co. F
Welch, Kenneth L	31292196	Pvt	Co. F
Wells, Walter T	20906286	Pfc	Co. C
Werkowski, Paul F	31309384	Pfc	Co. D
Williams, John V	13176640	Cpl	Co. D
Wilson, Arthur E	385062	Pvt	Co. D
Wood, Virgil H	2075171	Cpl	Co. D
Wojcik, Louis J	18611126	T/4	Hq. Co.
Wood, Robert D	12295314	Pvt	Co. F
Woods, John F	1813812	Pvt	Co. A
Woods, William Paul	18123176	Pvt.	Co. A
Workman, Clyde B	31771366	Pvt.	Co. F
Wrad, Arthur S	39025321	S/Sgt.	Co. E
Wright, Donald	12171339	Pvt.	Co. F
Yerger, Stanley G	34569031	S/Sgt	Co. E
Youghouse, Ernest A	31129154	Pvt.	Co. F
Young, Josed D	20602783	Pvt.	Co. F
Zartman, William D	33505227	Pfc.	Co. F

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WOUNDED IN ACTION

Brown, Delbert F	38272750	Pfc.	Co. B
Booley, Clarence H	19188-87	Pfc.	Co. B
Durham, Glenn (NMI)	315-7751	Pvt.	Co. E
Fergen, Thomas B	3071714	Sgt.	Co. E
Frane, George J	3717911	Sgt.	Co. E
Haywood, Edward H Jr.	33072937	1st Sgt	Co. E

SECRET

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WOUNDED IN ACTION  
(continued)

Helbrooks, James J	34769529	T/5	Co. C
Johnson, Francis K	37026504	S/Sgt	Co. A
Livingston, Van (NMI)	14011013	Fvt	Hq Co.
McBryde, Charles L	01300508	2nd Lt.	Co. D
McNeely, James O	35200109	S/Sgt	Hq Co.
Malisch, Robert E	37167609	T/4	Co. A
Nelson, Otis L Jr.	36567168	Fvt	Co. A
Owen, Johnny D	38135259	Lfc	Co. A
Palmer, James M	32033747	Fvt	Co. E
Phillips, Charles J	35055699	Fvt	Co. A
Robinson, Ronald J	31309321	Fvt	Hq Co.
Rogerson, Elmer T	38414926	Fvt	Co. A
Searle, William A	16109338	Fvt	Co. C
Sichler, Edward A	6891923	Fvt	Co. A
Swanson, Robert E	20707532	M/Sgt	Hq Co.
Tremblay, Russell R	01307480	1st Lt.	Hq Co.
Wiescarver, Donald R	35630982	Fvt	Co. A

KILLED IN ACTION

Allen, Troy (NMI)	15333216	Inf	Hq Co.
Lane, Nathan B Jr.	14194304	Fvt	Hq Co.
Parker, Isaac L M	19049256	Cpl	Co. A

For The Commanding Officer

*Russell R. Tremblay*  
 RUSSELL R. TREMBLAY  
 1st Lt. 1st RANGER BN.  
 Adjutant

(8)

OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX A

PO #19 HQ VI CORPS

OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX B

NAVAL ORDERS, SNOL

SECRET

FILED UNDER SEPERATE COVER INEN-1-0.3 (1325) Master.

Description: Naval Orders issued by Senior Naval Officer (Landing),  
"Ranger Sector", (Short Title "ACORN"), 18 January 1943,  
Office of Senior Naval Officer (Landing) "A", H.M.S.  
"Royal Ulsterman".



OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX C

PO #1, HQ RANGER FORCE

HEADQUARTERS RANGER FORCE  
APO 464, U. S. Army

17 January 1944

FIELD ORDER:

NUMBER 1:

MAPS : Italy 1:50,000, Sheets 158, I, II, III, IV.

1. (a) Int. Annex 4, Outline Plan - Operation Shingle, VI Corps,  
7 January 1944.

(b) VI Corps lands 0200 D day on beaches vic ANZIO, seizes  
and secures beachhead, advances direction COLLE LAZIALI (F 9451).  
D day to be announced.

(1) 3rd Inf Div (rein) lands 0200 A D day on beaches  
between NETTUNO (F 8813) and LA BANCA (F 9514), secures and  
establishes beachhead; contacts 504th Para. Inf. Regt on high  
ground N of ANZIO, contacts Ranger Force on West, protects  
right flank Corps, prepares on Corps order to advance direction  
of VILLETTE (F 9643).

(2) 1st Inf Div (Br) (rein) lands 0200 A, D day on  
beaches W of ANZIO, secures and establishes beachhead, protects  
left flank of Corps, contacts 504th Para. Inf. Regt on high ground  
North of ANZIO and relieves 504th Para. Inf. Regt within 1st Inf  
Div. (Br) sector, maintains contact 3rd Inf Div on right.

2. Ranger Force, consisting of 1st Ranger Bn., atchd 3rd  
Ranger Bn., 4th Ranger Bn., 509th Para. Inf. Bn., 83rd Cml Bn  
(- Co's C & D), Co H 38th Engr C. Regt, lands 0200 A D day  
at ANZIO (F 8517); and in following priority: (1) seizes  
port facilities in ANZIO and protects them from sabotage,  
(2) destroys any existing defense batteries vic ANZIO, (3) cleans  
beach area between ANZIO and NETTUNO; (4) secures and establishes  
beachhead; (5) contacts 1st Inf Div (Br) on left, 3rd Inf Div on  
right, 504th Para. Inf. Regt on North.

3. (a) 1st Ranger Bn will land at 0200 A D day on right half of  
Yellow beach, destroy enemy installations within its sector,  
establish beachhead as shown on attached overlay, make contact  
with 4th Bn on its left, be prepared to advance to the north on  
Force order.

(b) 4th Ranger Bn will land at 0200 A D day on left half of  
Yellow beach, destroy enemy installations within its sector,  
establish beachhead as shown on attached overlay, make contact  
with 1st Bn on right and, on its arrival, with the 3rd Bn on left  
be prepared to advance to North on Force order.

(c) 83rd Cml Bn (- Co's C & D) will land at 0300 A, D day on  
Yellow beach and take up positions vicinity of beach prepared to  
fire concentrations shown on attached overlay.

(d) 3rd Ranger Bn will land at 0400 A, D day on Yellow beach,  
pass through 4th Bn, clean town of ANZIO of enemy, seize and  
protect from sabotage the port of ANZIO, destroy enemy install-  
ations within its sector, establish beachhead as shown on  
attached overlay, make contact with 4th Bn on right, be prepared  
to advance to the North on Force order.

(e) 509th Para Inf Bn will land beginning 0400 A, D day on  
Yellow beach and assemble as shown on attached overlay, will  
clear beach area between ANZIO and NETTUNO and attack NETTUNO on  
Force order.

(f) Co H 36th Engr C Bgt will land as shown on landing table, clean beach of mines, wire and obstacles, prepare exits from beach, establish road blocks as shown on attached overlay and operate beach till relieved.

(x) (1) Naval and artillery gun fire on call after H hour through artillery parties provided.

(2) See landing diagram attached.

(3) On contact 3rd Div on right, Ranger Force is attached to 3rd Div.

4. See administrative annex.

5. (a) Current SOI.  
(b) C's to be announced.

DARBY  
Comdg.

OFFICIAL:

*Darby*  
DARBY  
Exec.





SECRET - BIGOT - SHINGLE

SECOND FLIGHT

H PLUS 2 HOURS

509th Parachute Bn. (120)

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

Hq & 4<sup>th</sup> Cos., 3rd Ranger Bn

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

1 Co., 1st Ranger Bn.

Co F, 4th  
Ranger Bn



LCM



LCM

100 M of Co H  
36th Engrs.

Remainder of personnel of W.C. to tranship to LCI(L)'s

THIRD FLIGHT

H PLUS 4 HOURS

Remaining one and one-half companies, 3rd Ranger Bn., and supplies to come ashore. Remaining personnel of 509th Para Bn., 36th Engrs., Port etc. of W.C., now afloat on LCI's to come ashore as LCA's become available.

WILLIAM O. DARBY,  
Col., Ranger Force,  
Commanding.

OFFICIAL:

*William O. Darby*  
WILLIAM O. DARBY,  
Lt. Col., Ranger Force,  
Executive Officer.

SECRET - BIGOT - SHINGLE

HEADQUARTERS BANNER FORCE, APO HGA, U. S. ARMY

## LOADING AND LANDING TABLE - OPERATION SHINGINE

SECRET - BICENT - SHINGINE

UNIT	PERS.	VEHICLES	CAMMO	DATE	PLACE	SHIP	HOUR	BOATS	LOAD	LAND	REMARKS
HEADQUARTERS	20	None	None	20 Jan	Bata	R U	H	1			Includes 10 man. rifle detail. 1-SCR 609 4-SCR 596 2-SCR 308 Odd supplies
MOJO BATTERY	12	None	None			R U					
1ST BANNER BN.	160	None	5 cases Cal. 30 Ball 5 cloverleaf's 60mm	20 Jan	Bata	R U	H	5			2 Hq & 2 Cos. Each Lda brings 1 case Cal. 30 & 1 cloverleaf 60mm ashore. Each man carries 1 rd 60mm to be cast on beach on landing.
1ST BANNER BN.	230	None	7 cases Cal 30 Ball 7 cloverleaf's 60mm	20 Jan	Bata	P B	H	7			2 Hq & 3 Cos. See ammo note above.
36th ENGRS.	9	None	None	20 Jan	Bata	R U	H				With Hq. 1st Bn. Men equipped with mine detectors.
36th ENGRS.	9	None	None	20 Jan	Bata	W C	H				With Hq. 4th Bn. See line above
2nd Inf Bde Division	3	None	None			R U	H				With Hq
4th Banger Bn.	390	None	12 cases Cal 30 Ball 12 cloverleaf's 60mm	20 Jan	Bata	W C	H	12			Hq & 5 Cos. See ammo note above.
FOO LAVY	1	None	None			R U	H				With Hq.
83rd CWS	781				Bata	#410 1ST	H + 60				20 DIMKS - 16 h. 2 mortars & 1580 rds.
36th ENGRS.	24				Bata	#410 1ST	H + 60				2 DIMKS with 3-57mm guns & ammo @ 100 rds.

## LOADING AND LANDING TABLE - OPERATION SHINGLE

Page 2

UNIT	PERS.	VEHICLES	CARGO	LOAD		LAND		REMARKS	
				DATE	PLACE	SHIP	HOUR		BOATS
FOO 36TH FA	5	None	None	20 Jan	Bala	W C	H + 60	With 4th Ranger Bn.	
FOO 77TH FA	5	None	None	20 Jan	Bala	W C	H + 60	With 4th Ranger Bn.	
1ST RANGER BN.	70	None	2 cases Cal 30 Ball 2 cloverleafs 60mm	20 Jan	Bala	R U	H + 2	2	1 Co. See amp note above.
3rd Ranger Bn.	105	None	3 cases Cal 30 Ball 3 cloverleafs 60 mm	20 Jan	Bala	R U	H + 2	3	1 Co. See amp note 1st Bn.
3rd Ranger Bn.	250	None	7 cases Cal 30 Ball 7 cloverleafs 60mm	20 Jan	Bala	P B	H + 2	7	Hq & 3 Cos. See amp note 1st Bn.
4th Ranger Bn.	70	None	2 cases Cal 30 Ball 2 cloverleafs 60mm	20 Jan	Bala	W C	H + 2	1	1 Co. in ICM. See amp note 1st Bn.
6th Rangers	100	None	None	20 Jan	Bala	W C	H + 2	1	ICM. Equipment includes demolitions.
509th Para Inf	420	None	None	20 Jan	Bala	W C	H + 2	12	
Sig Bn	3	None	None			W C			
Litter Bearer Detachment	36	None	None			W C			Franship to ICI to camp ashore as loads are available.
Correspondents	4	None	None			R U			Photographer & correspondent on each of ships shown.
63rd CWS	148	None	See remarks			W C	H + 3		8 MICS
3rd Ranger Bn.	105	None	3 Cases Cal 30 Ball 3 cloverleafs 60mm	20 Jan	Bala	R U		3	1 Co. See amp note 1st Bn.

LOADING AND UNLOADING TABLE - OPERATION SEVINGALE

UNIT	PTS	VEHICLES	CARGO	LOAD		LAND		REMARKS
				DATE	PLACE	SHIP	HOOR	
509th Para Inf.	180	Kino		20 Jan	Bata	PHIO 1ST	5	14 DIRTS - 800 rds h. 2 Cmm, Vpns & Equip
83rd CAS	88				Bata	PHIO 1ST		22 DIRTS - 3680 rds h. 2 Seserco & Welling equip.
83rd CAS	24					PHIO 1ST		
Sig Det	27							
#8 Beach Signal	27							
K Beach Command	52							
Co H, 36th Engrs	4	1-2 1/2 ton 1 bulldozer PDR	3 days rations					
Cannon Co	17	2 half tracks	and 3 days					
Para Co	8	1-ambulance 1-2 ton	ammunition all		Bata	LOT 542		2 1/2 ton 193 radia sets 1 1/2 ton misc car
3rd Engineer Bn.	3	1-1/2 ton 1-Weapons Carrier	types will be split between LCR #532					1/2 ton 193 radia sets with misc equipment
4th Engineer Bn.	5	2 1/2 ton 1-Weapons Carrier	LOT #551 and					1/2 ton 193 radia sets see also above

## LOADING AND LANDING TABLE - OPERATION SHINGLE

Page 4

UNIT	PQRS	VEHICLE	CARGO	LOAD			LAND		REMARKS
				DATE	PLACE	SHIP	HOUR	BOATS	
Co B, 16th Infs	4	1-2 1/2 ton Compressor 1- Bulldozer HD 7							
Cannon Co	18	2- Half Tractors 1- 1/2 ton	1 day's rations and 3 days ammunition, all types, will be split between LOT #542 and LOT #551		Bala	LOT #551			2 ton for Cannon Co.
Headquarters	4	4- 2 ton							2- 3/4 ton, 193 radio sets; 1 ea per 00 & zero 0.
1st Ranger Bn	5	2- 2 ton 1- Weapons carrier							2 ton for Bn 00-1-193 radio set No ea above
1st Ranger Bn	2	1- 2 ton							2 ton, 193 radio set.



## LOADING AND LANDING TABLE - OPERATION SHINGLE

Page 5

UNIT	PKGS	VEHICLE	CARGO	LOAD			LAMP			REMARKS
				DATE	PLACE	SHIP	BOAT	BOATS		
316 Bn	98	4-2 1/2 Ton 4-5/8mm Guns 6-2 Ton							4-5/8mm Guns towed and 4 loaded on 24's	
53rd GWS	13	8-2 Ton 2-3/4 Ton 3-2 1/2 Ton								
1st Ranger Bn	2	1-2 1/2 Ton			1ST #116				To be loaded with ammo.	
3rd Ranger Bn	2	1-2 1/2 Ton							To be loaded with ammo	
Headquarters	8	3-3/4 Ton 2-2 1/2 Ton							3/4 Ton: 1 each for signal, Cannon Co & Editors. 2 1/2 Ton for signal supplies & signal supplies.	
Air Support 2nd ASCS	2	1-2 Ton								
509th	4	2-2 Ton 1-3/4 Ton 1-2 1/2 Ton								
36th Engine	1	1 Bulldozer, RDU								
FOO Party	2	1-2 Ton								
4th Ranger Bn	2	1-2 1/2 Ton							See note under 1st Bn above.	



SECRET - BIGOT - SHINGLE

HEADQUARTERS RANGER FORCE  
APO 464, U. S. Army

13 January 1944

ADMINISTRATIVE ANNY - OPERATION SEINLE

**REPORTS** G-1 Reports will be submitted to Hq Ranger Force not later than 1800 hours daily.  
Essential battle losses of equipment will be reported immediately to the S-4, Ranger Force.

**ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL:** Sufficient administrative personnel will accompany unit to insure that required records may be maintained in complete and accurate form.

**GRAVES REGISTRATION:** Cemetery area to be selected by Force GRC. Each unit will designate GRC and report Officer's name to this headquarters in writing, not later than 17 January 1944.

**PRISONERS** OF War. To be delivered to Force Headquarters by unit guard for interrogation by PWI Teams, thereafter to be removed to PW enclosure to await evacuation to higher headquarters. PW enclosure to be designated on D-Day.

Combat units are responsible for guard and evacuation of Prisoners of War from Unit Collecting Points to designated collecting points of Corps and Divisions. Thereafter responsibility passes to VI Corps.

Combat units will segregate immediately Prisoner of War officers, non-commissioned officers, privates and civilians detained for suspected sabotage and espionage activities prior to marching them to enclosures or collecting points of Corps and Divisions.

Units will assure themselves that the necessary coordination exists between S-1 and S-2 with the view to having Prisoners of War made available to the unit intelligence officer or to attached Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams prior to evacuation to Division and Corps collecting points.

Prisoners of War will not be marched to or through Command Post Areas. Prisoner of War collecting points will be so established as to be out of sight and out of hearing range of unit Command Posts. Tactical interrogation will be conducted at a point which is also out of sight and hearing range of Unit Command Posts.

Items of military value, such as documents, maps, overlays, cameras, films, unit identifications, personal and official letters, will be placed in a Personal Effects Bag properly labeled and promptly turned over to the G-2 representative at the enclosure. Any personal effects taken from prisoners must be receipted for by an officer, receipt countersigned by prisoner, and copy given to prisoner. The military service record of the prisoner, in German called "SOLDBUCH", and his identification tags must remain with the prisoner. Other personal effects such as medals, jewelry, photographs of relatives, clothing, etc., should

## PRISONERS OF WAR (CONT'D):

also remain with the prisoner.

Enemy medical personnel, supplies and facilities will be utilized to the fullest extent possible for the treatment of Prisoners of War.

In the event that the captured enemy medical personnel, supplies and equipment are inadequate for proper care of Prisoners of War, the Corps Surgeon will designate Allied medical units for this purpose.

Seriously sick and wounded Prisoners of War will be hospitalized and evacuated in the same manner as for our own troops.

**REPLACEMENTS:** It is directed that each Ranger Bn detail an officer and suitable NCO's to remain with the rear echelon to secure and train volunteer replacements. This may include the officer in charge of unit rear echelons. Names of officers remaining with the rear echelon will be reported to this headquarters by 1200 hours 19 January 1944.

**EVACUATION:** See Medical Plan.

**REAR ECHOLON:** The rear echelons of the three (3) Ranger Bns and Force Hq will be consolidated in the buildings now occupied by the 1st Ranger Bn. 3rd and 4th Ranger Bn areas will be cleared. 1st Lieut JAMES J. LAVIN, 4th Ranger Bn, will be in command of the combined rear echelons. Lt. Levin will notify FBS of all bldgs cleared upon departure of units.

**FOLLOW UP:** Organization commanders will organize rear echelons into a follow up and a rear. The follow up to be prepared to join the main body on call.

**TENTAGE:** Tents to be dropped on the morning of the 20th, folded, and placed at a position easily accessible to transportation in each Battalion Area. Rear echelons will be responsible for returning tentage held on M/R to the appropriate depot.

**BARRACKS BAGS:** To be stored by Battalion in buildings now occupied by 1st Ranger Battalion Personnel by 1800 hours 19 January 1944. Rear echelons will be responsible for the safe guarding of personal property of officers and men.

**EXCESS SUPPLIES:** All excess supplies will be turned in to proper Depots by the Rear Echelons. All overcoats and all blankets in excess of four will be turned in.

**UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT (Individual):**

Combat Jackets  
Woolen underwear  
Woolen OD Shirt and Trousers  
Leggins  
Shoes  
Mufflers  
Steel Helmet complete  
Gloves (optional)

**Strip pack to include:**

Raincoat  
Rations (1-K, 2-B)  
Toilet articles  
Combat trousers

UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT (CONT'D)

Bedding Roll:

Two blankets

Extra socks

Extra underwear

Shelter half -

Shelter half - smaller half should be plainly marked, preferably stenciled with white paint on side away from buttons and on opposite peak - showing name and organization: I. I. JONES (Co. Sgt., 3rd Ranger Bn).

Entrenching tools will be carried.

Flashlights: on the basis of one per two men.

Wife Cutters: on the basis of one per two men.

Battalion Dressing will be responsible that all men wear M&O Waists undergarments and that they are suitable for entering craft for disembarkation.

AMMUNITION: All troops going ashore will carry basic loads of ammunition and in addition an extra handier. One (2) rounds of 60mm mortar will be carried ashore by each man and dropped on the beach.

Three days supply of ammunition will be available at the Beach Dump, to be established on arrival of LST and LCT's.

WATER: Canteens to be filled before embarkation. Strictest water discipline to be observed. Water in canteens will not be used while aboard ship.

GASOLINE: Each LCT will carry an extra 5 gallons in container, secured to vehicle. TROOPS will carry an extra 40 gallons in suitable containers.

EMBARKATION INSTRUCTIONS: Breakfast in camp the morning of the 20th. Personnel going aboard W/C will carry bedding rolls to the beach and drop them in the vicinity of the LST. 83rd CVS will be responsible for loading these rolls aboard the LST, at BALA. Other units will carry bedding rolls aboard ship and store in place designated by TQM.

COMMANDING OFFICER TROOPS ABOARD SHIP: W/C - Lt. Col. Roy A. Murray, Jr.  
R/U - Major Deason  
P/B - Major Alvin M. Miller  
LST - Lt. Col. Hutchinson  
LCT - Lt. Davey  
LCT)

TQM's: LCT's - Lt. Davey  
LST - Lt. Terton (83rd CVS)  
The TQM's aboard the LST's will be designated by the OC Troops of each vessel.

DOG TAGS: Careful check will be made to insure that men are wearing identification tags or are in possession of an improvised means of identification.

EMBARKATION INSTRUCTIONS: Troops sailing on the P/B and R/U will be prepared to embark at BALA at 0800 hours 20 January 1944.

Troops sailing on the W/C will be prepared to embark at BALA at 0930 hours on 20 January 1944.

VEHICLES: Wateryproofing per Warrent - instructions Form 3-4.  
For loading assignments, see Loading and Landing Table - Operation  
Shingle.

RATIONS: Three day supply rations will be dumped on beach upon arrival of  
LST and LCP's.

PASSENGER LISTS: Unit and detachment commanders will prepare passenger lists in  
sufficient copies to suit their own needs, and twenty (20) copies to  
this headquarters.

Some of the forms will be prepared for each unit or detachment on each  
boat; names will be listed in regular order in double space between lines.  
The names of drivers of all essential drivers will be included in passenger  
lists for the LCP's. All essential drivers of these drivers and essential  
passenger lists will be prepared in the same manner as a separate  
passenger list will be prepared with their own unit heading.

Changes will be corrected at the side of embarkation.

Passenger lists will be delivered to Force Headquarters not later  
than five (5) days prior to embarkation.

By order of the Force Commander:

HOWARD W. ZABELL  
Capt., Ranger Troop  
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

HOWARD W. ZABELL  
Capt., Ranger Troop,  
Adjutant.

SECRET - BIGOT - SHINGLE

HEAD QUARTERS RANGER FORCE  
APO 464, U. S. Army

13 January 1944

MEDICAL ANNEX - OPERATION SHINGLE

1. Plan of Evacuation:

a. There will be two surgical teams with sufficient personnel to handle major surgical casualties. This unit will serve as a hospital or collecting unit for all casualties until such time as a line of medical evacuation to clearing station of hospital is established. The surgical teams can be expected to land about mid-day D-Day and will locate in vicinity of beach, or in one of the hospital buildings located in the city, exact location to be announced.

b. It is expected that a Corps clearing station and/or field hospital will be available for medical evacuation on D plus 1.

c. It may be possible to evacuate directly from beach to hospital ship by hospital ambulance boats.

d. It is expected that ambulance service will be available D plus 1.

2. Personnel:

a. There should be sufficient medical personnel available in each Bn to assign one orderly to each company. If possible one orderly to each platoon is desired.

b. In addition to the normal personnel of the Bn medical sections, there will be twelve men attached to each Ranger Battalion to act as litter bearers. These men will be under the command of the Battalion surgeon and should be expected to land in a follow-up wave, probably at daylight.

3. Supplies and Equipment:

a. Each battalion surgeon will be responsible for equipping his individual medical section with ample quantity of emergency first aid supplies. This will be governed by experience obtained in past operations.

b. In addition, it is recommended that each surgeon have available for personnel the following items:

1. Benzocaine sulfate tablets - to be dispensed at the discretion of the surgeon, Co. commander, or medical orderly.

2. Individual bottles of halazone water purification tablets, to be issued prior to embarkation by Force S-4.

3. Morphine sulfate syrettes - to be carried by each officer who will be instructed how to use same.

4. Sulfadiazine tablets - individual packets of 8 to be carried in first aid pouch.

SECRET - BIGOT - SHINGLE

c. Individual battalion medical equipment, i.e., ambulances, Sn aid station, etc., cannot be expected to arrive for an indefinite period. Therefore, it is recommended that each unit pack several boxes of emergency medical supplies, plainly marked and carried ashore in a follow up wave.

d. Additional medical supplies will be available in small quantities from units such as clearing stations or hospitals after line of evacuation is established.

By order of the Force Commander:

JOSEF J. GOLDSTEIN,  
Capt., Ranger Force,  
Medical Officer.

OFFICIAL:

HOWARD W. KARBER,  
Capt., Ranger Force,  
Adjutant.

- 2 -

SECRET - BIGOT - SHINGLE

13 January 1944

S I G N A L I N T E N A N O. 1

OPERATION SHINGLE

1. SITUATION: See Outline Plan, Operation SHINGLE.
2. MISSION: To install, operate and maintain signal communication between the units in Ranger Force and Ranger Force Headquarters.

3. OPERATION:

a. Radio.

1. All Ranger Force units will communicate with Ranger Force Headquarters by means of SCR 636-A's (see frequency assignments in Ranger Force SOI, to be issued) from H-hour, 1-day, until communication by means of SCR 609's (see frequency assignments in SOI) is established. SCR 609's will report into the Force 609 Net immediately upon landing.

2. SCR 193 (or SCR 284 for the 509th Parachute Bn, the 83rd Chemical Bn and Co H, 36th Engineers) Net will not be established except upon order from Force Headquarters. (See Radio Nets, Appendix A to SOI).

3. Radio nets, as indicated in appendix 4, above, will be closed by the LCS upon satisfactory establishment of wire communications. (See Par 2, below). The SCR 609 Net will be reopened immediately upon the failure of wire communications. Note listening and transmitting assignments on "A" and "B" channels. (See Appendix A).

4. No radio set, including receivers, will be turned on during the voyage. Complete silence will be observed by each unit until it has landed.

5. Prior to embarkation, all radios will be carefully checked, calibrated, if necessary, and tested for proper operation.

a) All portable radios, combat loaded, will be enclosed in watertight containers, as provided by Signal Supply, Fifth Army, or water-proofed by other means. Water-proofing will not be disturbed except to insert fresh batteries, carried aboard transports separately, in 536's prior to embarkation into landing craft. Signal Corps water-tight containers will be collected and returned to Force Headquarters.

b. Misc.

1. Telephone lines will be installed from Force Hq to all units as soon as practicable after CP's are established.



2. Lines will be maintained by Ranger Force personnel, except the battalion personnel will assist in repairing broken lines by checking from Bn CP's, working rearward, until met by Force repair crews.

3. As Bn CP's move forward, battalion personnel will splice onto already existing lines, extending their own wire lines.

4. One telephone circuit will be simplex for telegraph. Telegraph messages may be considered secure for restricted and confidential messages, which may be sent in the clear. Secret messages will not be sent over telegraph circuits in the clear.

### c. Visual.

1. Recognition signals by flashlight, as indicated in SOI, will be used by all units.

unit a) One flashlight, TL 122, will be distributed between every two men by Signal Supply. Colored paper, as indicated in SOI, will be supplied by RF Signal Section and will be adjusted to flashlights by each unit.

b) All units will further self identification by marking helmet-backs and pack-backs as indicated in SOI.

c) All units will lead an adequate supply of Very pistols, ground projectors and flares for possible operations after the initial phase.

d) One yellow smoke grenade, for identification to friendly aircraft (see SOI) will be carried by each NCO.

### d. Codes and Ciphers.

1. Converter, 1-209 and cipher keys (see SOI) will be used. Codebook will not be used below Force Headquarters.

2. If the ~~1-209~~ <sup>1-209</sup> Converter Code (see SOI) is used, there will be no encipherment of coded coordinates. If top coordinates are to be enciphered, they will be enciphered from the clear text.

3. Verification by use of authenticators (see SOI) will not be made with each message. Authentication will be resorted to in order to challenge radio stations in circumstances other than usual.

### e. Security.

1. The Ranger Force SOI will not be taken further forward than Battalion HQ with the exception of Co's, 36th Engineers and SCR-193 radio prep teams.

2. All radio operators and message center clerks will carry an incendiary grenade in addition to normal equipment and are to be instructed to destroy beyond recognition all radios, codes and ciphers, SOI's and other secret and confidential documents and/or equipment in the face of possible enemy capture or compromise. Compromise of such equipment or documents will be reported to Force Headquarters at once.

4. SIGNAL SUPPLY:

- a. Signal supplies for a three day period will be landed from landing craft in small water-proofed units capable of being landed by one man in water, if possible.
- b. Additional signal supplies for a further ten day period will be landed with each unit's vehicles and baggage.
- c. A VI Corps Signal Depot may be expected in time to resupply. There will not be a Ranger Force Signal Supply Dump.
- d. All Signal Supply, including water-proofing materials, initially and at all other times will be obtained by, and will be the responsibility of, each unit's Signal Supply Officer.
- e. First and second echelons of maintenance will be performed by Force Signal personnel as soon as it is possible to land equipment. Heavy types of third echelon maintenance may possibly be performed.

5. ADMINISTRATION:

- a. Ranger Force CP will be established at H-hour, 1 mediately after landing, in the vicinity of the Casino,
  1. Commander from each unit will report to the Ranger Force CP as soon as its own CP is established. Commanders will remain with Force Hq until normal communication channels exist and will be released upon order from Force Hq.
  - b. The Force Signal Officer will know the whereabouts of the Force Commander at all times.
  - c. The Ranger Force SGT will govern all signal communication not described above.

By order of the Force Commander:

FRBERT AVELOR,  
1st Lieut., Ranger Force,  
Signal Officer.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
FRBERT AVELOR,  
1st Lieut., Ranger Force,  
Signal Officer.

OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX D

REPORT OF SNOL

SECRET

FILED UNDER SEPERATE COVER INBN-1-0.3 (1325) Master.

Description: Operation "Shingle", Report of the Ranger Landing  
and Development of Port Anzio, 31 January 1944,  
Office of Naval Officer in Charge, Anzio, Italy,  
H.M.L.C.I.(H), 315.

OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX E

PHOTO MAP

Anzio - Nettuno

APPENDIX E

FO #3

MAPS: 1/50,000 ITALY - Sheets 158 I, II, III, and IV.

1. a. See G-2 Summary. (Annex E)
- b. (1) VI Corps resumes the offensive and attacks to the North with the mission of seizing the ALBANO-VELLETRI area and continuing the attack to disrupt the enemy's communications to the 5th Army front.
- (2) 1st Rb Div attacks North in conjunction with 1st Arm Div commencing daylight, 30 Jan 1944, along the axis ANZIO-ALBANO road, seizes as an initial objective the high ground vicinity ALBANO.
- (3) Corps Artillery (1st Bn, 77th FA (155 M-1); 1st Bn, 38th FA (155 gun) supports the attack.
- (4) Air Support - see Annex 3.
2. 3d Inf Div, Reinf, advances and seizes CISTERNA DI LITTORIA and prepares to continue the advance to seize high ground vicinity of GORI and VELLETRI.
3. a. 7th Inf:  
Attached: 751st Tk Bn (4 Co's A, C and Co D - 1 Plat)  
Co A, 601st TD Bn (-1 Plat)  
Co B, 84th Cml Bn
- (1) Cross LD under cover of darkness at hour to be announced. Advance rapidly, seize and hold objective "A".
- (2) Destroy enemy forces in zone of action.
- (3) Block VELLETRI-CISTERNA highway from the Northwest.
- (4) Leaving at least one Bn on Obj "A" to accomplish (3) above, be prepared on Division order to:
- (a) Attack to the Northwest and assist in the capture of Object C.
- (b) Attack CISTERNA DI LITTORIA from the Northwest.
- (c) Advance to the Northwest on VELLETRI.
- b. Ranger Force (less 509th Front Bn)
- (1) Occupy assembly area (to be designated) after darkness night 29-30 Jan 1944.
- (2) Cross LD at hour to be announced move rapidly infiltration, seize CISTERNA DI LITTORIA and destroy enemy forces therein.
- (3) Hold CISTERNA DI LITTORIA and destroy enemy forces therein.
- c. 15th Inf:  
Attached: Co C, 751st Tk Bn (-1 Plat)  
Plat, Co D, 751st Tk Bn  
Co B, 601st TD Bn (-1 Plat)  
Co A, 84th Cml Bn
- (1) Cross LD under cover of darkness at hour to be designated, advance rapidly, seize and hold Objective B.
- (2) Destroy enemy forces in zone of action.
- (3) Be prepared on order to advance and seize Objective C and to block enemy forces moving South from the vicinity of GORI.
- d. 504th Front Regt (-2d Bn):  
Attached: Btry D, 376th FA Bn  
Prov Pack Btry  
Plat Co C and Co D (-2 Plats), 751st Tk Bn  
Plat, Ren Co, 601st TD Bn.  
Co C, 84th Cml Bn
- (1) Cross LD under cover of darkness at hour to be designated, advance rapidly in zone of action, seize and hold Objective D.
- (2) Block crossing indicated over MUSSOLINI CANAL and hold enemy Southeast thereof.
- (3) Protect the Div right flank North of Bridge 5.
- e. 509th Front Bn:  
Attached: Co D, 84th Cml Bn  
Plat, Co A, 601st TD Bn

Protect the Div left flank from position along LD in Bn zone with particular attention to an attack from the Northwest.

S E C R E T

- f. 30th Inf:
  - (1) With not more than one Bn screen movement of the 7th Inf to the LD.
  - (2) Assemble in Area E in Div reserve. (On Div Order)
  - (3) Protect the Div left rear.
- g. 3d Inf Div Arty:
  - Attached: 69th Armd FA Bn
  - (1) See Artillery Order, Annex No. 5
  - (2) Commencing at dark, 29 Jan 1944, occupy positions North of MUSSOLINI CANAL from which the attack can be supported.
  - (3) Support the attack by successive concentrations to be fired on call
  - (4) Coordinate supporting missions and counterbattery fires with Corps Artillery.
  - (5) Furnish liaison with 509th Preht Bn, 504th Preht Bn and Ranger Force.
- h. Remainder 751st Tk Bn:
  - (1) Advance from present positions to Area F, commencing at daylight, 30 Jan 1944, and occupy defiladed positions, prepared to assist advance of the 7th and 15th Infantry's by fire, or remain in Div reserve.
  - (2) Destroy any enemy force encountered along the CONCA-FAININA MORTA road.
- i. Remainder 601st TD Bn:
  - (1) Occupy firing positions under control of Div Arty, prepared to reinforce Arty fires in support of the attack.
  - (2) Be prepared to assemble on 30 minutes' notice in vic CR988245, prepared to counter an enemy armored attack, with particular attention to an armored attack from the Northwest.
- j. 84th Cml Bn (- Co's A, B, C, and D): Remain in present area.
- k. 3d Prov Sq (Mtr) (less Prov Pack Btry):
  - (1) Reconnoiter to line X-Y with strong patrols
  - (2) Outpost line X-Y and be prepared to give timely warning of an enemy counterattack against the Div left flank.
- l. 10th Engr Bn:
  - (1) Repair bridge at point M
  - (2) Maintain LE FERRIENE-CISTERNA and CONCA-CISTERNA roads.
- m.
  - (1) Date of attack: 30 January 1944.
  - (2) Leading elements of all units will by-pass such resistance as may be possible. Support elements which follow are charged with clearing such pockets of enemy resistance as may remain in the Regt zone of action.
  - (3) Upon reaching initial objectives, position for all-around defense will be immediately prepared. AT guns will be on these positions dug in and sighted by daylight.
  - (4) During the movement of troops across the MUSSOLINI CANAL, existing minefields will be clearly marked and guarded by units which employed them.
- 4. No change
- 5. a. Current SOI.  
b. CP's: Hq ed Inf Div Reinf; see overlay.  
Others to be reported.

TRUCOTT  
COMDC.

OFFICIAL:

CONNOR  
G-3

ANNEXES:

- #1 - Operations Overlay
- #2 - Intelligence Summary
- #3 - Air Support (To be issued separately)
- #4 - Administrative (To be issued separately)
- #5 - Artillery (To be issued separately)

- 2 -  
S E C R E T



OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX J

FO #3 HQ 3rd INF DIV



SECRET  
Auth: CG, 3rd Inf Div:  
Init:  
Date: 29 January 1944:

HQ. 3rd Inf. Div.  
Office of A C of S, G-8  
APO #3  
29 January 1944

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Annex #2 to FO #3.

No. 8

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. The enemy at present disposes Hermann Goering division on our right flank and front, and a scattering of units from various larger formation, probably now under command of 3rd PG Division, on our left front. The enemy's attitude on our front is entirely defensive. He has maintained a rather loose and poorly organized line of outposts well to the east of CANALE MUSCOLINI, south and southwest of CISTERNA DI LITTORIA, and south of the railroad embankment which runs northwest from CISTERNA. His patrolling has not been aggressive, as it has seldom penetrated to the point of seriously harassing our outposts; rather, our patrols have normally contacted German security patrols near or within his own outpost line. His OPLR, or defensive line backing up his outpost line, is believed to lie along the railway track itself, and may well be tied in with slight terrain eminences which begin to appear to the northeast and north of CISTERNA. His MLR will undoubtedly be found on true high ground both east and west of VELLETRI. Since we now effectively interdict Hwy #7 with artillery fire, the German would hardly interpose an MLR on less favorable ground this side of VELLETRI, especially in view of the fact that he must use all available time to complete and man a system of defensive works if he is to keep us off COLLI LAZIALI and Hwy #6.

The enemy's immediate situation with respect to tanks and artillery is not too good, and there have been many evidences that he is losing this precious material at a much higher rate than we; nevertheless, he may be expected to support his ground defenses at any point by counterattacks by small units including two or three tanks, and to employ light and heavy anti-tank guns, SP artillery and dual-purpose weapons on any or all the usable roads now under his control. The enemy's definite superiority of observation must not be overlooked, and this superiority will become more marked as we approach the CORI-VELLETRI areas.

b. The enemy's position regarding reserves is difficult to assess. His use of 356 Fusilier (Ron) Bn, 120 Ron Bn and 26 Ron Bn in the immediate battle zone indicates that some or all of the 356 Division (L of C), 29 PG Div and 28 PG Div may be earmarked for the ANZIO-NETTUNO beachhead. To date, however, the enemy has fed units into the line piecemeal as they have arrived, and there is no definite indication that he will depart from this practice by throwing one or more divisions entire against our positions in an organized counterattack. Even if he were to do so, it is likely that the division's proximity to the line would be discovered by air reconnaissance, PW or civilian reports before the counterattack itself could be delivered. He is known to have in immediate reserve an SS regiment in the VELLETRI area and probably the bulk of a newly-formed parachute division (4000-5000 troops) north of VELLETRI; it seems likely, however, that the mission of these units is to prepare and man defenses on the MLR rather than to be used in a counterattack against the beachhead, as they are now actually occupying the ground where he can be expected to put up his stiffest defense.

- 1 -  
SECRET

S E C R E T

2. TERRAIN.

- a. Two terrain features dominate the field of battle: The COLLI LAZIALI and the northern peaks of the MONTI LEPINI. Controlling heights in both cases are roughly 3000 feet, with the MONTI LEPINI, directly northwest of CISTERNA being somewhat higher. Both these features give excellent observation over the VELLETRI area, and the possession of either would enable the holder to block traffic both on Hwy 10 and Hwy 1. The COLLI LAZIALI and MONTI LEPINI is a gap about 2 miles wide which has a low summit and is generally suitable for AFV. Terrain immediately southwest of COLLI LAZIALI is generally suitable for AFV. The only serious terrain obstacles are the hill masses themselves, are LAGO di NEMI and the area occupying extinct craters in the southwestern portion of LAZIALI. There should be fairly good standing water in the area where above CISTERNA after a short dry spell. The area south of CISTERNA is not nearly so dense as on the flat ground to the south, the terrain being broken by many stream lines, and there are at least two roads which run through the gap between the two hill masses.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

- a. (See G-2 Periodic Report #80, 28 January 1944).
- b. The quality of troops available to the enemy must be considered in discussing his capabilities. While there is no doubt as to the training and discipline which are still to be found in platoon and company level, there is evidence that platoon and squad leadership has begun to deteriorate, and at least in the present operation, small enemy groups have not shown the excellent at liberty which we have come to expect of the Germans. In their own actions, if carried through with particular vigor and force, whether in attacking or defending, may enable us to attain successes which would not have been possible against old-type formations. This same fact also bears on the enemy's ability to counterattack strongly enough to drive us into the rear. His containing action and close-in defensive building has not been particularly successful, and he may be expected to fight a rear guard action across the TIBER and start over on a consolidated line across the peninsula.
- c. To sum up, it does not now seem probable that the enemy will deliver a major counterattack involving units of brigade strength. On the other hand, the enemy will probably resort to harassing action coupled with small-scale counterattacks in an effort to drive us to a standstill, as on the CASSINO Line. If he fails to do this on COLLI LAZIALI, he will probably evacuate the CASSINO area and fight a rear guard action across the TIBER and start over on a consolidated line across the peninsula.

TRUSCOTT  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

WILSON  
G-2

1 Inclosure - Overlay

- 2 -  
S E C R E T

OPERATION SHINGLE

APPENDIX K

FO #2 HQ RANGER FORCE

HEADQUARTERS RANGER FORCE (PROV)  
In the Field

/rec  
29 January 1944

FIELD ORDER )

NUMBER 2 )

MAPS: 1:50,000 ITALY, Sheets 158, I and II

1. a. See Annex 2, Field Order #3, Hqtrs, 3rd Infantry Division.  
b. See Field Order #3, Hqtrs, 3rd Infantry Division.

2. Ranger Force will cross LD at 0100A 30 January 44, move rapidly by infiltration, seize CISTERNA DI LITTORIA and destroy enemy forces therein. Hold CISTERNA area until relieved.

3. a. 1st Ranger Battalion will cross LD at 0100A 30 January and advance by infiltration methods by previously reconnoitered routes to CISTERNA, enter town, destroy enemy forces therein and occupy ground immediately northwest of CISTERNA prepared to meet counter-attack. Will avoid engagement with enemy between LD and CISTERNA if at all possible. At daylight will send patrol to northwest to contact 7th Infantry.

b. 3rd Ranger Battalion, with one platoon, Company "A", 83rd Chem Bn attached, will cross LD at time 1st Ranger Battalion clears plus 15 minutes and follow 1st Ranger Battalion toward CISTERNA. Will assist to the maximum the 1st Ranger Battalion in its mission. Will engage enemy forces which attempt interference with 1st Battalion. Will enter town and occupy ground immediately northeast of CISTERNA prepared to meet counter-attack. At daylight will send patrol to South-east to contact 15th Infantry.

c. 4th Ranger Battalion, with 8-man mine-sweeping party attached, will cross LD at 0200A 30 January, advance on CISTERNA astride CONCA-FERMINAMORTA-CISTERNA road, clear road of mines and enemy. On arrival CISTERNA, come into Force Reserve.

d. Cannon Company and platoon of 601st TD, initially in reserve will be prepared to move on CISTERNA via CONCA-FERMINAMORTA-CISTERNA ROAD. On establishment of Force in CISTERNA, will furnish AT protection.

e. 83rd Chemical Battalion (less 1 platoon Company "A", and Companies "C" & "D") will assemble in march order on road south of bridge (992-232) prepared to move forward to positions from which support can be given on order Force Commander.

x. (1) Recognition between troops by current pass-word, (BITTER - SWEET) and use of colored flash-lights signalling letter "R".  
(2) On arrival CISTERNA, 1st and 3rd Battalions will fire a series of red very lights, if no other communications are available.

4. a. No change.  
b. Rations and ammo load normal
5. a. SDI  
b. CP's to be reported.

By order of Colonel DAREY:

DANGER  
Exec

OPERATIONS SHINGLE

APPENDIX M

LOG OF ACTION

APPENDIX M

JOURNAL FROM 1200 31 JANUARY 1944 (Monday)  
1200 1 FEBRUARY 1944 (Tuesday)

1220 - Capt. Karbel to Col. Darby  
Karbel, I'd like for you to check around to see if can  
find any of our men.  
Check: 15th Inf.  
7th Inf.  
509th Para.

Yes, sir.

1226 - Col. Dammer comes back to C.P. rear. Says things are going  
rather slow.

1235 - 1st Bn. of 15th Inf. is now passing through our troops, with  
orders to

*Sighting of CP  
Resulted in killing 4 or 5 men.  
of Major Martin & 2  
demolishing CP Junk  
1235*

*OTI*



"Boyer is coming down the road towards you. So give it the works, Roy.  
Yes, sir.

1100 - "This is Murray, is that mine-sweeping party down there?"

Yes, he is right between you and me.  
Have him take the ditch all the way to my C.P.  
away"- He will follow us to the minefield, once we cross it he will have to sweep quick and clear the mine field.

1122 - Hello, Hutch ; this is Roy  
Will you put that smoke down now?

Yes, then I'll add a little H.E.  
If you see Porter, send him up so that he can lay wire to the first building on my right.

1130 - Hutchinson, this is Nye.  
As soon as you give them the W.P. I want you to pour on W.P. until I tell you to stop; then give me 10 rds. of H.E.  
Okay, Nye. In about 3 minutes.

1141 - Four light tanks ~~move~~ towards the forward C.P.

1144 - Col. Murray from Hutchinson  
Tell him that if he wants that W.P. turned off to let me know.

1145 - This is Col. Dammer. Tell Murray to stay in the C.P. until the tank officer gets there.

Hutchinson, Please.

Murray, the Tanker reports that W.P. is landing on friendly troops across the mined area.

Hutchinson, give me a 300 yd. left deflection. I just saw 3 Jerries run across to a new position.

1154 - A report came in that Lt. Davey died.

1159 - Darby to Lockout  
(No connection)

Conversation between Col. \_\_\_\_\_ & Capt. Krausa:

Krausa, the Col. wants to talk to you  
Is your set turned on?

We're near a tank and it cuts my set out, sir.

What's the situation of the 2 Ranger Bn.'s?  
Very few of them are back, sir.

- 0933 - Col. Darby to Capt. Nye  
The tank took out machine gun.  
I want you to move forward into building. Get Col. Murray  
and have him push tanks forward. Will keep 2 tanks and 2  
half-tracks there until mine fields are cleared.
- 0935 - Gen. O'Daniella to Col. Darby  
Wants to know how things are up there this morning.  
We can't clear mine field until we clear up machine guns  
and snipers.  
Must be done by 1 today.
- 0940 - Col. Darby to Col. Murray  
Get to get the mined field cleared by 1300 hrs. today.  
Be sure to start at once.
- 0945 - Lt. Avedon to Comet  
Do you have a wire team that can fix the wire between  
Lighthouse and Cook Blue.
- 0950 - Col. Darby, this is Col. Carlton  
Will you mount up and come to Cobra Advanced C.P. The  
big chief wants to speak to you.  
Yes, Sir!
- 0957 - Capt. Nye We haven't moved out yet, but we to coordinate  
with Col. Manheart and T.D. Officer. Capt. Nye? are you  
in contact with Boyer?  
No.  
I want some covering fire with tanks or T.D.'s.  
We're pinned down and can't move. Jerry's got machine  
guns layed right on us.  
Lt. Davey just got shot through the neck.
- 1020 - Cobra #3 to Lt. Avedon  
"1200" Do you know what I mean?  
Yes, Sir.  
Lt. Porter, I sent a patrol on our right. They have every-  
thing okay in this position. I contacted Col. Dammer and  
Capt. Nye. were about 300 yds. this side of the minefield.  
and I can't possibly move until I get some more tanks.  
If you can designate targets, call on the tanks to knock  
them out. In about half an hour we should be ready for an  
attack.  
Walt, those buildings abreast the road!  
Yes.  
Are those Jerries in those two houses?  
Yes, sir.  
I'm going to send a track up to you.
- 1151 - "H" hour at 1300
- 1155 - Col. Murray, please.  
Everything is dependant on you to get that mine field out.

0835 - Lockout to Lighthouse Forward

0840 - Lt. Haines to Lt. Avedon  
I was afraid for you last night. Saw M.G.  
Find 4iv. Sig. Men  
Get more operator 2 for here and 1 for there. The weapons  
carrier out of order. Send small swithe board up here.

0845 - Col. Darby to Capt. Nye  
What's the situation on machine gun position:  
(a) 1 at red farm house  
(b) 1 at Rd. Jnct.  
(c) 1 about 600 yds. from there.  
Keep The Engineers covered while they clear mine field.  
I want you guys to learn to read maps.  
Mine field about 200 yds. from where the road crosses the  
stream.

0850 - Lighthouse to Cook-Blus  
Col. Murray is about 300 yds. short of building you had  
the other day. Don't see why we can't use Chem. Mortars.

0858 - Major Martin to Cobra  
Are any of your G-2 people there? Got identifications, don't  
know whether you have or not. 221

Battery C.P. up to 29  
3 platoons of 3920 mm flak guns  
one truck  
1 plat. at 007-293  
3 plat. few hundreds yds. off  
2 plat. 1000 yds. to rear  
Battery of 88 in vic.  
2 guns 015-206  
1 gun  
rest withdrew east  
1 Co. arm. eng. in area  
1 Bn. Inf. entered town 28 Jan.  
Prisoners saw fire at 015-307  
Prisoners heard that they would receive reinf. from  
Airborne troops fighting as Inf.

0905 - Lighthouse to Lockout

0930 - Sgt. to Karkel  
Want to know if he has reserve rations.  
If you haven't any, come down and pick up here.

- 0102 - Lighthouse Forward to Lockout in re rations which he is supposed to pick up. ~~on show to get there~~ Col. Hutchinerson sending patrol up to your C.F. Don't have any body out on road.
- 0115 - Col. Hutchinerson to Div. Knows they are out because see Send 2 patrols out machine gun firing on them.
- 0130 - Col. Hutchinerson to Col. Frochea Chief staff says find out if you have cleaned up mine field. No. Can't get to it because of crossed machine gun fire. The 15th is working down toward you and is trying to clear cross fire.
- ~~0140 - Col. Hutchinerson to Lockout (No connection)~~
- 0215 - 83rd CWS to Lockout (Can't seem to get them; the line must be out)
- 0535 - Lockout Sunray to Darby I sent a patrol up there last night. Enemy activity is the same as before. There's a group of litter bearers coming up from 4th Bn. Hutchinerson has 150 behind you. Then there's 50 rear echelon men at crossroads. Roy, I'm sorry, fellow, but I just can't relieve you right now. The best we can do is to fight them off all day long. If, when daylight comes and the tanks would take off on the sides of the road up here, we could knock out most of this stuff. Well, Roy, the best we can do is to hold them off at any cost. I'm trying to relieve you, Roy. Fine, sir, only we can't pull out of the position I'm in now during daylight. Then, Roy the only thing left to do is to hold your ground.
- 0555 - Capt. Nye, Ex. Off. of 4th Bn. called and wants to talk to Lt. Porter when he shows up here. I need some "536 Batt." up right away if he doesn't get up here before daylight, he won't get here.
- 0635 - Col. Darby to War Room
- 0810 - Lt. Avedon to Capt. Karbel Who can I see about getting rations? See in the building where the 4th Bn. is. You can get some there.
- 0820 - Call to Lockout 15 men from D Co. wants to go back up. Want to know best way to get there.

- 1954 - Captain Karbel - Avedon  
Col. Darby wants 20 litter bearers for tonight; will need  
6 litters. They should be qualified litter bearers.  
Karbel, this is Col. Darby  
Is there any men who could carry ammo and water up to the  
4th En. You'd better get ahold of Anderson and send him  
up to me. Howard, cut the posts down so you can get 15  
men to work with Anderson.
- ~~1957 - Capt. Karbel to Capt. Anderson  
(Not here)~~
- 1957 Lt. Avedon to Lt. Haines  
Get your 6 men with weapons carrier.
- 2125 - Lt. Avedon to Capt. Karbel  
I'm still waiting for your man to come to guide them in.  
Probably have already got there.
- 2130 - Call for Force Medics  
Get an ambulance and go down the road where a Jerry vehicle  
wrecked with jeep.
- 2215 - Cobra 3 to Lighthouse (Col. Hutchinson)  
Cook Blue sending "I" tem Co. along road to contact you; be  
on the lookout for them.
- 2245 - Lt. Haines to Sgt. Dempsey  
Wasn't here at switchboard. Send Pedgat to Lighthouse for-  
ward.
- 2251 - Lighthouse to Lt. Haines  
The weapons carrier has just been hit and can't come up  
there.
- 2305 - Lt. Haines wants Dempsey to come back to switch board.
- 2310 - Lighthouse to Lighthouse forward. We have a telc. line  
to Lockout now. (4th En. C.P.)
- 0033 - Col. Hutchinson to Col. Murray  
"I" tem Co. is wandering up the road looking for you. Div.  
says to put out a patrol to look for them. The Co. on left  
where tanks were today. Contact their right flank. When  
you get them, I want a report on them.
- 0055 - Call for Capt. Anderson
- 0056 - Lighthouse forward to Lockout  
~~(No connection)~~

take pictures.

1402 - Gen. O'Daniella was seen going to Ranger Force Forward C.P.

1406 - Capt. Karbel reports to C.P. with Lt. Tremblay for a report on the Ranger situation. Capt. Karbel reports 14 1st Bn. men are now in hospitals.

1420 - Col. Dammer: There's 4 men from C Co. 4th Bn. Hold them there for a while, Bill. I'll tell Kness about them.

1500 - Capt. Karbel to Col. Darby  
Hello, Col. is there anything that I can do?  
Maybe you'd better come up here and see me. Watch the snipers.

1536 - Capt. Karbel reported back to C.P. with notice to go back to the old area and round up every able man that he could find.  
The present situation seems to be rather tense, yet nothing can be confirmed.

1537 - Enemy reported to be infiltrating on Forward C.P. but has not been confirmed.

1550 - Sgt. Costello reported to the C.P. with the 4th Bn. ration truck.

1614 - Lt. Avedon called and said to send two men with blankets up to C.P. Forward as guards.

1618 - Col. Dammer said for Major Martin to stand by. Information will follow later.

1830 - ~~Atkinson~~ and Davis, Co. E 1st Bn. returned

Cobra #3 to Col. Darby  
Inform you that Cook Blue is on the crossroads. He have not made contact. The Ex. Off. of the 4th is here now.

Lt. Haines, Will you get the wire men ready?  
Stand by, I have to talk to Capt. Karbel first. The whole wire team will be used.

~~1935 - Capt. Goldstein~~

~~1945 - Cobra will let you know who will run the lines.~~



JOURNAL FROM 1200 30 JANUARY 1944 (Sunday)  
TO 1200 31 JANUARY 1944 (Monday)

Page 1.

- 1212 - We're sending down a prisoner; Identification, 3rd Co. 356th Pz. Gren. Regt. He arrived yesterday with a Co. of 120 men. He was on patrol duty and outpost duty in this area.
- 1220 - Capt. Krauss.  
We've been trying to locate those observers for you. We've had no luck but will keep trying.
- 1225 - Martin to Cobra; give me War Room.  
Are any of the "2's" around? We just got a prisoner from the 3rd Co. 356th Pz. Gren. Regt. He says that there are 120 men in his Co. and he was on outpost and patrol duty in this area.
- 1234 - Report received that Major Miller was K.I.A. and Major Dobson was wounded.
- 1237 - Capt. Krauss to Comet White  
No, sir, we haven't moved as yet - same coordinates.
- 1250 - Lt. Avedon
- 1259 - Pvt. Kembler reports into C.P. concerning stretcher bearers for 3rd Bn. Pvt. Kembler says that the casualties are great. He took it upon himself to try to get aid for the wounded. Upon questioning, Pvt. Kembler, he said that there only three men that he actually saw wounded. Pvt. Kembler seemed very nervous and unsure of his self.
- 1302 - Lt. Col. Dammer gave instructions for Pvt. Kembler to remain at Force C.P.
- 1320 - Sgt. Marker, 10th F.A. F.O. Party for 1st Bn. Rangers was left behind and was at C.P. inquiring as to when he can *join them*
- 1324 - Comet 2 to Major Martin  
Any news?  
Not a thing right now. I'll call back, Major. Okay!
- 1330 - Capt. Krauss to Comet, please.  
Krauss, what's going on up there?  
The tanks are going into town.
- 1336 - Lt. Col. Dammer to Major Martin  
Where's Lt. Davey? Find him and send him up pronto.  
Yes, sir.
- 1345 - Riley was just here and said that our entire 1st Bn. was wiped out or taken prisoner.
- 1358 - War correspondent was here inquiring whether or not he could

Yes.  
Well, get your men and get back into that position. We're  
going to give the boys a hand.

1150 - Capt. Krauss to Comet White  
Andy, have you heard from any of the absentees?  
No, not a thing.

1152 - Capt. Krauss to Comet Green  
Have you heard from either of the observers with Rangers?  
No, not a thing.

1158 - Two correspondents visited the C.P. for info.

- 0620 - Krauss to Comet White & Green  
Give me Comet Green please. Give me your #3, please.  
Have you had any info. from those two forward observers  
that are with the 1st & 3rd Bn.'s
- 0622 - Darby to Cobra (out of communication)
- 0635 - Tanks moving up on road to Cisterna past C.P.
- 0640 - Shell lands in vicinity of crossroads near C.P.
- 0720 - Davey is in position as ordered by Col. Darby.  
1st Bn. 800 short of Easy, looking 3 S.P.'s in the face.  
(Signed.) Dobson
- 0740 - Jerry is throwing a lot of heavy stuff over on our left.
- 0745 - On the way. Concentration on.
- 0800 - Col. Dammer said to hold up on arty. fire.
- 0805 - Medium tank went by with wounded driver on cot.
- 0810 - Hutch, get a couple of Co.'s up here right away. Drive them  
as far as the canal and put them on carts with plenty of  
ammo. I'll deploy them after they get here.
- 0920 - They want a phone at the forward C.P. right away.
- 0945 - Lt. Avedon to Lt. Haines:  
Wants two crystal sets  
BA-39-12  
BA-38-12 6-536  
BA-40-12 TLL50  
BA-360-5  
BA-609-3  
ME-13-1  
T48-1  
Sure have multimeter. Put in house where C.P. truck is.  
Let me know when you get there.
- 0950 - Major Martin to Col. Dammer  
Have you any communication with 1 or 3P  
Only by rear sets. We have communication with Kitchens.
- 1035 - Major Martin goes down to Medic's building.
- 1120 - Call from Ass't. P-2 3rd Inf Div.  
We're sending about 15 prisoners down to 15th C.P.
- 1125 - Lt. Les-Kness is here about those 8 men. Have one of the  
non-coms call me.
- 1133 - Ranger Force Forward  
Lt. Kness speaking. Sgt. Stapleton; you know where you  
pushed off last night.

Goldie?  
Yes?  
Will you have Davey handy?  
Yes, sir.

- 0310 - Martin, I'm sending those radio operators back; try and find their Bn. We now have a line to Div. Things are very quiet except for a small flurry on the right flank.
- 0317 - Firing of small arms heard on the right flank from C.P.
- 0345 - Kraus to Comet Red  
I'm at Jig George Rodger; Love Charlie Peter.
- 0350 - Small arms fire on left flank.
- 0433 - We're catching either heavy mortar or large gun fire in 007-293.  
Col. Murray is about 2000 yds from here on the right and is catching a lot of small arms fire from some houses.
- 0435 - Major Martin reported action of previous paragraph to War Room, 3rd Inf Div.
- 0448 - Intermittant shelling in vicinity of 007-293. Also increase of small arms fire.
- 0450 - Bill, get Davey and T.D. unit. Tell Davey to go down and get his stuff moved to vic. Conca.
- 0503 - Cpt. Kraus to Comet Red  
341, this is Kraus. Repeat on that last message:  
Jig George Rodger Love Charlie Peter.
- 0510 - Martin, I've got to send Haines back to the old C.P. area to get a radio.  
Will you use your driver.
- 0536 - Heavy shelling in the same area (007-293)
- 0540 - Heavy shelling close to C.P.
- 0545 - Small arms fire in vic. of right flank.
- 0550 - Five rounds again landed in our immediate vic.
- 0601 - Telc. line to Ranger Force Forward out.
- 0602 - Shelling C.P. area; 6 rounds
- 0606 - Shelling C.P. area; 8 rounds.
- 0615 - Darby to Carlton:  
Murray is having a hell of a time. There isn't any contact with my 1st & 3rd Bn.'s  
I've got to get this road block cut.

- 1812 - Rec'd S-3 report from 83rd En. from 0800 27 Jan. 44  
to 0800 28 Jan. 44
- 1815 - 24 Guards Brig. Operation Instr. No. 2 Copy No. 15  
27 Jan. 44
- 1816 - Rec'd 1st Br. Div. location statement as of 1530  
20 Jan. 44
- 1818 - Overlay of positions 28 Jan. 44 received.
- 1820 - Return to message center all messages for Tokay.
- 1835 - Our mission is to seize, occupy and hold the town of  
Cisterna di Littoria. The city may have considerable  
opposition.  
Points: Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, Easy. Easy is the  
target.
- 1800 - Col. Darby held meeting of En. commanders for discussion  
of Field order #2 (Copy att'd.)
- 1930 - Meeting of T.D. officer and Lt. Davay in force C.P.  
(See Field Order #2)
- 1945 - Meeting of Force Staff for instructions concerning Field  
Order #2
- 1950 - C.P. Truck will be ready to move out at 2300 hrs. and will  
have all misc. equip.
- 2300 - Closed C.P. at 967-196.
- 2315 - Moved C.P. to *name of F 94726*
- 0125 - Reached new location.
- 0140 - Col's Darby & Dammer *X* C.P.
- 0225 - Phones tested to Switchboard (O.K.)
- 0246 - Telo. lines into Col. Darby & Medics.
- 0248 - Four radio operators from 3rd En. reported to Force C.P.  
for instructions. They seemed to have been lost. We  
send them immediately to see Col. Darby.
- 0249 - Major Martin to Col. Darby  
Sir; did those radio men from 3rd En. report to you?  
Yes, that's the god-damndest thing I've ever heard of.
- 0303 - Sir, we have a line to Comet, now.  
We also have a line to the Medics.

- 1631 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson leaves G.P. with instructions to be at G.P. at 1800 hrs. for final instructions.
- 1634 - Major Dobson leaves G.P.
- 1635 - Cpl. Graff, 10th Eng. Bn., reports at G.P. with a nine-sweeping party of 10 men. He will have a man at Force G.P. at all times to receive instructions.
- 1731 - Location of troops From 1200 27 Jan. 44  
to 1200 29 Jan. 44
- ~~1736 - Message  
We have a report of some men and tank at 890-34. Can you confirm?  
This from 24th.~~
- 1738 - Message  
Will you secure permission of VFG further orders that the civilians may move back to their old homes. They have two vehicles.
- 1740 - Lt. Rhinehart, F.A. forward observer reports to 1st Bn.
- 1741 - Message  
No. 1 Force Ex. Off. 28 Jan. 44  
Activity noted at 890-353. This is the next enemy defense line. We can't reach it with 60 or 4.2's. We are using mortar up to the 34 grid line only. Have some enemy (12 and M.G.) out to our front at about 895-538.
- 1747 - Message  
No. 1 to C.O. 894th T.D. Bn. 27 Jan. 44  
Place one T.D. Co. in support of Ranger force for anti-tank defense. Disregard mission of indirect fire support of Rangers. This was confirmed by a verbal order phoned at 141 27 Jan. 44  
Col. Darby, Ranger Force
- 1750 - Col. Darby returns to G.P.
- 1755 - Air raid in this area.
- 1756 - ~~Anzio, Nettuno beach map.~~
- 1758 - ~~Location of troops from 1200 16 Jan 44  
to 1200 17 Jan 44  
HQ, Ranger Force  
Lucino, Italy  
17 1300 Jan. 44~~
- 1805 - 4th Bn. overlay of position.
- 1808 - Message Received: (#4) 27 Jan. 1944  
To CO Ranger Force  
Positions and fields of fire for our 4.2" Chem. Mortars are as shown on overlay included. Lt. Col. Hutchinson



Page 1.

- 1202 - Lt. Davey called at C.P. to see if he couldn't get the vehicles in his outfit set and then return to the C.P.
- 1215 - Col. Darby returns to the C.P.
- 1340 - Message outgoing to all units:  
1. Greater dispersion is to be effected to reduce pick-up by aerial recon.  
2. Hour of departure from this area is changed to the one given plus 4 hrs.  
3. Units will draw their own rations and are not to wait for the arrival of Force S-4.  
4. Aerial photos of the problem area are on hand for study at HQ's.

(Signed)  
Lt. Col. Dammer

- 1420 - G-3 Report #6 rec'd from 3rd Inf. Div.

~~1432 - Message~~

~~\* Recon. vehicles of the 4th Recon. Regt. will cross front shortly. Do not engage. 0931 28 Jan.~~

~~3rd Notified~~

~~83rd Notified~~

~~APTY. Notified~~

~~509th Notified~~

~~1455 - Message to Ex. Off. Force Activity noted at 290-353. This is next enemy defense line. Cannot reach with 60mm. or 4.2 inch. We are using mortars up to the~~

~~1510 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson reports to the C.P.~~

~~1525 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson reports to the C.P.~~

1544 - Col. Darby returns to the C.P.

1545 - Lt. Col. Dammer & Col. Darby discuss Field Order #2.

1550 - Major Dobson to C.P.

~~1556 - of the 3rd Bn. wants info concerning the whereabouts of Force D. tonight and tomorrow.~~

1620 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson reports to C.P.

1630 - Capt. Knowles 9th F.A. reports to C.P.  
9th F.A. Liaison Officer has received final instructions.

29-1731

From: 1200A 27 Jan 44  
To: 1200A 29 Jan 44  
Lead: [unclear]  
Radio Force (Exp)  
~~In the Field~~  
29 January 1944

Number 6

1. OUR FRONT LINE: **None**

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS:  
**Assembly area 9719**

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:  
**None**

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:  
**Clear - Warm**


5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:  
**Period 27th to 29th January per verbal reports.**

6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:  
**Excellent**

7. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:  
**Relief from sector by British Recce Corps. Moved to assembly area 9719. 509th Parachute Bn detached.**

HERMAN W. DALLER  
Lt. Col, Recon Force,  
8-3

Positions from  
28 Jun 44.



8181-96

- 2330 - Col. Dammer to Laborlost  
 town, I just told Murray about this Recce. unit's HQ. It's  
 located in the little house on the east side of this road  
 that runs past our C.P. The house is right at the head of  
 this truck column.
- 2344 - Col. Dammer  
 This is Sgt. Munro. A and B of the 3rd Bn. are on their  
 way, sir.
- 0345 - The remainder of 3rd Bn. has cleared the old area by 0230 hrs.  
 and 0345 hrs. departure was finally made.
- 0600 - Capt. Anderson, I have 15 more trucks for you, but I can't  
 go with them. Could I have you or someone to send rep?
- 0645 - Lt. Frambley to Col. Dammer  
 Can I find GO of H Co.
- 0655 - Col. Dammer to Major Jones on whether or not he can give any  
 help up front.  
 T.D.'s are under Div. Artillery
- 0659 - Col. Dammer to Landlord (Cpl. Wheaty)  
 Does he know Lt. Davey? Get him to call Col. Darby right away.
- 0715 - Lt. Davey to Col. Dammer  
 Heavy gun flashes in front of Carroceto. Get map and come to  
 C.P.  
 Leaves tracks where they could go into actions.
- 0720 - Col. Dammer to Lt. Fram  
 Come over to C.P.  
 When Lt. Davey pulls out, you pull out with him. But be very  
 careful in pulling out. Leave your guns in firing pos. until  
 you're ready to pull out.
- 0740 - Lt. Davey reports into C.P. for info. on when and where to  
 move tracks back. Pull out of position 10 this morning.
- 0745 - Lt. from T.D. will report to Col. Yarborough
- 0805 - Major Ramsey to Col. Darby on how the move came off.  
 Try to get wire to you as soon as you get there.  
 Looked like a tank battle up toward Carroceto early this morn.  
 Was pretty heavy for about 2 hrs.
- 0812 - Wheta to Col. Dammer  
 Checking on telet. line.
- 0934 - Left old C.P. with convoy to assembly area in vic. of 3rd Div.
- 1126 - Arrived new C.P. location F(966-196) Set up for business.

- 1959 - Lt. Col. Yarborough reports to C.P.  
I suggest that you wait for Col. Darby.
- 2000 - Dammer to Lockout Roy?  
No, he left for the meeting.
- 2002 - Dammer left for the meeting of the Sn. CO's.
- 2149 - Col. Darby & Col. Hutchinson discussing instructions concerning the movement of troops.
- 2150 - Hutch. I'll see you tomorrow. Leave a guide out on the road.
- 2158 - I just received information that the 179th is taking all of the attached units.
- 2159 - Col. Dammer is on the way back to the C.P.
- 2222 - Col. Dammer returns to the C.P.

Dammer to Trembley?  
Hello, sir  
This Co. H attached to you; what's their situation?  
I don't know, sir.  
He is relieved from here and reverts back to his regiment.  
Also, I want you to pick up the dead around your area.

- 2230 - Martin to Laborlost Dirks, you'll just have to wait until you're relieved.  
Sir, one company is relieved, but nothing more than that.  
I'll talk to Major Miller; maybe he has a better picture of things.

2321 - Message received  
Crypto. 3rd Inf. Div.  
Received in clear by teletype  
To CG 3rd Inf. Div. "Op" 281315A  
O. 37 Warning Order. #3 U.S. Div. Resumes attack on Cisterna first light 29 Jan. 1 Div. is to attack North 30 Jan. in conjunction with 1st U.S. Armored Div. on left.  
Inter. Div. BNDY Effective 28 2000A will become all incl. 1 Div. Stream jct. 9137, stream jct. 9234. Rds. 9132 CR 9128. 1 Recon. less one sqn will relieve RANGERS complete by 28 2000 A Route Anzio, CR 8628, CR 9128, CR 9232. Recon. Rgt. will extend right 29 Jan. to take over 3/7 Inf. area.  
Will also recon. all routes and crossings within Div.  
BNDY with view to further advance by 1st Div. Recon. elements of the 1st U.S. Armored Division are to take over 2nd Inf. BDE sector 29 Jan, details later. All informed.  
British 1st Div.

- 2325 - Murray to Col. Dammer  
The 1st serial is ready to go now.  
Good; Roy, the H.Q. of this recon. outfit is located in that nice little house on the east side of the road, right down the road.

28/29 Jan  
 Major Miller to Lighthouse Minor  
 Al- Where are you?  
 One of my Co's has been relieved.  
 Then you re to start to assemble N.W. of Dobson's C.R. at  
 888-308. I don't know how long it will take.  
 Let's meet at the house across from Dobson.  
 I'll meet you and Roy at 8:30.  
 Either you or Len.  
 Okay.

Andy, how many trucks do you have?  
 I have 30  
 Let's give Dobson 25.

Tokay to Dammer  
 Yarrowwato Dammer: I'm ready pending the arrival of the British.  
 I'd like to leave supporting Co.'s in the same position pending  
 any decision.  
 You need not come down. If our Allies do get there, let's  
 let 'oson get out.  
 They've contacted me, but not yet moved in.  
 The British are on the way there now, so I'm okay. I'll be  
 down there.

1917 - Major Dobson given instructions to move to the new assembly  
 area. Routes and identifications of new area were discussed.  
 He was told to take over guide responsibility where 3rd Div.  
 M.P.'s leave off. Force is to keep open a 193 radio, and  
 be prepared to make a recon. tomorrow.

1918 - Dammer to Dobson  
 Where you settle there must be room for 3 En.'s. About  
 (975-195). Outside of the woods there's brush and could  
 be lived in for a day.  
 We can't leave a rear here that can't move itself.  
 The colonel is moving out last, so he can control the move.

1934 - Avedon to Dammer  
 I just got notice of some people who wear berets moved in  
 between us and our friends on our left.

~~1936 - Lt. Frient said if you want to get me, I'll be over by four  
 Andy to Dammer: Can I get the dope on what's going on?  
 Yes; later.~~

1945 - Hutchinson to Dammer  
 We'll have to hold 2 Cos. back off that road if you expect  
 us to be able to stay in firing position.

1949 - Instructions were given to Col. Murray and Major Miller.  
 On relief of their En.'s, they will pick up trucks allotted  
 and proceed, independently, to the assembly area. Routes,  
 traffic control, and communications were discussed.

~~1950 - Karbal to Redwood  
 Let me speak to one.~~



- 1705 - Karbel to Tokay Sunray  
The 1st Br. Recon. unit is relieving you tonight.
- 1708 - Karbel to Lockout Sunray  
Hello, Nye. The 1st Br. Recon. unit is relieving you tonight.  
Yes, we knew. They're here looking things over now.
- 1709 - Karbel to Laborlost Sunray  
All of the 1st Br. Recon. unit is to relieve you. So you can prepare to move while it's daylight.
- 1710 - ~~Karbel to Redwood.  
No connection- call back.~~
- 1714 - Major Dobson & Capt. Shunstrom report to C.P.
- 1800 - ~~Major Martin reports:  
Force has captured to date in this operation.~~
- 1807 - Major Miller to Major Martin  
We haven't yet been relieved. Have you any news for me?  
No. You'll have to wait for Col. Dammer.
- 1810 - ~~Karbel to Tokay Mollar  
Mollar, we can't get through to Redwood. You'll have to  
go down in para-ch.  
Yes, if he wants to go home bad enough, he can contact them  
personally ha-ha~~
- 1814 - Major Jones reports to C.P.
- 1815 - ~~Capt. Shunstrom left C.P.~~
- 1830 - Saam to Dobson  
Shunstrom just got back. He told me all he knew and left again. I think that he's on his way to RF C.P.
- 1856 - Lt. Col. Dammer returns to C.P.  
Major Martin, did you arrange for meeting of En. C.O.'s at the house that I prescribed.  
You, Dobson, can have 25 trucks.  
Best is news of relief of En.'s. When do they expect to move?  
4th En. is in process of relief now.  
Liaison from Brit.  
The assembly area is (970-195)  
Infiltrate your troops to assembly area.  
~~It is your responsibility to get everything to the ass. area.~~
- 1902 - Karbel, this is Lt. Kness  
Have you heard from Tokay?  
We're not entirely relieved as yet.  
This Major, a Liaison officer, for art. has an observer over here.

28/9 Jun

- 1605 - Col. Darby to Major Martin  
 Notify all Bn.'s except 509th to move by truck. Be prepared to  
 move out tonight. En. order will be 1; 3; 4. Hutchinson will  
 move tomorrow at daylight.  
 1st En. will assemble in area of Major Dobson's C.P., north of  
 the road.  
 4th En. will assemble in area of Capt. Neill's C.P. Col. Murray  
 will pull back all reserve Co.'s. Others will remain in the line  
 until relieved by Bn/M. Then they move back.  
 3rd En. pulls back all reserve in area to left of road.  
 North of road 888-308  
 Majors Miller and Dobson be at Col. Murray's house. Everybody  
 is alerted to move on minute's notice. Major Miller and Murray  
 will hold the line until properly relieved by Br.  
 As soon as dark, Col. Hutchins will assemble ~~at the house~~, but  
 still will be able to fire mortars.  
 Force C.P. will move tonight.  
 Col. Murray, Majors Miller and Dobson be at house by call from  
 Col. Dammer.  
 All att. units will probably move tomorrow.  
 Lt. Davey will move out tonight.  
 Co. M. 179th will ~~give~~ instr. when Col. Dammer gets to C.P.
- 1624 - Col. Hutchinson to Major Martin to get info. on move.
- 1625 - Major Martin to 4th En.  
 Info. on how to get ready for move by truck and be sure to  
 hold what have until properly relieved. Will be at Capt.  
 Neill's with the rest of En. Comm.'s at Col. Dammer's orders.
- 1634 - Col. Hutchinson at C.P. for instr. on when and how to move his  
 outfit.  
 Major Martin to Major Miller  
 Pull En. out to 888-308 (Reserve Co.'s at dark)  
 Rest of Co.'s when Br. take over.
- 1638 - Major Martin to Landlord G  
 As soon as dark assemble 1st En. at left of road in green, and  
 be ready for truck movement; also be at house with rest of En.  
 Commanders.
- 1650 - Martin to Karbel  
 Adj., we move sometime tonight. Col. Dammer will bring more  
 dope when he comes.  
 Lt. Avodon to Tokay (pronounced)
- 1705 - Shelling directly west of C.P. truck about 600 yds.

JOURNAL FOR 1200 28 JANUARY 1944 (Friday)  
TO 1200 29 JANUARY 1944 (Saturday)

Page 1.

- 1201 - Whipcord to Major Martin  
Please call Whipcord when Col. Darby returns.
- 1202 - Lt. Six (Phone Torpedo) 894th T.D. Co. B  
Left: Guns at 878-269 can reach to 758-316  
Right: Guns at 002-307 can reach to 875-396
- 1220 - Rep. of Gren. Gds. reports to C.P. to find out exactly  
what we are going to do.
- 1224 - Col. Bouche to Major Martin  
Do we have a liaison officer with the 24th Gds. Brig.?  
They have an American, Major Barnes as L.O.
- 1229 - Col. Darby & Lt. Col. Dammer return to C.P.
- 1302 - Force meeting held in vic. of C.P. Prep. for movement of  
Force C.P. made at this time.
- 1305 - ~~getting ready to move.~~
- 1400 - ~~Moved out of old C.P. area.~~
- 1405 - ~~Formed on road with convoy.~~
- 1410 - ~~Moved back into same position we just left.~~
- 1420 - ~~Camouflaged vehicle.~~
- 1450 - ~~All set up in old position.~~  
Col. 's Darby & Dammer left C.P. for the 3rd Div.  
Instr. rec'd. that Force is to be rel'd from present pos. by  
elements of Br. 1st Div. and will move to assembly area at  
F970-195 and be prepared to recon. routes of advance to  
Cisterma. Arrangements made for 75 trucks to be furnished by  
3rd QM. 509th Para Bn. rel'd from att. to Force. Force comes  
under Div. control and will be relieved by British and take over  
sector of 3rd Bn. 7th Inf. Co. H 179th Inf. reverts to Regt.  
control. Co. B 894th T.D. rel'd from att.
- 1526 - Col. Andrey comes by C.P. to see Col. Darby about battery of  
guns sitting behind C.P.
- 1545 - Major Bevington of the 894th T.D. at C.P. to see Col. Darby.  
Major Bevington's C.P. is at 872-297
- 1558 - Lt. <sup>Kness</sup> ~~Callans~~ called Major Martin  
He wants about 50 mines.  
Everything is pretty quiet. Few shots every one in a while.  
Are being shelled every once in a while. No casualties since  
noon.

28 Jan

- 1058 - Col. Kammerwat C.F. to see Col. Darby  
His loc. is (915-202) 179th Inf.
- 1104 - Major Fore to Major Martin  
Info. on tank in area 890-344 Woodcoard. Seagull his telc.  
Has patrol cut at main road.
- 1107 - Major Martin to Laborlost (Capt. Dirks)  
Info. about patrol of people on your left. Patrol will be on  
main road 890-344. Report on tank and 9 men being there.  
Positive tank not ours; don't think it's 4th Bn.
- 1112 - Major Martin to Seagull  
Info. on tank: Don't belong to people on left. Don't think  
it belongs to ones on right.
- 1115 - ~~Major Martin left C.F. to go to P.W.I.~~
- 1135 - ~~Major Martin back at C.F.~~
- 1136 - Received message:  
S-2 Ranger Force HQ 27 Jan. 44  
Special emphasis will be placed on the following questions on  
the following questions in addition to the regular P.W.I.:
  1. Where are company and Bn. C.F.'s?
  2. Where are reserve plats., Co.'s, and Bn.'s located?
  3. Where are tanks and SP assault guns parked at night?
  4. Where are kitchens and trains located?
  5. Do civilians give American troop dispositions?
  6. What is status of ammo. and supply?AC of S. G2 3rd Inf. Div.
- 1159 - Lt. \_\_\_\_\_ was at C.F. to find spot for naval observer.  
Right now we have a cruiser, but there trying to get something  
bigger.

25 JAN

- 0849 - Landlord line just went out.
- 0915 - Col. Darby going out on recon. with Col. Dammer
- 0916 - Cpl. Stroud to Sgt. Swanson  
To let know Col. Darby and Col. Dammer went out on recon.
- 0936 - Message from 4th Rngr. to RF HQ.
- 0940 - Laborlost Sunray to Darby  
I want to speak to artillery liaison officer right away. I have a mission for him.  
(Please have L.O. of artillery call me back at Laborlost Sunray.)
- 0952 - Major Martin to Laborlost  
4 Br. Recon. vehicles will pass in front of you; don't engage them. Tell art. officer to fire 3 or 4 hundred yds. left.
- 0955 - Major Martin to Longbow  
1002 - 4 Br. Rec. vehicles will pass to your front; be sure to identify and don't engage.
- 1002 - Capt. Bunton to C.P.  
890-353 Co. of 29th Gren. will fire on them with art.
- 1007 - Col. Kammer comes by C.P. looking for Col. Darby
- 1010 - ~~Major 3rd Div. at C.P. looking for Col. Dammer~~
- 1013 - ~~Capt. Karbel to message center  
Send runner to C.P.~~
- 1020 - Major Dirks to Major Jones  
Art. fire perfect. Increase range 150 yds., 50 yds. left and fire another volley.
- 1021 - Operations memorandum No. 25 For 25 Jan, 44
- 1023 - Summary of air activities 25 Jan. 1944
- 1025 - Summary of air activities 26 Jan. 1944
- 1045 - Land<sup>art</sup> to Major Martin.  
More info. on Br. Patrol 895-352  
4 buildings shelled and 4 vehicles pulled out and shifted fire over left and another vehicle left; looked like peep.  
Col. Murray getting high bursts. 5th Army hadn't moved further.  
British just holding on.
- 1053 - Major Martin to Cobra.  
Info. on prisoners captured in last 9 hrs.

~~0001 28 Jan~~  
JOURNAL 28 JANUARY (Friday)

Page 1.

To noon 28 Jan.

- 0001 - Today we start the daily Journal on a noon to noon basis. All reports will be turned in for typing at 1205 noon of every day. When finished will be returned to C.P. truck to Lt. Col. Dammer for reference in making up his daily ~~0001~~ S-3 reports.
- 0530 - Call from Cobra to Sunray  
Is there anything new for us this morning?  
No sir; everything is about the same.  
I got the info. about pt. 88-36 in ref. to vehicular activity at 0204 hrs. of 27th.  
Is that all?  
Yes, that's all for now.
- 0650 - Messenger brought up 3rd Div. news sheets.
- 0700 - Col. Darby to Major Jones  
Couldn't locate by phone. Sent message by runner to have Major Jones come to C.P. right away.
- 0715 - Capt. Saam to Col. Darby  
Wire and one mine field on right is in. Has passage-way through. Shelling going on but long way from here.
- 0720 - Major Jones reports to C.P. as ordered to see about gun positions close to C.P.
- 0732 - Air raid in this area; planes came real close to here; one plane shot down.
- 0738 - Col. Darby to Longbow 6  
What's wrong with 7 o'clock barrage?  
Will let know what's wrong.
- 0745 - Lt. Avedon reports to C.P.  
~~Col. Darby wants to know why line to 4th Bn. is still out. It was out last night and should be in by now.~~
- 0752 - Lighthouse to Col. Darby  
Cobra line just went out in air raid.
- 0757 - Land to Col. Dammer  
Lot of artillery in this area 890-353. Had a patrol in area last night. Patrol saw motor vehicle last night.
- 0801 - Col. Dammer to try to locate Col. Darby at some radio.
- 0807 - Col. Darby tells Major Jones to either move battery behind us, or while here, battery will not fire. By order of Col. Darby.
- 0819 - Air raid in this area; we got one plane.



27 Jan

- 2115 - Small arms fire in vicinity of our left front.
- 2116 - Col. Redman, I want you to stop the British from firing on my troops. This T.D. outfit is supposed to support you in an AT roll. He has instructions to do as you tell him.
- 2121 - Col. Ramsey talked to Col. Hill. He said he'd take care of the British. A Co. of Scots Gd's are at 875-345. I thought I'd warn you as to their position.
- 2136 - Major Dobson to Dammer  
I'm dug in and set up. I'm having the H.W. Co. wait until daylight to string wire.  
Okay, Dobson.
- 2138 - Whipcord to Darby  
Any news for us?  
Yes; vehicular activity in vicinity of 88-36 at 2045 hrs.  
also flares of White-Green-White-Green at same time.

27 JAN

QUARLES

- 1055 - Col. Darby to Col. Quarles  
 Hello, this is Darby. Hey, why don't you start some of this shooting. We'll give you all of the firing you want. Okay, tomorrow lets see some overhead. It's too damned quiet up here. I'm short one battery but will give you any cooperation you like. Sir, I think we'll have to use area fire, because observation is too poor for pin point firing.  
 Darby to Smith: Comes tomorrow will shoot all over the place.
- 2006 - Major Miller to Darby  
 Boy, the artillery sure was hot today. All I want you to do is to dig in, cause tomorrow I'm going to blast them good. Al, if worst comes to worst, or they smack you too hard, I want you to pull over to British Friends on your left.  
 One man from patrol reported that trucks movement at 8836
- ~~2015 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson to C.P.~~
- ~~2016 - Lt. Smith leaves C.P.~~
- 2017 - Hutchinson, comes daylight, we're going to fire like hell. I want noise; lots of it.
- 2031 - Targets for you tomorrow 83rd CWS  
 Boundaries for firing 0700  
 Left 8934  
 Search the area 898-351  
 931-349 CR
- 2036 - Heavy artillery firing by the enemy is now going on right now.
- 2045 - Darby to 4th Bn.  
~~Can't seem to reach them.~~  
 3rd Bn. reports  
 White - Green - White - Green flares are out in same direction.
- 2106 - Major Ramsey  
 British report that there's tanks in front of their sector, occupying.
- 2107 - 3rd Bn. reports barrage landed in one of our Co's positions. Landed 300 yards behind the road. Ramsey, there's no tanks on that rd. They're shelling the hell out of my troops. I want you to shut that Br. Art. off.
- 2110 - Col. Darby to Redwood  
~~No contact. Call us back when you get them!~~

27 JAN

- 1815 - Darby to 3rd Bn.  
Lgna, how goes it?  
Pretty hot, sir, today. We had 4 killed and 2 wounded.
- 1821 - Darby to Landlord 6  
Saam, andy's got 8,500 sandbags. Do you need any. We're drawing small amounts of shelling.
- 1831 - Hutchinson to Darby  
Report: One man trampled by bull this afternoon outside that nothing to report.  
Okay, Hutch, see you tomorrow.  
Oh, yes, I moved two Co.'s into 509th area today. Will send you overlay tomorrow of guns & positions.
- ~~1837 - G2 NRI  
Message: Fighter Bombers 0922 on CAPO DI GMLA 0827322  
4 hits town & scattered S.W. Slight heavy ack-ack.  
Intense light ack-ack target areas. 0942 hrs. on  
Cisterna all bombs target area. Light ack-ack moderate  
heavy ack-ack all target areas. No movement plus Bossa.  
No signature~~
- ~~1845 - G4 NR2 27 1515  
Fighters 1024 report mediums appeared for cover N.W.  
S.W. and north patrols Velletri. At Scilerferno G164495  
strikers mostly to north. Mediums got intense ack-ack  
(heavy) Velletri ceiling and visibility unlimited.  
No signature~~
- ~~1849 - Reg'd. Summary of Air activities.  
26 Jan. 1944 27 1820  
GRNR 3 271430 - GR50  
Mediums 1015 hrs. bombed Velletri. All bombs target areas.  
Smoke from previous attack obscured results. Possible  
target. Intense accurate heavy ack-ack target area.  
Fighter bombers 1107 hrs. bombed and strafed Piedmonte.  
4 bombs in field East South of town. Recon. target area  
no results observed just. Fighter bombers 1130 bombed  
VALMONTONE all bombs target area. Scattered meter enemy  
trucks road target to Caprano.  
No signature~~
- 1950 - Lt. Smith reports to C.P.  
Col. Darby says: Why in the hell can't I get some  
firing out of your artillery? Tomorrow I want you  
to shell everything. You have plenty of targets. So  
get started firing.

27 JAN

- ~~1631 - Col. Dammer to Lighthouse  
To give instruction on which phone to use.~~
- ~~1632 - Col. Dammer to Capt. Anderson  
Couldn't locate~~
- 1633 - Capt. Bunton into C.P. checking over situation with Col. Dammer
- 1657 - Operations Memorandum No. 25
- 1658 - Summary of air activities 25 Jan 44
- ~~1700 - Sgt. Swanson to Col. Dammer  
On what the password now is.~~
- 1701 - G-3 Report from 1201A 24 Jan 44 to 1200A 25 Jan 44
- 1705 - Major Dobson to Col. Dammer  
Have everything out here ready. Don't bother with mines, unless you can guard them. Plot in areas where you are going to put mines.
- 1706 - G-3 Report from 1201A, 24 Jan. 44 to 1200A 26 Jan 44  
HQ 3rd Inf. Div. A.P.O. #3  
1400A 26 Jan. 44
- 1710 - Tomasick to Col. Dammer  
Info. on CR about 400 to 600 yds. not covered.
- ~~1719 - Message intercepted. Spec. Mission #1 27 1316 A  
MCP OBOE Peter love at 892335 running north east on  
road then sugar east on road. Boundary at 904335  
north along river NW to 895-519 862-285. Our troops  
now in your zone. Move to our zone coordinating with  
you. No signature~~
- 1745 - Dobson to Darby  
We need an interrogator up here right away. We've found that almost all these people are Fascists and it's too easy for them to skip back across lines.
- 1759 - Darby to Tokay Sunrise  
I'll send a 6 x 6 and the ambulance can meet the 6 x 6 and bring your wounded back.  
Okay, thanks, Col.
- ~~Major Hoye  
#1 targets 959-527  
911-527~~
- 1807 - CO 179th Inf.  
Co. H. 179th Inf. is attached 3rd Div. In present position effective 271600A Jan. 44. Company not to be employed forward of present Div. MLR LMO Co: H 179th Inf. Report CO R.F. for further instr. w/o delay. CG VI Corps

1535 - Kolhegan to Dammer  
Captured prisoner's identification is 3rd Co. 104th  
Pz. Gren. Regt. of 15th Pz. Grn. Div.  
Their orders were to hold against small forces and re-  
treat in face of large forces.

1540 - Capt. 894th T.D. to C.P.  
1 Co. 894th T.D. En. report to Ranger Force  
Be prepared to protect right flank.

1541 - Message to Force  
Request objective line and left boundary of Rangers.  
Barnes

1545 - To: HW from OOO (Special Mission #1)  
27 1145  
DEMON ANCHOR FEMALE HERO WALDEN SKIN CABET LOVER  
LIZET FERRET FALCON LOVER WALBUS ARTIC BOSTON BRANK  
TO CIRQUEUS HBT. HEBER LIAC LUMP FABRIS BARKER  
DEMON 27 1145  
Signed

Message to Force  
Are your elements on road Carroceto to Albano?  
Barnes

Message to Force  
1 G AB3 (893-316) Now direct S.P.T. R. 4 being  
rel'd by 1 G B83, 2 G B83 & 2 G A 83 Now in position  
896-302. 1 G AB3 will then emplace at 896-302;  
2 G B83 at 893-316. G AB3 then direct spt 509;  
G B83, R 4  
Signed G.O. 83rdGWS En.  
Lt. Col. Hutchinson

1604 - Dammer to P.W. Interrogators  
Kolhegan we had rumors about an attack on us by Pz. Gr.  
Div.  
No, sir. No information concerning attack on us as yet.  
I'll call you back, Col. when I get more info.

1615 - Packard from United Press at C.P. looking for Major Martin

~~1617 - To Co. Mission #2 27 Jan  
No Parks ident. have X request details Parks waits in  
1st Div. Sector~~

Truscott

~~1621 - 27 Jan 44  
HQ VI Corps  
Art. Sect. 508  
Memorandum~~

~~1630 - Col. Hutchins to Col. Dammer  
asking about fountain pen~~

27 JAN

1410 Message #3 to CO R.R.  
 Enemy plane crashed in mortar position of Co. A, 1st  
 Bn. at 26-1800A. Killing one and wounding three men.  
 Position located at 896-302.

CO 8370 PWS - BR  
 Hulet

- 410 - Co. H of <sup>Kamickas</sup> ~~2nd~~ outfit (45th Div.), will not be used  
 in advance of canal and be able to release them at any  
 time they need them.
- 1420 - Cobra to Darby  
 I received a message from Corps. Ho. would like to send  
 Lt. Laymen and interrogation unit.
- 1422 - ~~Danner to message center~~  
~~Do you have a messenger who can find 1st Bn.~~  
~~99, sir.~~  
~~Send him over to C.F. right away.~~
- 1445 - Darby to Cobra 3  
 Col. Connor, I'm still trying to get this boundary  
 straightened.  
Left front Bound.  
 CR 863-288  
 892-309  
 891-315  
 893-318  
 894-325  
 894-325  
 903-380  
Right front bound.  
 See overlay to accom-  
 pany operations  
 instructions #1
- N. Lago Du Mimi
- 1520 - To British C.O. 1st Div.  
 I'm to report that the boundary has been changed and  
 that you were ordered to move into that positions.  
 Sir, it doesn't worry me at all.  
 And I shall not pull those troops until you have prop-  
 erly relieved me.  
 Very good, sir.
- 1530 - Message to Force 27-1130  
 Request location your reconnaissance patrols.  
 Signed,  
 Barnes
- 1532 - Message 27-0855  
 Third lateral left-link  
 Request location your advance elements.  
 Signed, Barnes



27 JAN

1316 - Message No. 3 27 Jan. 1944

CO Ranger Force

Enemy planes crashed in mortar position of CA, this  
 En. at 26 1800A. Killing one and wounding 3 men. Posi-  
 tion located at 896-302

CO 83rd CWS Bn.  
 Col. Hutchinson

1318 - Col. Dammer to Laborlost 6

~~One patrol from 22-300~~~~Fasting 892~~Tied in solid on left with Guards. *Outposts out to 4 or 500 yds.*

~~On patrol 300 yds. from rd.~~ *Boundary between you and Guards -*

~~One out 4 to 5 hundred yds.~~~~One out to 50 yds.~~~~One out at 100 yds. in Road on map~~~~Outpost out 500 yds. from there~~~~Limill line 36 between you and Guards~~~~88 Grid to rd. Jct.~~~~North east along rd.~~~~Jct. 88562 N.E. 88752~~

Stream and culvert are in your sector.

1335

~~Dammer to message center~~~~Have sent out the password for the day year etc.~~~~Have a receipt to show of 3rd receiving their password.~~

1344

Cobra to Darby

1 Platt. 60lat

But it all boils down like this: I'm left with just this,  
 right? How about that H.W. Co. I'm supposed to get. I'm  
 not sure of anything then. Right? Okay will try it our  
 way.

1349

~~Major the receipt of 3rd En.'s password is en way to the C.P. truck.~~

1352

Darby to Laborlost

Hello, Lem. Give me the dope.

Col., we had 1 killed, 4 wounded and we have 4 Jerry  
 prisoners, caught in between us and Roy's left.

1358

~~Send over a message, right away.~~

1403

Darby to Lockout Sunray

Give me his forward please. Tell him to mine that  
 road out front of road jct. Mark Minefield.

1410

Dammer to Lockout

Porter?

Yes, Col. Dammer.

Was that mine field picked up?

Yea sir, it was laid only at night.

Right. Thank you.

- 1201 - Major Martin to Capt. Anderson  
Send truck up to 4th En. to pick up 7 prisoners.
- 1203 - Major Martin to Laborlost to see if they have any  
prisoners.
- 1208 - Lt. Davey to Col. Dammer  
No other position where they can fire from.  
Stay in same place, then; but don't fire until have  
target.
- 1210 - G-3 report #4 25 Jan. 44
- ~~1225 - Capt. Schornstrom comes by G.P.~~
- 1230 - Major Martin to Capt. Lee  
Wants to know prisoners statement about enemy Panzer Div.
- 1232 - Major Ramsey to Col. Dammer  
Wants to get boundary situation straightened up. Road  
inct. in our area.  
Boundary road north-south 892335. Left boundary 100 yds.  
to the left of that, all the way into the factory.  
Rngr. boundary by river- southwest 863285  
Railroad crossing 885310
- 1238 - Col. Darby reports back to C.P.  
Gen. says will defend this area at all cost. Road inct.  
not full in our hands yet. Wants to know where 509  
are in contact on left. Thinks that they have blown a  
bridge.
- ~~1258 - Lockout to Col. Dammer  
on situation as of now~~
- 1259 - PW report and summary of information No. 4 27 Jan 44
- 1300 - Porter to Col. Darby  
Are on crossroads now. Everything fairly quiet.
- ~~1301 - Message No. 2 27 Jan 1944  
CG Bldg  
Request 10 copies of all 1:25,000 sheets in the following  
blocks: 144, 149, 151, 152  
CG 83rd CWS Bn.~~
- 1304 - Col. Darby to Cobra (Col. Conner)  
Co. B 894th T.D. supposed to be attached to force, but  
En CO says not.  
1 pt. of 601 ours, now.  
2 pt. coming from 601 and Rcms. Hqs.  
Co. of light tanks and possibly 3pts. of Med. tanks  
Mortar pts. of 751 st. On all pts. of our objective.  
Little done on road crossing  
Tight contact with Br. at town.  
Have road crossing at right. In contact with L Co. 7th Inf.

CG Ranger Force From CG Third Div. 262135A  
 Second Inf. Brig will advance their lines slightly  
 tonight so as to cover leading south in Grid Squares  
 8530 and 843L.

~~EXPOS~~  
~~2/28/64~~

1125 - 26 - 1750 A  
 VI Corps Pass 3rd U.S. Div. and Rngrs. Ref. No. 34  
 015 PD 2 Inf. BDE will adv. their eight TT line of  
 Roger Malletta so as to cover tracks leading south in  
 8530 and 843L PD. ~~later BDE RPT 508 BUDY RPT 7 BUDY all~~  
~~INSTR RPT 1001 2 Inf. BDE COLRPT PL SIX SIXTEN PAREN.~~  
~~BDE RPT PD 1001 2 Inf. BDE RPT 86 RPT 6305 dash three~~  
~~MAIN RPT RPT PD SOUTHBOUND PA 1001 R. PT AVE AIR~~  
 INFORMED.

~~Col. Hutchinson to Col. Dammer~~  
~~asked for name of today.~~

1130 - Porter to Major Martin  
 Have 7 prisoners. Will have them at C.P. Can have them  
 there in 15 minutes.

1131 ~~Col. Dammer to Major~~  
 No connection.

1131 - Cobra 2 to Major Martin  
 For info. on what the prisoners knew about Fanzer attack  
 were caught asleep in house. Custer at C.P.  
 Info. came from prisoners who were caught by Lockout.

1137 - Col. Hutchins to Col. Dammer  
 Wants to know how we are doing. 902338 is not doing so  
 good.

1145 - Capt. Lee to Major Martin  
 Info. on prisoners. 2 prisoners from 5th and 29th Inf.  
 Motorized. Picked up near Aprilia. Their Ins. were be  
 alert and withdraw when outnumbered. But were caught  
 asleep. Attack was around daylight on road leading out  
 of town. Has light contact all morning. Have artillery  
 in that sec. Guns - Dugout - trucks - guns 887063

1150 - Col. Hutchins to Col. Dammer  
 About half tracks up on hill from mortar position.

1155 - Col. Dammer to Lockout  
 Get in touch with Lt. Davey. Try to get him on phone.  
 Try to get new position. Firing at targets on road.  
 Fired on machine and on convoy.

1158 - Major Bobson reports into C.P.

1200 - Major Martin to Laboret  
 Line is still out.

27 JAN

Complaint to Gen. Daniel.  
I want you to know that the British almost shot at my  
3rd En. Will you please wait, General. I'll be right  
back. I want to talk this over more.

1015 - Cobra 3 to Dammer  
On this engineer outfit.

Yes.  
Well, you're going to lose all of the Engineers.  
What's happening to the 57-AT's?  
I don't know, sir.  
Well then, we'll keep em.

We don't want you to get these C.P.'s too far up, because  
of the proposed M.L.R.  
Our line reads right to left: 509th - 4th - 3rd.

General Daniel wants to speak to Ramsey.  
Hello, Ramsey you should not take those 57's away from  
these Rangers.  
Carlton said a Co. of T.D.'s are att. to Rangers.  
Carlton there's a report that there's a Panzer Div. attack  
planned against these Rangers according to 3 prisoners.  
Did you know that Darby was using all but 1st En. in his  
attack this morning.  
Hell, no. We didn't want that. I'm going to coordinate  
with Darby on the placement of this other Ranger En.  
(Carlton said): At the same time of the attack this morning  
we notified  
(Gen. Daniel): We must maintain our original line. Have  
you heard from Roson?

1039 - Col. Darby returns to C.P. Says we're hooked in tight  
with Scots Gd's.  
General says to get your 1st En. dug in in the position  
they're in now, ready for counter attack. 4M10 on road.  
Major Miller stretched way out. Hold this line here if  
possible. General says he can get heavy M.G.Co.

1050 - General O' Daniels to Cobra 5 (Col. Carlton)  
Left flank between us and British weak. Attack heavy weapons  
to Col. Darby ~~502 and 59130 area at center of pass 1st~~  
~~way on 488 and 80 on road west of 33~~  
~~4th Engr. 489 98's on road~~ Scots Gd's. on left by factory.  
~~part of 57 from Eng.~~ OK on artillery. Confusion on boundary,  
~~which is 29th line~~ Having to go way over to left on  
account of British being scattered. Put AT in weak spot  
protected by personnel.

1115 - Capt. Pithech to Cobra Holdfast  
Contact Capt. Swift and have him report at Rngr. Hd.  
G. Co. report to Concord.

1119 - Col. Darby leaves with Gen. O' Daniels

1120 - Message received:

27 JAN

- 0910 - Lt. Col. Dammer to Lt. Col. Murray  
Roy! There's a Gren. Gd's. rep. here. Said that  
an O.P. in the factory said he saw what he believed  
to be a large group of Rangers walking up the main  
road. (878-350) They must be Jerries.
- 0915 - Major Ramsey to Col. Dammer  
I'd like to have the situation.  
Yes, Ramsey, we're now on the objective given to  
us last night.  
Enemy has rather strong small arms fire in rd. sector.
- ~~0920 - Password for today is Flapper Fennie. Dammer to Sgt.  
in charge of password distribution for the day.~~
- 0930 - Roy to Dammer  
I'm at the W in the road. I want help from 3rd Bn.  
Roy. I can't see your point, so you'll have to talk  
that over with Al.  
Okay, I'll see him. I'm sure he can spare the men  
for my request.
- 0935 - Message to RF C.O.  
There will be an Engineer Officer report to your C.P.  
tomorrow morning. Designate an officer to actually go  
around with him to select areas for repair & mines.  
Engineers will do the work. We may have to call on  
you for help. Give him fullest cooperation.  
Signed, Truscott
- Eng. Capt. visited. Will recco. bridges at (905-290)  
and (919-288). States roads in Div. area have priority  
and doesn't know when can get at it.
- 0945 - Major Jones calls to C.P. to report his calls for fire  
from Murray.
- 0950 - Tokay reported to RF  
Tokay has reached objective.  
Dammer to Tokay: Message rec'd. Tell Tokay that Lockout  
is having trouble.
- 0955 - Dammer to Murray  
Tell Col. Murray that Tokay has reached there objective.
- 0959 - General O'Daniel was at C.P. to get our situation. He  
wanted to know what's been done about defenses.
- 1000 - Darby to Dammer  
British are in the factory but Jerries are right across  
from the factory. The Jerries have M.G.'s right in the  
middle of Al's area and are firing on the factory.  
The British are taking a hell of a shelling in that  
factory. Al & Roy are tied in. Roy & Tomasick are tied  
in. Right in front of Roy is a thick brush. It'll be  
hard to C. Post this frontal area.

JOURNAL FOR 27 JANUARY 1944 (Thursday)

Page 1.

0045 - Col. Dammer returns to C.P.

0140 - <sup>TOMASIC</sup>  
~~Thomack~~ to Col. Darby  
Patrol back with 1 man missing and 1 man wounded slightly.  
Found 2 M.G. around crossroad. Know that patrol wounded  
one enemy. Think maybe more.

0148 - Col. Darby to Lockout 6  
To let you know that the 509th had a patrol out at  
crossroad. Ey. has 2 M.G. there. Next CR probably  
has ey. there, too.

0240 - Col. Hutchins - Col. Darby  
For info. on message. News we are to move forward to  
crossroads tomorrow. Won't concern 83rd very much, but  
be on close watch to keep from firing mortars on our  
troops.

0645 - Col. Darby to Capt. Eunn.  
1. For info. on what contact on how close firing is to  
Col. Murray's position.  
2. Goes from left to right across front here now.  
3. About 1200 yds. from house.  
4. Troops crossing by right on field 3rd Rngr. Bn.

0734 - Col. Darby leaves C.P. to go on patrol with Riley and  
Walters.

0800 - Major Jones at C.P. for info. on gun positions.

0805 - Capt. 3rd Div. at C.P. looking for Lt. Davis, who will  
return to outfit.

~~0806 - Lighthouse to Major Martin - Checking line.~~

0809 - <sup>Vardegen</sup>  
~~Garbour~~ to Major Martin  
Is unit on right moving up. Important that contact  
them! 3rd Bn. 7th supposed to move up and fill up gap.

~~0820 - Martin to PWI group  
How about that P.W. report?  
Yes, I'll get right on it.~~

0900 - Message: To J.O. 83rd CW3 Bn.  
Co's C & D of 83rd CW3 Bn. revert to control of parent  
unit effective 1200 26 Jan.

~~CG 3rd Inf. Div.~~

~~6615 th Rm. Force~~

~~CG 1 O~~

~~AG 3-3 File~~

CG VI Corps  
Hill 3-3



SECRET

26 January 1951

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER

1.

1. Enemy made attack in some strength (Estimated 250 men, 25 tanks) mouth on main road against Guards Brigade on our left today. Scattered opposition seems to sum up enemy action in our sector. Corps G-2 believes 90th P.C. Division was moved vicinity of Gasta to oppose landing there. As adjustment of this situation is made attacks in increasing strength can be expected against us.

2. Our own situation is shown on attached overlay. In addition to units shown on overlay, 4 M-10's of 501st Battalion and Co "D" 894th TD will operate in our area to provide AT protection. PA support is furnished by 160th Bn and 77th Bn.

3. Division has directed that MLR be prepared as strong defensive position to form base for future operations. Unit CO's will prepare and submit plans for their areas to include sketch showing locations and lines of fire of BAR, and MG, dispositions of sections, field of fire of 60, 81, and 4.2 mortars, location and direction of fire of AT guns, recommended locations of mine fields, personnel and tank, wire, obstacles, and demolitions.

4. Plans are to be accompanied by requests for wire, sand bags, and demolition material.

HERMAN W. DAMMER  
Lt. Col., Ranger Force  
Executive Officer & S-3

Overlay attached.

SECRET

26-1833

From: IFC00A25 Jan 44  
 To: IFC00A25 Jan 44  
 Leader: IFC00A25 Jan 44  
 Ranger Force (EPO)

In the Field

26 January 1944

Number 5.

1. OUR FRONT LINE: See overlay
2. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See overlay
3. INFORMATION ON ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:
4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: See overlay

5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE 24th JAN  
 Made adjustment of troops on MLR  
 Moved CW mortars to better supporting position. Made contact right  
 and left. Moved CP. Engaged small enemy parties in houses forward  
 of our sector. Received none artillery fire. Fifteen Cuds unknown  
 caliber fell in 1st Bn area. No live rounds fired. Unable to retrieve  
 shells because of soft ground. Otherwise quiet night. One tank & about  
 615 enemy approached 4th Bn front. Driven off. Half tracks & TD engaged  
 targets several miles to north unable to observe  
 results.

- Excellent.
7. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS  
 Improved positions within sector. 57ms  
 guns emplaced at 915284 and 891301. Took 3 German prisoners. Guard  
 at minefield at 862277 turned over to No Staffordshire. Contact  
 made nightly at 1800, 2100, 2400, 0300 at 877313 with Scots Guards.

HUGHAN W. DARTER  
 Lt. Col, Ranger Force,  
 S-3

Over by to Accompan  
S-3 report 1200426 July  
Italy 1:50,000

36  
34

GREEN  
SOS

SCATS  
GDS

44  
OPT

509

50155

R4

G 82

A G 93

R  
2207

301

R

3  
17

1  
3

R E 7

3nd

26  
79

Green to accompany  
S-3 report 1200A to Jm  
Study 1:50,000

34

70

OREN GDS

SCOTS GDS

Distance between  
4th from 50

4th BN

509H

300 AT

R 4

A 83

A 83

R 30

504

X  
X 3

G 83

R

R 7

3

3rd BN

36

47

- 2210 - Col. Carlton to Darby - Darby ! How goes it with you?  
Okay, most of the action is on our left.  
Well, are you prepared for any trouble?  
Yes, we're set.  
I want you to move up to this road<sup>3</sup>  
and get set. I'm sending you some Engineers to ditch you  
in.
- 2235 - Col. Darby to Lockout  
Attack orders: 0530 Jump off time. You know the road  
reported to have a tank on it.  
Yes.  
Well this road has to be taken. As soon as you get your  
objective, you'll send out patrols to the next road. I'll  
attach 2 tracks to you till you get your obj.
- 2245 - Darby to Tokay  
Give me Tokay Sunray- Telephone connections very poor!  
Hello Tomasick. Attack order- 0530 jump off time. You  
must take that road<sup>3</sup>. Make sure you make con-  
tact with Murray at that crossroad. This will leave your  
right flank open. Everything clear?  
Yes, sir, clear.
- 2300 - Custer Blue  
Darby to Custer Blue Sunray  
Roson, tomorrow I'm ordered to take road(880-331 to  
900-902)
- 2305 - Landlord + Darby to Dobson  
Just wanted you to know 4th Bn., 509th Para. jump off  
tomorrow at 0530 hrs. on an attack. You're not initi-  
ally involved, but will be reserve.  
Okay, I understand, sir.
- 2330 - Col. Dammer left C.P. to inform 3rd Bn. to be prepared  
to move at 0500 hrs. tomorrow.

3. Division has directed that MLR be prepared as strong defensive position to form base for future operations. Units CO's will prepare and submit plans for their areas to include sketch showing locations and lines of fire of 60, 81, and 4.2 mortars, locations and direction of fire, of AT guns, recommended locations of mine fields, personnel and tank, wire obstacles, and demolitions.
4. Plans are to be accompanied by requests for wire, sandbags and demolition material.

Herman W. Dammer  
Lt. Col. Ranger Force  
Executive Officer & S-3

- 1920 - Col. Murray to Col. Darby  
Will meet <sup>at same time</sup> at same place tonight, 9, 12, 3.  
6. Sending in 4 prisoners. Prisoners say 4 companies are forming to attack again. Think 4 companies are way under strength.
- 1930 - Rep. of 894th T.D. reports to R.F. C.P.  
I want to report that our guns are in position. Our Co. is in direct support of you.
- 2014 - Rec. Overlay to accompany G-3 Report #5
- ~~2100 - Capt. Bunton to C.P.~~
- 2106 - Major Roson reports several trucks in vicinity of Carronc. At rd. jct. ~~is~~ a number of trucks pulling up at jct. and unloading. These trucks seem to be running down a small road. ~~is~~ The trucks are now moving west of Carronc.
- Col. Darby contacts Capt. Tomasick  
Tokay, did you get that?  
Yes  
Tomasick, hook me up with your OP. Sherman, the G.O. of the outpost. Sherman, I want you to ambush any vehicle that moves on that road.
- 2124 - Major Bond, Liaison officer ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> reported that the Scots Gds. wanted 4th Ranger En. to contact them at same place - same time.  
Col. Darby to Major Bond: The situation is: We are now to dig in in these positions.
- ~~2205 - Capt. Bunton, after receiving our per coordinates, left C.P.~~

1647 - No. 5 26 Jan. <sup>TEX</sup>  
We have info. Are prepared.  
CO Ranger Force

*James  
C. [Signature]*

1717 - Sgt. Swanson to Col. Dammer  
For info. on prisoner here now. Send him in peep with  
guard back to P.W. camp.

1735 - Darby returns to C.F.

1740 - 4 Enemy planes strafing and bombing - 1 shot down.

1750 - <sup>Frank</sup> reports that he got the half-track out, but he  
stuck two trucks.

1805 - Major Jones reports into C.P.  
Says that he estimates about 12 enemy guns up on the foot-  
hills.

1830 - Hutchins to Col. Darby  
Co. A. 8 mortars  
Co. B has one mortar  
Sand bag butt plates. Will have 15 mortars to fire in  
morning. Will be casualties on account of soft soil.  
Put timber down, then sandbag.

1831 - Capt. Karbel to 93d Army  
1 post at gate 1 at ~~C.P. truck~~ Stop vehicles at  
gate

1835 - Message  
26 Jan. Cq ARV 261753  
Enemy air attack 53720. 750 HRS. two ~~seriously shot~~  
down by flak ~~reference~~ one possible  
26 1834  
38

1848 - Operations Memorandum 26 Jan.  
Enemy made attack in some strength. Est. 250 men, 25  
tanks, south on main road against Guards Brigade on our  
left today. Scattered opposition seems to sum up enemy  
action on our sector. Corps G-2 believes 90th P.G.  
Division was moved vicinity of Gaeta to oppose landing  
there. As adj. of this sit. is made attacks in increas-  
ing strength can be expected against us.  
2. Our own situation is shown on attached overlay. In  
addition to units shown on overlay, 4M-10's of 601st  
Bn. and Co. D 894 T.D. will operate in our area to pro-  
vide AT protection ~~and~~ support is furnished by 160th  
Bn. and 77th Bn.



- 1518 - Major Martin to Sgt. Swanson  
Info. on when S-2 and S-3 reports will be ready.
- 1525 - Col. Dammer to Sgt. Swanson  
Wants to know why S-3 report wasn't made our way.
- 1540 - Col. Darby leaves C.P. to place 4-M10 on road.
- 1550 - Warrant officer from 3rd Div. wants to know how  
wounded are being handled. Wants to know where this  
area wants more ambulances. 95 and 93 Hospitals are  
here 36th will probably be in tomorrow. 93 at junction  
of road. 95 a few hundred yards from there;
- 1602 - Intercepted message  
Tank battle going on to the right about 20 enemy tanks  
no confirmation yet.
- 1605 - CO Ranger Force. (attention S-2)  
Enemy attacked at (877-344) at 260900A with approximate  
two five zero Infantry and two five tanks attack repul-  
sed by one British division. Report if you were involved.  
TRUSCOTT CG
- 1608 - C.B.S. - O - TOX  
26153Ba - GR-16  
Three enemy tanks reported moving south on north-south  
road your front have you this information  
261220/A
- 1611 - Message  
CBZ & TDX NRS - 261434A - GR5  
Request answer on Message 261220/A  
1444 SM
- 1625 - Col. Dammer comes by C.P. to get information on where  
front lines are
- ~~1631 - Capt. Bunton by C.P. hunting for Capt. Karbel~~
- 1634 - Capt. Saam to Col. Dammer  
Bridge Col. Darby asked about is good. Have mined it.  
Located out from our right flank.
- 1640 - No. 4 to Lighthouse 24 Jan.  
Kittens contacted enemy  
25 Jan. vice. (910-320)  
Attached art. has registered on house known to contain  
enemy and one M.G. House with power at (907-332) has  
fifteen enemy or 2 M.G.

Signed  
S-2 Katz  
1st Lt.

26 JAN

1410 - Lighthouse to Col. Darby  
Now have a line to Custer Blue

~~1412 - Col. Darby to Cobra - no connec.~~

1414 - Col. Darby to Cobra 5 (Col. Conner)  
Got message about attack. Only slightly involved.  
Got 5 prisoners. 3rd En. 29th Gren. Div. 2 tanks  
playing around on front. Contact with people on left  
only by patrol. 2 Co's on outpost. Outpost unit on  
right at small town very strong. Killed two Germans  
and had one man killed. Got tank and half track this  
morning. Sending S-2 over with oper. overlay. Will  
give location of new C.P.

~~1424 - Major Dobson left to go back to his C.P.~~

1430 - Capt. Anderson reports to C.P. Get 10,000 sandbags and  
also some wire. -order by Col. Darby

~~1437 - Lighthouse to Col. Dammer  
Have line in to lighthouse rear.~~

1442 - Capt. Karbel to Major Martin  
Wants info. on anti-tank guns in Force and 509th Para.  
3rd Div. wants this info.

~~1445 - Lighthouse to Major Martin  
Looking for Lt. Avedon~~

1447 - Capt. out of Cq. B 894th T.D. at C.P. Wants info. on  
how to get through on road. By outpost around blown  
bridge.

1455 - Lt. out of F.A. at C.P.  
Will support Rangers. Has 12 guns.

~~1459 - Col. Dammer to Lt. Avedon  
Couldn't locate  
to message center  
Radio operator coming to C.P.~~

~~1503 - Message  
CQ NW13 26 1445 26 1503 1445 Hrs. Flash 40 plus  
motor enemy trucks 33322 east  
1454th Hq~~

1510 - ~~SECRET~~  
Situation overlay 509th Para.

~~401 509 Para 1445  
Map 1445 4:50 AM  
Sheets 158 IV 1501  
26 1400 Jan 47 W. P. S.  
CQ 1445 1445  
Howland 413~~

1255 - Message 24, 1255  
C1 NFI 26 0059 BR22 Fighters over area 16007884  
6 plus tanks Batt on Rd. Bogs on either side with over  
area C/P 80245 CINT BAR

1300 - Report for Capt. Anderson:  
3rd Ranger- Strength 443  
Cannon Co. - Strength 50

1310 - Capt. Anderson reports to C.P.

1311 - Major Martin reports to C.P.  
G-2 and G-3 Report. Enemy can attack in force. Preparing  
to withdraw from 5A. Air situation good.

1315 - Capt. Anderson says that he can get vehicles as soon as  
the rest of the combat vehicles get in.

1320 - ~~Tommas~~ Tommasie to Col. Darby  
(1) On when to expect to move forward  
(2) Not any time soon.  
(3) Get wire to company on road at (904-329)  
(4) On his left Co. of 4th Rngr. has contact with Co. B  
(5) On right pt. of Co. A. with BAR.  
Main line at river line with 4th Rngr. (901-305)  
Sending runner to 3rd div 7th Inf.  
Coordinates of new C.P. (890-283) south of road.

1325 - Col. Dammer to ~~Robert~~  
No communication. Codes or Lockout. Labor lost

1331 - Col. Dammer to Lockout  
Has two Cos in reserve. Wanted to give info. on location  
of C.P.

1335 - Lt. Kolehagen reports to C.P. One <sup>enemy</sup> company wiped out ex-  
cept for 2 men. 12th Co. 3rd Regt. fixed on by machine  
gun. He has papers of a Frenchman who was a German  
prisoner of war.

1340 - Major Miller reports to C.P. A little action at 1st En.  
Infc. on how to get to Col. Murray's C.P.

1342 - ~~SECRET~~  
Disposition of Br Div. and attached troops as of  
1200 hrs. 25 Jan. 44. Ref. Map sheets 158111 & 158112  
scale 1:50,000

1350 - Lt. Davey reports to C.P. Get 3rd half tracks on down  
Can contact Lt. Davey at Capt. ~~Smith's~~ <sup>Neal's</sup> Company.

1407 - Capt. ~~Weissenberg~~ <sup>En</sup> reports to C.P. 83rd G has one Co.  
in woods by 1st En.

1409 - Major Dobson reports to C.P. Gives loc. of 1st En.  
Doesn't know about bridge-will find out.

JOURNAL FOR 26 JANUARY 1944 (Wednesday)

Page 1.

- 0708 - Col. Darby to 4th Para - Established contact left with British and right with 509
- 0744 - Col. Darby to Col. Murray  
Along line of river outpost to 2nd position. Dig in in depth. Set up interlocking fire. Set up obstacles. Do not put in wire. Leave path in mine field for road.
- 0915 - Col. Darby leaves C.P. for recon. trip.
- 0922 - Air raid in this area.
- ~~0923 - Lighthouse to labor lost - No connection~~
- 0931 - Message from 509th Para. Have contacted Sunray of Lockout and he has informed me of your instructions  
Sunray, 509
- 0938 - Leaving for new C.P.
- 1010 - Arrived new C.P. at (890-283)
- 1102 - Telephone line into C.P.
- 1103 - Test call to Landlord - Communications okay.
- 1104 - S-Sgt. Butler reports to Col. Dammer - boy wounded - Col. Dammer gave him his jeep to use
- 1145 - Col. Darby returns to C.P. with Major Jones, 160th F.A. Bn., 45th Div. Liaison Officer to R.F.  
Col. Darby says, At this time the British are settled into Carrocete. They're in the midst of a Jerry counter-attack right now. Reputed to be using Tiger tanks in that sector.
- 1149 - Col. Darby left C.P.
- 1155 - Capt. Saam reports at C.P. to Col. Dammer. Capt. Saam gets picture made at rear of C.P. A few shells landed close to 1st En. area. Apparently low M.V. Couldn't locate position.
- 1225 - Capt. Saam gets back to 1st En. area.
- ~~1230 - Spl. Dudkow checks light switch on C.P.~~
- 1245 - Col. Darby returns to C.P. with Capt. Goldstein. ~~Saam~~ <sup>Doesn't</sup> thinks British have very good hold on town. Made complete tour of area.
- 1248 - Col. Dammer to Lighthouse Lockout, Landlord, today telephone lines not up.

SECRET  
(Excluded British Forces Section)

From: 1200A  
To: 1200A25  
Headquarters  
Ranger Force (Bro)  
In the Field

25 January 1944

Number 4.

1. GCP FRONT LINE: See Overlay.

2. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See Overlay.

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:  
See Overlay.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:

Cloudy, mist - visibility poor.


5. TROOP OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD: Moved per division verbal orders to extend right flank of British 1st Division. 4th Ranger Bn and 509th Para Bn moved at 0730 hrs to positions shown. CPL established and patrols sent to Fiaccola Creek. Platoon of 4.2 mortars moved to support operation.

6. COMBATANT EFFICIENCY: Excellent.

7. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Extension of bridgehead.

HENRY W. DAVEN  
Lt. Col, Ranger Force,  
3-3

Overlay to Accompany  
S-3 report 25 Jan 44  
Italy (150,000)



25 JAN

- 1826 - Col. Embry, CO 160th F.A. Bn.  
Will send L.O. to C.P. Also send each of your Bns. a F.O. officer.  
Col. Embry's unit is ordered to relieve 10th F.A. Bn. and is to make  
necessary changes tomorrow.
- 1836 - Col. Darby to Lt. Hutchinson  
Sentry, Will you please come up and see Sunray  
Yes sir, I'll be right up.
- 1999 - Capt. Weisenberg to Col. Darby  
Hello, Col. I understand there's some sort of a change taking place tomorrow-  
Is that correct?  
Yes, I'll give you details tomorrow. How's everything with you?  
Okay! Goodnight, sir.
- 1950 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson Left Ranger Force C.P.



1625 - Martin to Longbow  
 Col. Hutchinson/  
 He isn't there, sir. Shall I have him call you?  
 Yes, sir

1650 - Message in British situation  
 Firm all along front, only difficulty being on the left, as the enemy  
 have mortars & M.G. Posts in woody land by bridge over river Walleeta & are  
 holding up our troops.

(No signature)

1700 - Message intercepted Unable to decode  
 JFC (Special Mission) 24  
 02-6-2515301  
 Tiger Ensign Eagle Error Mamel  
 Focus Finch Swipe Howling Bucket  
 Skunk Lilac Cuzco Micr Jockey  
 Banjo Jay Parake Falcon Hinstep  
 Firm Rascal Tomale Yacon P.D. Jones  
 Cigar Forrest Lee Bear Pappo  
 Tablet Tiger 2515301

1717 - Col. Darby returns to G.P.

1718 Message from G.P.C.  
 12 Heavy Bombers 1928 No 200 hrs. Severe ground haze made (B.C. difficult  
 to see) Bombers scattered N.W. FEBRUARY 25 1944. 0845. P.M. (4700-  
 5 N.Y. SW 0250) Scattered Mt. N. N.T.C. 0225 which all night. 0845 met.  
 SE FROSTING CIP AND 12 met. North 0850 155 20 Plus Met. (sou h 0470)  
 20 Met. East 0945. General impression little Mt. Early Light increased  
 to heavy by 0440 hrs. No particulars direction  
 G.P.

1735 - Message from G.P.C.  
 24 P.M. 0810 hrs. Bombed STAFED Velleuri and PMS 145 B. 085456 25 255000 Rd  
 June 1938 140. Reminders low results (G. Dist. 1074500). Sacrificed 2000.  
 Mt and 107 P.M. 0810 hrs. 0820 Radar S. No. 085000. Barracks 0845  
 Ops. 1 engine 0845 0850 0845. 1 year 15. 1074500. 085456 140  
 Walleeta Ave  
 G.P.

1755 - Comet to Col. Darby  
 North of 32 point 5 Grid. Inf. where to fire tonight.

1805 - To Sunray from Landless  
 2 Companies have moved to right now in position.

1848 Sgt. Johnson to Lt. Taylor  
 Inf. on to go.

- 1436 - Darby to Murray  
Murray's on 1st obj. 509th on 2nd obj. I want registration on those points out past 509th's 2nd obj.
- ~~1437 - Col. Hammer to Cepra~~
- ~~1440 - Darby to Cepra No connection.~~
- ~~1450 - Sgt. Powell to Major Martin.  
Wants information.~~
- 1405 - Lockout 4 to Sunray  
Bridge needs repair before being used.
- ~~1455 - No change to report.~~
- ~~1500 - Lt. Avedon to Lighthouse to let them know where he is.~~
- 1502 - Capt. Gibson to Major Martin  
Steel red 2 all ready to go. 2 observers just left C.P. to go to their Bn.
- ~~1510 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson at C.P. to see Col. Darby.~~
- 1525 - Call for Lt. Avedon about Cole line which is being put in by main road.  
Breaker position (882-282) or 882-285
- 1548 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson at C.P. asking for Col. Darby. B Co. 83rd could be moved in tonight. (Present position of 83rd Cus (886-483))
- ~~1555 - Cole's old line is out. Avedon, never mind. Don't worry about it.~~
- 1600 - Message relayed by telephone from radio to Sunray:  
Major Sunray not here, can I take the message? ~~lower.~~
- ~~1605 - Major Miller reports into Hunter voice C.P.  
Hello, how's the coffee? Ha, ha~~
- 1610 - Avedon to Gonzales  
Where did the information concerning isolation of some British come from?  
I don't know, sir, Gonzales isn't here. I'll have him call you back.
- 1615 - Avedon to Mexico  
Hello V. Is this Mexico? Yes, this is Mexico.  
How's the chow situation?  
Okay I'll be ready in a minute.
- 1620 - 3rd Bn. C.P. is now located at (877-254) as reported by Major Miller
- 1625 - 10th F.A. Officer to Major Martin  
Is it safe to fire at (882-272)  
Hell, no! We're in there now with patrols.  
Okay, thanks.
- ~~1649 - Col. Hammer returns to C.P.~~

25 JAN

- 1156 - Capt. Saam to Col. Damper  
Taking azimuth on Battery 12 degrees off road. Range est. about 8 miles  
at foothills of Carrocto.
- 1208 - Major Miller to Labor lost  
Plan to move out of present home. Get everything ready. Check pile of bed  
rolls and get them to the ones they belong to.
- 1212 - Strafing and bombing air raid in area of C.P. - One German plane.
- 1216 - Message from Tokay:  
We are dug in at 2nd obj. Have been in contact with unit on my right.  
Have no contact on my left.
- 1221 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
1244 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
1244 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
1244 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
1244 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
1244 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
1244 - ~~Message from Tokay~~  
Tokay to Labor
- 1230 - Artillery shell hit right near our C.P.
- 1237 - Dobson to Damper  
Am relaying message for Col. Darby. Col. Darby is now at the 4th Bn.'s old  
C.P. near dairy farm. Prepare movement order. Move to woods east of  
the dairy. ~~Wants Frank to get timber to repair bridge at~~  
(910-287).
- 1245 - Major Dobson to Col. Damper  
Sunray is on his way back to C.P.
- 1250 - Martin to Labor lost: ~~Frank~~  
Dirks, have you seen Frank?  
He is down at the main road. Tell him to report to C.P. right  
away.
- 1259 - Lt. ~~Frank~~ reports to C.P.
- 1300 - Intercepted message #4 25 Jan. 1944  
At present twenty-four Guards Brigade fighting for possession of large  
factory vicinity PARENPIFOT 75830 Signed, 251227A
- 1301 - Col. Darby returns to C.P.
- 1312 - Rec. G-3 Report #3 from 1201 25 Jan 44 to 1200 24 Jan. 44 from Mq. 3rd  
Div. A.P.O. #3
- 1316 - Message Lighthouse to Sunray  
We are dug in at our 2nd objective. No contact with unit on left. Have  
been in contact with combat patrol with unit on my right.  
Sunray Tokay
- 1335 - Message from CG VI Corps  
Beginning 25 Jan. and hereafter, P-47 Thunderbolt aircraft will fly 5th  
Army and VI Corps area. Close in appearance to FW-190. Warn all troops  
not to fire at Thunderbolts.

Signed, Bill G-3  
111

- 0915 - Col. Dammer for info. on obce, which is 509th.
- 0922 - OBOE Sunray to C.P.  
We have reached our first objective and on the absence of further orders we are moving on after we re-organize.
- 0929 - Received No. 1 Divisional C.P. Instructions No. 2 Copy No. 11 24 Jan.
- 0930 - Received 1st British Div. Location Statement of 24 Jan.
- ~~0932 - Major Miller to Major Martin~~
- 0936 - Major Miller to Major Martin  
Info. on plan which was to go into effect this morn. Everything going according to plan. 4th and 509th are on init. obj. British are at the place where they were kicked out of yesterday
- ~~0938 - Major Miller to Major Martin~~
- 0955 - Sunray to Major Martin  
We have established contact with the enemy at our second objective
- 0959 - Major Martin to Lighthouse for info. on Sunray telc. line. Was no telc. line.
- 1002 - S-4 to Major Martin for information on rations.
- 1005 - Major Martin to Lighthouse : send Lt. Waines to C.P.
- ~~1010 - Capt. Nanton reports at ...~~
- ~~1015 - Capt. Nanton leaves ...~~
- 1030 - Liaison officer from <sup>GUARDS</sup> ~~Reserve~~ Brigade at C.P. looking for and giving information.
- ~~1105 - Second Chemical Officer at C.P. for information.~~
- 1131 - Location Report S-2 and S-4 0800 24 Jan - 0800 25 Jan.  
Patrol to our front fired on with 20 rds. 8" mortar. No other contact. ~~Front~~ Front lines and locations see overlay. Contact with 3rd Rngr. Bn. on left. 509 Para on rt. Weather clear. Visibility unlimited.  
~~1131 1030 1100 1130~~ Patrols to front and rt. front. One man wounded no equip. lost, no prisoners. Result of opns. ~~Front~~ Front approx. 1200 yds. Reported clear of enemy.
- Squad S-2
- 1140 - Intercepted Message  
Request locations of advance elements of Seventh, Fifteenth and Thirtieth Inf. I have proper code machine to receive location by radio.
- 1150 - Col. Parby with Major Tobson
- ~~1151 - Major Miller reported at C.P.~~
- ~~1155 - Major Miller reported at ... for information.~~

JOURNAL FOR 25 JANUARY 1944 (Tuesday)

Page 1.

0057 - Lt. Col. Conner reports to Col. Darby. Says lots of elements of Herman Goering Div. giving Corps their main opposition in ~~3rd~~ <sup>3rd</sup> Sector. Col. Conner says R.F. should not go beyond initial objective without further orders from 3rd Div. ~~then~~

Enemy:  
 Elements of 3rd, Herman Goering  
 Elements of 29th

~~0058 - Col. Conner reports~~

0500 - Lt. Col. Murray reports into C.P. for last minute instructions before he pushes off.

0605 - Cobra calling S-2 or S-3. Asked situation as to quietness. Also asked if we were prepared to move out.

0705 - Col. Darby, Major Martin, & Capt. Weisenberg left to start the push. ~~then~~

~~0705 - Col. Darby reports~~

0810 - Col. Pammer to Landlord 8 3rd Bn. of 7th report being mortared from (908-370) (very rough guess). He moved by daylight. Sir, I'm picking up the Liaisons with 4th & 509th Para. and am sending them back.

0814 - Col. Darby called to say he is at 4th Bn.

0835 - Air raid in this section (3 planes)

0845 - Col. Carls & Major Williams S.A. calls at C.P. for info. concerning where to place Bn. of Field art.

0850 - Driver who has been driving for Eric. ~~the~~ Churchill, reported back to CP with his peep.

0852 - Major William, Col. Carl says Bn. of Field artillery can be here by noon.

0854 - ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> Sunray ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~reached~~ <sup>reached</sup> our first obj. Are moving on after we reorganize.

~~0900 - Col. Conner reports~~

0908 - Col. Darby, Major Martin, and Capt. Weisenberg back at C.P.

0910 - Col. Conner to Col. Pammer

- (1) On first objective.
- (2) People on left have accomplished State Express.
- (3) Lt. Col. Conner know when get there.

**SECRET**

STAFFORDSHIRE (CST. SEC. 2)

24-1423

From: 1800A 24 Jan 44  
To: 1800A 24 Jan 44  
Lead: mine sweepers,  
Ant. or Force: (S)ron  
In the Field

24 January 1944


Number: 8.

1. OUR FRONT LINE: See Attached Overlay.
2. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See Attached Overlay.
3. INFORMATION ON ADJACENT UNITS AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS:  
See Overlay; Company H, 36th Engr (Less Anti-Tank Platoon) held from attached.
4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Clear and Warm
5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD: Moved to occupy area held by 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment. Closed into new area 1630 hours. Patrols north to east and west road through 240-247 and east to NJ 215 224. 3rd Chemical disposed in support as shown on overlay.
6. COMBAT EFFECTIVITY: Excellent.
7. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Contact with No Staffordshires on left and 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry on right.

HERMAN J. DALE, JR.  
Lt. Col, Ranger Force,  
S-3


**SECRET**

**SECRET**



Overlay to accompany C-3  
Report 1200 A 24 Jan 44  
Italy 1: 50,000

Number three



**SECRET**



page 9.

JOURNAL FOR 24 JANUARY 1944 (Monday)

~~0800 - Lt. Pevey and Lt. Prater arrived at the barracks and  
checked in with the sergeant.~~

2300 - Received Administrative Order #1 to Accompany Field Order #2 from  
HQ's 3rd Inf. Div. (G-4 / P.O. #E).

2520 - 601st T.D.'s called report they are sending one platoon up to sup-  
port Lt. Col. Murray's step off tomorrow. Will report at dawn to  
Major Dobson of Rngr. 1st Bn. to await further orders there.

2550 - Lt. Col. Dammer returns to C.P. and reports:  
The Grenadier Guards expect to pass (our C.P.L.) at 0720.

Code Words: Cigar - Jumpoff Position  
State Express - Crossroads at Carroceto  
Goldflake - Crossroads at 8858

- 2140 - Darby to Cobra 5  
Could you spare me some T.D.'s?  
Carlton to Darby  
I'll send you the dope, Darby.
- 2145 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson ~~has~~ reported to Col. Darby for  
orders concerning the step off at daylight  
Col. Darby to Col. Hutchinson  
You will be ready to give support to the units I  
put into action tomorrow morning.
- 2156 - Capt. Weisenberg to 509th  
Let me speak to Lt. Knoles, please. He's the for-  
ward observer for you people. Knoles, tomorrow you'll stay  
in with 509th for this jump off tomorrow. Col. Darby and  
myself will be roaming around with 610 set.  
If you get in the position where you can't fire your  
guns, just relay straight to base. Ask support of 9th  
F.A. or 36th F.A. Bn.
- 2204 - At 1st light I'll have 4 mortars at the hill also  
1 gun with 1st and 1 with 4th Bn.
- 2215 - Capt. Weisenberg to Lt. Schultz:  
Schultz, come daylight we push due north- check-  
point 38 is the starting point. You're to join 4th Bn.  
and give him your able assistance. Put the additional  
two strips on your maps.
- 2225 - Capt. Weisenberg to Comet white:  
"5"aker Battery - Have you found the jeep of Lt.  
Schultz's?
- ~~2225 - Nothing to report~~
- 2300 - Message #37  
Received message #37, which reads as follows:  
609 ON G-8 OUT OF ACTION  
with (VEJ) Third Div. Via  
(UYM) The Liaison Station  
(No signature)  
(No date)

2030 - Dammer to Avedon  
I have a message here for you. (Get Lt. Haines to  
C.P. right away)

2040 - Col. Darby to ~~Doc~~ ~~27~~ ~~North~~ ~~Start~~ ~~(No)~~  
conversation.

2045 - Col. Darby to Cobra (Darby to Col. Carlton)  
I would like information concerning movements of  
our friends on our left.

Carlton to Darby: You will move out with the Scot  
guards - As support on their right flank.

2059 - Capt. Weisenberg liaison officer from 10th F.A.  
says he cannot fire beyond (Point 48) (~~Check Point 42~~)  
He can fire 2000 yards beyond Point 42

2100 - Darby to Lockout  
Roy, movement order, you will be ready to move out  
with your En. at QPL to give support to our friends on  
your left.  
I'll meet you at the bridge.

2110 - Report of Cobra  
Mine field at 860-274 - runs along field. Will  
you take responsibility of mine fields?

2112 - Patrol from 4th En. reported into Ranger Force  
H.Q.

2121 - Col. Darby to Lt. Col. Hutchinson  
Hutch, Jerry paratroops are reported in your  
vicinity. Warn your troops. And then you get the hell  
up here right away. We got business to do.

2125 - Darby to Landlord 6  
You notify Major Dobson that Roy's En. will be  
on his O.P.L. at daylight ready to step off.

2127 - Darby to Labor lost  
Al, there's a mine field at (860-274). It runs  
East 200-700 yards. You're now responsible. In event  
of movement, you're to either dig them up or mark them  
clearly.

2130 - Darby to Tokay  
You're to be prepared to move out at daylight from  
Murray's O.P.L.  
We'll try to give you A.T. support-possibly a  
company or platoon.

1918 - Dammer to Landlord  
Saam's results of afternoon Recon:  
B. co. went to stream at (875-308) Claim fired on  
by one rifle shot- Saw what was thought to be 5 Jerries  
move into a house at (865-315) Had 2 4.2's fire on this  
position. One platoon of C Co. as connecting link to  
509th Para.

Col. Darby wants to know if Saam has a double  
outpost line.

Major Dobson drove a peep into 21.7- West Main  
road sector. Reports no mines on route. British using  
new password which is causing much confusion - ~~Bliss~~.

1924 - Dammer to Tokay  
Reported that pilot from falling plane was well  
beyond 1st Bn. outpost lines.

1945 - Enemy fire coming from right front of Ranger Force  
C.P.

1950 - Lt. Davey reports that 2 of his tracks stuck in 1st  
Bn. sector. Fired all afternoon at various targets out in  
front of 1st Bn. outpost line.

Col. Darby gave orders for Davey to be ready to move  
out at daybreak.

Lt. Davey reports that he shot up the house at  
(863-315)

Col. Darby gave Lt. Davey his orders to operate  
along road.

2005 - Major Miller reports  
Art. observer reported that each of his Bn's has  
captured a parachutist in sector right front of 4th Bn.

2008 - Col. Darby to Lt. Col. Murray -  
Col. Darby alerted Col. Murray concerning German  
paratroops in 4th Bn. sector.

2010 - Darby to Landlord 6  
Capt. Saam has been alerted as to German paratroops  
He is to run patrol to Ranger Force H.Q.

2014 - British officer (Lt. Stevens from British 1st)  
claims that they are stepping off towards objective.

2019 - Col. Darby to Cobra 3  
Representatives of friends on our left, are at cur  
C.P. Is there any information for me?  
Cobra 3 to Darby  
Nothing new-will let you know later.

24 JAN

1610 - Col. Darby returned to C.P.

1637 - Lt. Avedon reports change of password.

~~1646 - Col. Dammer to Lt. Avedon (No connection)~~

1650 - Air raid vicinity of Anzio and British Loyals Sector.

1658 - Col. Dammer to Redwood  
Report finding of signal operation instructions-  
copy #178 @map ref. marked code - Reg. 1689 - Envelope  
marked Torpedo found on main road running N & S

~~1700 - Call to Redwood cleared~~

~~1740 - Nothing to report~~

~~1745 - Capt. Callahan to check telephone line~~

1804 - Col. Darby to Labor lost Checking to see if lines are okay.

~~1807 - Lt. Col. Murray called at C.P.~~

1817 - Tokay report plane's been hit Report Paratroopers are being dropped in vicinity of N.E. Tokay.

1820 - Darby to Landlord:

Kitchens alert your O.P.'s and contact Major Dobson about Paratroopers in Tokay sector.

1830 - Capt. Thomas reported at 1800 of seeing enemy plane, apparently hit by flak caught fire- traveled about two miles burning- Did a final plunge to earth at a spot about 2 miles to Tokay's right front Believed he saw 2 parachutists drop.

1852 - Lt. Colonel Murray & Capt. Nye left Force C.P. with orders to hold present positions until future orders.

1902 - Weaver of British Brigade to Col. Darby

I'm sending you a British liaison officer to speak to you about a few things.

1910 - Dammer to Labor lost

Major Miller says nothing new

Col. Dammer gives orders to hold pat in your present position.

1915 - Col. Hutchinson to Dammer:

It would be good to have an observer with Tokay

- ~~1320 - Major Martin from "F" Co.  
(a) Artillery liaison officer please~~
- 1325 - Major Martin to Labor lost (Sunray)  
(a) Info m the friends on our left that Naval Fire Control parties have been notified as to Carraceto.
- 1326 - Lt. Col. Dammer gives Lt. L. Kneass orders to start another patrol out
- 1316 - Message (Part 2)  
Operations- Occupation of positions and patrols to front and right  
Morale- Excellent, no combat losses.  
Op'rs. resulted in contact with Ey. patrol with no exchange of fire. No Ey. pers. or mat. captured or destroyed.
- 1359 - Reported by Col. Darby:  
2 half tracks firing on Ey. in 1st Bn. area
- 1400 - Col. Darby and Lt. Col. Dammer went out on recco. in peep with Riley & Walters as guards.
- 1423 - Lt. Col. Yarboro<sup>da</sup> reports 509th as now in position.
- 1424 - Capt. Bunton of British asks situation from Major Martin.
- 1429 - Believed Naval fire upon Carraceto explosions sound quite heavy.
- 1455 - General Penny<sup>e</sup> at C.P. to see Col. Darby
- ~~1450 - Lt. Nole called Major Martin~~
- 1500 - 83rd Chem. Officer to Labor Lost concerning radio lost yesterday.
- 1503 - Major Martin to Lighthouse concerning Custer tel. line Custer line out.
- 1512 - Col. Dammer returned to C.P.
- 1515 - Comet white 3 to Major Martin for info. con. coordinates (879-283)  
(a) Major Martin to Comet white 3 not to fire because of our patrols in that area.
- 1535 - Lt. Kneass to Major Martin  
In this area Germans are about 1 mile from here. Patrol has contacted 3rd Div. in this area.  
Ey. seems about to counter attack in this area.
- ~~1535-1535 Nothing to report.~~

1235 - Col. Darby directed the American Naval Fire Control party to start shelling Carroceto.

~~1240 - Col. Dammer to Tokay (important - no contact)~~

1243 - Received 3-3 report 3rd Div. 23 Jan.

1244 - Col. Darby returns.

1244 - Col. Dammer to Capt. Saam

(a) Has the outpost line been posted?

(b) Cpl. Yarboro is now moving through 4th En.

Col. Darby to Saam

(c) Two enemy tanks have just broken through your line. They are in your immediate front. One of your lts. shot in leg. Davey has been notified to move out forward of outpost line.

1246 - 1st Sgt. from "A" Co. shot in leg - believed to be mortar fragment.

(a) Sgt. Gabriel reported that he and his patrol ran smack into a Mark IV German tank in Carroceto.

1300 - Major Miller reports the British patrol claim:

(a) Tanks supported by Inf. in Carroceto.

(b) British are pulling back from Carroceto.

~~1310 - Col. Dammer to Capt. Karbel  
(call cancelled)~~

1312 - Col. Dammer to Lt. Avedon

We want runners at G.P. Truck at all times.

1314 - Message from Col. Dammer to C.G. 3rd Div.

Bridge at 918-288 blown.

Patrols find enemy in Carroceto 865-330

1 Mk IV Tank and some Infantry

2 tanks moving S.E. from Carroceto at 860-322

Enemy patrol estimated at 15 in Padiglione

920-288

1316- Message from force 3-2 and 3-3:

S-2 reports 0800 23 Jan. 1944 to 0800 24 Jan. 1944

Contact with Ey. patrol est. strength 8 at F880-297 during early evening; Ey. radio in Vic. later patrol in more strength unable to locate. Ey. patrol reported Vic 0800 moving fast in N.W. direction.

S-3 report 0800 23 Jan. 1944 to 0800 24 Jan. (Location of troops - overlay art. Contact 3rd Ranger En. on right. Patrol to 7th Inf. on Left. Visibility A.M. 23 unlimited.



- 1115 - Capt. Saam wants information concerning bed rolls.  
 (a) Col. Dammer says get them their bed rolls.  
 (b) Major Miller was at 1st Bn. - his information was passed on by one of his art. parties.  
 (c) Italian family walking from Rome to Anzio on its way to C.P. to give information concerning enemy.
- 1120 - Lt. Jordan 3rd Division reported with one more forward observer.
- ~~1125 - Checking time to Landlord (Capt. Saam)~~
- 1127 - Comet White reports mortar firing one thousand yards from 886-245 325 azimuth.
- 1128 - Capt. Bunton British liaison officer reports:  
 (a) No contact with enemy during night patrol to 865-326; found cross roads unoccupied.  
 (b) Intermittent firing during night  
 (c) No casualties.
- 1132 - Col. Murray reports 5 men wounded & 1 killed - believed by mortar fire - mentioned in previous paragraph.
- 1137 - Col. Dammer to Lockout. reports dope to Col. Murray about mortar firing from one thousand yards from (886-245) 325 azimuth.
- 1137 - Party of Italians from Rome to Anzio reports to C.P.
- 1144 - Capt. Karbel reports: The Italians (1 man, 1 woman, 3 children) claimed there were about 750 German troops about 13 Km. due north.
- 1144 - Message #12 received.
- 1209 - Col. Murray to Col. Dammer:  
 (a) Patrol moved out as previous ordered.  
 (b) Sending FOC party from 36 Field Art. up to you.
- ~~1210 - Major Martin reports into C.P.~~
- 1212 - Major Martin reports on contact with North Staffordshires.  
 (a) - N.S.'s are using motor patrols in their immediate sector. N.S.'s are in contact with our 3rd Bn.
- 1216 - Capt. Karbel to Message Center:  
 (a) C.O. wants 2 runners over to C.P. truck.
- 1217 - Col. Dammer to Labor Lost 6  
 (a) (Lt. Evans by mistake)  
 (b) Col. Dammer wants any one of these.
- 1222 - Col. Dammer to Miller  
 (a) Wants telephone line to North Staffordshires from 3rd Bn.

JOURNAL FOR 24 JANUARY 1944 (Monday)

0800 - Lt. *Darby* & Lt. *Frank* instructed to place AT guns & track on *at 3rd line*  
0830 - Capt. Weisenberg - Arty. Liaison with Jordan & Shultz reported - given instructions

0900 - Rec'd 3rd Div. G-2 #61 report 23 Jan. Gave to Martin.

0900 - Rec'd Map reference code SOI - 3rd Div. Gave to Avedon.

0900 - Rec'd G-3 report 22 Jan. Gave to Avedon.

0900 - Rec'd SOI & signal circulars 3rd Div. Gave to Avedon.

0945 - Msg. to XII A.S.C. re bomb line.

1005 - Col. Darby left on recco. to 1st & 3rd re AT defense.

1008 - Maj. Martin left to contact British.

1040 - Tel. msg. from Maj. Miller that British have taken Carroceta, taken some prisoners & gotten info. that a Pz. Div. can be expected against this force shortly.

1045 - (a) Lt. <sup>Hokve</sup> ~~Wang~~ 22nd to Capt. Karbel 444  
(b) 23rd 443 one wounded  
(c) 183 not for duty  
(d) 612 total for duty

1046 - Capt. Shunstrom reports:  
(a) Bridge at 919-287 blown  
(b) 12 men reported to be working in 9231 sector  
(c) Believed to be working on road 5 men in 680-335 sector.  
(d) At this bridge very good O.P. 919-287

1055 - Col. Darby left on recco. with cycle.

1055 - Small arms fire reported out to our right flank (Col. Darby)

1106 - Capt. Bunton British FOO given <sup>situation</sup> ~~reference~~ by Col. Dammer

1107 - Capt. Goldstein reports 2 men with infections. Lt. Col. Dammer told them to turn in their equipment.

1112 - Col. Murray called - 5 men wounded, 1 killed.

**SECRET**

(Equivalent to British "TOP SECRET")

1900 22 Jan 44

From: 1000 23 Jan 44

To: Headquarters,  
Rangers, Italy (Prov)

25 January 1944

2.

Number


1. OUR PROBLEMS: See Atchd overlay.
2. LOCATION OF TROOPS: See Atchd Overlay.
3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:  
Contact between 1st Div (Brit) and 8rd Div (US) at CR 862286.
4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:  
Cloudy and cold.
5. OUR OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD:  
Extended to initial beachhead line.
6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Excellent.
7. BUSINESS OF OPERATIONS: Port cleaned up to permit landing of Peter shipping. Contact established with 8th S.S. Brigade at 860208 and 1st Battalion 7th Infantry at 860228. Physical contact with Scots Guards at 858206.

HERBERT W. DALLER  
Lt. Col, Ranger Force,  
G-3


**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Number Two



Italy 1:50,000  
Overlay to accompany  
S-2 Report to  
1200-A-23 Jan 44.



**SEC**

23 JAN

- (7) Atch'd Surv. teams will remain Anzio and report to Surgeon VI Corps.  
 Co. HQ 26th Eng. ret'd from atch'd with exception 3 AT guns & mine sweeps.  
 (8) 83rd CWS will support from positions vic. (867-261)  
 (9) DUKWS revert to VI Corps - report to Col. Stanley.  
 (10) Col. peep - CP truck - wire truck - Dammer peep & recon. will move  
 in ahead.

- 1400 - Recon. party & CP group moved out from Anzio.  
 1405 - *By intelligence, Radar Zone moved by truck to new area.*  
 1630 - All units closed in new areas.  
 1625 - *Arrived in new area & set up CP*  
 1720 - Rec'd 509 situation overlay.  
 1830 - Rec'd msg re HSL from XII ASC  
 1840 - Naval art. officer, Lt. Reinhart reported - told to stand by till AM  
 2100 - Rec'd Dabson's situation report.  
 2105 - Rec'd Div. FO #2 20-2 periodic report by msg.  
 2135 - Col. Darby & Lt. Avedon ret'd from recon.  
~~Major Miller visited.~~  
 2330 ~~Major Miller left for HSB~~

JOURNAL FOR 25 JANUARY 1944 (Sunday)

Page 1.

- 0310 - Lt. Col. Gardes, FX Off, 36th Ingr stopped in to inquire about tactical situation.
- 0439 - 509th called in and reported all okay.
- 0545 - 509th called in and reported all okay.
- General - Beginning at 2300 22 Jan 44, and continuing throughout the night, harbor and beach shelled steadily. Caliber of gun undetermined. Relieved to be a mobile 88mm.
- ~~0645 - Lt. Col. Hutchinson reported in at CP.~~
- ~~0655 - Major Dobson reported in at CP.~~
- 0925 - Col. Darby left for a recon. of positions.
- 1000 - Information with reference to Irish troops: Received from Capt. Buntton. Loyals Square (82-28), North Staffs (84-28), Scots Guards (84-24). Info. from Capt. Lewis, "just returned from CR (862-286). British and U.S. have contact at that CR.
- 1020 - Call from Col. Yarborough requesting information.
- 1040 - Col. Darby returned from recon.
- 1050 - Col. Darby left for 3rd Inf. Div.
- ~~1055 - Major Hutchinson and Capt. Seam at CP.~~
- 1125 - Short air raid on ships in harbor of about 5 minutes duration.
- 1150 - Col. Darby received FO (verbal) from Commanding General, 3rd Inf. Div. at Div. CP.
- 1230 - Col. Darby returned from 3rd Inf. Div. and held meeting of all force Commanders, in which he gave verbal ~~order~~ field order (See Col. Darby for Copy of Orders)
- 1300 - Meeting of all Bn. and unit CO's - Col. Darby ret'd from 3rd Div. with following inst:
- (1) Force will move out w/o delay to relieve 2nd Bn. 7th Inf. vic. square 8626.
  - (2) 1st and 3rd Bn. will move w/o delay to take up positions along road (860-268) to (877-267) - outpost to road (862-286) to (860-285)
  - (3) 4th Bn. will assemble present location and follow north after 1st Bn. clears and assemble in reserve vic. CR(865-240)
  - (4) 509th Pn. will move when ready to assemble in reserve vic. CR (863-226).
  - (5) Eng. AT guns will be towed by Cannon Co. half tracks to vic. Force CP.
  - (6) CP will be at CR(867-253)

**SECRET**

(English British 1057 SEC 102)

From: ~~1000 21 Jan 44~~

To: ~~1000 22 Jan 44~~

Headquarters, 82 Airborne Division

Ranger Force (Sec)

Anzio, Italy

22 January 44

Number: 1

1. **OUTPOST LINE:** See attached Overlay

2. **LOCATION OF TROOPS:** See attached Overlay

3. **INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS:**

4. **WEATHER AND VISIBILITY:** See attached Overlay.

Clear and Cool, visibility unlimited.

5. **KEY OPERATIONS FOR THIS PERIOD:**

Landed on Yellow Beach, Anzio at 0200 hours with two battalions abreast, seized port and town of Anzio, captured and secured town of Nettuno, established beachhead as shown on overlay.

6. **COMBAT EFFICIENCY:** Excellent.

7. **RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:** Beach cleared of mines and put in operation. Port reported ready for operation at 1000A. 18 Russian internees taken, 22 Prisoners taken, estimated 40 enemy killed. Ships entered port for unloading.

HUBERT V. DALRYMPLE  
Lt. Col, Ranger Force,  
S-3

**SECRET**




83  
22

SECRET

↑  
Contact by motorcycle  
with British.

SECRET



Contact with 3rd  
Div by Liaison Off and  
Recon car 601st TD

90  
16

Italy 1:50,000  
Overlay to Accompany S-3 Report  
to 1200 hours 22 Jan 44

Number One.

Page 6.

- 1830 - British and American liaison officers from 3rd Inf Div. reported to CP. Gave them the situation.
- 1845 - One company, 1st Ranger Bn. given verbal message to report to Capt. Anderson for unloading of ammunition *on date*.
- 1905 - Hutch not to move. No reconnaissance or contact with Murray.. Will move in the morning.
- 2137 - Major Miller, CO 3rd Ranger Bn. was given instructions by overlay to make contact with CO Scots Guards, by first light, 23 Jan. and to make contact with CO #9 Commandos by first light, if possible. Officer patrols.
- 2300 - Shelling of harbor and port started and continued throughout the night. Appears to be a single gun.

- 1101 - Hutchinson engaging gun firing from 850-172
- 1107 - Firing ceased.
- 1117 - Katz, 3-2 of the 509th reports:  
I have seen 3 German PW's, part of a work detail. One German is in civilian clothes and another is from 8th Co., 3rd Bn., 71st Panzer Gren. Reg., 29th Div. I will be sending documents from dead and from house of Italian Naval Fascist.
- 1120 - Refer to note of 1101. Enemy gun stopped firing. Will dust lightly and investigate.
- 1205 - 601st TD Recce. Report: Our battalion is completely ashore. Co. A is at 910-182; Co. B is at 913-200; Co. C is at 927-206. Going from present position thru Anzio to contact British units.
- 1215 - Message from 1st Inf Div (Brit): We have no information of enemy tanks. Our tanks have landed and are moving in. We have no information on commandos.
- 1235 - Commandos <sup>reported</sup> ~~reported~~ Tiger tanks at CECCHINO, 24 kms on road (Rome).  
Dead cyclist identified as being from 1st Co. Armored Recce. Regt., 29th Pz. Gren.  
Commandos turning south down yellow route. 3rd & 4th Bn's informed of above.
- 1413 - Orders to CO's all units, 3rd & 4th Rngr Bns. and 509th Bn. Will move out without delay to positions shown to attached overlay.  
1st Ranger Bn. will remain in present location in reserve. Contact from left to right. 509th will expect to contact 1st Bn., 7th Inf. at 880-203  
1 Company of Chemical Bn. will be displaced forward astride ANZIO-ROME Highway in support.  
1 - 57 mm. will be displaced FWD under direction CO, 4th Ranger Bn.  
Communications officer has been advised.
- 1459 - Intermittant shelling of positions around CP.
- 1640 - <sup>Two</sup> ~~Two~~ LCT's pulled into harbour. CP truck unloaded and personnel with truck reported to Force Headquarters.
- 1722 - Capt. Anderson informed all units of force that the vehicles were in. ~~They are to be~~ ~~to be~~ Come to CP for location. On main drag, with palm trees on both sides of the street.
- 1748 - 32 German PW's and 18 Russians were dispatched to 3rd Div PW Enclosure. Total to date. 2 Germans have been hospitalized.

- 1005 - Papers and maps of German prisoner and vehicle arrive from 4th Bn.
- 1006 - Hutchinson reports tanks on coast road. (Observed by Shunstrom)
- 1015 - Capt. Turner and Col. Stanley stated that the port was mined, or rather that there were extensive mine fields but that they were not charged or connected. Col. now arranging for authority and minesweeper to clear channel so as to unload anti-tank weapons and vehicles. (fr VI Corps) (Capt. Anderson reports buildings with charges and booby traps at port)
- 1018 - Reported by Tokay, have reached their objective. Killed 3 Germans and the rest retreated to the north of town.
- 1024 - RADIO MESSAGES RECEIVED  
#1 Forward units between 834-229 and objective moving vic. 863-226.  
#2 2 N. Staffs and 6 Gordons will move to objective at 0915.  
#3 2 N. Staffs and 6 Gordons will move to objective at 0955.  
From Liaison Officer 1st Inf Div (Brit) Reinf.
- 1029 - Both anti-tank guns in place <sup>approx 125 rds.</sup> Reported by Capt. Gillespie, C.E.
- 1030 - 3 enemy scout cars moving at 850 - 175 along road running northeast and disappearing in grove. Moving from west to east across our front. (S. Theresa)
- 1031 - Another air attack to our right (3rd Div) and ships in harbor. 5 minute duration. Unable to ascertain extent of damage.
- 1040 - Total of captured to date: 24 German PW's, 9 vehicles, and 5 Russians. The Germans are said to have been using Russian prisoners in labor gangs in this vicinity. Col. Williams, G-2 of the 3rd Div here for report on situation
- 1050 - Artillery or mortar fire of unknown origin in this area. It is believed to be high bursts and is being checked.
- 1055 - Artillery barrage apparently coming from North. 83rd Chem has been asked to check. Barrage is intensifying. Believed to be SP.
- 1059 - Shelling ceased.
- 1100 - Barrage starts. Saam reports that 4 tanks are doing the firing from a location about 2000 yards north of 1st Bn. position. Shelling intermittent. 177-857 NW part of circle. Sensing by sound.

- German troops are scattered all over hell with no uniformity.
- 0445 - Two companies, reinforced of 509 landed and are assembling. Also CoG "F" 4th Ranger Bn. and 100 Engineers of *C. N. 36<sup>th</sup> Eng.*
- 0500 - #3 well met.
- 0552 - #4 well met.
- 0557 - Capt. Turner & party transferred from R.U. to L.S.I.
- 0600 - Ammo, bed rolls, and rest of signal section with surgical teams from R.U. arrive on shore.
- 0620 - 2nd Flight of DUKWS arrived.
- 0630 - Gillespie reported all three bridges mined.
- 0700 - Report from Major Martin, that all personnel cleared *from ships.*
- 0805 - Major Miller reports hospital area cleared. Enemy killed at bridge.
- 0815 - 509th ordered to move out towards Nettuno as planned.
- 0841 - Air raid on red and green X-ray beaches of 6 minute duration.
- 0846 - Major Martin and party reported in *7<sup>th</sup> Form Co.*
- 0857 - Five Russian P. of W's arrived at CP and were turned over to IPW.
- 0900 - Mission is given to a company from the 3rd and 4th Bn.'s under command of Lt. Col. Murray to put out gun battery northwest of town at request of VI Corps.
- 0903 - Capt. Turner reported in to discuss landing of vehicles with Col. Darby.
- 0912 - Col. Yarborough reported by phone. His 2 companies are 2/3rds of the way to their objective. Meeting some resistance. Have killed from 6 to 8 Germans. He is moving his CP. forward.
- 0922 - Lt. Col. Murray reported in. Request additional information as to the position of gun battery. Cannot locate. Is sending Co.'s A and B instead of one from each Bn. Request for additional information made to VI Corps. Telo. line to 3rd out.
- 0950 - Request of 83rd to register mortars. Told to register only with Ranger Bns.
- 0955 - Capt. Meyerson reports tanks coming down main road. Number unknown. From north. Troops being alerted. 0900 to Col. Murray cancelled.

- 0250 - Machine guns heard from Yellow sector.
- 0252 - Large flash seen from Yellow beach.
- 0259 - Peter beach lands okay.
- 0300 - Call from Sunray to Acorn  
Ducks landing.  
83rd Chemical Battalion flight touched down.
- 0303 - Sunray. Visibility poor. Scattered resistance between us and our friends on the left.
- 0310 - Message #2 cleared from Acorn to Sunray.
- 0314 - A row of pin point lights became visible on Yellow beach.
- 0319 - Shell burst or explosion on yellow beach.  
(Base light of summer party)
- 0320 - Engineers report many mines removed from beach.
- 0328 - Net control established contact with Oboe Victor Uncle.
- 0330 - 1st Battalion reports Armored Car at rear of Casino.
- 0340 - Murray reports on 1st Phase Line.
- 0345 - 2nd Flight, composed of Hq and five companies of 3rd Ranger Bn. and Co. "F" of 1st Battalion landed and sent on their mission.
- 0350 - Murray reports small resistance at his bridge.  
2 dead Germans found east of beach by *signatures (Killed by 1st Bn)*
- 0351 - Message from VI Corps.
- 0355 - Major Martin reports VI Corps (3rd) on way.
- 0400 - Miller off with Col. Stanley, Engr & CWS observer.  
Avedon reports communication with 3rd Div - Ludlow and VI Corps.
- 0405 - Machine gun fire in X-ray sector.
- 0407 - Sugar William X-ray
- 0420 - German Volkswaggon captured complete with radio and 2 dead Germans.  
#4 Murray on objective but is having difficulty at *obj.*  
One gun located; gun target 93 or 94  
Group on way to silence gun.

JOURNAL FOR 22 JANUARY 1944 (Saturday)

- 0001 - Ships anchored and all craft lowered for 1st flight.
- 0030 - S.C. 522 off with 1st flight.
- 0045 - S.C. got underway again.
- 0050 - R.U. moves position one mile.
- 0123 - Lights seen on shore; appeared to be auto's.
- 0145 - X-Ray rocket ship fires away.
- 0147 - X-Ray beaches finish rocket firing with red and green signals going up.
- 0149 - Rockets left of X-ray beach.
- 0150 - Peter sector firing rockets.
- 0154 - Ducks formed up on S.C.
- 0159 - Ducks passing out towards beach at port side.
- 0200 - Touched down 1st Flight. 1st and 4th Battalions less 1 Co. and Engineer detachments, each. Rocket ship failed to fire for reason unknown. Landing complete surprise. Troops organized and moved to first phase line. Scattered firing heard on 1st Battalion's right flank.
- 0202 - Ducks formed in perfect formation.
- 0206 - Explosion of medium size heard from yellow sector.
- 0209 - Gun fire from X-ray of 3 round duration.
- 0210 - Ducks moving off.
- 0215 - Message #1 received.
- 0218 - Heavy firing & small arms fire from Peter sector.
- 0220 - Rocket ship signalling: Too late for firing, requesting orders.
- 0240 - LCA's returning from 1st flight.
- 0245 - X-ray beach is clear for LCI's to land.
- 0246 - Big gun fire coming from shore.

(see report C.O.  
+ CT(R) attached  
naval admin reports)



JOURNAL FOR 21 JANUARY 1944 (Friday)

1200 - Weighed anchor from Pozzouli Bay (Italy)

2230 - Troops formed on boat deck of R.U.

JOURNAL FOR 20 JANUARY 1944 (Thursday)

0900 - Started loading for Operation, Shingle at Bala, Italy.  
Troops ferried by LCI's to LSI's. LCT's and LST's  
also loaded at Bala.



THE

NARRATIVE HISTORY

OF THE

SECOND RANGER INFANTRY

BATTALION

- 1944 -

TMBN-2-0-3

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Museum

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**HEADQUARTERS  
SECOND RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
APO 655** **US ARMY**

**A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECOND RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
1944**

The History of the Second Ranger Infantry Battalion during the year 1944 is divided into various phases of combat interspersed by periods of training.

Listed chronologically, these various phases are:

<u>SEQUENCE</u>	<u>OPERATIONS</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
I	Commando-style Raids; D-Day Preparation.	1 Jan - 31 May
II	D-Day Landings; D-Day Assault.	1 Jun - 18 Jun
III	Reorganization; Reinforcements.	8 Jun - 2 Jul
IV	Beaumont-Hague; Mayenne.	3 Jul - 17 Aug
V	Brest Campaign	18 Aug - 28 Sep
VI	Arlon, Belgium; Eech, Luxembourg.	29 Sep - 2 Nov
VII	Hurtgen Forest	3 Nov - 5 Dec
VIII	Bergstein	6 Dec - 15 Dec
IX	Simmerath	16 Dec - 31 Dec

Commando-style RaidsD-Day Preparation

1 January - 31 May

On 1 January 1944, plans for Ranger participation in Commando-style raids on the coast of France were well under way. Pursuant to instructions contained in Ltr, Hq-GOSSAC, 14 Dec 43, file GOSSAC/CC/156/OFB, Subject: "Use of Rangers in Raids and Reconnaissance", Lt Col James E. Rudder, Major Max D. Schneider, Captain Harvey J. Cook, and two Intelligence enlisted men were at this time in the initial stages of planning at COHQ, Whitehall, London. A detachment of Headquarters personnel was obtaining billets in the Southampton area. Both parties had departed from Bude, Cornwall, the Battalion's home station, during the latter part of December 1943.

So as to facilitate training under Commando techniques, the following measures were authorized:

- (1) The Battalion was placed on a Per-Diem basis under authority contained in Ltr, Hq-ETOUSA, 27 Dec 43, file AC 245, Subject: "Authorization for Payment of Per-Diem and/or monetary allowances, in lieu of Rations and Quarters, to U. S. Ranger Battalion".
- (2) The 2nd Indorsement to the above letter made by FUSA, 1 Jan 44, file 370/22, contained the following instructions from CG FUSA: "There is no change in the assignment or attachment of the 2nd Ranger Battalion but for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of GOSSAC, you will operate under orders from COHQ".

Companies 1/D/F departed from Bude by train on 28 December 1944. On 1 January, these units were billeted in the following towns: Company A - Titchfield, Company D - Park Gate; Company F - Botley; all being in the Southampton area. Headquarters personnel were billeted in Warsash. The Battalion Staff, at this time, operated from the British Naval Headquarters located near Warsash.

During the period 1-10 January, Companies 1/D/F conducted physical conditioning and watermanship, working with Commando instructors in the Southampton Bay area. Emphasis was placed on the handling of motor-dories and the technique of disembarking from the LCI(L). During this same period, Companies B+C/E conducted a four-day, small unit reconnaissance exercise extending from Bude to Brunton Sands, North Devon, a distance of approximately fifty miles. Plans for Ranger participation in raids were delayed due to the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary special equipment not readily obtainable thru normal U. S. Army supply channels.

Lt Col Rudder, making a special trip to SHAEF, London, was given a blanket authorization by General Eisenhower for the necessary supplies and, on 10 January, Company A moved to the Beachborough House, a Commando Training Center, near Folkestone, England. A detachment of sixteen men from Company D was sent to another Training Center at Dartmouth. The base of operations for the Battalion was moved to Titchfield.

The mission of Company A, reinforced to a strength of ninety-four men by Headquarters personnel and French guides, was to make a raid on the coast of France in the vicinity of Calais for the purpose of taking a prisoner. The detachment from Company D was to conduct a reconnaissance of the Island of Herm, one of the Channel Islands group.

As afforded by eye-witness accounts, the preparations and actions of Company A were as follows:

The plan finally selected was to divide the force into four teams, two to an Assault Craft. The Company would board the LCI(S) at Dover, transfer into LCAs for the run-in to the beach, recall the LCA's by the pre-arranged light signal upon the completion of the mission, then, using secret British direction-finding devices, locate and re-embark on the LCI(S). Ashore, the force would accomplish its mission by either of three plans, as follows:

Plan 1 - If a prisoner was captured on the beach, the mission was considered accomplished and the Company would not proceed inland but would recall the LCAs at once.

Plan 2 - Group 1 would cut the beach wire, clear a path thru the beach mine belt, and establish a perimeter to defend the beach exit. The other three groups would pass thru Group 1, turn right just beyond the coastal road and, moving parallel to the road, would proceed 1000 yards to a known beach position consisting of 7-8 pillboxes and numerous dug in emplacements. This strongpoint was enclosed within a ten-yard wide belt of concertina and apron fences. Being that the position was semi-flooded at this time due to recent Channel storms, it was believed to be unoccupied except for possible sentries.

Cutting the wire by stealth and blowing it by a previously inserted Bangalore if discovered, the Number 2 Group would clear and search the position. The remaining two groups would cover this action in position on the landward side of the strongpoint.

Plan 3 - No enemy having been found in the beach position, Group 3, followed by Group 4, would proceed inland thru a network of drainage ditches, parallel to the main road leading inland, to two known enemy occupied dwellings; these were CP's for the defenders of this area and were to the seaward side of an extensive defensive installation.

Group 3, placing one squad forward as a roadblock, would assault the left house while Group 4 was, simultaneously, attacking the house to the right. Group 4 was then to return to the beach by the most direct cross-country route while group 3, with one squad as rear-guard, would move back to the beach along the main road. When Group 3 had reached the junction with the coastal road, Group 2 would take up the rear-guard action. The final unit to enter the LCI's would be Group 1, which would cover the embarkation with two LMG's and 60-mm mortars.

Training for the contemplated raid was of two aspects; boat-work in Dover Bay and rehearsals of the expected land action at Beachborough House. The final rehearsal, executed on a scale exactly that of the area to be covered by the raid, was witnessed by the GOC Special Service Group, who commended the unit on its excellent state of readiness.

Two important factors governed the execution of the action; the moon and the sea. The precise timing necessary afforded only three nights on which the "Dark Period" was of sufficient duration to permit the carrying out of the operation under cover of complete darkness. On each of these three nights, the Royal Navy postponed the embarkation due to the roughness of the waters of the English Channel. On 27 January, the now insufficient "Dark Period" precluded any further action for the month and the raid was cancelled. If the weather had permitted, Company 1 would have been the first complete American unit to strike the coast of fortified Europe; the 1st Ranger Battalion had been represented by selected individuals at the Dieppe raid.

The detachment of Company D trained under 4th Commando instructors at Dartmouth. These sixteen men, only twelve of whom would be selected to make the raid, specialised in the handling of motor-dories and movement by night. The plan by which they were to proceed with their mission of reconnoitering the Island of Hern was as follows:

Dividing into four three-man teams, they would cross the Channel by British Gun-boat, disembarking into the dory for the silent approach to the beach. Enemy patrols being expected, one team would return the dory to the open sea while the three remaining groups each had a sector to reconnoiter. The teams would return to a designated point on the beach and would then signal the dory in. Proceeding ten miles out to sea, the party would then contact the Gun-boat.



This raid was also cancelled due to the Royal Navy's refusal to undertake the operation in foul weather.

Along with Company A and the detachment from Company D were Headquarters Communication and Intelligence personnel. Communications training consisted of instruction by Commando personnel in secret techniques of radio transmission and direction-finding. A portion of this personnel was selected to accompany the raiding parties and participated in the rehearsals. The Battalion Staff secured the intelligence information necessary for detailed planning and also procured the necessary special equipment.

The following Communications Plan is submitted with the view of portraying the extensive planning necessary for this type of operations:

Radio was to be the primary means of communication. Alternate nets, employing different frequencies and radios, were established to insure communications in the event of enemy jamming, interference, radio set failure, or the operator becoming a casualty.

The Primary mission of communications was to provide a means for coordinating the tactical operations. Strict radio silence was to be maintained until "Touch-down". Thereafter, all transmissions were to be made in accordance with a prearrangement, employing Code-words. In the event of an unforeseen emergency, any message necessary could be transmitted.

Blue-colored signal lamps were to be carried by all radio operators for use in event of set failure. The Beachmaster was also to employ the blue lamp to provide a beam for the LCI's on the pickup run.

An escape plan was also formulated for the purpose of picking up at a prearranged time and place any members of the Task Force who may have been stranded. Under this plan, the Beachmaster's party was to bury a SCR-556 and a signal lamp in a near-by gravel pit for use by the stranded members. A MTB was to appear off-shore at the proper time and the proper place and would transmit a certain codeword. The stranded party was to reply with the proper codeword or the proper code-letter with the signal lamp. A dory from the MTB would then evacuate the stranded party, providing that the proper return symbol was received.

(Note: Pursuant with YOGOC Special Service Force, all correspondence and files pertaining to the contemplated action were destroyed by this unit. Should additional information be desired, it is believed that the files of COHQ, Whitehall, London, would provide such information)

Companies B/F trained under Commando instructors, working out of Warsash, Hants, in Southampton Waters. Company D specialized in motor-dory handling while Company F conducted exercises involving the LCI(S). The following exercise, offered for your information, proved the Ranger capabilities during this period:

The problem given Company F was to effect a dry-landing from the LCI(S) at a point on the English coast at what was thought to be an abandoned fortress. The Company was to breach the coastal wire barriers and reconnoiter to an airfield one mile inland with emphasis placed on stealth and proper timing for the operation.

The landing was made the night of 12 January, as scheduled and the reconnaissance parties moved inland according to plan under the protection of a covering party on the beach. At the appointed time, the company assembled on the beach for re-embarkation. Roll was then called and three men were found to be missing. One of these appeared shortly thereafter, in custody of two Royal Marine Shore-patrolmen. It was then discovered that the Fort had been secretly re-occupied and that the British sentrys knew nothing of our presence until they overheard the noise of roll call. Almost sixty men had passed thru their lines twice without detection.

The remaining two missing men were recovered the following morning. They had scouted to the right, entering the grounds of a secret laboratory before they were detected, only 100 feet short of a charged protective wire.

On 17 January, Company D, less the detachment of sixteen men at Dartmouth, moved by LCA to Freshwater, IOF, for two weeks of cliff scaling on the Needles. These were sheer chalk cliffs from 200 to 300 feet in height. Only one fall, fortunately not serious, occurred during the period. Company F continued LCI(S) training at Warsash.

Companies B/C/E, together with the remainder of Headquarters Company, less the Personnel Section, moved to the Isle of Wight on 18 January. To preserve secrecy, this change of station was executed Commando-style; small groups of men traveling in any manner they chose, with 72-hours permitted for the movement. Companies B/C were billeted in Sandown. These Companies conducted training in cliff scaling, forced marches, removal of mines, and exercises involving boat-work and reconnaissance.

Bude, Cornwall, remained as the official home station but the bulk of the Staff activities was carried on at the Beachborough House and in Titchfield. This condition lasted thru-out the month of January.

During the period 1-10 February, all companies remained in location and continued training. Companies B/C/E rehearsed but were unable to carry out, a three-company exercise against the IOW Home Guard. Battalion Staff Officers, during the period 2-4 February, interviewed prospective Ranger applicants from the 28th Division under authority contained in Ltr, Hq-FUSA, 27 Jan 44, file 200.3/39 (AGCL); Subject: "Overstrength Fillers for 2nd Ranger Battalion".

On 12 February, the Battalion Commander received the following Ltr, Hq-SHAEF, 2 Feb 44, file SHAEF/21306/SD; Subject: "Cancellation of Raids and Reconnaissance for operation OVERLORD" and, in accordance with instructions contained therein, directed all Companies to re-assemble at Bude. Movement was primarily by rail with the Supply installation at Titchfield returning by organic transportation.

By 16 February, all Companies occupied their original billets in Bude. Training was resumed; this consisted of small unit assault exercises employing demolitions and live ammunition. Cliff climbing was also stressed. Volunteer-interviewing parties continued to be dispatched, some going to the 8th Division while others contacted the Armed units in the area. Various officers and enlisted men were sent to Army Specialist Schools under existing quotas.

During the last week of the month, all troops participated in a thirty-mile, light equipment march; the last nine miles of which were cross-country along the hilly coast.

All Companies were rotated on five-day furloughs during the month of March. Training was continued with emphasis on cliff scaling and Company-size firing problems. A typical enemy beach strongpoint was constructed with enemy artillery represented by emplaced explosives. The Company assault team, using hand-placed charges, Bangalores, Bazookas, and 81-mm mortar screening smoke, became quite adept at this type of assault.

Selected officers and NCO's under the command of Major Schneider, set up a Ranger Replacement Training Center located at Braunton Camp, North Devon. Volunteers, selected by the interviewing teams from the 8th and 28th Divisions, commenced to arrive on 1 March. The course consisted of cliff scaling, weapons instruction and firing, and other intensified technical and physical training. Those replacements who satisfactorily completed the course were assigned to the Companies on 22 March. Another new addition to the Battalion at this time was the Cannon Platoon, consisting of twenty-six volunteers from Armed units and four half-tracks mounting 75-mm Assault Guns. The Battalion now had its authorized over-strength of 25% officers and 15% enlisted men.

On 26 March, Major Schneider was relieved of assignment as Executive Officer and assumed command of the 5th Ranger Battalion. Captain Cleveland A. Lytle was appointed Executive Officer on this day.

A Battalion exercise with the view of testing Supply activities and inter-Company cooperation under field conditions was held from 29-31 March. The Battalion marched approximately forty miles during this exercise, under full combat load, overcoming innumerable rear-guard actions by the detachment simulating "enemy" forces.

Information of the D-Day mission was received during the first week of March and, on 15 March, the Battalion Commander, the S-2, and one enlisted man departed for Plymouth, England, to obtain the available information and initiate planning for the assigned mission.

On 3 April, the Battalion moved by rail to the Assault Training Center, Braunton Camp, for a seven-day course in the technique of beach and fortification assault. Here, the Battalion was joined by, and worked with, the 5th Ranger Battalion. The Companies were divided into two thirty-man assault teams under A.T.C. guidance. The course consisted of methods of breaching wire defenses, handling of shaped charges and flame-throwers, and practical work in destroying installations. The final test of the course was held on Baggy Point, a promontory on which was built a replica of the fortification system existing on the French coast. Here, the Cannon Platoon proved its effectiveness by placing pinpoint fire on pillbox apertures at 1000 yards.

On 9 April, Companies D/E/F, commanded by Captain Harold K. Slater, moved by rail to Swanage, Dorset, for instruction in the newest methods of cliff assault. All types of climbing was practised; these included free-hand, smooth rope, toggle rope, rope ladder, and steel ladders in four foot sections which could be assembled to any height desired. All manners of cliff formations were mastered; sand, chalk, solid rock, loose rock, and combinations of these. An innovation at this stage was the method of anchoring the rope at the top of the cliff by the use of naval rockets; this method had been tested and proved by the British Commandos. A rocket-type mortar was employed which could hurl a rope 200 feet into the air, the special grapnel attached to the leading end of the rope digging into the ground and providing an anchor so that the rope could be safely ascended.

Companies A/B/C underwent instruction in the technique of transferring from the LSI(S) to the LCA. Exercises were then conducted in conjunction with the 5th Ranger Battalion in the beach-assault and movement overland along a route similar to that expected on D-Day. The missions allotted to the Companies on this exercise were based on those expected on the actual D-Day mission. Another combined exercise culminated in a dawn attack on a near-by airfield with British soldiers providing the opposition.

On 27 April, Companies A/B/C moved by rail to Staging Area D-1 near Dorchester, Dorset, for participation in the Operation "Fabius I".

On 1 May, Companies A/B/C embarked on the Prince Charles. Companies D/E/F embarked on the HMS Ben My Chree and HMS Amsterdam at Swanage, joining Companies A/B/C in Weymouth Harbor on the evening of 3 May. The above-named ships had previously been transporting the 1st Ranger Battalions in their actions in the Mediterranean theater. The troops slept in hammocks below decks and were fed American 10-in-1 rations prepared by the ship's cooks. Mealtime was not looked forward to with much eagerness. Time on board was spent chiefly in briefing and attending ship's movies; games of chance were also much in evidence.

"Fabius I" was a full scale rehearsal of the actual D-Day assault operation. Troops participating included the I/116th Infantry, the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions, and two Amphibious Tank Platoons. The terrain selected was near Dartmouth. The mission of the Battalion was as follows:

Companies D/E/F were to land at H-Hour, ascend a slight cliff, and secure the assigned objective. Company C would also land at H-Hour with I/116th Infantry and would simulate clearing the beach. Companies A/B with the Bn Hq Det would land one hour later and, with company B acting as point and Company A as flank protection, would precede the 5th Ranger Battalion across the country to the location of Companies D/E/F. For the purpose of control, Companies A/B were placed under the command of the CO 5th Rngr Bn for the operation.

Landing at dawn, 4 May, the Battalion proceeded thru the operation which, after contact with Companies D/E/F was established, lengthened into a forced march of about twelve miles. Burdened as the men were with their complete fighting load, the heat of the day made the march a grueling task. The Battalion was assembled in the evening and Higher Headquarters dictated a non-tactical night.

The exercise was officially ended on 5 May and Companies D/E/F re-boarded their ships for the return to Swanage. They were joined there on 7 May by Companies A/B/C and the Headquarters personnel which made the movement by rail and motor.

On 9 May, the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions were formed into a Provisional Ranger Group, commanded by Lt Col Rudder. The Battalion planning Staffs were admitted into the Group War Office and preparations for D-Day were increased.

Training was continued with Companies D/E/F perfecting their cliff climbing techniques while Companies A/B/C conducted forced marches and firing problems.

A Battalion beach assault exercise was conducted during this period, employing the until-then secret DUKW's mounting fire-fighting type extension ladders. The troops landed as per schedule and Companies D/E/F scaled the 100 foot cliffs, securing the necessary beachhead but the exercise was handicapped because the overly-inflated tires of the DUKW's would not grip the water-soaked sand. The Battalion returned to Swanage by motor.

On 22 May, the Battalion moved by rail to Staging Area D-5 near Dorchester and the Battalion commenced briefing in preparation for the assigned mission. Rubber models procured thru Army channels and plaster models, constructed by Intelligence personnel, assisted in this instruction. Companies D/E/F continued to work out on ropes attached to trees in the camp.

Field Order No. 1, Hq-2nd Ranger Bn, was issued on 27 May 1944.

The following eye-witness account written by Captain Walter E. Block, KIA at Bergstein, Germany, 8 December 1944, is submitted with the view of portraying the intelligence material available to the Battalion for the operation and the thoroughness of the "breifing" procedure:

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"It was about 5:30 PM on April 7th, 1944, when Major Schneider called me in the Operations Room at the Assault training Center near Braunton, Devon, and first showed me the Points. 'That's it!, Doc, that's the spot where we are going to operate. Pointe du Hoc'. On the map, it actually looks insignificant, merely a tiny protuberance jutting out from the beachline, approximately mid-way between the towns of Grandcamp and Vierville-sur-Mer on the coast of Normandy. I don't think I was particularly impressed because it looked like any one of a hundred similar protuberances on the invasion coast and my face evidently showed this for, after looking up, the Major continued, 'Now, take a look at this', slowly rolling up a thick cloth covering hanging on the far wall of the room. 'This' was a series of photographs taken at every possible angle by airplanes of a coastline. Closer inspection showed this to be no ordinary coastline with smooth beaches, fine grained sand, and a gentle sloping inward. What I saw was a panorama of many air photos linked together to form an unbroken line. Carefully looking thru a lens, I saw what appeared to be an unbroken line of cliffs, for the most part sheer, stretching out on either side of a sharp spear-pointed outcropping. This outcropping was Pointe du Hoc. The beach was covered with boulders, broken-off portions of the cliff and, in outline, was irregular.

"That's going to be a pretty hard climb, Major. Why such a tough spot to make an assault landing?' I asked. 'Good question, Doc. Come over here and I'll show you some more pictures',

"So off we went to another wall in the room and another cloth was rolled up. Here, on a 'blow-up', was an aerial photo of the Points and the adjacent terrain. Whereas the large over-all photos had showed only the coastline, a few houses, hedgerows, paths, and roads, this photo showed the Points itself and the land extending for about 1500 yards to either side and about 2000 yards inland. On the extreme tip of the Points, at the top of the cliff, was a square whitish-gray outline. On each side of this were three round whitish-gray masses, approximately 30-35 feet in diameter, judging from the scale of the map. The Major went on to explain that these were six 155-mm gun emplacements, two of them casemated and the others open. By casemated, he meant that the guns were encased in a protective covering of concrete on the top as well as on the outer walls. The square mass on the tip of the Points was an observation post.



"Each of the emplacements was linked to the others by a series of camouflaged paths and underground tunnels. Such gun emplacements were protected by coverings varying anywhere from six to ten feet of solid concrete. Most of the concrete had been poured in the past year but some of it was at least three years old and had become harder with each succeeding month. Extending back from the cliff and encompassing all six guns was row upon row of wire, single and multiple apron. Our G-2 information revealed that interspersed between the protective wire and on both sides of the position were extensive minefields. Truly a formidable setup! But that was not all! Extending along the cliffs on both sides of the Points were open and closed machine gun positions. There were four that could readily be seen on the left flank of the Points and three on the right flank. These were the ones that were visible; how many more there were that were well camouflaged was anyone's guess. Off to the upper left of the photo was a series of small buildings, the village of St. Pierre du Mont.

"The landing on this beach, the climbing up the cliffs, and the destroying of these six large guns was to be the mission of the Rangers. For many months, the men of the Battalion had been undergoing hard, intensive training; including rope climbing, cliff scaling, and physical exercises far harder than the usual infantryman undergoes.

"But there was more training in store for the men. In order to make sure that the operation would be successful, no stone was left unturned. The German mind, working on the premise that the sea and the high, steep cliffs would prove to be obstacles no human could master, had built their defenses on the assumption that any attack on this stronghold would have to be made from inland, assuming that a bridgehead had previously been established elsewhere. Their perimeter defense clearly proved this.

"Nevertheless, this bastion could not be permitted to stand by any invading army because these guns could command and control a vast area to each flank and out to sea. If the main assault on the continent were to be made anywhere near this area, these guns must be silenced. There was one way to do it - an audacious and bold plan: To attack the position from the rear, that is, the sea side. For this attack, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, under the command of Lt Col James E. Rudder, was selected.

"Briefing consisted of explaining every particular detail of the operation. This generally started out with a recital of the mission, the potential strength of the enemy at a given point, all the capabilities of our own and the enemy's, and a thorough discussion of the terrain over which the mission was to be performed. A thousand and one other factors to be considered in a water-borne operation included the rise and fall of the tides, type of beaches, and weather conditions. The troops received detailed maps of the region and adjacent territory, depicting enemy defenses, plus all the information the intelligence department could obtain. This included positions of minefields, description of enemy installations, details of critical points on the guns, and so forth. To cap it all, aerial photographs of the entire territory and blow ups showing the smaller details filled out the "briefing" period. Finally, each man's part in the operation was explained and he was made thoroughly familiar with every phase of the operation".

By **WALTER E. BLOCK**  
Captain, MD.

II.

D-Day Landing

D-Day Assault

1 June - 8 June

On 1 June, the Battalion moved by motor to Plymouth for embarkation as follows:

Companies A/B/C with Battalion Headquarters and Communication personnel - HMS Prince Charles.

Company D and the 2nd Platoon/Company E - HMS Lester-Gale.

Company F, Platoon 1st Platoon/Company F and the Battalion Command Post Detachment - HMS Ben My Chree.

The Battalion as part of the Provisional Ranger Group was attached to the 116th Infantry for operations. The mission assigned to the Battalion was to destroy the battery on Pointe du Hoc and to establish an initial beachhead on the coast of France. The plans by which the Battalion would attempt to carry out this mission are included in the various Force Histories.

On 2-3 June, the Battalion vehicles, including the four "Ladder-D" tanks, loaded from the Harb at Portland.

The period 2-3 June was spent in final briefing and the perfecting of small unit plans. At 0000, a portion of the LST convoy sailed, but was later recalled due to heavy seas which necessitated a 24-hour postponement.

The LST convoy moved out again on the afternoon of June 5, and at 0510, the troopships weighed anchor. The voyage was uneventful except for an "Air Alert" at 0600, with the "all clear" sounding soon afterward. The transport area was reached at 0700.

The following narratives of the D-Day actions of the three Forces were compiled from memory-histories written by eye-witnesses one month following the action. The actions of Force A on Pointe du Hoc and Forces B and C on Omaha Beach, being composed of a multitude of individual and small unit actions, cannot be completely portrayed in these narratives which are necessarily based on eye-witness accounts of but a portion of the men taking part in the action. To cover this need and to provide a thorough, factual history of the D-Day actions on Pointe du Hoc and Omaha Dog Green Beach, Lt Col Taylor of the War Department Historical Section conducted a series of personal interviews with the D-Day veterans during October, 1944; the sum of which is at present in the process of publication. The following narrative-histories have been checked with the draft copy of this report and were found to be correct.

Each Force History is divided into three phases; these are as follows:

The Plan of Attack    The Beach Assault    The Subsequent Action.

## Force "A"

Companies D/E/F

### The Plan of Attack:

Force "A", comprising Companies D/E/F and the Bn Hq Det with attached Naval Shore Fire Party and Photographic Party, accompanied by two British Official Observers, commanded by Lt Col James E. Rudder, was to land at H-Hour on Beach Charlie (Pointe du Hoc) with the mission of destroying the six-gun coastal battery located thereon and establishing a perimeter 1000 yards inland so as to protect the landing of Force "C". In support were the battleship "Texas", a number of destroyers, and several flights of attack-bombers available on call as long as the Ranger Force remained within the limiting range.

### The Beach Assault:

Companies D/E/F plus attached parties lowered away at 0445. Heavy seas imperiled the heavily-laden craft, each of which carried a large amount of cliff-scaling apparatus in addition to the normal complement of men. The LCA's shipped water so badly that the pumps could not cope with the amount received and the men, some of whom were sea-sick, assisted in keeping the craft afloat by bailing water with their helmets.

About 0530, the LCA containing Captain Harold K. Slater and twenty men, including the Company Commander, of Company D, radioed that it was sinking. These men were picked up by a British gun-boat after several hours in the water and were evacuated to England, suffering from exposure. Another supply craft never reached shore and its two Ranger occupants have been reported as KIA.

Radio contact was gained with the "ladder-DUKV's" at 0545; they reported that all was well. Later, as the DUKV's neared the shore, they were subjected to intense long-range MG and artillery fire which wounded several men seriously and sank one of these craft. Although every effort was made, the DUKV's could not gain a footing on the beach due to the large craters caused by the preliminary bombardment and were all lost thru enemy action. The surviving personnel assisted in action on the Pointe.

"Touch-down" was at 0705, thirty-five minutes late due to an error in direction by the guide-craft. The flotilla of LCA's came in almost at Pointe El Raz de la Percee and, in moving parallel to the cliff-line to Pointe du Hoc, had to run a haillet of plunging MG and rifle fire which caused a number of casualties. It was during this parallel movement that the first DUKV was knocked out.

The preparatory fire from the 14-inch guns of the Texas ceased as planned at H-5. The plans of Force "A" called for

60-mm mortar fire from the LC's during the five minutes before H-Hour. The lapse in landing time caused by the error in navigation allowed the enemy forty minutes in which to recover from the effects of the bombardment and man their positions in readiness to repel the assault.

As the LC's neared the beach, they were met by a hail of MG and rifle fire. The climbing-ropes were so water-soaked that the rockets could not carry the extra weight to the desired height. Only one craft succeeded in placing all six of its ropes on top of the 100-foot cliff. Others fired their rocket-mortars from the beach, some assembled steel ladders, while those first up scaled the cliff free-hand, aided by the rubble which the softening-up bombardment caused on the beach. The enemy snipers' fire at the men on the ropes and added a constant rain of grenades. Lt Col Trevor, one of the British Observers, proved invaluable in calming the men in their initial action. His extreme coolness and showmanship tactics caused the men to forget themselves and within one half-hour after landing, all the men, including the walking wounded, were on top of the cliff. The Force CP and Aid Station were set up in a cave on the beach directly under the enemy CP. Pre-arranged messages were sent to Group Headquarters and were "go-ahead" for the Medics, destined to receive no evacuation until 2430 hours, cared for the wounded under cover of the over-hanging cliffs.

#### The subsequent actions:

To show the completeness of the small-unit planning, the following Company Plan of Attack is submitted as an example.

Company B was divided into four assault teams, based on principles taught by the A.T.C. The first team, which was to ascend the cliff not more than 25 yards from the Number 3 gun, was to destroy that gun and its casemate. (Note: The enemy was then in the process of casemating all guns and a study of aerial cover flown D-5 showed that four guns were still in open emplacements, pending completion of their individual casemates.) The second team was to ascend the cliff, push rapidly thru the position to the Pierville-Grandcamp Road and, in conjunction with elements from Companies D/F, organize a perimeter to stop any enemy reinforcement threat. The third team had the mission of destroying the concrete CP, aided by the fourth team, if necessary. All teams were then to proceed to take up positions on the perimeter as soon as they had completed their initial mission.

The scene that greeted the Rangers as they reached "topside" was one of utter destruction. The preliminary bombing and naval shelling had pitted the terrain with deep craters, leaving not an inch of topsoil unturned. Investigation showed only one gun remaining on the Pointe; this had been knocked from its mountings by the guns of the Texans. The remaining five guns were later discovered about 1000 yards in-land

and were destroyed by patrols. Only a few installations above ground had survived the terrific shelling prior to the landing operation.

The enemy, having been permitted to reorganize his defenses due to the unforeseen time lapse, provided stiff opposition from concealed MG and sniper posts. The first men up the cliff engaged the defenders at short-range, and as more and more men came up the ropes, their determined drive forced the enemy back from his cliff-edge positions. Company E personnel, led by their Company Commander, Captain Gilbert C. Baugh, successfully assaulted a still-active pillbox, taking a number of prisoners in the action at the cost of having their Captain seriously wounded. The third and fourth sections of Company E, after a short but fierce battle, succeeded in neutralizing the OP, but were unable to destroy it as planned due to a landslide burying the demolitions on the beach. It being unable to force the steel doors, a guard was placed on the position, pending the obtaining of additional explosive and the remaining men pushed out for the perimeter as planned.

Company D, ascending the cliff to the left of the OP, discovered that the guns assigned them had been withdrawn. Acting according to plan, this force pushed out to the perimeter, overcoming scattered opposition, and going into position on the right with twenty men.

Company F, having been fortunate with its rocket-mortars, descended the cliff in good order, although a fire and grenades were directed at the men on the ropes. Clearing the ground to the left of Company E, as planned, Company F moved 500-yards inland before being pinned down by heavy artillery and sniper fire. About twenty men by-passed the sniper resistance and, moving thru a zone of mortar fire, reached the main road and established contact with the second section of Company E, already in position. That portion of Company F remaining near the beach repulsed two enemy counterattacks during the afternoon, without casualty. The accurate fire of the 60mm mortar proved extremely effective in forcing the enemy to disclose his position and, when he attempted to escape this fire, the riflemen would cut him down.

By noon, sufficient men had made their way thru to the road so that a perimeter was definitely established with Company F on the left, Company E in the center, and Company D on the right. Patrols were immediately dispatched to the front, capturing several enemy and killing many more. A patrol from Company D located the five remaining guns in a partially wooded area about 1000-yards to the right rear of the road. Destroying two guns by placing thermite grenades on the breechlocks, the patrol then returned to the perimeter for more grenades. Returning to the area, they found that the remaining three guns had been destroyed by a patrol from Company E during their absence.

Infiltration via concealed routes by the enemy behind the outpost line was extremely accurate 88-mm fire severed communications between the perimeter and the Force CP. In hedgerow fighting during the afternoon, the men on the perimeter totaled forty enemy captured and fifty killed, with Sgt Fetty accounting for three-fifths of this total with his EM marksmanship.

Back on the Pointe, the Command Group moved top-side at 0830 into a large, cliff-edge crater. The Aid Station remained on the beach until all the wounded were cared for, at about 1300, it was set up in a pillbox just forward of the CP. Many of those wounded elected to remain at their posts after treatment and were highly instrumental in the success of the operation.

Communication was limited to Naval units only. Means employed were the SCR-284 and the Signal Lamp EE-84, with the Lamp proving far more effective of the two during daylight only. At 1130, a Pgn Msg was sent to CG 1st Div; Msg as follows: "Enemy battery on Pointe du Hoc destroyed". This Msg was never redelivered for. Messages to the Navy requesting aid in conducting casualties resulted in a small party being sent in, only to be destroyed by enemy fire. The SCR-284 and the Signal Lamp also provided Shore Fire Control, with the Lamp again affording the best results. At 1400, SCR-300 contact was made with the 116th Infantry; Msg sent was as follows: "Enemy casualties, need reinforcements, my position is Pointe du Hoc (in code)". Expecting an immediate reply, the radio was kept open thru-out the night but it wasn't until 070015 that a reply was received stating that the message had been received and acted upon. Another Pgn Msg was sent to CG 1st Div during the afternoon of D-Day; Msg as follows: "Enemy casualties, ammunition almost gone, need reinforcements". This Msg was also never redelivered for. Little effort was continually made to contact the remainder of the larger force, none were successful. The only enemy action directed at the CP during daylight consisted of mid-range auto-weapon and sniper fire.

An enemy strongpoint several hundred yards to the west of the position was troublesome thru-out the day and the three different attempts were made to knock it out, lack of cover and extremely accurate artillery fire made this position impregnable. During late afternoon, a destroyer approached to within point-blank range of the position and completely destroyed it.

A check made of the perimeter in the late afternoon totaled sixty-five men; the casualties reported were:

Company D, totally lifted up, could make no assessment.  
Company E suffered 5 EM KIA, one officer and 15 EM SWA, and 6 EM MIA.

Company F suffered one officer and 4 EM KIA, one officer and 6 EM SWA, and 2 EM MIA.



About 2100, Lt Parker and 23 men of the 5th Ranger Battalion made contact with the perimeter and were given a sector to defend. This force had been separated from the 5th Ranger Battalion and had proceeded independently to the aid of Force "A", as planned.

A patrol from the perimeter succeeded in breaking thru the enemy cordon to reach the Force CP at 2200. Also, about this time, a group of from 50 to 60 enemy were spotted moving abreast of Company F's right flank. The perimeter defense was drawn tighter to counteract this threat and the outpost line was pulled back.

The first counterattack hit the right of the perimeter at 070005 but was driven off by Company D. A much stronger attack directed at Company D at 0030 cost this force eight casualties and drove it into a smaller area. A survivor of these two actions reports the following particulars regarding the enemy form of attack:

Following heavy but inaccurate mortar and MG fire, the enemy would initiate his assault with loud yelling. His riflemen moved forward at a walk, standing upright and keeping up a continuous flow of talking. Following the second futile attack, the enemy contented himself with using s/a fire to draw our answering fire, then, would lay down a mortar and artillery concentration on the thudly located targets.

At 0130, the enemy shifted his forces to the center of the perimeter. The first attack on a strategic corner position wiped out the defenders here but the rest of the men held, repulsing the enemy forces. Due to the divided nature of the defense and the darkness of the night, the fact that the enemy had broken the line was not generally known. Information was being sent out to prepare to fall back when the second enemy attack came, smashing thru the shattered corner. The platoon of Company E which bore the brunt of this attack fought on until they were completely enveloped. Fighting their way back to the Point, the survivors of this action joined Company F which had withdrawn when informed to do so as a result of the first attack. A series of strongpoints was then set up around the CP for a last-ditch stand. Company E lost one officer KIA and 19 EM KIA when their position was overrun in the second attack on the center of the perimeter.

With the advent of daylight, the enemy commenced to harass our position, employing snipers, MG's, mortars, and artillery. Secret passages permitted the enemy to advance snipers to within close-range of the CP but extremely accurate rifle and mortar fire kept these activities to a minimum. Naval fire from the supporting destroyers, assisted by mortar and rifle fire, broke up all enemy attempts to organize for an attack. Two Volunteer

patrols blew up the enemy ammunition dump, his source of supply and his rallying point, and the concrete OP. Forty pounds of C-2 set the interior of the OP on fire, driving out eight enemy who had entered by means of an underground passageway, one of many connecting up the emplacements.

Personnel also assisting in the defense of the Points were British sailors from beached LCA's, the surviving men from the sunken DUKW's, and several paratroopers who had been dropped into the sea and had made their way to the Points. Lewis machine guns taken from their mountings on top of the DUKW-ladders and the beached LCA's supplanted the worn-out, thru over-use, weapons of the Force. Due to the severe lack of ammunition, captured enemy weapons were also used to a great extent.

Patrols were dispatched during darkness, to determine the intentions of the enemy. Due to the advance of Force "C" this day, the greater part of the enemy strength in the area was deployed to meet this new threat. The only casualties suffered this day were those hit on out-guard.

Communications, supply, and evacuation were much better this day. The fire of several destroyers was controlled by the radio and lamp signals. Requests for supplies and reinforcements sent to the USS Ancon resulted in Major Street, a Staff Officer of the 11th Amphib Force, bringing in an LCI-load of ammunition, medical supplies, and food. This craft also evacuated the casualties, many of whom had been awaiting expert care for thirty-six hours. Later, Major Street brought in a group of 5th Rangers who had become separated from their Battalion on the beach, plus one officer and twelve men of the Cannon Platoon who brought their vehicles safely to the beach, only to have them destroyed thru enemy action. This group had been instrumental in the clearing of Exit D-3 where, acting as infantrymen, they had assisted in the mopping up of several enemy positions still holding out in that area.

From this point on, supplies were brought in upon request and the situation on the Points became more hopeful. At 1700, SCR-300 contact was finally established with Company G/5th Ranger Battalion/Force "C", then only 1000-yds away. Lt Col Rudder sent them the following message "Try and fight thru to us". This message was acknowledged but, being under orders of Higher Headquarters, Force "C" could not comply with the message without the consent of the CO, 116th Infantry.

Sniper fire which commenced at dawn on 8 June, died out as the relieving Force drew near. Becoming aware of the 116th Infantry in attack formation to their front, the Commander of Company F dispatched a patrol to contact them but before the attacking troops could be made aware of the identity of the Force on the Points, friendly MG and tank-gun fire caused a number of casualties. Even tho a yellow

recognition flare was fired and the American flag flown over the CP tank shells scored several near-misses in that vicinity. Following the cessation of this action, Company E was rejoined by three of its' missing men, two of whom were severely wounded. These men had laid hidden in enemy territory for two days. The portion of Company D, cut-off by the attack which over-ran Company E on D-Day night, reduced to one officer and twelve men, succeeded in breaking thru on the right to make contact with the 116th Infantry. Force "A" was then joined by the remainder of the Battalion which had held up near St. Pierre du Mont during the 116th Infantry action. (See Force "C" account)

Force "B"

Company C

The Plan of Attacks

Force B, consisting of Company C, commanded by Captain Ralph E. Goranson, was to land with Company A/116th Infantry at H+3-minutes on Omaha Dog Green Beach, Vieux-ville-sur-Mer, and destroy the installations located on Pointe El Raz de la Percee. Upon the completion of this initial mission, Company C was to proceed along the cliff line, destroying all installations along the route taken, to Pointe du Hoc. One Amphibious Tank Platoon, two if necessary, was to be "On call" to the Company for the initial mission. Company C/116th Infantry was to provide flanking protection during the movement to Pointe du Hoc.

The Beach Assault

Company C, consisting of three officers and 65 men, lowered away at 0430 and proceeded to the rendezvous area where contact was made with Company A/116th Infantry. The run-in to the beach was hampered by heavy seas, causing the majority of the men to become seasick. Near shore, AT fire scored several direct hits on one of the LCAs, smashing the ramp and causing severe casualties. The men disembarked into the face of intense rifle, MG, mortar, and artillery fire. Moving individually, slowed down to a walk by their illness and the soft, water-soaked sand, the survivors had to cross almost 300 yards of exposed beach before coming under the cover of the cliffs to the East of Exit D-1. The casualties suffered in crossing the beach were:

19 KIA; 13 SWA; 5 LWA, who elected to remain duty.

The Subsequent Action

The intensive enemy fire making movement thru the Beach Exit impossible, Plan 2 was put into effect. One officer and two men moved along the cliff to the East until a spot was found where free-hand climbing was possible. Ascending the cliff and making fast several ropes which had been brought along for that purpose, this party then guided the remainder of the Company "top-side". One LCA containing 116th Infantry troops touched-down at this position and twenty men of Company B/116th Infantry were also brought up the ropes.

Reconnaissance patrols brought back the information that enemy troops located in the house and surrounding entrenchments to the West of the Company's position were placing enfilade fire on the beach. The area had been subjected to forty-five minutes of Naval bombardment but, even tho the house was partially destroyed, the enemy had reoccupied the positions. Captain Goranson decided to

even tho the house was partially destroyed, the enemy had reoccupied the positions. Captain Goranson decided to clear out this position before proceeding on East to the initial objective. Small combat patrols cleaned out a number of mortar and MG emplacements, but the enemy continued to reinforce the garrison with troops who made entry into the position from Vierville by means of concealed passages. The Company was forced to remain in the locality to wipe out these new arrivals as fast as they appeared. By mid-afternoon, when this flow of reinforcements ceased, sixty-nine enemy had been killed at a price of two casualties to the Company.

At about 1430, Captain Goranson led a patrol East to reconnoiter Pointe Percee. The party arrived in position from where they could observe the Pointe, just in time to watch the close-in destroyer knock out the position with direct hits. Satisfied that the mission of destroying Pointe El Raz de la Percee was completed, Captain Goranson then returned to his Company. A destroyer started to open fire on Company C's position about this time but an alert Observer on the beach soon caused this fire to stop.

Contact was later established with the 116th Infantry and Company C moved down to the Beach Exit. A patrol from Force "C" was contacted here and, upon receiving the location of that Force, Company C proceeded thereto without incident, arriving at the Force bivouac area at about 2200-hours.

From this point on, Company C worked with Force "C".

## Force "C"

## Companies A/B

### The Plan of Attack:

Force "C", consisting of Companies A/B, plus the bulk of the Bn Hq Det, was to land under control of the CO 5th Ranger Battalion, by either of two plans, as follows:

Plan I - Upon the receipt of a pre-arranged signal from Force "A", prior to H+45-minutes, stating their mission had been successful, the Force would proceed to Pointe du Hoc, ascend the cliffs by means of the DUKW-ladders, and Companies A/B would revert to the control of the CO 2nd Ranger Battalion.

Plan II - If the "Success" signal was not received from Force "A" by the appointed time, Force "C" was to land at Omaha Dog Green Beach at H+60-minutes and, with Company B acting as point and Company A as flank protection, would precede the 5th Ranger Battalion to Pointe du Hoc, as swiftly as possible, along a pre-arranged cross-country route. When the Pointe was reached, Companies A/B would form a defense line to protect the rear of the 5th Ranger Battalion which would make a frontal attack on the Pointe du Hoc defenses.

### The Beach Assault:

Companies A/B plus the Bn Hq Det lowered away at 0615 and made rendezvous with the 5th Ranger Battalion according to plan. The heavy seas caused many men to become seasick on the run-in. The majority of the men stood up to gain relief from the sea-breeze and to watch the bombardment of the beach. "Listening Watch" was maintained in the Headquarters craft for signals from Force "A". At approximately 0700, the flotilla of LCA's lay-to for five minutes awaiting word from Force "A". An unintelligible message was received at 0735; the only recognizable word being "Charlie". The SCR-284 was set up but failed to contact either Force "A" or the Force Headquarters Ship, the Prince Charles. The radio communications on the Guide-craft also failed, when it was desired to use that means of transmission. Precious minutes were also spent when the loudhailer on the Guide-LCA also failed to function properly.

By this time, the line of LCA's was so near to shore that a landing on Omaha Dog Green Beach was mandatory. As the craft throttled down to thread the mined under-water obstacle area, artillery shells began to straddle the boats. At 0735, a craft containing the 2nd Platoon/Company B either struck a mine or received a direct hit. The resulting explosion severely wounded one officer and several men. Sinking quickly, the LCA threw its occupants

into deep water. Losing most of their equipment in the process, these men were forced to swim until they could get a footing for the dash across the beach.

"Ramps Down" was at 0740. The 2nd Ranger portion of Force "C" was landed directly into the face of withering sniper, MG, mortar, and artillery fire - none of which had been cleared prior to their arrival. This first wave came in about one thousand yards to the left of the Beach Exit, the planned "Touch-down" area. The 5th Ranger Battalion was caused in to be brought in still further to the left on order of its Battalion Commander, when he observed the plight of the first wave. The entire 5th Ranger Battalion came across the beach with but a minimum of casualties.

Six craft were in the first wave to hit the beach at H+70-minutes. From left to right, they were as follows:

2 Co & LCA's - Gp Hq LCA - En Hq LCA - 2 Co B LCA's

Machine gun fire directly into the open ramps of the LCA's caused a number of casualties, forcing the survivors to dive thru a hail of lead into the sea. Some men proceeded ashore as they had done in countless training maneuvers; others, dropped in chest-deep water, swam ashore under-water, then, dashed across the 100-yards of beach to the cover of the sea-wall. T/5 Ray of Company A had a method all his own; standing upright to better gauge the pattern of the constantly shifting MG cross-fire, he would lightly step out of the way of the sand-sputts as they reached for him. During subsequent action, this individual, again standing up and firing his BAR from the hip, accounted for a number of the enemy.

The greater part of the enemy's fire was enfilading the beach from the right with a strongpoint consisting of one MG protected by a number of riflemen located on the bluff 200-yards to Company A's front. This gun killed the Commander of Company A when he neglected his own safety to direct his men across the fire-swept beach. By 0805, all the men surviving the beach holocaust were reorganizing under cover of the fortified-house line.

#### The Subsequent Action

Advancing first as individuals and later as teams, as more and more of the men made their way across the beach, the Rangers of Company A stormed the bluff to their front to knock out the machine gun which was, laterally, firing down their throats. The bluff-line being finally cleared the Company was then reorganized under leadership of their NCO's, all the officers having become casualties on the beach. (The Company was to be without officers until D+2)



The 1st Platoon/Company B, led by their Company Commander, crossed the beach in good order. Attempting to continue according to plan, Captain Edgar L. Arnold led his men along the beach road toward Exit D-t. Contacting and working with a platoon of Amphibious tanks, this force searched a number of the fortified houses under severe sniper fire. The strength of the enemy defenses added to the small number of men remaining in fighting condition forced the Captain to undertake the alternate plan, that of returning to the landing site and moving inland over the bluff. This platoon joined the remaining elements of Company A at the top of the bluff and, moving off with Company A, soon made contact with the 5th Ranger Battalion.

The six survivors of the 2nd Platoon/Company B, after obtaining weapons and ammunition, ascended the bluff under cover of smoke from the smoldering vegetation. Joining up with seven men of Company A who were now in possession of the enemy MG, this group pushed on inland to be the first to contact the 5th Ranger Battalion. These men volunteered to continue according to plan, that of leading the 5th Battalion to the Points but the CO 5th Ranger Battalion denied their request.

The Bn Hq Det also suffered heavy casualties, commencing with the first officer off the LCA being hit by mortar fragments. Those of the survivors who did not contact the Companies for the move to the 5th Ranger Battalion aided the Battalion Medical Detachment, which performed heroic measures in aiding the wounded on the beach. The loss of the greater part of their GP equipment in the bullet-churned waters caused these men to revert to riflemen, assisting in the clearing out of snipers still operating in the beach area. The detachment went into position on the bluff for the first night.

Having been released, due to their depleted state, from the mission of preceding the 5th Battalion to Points du Hoc, Companies A/B were placed in Force "C" Reserve. Captain Arnold then reorganized the remnants into one understrength company. This composite Company, moving in reserve, followed the 5th Ranger Battalion to, and thru, Vierville, without further incident. Bivouac was set up for the night just East of Vierville and a perimeter defense was established. A patrol which returned to the beach for ammunition, contacted Company C at 2130 and directed the Company to the location of Force "C". This patrol returned safely at 2230. A mixed unit of approximately ten Medium and Light tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion closed into the bivouac area that evening. Strong security posts were maintained thru-out the night.

Moving out as infantry-tank teams with the twenty remaining men of Company A as the point, the Force advanced straight down the Grandcamp road toward Pointe du Hoc on the morning of 8 June. Four miles of the road were speedily cleared and the point, investigating all buildings along the route, flushed and killed a number of snipers. Communication with the tanks was difficult, being limited to physical contact only. However, the tanks gave excellent support in placing fire on stubborn resistance. (Note: Prisoners later taken in this area by other friendly forces were amazed by this "crazy advance" which swept right thru several defense lines prepared on both sides of the road.)

Just beyond St. Pierre du Mont, 88-mm fire straddled the road but the point led the rest of the column to, and thru it. Slightly later, the column was held up by a huge road crater which the tanks could not negotiate until the tank-doser could be brought forward to partially fill it in. The first of the tanks then made their way thru the crater when 88-mm fire again hit the column, cutting the point off from the main body. Acting on orders from Higher Headquarters, the Force then fell back but the point, now down to seven men, continued to advance. Reaching the limits of au Guay, the point struck an ambush of four mutually supporting machine guns. The point succeeded in the destroying of one gun and the taking of twelve prisoners at the cost of having two men killed and three injured. T/S Ray, the "standing" BAR man of Company A again performed notable action in this encounter, altho slightly wounded. The five members of the point then rejoined the Force with their prisoners.

Acting again under orders from Higher Headquarters, the Force withdrew to St Marie du Mont to construct defensive positions to withstand the expected counterattack. It was later discovered that the point had advanced to within but a few hundred yards of the RJ leading to Pointe du Hoc. Ammunition and rations were brought up this evening by the two half-tracks of the Cannon Platoon which had successfully crossed the beach.

The Bn Hq Det assisted in clearing a portion of the hill-top during the morning. Contact was then made with the 5th Ranger Battalion in Vierville and, moving thru the Beach Exit, the detachment joined the 5th Ranger Battalion during the evening of 7 June. The men remained in Vierville during the night under sporadic bombing.

While standing by on the morning of 8 June to permit the III/116th Infantry to pass thru their position, Force "C" was rejoined by the men that had become separated on the beach. Moving out at 0900, Company B as the point, the 2nd Ranger elements of Force "C" turned right at the RJ in St Marie du Mont for a new route of approach to the Pointe. Following a short halt during the attack on the

Points by the 116th Infantry, the Companies pushed rapidly on and, passing thru a minefield without casualty, joined Force "A" on Pointe du Hoc at approximately 1200-hours.

During the four-hour period of reorganization, Company B was dispatched to clear out the remaining installations between Pointe du Hoc and Pointe El Raz de la Perce. This force took a number of prisoners without casualty in the process, returning at the completion of this action to Pointe du Hoc.

Lt Robert Arman of Company F was then placed in command of Company A and Companies A/B reverted to Battalion control.

III

Reorganization

Reinforcements

8 June - 2 July

During the four-hour period of Battalion reorganization, Intelligence personnel made a search of the still-burning OP. A considerable amount of material, including the German Naval Pennant Code, was gathered, and was transmitted to the USS Ancon. A small patrol was then sent out to locate the 5th Ranger Battalion which was then preparing to attack Grandcamp. This patrol safely rejoined the Battalion which was standing by on the coastal road.

Just prior to the Battalion departure from the Pointe at 1600, a Company F patrol located and destroyed a still-active enemy MG firing from a tree-top. Moving out without incident to the Pierville-Grandcamp Road, the Battalion was held up awaiting the return of the contact patrol. Upon the receipt of the patrol information, Lt Col Rudder moved the Battalion into bivouac near au Gusy to await the clearing of Grandcamp. Moving out by foot at 1700, the Battalion proceeded to another bivouac area in the Sluice Gate vicinity. Shortly thereafter, the Battalion Supply vehicles were closed into the area and rations, water, ammunition, and bed rolls were distributed. The troops rested during this period with security provided by the "buddy-system", each unit providing its own rotating sentry. Altho this area was bombed during the night, no casualties occurred.

Moving out on foot in mid-afternoon of 9 June, the Battalion proceeded thru Grandcamp to a bivouac near Osmanville; no incidents were reported enroute. Eight miles were covered in a misty rain which ceased as the Battalion closed into the bivouac area. A patrol dispatched to make contact with the 116th Infantry on the left, was unsuccessful. Normal security measures were taken this night.

Commencing at 0800, 10 June, patrols from Companies A/B/C searched assigned zones of the area seaward from Osmanville to the coastal road. No contact was made, but evidence showed that the enemy had but recently departed. Captured intelligence material was transmitted to the 29th Division. All searching parties returned safely.

Company F, reinforced by the two half-tracks of the Cannon Platoon, was dispatched to Isigny with the mission of recapturing several hundred enemy marines reported as having escaped from previous captors. Investigation proved this report to be false. Company F was then ordered by General Gota/29th Division to assist elements of the 102d Cavalry in the investigation of five pillboxes located near

Isigny. These pillboxes proved to be unoccupied and, upon the completion of this mission, Company F returned to the Battalion area at 1600. A Company F seven-man patrol sent to investigate a civilian report of "some enemy in woods" captured fifty-three enemy after a short fire-fight; the enemy commander was wounded in the action. The seven-man patrol later returned to this area and killed two enemy who attempted to evade capture. The Battalion area was bombed this night when a near-by unit fired at low-flying enemy planes; No casualties were reported.

The Battalion being alerted to move to Bois de Molay on 11 June, the troops spent this day awaiting transportation. Religious services, the first since 5 June, were held and the first V-Mail was written home. The trucks having failed to appear by dusk, Lt Col Rudder decided to move the Battalion out on foot due to the expected return of the bombers with the coming darkness. Turning left at Isigny, the men had marched about six miles when the first of the truck convoy caught up with the column. It being necessary to shuttle the Companies to Bois de Molay, about another six miles up the road, it wasn't until daylight that the last bone-weary Ranger arrived at the new area.

The Battalion remained in bivouac in this location in V Corps reserve until 16 June. The Companies spent this period in reorganization and much-needed rest. Most of the sleeping was done while the sun was up for at night, the unmistakable hum of enemy aircraft just overhead and the cranking hail of anti-aircraft fire kept all wide-eyed until dawn. The vehicles and communications equipment had to be thoroughly checked to correct the ravages of the sea and the Command Group prepared for future operations. The reinforcements sent overseas expressly for the Ranger Force were checked by interviewing officers. Those weeded-out as below standard were returned to the Replacement Depot. The selected personnel were placed in Training Platoons under the officer-replacements. The detail of transporting the fallen Rangers from Points du Hoc to the cemetery was attended to while the adjutant commenced compilation of the casualties, a difficult task to the divided nature of the previous action. On 15 June, three enemy were spotted in the bivouac area in the act of drawing a bead on an unsuspecting Ranger. A quick-thinking NCO shot first, wounding one and taking all three prisoner.

On the morning of 16 June, the Battalion speed-marched seven miles to Columbrieres where it went into bivouac in 1st Army reserve. The selected reinforcements were placed in the Companies and small unit training was commenced, to continue thru-out the period in this area. An additional

group of volunteers was received on 18 June. Those selected as satisfying the Ranger requirements brought the unit almost to normal strength. Captain Slater returned to the Battalion on 19 June, along with twenty survivors, including 1st Lt McBride, the Commander of Company D.

During this period, Colonel Slapsy assumed command of the Provisional Ranger Group and Lt Col Rudder reverted to command of the Battalion. Prior to this, the Battalion had no Commanding Officer and had operated under the command of Lt Col Rudder. Captain Slater resumed his capacity as the Battalion Executive Officer.

The Battalion kitchens arrived on 20 June after having to remain at sea for a number of days due to the storm off Omaha Beach during that period. The 10-in-1's that the men had been preparing to taste were again served Army-style. A presentation ceremony was held on 21 June with General Hodges awarding DSC's to eight officers and men of the Battalion. General Gerow, in a similar ceremony on 23 June, awarded fourteen Silver Stars and expressed his gratitude for the superior manner in which the Battalion had accomplished the assigned D-Day mission.

Lt Col Rudder was called to VII Corps on 24 June for a possible Ranger mission in the assault on Cherbourg. This proposed mission was cancelled by the CG VII Corps when the forces driving on the city cracked the outer defenses that same day. The troops continued day and night training with the afternoons devoted to athletics.

On the morning of 25 June, the Battalion was moved by motor to the vicinity of Valognes with the mission of acting as Prisoner-of-War Escorts for the 1st Army PWE No. 1. The mission was discharged in three phases; the picking up of the prisoners at the 4th and 79th Division cages in the city, the processing thru the enclosure, and the delivery to 1st Army PWE No. 2 located near Utah Beach. Working day and night from 25 June to 2 July, almost ten thousand prisoners were processed thru this enclosure. On 2 July, the Battalion Commander dispatched billeting parties to locate a training area in the Beaumont-Hague Peninsula.

Beaumont-HagueNoyenne

3 July - 17 August

Moving out by motor on the morning of 3 July, the Battalion was closed into a former enemy installation located near Beaumont-Hague. The line Companies were billeted in wooden barracks while Headquarters occupied wooden structures which formerly housed an enemy Flak Battalion Command Post. Two days of strenuous work by all hands transformed the war-torn area to a garrison-like state. The showers were restored to working order, a captured generator permitted a lighting circuit to be established, a combination day-room-theatre was set up, ball diamonds were laid out, and B-rations were secured. Each Ranger was determined to bring his Battalion to that pre-D-Day state of efficiency in the shortest possible time.

Unit problem courses were laid out and training began in earnest on 5 July. Dry runs, evolving into firing problems, were continued day and night, with the only change from this program being a thirty-mile march, until 11 July. On that day, the Battalion relieved the 24th Cav Ron Sqdn of the defense of the peninsula on order of CO Prov Ranger Gp. The Companies were assigned definite zones of responsibility and were dispatched to secure the key coastal area of their respective sectors. The Company locations were as follows:

Co A : Beaumont-Hague	Co D : Auderville
Co B : Beaumont-Hague	Co E : Yauville
Co C : Omonville-la-Rogue	Co F : Urville-Hague

All Companies, being situated along the coast opposite the enemy-occupied Guernsey Islands, established a system of patrols and OP's to give warning of any enemy raids which were liable in the area. The Companies also had the mission of policing their sector for any remaining enemy, all Allied and enemy dead and material, and the plotting of minefields. The area was thoroughly cleared by 19 July when the defense of the area was handed over to the 15th Cav Ron Gp. Results of the searching operation were as follows:

Several enemy in civilian clothes were apprehended, the coordinate location of Allied and enemy dead had been reported to the Prov Ranger Gp as directed, a quantity of Allied and enemy material had been located, and many unmarked mined areas had been plotted. (These scattered mines had inflicted several severe casualties during the period) except for nightly, aerial reconnaissance, there were no enemy raiding attempts during the period.



All Companies returned to the Battalion area on 19 July and resumed training. At this time, the first of the D-Day casualties, now recovered from their wounds, returned to the Battalion. A number of these returnees, in their eagerness to rejoin, had gone AWOL from hospitals in England, making their way back without orders. Another prisoner-of-war escort mission on 24 July moved Companies 1/B to St Jean du Daye and Companies D/F to St Suzanne to handle the prisoners taken in the St Lo breakthrough. Companies C/E, having the largest percentage of new men, remained in location and continued training. A detail of twelve expert riflemen, then undergoing instruction as snipers, was sent to the 2nd Division area near St Lo for practical work.

On 3 August, the Battalion was assigned to the Twelfth Army Group and attached to the Third Army. Being alerted for movement on 4 August, the Battalion was re-assembled at Beaumont-Hague. On 5 August, the Battalion was detached from the 3rd Army, becoming attached to the 1st Army with the mission of participating in the then North-ward sweep thru France.

Moving out by motor at 0900, 6 August, the Battalion closed into bivouac near Canisy at 1730. On 7 August, the Battalion was attached to a composite combat team consisting of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, the 5th Ranger Battalion, the 99th Infantry Battalion, the 18th FA Battalion, the 759th Light Tank Battalion. The training during the next four days consisted of the perfecting of infantry-tank cooperation in hedgerow country. The proposed mission was cancelled on 11 August, and at 2100, the Battalion was moved by motor to Buais, closing into bivouac there at 0300, 12 August. The convoy was bombed enroute but no casualties were reported.

The mission assigned was to secure the right flank of the 1st Army near Mortain and repel any enemy attempts to withdraw South from the area. Accordingly, the Battalion took up defensive positions on the high ground North of the town of Buais and instituted active patrolling. The Battalion held the third Line of defense in this sector with the 18th FA Battalion in direct support. Effective 120955, the Battalion was attached to VII Corps and further attached to the 4th Division. Defensive positions were maintained until 1630, 13 August, when the Battalion, being alerted for movement, was relieved by the 99th Infantry Battalion. At 1800, the Battalion was released from attachment to the 4th Div and the Prob Ranger Gp. Moving out by motor at 2000 under order of VII Corps, the Battalion proceeded to Mayenne. The troops detrucked in the center of the city at 2400-hours.

By 0200, Companies D/E/F had completed the mission of relieving the II/16th Infantry in defensive position East of Mayenne; Companies A/B/C being held in reserve. At 0800 on 13 August, the Battalion Command Group was moved into the former 16th Infantry CP in Mayenne. The remainder of Headquarters Company closed into this area during the afternoon. On VCG VII Corps, the Battalion was attached to the 9th Division at 2400 for supply and administration.

The enemy forces having withdrawn from contact, Companies A/B/C under Captain Arnold and Companies D/E/F under Captain Slater were assigned areas of responsibility which included the guarding of bridges over the Mayenne River and the approaches to the city. These task forces continued in location from 13 to 17 August, patrolling their various sectors. All civilian reports of enemy in the area were checked and tho the wooded areas in this region were thoroughly screened, the daily number of prisoners was small. Headquarters personnel assisted in patrolling Mayenne and apprehended several enemy in civilian clothes. The Battalion was re-attached to the Provisional Ranger Group on 14 August when that Headquarters arrived in the area.

On 17 August, the Battalion was released from attachment to VII Corps, the 9th Division, and the Provisional Ranger Group, and was attached to the 3rd Army and further attached to VIII Corps. The 18th PA Battalion was released from direct support.

The Battalion was alerted for movement to the Brest area by VIII Corps on 17 August.

V

The Brest Campaign

18 August - 28 September

The Battalion departed from Mayenne by motor at 1330, 18 August. Arriving at the original destination, La Condraye, at 2130, Lt Col Rudder received orders to proceed on to the VIII Corps assembly area at Lesneven. The blackness of the night, the slippery rain-wet roads, and the extreme fatigue of the drivers caused a number of accidents, none of which, fortunately, were serious. The Battalion closed into the assigned bivouac area vicinity Le Folgoet at 0600, 19 August. Becoming alerted for operations at 2000, all companies were prepared to move out on short notice. On 20 August, orders were received placing the Battalion in Corps Reserve with the mission of providing security for the Corps CP. Accordingly, a system of patrols and outposts was set up for this purpose.

Company D moved out at 0730, 21 August, on order of the CG VIII Corps, with the mission of accompanying elements of the 86th Cav. Recon Sqn (Mech) on combat patrols in the St. Renan area. Acting on FFI information that an enemy garrison was willing to surrender to American troops, Lt Col Rudder dispatched one platoon/Company A to effect their surrender. In the patrol approach to the reported enemy position, the column struck an ambush, losing one officer and 3 EM KIA and one Medic wounded by machine gun fire. The remainder of the Battalion prepared for the coming operation and continued to protect the Corps CP this day.

Companies E/F moved out at 1300, 22 August, on order of the CG VIII Corps, for outpost duty vicinity St. Renan. No enemy forces were encountered this day but the Companies, in an exposed position, were subjected to heavy direct artillery fire. Company D continued to operate with the Cavalry on combat patrols originating from St. Renan. That night, all Companies set up ambushes at the approaches to the town but no enemy was encountered. Companies A/B/C continued to hold the outpost line securing Corps CP and prepared for future operations.

Companies D/E/F were attached to the 29th Division on 23 August for operations and supply, being further attached to Task Force Sugar/29th Division. The Companies were now in mutually supporting positions South of St. Renan. At 1300, Company E was informed by the FFI that an enemy patrol was approaching their position. A patrol was sent to flank the enemy force, killing three and dispersing the remainder. The enemy then attacked Company F frontally with a combat patrol of 56 men. (Note: The enemy combat patrols in the Brest area normally numbered upwards of fifty men) Company F repulsed this attack without loss, causing an undetermined number of casualties to the enemy. Realizing that the near-by enemy OP

was made aware of their exact locations by these encounters. Companies E/F withdrew several hundred yards. The extremely heavy concentration of 88-mm fire which shortly thereafter struck the area, fell on their recently-vacated positions. All Companies again set ambushes that night but again met no enemy. At 2145, 23 August, the entire Battalion was attached to the 29th Division per order of the CG VIII Corps.

On 24 August, Companies E/F continued in position and patrolled the St. Renan area while Company D, working with the 86th Cavalry, conducted combat reconnaissance to the South and South-west. The Battalion, upon receipt of the Corps Field Order, completed preparations for the coming operation. At this time, negotiations were underway for the use of FFI assistance as scouting parties and holding forces with the district leader of the FFI, Colonel Louie, an agent from the Office of Strategic Services, Major Summers, and Lt Col Rudder perfecting a plan to establish an intelligence contact point in enemy territory to which the French could bring their information. The Battalion S-2, Captain Harvey J. Cook, and a detail from the Intelligence Section moved out to establish this contact point at 0800, 25 August.

The attack on Brest officially began at 1300, 25 August. The original Battalion mission in the operation was to secure the right flank of the 175th Infantry.

Companies D/E/F assembled near St. Renan and jumped-off to the South at H-hour, reinforced by one platoon and five Scout Cars of the 86th Cav Rcn Sqdn and seven light tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion. Company B was alerted to join the force and, moving out from Le Folgoet at 1300, made contact with the Companies South of St. Renan at 1500. The four Companies were then formed into a Force commanded by Captain Harold K. Slater. Force Slater advanced to and occupied Hill 145, South-west of St. Renan, killing three enemy at the cost of one Ranger wounded.

The FFI-liason party was set up North of St. Renan in a former enemy Headquarters beyond the limits of the friendly advance. Contact was established with the FFI Staff and the installation was secured by FFI and Headquarters personnel that night. No incidents were reported.

On 26 August, Force Slater conducted extensive combat reconnaissance to the South and West. Pushing on to the West and killing fifteen enemy during the course of the advance, Force Slater set up defenses for the night at Kervacoen, the site of a former enemy Headquarters, just North of the Brest Le Conquet Road. Due to the open nature of the operation and the thinly-held lines, all troops were instructed to remain in their foxholes and "shoot at anyone seen moving around". The only casualty suffered this day was one man killed on outpost.

The FFI-liason party remained in location this day and prepared plans for Ranger-FFI cooperation in the campaign to follow. Inter-Allied cooperation commenced with the 81-mm mortar section of Company C, one officer and eleven men, providing covering fire for an FFI assault on an enemy fort the afternoon of 26 August.

Companies A/C moved out from Le Folgoet at 0700 on 27 August and joined Force Slater at Kerveguen. The Battalion was attached to Task Force Sugar for operations. Two other missions, the taking of the Lochrist Battery and clearing of the Le Conquet Peninsula, were now assigned to the Task Force.

Force Slater moved out in the early afternoon with the mission of reaching the sea at Kerveguen to block the enemy attempts to move from the Le Conquet area to Brest. Meeting intermittent resistance and inflicting an undetermined amount of casualties to the enemy at no cost to the Rangers, this Force was held up just short of the final objective by heavy enemy fire. The mission, however, was accomplished with the Brest-Le Conquet Road being cut and with Company D, on the hill-top overlooking Kerveguen, covering the shore escape route by fire. Company B, at Loc Maria Plouzane, placed a block on the Brest road while Companies E/F, at Pen-ar-Prat, controlled the center of the line. The divided, open nature of the operation made supply impossible and the Force was self-sustaining, operating in guerrilla fashion during the first week of the campaign.

Companies A/C were formed into a Force, commanded by Captain Edgar L. Arnold, with the mission of clearing all remaining enemy pockets of resistance along the East coast, South of Trezien. Moving out on the afternoon of 27 August, Force Arnold, reinforced by FFI, proceeded North-west and, by nightfall, had surrounded an enemy island of resistance North-west of St. Renan. Fifteen prisoners were taken in the advance at the cost of one man wounded by artillery.

On 28 August, Force Slater reorganized defenses and conducted combat reconnaissance to the West. Companies B/D consolidated at Loc Maria Plouzane while Companies E/F held in position at Pen-ar-Prat. Several enemy positions located by patrols were shelled by the Task Force Sugar supporting artillery with satisfactory results. Company officers acting as observers. Enemy casualties were undetermined while the Force lost five men wounded by the first artillery fire to be encountered in the advance to date. Prior to this day, the Force moved in complete freedom from enemy artillery.

Force Arnold assaulted the encircled enemy garrison, under the cover of fog, on the morning of 28 August. Two attached TD's of the 644th TD Battalion opened the attack by placing fire on the enemy strongpoint. Fearing close combat with the swiftly advancing Rangers, the enemy soon raised the white flag. Ninety-four prisoners were taken and nine enemy killed in this action without cost to the Force.

Moving out on foot at noon, Force Arnold proceeded to Trezien to attack an enemy strongpoint on Pointe de Corson. This position was being contained by Russian troops of the FFI. These Russians were former Red Army troops who had been captured by the Germans who forced them to act as slave labor in the Brest area. Escaping when the armored drive split the Brest Peninsula, they had banded together to form a fighting unit of 162 men led by capable commanders. This force aided considerably in the successful accomplishment of the campaign in the Le Conquet area.

Force Arnold went into attack formation opposite the center of the enemy perimeter while the FFI formed a line to the South to prevent reinforcement of the garrison. When the promised 105-mm support could not be obtained, the two TD's were directed to take up firing positions to the North. At 1900, Companies A/C being in position, the TD's opened fire. The troops then jumped off to overcome s/a and MG resistance from prepared positions along the perimeter. Enemy direct fire weapons from the Le Conquet placed artillery fire on the position but our troops were in defilade. The enemy then put air-bursts on the area, forcing the TD's to withdraw but was still unable to place fire on the advance. The TD's were sent to the left flank and again opened fire on the position. The Companies, continuing to advance under mortar, artillery, and s/a fire, killed and captured a number of the enemy. At 2115, indications were that the enemy was prepared to receive surrender terms. A patrol was sent forward with a prisoner to effect the capitulation and proceedings were going well when, at 2129, a heavy artillery concentration was placed on the area and the enemy again opened up with s/a fire. Two men were wounded by the artillery and the lines were drawn back to positions around the perimeter for the night. The FFI were cautioned to be on the alert for enemy action from the South and, that night, the Russians succeeded in drawing an enemy eight-man patrol into an ambush. They later made an apology for not saving one of the enemy for questioning.

At 0730, 29 August, the TD's again opened fire on the position while the troops advanced without firing. A prisoner was persuaded to attempt to effect the garrison's surrender and, at 0843, the white flag appeared over the position. The action resulted in the taking of seventy-two prisoners and the killing of eight enemy at the cost of the two men wounded by the artillery. Force Arnold then moved on foot East to Ploudaniel, arriving there at noon. Shortly thereafter, the FFI reported that forty enemy were counterattacking Trezien. Captain Arnold with one platoon/Company A and the two TD's departed to investigate this report while the remainder of the Force under Lt Col Rudder moved South to Ploumoguer and then West to the coast to trap any enemy attempting to escape

the attack by Captain Arnold's force. The report proved to be false so Captain Arnold, moving South along the coast, made contact with Lt Col Rudder's force at Kerlogut. When the column came under 20-mm fire at dusk, the Force moved off the road and went into bivouac. Patrols were dispatched to spot the enemy guns but were unable to do so due to the blackness of the rainy night. The Russian PFI assisted in the securing of the area for the night.

Patrols from Force Slater, dispatched the night of 28 August on Task Force Sugar order, returned safely at dawn. Companies E/F, reinforced by light tanks, then attacked to the West at 1115. Encountering sporadic resistance, killing three and capturing two enemy, the Companies advanced until halted and ordered to return to Loc Maria Plouzane by the CO TF Sugar. Higher Headquarters had conceived a plan of making an assault landing on the Le Conquet coast by Force Slater embarked on rubber boats. The Division Engineer Officer was guided to the selected beach and, seeing at first hand the risks involved, pronounced the water-borne operation much too hazardous to undertake under the prevailing conditions. Companies E/F were then separated, Company E joining Company D and Company F merging with Company B. During this period, Company B had maintained the block on the Brest Road and had conducted patrols to the South. Company D, working with the light tanks, had conducted combat reconnaissance to the West.

Companies D/E, reinforced by elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sqdn, attacked to the West at 1800, this day. Meeting scattered resistance and killing several enemy, this force advanced until held up by a mined area of the Brest road at 1910. Clearing the area, the force continued the advance to Kersturet where the attack was halted on order of TF Sugar. Defenses were established and patrols were dispatched to search out the surrounding area. The force lost three men wounded during the advance. Companies B/F, following in the zone of advance of Companies D/E, proceeded to Kervegnon, to go into defensive position for the night.

Companies D/E resumed the attack on the morning of 30 August, moving West to and occupying Hill 63, South-west of Ty Baul. This advance netted fifteen enemy killed and fourteen captured, at the cost of one Ranger wounded. Companies B/F then joined the troops on the hill and a perimeter was established while patrols screened the position. The enemy commenced to shell the hill with mortars and direct fire artillery at 1520. The 88's were laid so as to fire thru the hedgerows along ground-level while the mortars searched out the flat fields. Foxholes had to be dug deep under the hedgerows to afford any measure of protection. This enemy fire, continuing thru-out the night, caused a number of men to become casualties.



Remaining in position during the morning of 30 August, Force Arnold dispatched patrols which found the 20-mm to be part of an enemy coastal strongpoint to the South. Moving out at 1300 to prepare to attack the position, the Force Hq and Company C, going by way of Ploumouguer, proceeded to the village of Kergolliau. Company A and the two TD's proceeded without detection to a position overlooking the strongpoint which was situated on the center of three paralleling hills. The Russian FFI also went into position on this flank. The Force CP was set up in Kergolliau and the FO of the 105-mm Battalion reported in. The 81-mm mortars were set up to the front while Company C maneuvered into position on the enemy right flank, under cover of the Southward hill. H-Hour for the assault was set at 1900 but when our infiltrating troops came under enemy mortar fire at 1830, caution was abandoned, as planned. Company A, skirting an enemy minefield, moved with utmost speed, covered by the TD fire, across the barren valley onto the protection of the high ground on which the position was located. Unnoticed in the flurry caused by Company A's dashing assault, Company C came in from the left and tied in with Company A on the center hill.

The enemy 20-mm and mortar fire halting any further advance across the open plateau which fronted the position, the 105's were permitted to fire. The results were good; the 20-mm, in an open emplacement, being knocked out and the mortar, being encased in concrete, ceasing fire. Direct gun fire from the Le Conquet area forced the TD's to seek cover and the troops were instructed to dig in for the night. The Russians which continued to hold the hill to the North aided the attack by covering fire from their mortars.

Company C, advancing into position for the final assault during the morning of 31 August, was held up by mortar and MG fire. The 81's silenced the enemy mortar permitting the movement of Company A into position from which covering fire could be provided for Company C's assault. The 20-mm then reopened fire until a 105-mm concentration again knocked out this gun. Company A's 60-mm mortars neutralized the enemy MG permitting Company C to infiltrate onto the position. Just as Company C was preparing to blast the enemy from his fortifications, enemy artillery from Le Conquet zeroed-in on the position. Company C was forced to withdraw under cover of screening smoke provided by the 81-mm mortars and, being accompanied by Company A, fell back 200-yards to escape the intense artillery fire. The enemy position again opened up with 20-mm and mortar and, due to the inability of the two TD's to register in properly, the Cannon Platoon was brought into action. Going into a hull-down position directly to the front of the strongpoint, the 75-mm assault guns were on the target in a matter of seconds, silencing the 20-mm with direct hits. Due to the hazards of crossing the enemy protective minefield at dusk, The Companies were again ordered to dig in for the night. No casualties were reported during the period.

Force Slater continued to hold in position on Hill 63 on 31 August, under heavy mortar and artillery fire. Combat patrols to the South and West encountered sporadic resistance and killed four, capturing five, enemy. One man was killed and ten were wounded by the enemy artillery fire this day.

The Battalion Rear Echelon displaced forward this day to Keraouen, to remain at this location until the culmination of the Le Conquet campaign.

On 1 September, Force Arnold held in position while the Corps Artillery attempted to knock out the strongpoint using 210-mm howitzers. When the heavy artillery failed to zero in, the FO of the supporting 105-mm battery was permitted to fire. This officer performed out-standing work during this battle, often going beyond the front lines to adjust fire. Under the cover of the 105 fire which scored several direct hits with concrete-cracking ammunition, Companies A/C moved up to the last cover before the enemy position. Two P-38's which had been requested to strike the position appeared just before dusk and dropped their bombs into the sea. The enemy continued to harass our troops thru-out the day with artillery, mortar, and the repaired 20-mm but no casualties were reported. At 1800, Force Arnold was alerted to move to RJ 59, located near the village of Treamil, and at 2000, Captain Arnold with 40 men of Company A and the TD section departed under the cover of 105-mm fire.

Force Slater continued to hold Hill 63 on 1 September and conducted combat reconnaissance to the South and West. One patrol from Company B succeeded in reaching the sea to the South while other patrols, working together and using flanking tactics, succeeded in taking 100 prisoners this day. Two enemy were killed at the cost of eleven Rangers wounded during the period by artillery fire. The Force continued to hold in position on 2 September under intense artillery, s/a, and mortar fire. Combat patrols to the West encountered strong enemy resistance, inflicting an undetermined number of casualties to the enemy without cost to the Force.

At 0800, 2 September, the remainder of Force Arnold, less 20 men of Company C who were left to contain the position, moved out from the Kergolleau area under cover of 105 fire and proceeded to join Captain Arnold's force at RJ-59. Company A was given the mission of taking Trebabu to the West and Company C was ordered to take Treamil to the South. Combat patrols led the Company advance to the objectives. The Company A patrol passed thru Trebabu without incident, coming under MG fire West of the town. Assaulting the MG position, the patrol killed three enemy and captured one prisoner. The patrol was then ordered to join Company A, now in Trebabu. Four medium tanks of the 709th Tank Bn and 50 FFI were sent to reinforce the Company, and at 1435, Company A reported as being in defensive position in and around Trebabu with two tanks on line, two in reserve, and the FFI on the right flank. The tanks were moved so silently into

position that the enemy was unaware of their presence. The FO of the supporting 105-mm Battalion was sent to Company A and adjusted fire on several enemy installations to the West and South with excellent results.

The Company C combat patrol ran into an enemy defensive line North of Tremail, knocking out two MG's and killing four, capturing one, enemy without loss. Being out-flanked, the patrol then withdrew to await the arrival of the Company. Bolstered by FFI, the patrol pushed forward under enemy mortar fire to within 200-yards of Tremail, killing two enemy without loss. Heavy enemy artillery fire then caused the patrol to withdraw but when the fire lifted, the patrol regained the advance. The enemy then withdrew and, at 2015, Company C reported Tremail as cleared. At 2050, heavy 88-mm and mortar fire heralded an enemy counterattack. Then the FFI broke and ran, the 40 men of Company C were forced to withdraw from an enemy force approximately 150 strong. The Company went into defensive positions North of Tremail at 2200. Elements of the 86th Cavalry assisted in maintaining contact between Companies A and C during the night.

On 3 September, Company A, reinforced by the four tanks, drove South from Trebadu while Company C, reinforced by two TD's and the Cannon Platoon, moved against Tremail. Moving thru Tremail without incident, the enemy having withdrawn, Company C proceeded South-west. At 1028, the Company had a meeting engagement with a thirty-man enemy patrol; five of the enemy were killed and six captured, the remainder being dispersed. The Company lost three men wounded in the action, two of whom remained duty. Halted by enemy action at 1109, the Company, adjusting 105-mm fire via Battalion communications channels, succeeded in silencing the enemy fire. The front lines were then marked with undershirts on TF Sugar order and P-38's strafed the enemy to the front with good results. At 1800, contact was established with Company A, which had killed eleven enemy without loss during their advance, and the Companies consolidated positions for the night.

Force Slater continued to hold Hill 63 on TF Sugar order during this day and dispatched combat patrols to the front which encountered strong resistance. Direct-firing 88's and the 280-mm shells from the Lochrist battery killed two and wounded 21 Rangers this day.

On 4 September, Force Arnold held in position and continued routine patrolling. With Rangers acting as Observers, the supporting 105's silenced an active enemy 150-mm battery and smashed an impending counterattack directed at the positions of Company C at 1800. The Force CLR was under occasional shelling during the period, some of this being of 280-mm. FFI were used to reinforce the thinly-held lines during the night and Headquarters personnel provided protection for the Force CP.

Force Slater reorganized defenses this day. Companies D/F were moved back 500 yards for a richly-deserved rest and Companies B/E established an OPL on Hill 63 to minimize the effects of the enemy shelling. Altho the area continued to be heavily shelled, due to the spreading of the defenses, only three casualties were reported during the period.

On 5 September, Companies D/F took over the OPL on Hill 63 while Company B/E moved back to the Force rest area. Probing patrols were dispatched to locate the enemy defenses in preparation for the scheduled morning attack. During the early part of the afternoon, an intense 4.2 mortar concentration was laid on the located enemy positions to the front with the FFI having a field day picking off the enemy as they ran to escape the deadly WP. The III/116th Infantry moved in on the left flank at 1900. That night, several men on the Hill were buried alive by the 280-mm shells of the Lochrist Battery; fortunately, all were rescued, suffering only from shock. The severe enemy shelling caused the FFI to pull back out of position and all the available personnel from the Force Hq, 22 in all, were thrown in to hold the 800 yard gap caused by this withdrawal.

Force Arnold remained in position on 5 September and dispatched patrols which encountered occasional resistance. The Force was under intermittent artillery, mortar, and s/a fire during the period which wounded two men. P-38's continued to strafe the enemy area, concentrating on the Lochrist Battery. The planes dropped one bomb in Company A's area but no casualties were reported. Fourteen men were recalled from the holding force at Kergolleau this day to join Company C. An equal number of Russians, dressed as G.I.'s, took up their positions to reinforce the one officer and five men remaining in the area.

At 0825, 6 September, all Companies opened fire on the enemy positions to their front. Force Arnold, on the North, created a diversionary action, while Force Slater, with Companies B/D/E abreast and Company F in reserve, jumped off to the West at 0830. Over-running a number of successive enemy positions, Force Slater advanced one thousand yards, under 88-mm and 75-mm SP fire, holding up for the night at 1745 on TF Sugar order. The enemy, recoiling from the determined drive of Force Slater, fell into the waiting hands of Force Arnold. Company A, remaining in position, took twenty enemy who said that 20 more had been killed by the preparatory 4.2 barrage. Company C, advancing 200 yards, contacted the demoralized enemy, killing five and capturing two who reported that six from their unit had been killed by the WP barrage. Company C then returned to their previous position on order of Lt Col Rudder and provided 81-mm mortar fire for Force Slater. Aerial bursts directed at Company C ceased when the Cub-observer silenced the offending battery with 105-mm fire. A patrol from Company A cut the Brest-Le Conquet cable at 1252 and, at 1828, a patrol from Company C made contact with

Company B and the two Forces consolidated their defenses for the night. Company E maintained contact with the 116th on the left. The Battalion, at this time, held a defense line of a length normally assigned to a Division. Prior to this day, the action had been primarily open warfare, due to the extent of the area to be covered in the assigned operation. The advance by Force Slater this day netted forty prisoners and sixty known enemy dead; the Force casualties were one man killed and nineteen wounded.

Moving forward on the morning of 7 September to shorten the lines, Company C captured one prisoner and a 75-mm gun. Company A remained in position and dispatched two patrols to the West at 1300. These patrols, after working their way undetected almost into an enemy position, returned safely at 1835 and the information obtained was given to the FO and to TF Sugar. Assisted by a platoon of 29th Division Engineers, Force Arnold consolidated defensive positions for the night. One enlisted man of Company C was reported MIA this day; he was later discovered KIA, with the bodies of seven enemy to testify to his fight for survival.

Force Slater resumed the attack at 0830, 7 September, and by nightfall, all Companies had reached the final objective, the Brest-Le Conquet Road. The slight resistance of the enemy this day cost the Force three wounded; the enemy losses were eleven killed and twenty captured. FFI reports received this day indicated that the bulk of the enemy in the area were withdrawing towards Le Conquet. The Force consolidated positions and the Companies tied in for the night. Contact was maintained on both flanks.

Force Arnold displaced forward during the morning of 8 September and, at 1345, closed into position alongside of Force Slater near the Brest-Le Conquet Road. Three prisoners were taken in this movement. At 1420, the two Force CP's were merged and the Battalion operated as a unit from this time on. All companies dispatched strong combat patrols to the West thru-out the day. Encountering but slight resistance, these patrols captured a total of 144 enemy, killing thirty without cost to the Battalion. At 2105, all Companies were moved forward to their jump-off positions for the morning attack. The defenses were consolidated and the Battalion experienced intermittent shelling thru-out the night. With the III/116th Infantry tied in on the left and the 5th Ranger Battalion moving in the night of 7 September on the right, the first of the three missions assigned to the Battalion was accomplished; the right flank of the 29th Division was secured.

As the location of the Lochrist Battery was not clearly determined, the Battalion plan of attack assigned each company a converging zone of operations to the South-west. The

Companies jumped off at 0830, 9 September, with instructions to move as rapidly as possible to permit the enemy no time in which to organize his defenses. The 5th Ranger Battalion on the right had the mission of taking the town of Le Conquet and the III/116th Infantry on the left was to jump off with the Battalion, having Plouguelin as its final objective.

Difficult terrain in several zones caused some Companies to fall behind the others in the speedy advance. The multitude of prisoners taken also hindered the drive and a Battalion Cage was set up to handle this problem. The nature of the advance is shown in the following action of Company B:

Companies E/F were preparing to attack an enemy-held village when the town was taken from another direction by Company B. This Company, advancing almost to the village without detection, opened fire with every available weapon at the signal burst of the Company Commander's SMG. The enemy, cowed by this sudden over-whelming fire, quickly surrendered.

Company A was the first to enter the Lochrist Battery position. Gaining entrance into the enemy CP, Lt Edlin and four men negotiated the surrender of the garrison commander, employing as a forceful argument, a pin-less grenade. Lt Col Rudder, then in a Forward OP position, proceeded to the Battery and officially accepted the unconditional surrender at 1212-hours. All Companies were immediately instructed to increase their rate of advance to cope with the problem of handling the many prisoners in this position.

Proceeding next to St. Matthieu, the furthest town in the Le Conquet Peninsula, Lt Col Rudder contacted the enemy commander of the area, Lt Col Fuerst. The surrender of the entire peninsula, less the pockets still holding out against the advance of the III/116th Infantry, was effected at 1330. Lt Col Rudder then called Battalion Rear for transportation to pick up one Company for delivery to St. Matthieu to assist in the prisoner problem in that area. Company F was ordered to proceed on foot to that area with the utmost possible speed. The remainder of the Companies, less Company A which held the Lochrist Battery area, then cleared the remainder of the Battalion sector of the Le Conquet Peninsula. The Battalion convoy arrived at St. Matthieu without incident, evacuated the prisoners there, and later assisted in the movement of the prisoners from the Lochrist Battery.

When the Battalion Zone of Action was completely clear, Companies B/E/F were instructed to move East to take up positions astride the III/116th Infantry sector to snare any enemy which might attempt to escape the 116th's attack. At dusk, Company B moved to and secured Pointe St. Matthieu while the remainder of the Battalion closed into the Lochrist Battery position. This night was extremely quiet.

Thus, the second of the assigned missions was accomplished; the taking of the Lochrist (or, as it was commonly called, the "Graf Spee") Battery. Besides the four 280-mm guns, some of which were still in firing order, the position consisted of numerous 88-mm and 20-mm dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns. An undetermined number of enemy were killed and 814 prisoners were processed thru the Battalion cage this day. The Battalion suffered no casualties in the attack.

On 10 September, the Battalion, less Companies A/C, completed mopping up the Le Conquet Peninsula. Companies A/C, under the command of Captain Arnold, returned to the strongpoint at Kergolleau and, by 1100, were in position to attack. The position had been pounded by an 155-mm SP for several days. The preparatory 105-mm fire commenced at 1249 with the two TD's taking up the fire at 1324. The 155-mm SP also assisted in the "softening up". The forward wave moved out at 1428 but was held up by enemy mortar and MG fire at 1448. The Force CO requested the 155-mm to "fire for effect" at 1455; the mortar was silenced at 1459. All artillery was ordered to Cease Firing at 1509, the leading elements being almost on the position. A few rounds were received shortly thereafter but, fortunately, they fell short of the men who were then almost upon the concrete mortar emplacement. The enemy garrison hoisted the white flag at 1515 and Captain Arnold quickly moved the prisoners and the Companies from the area, fearing enemy action from the batteries located at Le Conquet. The 5th Ranger Battalion, however, had taken this position and no fire was forth-coming. Seventy-four prisoners were taken from this position at no cost to the Force. The last of the three Battalion missions was complete; the Le Conquet Peninsula was now entirely cleared.

Company B continued to occupy Pointe St. Matthieu this day while Company E took over the guard of the Lochrist Battery. The remainder of the Battalion was closed into the Battalion Rear location. Following a ceremonial review by Company E for the FFI leader of the district on 11 September, the entire Le Conquet Peninsula was turned over to the FFI and Companies B/E closed into the Battalion assembly area. At 0930, this day, the Battalion was released from attachment to the 29th Division and was placed in Corps reserve.

Remaining at Kervouen until 14 September, the troops were given showers, rest, and recreation. The majority of the men had echoed Lt Col Rudder's vow not to shave until the campaign was completed but, beards being outlawed, the hirsute individuals had to be content with trimming their newly-grown moustaches. Supply was also a problem. The men of Companies D/E/F, having been ordered into action on short notice, had been unable to take proper personal care of their



duffle bags and, the Company baggage having been turned in to Supply, it was necessary to re-equip these men from the Battalion Pool.

Moving out by motor on 14 September on order of CG VIII Corps, the Battalion was closed into a bivouac area near the town of Landerneau at 1700, this day. Care and cleaning of equipment, preparations for future operations, and sports kept the men occupied until 17 September when the Battalion again was alerted for operations. Becoming attached to the 8th Division for participation in the clearing of the Crozon Peninsula, the Battalion was moved by motor to Argol, going into bivouac there at 1940.

The initial mission assigned to the Battalion was to relieve Task Force "A", a combined Infantry-Cavalry unit, of the mission of clearing the center of the Crozon Peninsula and maintaining contact between the two forward Regiments of the 8th Division. Moving out on foot at 0700, the Battalion completed the relief without incident at 0930. A new mission was then assigned, that of clearing the Le Fret area; a job that must be done with small arms only, the artillery not being permitted to fire on the area due to the hospital plant located there. After assembling the Battalion and issuing the necessary orders, Lt Col Rudder, accompanied by the Command Group, moved out by motor for the assigned area. When the base of the peninsula was reached without incident, the Group dismounted and effected the surrender of the Le Fret Peninsula. Approximately forty prisoners were taken in this area and four hundred American and Allied prisoners were released. One of the prisoners released was a Battalion cyclist who had been captured on 29 August.

The remainder of the mission, the securing of the hospital town of Le Fret, was discharged with the arrival of the Companies. Companies A/B/C/D cleared and occupied the town while Companies E/F outposted to the West and searched out the surrounding area with patrols. No incidents were reported altho 1600 enemy, a thousand of which were hospital cases, were in the area. The released American prisoners were evacuated by 8th Division vehicles that evening.

The Battalion was relieved the morning of 19 September by the III/28th Infantry and was assembled at Prat Muer. The Battalion was now attached to the 13th Infantry with the possible mission of making a sea-borne assault on the last remaining enemy peninsular strongpoint in the area. This position fell to the assault of the 13th Infantry and the Battalion, being released from attachment, went into bivouac for the night.

Being released from attachment to the 8th Division at 0800, 20 September, the Battalion moved North by motor to Kirbilden, closing into bivouac there at 1800. The period in this location was spent in preparation for movement, physical conditioning and rehabilitation. The 2nd and the 5th Ranger Battalions competed in a Softball Tournament with the officers and the NCO's of the 2nd Ranger Battalion each winning their respective games.

The organic transportation departed for the VIII Corps assembly in Belgium at 1045, 25 September.

The troops were moved by motor to a bivouac near Landerneau on 26 September. Entraining at 2300, the Battalion departed from Landerneau at 2330, 28 September.

The Battalion had been assigned to the 9th Army at 1200, 5 September. On 28 September, the Battalion was released from assignment to the 9th Army and was assigned to the 12th Army Group, becoming attached to the 9th Army.

Arion, BelgiumEsch, Luxembourg

29 September - 2 November

The organic vehicle convoy completed the four-day, seven hundred and thirty mile movement without incident, arriving at the assigned staging area, Foy, Belgium, on 30 September. On orders of the CG VIII Corps, the convoy moved on 1 October to Longvilly, Luxembourg, with the object of preparing a Battalion Bivouac in that area. Being detached from VIII Corps and placed in NUSA Reserve on 2 October, the organic vehicles were moved on orders of CG 9th Army to a former Belgian range area located near Arion, Belgium. While the Hq Comdt set up the Battalion Bivouac, the personnel-carriers unloaded and proceeded to Longuyon, France, to await the arrival of the Battalion.

The troops detrained and entrucked at 0700, 3 October. The entire Battalion was closed into the bivouac area by noon and the troops spent the remainder of the day in personal police and equipment check. The first of the reinforcements, four officers and thirty-four men, were received this day.

On 4 October, the Battalion was assigned the mission of acting as a mobile counterattack force for 9th Army Forward in the event of an enemy air-borne attack. The staff prepared the necessary plans while the troops continued to improve their living facilities. Training commenced on 5 October; the schedule consisted of range practice, physical conditioning, and small unit exercises. Recreation consisted of passes to Arion, now placed "On Limits" by the CG NUSA.

A Battalion Review was held on 6 October to honor 1st Sgt Leonard G. Lomell, the first enlisted Ranger to receive that coveted battle-field commission. Five additional reinforcements arrived on 7 October. Those who had received Infantry training were assigned to Companies while the remainder were formed into basic-training squads under the newly-assigned officers. An honor guard was formed on 9 October in accordance with instructions received from the CG NUSA. These sixty men, selected for uniformity in height and proficiency in the manual of arms, were to act as an escort of honor for visitors to 9th Army Forward, if so directed. On 10 October, Lt Gen Simpson, CG NUSA, awarded numerous decorations in a presentation ceremony held in the Battalion area. General Simpson also commended the Battalion for the out-standing service performed during the Brest Campaign.

The frequent cold rains caused Lt Col Rudder to dispatch a billeting officer to scour the area to the South for winter quarters on 11 October. On this day, one-half of the Company Commanders of the Battalion visited the front lines to study the West Wall defenses at close range.

Lt Col Taylor of the War Department Historical Section visited the Battalion on 12 October to obtain personal interviews from the veterans of the Omaha Beach Campaign. When this officer departed three days later, he remarked that "he had come with the idea of writing a Chapter on the Battalion in his account of the D-Day action but he was leaving with the material for a book!"

Upon the return of the initial party, the remaining half of the Company Commanders departed for the Seigfried Line to see, at first hand, the job they had to do. This last group returned on 15 October. All range firing having been completed, the schedule for the week beginning 16 October was based on physical conditioning and multiple-company exercises, by day and night. Another billeting officer was sent to locate possible billets to the East this day.

The Battalion Commander transferred a number of undesirable men to other units in the 9th Army and, on 17 October, the final group of four officers and twenty-two enlisted reinforcements was received. A practice air-alert was called this night in a driving rain. An error in the dispatching of the QM transportation was corrected at midnight and the troops, en trucking at 0010, were in position to repel the simulated attack against 9th Army Forward at 0100. This alert was called off at 0112 and the troops returned to the bivouac, to resume the normal schedule on 18 October.

On 20 October, Lt Col Rudder, having received permission to do so from 12th Army Group, dispatched two companies to Esch, Luxembourg, to prepare the selected billets. Moving on organic transportation, the entire Battalion was closed into Esch by 2030, 21 October. Companies A/B/C were placed in a former German summer camp, Companies D/E/F were housed in refugee barracks, and the Headquarters installations were placed in enemy-owned buildings in the city. Being released from attachment to NUSA, the Battalion was attached to FUSA, being further attached to the VIII Corps.

The mission initially assigned was to provide a mobile counterattack reserve for 12th AG Tac, located in the city of Luxembourg. Accordingly, two companies were held on constant alert while the remainder of the Battalion, upon the completion of setting the new area in order, commenced training on 23 October. Competitive sports, Physical conditioning, and unit exercises were continued during the stay in this area. Esch being declared "On Limits" to the Battalion, one third of the troops were permitted passes during the evenings.

The Battalion, being out of the Corps area, was alerted to move back to Arlon on 30 October but the alert was called off by VIII Corps on 31 October. The mission of the Battalion was now enlarged to include use in a counterattack role for the three Divisions comprising VIII Corps. Lt Col Rudder was called to FUSA on 1 November and, on 2 November, the Battalion became alerted for movement.

The Hurtgen Forest Campaign

3 November - 5 December

The Battalion, moving out from Esch by motor, was closed into bivouac vicinity Raeron, Belgium, at 1730, 3 November. Becoming detached from VIII Corps, the Battalion was attached to V Corps and further to CCA/5th Arm'd Division for operations. Company F/85th Cav Rcn Sqn (MecZ) and one platoon 1/893rd TD Battalion were attached to the Battalion on this day. The mission assigned on 4 November was to reinforce CCA in a three-day attack which was to pass thru the ruptured West Wall at Lammersdorf and, sweeping in an arc to the South, assault an enemy-held portion of the Siegfried Line from the rear. Intelligence information showed that more than a hundred fortifications were located in the area to be covered by the proposed operation. The plan of attack hinged on the 28th Division's ability to take and hold Schmidt, an important enemy road-center. The 28th Division would also move troops Southward to protect the exposed rear of CCA after the attack had swung South.

The Battalion was grouped into three teams for the operation. Companies E/F would first effect a bridgehead to protect the engineer bridging crew, then would move with 1/CCA rapidly to the East, going into position for the night near Kepternich. Companies C/D, working with B/CCA, were on the inner track of the sweep and were to hold up for the first day at Paustenbach. Companies A/B, together with C/CCA, were in reserve with one platoon/Company B being placed on outpost duty at Strauch, the extreme East Flank of the operation. The plan was then to swing South and West in a semi-circular drive with the Rangers mopping up all resistance by-passed by the two armored-infantry spearheads. Flame-throwers were to be used freely during the operation.

At 1300, 4 November, information was received that the attack had been postponed one day. That night, the Commanders of Companies E/F conducted a personal reconnaissance of the bridgehead site, passing thru the enemy outpost line without incident. Preparations for the attack, including forward reconnaissance, continued on 5 November. Orders received from the CG CCA this day postponed the operation indefinitely due to the 28th Division's difficulties at Schmidt. The first snow fell on 6 November and the alternating thaws and freezes soon turned the grassy bivouac area into an icy morass. Altho there was an acute shortage of winter equipment, the superb physical condition of the men kept the non-battle casualty rate to a minimum. Daily physical conditioning periods were conducted over the snow-clad hills.

Generals Eisenhower and Bradley visited the Battalion area on 8 November. At 1130, this day, the Battalion was placed on two-hour alert for possible use as a counterattack force in the Vossenack area. Personal reconnaissance of the routes and the critical areas was conducted by Lt Col Rudder and the S-2. The party then returned and briefed the Company Commanders. This alert was lengthened to six-hours the next day. On 10 November, the alert status being cancelled, the platoon/A/893rd TD Battalion was released from attachment. The Battalion received a new mission on 11 November, that of acting as a counterattack force for the 102nd Cavalry sector between Lammersdorf and Monschau. Plans were prepared and Staff officers completed a road reconnaissance to the critical areas. On this day, notification was received of the Allied proposed "Prarie Dog" bombing and all troops dug in as instructed.

The troops continued physical training during the remainder of the period in this area and were oriented as to the latest situation by the Battalion S-2. Preparations were continued for possible operations in the 102nd Cavalry sector. At 0230, 14 November, the Battalion was alerted for possible movement to the 28th Division sector. At 0830, all being in readiness, Lt Col Rudder departed for Division Hdq for final instructions. The Battalion stood by, until the movement orders were cancelled at 1000. However, at 1040, another call from Lt Col Rudder ordered the Battalion to assemble in the Germeter area as quickly as possible. The advance party was then immediately dispatched and, upon the arrival of the QM transportation, the Battalion, less the Rear installations, moved out at 1300. Detrucking vicinity K-987313, the troops moved on foot to the designated assembly area. The last mile of this six mile approach march was up a long steep hill and the men, carrying in addition to their normal load, two blankets and an overcoat, had difficulty going thru the knee-deep mud.

The Battalion was detached from GCA/5th Army Division, becoming attached to the 28th Division with the mission (Par 4, FG No. 32, Hq-V Corps) of relieving the II/112th Infantry. The relief process, commencing at 1730, was completed at 1930 without incident. Companies E/F took up positions to the South of RJ-F-023328, Companies C/D went into position along the road West of Vossenack, and Companies A/B were in an air-raid shelter at F-022329. Due to congested roads, the Command Group vehicles were unable to arrive until 2300. The only enemy activity during the period consisted of harassing mortar and artillery fire.

The Battalion counterattack plan, based on that of the II/112th Infantry, was issued at 0200, 15 November. Until the arrival of III/121st Infantry on 19 November, the Battalion was the sole reserve unit of the 28th Division. A conference was held at 1100 with the CO/2d Ranger Bn, the CO/II 112th Infantry, the CO/112th Infantry, and the CO/707th Tank Battalion (Med) discussing the defensive set up. The meeting resulted in the following contact patrols being initiated:

Companies A/B would contact Company K/12th Infantry at F-029340, once during each six-hour period.

Companies E/F would contact Companies C/D by sight during the day and by patrols at separated intervals, each six-hours during the night.

Because of faulty radio communication, the Ranger patrol was the only contact Company K/12th Infantry had with the outside world. The CG 28th Division visited the Battalion CP at 1645. At 1745, Company A reported that a one-hour WP concentration on their area had caused no casualties. Upon the receipt of instructions to reconnoiter the area K/12th Infantry to I/109th Infantry, a patrol from Company B was briefed by the S-2 at 1800. The Companies held in position this day and all contact patrols were successfully made. One casualty was caused by the continuous mortar and artillery fire which fell in the area thru-out the day.

At 0155, 16 November, it was necessary to change the SCR-300 channel due to enemy jamming. Wire was laid this day but was continually cut by the enemy shelling. The reconnaissance patrol departed at 0801 and, surprising the enemy vicinity F-035358, killed two and captured four, withdrawing in the ensuing fire-fight. The locations of several enemy MG's were noted but the shell-torn timber severely limited observation. The Battalion was alerted for the "Prarie Dog" bombing at 0805 and all troops were warned to keep under cover during the attack which began at 1115. The enemy retaliated with an artillery barrage at 1400. At 1930, Company A reported s/a fire and attempted infiltration. Next, at 2000, Company B reported enemy 200 yards to the left of their position with "everything under control". At 2110, a flare was tripped to Company F's front with the enemy moving to the North after exchanging s/a fire. A flare was again tripped in this area at 2325 but no movement or fire was observed. All Companies remained in position this day and all contact patrols were successfully made. Moderate to heavy artillery and mortar fire during the period caused six casualties. During one twenty-minute period, seventeen 120-mm mortar rounds landed in close proximity to the CP.

A combat patrol dispatched at 0130, 17 November, to investigate a sector from which fire was directed at the wire party found the building concerned to be held by friendly troops. Company B requested 4.2 mortar fire on observed



enemy activity to their front at 0920 but the request was denied by the GO/109th Infantry. The Executive and S-2 departed at 1025 for V Corps to receive instructions from G-3 as to the future use of the Battalion in the Germster area. They returned at 1820 with the information that the Battalion was to remain in position until relieved, probably 20 November. All signal communication was lost with Company A at 2045; the messenger immediately dispatched returned at 2110 with the information that "Everything was all right". Flares were again tripped to Company F's front at 2325 but no further developments were reported. On this day, the Staff officers continued their policy of visiting the front-line Companies. All Companies held in position this day and all contact patrols were successfully made. Heavy to intense artillery and mortar fire received thru-out the day caused eight casualties, one of which was fatal.

Information was received at 1000, 18 November, of the pending relief that night of the 109th Infantry in the sector occupied by the Battalion. The increase in friendly artillery this day moderated somewhat the enemy's fire, only two casualties being reported during the period. A direct hit on the CP of Company F at 1520, fortunately, caused no casualties. The Battalion Medical Section assisted this night in evacuating severe casualties incurred when 120-mm mortar fire fell on a close column of out-going 28th Division troops. The men of the Medical Detachment performed out-standing service under the harsh conditions of the campaign in this sector. All Companies held in position this day and all contact patrols were successfully completed.

Lt Col Rudder departed at 0930, 19 November, for the 109th Infantry and 28th Division Headquarters, returning at 1210 with the information that the Battalion would be partially relieved that night. The Company Commanders were briefed on the movement order at 1300; the plans for movement were:

The heavy equipment of Companies C/D would be transported on the Command Group vehicles and Companies C/D/E/F would move out by sections at separated intervals so as not to interfere with the relief process of the 28th Infantry Regiment. Companies A/B were to remain in position and continue to dispatch contact patrols until relieved, probably 20 November.

At 1430, the Battalion was notified that it was detached from the 28th Division and was attached to the 8th Division, being further attached to the 28th Infantry. At 1440, company B again reported enemy activity to their front and 4.2 fire was placed on the area with good results, Company B adjusting the fire via Battalion communications channels.

The Command Group, less the Battalion Commander, the S-2, and the Sgt Major, departed on foot at 1730. At 1810, Companies E/F reported as being completely moved out. The relief of Companies C/D was completed at 2200 and, by 2400, all Companies were closed into the new assembly area vicinity F-005322. The movement to this position was without incident but one casualty occurred when the area was mortared during the night. Companies A/B remained in position on 19 and 20 November under intermittent mortar and artillery fire, continuing to contact Company K/12th Infantry. On 20 November, Companies C/D/E/F constructed log shelters and prepared for further operations. No casualties were reported altho the assembly area continued to receive intermittent shelling.

All Companies remained in location on 21 November, Companies C/D/E/F continuing rehabilitation while Companies A/B continued to contact Company K/12th Infantry. At 1500, this day, the CO/28th Infantry directed that a patrol be sent to determine the exact location of the right flank of the 121st Infantry. The patrol from Company B moved out at 1530, returning at dusk without making contact. The CO/28th Infantry then directed at 1740 that Company B would proceed to the location of Company K/12th Infantry from where they would be guided to and would take up position on the right flank of the 121st Infantry. Company B moved out at 1837 and, picking up the officer-guide at 2045, reported at 2145 that they were in position as ordered: F-031345. There was some confusion between the 28th Infantry and the 121st Infantry as to where the Company should be placed. As a result of this indecision, the Company was guided thru a minefield, causing three men to become severely wounded. Intense artillery and mortar fire directed at the Company's position caused nine additional casualties, one of which was fatal. Company A, meanwhile, remained in position and continued to contact Company K/12th Infantry.

Companies C/D/E/F continued rehabilitation on 22 November. Company A, remaining in position, dispatched contact patrols to Company B and to Company I/121st Infantry which had relieved Company K/12th Infantry. One of these patrols, on the return trip, captured two enemy carrying important documents. Company B, holding in position, received intense mortar and artillery fire thru-out the period. One direct hit on the Company CP added to the total of twelve casualties during the period, one of which was fatal. Engineers requested by Company B to clear a path thru the minefield failed to appear. Rations for the Company were delivered by Company A carrying parties after dark.

The Battalion Rear Echelon closed into the Forward assembly area on 23 November and Companies C/D/E/F erected log shelters for the installations. Company B, remaining in position, repulsed an enemy patrol attempting to turn their

right flank at 1345. At 1553, the Battalion Commander, on receiving the permission of the CO/28th Infantry, instructed Company A to prepare to relieve Company B. A counterattack at 1712 was repulsed by Company B. By 1725, the advancing friendly forces were well up to the rear of Company B and, at 1745, the friendly forces on line opened fire on the unit which was now almost at Company B's position. A heavy s/a fight ensued with the enemy joining in the fire to add to the confusion. For almost forty-five minutes, Company B was trapped under a three-way cross-fire but, fortunately, no casualties were incurred in this action. The intense enemy artillery caused seven casualties this day; the Company was now down to less than 50% and many of the top NCO's were hit. One volley of friendly artillery fire fell on the position at 1923 but no casualties were suffered at this time. Upon the completion of the laying of engineer tape to the area at 2030, Company A commenced to move up by sections. At 2222, Company A reported as being in position, without casualty, and at 240015, Company B was closed into reserve in the area originally held by the Company vicinity Germeter.

With the permission of the CO/28th Infantry, Company B rejoined the Battalion at the assembly area, going into log hutments constructed for them by the other Companies. Company A, remaining in position, continued to provide right flank protection for the 121st Infantry. Intense artillery and mortar fire received this day caused eleven casualties, one of which was fatal.

The Battalion, less Company A, continued rehabilitation on 25 November. Company A, remaining in position under moderate mortar and artillery fire, suffered but one casualty this day. At 0955, the Company was given the mission of having a patrol reconnoiter the terrain to Hill 54 (035347) to determine the locations of enemy positions and minefields in that area. This patrol departed at 1105, returning at 1232 with the information that no mines were encountered along the reconnoitered route. The patrol was fired upon at Hill 54 by an AT gun located on the high ground to the West. The only enemy seen were several moving to the North; the dense pine forests limited visibility to but twenty yards.

The Battalion, less Company A, continued rehabilitation on 26 November. Company A, remaining in position, was to again reconnoiter the route to Hill 54 this day, but this order was cancelled when the friendly forces pushed thru the Company's position and continued on to the North. Lt Col Eudder requested that Company A be permitted to pull back but the CO/28th Infantry feared this action would "stir up the enemy". Altho the Company continued to receive moderate mortar and artillery fire this day, no casualties occurred.

The troops were processed thru QM Showers on 27 November. Permission was received from the CO/28th Infantry at 1540 to withdraw Company A. Moving out under moderate shell fire, Company A closed back into the Germeter area at 1705, without casualty. At 1015, 28 November, Company A moved to the assembly area and, at 1100, the Forward CP party joined the Battalion. The mission assigned by the CO/28th Infantry at 1130 was to prepare to act as a counterattack force for the Division area. Plans were prepared and were dispatched to the 28th Infantry for approval. Upon the receipt of the approval of the CO/28th Infantry at 1100, the Staff officers conducted route reconnaissance to the critical areas. Upon the return of these parties, a Staff and Company Commanders meeting was called to discuss the possible future use of the Battalion in this role. The troops continued preparations for future operations.

The Battalion Commander, having received the permission of the CO/28th Infantry, departed for V Corps at 0930, 30 November. At 1040, the G-3 8th Division issued this order:

"Reconnoiter areas taken yesterday (Hurigen and Kleinhau) with view of occupying said areas. Make recommendations as to whether movement to areas be made by day or by night."

The Executive and S-3 departed for Division Headquarters at 1045 for additional information; the CO/Company E assumed temporary command of the Battalion. At 1145, the CO/28th Infantry issued the following order:

"Move Battalion to assembly area in vicinity O15349 as quickly as possible. Prepare to carry out Battalion mission as quickly as possible."

The Executive and S-3, returning at 1150, were informed of the order. At 1200, the Executive called Lt Col Rudder at Corps to inform him of the conflicting orders. Briefing of Company Commanders was at 1210, the Executive and S-3 departed on Forward reconnaissance at 1215. The Ass't S-3 and a guide party moved out for the proposed assembly area. Just as the leading elements were crossing the I.P., the Battalion Commander called with the following message:

"Movement postponed pending orders from Division."

The troops then returned to the area and stood by until 1340 when the following message was received from the G-3 of the 8th Division:

"Movement order cancelled on order of Victor 6."

The Ass't S-3, returning from posting the guides, was informed of this change in orders and departed to recall the

forward parties. At 1445, the CO/28th Infantry called:

"Is Battalion on the way?"

The change of orders was made known to this officer and he then called Division for confirmation. The Battalion Commander, returning at 1500, placed the troops off alert. At 1525, the G-3 8th Division called with the final verification of the change of orders. All advance parties closed back into the assembly area at 1600.

The Battalion continued preparations for operations and conducted partial training during the remainder of the time spent in this area. On 2 December, twenty 2 1/2-ton trucks of the 445 AAA Battalion were attached to motorize the unit in the event of a counterattack mission in the Division sector. A tactical road march was conducted on 3 December and, altho the area was strafed, no casualties were reported. On 4 December, an exercise was conducted which involved the movement to and out of a forward assembly area. All troops participated in a speed march on 5 December with another strafing attack speeding up their speed.

On 5 December, the Company Commanders submitted names of the men recommended for rotation to the United States. One enlisted man was accidentally killed this day by a Retgal mine while on a search for stove-pipes. At 1700, this day, Lt Col Rudder was ordered to report to G-1 FUSA the next day and rumors ran rampant as to why the "old man" received this summons.

## VIII

The Bergstein Campaign

6 - 15 December

Lt Col Rudder departed for FUSA, as directed, at 0700, 6 December. During the morning, several Staff officers conducted route reconnaissance to Brandenburg; visiting the CP's of the units holding Hürtgen and Klienau to gain the latest situation report; this party returned at 1145 with the acquired information. Meanwhile, the troops were being oriented as to the situation on the Division front by the Assistant S-3. At 1410, a high-velocity round struck a tree under which one platoon/Company C was being briefed. This tree-burst inflicted thirteen casualties, two of which were fatal. At 1705, the following "URGENT" message was received from the GO/28th Infantry Regiment:

"Battalion alerted for movement to Bergstein".

At 1710, the Companies and transportation having been alerted, the Battalion Executive and S-2 departed for the 8th Division Forward for information. Returning at 2110, the Executive issued the following oral FO:

"The Battalion is to move to Bergstein with the mission of securing the town and taking the hill to the East. Companies A/B/C will go into defensive positions in Bergstein and Companies D/E/F will take and hold Hill Four-hundred. Positions for A/B/C are as follows:

Company A : 075333, with a road block at 077332;

Company B : 079333;

Company C : One platoon on road block at 085335, the other will man 81-mm mortars from positions in Bergstein.

Company L/28th Infantry, in draw to West, will maintain contact with Company A.

Companies D/E/F will attack Hill 400 (P-087338) under command of Captain Slater (The Bn S-3). H-Hour to be approximately 0800.

FO/56th Armd FA Bn will accompany Force Slater; support for Companies A/B/C will be furnished by FO/5th Armd Div thru Battalion Communications channels. Two platoons/G/893rd TD Bn will become available at 070600. SCR-300 will be supplanted by wire as soon as possible. Medical evacuation will be thru the 121st Infantry.

Colonel Rudder returned at 2121 and was informed as to the situation. The Executive was promoted to Major at 2227. All available information was distributed to the Company Commanders who in turn passed this on to their troops. The trucks of the 445th AAA Bn caused considerable difficulty as they, being well dispersed against possible strafing attack,

had trouble pulling onto the road this moon-less night. Just as the troops started to entruck at 2231, one of the kitchens burst into flame but the expected artillery failed to materialize. The Advance Party moved out by motor at 2255; the troop convoy moved out shortly thereafter.

Blackout lights were switched off as the convoy neared the end of the Hurtgen Forest and the remainder of the trip was uneventful until the lead vehicle became mired in a shell hole just before Brandenburg. Colonel Rudder, Major Williams, and Captain Cook proceeded on foot to the 47th AIB CP located in Brandenburg; here, the CO/CCR/5th Armd Division oriented the party as to the current situation. Attempts to extricate the lead vehicle led to enemy AT fire hitting the nearby road junction; no casualties were reported. The S-2 returned to bring up the Advance Party on foot, telling the drivers to follow with their vehicles as soon as they had made their way around the mired vehicle. The PG/56th Armd FA was contacted at the NJ at this time.

At 0005, 7 December, Colonel Rudder turned the command of the Battalion over to Major George S. Williams; Colonel Rudder had been placed in command of the 109th Infantry on orders of CG FUSA. Major Williams had assumed the duties of Battalion Executive on 9 October 1944; prior to that date, the Major had been Battalion S-4. The Command Group vehicles closed into Brandenburg at 0035 and were dispersed. The Advance Group was then guided on foot to Bergstein where the only CP facilities were in the already over-crowded CP of Company A/10th Tank Battalion. The Battalion Staff worked in coordination with the CO/A/10th Tank Bn while the greater part of the installations were dispersed above ground. The Battalion S-3 departed to contact the front-line unit on the East limits of Bergstein; Company C/10th Tank Bn, returning at 0230.

The troops, arriving in the Klienbau area without incident, detrucked and moved on foot to Bergstein with Company A, leading, arriving at 0230. No casualties were suffered during the foot movement altho harrassing artillery forced the troops to hit the ditches many times on the way up. The CO's/Companies A/B/C received final briefing at 0245 and proceeded to their respective areas without the promised guides. Companies D/E/F were held on the road pending the return of Captain Slater who was again on forward reconnaissance. The CO's/companies D/E/F arrived at the CP at 0335 and, when the prolonged absence of Captain Slater indicated the possibility of his becoming a casualty, straws were drawn as to which of two possible plans would be used:

A frontal assault over open terrain or a flanking attack which, tho covered, would lead thru known mine fields.



Captain Slater, returning at 0515, had determined from his reconnaissance that the frontal approach would offer the best chance of success. A patrol from each Company, D and F, were dispatched at 0530 to conduct further reconnaissance and, at 0540, Companies D/E/F moved out for the LD.

Company A, in position at 0530, occupied a network of former enemy entrenchments in the assigned area. Company B, in position shortly thereafter, having an open field as its assigned area, found it necessary to dig individual foxholes. Previous experience had decreed that the men dig in on a line parallel to the front. Eye-witnesses of this action later remarked:

"It was surprising how few casualties we had even tho we continually observed shell bursts all around us".

Company C reported, at 0622, that both platoons were in position and that enemy activity had been heard to the South.

In the movement to the selected LD on the East edge of Bergstein, Company E surprised a number of the enemy at breakfast in a Bergstein home. One grenade burst sufficed in the taking of 13 prisoners. Companies D/F arrived at the LD without incident, Company D taking up position on the right. Company E moved on order of Captain Slater to the North; one platoon going into defensive position on the left flank while the other was placed in reserve at the selected Forward CP, the church at F-084338. The two reconnaissance patrols returned at 0705 and reported no contact made with the enemy.

Companies D/F jumped off at 0730, with combat patrols leading. No artillery preparation was used to gain the element of surprise. The troops assaulted the hill at a dead run with the speed of their attack and the intensity of their s/a fire driving the enemy off in disorder. As one participant put it:

"It was one wave of shooting, screaming Rangers".

The enemy protective curtain of mortar and artillery fire, when it came, fell to the rear of the swiftly moving Companies. The enemy defenses which attempted to hold the attack of Company F was soon shattered when:

"Captain Masny (the Company Commander of Company F) put his big foot against that pillbox door, broke it down, threw in one grenade, and out came twelve prisoners".

Company D, advancing in the zone already cleared by the combat patrol, had the first element of the main body over the hill and almost to the Roer River when orders were received to dig in on the hill-top. The troops, starting to dig in at 0835, had difficulty working with the frozen, rocky ground and the holes were just beginning to take shape when

the enemy artillery fire shifted to the hill-top. The enemy was able to direct observed fire from three sides of the perimeter, employing 88's, 75-mm SP's, and 120-mm mortars. Tree and ground bursts inflicted the extreme casualties of the operation at this time.

The captured enemy bunker just off the crest of the hill was turned into a First Aid Point. During the subsequent counterattacks, direct fire was laid on the shelter entrance and, at times, the attacking enemy forces advanced so close that it was necessary to shoot one's way out of the bunker in order to reach your assigned defensive position.

Evacuation to the Clearing Station at the Forward CP could be carried on only during the infrequent quiet periods by litter-teams from Companies D/E/F. Litter-Jeep, three of which were destroyed during the action, transported the casualties to the ambulance point at Brandenburg for transmittal to the nearest Collecting Company at Kleinbau. Due to the wrecked vehicle road block between Bergstein and Brandenburg, it was necessary to hand-carry the litters the last three hundred yards to the waiting ambulance.

Five counterattacks, each approximately 150 strong and all supported by intensive mortar and artillery preparation, struck the force on the hill during the forty hours of occupation. The first counterattack, following the devastating barrage, came from the South-east at 0930. The woods in this sector covered the enemy's advance and, in some instances, the attack was discovered just as the enemy was about to rush the last few hundred yards to the bunker. When close in, the enemy would use MG's, s/a, and grenades. Bayonets and hand-to-hand fighting repulsed the near-in enemy, s/a and grenades took care of those further away, while a curtain of artillery fire which continued to grow in intensity caught them coming and going. In this initial attack, S Sgt Secor of Company D, his own weapon smashed into uselessness, turned the tide of the battle when, with a captured machine pistol under each arm, he stood up to turn twin streams of demoralizing fire upon the close in enemy.

Artillery concentrations were plotted to cover the critical zones with the fire adjusted by the troops on the hill and the 5th Arm Division FO performed superior service in placing the fire where it was wanted. At times, due to the nearness of the enemy approach, the troops called for fire almost on their positions. The excellent artillery fire was an important factor in the successful holding of the Hill.

At 1242, Captain Slater, returning to the Battalion CP, reported that only 17 men of Company F and 15 men of Company D were still in fighting condition. Additional Battalion Medics went forward to assist in the casualty treatment. A patrol from Company D searched the 088338 area for a tunnel

reported by the CG 8th Division, returning at 1300 without success. The second attack came from the North-east at 1450, penetrating to within 100 yards of the Forward CP before it was stopped by s/a fire. The enemy artillery fire continued to be intense. The solid masonry of the church withstood 82 direct hits, only one of which penetrated, coming thru one window and glancing out another, causing two casualties from the resulting stone fragments.

At 1606, the following message was received from the one remaining officer of Company D:

"Counterattacks on hill all afternoon; very heavy artillery; only 25 able-bodied men left; help needed badly; are surrounded".

The reserve platoon of Company C was alerted and a request was sent to the CG 8th Division for reinforcements. The Hill was ringed to the North-East, East, and South-east with additional artillery concentrations. An urgent call for help from the Hill at 1652 resulted in the reserve platoon of Company C being rushed immediately into action. The attacking enemy force withdrew in the face of these on-rushing reinforcements and, at 1735, the report was received:

"Everything is quiet on the hill".

Litter parties immediately commenced evacuation from the bunker and, by 2140, all casualties were at the Church Clearing Station. The litter-Jeep was kept busy all night and far into the next day. Cpl Korb of the Medical Detachment voluntarily drove this vehicle during daylight hours even tho. the enemy fire in this area did not respect the Red Cross.

Companies A/B/C, remaining in position, were shelled intermittently thru-out the day. The Battalion CP location was a prime enemy mortar target, being subjected to concentrations at various intervals. The guides which had been stationed in Brandenburg since 0500 brought in the first of the seven TD's at 1913. Two were sent to Company A, two to Company C, and three to Company B. The pending relief of Company A by Company K/28th Infantry was effected at 2100; Company A then returning to defensive positions in Pergstein, by platoons. The only enemy activity during the relief process consisted of several flares and the normal harrasing artillery fire. One platoon of Company A picked up the 28 prisoners from the Forward CP, the Battalion total for this day. After processing at the Battalion CP, the prisoners were delivered to the 47th AIB in Brandenburg. Rations, water, ammunition, mortars, and LMG's were brought in by the Battalion Supply vehicles at 2345. Division Engineers also arrived at this time to lay hasty minefields in the Companies B/E areas.

At 0018, 8 December, Company E reported attempted enemy infiltration and continued artillery fire. The strength report received from the force on the hill at 0130 was:

Company D : One officer and 15 men;  
Company F : One officer and 14 men.

At 0225, Company E reported with three officers and 57 men. The enemy continued to shell the area thru-out the night.

Company C/121st Infantry, three officers and 104 men, arrived as reinforcements at 0333 and was sent to take up positions on the right flank of Company D. One HMG section of this force was sent to reinforce Company E at the Forward CP. The elements of GCR/5th Armd Division in Bergstein were relieved this night; the first unit moving out at 0300 and the final element departing at 0540. Company C/121st Infantry reported that all troops were in position as ordered at 0540. Upon the departure of the Command Group of Company A, 10th Tank Battalion, the CP was completely cleared out, the trash removed, and just as the renovation was completed, the enemy began his preparatory fires for the 4th counterattack. It was during this attack that the Command Group set up several LMG's, preparing for a last-ditch stand.

By far the heaviest concentration of the entire period in this area commenced to fall on Bergstein and Hill 400 at 0730. The artillery fire on Bergstein was so heavy that it seemed to have a "drumming" sound while that which fell on the Hill was of such intensity that one explosion would cover the sound of the next approaching shell.

Corps artillery was alerted and when Company E reported that the attack was coming from the North at 0758, the appropriate concentrations were immediately fired with excellent results. Those of the enemy who survived the barrage were repulsed by the force on the hill and, at 0850, the attack was over. Company D then reported:

"Only ten men left".

As part of this enemy attack, a diversionary force had struck Companies B/C at 0810 under covering fire of three towed AT guns. One SP-gun also attempted to penetrate the position but it was blocked from entrance to Bergstein by a wrecked vehicle road block which it then attempted to blast off the road without success. The fire of the supporting TD's and mortars forced the withdrawal of these enemy guns and this attack was stopped at 0837. Another attack from the South at 1036 was stopped in its tracks by prepared artillery concentrations.

All companies remained in position thru-out this day under varying enemy mortar and artillery. Observers located on the Hill directed fire on located enemy installations to the East with excellent results. The CO/I/13th Infantry, the

relieving unit, arrived at the Battalion CP at 1330. Plans for the change-over were agreed upon and, at 1545, all Companies were alerted for relief. The Battalion Medical Officer, Captain Walter E. Block, was instantly KIA just outside the CP when he was departing to supervise evacuation. This officer had remarked that morning that he had a premonition he would not live out this day.

The fifth and final attack began when large-caliber guns to the East of the Roer River concentrated on the area at 1630. The enemy came from the South-east and, at 1702, engaged Company D in a fire-fight. At 1713, Company E reported another enemy force at 079335, almost into Bergstein. This force was also engaged by Companies B/C. At Kettlehut, the FO/5th Armd Division, called down all the artillery available in Corps, eighteen battalions in all, the resulting overwhelming fire forced the enemy to withdraw at 1715. The force attacking Bergstein retreated into a previously zeroed-in draw at 085333 and at 1721, Companies B/C reported:

"Things were pretty hot for a while but are OK now".

The enemy force attacking the Hill came within thirty yards of the bunker before being stopped by s/a fire. This force, when our artillery was laid down, must have thought that he was under his own artillery fire for a while since that he was fired and the shells which had been landing on the hill top lifted 100 yards to the West. The enemy, attempting to retreat, was blocked by this curtain of fire and, in their demoralized state, proved easy targets for the embittered men on the Hill. This attack ended at 1735 and the only enemy action prior to the relief was the normal harrasing fire and one mortar barrage on Bergstein.

At 1845, two officers and seven men were taken to the Battalion Rear as the first lap of the journey back to the States. Guides were also dispatched at this time to contact the relieving unit at Brandenburg. Thru the additional aid of vehicles of the I/15th Infantry Medical Detachment, all casualties were evacuated from Bergstein by 090100. The relief process commenced at 2140 and was completed without incident at 090240. The troops, Company E in the rear, departed on foot for the entrucking point near Kienhau. The Battalion was entirely closed into the original assembly area at 0516, 9 December, and was re-attached to the 28th Infantry Regiment/8th Division.

The casualties during the Bergstein action were:

KIA : 19	SMA : 26	SIA : 6
DOM : 4	LMA : 60	LIA : 14
MIA : 4		

The period 10-15 December was devoted primarily to reorganization, rehabilitation, and recreation. A liberal pass policy issued by V Corps permitted the majority of the Battalion personnel two day passes to the Corps Rest Center in Eupen. The troops were processed thru QM Showers and the duffle bags were brought up.

At 0900, 11 December, the Battalion Commander and S-2 departed to interview prospective reinforcements at the 11th Replacement Depot. On this day, the Battalion was detached from the 28th Infantry Regiment and was attached to the 311th Infantry Regiment which was in turn attached to the 8th Division. The Battalion mission (FO No. 22, Hq-8th Division) was to act as counterattack reserve for the Division sector.

At 0700, 15 December, three officers and sixty men departed on a two-day Paris pass and, at 0700, 16 December, what was destined to be the final group departed for the Eupen Rest Center.

Note: In reference to the Bergstein - Hill 400 action, an 8th Division G-2 Summary received shortly after this action took place contained the following information:

"General Model, Chief of the German General Staff, had offered seven-day furloughs and the Iron Cross to each member of the unit which was successful in the re-taking of Hill 400".

Among the units which tried, and failed, was one battalion of paratroopers stationed at that time in the Obermaubach area, to the North of Bergstein.

The Simmerath Campaign

16 - 31 December

At 0940, 16 December, the CG 8th Division alerted the Battalion for movement. Some confusion resulted when the orders of the 8th and 78th Divisions conflicted as to the time of movement, the location of the initial assembly area, the means of transportation, and the time and place of final briefing. Matters were finally clarified and the Battalion Commander and Executive, returning from the briefing, joined over by the CG V Corps at 78th Division Forward, joined the Battalion at the initial assembly area at 1740.

Having received no information as to the type of mission prior to entrucking, the troops were permitted to leave their carefully constructed shelters standing and traveled only with their basic load. The Battalion was considerably under strength at this time due to the recent severe losses during the battle of Bergstein and the fact that 120 men were then absent on pass. Prior to entrucking, an alert call had been sent to the V Corps Rest Center at Eupen, requesting that the Rangers there be rounded up and returned. It was deemed impossible to recall the sixty-man Paris Group.

A meeting of the Staff and Company Commanders was held at 1750 and Major Williams issued the following oral FO:

\*The Battalion is now attached to the 78th Division and will take up defensive positions in Simmerath; Company A/10th Tank Battalion will be attached in support. The artillery support will be furnished by FO's from the 307th FA, the 309th FA, and the 5th Armored Division. Company D will man the 81-mm mortars and Company F is tentatively selected to provide LMG support. (Note: The sole remaining officer of Company F being absent on Paris leave, an officer from Company E was placed in temporary command of the Company.)

The advance group moved out by motor at 2000 with the troops following on foot. Receiving the current situation at the 309th Infantry Rear in Lammersdorf and Forward in Simmerath, the advance group then established the Battalion CP vicinity 986239. The extensive linear distance of the perimeter assigned to the Battalion necessitated a change of plans. It was decided to place four companies on line, keep one in reserve in Simmerath, and permit Company D to continue as planned. The troops, Company A leading, arrived at 2300 and were immediately guided into position by the Battalion Exec. Two Companies of the 78th Division were attached to



assist in manning the perimeter. The CO/Company K/309th Infantry, arriving for instructions at 2315, was directed to go into position on the right flank, South of Paustenbach. The CO/Company G/310th Infantry, arriving at 2330, was given the sector to the left, near the road to Kesternich. Enemy artillery and mortars were active thru-out the period with at least one direct-fire weapon zeroed in on the Kesternich Road to the front of the Battalion CP.

Approximately thirty of the men in Eupen were alerted, the remainder being out of contact. These men were moved to the Battalion Rear by truck and were alerted for movement in the morning.

Companies A/B/C, relieving Company C/309th Infantry, were in position South of Simmerath at 0120, 17 December. The troops constructed two-man foxholes and each Company was permitted one cellar for use as a CP and rehabilitation room for the troops off duty. All precautions were taken against trench-foot. At 0310, all Companies reported in position:

From left to right on line: Company A - 989238; Company B - 985237; Company C - 983241; Company F - 983241.

In Battalion Reserve: Company E - 986240

With mortars in position: Company D - 985242

All Companies were alerted for a possible paratroop attack from the North-east. Company G/310th Infantry had reported observing four planes drop chutists in that area at 0445. By daylight, the SCR-300 communication had been sup- planted by wire. The wire section performed out-standing service in keeping the system in operation even tho the wire lines were being continually broken by the enemy fire which fell on the town. At 0527, Company E was ordered to search out the center and South-west sections of Simmerath; close-range enemy s/a fire having been heard in that area thru-out the night. Altho this area was thoroughly checked by the Company, no enemy was found. All Companies continued to improve their positions during the day, under continuous enemy mortar and artillery fire which caused two casualties.

The thirty Eupen returnees assisted in breaking camp in the morning, then departed at 1230 by truck for Lammersdorf. Moving on from there on foot, these men proceeded, without incident, to Simmerath and were guided to their respective Companies. At 1315, Company C/310th Infantry reported that they had "killed one paratrooper and captured three". The FO/5th Armd Division departed at 1330 and was replaced by the FO/307th FA Battalion at 1340. 78th Division Engineers who were requested to install trip flares and booby traps arrived at 1600 and, assisted by the front-line troops, completed this work before daybreak.

Commencing at 1635, artillery concentrations were zeroed in on the critical areas to the front with observation furnished by the front-line companies. At 1900, the FO of a 4.2 Mortar Company arrived and defensive fires were planned for this weapon. A flare was tripped to Company C's front at 2350; the enemy, moving West, was observed by Company B as he entered a previously zeroed-in draw. The appropriate concentration was requested at 2355; but, due to a failure in radio communications, the 105-mm FDC could not be contacted. The enemy's approach was halted by the s/a fire of Company B at 0010. The 4.2 mortars, commencing to open fire on this target at 0025, were adjusted by Company B. Meanwhile, the request for artillery fire had been relayed to Division FDC thru Regimental Switch. The promised 155's being unable to fire due to enemy planes overhead, at 0105, Corps artillery placed an 8-inch gun concentration on the target. Then the enemy planes departed, the 155-mm Battery also fired a concentration. By this time, the 4.2 mortars had been zeroed in. This intense concentration of fire struck the target at almost exactly the same moment and, at 0120, Company B reported: "Results excellent". No additional movement was observed in this area during the remainder of the night.

At dawn, 18 December, the FO communications to their respective FDC's were increased by wire and their radios were checked. The Battalion relay station, an SCR-284, was also set up at the 155-mm firing position. Additional artillery and mortar concentrations were zeroed-in this day and their locations were made known to the companies. Interdictory fire was also commenced on known enemy positions and critical terrain features. At 1040, artillery fire was placed on observed enemy activity near a pillbox at 984233; results unknown. The front-line companies, remaining in position under intermittent mortar and artillery fire, reported no enemy activity until 1420. At that time, Company B, having permitted an enemy patrol to approach within 100-yards of their position, pinned them down by s/a fire and called on the 81-mm mortars to complete the job. The 81's were also zeroed in on close-in concentrations and placed harrassing fire on near enemy positions. In subsequent prisoner interrogation, it was discovered that one round of this mortar fire had inflicted a considerable number of casualties when it fell just as a garrison was forming up outside of its bunker.

The Battalion Commander, in discussions with Division and Regiment, had perfected the defensive plans this day. The Division engineers were contacted in reference to the laying of protective wire and AT-mines. The thinly-held front lines were tied in and the fire of auto-weapons was interlocked. Light tanks, TD's, and towed AT guns were also included into the defensive set-up.

Nebelwerfer fire struck the area at 1715, causing three casualties. An enemy patrol which attempted to probe our defenses at 1750, was driven off by the s/a fire of Company C and 4.2 fire. Company C then attempted to round up the demoralized enemy but the WP smoke of the mortar shells covered his withdrawal. Friendly interdictory fire continued and, in retaliation, the enemy brought up several SP guns from the South which fired on our lines at intervals during the night. At 2150, fifty-three replacements plus the remainder of the men returning from Eupen pass arrived at the CP and were guided to their respective Companies.

Heretofore, it had been a Battalion policy to give the new arrivals pre-battle conditioning before permitting them to enter combat. However, the Companies, being so low in strength, had urgent need for additional man power so the reinforcements were, necessarily, used to fill this need.

Guides were dispatched at 2232 to pick up the Engineer wiring party waiting outside of Simmerath. The SP gun again opened fire at 2255 but was silenced by 4.2 and 105-mm fire.

At 0001, 19 December, the Battalion was officially released from attachment to V Corps and the 8th Division, becoming attached to VII Corps, the 78th Division, and the 309th Infantry Regiment. Division Engineers, assisted and covered by the front line troops, commenced to lay a single concertina to the front at 0005. Enemy movement of troops and armor, discerned in the draws to the South at 0020, was caused to cease by accurate 4.2 and 105-mm fire. At 0610, Company E relieved Company A which then went into Battalion reserve in Simmerath. Employing Company D's mortars at 1000, Company B routed an enemy patrol which had approached too close for artillery fire. At 1010, in accordance with the instructions received from Regiment, two WCO's from Company D led a 309th Infantry patrol on a sweep of Simmerath but, again no results were reported. Regiment called at 1040 and alerted the Battalion for an anticipated attack by the 6th Panzer Division. The Battalion stock-piles of AT ammunition were increased and all available bazookas were brought up from the Forward Battalion Supply located in Lammersdorf.

At 1200, 19 December, the Company strengths were:

Company A : 41 + 3  
Company B : 49 + 3  
Company C : 52 + 3

Company D : 42 + 3  
Company E : 56 + 3  
Company F : 32 + 1

Company D, firing prearranged 81-mm mortar fire to protect Company B's reconnaissance patrol at 1645, was hit by counter-battery fire which knocked out one mortar, wounding

three men. The patrol returned safely and the information obtained was passed on to Regiment at 1745. At 2000, Company B, observing an impending counterattack forming at 992230, requested artillery fire on the target. By 2005, both the 4.2's and the 105's had answered this request. Excellent results were obtained with the Company adjusting the fire and, at 2023, the order to cease fire was given, the attack having been completely smashed. Company C had dispatched a patrol to determine the amount of explosive necessary to blow a pillbox at 980234. Accomplishing this mission without detection, this patrol returned at 2025 with the information that a Bee-hive charge would do the job. Company A, 10th Tank Battalion was released from attachment at 2115 and departed from Simerath prior to dawn. The Engineers and the front line Companies continued to lay wire this night.

At 0025, 20 December, Company B reported enemy digging in 100-yards to their front; 105-mm fire dispersed this activity by 0105. At 0145, the Company G patrol returned from destroying the pillbox at 980234 which was found to be occupied. The method of destruction was as follows:

Two Bee-hive charges with identical time fuses were placed on opposite sides of the pillbox. The firing party was but a few hundred feet away when the charges blew. The party observed the enemy, attempting to escape the inside pressure, run into a case of TNT, which, with a slightly longer time fuse, had been placed at the pillbox exit.

The patrol reported the pillbox satisfactorily destroyed. The enemy re-commenced digging to Company B's front at 0300; ten minutes of 105-mm grazing fire halted all activity in this area for the night. Those of the enemy force which had been driven toward our lines by this fire were dealt with by the 81-mm mortars.

At 0500, Company E reported hearing enemy armor in the village of Huppenbroich to the South-east; 105-mm fire on the target at 0510 and 155-mm fire at 0555 caused this movement to cease. Vehicular movement was heard in this area at 0740; Corps placed 8-inch guns on the target at 0750. At 0800, Company E reported that enemy troops were observed at 988234; the resulting 105-mm fire obtained good results. Company A, conducting a search for snipers in Simerath during the morning, reported no results. At 1130, Company B again requested fire on observed activity at 988234; 105-mm fire obtained excellent results at 1140.

At 1217, a new FO replaced the original FO of the 4.2 mortar Company and was informed of the mortar concentrations and harassing fires. Company E adjusted fire on an enemy OP at 992236, reporting six direct hits at 1335. One squad of Company F was placed as security for the treadyway bridge of 975247 at 1350, as directed by Regiment. All Companies

were informed of possible infiltration from the West by five hundred paratroopers. At 1640, Company B, hearing enemy activity in the draw to their front, called for the appropriate 105-mm concentration. Company D also assisted with the 81's and, at 1650, the activity ceased. At 1949, Company E asked for artillery fire on vehicular movement in Huppenbroetch. The first concentration of 105-mm fire at 2003 fell to the right of the target; the second concentration of 36-rounds dropped 12-rounds short into Company E's area but, fortunately, no casualties were reported.

Companies A/B dispatched reconnaissance patrols to the front at 2000. The Company A patrol returned safely at 2110 with the information that the pillbox blown by Company C the previous night was completely destroyed but that there were more pillboxes, one of which was definitely occupied, in the same general area. The Company B patrol returned safely at 2200 and reported an unoccupied pillbox at 989229. The Division Engineers, assisted by Company B, continued to lay a single concertina this night, hampered by enemy s/a fire. At 2233, the enemy approached so close to Company C's front line that the 60-mm mortars had to be employed to drive him off; enemy artillery placed counter-battery fire on these mortars at 2246 but, being that the gun crews were properly dug in, no damage was done. Due to a security ban this dark period, the Division artillery declined to place fire on the many targets which were observed to the front. The area was under almost constant artillery, SP-gun, mortar, or s/a fire during the period but no casualties were reported.

At 0025, 21 December, enemy activity was again heard to Company B's front; 4.2 fire soon dispersed this threat. The protective concertina was completed in Company B's area at 0055. Company A then relieved Company B at 0137. Company B going into mobile reserve in Simmerath. During the hours of darkness, the enemy would attempt to obtain the locations of the auto-weapons by firing machine pistols at the front line troops, hoping to draw return fire; the 4.2 mortars soon discouraged this practice. Just prior to dawn, the SP-gun again opened fire; 105-mm and 4.2 fire forced this gun to change positions frequently, finally driving it off. At 1005, Company A reported one hundred enemy massing 1000-yds to the South; the 105's and 4.2's dispersed this threat with excellent results observed. During this day, all Companies remained in position under intermittent enemy fire and adjusted fire on observed enemy activity to the South.

The night patrols commenced at 1730; Company C sent out one patrol to set up an ambush at 981234 and another to locate a reported HMG at 980238. Artillery concentrations were plotted to protect the patrol routes of withdrawal and all Companies were notified of this action. At 1815, the Battalion was alerted for an armored counterattack from the North-east; this alert status was cancelled by Regiment at

1945. The ambush patrol returned, as directed, at 2030 and reported that, altho six enemy had been seen at 981235, none had approached near enough to be taken. At 2105, Company A reported the killing of one enemy in their wire. The patrol of Company A, having the mission of determining the condition of the pillboxes at 982234, departed at 2308. Nebelwerfer and artillery fire caused four casualties this night, one of which was fatal. One of the newly-arrived reinforcements, standing guard-duty at the entrance to the Company A CP, was killed by a direct hit from a Nebelwerfer.

Additional reinforcements having been received on 21 December, the strength of the Companies at 0001, 22 December was as follows:

Company A	: 59 + 3	Company D	: 55 + 3
Company B	: 55 + 3	Company E	: 58 + 3
Company B	: 56 + 3	Company F	: 47 + 2

The Company A patrol returned safely at 0155 with the information that the pillbox at 982234 was found to be held by the enemy but that enemy artillery in that area prevented any closer reconnaissance. The Company C patrol returned safely at 0230 with the information that six unoccupied concrete shelters were located at 981236 and that the reported HMG was non-existent. At 0600, Company C reported one man MIA; this man was seen to go forward of the lines to obtain water from a nearby stream and it was believed that he fell into the hands of a waiting enemy patrol.

The companies remained in position during the day under intermittent mortar, artillery, and SP-gun fire. Fire missions were adjusted on observed targets to the South, with good results. At 1555, an estimated platoon of enemy were spotted coming toward Company C's right flank; 4.2 and 81-mm mortars were fired for effect, dispersing the enemy and inflicting a number of casualties. At 1622, Regiment again notified the Battalion of a possible armored attack from the East. Company B relieved Company C at 1950. Company C going into reserve in Simmerath. At 2205, Division alerted the Battalion for a possible counterattack from the South and all Companies were notified.

The Engineer mine-laying party which was scheduled to lay AT mines during this period reported at 0315, 23 December that they could not "do the job tonight - it's too hot out there!". At 0740, Company E requested artillery fire on enemy infantry vicinity 992236; 105-mm fire was soon forthcoming with satisfactory results. Enemy mortars which opened fire at 0800 were silenced by 105-mm fire, Company A adjusting. At 0855, Company A reported one SP-gun at 986225; 105 and 155-mm fire both obtained several near-hits. All troops remained in position during the morning under intermittent mortar and artillery fire which caused one casualty. Enemy

targets which appeared to the South were fired on by concentration number, with adjustments from there, if necessary.

A meeting of all Company Commanders was called at 1410; matters discussed included the relief of the 309th Infantry that night and the possibility of the Battalion remaining in the Simmerath area for a longer period than was expected. The Company Commanders were instructed to continue to improve their defensive positions while permitting as many men as possible periods of rest so that they might conduct personal police. The battle-field commissioning of exceptional enlisted men also entered into the discussion. During the remainder of this day, all Companies held in position and, when night fell, commenced to improve their defenses. Enemy mortars and artillery were active thru-out the period but this fire, along with several attempts to probe the position of the front lines, was neutralized by 155-mm, 105-mm, 4.2, and 81-mm concentrations. Staff officers inspected the defenses during the night, causing a combat outpost composed of Company D personnel to be placed to the front in a sector not yet covered by the protective wire. The CO/311th Infantry arrived at the Battalion CP at 2135, discussed the situation with Major Williams and departed at 2210. Division Engineers, assisted and covered by the front-line Companies, continued to lay the single concertina this night.

The early morning hours of 24 December were quiet except for one enemy threat at 0130 which ceased when a 105-mm concentration was placed on the area of activity. At 0905, Company A, detecting a four-man patrol moving toward Company B's front, employed 60-mm mortars on the target with satisfactory results. The remainder of the day was quiet and the Battalion Staff perfected coordination with the 311th Infantry which had relieved the 309th Infantry in the sector. At 1300, Regiment reported that the 709th Tank Battalion had been placed in Division reserve and would move from Simmerath that night. Company E, adjusting 105-mm fire on a suspected enemy CP, reported satisfactory results at 1305. At 1415, Regiment ordered that the protective wire be increased to a triple concertina.

The night patrols commenced at 2230 with Company B dispatching a reconnaissance patrol at that time. When just beyond the wire, this patrol spotted an enemy formation approaching the front line. Returning and reporting this fact, the patrol then continued on the assigned mission. At 2305, Company B reported three enemy standing up in a hedgerow just forward of the wire, attempting to spot the positions. A combat patrol was sent to trap the enemy at 2320.

The flanking patrol was almost upon the enemy when it was discovered and a fire-fight ensued. Returning at 0230, 25 December, the patrol reported that the enemy had escaped



but not without casualties. The reconnaissance patrol then returned at 0345 and reported enemy activity observed in the woods vicinity 985232. All front-line Companies continued to improve their defenses this night under occasional enemy shell and s/a fire.

This day being fairly quiet, the Battalion S-2 visited the Companies to orient the men as to the latest situation in the Battle of the Bulge. Ten-in-one rations were obtained this day and the policy of having hot coffee, sandwiches, and some sort of pastry was instituted. The lack of the necessary containers made it impossible to serve hot meals so the troops subsisted mainly on K-rations until the semi-supper could be arranged.

Company C dispatched an ambush patrol at 1220; this patrol returned, as directed, at 1922. The leader reported no success and that enemy in platoon strength were observed at 980232 and armored movement heard far to the South. Enemy activity this night was confined to the flanking units; the front-line troops continued to improve their defenses.

Returning to the Battalion CP at 0600, 26 December, the Engineer mine-laying party reported that they had laid a five-wide belt of AT-mines to the Company A/B front. This party, covered by the front-line troops, had divided into two teams which, starting at opposite ends of the front, worked toward the center of the perimeter paralleling the protective wire. Captain Slater, the Battalion S-3, was placed in command of Company F at 0900. This day was extremely quiet. Plans were completed for the continuance of the mine-laying and an officer of the Regimental AT Company and Major Williams discussed the insertion of towed AT guns into the Battalion defensive set up. The Engineer mine laying party came under machine pistol fire at 1948 but s/a fire of Company B soon neutralized the enemy gunner. At 2030, Company F relieved Company E, which then went into Battalion reserve. Several flares were set off to Company C's flank at 2255 but an investigating patrol reported no enemy in this vicinity.

Departing at 0310, 27 December, a patrol from Company F returned safely at 0500 with the following information:

"Four buildings at RJ-992235 are occupied by enemy who are suffering from colds".

The 0530 periodic report to Regiment was as follows:

"No armor or enemy patrols in area; approximately fifty rounds of artillery, caliber medium to heavy, received during the night".

At 0635, Company B, hearing enemy constructing barbed wire to their front, caused this activity to cease by well placed 4.2 fire. The only enemy activity reported during

the hours of daylight was an enemy patrol, repulsed by 4.2 fire at 0925, and some long-range harrassing auto-weapon fire at 1300. Company A, adjusting the 105's on enemy mortar activity at 991228, had to cease fire at 1750 due to poor visibility. The Battalion was alerted at 2115 for a possible air-borne attack and, at 2250, Division reported a possible attack by three enemy divisions, with battalions in column, on this sector. Only one reconnaissance patrol was dispatched during the period; returning safely, the patrol reported enemy activity at 992275.

The periodic report to Regiment at 0530, 28 December, was as follows:

"Artillery extremely light; no armor; no aircraft; only patrol activity reported was sound of digging heard to Company A's front at 0205".

The Engineers, assisted and covered by the frontline troops, continued to lay the five-wide mine belt while the Companies tripled the concertina wire to their front. At 0740, Company C reported hearing armored movement to the South-east; all Companies were informed to be on the alert. This day, however, was quiet with the only activity reported being the SP-gun at 1036 and again at 1735. Friendly artillery fire continued to be active. Plans were coordinated with the artillery FO's for protective fires during the night patrol period.

At 1845, a party of Division Engineers, guided and covered by Company C personnel, demolished the six concrete shelters at 981235. Long-range, heavy artillery fire fell on Company F's area at 1915. The shell-frag obtained was given to Regiment. Company E relieved Company A at 1915 with Company A going into Battalion reserve. The reconnaissance patrol from Company F departed at 2010, followed at 2015 by the patrol from Company C. All Companies reported a fire fight to their front at 2115. Returning safely at 2130, the Company C patrol leader gave the following report:

"Worked South along the main road to RJ-981232 and took the enemy by surprise, inflicting three casualties. Saw MG's dug in along both sides of the road, also, several 50-mm mortar and a number of rifle emplacements".

This patrol returned down the main road under a hail of fire laid down by the aroused enemy. The 4.2 mortars were placed on this target with apparently good results reported. The mortars then continued to harrass this position. The Company F patrol returned safely at 2315 with this report:

"Set ambush vicinity 990236. Enemy outpost definitely located fifty yards to the South; mortar position located vicinity 985232. No prisoners taken".

The periodic report to Regiment at 0530, 29 December, was as follows:

"Only enemy activity in sector was forty rounds of mixed artillery during the night".

At 0540, Company E reported being fired upon by the SP gun; 105-mm fire drove this gun off. The mine belt was almost brought to completion this night and the protective wire continued to be strengthened. At 0810, Company F reported vehicular movement in Huppenbroich. This report was passed up thru channels and the information was received in return that Corps artillery would fire three TOT's on this target, employing 8-inch and 155-mm guns, at the following times; 0850, 0950, and 1110. A few rounds of the initial concentration fell short into Company E's area but no casualties were reported. An enemy mortar which commenced to fire at 1040 was silenced by 4.2 fire. No other enemy activity was reported during the hours of daylight.

Company C reported one flare set off, 200 yards to the rear of the lines; no further activity was noted in the area. At 1810, Company F, hearing vehicular movement to the front, adjusted 4.2 fire on the target; the activity ceased. The 4.2's also fired on enemy activity vicinity 983231 at 1945; the results could not be observed. The scheduled ambush patrol from Company F departed at 2010. An enemy MG firing from 981232 at 2040 was silenced by 4.2 fire, Company C adjacent. At 2200, Company F reported sounds of digging at 992235. The Company F ambush patrol, returning safely at 2240, as directed, gave the following information:

"Enemy digging in along the 990235-985233 line; no prisoners taken".

The 105's, 4.2's, and 81's placed concentrated fire on the reported line and, at 2305, all guns were ordered to cease firing with excellent results reported; all enemy activity in the area had ceased. Receiving mortar fire at 2318, Company F employed the 4.2 mortars as counter-battery.

Enemy s/a fire directed at the front lines ceased at 0445, 30 December, when 81-mm mortar fire was placed on the offending area. At 0500, Company F, over-hearing enemy conversation at 992235, employed the 60-mm mortar to discourage this practice. The periodic report to Regiment at 0530 was:

"Fifty rounds of medium artillery fire received during the night; no armor or aircraft".

The Battalion Commander inspected all positions during the day; the belt of AT mines had been completed but a portion of the protective wire was still in the single concentration stage at this time. All Companies remained in position this day with only fifty rounds of light artillery reported as falling in the area. At 1915, Company A relieved Company

B which then went into Battalion reserve in Simmerath. The remainder of the period was quiet except for light artillery fire. Due to patrols from the adjacent units being out this night, the scheduled patrols were postponed.

An Engineer Demolitions party arrived at the Battalion CP at 0115, 31 December, and plans were prepared for the destruction of the pillboxes vicinity 981235. At 0140, the 4.2 and 81-mm mortars fired concentrations on the pillbox location, as planned. The fortifications were blown without incident, at 0210, and the Engineer/Ranger party withdrew under covering fire laid down by the mortars. The periodic report to Regiment at 0540 was as follows:

"Forty-fifty rounds of light artillery during the night; no other activity observed".

A forward Battalion OP was set up in the last building on the road leading South from Simmerath. Battalion Intelligence personnel and a squad from Company D manned this post and reported a quantity of daylight observation. The troops remained in position during this day under light artillery fire. Night patrols were briefed during the afternoon; they were to have but one mission: "Bring back a prisoner".

Major Williams departed for 9th Army Forward at 1415 on orders received from NUSA G-1 regarding the Reinforcement Training Program. Company B, then in Battalion reserve, was attached at 1635 to the II/311th Infantry on order of the CO 311th Infantry. The Battalion Exec and the CG/Company B departed at 1700 to contact the CQII/311th Infantry for the necessary information. At 1843, Regiment released Company B from attachment to the II/311th Infantry. Patrols from Companies E/F, clad in snow-capes, departed at 2200 with the mission of taking a prisoner.

At 2400, 31 December, all available Division and Corps artillery fired two rounds per gun into the enemy territory in the Division sector. The enemy countered this with a barrage of artillery, mortar, and s/a fire directed at the town of Simmerath.



D DAY



OMAHA BEACH



NORMANDY



NORTH FRANCE



RHINELAND



ARDENNES



CENTRAL EUROPE

**WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
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HEADQUARTERS 3RD HANGER BATTALION  
APO 758, U. S. Army

31 July 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Action.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.  
THRU : Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division.

1. The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by paragraph 10, AR 345-105 for the period 10 July 1943 thru 18 July 1943.

10 July

2. The assault elements of this battalion, attached for the initial phase of operations to the Green Assault Force, 3rd Infantry Division, landed at 0255 hours, 10 July 1943, on beach at San Mollarella (Green Beach) three miles west of Licata, Sicily, reducing beach defenses at that point in preparation for the landing of subsequent waves of infantry. Only mild resistance was met, the element of surprise having been partly achieved. By the time the first wave of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry landed, all defenses of the beach proper had been reduced, and two companies pressing eastward toward commanding terrain 1500 yards east of the beach, had met and neutralized the only resistance encountered along the line of approach to the town of Licata. Casualties suffered by the battalion in this phase were three: 1st Sergeant R. S. Levin, seriously wounded, who died subsequently, and two sustaining superficial wounds inflicted by Italian concussion grenades. All objectives assigned to the battalion were gained.

11 July

Upon release from attachment to the 15th Infantry in the afternoon of 10 July, the battalion was placed in Division Reserve, 3rd Infantry Division, and given the mission of securing certain facilities in the town of Licata, and the Port and its installations. During the morning of 11 July, nine casualties of varying degrees of seriousness were suffered by the battalion as a result of attacks carried out against the Port area by German fighter-bombers. One casualty was incurred when the Port area was strafed, and eight were the result of the explosion of an anti-aircraft shell, fired from a ship outside the harbor, which landed in the doorway of a building occupied by troops. The Battalion was relieved of its responsibilities in the town and Port by the 36th Engineers, and progressed into bivouac, initially in an area about four miles north of Licata, where it remained during 12-13 July.

14 July

at 0600 hours, 14 July, the battalion, a orders, 3rd Infantry Division, moved on foot to vi. Campobello di Licata, remaining there until about 2 at which time it moved by truck to Moro, arriving

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Report of Action, 3rd Ranger Battalion.  
Period 10 July to 18 July 1943. Cont'd

15 July

2330 hours. Movement was then continued on foot in a westerly direction to commanding ground (Hill 313) two miles east of Favara, this objective being gained without incident at 0530 hours 15 July. Favara was entered at about the same hour by radio patrol and occupied by a company at 1000 hours. Contact was gained with 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry on our left at about 1230 hours by patrol operating out of Favara. The balance of the Battalion closed in bivouac area at eastern edge of town at about 1300 hours. At 1730 hours notification was received of attachment to 7th Infantry with orders to continue westward movement to Montaperto, then move south and occupy Porto Empedocle.

16 July

Movement on foot was begun at 1900 hours 15 July along Favara-Agrigento road, the battalion coming under hostile artillery fire at a point about three miles west of Favara. No casualties were suffered, the battalion continuing along road until scouts encountered road block at junction of Agrigento-Favara, and Agrigento-Aragona roads. Here the battalion deployed and attacked at about 0030 hours, 16 July. After a sharp skirmish resistance was overcome at about 0130 hours and 165 Italian prisoners, secured from road block and emplacements in high ground north of the Agrigento-Aragona road, were marched back to Favara and there turned over to the 7th Infantry. The Battalion then occupied the high ground until daylight.

At 0600 hours movement on Montaperto was resumed. The battalion, moving in extended column, was taken under fire by poorly directed enemy artillery while crossing the valley between position occupied during the night, and the town of Montaperto. An enemy column of ten motorcycles and two trucks, moving northeast on the Agrigento-Raffadell road, was intercepted and destroyed, the personnel of which either being killed or captured. Entrance into Montaperto at about 0800 hours gave command of the valley south of town in which were located four artillery battery positions commanding roads converging north of Agrigento. These were taken under fire from the battalion's 60mm mortars and some automatic weapons, with the result that positions were evacuated, and the personnel manning them submitted to capture. Leaving Montaperto, the battalion moved south, capturing the command group of the valley defenses, and encountering sniper action and some machine gun fire from the enemy. One officer, Lieut. Raymond E. Campbell, was killed in attack upon a machine gun position. The battalion paused for rest preparatory to the attack on Porto Empedocle in an almond grove 2000 yards north of that town, permitting study of the approach thereto.

The attack upon Porto Empedocle was made in line of companies, three companies under the command of the Battalion Commander attacking east of the draw running north-south out of town, and three companies under the command of the Battalion Executive Officer attacking west of that line. The attack was launched at about 1420 hours, 16 July, and a sharp skirmish ensued. Two companies under the Battalion Commander gained access into the eastern edge of town and port area in the face of mild resistance, while the third company covered the rear and left flank

Report of Action, 3rd Ranger Battalion.  
Period 10 July to 18 July 1943. Cont'd:

of the battalion. Progress of the companies on the right was delayed by determined resistance of enemy located in walled cemetery and incoastal defense and anti-aircraft positions west of town, which were manned by German personnel. By 1600 hours all resistance had been overcome and a perimeter defense of the town had been established. At about 1900 hours a spotting plane from the cruiser Philadelphia was induced to land in the harbor. The Battalion Commander was then flown out to the cruiser and arrangements were made to communicate the fact of Porto Empedocle's fall to the 3rd Infantry Division. Prisoners taken during the days operations numbered 675 Italians, about 200 of who encumbered the battalion's movements along the line of march, and ninety-one Germans.

During the night 16-17 July, a radio patrol consisting of the Battalion Signal Officer and two enlisted men, traveling in company with vehicles of the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop along the Agrigento-Porto Empedocle road, was overtaken and attacked by a column of fifteen enemy light tanks (Renault) bearing the Death's Head device, while halted at a blown bridge about two miles south of Agrigento. Occupants of the lead tank were disabled or killed by an offensive grenade thrust into an open port by a sergeant of this battalion, and the tank continued over the brink of the crater. Two other tank crews were taken prisoners at daylight and turned over to the 7th Infantry.

17 July

18 July

At 1900 hours 17 July, the battalion in accordance with orders received from the 7th Infantry, moved into bivouac in an area just below Montaperto, remaining there until 1300 hours 18 July, when it moved to outpost positions two miles southwest of Raffadell.

3. Casualties during period: One (1) KILLED IN ACTION:  
2nd Lt. Raymond E. Campbell, #1048798, Co "F" 16 July 1943

WOUNDED IN ACTION:

2nd Lt Morris M Teague 0-1294219, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
T-5 Julian P Babrowaki, 11107251, Hq Co 10 July 1943  
T-5 Paul G Martin, 111057517, Hq Co 11 July 1943  
T-5 Fernand R Sylvain, 11029584, Co "E" 10 July 1943  
(Died subsequently)  
Sgt Robert C Keberdle, 35029827, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
Sgt George C Montgomery, 35131579, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
Sgt Eric C. Mozzetti, 33104321, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
Cpl Donald A Burke, 33127274, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
Pfc Martin D Cashner, 16151168, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
Pfc Dwight Forshaw, 3744629, Co "D" 11 July 1943  
Pvt Frank Kayanek Jr, 36404605, Co "D" 11 July 1943

*Herman W. Danner*  
HERMAN W. DANNER  
Major, 3rd Ranger Bn,  
Commanding.

**WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON**



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**HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION**

**ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

10-1-53

Department of Defense - The Adjutant General's Office

10-1-53

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HEADQUARTERS 3RD RANGER BATTALION  
APO 758, U. S. Army

31 July 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Action.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division.

1. The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by paragraph 10, AR 345-105, for the period 19 July 1943 through 23 July 1943.

19 July

2. At 0500 hours 19 July, the Battalion moved on foot from outpost positions two miles southwest of Raffadali, Sicily, to Mt. Sara, two and one half miles northwest of Castellina Eraclea. Patrols and outposts were recalled to resume march at 2200 hours on orders from 3rd Infantry Division to provide defense of road junction one mile northeast of Calamonaio by daylight of the 20th of July. Objective reached at 0545, 20 July and defenses established.

20 July

During the day of 20 July, the battalion was relieved from attachment to 3rd Infantry Division and attached to 82nd Airborne Division; Relieved from attachment 82nd Airborne Division and attached Task Force X; Relieved from attachment Task Force X and attached Provisional Corps. Under orders from Provisional Corps the battalion was relieved of outpost mission to provide road guards along the route Ribera-Sciaccia-Menfi-Castelvetrano to facilitate movement of 2nd Armored Division, and to provide patrols and prisoner guards in towns of Sciaccia and Menfi. These functions were continued until the end of the period.

23 July

3. Casualties during period:

KILLED IN ACTION: None.

None.

WOUNDED IN ACTION:

None.

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*Herbert W. Dabner*  
HERBERT W. DABNER  
Major, 3rd Ranger Bn,  
Commanding.

*John* 1943

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**HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION**

**ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

**RESTRICTED**

FORM 1-4-5

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Master

Report of Action - 2nd Major Division

7 - 21 Aug 44

6/29

HEADQUARTERS 3RD RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
APO 758, U. S. Army

31 August 1943

Subject: Report of Action.

To : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Thru : Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division.

1. The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by paragraph 10, AR 345-105 for the period 7 August 1943 through 31 August 1943.

7 Aug

2. On 7 August this battalion, on order of Lt Col WILLIAM O DAREY, commanding the Ranger Force, moved from bivouac in vicinity of Menfi, Sicily, to the vicinity of Corona, Sicily where orders of attachment to the 3rd Infantry Division were received. The battalion remained in bivouac during day of 8 August awaiting further orders. On 9 August the battalion received fifty (50) peak animals and was ordered to the vicinity of St Agata. Here the battalion was joined

8 Aug

9 Aug

10 to

11 Aug

by the 1st Ranger Battalion, attached for the purpose of operating supply train. On the same date, the battalion was attached to the 7th Infantry and given the mission of securing commanding ground (Pope di Morce) east of juncture of dry stream bed and Highway 113, four miles south-southwest of Capo d'Orlando. While moving into position at daylight of 12 August, the battalion came under heavy enemy artillery and machine gun fire, resulting in the loss of some animals and radio equipment, but incurred no loss of personnel. By about 0600 hours, three companies had gained the high ground, having met only sporadic machine gun fire, but were forced to withdraw when our own artillery fired upon the hill, wounding one man who died subsequent to his admission to the hospital. Sporadic enemy shell fire landing in the stream bed at the base of the hill inflicted further casualties in animals and wounded one man. The battalion gained the objective at about 1200 hours and moved to secure it. Enemy artillery laid fire upon the hill, resulting in serious injury to one man and superficial injury to several others. A counter-battery mission, fired at the Battalion Commander's direction, neutralized the offending battery and no further difficulty was experienced.

12 Aug

13 Aug

At about 1600 hours orders were received to move to the vicinity of Cresta di Naso, and, in conjunction with the 7th Infantry, secure the Naso-Capo Orlando road against attack from the east. The battalion closed in designated area at about 0200 hours, 13 August, without incident, remaining there until about 1100 hours when orders were received relieving the battalion from attachment to the 7th Infantry, and directing movement to Brolo. The battalion remained in the vicinity of Brolo until about 2100 hours, when, under orders from the 3rd Infantry Division, attaching the battalion to the 15th Infantry, movement was made by truck to St Angelo di Brolo. Here the battalion was joined by its supply train, and after rationing, preceded the 15th Infantry cross-country in the direction of Patti. The battalion, having been assigned the mission of outposting Mte Balavaggio, continued northward to accomplish same. At about 0900 hours 14 August, the battalion moved to a point one mile east of Patti where orders were received relieving from

14 Aug

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Ltr, Report of Action, cont'd.

attachment to the 15th Infantry and ordering the battalion to continue to vicinity of Falcone.

- 15 Aug At 2300 hours 15 August, the battalion moved by truck to manaforte, and was joined at that point by two pack howitzer sections from the 39th Field Artillery, and a fire control party from 3rd Infantry Division. At 0609 hours on 16 August, with these attached, the battalion moved cross-country in a south-easterly direction to Sambuca, Terminal point of a military road running North-northeast to a junction with Highway 113 at a point four miles west of Messina. From Sambuca, the Straits of Messina were clearly observed as well as portions of the East Coast Road running into Messina. As the day progressed, observation became difficult because of the haze, and the results of a fire-mission on ship-ping in the straits could not be reported with certainty. The battalion then moved to a point close to the city, at which point communication became difficult. At about 2030 hours the battalion was ordered to the Road Junction four miles west of Messina. From that point, a patrol was sent into Messina, entering the city at about 0800 hours. 17 August, finding friendly troops already in occupation. The balance of the battalion, less two companies left astride Military Road, entered Messina at about 1100 hours. The Battalion was withdrawn from Messina during morning of 18 August 1943, and returned to Coronea where orders of attachment to II Corps were received. The battalion remained in bivouac at Coronea until 0700 hours 21 August when it moved to vicinity of Corleone to receive and train replacements, which function it continued to the end of the period.

Casualties during period:

Killed in Action: None

Wounded in Action:

Tech 5th Gr EVERETT L WALSH, 16064491 - (Died subsequently)  
Corporal JOHN W HERADE, 20824456  
Tech 5th Gr GEORGE B MOORE, 33370016  
Pvt 1st Cl JOHN M HUSS, 37465965  
Pvt 1st Cl RAYMOND J HOLT, 11161031  
Pvt 1st Cl Arvel D GAMB, 38291523  
Pvt 1st Cl CHESTER L SCHWATZEN, 37497818

*Herman W Dabberdt*  
HERMAN W DABBERDT  
Lt Col, 3rd Ranger Inf Bn.,  
Commanding.



**WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
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Form 2-63  
(1200)  
Master  
Report of Action - War Ranger Battalion

10 - 12 JUL 45

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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 4TH RANGER BATTALION  
A.P.O. 758, U.S.ARMY

9 August 1943

SUBJECT: Report of action.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S.ARMY, Washington, D.C.

THRU : Commanding General, 7th Army.

1. The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by Par 10, AR 345-105, for the period, July 10 to July 12, 1943.

2. On 10 July, the 4th Ranger Battalion was attached to Force X under the command of Lt Col William O Darby with mission of assaulting and holding the eastern half of Gela Sicily. The first assault wave consisting of Companies A, B, C, and Hqs Detachment landed on beach #7 at 0255 hrs. The second assault wave consisting of Companies D, E, and F, landed on beach #7 at 0301 hrs. The beach was mined with AP and AT mines. The first wave continued its advance directly through the town and established a perimeter at 0330, around the eastern edge of the town. The second wave established its command post in the town square at 0320 and proceeded in its mission of cleaning the Battalions area of snipers and pillboxes. At 1030 hrs an enemy attack of Italian light tanks and Infantry took place. The Infantry was repulsed by mortar fire before entering the town. Ten enemy tanks continued on into the town. Three tanks were disposed of by Rocket launchers. The remaining tanks left the town at 1050 hrs. Sniping along the beach continued throughout the remainder of the day with little effect on our men. 200 Italian prisoners were taken. On 11 July the town was cleared of snipers. There was no other activity other than sporadic Light artillery fire and strafing by enemy aircraft throughout the day. 50 prisoners were taken. On the morning of 12 July a formation of German Mk IV and Mk V tanks was broken up 1 1/2 miles east of Gela by attached 4.2 mm Mortar and naval gunfire. Nine damaged tanks were demolished during the afternoon by prepared charges of TNT. There was no other enemy activity today. 5 prisoners were taken.

3. The following were killed, wounded and evacuated during the action:

	<u>KILLED</u>
WOJCIAK, WALTER J.	2nd Lt 0-885705
Brady, Sberald P.	Cpl 35714078
Somuk, John A.	Pfc 13148121
Marty, Joseph M.	Pfc 52208033
McCarthy, John P.	Cpl 16068141

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Report of Action, Adjutant General U.S. Army, Washington D.C.,  
Thru, Commanding General, 7th Army

KILLED (CONT'D)

Bennet, Richard J.	Pfc	12164518
Butterworth, Dewey F.	Pvt	36716642

MISSING IN ACTION

Bush, Stanley (NMI)	Cpl	36012067
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WOUNDED AND EVACUATED

FISHER, CHARLES H.	2nd Lt	0-1015174
JONES, ARCHIE A	2nd Lt	0-1305166
Harris, Randall (NMI)	1st/Sgt	20705665
Gannon, Evan J.	Pfc	38015435
Duckworth, Glen A.	T/4	14021419
Korytowski, Edward B.	Pfc	12131889
Jalbert, Conrad J.	Pfc	31178939
Oroszko, Joseph Jr. (NMI)	Pfc	31005122
Canfield, Richard H.	Pfc	31274447
McNary, Philip G.	Pvt	12203204
Lambert, John P.	Cpl	31200162
Earhart, Thomas A.	Pfc	20703977
Rodrigues, Raymond	Sgt	20704908
Greenfeather, James I.	T/5	38319915
Hogue, Charles N.	Pfc	31178348
Ross, Carl E.	Pvt	36659480
McCunniff, Francis E.	Pfc	37445485
Novak, John F.	Cpl	16078397
Gordon, Roy V.	Pfc	14096259
Pierce, James W.	Pvt	32737089
Shurmak, Sylvester (NMI)	T/4	36227316
Lazarski, Egnacy J.	T/5	11102899
Pollard, Lloyd T.	Pvt	36297822
Dukes, George E.	Pfc	39271580

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File No



ROY A. MURRAY, Jr.,  
Major, Inf.,  
Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS, 4TH RANGER BATTALION  
APO 758, U.S. ARMY

9 August 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Action.

TO : The Adjutant General, U.S. ARMY, Washington, D.C.  
THRU : Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758, U.S. ARMY.

1. The following report of action against the enemy is submitted as required by paragraph 10, AR 345-105, for the day, 21 July, 1943.

2. On, 21 July, 1943, the 4th Ranger Battalion, attached to Force I, moved by motor patrol to accomplish it's mission in the capture of Salami, Sicily. The forward reconnaissance patrol entered the town at 1615 hours, without encountering enemy activity. The remainder of the battalion followed into the town without resistance, occupying the town and establishing a civil affairs office in the town square. The battalion command post was established five miles South of Salami. A perimeter of companies was established to the towns front and flanks. Guards were posted on five large ammunition dumps and two large gasoline dumps. Many Italians and German axes, several large field pieces and three partially destroyed German ME 109 aircraft were captured. Two Hundred and Fifty German and Italian prisoners were taken.

3. There were no casualties.

ROY A HURRAY, 77.  
Major, Infantry  
Commanding

SECRET

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**HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION**

**ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

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S E C R E T

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BY AUTHORITY OF: ICS

HEADQUARTERS 4TH RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
A.P.O. 464, U.S. ARMY

Log 1812/44  
Call 29 Feb 44  
5 October 1944  
over

10 Dec 45

ITSD

Date SUBJECT: Report of Action (9 Sept to 29 Sept)

TO : Adjutant General, Washington D.C.  
(Thru channels)

(Note: For coordinates, refer to Map of Italy  
1/100,000, Sheet 185, Salerno.)

The 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion landed from assault craft at 0310 hours on the morning of the 9th of September 1943, at Maiori, Italy, with the mission of establishing a beach head, and securing the left and right flanks for the Ranger Force. The beach head met with no resistance and was secure at 0345 hours. Company A proceeded West on coastal road and occupied high ground, overlooking Minori, and established a road block at (534-274) of prepared demolitions with the aid of the Battalion Demolitions Section. One German enlisted man was killed and one German vehicle was captured. Companies B, C, D, E, cleared Maiori, and established beach head by occupying high ground overlooking Maiori. Company F moved on coastal road toward Salerno with the mission to neutralize two enemy observation posts and one machine gun position. Approximately 1 1/2 miles from Maiori, one German N.C.O. and two enlisted, on motorcycle with side car, were captured. The company continued on for approximately 3 1/2 miles and encountered a fortified enemy observation post at (574-259) containing eleven Italian soldiers, who opened fire with machine guns and rifles. One Italian soldier was killed and one wounded. The company proceeded on approximately one-half mile and in the region of Lanterna, at (582-258) encountered the second observation post which contained naval personnel, who placed fire with rifles and grenades on the reconnaissance patrol. Two Company F enlisted men were wounded, four Italian personnel were killed, and one taken prisoner. The Italian prisoner stated that they had not been notified of the armistice. A road block was established at (582-259) at 0600 hours. The battalion command post was established with Force Headquarters in Maiori. At day break Company B cleared Minori, capturing one German Colonel, and three enlisted men, then proceeded with Company A, on the coastal road to Amalfi, a road block at (503-256) and at (483-242) was established. On the morning of the 10th, reconnaissance patrols were sent out to the West and North which reconitered to (404-250) and (455-283) respectively; no contact with the enemy was made. Companies C and D moved from Maiori to Amalfi and were placed in reserve. On September 11, Companies A, C, & D moved up the Agerola road with the mission to clear road of enemy patrols to Pimonte, and

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Report of Action, 4th Ranger Inf Bn., (cont.)

there establish a roadblock. Company A took up positions on Mt. Pendolo (435-315) overlooking German positions in Gragnano. Co. B patrolled the San Lazzaro sector (480-252). Companies E and F moved West on coastal road with the mission to clear Sorrento-Meta area. The area was cleared by 1000 hours, forcing one enemy road block to retreat. A road block was established at (345-280) on the 12th September. On the 13th September it was moved North of Vice Equense where four German prisoners and a reconnaissance car containing military papers were captured. The Battalion Demolition Section destroyed a bridge in that area. On Sept 12th, Company C moved to the high ground (417-317), overlooking German positions in Castellammare. A patrol was sent into Castellammare to feel out enemy strength. Heavy resistance was encountered, and the patrol was forced to withdraw. One officer and one enlisted man were wounded. Twelve Germans were wounded or killed. Companies A and D established contact with the enemy at Gragnano. An attack was made by A and D with Company H, 504th Paratroopers attached, at 1930 hours 12 September, and in the face of heavy automatic weapons and artillery, were forced to withdraw to their positions on Mt. Pendolo. One enlisted man was killed and two enlisted men are missing from this action.

On September 13th, the battalion was ordered to return to Maiori. Companies E and F moved to Polvico (542-326) where enemy patrols were reported to be operating. Companies A, C, D, and E moved to Salerno to reinforce the 138th Brigade (British). On the 14th September the battalion, relieved from assignment to 138th Brigade and returned to Ranger Force, took up positions on the high ground NW of Polvico, on a line running from (488-325) to (504-329) to (517-351) with the mission to guard the left flank and rear of 10 Corps. From the 15th to the 27th of September, our patrols were in continuous contact with the enemy, likewise many enemy patrols (paratroopers) were engaged, while trying to infiltrate thru our position. All companies were subjected to continuous mortar and artillery fire from enemy positions in the valley. Effective mortar and artillery fire was directed against the enemy from the Battalion C.P.s. On 18th Sept, Company D, with one Engineer officer, and one Signal officer and five enlisted men attached, proceeded at 2030 hours, from Chiunzi, down the road toward Sala, with mission to reconnoiter for road blocks, mines, or prepared demolitions. Heavy fire from automatic weapons and grenades was encountered from hill (508-358). One platoon attacked the hill, the other platoon with attached personnel, moved down the road to Sala, removing various mines and cutting enemy communication lines. Resistance was heavy, resulting in the Company Commander and five enlisted men being wounded, with three enlisted men missing in action. Approximately sixteen Germans were killed or wounded. On 27th September, the Ranger Force made an attack on Sala and vicinity. No resistance was met. The 4th Ranger Battalion remained in position on the high

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

Report of Action, 4th Ranger Inf Bn., (cont)

ground. Scouting parties were furnished the 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions, to guide them through the mountains. On 28th September, the battalion moved from the mountains to a bivouac area near Polvico.

For the period of 9 Sept to 28 Sept: Total killed, Eight; Missing in action, Eight; Wounded, Twenty-two, of which two officers and fifteen enlisted men were evacuated.

*Roy A Murray, Jr.*

ROY A MURRAY, Jr.,  
Major, Infantry,  
Commanding.

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**WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON**



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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION  
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

FORM 1-63  
(10/63)  
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Auth: CG VI Army  
Initials: [unclear]  
Date: MAR 17 1944

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH RANGER BATTALION  
APO 464, U.S. ARMY

15 February 1944

**DOWNGRADED TO:  
CLASSIFICATION REMOVED**

SUBJECT: Report of Action, Period 22 to 31 January 1944

TO : Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

MAP : Italy, 1/50,000 Sheets 158, I, II, III, IV

14 Dec 45  
Date: [unclear]

The 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion, less C Company, acting as a part of Ranger Force, landed from A.L.C.s at Yellow Beach (856172) at 0201 hrs. the 22 January 1944 with the mission of securing the left half of the beachhead and clearing part of the town of Anzio. The companies landed abreast from left to right, A, B, Hq, D, E, F, and the remainder of Hq. The landing was unopposed and the beachhead and town were secure at 0500 hrs. C Company landed by L.C.M. in the second wave at 0455 hrs. and went into Battalion reserve. An enemy motorized outpost at bridge (856174) withdrew after a sharp scrap with our patrols. Patrols were sent North to the 18 Grid line with no enemy contact. The bridge (856174) and town of Anzio were shelled spasmodically during the day by heavy artillery. At 1800 hrs. A & B Companies moved to positions on a line (855203-861202) with the 3rd Ranger Battalion on the left, 509 Precht. Battalion on the right, and 9 Commando in wooded area (855205) to the front. C Company moved from reserve to a line approximately 500 yds behind B Company. D & E Companies were held in position around Anzio as Battalion reserve. Battalion C.P. was established with the reserve companies. Our casualties for the day were: 2 Officers and 1 EM killed and 1 EM wounded.

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At 1700 hrs 23rd January 1944 the Battalion reverted to Force reserve and moved to assembly area at (865239). The Battalion sent out patrols and established local security as protection against possible enemy infiltration and paratrooper activity. At 1115 hrs 24 January two shells landed in area killing 2 EM and wounding 2 EM. At 1145 E Company sent patrols to the vicinity (868245) in search of a reported enemy artillery piece. Patrol was unable to locate any gun.

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[unclear]

(Report of Action, 15 February 44)

At 0210 hrs 25 January the Battalion moved forward to take road between (863309-907290). A Company took up positions on the left of B Company. Contact on the right flank was made with the 509 Prcbt Bn. Contact on the left flank with the British Brigade. In reserve D Company moved to (870286) and C,E,F Companies to (878297). A & B Companies established road blocks and sent patrols forward. At 0930 hrs. Battalion C.P. was set up at (865239). At 1642 hrs a patrol from B Company was pinned down by enemy fire from a road block at 091321. B Company destroyed the road block by mortar fire killing 2 enemy. At 1830 hrs D Company moved from reserve to positions in front of B Company and established a road block at (091321). Our casualties for the day were 1 EM killed and 1 EM wounded. The following morning about a company of Germans attacked D Company's position. The attack was repulsed with mortar and small arms fire. Estimated enemy killed 9, and a large number wounded. 12 prisoners were taken.

At 0545 hrs 27 January E & F Companies moved through D Company's position, with the objective, road between (892335-902338). E Company moved North down the road, with F Company paralleling, 200 yds to the East in stream bed. E Company reached road junction with no opposition. F Company located enemy in about five large buildings at (897336). The Germans had a strong point consisting of about a platoon of infantry with MGs and mortars. Their MGs were dug in about 15 yds from the outermost buildings, which gave all around protection. The snipers in the buildings were firing from the windows. F Company attacked at 0715 capturing enemy strong point. Positions were consolidated while artillery and 4.2 mortar fire was placed on enemy held house (989339). The enemy withdrew into wooded area 500 yds North of road, and the house was outposted at 1100 hrs. Both E & F Companies positions were shelled during the day. At 1700 hrs A Company moved to left flank of E Company. B Company moved to a position (899333) in support of companies on the line. The Battalion C.P. was located at 982325. Enemy casualties for the attack were 3 killed and 15 captured. Our casualties for the day were 1 officer and 2 EM killed, 1 officer and 2 EM wounded.

(Report of Action, 15 February 44)

At 0700 hrs. January the front line companies were heavily shelled by artillery and mortars. There was no change in the front lines for the day but positions were shelled intermittently. The Battalion was relieved by the British at 2400 hrs. and moved to an assembly area at (970195). The day of the 29th was spent in reconnaissance and preparation for the attack of the following day. At 2100 hrs. the Battalion moved to the line of departure at (995262). The time of departure was 0100 hrs. 30 January. The mission was to clear road (000274-020313) to Cisterna di Littoria where they would go in Force reserve. The Battalion moved in approach march formation North down road to 998273 where it divided into two groups: C,D,Hq,A,B, moved 300 yds East of road and then proceeded North paralleling road, while E,F, & Hq. followed by Force Hq. moved down road. Battalion Headquarters was separated into two elements. The C.O. and S-3 and radio operators were with C,D,A,B Companies; the remainder of Headquarters with the S-2 in charge followed E and F Companies. C Company, forming the advance guard, encountered MG fire at (002275); D Company was moved to the right flank of C Company where they were pinned down by MG fire. The field was flat and afforded little cover except for irrigation ditches that were interlaced in the field. These were about one foot deep. The enemy then opened fire with a number of MGs and mortars and small arms. C,D,A,B Companies and Hq were all pinned down. Thrusts were made to find loop holes in enemy line but were met with heavy fire. This enemy line proved to be their M.L.R. and was manned by a Parachute Machine Gun Battalion and consisted of a MG position about every 100 yds. and riflemen about every 10 yds. Positions were in depth and were well camouflaged and dug in. MGs were firing about one foot above the ground with very effective cross fire. At 0600 hrs. the companies dug in to the defensive; Approximate positions: C Company at (002275), B Company at (004275), D Company at (004274), A Company at (003273). E & F Companies were moved to (997267). Sniping and MG fire from the enemy was received when personnel exposed themselves during the morning hours. However, the afternoon found conditions very quiet and movement met very little enemy fire. An attack was made at 1500 from positions in field by A and B Companies with E and F

(Report of Action, 15 February 44)

Companies attacking West of road. Companies A & E met with heavy MG fire, but advanced to within 200 yds of enemy positions where the fire became so intense that further movement was impossible. E Company destroyed two MG positions west of road and advanced to (000278) where elements of the company captured a building which overlooked enemy positions and was about 150 yds. in front of their M.L.R. At darkness the Battalion was ordered to hold all positions gained, which was done with spasmodic exchanges of fire between our lines and the enemy line which were approximately 200 yds apart. Battalion C.P. was moved from the field to (000272). F & C Companies were brought back as Battalion reserve. E Company maintained position gained. D Company remained in positions in field as reserve for A & B Companies. At 1100 hrs 31 January the Battalion was ordered to attack and take buildings at right and left of road at (003280). 4.2 mortar fire was brought down on enemy positions and buildings. Two 75mm rifles from Ranger Cannon Company on half tracks and two medium tanks were in close support; however, their movement was restricted by a mine field at (002250) and muddy fields. The tanks and 75 S/P laid down fire on the enemy positions. Under this fire, together with small arms and MG fire from E Company, F Company with C Company in support moved up ditch on East side of road to (002280) where they attacked buildings on right and left of road. Both groups of buildings were taken by 1200 after heavy fighting. The mine sweepers moved up the ditch and commenced clearing the mine field which was done quickly as the mines were placed only on top of the road, not dug in. At 1300 hrs. enemy of approximately platoon strength were observed moving West on Road to (005281). Small arms fire forced enemy to take cover in ditches and buildings. The half-tracks were then moved to (003281) where they placed direct fire on buildings and ditches. 20 of the enemy surrendered and came to our line waving white handkerchiefs; the remainder withdrew to the North. D Company with two light tanks moved toward building (009278) and took same. The positions were consolidated and the companies proceeded with mopping up operations. The M.L.R. having been broken, the Germans in the field gave up to the infantry troops following up. Approximately 19 Germans were killed and 13 wounded in this operation. Our

(Report of Action, 15 February 1944)

casualties were high. See attached casualty report. Approximately 150 Germans were taken prisoner from the fields where the original attacks were made.

At 1800 hrs the Battalion was given the mission of guarding the lines of communication from 602280 to 996265, also of occupying a defensive position in case of enemy breakthrough along that line.

*Roy A. Murray, Jr.*  
ROY A. MURRAY, Jr.,  
Lt. Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding.



SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
4TH RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
APO 464, U.S. ARMY

15 February 1944

SUBJECT: Battle Casualties for period 22 Jan 44 to 31 Jan 44 incl.

KIA

1. FOWELL, HUBBARD C.	1st Lt.	0-1010255
2. NUNNALLY, GEORGE B.	1st Lt.	0-1014052
5. TAYLOR, ORIN E.	1st Lt.	0-1295861
4. HOOD, CARL R.	1st Lt.	0-1551028
5. BATES, THOMAS B.	1st Lt.	0-1307188
6. ANDRE, HOWARD W.	2nd Lt.	0-2055675
7. CASE, LEWIS B. Jr.	2nd Lt.	0-1305199
8. AGY, George W.	S/Sgt	13171263
9. Long, George W.	Pfc	33694516
10. Miller, Ernest	Pvt	37131270
11. Hayward, Wendell L.	S/Sgt	17067240
12. Zielinski, Herman	Sgt	36153627
13. Bell, Thomas F.	Pvt	36679130
14. Sullivan, William E.	Sgt	17059390
15. Olman, Richard M.	Sgt	59653716
16. Brown, William S.	Pvt	33603556
17. Gerick, Albert R.	Pfc	34619871
18. Taylor, Willis E.	Sgt	36646395
19. Griffing, John H.	Sgt	34421600
20. Lewis, Thomas G.	T/5	33655496
21. Coughlan, James F.	Pfc	34692453
22. Witmer, Eugene J.	Pfc	33603070
23. Hood, Charles D.	T/5	36686320
24. Everhardt, Garland	Pvt	34770136
25. Liefer, Robert M.	Pfc	36661446
26. Eildebrandt, James J.	S/Sgt	12087767
27. Lamandre, Dominick	S/Sgt	36676811
28. Karas, Edward	S/Sgt	18093491
29. Winevica, Albert J.	T/4	36651402
30. Vosika, John J.	Pfc	17005914

MIA (Hosp)

1. BUNN, RADIE H.	Capt	0-364606
2. HARRIS, RANDALL	2nd Lt	0-2055097
3. Lines, William M.	Pfc	33618541
4. Goral, Richard	T/5	33695819
5. Harrison, Elby	T/5	15070944
6. Karboski, Stanley	1st/Sgt	330039853
7. Alsup, James K.	Pfc	32802125
8. Bertelsmeyer, Joseph	Pfc	37605548
9. Carney, William	Pvt	32379101
10. Cleveland, Thomas	Pvt	34762772

SECRET

## SECRET

## BATTLE CASUALTIES WIA (Hosp) (Cont'd)

11. Grayson, Lloyd	Pfc	55676007
12. McTague, Charles F.	Sgt	26226891
13. Manska, Jack H.	T/Sgt	20713706
14. Mitchell, James E.	T/4	35555666
15. Harman, William	Pfc	35555724
16. Eaun, Charles W.	Pvt	33758437
17. Pierce, Ira	Pfc	15054202
18. Miley, Eugene D.	S/Sgt	35494322
19. Eprdash, Andrew A.	Pvt	32606747
20. Ochowski, William G.	T/4	35542956
21. Furber, George P.	Cpl	11049764
22. Collins, Daniel F.	T/5	31327564
23. Kosciuzko, John	Pvt	35605536
24. Jantz, Irwin W.	Sgt	17020999
25. Johnson, Roy	Gpl	36594204
26. Cashen, Louis R.	Cpl	33699993
27. Bright, Ollie P.	T/4	33423709
28. Lucab, Harvey D. Jr.	Pvt	35216153
29. Newman, Thomas E.	S/Sgt	17155508
30. Burton, Linwood E. Jr.	Pfc	31518240
31. Gornley, Francis P.	Pfc	33600341
32. Miller, Bert Jr.	Pfc	35142304
33. Chase, Harlan O.	Pfc	32656796
34. Dill, Charles D.	Pfc	31322066
35. Meyer, Albert L.	Pfc	34713722
36. Olejniczak, Arthur	Pvt	32891355
37. Owens, Chester H.	Pfc	33758965
38. Walker, Ralph L.	S/Sgt	18054585
39. Rabachinski, Stanley	Pfc	33623901
40. Buss, LeRoy L.	Sgt	36219442
41. Merrill, Allen E.	Cpl	12072566
42. Renecher, Ross	Pfc	19096122
43. Jech, Randolph	T/Sgt	19103939
44. Johnston, Thomas F.	T/Sgt	20247755
45. Tagstaff, Talmadge	T/4	38411082
46. Williams, William H.	Cpl	33564132
47. Dalton, Wallace	Pfc	35700201
48. Tidwell, Aerial E.	Cpl	18122361
49. Thalen, Raymond F.	Pfc	35551661
50. Wilson, Charles R.	Pfc	34731031
51. Dagnais, Walter H.	Pfc	31297398

LLA

1. Kirk, Leonard C.

Pvt

55657689

MIA

NONE

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SECRET

BATTLE CASUALTIES (Cont'd)

WIA (Not Hosp)

1 Officer  
5 Enlisted Men  
6 TOTAL

For the Battalion Commander:

*Walter F. Nye*  
WALTER F. NYE,  
Major, Infantry,  
Executive Officer.

SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON**



**DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE**

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.**

**HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION**

**ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

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HEADQUARTERS, 4TH RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
A.P.O. 464, U.S. ARMY

SECRET  
Auth. CG VI Corps  
Initials *HT*  
Date MAR 17 1944

**DOWNGRADED TO  
CLASSIFICATION REMOVED**  
*PROPERTY OF THE AFSC*

SUBJECT: Report of Action, Period 1 to 29 February 1944

TO : Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)

MAP : Italy, 1/50,000 Sheet 158 I

14 Dec 45 1150  
*Done*

From February 1st to 29th the 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion was in position as follows: A, F, E, & D Companies on line at 001280-010282; B & C Companies on line at 008786-010286; and Battalion Headquarters at 001279. The Battalion outposted this area with the mission of guarding the lines of communication between 994260-003282 and to act as reserve in that sector in case of enemy breakthrough.

At 0500 hrs February 3rd, D, E, & F Companies moved in march formation to bivouac area at 975182. At 0615 hrs A, B, C Companies and Headquarters moved in march formation to bivouac area at 975182. The Battalion stayed in this area until February 10th and was under intermittent artillery fire all the time.

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On February 10th the Battalion was attached to the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and was placed in reserve. At 2800 hrs the Battalion moved to reserve positions by truck. The Battalion was in position by 0450 hrs February 11th. (See attached overlay) The mission of A Company was to hold a secondary line for the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and to be prepared to counterattack if there was any enemy breakthrough. B Company was to hold an O.P.L. line in front of the M.L.R. and be prepared to counterattack any breakthrough made in the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment sector. C Company was on B Company's immediate right with like mission. D Company was on the M.L.R. with the mission to guard the bridge and to give covering fire for our troops if they drew back to the M.L.R. E Company was on the M.L.R. and was to guard against breakthrough around bridge at 030236. They also were to give covering fire for units which would draw back to the M.L.R. in case of a major enemy breakthrough. F Company was in immediate support of E Company and also would be used to counterattack any breakthrough in that

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(Report of Action, 1 to 29 February 1944)

area. The entire Battalion consolidated their positions with machine gun strong points.

On February 12th there was spasmodic shelling of our positions during the day by high velocity guns which were believed to be self propelled. At 2050 hrs a patrol of 1 officer and 8 EM went out about 900 yds over designated route in front of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment with the mission of investigating area and capturing prisoners. This patrol stayed out till 2515 without contacting any enemy. At 1530 hrs C Company, 4th Ranger Battalion was attached tactically to the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. C Company moved into positions on the line with the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and B Company spread out at 2000 hrs to take over the line held by C Company.

On February 13th a patrol of 1 officer and 15 EM went out at 1845 hrs in the same vicinity as the patrol of the 12th with the same mission. The patrol contacted the enemy but retired under heavy enemy machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire. The patrol returned at 2510 hrs with 2 wounded men. There was spasmodic artillery fire laid in the Battalion area all day.

On February 14th at 0300 hrs the Battalion was alerted by the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. At 0325 hrs the S-3 of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment reported enemy infantry and tanks moving towards their 2nd Battalion. The 4th Ranger Battalion was prepared to counterattack any enemy breakthrough. A and B Companies were immediately alerted but were not needed as the attack was broken up. At 1900 hrs a patrol of 10 EM moved out to 048268 and set up a v-shaped trap to capture any enemy using the road. This patrol stayed in position till 0145 hrs February 15th when they returned to our lines. No enemy were contacted. There was spasmodic shelling of our line during the day.

On February 15th at 2000 hrs enemy aircraft dropped anti-personnel bombs. There was spasmodic shelling of our positions during the day.

On February 16th at 0630 hrs there was heavy small arms fire in front of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. At 0715 hrs the 4th Ranger

(Report of Action, 1 to 29 February 1944)

Battalion was alerted to support the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment as the enemy were attacking their position. The 2nd Battalion repulsed the attack; consequently the 4th Ranger Battalion was not used. At 1000 hrs enemy aircraft strafed the area. The remainder of the day was spent in preparation for the relief of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, who were then in positions on the line. At 1830 hrs B and D Companies moved to positions in the line. At 1915 hrs A,E,F Companies moved to their positions in the line. At 2000 hrs C Company was relieved from the 1st Battalion, 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment and moved to reserve position for the Battalion. At 2030 hrs Battalion Headquarters moved to new C.P. All companies were in position as shown on attached overlay at 2330 hrs. The 2nd Battalion, 504th Infantry Regiment was relieved and occupied positions left by the 4th Ranger Battalion. The following units were attached to the 4th Ranger Battalion: 1st & 3rd Platoons, D Btry, 376 Field Artillery Battalion; 2nd Platoon, C Company, 84th Chemical Battalion; 1st Platoon, A Company, 751st Tank Battalion; Platoon of A Company, 601 Tank Destroyer Battalion. Our positions were on enemy side of ditch and were manned by five companies on the line with one company in reserve. The Battalion fire power was extremely heavy. On the line were three 50 caliber machine guns, six heavy and 30 light machine guns in addition to our normal fire power. All placements were well dug in and reinforced with sandbags. Some positions, as time permitted, were dug through the bank to enable better fields of fire and much hotter cover. All bridges leading into our area were previously blown and mine fields consisting of both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines had been established along likely approaches. During hours of darkness listening posts were sent out in front of the line approximately 150 yards to give added security. The line was not impregnable but definitely unhealthy from an enemy view point. Backing this line were the artillery, 4.2 mortars, 81mm mortars, tank destroyers, and medium tanks. (See attached overlay)

On February 17 there was intermittent enemy artillery and mortar fire



(Report of Action, 1 to 22 February 1944)

laid on our lines. There was a heavy exchange of machine gun and sniper fire during the day with an estimated three enemy casualties. Our mortar and artillery fire was more active than the enemy's and with better effect.

On February 18th there was intermittent enemy artillery and mortar fire laid on our line. Self propelled guns shelled the line spasmodically all day and enemy 20mm guns and machine guns were also active. Our artillery and 4.2 mortars fired on the self propelled guns, but no direct hits were observed. Our 60mm mortars fired on all enemy positions they could reach to their immediate front. The enemy line consisting of machine gun strong points was approximately 500 yds in front of our line. The enemy troops manning this line were very careless and exposed themselves unnecessarily until heavy casualties brought them to their senses. However, when this enemy unit was relieved the new unit was likewise poorly trained and was dealt with in similar manner. At 1900 hrs a patrol of 1 officer and 15 EM proceeded to O43278 with the mission of gaining information of enemy positions and capturing prisoners. The patrol encountered heavy enemy machine gun and small arms fire at this point. Being unable to move forward the patrol returned to our lines.

On February 19th the enemy laid down intensive intermittent fire all day with heavy artillery, mortars, self propelled guns, and machine gun fire. Communications wires were cut by artillery fire three times during the day but communication was maintained by use of 602 radios. Our artillery and mortars were very active firing on all enemy installations and positions observed.

On February 20th there was intermittent artillery and mortar fire laid on our lines but no flak wagon or self propelled gun fire was noted during the day. The enemy shot propaganda leaflets at our lines once during the day. Small groups of enemy were noted and our artillery and mortars fired on them and an enemy mortar position.

On February 21st the enemy moved up close on our right flank but had two of their outposts knocked out by our mortar fire inflicting about eight casualties on them. At 1850 hrs a patrol of eight EM were sent out to O41274 to reconnoiter

(Report of Action, 1 to 29 February 1944)

for enemy emplacements. Finding none the patrol returned. There was intermittent enemy artillery and mortar fire laid on our lines during the 24 hour period.

On February 22nd an enemy patrol came south down road toward bridge at O41274. The patrol was driven off by machine gun fire. There was intermittent artillery, mortar, self propelled guns, and flak wagons firing on our lines during the day. Artillery and mortars fired on enemy positions and 4.2 mortars knocked out one enemy self propelled gun. Enemy seems to be building a line across canal at O51267 as about 50 were seen digging in in this vicinity. 4.2 and 60mm mortar fire was laid on them inflicting approximately 9 casualties and driving them to east side of canal.

On February 23rd the enemy tried all day to secure positions at O49262 but was dispersed or driven back by our mortar fire. These enemy groups were supported by artillery, mortar, self propelled gun, and flak wagon fire. At 2200 hrs a patrol was sent out to get papers off a dead German at O48266. The identification papers were obtained and the patrol returned without contacting the enemy. At 2250 hrs our tank destroyers tried to get an enemy self propelled gun in their sights under a 60mm flare. The tank destroyer fired four rounds with undetermined results. The enemy self propelled gun had been coming to within 700 yds of our positions and firing directly into our line on the bank of the canal. This action may have been two fold. Harrasing or attempting to draw fire from our heavy mortars and close support artillery. Likewise the gun would hide behind buildings and during daylight pull out and blast directly into our lines or buildings behind the lines firing ten to twenty rounds then pull under cover of buildings from our artillery fire. At 2300 hrs C Company sent out a patrol to reconoitier area around O41278. No enemy were encountered. Enemy only seemed to be trying to work close to our positions in that area.

On February 24 there was light enemy artillery and self propelled gun fire laid on our positions. A patrol of five EM went out to try to feel out enemy and was held down by enemy MG and machina pistol fire. One man was believed killed and

(Report of Action, 1 to 2 February 1944)

had to be left due to enemy fire. Our artillery and mortars were not quite as active as on the previous days, but 4.2 mortars knocked out an enemy 20mm gun.

On February 25th there was just light spasmodic enemy artillery fire laid on our positions. There was a great deal of movement noted on Highway #7. Our artillery and mortars fired a few times with the mortars knocking out an enemy 20mm gun on a ground mount. At 1900 hrs C Company relieved F Company of their front line positions. F Company moved into reserve in C Company's former position.

On February 26th there was light enemy artillery, self propelled gun, and mortar fire laid on our area. Our artillery and mortars fired at enemy positions and self propelled guns with unknown effect.


On February 27th there was light artillery and mortar fire both friendly and enemy. Two enemy self propelled guns fired on our lines during the day. There was a great deal of enemy vehicle movement on Highway 7 during the day.

On February 28th there was intermittent artillery, mortar, machine gun, and self propelled gun fire laid on our lines all day with one strong concentration of fire at 1210 hrs which lasted about 30 minutes and seemed to be a 47mm gun. At 1500 hrs our tank destroyers returned fire of an enemy self propelled gun with undetermined results. Our artillery and mortars silenced the enemy guns every time they opened up with the exception of the enemy's big guns which were firing at a great distance and couldn't be picked up by our observers. There was heavy traffic on Highway #7 with the majority of it going north toward Cisterna di Littoria. At 1945 hrs a patrol of 5 EM went to 049665 where there was a known enemy O.P. The patrol got within 20 yds of the enemy O.P. but had to withdraw due to enemy machine gun and rifle fire. The patrol returned at 2150 hrs.

On February 29th the enemy's artillery, mortars, self propelled guns, flak wagons, tanks and infantry were very active all day. There were two attacks on our left flank during the day, one at 0645 hrs at 059275, and one at 2100 hrs. These attacks were driven back by artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. Our artillery and mortars fired on all targets that they could see, and although no direct hits

(Report of Action, 1 to February 1944)

were observed, the enemy guns ceased firing. During the first attack an enemy tank was believed to have been blown up by our mine field. A German prisoner taken in the first attack stated that it was a company attack of 180 men and that the supposed tank was an electrically controlled tank with high explosives in it. Heavy casualties were believed to have been inflicted on the enemy as the prisoner stated that he was dressing the wounds of four men, and enemy were observed all day trying to escape from our mortar and artillery fire. The engineers laid anti-tank mines at 2105 hrs under protection of our patrol.





ROY A. MURRAY, JR.,  
Lt. Colonel, Infantry,  
Commanding.

R. HQ S-3 Report  
ITALY 1:50000 SHEET 158

Feb. 11, 1944

T/Sgt. Grandall









HEADQUARTERS, 4TH RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
A.P.O. 464, U. S. ARMY

SECRET  
The Corps  
26 March 1944  
1944  
MITO

A  
SUBJECT: Report of Action, Period 1 to 25 March 1944  
TO : Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. (thru channels)  
MAP : Italy, 1/50,000 Sheet 158 L

On March 1st the Battalion was still attached to the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment with the mission of holding the line between (032272,- 046256). Companies were in position as shown on attached overlay. There was intermittent artillery, mortar, self-propelled gun, and flak wagon fire laid on our positions. There also was direct fire from enemy tanks laid on our position which caused in many fox holes. Our artillery knocked out two Mark IV tanks and one personnel carrier and also fired at small groups of the enemy. There was fairly heavy traffic moving on Highway 7.

On March 2nd there was heavy traffic of vehicles all day in front of our positions with most of it on Highway 7. There was intermittent artillery, mortar, self-propelled gun, flak wagon, and machine gun fire laid on our positions all day. There was hardly any enemy personnel seen during the day. Our artillery, mortars, and machine guns fired at all targets with undetermined effect. Our mortars laid a smoke screen for our tank destroyers and tanks when they fired on all houses in front of our positions. They ran out two enemy tanks and knocked out one small vehicle and one personnel carrier or flak wagon. Our mortars also fired on enemy positions at (060276) which was believed to be an enemy C.P. F Company moved from reserve position and relieved D Company at 2100 hours. D Company moved back to reserve.

COM  
On March 3rd the ~~traffic~~ *travel* on Highway 7 slackened quite a bit but there was still some movement. Our positions were intermittently

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(Report of Action, 1 to 25 March, 1944 Cont'd)

shelled by artillery, mortar, 20mm gun, and machine gun fire all day. Most of the shelling was from enemy mortars and heavy artillery which was at least 170mm. Our artillery, mortars, and machine guns fired on all targets with the mortars and machine guns concentrating their fire on enemy 20mm guns and machine guns. Our fire could not reach the big guns, so they were never silenced.

On March 4th there was intermittent artillery, mortar, self propelled gun, flak wagon, and small arms fire laid on our positions all day. Most of this fire was on our right flank with two strong concentrations of mortar and artillery fire which seemed to be laid as if there were an attack coming. Much of it was smoke. No attack developed which was believed to be due to the fact that our artillery and mortars seemed to silence all enemy guns that were close and possible halted the attack before it could get started. A patrol of five men went to house at (047266) to cover a patrol of seven men moving up the canal. This patrol reported five enemy machine guns and one mortar position but couldn't advance due to machine gun fire. The patrol returned at 2315 hours.

On March 5th there was intermittent artillery, mortar, and small arms fire laid on our positions. This fire was not as heavy as on previous days. There was very little movement of both enemy personnel and vehicles during the day. Any movement that was seen was fired on by our artillery and mortars with seemingly good effect.

On March 6th there was intermittent artillery, mortar, self propelled, and small arms fire laid on our positions. There was one concentration of about 40 armor piercing shells at 1200 hours. The Battalion was alerted to be relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. At 1700 hours D Company moved from

(Report of Action, 25 March, 1944, Cont'd)

reserve position and took up positions as shown on attached overlay with the mission of holding Bridge 5. At 2000 hours B Company and E Company were relieved and moved with half of Battalion Headquarters to positions as shown on attached overlay with the mission of holding a secondary line for the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and in case of a breakthrough to be prepared to counterattack. E Company had the mission of holding the bridge and to give covering fire if our troops withdrew behind the canal. At 2330 hours A and F Companies were relieved and moved to position as shown in attached overlay with A Company having the mission of holding a secondary defense line for the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and to be prepared to counterattack in case of enemy breakthrough. F Company had the mission of being in immediate support of D Company in case of an attack. At 2400 hours C Company was relieved and moved to position shown on attached overlay. C Company had the mission to counterattack in case of enemy breakthrough of any position.

On March 7th at 0030 hours the remainder of Battalion Headquarters moved to new C.P. as the Battalion was completely relieved.

At 0100 hours the Battalion was in their new positions. There was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day.

On March 8th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions. At 2000 hours about 15 rounds of enemy artillery landed around the Battalion C.P. knocking out part of the communications which were quickly repaired. At 2400 hours our outposts were moved out to houses 6 & 7 (025-257).

On March 9th at 0020 hours the outposts had consolidated their positions in houses 6 & 7 meeting no resistance. F Company relieved D Company at 0100 hours and D Company moved back to F Company's position. There was intermittent shelling of our positions by

(Report of Action, to 25 March, 1944, Cont'd)

artillery all day.

On March 10th at 0015 hours a patrol of one officer and ten EM left house 7 to locate enemy positions west of Sessang. The patrol returned at 0320 hours after advancing as far as (042239). The patrol reported about 15 enemy on right side of road and pill box at (043233). There was intermittent shelling of our positions by artillery fire all day.

On March 11th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day. Our company on the line fired their mortars during the day at enemy positions with undetermined effect.

On March 12th at 1200 hours C Company relieved F Company with the exception of the outpost which was relieved after dark. F Company took over C Company's positions. There was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day.

On March 13th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day. No enemy were contacted.

On March 14th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions. There was mortar fire laid on our company holding the bridge.

On March 15th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day. B Company relieved C Company at 2200 hours. C Company took over B Company's position. A Special Service Force officer who had escaped from the enemy reported that the enemy were going to attack the Special Service Force sector that night or the next morning. Our outposts were warned but no attack came.

On March 16th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day. Everything else was quiet. 152

On March 17th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on our positions all day. At 0115 hours a 70 man enemy patrol was

Report of Action, to 25 March, 1944, Cont'd  
reported  
in front of our positions. The company on the line was alerted and  
flares were thrown up. No enemy were seen. At 1500 hours the  
Demolition Section tried out the 60mm mortar grappax for clearing  
mine fields. Experiments were not entirely successful.

On March 18th intermittent artillery fire was laid on  
our positions all day. At 0315 hours E Company patrol returned from  
reconnaissance. The patrol moved to within about 50 yards of House  
30 on main road where they ran into barbed wire. The wire was regular  
double apron with tin cans tied on it and extended into mine fields.  
The patrol could hear voices on the other side of the wire but could  
not get across due to enemy and friendly flares. At 1400 hours B  
Company relieved D Company with the exception of the outpost which was  
relieved at 1900 hours. D Company took up B Company's positions.

On March 19th intermittent artillery fire was laid on our  
positions all day. The enemy fired propaganda leaflets into our lines  
which were turned over to G-2, 3rd Infantry Division.

On March 20th there was intermittent artillery fire laid on  
our positions all day. Communications were cut twice during the day  
but were quickly restored. While the telephones were out the company  
used 609 radios. Many enemy flares were thrown up between 2000 and  
2400 hours from Sessano.

On March 21st intermittent artillery fire was laid on our  
positions. E Company relieved D Company with the exception of the  
outpost. At 1750 hours D Company took over E Company's positions.  
The outpost was relieved at 1900 hours and reported enemy rocket  
mortars had been firing on their positions.

On March 22nd there was intermittent artillery fire laid on  
our positions all day. At 2400 hours the 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion

(Report of Action, 1 to 25 March, 1944 Cont'd)

was relieved from the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and attached to the 1st Special Service Force. The Battalion was given the mission of holding Bridge 5. All companies remained in the same positions.

On March 23rd intermittent artillery fire was laid on our area. Communications were blown out but were quickly restored.

On March 24th intermittent artillery fire was laid on our positions all day. Communication lines were out once but were quickly repaired.


On March 25th intermittent artillery fire was laid on our positions. The 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion was relieved of all assignments to the Fifth Army and assigned to P.B.S. for administration and movement. The Battalion was relieved of all positions by the 3rd Regiment, 1st Special Service Force and relieved of out post positions by the 168th Infantry Regiment at 2000 hours. The forward C.P. was closed and new C.P. opened at (980194). All companies moved to bivouac area at (974194).

On March 26th the Battalion was separated into two groups. One group was to be transferred to the 1st Special Service Force and the other was to leave the Anzio Beachhead by LST for staging area in Naples to return to the United States by order of War Department. On March 27th at 1030 hours the 4th Ranger Battalion left the Anzio Beachhead and sailed for Naples.

Total casualties for this period was 3 Killed in Action, 18 Wounded in Action, and 3 Died of Wounds.

*ROY A. MURRAY, Jr.*  
ROY A. MURRAY, Jr.  
Lt. Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding.

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


HQ B. S-3 Report  
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**WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON**



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(1971)  
Kear, John, Report - 9th Army Section  
6 - 10 June 44

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION  
A. P. O. 230 U. S. ARMY  
22 July 1944

7 Dec 45  
Date 1152  
Initials

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The following is the story of the Fifth Ranger Infantry Battalion from the landing on the coast of France on D-Day, 6 June 1944, to 10 June 1944 which was the unit's last day of combat during the month of June:

**D-Day 6 June 1944**

At 0530 hours the Fifth Ranger Battalion loaded into L. C. A.'s from the mother ships, H. M. S. Prince Leopold and Prince Boudouin, and started the ten mile run to the coast of France. The morale of the men was excellent, the weather cloudy, and the sea very choppy.

About five miles from shore, one (1) L. C. A. containing the First Platoon and a part of company headquarters of Company F had shipped so much water that it was forced to drop out of the formation. This platoon did not make the assault landing with the battalion but did land near the St. Laurent-sur-Mer Beach exit at 0900 after transferring to a passing L. C. T.

The beach was protected by a large number of under-water obstacles consisting of elements "C", hedgehogs and tetrahedra, many of which had Teller-Mines attached. Mortar and artillery shells were bursting in the area of these obstacles and a heavy concentration of small-arms fire swept the beach. A four foot sea-wall ran laterally along the beach about 75 yards from the waters edge. Friendly troops were observed utilizing the protective cover afforded by this wall. A ball of smoke obscured the sharply rising ground immediately in the rear of and overlooking the beach. Our naval bombardment evidently had set fire to the vegetation covering the hill.

The L. C. A.'s slowly threaded their way through gaps in the lines of obstacles and at H475, 0745, the first wave consisting of one half Battalion Headquarters, Companies A, B, and E, landed on Omaha Dog White Beach at a point approximately 800 yards East of Exit D-1. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Max F. Schneider, had ordered the flotilla commander to touch down his craft east of the intended landing point, Dog Green, because the tremendous volume of fire which covered that portion of the beach was inflicting a large number of casualties on the preceding wave.

The first wave crossed the beach in good order with few casualties, halted temporarily in rear of the sea wall, and immediately reorganized.

The second wave, consisting of one half Battalion Headquarters, Companies C, D, and one (1) Platoon of Company F, duplicated the feat of the first wave.

At a signal from the Battalion Commander the leading echelon scrambled over the wall, blew gaps in the protective wire, and protected from enemy observation by the curtain of rising smoke advanced unhesitatingly to a point near the top of the hill. Here the smoke had cleared and the topographical crest was being swept by effective automatic weapons fire. First Lieutenant Francis W. Dawson, Company D, led his platoon over the top and wiped out a strongpoint thereby enabling the battalion to advance.

Because of numerous mine fields the battalion now changed into a column formation and, after winding through their intricate pattern, the leading unit, Company B, reached the St. Laurent-sur-Mer-Vierville-sur-Mer road at a point approximately one (1) kilometre east of Vierville-sur-Mer. During the advance numerous Germans, well concealed in weapons pits constructed in hedgerows, were killed.

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(22 July - 44)

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Company B advanced toward Vierville-sur-Mer receiving heavy sniper and machine gun fire. Several direct hits from enemy artillery on the rear of the battalion column caused numerous casualties. Company E attempted a penetration to the South but was halted by intense machine gun fire. An 81 mm mortar concentration fired by Company C knocked out several of these positions but they were rapidly replaced and the advance remained halted.

The weight of the attack was shifted toward Vierville-sur-Mer and, after overcoming considerable sniper resistance, the battalion advanced through the village to its western outskirts where it was again held up by a large volume of concerted machine gun and sniper fire. At this point contact was established with the Commanding Officer First Battalion 116th Infantry and approximately 150 men of his unit. Dusk was falling and the battalion was ordered to dig-in a perimeter defense for the night. Companies A, B, and C of the Second Ranger Battalion, numbering approximately 80 men, also assumed a portion of the defense area. Tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion moved within the defense area where they remained for the night. Except for occasional exchanges with enemy snipers and machine guns the night was one of little activity.

One (1) platoon of Company A which became separated from the battalion after crossing the sea-wall proceeded through Vierville-sur-Mer to the rallying point southwest of the town, arriving there at 1600 hours. In accomplishing this feat they captured 12 Germans and killed at least an equal number. Leaving the rallying point shortly thereafter this unit fought its way through to route du Hoe (the Battalion objective) and contacted the Second Ranger Battalion, arriving there at about 2200 hours.

The platoon from F Company which landed near St. Laurent-sur-Mer received a large amount of artillery and machine gun fire on the beach. Patrols were sent out to locate the remainder of the Fifth Battalion but were unable to gain contact. Attempting to move along the beach toward Vierville-sur-Mer this platoon was subjected to artillery fire receiving 8 casualties. After advancing 600 yards to the West the unit was engaged by a superior force and pinned down. When darkness fell the platoon retained this position.

The results for the first day were about 100 prisoners taken, 150 enemy dead, and approximately 60 Rangers killed and wounded.

D-1 7 June 1944

Plans were made for enlarging the beach-head and for relieving the three companies of the Second Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoc.

At 0600 a force composed of 80 men from the Second Ranger Battalion (Cos. A, B and C), Companies C and D of our battalion, 150 men from the First Battalion 116th Infantry, and 6 tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion, advanced toward route du Hoe. Encountering harassing sniper fire this force advanced to a point approximately one (1) kilometer west of St. Pierre du Mont where it received a large concentration of artillery fire. This fire continued, falling from 1000 hours until 1800. The force withdrew to St. Pierre du Mont and set up a defense in the town. Under cover of darkness a two-man patrol moved through the enemy lines to Pointe du Hoc, contacted the Commanding Officer Second Ranger Battalion, and returned laying wire to establish communication between the two forces.

The remainder of the battalion was given the mission of improving the beach-head.

Company B resumed the attack to the southwest from the western edge of Vierville-sur-Mer at 0630. This unit was not able to advance far but did knock out several machine gun nests and numerous snipers.

The remaining platoon of Company A and the remaining platoon of Company F supported by four tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion attacked South from the town wiping out snipers, machine gun nests, and several enemy combat patrols. Approximately 25 of the enemy were killed and 85 were captured.

During the night snipers had infiltrated back into the town so Company E cleaned out the town again.

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At approximately 1100 these units were ordered to set up a defense around the town. At 1400 hours, Company E, which was defending the eastern portion of the town beat off a determined counter-attack of about company strength.

At 1900 hours elements of the 116th Infantry moved into the eastern half of the sector and the units of this battalion shifted to the right to defend only the remaining half of the sector.

The A Company platoon on-Pointe du Hoe assisted in repulsing three counter-attacks early this morning. A seven man patrol from this platoon made an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate through the enemy positions to contact the Fifth Ranger Battalion. The remainder of the day was spent manning a portion of the defense area.

The first platoon of Company F attacked inland from the beach at 0800 and by 1400 hours secured their objective, destroying three pillboxes and several weapons emplacements. 8 Germans were killed and 36 captured. At this time the platoon was contacted by Major Street of Admiral Hall's staff, loaded into a L.C.V.P. with food, water, and ammunition; and transported to Pointe du Hoe contacting the Commanding Officer Second Ranger Battalion at 1700 hours. An eight man patrol from this platoon infiltrated through the enemy positions and by 0800 of D+2 had contacted the force at St. Pierre-du-Mont.

Results for the second day were approximately 150 prisoners taken, 80 killed, and 40 Ranger casualties.

D/2 8 June 1944

At 0100 hours orders were received to prepare to move to Pointe du Hoe at 0600. At 0630 hours a force composed of two battalions of the 116th Infantry and three companies of the Fifth Ranger Battalion advanced from Vierville-sur-Mer down the road west toward Pointe du Hoe. No resistance was encountered and the force at St. Pierre-du-Mont was contacted at 0815.

Companies B and E were given the mission of taking and holding the high ground west of the Sluice Gate at Grandcamp-les-Bains. These companies in column, Company B leading, advanced through the low ground south of the East-West road leading into Grandcamp at 1000. Initially no fire was received and the town appeared to have been deserted by the enemy. The leading elements of the two companies approached to within 25 yards of the bridge where the force was pinned down by a heavy concentration of mortar and machine gun fire. The two companies withdrew to positions on the high ground east of the Sluice-Gate Bridge where they were joined by Company D which had just returned from Pointe-du-Hoe. They were passed through by the Second and Third Battalions of the 116th Infantry, which, supported by tanks, artillery fire, and naval gun fire, successfully captured the town of Grandcamp-les-Bains. D Company and E Company went into defensive positions protecting the Sluice-gate Bridge and mopped up positions along the coast toward Point du Hoe. B Company occupied a portion of the all round defense set up by the Second Ranger Battalion on the high ground east of the Sluice Gate Bridge.

At 0900 Companies C, D, one platoon F Company, the remainder of A, B, C, of the Second Ranger Battalion, and one Platoon Company A advanced toward Pointe du Hoe to assist the three companies of the Second Ranger Battalion. Meeting no resistance they contacted that unit. Companies A and F were now complete organizations.

Shortly thereafter the Rangers were brought under fire by the Third Battalion 116th Infantry and tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion. This force was attacking Pointe du Hoe from the south west and inflicted six casualties on our force, two of which were killed.

D Company advanced toward Grandcamp-les-Bains and joined Companies B and E.

Companies A, C, and F advanced east and south of the inundated area toward Maisy as part of a force consisting of the First Battalion 116th Infantry. Two half-tracks of the Second Ranger Battalion were attached to the Rangers. This force halted one-half mile northeast of Maisy for the night, meeting no resistance enroute.

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Results for the third day were approximately 20 Germans killed and 35 captured. The battalion had 10 casualties.

D/3. 9 June 1944

Company E continued to mop-up positions along the coast toward Pointe-du-Hoc killing several Germans and capturing about 40.

At 1300 hours Companies E, D, and E marched directly south from Grandcamp on a secondary road, changed direction to the west at Le Manoir, again changed direction to the south on the Isigny road, and went into bivouac about 400 yards west of Osmanville.

A, C, and F Companies, detached from the First Battalion 116th Infantry which had by-passed the battery position southwest of Maisy, were given the mission of cleaning out that strong point. They were supported on this mission by the two half-tracks Second Ranger Battalion, Company B, 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, and the four 81 mm mortars carried by Company C. A concentration by the 58th Field Artillery Battalion preceded the attack. Attacking with two companies in column the position was successfully carried. The strong point contained three 105 mm howitzers, numerous small arms, large stocks of ammunition and food, and ejected approximately 90 prisoners. Shortly thereafter this force marched to the bivouac area west of Osmanville where it joined the remainder of the battalion at 2000 hours.

At 2100 a three man patrol from Company E was dispatched to reconnoiter the Light Engineer Bridge across the Vire River. This patrol accomplished its mission and returned at 2400 hours.

Results for the fourth day were approximately 20 Germans killed, 130 prisoners, and 18 Ranger casualties.

D/4. 10 June 1944

At approximately 0430 hours the battalion bivouac area was bombed and the unit suffered three casualties.

Companies C, D, and F were given the mission of mopping up the coastal fortifications from Grandcamp-les-Bains to Isigny. They moved out at 0830 and meeting little resistance, returned at 1530 with approximately 200 prisoners. Mine fields inflicted three casualties on the force.

Patrols in the vicinity of the battalion area captured approximately 35 Germans.

Results for the fifth day were 235 Germans captured and 6 Ranger Casualties.

2. In five days of fighting this battalion had 23 men killed, 89 wounded, and 2 missing.

Approximately 850 prisoners were taken and 350 Germans killed.

For the Commanding Officer:

100 A C 3

AUG 27 1944

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HUGO W. HEFFELFINGER  
Capt.  
I-0, S-3

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**WAR DEPARTMENT  
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100-101  
(1933)  
MAY 19

100-101 - 5th Major Division

JUN 14

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JOURNAL

Unit 5th Ranger Inf Bn

Location Flaminville, France

From 0001, 1 June 1944 <sup>OPD</sup>  
 (hour and date) <sup>CTD</sup>  
 To 2400, 30 June 1944  
 (hour and date)

Time Sent or Re'd	Ser No	In	Out	Incidents, messages, orders etc	Dis
				<p>1 June - VCGG First Inf Div; left Dorchester England by vehicle 0700. Arrived Weymouth, England 0939, went aboard LGA's, left Weymouth Harbor arrived at and boarded HMS Leopold, Boldouin, and Prince Charles at 1045.</p> <p>2 June - VCGG First Inf Div; D-Day announced, 5 June 1944, H-Hour 0610.</p> <p>4 June - CO talked to En, re-D-Day, what to expect etc. VCGG, D-Day postponed to 6 June 1944 H-Hour 0630.</p> <p>5 June - 1000 VCGG; get packs and all equipment set. 1300 VCGG; prime all charges. Load all crew served wpns and individual equipment on LGA's. 1630 ships hoisted anchor. Joined Convoy in Channel.</p> <p>6 June - 0530 embarking from HMS ships in transport area. 0545 lowered to channel and shoved off. 0700 we are approximately 5 kilometers from the coast of France. VCGG 0750 landing on Omaha Beach, Vierville-sur-Mer approximately 1/2 kilometer S D-1 exit. This is the initial assault on German occupied coast of France. Enemy fire was heavy as we struggled across the beach. Casualties seem to be heavy but this is no time for check-awaits orders-hugging beach wall. 0753 VCGG 29th Inf Div: "lead the way Rangers" VCGG "Co B lead way-cleared path thru barbed entanglements. Co's A &amp; F take the flanks knock out the pillboxes to our left and right. Co's C, D, E, &amp; CP groups "lets go" get those MG's and snipers to out front" (2 hours later near Vierville-sur-Mer) and we went over the wall and on over the burning hill at the beaches edge and pushed inward toward Vierville, under constant enemy fire machine guns, automatic pistols, snipers rifles, mortars and self propelled 88's. 1043 reaching outskirts village Vierville-sur-Mer. Sniper fire heavy. Two MG nests located in a building, knocked out. <del>Snipers</del> rapidly: Several patrols are searching building to building while the battalion is moving on cautiously. 1400 CO can't contact anyone by radio. 1935 have reached westerly outskirts of town. VCGG all around defense. No perimeter defense of the town can be established. 116th Inf has not moved up to our left.</p>	

INBN-5-0-7

30 June 1944  
 1944  
 116th Inf

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Time sent or rec'd	Ser No	In	Out	Incidents, messages, orders etc	Dis
				<p>No contact can be made. CP set up in shed at towns edge. 2300 twenty three U.S. tanks are moving up thru the town and into their pre-arranged transport area, which is inside our defense. Known casualties to now, 2400 6 June 1944; Hq Co T/Sgt Walter J Zack (KIA), T/5 Vincent Walters, T/5 Theodore Wells, Pfc Arthur McCullough, T/Sgt Wilfred McGuire, T/4 James V Fitzgerald, T/5 Thomas Lanham, (SWA &amp; LWA); Med Det Cpl John Amador (LWA); Co A, 1st Lt OSCAR SUCHIER (LWA), T/5 William Fox, Pfc Chester A Tarlano, Pfc Bernard V Spring, (KIA), Sgt James O'Hare, Pfc Earl R Moynihan, Pfc Bernard Berkowitz, Pfc Stephen J Beck, Pfc Daniel D Farley, Pfc Anthony A Vullo, Pvt James W Gabaree, Cpl Michael G Zifcak, Pfc John P Bellows (SWA &amp; LWA); Co B, S/Sgt William E Reilly, T/5 Elmo E Banning, T/5 Clinton O Read, Pfc Nickolas (NMI) Wassil, Pvt Raymond F Wilhelm (KIA), S/Sgt James R Copeland, S/Sgt Walter N McIlwain, Sgt Dalton Boudreaux, T/5 Lawrence Antrim, T/5 Ashley R Kimball, Cpl Clayton E Gardner (SWA &amp; LWA); Co C, T/5 Robert M Goldacker (SWA); Co D, T/5 Stephen (NMI) Szerszcz, Pfc Harry I Bolton (KIA), T/Sgt Louis (NMI) Rock, S/Sgt Dwain J Radcliffe, Sgt Richard E Bendix, T/5 Albus P Krieder, Pfc Denman E Wolfe, Pvt Ray E Olcott, T/5 Andrew J Rose, Pfc Elmer L Lunsford, Pvt Russell F Vossen (SWA &amp; LWA); Co E, 1st Lt DEE C ANDERSON, Pfc Matthew E Morse, Pfc Robert C Steinen (KIA), 1st Lt WOODFORD L MOORE, 1st Sgt Sandy Martin Jr, Sgt Lloyd Posey, T/5 John W Manifold (SWA), S/Sgt Robert S Stucker, Pfc James E Mercer, Pfc Elmer P Shilling (LWA); Co F, Pfc Edward J Gardner, Pfc Bernard J Laboda, Pfc Robert T Miller, (KIA), 1st Sgt Howard A Macdonald (SWA), S/Sgt Orville Rosenblad, T/5 Roy F Hard, Pfc Clark L Baker, Pfc Stephen W Minor, Pfc Louis (NMI) Smolich, Pfc Richard T Sorenson (LWA).</p>	
7 June -				<p>0630 reinforced Bn assembled on road to move to Pointe Du Hoc. 6635 heavy MG and sniper fire on col rec from left flank. Co's "E &amp; B" and elements of "A &amp; F" with four tanks left to clear Vierville and area south; remainder of Bn proceeds toward Pointe Du Hoc. Known casualties to now; Co A, Pfc Paul H Pavey (KIA), S/Sgt Ted M Walters, T/5 Edward L Podkowska, Pfc Abbott S Wittels (SWA), Sgt William R Kalar (SWA); Co D, Pfc Carl F Charboneau (LWA); Co E, 1st Lt WOODFORD MOORE (DOW), T/5 Floyd A Bursch (KIA), Sgt William P Fennhahn (LWA).</p>	
8 June -				<p>0700 Maj RICHARD P SULLIVAN with Co's C, D, reached Pointe Du Hoc to assist 2nd Rangers. 0800 VCCG 29th Inf Div; 5th Rangers to proceed to and take Grande Camp Les Bains. 1600 Railo to VCCG; met heavy resistance, 1</p>	

Location Flaminville, France

From 0001, 1 June 1944  
(hour and date)

To 2400, 30 June 1944  
(hour and date)

Time sent or received	Ser No	In	Out	Incidents, messages, orders etc	Dis
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- Kill south of Grande Camp, being held up by heavy mortar barrage, request support.  
Radio VOCC 29th; hold present location till relieved by 116th Regt.  
1730 Relieved by 116th Regt.  
1920 VOCC; Grande Camp cleared of all resistance.  
1930 VOCC; Co ~~C~~ set up defense around Sleuce Gate bridge. Remainder Bn, set up all around defense.  
2400 - Enemy planes bombed area light 1/4 Kill south Grande Camp. CP set up 1 abandoned German tunnel.  
Casualties; Maj RICHARD F SULLIVAN, Hq (LWA) Hq Co, S/Sgt LeRoy T Button (SWA), Med Det T/4 David Clawson (LWA), Co B, S/Sgt Vern Detlefsen, T/5 Joseph W Levesque, Pfc Carl W Morgan Jr (SWA), Pfc Carl W Morgan Jr (DOW), Co D Pfc Robert F Stein, (KIA), S/Sgt Stanley T Jakubowski, T/5 Victor I Wilson (SWA), T/5 John C Smolarek, Pfc Clarence A Styles (LWA); Co F, Pfc Edward I Mapes (LWA).
- 9 June - 0500 VOCC; Co E patrols to town and along beach to get stranded snipers and to previous unlocated enemy mortar positions.  
1400 Co E mission completed.  
1620 VOCC; 29th Div; move thru Grande Camp along road and proceed to Osmanville.  
2000 arrived 1/2 Kill Osmanville - Set up all around defense.  
2100 VOCC - Co E sent night patrol to river via check foot bridge leading to ~~Osmanville~~ Peninsula.  
2400 mission completed. Area Bombed by enemy.  
Casualties; Hq Co, Pfc Harry R. Dunham (LWA) S/Sgt William Scott (NMI), Pfc Henry Santos (NMI) Pfc George F Chiatello, T/5 Dana W Wallace (MIA) 1st Sgt Jerome V Bugnacki, T/5 James L Sullivan Jr T/5 Robert D Battice, Pfc Hubert A Putney, Pfc John H Tucker (SWA); Co D, S/Sgt Charles W Bolmer (SWA); Co E, T/5 Steven Oboryshko MIA, Pfc Robert H McCoubrey (SWA), Pfc George J Petersohn (LWA) Co F Sgt Clinton L Fogel, Sgt Anthony F Muscatello Tec 5 Nicholas (NMI) Pasuk, T/5 Burton E Ranney. (LWA)
- 10 June - 0600 VOCC; Capt Hefflefinger take Co's C, D, & F commencing at Gefusse-Fontenay, proceed north to coast. Clearing all left resistance and taking all remaining German prisoners. Mission completed 1530. Total prisoners taken 235. Casualties; Hq Co Sgt Andrew J Caraber, Cpl Harold A Lewis, Pfc Francis T Coughlin (SWA); Co A T/5 Henry R Seaman Pfc Richard L Foley (SWA); Co D Pfc Carmen W Montello (MIA), Co E S/Sgt Perry D Osborne, Sgt John B Spurlock, Pfc George W Boles (LWA).  
0900 Ranger Bn reverted to V Corps control.
- 11 June - 2330 VOCC; V Corps; move by truck to Bois Du Molan 627785 Casualties; Co A Pfc William M Gardner (LWA) T/5 Dana W Wallace, Pfc George F Chiatello (KIA)
- 12 June - 0200 arrived VOCC outpost and interior guard set up. 1000 - Re-equipment and shortage lists were made and submitted.

JOURNAL Unit 5th Ranger Inf Bn

Location Flaminville, France

From 0001, 1 June 1944  
(hour and date)

To 2400, 30 June 1944  
(hour and date)

Time sent or rec'd	Ser No	In	Out	Incidents, messages, orders, etc	Dis
				13 June - 0500 - VCOG First U.S. Army; Ranger Bn converted to First Army control.	
				Casualties; Co A, Sgt William R. Kalaf (LWA)	
				14 June - Casualties Co E, T/5 Steven (NMI) Oboryshko.	
				15 June - Received 16 Officers and 116 Enlisted replacements.	
				16 June - 1300 VCOG First U. S. Army; Bn moved to Colombiers 582835 by road.	
				1700 CP set up in farm house. Bn bivouaced in orchard.	
				2000 received 4 Officers and 17 enlisted replacements.	
				20 June - VCOG First U. S. Army; Bn move by vehicle to Foucarville in charge of operations of PW #1 First U. S. Army	
				30 June - To date received 21,000 PW's and evacuated 20,730.	