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Report date: 1943-1945

Title: After Action Reports

Units: United States Army 11th Airborne Division, 408th Airborne Quartermaster Company, 466th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, XVII Airborne Corps, 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division

Abstract: **Item 833, Part A:** U.S. Army, 11th Airborne Division, field orders and accompanying administrative orders, Leyte, 1 November-25 December 1944, overlays, Leyte 1/50, Central Philippines 1/50,000 and 1/250,000; **Item 833, Part B:** Historical summary, 25 February 1943-10 February 1945, general orders; **Item 835:** Maps, Leyte 1/50,000, overlays, Leyte, 511th Parachute Infantry positions, Supplement to D-20 film; **Item 836:** U.S. Army, 408th Airborne, Quartermaster Company, Historical operations report, K-2 operation, Leyte, 20 October-25 December 1944, map, annexes, special orders, general orders; **Item 852, Part A:** U.S. Army, 466th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, After action report, 24 March-31 March 1945, supporting data, casualty report, glider operation results of special Airborne forward observer group for Operation Varsity (Germany); **Item 852, Part B:** Unit journal, 24-26 March 1945, overlay, map (Germany); **Item 863, Part A:** U.S. Army, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, History of 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, 1-31 October 1943, casualty report (Castellamere, Naples, Italy); **Item 863, Part B:** History of 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion,

82nd Airborne Division, 22-30 September 1943 (Red Beach, Paestum, Italy); **Item 863, Part C:** Journals of 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 7-30 September 1943, operations overlays (Sicily, Italy); **Item 864, Part A:** U.S. Army, 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, Historical record, October 1943, overlays (Italy), Supplement to D-20 film; **Item 864, Part B:** Report of action, September 1943, overlays, map (Tunisia and Italy), Supplement to D-20 film; **Item 871, Part A:** U.S. Army, 505th Parachute Infantry, Historical records, October 1943, overlays, field order #5 (Italy); **Item 871, Part B:** G-3 report, October 1943, overlays, Kernel White unit reports, 23 Armored Brigade operations orders; **Item 872, Part A:** U.S. Army, 508th Parachute Infantry, 30 days in Holland and Germany with the 508th Parachute Infantry, 17 September-16 October 1944; **Item 872, Part B:** History of 508th Parachute Infantry, 1-18 February 1945 (Germany); **Item 872, Part C:** Battle of the Bulge, 1-31 January 1945, overlays; **Item 872, Part D:** Belgian campaign, 17-31 December 1944, overlays; **Item 896, Part A:** U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps, Report of Airborne phase, 17-27 September 1944, Operation Market; **Item 896, Part B:** U.S. Army, 82nd Airborne Division, Operation Market historical data, overlays, maps, charts; **Item 896, Part C:** U.S. Army, 101st Airborne Division, Participation of 101st Airborne Division in Operation Market for period D-D plus 10; **Item 896, Part D:** U.S. Army, 101st Airborne Division, Report of Operation Market, D-D plus 10, Charts, annexes, tables, overlays, casualty report, air support requests, resupply; and **Item 896, Part E:** U.S. Army, XVIII Airborne Corps, "Mission accomplished," illustrations.

Number of pages: 399 p.

Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Microfilm collection. Call #: D 21, Items 833, 835-836, 852, 863-864, 871-872, and 896.

Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release

D
P. 5
P. 119

511-S-9

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

(12424)
Meters



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

11th Airborne Division Field Orders No. 1 - 8
and Accompanying Administrative Orders, Logbook

Nov, Dec 1944

833

124

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
AUTH: CG 11 AB DIV
INIT: G-3
25 DEC 1944

HQ 11 AB DIV, APO 458
SAN PABLO (59,8-89.8)
1200 I 25 DEC 1944

Confirming Verbal Orders

FO NO 8

MAP: Special Map LEYTE, 1/50,000, Sheets 5, 4, D, G.

1. a. See current G-3 Periodic Report.
- b. See Opns Overlay.
2. This division will:
 - a. Mop up enemy within its zone of action;
 - b. Defend the SAN PABLO and DULAG Airfields, and Airforce and Hospital in installations in BURAUEN.
3. a. 511 Front Inf will:
 - (1) Maintain at least one company in ambush on main Jap Supply Trail W of MARDAG;
 - (2) Less ambush detachments, remain in Division Reserve at KITO BEACH.
- b. 188 Inf will:
 - (1) Secure the MAMARSHAT AIRSTRIP employing forces now stationed there;
 - (2) Attack and destroy all enemy forces within its zone of action;
 - (3) Assist the 187th Inf in its effort to an extent which will not jeopardize the performance of (1) and (2) above.
- c. 187 Inf (- 2d Bn) will:
 - (1) Attack vigorously and destroy the enemy N and NW of ANAWONG;
 - (2) Destroy all enemy within its zone of action.
- d. 2d Bn 187, under Division control, will:
 - (1) Patrol, within its zone of action, the main Jap Supply Trail, insuring that positions recently gained along the trail are not recaptured by infiltrating enemy;
 - (2) Destroy all enemy within its zone of action;
 - (3) Maintain contact with 7th Division on the W.
- e. Div Recon Platoon, Coy 1, commanding, attached 187 Inf.

311-319

- 1 -

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED ~~SECRET~~
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
G. O. McElroy Capt
DOWN: 30 June 1945

11-29-44
12-4-44

SECRET

(Cont'd) HQ 11 AB Div FO No 8, dated 25 Dec 44.

f. Div Arty will support Division operations:

(1) 487 - A - direct support 187 Inf, with secondary mission to support 188 Inf.

(2) Others - no change.

g. 187 Engr Bn (-) return to HIND BEACH and maintain Div roads and airstrips.

h. 158 AA - AT Bn - Godfrey II station move from MAQUAGAC to Rd Bn 187 CP.
Others - no change.

i. Others: no change.

k. Centre will exploit the advantages of the dawn attack on the Japanese.

4. No change.

5. a. No change.

b. CP's: See Opns Overlay.

SWING
Contg

OFFICIAL:

CHIEF
G-3

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10 - Div Arty

11 - CG 148 Inf

12 - CG 388 Inf

13 - CG 187 Inf

14 - CG 188 Inf

15 - CG 511 Inf

Copy No 1A - CG 187 Engrs

16 - CG 188 AA Bn

18 - CG 787 TC Bn

19 - CG Co A 780 Amph TC Bn

20 - CG 487 FA Bn

21 - CG 674 FA Bn

22 - CG 675 FA Bn

23 - CG 68 FA Bn

24 - CG 51 FA Bn

25 - CG XXIV Corps

26 - CG XXIV Corps



27 - CG XXIV Corps

28 - Div Sig O

29 - Div CM

30 - TAG

31 - Journal



- 188
- A 457
- D 457
- FWD
- 152

No CHANGE
South

No CHANGE
East

ODNS OVERLAY :
 To ACCOMPANY FO No 8
 Has 11th AB Div. SAN PABLO A/D
 251200 1 DEC 44
 MAP REF : LEYTE ISLAND
 Scale : 1/50 000

OFFICIAL: SWING
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QUANDT
 G-3

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AFHQ: OO 11 AB DIV
DETAILS
15 DEC 1944

HQ 11 AB DIV APO 648
SAN PABLO (SO-S-39.3)
15 DEC 1944

- (2) Defend the SAN PABLO AIRFIELD and installations against attack by enemy forces and infiltrators.
- TO HQ (3) Maintain one Bn in Div Reserve vicinity of SAN PABLO STRIP No. 2 prepared to defend the SAN PABLO and DULAG Airfields against enemy attack. Alert one company and one section of HQ's as a mobile force for defense against airborne attack of the DULAG Airfield. (See Opns Overlay)
1. a. See current G-3 Periodic Reports.
b. See Opns Overlay.
2. The Division will:
- From positions now gained, mop up enemy forces in the LUNI - MARIWAG - MAS TAGE.
 - Defend the SAN PABLO and DULAG Airfields, and air force and hospital installations in MURAUEN.
 - Seek out and destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
3. a. The 511 Front Inf, from positions now gained will seek out and destroy all enemy in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
b. The 188th Para-Glider Inf will:
- Protect the left (SOUTH) flank of the Div in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
 - By aggressive patrolling seek out and destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action.
 - Maintain contact with the 187th Para-Glider Inf on its right (NORTH) flank.
4. The 187th Para-Glider Inf will:
- Garrison the Airstrip at MANAWAT with one company.
 - Seek out and destroy all enemy within its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay).
 - Prevent movement of enemy forces through the MARIWAG - LUNI pass.
5. The 149th Inf Regt (less one Bn) will:
- By aggressive patrolling locate and destroy all enemy forces and infiltrators in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
 - Defend the SAN PABLO AIRFIELDS and installations against attack by enemy forces and infiltrators.
 - Maintain one Bn in Div Reserve vicinity of SAN PABLO STRIP No. 2 prepared to defend the SAN PABLO and DULAG Airfields against enemy attack. Alert one company and one section of HQ's as a mobile force for defense against airborne attack of the DULAG Airfield. (See Opns Overlay)
6. The 1st Bn 308th Inf (with Co's A-B-767 Bn Bn attached) will protect the air force and hospital installations in the vicinity of MURAUEN. (See Opns Overlay)
7. Outpost Force (574 PG FA Bn (-), 675 PG FA Bn (-), D Btry 457 Front FA Bn; Comdr: OO 574 FA Bn) will:
- Prevent enemy movement into MURAUEN Area from the WEST and NORTH.

- 1 -

SECRET

S E C R E T

(Cont'd) 11 AB Div FO No 7, dated 15 Dec 1944.

(2) Seek out and destroy enemy troops in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)

G. Div Arty will support the Div.

(1) 51st FA Bn direct support 187th Para-Glider Inf.

(2) 457th FA Bn. (less A and C Btrys) direct support Outpost Force.

(3) A Btry 457th FA Bn direct support 511 Parat Inf. Secondary mission support 187th Para-Glider Inf when that unit progresses beyond the range capabilities of the 51st FA Bn.

(4) 48th FA Bn general support. Secondary mission support 1st Bn 502nd Inf.

H. 187th Engr Bn. No change.

I. 188 AA Bn. No change.

J. Co A 780 Amphibious Tractor Bn. No change.

K. Patrolling will be continuous in respective zones of action; travelled trails will be unobscured during hours of darkness.

4. No change.

5. a. No change.

b. CP's:

511 Parat Inf - To be reported.
Others - See Opns Overlay.

SWING
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QUANTR
G-3

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15 - CG 311 Inf

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17 - CG 188 AA Bn
18 - CG 767 Tr Bn
19 - CG Co A 780 Amph Tractor Bn
20 - CG 457 FA Bn
21 - CG 674 FA Bn
22 - CG 675 FA Bn
23 - CG 45 FA Bn
24 - CG 31 FA Bn
25 - CG XXIV Corps
26 - CG XXIV Corps
27 - CG XXIV Corps
28 - Div Sig O
29 - Div CM
30 - Div CM
31 - Journal

REF: 02 11 AB DIV
INSTR: 0-3
DATE: 12 DEC 1944

HQ 11 AB DIV APO 468
SAN PABLO (50, 3-29.5)
1944 I 12 DEC 1944

FO NO 6

1. a. G-2 Periodic Report No 29.
 - b. XXIV Corps continues its attack in assigned zone of action.
2. The Division will:
 - a. Continue its advance to the W through the MARONAS - ANAS Pass and contact 7th Div on the W.
 - b. Defend the SAN PABLO and DULAP Airfields against attack.
 - c. Locate and destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action.
3. a. The 811 Front Inf will:
 - (1) Hold MARONAS - ANAS Pass.
 - (2) Locate and destroy all enemy forces in the vicinity of ANAS.
 - (3) Upon contacting 7th Div be attached to them.
- b. The 182th Para-Gli Inf will:
 - (1) Protect the left (SOUTH) flank of the Div in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
 - (2) By aggressive patrolling locate and destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action.
- c. The 187th Para-Gli Inf (less Co G, with 674 FA, less firing battery equipment, attached) will:
 - (1) By aggressive patrolling locate and destroy all enemy in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
 - (2) Maintain contact with the 182th Para-Gli Inf on its left (SOUTH) flank.
- d. The 142th Inf Regt (less one Bn) will:
 - (1) By aggressive patrolling locate and destroy all enemy forces and infiltrators in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
 - (2) Defend the SAN PABLO Airfields and installations against attack by enemy forces and infiltrators.
 - (3) Maintain one Bn in Div Reserve vicinity of SAN PABLO Strip No 2 prepared to defend the SAN PABLO - DULAP Airfields against enemy attack. Alert one company and section HQ's as a mobile force for defense against airborne attack of the DULAP Airfield. (See Opns Overlay)
- e. 522 Inf (less one Bn with Co's A & B, 767 TK Bn attached) will:
 - (1) Defend designated installations in its zone of action.
 - (2) By aggressive patrolling locate and destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
- f. C Co, 187th Para-Gli Inf will garrison MANANANAS.

SECRET

11th AB Div FO No 6, dated 18 Dec 1944.

g. 11 AB Div Arty will support the Div.

- (1) 48 FA Bn direct support 588 Inf. Secondary mission support 149 Inf.
- (2) 51st FA Bn direct support 187 Para-Gli Inf. Secondary mission support 188 Para-Gli Inf.
- (3) 457 FA Bn, less one Btry, general support.
- (4) A Btry, 457 FA Bn direct support 511 Provt Inf.

h. 187 Hqr Bn will:

- (1) Maintain the Airstrip at MAWAWARAT.
- (2) Maintain access roads to the Div CP and Rear Echelon.
- (3) Be prepared to construct obstacles for security of installations in Div zone of action.

i. 188 AA Bn will garrison and maintain communication stations at key points on the BURUEN - ALBUERA Trail.

j. Co A, 728 Amphibious Tractor Bn will secure DULAG Airfield against any enemy attack. (See Opns Overlay)

k. All troops are responsible for the destruction of any enemy infiltrators within their zones of action or proximity of their bivouac areas.

4. Administrative Order No 4 to accompany FO No 6 (Annex No 1)

5. a. No change.

b. CP's:

511 Inf - To be reported.

Others - See Opns Overlay

SWING
Contd

OFFICIAL:

QUINCY
6-5

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 10 - Div Arty
 11 - CO 149 Inf
 12 - CO 588 Inf
 13 - CO 187 Inf
 14 - CO 188 Inf
 15 - CO 511 Inf
 16 - CO 187 Hqr Bn
 17 - CO 188 AA Bn
 18 - CO 847 Tr Bn

Copy No 19 - CO Co A, 728 Amph Tractor Bn
 20 - CO 457 FA Bn
 21 - CO 674 FA Bn
 22 - CO 675 FA Bn
 23 - CO 48 FA Bn
 24 - CO 51 FA Bn
 25 - CO XXIV Corps
 26 - CO XXIV Corps
 27 - CO XXIV Corps
 28 - Div Sig C
 29 - Div QM
 30 - TAG
 31 - Journal

- 2 -
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Auth: CG 11 Abn Div.

Init: G-4

Date: 12 Dec 1944

Unit: 11 Abn Div

Location: SAN PABLO

(50.2-29.1)

Time: 1800Z 1 Dec 44

1. SUPPLY

a. Cl. I

(1) Except Water:

- (a) Units South of CAGINQUINGAN from BASE CAMP.
 - (b) Units in LA PAZ area from Sub Base K, DULAG.
 - (c) Units East of SAN PABLO STRIP No. 2 from Div Dump, vic. C.F., (50.3-29.2).
 - (d) Units in BURAEN area, from Fifth Air Force Dump, BURAEN.
 - (e) Units in BURI area from Sub Base K, DULAG (via DAGAMI).
 - (f) Units between BURAEN and ANAS from Drop-Dumps at CATAAGAN, TAKIN, ANONANG, MANARAWAY AIRSTRIP, and MAHONAG.
 - (g) Units West of ANAS, from 7th Div.
- (2) Water: Unit responsibility. Div. WPs at SAN PABLO and BURAEN; Corps WP at TARRAGONA.

b. Cl. III

- (1) Dumps at BASE CAMP, DULAG, and vic. CF (50.3-29.2).

c. Cl. IV (and II)

- (1) Dumps at BASE CAMP and SAN PABLO STRIP No. 1.
- (2) To DZs as called.

d. Cl. V

- (1) Units South of CAGINQUINGAN from Div. Dump No. 1 (50.3-24.6).
- (2) Units West of BURAEN from DZs as called.
- (3) All others from Corps ASPs 5, 6, 7, and 11.
- (4) DAO at Div. CP with branch at BASE CAMP.

2. EVAC

a. Casualties by 221st AB Med Co.

b. Burial - USAF Cemetery No. 1, DULAG. Temporarily in Unit Cemeteries.

c. PW - Div. Enclosure, Div. CP.

SECRET

S E C R E T

12 December 1944, Continued.

3. TRAF

a. Circulation

- (1) MSR - BASE CAMP to BUCEO
- (2) MSR - Sub base K, DULAG, to:
 - (a) MAYORGA - LA PAZ
 - (b) SAN PABLO
 - (c) TANUAN - DAGAMI - GUIVARONA - BURI

4. TRAINS

- a. Fifth Inf under Div Control
- b. Others released to Units

5. PERS

- a. Surplus Baggage - Div. Rr Ech.

6. PERIODIC REPORTS

No change

7. REAR ECH DIV HQ


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CHAMFORD

U-4



OPNS OVERLAY:
 TO ACCOMPANY FO No 6
 HQS 11th A/B DIV. APO 468
 1700 12 DEC. 44
 MAP REF: LEYTE ISLAND
 Scale 1:50,000


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
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 6-3**

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 SHEET 1 of 3 SHEETS

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CORPS
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


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SHEET 2 of 3 SHEETS

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SHEET 3 OF 3 SHEETS

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AUTH: CG 11 AB Div
REF: G-8
DATE: 8 DEC 1944

Hq 11 AB Div APO 468
SAN PABLO (59.2-29.3)
1169 I 98 DEC 1944

FO NO 8

MAP: Special Map LEYTE, 1/50,000, Sheets 3, 4, D, G.

1. a. G-8 Periodic Report No 18.
- b. XLIV Corps continues the attack against the Japanese in the CROMOC CORRIDOR.
2. This Division will:
 - a. Continue the aggressive advance over the BURAUEM-ALBUERA Trail to assist the operations of 7th and 77th Divisions and destroy all hostile forces encountered. Upon contact with 77th Inf Div, units of 11 AB Southwest of the line ANAS (24.9-26.6) - PAHAGAN (21.5-29.3) are attached to 77th Inf Div.
 - b. Maintain the security of the BURAUEM Airfield area within zone of action.
 - c. Defend all captured areas in its zone of action.
3. a. The 511 Frecht Inf will advance to the West through the MAHONAG-ANAS Pass defeating all enemy encountered, to assist the operations of the 77th Inf Div. Upon contact with the 77th Div the Regt will be attached to them.
- b. 188 Para-Gli Inf will:
 - (1) Protect the left (SOUTH) flank of the Div in its zone of action.
 - (2) Locate and destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action.
 - (3) Maintain contact with the 187 Para-Gli Inf on the NORTH.
- c. 187 Para-Gli Inf (less 2d Bn and Co C with 674 FA Bn, less firing battery equipment and 1st Bn 388 Inf, attached) will by aggressive patrolling locate and destroy all enemy within its assigned zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
- d. 2d Bn 187 Inf under Div control will protect the advance of the 511 Frecht Inf.
- e. 11 AB Div Arty will support the Div.
 - (1) A Btry 457 FA Bn at MANARAWAT direct support 511 Frecht Inf.
 - (2) C Btry 457 FA Bn prepared to occupy selected positions on Div order.
 - (3) 457 FA Bn less A and G Btrys and firing battery equipment Btry D, to vicinity SAN PABLO Strip No 1.
 - (4) 674 FA Bn less firing battery equipment, attached 187 Para-Gli Inf.
 - (5) A Btry 675 FA Bn attached 7th Div.

- 1 -

SECRET

1. 187 Engr Bn (less detachments) Div Reserve [See Opns Overlay]
2. 188 will garrison Div line of communications (See Opns Overlay)
3. 1st Bn 149 Inf by aggressive patrolling will maintain the security of the BURAHAN Airfields and locate and destroy all enemy within its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
4. Bn 149 Inf by aggressive patrolling in assigned zone of action will locate and destroy all enemy. (See Opns Overlay)
4. No change.
5. a. No change.
- b. OP's:

511 Praht Inf - To be reported
 24 Bn 187 Para-Alt Inf - To be reported
 11 AB Div FWD Ech - Airstrip MANAWARAT
 Others - See Opns Overlay


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
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


OVERLAY :

CORRECTION TO OPNS
 OVERLAY FO No 5
 HQS 11th AB Div APO 468
 OB 1100 1 DEC 44
 MAP REF. LEYTE ISLAND
 scale 1/50,000



SECRET



OPNS OVERLAY
 TO ACCOMPANY FO No 5
 08 1100 I DEC 1944
 HQS 11th AB Div. APO 468
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 Scale 1/50000

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

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AUTH: CG 11 AB DIV
INFL: G-3
DATE: 4 DEC 1944

HQ 11 AB DIV APO 448
SAN PABLO (89.2-29.3)
1500 I 4 DEC 1944

FO NO 4

NAME: Special Map LEYTE, 1/50,000, sheets 3, 4, 5, G. Operation
Sketch MANAWAT - LURI Area, 28 Dec 1944. Overlay attached.

1. a. Intelligence Annex.
- b. XIV Corps continued the attack against the Japanese in the CERMOC-GORINDOS.
2. This Division continues the advance to the WEST through the ANAS-MAHONAG Pass.
3. a. The 811 Pz Inf will advance with the bulk of the Regt to ANAS to secure the pass & defeat in detail enemy encountered enroute. (See Opns Overlay)
- b. 187 Para-Gli Inf, with 3 Btry 158 AA Bn attached will:
 - (1) Advance to LURI relieving elements of the 811 Inf as it advances, protect the right (NORTH) flank of the Div and maintain contact with the 54 Bn 504 Inf & 98th Div on the NORTH in its zone of action. (See Opns Overlay)
 - (2) Protect line of communications (See Opns Overlay).
 - (3) Protect the Div Airstrip at MANARAWAT.
4. 188 Para-Gli Inf, will protect the left (SOUTH) flank of the Div in its zone & maintain contact with the 187th Para-Gli Inf on the NORTH.
5. 54 Bn 504 Inf will by aggressive patrolling eliminate all Japs in its zone of action maintaining contact with the 48th Div on the NORTH & the 187 Para-Gli Inf on the SOUTH.
6. 11 AB Div Arty will support the advance.
 - (1) 487 FA Bn at MANARAWAT direct support 811 Inf.
 - (2) 874 FA Bn will occupy selected positions via MAHONAG on Div order. (See Opns Overlay)
 - (3) 875 FA Bn will occupy selected positions via LURI on Div order. (See Opns Overlay)
 - (4) Others no change.
7. 187 Engr Bn (less Plat of Co C at MANARAWAT) in Div Reserve (See Opns Overlay)
- a. 158 AA Bn (less 3 Btries in Div Reserve) (See Opns Overlay)
8. Administrative Order No 3 to FO No 4.
9. a. No change.
- b. See Opns Overlay.

- 1 -
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Comd

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G-3

ANNEXES:

Annex No 1 - Intelligence
2 - Administrative

DISTRIBUTIONS:

CG
Asst Div Comdr
C/S
G-1
G-2
G-3 - 5
G-4
CG Div Arty
CG 504 Inf
CG 811 Inf
CG 187 Inf
CG 84 Bn 187 Inf
CG 188 Inf
CG 187 Engr Bn
CG 158 AA Bn
CG 102 AA Bn
CG Div Tr Sch
CG Co A, 767 Tr Bn
CG Co B, 767 Tr Bn
CG 81 FA Bn
CG 48 FA Bn
CG 487 FA Bn
CG XIV Corps - 3
Div Sig C
Div C
TAG
Journal

- 2 -
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By a/c: CG, 11th AB Div
1 Dec 44
Initials: _____

ARMY NO. 1)

F.O. NO. 4)

INTELLIGENCE

Maps: SPECIAL MAP LETTER, 1/30/44
Sheets D, G, E, and 4
SKETCH MAP, BUREAU - LUBI AREA
Approx scale: 1 inch equals 1500 yards.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. The 26th Div on our right is in contact with remnants of the 16th Div. The units of this Div have suffered heavy losses and their combat efficiency is greatly reduced. Recent PW report indicates the strength of the 26th Div may be as low as 100 men. The CP of the 16th Div has been reported in the MT MAJUNAG Area. It is possible that it may be located in a cave which has previously been reported in that area. Elements of the 7th Div are in contact with units of the 26th Div Div-1 of ALBUREA. Units of this division comprise the only combat elements reported to of the 62ND Area. The following units have been identified in this location:

- 2nd Bn, 11th Inf Div
- 12th Inf Div (Less 3rd Bn)
- 13th Inf Div (probably Regt B; a 1st Bn)
- 25th Regt Regt
- 65th Inf Regt Bn (attached to 26th Div)

The 3rd Bn, 12th Inf Div has been identified near MT LAAG and the 3rd Bn of the 13th Inf Div in the LUBI-SAN PEDRO-PARAO Area. Since the 2nd Bn of the 13th Inf Div was reported lost enroute from FORMOSA to MANILA as a result of our submarine action, this accounts for all inf bns of the 26th Div with the exception of 1st and 3rd Bn of the 11th Inf Div. This regiment was reported to have landed on LITEN intact.

The 3rd Bn of the 13th Inf Div was reported to have a reduced strength of from 400 to 500 men which has been further reduced by a team 110 killed during recent combat with the 511th Parach Inf.

b. ARMY observer reports from W guerrilla 23 the indication that there exists an estimated 2000 JAP in a cave at MT MAJUNAG with their supplies at ANAG. It is probable that supplies are transported along the horse trail reported to be under construction along the HALLIGAYAN RIVER. From here it would appear that the supply trail leads to MAHONAG and thence NE to MT MAJUNAG and EN to the LUBI-SANAG Area. During the late afternoon of 30 Nov campfires were reported running W and NW from MAHONAG. On morning of 1 Dec a campfire was observed 2000 yds N of ANAG. An Army IA pilot observed three trails running W from MAHONAG on 1 Dec. All appeared to be well used. Additional trail information reported by Army observer at 040000 1 Dec is shown on trail sketch, appendix No. 1.

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c. The following conclusions may be drawn to explain the presence of the 3rd Bn, 13th Inf Div in the LUBI-SAN PEDRO-PARAO Area:

- (1) Reconnaissance in force preparatory for an attack by the 26th Div in the direction of BUREAU and/or
- (2) Prevent the left flank of the 26th Div by securing passage to the West Coast and/or
- (3) Prevent the AMS to MT MAJUNAG supply route.

4. Enemy capabilities:

- (1) Defend the ANAG-MAHONAG Pass Area with remainder of 3rd Bn, 13th Inf Div.
- (2) Reinforce the ANAG-MAHONAG Pass Area with at least one inf. Bn.
- (3) Attack our supply lines with elements of 3rd Bn, 13th Inf and units from the MT MAJUNAG Area.

5. Inference:

- a. Will enemy attempt to reinforce the ANAG-MAJUNAG Pass? With 2nd and 3rd Bns?
- b. What supply route is enemy using W and NW from ANAG?
- c. Will enemy attempt to cut our supply lines from BUREAU?
- d. What action, if any, will enemy take against our supply planes?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS:

Aerial and photographic run in front of 511th along trails from MAHONAG West. Times to be arranged.

4. MESSAGE FOR HANDLING PHASES OF WAR:

- a. Attachment of Language Teams: No change.
- b. Location of Div IV Call points: 200 yds N SAN PABLO (50.2-09.6).


By command of Major General SWINIS

IRVIN H. SCHNEPPFELDER
Colonel, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff.

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MULLER
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62



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
11th Airborne Division
APO 468

ANN O. 2 to
accompany FO 4

SECRET
AUTH: CG 11 Abn. DIV.
Init:
[Pct]: 4. 1944. 1944....
Unit: 11 AB DIV
Location: SAN PABLO
(56, 2-29, 1)
Time: 241900Z Dec. 44

1. SUPPLY

a. G1. I

(1) Except Water:

- (a) Units south of GAGINGQUINGAN from BASE CAMP.
- (b) Units in LA PAX - SAN PABLO - BARAUN - GUINARONA area from Sub Base K, DULAG.
- (c) Units west of BARAUN from drop-dumps at ABUYAGON, TAKIN, CATABAGAN, ANOHANG, PATAQ, MANARAWATO AIRSTRIP, and advanced DG to be announced.
- (d) Units west of MAROHAG, after ground contact is established with 7th or 77th Div., from XXIV Corps Dumps.

(2) Water - Unit responsibility. WPs at SAN PABLO and BARAUN.

b. G1. III

- (1) Dumps at BASE CAMP, and DULAG.

c. G1. IV (and II)

- (1) Dumps at BASE CAMP and DULAG.

- (2) To DGs as called.

d. G1. V

- (1) Units south of GAGINGQUINGAN from Div. Dump No. 1 (56, 3 - 24, 0)

- (2) Units in LA PAX - SAN PABLO - BARAUN - GUINARONA area from XXIV Corps ASPs 5, 6, 7, and 11.

- (3) Units west of BARAUN from DGs as called.

- (4) DAD at Div CP w/branch at BASE CAMP.

2. EVAC

a. Casualties by 221st Abn Med Co.

- b. Burial - USAF Cemetery No. 1, DULAG, and Div. Cemetery LUBI area, location to be announced. (Evac. by 221st AB Med Co.)

c. PW - Div. Evacuation BARAUN - MAROHAG - BARAUN

3. TRAF

a. Circulation

- (1) MSR - BASE CAMP to BUBHO

- (2) MSR - Sub Base K, DULAG to:

(a) MAYORGA - LA PAX

(b) SAN PABLO

(c) MANUAN - DAGAMI - GUINARONA

4. TRAINS

- (1) 511th Inf. and 187th Inf., under Div. Control.

- (2) Others released to Units.

5. PMS

- a. Surplus baggage - Div. Rr Bah.

6. PERIODIC REPORTS

- a. S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, as of 1800, to reach Div. Hq. by 0600 following day.

- b. Dump inventories as of 1800 to reach Div. Hq. by 0600 following day.

- c. Drop supplies required, radio request to Liaison Plans or to Div. advanced OP.

7. REAR 504 DIV HQ

No change

OFFICIAL:

CRAWFORD
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SWING

S E C R E T

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SECRET
AUTH: CG 11 AB DIV.
INITIALS:
189 NOV 1944

CG 11 AB DIV APO 468
SAN PABLO (56, 2-29, 2)
1800 1 29 Nov 44

FO No 2 (CONFIRMATION OF VERBAL ORDERS)

MAPS: Special Map, Central PHILIPPINES, 1/250,000
LEYTE ISLAND, CGN, CGM, SWFA, 1/100,000. Overlay attached.

1. a. See Current G-3 Periodic Report No 2, 28 Nov 1944.

No change.

- b. The 11th AB Div (with 504 Inf (less 1st Bn), Cos A and B, 787 Tank Bn, 51st YA Bn, and 45th YA Bn attached) will:

- a. Believe all elements of the 17th Inf in the HURAHIN area and protect the GUINARONA-HURAHIN area;

- b. By aggressive advances through the central mountain range over all trails in its zone of action, take early offensive action via the HURAHIN-ALBUENA trail against enemy forces in the ALBUENA area, destroying all hostile forces found, and assist the attack of the 7th Division;

- c. Defend occupied areas.

- d. a. The 504th Inf (less 1st Bn) will:

- (1) Believe the 5d Bn 17th Inf;

- (2) Seize and secure all exits into the LEYTE VALLEY in its assigned zone of action;

- (3) Attack and destroy all enemy forces in its assigned zone of action;

- (4) Within its zone of action, establish and maintain contact with the 504th Inf Div on the RIGHT (NORTH) FLANK.

- (5) Maintain one Bn NORTH of HURAHIN to be committed on Div order; only this Bn (with one platoon each from Cos A and B, 787th Tank Bn attached) will:

- (a) Be prepared to assemble two companies in the vicinity of Bn 5th Air Force for meter movement to defend against Airborne attack.

- (b) Maintain security detachments on Airstrips SAN PABLO No 2 (BAYUG) and MALANCA (BUBI);

- (c) Coordinate and establish liaison with CG, 5th Air Force through G-2, 11 AB Div for the accomplishment of (a) and (b) above.

(See Operations Overlay)

The 51st Inf will:

- (1) Seize and secure all exits through the mountains into the LEYTE VALLEY in its assigned zone of action;

- (2) By aggressive advances through the central mountain range

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over all trails in its zone of action, secure the western exits from the mountains into the West Coastal Corridor to assist the attack of the 7th Inf Div;

- (3) Defend occupied areas;
 - (4) Within the zone of action, establish and maintain contact with the 506th Inf Div on its right (NORTH) flank;
 - (5) Destroy by offensive action all hostile forces encountered. (See Operations Overlay)
- g. The 187th Inf (Less 2d Bn) with the 674th and 675th YA Bns, and the 108th AB AA Bn attached will:
- (1) Protect the Division rear echelon in the vicinity of the RICE RIVER;
 - (2) With one battalion in the ANUOC - UNION area,
 - (a) Hold that portion of the ANUOC - BAYDAY road within its zone of action;
 - (b) Prevent hostile beach landings in its zone of action;
 - (c) Locate and destroy hostile forces within its zone of action by strong and vigorous patrolling;
 - (d) Maintain contact with the 180th Infantry on the NORTH and the 7th Inf Div to the WEST.

d. 180th Inf: No change except 4 (5) is changed to "establish and maintain contact with the 180th Inf and the 511 Inf on its right (NORTH) flank."

e. Coe A and B, 767 Tank Bn (less one platoon each), 48th YA Bn, and 51 YA Bn are attached to 11 AB Div Arty. One platoon each of Coe A and B, 767 Tank Bn are attached to 506 Inf.

f. The 11 AB Div Arty, with Coe A and B, 767 Tank Bn, 48 YA Bn, and 51 YA Bn attached, will support the attack of the division to the WEST:

- (1) 457 Front PA Bn direct support 511 Inf, with 500 HVTs required to occupy position by air;
- (2) 48 YA Bn direct support 506 Inf (- 1st Bn);
- (3) 51 YA Bn, general support.
- (4) Coe A and B, 767 Tank Bn (less one platoon each), reinforce fires 48 YA Bn and 51 YA Bn;
- (5) 674 and 675 YA Bn attached to 187 Inf. (See Operation Overlay).

g. The 187 AB Engr Bn will:

- (1) Maintain the Div Access Road;
- (2) Construct facilities for packing and drying parachutes;
- (3) Assist the 180th Inf and the 511 Inf in their advance. (See operations Overlay).

h. The 158 AB AA AT Bn (less one Btry to remain in the vicinity of SAN PABLO AIRFIELD NO 2 under div control) will:

- (1) Establish and maintain wire and radio communication from HURAHN to LUKI.

- (2) Secure critical points on the HURAHN-LUKI trail (See Operations Map)
- (3) Establish and maintain a Medical Evacuation route from LUKI to HURAHN.

i. The 1084 AB AA Bn is attached to the 187 Inf.

j. The 2d Bn, 187 Inf will:

- (1) Relieve the 2d Bn 511 Inf on the high ground WEST of HURAHN;
- (2) Secure the exits from the mountains into the LEYEN VALLEY within its assigned zone of action;
- (3) Establish and maintain contact with the 511 Inf to the WEST and the 506 Inf to NORTH;
- (4) Prevent hostile infiltration in its assigned zone of action, and destroy all infiltrators located;
- (5) Defend occupied areas.

k. Troops, other than anti-aircraft artillery, will not engage enemy aircraft unless subjected to low strafing attack against the immediate troop area.

4. No change.

5. a. No change.

b. See Operations Overlay.


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DISTRIBUTION:

- CG
- Asst Dir Comd
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- G-3
- G-4
- CG Div Arty
- CG 506 Inf
- CG 511 Inf
- CG 187 Inf
- CG 2d Bn 187 Inf
- CG 188 Inf
- CG 187 Engrs Bn
- CG 158 AB AA AT Bn
- CG 108 AB AA Bn
- CG Div Br Bn
- CG Co. A, 511 Inf Bn
- CG Co. B, 767 Tank Bn
- CG 51 YA Bn
- CG 48 YA Bn
- CG 457 Front PA Bn
- CG XXIV Corps - 3
- Div Sig C
- Div Sig
- ENR
- Journal



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
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 TO ACCOMPANY FO #3
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 HQS 11TH AB DIV. APO 468
 MAP REF. LEYTE ISLAND
 SCALE 1/50000

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
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


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GENERAL SITE OPNS PATROL SKETCH

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
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SHEET 1 OF 3 SHEETS



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OPNS OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY FO#4
 HQS 11th AB Div APO 468
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 MAP REF: CENTRAL PHILIPPINES
 Scale 1:50 000

SWING
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 SHEET 2 OF 3 SHEETS

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SHEET 2 OF 3 SHEETS

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AUTH: CG 11 AB DIV
DIT: [REDACTED]
DATE: 25 NOV 1944

11 AB DIV
SUBJ: (SS.55-500)
25 Nov 1944

FO 3

MAPS: Special Map, Central PHILIPPINES, 1/250,000.
LEYTE ISLAND, CGC, CGQ, SWPA, 1/50,000.
Overlay attached.

1. A. See Intelligence Annex.
- B. I Corps will continue its offensive operations in the high ground NORTHEAST of the ORMOG VALLEY and along the axis of the PINAMPOGAN-VALENZUELA-ORMOG Road. XXIV Corps will attack NORTH along the West coast of LEYTE to seize and hold the ORMOG-GAMP-DOWNES area, will seize the mountain passes in its zone of action, and will prevent the entrance of additional hostile forces into the LEYTE VALLEY, destroying by offensive action all hostile forces encountered. (See Opns Overlay)
2. The 11th AB Div, (with 17 Inf (-8d Bn), Co's A & B, 787th Tank Bn, 51st FA Bn, & 48th FA Bn attached) will:
 - a. Relieve all elements of the 7th Inf Div within its assigned zone of action;
 - b. Seize and secure all exits through the mountains into the LEYTE VALLEY in its assigned zone of action;
 - c. By aggressive advances through the central mountain range over all trails in its zone of action, secure the western exits from the mountains into the WEST coastal corridor to assist the attack of the 7th Inf Div;
 - d. Patrol and maintain the security of the Corps Service Area, including key bridges, and destroy all hostile infiltrators located;
 - e. Defend occupied areas. (See Opns Overlay)
3. a. The 17th Inf (-8d Bn) will:
 - (1) Seize and secure all exits through the mountains into the LEYTE VALLEY in its assigned zone of action;
 - (2) Maintain the security of all key bridges on the GUMARONA-BURAUEN Road (both towns inclusive);
 - (3) Within its assigned zone of action, prevent hostile attack on SAN PABLO, BUTOG and HABALKA Aircrosses.
 - (4) Establish and maintain contact with the 64th Inf Div on the right (NORTH) flank and with the 511 Inf on the left (SOUTH) flank. (See Opns Overlay)

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B. The 511 Inf will:

- (1) Relieve all elements of the 17th Inf within its assigned zone of action except bridge guards on the DAGAMI-BURAUEN Road;
- (2) Seize and secure all exits through the mountains into LEYTE VALLEY in its assigned zone of action;
- (3) By aggressive advances through the central mountain range over all trails in its zone of action, secure the western exits from the mountains into the WEST coastal corridor to assist the attack of the 7th Inf Div;
- (4) Defend occupied areas;
- (5) Within the zone of action, establish and maintain contact with the 96th Inf Div on the right (NORTH) flank;
- (6) Destroy by offensive action all hostile forces encountered. (See Opns Overlay).

g. The 167th Inf will:

- (1) Less detachments required to accomplish missions given below, remain in present location as Div Reserve;
- (2) Continue present missions in ABUYOG-UNION area until relieved by 7th Inf Div, at which time all 167 Inf troops in that sector will return to regimental bivouac area;
- (3) Patrol and maintain the security of the Corps Service Area, including key bridges, and destroy all hostile infiltrators located;
- (4) Coordinate the defense and security of the Corps Service Area with all units stationed therein;
- (5) Maintain the security of the Div Rear Echelon. (See Opns Overlay)

g. The 188 Inf will:

- (1) Relieve all elements of 188 Inf in its assigned zone of action;
- (2) Seize and secure all exits through the mountains into LEYTE VALLEY in its assigned zone of action;
- (3) By aggressive advances through the central mountain range over all trails in its zone of action, secure the western exits from the mountains into the WEST coastal corridor to assist the attack of the 7th Inf Div;
- (4) Defend occupied areas;

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(b) Establish and maintain contact with the 187th Inf and 511th Inf on its right (NORTH) flank and with the 7th Inf Div on its left (SOUTH) flank and to the WEST;

(c) Destroy by offensive action all hostile forces encountered. (See Opns Overlay).

g. Co's A & B, 767 Tank Bn, 48 FA Bn, and 51 FA Bn are attached to the 11 AB Div Arty.

f. The 11 AB Div Arty, with Co A & B, 767 Tank Bn, 48 FA Bn, and 51 FA Bn attached, will support the movement of the division to the WEST.

(1) 487 FA Bn direct support 511 Inf;

(2) 48 FA & 51 FA Bns and Co's A & B, 767 Tank Bn reinforce fires of 487 FA Bn;

(3) 674 & 675 FA Bns remain present location. (See Opns Overlay).

h. The 187 Ingr Bn will:

(1) Complete and maintain Div Access Road;

(2) Assist the 188 & 511 Inf in their advance.

i. The 188 AA AT Bn will proceed to BUBAEN on division order and await further orders.

j. The 1084 AA AT Bn - no change. (See Opns Overlay)

k. (1) OT's cease;

(2) Identifications are desired;

(3) Filipino Carabaores and Carabao will be employed wherever possible for supply and movement.

4. See Administrative Order.

5. A. No change;

B. See Opns Overlay.

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OFFICIAL:

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DISTRIBUTION:

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9 - CG 511 Inf
10 - CG 187 Inf
11 - CG 188 Inf
12 - CG 187 Ingr Bn
13 - CG 188 AA AT Bn
14 - CG 1084 AA AT Bn
15 - CG 17 Inf
16 - CG Co A, 767 Tank Bn
17 - CG Co B, 767 Tank Bn
18 - CG 51 FA Bn
19 - CG 48 FA Bn
20 - SI - ES - CG XIV Corps
21 - CG 7th Inf Div
22 - Div Sig O
23 - Div CM
24 - Div Ord Co
27 - TAG
28 - 29 - 30 - Journal

ANNEXES:

Annex No 1 - Intelligence
2 - Administrative Order

- 4 -
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NO. _____

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By auth: CG 11TH AB DIV
25 Nov 1944
Initial _____

AMMO NO. 1)

TO)

F. O. NO. 2)

11th AB Division
APO 468
250600 I Nov 44

INTELLIGENCE

Maps: CENTRAL PHILIPPINES, 1/250,000
Sheet 3 of 5.
SPECIAL MAP, LETE, 1/50,000
Sheet G, D, J and K
OPERATIONAL MAP No. 1, NORTHEASTERN
LETE MOTOR, 1/100,000 (2 unnumbered sheets)

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. General: Enemy forces with an estimated strength of 35,000 to 40,000 control the northern end of the ORMOG VALLEY, the mountain passes to the east and northeast thereof, and HWY #2 in the vicinity of ALBUERA. Enemy reserves estimated at one Div are believed located east and southeast of ORMOG. A hostile offensive is indicated with its probable objective FIMANCOAN, CAPOGAN, BURAUEN, and DAGAMI, the later attack coming from the west coast across the mountains.

b. 11th AB DIV Area: See situation overlay.

c. Enemy capabilities:

- (1) Attack across mountains from the west to recapture airfields in BURAUEN-BAYUD-SAN PABLO area employing one division or elements thereof.
- (2) Reinforce and defend present positions.
- (3) Reinforce present troops and defend mountain passes to west coast.
- (4) Continue delaying action.
- (5) Employ infiltrating groups in DIV rear areas to destroy bridges, supply dumps, other installations.

2. I. I. I.

- a. Will enemy oppose our advance to seize and secure mountain passes? If so, where, with what forces?
- b. Location, strength and disposition of reserves capable of launching counterattack against our positions in passes.
- c. New identifications or any evidence of arrival of new troops in Div zone.
- d. Location and condition of trails and roads in Div zone.
- e. Will enemy attempt to send infiltrating groups into Div rear areas? If so, in what strength? What are their objectives?

a. Location of Div PW call points: To be announced later.

b. Attachment of language teams: No change.

SECRET

-1-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T :
:Auth: CG 11 AB Div:
:Init: :
:Date: 25 Nov. 1944:

HEADQUARTERS, 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 468

Annex 2 to F.O. 2
Adm. O. 2

11 AB Div
SUNGI (58.3~~0~~-~~08.2~~)
25~~08~~ Nov. 1944

1. REF. SOP 11 AB Div 26 Aug 1944

2. SUP.

a. Cl. I

(1) Except Water

(a) 511 Inf, 188 Inf, (-Bn), from Base K DULAG.

(b) Div Trps from 511 Inf Dump until 408 QM
Closes.

(c) 1st Bn 188 Inf. Unit Dist until relieved.

(d) 1st Bn 187 Inf. Unit Dist until relieved.

(e) Others Dump Dist at Base Camp

(2) Water - Unit responsibility until opening of
Div Water Points at BURAUEN and SAN PABLO

b. Cl. III

(1) 511 Inf, 188 Inf (-Bn), Div Trps, from Base K,
DULAG

(2) 1st Bn 187, 1st Bn 188 Unit Dist

(3) Others Dump Dist at Base Camp

c. Cl. IV - Dump (Dist Base Camp)

d. Cl. V

(1) Small Arms (Carbine, M-1 Rifle, 30 Cal. MG)
ASP 5 (vicinity SAN PABLO)

(2) All others - Present Dump (56.3-~~04.6~~)

(3) DAO Base Camp (59.2-~~05.4~~)

3. EVAC

a. Casualties by 221 AB Med Co

b. Burial - USAF Cemetery #1, DULAG (Evac by 221 Med Co)

c. PW - Div Enclosure at JULITA

4. TRAF

a. Circulation

MSR - DULAG to BURAUEN
MAYORGA to LA PAZ

S E C R E T

b. Control

Traf Control Posts - to be announced

c. Maintenance of MSR by Div Engrs, upon completion of Base Camp installations

5. TRAINS - Released to Units

6. PERS

a. Surplus baggage - Div Rr Ech

7. PERIODIC REPORTS

a. S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, as of 1800. Reports to reach Div Hq by 0600 following day.

b. Dump Inventories as of 1800 to reach Div Hq by 0600 following day.

8. REAR ECH DIV HQ - No Change.

OFFICIAL:

SWING

CRAWFORD
G-4

S E C R E T

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
: ATTN: CG 11 AB DIV :
: 19 Nov 1944 :
: Initials *WJ* :

HQ 11 AB DIV
APO 468
193469 I Nov 1944

FC No 1.

MAPS: GENERAL PHILIPPINES, 1/100,000, SHEET 3 of 8.
SPECIAL MAP, IZITE, 1/50,000, SHEET 4 of 4.
OPERATIONAL MAP NO. 1, NORTHEASTERN LITTE SECTOR, 1/100,000
(2 Unnumbered Sheets)

1. a. See Annex No. 1 (Intelligence).

b. The Sixth Army is in contact with the enemy, X Corps on the right (NORTH) and the XXIV Corps on the left (SOUTH). The 7th Division is disposed along a line GUBARONA - LA PAE - ANUDOG - RAYDAY (See Overlay, Enclosure No 2, Situation Map, 7th Div distributed to OT Centre only).

2. This division relieves elements of the 7th Infantry Division along the line GUBARONA - MURATH - LA PAE - UNION commencing at 231000 I.

3. a. OT 1 (less Co G, 187 AB Engr Bn) will march by motor to the vicinity of MURATH commencing at 200630 I and relieve the 17th Infantry. (See Operations Overlay)

b. OT 7 (less Co B, 187 AB Engr Bn) will relieve the 2d Bn 184 Inf with one (1) Bn 187th Inf.
OT 7 (less 1 Bn) Division Reserve, present location. (See operations Overlay)

c. OT 8 (less Co A, 187 AB Engr Bn) will march by foot and motor to the vicinity of LA PAE commencing at 220630 I and relieve the 184th Inf (less 2d Bn). (See Operations Overlay)

d. The 102d AB AA AT Bn (less Btry A) and the 102d AB AA Bn, from present positions, will provide for the anti-aircraft defense of the Division Rear Area. The 102d AB AA AT Bn will continue to provide anti-aircraft defense.

e. The 187th AB Engr Bn will remain in present area.

4. (1) All units will hold the line occupied by the unit relieved and will conduct strong active patrolling.

(2) Elements of OT 1 and OT 8 will move to forward positions as scheduled by Division.

(3) Aviation support requested through Division.

(4) Rear echelons remain in present positions.

(5) S-3 reports as of 1800 hrs. Reports to reach Division by 0700 hrs the following day.

4. See Administrative Order No 1.

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FO No 1 Hq 11 AB Div 19 Nov 44.

5. a. OSI Index effective 31 Oct 1944.

b. Div OP: See Operations Overlay
Subordinate unit OP's to be reported.

SWING
Comdg

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]
CHIEF
G-3

ATTN: No. 1 Intelligence.

ENCLOSURE 2: No. 1: Operations Overlay
No 2: Sit Overlay, 7th Inf Div (Dist to OT Comdr only)

DISTRIBUTION:

- Copy No. 1 - OS
2 - Asst Div Comdr
3 - OS Div Arty
4 - G/S
5 - G-1
6 - G-2
7 - G-4
8 - CO OT 1
9 - CO OT 7
10 - CO OT 8
11 - CO 128 AB AA AF Bn
12 - CO 102 AB AA Bn
13 - CO 127 AB Regt Bn
14, 15, 16 - CO XXIV Corps
17 - AB
18 - ~~OS~~


TOP SECRET

OPNS OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY FO #1
 HQS 11th AB DIV APO 468
 1924 00 I NOV 44
 MAP REF: CENTRAL PHILIPPINES
 SHEET 3 OF 5 SHEETS
 scale 1/250,000

SECRET

OFFICIAL:

SWING
 COMDG



LEGEND:

ROUTES: 187 → →
 188 → →
 511 → →

T O P S E C R E T

Copy No. _____

11th Airborne Div
APO 468
19 2400 Nov. 1944

ADM O No. 1 To accompany FO No. 1
Maps: CENTRAL PHILIPPINES, I/250000, Sheet 3 of 5

1. SUP.

a. Cl. I

- (1) Except water

Guide Release Points

- (a) CT 1 - DAGAMI at 1700
(b) CT 7 - ABUYOG at 1300
(c) CT 8 - (less 1st Bn 188th Para G11 Inf) - LA PAZ
at 1700
(d) 1st Bn 188th Para-G11 In BUHO at 1700

- (2) Water - Unit responsibility

b. Cl. III - Later

c. Cl. V - Present Dumps

2. EVAC.

a. Casualties by 221st AB Med Co

b. Burial - DULAG (Evac by 221st AB Med Co)

**c. PW - Div Enclosure at Junction U.S. HIGHWAY No. 1 and
Div ACCESS ROAD.**

3. TRAF.

a. Circulation

MSR - U.S. HIGHWAY No. 1

b. Control

**Traf Control post - Junction U.S. HIGHWAY No. 1 and Div
ACCESS ROAD**

c. Maintenance of DIV ACCESS ROAD by 127th AB Engr Bn

4. TRAINS.

a. CT 1 and CT 8 - Released

b. CT 7 (less 1st Bn 187th Para G11 Inf) - Div Control

c. 1st Bn 187th Para G11 Inf - Released

5. PERS.

Surplus Package - Div En. Ech

6. PERIODIC REPORTS

**a. S-1 - as of 1200. Reports to reach this Hq by 0600 follow-
ing day.**

**b. S-2, S-3 and S-4 as of 1800. Reports to reach this Hq by
0700 following day.**

7. REAR ECH DIV HQ - No Change

OFFICIAL:

CRAWFORD
G-4

SWING

SECRET

HR 15 25 DIV 400 448
Dated 1 Nov 44

SUBJECT: Orders (Ref: FO 1, Hq 11 25 Div, 19 Nov).

TO : CO CT 1.

1. CO 1: CO 1 (less 2nd Bn, 407 Front FA Bn, CO G 1st Regt M, 2nd Bn, 1st Bn 44 22 Bn) with 1st party 407 FA Bn will proceed to the vicinity **HEMUNG - SUIMANGA** commencing at 2200G 1 (see movement order this Hq dated 21 Nov).
 1. 24 Bn 811 Inf (less one company) will proceed to **SUIMANGA**, bivouac, and prepare to relieve the 17th Inf as divided order.
 1. One company, 24 Bn 811 Inf will proceed to **THEKRAPU** and relieve the company of the 17th Inf now at **THEKRAPU**. It will accomplish all missions now assigned the 17th Inf Co.
 2. 811-1: (1) 1st Bn 811 Inf will proceed from present positions to **PANAO**, contact the elements of the 17th Inf on its right (**WUEN**) and left (**SUENH**) flanks, and prevent hostile movement to the WEST. (See Opns map).
 - (2) Under the direction of CO 1st Bn 811 Inf, the Div Recon Plat will reconnoiter the terrain between **PANAO** and **LUMI** to determine:
 - (a) Presence of enemy;
 - (b) Feasibility of occupation of **LUMI** by 1st Bn 811 Inf.
 - (3) If the Div Recon Plat reports justify such action, CO 1st Bn 811 Inf will occupy **LUMI** with one company. The missions of the company occupying **LUMI** are:
 - (a) To conduct strong active patrols WEST and NORTHEAST of **LUMI**;
 - (b) To prevent or delay any hostile movement to the WEST in the vicinity of **LUMI** (see Opns map).
 - (c) To block trails as shown on opns map.
2. 811-2: 2nd Bn 811 Inf will remain in present location prepared for movement to the **HEMUNG** area.
3. 407 FA: Recon party 407 FA Bn will reconnoiter positions to support the action of CO 1 and will prepare to move on Div Order by air, foot, and/or motor.

- 1 -

1. Div Recon Plat: Div Recon Plat is added to CO CT 1 effective 2200G 1 (see 1's (2) above).

2. Preparations for aerial resupply of elements of 811-1 to begin 28 Nov will be initiated by CO CT 1, contact with Air Corps by AG of S G-6.
3. Fragmentary reports (negative or positive) will be made to Division each two hours on the even hour. Periodic S-G reports as of 1800 hrs to reach Division by 0700 hrs the following day.

By command of Major General SWINE:

ORDER
G-5

DISTRIBUTION:

CO CT 1
 CG Div Arty
 CO 407 Front FA Bn
 CO Div Recon Plat
 AG of S G-6
 G/S
 Journal

1 Enclosure: Opns Overlay.

①
P. 5

311-0-1

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

(20663)
Master



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

11th Airborne Div - Historical Summary

25 Feb 43 - 10 Feb 45

833

HEADQUARTERS
11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 468

AG 314. 7 (FB)

18 March 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Histories.

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343.

In compliance with Section IV, Circular Number 42, your headquarters, dated 29 October 1944, a historical summary of the 11th Airborne Division for the period 25 February 1943 to 10 February 1945 is transmitted herewith.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

ROBERT E CONINE
Lt Col A G D
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Historical Summary

311 ARMY FILE NO. AG

311-0.1

CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
W. H. ... *...*

FEB 19 1946

2643
MASTER

ma

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
FORM 11
INIT: *[Signature]*
DATE: 18 March 40

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

11th Airborne Division
25 February 1943
to
10 February 1945

Activation and Source of Troops

a. The 11th Airborne Division was activated 25 February 1943 at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, by General Order No. 1, Headquarters 11th Airborne Division, dated 25 February 1943 (copy attached).

b. Source of troops:

- (1) Officer Cadre - 76th Inf Div and Airborne Command
- (2) Enlisted Cadre - 88th Inf Div and Airborne Command
- (3) Fillers:
 - (a) Parachute volunteers direct from Reception Centers
 - (b) Others - direct from Reception Centers in Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Service Commands.

Maneuvers, Special Training, Staging Areas

a. Maneuvers

- (1) Airborne Maneuvers, 5 to 9 December 1943, vicinity of Knollwood Field, Pinehurst, North Carolina, the first large scale airborne maneuver to be held which proved the feasibility of the airborne division. Entire division was lifted and resupplied by air, to an objective area at a distance of 300 air miles. 4,500 division troops and necessary transportation were dropped at night by parachute and glider utilizing four Troop Carrier Groups. Balance of division was landed by parachute, glider and airlanding in subsequent daylight hours. Resupply by air-landing and parachute was effected during all hours of day and night. Evacuation was accomplished by air.
- (2) Louisiana Ground Maneuvers, 4 to 18 February, 1944, in the State of Louisiana.

b. Special Training

- (1) May and June, 1943. Parachute elements of the division attended Parachute School at Fort Benning, Georgia, for three weeks parachute training and individual qualification in battalion echelons.
- (2) July and August 1943. Selected officers and enlisted men of glider elements of the division received intensive

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- training at Maxton Field, North Carolina, in glider
towing and loading, qualifying them as instructors for
their units.
- (3) September through November 1943. Parachute and glider
elements of the division conducted a series of combined
field problems, mostly at night, in which parachute and
glider drops were simulated (using trucks). The groups
learned how to assemble, organize, and attack.
 - (4) October-November 1943, Joint training, parachute and
glider, with the 436, 437, 438 and 439 Troop Carrier
groups was accomplished in the Laurinburg-Maxton, Pope
Field and Camp Mackall areas, both day and night.
 - (5) March 1944 to September 1944. Division Parachute School
operated at Camp Polk, Louisiana and Dobodura, New Guinea
for qualification of parachute volunteers from all units
of division. By 1 October 1944, 75% of all enlisted men
and 82% of all officers of the division were qualified
parachutists.
 - (6) August and September 1944. A Glider School was operated
in conjunction with 54th Troop Carrier Wing at Nadzab,
New Guinea, during which time selected parachutists were
trained for glider duty, and personnel replacements re-
ceived since the division had glider training were qual-
ified. A new class attended each week.
 - (7) July through September 1944. In addition to the operation
of the Parachute School, the division and the 54th Troop
Carrier Wing conducted combined airborne-troop carrier
parachute training. Sixteen squadrons received one week's
combined training with all division parachute and para-
glider units participating in squad, platoon, company, and
battalion jumps. A Standing Operating Procedure for Air-
borne-Troop Carrier Operations was perfected and adopted
by the division and the 54th Troop Carrier Wing.
 - (8) August and September, 1944. Amphibious training was con-
ducted in conjunction with Fourth Engineer Special Brigade
at Oro Bay, New Guinea.
 - (9) July 1944. A selected group of intelligence officers and
enlisted men attended the Alamo Scout School at Humboldt
Bay, New Guinea.
 - (10) July 1944. Selected officers and enlisted men were sent to
a school for jungle training conducted by ANCAU in the vicin-
ity of Negatura, New Guinea.

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SECRET

c. Staging Areas

- (1) Camp Polk, Louisiana, preparation for overseas movement, March and April 1944.
- (2) Debodura, New Guinea, staging for Leyte Campaign, October 1944.
- (3) Bito Beach, Leyte, P.I., staging for Luzon Campaign, January 1945.

Operations, Citations

a. Operations

- (1) KING II Operation, Leyte, P.I., 18 November 1944 to 10 January 1945.
- (2) MIKE VI Operation, Luzon, P.I., 31 January 1945 to 10 February 1945.

b. Unit Citations

- (1) The 11th Airborne Division received Unit Citation from Lt. Gen. Robert L. Kichelberger, Commanding General, Eighth Army, on 13 February 1945, for outstanding performance of duty in the Luzon Campaign. (Copy of citation attached.)

Major Commanders and Changes

a. At activation:

Division Commander: Major General Joseph M. Swing
Assistant Division Commander: Brigadier General Albert Pearson
Division Artillery Commander: Brigadier General Wyburn D. Brown

Commanding Officer, 511th Parachute Infantry: Lt. Col. (later Col.) Orin D. Haugen.

~~Commanding Officer, 187th Glider Infantry: Colonel Harry G. Hildebrand.~~

Commanding Officer, 188th Glider Infantry: Colonel Robert R. Soule.

b. Changes:

Colonel (later Brig. Gen.) Francis W. Farrell replaced Brigadier General Wyburn D. Brown as Division Artillery Commander on 11 March 1944.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Lt. Col. (later Col.) Irvin R. Schimmelpfennig replaced Colonel Francis M. Farrell as Chief of Staff, 11 March 1944.

Colonel Alex H. Williams, Jr. replaced Colonel Irvin R. Schimmelpfennig (killed in action) as Chief of Staff, 5 February 1945.

Special or Noteworthy Date of Value

In both the LEYTE and LUZON Campaigns, this division has found it profitable to depart from the custom of digging in and ceasing all activity before nightfall, and to conduct night operations where and when the tactical situation warrants such action. Two examples are particularly significant of the value of night activity.

During the LEYTE Campaign, the 511th Parachute Infantry was located in the vicinity of MAHONAG with the mission of pushing through the ANAS pass to join elements of the 7th Division on the west coast. The attack was launched early in the morning of 22 December, well before daylight. The enemy was caught completely by surprise, with his troops asleep in bivouac. As a result, the enemy was completely destroyed before an effective defense could be organized.

When the amphibious elements of the division landed at MASUGBU, LUZON, on 31 January 1945, a rapid and steady drive eastward to TACAYTAY RIDGE was begun and maintained. The combination of rapid movement by day and continued advance at night prevented the enemy from completing demolition of bridges, or establishing well organized defenses. The 30 mile drive to TACAYTAY RIDGE was completed through strong Japanese forces by the third day after landing.

In the LEYTE Campaign, the division operated through rugged mountainous terrain with resupply feasible only by air. The division advance command echelon, parachute surgical team, an engineer platoon, two infantry platoons and individuals were dropped by parachute from L-4 and L-5 liaison planes. Approximately 470 tons of supplies of all classes were dropped from liaison planes, with the peak days deliveries amounting to 18 tons. 44 patients were evacuated from the mountains by L-4 liaison plane.

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HEADQUARTERS 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
Camp Mackall North Carolina

February 25, 1943

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 1

- SEC I - ACTIVATION OF 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
- SEC II - OPENING OF HEADQUARTERS
- SEC III - ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND
- SEC IV - ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER
- SEC V - COMMANDING GENERAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
- SEC VI - GENERAL STAFF
- SEC VII - UNITS OF THE DIVISION

I. ACTIVATION OF 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION: The 11th Airborne Division, less the 711th Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company, 48th Airborne Quartermaster Company, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry (including Band,) and Band, 11th Airborne Division Artillery, is activated this date at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. Authority: Letter HQ Second Army, AG 322.09-3 (Airborne) (LHMES), dated Feb 3, 1943, subject: "Letter Orders No A-140 (Activation of the 11th A/B Div,)" and letter WD TAG, AG 320.2 (11-24-42) OB-I-GM-M, dated Nov 27, 1942, subject: "Activation of the 11th A/B Div" as amended by letter AG 320.2 (11-15-42) OB-I-GM-M, Dec 18, 1942, AG 320.2 (1-5-43) OB-I-GM-M, Jan 7, 1943, and AG 320.2 (1-14-43) OB-I-GM-M, Jan 19, 1943, same subjects.

II. OPENING OF HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 11th Airborne Division, is opened at this station at 0001 this date.

III. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND: Under the provisions of paragraph 4, AG 500-20, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 11th Airborne Division.

IV. ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER: BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBERT PIERSON, O11838, USA, is announced as the Assistant Division Commander.

V. COMMANDING GENERAL DIVISION ARTILLERY: BRIGADIER GENERAL WYBURN D. BROWN, O12260, USA, is announced as Commanding General Division Artillery.

VI. GENERAL STAFF: Pursuant to authority contained in paragraph 5, AR 605-145, the following officers are detailed in the General Staff Corps with troops and are announced as Chief of Staff and Assistants Chief of Staff, respectively:

COLONEL FRANCIS W. FARRELL, O12784, FA	Chief of Staff
LT. COL. JAMES W. SMYK, JR. O16928, Inf	AS of S, G-1
MAJOR CLIFFORD L. DIER, O216655, Inf	AC of S, G-2
MAJOR ROBERT A. PORTS, O18175, FA	AC of S, G-3
LT. COL. GLENN A. ROSS, O5208, Inf	AC of S, G-4

The 11th Airborne Division is composed of the following units:

- Headquarters, 11th Airborne Division
 - Headquarters Company, 11th Airborne Division
 - Military Police Platoon, 11th Airborne Division
 - 100th Airborne Quartermaster Company, (Previously activated.)
 - 11th Airborne Signal Company
 - 11th Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company.
 - (Previously activated.)
 - 11th Airborne Medical Company.
 - 137th Airborne Engineer Battalion
 - 150th Airborne Anti-aircraft Battalion
 - Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 11th Airborne Division Artillery (Band)
 - (Band previously activated.)
 - 67th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, (Previously activated.)
 - 67th Glider Field Artillery Battalion
 - 67th Glider Field Artillery Battalion
 - 100th Glider Infantry Regiment
 - 100th Glider Infantry Regiment
 - 137th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Band)
 - (Previously activated.)
- Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding
- DISTRIBUTION:** 2 AF & 2nd
- 2 CG AOF Wash, D. C.
 - 2 CG SOR Wash, D. C.
 - 2 CG Second Army, Memphis, Tenn.
 - 2 CG AB Command, Ft Bragg, N.C.
 - 2 CG 4th Service Comd, Atlanta, Ga.
 - 2 CG Camp Mackall, N.C.
 - 2 Chief of Staff
 - 2 Director, AF Staff
- 10 Files

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

GENERAL ORDERS)

11 February 1945

NUMBER 12)

E X T R A C T

SECTION VI - UNIT CITATION

Section VI - Unit Citation.

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9396 (Sec I, Bulletin 22, WD, 1943), and Sec IV, Circular No. 333, WD, 1943), the following unit is cited by the Commanding General, Eighth Army:

The 11th Airborne Division is cited for outstanding heroism and superior performance of duty in action against the enemy on Luzon, Philippine Islands. On 31 January 1945 the 11th Airborne Division landed on the southern coast of Luzon at Masugbu which had been organized for defense by the enemy during their three years of occupation. By determined and aggressive action, employing only infantry with light artillery support, the town of Masugbu was seized and a spearhead pushed rapidly to the east. By speed and maneuver, through forced marches over extremely difficult terrain, the defiles on the approaches to Tagaytay Ridge were captured one day after the landing. Tagaytay Ridge and the avenues of approach to Cavite Plains were seized by the third day. On the fourth day, the town of Imus was by-passed, a bridgehead was established across the Pasanque River and the enemy were driven from their main defensive positions south of Nichols Field. The rapid progress of the division, made possible through by-passing strong points and using a minimum of troops for the reduction of obstacles, completely disrupted the enemy strategy of defense. In the period of four days, the outstanding courage, aggressiveness and determination of the men of the 11th Airborne Division in marching and fighting their way through sixty miles of enemy-held territory and maintaining an undefended line of communication completely disorganized the enemy forces, weakening them in the north and thereby hastening the fall of Manila.

By command of Lieutenant General MICHELBERGER:

CLOVIS E. DYER,
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff:

OFFICIALS


(S) MORRIS A. WIMBERLEY
MORRIS A. WIMBERLEY,
Colonel, A.C.D.
Adjutant General

DIST "A" & "B"



Reproduced by Headquarters 11th Airborne Division. R.E.O.

2-3-45


8



PREPARED UNDER DIRECTION OF X CORPS ENGINEER
 BY 671st ENGR. CO. (TOP) U.S. ARMY OCTOBER 1944
 COMPILED FROM C8G3 1:200,000 SERIES LEYTE




NOTE: FORM LINES 300' INTERVAL (APPROX) SPOT ELEVATION IN FEET
 1000 YARD PHILIPPINE POLYCONIC GRID
 POLYCONIC PROJECTION





NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND
 ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT TO
 "ENGR. X CORPS" WITH INFORMATION COPY TO "THE CHIEF ENGR. GHO. SWPA."


APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1944
 FOR CENTER OF SHEET
 ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1 INCREASE



PREPARED UNDER DIRECTION OF X CORPS ENGINEER
BY 671st ENGR. CO. (TOP) U.S. ARMY OCTOBER 1944
COMPILED FROM C & G S 1:200,000 SERIES LEYTE




NOTE: FORM LINES 300' INTERVAL (APPROX) SPOT ELEVATION IN FEET
1000 YARD PHILIPPINE POLYGNONIC GRID
POLYGNONIC PROJECTION



NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT TO
APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1944 FOR CENTER OF SHEET
ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1' INCREASE

REPRODUCED BY THE ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY, CORP.



Prepared under the direction of the Chief Engineer, GHO, SWPA, by the Engineer Intelligence Section, OCE, GHO, SWPA, U.S. Army, Sept. 1944. Compiled from F-18, K-17, and low oblique photography by 91st Recon Wing, 5th AF, U.S. Army, and by U.S. Navy. Controlled by U.S.C. & G.S. Interpretation and Partial-line-plot. Contour plotting by Fairchild Stereocomparators from Tri-metrogon photography. Additional information from U.S.C. & G.S. Base Sheets; Sixteenth Naval District, P.W.D. Plans Scale 1"=200'; U.S.C. & G.S. Hydrographic Charts No. 4423 and No. 4420.




APPROX. SCALE 1:50,000
5000 2500 0 0 5000 10000 FEET
MILES
KMS.
Contour and Form Line Interval 50 feet. Datum Sea Level.
1000 YARD PHILIPPINE POLYCONIC GRID
Polyconic Projection
Approximate Luzon Datum



LEGEND

Reef	Swamp	Triangulation Station
Depth Line (30' and 12')	Contour	Form Line
Interruption Stream	Spot Elevation	Road, lightly surfaced
Rain Forest	Road, minor military traffic	Track
Scrub or Secondary Growth		
Plantation		
Mangrove		

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL NOTE REVERSE LONGITUDE AND SOUNDINGS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND WILL CORRECT TO THE CHIEF ENGINEER, GHO, SWPA.



Prepared under the direction of the Chief Engineer, GHQ, SWPA, by the Engineer Intelligence Section, OCE, GHQ, SWPA, U.S. Army, Sept. 1944. Compiled from K-8, K-17, and low oblique photography by 91st Recon. Wing, 5th AF, U.S. Army, and by U.S. Navy Controlled by U.S.C. & G.S. Triangulation and Radial-line plot. Revised by 671st Engineer Co (Top), by road check and data from Photographs 1:25,000, November 1944.




NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL HERETOFORE MAKE CONNECTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL TO THE CHIEF ENGINEER, GHQ, SWPA.

NOTE: Spot heights shown in feet of mean lower low water taken from U.S.C. & G.S. Chart 4425, dated 1940

LEGEND	
Depth Line (30' and 12')	Farm Line
Intermittent Stream	Spot Elevation
Mangrove	Road, highly surfaced
Swamp	Road, minor roadway traffic
Triangulation Station	Track
	Reef

REPRODUCED BY STATE MAPS CO. OF THE U.S.A. NOVEMBER 1944



INDPT. INF. REGT.

36 ENGR. REGT.

1325

1322

1330

OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
LEYTE 11:50,000
DEC. 1, 1944
GUNBO 2

* REMNANTS OF
THESE JAP UNITS

MAP OBTAINED BY G. LORR

1340

EST. 1 Co. NOV. 27

1329

SHALL GROUP
DEC. 3

EST. 1 Co.
DEC. 3



EST. 2 PLATOONS
RIFLE, MG. MOTOR
DEC. 3

ENEMY RCN PATROL
NOV. 28

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

OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
MAP PREP. BY
LITTLE
LEYTE REGION
NOV. 27 - DEC. 3



NOTE:
 LANDED AT ORMOG
 DATE UNKNOWN. INFO
 TAKEN FROM CAPTURED
 DOCUMENTS.
 E. FORCE 6089 /
 FD. HOSP. #1 6564


OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
 MAP PREP BY GLIDER
 ENSR. LEYTE 1150,00
 DEC. 7, 1944
 GUMED 2.

* - REMNANTS OF THESE
 JAP UNITS.



OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
 MAP PREP BY GLIDER
 ENSR. LEYTE 1150,00
 DEC. 8, 1944
 GUMED 2.

* REMNANTS OF THESE
 JAP UNITS.



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MAD PREP GLIDER
ENGR. Y - 1:50,000
DEC 16 1944
GUMBO 2

REMNANTS OF THESE
JAP UNITS.

207
189

*
16 (DN) ENG. REG'T

*
12 INDP. INF. REG'T

*
35 DIV. OR CORP. HQ.

*
26 ENG. REG'T.

*
26 ENG. REG'T HQ.
ON E. SIDE HILL

197
203

OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
CAPTURED JAP MAP
OR MOC
DEC. 16-1490
GUMBO 2 (767)

* REMNANTS OF THESE
JAP UNITS.

12 INDPT. INF REG'T
13 INDPT. INF. REG'T (3RD CO)
MC GINN'S HILL

1329 + 1340

1322 + 1330

OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
GLIDER ENGR. MAP
LEYTE 1:50,000
DEC. 18-1960
GUMBO 2

*-REMNANTS OF THESE
JAP UNITS.

*16 (DIV.) ENG. REGT.

12 INDEPT. INF. REGT. (8th CA)

* 12 INDEPT. INF. REGT.

MC GINN'S HILL

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OVERLAY TAKEN FROM

GLIDER ENGR. MAP

LEYTE 1:50,000

DEC. 19 1944

GUMBO 2

* - REMNANTS OF THREE
JAP UNITS

* 11 INDEPT. INF. ?

11 INDEPT. FA. REG'T. (4TH CO.)

* 26 ENGR. REG'T.

12 INDEPT. INF. REG'T. (4TH & 2ND CO.)

26 INF. DIV. HQ.

MALONEY HILL

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OVERLAY TAKEN FROM
GLIDER MAP (ENGR)

~~1322~~
DEC. 22, 1960

GUMBO-2

* - REMNANTS OF THESE
JAP. UNITS

OVERLAY OF UNITS OF
SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY OF 1942
NOV. 25
UNITS & SPECIAL MAP
1:50,000



BURABEN



NOV 25 1944



1892-26-1891




Nov 27, 1944

OVERLAY 511TH UNITS
1800 - 27 NOV
WYTE SP. MAP
1:50,000




BUREAU



OVERLAY WITH UNITS
1700 25 NOV
AFTER SP. MAP
1:50,000

Nov 29 1948

A



OVERLAY 511+H
1800, 29 NOV. 144
LEVER. SR. MAP
1150,000



NOV 29 1944



SURVILL



OVERLINE 3117 UNDS
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4127E SP. RRY
1:50,000



Nov 30, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITION
OF 5th REGT. INF. AS
OF 1800 1 Dec 44
MAP - SPAIN
WY TO I - Scale
1:50,000.



022000



DEC 1, 1944

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BRANEN



10-1

10-1

OVERLAY 511TH UNITS
1800 2 DEC '44

RENTS GR. MIND
130,000



10-1

10-1

10-1

Dec 2, 1944



BURMAN

OVERLAY 51TH UNITS
1800, 3 DEC. '44
4EYTS SP MAP
1:50,000.

Dec. 3, 1944



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OVERLAY 511TH UNITS
1800, 4 DEC '44
LEYTE SP. MAP
1:50,000



Dec 11, 1944



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


01000


OVERLAY 511th LINES
511, 6 DEC 44
LEYTE SR. MAP
1:50,000



6 Dec 1944






OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 ACENT MEAS
OF 1800 TO DEC 44
MAP - SPEC MAP LEYTE I
SCALE - 1:50,000



DEC 7, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PRESENT LINE AS
OF 1800 8 DEC 44
MAP - SPEC - MAP LAYTE I
SCALE - 1:50,000.






OVERLAY 511th UNITS
1800, 5 DEC. 144
LEFT SR MAPS.
1150,000

DEC 5, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PRCNT INF AS
OF 1800 9 DEC 44
MAP - SPEC. MAP LEYTE
I - SCALE - 1:50,000



DEC 9, 1944




OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
5th PRCT. INF. AS
OF 1300 TO DEC 44
MAP: SPEC. MAP -
LEYTE I - Scale
1:50,000.

10 DEC 44

DEC. 10, 1944



OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 5TH PRCPT INF AS
OF 1800 17 DEC 44
MAP: SPEC MAP LEYTE
I. SCALE: 1:50,000



Dec 19, 1944



DEC. 12, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PRCHT INF. AS
OF 1800 14 DEC 44
MAP: SPEC. MAP
LEYTE I, SCALE
1:60,000.



DEC 14, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PRCHT INF AS
OF 1800 15 DEC 44
MAP: SPEC. MAP LEYTE
I: SCALE - 1:50,000




DEC 16, 1944.

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PREHT. INF. HS
OF 1800 16 DEC 44
MAP. SPEC. MAP LEYTE
I. SCALE 1:50,000



DEC 16, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 5TH GREAT. INF. AS
OF 1800 17 DEC 44
MAP 302E MAP LEYTE
I - SCALE: 1:1,500,000




Dec 17, 1944

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 FRONT INF REG
OF 1800 18 DEC 44
MAP: SPEC. MAP LEITE
I-SCALE 1:50,000





18 DEC 44

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PRENT. MAP AS
OF 1800 19 DEC 44
MAP. SPEC. MAP. SCALE
I - Scale - 1:50,000



21 Dec 44

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 54 PRENT. INF REG
OF 1800 20 DEC 44
MAP. SPEC MAP DATE
I - SCALE - 1:50,000



20 Dec 44





OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 PROJECT INF. AS
OF 1800 21 DEC 44
MAP: SPEC. MAP LEFT
I. - SCALE: 1/50,000





21 Dec 44

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 511 FRONT INF. CO
IN 1800 22 DEC 44
MAP, SPEC. MAP 1075
I - SCALE - 1:50,000






OVERLAY OF POSITION
OF 511 PREC. INF AS
OF 1800 23 DE 44
MAP: SP2 MAP LEFT
I - Scale - 1:50,000



23 DE 44

OVERLAY OF POSITIONS
OF 5TH PRENT INF AS
OF 1800 24 DEC 44
MAP: SPEC MAP LEYTE
I - SCALE: 1:50,000



24 DEC 44

P. 5

311-04-0.3

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

(20806)
Master



408th A/B CW Co., Historical Gm Report-R-2 Gm. (let's) 20 Oct-25 Dec 44

DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

836

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS
408th Airborne QM Company
APO 466

1 January 1945

Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte)

20 October 1944 (D-Day)

On D-day the 11th Airborne Division was stationed at Oro Bay, New Guinea. The 408th Airborne Quartermaster Company, organized under Table of Organization 10-327 dated 1 August 1944 consisted of five officers (see annex No. 1) and one hundred forty six enlisted men (see annex No. 2).

The final days in the preparation of the division for movement were particularly busy as the Q.M. company had to draw and warehouse the division reserve of Class I, II and III supplies as well as make daily issues of Class I and show down shortage issues of Class II. There was also final training to be accomplished; new weapons to be fired, Q.M. parachutist to be qualified, etc. and company organizational equipment to be packed.

Logistics compiled by Office of the Division Quartermaster revealed the following:

	Dead weight tons	Measured tons
Storage Ration	283.1	423.1
Reserve Supplies		
Class I	588.0	950.0
Class II	274.1	739.7
Class III	642.7	1003.1
Total	<u>1796.9</u>	<u>3175.5</u>

These supplies were distributed to the eight ships allocated for the movement, according to capacity of the vessel and personnel to be carried. (see annex No. 3). A late change in the loading time and ship capacities required a revision in figures and some reserve supplies.

Page 1

311-AM-03

20506
MASTER

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

J. J. [Signature]
[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

114.5 D.W.T. had to be left for the next available vessel. (see annex No. 4).

Lt. Col. Roy E. Stout Division Quartermaster coordinated the loading of the ships as well as all of the quartermaster activities.

8 November 1944

The climax to work of the previous several months came on 8 November 1944: the Q.M. Company boarded USS Rixey anchored in Oro Bay, New Guinea. At 0830 11 November 1944, the 11th Airborne Division convoy left New Guinea for a destination referred to in classified documents as "accumulation".

The voyage to Leyte, P.I. was fortunately uneventful. This must have been pure luck as a subsequent troop convoy from New Guinea to Leyte received air and water attacks and lost many personnel.

18 November 1944

Early on the morning of 18 November 1944, the Q.M. personnel disembarked at San Pedro Bay, Leyte, P.I. about two miles north of Abuyog. After nine days on ship board everyone was anxious to get started on the big job waiting for them.

Hectic days followed for Q.M. responsibilities are continuous regardless of circumstances. During the first few days the division was issued emergency rations. R bivouac equipment and B rations were not completely available until about the third day when the first issue of B rations was made. While the Q.M. Service Section located ration items unloaded from beach craft the Transportation Section was spread along the entire beach waiting for sorely needed vehicles. The job of setting up a company

~~SECRET~~

Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

bivouac had to be performed by other company personnel. It was fortunate that almost all organizational equipment had been mobile loaded on some of the ten $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, twenty two jeeps and thirty $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trailers which belonged to the Q.M. Company.

The problem of unloading the hundreds of tons of Q.M. division reserve supplies was no easy matter. Because of the danger of air attack unloading time was cut to a bare minimum. All available division personnel were organized into unloading parties. Quartermaster supplies were given as high a priority as possible but thousands of tons of other important supplies also had to be unloaded in the limited time. Continuous rains and rough water did not facilitate neat, orderly stacks of equipment and supplies. The result was a two mile beach piled high with unsorted piles of everything imaginable. Haste was necessary as the rains and sea had soaked into the piles. During high tides work parties had to remove their clothes and retrieve from the waves food, clothing, equipment, gasoline, precious parachutes. When unloading the small beach craft there wasn't time to carry everything far onto the beach therefore to clear the beach as quickly as possible was imperative.

To permit immediate issue of rations a small dump was established with items which could be easily taken from the piles on the beach. This had to be done entirely by Q.M. personnel.

25 November 1944

At this date it was practical to secure a two hundred man labor detail and additional trucks to set up a Q.M. Dump on a desirable site vacated by

~~SECRET~~

Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

our troops sent forward.

It required about five days to clear the beach of all Class I and

II. Q.M. responsibilities were allocated by the Division Q.M. as follows:

Lt. Col. Roy E. Stout	-	Operation Plans
Capt. Thomas A. Jordan	-	Supervision of beach clearance, organisation of supplies in dump, Company Duties.
1st Lt. John H. Flood	-	Daily issues of Class I.
1st Lt. Edward Iandoli	-	Motor maintenance
2d Lt. Melvin A. Levins	-	G.R.O. Plans.

The most pressing work was to get all Q.M. supplies off the beach where the loss from high tide, rain and pilferage was reaching a serious peak.

At one time Captain T. A. Jordan had to draw his gun to half a non-divisional truck which had loaded rations from the dump and had started to drive from the division area. As troops became settled in bivouacs their attention turned to desirable piles of clothing, equipment and food too abundant for careful guarding at that time.

Organisation of the dump progressed favorably. Ground was cleared and leveled by hand and later by bulldozer. The two assembly tents erected provided 10,400 sq ft of storage space. Class III was placed in deep trenches about one hundred yards from class I and II stocks.

At this point Captain T. A. Jordan moved the company to the dump area in a position where it guarded the front of the entire dump area. Guard requirements were reduced to a minimum.

Early contact was made by Lt. Col. Roy E. Stout at 6th Army, 24th Corps, Base K, Sub Base K Q.M. Offices and a few days after our arrival

~~SECRET~~
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Lays) (Continued).

bread and perishables were drawn from Sub-Base K, Dulag. This would not have been possible if "Dukws" had not become available to Division Q.M. It was impossible to use 2½ ton trucks from Division rear echelon north to Dulag. The deteriorated inland road was impassable and the route along the beach was divided by the mouths of four fresh water streams.

First Lt. John H. Flood, Second Lt. Malvin A. Lavins and S/Sgt Maurice W. Archer departed for Burezun as advance party to locate Q.M. Dump. (see map annex). At this time approximately fifty percent of the division had left the rear base. The following day, 26 November 1944, Lt. Col. Roy E. Stout guided five 2½ ton trucks of Q.M. Company and fifteen Q.M. personnel to initial forward dump at Burezun. The detachment moved to Dulag via water and then drove to Burezun over the barely passable east-west road, made worse by recent rains.

27 November 1944

The division C.P. had moved to vicinity of San Pablo airstrip number one, approximately seven miles West of Dulag. About two thirds of the division had left the rear base. The supply picture was becoming complex. Distribution was made in the following manner:

From Div. Rear Dump:		<u>Distribution</u>
Rear Echelon	-	Dump
Units S and SW	-	Unit and Dump
From Initial Food Dump		
Units at Burezun	-	Dump
Units in mountain	-	Aerial - re-supply
West of Burezun	-	(Strip No. 2)
From Dulag via Q.M. vehicles		
Units vicinity of Div. C.P.	Unit	
Units S.W. of Dulag	Unit	

~~SECRET~~

Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

Second Lt. Melvin A. Levins, G.R.O., maintained liason with Base K, XIIIV Corps and 6th Army G.R.O. representatives. Preparation for burials, record keeping, etc. were completed.

1st Lt. John H. Flood maintained daily contact with Sub Base K Q.M.

Current rains had made travel on roads west of Dulag and north of Bureau quite hazardous. If a truck slid into the mud on the side of a one-way section of the road and could not readily be pulled out it was usually pushed deeper and out of the way. Recovery depended on many factors.

When not required for supplies Q.M. trucks were dispatched for troop and equipment moves. It was obvious that truck deadlines would soon occur. Maintenance was practically impossible as the trucks were constantly in use and always in mud or water.

29 November 1944

Instructions had been sent to Captain Thomas A. Jordan to bring the balance of the QM Company less a squad of transportation and a squad of Service Section and less several ODQM and Company Headquarters personnel to Bureau. On the evening of 29 November 1944 the detachment moved with five 2½ ton trucks via water to Dulag and then drove to Bureau. The vehicles were delayed for twelve hours because of an impassable section of the road.

Rain continued and the roads east and north of Bureau were becoming impassible. (see map annex) When the section of road between airstrip one and two on the Bureau - Dulag road was closed completely the route via Degani - Tansuan - Dulag was employed. This meant the trucks had to travel

~~SECRET~~
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte). (Continued).

twenty three miles instead of eight. As roads became worse the trucks took as long as eighteen hours to travel from Dulag to Buresun via Degami.

30 November 1944

The road conditions threatened to tie-up all the Q.M. trucks, at this time and jeopardise division supply. It was decided to establish the main forward dump inside the division C.P. perimeter near airstrip number ~~two~~ ^{one} and maintain a small dump at Buresun for those troops which had not yet moved where aerial re-supply was employed. On 30 November 1944 Lt. John H. Flood and one Service Squad was sent to Dulag via the north road where Lt. Flood was to establish liason at Sub Base K Q.M. depot and have the Service Squad load division Q.M. trucks each day.

1 December 1944

Lt. Col. Roy E. Stout and Lt. Melvin A. Levins foot marched from the Buresun dump to the new dump site near airstrip number ~~two~~ ^{one}. They were accompanied by a Service Squad and C.D.Q.M. personnel. Bivouac equipment sent via truck on the north road out of Buresun arrived at the new dump site the following day.

Supplies were immediately sent by our Dulag detachment and the new dump was established.

A secondary dump was also set up on airstrip number one. The airstrip dump soon became most important as more of our troops had moved into the west mountains. The secondary dump on airstrip number two isolated by road conditions was closed.

~~SECRET~~
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

2 December 1944

Captain Thomas A. Jordan was instructed to immediately start all trucks with equipment over the Buresun north road and march the following day to the main forward dump. This was accomplished but the trucks were delayed and did not arrive until late the following day.

Demands for aerial re-supply grew rapidly. Assistance in this most effective delivery system was secured from 11th Cargo Supply Squadron which used the Tacloban airstrip, and a division re-supply team at the same strip.

The Q.M. airstrip dump was operated by three Q.M. personnel. A complete stock of individual clothing and equipment was maintained. Class I supplies consisted of "10 in 1", "C", "K", and "D" rations. Gratuitous kits were also dropped.

It was found that all emergency rations except "D" could be dropped without parachutes. Loss from breakage and unlocated drops was estimated at ten percent. This was a very low percentage considering the number of drops made, the terrain, etc.

During the peak of the operation, when our troops were annihilating the Japs in the west mountains aerial re-supply reached a new high. On some days thick fogs grounded the planes. This meant ^aincreased requirements for succeeding days. Following are some of the pertinent average figures relative to airstrip number one:

Planes used (L-5) 8
Loads per plane per day 15
Capacity per plane (L-5) 4 cases
(10-1, C, K rations)

Full capacity was not regularly used for Q.M. supplies. During

~~SECRET~~
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

one period after planes had been grounded for several days overage class I dropped exceeded 3000 rations per day. This was in addition to many loads of clothing and equipment.

Aerial re-supply at Tacloban with C-47 transports was not as productive as that at airstrip number one. Loss from breakage and unlocated drops was estimated to be over fifty percent.

4 December 1944

The supply picture had by this time settled along more definite lines. Disposition of the Q.M. Company was as follows:

Bureau Dump:			4 E.M.
Airstrip number one			3 E.M.
Main Food Dump	3-0	-	2 Service Squads
<i>Food</i>			2 Transportation Squads
			O.D.Q.M. and Co. Hq.
			personnel
Dulag Q.M. Dump	1-0	-	1 Service Squad
Rear Dump	1-0	-	1 Service Squad
			2 Transp. Squad
			O.D.Q.M. and Co. Hq.
			personnel.

Vehicles of the Q.M. Company had been changed to twenty-four 2 1/2 ton trucks and five jeeps. Eleven trucks and three jeeps were in the forward area. Vehicles were employed on a round the clock basis according to supply requirements and troop movements. Breakdowns started to occur.

The road to our rear base had not yet opened. Class II from the rear base was hauled to Dulag by "Bukws" and taken by truck from there.

The Tansuan-Degani road was the only access to Bureau. Fortunately requirements there were small.

Attached units had increased division strength to over twelve thousand. The Q.M. Company had full responsibility for all Classes of supply to attached units.

~~SECRET~~
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

Morale was high as all personnel realized the importance of their jobs. Frequently men and trucks would haul supplies for eighteen hours, rest for a few hours and start out again. Many a wet night was spent in a bogged-down truck or waiting for roads to be repaired.

Captain John S. Conable was assigned and joined the Q.M. Company as Assistant Division Quartermaster (see order in annex).

No local contact had been made with the enemy. It appeared as though the Japs would not get near our supply installations.

5 December 1944

Word was received that contact with the Japs had been made near Buri Airstrip, north of Buremun. Guard was increased to protect installations from infiltrators. During darkness three of the Q.M. trucks ran into an ambush between Degaal and Buremun. Under a hail of enemy bullets the trucks were quickly turned around and, it was reported, a very hasty withdrawal was made. Corporal Richard E. Bowman was in charge of the trucks. Pvt. Warren O. Conklin while moving troops was wounded in the left leg. By this time the Q.M. Company started to appreciate earlier combat training so difficult to complete while servicing the division.

6 December 1944

Report was received from our dump at Buremun that the previous night had been spent fighting Jap infiltrators. Two BAR men were sent there to assist in the night defense.

About 1800, just before darkness, an air attack warning was sounded. The importance of this warning was not appreciated until a group of enemy transport planes circled the area and Jap parachutists bailed out. Since

██████████
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

several areas.

Q.M. vehicles had received little maintenance and much rough use since arrival on Leyte. Running-board deep mud had gotten into brakes, clutches, starter, generators, etc. Lt. Edward W. Iandoli brought to the main forward dump four more trucks and another Transportation Squad.

The Abuyog-Dulang road was passable during dry periods and now Q.M. vehicles could haul Division Reserve Supplies directly from the rear base.

It was fortunate that division reserve supplies were available as many items were not then available at the Q.M. Depot, Sub Base K.

An unusual means of transportation was found practical for the situation. Caribou formed at Bureau into pack trains carried emergency rations and supplies from division Q.M. dump at Bureau to units in the west foothills. Capacity of the animals was low, two cases of rations per caribou.

Q.M. supply progressed favorably. The company felt much more confident after combat experiences. Personnel were rotated with those at the rear base for rest and so that others could learn to exist in mud and rain.

When Lt. Edward W. Iandoli was brought forward from the rear base Master Sergeant Julius Masor was left in complete charge. Because of the unusual ability of M/Sgt Masor and because of the splendid manner in which he conducted the Q.M. rear dump and bivouac he has been recommended for commission as second lieutenant.

22 December 1944

As troops moved over the west mountains they were attached to the 7th Division for supply. A request was received for liaison between 7th and 11th Divisions. A most capable Q.M. supply man, Tec 5 William C. Lynch,

~~SECRET~~
Historical Operational Report
K-2 Operation (Leyte) (Continued).

was flown over the 7th Division C.P. near Ormoc where he parachuted to the ground. Lt. Col. Stout and several other Q.M. personnel later moved to the west side of Leyte, to assist in the supply and evacuation of our troops.

24 December 1944

On Christmas day the troops in the hills were not to go with a good turkey dinner. By L-5 liaison plane and by fat, lay caribon canned turkey, and all the fixings complete with cigarettes and candy were delivered to the troops. Fresh turkey was issued to those with cooking facilities.

25 December 1944

The operation was officially closed but there was still considerable mopping up to be done. As the division troops returned to the rear base Q.M. installations were closed. On 13 January 1945 all Q.M. personnel were at the rear base.

Lt. Col. Roy E. Stout for meritorious achievement in connection with military operations on Leyte, P.I. was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. (see annex file).

Thomas A. Jordan

THOMAS A. JORDAN,
Captain, Q.M.C.,
Commanding.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
100th Airborne CM Company
APO A68

1 January 1945

Roster of Officers
20 October 1944 to 25 December 1944

- | | Duty |
|---|-------------------------|
| 20 October 1944 | |
| Ray E. Stout, Lt. Col. OMC O-351442 - | Division Q.M. |
| Joseph W. Martorena, Capt., OMC O-455834 | Sick in hospital |
| Thomas A. Jordan, Capt., OMC O-455694 | Company Commander |
| Robert L. George, 1st Lt., OMC. | Acting Asst Div. Q.M. |
| John H. Flood, 1st Lt., Inf. O-1308622 | Div. QM. Supply Officer |
| Malvin A. Levins, 2d Lt., F.A., O-1169216 | Sales Officer |
| 26 October 1944 | |
| Edward W. Landoli 1st Lt., O470276 | Transportation Officer |
| assigned from 187th Gl I Inf Regt. | |
| 19 November 1944 | |
| Joseph W. Martorena Capt., OMC. O-455834 | Sick in Hospital |
| Transferred to 108th Station Hospital | |
| Oro Bay, New Guinea. | |
| (In hospital on departure date). | |
| Robert L. George, 1st. Lt., OMC., O-1577219 | Acting Asst. Div QM. |
| Transferred to 249th General Hospital, Oro | |
| Bay, New Guinea. (In hospital on departure | |
| date). (Hospitalized 7 November 1944) | |
| 5 December 1944 | |
| John S. Conable, Capt., F.A., O-1165484 | Asst. Div Q.M. |
| Assigned from 457 Procht. F. A. Bn. | |
| 15 December 1944 | |
| Malvin A. Levins, 2d Lt., F.A., O-1169216 | Graves Reg. Officer |
| Appointed Graves Registration Officer. | |

Note: Five of the present officers are qualified parachutists.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
400th Airborne CM Company
APO 468

1 January 1945

Enlisted Strength
20 October 1944 to 25 Dec 1944.

	<u>Present for Duty</u>
20 October 1944 (New Guinea)	142
9 November 1944 M/Sgt William R. McCarthy. 32377091 sustained gasoline burns. Transferred to hospital.	141
27 November 1944 (Leyte, P.I.) Pvt. Joseph J. Laps, 31215116 injured by backing truck. Transferred to hospital.	140
29 November 1944 18 E.M. attached from other divisional units for assistance in aerial re-supply. Tec 5 Marion C. Swain, 35597219, injured elbow in fall from LST. Transferred to hospital.	137
6 December 1944 Seven E.M. transferred to other division units from which they came.	130
10 December 1944 Pvt. Warren O. Conklin, 32818861 shot in leg by Jap while driving truck. Transferred to hospital.	149
21 December 1944 Pvt Robert F. Brooks, 31240411, contracted yellow jaundice. Transferred to hospital.	148

Note: An average of 50% enlisted personnel are qualified
parachutists.

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OFFICE OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER
11th Airborne Division
AFO 468

2 November 1944

SUBJECT: Tonnages of QM Cargo per Ship

TO : Water Movement Office, 11th AB Div.
(Copies to Ship Loading Officers)

	<u>P.W.T.</u>	<u>M.T.</u>
<u>SHIP #1 (511th Inf)</u>		
24,480 Voyage Rations	52.5	89.5
Class I Combat Reserve	63.5	103.2
Class II Combat Reserve	38.9	137.7
Class III Combat Reserve	68.7	106.5
	<u>223.6</u>	<u>436.9</u>
<u>SHIP #2 (188th Inf.)</u>		
12,900 Voyage Rations	27.6	47.1
Class I Combat Reserve	60.4	98.4
Class II Combat Reserve	34.5	129.0
Class III Combat Reserve	68.7	106.5
Totals	<u>191.2</u>	<u>381.0</u>
<u>SHIP #3 (127th Eng Bn)</u>		
19,275 Voyage Rations	41.3	70.5
Class I Combat Reserve	60.4	98.4
Class II Combat Reserve	33.4	112.1
Class III Combat Reserve	68.7	106.5
Totals	<u>203.8</u>	<u>387.5</u>
<u>SHIP #4 (187th Inf)</u>		
26,565 Voyage Rations	56.9	97.1
Class I Combat Reserve	60.4	98.4
Class II Combat Reserve	34.3	84.3
Class III Combat Reserve	68.7	106.5
Totals	<u>220.3</u>	<u>386.3</u>
<u>SHIP #5 (675th P.A.)</u>		
23,595 Voyage Rations	50.5	86.2
Class I Combat Reserve	36.7	57.3
Class II Combat Reserve	17.6	35.5
Class III Combat Reserve	41.9	64.5
Totals	<u>146.7</u>	<u>243.5</u>

Tonnages of CM Cargo per Ship (Contd)

SHIP #6 (67th F.A.)

3000 Voyage Rations	6.4	10.7
Class I Combat Reserve	140.0	233.3
Class II Combat Reserve	53.0	123.2
Class III Combat Reserve	<u>151.4</u>	<u>232.2</u>
Totals	350.8	599.8

SHIP #7 (657th F.A.)

3180 Voyage Rations	6.8	11.6
Class I Combat Reserve	139.8	221.0
Class II Combat Reserve	56.1	105.9
Class III Combat Reserve	<u>190.8</u>	<u>231.3</u>
Totals	393.5	

SHIP #8 (No)

19170 Voyage Rations	41.1	70.0
Class I Combat Reserve	25.8	40.0
Class II Combat Reserve	5.9	12.0
Class III Combat Reserve	<u>30.8</u>	<u>49.1</u>
Totals	103.6	171.1

ROY E. STOUT
Lt. Col., GSC
Division CM

Receipts:	DWT	MT
Voyage	283.1	482.7
Class I	588.0	950.0
Class II	274.1	739.7
Class III	<u>642.7</u>	<u>1003.1</u>
Totals	1788.9	3175.5

Annex No. 3
Historical Operational Report

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office of Division Quartermaster
Headquarters 11th Airborne Division
APO 468

9 November 1944

SUBJECT: List of items of Quartermaster Combat Reserve Remain-
in Storage.

TO : Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division, APO 468
(Attention: G-4)

1. Class I	<u>Cases</u>	<u>DWT</u>	<u>MT</u>
40,020	3,335	64.0	116.7
2. Class II			
<u>Containers</u> <u>DWT</u> <u>MT</u>			
a. Tents	198 bundles	11.7	30.5
1 ea Tent Assembly			
5 ea Tent, C.P.			
162 ea Tent, Feranable			
7 ea Tent, Storage			
9 ea Tent, Small wall			
23 ea Palin, large			
b. Poles, tent miscellaneous	136 bundles	5.7	13.8
c. Pins, tent	145 Cases	10.0	16.1
d. Jungle Equipment	1712 Cases	70.8	184.5
8503 ea Hammock, jungle			
11,334 ea Boot, jungle			
13,920 ea Bag, food waterproof			
3,290 ea bag, clothing			
3,200 Band, helmet camouflage			
5,250 ea Packin jungle			
e. Paper Toilet	274 Cases	5.0	17.4
f. Soap, laundry	290 Cases	8.0	8.0
g. Compound tent, waterproofing	17 drums	2.7	4.2
		114.5	275.2

Annex No. 4
Historical Operational Report

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

fb

3. Class III

	<u>Containers</u>	<u>DWT</u>	<u>MT</u>
Distillate	194 drums	36.	57
Gasoline, red (80 octaine)	302 drums	59	90
Gasoline, white	103 drums	22	33
Gasoline, 75 octaine (aviation)	45 drums	9	12
Grease, miscellaneous	55 -2 1/2 cans	1	2
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		127	194

4. Recaptulation:

	<u>DWT</u>	<u>MT</u>
Class I	64.0	116.7
Class II	114.5	275.2
Class III	<u>127.0</u>	<u>194.0</u>
Total	305.5	585.9

ROY E. STOUT
Lt. Col., OMC.
Div Quartermaster.

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS
11th Airborne Division
APO ACG

15 December 1944

SPECIAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 234)

B-X-T-R-A-C-T

2. 2d Lt MELVIN A IRVING 01169216 PA 457 Probt PA-Ba
(attd ACG Abn CM Co) is ap'd Graves Registration O in addition
to his other duties.

By command of Major General SWING:

IRVIN R. SCHIMMELPENNIG
Colonel, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIALS:

/s/ Robert E. Conine
ROBERT E. CONINE
Lt Col., A. G. B.
Adjutant General

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Thomas A. Jordan
THOMAS A. JORDAN,
Capt., GSC.

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS
11th Airborne Division
APO 468

3 December 1944

SPECIAL ORDERS)
:)
NUMBER 228)

~~SECRET~~
B-X-T-B-A-C-T

A. Capt JOHN S. COMARIE 01163484 FA is relieved from assignment
and duty with 457 Front FA Bn and is assigned to 456 Assault Co and appointed
Asst Div Cdr.

By command of Major General SWING:

IRVIN R. SCHINGELFERNIG
Colonel, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Robert E. Conine
ROBERT E. CONINE
Lt Col, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Thomas A. Jordan
THOMAS A. JORDAN,
Capt., GSC.

~~SECRET~~
21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
11th Airborne Division
APO 468

6 January 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 6) E-X-T-R-A-C-T

III. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9419, 4 February 1944 (Sec II, Bull. 3, WD 1944), a Bronze Star Medal is awarded by the Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division, to the following named officers and enlisted men:

Lieutenant Colonel ROY E. STOUT, O951A42, Quartermaster Corps, United States Army. For meritorious achievement in connection with military operations on Leyte, Philippine Islands from 25 November 1944 to 31 December 1944. Home address: Mrs. Ann E. Stout (wife), 2961 Tyler Street, Corvallis, Oregon.

By command of Major General SWING:

IRVIN R. SCHIMMELPENNIG
Colonel, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff


OFFICIAL:

/s/ Robert E. Conine
ROBERT E. CONINE
Lt Col, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Thomas A. Jordan
THOMAS A. JORDAN,
Capt., OMC.


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
Prepared under the direction of the Chief Engineer, GHQ, SWPA, by the Engineer Intelligence Section, OCE, GHQ, SWPA, U.S. Army, Sept. 1944. Compiled from K-18, K-17, and low oblique photography by 91st Recon Wing, 5th AF, U.S. Army, and by U.S. Navy. Controlled by U.S.C. & G.S. Triangulation and Radial-line-plot. Revised by 67th Engineer Top Co. by road check and data from Photomaps 1:25,000, November 1944.

NOTE: Due to inadequate ground control, scaled distances may be or vary with actual ground distances.

INDEX TO SHEETS



SCALE - 50,000 (Approx)



Contour and Form Line Interval 300 feet Datum Sea Level
1000 YARD PHILIPPINE POLYCONIC GRID

Polyconic Projection

Approximate Luzon Datum

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL TO "THE CHIEF ENGINEER, GHQ, SWPA"

APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1944
FOR CENTER OF SHEET
ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1' INCREASE

REPRODUCED BY 67th ENGR TOP CO SWPA NOVEMBER 1944

LEGEND

Depth Line (30' and 12')	Form Line	300'
Intermittent Streams	Spot Elevation	5-545
Mangrove	Road, lightly surfaced (Primary)	
Swamp	Road, minor muddy traffic (Secondary)	
Triangulation Station	Track (Tertiary)	
	Rail	

23

1-11-6
p. 116

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

31721(468)-0-5
(10788)
Master



Action Report - 468th Provnt Inf Regt

DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

852

24 - 31 March 45

HEADQUARTERS
466TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

AFTER ACTION REPORT

24 March 1945

The Battalion dropped at P/24 hour (1024), in previously selected area, approximately 5000 meters north of Wesel, Germany with the mission of direct support of 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Moderate flak was encountered during last two minutes before reaching the DZ. One complete howitzer section was dropped west of the Rhine River, ten minutes prior to reaching the DZ. This was due to crew chief giving the "go" signal too soon.

On the ground heavy small arm fire and 20mm flak fire was encountered. As no infantry was dropped in the vicinity, the Battalion deployed and fought as infantry in order to secure their equipment. American and British gliders began landings shortly after the Battalion drop and also encountered heavy .86mm, 20mm and small arms fire.

Battery B assembled the first howitzer at 1208 which was used for direct fire on a house which had automatic fire coming from it.

By early afternoon the resistance had been sufficiently cleared for the gun crews to assemble some of their equipment. At approximately 1530 a Base Point Registration through FDO, was under way by Captain James Gake.

By 1700 the Battalion had thirteen howitzers in position to fire. At this time Lt James Namnek was given command of Batter A due to casualties of all battery officers.

Radio communication was established the 513th Combat Team Headquarters at 1400, and wire communication was established by 1800. Battalion radio net was complete by 1600 and wire at 1540; wire in to Temporary Division Artillery Command Post by 1500.

Brigadier General Gaither, Commandant the Parachute School, Brigadier General Dalby, Commanding General of the Airborne Center, and Colonel Dickerson, Ward Department Observer Board jumped with this Battalion. They congratulated the Battalion on the superior performance both as infantrymen and artillerymen, the efficiency of the Battalion in clearing the area and assembling of the equipment.

A strong perimeter defense of the Battalion area was established, resulting in the capture of four and killing of three enemy.

The Battalion captured over 400 prisoners during the day. Sporadic artillery fire fell in the Battalion throughout the night.

25 March 1945

The Battalion still in position north of Wesel, Germany.

At approximately 0200, men of Battery C and Battery B who were on the perimeter defense, dispelled an enemy patrol with small arms and machine gun fire; inflicting 3 casualties on the patrol. (2 officers and 1 enlisted man).

At 0900, the last howitzer of Battery C, which was dropped 1500 yards short of the DZ, arrived and was put into action.

315-FA (466)-0-3

AUG 13 1946

10789
Kuster

By 1300, the last howitzer of Battery A, which was dropped west of the Rhine River arrived with the complete gun crew. The battalion has all 15 howitzers in action.

The mission of the Battalion remains the same, as direct support of the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

26 March 1945

The battalion still in position north of Wesel, Germany.

At 0730, the Battalion truck column under command of 1st Lt. Charles Larkin arrived from base. The trucks brought in kitchens, bed rolls for all personnel and three more howitzers with ammunition. Battalion now has 17 howitzers in action and unserviceable - enemy small arms fire destroyed the recoil cylinder.

Prior to and during the attack at 0900 by our supported unit, the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment, this Battalion fired 34 concentrations. A number of these concentrations on the final phase line were particularly successful, as reported by our forward observers. These fires drove some 200 enemy into the open where they were killed or captured by our supported infantry.

At 2000 the mission of the Battalion changed to direct support of units of the British 2nd Army who had relieved the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment after the final phase line was taken.

27 March 1945

At 0800 this unit was relieved of direct support of the British unit. We are now reinforcing the fires of the 681st Glider Field Artillery Battalion. These field artillery battalions were formed into a group "Keating" to support the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment.

At 0930 this battalion had occupied new positions about 4000 meters north-east of Wesel, Germany. Almost continuous reconnaissance for better positions is being pushed forward due to the speed of the offensive.

At approximately 1500 the Battalion again moved out and at 1730 arrived in new positions at 31774491 about 800 meters southwest of a German Hospital called Kol. Luhlerheim.

The Battalion fired five harassing missions shortly after arrival.

28 March 1945

The Battalion moved to new position approximately 4000 meters west of Schermbeck at 0900.

The mission of the Battalion remains the same reinforcing the fires of the 681st Glider Field Artillery Battalion.

Battalion moved again at approximately 1500. Due to unexpected enemy opposition the Battalion was required to wait in an assembly area, north of Schermbeck. Unit into position at 1845. Battalion took 17 prisoners 3 of which were taken out of Battalion Command Post. One Enlisted Man killed in action and one Enlisted Man wounded by small arms fire when A Battery was going into position. Due to the rapid advance of the infantry small pockets of enemy resistance are being left behind.

29 March 1945

At 1545 this Battalion moved forward by truck. Battalion was held up overnight by armor priority on roads.

Battalions's mission remains as reinforcing fires of the 681st Glider Field Artillery Battalion

30 March 1945

Battalion able to move on roads again at 1325 arrived at new positions 2000 meters south of Dulmen, Germany at 1530.

Small isolated enemy groups continue to harass the occupation of position. Enemy air activity is sporadic but confined of only observation.

31 March 1945

At 1720 this Battalion moved forward to new position 1000 meters south of Nottuln, Germany, at 1930.

Battalion mission still to reinforce fires of the 681st Glider Field Artillery Battalion, however, the battalion has been assigned to support the 2nd battalion, 194th Glider Infantry in their occupation of Nottuln.

Supporting Data

The 466th Pcht. Field Artillery Battalion commanded by Lieut. Col. Kenneth L. Booth, O-24519 loaded into 42 C-47 air planes at 0800 hours on 24 March 1945. The mission of the battalion was direct support of the 513th Parachute Infantry regiment which was to precede the 466th F.A. on to the same drop zone.

In addition to the 42 C-47 airplanes the battalion had men and equipment loaded into a total of 17 CG4A Gliders. These gliders were divided into two groups at separate departure fields. One group of three gliders containing three 75mm howitzers was assigned to come in with the glider element of Division Artillery Headquarters battery. A second group of 14 gliders containing 1/2 ton trucks and trailers as well as the SCR 193, SCR 608, SCR 694 radios was assigned to come in with the glided transportation of the 513th Pcht. Inf. Regt.

The jumping element of the battalion consisting of 27 officers and 358 enlisted men, passed over the Rhine river at 1020 hours. At 1025 H the planes had reached the designated drop zone and the green light was given to release the loads and jump the sticks. Between the river Rhine and the DZ medium to heavy flak consisting mainly of 20MM AA was encountered with the heaviest flak being concentrated in the vicinity of the DZ. Two enlisted men were wounded by flak while still in the plane and did not jump. A considerable number of equipment bundles were hit by flak but serious damage was encountered only in the case of one howitzer load.

The batteries were jumped in the order Headquarters, A, B and C, although all batteries in trail jumped at the sight of silk from the leading elements. The accuracy and the general pattern of the drop was excellent. The battalion commander Lieut. Colonel Kenneth L. Booth, O-24519 jumping with the Headquarters element landed 20 yards away from a building he had previously selected from photo reconnaissance to be the Battalion CP.

All batteries with the exception of "C" battery had a concentrated drop pattern on the ground.

Immediately upon landing the battalion encountered stiff resistance by the defending enemy. The situation was extremely serious as the Parachute Infantry Regiment that was supposed to precede this battalion into the drop zone had been dropped in error approximately four miles to the north. It remained for this artillery battalion to perform the infantry task of clearing the drop zone of enemy as well as recovering the equipment bundles and organizing an artillery position.

In order to show specific details of the ensuing action the activities of each battery will be taken up separately.

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

The majority of the men landed in close proximity to a group of buildings that had been previously selected as the battalion command post. Several men who landed immediately adjacent to the buildings were wounded by small arms fire emanating from the buildings. The battalion commander directed the assistant--

S-3, Capt. Charles McGee, O-300416' to organize the men in the vicinity and clear the area. In the ensuing action two of the enemy were killed and a total of 23 prisoners taken.

Members of the battery who landed further away encountered sharp skirmishes in making their way to the CP. The platoon Communication Officer 1st LIEUT. JOHN F. STACY, O-1049366 and the Battalion Ammunition Sergeant S/Sgt. Henry Y. Parker, 14002525 with a small group of men encountered intense fire from some 20MM AA positions. By organizing the men and attacking the positions Lt. STACY and Sgt. Parker silenced the weapons. The operations Sergeant Tech/Sgt. Joseph Flanagan, 32160342 landed near a fixed artillery piece. Reacting quickly Sgt. Flanagan dashed wildly toward the weapon and succeeded in capturing the crew of six men. This weapon was later used against enemy strong points that offered stubborn resistance.

The Battery Commander 1ST LIEUT. RONALD J. MULLIGAN, O-1170502 was wounded as he was leading a small group to the battalion CP location.

When the buildings of the CP had been cleared the personnel of the Headquarters set about to organize the CP. Luckily a SCR 609 radio bundle had been recovered and it was set up immediately. No replies however were received in answer to the initial call ups. The time was about 1130 Hours.

The Fire Direction Center, the Wire Section and the Message Center personnel organized themselves quickly and began immediately to pick up equipment bundles that had landed nearby. The CP installations were beginning to make their appearance.

As the fighting in areas adjacent to the CP location quieted down more of the CP equipment was recovered. Additional radios were set up, wire was laid to Battery positions, a switchboard was installed and a firing chart was set up.

Radio communication was made with the Regimental Commander of the supported infantry at 1200 Hours and at that time the friendly situation became clearer. The infantry troops who were supposed to have landed in the same DZ were at that time considerably scattered and were fighting their way to assembly points. It was obvious that several hours would elapse before the infantry battalion could organize and set about reaching objective points. However the Regimental Commander was informed that artillery support would be available to him for any mission.

By 1300 hours "A" Battery had set up four pieces in position and "B" Battery had three pieces. "C" Battery did not have any pieces in position at this time, altho two pieces had been assembled. These two pieces were used also where for direct fire missions. Wire communication had been established with both "A" and "B" Battery as well as with a small command group of Division Artillery who had landed by parachute close by.

At 1330 Hours CAPTAIN JAMES CAKE, O-25372 a Liaison Officer with the infantry called for a fire mission on an enemy strong point in a house. The data

was prepared at Fire Direction Center and transmitted to "B" Battery who was assigned the mission. The second round, with smoke shell being used, hit the house and set it on fire. Cease firing was given to enable the infantry to take prisoners as the enemy came out of the house. The data from this mission was used for registration.

In addition to interior Battalion Radio Communication being set up, Radio Communication was also completed with reinforcing artillery units on the west bank of the khine, thru the radio set of the Corps Liaison Officer who had jumped in with the battalion. The first contact made was at 1200 Hours and insured maximum artillery support for any mission assigned to the battalion.

By 1500 Hours wire communication was established with "C" Battery who reported three pieces laid and ready to fire. This brought the total up to 12 pieces in the battalion as two more pieces in Baker Battery had been set up. The Battalion survey sergeant reported that an orienting line had been established and the position area survey had been completed.

At 1530 Hours personal contact was made with the supported Infantry Regimental Commander who established his command post close to the 466th Pcht. F.A. Bn. CP. Immediate plans were made to continue on with the assigned missions and full artillery support was assured the Infantry Battalion Commanders.

All Forward Observer and Liaison Officer parties had by this time checked into the Battalion Radio Net and reported they were with their assigned infantry units.

The element of Headquarters Battery that came in by glider began arriving at the CP at approximately 1500 Hours. The SCR 193 and SCR 608 radio/trucks were damaged in the crash landings of the gliders. However, the SCR 694 and second 1/2 ton truck, both hauling trailers loaded with communication equipment landed safely and made their way directly to the CP.

In the clearing of the area of enemy and setting up of the CP Headquarters Battery suffered eighteen casualties including five killed as contrasted to capturing a total of 100 prisoners and killing 15 of the enemy.

"A" Battery

Initially the men of this battery encountered extremely heavy small arms fire and were unable to reach their equipment bundles. The Battery Executive Officer, 1ST LIEUT. JOHN E. O'BRIEN, O-117333 immediately upon landing gathered the men closest to him and dashed heedlessly toward the equipment chutes intent upon getting the howitzers assembled. LT. O'BRIEN and several men of the group were killed by small arms fire as they crossed an open field on the way to the equipment.

D. JC

CAPT. CHARLES DUREE, O-1822247 the Battery Commander began to organize his men as infantry in order to first clear the enemy from their installations. He was seriously wounded while doing this and the command of the battery passed on to the First Sergeant George R. Grasel, ASN 6940906.

As the enemy resistance was reduced the men procured the equipment bundles and assembled the guns. The first two pieces were assembled by 1100 hours; the third piece was delayed until 1400 hours as it had landed close to an enemy strong point that had been difficult to neutralize; the 4th section was a howitzer that had come in by glider and did not reach the position area until 1430 Hours. The fifth section of their battery had been erroneously dropped with its green entire crew on the west bank of the Rhine. However, the Chief of Section collected his men and equipment, commandeered two 1/2 ton trucks, engaged in heated arguments with the British Forces and made his way over the river Rhine to the battalion position area. The piece was laid and ready to fire by 1830 Hours on the following day.

At 1200 Hours on D-day the Battalion Commander on visiting "A" Battery area discovered that all officers had been killed or wounded. He directed a Staff Officer, 1ST LIEUT. JAMES NAMMACK, O-388550 to take command of the battery.

At 1630 Hours the Battalion Commander directed that "A" Battery move from its initial position to an area about 2000 yards to the south to a position that had been previously selected. The initial position had been occupied as the originally planned position was under enemy fire at the time the pieces were assembled. The move was necessary as the three batteries were too close together in their initial positions and would be subject to heavy casualties if subjected to enemy artillery fire. The move was made quickly, the orienting line was extended and additional position area survey made.

In clearing the enemy from its initial position area and occupying a battery position "A" Battery suffered a total of 22 casualties including five killed as contrasted to capturing sixty prisoners and killing 10 of the enemy.

"B" Battery

As in the case of "A" Battery this battery met heavy enemy resistance immediately upon landing. Most of the resistance came from 20MM AA guns that had engaged the airplanes while in the air and then the men as they landed. T/5 Levi Bales, ASN 2075026 eliminated one of the guns when he crept up close enough to one of the guns and fired a rifle grenade. This round neutralized the gun.

First Sergeant John Bennick, ASN. 6895454 and Pvt. Dan Morgan, ASN. 1804903 eliminated another enemy strong point when they both crashed thru the roof of a house on landing. They took a total of 16 prisoners from the house all of whom had fields of fire on to the area where the battery was intending to set up a position.

The first piece was assembled at 1100 Hours, under the direction of Sergeant James E. Guy, ASN. 19004931. When moving to the battery area the section encountered the Battalion S-3, MAJOR GEORGE ROBIE, O-272433 who directed Sergeant Guy to take his piece to a hedge row near the CP and take under direct fire a house from which deadly small arms fire had been received. It was the fire from this enemy strong point that killed LIEUT. O'BRIEN and several men from "A" Battery as they tried to reach their equipment.

Direct fire was used against the building until the ammunition supply gave out. At this point several men volunteered to go out on a fire swept field and recover additional ammunition bundles. When more ammunition was received direct fire was continued until a white flag appeared and 25 prisoners came out and surrendered. After this Sergeant Guy who had been wounded in the meantime led his section to the battery position.

By 1145 "B" Battery had three howitzers laid and ready to fire. The fourth howitzer had landed near "C" Battery area and was not recovered as quickly due to sharp enemy resistance. It was put in position by 1530 Hours. The fifth and last section was the piece that came in by glider and was laid and ready to fire at 1630 hours.

In spite of suffering casualties and the stiff resistance of the enemy this battery made one of the best jumps in its history including training jumps. All of its howitzers were laid and ready to fire in excellent time and all equipment and ammunition was collected.

In clearing the enemy from its area and in occupying its position "B" Battery suffered 21 casualties including 13 killed as contrasted to capturing 80 prisoners and killing 10 of the enemy.

"C" Battery

This battery met the stiffest resistance encountered in the entire battalion area. In addition the personnel were dropped over a considerable distance and were not as well concentrated as the personnel of the other three batteries. Since this battery was in the last airplanes of the battalion column it received a heavier concentration of flak as it passed over the DZ and as the men descended on the DZ. An entire stick of twelve men were all either killed or wounded and it is known that some of these men were hit while in descent.

On the ground the men reacted quickly to the enemy resistance and despite the heavy losses succeeded in eventually clearing the area.

The first pieces assembled were dropped short of the battery position and were assembled at 1115 hours. 1ST LIEUT. CHARLES DUGGAR, O-1170349 directed the assembly of one piece and led it to the battalion area. En route he was forced to use the piece to neutralize an enemy strong point in a house.

The second howitzer was lead by its Chief of Section Sergeant LeRoy Haynes, ASN. 20514968. En route to the battalion position Sgt. Haynes was killed by enemy small arms fire as he observed the results of some direct fire the section had undertaken against some enemy in a woods. When the area had been neutralized the section proceeded to the battalion position.

The first piece to be layed and ready to fire was a howitzer that was glided in and reached the battalion position at 1500 hours. The pieces that had landed short of the position area arrived and were layed at 1600 Hours. The fourth piece was finally recovered from a fire swept field and was layed at 1700 Hours. The fifth piece had been dropped in woods held by the enemy until the night of D-day. The piece was recovered and in position at 0800 Hours on D1.

When the Battalion Commander visited the battery position at about 1300 Hours and saw the large number of casualties he directed that "A" and "B" Battery send five men each to "C" Battery as additional help.

In clearing the area of enemy and organizing its position this battery suffered total of 41 casualties including 24 killed. The battery captured eighty prisoners, killed fifteen and wounded fifteen of the enemy.

Medical Detachment

The Battalion Surgeon CAPT. LORAN MORGAN, O-515568 jumped second only to the Battalion Commander. In his Headquarters Section were five aid men. While with each firing battery were two aid men. Two medical $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks were due to come in with the glider lift.

Immediately upon landing the entire Medical Section went into action administering to the wounded. The Battalion Aid Station was established in the CP building by 1130 hours and within the next five hours a total of 106 casualties were treated with the amazing record of not having one patient die while under their care. The Battery Aid Men performed heroic tasks in the field particularly in areas where enemy resistance was so stubborn.

The two medical $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks arrived at the aid station at approximately 1400 Hours. In addition to bringing a welcome supply of plasma and other medical equipment the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks were invaluable as litter carriers.

With a total of 13 howitzers in position by 1700 Hours and a complete wire net of communication established the howitzer was working directly through its Forward Observers with the Infantry. The main effort of the infantry was directed toward a large woods to the west of the Drop Zone. However, enemy resistance by this time had partially disintegrated and due to the large number of wandering friendly units no artillery fire was called for to support this attack which was completed at 1900 Hours.

Another infantry objective was the securing of the Issel river to the east of the Drop Zone. Several fire missions were called for in support of this attack and they were referred to the reinforcing artillery battalions located on the west bank of the Rhine. The reason for this was to avoid shifting the

-howitzers of the 466th Pcht. F.A. Bn. on a 3200 mil shift as they were laid in a westerly direction in order to offer immediate support to the attack to the west. The fire missions however, passed thru the direct support Artillery Fire Direction Center and were relayed to the reinforcing artillery unit by the Liaison Officer.

During the night of D-day continuous harassing fire was placed in front of our lines on the Issel canal. At the battalion positions a strong perimeter defense was maintained as there were still a great many isolated groups of enemy in the area. During the night a total of fifteen prisoners were taken, five of the enemy were killed and one was wounded. No casualties resulted for the 466th Pcht. F.A. Bn.

On D+1 a final check of the area was made for equipment that had not been collected particularly ammunition containers. The fifth howitzer for "A" and "C" Battery arrived and were placed in position. Strong harassing fires were maintained in front of the line along the Issel canal as the infantry consolidated their gains and prepared for an attack to the east. On one occasion a heavy concentration of fire broke up an ineffective enemy infantry counter attack. The heavy harassing and interdiction fire continued throughout the night of D+1.

A review of the activities of the 466th Pcht. F.A. Bn. showed that the battalion committed an original strength of 27 Officers and 358 Enlisted Men to come in by parachute and a total of 2 Officers and 55 Enlisted Men to come in by glider. 12 howitzers were dropped in parachute loads and three howitzers were brought in by glider. A total of 1550 rounds of 75MM ammunition was also brought in Airborne.

Among the personnel, casualties were sustained as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
KIA	2	44
DOW	1	2
LWA & SWA	5	47
IIA	1	5
TOTAL	9 Officers	98 Enlisted Men

Aggregate Casualties 106 Officers and Men.

All of the howitzers that were brought in Airborne were eventually relayed in position and fired in support of the infantry. This is the first time a Parachute Field Artillery Battalion has made a combat jump and recovered all of its pieces to fire against the enemy. In addition, almost 100% of the ammunition was recovered.

A survey showed that awaiting on the ground the enemy had many strong fixed defenses. Included among these were 10 artillery pieces of 76MM calibre, two batteries of four guns each of 20MM Antiaircraft guns. The 466th Pcht. F. A. Bn. inflicted the following losses on the enemy:

Total prisoners taken:	320
Total enemy dead :	50
Total enemy wounded :	15
Enemy M/G destroyed :	20

Jumping with the 466th Pcht, F. A. Bn. was BRIG. GENERAL RIDGELY GAITHER, USA Commandant of the Parachute School and BRIG. GENERAL JOSIAH T. DALEY, USA Commanding-General of the Airborne Command. Both of these General Officers gave a first hand account of what takes place where a Parachute Artillery Battalion meets determined enemy resistance on the ground. Following the operation GENERAL GAITHER in addition to citing several individuals for awards wrote the following letter to the Division Commander:

2. In addition to individual commendations in 1 above, may I also compliment the combat efficiency of your entire 466th P. A. Bn., and of its outstanding Commander, LT. COL. BOOTH and his Executive, MAJOR HADLEY. Faced with a most difficult situation they fought rapidly and efficiently as infantry, cleared the DZ of enemy, attacked and secured gun positions and set up for artillery support of infantry before any contact had been made with the infantry. It was a privilege to have been associated with them.

/s/ RIDGELY GAITHER
BRIG. GEN. USA

KENNETH L. BOOTH
LIEUT. COL., F.A.

HEADQUARTERS
466TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO #452 U.S. ARMY

12 April 1945

SUBJECT: Casualty Report.

TO : Commanding General, Division Artillery, 17th Airborne Division,
APO #452, U.S. Army.

1. The following report is submitted as per Memorandum your Head-
quarters dated 10 April 1945:

GROUP 1 CIA
MEDICAL DETACHMENT

Stanford, Donald, 37551278, T/5 24 Mar
G Diemissewaki, Walter J., 36316466, Pfc 24 Mar

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Ideler, Martin, 12103158, Pfc 24 Mar
Johnson, William R., 36716740, Pfc 24 Mar
Lynch, Peter T., 39000882, Pvt 24 Mar
Reichenbach, Arno K., 32883205, T/4 24 Mar

BATTERY A

Wilson, Pearl, 35034217, T/5 24 Mar
McDonald, Henry G., 6387725, Sgt 24 Mar
Bourne, Ben F., 36351989, Pvt 24 Mar
O'BRIEN, JOHN L., O-1181393, 2nd Lt 24 Mar

BATTERY B

Black, Clifford R., 20423439, Pvt 24 Mar
Dimasimo, Joseph, 31332159, Pvt 24 Mar
Nesbit, Jack, 20237126, T/4 24 Mar
Pierce, Richard, 31392375, Pvt 24 Mar
Richardson, Allen, 35609557, T/5 24 Mar
Snellton, Kenneth, 36658137, Pvt 24 Mar
Yager, Quentin J., 36033458, Pvt 24 Mar
Bessant, David, 6847877, S/Sgt 24 Mar
Tripplett, Loyd, 38018871, Cpl 24 Mar
Zuhn, Fred, 31134643, Pvt 24 Mar
Wood, Charles, 31266989, Pfc 24 Mar
Whalic, Love, 35025214, Cpl 24 Mar
Haynes, Harry 36594971, Pvt 24 Mar

BATTERY C

Durham, Robert S. Jr., 54732066, Pfc 24 Mar
Fernandez, Henry B., 30423127, T/4 24 Mar
Haynes, Leroy L., 20514968, Sgt 24 Mar
Helm, Robert G., 36553232, Pfc 24 Mar
Horick, Pete, 33034643, S/Sgt 24 Mar
Kerrigan, Edward H., 33452922, Cpl 24 Mar
Kempfer, Elah E., 36450107, Pfc 24 Mar
McDonald, Kenneth C., 36864628, T/5 24 Mar

-2-

Casualty Report, ~~Front~~ FA on Cont'd
12 April 1945

Miller, Clair A., 37262855, 1st Sgt	24 Mar
Passmore, Robert E., 20316748, Pfc	24 Mar
Rhodes, Gene B., 15902016, Pvt	24 Mar
Shea, Frank L., 20123461, Pfc	24 Mar
Wheat, Warner R., 31102730, Cpl	24 Mar
Zaleski, Michael C., 42004936, Pfc	24 Mar
Infantino, Anthony, 32002715, Pvt	24 Mar
Iacaterra, Samuel, 20237189, Pfc	24 Mar
Yoch, Verne B., 37481555, Pfc	24 Mar
Jessup, John W., Jr., 39155423, Pfc	24 Mar
Booth, Harry B., 7024154, T/4	24 Mar
Freston, Louis G., 32277961, Pfc	24 Mar
Gongola, Eugene V., 36724819, Pvt	24 Mar
Minor, Jack W., 39039524, Pvt	24 Mar
PAYNE, DONALD F., 01171712, 1st Lt	24 Mar

DOW

JENNINGS, EARL F., 01179201, Capt	25 Mar	Bn Hqs
Hammerstrom, Ralph K., 37673973, Pvt	25 Mar	C Btry

SMA L/A

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

DoVsett, Joseph W., 39196715, Cpl	24 Mar
Galt, William H., 6950923, Sgt	24 Mar
Halarax, Walter L., 36716740, Pfc	24 Mar
Sander, Carl A., 20514206, T/4	24 Mar
Marchant, Gordon W., 6922894, S/Sgt	24 Mar
Hildenbrand, Roger T., 32789023, T/4	24 Mar
Wilmoth, Frank L., 20367238, Pfc	24 Mar
MULLIGAN, RONALD J., 1st Lt	24 Mar

BATTERY A

Radar, Dee R., 38566754, Sgt	24 Mar
McGraw, Melvin G., 36481356, Cpl	24 Mar
Hoid, Hugh P., 13004943, T/4	24 Mar
Rivers, James M., 34530210, Pfc	24 Mar
Sedillo, Frank, 39859370, Pfc	24 Mar
West, Lawrence A., 34450756, Pfc	24 Mar
Boatner, Melvin, 34849039, Pfc	24 Mar
Bowersox, Russel, 15307729, S/Sgt	24 Mar
Cottingham, Vando C., 33419040, Cpl	24 Mar
Fouli, Ralph D., 35152004, Sgt	24 Mar
Coring, Harold B., 36247826, Sgt	24 Mar
Mount, Glinton W., 32670971, T/5	24 Mar
Gray, Paul V., 35232593, Pfc	24 Mar
Bennan, David W., 35899757, Pfc	24 Mar
DUREE, CHARLES D., 018222481, 1st Lt	24 Mar
DICKERSON, ALBERT M., 01179760, 2nd Lt	24 Mar

BATTERY B

G Gordon, James, 20443670, Sgt	24 Mar
McIlroy, William, 14005673, Cpl	24 Mar
Phillips, George, 39380261, Cpl	24 Mar
Reed, Robert, 37559199, Pvt	24 Mar
Barringer, James, 20539297, Pvt	24 Mar

-3-

Casualty Report 400th Night FA Bn Cont'd
12 April 1945

Tripp, Charles H., 6467173, Pvt	24 Mar
Libetti, Joseph H., 3279952, Pfc	24 Mar
McGRAFT, JOSEPH B., C536975, 2nd Lt	24 Mar

BATTERY G

Brown, Samuel C., 18084840, Cpl	24 Mar
Curth, Harry A. Jr., 32844202, Cpl	24 Mar
Fresle, Theodore L., 36257612, T/5	24 Mar
Girven, Harlan C., 36450505, Pfc	24 Mar
Gritter, James R., 35612906, T/5	24 Mar
Hayward, James S., 11030512, Pfc	24 Mar
Hilgers, Darrell K., 37701221, Pfc	24 Mar
Kowalewski, Chester R., 37577507, Pvt	24 Mar
Hanson, Himan T., 30752143, Pfc	24 Mar
Miller, Harold F., 37345775, Pfc	24 Mar
Sveinsson, Robert L., 37550210, Pfc	24 Mar
Larrapodi, Frances J., 42054554, Pvt	24 Mar
Hockman, Roger D., 39116346, Pvt	24 Mar
Long, Mathew A. Jr., 1029512, Pfc	24 Mar
Martin, Francis B., 39111587, Pfc	24 Mar

SMA LIA

BATTERY H HEADQUARTERS

G MILLER, DAVID, C816692, Capt	24 Mar
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HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Cutherland, Joe F., 34095772, T/4	24 Mar
G Harris, Lloyd C., 36059286, Pfc	24 Mar
G Freeman, Donald L., 36471515, Pvt	24 Mar

BATTERY A

G Heid, Harold F., , Pvt	24 Mar
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BATTERY C

G Phillips, James P., 6934065, Pfc	24 Mar
Jordan, Walter C., 6862013, Pfc	24 Mar

MIA

GROUP II

KIA

BATTERY A

Austell, Joe S., 14000064, Pvt	28 Mar
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SMA LIA

BATTERY A

Letendre, Albert G., 20122355, Pvt	28 Mar
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GROUP III

SMA LIA

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Magill, John F., 33439667, Cpl	3 Apr
Watkins, Floyd L., 35291400, T/4	9 Apr

Casualty Report, 400th Night F.A. Bn Cont'd
12 April 1945

For the Commanding Officer:

George F. Robie
GEORGE F. ROBIE
Major, FA
Actg Ex

HEADQUARTERS
466TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO #452 U.S. ARMY

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Glider Operations.

TO : Commanding General, 17th Airborne Division, APO #452, U.S. Army.
(Thru: Division Artillery, 17th A/B Division, APO #452)

1. In compliance with Memorandum your headquarters dated 1 April 1945 the following report is hereby submitted.

2. The total amount of gliders used in operation was 17.

3.

SERIAL #	GLIDER	ABORT	REMARKS
20	41	No	Glider # 41 hit power line and made crash landing, but no one was injured. Glider landed about 2 miles to the north of the LZ. Pilot and co-pilot assisted in unloading.
	42	No	Glider # 42 landed approximately 600 meters northwest of the LZ. This glider crashed into a tree severely injuring Capt David Miller, and slightly injuring two enlisted men. The load carried by this glider was destroyed. Actions of the pilot and co-pilot are unknown.
	43	No	Glider # 43 landed 1500 meters northwest of the LZ. They had a good landing. The co-pilot was wounded during the landing. Pilot helped remove the equipment. The cable attached to the jeep for opening the nose of the glider failed to work, however the nose was forced open later. Mortar fire destroyed the rear half of the glider however the load was undamaged.
	44	No	Glider # 44 landed in the LZ. Landing was good but glider tore wing loose by hitting the tail of another glider. No one was injured nor was the load damaged. Pilot and co-pilot attempted to open the nose but were unable to do so. Passengers secured more help and load was removed. The pilot and co-pilot left the area before the load was removed.
	45	No	Glider # 45 landed in the LZ in the northwestern corner. Landing was excellent. One man was wounded by small arms while landing. Pilot and co-pilot helped unload the glider. Flak has slightly damaged the load. Glider was apparently undamaged.

Report of Glider Operation Cont'd
3 April 1945

SERIAL #	GLIDER	ABORT	REMARKS
20	46	No	Glider # 46 landed in the western tip of the prescribed LZ. The landing was good. The load was undamaged and secure. The pilot and co-pilot helped unload and remove the equipment.
47	No		Glider # 47 landed west of the railroad tracks and approximately one mile to the southwest of the LZ. Glider made a good landing. Heavy ground fire made it impossible to unload glider. Pilot and co-pilot moved away from the glider with the passengers to avoid the intense fire. The load was recovered later.
48	No		Glider # 48 landed at the western end of the LZ. Glider hit a ditch on landing and wrecked the front part of the glider. No one was injured nor was the load damaged. Pilot and co-pilot assisted in unloading the equipment.
49	No		Glider # 49 landed about a mile north of the LZ. Hit power line coming in which tore the tail off of the glider. No one was injured and the load was undamaged. Pilot and co-pilot helped unload and make search for other gliders.
50	No		Glider # 50 landed in the LZ. Glider hit another glider in landing and tore its tail off. No one was injured and the load was undamaged. Co-pilot was slightly injured immediately after landing. Pilot helped to unload equipment.
51	No		Glider # 51 landed west of the LZ by 200 yards. Landing was good but glider went through two fences on the way in. The nose of the glider was damaged somewhat. Load was undamaged. Pilot and co-pilot assisted men in unloading equipment.
52	No		Glider # 52 landed about 200 yards north of the LZ. Landing was good but hit fence and got stuck between out of glider. No one was injured and no equipment was damaged. Glider landed in a marshy area which made the load inaccessible.
53	No		Glider # 53 landed approximately two miles south of the LZ. Landing was good. The nose of the glider was damaged to such an extent from hitting fences on landing that it was impossible to remove the load. Pilot and co-pilot gave as much assistance as they could to help remove the equipment.
54	No		Glider # 54 landed approximately 2000 meters south of the LZ. Glider hit a fence and telephone pole on landing but no one was injured nor was the equipment damaged. However the glider had one wing smashed.

Report of Glider Operation Cont'd
2 April 1945

SERIAL #	GLIDER	ABORT	REMARKS
24	18	No	Glider # 18 landed approximately one mile to the south of the LZ. Glider landing was successful. Glider pilot and co-pilot helped the gun crew considerably in loading and unloading the howitzer and helped them drag it into position.
	19	No	Glider # 19 landed in the LZ. The load was quite secure. The pilot and co-pilot assisted the gun crew in the unloading of the howitzer and the pulling of it to the position.
	20	No	Glider # 20 landed approximately 2 miles north of the LZ. The landing wheels were torn off and one wing slightly damaged on landing. No one was injured and the load was secure. Pilot and co-pilot helped unload the equipment and moving it into position.

For the Commanding Officer:

CLEO V. HADLEY
Major, FA
Executive

HEADQUARTERS
466TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO #452 U.S.ARMY

REPORT ON MEDICAL DETACHMENT

The superior performance of the Medical Detachment of this organization, both as individuals and as a team, in the recent combat parachute jump in Germany warrants, in my opinion, a unit citation.

At the start of the operation the Medical Detachment consisted of sixteen men, the airborne portion of the battalion of four hundred and forty men. Our Detachment was divided thus; (1) the aid station group, consisting of the Battalion Surgeon and five men, (2) the battery aid men, two with each firing battery, (3) the glided portion, two drivers and our clerk, and (4) the ambulance driver with the ground lift.

The performance of the aid station group, all parachutists, was superb. The Battalion Surgeon, who jumped second only to the Battalion Commander, landed in the orchard near the proposed C.P. After checking the stick and verifying the location of the C.P. with Colonel Booth, he found the entire area under heavy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. Finding entry into the C.P. building impossible because of a machine gun emplacement in the doorway, he ran to the edge of the orchard and into the field to care for casualties on the field until such time as an aid station could be set up. The casualties were very heavy at this time, mostly from flank and machine gun fire during the jump. There were also increasing casualties from fire on the ground as the men began to assemble the guns under fire of the German troops who were well dug-in on the drop zone.

Landing about one hundred yards further down the field and about fifty

Report on Medical Detachment Cont'd

yards apart, T/4 Manuel G. Campos, 20424040, and T/4 Marion S. Daugherty, 35250092, were seen slowly working their way down the field giving care to the wounded and making mental note of their location hoping the much needed jeep-ambulances would arrive by glider in time to evacuate and save the lives of their seriously wounded comrades. Adding a great deal to their troubles was the unexpected arrival of the gliders of the Sixth British A/B Division, who had missed their landing zone and were having great difficulty in landing in the small space allowed by the drop zone. Many crashed, many burned. As per previous instruction of the Battalion Surgeon British soldiers were treated on an equal priority with American soldiers, and their casualties numbered nearly as high as ours.

T/3 Steve Miladinovich, 33011819, landed furthest north of the headquarters section and was almost immediately pinned down, having landed within thirty-five yards of an active artillery piece emplacement. His outstanding work came later in the aid station. Pfc Frank R. Harmer's, ASN 20817075, experience was much the same only he landed at the east end of the drop zone near the main highway and was held down by machine gun fire.

Upon returning to the C.P. the Battalion Surgeon found Headquarters Battery had cleared the orchard and building but the number of wounded in the area had increased a great deal. Entering the building after giving aid to the latter cases, he found S/Sgt Robert C. Carr, 18026003, had selected an aid station, had it cleared, and the station ready and operating. The wounded were already arriving in large numbers.

The achievement of Pfc (now Corporal) James R. Lefler, 32144109, was the outstanding one of the day. His glider with the precious jeep-ambulance had

Report on Medical Detachment Cont'd

missed the glider landing zone upon which he had been briefed and had landed at the far north-west corner of the parachute drop zone across the double track railroad, with great skill, ingenuity, and clear thinking while under heavy small arms fire he managed to unload his glider and work his way to the C.P., being the first of all the battalion jeeps to arrive there. He unloaded his much needed cargo of plasma, dressings, and splints and proceeded at once to the field where, with the assistance of Pfc Frank R. Harmer, he began the pickup of the wounded and their transportation to the aid station. Later these two men evacuated the treated cases from the aid station to the clearing station.

This is the time T/3 Steve Miladinovich showed great skill and medical knowledge, for to him fell the job of triage (sorting). It was his duty to see the wounded man first and send him to the correct section of the aid station, which now occupied four large rooms: (1) the seriously wounded department, operated by the Battalion Surgeon and S/Sgt Robert G. Carr, (2) the walking wounded or less seriously wounded department, operated by T/4's Manuel G. Campos, and Marion S. Daugherty, (3) treated cases needing immediate evacuation, and (4) treated cases who could be handled by our own station for several hours without jeopardizing the patients chance for complete recovery. Such classification is very difficult and requires constant examination and scrutinization, for a patient can rapidly pass from one classification to another. To T/3 Steve Miladinovich goes the credit for the outstanding achievement that although approximately 106 patients were treated not one patient died in our aid station.

Our clerk, Corporal Carl B. Greene, Jr., 6970597, made his way from the

-4-

Report on Medical Detachment Cont'd

glider to our aid station with two bullet wounds in his right leg. He reported that our other driver, Pfc Walter J. Dzienniszewski, 36316460, had been shot and killed by a German soldier at the same time that Cpl Carl B. Greene, Jr., had received his injuries. They were unable to recover our other jeep-ambulance.

The behavior of all our six battery aid men was superb, but the performance of three was outstanding. T/S Donald Stanford, 37551278, landed only twenty-five yards from a dug in machine gun nest and was killed in cold blood, being unarmed and wearing a large Geneva Convention Red Cross, while making his way to aid a wounded comrade. Every member of his stick was killed within a few minutes after touching the ground.

Pfc Fred C. Reeves, 34685223, T/S Donald Stanford's partner aid man, cared for their battery alone and saw them safely to their gun position. After reporting to the Battery Commander he asked permission to return to the field to help with the evacuation. It was while engaged in this work that he was hit in the thigh and had to be evacuated.

T/S John F. Champagne, 39039250, landed near a German hospital and with the help of two British glider infantry soldiers he took complete charge and for some time operated an aid station by himself. When more British arrived, he had them force the two German doctors and one German dentist to work on the casualties which were now coming in by litter bearer squads which he had organized. The clearing company later evacuated these cases.

I believe our Medical Detachment is entitled to a unit citation inasmuch as they functioned so efficiently under such adverse and unexpected circumstances. We were led to believe that there would be little flak, and

Report on Medical Detachment Cont'd

entire infantry regiment would be on the drop zone by the time we jumped, and fighter aircraft would neutralize any enemy installations present before the jump. None of these were true, but the flak was heavy, the infantry missed the drop zone, and the field was covered with dug in anti-aircraft batteries, artillery and machine gun positions. Headquarters Battery had a stiff fight for the C.P. and each firing battery had to assemble their guns under fire and clear their gun positions before laying the guns; incidentally every gun jumped was recovered, assembled, layed and fired. A record for Parachute Field Artillery.

KENNETH L. BOOTH
Lt Col., FA
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
466TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO #462 U.S. ARMY

18 May 1945

SUBJECT: Results of Special Airborne Forward Observer Group for Operation "Varsity".

1. Personnel:

a. Prior to explaining for the airborne operation "Varsity" the specially trained Forward Observer and Liaison Parties were attached to the units as indicated below:

Fire Direction Center 466th Preht FA Bn - 1 Liaison Party
1st, 2nd, 3rd Bns, 513th Preht Inf Regt - 1 FO Party each.

b. On the drop some all parties listed in a. above landed intact and joined their respective units. There was no infantry battalion without a functioning forward observer party who represented the reinforcing artillery in position west of the River Rhine.

2. Communication:

a. The SCR 609 radio was the primary means of communication for all parties. In the event that the Forward Observer with the infantry could not contact the reinforcing artillery-FDC directly there were two relays possible:

- (1) Thru the Liaison officer located at the direct support battalion (466th Preht FA Bn) FDC.
- (2) Thru the SCR 609 radio of a artillery Liaison plane that was particularly briefed to serve that purpose.

b. In all cases excellent radio communication was established direct with reinforcing battalions. There was no necessity of using the relays that were available altho the presence of the relay stations insured continuous radio contact.

c. The first radio contact direct to the reinforcing artillery was made by the Forward Observer attached to the 3rd Bn 513th Preht Inf Regt at approximately 1200 H on D-Day. The Liaison Officer with the FDC of the 466th Preht FA Bn was also contacted by the Forward Observer on D-Day and heard fire missions being sent by the FO with the 3rd Bn 513th Preht Inf Regt.

3. Missions:

a. On the afternoon and night of D-Day the FO with the 3rd Bn 513th Preht Inf Regt called for missions on targets located on the east side of the Issel River. These missions were called direct to the reinforcing artillery on the west side of the Rhine, altho the transmissions were audited by the Liaison Officer at the 466th Preht FA Bn FDC. The 466th Preht FA Bn was not used in these missions for the following reasons:

- (1) The pieces were laid initially in a westerly direction in order to be able to furnish immediate support to the 2nd Bn 513th Preht Inf Regt who were attacking the woods to the west. Turning the pieces on a 3200 mil shift would have resulted in some loss of time.
- (2) The support rendered by the reinforcing artillery was fully sufficient to accomplish the missions called for.
- (3) The 466th Preht FA Bn was cautious in the expenditure of its airborne supply of ammunition. The ammunition of the reinforcing battalions on the west bank of the Rhine was comparatively limitless.

b. On D+1 the FO with the 3rd Bn 513th Preht Inf Regt continued calling directly to the reinforcing battalions for fire missions with all transmissions being audited by the liaison officer at the 466th Preht FA Bn FDC. At approximately 1100 hours the 2nd Bn 513th Preht Inf Regt had taken its objective in the western part of the sector and the 466th Preht FA Bn relayed its pieces in an easterly direction. However, most of the fire missions called for by the 466th Preht FA Bn observers with the 3rd Bn of the 513th Preht Inf Regt were given over to the reinforcing battalions through the liaison officer in order to conserve the airborne load of ammunition. All missions so requested were executed by the reinforcing battalions.

During the night of D+1 all H and I fires were assigned to the reinforcing battalions with the purpose of conserving the ammunition of the direct support battalions. Again these missions were executed.

c. On D+2 the reinforcing battalions were used considerably in reinforcing the fires of the 466th Preht FA Bn which had a large number of fire missions resulting from the direct support of the 513th Preht Inf Regt as they advanced east across the Issel River. In addition, the FOs with the Infantry continued to fire observed missions working with the liaison officer at the 466th Preht FA Bn FDC auditing all transmissions.

The reinforcing units continued to execute fire missions until the attacking infantry had advanced beyond the range of the pieces located west of the Rhine.

4. Conclusions.

- a. The artillery plan for the airborne operation "Varsity" was conceived and expertly executed brilliantly. *brilliantly*
- b. The careful painstaking preparations and the meticulous briefing of all artillery units both airborne and the reinforcing units located on the west bank of the Rhine resulted in an artillery support for the operation that gave the attacking forces an overwhelming artillery superiority and a tremendous advantage over the defending enemy.
- c. The added fire power of the reinforcing units located on the west bank of the Rhine was an important factor in the success of the operation.

-3-

4. The forming and special training of Forward Observer and Liaison Parties who were to work with the reinforcing units was an especially important measure taken on this preparation for the operation.

KPB
KENNETH L. BOCH
Lt Col., F.A.

CGK

442TH FIGHT F A BN UNIT JOURNAL

FROM 0630 24 March, 1945

TO 1300 24 March, 1945

TIME DATED	IN	OUT NO	INCIDENTS, REMARKS, MESSAGES
24 March		0630	1 Bn left tent area for runways
	0730	2	General GATNER, General DALREY, Colonel DICKERSON, joined Bn for combat jump as observers
	0800	3	Bn completely loaded in C 47s
		0835	4 Bn Airborne
	1020	5	One complete howitzer section jumped west of Rhine River
		1015	6 Planes crossing Rhine River and encountering heavy flak, visibility out by heavy smoke screen
	1034	7	Bn jumped on assigned DI
	1025	8	Bn encountered enemy in close combat, attacking with every weapon available
	1026	9	Bnny 20 mm flak guns firing as ground weapons
	1030	10	Bn comr got S-3 and asst S-3 gave orders to S-3 to supervise the DI and asst S-3 to organize the FDC
	1045	11	Bn assembling guns and equipment under heavy small arms fire, mortar fire, and artillery fire
	1100	12	One "B" Btry Howitzer firing direct fire at enemy strong point in house
	1115	13	Previously abbed Bn CP, taken from enemy under small arms fire
	1130	14	CP and FDC organized and communications with temporary Div Arty CP established
	1132	15	Brig General GATNER arrived at CP
		1133	16 CP guard set up
	1135	17	Brig General DALREY arrived at CP
		1135	18 Gliders arriving in Bn area (British)
	1140	19	Col BOOTH arrived at CP
	1145	20	Radio communication established with B Btry
	1150	21	American Gliders arriving in Bn area
		1152	22 Col BOOTH left CP for Btry positions
	1156	23	Communications established with "A" Battery
	1200	24	Co mnications established with In Off with Infantry
	1208	25	Bn Aid Station set up and operating wounded coming from all directions
	1215	26	Communications established between Corps LdO and Corps Arty using Bq Btry radio set
	1220	27	Majr AMERSON and Lt WOOD arrived at CP
	1230	28	Glider pilots organized and placed in charge of PWs
	1245	29	Communications complete with all elements of BN
	1300		Bn still under small arms fire

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146TH FRONT F A BN UNIT JOURNAL

FROM 1230 24 March, 1949

TO 1800 25 March, 1949

<u>TIME DATED</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>INCIDENTS - REMARKS - MESSAGES</u>
24 March	1230		31	Bn in fire mission in support of Maf
	1345		32	General PERLPS arrived at the CP
		1400	33	General PERLPS LEAVE CP for Div arty CP
		1415	34	1st Lt HAMMACK placed in command of "A" Btry by order of Col BOOTH
	1445		35	Infantry elements arriving in and around Bn area
	1500		36	Col LIEBEL arrived at CP Small arms fire continuing from scattered points
	1515		37	13 Howitzers in position
		1520	38	Col LIEBEL left the CP
		1600	39	"A" Btry ordered to move to previously designated position
	1615		40	"A" Btry reported small arms fire met and overcome
	1645		41	"A" Btry move completed
	1700		42	Communications established with new Div Arty CP
	1800	4	43	14th Howitzer in position (A Btry was dropped 3 miles from the DE)
	2000		44	Sniper fire continuing
	2130		45	Col COUTTS arrived at CP
		2200	46	Col COUTTS left the CP
	2400		47	MIDNIGHT REPORT
				Bn Captured in Days Combat : Over 300 PWs
				5 75.6 Guns Intact
				Bn Destroyed : 6 75.6 Guns
				8 20mm AA gun positions
				12 Machine gun positions
				Bn Casualties : 2 Cfs KIA reported
				44 EM KIA reported
				5 Cfs, 2EA reported, 5WA and 1VAC
				44 EM 1WA and 5WA and 1VAC reported
				1 Off injured and evac reported
				6 EM injured and evac reported
				Bn Strength : 319 EM , 21 Cfs
				Bn Morale : Excellent
25 March	0125		48	C Btry reports heavy small arms fire going in btry area
	0900		49	C Btry reports enemy patrol overcome
	0800		50	Bn supporting attack of 3rd Bn 513th Inf east across Issal Canal
	0930		51	15th Howitzer and section in position (C Btry jumped west of Hane River on command of Air Crew Chief)
	1700		52	British armor arriving in Bn area

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44TH FRONT V A BN UNIT JOURNAL

FROM 2400 25 March, 1945

TO 2400 26 March, 1945

TIME DATED	IN	OUT	NO	INCIDENTS . REMARKS . MESSAGES
25 March	2400		53	MIDNIGHT REPORT Bn fired 27 rounds of ammo 75 mm 1 Off and 1 EM previously reported BMA now reported DOW Bn Strength : 21 Offs , 319 EM Morale : Excellent
26 March	1130		54	Bn land lift arrived in Bn area 1 Off, 1 WO, 103 EM
		2000	55	Bn held from direct support of 513th Prent Inf
	2000		56	Bn in direct of British 6 A/S Div
	2400		57	MIDNIGHT REPORT Bn fired 405 rds of ammo 75 mm Bn strength : 22 Offs, 1 WO , 421 EM Morale : Excellent

Original copy of Unit Journal forwarded. No file Copy retained.
The information shown is compiled from other records available in Battalion supplemented by memory of those participating in action described.

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


Geographical Section, General Staff, No. 4414. Published by War Office, 1944.

Geographical Section, General Staff, No. 4414. Published by War Office.

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Scale 1:25,000

SECTION C

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1 p. 119

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

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WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB 867 PENTAGON

307th Airborne Engineer Bn - History - Italy

22 Sep-30 Oct 43

863

HEADQUARTERS
307TH AIRBORNE ENGINEER BATTALION
CLASSIFICATION AFO 469, U. S. ARMY

CANCELLED

November 4, 1943.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

M. M. White, Capt AFO
WINGRADS COMMITTEE 12 June 46

SUBJECT: History of 307th A/B Engr Bn, 82nd A/B Div, from
1 October 1943 to 31 October 1943.

TO : Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division, AFO 469,
U. S. Army.

Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters and Service
Company moved by motor convoy from CASTELLAMARE to NAPLES, ITALY
on 1 October 1943, arriving at NAPLES at 0530. Companies A, B,
C, and H Co, 36 Engr Regt (Attached) arrived 2 October 1943 and
bivouaced in 31st Infantry Barracks (Italian), NAPLES, ITALY.

Companies engaged in checking bivouac areas and build-
ings for mines and booby traps and in doing minor road work in
NAPLES area. Water, light, and sewage reconnaissance was carried
on. Company A procured and assembled light plant for use in
division area. Company H maintained roads and cleared wreckage
with heavy equipment.

Water points were maintained by Hq and Serv Company at
various points in NAPLES, ITALY.

An explosion occurred in Battalion Area on 10 Oct 1943
at 0830 hours, wrecking south end of building occupied by Company
B, 307th A/B Engr Bn and Co H, 36th Engr Regt. Company H, 36th
Engr Regt relieved from attached on 10 Oct 1943. Battalion
engaged in searching debris for victims of the explosion until
18 Oct 1943, still maintaining searching parties for mines and
booby traps.

Battalion moved to bivouac area at CAMPO SPORTIVO
MILITARE on 10 Oct 1943.

From 20 Oct 1943 to 24 Oct 1943 Companies B and C
were on mine removal detail at MONTEDICUM.

Company A conducted a mine school for the 325th Inf
Regt from 25 Oct 1943 to 29 Oct 1943.

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~~Str. Hq. 307 A/B Engr. Bn. Subj. History of 307 A/B Engr. Bn. (Cont.) Page 2.~~

Company C attached to 504th Combat Team as of 26 Oct 1943,
building by-passes and jeep trails on the front line.


R. S. PALMER,
Lt. Col., 307 A/B Engr. Bn.,
Commanding.

2 Incls:

Incl No. 1 - S-2 & S-3 Journal.

Incl No. 2 - Casualty Report.

HEADQUARTERS
307TH AIRBORNE ENGINEER BATTALION
APC 469, U. S. ARMY

S-2 & S-3 JOURNAL

- 13
- Oct 1 - Operated WP at CASTELLAMARE. Placed signs on By-Pass from CASTELLAMARE to PORTO ANNUNCIATA. Moved to barracks in NAPLES 232513. Made reconn of CAMPODICHINO Air Field under fire. Set up WP in a Pasteurization Plant 232517.
- Oct 2 - WP moved 232517 to 241507. Delivered maps.
- Oct 4 - Reconn of city water systems. WP at CASTELLAMARE closed.
- Oct 5 - Set up WP with British at 223492. Delivered maps.
- Oct 6 - Set up WP at 242493. Reconn of water situation, city of NAPLES. Water supply situation map made.
- Oct 7 - Road reconn of AUTO STRADA - NAPLES to TORRE EL GRECO.
- Oct 8 - Moved WP 241507 to 233509. Delivered maps.
- Oct 9 - Road reconn from NAPLES to VILLA LIPURNO. Sent to map depot at PAESTUM for maps.
- Oct 10 - Reconn of city power and water systems. Moved to bivouac at 232509 after explosion in barracks.
- Oct 11 - Delivered maps.
- Oct 12 - Reconn of city sewer system. Made drawings of building demolished by explosion. Made operations sketches of line companies actions in campaigns of SICILY and ITALY.
- Oct 13 - Delivered maps.
- Oct 14 - Delivered maps.
- Oct 15 - Sent to map depot at MADDALONI for maps.
- Oct 16 - Made water and electric reconn. Distributed maps.
- Oct 17 - Overlays of water, power, sewer, dumps, and troop locations made.
- Oct 18 - Distributed maps.
- Oct 19 - Reconn of training area NE of POZZUOLI.
- Oct 20 - Reconn with B and C Coe of training area.
- Oct 21 - Sent to base map depot, NAPLES. Delivered maps.
- Oct 22, 23, & 24 - Sorting maps in map room.
- Oct 25 - Sent to map depot at MADDALONI for maps.
- Oct 26, 27, & 28 - Delivered maps for 504 CT operations.
- Oct 29 - Reconn to front lines at ALLIANO.
- Oct 30 & 31 - Usual inspection and supply of three WPs and occasional map issue.

R. W. Williams JWS
R. W. WILLIAMS,
Capt., 307 A/B Engr. Bn.,
S-2 and S-3.

* Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT OF

** Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

107 A/R ENGR BN
(Designation of Unit)

20 OCTOBER 1943

(Date)

N A M E			GRADE	ASN	* TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE OF CASUALTY	** FLYING OR JUMP STATUS	REMARKS (Place of Casualty)
(LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)						
Butcher, Herbert W			Pfc	6975344	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	All Casualties occurred in Italy, and
Coe, Robert T			Pvt	15078260	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	were sustained when enlisted
Denoyer, Albert J			Pvt	36122826	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	mens barracks were demolished
Fitzpatrick, William (NMI)			Pvt	32359057	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	by explosion of undetermined
Forney, Llywllyn G			Pvt	12082123	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	origin at app- roximately 0830
Gidner, Walter H			Cpl	36523989	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	10 Oct 43.
Hardy, Carl E			Pfc	18134234	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Hartzler, William R			Pvt	35369597	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Johannson, Donald F			Sgt	13086393	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Jordan, Joseph R			Pvt	13096498	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Kalat, Walter R			Pfc	36042489	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	

This report consists of 5 sheets. Control No.

NAFOUSA Form 6

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Page 1

(Signature)

(Title and Branch)

** FLYING AND JUMP STATUS CODES:

A - Pilot, Co-pilot, Command Pilot
B - Navigator
C - Bombardier
D - Observer
E - Flight Surgeon
F - Photographer
G - Radio Operator Gunner
H - Engineer Gunner
I - Armorer Gunner
J - Paratroops on Jump Status
K - Gunner
L - all others on Flying Status
Z - Not on Flying or Jump Status

* TYPE OF CASUALTY CODES:

KIA - Killed in Action
DOW - Died of Wounds received in Action
DOI - Died of Injuries received in Action
SWA - Seriously Wounded in Action
SIA - Seriously Injured in Action
LWA - Lightly Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)
LIA - Lightly Injured in Action (Hospitalized)
MLA - Missing in Action
GAS - Seriously gassed (Hospitalized)
POW - Captured by Enemy
INT - Interned as result of enemy Action
DUTY - Returned to Duty from a previously reported casualty status.

* Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

** Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT OF

307 A/B ENGR BN
(Designation of Unit)

20 OCTOBER 43
(Date)

N A M S			GRADE	ASN	* TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE OF CASUALTY	** FLYING OR JUMP STATUS	REMARKS (Place of Casualty)
(LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)						
Kirkland,	Harold	R	Cpl	35106831	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	All casual-
Koslosky,	Joseph	S	Pvt	33030147	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	ties occurred in Italy.
McCardle,	A. M.	(IO)	Pfc	14097569	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	See remark on Page 1.
Otopki,	Frank	(NMI)	Pvt	11034269	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Pultz,	Glen	M	Pvt	12072477	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Ratliff,	Russel	O	T/5	15053961	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Roles,	Robert	M	Evt	13083080	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Smith,	Roy	E	Cpl	6998426	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Thompson,	Lewis	R	T/5	37018430	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Tilleskar,	Hugo	R	Pfc	37311800	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	
Vastysnak,	Joseph	(NMI)	Pfc	33175008	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	

This report consists of 5 sheets. BCR Control No. _____

NATOUISA Form 6

Page 2

(Signature)

(Title and Branch)

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A - Pilot, Co-pilot, Command Pilot
B - Navigator
C - Bombardier
D - Observer
E - Flight Surgeon
F - Photographer
G - Radio Operator/Gunner
H - Engineer/Gunner
I - Armorer/Gunner
J - Paratroops on Jump Status
K - Gunner
L - all others on Flying Status
Z - act on Flying or Jump Status

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POW - Captured by enemy
INT - Interned as result of enemy action
DUTY - Returned to Duty from a previously reported casualty status.

* Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

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(See reverse)

BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT OF

307 A/B ENGR BN
(Designation of Unit)

20 OCTOBER 1943
(Date)

8

A A M S			GRADE	ASN	* TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE OF CASUALTY	** FLYING OR JUMP STATUS	REMARKS (Place of Casualty)
(LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)						
Vosburg,	Wellington	N	Pvt	33356720	KIA	10 Oct 43	J	All casualties occurred in Italy. See remark on page 1.
Cardew,	Louis	J	Gpl	16085022	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Catalano,	Joseph	(NMI)	Pvt	32193745	SWA	10 Oct 45	J	
DeMaio,	Enzo	C	Col	12049962	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Ellis,	Elmer	(NMI)	Pvt	20406903	LWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Fry,	Walker	O	Sgt	39160098	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Gsch,	Theodore	I	Pvt	19099177	LWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Hosman,	Billy	A	Pfc	37387750	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Jewell,	William	E	T/4	19013840	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Kurtz,	Edward	J	T/5	37330604	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Lapiers,	Richard	J	Pvt	12072158	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	

This report consists of 5 sheets. BCR Control No. _____

NAFOUSA Form 6

Page 3

(Signature)

(Title and Branch)

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DUTY - Returned to Duty from a previously reported casualty status.

* Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

** Insert code applicable.
(See reverse)

BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT OF

307 A/B ENGR BN
(Designation of Unit)

20 OCTOBER 1943

(Date)

NAME			Grade	ASJ	* TYPE OF CASUALTY	DATE OF CASUALTY	** FLYING OR JUMP STATUS	REMARKS (Place of Casualty)
LAST	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)						
Marceau,	Joseph	G	Pvt	11068184	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	All casualties occurred in Italy. See remarks on Page 1.
Moser,	Robert	L	Pfc	14122393	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Fartridge,	Walter	J	Pvt	6880370	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Pentecost,	Cecil	I	Pfc	34147109	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Rydzewski,	Carl	W	Pvt	13081478	LWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Schultz,	Robert	L	Pvt	19142047	LWA MD	10 Oct 43	J	
Smith,	Robert	W	Pvt	35319828	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Southerland,	Robert	D	Sgt	20454760	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Szakara,	Michael	(NMI)	T/5	36164336	LWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Taylor,	Raymond	E	Pvt	17058476	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	
Tedeschi,	Jack	L	Pvt	32175104	SWA	10 Oct 43	J	

This report consists of 5 sheets. BCR Control No. _____

NAFOUSA Form 6

Page 4

(Signature)

(Title and Branch)

10

FLYING AND JUMP STATUS CODES:

- A - Pilot, Co-pilot, Command Pilot
- B - Navigator
- C - Bombardier
- D - Observer
- E - Flight Surgeon
- F - Photographer
- G - Radio Operator Gunner
- H - Machine Gunner
- I - Armorer Gunner
- J - Paratroops on Jump Status
- K - Gunner
- L - all others on Flying Status
- Z - Not on Flying or Jump Status

TYPE OF CASUALTY CODES:

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- DOI - Died of Injuries received in action
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- LIA - Lightly Injured in Action (Hospitalized)
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- POW - Captured by enemy
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- DUET - Returned to Duty from a previously reported casualty status.

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(equals British SECRET)

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POW - Captured by enemy
INT - Interned as result of enemy action
DUTY - Returned to Duty from a previously reported casualty status.

HEADQUARTERS
307TH AIRBORNE ENGINEER BATTALION
APO 469, U. S. ARMY

October 18, 1943.

SUBJECT: History of 307th A/B Engr Bn, 82nd A/B Div, from 22 Sept 1943 to 30 Sept 1943.

TO : Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division,
APO 469, U. S. Army.

Bn Hq and H&S Co landed on Red Beach, PAESTUM, ITALY on 22 Sept 1943. Previously Companies A, B, and C had been committed by division to combat teams. Battle reports for the engr companies will be found in Combat Team Histories.

Battalion, less Co A and H&S Co, was assembled on 21 Sept 1943 and constructed 2 by-passes across CALORE and SELE RIVERS near CONTRONE (see attached overlays. Roads and bridges in vicinity of CONTRONE were checked for mines and demolitions. One particular device was noted, and report and sketch are attached.

Bn Hq and H&S Co advance detachment moved by motor convoy from PAESTUM to AGRIGOLA and constructed bridge across narrow gorge on mountain road 4 miles N. of AGRIGOLA (see overlay), passable for foot troops and 1/4 ton trucks. (Later rebuilt to carry 2-1/2 ton trucks by Company B, this Bn).

Bn Hq and H&S Co moved by motor convoy from AGRIGOLA to CASTELLEMARE on 29 Sept 1943 while awaiting line companies, who were to leave Red Beach via LCIs. All companies assembled in CASTELLEMARE on 30 Sept 1943. Harbor reconnaissance and road nets around CASTELLEMARE were checked and bridge reconnaissance made. Two sites were picked for reconstructed bridges across SARNO RIVER. Bridges were completed for traffic the same day.

Water points were operated throughout period covered.

R. S. PALMER
R. S. PALMER,
Lt. Col., 307 A/B Engr. Bn.,
Commanding.

Inlosures:

Journal Co A less 2nd Plat
Journal 2nd Plat, Co A
Journal Co B
Journal Co C less 1st Plat
Journal 1st Plat, Co C
Journal Bn Hq and H&S Co
Overlays and Sketches
Messages
Casualty Reports

382 - 2506 - 0.3

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MASTER

14

COMPANY "A" (LESS 2ND PLAT)

30TH A/B ENGR BN

JOURNAL

Sept 13 - Sept 30

- Sept 13: Left Castevtrano, Sicily at 0815 by plane. Flew to LICATA, SICILY, landing at 1015. Embarked on LCI at 2000 to mission unknown with 325 CT.
- Sept 14: Docked at PALERMO, SICILY at 2000.
- Sept 15: At 0430 headed NE and made beach landing at SALINA BAY, ITALY. No action.
- Sept 16: At 1000 marched 35 miles to position approximately 3 to 5 miles behind front lines.
- Sept 17: Waited for move to front.
- Sept 18: Company less 2nd Plat left area at 0600 by truck for ALBERNELLA, ITALY, arriving at 0730. 1st Plat attached to 1st Bn, 325th Inf to form defensive positions. Moved to area at 1030. Company Headquarters at CT Headquarters.
- Sept 19: No change.
- Sept 20: Company left area 1700 and marched half way and rode half way by truck to beach. 2nd Plat returned to duty minus one squad who advanced to mission.
- Sept 21: Loaded in LCIs at 1400 and landed at Maiora, Italy at 1830. Dropped equipment in bivouac area near Maiora and unloaded an LST of ammunition and supplies.
- Sept 22: Finished unloading LST at 0530 and performed regular bivouac duties.
- Sept 23: Left area at 0730 by truck to face of mountain and marched up and formed a front line position on forward slope. 1st Plat still in front, 2nd Plat sent back. Mt Vesuvius in view on left front about 12 miles. Four EK wounded on mountain trail by German 88.
- Sept 24: Still on front lines under heavy 88 fire. Captain's MI got blown apart. DeFalice was captured by Germans and turned loose.
- Sept 25: Moved out of position at 0700 to other side of mountain for sleep and rest. Moved back in defensive position at 1730 to hold pass for the night.
- Sept 26: No change.
- Sept 27: Moved out of defense position at 0700 and ate breakfast. Moved back on front lines 500 yds East of original position.
- Sept 28: Still in position.
- Sept 29: Left position at 0800 and marched over mountains to SANEDIDIO, ITALY, arriving at 1600. Bivouaced overnight.
- Sept 30: Left bivouac area at 1000 by truck and arrived at CASTELLERMARE, ITALY 1200. 2nd Plat rejoined company at 1200. They had been laying communication lines for 1st and 3rd Ranger Bn. Bivouaced in school house in CASTELLERMARE, ITALY.

2ND PLATOON, COMPANY "A"
10TH AVIATION ENGINE BN

JOURNAL

Sept 7 - Sept 29

- Sept 7 : Lt Tribe and 2nd Plat were detached to act as shore engineers for 319 OT. Loaded on LCI & LCT at Bizerte and sailed for MAIORI, ITALY. Part of platoon was separated while at sea.
- Sept 8 : At sea.
- Sept 9 : At sea.
- Sept 10: At approximately 2145 Lt Tribe and 12 EM landed at MAIORI, ITALY. No action.
- Sept 11: Attached to 540th Shore Engr.
- Sept 12: Worked as shore engineers with 540th.
- Sept 13: Lt Tribe was appointed town major by Lt Col Darby. Sgt Loveless and 11 EM still with 540th.
- Sept 14 to Sept 23: No change.
- Sept 23: T/4 Robertson, Pfc Burkhart, Pfc Surgoine, and Pvt Alex wounded by enemy mortar fire at TRAMONTI, ITALY; Lt Tribe, Cpl Lynch, Pfc Szabo, Pvts Morse, Harsh town major and assistants.
- Sept 24: Lt Tribe is at CHUIZI MOUNTAIN under mortar and artillery fire, waiting for Ranger "push" from 24 Sept to Sept 27 (mission to lay communication line from Ranger CP on CHUIZI MT. to SALA, ITALY. Mission begun on 27 and finished on Sept 28th at 1900. (Lt Erl was wounded by artillery shell at 1205 on Sept 25).
- Sept 29: Assembled Plat and marched to Co assembly area at SAN EGEGIO, ITALY. Arrived at 1200 on 30th at Bn CP at school house at CASTELLEMARE, ITALY.

COMPANY "B"
307TH AIRBORNE ENGINEER BATTALION

JOURNAL
Sept 14 - Sept 27

- Sept 14: Departed from BORAZZO FIELD, SICILY 2239 hours. 121 EM and 9 Off.
- Sept 15: Landed by parachute 0130 hours 2 k South of PAESTUM, ITALY. 120 EM and 9 Off; 4 EM hospitalized. Moved in to position SW slope of MT SOPRANO. Capt Johnson was sent to hospital, 1st Plat attached to 1st Bn; 2nd Plat attached to 2nd Bn; 3rd Plat attached to 3rd Bn; Co CP at Regt Headquarters.
- Sept 16: Platoons performing engineering missions. Reconnaissance was made by CP staff.
- Sept 17: No change.
- Sept 18: Capt Johnson returned from hospital and made reconnaissance into enemy territory.
- Sept 19: No change.
- Sept 20: No change.
- Sept 21: All platoons returned to company control. Bivouac area is on SW slope of MT SOPRANO.
- Sept 22: Company returned to Bn control. Moved bivouac to 1500 yds south of CONTRONE-- 025113 Italy 1:50,000 Sh 198-II Lavrino; or 0 025113 Italy 1:100,000 Sh 198 Campagna.
- Sept 23: 2nd Plat moved into bivouac at N945222 Italy 1:100,000 Sheet 198 Campagna, and are preparing by-passes at blown bridges on SELE RIVER. Rest of company in old bivouac bathing and washing clothes. Rocks rough on feet--water fine.
- Sept 24: 2nd Plat returned to company bivouac area. No change.
- Sept 25: No change. False alert.
- Sept 26: Company moved bivouac area to approximately 2.5 miles NE of PAESTUM. First rain in night.
- Sept 27: No change.

COMPANY "C"
307TH AIRBORNE ENGINEER BATTALION
APO 469, U. S. ARMY

JOURNAL
Sept 13 - Sept 29

- Sept 13: The company was told this morning to be ready to leave on an hour's notice. This afternoon at 1600 Capt Wight told us we would jump this date. At 1700 the company moved to Licata airport. It was found out that the 1st Plat had a separate mission and would jump tomorrow night. The 2nd & 3rd Plats took off at 1900 headed for Comiso, the assembly area of the CT. We stayed there until 2320, when the planes took off again, this time bound for Italy. At 0125 Sept 14 after a smooth journey from Sicily, we jumped on the beach-head established by the 36th Div. After assembling we moved out by Plats to Regt CP (504). The 3rd Plat was attached to 1st Bn, and 2nd Plat to Regt CP. The CT was bivouaced in a valley about 6 miles SW of Albernella.
- Sept 14: The 2nd Plat set up CP guard and 3rd Plat set up a road block at 1st Bn CP. The 2nd squad of 2nd Plat failed to jump. It was thought that their plane turned back over Sicily. Five men were injured on the jump. — S/Sgt Zeigler, T/5 Martin, Pfc Stant, Pvt Reoch, and Sgt DePolo. All were evacuated. Several 88 shells were dropped near the CP during the day, and we had two air raids.
- Sept 15: No change since yesterday. 88 shells came over intermittently. Each morning and afternoon German planes came over, but gave us no trouble.
- Sept 16: The 2nd squad, 2nd Plat, joined us this morning. They had jumped with 505 CT on night of Sept 14, and had been with that outfit. At 1100 the CP moved up to Albernella. The 2nd Plat joined with the 2nd Bn and moved out with them. The 1st Bn moved out with 1st Bn. The long arduous march up the hill to Albernella was completed about 1700. After a brief rest the Plat moved out to positions 2 miles NE of Albernella.
- Sept 17: Word was received this morning that Capt Wight had been killed. He was with the advance CP when it was barraged by German 88s. A piece of shrapnel hit him in the back. The 2nd & 3rd Plats on their way to their positions underwent severe 88 fire, but suffered no casualties. They dug in with their respective Bns on two hills just S of Altavilla. Severe 88 fire in morning and afternoon. It has the men jumpy. Water and food are scarce. Pvt Stokes was killed this morning by shrapnel from 88 shell. He was buried in his fox-hole. Sgt Warner got it this afternoon by an 88 also. As yet he hasn't been buried.
- Sept 18: Continued 88 fire during the night and throughout the day. The men are nervous from lack of sleep and the bombardment. There are no rations, but water is available. The men are hungry and tired, but determined.
- Sept 19: No shell fire all day. Apparently the Germans have given up trying to drive us off the hills. Rations finally reached the men. Their spirits have been boosted by the cessation of fire and acquisition of food. Relief is supposed to be on the way.
- Sept 20: We were relieved by the 1st Bn today. The CT moved

Co "C", 307 A/B Engr Bn Journal, Sept 13-Sept 29. Page 2.

~~Sept 20: back to first bivouac area for rest and reequipment.~~

(Cont)

Sept 21: Moved out this morning to join our Bn in construction of by-pass across Calore River near Controne. Set up in bivouac on the river. Keeping up maintenance of by-pass, and running water-point.

Sept 22: Hq Co arrived today, thus making the Bn complete with the exception of A Co. Continuing maintenance of by-pass. A detail removed prepared charges from a bridge. The charges had been booby-trapped, but were removed safely.

Sept 23: Resting in bivouac.

Sept 24: Resting in bivouac.

Sept 25: Lt Harris and 3 men (Miller, Ridley, Redmond) returned from 1st Plat. They are the only ones who have showed up.

Sept 26: Pfc Watson of 1st Plat returned today, thus adding one more. Continuing with camp duties.

Sept 27: Moved today with the Bn to temporary bivouac in valley SW of Albernella, awaiting movement by boat.

Sept 28: Company moved out to Paestum beach at 1300. Boarded LCIs at 1500 and sailed for Maori. Arrived at Maori at 1900 just as thunderstorm broke. We finally located a cave in which we bivouaced for the night.

Sept 29: After waiting around all morning for trucks we finally moved out at 1400. Arrived at Castellmare at 1600.

2ND & 3RD STICKS 1ST PLATOON
COMPANY "C", 307TH A/S BRIG. RE

JOURNAL

Sept 28 - Sept 14

Time of Jump: 0030 Sept 15, 1943.
Location of Jump Field: 5 mi NE of Paternapoli. Coord.:
Location of DZ: Valley SE of Santa Lucia and Avellino.
Distance from Jump Field to DZ: See map.

Sept 14, night: Equipment bundles of only 2nd Stick were dropped. All men with the exception of Pfc Fries assembled on them and obtained 12 TNT kit bags, 20 MIAL mines and fuses, 1 IMG, and 1500 rds of ammo, in addition to their other equipment. Three small German tankettes were observed reconnoitering the jump field so S/Sgt Morrison was detailed to use 14 of the mines to prepare for them. One patrol of 4 men and Sgt Kratsch was detailed to search for Pfc Fries. They were unable to find Pfc Fries at the end of an hour, so we moved out. We left the jump field after one tankette had been destroyed by a mine and the other two had retreated. We marched SW until 0700 and it had become too light to move safely. In this march we cut 17 different telephone lines and used 1/2 of our TNT to blow 3 towers in a high tension line. When we cut the line we noticed that a large German cross on a mountain behind CHIUSANO was extinguished; within an hour the lights were burning again. We then used 4 more of our TNT bags to wreck 2 towers and short and burn the lines between CHIUSANO and the point at which the Germans had made the repairs. Bivouac at PATERNAPOLI.

Score: 1 tankette, 17 telephone lines, 1 power line.
Sept 15, night: Noticed two German patrols during day, but were not molested. Continued course SW as soon as dusk fell; crossed small river with German patrols on both sides and found standard gauge railway with many communication lines. Removed one length of rail from curve and cut all of communication lines. Went into bivouac at 0600 about 1 mi NE of CASTELVETRE.

Score: 1 RR, 50 telephone lines.
Sept 16, night: Numerous German patrols were spotted during day and convoys were observed going thru CASTELVETRE. Spent night until 0100 looking for convoy park which Italians had said was around; we were unable to locate dump, so moved through German-held town of CASTELVETRE, cutting another power line and all communication lines. Encountered one German patrol and were searched for all night with German observation plane which dropped flares. Bivouaced in mountains SW of CASTELVETRE, and men ran out of food and water.

Score: 1 power line.
Sept 17, night: Three German patrols sighted during daytime; but we were not discovered. We broke camp at dusk and continued SW thru the mountains and climbed MT TAGLIANO. We bivouaced on SW slope over looking Highway No. 7, and the TAVERNOLE intersection and bridge. German convoys were observed moving in both directions, to and from AVELLINO. ~~_____~~ were on all known water holes. No water or ~~_____~~
Score: Nothing.

Sept 18, night: German patrols were sighted many times during the day but a scouting party consisting of Lt Kellogg & 4 men were not discovered. This party found a way across Highway No. 7 and a good location to use our remaining 6 mines and 2 TNT kit bags. The location found was a very well defiladed single span concrete arch bridge. This night the 27 men crossed to the SW side of the road and the north side of the bridge, and took up defensive positions upon heavily wooded slope. Sgt Hayes, Sgt Kratsch, and Lt Kellogg took up position by bridge, which was well covered by our men's fire. We allowed one serial of convoy to pass unmolested and then mined bridge with three mines (US M1A1) and two TNT kit bags with pressure type firing devices, and then connected the five explosives with primacord. We then withdrew and waited. The first truck of a serial went through the bridge, and the second vehicle hit the mines. This vehicle was a troop carrying truck headed for AVELLINO. Two armored personnel carriers arrived at the bridge and shot MGs all around the hills attempting to draw our fire. Everything subsided in 1/2 hour, and we had 3 mines left. The procedure was repeated and another troop carrier was blown up. Within 4 minutes two Mark IV tanks were at the bridge and fired 75s into the hills—we still had no definite targets, so we did not betray our positions. A company was observed starting to envelop our flanks, but we were well protected by heavy brush. During the resulting confusion we withdrew to the top of the mountain and the German patrols became mixed up and fired into each other. We then changed course to the W and the only other enemy resistance was a plane dropping flares. We went into bivouac at 0700 after finding a water hole.

Score: 2 German troop carriers and an estimated 24 German casualties.

Sept 19, night: We moved down to SAN STEFANO DEL SALE at dusk and obtained food and rested all that night, after discovering that AVELLINO was still in German hands. Bivouac at SAN STEFANO DEL SALE.

Score: Nothing.

Sept 20: Sent Pvt Wood to hospital. Observed large concentrations of German troops moving back to valley of SANTA LUCIA. They went into bivouac and started stringing wire. We moved out south, going about 200 yds above the German bivouac area, and attempted to cross the valley at SANTA LUCIA; but ran into heavy concentrations of German troops. Bivouaced at 0300 on West slope of the mountain East of SANTA LUCIA. Obtained water and food.

Score: Nothing.

Sept 21: Went further South down valley thru small German bivouac area. Were surprised by airplane flare in middle of bivouac—no casualties, but we were forced to retreat to hills by large German patrols. Bivouaced on mountain side above SAN SOUSSIA. No food and water.

Score: Nothing.

- Sept 22: Arrived at top of mountain at 0700 in morning, and were bombed by American planes at 0730 before we had finished digging in. Found sheep wounded by American airforce, and cooked it. Still no water. Bivouaced at top of mountain between SAN SOUSSIA & VOLTURARA.
Score: Nothing.
- Sept 23: Obtained water and found potato field. Men rested all day and tried to regain strength. Our patrols discovered Germans had moved from VOLTURARA with only patrols left in the hills. Men were now considered too weak to fight. Bivouaced at top of mountain. Continual artillery fire.
Score: Nothing.
- Sept 24: Men continued to rest, and 14 men went to try to find food. A British bomber flying over exploded in the air. Two men parachuted down, and Lt Kellogg was able to rescue Sgt J. L. McAninch, R-78612, 24th Sqdrn SAAF, under hail of German AA fire. During rescue our positions were bombed and the chute of the Sgt caught a stick. The Sgt had foot almost shot off and was badly burned all over. Lt Kellogg used morphine, sulfanilamide powder, and sulfadiazine tablets in administering first aid. All water this day went to the Sgt. The other aviator was captured by the Germans. Same bivouac. Patrols of our men found Germans had moved bivouac closer to AVELLINO. Continued heavy artillery fire.
Score: Nothing.
- Sept 25: Obtained food for men and water for all, including wounded man. Attempted to cross valley of SANTA LUCIA with wounded man; but were driven back by artillery fire. Patrols found that Germans had withdrawn from SANTA LUCIA.
Score: Nothing.
- Sept 26: Bombing, strafing, and artillery fire all day. Attempted to find doctor for wounded man and food for men. Sgt Kratsch and 4 men discovered location of German patrol. German patrol moved before we could get our men to capture it.
Score: Nothing.
- Sept 27: Moved out of VOLTURARA area and attempted to take Sgt McAninch to MONTELLO which we had heard was in hands of English. Had to abandon Sgt McAninch at an Italian house after carrying him over one mountain. Men were in bad physical condition. Rained all night and we continued on course to MONTELLO. Encountered 4 German patrols which were making much noise; they fled in the dark woods so we had no targets. Sighted no friendly troops. No food, no sleep, no water.
Score: Nothing.
- Sept 28: At 2300 ran into patrol of Co C, 1st Bn, 7th Inf, 3rd Div at MONTELLO. Aided in taking a German patrol. Relieved at 2400. Guided patrols to Sgt McAninch.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND H&S CO
307TH A/B ENGR BN

JOURNAL
Sept 22 - Sept 30

Bn Hq and advance detachment of H&S Co embarked on LSI at 1530 on Sept 22, 1943 at TERMINI IMERSE, SICILY. Companies A, B, and C had been attached to the division combat teams. Lt Col Palmer, C.O., and Capt Gibson, S-4, had flown to ITALY on 18 Sept 1943 to check on engineer supplies and to make advance engineer reconnaissance. Companies B & C -- one platoon had, under the command of Lt Cpl Palmer, made 2 by-passes across Calore River near Catrone and across Sele River (see attached company journals and overlay) and until 23 Sept were maintaining water points and repairing by-passes on Calore River.

Bn Hq and advance detachment of H&S Co arrived Red Beach near PAESTUM, ITALY at 1230 on 23 Sept 1943. Engr equipment consisted of 2 Bantam Bulldozers and 1 airborne air compressor. Moved to engr area as designated by 82d Div on 24 Sept and used all available men and equipment to improve by-passes on Calore River.

Period 24 Sept 1943 to 28 Sept 1943 organized road reconnaissance and removal of demolitions from prepared bridges as left by enemy. (See attached maps and overlays).

Bn Hq & H&S Co left Catrone area by motor convoy on 28 Sept 1943 for AGRIGOLA. Lt Col Palmer, C.O., and 1st Lt Kirkwood, ADJ, had made advance reconnaissance two days previously. Immediately on arrival at AGRIGOLA personnel of H&S Co under supervision of Capt Williams and Capt Gibson constructed a bridge across blown stone arch bridge approximately 4 miles N of AGRIGOLA. Bridge completed for 1/4 ton trucks and foot troops at 1810 hours, at which time patrols moved across.

On 29 Sept Bn Hq and H&S Co left AGRIGOLA after checking roads for mines for CASTELLENMARE, ITALY and established CP and Battalion bivouacs in Elementary School at CASTELLENMARE. Companies B and C rejoined Bn and repaired bridges across SARNO RIVER N of CASTELLENMARE at points previously reconnoitered by Bn Hq (see overlay and maps).

On Sept 30, 1943 H Co, 36th Engr Regt was attached and Co A 307 A/B Engr Bn, rejoined Bn. Water points established and entire Bn bivouaced in Elementary School. Harbor reconnaissance report was submitted to Div, and road nets from CASTELLENMARE were checked for mines.

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	Phone NUMBER
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)		(CLASSIFICATION)
No.	DATE 25 Sept 43	
To	307 A/R Engr Bn.	
052029 - Stone bridge 5 spans 1 Pier 2 spans destroyed. 30yd gap By-pass for Jeeps only but could be made passable with few hours work.		
09A039 - Single span stone bridge completely destroyed - Chasm 10'-0" wide - 30'-0" deep.		
G-2 from recon reports.		TIME SIGNED
APPROVED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	Phone NUMBER
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)		(CLASSIFICATION)
No.	DATE 29 15 35 SEPT	
To	CO, RINGB. FORCE Co, 307th ENGRS Co H, 36th ENGRS	
RELIEVED FROM YOUR COMMAND AND ATTACHED 307th ENGRS AT ONCE REDGWAY		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME SIGNED
APPROVED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

24

Office Date Stamp

No. of Groups
GR.CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONSIN
OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

307 A/S Bngr Pn.

FROM

CE 10 Corps.

Originator's Number

X1

Date

30

In Reply to Number

As

for

as

9

has

at

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bridging
Engineers
anythese
SARNO
①is
at
Will
①

change

no
298364
informintention
by
youof
British
ofThis message may be sent As Written
by any means

(except)

.....) Wireless

Signature.....

This message must be sent in Cipher
if liable to interception or to fall intoJ. Hansen
Capt.Originator's Instructions
Degree of Priority

Time of Origin

30 1715 A

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

System In	Time In	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

29 17 30 SPT

Col PALMER

Before final decision on
 BDE site, bit road on far
 side must be recommended to
 point of junction with Coast Road.
 When decision is made please
 push budget construction eqy
 and meet with passage of 2/12/44
 trucks is ok. Railway 21/

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 11/2 MSG CEN No. 8 (CLASSIFICATION) RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT IN MESSAGE CENTER IN PUPILARY)

No. 7 DATE Sept 23

To: CG 307 Engr.

1. Remove existing proposed demolition
 for TAMMONG JA concrete at
 POLLA (267137) ATENA
 (267137) AT (1-2-44)

2. SAME work at FASAKUWA/R
 concrete at (083027) and S. 60.
 REMOVED if not already accomplished.
 Railway

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Palmer

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. (CLASSIFICATION)

MESSAGE (SUBMIT IN MESSAGE CENTER IN PUPILARY)

No. 1 DATE 26 SEPT 1943

To: G-2, 82 Div

1. BRIDGE OUT N 952233, BR PASSED.
 SMALL HOLES VICINITY N 955220 -

2. BAD ROAD APPROX 1/2 MILE PASSA

3. BY PASSES N 932233, N 946223, O. 02211
 WILL NOT BE PASSABLE AFTER RAIN

4. No prepared DEMOLITIONS AT POLA
 267137 AND ATENA 297070.

5. NINES REMOVED FROM BRIDGE N. 173046
 C.O. 347 ENGR. O.B. 05


OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR PALMER SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

W. H. ... Capt.


**OPERATIONS
SEPT 28-30 1943**

OVERLAY FOR MAP ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 47 NAPOLI



**OPERATIONS
SEPT. 21-26, 1943**

TO: ISOLA
OVERLAY FOR MAP ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 48 CAMPANIA



**OPERATIONS OVERLAYS
307th ENGINEER BATTALION
SEPTEMBER 1943**

23

40

50

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


40

BRIDGES CHECKED TO EXP. AS FAR AS POSSIBLE
O-1105 SEPT. 25-26

BY-PASS WITH FORDS, SEPT. 22-24
ON LESS C.A.B. ASSEMBLED HERE
29 SEPT. 1943

REPAIRS AND MAINTAINED AS

By-pass with fords



DETAIL
 $\frac{3}{4}'' = 1'-0''$

BRIDGE
 MINED BY GERMANS
 SOUTH OF CORLETO O-173046

REMOVED BY 1ST PLAT. CO. C.
 307th ENGR. BN. 26 SEPT 1943.

231300

To Co 307th Eng Bn

1. On continued recon this AM I discovered another 1-way narrow lane by-pass about a mile or two beyond the blown bridge over the S&L. On this rd was a small wooden bridge that didn't look like it would hold a 2 1/2 ton truck fully loaded -

2. Check the reason for by pass maybe you could find a shorter better by pass -

3. Let me know this evening

1/1/65

GF

*Folder
124*

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

382-71003
(12116)
Master



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

3194 Elder VA Bn Historical Record - Italy

6 Sept - 8 Oct '43

Folder #1

864

HEADQUARTERS 319TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO 469, U.S. Army

October 30, 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Historical Record for Month of October.

TO : Commanding General, 82D A/B Div., APO 469.

THRU : Commanding Officer, 82D A/B Div. Art., APO 469.

In compliance with Par. 16, AR 345-105, and Changes Number 3, dated March 9, 1945, the History of this Battalion for the month of October 1945, together with supporting documents, is transmitted herewith.

James C. Todd
JAMES C. TODD

Major, P.A.,
Comdg.

Incls:

- 4 - Copies of Unit History
- 1 - Copy of Unit Journal
- 1 - Copy of Casualty Report
- 3 - Overlays

Environmental Group

1st Ind.

ASH/ejc

HEADQUARTERS 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION ARTILLERY, APO 469, U.S. Army, 31 Oct., 1945.

TO: Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division.

1. Forwarded.

For the Division Artillery Commanders

Augustin S. Hart, Jr.

AUGUSTIN S. HART, Jr.

Major, Field Artillery

Adjutant.

Incl: n/c

382-FA(1)0.5

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MASTER

A-1

DOWNGRADED TO:
CLASSIFICATION REL.

HEADQUARTERS 519TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY ~~RE~~ ~~SECTION~~ OF 220 P.H.C.
APO # 469, U. S. Army

HISTORICAL RECORD 519TH GLIDER FA BN FOR OCTOBER, 1943

Date

Entry

On September 30, the battalion was in bivouac in the vicinity of Castel-lamare. At 2100 hours, on that date, verbal orders were received from the Division Commander, to move the battalion forward to the vicinity of Torre Annunziata with the mission of supporting the 505th Parachute Infantry which, at that time, was assisting the British 23rd Armored Brigade in the approach to Naples. The Battalion Commander, S-2 and S-3 proceeded to Torre Annunziata where instructions were received from the Brigadier commanding the 23rd Armored Brigade, covering the situation and position area to be occupied. The S-2 returned to the bivouac area and guided the battalion forward to a rendezvous area in the vicinity of the main street intersection in New Pompeii, arriving at 0330 hours, October 1. The Executive and the Battery Commanders with their parties reported to the Battalion Commander at the Command Post which was then located in the railroad station at Torre Annunziata. The Battalion Commander issued an oral order covering the situation, mission and position area. The situation was as follows: The 23rd Armored Brigade is being held up by a strongpoint located on the prominent hill north of Torre Annunziata (see overlay). The 505th Parachute Infantry will attack at 0900 hours, October 1, driving the enemy to the north. The mission of the battalion was to support the 505th Parachute Infantry. In compliance with the Battalion Commander's order the batteries occupied positions selected by the Executive, as shown on overlay, prior to the hour of attack. The CP was moved forward and placed just opposite the 505th CP (see overlay). At 0830 hours advance patrols of the 505th Infantry reported that the enemy had abandoned our objective and units of the 23rd Armored Brigade followed closely by the 505th Parachute Infantry and this battalion, moved forward into Naples without opposition. After arriving in Naples, the battalion immediately went into reserve at the city's railroad station. Enemy troops were still reported in the north part of the city, and armed mobs of Italian civilians were numerous. On October 2nd, the battalion moved to its assigned area and began its mission of police. Many arms, ammunition, and demolitions were taken from willing civilians.

On the morning of October 4th, on VOOG, the battalion broke bivouac and prepared to move forward to Villa Literno, and support the 505th Parachute Infantry. At 1600 hours the battalion moved forward toward Villa Literno, but found the road blocked by vehicles just south of Qualiano. Orders were received from the Commanding Officer, 505th Parachute Infantry to bivouac for the night and to move forward into position as soon as the crowded road would permit. The battalion stayed alongside the road for the remainder of the night.

At dawn on October 5th, the battalion moved forward to rendezvous on the road three miles south of Villa Literno. At 1500 hours Lt. Col. Bertsch was ordered back to Naples and on VOOG, Major Todd, Executive, assumed command of the battalion. At nightfall the road was cleared sufficiently to allow the battalion to move forward over three difficult diversions to Villa Literno. The battalion executive had selected positions on a previous reconnaissance, and the batteries moved into position at dawn of October 6th.

Early on October 6th the mission of the 505th, supported by this battalion was as follows: Hold defensive positions along the canal Regi Lami and await arrival of infantry units of the 46th Division (British). Due to heavy friendly patrols operating as far north as the Volturno River, none of the batteries were able to fire, maximum range being just south of the river. Battery "C" was

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immediately displaced to a forward position (see overlay) to cover these friendly patrols. Forward observers of this battalion pushed forward to the town of Arnone and encountered heavy enemy artillery fire. Since they were beyond maximum range, all forward observers except Battery B observer who was adjusting some British 25-pounder batteries, moved back to the MIA. Lt. Fitzgerald, the Battery B forward observer, was killed this day while overseeing the safe evacuation of his personnel from the town during an enemy counter-attack. During this night an enemy patrol of fifty men broke through and penetrated to Battery C's position but were forced to retreat before any damage was done. The battalion CP was heavily shelled at intervals during the afternoon and most of the night.

Activity on October 7th was confined to Battery C, the only battery to fire during the whole mission. Enemy activity was confined to patrols which were kept pinned down or scattered by this fire all during the day. At 1300 hours the Battalion Commander reported to 505th GP and received orders to prepare to move back to Naples at dawn on October 8th. Infantry and artillery elements of the 46th Division (British) moved into position at 0630 hours October 7th and the 505th Parachute Infantry together with this battalion commenced withdrawal at dusk to bivouac areas.

At dawn, on October 8th, this battalion was released from combat team control and began the return march to Naples, arriving in its assigned area at 0815. After two days of cleaning equipment and materiel the battalion again took up its mission of patrol and police in the city of Naples.

James C. Todd
JAMES C. TODD
Major, FA
Comd.

Annexes:

1. Unit Journal.
2. Casualty Report.
3. Position Overlay, Torre Annunziata Area.
4. Position Overlay, Villa Literno Area.
5. Concentration Overlay, Villa Literno Area.

HEADQUARTERS 319TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO #469, U. S. Army

JCT-bts

October 29, 1943

SUBJECT: Battle Casualty Report

TO : AGO 82D A/B Division, APO #469, U.S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is a report of "WIA, MIA, and KIA" of this Battalion for the period from October 1, 1943 through October 8, 1943:

K I A

1ST LT BENJAMIN L. FITZGERALD 0445349

M I A

CPL ERNEST P. RAULERSON 1A081153 GSW

PVT ROBERT F. MILLER 36629007 GSW

James C. Todd
JAMES C. TODD,
Major, P.A.,
Comdg.

Annex No. 2

3

HEADQUARTERS 519TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO 469, U.S. Army

JOT-jk

November 12, 1945

SUBJECT: Journal of Experimental Group.

TO: Commanding General, 82D A/B Division, APO 469, U.S. Army

Forwarded herewith Journal of Experimental Group of this battalion,
from October 20, 1943 to November 1, 1945.

James C. Todd
JAMES C. TODD
Major, F.A.,
Comdg.

1 Incl:

1 - Journal of Experimental Group.

JOURNAL

319TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION EXPERIMENTAL GROUP

OCTOBER 20th, 1943

The 319th Glider F.A. Bn. Experimental Group composed of the following personnel: 1st Lt. R.S. Simpson - Hq; S/Sgt R. McArthur, Sgt. J.H. Brewer; Sgt. J.F. Rafferty; Sgt. R.V. Fisher - Btry "A"; Sgt. L.J. Small; Sgt. B.J. Stocks, Cpl. M.E. Chadwick, Cpl. F. Vujevic - Btry "B"; Sgt. R.W. Wade, Sgt. W. Edwards, Sgt. W.V. Davis, Cpl. A.W. Hein - Btry "C"; left Pomigliano Airport, Italy, about 1100 hours and arrived at Comiso Airport, Sicily about 1300 hours.

OCTOBER 21st, 1943

Established bivouac area at Comiso Airport, Sicily, with 325th Inf. Experimental Group. Attached for rations to 319th Glider F.A. Bn., Rear Echelon.

OCTOBER 22nd, 1943

Tested radio communication using SCR 609 from plane to plane and from plane to ground (used O47 planes). Lt. Simpson operated the set in plane No. 1; Sgt L.J. Small in plane No. 2 and Sgt. B.J. Stocks operated the ground set. The results of the test were poor and considered not conclusive.

S/Sgt. R. McArthur and the remainder of the Group experimented with various methods and aids in loading the 105mm Howitzer.

OCTOBER 23rd, 1943

Lt. R.S. Simpson and S/Sgt R. McArthur in a glider loaded with a 105mm Howitzer, flew to a height of 12,200 feet above Comiso Airport. The glider was released at 12,200 feet about 13 miles from the airport; it was over the airport at 6400 feet. The entire flight lasted 77 minutes and the glider glided 26 miles at a constant indicated air speed of 90 miles per hour from the point of release at 12,200 feet, to the point of landing at the Comiso Airport. The flight was made in daylight.

OCTOBER 24th, 1943

Lt. R.S. Simpson, Sgt. J.F. Rafferty, and Cpl. A.W. Hein were in a glider, No. 3; and Sgt. R.W. Wade and Sgt. W. Edwards were in glider No. 4 of a formation of four gliders and four O47 tug planes that took off from Comiso Airport and made a 35 minute daylight formation flight completed by a formation landing at the airport. Glider No. 3 carried a 1/4 ton truck and glider No. 4 carried a 105mm Howitzer. During the flight radio communication, using SCR 609, was carried out very successfully from glider to glider, and from glider to ground. The ground station was operated by Sgt. L.J. Small.

JOURNAL OF 319TH GLIDER F.A. EW. EXPERIMENTAL GROUP CONTINUED

OCTOBER 25th, 1943

Lt. R.S. Simpson and S/Sgt. R. MoArthur in glider No. 1, Sgt. W. Edwards, Sgt. R.V. Fisher, and Sgt. B.J. Stocks in glider No. 3, Sgt. R.W. Wade, Sgt. L.J. Small, Sgt. W.V. Davis, Sgt. J.H. Brewer, Cpl. A.W. Hein, Cpl. M.E. Chadwick, and Cpl. F. Vujevic in glider No. 6, flew in a formation of eight gliders which took off from Comiso Airport and made a 40 minute flight, in two formations of four gliders each, to Ponte Di Olivo Airport. The gliders landed on skids having jettisoned tactical landing gear over Comiso Airport. Glider No. 1 carried a 105mm Howitzer, glider no. 3 carried a 1/4 ton truck, and glider no. 6 carried a personnel load of 13 men. During the flight, radio communication, using SCR 609, was again tested from glider to glider and found very successful. The flight was made in daylight.

OCTOBER 26th, 1943

Lt. R.S. Simpson and Sgt. L.J. Small in plane No. 2, Sgt. R.W. Wade and Sgt. W. Edwards in plane No. 4, made a night flight in C47 planes to again test possibilities of radio communication from plane to plane and from plane to ground, using SCR 609. The planes were towing CG 4A gliders in a night formation flight. The radios in both planes were placed in the open side doors with the aeriels projecting out of and above the plane. Communication during the entire flight was good.

OCTOBER 27th, 1943

Inclement weather prevented plane and glider flights.

OCTOBER 28th, 1943

Group experimented with loading the 105mm Howitzer for time. Lt. R.S. Simpson, S/Sgt. R. MoArthur, Sgt. R. V. Fisher, Sgt. J.H. Brewer, Sgt. B.J. Stocks, Cpl. A.W. Hein, flew in glider No. 4 of formation of four gliders in a 35 minute night flight over Comiso Airport. Purpose of the flight was to practice night formation flying and landing.

OCTOBER 29th, 1943

Practiced night loading and unloading of the 105mm Howitzer.

OCTOBER 30th, 1943

Lt. R.S. Simpson, Sgt. R.W. Wade, Sgt. W. Edwards, Sgt. J.F. Rafferty, Cpl. F. Vujevic in glider No. 8, Sgt. L.J. Small, Sgt. W.V. Davis, Cpl. M.E. Chadwick, in glider No. 6, Sgt. R.V. Fisher, Sgt. B.J. Stocks, Sgt. J.H. Brewer in glider No. 4 flew in a formation of seven gliders that took off at Comiso Airport about 1710 hours towed by C47 tugs carrying paratroops and flew to Agrigento Airport, landing there about 1810 hours. Glider No. 4 carried a 1/4 ton truck, glider No. 6 carried a 1/4 ton truck, glider No. 8 carried a personnel load of ten men. Radio communication was carried on from glider No. 2 to glider No. 8 in a successful manner. The flight was a tactical training exercise. Glider No. 2 with S/Sgt. R. MoArthur and Cpl. A.W. Hein, was loaded with the 105mm Howitzer; but, the tug ship

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JOURNAL OF 319TH GLIDER F.A. BN. EXPERIMENTAL GROUP



accelerated too fast on the take off, causing the tow rope to break and to snap back through the glider nose, so damaging the glider that it was not able to make the flight. No personnel were injured. The landing at Agrigento Airport was made darkness, using seven tactical lights placed there by a Pathfinder team which dropped on the field 10 minutes before the gliders came in to land.

OCTOBER 31st, 1945

Preparation of plans for Training Exercise No. 2 at Agrigento Airport.

NOVEMBER 1st, 1945

Training Exercise No. 2 began at 1650 hours at Cowiso Airport with the take off of eight C47 tugs carrying paratroops and towing eight gliders. Lt. R.S. Sims, Sgt. R.W. Wade, Sgt. W. Edwards, Sgt. J.F. Rafferty, Cpl. F. Vujevic, and four men from the 325th Inf. Regt. were in glider No. 5; Sgt. Inf. Small, Sgt. M.V. Davis, Cpl. M.E. Chadwick, were in glider No. 6; Sgt. R.V. Fisher, Sgt. B.J. Stocks, and Sgt. J.H. Brewer, were in glider No. 4; S/Sgt. R. McArthur and Cpl. A.W. Hein were in glider No. 2. Glider No. 3 carried a personnel load, glider No. 6 carried a 1/4 ton truck, glider No. 4 carried a 1/4 ton truck, and glider No. 2 carried a 100mm howitzer. The gliders were cut loose from the tugs at an altitude of about 700 to 800 feet over Agrigento Airport. The gliders landed about 1800 hours on Agrigento Airport aided by seven lights (tactical lights) on the runway. All four gliders of the 319th Glider F.A. Bn. landed wing tip to wing tip with ease and without accident. The group of four gliders landed on the exact area planned for them to land on. The other four gliders also made excellent landings, close together, in the place planned, with only one minor accident caused by a mound of sod just off the runway. At about 1830 hours 12 gliders came into the field for a landing. They were cut loose from the tugs over the field at 2200 feet. About the first four gliders were able to land without damage; of the remaining gliders, most were damaged in landing and one missed the field entirely, landing on a hill about one half a mile away. There was a strong tail wind on the runway. The last twelve gliders carried only pilot and co-pilot and ballast. The Division Commander and the Assistant Division Commander were present for the exercise.



Annex #3

319th F.A. Bn.

AFB 440 15-1-45

Overlay: Showing Bn. Installations and Zones of Fire at Torre Annunziata

Legend: R - Red

B - Black


G - Blue

Map Ref: Italy, Cassin Sheet 1502 N.E.

Official:

3-3

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
△
 Actual
 Obstructions
 1945

300-50

JP

MIX

MIX



Annex #4

378⁴ FR 8

ARO 109

4-10-48

Overlay: Showing BN Installations and Ranges
 of the 4th Villa Light Co.

Legend: Black Dots are
 2/100 - C Battery positions

Maplet: Idub, Same, Grid 120 SE 5 W

Official
 Signature
 S-3

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SECRET



C-7


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Annex 5

3125 F.F. B.

RBC 422

10-2-50

Galley C Concentration

Villa L'Alcazar Area

San Juan, P.R.

Dist. 1

11/1/50

1319

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HEADQUARTERS 319TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

A.P.O. #469, U. S. Army

10 October, 1945

REPORT OF ACTION DURING MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1945

382-FA (10) 0.3

1. On September 6, the battalion was in bivouac on the beach about ten miles north of Bizerte, Tunisia. At about 10:30 that day, orders were received from the Division Commander to proceed immediately to a staging area near the Bizerte dock area preparatory to embarking in connection with the Giant 2 Operation. The battalion was closed in the staging area by 1600, September 6.
2. According to plan, the battalion embarked at Bizerte on September 7. Together with Company "H", 504th Parachute Infantry and elements of the 80th A.A. Battalion and 307th Engineers, the firing battery commanders and their parties each boarded one of three LCI's. The remainder of the battalion loaded aboard an LST.
3. The three LCI's sailed September 8, presumably bound for the destination specified in Operation Giant 2. The LST sailed September 9, also presumably bound for the same destination. Once at sea, however, it was revealed that these ships were ordered to report to the Command Ship Ancon in the Gulf of Salerno, where further orders were to be issued.
4. The LCI's reached the Ancon on September 10th. In accordance with orders issued by the Commanding General, 5th Army, the personnel aboard were landed the same day on the beach at Maiori, where they came under the command of the Commanding Officer, Ranger Force.
5. On September 11, the LST reached the Ancon. The Battalion Commander received orders from the Commanding General, 5th Army, to land immediately at Maiori with the mission of supporting the Ranger Force. Accordingly the battalion was landed during the evening of September 11 and in compliance with orders from the Commanding Officer, Ranger Force, immediately occupied positions in direct support of the Rangers.
6. Firing commenced early on the morning of September 12. The target area contained many targets of opportunity and a very satisfactory effect was obtained.
7. The terrain in which the position area was located was extremely difficult due to its rugged character. The mask, a high ridge immediately in front of all batteries, provided a minimum elevation in excess of 500 miles. Inasmuch as the maximum elevation of which the 105mm Howitzer, M3, is capable is 240 miles, it was necessary to dig deep pits for the trails. In order to fire with quadrant elevations as high as necessary to dig deep pits for the trails. In order to fire with quadrant elevations as high as necessary to dig deep pits for the trails.

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BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOUGLAS BOARDING COMMITTEE

JUN 18 1948
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as 700 mls. In such cases, the range table was useless. The battery commanders displayed considerable ingenuity and resourcefulness in solving the incidental problems in gunnery. Check points were registered upon, after which it became possible to deliver accurate fire anywhere within the zone of fire. Much dead space was eliminated by "juggling" powder charges (i.e. using combinations such as charge 1, 2, and 4 or 1 and 3, etc). O.P.'s on the ridge, while difficult of access, offered splendid observation.

8. Throughout the entire action the mission of the battalion necessitated covering a zone of approximately 1400 mls in width. Battery "A" was sited to cover the left third of this sector while Batteries "B" and "C" together, were sited to cover the more important remainder. Battery "A"'s zone of fire overlapped the zones of fire of the other batteries to a limited extent only. Moreover, considerable time was required to resite batteries within their respective position areas due to restrictions imposed by the terrain. Therefore, it was not practicable to often mass the fires of the entire battalion. The bulk of the firing was conducted by battery observers on targets of opportunity. The remaining missions were handled through the battalion command post in accordance with requests from our infantry and the British X Corps.

9. During the afternoon of September 13, it was reported that a raiding party of 200 Germans was approaching Battery "B"'s position from the left rear. During a lull in the firing, the battery was displaced to an alternate position out of reach of the raiders. The enemy was ejected the following day by our infantry.

10. All during the day of September 13, Battery "A" was subjected to intermittent shell and mortar fire. On one occasion, several stacks of ammunition were set afire. Lieutenant Vereen, Battery "A", together with five enlisted men distinguished themselves by seizing fire extinguishers and putting out the flames. So well was the battery dug in that only four men were wounded as a result of the enemy fire. Battery "A"'s O.P. was also shelled during the day, slightly wounding the Battery Commander. To round out an eventful day, the battery was attacked from the rear by an enemy raiding party. This attack was beaten off by our infantry, assisted by the personnel of the battery. One enlisted man of the battery was killed and one wounded in this action.

11. The O.P.'s of Batteries "B" and "C" were also shelled during the day of September 13, resulting in the wounding of one officer. So persistent was the enemy fire that all O.P.'s were forced to move to other vantage points on several occasions.

12. Early in the evening of September 13, orders were received from the Ranger Force Commander to attach one battery to a Ranger Battalion for the purpose of carrying out a mission in the vicinity of Vietri. Battery "A" was selected for this mission and was ordered to Maiori to join the Ranger Battalion. At the moment of leaving its position, the battery was again shelled, rendering the operation both difficult and hazardous. By the time the battery reached Maiori, its mission had been cancelled, due to a change in the situation. Accordingly, the battery rejoined the battalion, occupying a position somewhat removed from and more favorably located than its original position.

9

13. Until September 29, by which time our forces had made a considerable advance, no further changes of position were necessary. All batteries were well defiladed and concealed as to render enemy counter battery fire ineffective.

14. During the period September 11-28, the Ranger Force was repeatedly reinforced by the addition of infantry and artillery units. By September 20, Batteries "A" and "C", 155th Field Artillery Battalion (155 Howitzers) and Battery "A", 153rd Field Artillery Battalion (105 Howitzer, M2) had arrived and were in position in the vicinity of this battalion. By direction of the Commanding Officer, Ranger Force, all of the artillery was grouped under the Commanding Officer, 319th Field Artillery Battalion. Upon the formation of this group, the fires of all batteries were coordinated through the battalion command post.

15. During the period September 11-28, this battalion expended a total of approximately 15,500 rounds of M.E. Shell. The effect thereof upon enemy personnel and materiel was highly satisfactory. During the early part of this period, there was considerable enemy vehicular movement in the target area during daylight hours. However, after numerous vehicles had been hit and destroyed, even while moving, virtually all daylight movement ceased. The battalion countered by interdiction and harassing fire each night. On other occasions, ammunition and supply dumps were destroyed, a number of artillery pieces were either destroyed or neutralized and several troop formations were shelled both while in assembly areas and while moving to the attack.

16. During the night of September 28-29, the Ranger Force moved forward and established a bridgehead to protect the advance of the 23rd Armored Brigade (British) through Chiunzi pass. In the meanwhile, the British X Corps was advancing steadily on our right.

17. By noon of September 29, our front line was so far forward that a displacement of the artillery was ordered by the Ranger Force Commander. Accordingly the battalion displaced during the afternoon to positions in the vicinity of Sala. This displacement, in daylight, was rendered somewhat hazardous, due to light enemy shell fire which was falling along the route of advance. However, no casualties were suffered. No opportunities to fire were offered in the new position due to the rapid withdrawal of the enemy.

18. On the morning of September 30, the battalion reverted to Division control and was ordered by the Division Commander to proceed to a bivouac area in the vicinity of Castellmare. The battalion was closed in its assigned area, by late afternoon, September 30.

19. During the night of September 30 - October 1, the battalion was attached by division order to the 509th Parachute Infantry. The mission of this combat team was to assist the 23rd Armored Brigade in its advance on Naples. The battalion left its bivouac area at about 2400, September 30 and before daylight October 1, had occupied positions in the vicinity of Torre Annunziata in support of the

William H. Berison, Jr.
WILLIAM H. BERISON, Jr.
Lieut. Col., F. A.
Commanding.

Annexes:

- # 1 - Unit Journal
- # 2 - Casualty Report
- # 3 - Concentration Overlay, Maiori Area
- # 4 - Position Overlay, Maiori Area
- # 5 - Position Overlay, Sala Area
- # 6 - Position Overlay, Torre Annunziata Area

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HEADQUARTERS 519TH GLIDER FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO # 469, U. S. Army

October 10, 1945

Casualty Report for September, 1945

Commissioned Personnel

WIA

CAPTAIN	ALBERT E. LOUGHMILLER	0-514648	GSW
1ST LT.	FOREST W. HOKERT	0-1166054	GSW

Enlisted Personnel

KIA

PFC	CHARLES J. SPAINHOUR	35236569	
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
WIA

PFC	ROBERT L. GARTE	35425227	GSW
PFC	HOWARD J. CURL	35290657	GSW
PFC	RAY LAMPLEY	37185441	GSW
PFC	ARNO J. MINDT	36289650	GSW
PFC	HOMER PERSINGER	35335727	GSW
PVT	MERLE R. OLEMONS	36176905	GSW
PVT	LLOYD J. PRICE	35136726	GSW
PVT	RALPH F. RADOSH	36629267	GSW
PVT	NORBERT TAMB	32507957	GSW

Annex No. 2 to Report of Action.

12

SECRET



HQ. 319th FA. BN. Oct 1, 1943 **F**
OVERLAY

SHOWING BN. INSTALLATIONS (TORRE ANNUNZIATA)

ITALY SHEETS #184 II, 185 III Scale 1/60000

OFFICIAL:

W. Johnson


3-3

ANNEX #6 TO REPORT OF ACTION

SECRET

SECRET

45
52



37
41

WJH
M

pb

HQ. 319th FA. BN. *Sept 29, 1945*

OVERLAY

SHOWING ZONES OF FIRE AND INSTALLATIONS (SALA AREA)

ZONES OF FIRE

Btry A
Btry B
Btry C

ITALY SHEET #185 III

Scale 1/50000

SECRET


OFFICIAL:

W. J. H.

3-3

ANNEX # 5 TO REPORT OF ACTION

SECRET



HQ 319TH FA BN *Sept 17, 1943*

OVERLAY

SHOWING ZONES OF FIRE AND INSTALATIONS

ZONES OF FIRE: A btry _____ (Major Area)

B btry _____

C btry _____

ITALY SHEET #185 III

Scale 1/50000

OFFICIAL:

W. H. H.


ANNEX # 4 TO REPORT OF ACTION

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HQ 319TH GLIDER F.A. BN.
OVERLAY

SHOWING BN CONCENTRATION AND
IDENTIFICATION POINTS (MAJOR AREA)
FOR PERIOD SEPT. 23-28, 1943 (Final phase of action)

ITALY SHEET #185 III

SCALE 1/50000


OFFICER:

William

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ANNEX #3 TO REPORT OF ACTION

SECRET



SOUTH ITALY GRID (BLUE)

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET
Pay attention to the **grid** and **margin** figures at the corners and in margins.
They are for **reference** only.


PAY ATTENTION TO LARGER MARGINAL FIGURES AND TO THOSE PRINTED ON THE FACE OF THE MAP.

POINT		Oscilia		N 987245	
East	93	North	24	East	245
Estimate back to westward	7	Estimate back to northward	5	East	245
Estimate back to eastward	837	Estimate back to northward	245	East	245

Nearest similar reference on this grid 500 Km. distant.

GRID DATA
Southern Italy Grid

Colour: Blue
Projection: Lambert Conical Orthomorphic
Reference: Rome
Origin: 32°30' N, 14° E. of Greenwich
False Co-ordinates of origin: 700,000 metres E., 600,000 metres N.



REFERENCE

Railway, low or more tracks with station	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
High track and electrified	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Narrow gauge or tramway	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Tram lines on a road	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Canal railway	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
National Highways (Autostroads)	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Main Roads (Single States with route numbers)	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Other Main Roads (Single States with route numbers)	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Other Main Roads (States of general communication)	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Secondary Roads	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Other Roads and Cart Tracks, generally unmetalled	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Public Tracks	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Paths	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Boundaries, State	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Province	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Coast	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Appurtenances, over and underground	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Walls, fortification, non-permanent	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Walls and Beacons	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Church, Chapel, Cemetery	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Remains of physical features	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Topographical points	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Peaks in metres	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Contour	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Embankment or dyke	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—
Wells	—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—+—

Contours at 50 metres interval

ADJOINING SHEETS

185	186	187
197	198	199
S	209	210

COMPARATIVE INDEX

IV	I
III	II

AREA REVISOR FROM AIR PHOTOS

AUTHORITIES
Copied from Carta Topografica
1:100,000 Sheet 198, 1929.
Istituto Geografico Militare
Partially revised for communications, 1943.

1
p. 19

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-887 PENTAGON

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Master

505th Para Inf Regt Historical Record - ITLBY

Oct 45

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HEADQUARTERS
50TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
A.P.O. #469, 7 P.M.
NEW YORK, N.Y.

4 November 1945

SUBJECT: Historical Record for the month of October 1945.

TO : Commanding General, 82nd A/S Division.

1. Herewith the historical records of this regiment for the month of October 1945 including all supporting documents available.

FIRST PERIOD

OCTOBER 1ST

The morning of the 1st found this regiment in an approach march formation headed for the city of Naples, along the East coast of Italy, the left flank of the FIFTH ARMY front. The forward regimental command post was located in the center of the town of Torre Annunziata being established at 2100 hours the previous day.

The 1st Battalion was in the process of moving by motor to a position to the East of Torre Annunziata, astride the main overhead highway. It arrived in this assembly area around 0700 hours. The 3rd Battalion was in an assembly area on Highway 16 in Torre Annunziata, where it arrived at 0100 hour. The 2nd Battalion was still in bivouacs at Castellare awaiting transportation forward.

The rear regimental command post was moving with the 1st Battalion and arrived at the forward command post at about 0750 hours. A regimental rear echelon was left behind on September 28 at Cappaccio, consisting of Service Company personnel under the command of the Provost Marshall. This unit did not come forward until October 3rd because of priorities on the roads. There also existed a base echelon at both Comiso, Sicily and Biserte, Africa of parachute maintenance personnel and men who had been returned from hospitals for duty but who were unable to obtain transportation to either the rear or forward echelons.

At 0750 hours on October 1st it was determined by the reconnaissance units of the 23rd Armored British Brigade that the enemy had withdrawn towards Naples. Orders were given to proceed on towards the city following the reconnaissance units. The order of march was 3rd Battalion, the forward command post group, 1st Battalion, rear command post group, and later the 2nd Battalion as soon as transportation became available. At 0755 hours, the head of the column moved out. At 1000 hours the head of the column was stopped at San Giovanni while the reconnaissance units searched the outskirts of Naples. At 1100 hours Company "I" was dispatched on foot to secure the northern approaches to the city.

At 1200 hours orders were received to proceed forward into the city. At this point Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark and Major General Matthew B. Ridgway joined the head of the column in a British reconnaissance vehicle. Protection for this party was provided from the 3rd Battalion. The first elements of the column arrived at Piazza Garibaldi at 1350 hour at which time the forward regimental command post was established in the railway station. The 3rd Battalion immediately fanned out within the city. Patrols from this unit were sent to the two reservoirs to the north of the city and forced remaining enemy personnel to the north.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOUG GRADING COMMITTEE 27 March 1961

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The remainder of the afternoon and evening were spent in collecting arms from the civilians, quelling civilian disturbances, and stopping fire fights between Fascists and disgruntled local civilians. The 1st Battalion arrived by motor at 0400 hour and immediately moved to their pre-assigned areas of responsibility. The 2nd Battalion arrived at 0500 hour and were sent to the Capodichiano Airport to garrison and secure same.

OCTOBER 2nd and 3rd

The 2nd Battalion moved from the Capodichiano Airport (less Company "E") to their pre-assigned area of responsibility and took up the guard thereof. The regimental command post was moved 300 yds South on Corso Garibaldi to a building just north of the street car station. Colonel Gavin was transferred to 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters and designated Assistant Division Commander and Lieutenant Colonel Estabeller assumed command of the regiment. On the 3rd Company "E" rejoined their Battalion. Patrolling by this time had assumed normal proportions.

SECOND PERIOD

OCTOBER 4th

A phone call was received at 0630 hours to alert two Battalions for immediate combat mission. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were designated and alerted at 0700 hours were upon the regimental commander reported to 82nd Airborne Division for orders. After a preliminary discussion the two Battalions were instructed to assemble their units and prepare to move out, by 0745 hours. The regimental commander called a meeting of the Battalion and Special Unit Commanders and the regimental staff at 0845 hours at which time he gave the preliminary field order as follows: The two Battalions would immediately proceed by foot to the Capodichiano Airport and await further orders. The 83rd Chemical Battalion and the Division Reconnaissance Platoon were attached for this operation and would be picked up in route. The general mission was to aid the 23rd Armored British Brigade in pushing the enemy north of the Volturno River along the coastal highways. The 3rd Battalion was to remain in the city and take over the entire regimental guard area.

The regimental commander with the regimental S-3 then proceeded to the vicinity of Mignano to meet Brigadier Awwright and receive the orders for the commitment of the Combat Team. The route of advance would be via the following named towns: Capodichiano, Secondigliano, Miano, Prullon, Caggiano, Mignano and Giugliano, Qualano, Villa Leterne and Arnone. Orders were then sent back to move the Combat Team by steps as shown on the overlay herewith.

The Combat Team was moved forward by motor to just west of Giugliano where the 2nd Battalion detrucked at 1350 hours and proceeded forward on foot less Company "D" which rode on the forward elements of the British Tanks for the protection thereof. The 1st Battalion detrucked 3 miles north of Qualano at 1745 hours and proceeded on foot for 2 miles where upon it went into an assembly area. The regimental command posts are shown in progression on the overlay herewith.

At 2050 hour the 2nd Battalion had arrived at a point just south of Villa Leterne. At 2045 hours Company "F" sent one platoon to secure the bridge over the Regi Legni canal to the front, and sent another unit to put up road blocks to the east and west of the town. Upon moving forward on these missions these units made contact with the enemy in the town square of Vill Leterne at 2116 hours. The enemy offered opposition at this point with machine pistols and guns and finally withdrew to the north after which Company "F" proceed with its mission. Company "G" by passed the village and set up a defense around the northern edge of Villa Leterne. Company "D" was returned to Battalion control at about 2200 hours. Harassing fire from small arms continued through most of the night.

OCTOBER 5th

The morning hours of the 5th found the 1st Battalion moving forward to the area of Villaliterno arriving there at by 0500 hours. At 0530 hours the 2nd Battalion proceed forward in the following order, Companies "D", Headquarters, "E", and "F". Strong enemy resistance was encountered on the left of the road about 500 yds north of Villaliterno. Company "E" was committed and overcame this resistance. Many mines and "Booby Traps" delayed the progress of the attack. Several vehicles were knocked out by road mines including 2 ambulances, 2 jeeps and one tank. Most "Booby Traps" were the pull type with long trip wires attached. These were found in the open fields as well as around roads.

The advance was resumed and the bridge over the Regi Langui Canal was reached by 0830 hours. The platoon which was sent to secure the bridge did not accomplish its mission. The bridge consisted of 5 spans, the furthest of which had been blown by the enemy, however we held the remains. The 2nd Battalion then pushed forward with Company "E" on the right, Company "D" on the left and Company "F" on the rear to Ligno Vecchio Apramo Canal where they were held by regimental order. At this point the Battalion went into a defensive position at 1000 hour.

The 1st Battalion sent Company "C" to the city of Albanuova on the right flank and Company "A" to the city of Castelvolturno on the left flank to secure the same. Company "A" made contact with an enemy patrol in Castelvolturno and they immediately withdrew to the north. Company "C" made contact with the British in Albanuova. Both units were subjected to artillery fire. By 1700 hours the remainder of the 1st Battalion moved forward to cover the rear of the 2nd Battalion defense. Many "Booby Traps" were encountered in all these operations and we had several serious casualties caused there by including the company commander of Company "A". A forward regimental command post moved up around 1730 hours. At 1830 hours the 2nd Battalion sent patrols out from Companies "D", "E", and "F" to reconnoiter routes across the river and to gather enemy information. The east and west patrols found passable routes and encountered little enemy opposition. The center patrol was unable to accomplish its mission due to the superiority of the enemy in this area.

OCTOBER 6th

At 0430 hours a patrol from Company "F" was sent forward to capture prisoners but returned at 0530 hours unable to contact the enemy. At 0900 hours a platoon from Company "F" and the Regimental Demolition Platoon were sent to the city of Arnone to seize and secure the town. With the exception of artillery no enemy opposition was encountered. At 0930 hours a patrol was sent out from the 1st Battalion to Castelvolturno. The only opposition encountered was snipers within the village. At 1130 hours the balance of Company "F" and the 2nd Battalion 81mm mortar platoon were sent into Arnone to join the other elements there. One platoon of Company "E" was committed to the left flank for the protection of Company "F". At 1530 hour a very heavy enemy artillery barrage fell on Arnone. This was followed by an enemy counter attack to take back the village. At this time the balance of Company "E" was committed on the west along the railroad. At 1600 hours the first platoon of Company "E" hit the enemy's right flank along the railroad tracks in the vicinity of the railroad station. In the meantime Company "F" withdrew from the town in an orderly manner. At this time the 319th F.A. Battalion attached to us the day before fired on the enemy in the town and along the north banks of the river. This fire was very effective. By 1700 hours Companies "E" and "F" had established a defensive positions on the road running east and west 1000 yards south of Arnone. At 1847 hours Company "A" of the 1st Battalion relieved Company "E". During the night the position was well outposted and remained quiet.

OCTOBER 7th

At 0957 Company "E" reported an enemy patrol crossing the river on the remains of the railroadbridge and called for artillery support. The fire was accurate and caused the enemy to withdraw. The 1st Battalion sent out 2 patrols, 1 to reconnoiter Grassanico, and the other to reconnoiter Castelvolturno. In Grassanico British reconnaissance units were contacted, and in La Socia a German patrol was encountered and a short skirmish took place. The other patrol received artillery fire near Castelvolturno but otherwise no action took place. Our patrols were active the rest of the day but no enemy resistance was encountered.

The regimental commander called for a meeting at 1430 hours to make arrangements with the British for the relief of this Combat Team. General's Riggway and Gavin were present at this time and attended the meeting. It was decided that the relief would take place between 1830 and 2300 hours. Sixty British Lorries were to be provided for our return to the base in Naples. The 2 Battalions were pulled out of the lines but did not obtain transportation until the following morning. No enemy action took place during the night.

THIRD PERIOD

OCTOBER 8th to 23rd


All units returned to their base in Naples on October 8th and took up the process of cleaning and reorganization. Inspection of weapons and arrangements for bags were made. The 1st and 2nd Battalions did not assume their former guard responsibility until October 11th. Enemy air-raids on the city of Naples took place on October 8th and 21st. The main part of this period consisted of patrolling the city according to the plan of area of responsibility. (See Unit Journal attached for detail) A regimental parade was held on October 12th for General Gavin.

FOURTH PERIOD

OCTOBER 23rd to 31st

Another enemy air-raid took place on the night of October 28th. The main body of this period consisted of the assigned guard duties and shore period of field training. The field training included a 17 mile march to a training area west of Naples. The period consisted of 4 days, the first three of which were spent in the following basic subjects, scouting and patrolling, map and compass reading, mine and "Bobby Traps", field artillery coordination and firing problems and etc. The last 24 hours were spent in a Battalion problem in the attack and withdrawal. The 3rd Battalion insisted this phase on the 23rd and the 1st Battalion followed on the 28th. No other unusual events occurred. (See Unit Journal attached for details.)


For the Commanding Officers:


WILLARD R. FOLLMER,
CAPT. 50TH FRONT. INF.,
ADJUTANT.

4

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION A





Overlay - showing movement
 of 505 CT, 82nd A/B Div.
 in Sicilian operation

map - 1:250,000 2nd Ed Army/Air

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION B



Ribera 505th CT bivouacs July 19


Agrigento 505th bivouacs - July 17

1st Co. 505 drops on contact d2, establishes contact with 505th July 14

505th CT passes IP and bivouacs - July 14

4/Air

SECTION C



July 29 -
505th CT moved to Trapani
Sector (to July 30)
10 km south of Ribera #113
25 km north - "

August 19, 1943 -
505th CT moved to Trapani-Marsala
airport to prepare for flight

505th CT bivouac
- July 22

Ribera 505th CT bivouacs
July 19

Agrigento 505th bivouacs - July 17

**Overlay - showing movement
of 505th CT, 82nd A/B Div.
in Sicilian operation**


map - 1:250,000 2nd Ed. Army/Air

CONFIDENTIAL

Flight begins
airfield near Er
July 9, 1943

62

SECTION D




CONFIDENTIAL

4/Air

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT. 4, 1943



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(505)


63

6743
28-561

21040 282-INT-0.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT. 5, 1943



Patrols in dotted lines.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64

573
28-561

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT. 6, 1943



AC in position at 4:45 PM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6743
28-561

CONFIDENTIAL

CAPOLUOTURNO

ALBANOYA

05830 HRS

092100 HRS

508

01530 HRS

01415 HRS

Mag. N. True N. Grid North

15° 00' 00"

01330 HRS

515

Blown BRIDGE

Gigellano

Quiliano

Mugnano

Blown BRIDGE

1200 HRS

508

01050 HRS

508

I. 2

Aspas Airfield

Entrusted


Drawn from Map of ITALY
Scale 1:50,000

CONFIDENTIAL

Sgt. Freeland

850
E. 10000

Maps: Italy
Caserta
Shed
OACG



Date: A. Royal
P. J. T. S.

4 March 1945

Notes from General
Colonel Batcheller

This is the enemy situation. Our forces have pushed to the outskirts of the city. We have pushed just west of Villara where last enemy contact was made. The 23rd Armored Squad last made contact with the enemy at night. We are part of the 23rd Armored and off to the right of the 56th Inf Area. We are part of the 23rd Armored again. This Regiment last 3rd Bn which will remain in the area and take over police responsibilities will be attached to the 23rd Arm. We will have attached 319 F.A. Co. 2nd Bn 3rd Fl. of the 307 Med Co. 1 Arm Jeep and 2 motorcycles.

Orders have from General Artright have not been received yet but I am going forward *for the order*.

Mission: Mission at present is to have the combat team close on the air drome. 2nd Bn will line up on the advance guard formation followed Reg. Hq. Co. 1st Bn will line up on the side of the air drome facing SW and column will then consist of the 319 F.A. Co. 2nd Bn and the 307 Med Co. The 319 F.A. Co. will be attached to the 2nd Bn. We will proceed to west of the air drome to a point SW of the air drome at a point S of 56th Inf Area and close to the head of column. Contact will be maintained with the 56th. (D.M. on our right) Contact will be maintained with the 56th.

I don't think the enemy opposition will be heavy. We provide the advance guard for 23rd Arm. I believe we can rely on having Tank and Artillery support. The advance GP will be located on the right as early as possible. Unit commanders will report here for later orders. Each of the 2 Bns moving out will leave at least one officer and a few men to guard the area. Maj. Krause will be contacted if more men are needed. This will be only a two or three day operation.

Supply and transportation: 1st Bn and 2nd Bn will have each 3 1/2 Tons, 2 Tons with ~~XXXX~~ Trailers and 3rd Bn 1 1/2 Tons, 1 1/2 Tons and 1 1/2 Tons. 3rd Bn's trucks have trailers. Reg. Hq. Co. 1 1/2 Tons and 1 1/2 Tons in addition to the Staff. Squad of Cavalry will be thru 307 Med. Co. 1/2 Tons will be carried. 1st and 2nd Bns will each have a water trailer. 3rd Bn will have 1 water trailer.

The advance GP will open on the air drome at approximately 0910. Forward will have S-2, S-3 and one representative of S-4 and also the Sgt/Maj.

Radio contact will probably be impossible because we will be on the move.

sent to city

Villa Litona

4 March 1945

NOTES FROM CONFERENCE
COLONEL BATCHELLER

Operation

This is the enemy situation. Our forces have pushed to the outskirts of the city. We have pushed just west of Villara where last enemy contact was made. The 23rd Armored Squad last made contact with the enemy at night. We are part of the 23rd Armored and off to the right of the 56th Inf Area. We are part of the 23rd Armored again. This Regiment last 3rd Bn which will remain in the area and take over police responsibilities will be attached to the 23rd Arm. We will have attached 319 F.A. Co. 2nd Bn 3rd Fl. of the 307 Med Co. 1 Arm Jeep and 2 motorcycles.

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The advance GP will open on the air drome at approximately 0910. Forward will have S-2, S-3 and one representative of S-4 and also the Sgt/Maj.

Radio contact will probably be impossible because we will be on the move.

0530 to 0545

CO
CT 505

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS 82d AIRBORNE DIVISION REINFORCED
APO #449, U S ARMY**

.....
SECRET
By Authority of
G2, 82d A/B Div
Initials *SM*
Date: 1 Oct. 1943

FO-No. 5

Map: ITALY 1:50,000 GSGS 4229 Sheet No. 184.

1. a. Enemy forces have stopped 23rd Arm'd Brigade (BRITISH) in vicinity of QUIGLIANO - VILLARICA.
- b. 10th Corps continues the attack.
2. a. 505th Parachute Inf Regt (less one Bn) with 219th Glider FA Bn, Co C 83rd Cal Bn, 3rd Plat 207th Med Co, Det 207th Eng Bn, Det 82d Recon Plat will move by marching and motor to vicinity of FM NTI 19532 report to Commanding Officer 23rd Arm'd Brigade (BRITISH) for orders. This CT will relieve the 1st Bn 143rd Inf on orders of the Brigade Commander.
- b. Order of March: Prescribed by CO CT 505.
- c. Route of March: See Operations Overlay.
- d. 1st Bn 143rd Inf upon relief will move by marching to its bivouac area in NAPLES, see memo. This Bn will remain within limit of its bivouac area until ordered on police duty by CG 82d A/B Div.
- e. Guide will be posted by 505th Parachute Inf.
- f. 219th Glider FA Bn, Co C 83rd Cal Bn will move as seen as motorized, by way of prescribed route to vicinity of FLANTI and report to CO CT 505 at that point for orders.
3. Current
4. a. SOI - 1aa-12.
- b. Communications maintained by 82d A/B Div Signal Co by radio.
- c. CG CT will report location of CT to this Hq by radio. He sends reports except as called for by this Hq.

OFFICIAL: *Turner*
TURNER
G-3

RIDGWAY

SECRET

SM
RB
SM
TRICK

SECRET

HQ 82ND A/B DIV REINF
4 OCTOBER 1943

OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
F.O. NO 5

MAP - ITALY 1:50,000 GSGS 4229
SHEET 1841

OFFICIAL

Turner
TURNER
G-3

RIDGEWAY
CONDUIT

HEAD
OF
COLLING



X
23

24

56

AIRFIELD

TR

50

NAPLES

20

SECRET

Section
 Headquarters M Battalion
 505th Central Postal
 A PO Box Italy, 3/2 PM
 New York, New York
 From 1800 hr 6 Oct 43
 To 1800 hr 7 Oct 43

To: Regt. S-3

Periodic G-3 Report

1. See Overlay
2. See Overlay
3. See Overlay
4. Rain + Cool

5. 1700 hr. 6 Oct 43. Bn
 in bivouac as per overlay
 submitted 1800 hr with the
 exception of 1 pl of C Co on
 patrol as indicated by same
 overlay.
 1025 hr. patrol returned
 and reported spiders in Castel-
 volturua. No enemy activity other-
 wise. Both bridge over roads
 south of Castelvolturua blown.
 0800 hr. 7th Co. attached
 to 2nd Bn and moved out as
 2nd Bn reserve (see overlay)

B. Co. patrolled both flanks
 of 2nd Bn. Snow 2120 hr to Oct
 to 0630 hr. 7 Oct 43. no enemy
 contacted. 1 casualty - Army Fire.

C Co. patrol to Grossanise
 left 0630 hr 6 Oct 43. Went on
 path as indicated. At N 625 715
 a small airfield and wrecked
 planes was noticed. Also a large
 4 wheel tractor intact there.
 Reached Grossanise at 0945 hr
 contacted British in Grossanise
 Food from Approx. N 065 753 to
 Grossanise - mixed. Bridge blown
 See ds. east of Grossanise.
 British cleaned mines out of
 Grossanise. Germans led over
 flat in Grossanise. One Company
 from Grossanise to S. Maria
 Germans contacted at La Socra
 shot in fire fight with six enemy
 shot in S. Maria at N 046 707

C Co. patrol to Castelvolturua
 0540 hr. 6 Oct 43. Reports
 Bridge Blown at N 785 703. No
 enemy or civilians in Castelvolturua
 Castelvolturua shelled at 1700 hr,
 1200 hr and 0940 hr.

Germans at one time put
 gas across river at
 Castelvolturua. River bank mined
 all along from sea up. (see soldier
 reports)
 Castelvolturua good piece for
 Army G.P.

6. Excellent
7. Regt. Reserve.
 successful patrol of both flanks
 of 2nd Bn.
 Successful patrols to Castel-
 volturua and Grossanise.
8. Nothing to report.


Date A. Roydon
 Capt. Inf.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG. CEN. NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. CO 505	DATE 6 OCT 43	
TO NOTIFY MOLAR TO HAVE		
JEEP MEET DESTALICH AT		
BRIDGE		
(0936) KS		
(0940) Jld		
PLAYING		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	DATE SIGNED	
	1943	
APPROVED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG. CEN. NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE 6/10/43	
TO K. M. J. [unclear]		
(RECON + OP)		
Platoon advancing on		
airfield field of [unclear]		
impers.		
(0945) Capt. [unclear]		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	DATE SIGNED	
	1943	
APPROVED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(M)
040745

2 Bn + 40 men
 For [unclear] [unclear]
 For 2nd Bn in [unclear]
 column along SW side
 of airfield facing
 away from city -
 with [unclear] [unclear]
 part of [unclear]
 of [unclear]
 1st Bn on SE side
 of airfield in good
 position.
 For coat [unclear] [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear]
 1/500 [unclear]



Overlay to accompany
 Periodic 6-3 Report
 6 Oct 43

Map. Italy 1:100,000
 Casserta & Napoli
 Sheet-170-184
 GS. GS No. 4164

15 30
 Jhu

Disposition of 1st Bn 505th C.P.D.

Dale A. Raymond
 Capt. Inf
 5-3

Plan for Relief at
505 C. H. by 464 Div.

1/20 - 2/30

464 Div. occupy
positions

2130 - C. H. Post Elements
move out simultaneously
from respective positions
by Post to assembling
point on Road 5th.
Villas Literno

Exact Location:

To be Determined

2300 - 319 2d. r. 83rd
Elem: move by

move from respective
locations during
Lumpert by 2545.

2330 - 267 AD Pos. move out
by route - Also Lumpert
by 0015

All Attached Units
relieve from 505 C. H.
Central on Crossing
Lumpert.

Order of Departure 505 Int.
and Assignment of Jurisdiction

Ad. Party (C.P. Group)
505 - 5th Series

1st floor - West 25 Rooms

2nd floor " " "

Room C.P. and Deputy but 5 hours

For to proceed to Naples

Under their own Control.

Regtl. S-4, and Main office
and Casbah and Control
Agency.

Petitioning by Entire C.I.
in the City of Naples
to be removed 11 a.m. Oct

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
128		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 15	DATE Oct 1	URGENT
TO: C.O. 1st Bn, 143 IAW		
CP NOW LOCATED AT 354203Z BATTALIONS LOCATED IN FLDS FIRST 358410, SECOND 409122 THIRD 351244		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
S. J. WEST		0120
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
129		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 11	DATE Oct 1, 1943	URGENT
TO: C.O. 1st Bn, 143 IAW		
REPORT TO C.O. 505 PRECINT IAW AT 0500 AT REGIMENTAL C.P. (SAME LOCATION AS CP OF A Co, 143 IAW)		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
S. J. WEST		0400
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
130		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 4	DATE Oct 1	URGENT
TO: C.O. 1st Bn		
MOVE YOUR BATTALION BY EART AT ONCE TO VICINITY OF P. 1 (317434) PERCENT ARRIVAL ONE FORWARD ELEMENT AT TURRE DEL GRECO REPORT NO CONTACT W/ ENEMY		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
S. J. WEST		0120
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
131		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 2	DATE Oct 1	URGENT
TO: C.O. 1st Bn		
SEND OUT A STRONG RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TO CHAIN HILL AT ONCE W/ COMMUNICATION TO REAR DESIRE AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON ENEMY'S PRESENCE ON HILL		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
C. O. 505 IAW		0622
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
131		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE Oct 1	
TO: General Scapell		
Tornado patrol left to recon Gondola at 0605 hr		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
S. J. WEST		0609
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
132		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 3	DATE 1 OCT 43	
TO: C.O. KERNEL		
HEAVY ENEMY SHELLS FELL ON OUR AREA AT 2250. NO KNOWN CASUALTIES		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
C. O. KERNEL WHITE		2500
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
133		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE 1 OCT 43	
TO: C.O. KERNEL		
LOCAL POLICEMAN REPORTS MINES & BOoby TRAPS AT 135545. ALSO STATES THAT GERMANS EVACUATED AT 1630 IN TRUCKS. 2 PATROLS HAVE RETURNED WITHOUT CONTACTING ENEMY. ALL MEN ARE SEARCHING AREA.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
C. O. KERNEL WHITE		0625
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
134	3	MSG
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 7	DATE 1-10-43	
TO: C.O. 505 IAW		
2nd Bn CASED 1800 hr.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
C. O. 505 IAW		2000
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
135		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATES) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE	
TO: KERNAL SCAPULL		
OUR POSITION AS ORDERED HAVE BEEN SWIPPED BY ITALIAN WIFFERS (2nd Pn)		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		TIME GRABED
KERNAL IN SCAPULL		01103
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
DUSTON CANT		NORM CANT

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
128		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 15	DATE Oct 30	
TO: C.O. 352 OF 1st BN		
CP NEW LOCATED AT BATTALIONS LOCATED IN 354035. FIRST 356410 SECOND 409330 THIRD 356365		
5-3 SUBJECT		2120
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Norman Capt</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
131		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE Oct 1, 1943	
TO: C.O. 1st Bn, 143 TWE		
REPORT TO C.O. SPS PRENTICE BE 0500 AT REGIMENTAL C.P. (Same location as CO of A Co, 143 TWE)		
5-3 SUBJECT		10400
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Norman Capt</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
133		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 4	DATE Oct 1	
TO: C.O. 1st Bn		
MOVE YOUR BATTALION BY FOOT AT ONCE TO VICINITY OF P.J. AT (311434) REPORT ARRIVAL ONE FORWARDED ELEMENTS AT TURE DEL GREEN REPORT NO CONTACT W/ ENEMY		
5-3 SUBJECT		10400
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Norman Capt</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
132		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 2	DATE Oct 1	
TO: C.O. 1st Bn		
SEND OUT A STRONG RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TO CAVADON HILL AT ONCE W/ COMMUNICATION TO REAR DESIRE AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON ENEMY'S PROGRESS ON HILL		
C.O. SPS 62		0652
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Norman Capt</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
131		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. No 1	DATE Oct 1	
TO: Kernal Seagull		
Tornado patrol left to recon Cavada at 0645 hr		
5-3		0609
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Seagull Capt</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
133		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 3	DATE 1 OCT 43	
TO: C.O. KERNEL		
HEAVY ENEMY SHELLS FELL ON OUR AREA AT 2250. NO KNOWN CASUALTIES		
C.O. KERNEL WHITE 2500		2350
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Seagull</i>


TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
131		URGENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 2	DATE 1 OCT 43	
TO: C.O. KERNEL		
LOCAL POLICEMAN REPORTS MINES & BOOBY TRAPS AT 185545. ALSO STATES THAT GERMANS EVACUATED AT 1630 IN TRUCKS. 2 PATROLS HAVE RETURNED WITHOUT CONTACTING ENEMY. ALL MEN ARE SEARCHING AREA		
C.O. Kernel White 1045		1045
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Seagull</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
2040	3	MSG
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 7	DATE 1-10-43	
TO: C.O. 505 INT		
2nd Bn. CASES 120016		
Kernel White Morning		2002
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Seagull Capt</i>

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
20		MSG
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE	
TO: KERNAL SEAGULL		
OUR POSITIONAL ORDERED HAVE BEEN SWIPPED BY ITALIAN WIPERS (2nd Bn)		
KERNAL J. SEAGULL		011103
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR		SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>Seagull</i>

1170 469 1196-107

01
76+



#1 Patrol: Reconnaissance route to
River. Bridge under construction.
River may be bridged easily.
Width 25 yds. Depth unknown. About
20 Germans contacted 400 yds. South
of Pt. No. 0. A Positioner. River Bank
is a Sandy Clay. 18+ located on
opposite bank.

#2 Patrol: Reconnaissance R.R. to point
1000 yds. South of River - Found open
and got one further. Patrol leaders
reported about 60 Germans contacted
between R.R. and long south of River.

#3 Patrol: Patrol Reconnaissance to
Point "B". Approach unfavorable
River Bank Muddy. River about
100 yds. wide at this point. Estimated
60-95 Germans South of River.
Civilian reports that Germans are
withdrawing to N. side of River Bank.

Note: Three patrols sent out
at 10130 to capture
Russians and gain
desired information.

Kernel White patrol Activities.
Night Oct 26

Patrol under Lt. Dostak went
into the City at Avonow
from 0230-0500.
No Enemy Contacted

JM
071500

DATE - Oct 7, 1943
UNIT - 1st NZEL WHITE
FROM - 061200
TO - 071200

1. OUR FRONT LINES - SEE OVERLAY
2. INFORMATION ON ADJACENT SITES & SUPPORTING TROOPS
1st BN TO OUR REAR IN RESERVE & NUMEROUS ALLIED
ARTILLERY UNITS.
3. LOCATION OF TROOPS - SEE OVERLAY
4. WEATHER & VISIBILITY - CLEAR UNTIL 061100 THEN RAIN
STARTED TO FALL & CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY DURING REST
OF PERIOD.
5. OUR OPERATION FOR PERIOD - F CO SENT ^{AT 051000} 1 PLATOON
INTO ARNONE & SECURED CITY ^{AT 051000} ~~IN~~ ~~AT~~ ~~051000~~ ~~051000~~ ~~051000~~
FELL ON ARNONE. BALANCE OF F CO WAS SENT INTO
ARNONE AT 061230 AND AT 061520 RECEIVED A VERY HEAVY
ENEMY ARTILLERY CONCENTRATION ON ARNONE. AT 061540 ENEMY
COUNTER ATTACKED & FORCED F CO TO WITHDRAW 500 YARDS
SOUTH OF ARNONE. F CO WAS COMMITTED UP THE RAILWAY
AT 061530 & THEY RAN INTO HEAVY AUTOMATIC SMALL ARMS
FIRE FROM RAILWAY STATION. AT 061630 D CO WAS ALERTED
& 1 SQUAD SENT FWD TO REMOVE F CO WOUNDED & DEAD.
AT 061715 A CO MOVED INTO DIRECT SUPPORT - SEE OVERLAY.
BN MOVED INTO POSITION ALONG ROAD RUNNING E/W 1000 YDS
SOUTH OF ARNONE. BALANCE OF PERIOD WAS QUIET
EXCEPT FOR INTERMITTENT FIRE ON FRONT LINE
POSITIONS.
6. CASUALTY INFORMATION - SUPERVISOR
7. RESULT OF OPERATION - ROAD CLEARED FOR BRITISH
& TANK STATUS - NONE

Seagull
KENNEDY WHITE

MESSAGE FILE

OCT 3	1	ALERT ORDER
OCT 4	2	WARNING ORDER to 2nd Bn
	3	Transportation into 2nd Re
	4	Telegram from British
	5	Mtg to C.O. 82 A/B Div
	6	" from Col Batcheller
	7	" to CO 82nd A/B Div
	8	" " " " " "
	9	" " " " " "
	10	" " Capt. Follans
	11	" " " " " "
	12	" " " " " "
	13	" " " " " "

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 140	DATE Oct 9 1943	
To: Sun Ray Mess, 82nd AIB Div		
Investigation of small arms firing in 505 Area this Am. Hdqrs. Co. 3rd Bn		
Reports firing occurred in		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	TIME SIGNED	
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 141	DATE Oct 9, 1943	
To: 1st 2nd Bn		
Have A Complete Historical Record on this Mess by next Friday Noon.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	TIME SIGNED 0930	
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Norton	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Norton Capt

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 74	DATE 10/2/43	
To: Kernel Sunray		
Entire airport in our hands. British have withdrawn from fld - not in contact. We are frequently subject to heavy shell fire from north. Are having some trouble w/ Italian snipers. Have defensive plan for daylight. At dawn will		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	TIME SIGNED	
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 74	DATE 10/2/43	
To: Kernel-Sunray		
have strong recon patrol in Secondigliano. No Germans in this area.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	TIME SIGNED 0430	
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Panther	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
To: Sun Ray Mess, 82nd AIB Div		
vicinity of Gas 1226 (235495). Source of fire undetermined. No casualties reported.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER	TIME SIGNED 0930	
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Norton	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Norton Capt

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A
REVISED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1928

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU

4

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES

0 GR 4

WHAT IS YOUR SITUATION 041107

~~Answered~~

1155

06 11/10

Waj Antakimur LOC 83 at CP.
1 pl. 83 (4 members). Direct support
200 pm - went to 240 pm - runner
to Regt CP - 83 CP 300 yds forward.
of 500 yds forward.

Establish all day ~~at~~ OPS.
to be outside beyond river.

4 documents ~~at~~ #4 reported to
by 11 ~~at~~ 0720
Batter in ~~at~~ 060300-060500
No enemy contact.

Col. Barre ~~at~~ advised Col. May
at 0700
Answer volume

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. [] DATE **Oct 4**

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

WARNING CENTER

Be prepared to move by march
 started on 2000 0000
 to ~~the~~ ~~out~~ ~~of~~ ~~city~~ ~~two~~ ~~days~~
 2nd Bn is taking out which
 will come on sector in town
 will be furnished the 200000 detail
 to the 2nd AM and ~~will~~
 P.P. after ~~my~~ ~~leave~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: **0714**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: **BRUNNER, CW**

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **(3)** DATE **Oct 4**

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

Use 23 lanes, to be a F
 aircraft along road, to move
 your unit to ~~the~~ ~~road~~ ~~head~~
 of ~~the~~ ~~road~~ ~~head~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 ROAD. Do not release vehicles
 until ordered

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: **1025**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: **WORTH, Capt**

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **16** DATE **Oct 4 1143**

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

2nd Battalion closed with its
 head at ~~the~~ ~~head~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 at 1145 with advanced CP
 1st ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 Ambulance. Advanced units of
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 5 miles NW of any contact
 possible on part of ~~the~~ ~~road~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: **1152**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: **H.F.R.** SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: **BRUNNER, CW**

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **(3)** DATE []

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

Machine 11600

2nd Bn will ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 of ~~the~~ ~~road~~ ~~head~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 in ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 Tell my ~~unit~~ ~~to~~ ~~move~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: **1110**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: **Battelle**

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **15** DATE **Oct 4**

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

2nd BN AT (154583) 2 CO

2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: []

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: **WORTH, Capt**

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **(18)** DATE []

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

2nd BN AT (154583) 2 CO

2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: **1112**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: **WORTH, Capt**

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **9** DATE **Oct 4**

TO **CO 2nd Bn**

2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: **1155**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: []

TIME FILED: [] MSG CEN NO: [] NOW SENT: []

MESSAGE (PRIORITY TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) **URGENT**

No. **10** DATE **4 Oct**

TO **Capt Norton or Capt Palmer**

Move forward CP to Right L
 of Rd 400 yds N of ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 w/ ~~the~~ ~~road~~ ~~head~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~road~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~
 2nd Bn ~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR: [] TIME STAMPED: []

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: [] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: []

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SHRIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. <i>11</i>	DATE <i>4 Oct</i>	
To <i>(Capt Norton)</i>	<i>S-3</i>	
<p><i>Adv elements of 2nd Bn at Macedon Vecchio 079674 Raid over pass over 2 tank batts Ry not shown in Map of 1-08658 just N of Pescara bay Town burning in distance possibly GRAZZANISE and something W west of VILLA LITERNO</i></p>		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR	TIME SIGNED	
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SHRIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. <i>Pg 2</i>	DATE <i>4 Oct</i>	
To <i>S-3</i>		
<p><i>Misc Co P forward to Ry hhs or further if situation changes Send Co P forward Send Whiston less Co A forward to positions on south of VILLA LITERNO Advise Brigade of situation Tell Reg I want communication</i></p>		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR	TIME SIGNED	
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		


TIME FILED <i>3</i>	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SHRIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. <i>#3</i>	DATE	
To <i>S-3 505</i>		
<p><i>Forward and will get a gun O when can get it he cont. It's a good use of wire Come that I met you until tanks stop moving by Company WILL be aggressive and get into up to support Abandon (-) A & not ready S-3 505 1940</i></p>		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR	TIME SIGNED	
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SHRIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
To CODE NAMES		
<p><i>AXIS OF ADVANCE - REGENT ST. MAIN CANAL - LIVERPOOL VOLTURNO - WINDY GOODWOOD WIL RAILWAY - WAVERLY TRENITIVA - BURTON S. MARCELLINO - TRUMPER FRIGNANO - DUGGIE GR. OZZESE - SIX ALBANORA - WALTER</i></p>		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR	TIME SIGNED	
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SHRIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
To CODE NAMES CONTD		
<p><i>VILLA LITERNO - ROSKIN 2ND CANAL - RICHARD I 3RD CANAL - RICHARD II GRAZZANISE - SAINT PAUL ARNONE - CHICAGO CANCELLO - PITTSBURGH</i></p>		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR	TIME SIGNED	
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SHRIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE <i>10/43</i>	
To KERNEL SEAGULL		
<p><i>Now AT V2 UNDER SMALL ARMS MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE.</i></p> <p><i>1028</i></p> <p><i>KERNEL WHITE</i></p>		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENIOR	TIME SIGNED	
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

-SECRET-



-SECRET-

NORTAN S-3

BATCHER
cmdg.

06
74

One platoon EHQ
One 57
Two 57
Two 57


Two 4.2
Howitzer

20+
03

Kernel White
Seagull
How 0510

06
74

84
1500



70
03

Kernel-White
Seagull
Hour 1400
ITALY 1:50,000

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
143		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
	Oct 10, '45	
To	C.O. 376th F. Co.	
<p>Effective 0800 Sept 11 You will be responsible for patrolling of the area from 7" 30" to 14" 00" "7" 30" to 14" 00" etc.</p>		
<p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: <i>W. H. [unclear]</i> TIME SIGNED: <i>11:00</i></p>		
<p>AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: <i>None</i> SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>[Signature]</i> SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: <i>[Signature]</i></p>		

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
142		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
	Oct 10	
To	5-33-192 and 13th Bn 4 Bnms. Subson C.O.	
<p>Request following information be submitted to the 4th within 24 hrs. to complete study of the various uses of the [unclear] under the of [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] that are in the future 1945</p>		
<p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: <i>W. H. [unclear]</i> TIME SIGNED: <i>[unclear]</i></p>		
<p>AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: <i>None</i> SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>[Signature]</i> SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: <i>[Signature]</i></p>		

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
143		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
	Oct 15	
To	C.O. 15, Regt Hq Co, 1st. 2nd Sd Bn	
<p>Inspections will be conducted by this Hq tomorrow, Oct 16, as follows: [unclear] equipment will be assembled at 0800 hrs and deployed for inspection by the Regt Comd. Schedule inspection:</p>		
<p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: <i>[unclear]</i> TIME SIGNED: <i>[unclear]</i></p>		
<p>AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: <i>[unclear]</i> SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>[Signature]</i> SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: <i>[Signature]</i></p>		

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
143		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
To		
<p>0800-1000 - Regt Hq Co 1015-1215 - 3rd Bn 1300-1500 - 1st Bn 1530-1730 - 2nd Bn Bn Com. O's contact Regt Com. O. for details of the inspection</p>		
<p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: <i>[unclear]</i> TIME SIGNED: <i>[unclear]</i></p>		
<p>AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: <i>[unclear]</i> SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>[Signature]</i> SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: <i>[Signature]</i></p>		


THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
143		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
To		
<p>Area field ranges will be inspected in this morning between the hours 0800 and 1100. Most supply officers will report to the [unclear] at [unclear] at 1400 HR today for instructions</p>		
<p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: <i>C.O. 505th</i> TIME SIGNED: <i>0750</i></p>		
<p>AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: <i>[unclear]</i> SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: <i>[Signature]</i> SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: <i>Doehn, Capt.</i></p>		

Overlay to accompany
1st Bn. Periodic G-3 Report

Disposition of 1st Bn
505 C.T.

Map Italy
1:100,000


Sheet 172
GSGS 4164



Data A Royson
Capt. Inf
S-3

Disposition of 1st Bn
505 CT.

17:25 hr. 5th Oct, 43



Maps, Italy

1:50,000

Casal Di Principe

Sheet-172-III

GS,GS. No 4049

Date: A. Roydon

Capt. Inf

S-3

SECRET

G.S

Copy No. 1

23 ARMD BDE 070/NO. 37

Ref Map: STAT 1:50,000

Sheets 184 I, 184 IV,
172 II, 172 III.

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

- (a) It is not yet clear whether the enemy intends to hold positions on the R. VOLTURNO in any strength.
- (b) spasmodic shelling on our positions has been the only contact on bde front.

2. Own Tps.

- (a) 22 Armd Bde is holding br 118700 - ALBANOVA 1066.
- (b) Jdy between 22 Armd Bde and 23 Armd Bde.

On Basting rd from R. VOLTURNO - 080710 - track
095710 to 104672 incl 22 Armd Bde - 10 Basting
grv - 100623 rd to QULLIANO 1257 incl 22 Armd

INTENTION

23 Armd Bde will hold a bridgehead over RIXI LAGNE on bde front and will recon crossings over R. VOLTURNO.

METHOD

1. Tasks

(a) 505 Para Regt with under cmd 319 P. B. Coy, G Coy G.S. Coy Bn and 267 A. Tk Bty will

- (1) hold bridgehead incl 068700 - 076716 - 044715 - 024639.

(1) patrol strongly during night 5/3 Oct on R. VOLTURNO between incl 046704 - 996723 and report by 0800 hrs 6 Oct on strength and dispositions of enemy holding that sector.

(b) GREYS with under cmd n sgn 46 Div Rocca Regt will

- (1) op 505 Para Regt in holding bridgehead.

(1) maintain line of observation during night 5/6 Oct on rd 085704 - 104672.

(c) KMG will recon to find route west from bde centre line to ford at 950702.

5. ARTY.

24 Army Pz Regt and 46 Army Pz Regt grouped under comd of 24 Army Pz Regt will be in sp of 505 Para Regt and will be prepared to support operations as already arranged with 505 Para Regt.

5. ARTY

267 A. Tk Bty will be under comd 505 Para Regt.

7. Lt. A.A.

H Tp 195 Lt A.A. Bty will continue to give protection to Tac Bde HQ.

8. R.P.C.

573 Army Pz Coy will improve and maintain bde centre line to incl br 054697 to carry two way traffic where ever possible.

9. Junc Pts.

(a) Between 22 Armd Bde and 23 Armd Bde:-

GREYS will make contact with 22 Armd Bde in ALBANOVA.

(b) Between 505 Para Regt and GREYS:-

contact will be made by mutual patrolling on line of coord 085704 - 068700.

AIM

(a) Replenishment will be between 1000 and 1130 hrs 6 Oct at Amn pt 1159. It is hoped that one day's bread will be available tomorrow. Except for bread no rations will be issued, but units will draw two days rations on 7 Oct for consumption 11/12 Oct.

Now included in the Amn Pz holdings are

- 30 P.P.G. - 105 am
- 90 P.P.G. - 25 pr.

(b) Locations

All bde units excl 331 Coy RASC and 23 Armd Pz Coy are now located on rd QULLIANO - R. VOLTURNO. Main Bde HQ are situated at 1258. 23 Armd Bde Hq (incl 305 P.P.G.) are in the barracks at 2154.

(c) Rpts.

Units will submit to DAA & OMG Tac Bde HQ by 1200 hrs 6 Oct rpt demands showing separately those urgently required for ops. Rpt demands will be submitted to this HQ weekly by 1200 hrs on Sundays.

(d) Vchs and Controlled stores.

Units should notify this HQ of losses, due to enemy action, or any controlled stores or vchs as and when they occur.

(a) The above adm paras do not apply to U.S. units under comd.

INTERCOM

11. Bde HQ.

(a) Tac Bde HQ at 088646.

(b) Centre line - QULLIANO 1257 - ARNONE 0274.

12. L/T.

(a) 505 Para Regt will lay and maintain a line from their comd post to their rear comd post and will have an off-communicably available at rear comd post to deal with calls on night or day as required.

(b) 505 Para Regt will lay and maintain a line from their comd post to 505 Para Regt rear comd post.

13. L.O.

All units unless placed under comd other units of the Bde by this O.O. will provide an L.O. who will sleep at Tac Bde HQ each night until further notice.

ASK

Time of signature

Method of despatch

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.

505 Para Regt	1 - 4
COM	5
GREYS	6
24 Army Pz Regt	7
46 Army Pz Regt	8
B Sqn 46 Div Rocca Regt	9
267 A. Tk Bty	10
H Tp 195 Lt AA Dty	11
573 Army Pz Coy	12
Sigs	13
150 Lt Pz Unit	14
Comd	15
EM	16
DAA & OMG	17
Liaison	18
Amn Pz	19
Pro	20
Capt OZMA	21
Bde RASC Unit	22
7 Armd Div	23
22 Armd Bde	24
File	25 - 26
War diary	27 - 28

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7	
TO		
"Plan for Relief of 505 C.P. by 46th Division"		
1830-2130 - 46th Div occupy positions		
2130 - Combat Team Foot elements move out simultaneously and		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7	
TO		
respective positions to extracting point on Road SE Villa LTERNO		
Exact location to be designated		
2300 - 319th FA. 783rd Chem.		
Move by Motor from respective locations		
Charing Liverpool by 2305		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7	
TO		
2330 - 267th A.P. Bn move out by Motor - Charing Liverpool by 0015		
All A.P. units released from 505 C.P. control on crossing Liverpool		
Order of Departure 505th Inf.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

DATE 5 OCTOBER 1943
UNIT KERNEL WHITE
FROM 041200
TO 051200

1. OUR FRONT LINES - SEE OVERLAY
2. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS & SUPPORTING TROOPS. A BRITISH FIELD ARTILLERY UNIT OF 12 - 105s IS IN DIRECT SUPPORT. 1st BN SOS IS IN RESERVE TO OUR REAR. NO FRIENDLY TROOPS REPORTED ON EITHER FLANK.
3. LOCATION OF TROOPS - SEE OVERLAY
4. WEATHER & VISIBILITY - CLEAR & UNLIMITED
5. OUR OPERATION FOR THE PERIOD. MADE FIRST CONTACT WITH ENEMY AT 2116 HOURS AT RUSKIN. ENEMY ESTIMATED AT 1 COMPANY. CLOSED WITH HIM & HE IMMEDIATELY WITHDREW AFTER FIRING SEVERAL THOUSAND ROUNDS OF AUTOMATIC SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION. PROCEEDED NORTH ALONG REGENT SP (DORRIGT & ON LEFT F.M. RESERVE) WERE IN CONSTANT CONTACT & UNDER ENEMY SHELL FIRE. TOOK LIVERPOOL AT 0830 HOURS & FOUND 1-BLOWN BRIDGE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BYPASS THIS BLOWOUT. PUSHED AGGRESSIVELY FWD & TOOK RICHARD I AT 1000 HOURS WHERE WE WERE HALTED BY ORDER - SEE OVERLAY. CAPTURED 3 HEAVY MORTARS, 1 37MM AT GUN WITH AMMUNITION WHICH WE NOW HAVE. A SMALL AMOUNT OF SMALL ARMS & 6 GERMANS. KILLED APPROXIMATELY 30 GERMANS.
6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY - SUPERIOR

1. RESULT OF OPERATION - CLEARED REGENT SP FOR BRITISH.
2. TANK STATUS - NONE

SEAGULL
KERNEL WHITE

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7	
TO		
And Reassignment at Liverpool		
As party (505 C.P. group) - 5 hours		
1st Bn - - - - - Next 25 hours		
2nd Bn - - - - - Next 25 hours		
Rear C.P. and Supply - 1st 25 hours		
Regt 3rd and Motor office		
will coordinate and control Group.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7	
TO		
Detailing by entire C.P. in the C.P. at NAPLES 1.		
to resume 11000 Oct.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE 7-10-43	
TO		
Cease all artillery fire in the vicinity of Railroad station		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE 7 Oct 43	
TO		
C.O. 505 CT		
172 RDS HE AND 2 ADS WP 42 CHEMICAL MORTAR AMMUNITION EXPENDED DURING PERIOD 041130 - 071600		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE 7 Oct 43	
TO		
KERNEL SUNRAY		
SITUATION AT FRONT UNCHANGED PATROLS FROM E AND F COS OUTLOOKING FOR DEADLY PERMITTED ARTILLERY ON FORWARD TROOPS PATROL ENHANCED RESISTANCE		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7 - File	
TO		
C.O. 505 CT 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, 4th Bn, 5th Bn, 6th Bn, 7th Bn, 8th Bn, 9th Bn, 10th Bn, 11th Bn, 12th Bn, 13th Bn, 14th Bn, 15th Bn, 16th Bn, 17th Bn, 18th Bn, 19th Bn, 20th Bn, 21st Bn, 22nd Bn, 23rd Bn, 24th Bn, 25th Bn, 26th Bn, 27th Bn, 28th Bn, 29th Bn, 30th Bn, 31st Bn, 32nd Bn, 33rd Bn, 34th Bn, 35th Bn, 36th Bn, 37th Bn, 38th Bn, 39th Bn, 40th Bn, 41st Bn, 42nd Bn, 43rd Bn, 44th Bn, 45th Bn, 46th Bn, 47th Bn, 48th Bn, 49th Bn, 50th Bn, 51st Bn, 52nd Bn, 53rd Bn, 54th Bn, 55th Bn, 56th Bn, 57th Bn, 58th Bn, 59th Bn, 60th Bn, 61st Bn, 62nd Bn, 63rd Bn, 64th Bn, 65th Bn, 66th Bn, 67th Bn, 68th Bn, 69th Bn, 70th Bn, 71st Bn, 72nd Bn, 73rd Bn, 74th Bn, 75th Bn, 76th Bn, 77th Bn, 78th Bn, 79th Bn, 80th Bn, 81st Bn, 82nd Bn, 83rd Bn, 84th Bn, 85th Bn, 86th Bn, 87th Bn, 88th Bn, 89th Bn, 90th Bn, 91st Bn, 92nd Bn, 93rd Bn, 94th Bn, 95th Bn, 96th Bn, 97th Bn, 98th Bn, 99th Bn, 100th Bn		
MEETING OF UNIT COS AT REGT CP AT 1400 REGRANG RELIEF OF 505 CT BY 46 DIV TONIGHT. TENTATIVE PLAN: INFANTRY UNITS WILL BE RELIEVED BETWEEN 1830 HR. AND 2100 HR.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
TO		
UNITS WILL MARCH TO EXTRACTING POINT SE. OF VILLA LTERNO. ROAD N. OF VILLA LTERNO WILL BE CLEARED BY 2300 HR. 100 LORRIES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR 505 CT.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 7	
TO		
C.O. 505 CT 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, 4th Bn, 5th Bn, 6th Bn, 7th Bn, 8th Bn, 9th Bn, 10th Bn, 11th Bn, 12th Bn, 13th Bn, 14th Bn, 15th Bn, 16th Bn, 17th Bn, 18th Bn, 19th Bn, 20th Bn, 21st Bn, 22nd Bn, 23rd Bn, 24th Bn, 25th Bn, 26th Bn, 27th Bn, 28th Bn, 29th Bn, 30th Bn, 31st Bn, 32nd Bn, 33rd Bn, 34th Bn, 35th Bn, 36th Bn, 37th Bn, 38th Bn, 39th Bn, 40th Bn, 41st Bn, 42nd Bn, 43rd Bn, 44th Bn, 45th Bn, 46th Bn, 47th Bn, 48th Bn, 49th Bn, 50th Bn, 51st Bn, 52nd Bn, 53rd Bn, 54th Bn, 55th Bn, 56th Bn, 57th Bn, 58th Bn, 59th Bn, 60th Bn, 61st Bn, 62nd Bn, 63rd Bn, 64th Bn, 65th Bn, 66th Bn, 67th Bn, 68th Bn, 69th Bn, 70th Bn, 71st Bn, 72nd Bn, 73rd Bn, 74th Bn, 75th Bn, 76th Bn, 77th Bn, 78th Bn, 79th Bn, 80th Bn, 81st Bn, 82nd Bn, 83rd Bn, 84th Bn, 85th Bn, 86th Bn, 87th Bn, 88th Bn, 89th Bn, 90th Bn, 91st Bn, 92nd Bn, 93rd Bn, 94th Bn, 95th Bn, 96th Bn, 97th Bn, 98th Bn, 99th Bn, 100th Bn		
MEETING OF UNIT COS AT REGT CP AT 1400 REGRANG RELIEF OF 505 CT BY 46 DIV TONIGHT. TENTATIVE PLAN: INFANTRY UNITS WILL BE RELIEVED BETWEEN 1830 HR. AND 2100 HR.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
0415		
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE	
TO		
UNITS WILL MARCH TO EXTRACTING POINT SE. OF VILLA LTERNO. ROAD N. OF VILLA LTERNO WILL BE CLEARED BY 2300 HR. 100 LORRIES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR 505 CT.		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER		
TIME SIGNED		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE 7-0-43	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
all activity for will be lifted at 1200		
<div style="text-align: right;"> 12:00 </div>		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE 00-1-43	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
<u>St. Paul</u> has reported with his men and is here now <div style="text-align: right;"> 11:00 </div>		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>St. Paul</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE 7-0-43	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
<u>"F" Co</u> patrol reports main road to Regent St to St. Paul idiosyncrasy for two miles east of Regent <div style="text-align: right;"> 14:30 </div>		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 8	DATE Oct 7	
To: <u>C.O. 5, 1st Bn, 2nd Pz, 319 Pz Bn, C Co, 53 Cdn, 267 AF BN, Hq Co, and staff</u>		
Meeting of unit C.O.'s at Regt CP at 1100 RECEIVING RELIEF OF 505 CT BY 41 DIV TONIGHT. TENTATIVE PLAN: INFANTRY UNITS WILL BE RELIEVED BETWEEN 1830 HR AND 2100 HR. UNITS WILL		
Official Designation of Sender:		
Signature and Grade of Writer:		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
MARCH TO ENTRUCKING POINT S.E. OF VILLA DE LITERNO. ROAD N. OF VILLA LITERNO WILL BE CLEARED BY 2300 HR. 60 LORRIES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR 505 CT.		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>C.O. 505 CT</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>Norton Capt</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE Oct 43	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
PW Report bridge near Monch at bridge flows		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 3	DATE 6 Oct 1943	
To: <u>SUNRAY</u>		
F Co located 60 YDS SOUTH OF CEMETERY FACING WEST. COORDINATES 027745. SITUATION NOW WELL. HANO F Co located 024734 OCCUPIED RAILROAD STATION		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>ACORN</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>Edwards</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 4	DATE Oct 6 43	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
F AND F Co's in DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ALONG ROAD AT 034734. GERMANS ARE REPORTED IN CHARGE. THREE FLARES WENT UP FROM THE DIRECTION OF ST. PAUL. HAVE SHUT DOWN RADIO AS WE HAVE WIRE COMM. WITH F AND F Co's		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>ACORN</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>D.A. UFLER</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 44	DATE Oct 6	
To: <u>2300 BRIGADE</u>		
What is the situation at St. Paul		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>Norton</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>Norton Capt</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE 6/10/43	
To: <u>Kernel Seagull</u>		
TARNADO REPORTS NO TROOPS IN AREA SUPPOSED TO BE OCCUPIED BY FORTY SIXTH BRITISH		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>FROM GOLDEN</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 3	DATE Oct 6-43	
To: <u>C.O. 505</u>		
your patrol report at St. Paul <u>048733</u> march to 035745 is O.K. River crossing at this point approx 25 yds and 188 men 100 YDS WEST of main road 028733. M.G. and area of		
Official Designation of Sender:		
Signature and Grade of Writer:		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 1	DATE Oct 6	
To: <u>C.O. 23 BRIGADE</u>		
NO CONTACT MADE WITH UNITS		
Official Designation of Sender:		
Signature and Grade of Writer:		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 33	DATE Oct 6-43	
To: <u>C.O. 505</u>		
Casualty 033734 - the river bank ball for C.O. 505 advanced post at 041733		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>Patrol</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 2	DATE Oct 6	
To: <u>C.O. 505</u>		
OUR PATROLS TO GARDEN MET STRONG OPPOSITION AT 0130 IN CHARGE FROM 0130 TO 0500 THE MESSAGE AND REPORTED NO ENEMY OR CIVILIANS ESTABLISHING CONTACT UP IN CHARGE TO GARDEN AND		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>C.O. 505</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 7	DATE Oct 6	
To: <u>C.O. 23 BRIGADE - C.O. 9746 DIV</u>		
SMALL UNIT IN GARDEN MET 1000 YDS SE OF GARDEN AT 0130 FROM 0130 TO 0500 THE MESSAGE AND REPORTED NO ENEMY OR CIVILIANS ESTABLISHING CONTACT UP IN CHARGE TO GARDEN AND		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>C.O. 505</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>Norton Capt</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 2	DATE Oct 6	
To: <u>C.O. 23 BRIGADE</u>		
OUR PATROLS TO GARDEN MET STRONG OPPOSITION AT 0130 IN CHARGE FROM 0130 TO 0500 THIS MORNING AND REPORTED NO ENEMY OR CIVILIANS ESTABLISHING CONTACT UP IN CHARGE TO GARDEN AND		
Official Designation of Sender: <u>C.O. 505</u>		
Signature and Grade of Writer: <u>MSK</u>		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
4		
MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 3	DATE 6 OCT 43	MAS
TO: KERNEL ACORN		
CIVILIAN REPORT STATES		
48 GERMANS WITH 2 M.G.'S		
LOCATED AT 97269		
REQUEST FOR MORE		
INFORMATION OF TIGER		
SITUATION TO ME		
1600		
KERNEL ACORN 1550		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF MEMBER		
TIME SAVED		
ATTACHED TO BE FILED IN CLASS		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
4		
MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE 11-6-43	
TO: Shall draft White		
Enemy Bn located beyonds range		
D. 12. 0831		
Near Charles Highway		
1600		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF MEMBER		
TIME SAVED		
ATTACHED TO BE FILED IN CLASS		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
40		
MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE OCT 6	
TO: Brigade + 1st + 2nd Bns Kernel		
Additional Code, names		
300 yds NW of Pittsburgh one		
Toward ST in Broadway		
The 100 yds NW of Broadway		
ON FRONT ST IS ALER		
1300		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF MEMBER		
TIME SAVED		
ATTACHED TO BE FILED IN CLASS		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
71		
MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 11	DATE Oct 6	
TO: C.V. 23 BRIG and 52 NIDN		
1st Bn + Co. CL BY PHO		
CHICAGO OCCUPIED BY F		
COMPANY AT 1245 W. AT		
CHARLES HELD BY REINFORCED		
SMALL E COMPANY HENRY FARM		
ARTILLERY CONCENTRATION IN		
PINKALO AT 1750 3 CASHELPS		
1315		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF MEMBER		
TIME SAVED		
ATTACHED TO BE FILED IN CLASS		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No. 6	DATE Oct 6	
TO: C.G. 23 BRIG		
MINES LOCATED AT 070707		
REQUEST BR OVER RUMED I		
BE DENIED		
0925		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF MEMBER		
TIME SAVED		
ATTACHED TO BE FILED IN CLASS		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
39		
MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE Oct 6-43	
TO: C.G. 23rd Brigade		
Request Budge over		
Richard 1st Canal - intersection		
of Regent St. and Richard 1st		
- be demined by Sappers.		
0910		
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF MEMBER		
TIME SAVED		
ATTACHED TO BE FILED IN CLASS		
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER		
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER		

B. Co. secured R.I. during the night and until app. 1100 hr. 5, Oct 43.

600th Bn. less B. Co. moved out by Capt. "A" Co. to secure the R.I. at Villa Lillano. "C" Co. to secure R.I. west of Albanova (1103672)

1000 hr. 5 Oct. 43 the Bn is intact at Villa Lillano, less C. Co. which remains at R.I. (1103672) west of Albanova.

6. Excellent

7. Regt. Reserve. Secured Road Junction (1109153 and 1109272) and supported near and flank protection for Bn. D. Co. in their advance from Quilano to Villa Lillano and towards Arona.

8. Nothing to Report

Date 11.8.43
Capt. Jus
Suz

45 Bn. positions

(a) 068-688 319

(R) 061-677

(C) 051-705-

JM
1135

SECRET

G.5

23 ARMD BDE O.O. NO. 37

Copy No. 4

1 Oct 43

Ref Maps: ITAM 1:50,000
Sheets 184 I, 184 IV,
172 II, 172 III.

1. Enemy.

(c) It is not yet clear whether the enemy intends to hold
poena on the R. VOLTURNO in any strength.

(b) Spasmodic strolling on our poena has been the only contact
on the front.

2. Own Troops.

(1) 22 Armd Bde is holding br 118700 - ALBANOVA 1066.

(b) Bdy between 22 Armd Bde and 23 Armd Bde.

08 Easting grid from R. VOLTURNO - 060718 - was
095718 - to 104672 incl 22 Armd Bde - 10 Easting
grid - 100623 - rd to QUALIANO 1257 incl 22 Armd Bde

INTENTION

3. 23 Armd Bde will hold a bridgehead over RAI LAGNI on
Bde front and will recon crossings over R. VOLTURNO.

METHOD

4. Tasks

(a) 505 Para Regt with under comd 319 P.A. Bn. C Coy 83 C
Bn and 267 A.Tk Bty will

(1) hold bridgehead incl 068700 - 076716 - 044715
- 024689.

(11) patrol strongly during night 5/6 Oct on R. VOLTURNO
between incl 048764 - 996723 and report by 0600
hrs 6 Oct on strength and dispositions of enemy
holding that sector.

(3) GREYS with under comd 319 P.A. Bn. will

(1) sp 505 Para Regt in holding bridgehead.

(11) maintain line of observation during night 5/6
Oct on rd 065704 - 104672.

(c) KDG will recon to find route west from Bde Centre line
to ford at 950702.

5. ARTY

24 Army Pz Regt and 146 Army Pz Regt assigned under comd
OC 24 Army Pz Regt will be in up of 505 Para Regt and will
be prepared to carry out DF tasks as already arranged with
505 Para Regt.

6. A.TK

26 / A.Tk Bty will be under comd 505 Para Regt.

-2-

7. L.A.A.

H Tp 195 Lt A.A. Bty will continue to give protection
to Tac Bde HQ.

8. R.E.

573 Armd Pz Coy will improve and maintain bridge control
line to inc. or 044697 to carry two way traffic where ever
possible.

9. June Pts.

(a) between 22 Armd Bde and 23 Armd Bde.

GREYS will make contact with 22 Armd Bde in ALBANOVA.

(b) between 505 Para Regt and GREYS.

Contact will be made by mutual patrolling on line of comd
065704 - 068700.

10. ITAM

(a) Reconnaissance will be between 1000 and 1130 hrs 6 Oct
at Am Pt 1159. It is hoped that one day's bread will
be available tomorrow. Except for bread no rations will
be issued, but units will draw two days rations on 7
Oct for consumption 11/12 Oct.

Now included in the Amn Pz holdings are
3m r.p.g. 405 am
90 r.p.g. 25 pr.

(b) Locations

All Bde units excl 331 Coy TASC and 23 Armd Bde Wksp
are now located on rd QUALIANO - R. VOLTURNO. Main Bde HQ
are situated at 1258. 23 Armd Bde Wksp (incl 303 T.D.T.)
are in the barracks at 2454.

(c) Rpts.

Units will submit to D.A. & QMG Tac Bde HQ by 1200 hrs
6 Oct rft demands showing separately those urgently required
for ops. Rft demands will be submitted to this HQ weekly by
1200 hrs on Sundays.

Units should notify this HQ of losses, due to enemy
action, or any controlled stores or vch as and when
they occur.

(c) The above adm para do not apply to U.S. units under
comd.

INTERCOMM

11. Bde HQ.

(a) Tac Bde HQ at 068646.

(b) Centre Line :- QUALIANO 1257 - ARNOVA 0274.

12. L/T.

(a) 505 Para Regt will lay and maintain a line from their
comd post to their rear comd post and will have an offi-
cer permanently available at rear comd post to deal with
calls L/T or /T as required.

- 3 -

(b) Sigs will lay and maintain line from Tac Bde HQ to
505 Para Regt rear comd post.

13. L.Os.

All units under comd will be required to
do by this O.O. will provide an L.O. who will sleep at
the Bde HQ each night until further notice.

ACK

Time of signature.....

Method of despatch.....

DISTRIBUTION

	Copy No.
505 Para Regt	1 - 4
KDG	5
GREYS	6
24 Army Pz Regt	7
146 Army Pz Regt	8
B Sqn 46 Div Recon Regt	9
267 A.Tk Bty	10
H Tp 195 Lt AA Bty	11
573 Armd Pz Coy	12
Sigs	13
1505th TC Amb	14
comd	15
BN	16
D.A. & QMG	17
Liaison	18
Amn Pt	19
Proc.	20
Capt comd	21
Bde TASC Officer	22
7 Armd Div	23
22 Armd Bde	24
File	25 - 26
War Diary	27 - 28

[Signature]
Maj.
B.H.

5-3

CO 505 Preht Inf
Site: JM

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION REINFORCED
APO 4469, U S ARMY

SECRET
By Authority of
CG 82d A/B Div
Initials
Date: 5 Oct 1943

FO No. 5

Map: ITALY 1:50,000 GSGS 4229 Sheet No. 184.

1. a. Enemy forces are resisting 23rd Arm'd Brigade (BRITISH) in vicinity of GUGLIANO - VILLANICA.
- b. 10th Corps continues the attack.
2. a. 505th Preht Inf Regt (Less one Bn) with 319th Glider FA Bn, Co C 83rd Cml Bn, 3rd Plat 307th Med Co, Det 307th Engr Bn, Det 82d Ren Plat will move by marching and motor to vicinity of PLANTI 195532 report to Commanding Officer 23rd Arm'd Brigade (BRITISH) for orders. This CT will relieve 1st Bn 143rd Inf on orders of the Brigade Commander.
3. a. Order of March: Prescribed by CO CT 505.
- b. Route of March: See Operations Overlay.
- g. 1st Bn 143rd Inf upon relief will move by marching to its bivouac area in NAPLES, see map. This Bn will remain within limit of its bivouac area until ordered on police duty by CG 82d A/B Div.
- d. Guides will be posted by 505th Preht Inf.
- z. 319th Glider FA Bn, Co C 83rd Cml Bn will move as soon as motorized, by way of prescribed route to vicinity of PLANTI and report to CO CT 505 at that point for orders.
4. Current
5. a. SOI - 1aa-12.
- b. Communications maintained by 82d A/B Div Signal Co by radio.
- e. 505 CT will report location of CP to this Hq by radio. No other reports except as called for by this Hq.

RIDGWAY

OFFICIAL: TURNER
G-3


SECRET

Q 82d A/B DIV REINF
4 OCTOBER 1943
OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
F.O. NR 5
MAP - ITALY 1:50,000 GSGS 4229
SHEET 184-1

OFFICIAL:
TURNER
G-3

RIDGWAY
CON'D

HEAD
OF
COLUMN



SECRET

M
07150

DATE Oct. 6
Unit - 2nd Div
FROM 051500
TO 061500

1. ...
2. ... SURVIVING TROOPS -
1st. ...
3. ...
4. ...
5. ONE OPERATED ...
6. ...
7. ...
8. ...

Oct 5	14	...
	15	...
	16	28 Brigade
	17	...
	18	...
	19	...
	20	...
	21	...
	22	...
	23	...
	24	...
	25	...
	26	...
	27	...
	28	...
	29	...
	30	...
	31	Telegram from British

STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Approved by the President
March 10, 1958

WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS - GOVERNMENT RATES

030507

WHAT IS YOUR SITUATION WHERE IS
YOUR CP BY COORDINATES

Avald before
seal.

Red
275
J

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 1 DATE 4 Oct 43

TO S-1 SOS

Bluecast C.P. Establied
5:45 P.M. M052704

Bluecast 6:00P
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 3 DATE 4 Oct

TO S-1 SOS

OUR CP LOCATED 7700
MIDWAY S.E. RUSKIN ON
REGENT ST.

S. J. SULL 11:00
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 4 DATE Oct 5

TO S-1 SOS

2nd BN CONTACTED WITH LIFE
AND REG. LATER EARLY P.M. N
INVEST LAST NIGHT ABOUT 11:00
FROM REGIMENT AND SUPPLYING
MILES AND ONE COMPANY AND
FOR ADVANCE LE 23 BRIGADE 1ST
BN WAS 7 CUS AT VILVA 11:00
8 CO MUST NOT HURRY TO

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 5 DATE

TO

PART OF ALGANDA (L.F. 11111)
IN THE AREA 319 EA
STILL NOT A SURE THING
AS NOT IN AREA 305 CP
AT 07:00 OVERLY 40 CODE
RECEIVED ON 7000

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 7 DATE 5 Oct

TO S-1

Dinky jump wire stretching SW.
From Regent St. Just South of
Richard I
Kerrel information for an 600
Week information on Regent

0905
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 18 DATE 5 Oct

TO S-3

(C.G. across Regent within
night of WALTER sighted area
Carrier 1038 in WALTER
Tiger CP just South of Richard
I. Moving out Forward elements
1000 yds beyond Richard II
Position at intersection of Waverley
and Richard I.E.H. Motor bus on Regent

0945
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 19 DATE

TO HORRIBLE HERBY
CHETNIK REPORTS THEY
have a 200 yds area
of Regent and Waverley
at intersection of Regent
and Waverley

Blumme 0930
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 20 DATE Oct 5 43

TO Kerrel Seagull

Non Moving Baker Company
forward by foot to Ruskin
AT ONCE

Kerrel Seagull 11:15
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 21 DATE Oct 5

TO Kerrel Seagull

56th S.B. 105 men have been
is to be located in support
of Kerrel.

Kerrel Seagull 11:35
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 2 DATE 5 Oct 43

TO Kerrel Seagull

PW Reports bridge over
Roadcut at Bunker House

11:50
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 22 DATE Oct 5 43

TO S-3, 1 and 2 Bns

Submit SITREP #1 as of
051200 by 051400.

Please be specific and
Complete

11:50
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 23 DATE 5 Oct 43

TO S-3

Square NE corner Ruskin mine
Ambulance destroyed 2 casualties
including Doc Stein moderate
Regt. Gullys NW of Ruskin
mine. Tiger jeep destroyed. 2 men
killed, 1 man killed, 2 men seriously
injured.

11:50
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 24 DATE 25 OCT

TO KEYSTONE SEAGULL

KEEN NOW LOCATED 6000 yds
SE OF KERNEL CP ON
REGENT SHEAPNEL LOCATED
100 yd S KERNEL CP BAKER
Now passing 1300

1300
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 10 DATE 10/5/43

TO Kerrel Seagull

2nd Bn reports withdrawal
of position across support
of stay at Blyg No all with
He is not to be held at
1840

11:50
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 3 DATE 5 Oct 43

TO Kerrel Seagull

"B" Company closed on Ruskin
at 1230 hrs. C Company reports
no enemy activity near Waverley

12:35
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 26 DATE Oct

TO 23 BRIGADE

BAKER Company closed
Ruskin 1230

1300
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 324 DATE 5 Oct 1943

TO SUNRAY

ARTILLERY FIRE HEAVY
ARE STILL IN DEFENSIVE
POSITION BRIDGE AT
LIVERPOOL TOWN UNKERNEL
137 MORTARS CAPTURED
30 GERMANIS KILLED

1455
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE (CLASSIFICATION)

NO. 14 DATE Oct 5

TO SUNRAY 23 BRIG AND KEYSIDE
and SUNRAY KEYSIDE


KERNEL CP NOW IN (2440)
ON REGENT ST 700 YDS N LIVERPOOL

1455
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER



23X22

23X22


SITUATION SUSCT
1900 A Oct 5
MAPS 1/50,000

2ND BN TO SEND OUT PATROLS
TO RECONNOITER IN FORCE
AND REPORT BY 060530

BATCHELLEK
COMDG

Official
Dorton
S-3

-SECRET-



SECRET

Headquarters 1st Bn
505th Combat Team
APO, 4th Army 50 P.M.
New York, New York

From 1200hr 4 Oct 43
To 1200hr 5 " 43

To: Regt. S-3

Parade G-3 Report.

1. See Overlay
2. See Overlay
3. See Overlay
4. Warm & Clear

5. 1200hr 4 Oct 43. Bn. in
Bivouac at Cape Dickins Arr-
Part in preparation to move
forward.

1600 hr 4 Oct 43. Bn en-
Trucked and moved forward
to Qualians, detached app.
3 miles N.W. of town. From
there the Bn. moved by
Soot to a Bivouac Area located
south of R.D. 091635.

Overlay to accompany
Periodic G-3 Report
7, Oct. 43

Maps Italy 1:100,000

Caserta & Napoli

Sheets - 724184

SSCS No 4164

Disposition 1st Bn 505 - Casual Tests

Date A. Roydon
Capt. Inf
S-3

Oct 7

50	May	to	S-3
51	"	"	Went down Bay
52	"	"	"
53	"	"	From 1st Bn
54	"	"	"
55	"	"	"
56	"	"	00 505
57	"	"	" 1st
58	"	"	From 1st Bn
59	"	"	28-4 Pop.

From 1000 hr 7 Oct 43
To 1000 hr 8 Oct 43

To: Repl. S-3
Periodic G-3 Report

1. See Overlay
2. See Overlay
3. See Overlay
4. Rain & Cool
5. Mail

Delivered to get overlay submitted
1000 hr 7 Oct 43

2130 hr 7th Co. with 2nd Bn 505
and 1st Bn 505 was relieved by the
8th Co. Moved out on road to hills behind
Bunker Line till 0430 hr. extracted and
arrived in Napoli at 1000 hr 8 Oct 43

6. Excellent
7. Repl. Reserve until 8100 hr. 9th Co. attached
to 2nd Bn. as reserve company. Moved
to base bivouac at Napoli
8. Nothing to Report


Date A. Roydon
Capt. Inf
S-3

UTE

MAYALMERCURIA

OMP

MAPOL



Overlay to Accompany
Periodic G-3 Report
Maps Italy 1:100,000
Napoli,
Sheet 184
GS-GS 4164

Date A. Reynolds
Capt. T.S.
G-3

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

872

362-11-10-3
(3)

(1/7/50)
Master

30 Days in Holland and Germany with
50th Parachute Infantry

17 Sept - 19 Oct 1/44

17 Sep - 19 Oct 44

Base South Front, Inf.
A.P.O. 230, U. S. Army
In the field
24 October 1944

30 DAYS IN HOLLAND AND GERMANY WITH THE 80TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY

PART I - 17 September to 24 September 1944.

80th Parachute Infantry splined in three lifts at LANGEN and PUSSEN airfields, HOLLAND, at 1000 hour, 17 September 1944. The weather was cloudy with a ceiling of 1000 feet over the fields. The three lifts flew in low scattered clouds over HOLLAND, but broke into the clear when they reached the ENGLISH CHANNEL. After departure from HOLLAND the weather was clear and warm.

The flight reached the Dutch coast on schedule, and all check points to the LZ were crossed at the scheduled time. No enemy fighter opposition was encountered. Some scattered flak was encountered at the landfall on the Dutch coast. After leaving the coast of HOLLAND being no more flak was encountered until fifteen minutes before drop time. The last of fifteen minutes of the flight was made through intense light and heavy flak. Machine gun, EOMs and search fire was clearly visible. Casualties among the parachutists from AA fire were light.

The regiment jumped in the following order - 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, on LZ "T", 1000 yards north of Groenendaal, HOLLAND. 1st and 2nd Bns were dropped on the LZ. 3rd Bn was dropped 700 yards southeast of the LZ. Lifts were bunched on the drop facilitating prompt assembly.

Initial enemy resistance on the LZ was negligible, amounting to fire from a few widely scattered AA crews and some isolated labor troops. Generally, the assembly was made without enemy interference.

Drop time was 1000, 17 September 44. All units were 10 percent assembled and enroute to objectives by 1000 hour. The 1st and 3rd Bns had captured their objectives at 1000 hour, 17 September 44. The 2nd Bn had captured its objective and was on its objective at 2000 hour, 17 September 44.

From this point on the action of each battalion constitutes a separate account and will be given below.

A. - 1st Battalion: 17 September to 24 September 1944.

The 1st Battalion, 80th Parachute Infantry, commanded by Lt. Colonel Charles Warren, Jr., landed on LZ "T" (725884) and assembled. The 1st Battalion had moved up and occupied its assigned initial objective in the vicinity of DE WICHT (725894) by 1000 hour, five minutes past drop time. This operation involved a march through enemy territory to an objective three miles from the assembly area.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

CANCELLED

14750
MASTER

382 - 11/15/44 - 3

At 2430 hour, 17 September, Companies A and B moved into the town of Hilsleben, to seize the road bridge across the WALT RIVER, while Company C remained in position holding the high ground at DE WOOD. Upon entering the town Companies A and B met strong resistance from the enemy garrison supported by armored vehicles. The attack was made with no prior reconnaissance, based on information from Dutch civilians that HILSBLEN was practically defenseless. After two hours of street fighting in the dark, the action had become localized to platoons, squads, and even smaller groups.

The night of D Day, 17 September, found the 1st Bn deployed as follows: Bn CP in the vicinity of 731821. Company A followed by Company B, attacking to seize the HILSBLEN highway bridge, had reached and was fighting in the parkway at 710020. A platoon of Company C plus the Bn S-4 section, by a different route and at an earlier hour had advanced to and fought in the same parkway. This unit returned to Company C and the Bn CP respectively at 0000 hour, 18 September. Company C, less one platoon, was in battalion reserve in the vicinity of the Bn CP.

After bitter street fighting during the night 17-18 September, Company B had pushed through the Company A position to vicinity 703021 by daylight. Shortly after dawn Company A was in the process of reorganizing to push the attack to the final objective when a strong German attack developed on the south regimental flank in the WALT area. The Germans were already beginning to overrun the glider landing zone there. At 0630 hour 1st Bn was ordered to send Company C to the vicinity of 040021 (VILCHENBERG 747804) to hold the high ground at that point and to secure a line of departure for a contemplated counter-attack to clear the landing zone. Company A and the glider mortar platoon returned to the DE WOOD area, reorganized, and moved out to the southeast prepared to either attack to clear the landing zone or to move east and attack the HILSBLEN bridge in conjunction with Company B which was making good progress towards the bridge from the southeast. Company B remained in possession of the park at 710020.

By this time Captain Adams and a platoon of Company A, still in HILSBLEN, had reached and destroyed what is believed to be the control room for the demolition of the bridge. Captain Adams and this platoon were captured, and the remainder of the platoon was out of fighting their battalion on 18 September. During the time they were out of fighting, this force was fighting constantly against a superior German force.

On the glider landing zone Company D was engaged in bitter fighting with a much larger German force. By 1100 hour, 18 September, the enemy had surrounded Company D and was threatening to overrun the regimental supply dump. The regimental S-4 had organized the supply personnel into a fighting unit and was evacuating his supplies under enemy fire. The seriousness of the situation necessitated prompt and forceful action.

The 1st Bn was ordered to attack without delay to drive the enemy from the landing zone with the KAMPENBERG road the battalion objective. Company B moved from HILSBLEN to be ready to rejoin the remainder of the battalion. From there Colonel Warren moved his unit to the line of departure at 040021 (VILCHENBERG), now secured by Company C.

At 1200 hour the battalion attacked, Companies B and C abreast, Company C on the right. The CP group followed in the center at 300 yards, with Company A following, Company B at 400 yards, in battalion reserve. Emerging from the woods 600 yards northwest of VOXBIL, the companies encountered heavy small arms fire but quickly pushed beyond the first high ground. A Bn CP was established in the vicinity of 762578. Continuing the attack at a run, Companies B and C cleared enemy opposition in the vicinity of VOXBIL-VOSSKNDAAAL, 7757. Company A, less one squad which cleared the high ground on the left flank (vic of 764583), pushed rapidly up WALLBRAAF ROAD to the vicinity of VOSSKNDAAAL-WYLLA (761583). The 1st Bn seized its objective at 1400 hour, as the gliders were coming in to land.

In this action the battalion killed approximately 50 Germans and captured 149. The battalion also neutralized 10 20mm guns which had been firing on the landing zone. Up to this point losses were light, due to the speed of the attack. (Four MIA in the CP group, two KIA and five MIA in the rifle companies).

Two squads on the left flank in the vicinity of 763583 reported that an indefinite number of Germans were moving from the vicinity of ALTHORST (767537).

The Bn GO had Company A organize a defensive position in the vicinity of the high ground 200 yards northeast of the WALLBRAAF ROAD near 766535. Company B occupied the high ground in the vicinity of VOXBIL, 767573-766537. All companies established an outpost system 200 to 400 yards in front of this MGR before dark. Bn CP was established in vicinity of 767578. Company C made contact on the right flank with the 505th Parachute Infantry in the vicinity of KAMP (763533).

During the night and early the next morning the line was extended to vicinity of TRUFELS BERG (764597) - ALTHORST 9747537 - high ground (763533) - high ground (766574), with a platoon roadblock at WYLLA and a point at 773533. Company B took over the VOXBIL area on the right flank.

Principal features of this series of quickly changing events were:

- (1) The excellent control of all echelons of the battalion from the time of the drop through the period of this narrative.
 - (a) The rapid movement to and occupation of the first objective.
 - (b) The daylight withdrawal from the town in the face of German resistance.
 - (c) The rapid move to a directionally opposite objective.
 - (d) The attack from the correct area after a 2000 yard deployed march, much of it through heavy woods.
 - (e) The dashin attack, almost on a run, for 1000 to 1200 yards in the face of 20mm, 40mm, and small arms fire.
 - (f) The prompt reorganization and movement without casualty to a chosen defense line, followed by prompt outpostting and digging in.

- (2) The excellent timing in employment of the battalion reserve for exploitation of a reeling enemy on the landing zone.
- (3) The rapid decisions and orders of the Bn CO, who after an all night street fight, throughout the next day, vigorously led the battalion on a rapid approach march followed by a fast attack and reorganization.
- (4) The movie-thriller sight of landing gliders on the LZ as the deployed paratroops chased the last of the Germans from their 16 20mm guns.

At 1500 hours on the 19th GO Company A (Lt Foley commanding in the absence of Captain Adams, who was still fighting in NUTZEGEN) was alerted for an attack on HILL 75.9. Company A at this time consisted of 2 officers and 42 men from the original company plus an attached platoon of Company G numbering 34 men and 1 officer. At 1600 hours the Bn CO ordered Company A to seize and hold HILL 75.9 and establish road block at its base, where the BAD WILER causeway met the main highway (7c55b3).

The attached platoon of Company G had been beaten off the hill three times during the morning by an estimated company of German paratroopers. With the enemy on the eastern, western and northern slopes of HILL 75.9 Lt. Foley led his company through the woods, approaching the crest from the south and arrived at the LD undetected. 200 yards south of the crest Company A deployed and charged the crest at a run. The Germans on the summit were literally yelled out of their holes, but recovered on the slopes and fought bitterly from positions on the hillside. They counterattacked repeatedly, supported by eight MG's, but the men of Company A, fighting from hole to hole, gradually drove them down the very steep hill.

At 1700 hours on the 19th Company A's five light machine guns were emplaced on the crest, from where they fired on the Germans as they fled north across the open ground and southeast down the highway to WILK. Company A lost ten men killed (all shot in the head) and seven wounded. Enemy dead littered the hillside. At the foot of the hill the enemy left three motorcycles, two staff cars, a truck in running order and another truck which was damaged, two intact 81mm cannon with 300 rounds of ammunition, thirty odd rifles, and most of their miscellaneous individual equipment. At twilight the company reorganized and took up positions in the foxholes vacated by the enemy. Owing to the long battalion front (approximately 2000 yards) Company A was almost isolated from the remainder of the battalion, and it was extremely easy for the enemy to infiltrate in force through the wooded hills around the company. During the night, however, a carrying party of twelve men under Lt. Kelly (Bn S-1) reached the hill with ammunition. In the morning Company C, on Lt. Col. Far en's order, flushed the area around DEVIL'S HILL, seizing 12 prisoners who had fled from the hilltop toward HOLLAND instead of into GERMANY during the previous days' attack. The prisoners evacuated our wounded. Two British MG's, approaching from the 3rd Bn area, picked up 13 wounded Germans in the area who had been unable to retreat with their company.

At the same time that Company A was completing the capture of HILL 75.9 Company B, less one platoon, was attacking WILK. After driving out the German garrison, estimated at one company, Company B quickly reorganized and established a defensive position and a road block at the main

junction in the town. The road block was reinforced with two 87mm anti-air guns. At daylight the following morning four prisoners were captured in the houses of the village.

At approximately 0800 hours on the 20th, a German truck carrying supplies and 10 men approached the road block from the southeast. One of the 57mm guns fired and a MG fired on the truck. The truck was disabled and all except three Germans, who escaped along a road ditch into the woods, were killed. At about 0810 a motorcycle approached from the same direction. The rider saw the demolished truck, turned and rode away before he could be killed. At 0845 hours enemy infantry, estimated at one company, was seen moving across the open ground from southwest to northeast at a distance of about 300 yards from the road block. The enemy was partially concealed by the heavy mist and moved out of sight in the hedgerows and ditches towards GERMANY. At 0930 hours the road block received ten rounds from an enemy artillery piece (80mm or 75mm) located in ZYFFLICH, GERMANY (7859). Artillery fire was adjusted on the gun position by 300 radio and no more fire was received from there. At 0950 hours the road block received fire from two enemy 82mm guns located in ZYFFLICH, and from enemy MG's at 782537. At the same time it was discovered that troops (estimated two companies of Infantry) were advancing from the north and northeast. An artillery barrage was called for immediately and it broke up the enemy attack on both fronts. About an hour and a half later the enemy again advanced in force, firing MG's and small arms. The fire was returned, and a fight began; at the same time sniper fire broke out from several houses in the village. The Germans set fire to a couple of buildings under cover of the smoke began to infiltrate around the road block. The enemy advance continued across the field. A strong attack of battalion strength, well supported by artillery developed.

During the night 19-20 the enemy activity in Company A's sector increased. At dawn a company of enemy, with artillery and mortar support, attacked the hill, making fanatical assaults up the hillside. In the middle of the firefight German fire ceased and a well-dressed German officer stepped into the open calling on Company A to surrender. Lt. Foley replied, "If you want me, come and get me!", and ordered his men to resume fire. The fight continued for an hour before the attack was repulsed. Company A suffered one casualty, killed by an artillery tree burst.

On September 21st, Lt. Havens and 14 men who had been holding high ground to the south, rejoined the company. An hour after they had left their former position German machine guns were still firing on it. Lt. Havens placed his men to the "rear" of the company (the south side) just in time to assist in repulsing the final and most bitter attack. On the next day Captain Adams, Lt. Emma and the remainder of the 1st platoon returned to the company from NICKELHILL.

From 20-22 September, Company A repulsed four attacks in company plus strength. Attacks were made by parachutists (fighting as infantry), marines, and flak troops. The parachutists were especially fanatical, at one time charging to within 15 feet of the machine guns located 300 feet above the road on the hilltop. Attacks were made from three and

four sides at once. Food and ammunition were extremely short. At one time a patrol of selected NCO's sent to battalion for ammunition, returned (with 4 bandoliers, 1 box LMG, and 200 rounds of T3EG pieces) to find that the enemy had attacked in their absence, that automatic weapon ammunition had been entirely expended, and that the rifleman were down to an average of five rounds (not clips) apiece. One rifleman asked his squad leader where the company would withdraw when out of ammunition and was told: "We can withdraw straight up or straight down and that's all". The constant attacks and enemy night infiltration allowed the men of Company A little sleep. At night, men in adjoining foxholes, tied bandoliers to each other to pull each other awake. A German paratrooper, with a beltful of grenades, was shot one night within a few feet of a foxhole. However, during the remainder of their defense of Devil's Hill, only one more Company A man was killed.

The following days, until Company A was relieved by a company from the 504th Parachute Infantry, were relatively quiet except for harassing fire. An artillery observer reached the hill and directed fire against many targets on the flat ground to the east, knocking out two JG's at 778000, among other targets. Company A directed fire with the two captured 20mm cannon on targets along the WHER DAM. The night of 24-26 Company A, with no regrets, left Devil's Hill.

The following episode deserves special mention: Two plane loads from Company A were erroneously dropped approximately two miles east of the drop zone in German territory. Lt. Combs, the senior officer present, assembled and reorganized these men and with the unit thus formed he fought his way back to his battalion, killing an estimated 20 Germans and bringing in 40 German prisoners. Lt. Combs had 22 men in the group which accomplished this. Lt. Combs carried out this action after having been wounded by flak prior to jumping.

B - 2nd Battalion: 17 September to 24 September, 1944.

The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Major Otho E. Holmes, landed on DZ "G" and assembled without delay. Initially Company B, under regimental control, had the mission of seizing, clearing and holding LZ "X" for glider landings.

With his battalion, less Company D, Major Holmes had to occupy a defensive sector more than three thousand yards wide. Moving four and a half miles through hostile territory against enemy opposition, the 2nd battalion seized and organized its objective at DE HUP (704592) within seven hours after dropping.

Early on the morning of 18 September the 2nd battalion was ordered to seize bridge 10 (672004) across the MAAS-WAAL CANAL. This mission had not been assigned to this regiment originally, but was undertaken as a result of the unusual tactical situation. Bridge 10 was the only bridge across the MAAS-WAAL CANAL remaining undestroyed.

At 0330 hours, 18 September, 1st Lt. Folette, with a platoon, started to move towards Bridge 10. The group moved to a point 300 yards

east of the bridge where it was stopped by small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. In the darkness, the enemy fire was not accurate, but as the sun rose higher, the accuracy and intensity of the fire increased. Lt. Polette's attacking platoon continued to press the assault, and worked their way to within a hundred and fifty yards of the bridge. Here the intensity of the fire did not permit further advance without supporting weapons, and Lt. Polette requested support from the 31st mortar platoon. Meanwhile he disposed his light machine guns and BAR's so as to bring fire of the maximum effect on the enemy. Soon after they opened fire from their advanced positions the MG's were put out of action by German mortar fire.

As the fight went on, small groups of enemy could be observed preparing the demolitions around the railroad and highway bridge. Each time the enemy would commence work, Lt. Polette's Riflemen would drive them back to cover. At 1030 hours the enemy blew the charges, destroying the railroad bridge and damaging the highway bridge. At 1100 hours a section of 81mm mortars arrived and immediately went into action against the enemy around the bridge. The intensity and accuracy of this fire caused the enemy to withdraw, leaving the highway bridge in good condition. Lt. Polette reorganized his depleted platoon and established a defensive position at the bridge. At about the same time a small patrol from the 504th parachute infantry arrived and contacted Lt. Polette. Lt. Polette's force remained in position defending the bridge until recalled by his battalion commander at 1730 hours. By this time a company from the 504th Parachute Infantry had arrived at the bridge and was able to take over responsibility for its defense.

The 2nd Battalion, less D Company, maintained its defensive position until 1800 hours, 18 September, at which time the sector was reduced to a width of 1000 yards and Company F was detached and attached to the 3rd Battalion. This detachment left the 2nd Battalion, less two rifle companies. At 1800 hours 19 September British armored units reached the 2nd Battalion positions.

On 20 September the 2nd Battalion, less Company F, moved to and established a defensive position along the line KBAR-VOKHIL. The battalion remained in this position until 24 September, at which time it was relieved by the 504 Parachute Infantry.

G - 3rd Battalion: 17 September to 24 September, 1944

The 3rd Battalion, 503th Parachute Infantry, Lt. Col. Louis G. Menendez commanding, landed several hundred yards southeast of DE "T", assembled quickly, and occupied its initial objective, the high ground in the general area BANG AN DAU-UBHANGAN-BARK at 1830 hours, without serious resistance. The success of all operations in the HJMLON area depended to a great extent upon the retention of this high ground by the 3rd Battalion.

Late in the afternoon of 17 September, G Company seized HILL 04 (752616). At midnight the company attacked to seize the HJMLON

highway bridge, advancing to a point within four hundred yards of the bridge by the next morning. Due to a heavy enemy attack on the southern perimeter of the Regimental area at WYLER, and to a serious threat at BSEK, G Company had to be moved to the high ground north of BERG BN DAL before it had seized the bridge.

The situation demanded that the enemy be denied the use of the NIJESGEN-WYLER road (Highway K). By the afternoon of the 19th, road blocks had been established at the main intersection in BERG BN DAL and on Highway K at BSEK. Company D, 307 Engineer Bn and four 57mm anti-tank guns from the 30th AA Bn were attached to the 3rd bn. Two AT guns were placed at the roadblock in BSEK and two at the block in BERG BN DAL.

Throughout the 19th much enemy movement had been observed in the area behind BSEK, and the general opinion was that an attack was imminent. As the enemy would concentrate his activity at a particular place, apparently massing for an effort, our artillery would force him to disperse.

On 20 September, the Germans began to systematically shell the positions in BSEK and BERG BN DAL, causing some casualties. In the late afternoon an attack by enemy armor and infantry developed at BSEK. The platoon road blocks were overrun and the enemy advanced almost to BERG BN DAL. Company R counter attacked, and reestablished the BSEK position at 2140 hours, after a bitter fight.

The enemy wanted BSEK, and to get it they threw in an immediate counter attack in greater strength than before. By dawn a portion of Company H was completely surrounded. The 3rd Battalion launched a full scale attack, one platoon of Company G attacking from the northwest, while Company F attacked from the southeast. What remained of Company R made the frontal assault. The initial attack made little progress. Losses to both sides were very heavy. The enemy came forward in another attack, attempting to press his temporary advantage by pushing southwest from BSEK towards BERG BN DAL and southeast towards WYLER. This effort met with no success. In the early afternoon the 3rd Bn renewed the attack with a ferocity which sustained Lt. General Dempsey's reference to the 92nd Division as "The finest fighting division in the world". By 1815 hours BSEK was ours, and for this time on no live Germans, except prisoners, were in the town again.

On the 22nd orders were issued for the 3rd Battalion to attack and clear the enemy from the eastern portion of the CINCUL VAS DE COIL and establish the MFC along the new line SMOULAN HOOP-QUEL LAH-SANDON.

Company I, supported by a troop of tanks from the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, initiated a reconnaissance in force and reached WAGNEREN by 1610 hours. At the south end of WAGNEREN LAKE Company I encountered enemy estimated at two companies in well dug-in positions, supported by AT guns and artillery. Company I was unable to advance through or around this enemy position, and at 1800 hours, after suffering

operations were initiated for an attack to be launched the next day.

At 0430 hours 23 September, the 3rd Battalion moved out to a rendezvous near FULDA. The attack began at 0710 hours, with companies echeloned to the left rear, in order from right to left, Company G, Company H, Company I. A troop of tanks was attached to each company.

On the north flank, Company I overcame enemy resistance easily, and reached the objective at the ZULEKON brick kilns at 0830 hours. Company H reached its objective at HILL 9.2 (774624) with no resistance being encountered. Company G ran into the center of enemy resistance and reached its objective (THORNESCHKE MOLEN) at 0815 hours after a fierce fight. The enemy counterattacked without delay, concentrating their efforts on Company G. The counter attack caught company G in the midst of reorganization and resupply, and forced it back six hundred yards to the WÄSCHERER LAKE.

In the afternoon (23 September) Company G attacked and regained the THORNESCHKE MOLEN position. The enemy concentrated artillery fire on the company position, and engaged our forces with small arms, mortars, and automatic weapons. It was decided to move Company G to the vicinity of WÄSCHERER LAKE and organize that ground for defense. By nightfall Company G was in position and firmly established.

At 2100 hours the enemy launched a coordinated attack on Companies G and I, which was repulsed after heavy fighting. In the course of the battle Company I damaged a PzKw IV tank.

On the morning of the 24th Company G made its third attack on THORNESCHKE MOLEN and for the third time drove the enemy from the position. The enemy resumed their bombardment of the dykes, and it was decided that the mounting casualty rate did not warrant retention of the tactically valueless position. On Regimental order Company G returned to the WÄSCHERER LAKE positions and organized the MLR at that point.

On the evening of the 24th the 3rd Battalion was relieved by 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry.

In eight days of fighting the 3rd Bn had attacked six times, had withstood five enemy attacks, and had driven the German from twelve thousand square meters of Germany and Holland. In these actions the 3rd Bn lost 40 killed, 120 wounded, and 30 missing in action. 146 German prisoners were taken and an estimated 100 enemy were killed.

D - General:

At 1600 hours 14 September, 504th Parachute Infantry began relief of the regiment in the entire sector. By 2040 hours the relief had been completed, and all units of the regiment went into Division Reserve.

II - 24 September to 5 October, 1944

The regiment remained in Division Reserve until 24 September.

At 1830 hours on 29 September 2nd BN was placed under Division control as Division reserve. At 0110 hours 29 September the 2nd Bn relieved the 3rd Bn, 504 Parachute Infantry on the MRL in the VOXHIL area. At the same time the 1st Bn went into position on the MRL in rear of the 2nd Bn.

On the night of 29 September the 2nd Bn sent two combat patrols to DEN HAUVAL and the woods southeast of there. The patrol on the south reached its objective after some fighting. In DEN HAUVAL, a violent small scale battle was fought. The patrol penetrated DEN HAUVAL some two hundred yards, fighting from hole to hole. Enemy in the woods were deeply entrenched with overhead cover. As the patrol advanced each dugout had to be cleared out individually. Eight German machine guns and a 20mm flak wagon brought fire on the patrol. The patrols returned with four prisoners. While the patrols were keeping the enemy occupied along the front, attack Engineers from Company D, 307 Airborne Engineer Battalion laid a mine field across the front of the VOXHIL position.

On the following day the enemy began intensive shelling of our forward, reserve and regimental command post areas. Light, medium, and heavy artillery were employed. At midnight 1 October the enemy culminated an extremely heavy barrage with an infantry attack supported by armor. The rear area barrages were extremely effective in cutting all wire communication between battalion, regiment, and division.

At 0005 D and E companies were attacked by enemy estimated at a battalion of Panzer Grenadiers supported by tanks, engineers, assault guns, and artillery. The weight of the attack drove the right platoon of E Company back seven hundred yards. F Company counterattacked from its reserve position at 0400 and restored the original position at 0430 hours. Company D destroyed a Panther tank with bazooka fire at 20 yards. The attack cost the 2nd Battalion 5 men KIA, 33 men WIA. The enemy lost an estimated 100 killed and wounded. We captured 20 prisoners. At dawn it was discovered that we had destroyed one Panther tank, three half tracked personnel carriers and two self propelled assault guns during the night.

Harwick set fire to the abandoned and partially damaged enemy vehicles.

Subsequently the enemy confined his activities to sniper and harassing artillery action until the night of the 5 October at which time the regiment was relieved in this sector by the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment.

III - 6 October to 16 October, 1944:

On 6 October, the regiment with 119th FA Bn, Co. H, 307th Engineer Bn, and Battery B, 30th AA Bn, attached, moved to the vicinity of

BRUNEL, HOLLAND, and relieved the 231st Brigade (British) on the front. The combat team was attached tactically to the 50th British Division.

Upon moving into its area the 3rd Battalion found numerous anti-personnel mines in its area. Thirty two British anti-personnel mines were recovered in the area.

At 1200 hours 7 October the regiment was attached to the 53rd British Division and remained in the same sector.

The enemy in this area showed little offensive spirit, and seemed content to attempt to restrict our activities to the south-west side of the WATERING LINE. He maintained numerous automatic weapons along the dyke and covered the extremely flat terrain with bands of interlocking fire. At night his artillery was extremely active along the front line and in the rear areas.

Our patrols kept in close contact with the enemy, patrolling up to the dyke every night.

One patrol in particular deserves particular mention. Corporal Smith and Pfc Heath on 15 October, crossed the WATERING LINE and moved northeast to the PANNEBENGELE AREA, some four thousand yards behind the front lines. They continued to move through enemy territory throughout the day, gathering much useful information. At nightfall the pair moved back to our lines, stopping once enroute to pull a German soldier from his hole. By 2300 hours 16 October Smith and Heath, accompanied by their prisoner, were back in friendly territory.

IV - GENERAL:

Throughout the history of the first thirty five days of this, the liberation of Holland, little mention has been made of the supporting arms which made the successes of the 50th Parachute Infantry possible. Not enough credit can ever be given to the 31st Field Artillery Battalion. The superior manner in which our artillery responded to every request, delivering fire promptly and accurately, made difficult tasks easy and often was the deciding factor. The 31st Field Artillery Battalion were not mentioned specifically in any of the foregoing accounts, but without their support much of this history would have been changed.

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

1. Established and maintained a defensive position along an MIA over twelve thousand yards in length, with enemy on three sides of the position.
2. Seized bridge 10 and prevented its destruction.
3. Destroyed the apparatus for the demolition of the NIJBOER BRIDGE across the WAAZ RIVER, thus making possible the successful completion of the major Division mission.

4. Seized, occupied, organized and defended the BING AN Dai-KAMP Hill mass, terrain which controls the CHOSEBUN-NIJMEORN area.

5. Cut Highway 4, preventing movement of enemy reserves or escape of enemy along this important international route.

6. Withstood and repulsed the major enemy efforts at NYLER and at BEEK to penetrate the Division position and isolate the units to the north.

7. Captured 481 prisoners.

8. Sustained casualties as follows:

Killed in Action: 120
Wounded in Action: 408
Missing in Action: 113
Captured: None

9. Was first Allied Airborne unit to operate tactically in GERMANY.

10. Captured first prisoners of war in Germany to be secured by Allied Airborne Troops.

PERSONNEL OF 503 COMBAT TEAM

Colonel Roy E. Lindquist
Lt. Col. T.J.B. Shanley
Lt. Col. Shields Warren, Jr.
Major Othe E. Holmes
Lt. Col. Louis G. Mendez
Lt. Col. James C. Todd
1st Lt. Charles W. Chaplinski
1st Lt. John G. Cliff

C.O. 503 Procht. Inf.
Ex. C. 503 Procht. Inf.
C.O. 1st Bn, 503 Procht. Inf.
C.O. 2nd Bn, 503 Procht. Inf.
C.O. 3rd Bn, 503 Procht. Inf.
C.O. 314 P.A. Bn.
C.O. Co. D, 307 Engr. Bn.
C.O. Btry 3, 30 AA Bn.

FO-3
51A
10

HEADQUARTERS, 508 PARACHUTE INFANTRY
A.P.O. 230, U. S. ARMY

19 October 1944

SUBJECT: Capture of Bridge #10.

TO : Commanding General, 82 A/B Division, APO 469, U.S. Army

1. Due to the numerous activities of this Regiment, until recently it has been difficult to obtain the facts as to the capture of Bridge #10 (671604). The following report is now submitted, based on sworn statements made by those who have knowledge of the facts.

2. Although the capture of Bridge #10 was not specifically prescribed as a mission for this Regiment, it was undertaken on 18 September. One platoon of Company F, commanded by 1st Lt. Lloyd L. Polette, moved out from the 2nd Battalion defensive position at approximately 180330 to seize and hold the bridge. The platoon reached a point about 300 yards SE of the bridge at daylight, where it became engaged in a heavy fire fight with a German unit defending the bridge. The platoon advanced by fire and movement to within 150 yards of the bridge where it was pinned down and could not advance further. In the meantime a platoon of Company E, commanded by Lt. Tomlinson, had reached bridge #9 (677583) without opposition and reported this bridge to have been destroyed. Lt. Polette reported heavy opposition and requested support in the form of another rifle platoon and some 31mm mortar fire. Accordingly, Lt. Tomlinson's platoon was ordered to reinforce Lt. Polette in his attack on Bridge #10, and a section of 31mm mortars was made available to Lt. Polette. During the morning Lt. Polette continued to engage the Germans on Bridge #10 with fire and attempted unsuccessfully to seize the bridge, suffering heavy casualties in doing so. The Germans made several attempts to place demolitions on the bridge but were prevented from succeeding by fire from Lt. Polette's platoon. The Germans succeeded however in blowing the railway bridge which runs alongside of the highway bridge. At about 1100 the mortars arrived and Lt. Polette had them fire concentrations on the bridge. After the mortar concentration had been placed on the German position the Germans appeared to be in a state of confusion. The platoon had been badly disorganized and had suffered heavy casualties during the morning so he withdrew the platoon about 300 yards, contacted Lt. Tomlinson's platoon, reorganized, and prepared to assault the bridge with both platoons. Upon moving back to within sight of the bridge, and about a half hour later, he found that the Germans had completely withdrawn and that there were some civilians and a small group of men from the 504 Parachute Infantry at the bridge. He established a defense of the bridge with both platoons and remained there until recalled by his Battalion at around 1730.

Roy E. Lindquist
ROY E. LINDQUIST
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1 - Incl., Sworn Statements
Lt. Lloyd L. Polette
Major Otho E. Holmes

13

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
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518th Parachute Infantry History (Operational),
Battle of the Bulge, Belgium and
Germany

17 Dec '44 - 18 Feb '45

872

HISTORY 508 PARACHUTE INFANTRY

1 February to 18 February, 1945 Incl.

From February 1st to 3rd the regiment remained in the defensive position in the vicinity of LANZENATH which it had been occupying at the close of January. The 87th Division, moving east across our front was slowly pinching out elements of the regiment as it advanced. On the 3rd the regiment relieved the 505th Parachute Infantry in a sector northeast of the previous position. The 394th Infantry Regiment, 98th Division, relieved the 508th on the evening of 4/5 February. The 508 then moved to an assembly area at RENGHEUX.

On 8 February movement was initiated into a new sector overlooking the ROER RIVER, in GERMANY. First the unit moved to HAHN and thence to BERGSTEIN where the regiment relieved the 517th Parachute Infantry and elements of the 505th Parachute Infantry on the night of 8/9 February.

On the morning of 9 February the 2nd Battalion attacked, in conjunction with the 505th Parachute Infantry, to clear the area south of BERGSTEIN. After advancing fourteen hundred yards through a series of extremely dense minefields the battalion was halted by heavy mortar, machine gun and small arms fire coming from high ground to the south of the battalion boundary. Investigation revealed that the adjoining friendly unit had run low on ammunition and would not continue its attack until supplies could be brought up. The 2nd Battalion organized a defensive position about a thousand yards south of BERGSTEIN.

Early that evening orders were received from Division to clear the area to the ROER RIVER of all enemy, and to seize the high ground overlooking the narrow river valley. The 1st Battalion made a night attack on 10/200 February through dense A.P. minefields and seized the intermediate hill mass southeast of BERGSTEIN. Company C, which was leading the attack, encountered solid belts of Schu mines, stock mines, trip mines, and baby traps. Company C moved forward a few hundred yards without encountering any enemy, but at the base of HILL 400 the attack was met by the coordinated fire of six enemy machine guns. Artillery fire was called for, but in the dark moonless night it was extremely difficult to accurately adjust the fire. Companies A and B attacked around the right flank of Company C while Company C laid down a base of fire. This action dislodged the enemy from position, and at 0350 the 1st Battalion was on objective. Losses from enemy fire had not been heavy, but the 1st Battalion lost 25 men and two officers as a result of the AP mines encountered.

At 0950 the 2nd Battalion pushed on to the river line in its sector and by nightfall all enemy opposition west of the ROER had been wiped out.

The regiment remained in this location until February 18th, devoting the period to extensive reconnaissance patrolling of the river line. Information regarding the bridges, approaches, roads, enemy installations, depth of stream and other data necessary for a river crossing was obtained and forwarded to higher headquarters.

The campaign closed on 18 February when the 508th moved to a rear assembly area in the vicinity of KORNELIMUNSTER, GERMANY, and thence to the base camp at SISSONNE, FRANCE.

CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
19 Feb 45

22424
MASTER

382 - 1A-F-0.3 (95)

10 JUL 1945

The following day Company I moved into COÛTE with very little opposition.

In order to establish contact with advance elements of the 3rd Armored Division to the south Company A was moved to STE MARIE on 8 January to establish roadblocks on the approaches from enemy held SALT PATEAU and to maintain contact with the 3rd Armored unit in FROVEDROUX.

Late on the 10th the 289th RCT from the 75th Division began the relief of the regiment and by 0400 had taken over the sector. On the night of 10-11 January the regiment moved to rest billets at CHEVRON.

Twenty-four days after leaving Camp SISSONNE the 508th Parachute Infantry had:

1. Captured 235 prisoners.
2. Killed an estimated 445 Germans.
3. Assisted in the successful extraction of elements of three divisions from the ST VITH area.
4. Seized the THIER DU MONT ridge, the final objective of the 82nd Division in the attack from BASSE DODEUX-BERIA.
5. Sustained casualties as follows:

Officers	Enl	
3	69	MIA
21	356	MIA
2	57	MIA
17	368	Evacuated Sick

The regiment stayed in rest billets in the CHEVRON area until the morning of 21 January. At 0800 movement by motor was begun to the DEIDENBERG sector. The combat team was attached to the 7th Armored Division.

Going into the line, the regiment relieved the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry and elements of Combat Command "A" of the 7th Armored Division. The regimental command post was established in DEIDENBERG.

Enemy artillery was active in the beginning, and except for minor patrol activity there was little of note in this phase.

At 1500, 24 January 1945, the 424 RCT of the 106th Infantry Division began the relief of the regiment, and by midnight of that day the 508th was in Corps Reserve under control of the 62nd AFD Division in the TROIS PONTS-BASSE DODEUX area.

After a brief period in Corps reserve at BASSE DODEUX the regiment moved forward again on January 26. Following a motor move the battalions assembled in the vicinity of SART LES ST VITH. The halt was short and the next day the 508th marched to WALLE-RODE and occupied an assembly area as division reserve. Here the first enemy contact in the new offensive occurred when a small group which had been bypassed wandered into the 2nd Battalion bivouac area. The company commander of D Company and his runner were killed before the Germans were eliminated.

On the evening of the 28th, the attack order was received. At 2100 the battalions began marching again along roads, trails and firebreaks which were knee-deep in snow. The terrain was impassable to movement except for foot troops. At 0400 the assault units crossed the line of departure. The 1st Battalion was ordered to seize HOLLERBACH while the 2nd was given the mission of taking DEIDENBERG. Light tracked vehicles were not available and they were the only conveyances which could negotiate the supply and evacuation routes. The plan was a delicate balance between maximum surprise and a dangerously fragile supply situation.

When the 1st Battalion reached the hillcrest overlooking HOLZBACH the value of its swift cross country attack was evident. The little village was defended with at least two battalions of enemy. The 1st swarmed into the town rapidly, and soon had the objective under control without taking a single casualty. Over a hundred twenty five enemy were captured. Colonel Holmes' 2nd Battalion attack was progressing well also. At the line of departure the 2nd Battalion began meeting the German rear guard. Snipers and delaying groups fired on the attackers from successive positions along the way. It was annoying but not very effective. On the outskirts of HEDEHENDORF, the 2nd Battalion encountered what was intended to be a determined stand but after seven of the enemy had been killed the remainder retreated to the south. Clearing out the houses took a short time, and the 2nd Battalion was on objective. F Company was sent to take EBERSCHIED. A brisk engagement developed on the outskirts of the village. F Company began to run low on ammunition and it became apparent that without resupply the attack would have to stop soon. F Company was ordered to hold a position overlooking the town and consolidate. The 3rd Battalion was moved to a position between and in rear of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. During the night 29th-30th elements of the 50th relieved Company F, and at 0400 on the 30th the regiment continued the attack toward LANZERATH and the high ground north of there. The plan was for the 2nd Battalion to capture the town; the 2nd Battalion was to seize the high ground to the north, and the 1st Battalion was to move behind the 3rd, mop up, and occupy a position in depth west of the town.

The 2nd Battalion moved along quickly along snowcovered trails and routing rearwards elements. As the 2nd Battalion reached the high ground north of town they spotted several enemy field pieces in position, with the crews standing around, completely unaware of their presence. The guns and crews were captured without delay. After capturing the high ground north of town and three buildings on the edge of the village the 2nd Battalion organized its objective for defence. At 0300 31 January the 2nd Battalion sent patrols into Germany. This is believed to be the first entry into the Reich by troops of the 82nd Division in this campaign.

The 3rd Battalion advanced to the very edge of the village without meeting the enemy. Its rapid cross country movement was paying a big dividend in surprise. The battalion and company commanders were able to make a detailed and uninterrupted visual reconnaissance before launching the final assault. As they observed the town below them the commanders could see a stream of infantry evacuating to the south, leaderless and routed by the 2nd Battalion's unexpected thrust on the north side. Unfortunately, communication difficulties did not allow the immediate adjustment of artillery fire on the withdrawing column. The 3rd Battalion went into LANZERATH and seized the town.

During the night of 30/31 January the regimental CP moved to LANZERATH, so as to be in position for the next day's attack. According to plan, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were to move northeast up the main highway into GERMANY, seizing the ridge overlooking LOSSEL and the SIEGFRIED LEUE, while the 1st Battalion was to move east of the WADENFELD-LANZERATH road and occupy the forward slopes of the high ground to the east and south east. By 0725 the 1st Battalion had seized its objective. The morning was cold and foggy, with visibility limited to one to two hundred yards. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions had already started north in their attack when the fog lifted enough to reveal a pair of MK VI tanks within a stone's throw of C Company's position. Moving north along the road were six tanks and more than a hundred supporting infantry. C Company had no anti-tank weapons other than rifle grenades and anti-tank rocket launchers. The closest tank destroyers or friendly Sherman were at least three miles away. The situation was critical. Artillery fire was rapidly placed on the advancing column by the forward observer (310 FA) with Company C. The small arms fire of Company C stopped the infantry. 57mm AT guns were rapidly emplaced. Company B counter attacked on the right of Company C, heavily armed with Panzerfausts, but found that the Germans had fled, leaving behind one Mark VI tank disabled by artillery fire. After a brief lull, an alert artillery forward observer spotted enemy infantry and armor assembling for what appeared to be another attack. Once again artillery was laid down and this time it forced a complete withdrawal of the attacking force. One P' taken during the engagement identified the assault unit as part of the 9th Panzer Division and assessed its strength at from two to three hundred panzer grenadiers supported by at least six tanks.

While the 1st Battalion was engaging the Germans south of LANZERATH, things were going well with the attack of the other two battalions. D Company, working down the sides of a deep railroad cut came upon a company of infantry marching towards them in the defile. The Germans took a 10 minute break without posting local security and D Company made short work of the situation, killing or capturing the entire unit. Some forty-odd PW's were taken, and the battalion went on to its objective without further opposition.

The 3rd Battalion encountered a group of enemy about five hundred yards east of LOSHEIBERGGRADEN near international boundary marker #20. After having been called on to surrender by the Germans the advance guard company commander sent a platoon to flank the enemy while another platoon established a base of fire. The flanking maneuver was successful in routing the enemy from his position and the stragglers withdrew hastily towards LOSHEIB. As this was happening, a loud explosion was heard to the southeast some thousand yards away. When our unit reached the area they found that they had overrun and forced the enemy to destroy a 350mm artillery piece. This was one of the largest pieces of enemy ordnance to be destroyed by 1st Army troops in the current campaign. The objective was occupied soon thereafter.

During the fighting from 27 January to 1 February, our greatest enemy was the weather. The daily minimum temperature was below zero and snow fell almost every day. Trails were drifted over and were virtually unrecognizable. Arctic equipment was not yet available. The troops were constantly working under terrific hardships. This situation in itself contributed to our success in that the enemy felt secure behind a barrier of snowed in approaches and impassible supply routes.

Results of Operations - January 1945.

1. The initiative was snatched from the enemy, and this regiment advanced from BASSE EODENUX, BELGIUM to LOSHEIBERGGRADEN, GERMANY.
2. 660 prisoners were taken.
3. A patrol from the 2nd Bn. made what is believed to be the first reentry into Germany by 32nd Div troops since the start of the German drive towards LIEGE.
4. The 3rd Bn. captured a 350mm gun, believed to be one of the largest artillery pieces taken by 1st Army troops in this campaign.

UL 508

ON MORNING 21 JAN 45
MOVEMENT OF 508TH RCT.
WAS INITIATED FROM REST
AREA VIC CHEVRON TO
RELIEVE 2ND BN 23RD
INF & ELTS CCA VIC
DIEDENBERG.

REST AREA

57 03


UL 508

REST AREA

508TH PCHT INF DIEDENBERG
MOVED FROM REST AREA,
VIC TROIS PONTS, BASSE
BOUDEUX (23 JAN 45)


77 96

2 POSITION WAS
DEFENSIVE VIC DIEDENBERG
MAINTAINED 508TH RCT.
21-23 JAN 45. NIGHT 23
WAS RELIEVED BY 424TH RCT.
JAN 45




4

NIGHT 10-11 JAN 1945
508TH PCHT INF REGT
WAS RELIEVED BY 289TH
RCT AND MOVED TO
REST AREA





1
JAN 2ND 1945, 508
PCHT INF REGT
MOVED FROM DEFENS-
IVE POSITION TO
ASSEMBLY AREAS



2
BY 4 JAN 1945 ALL
BNS HAD DISPLACED
TO FORWARD ASSY
AREAS.



3
JAN 7, 1945 508TH
PCHT INF REGT ATTACK-
ED IN COLUMN OF BNS
3RD, 2ND FOLLOWED BY
1ST BN.



1
JAN 26-25, 508TH FRONT
INF REGT MOVED FROM
REST AREA AS XVIII CORPS
RESERVE AREA VIC 6497 TO
ASSEMBLY AREA VIC 8189.

2
27 JAN 508TH FRONT INF
REGT MOVED TO ASSEMBLY
BY AREA VIC 8890.
FIRST CONTACT WAS MADE
WITH EN WHEN 11 MAN
PATROL WANDERED INTO
ASSEMBLY AREA.

3
NIGHT 27 JAN 508TH FRONT
INF REGT DISPLACED
WARD VIC 9094.

4
29 JAN 0400 ASSAULT
UNITS CROSSED LD BY
MID AFTERNOON EXCEPT
THE TOWN OF BIEBERSFELD
HAD BEEN TAKEN.

5
30 JAN 508TH FRONT
INF REGT CONTINUED ATK
1ST BN TAKING HIGH GROUND
1500 YDS W OF ITS
PREV POS TAKING HIGH GROUND
AND 3RD
BN TAKING N OF LAUZERATH
OF LAUZERATH

6
31 JAN 2ND AND 3RD BNS
OSOB OVERLOOKING
LOSHEIM.

6
0800 31 JAN 1ST BN
ATK BY ELTS 9TH
PZ DIV SUPPORTED
BY TKS ATK REPULED.

99
02

9A
90

Harry Southrecht, Inf.
APO 230, U. S. Army
in the field
15 January 1945

THE BELGIUM CAMPAIGN - PART I

17 December to 31 December, 1944

On December 17, 1944 the German Army massed a volume of armor and infantry unprecedented since Normandy's D Day in an offensive which was to drive deep into Allied territory. Through ST VITH, SALCHATEAU, VIELSAMB, LA ROCHE, swarmed the power of Nazi armor before it could be halted at the gates of DINA T. The countermeasures which stopped this bold offensive thrust involved the 82nd Airborne Division in a major roll and the 308th Parachute Infantry Regiment as one of the division's most powerful striking forces.

On December 17, 1944, the regiment was at SISSONNE, FRANCE, twenty miles northwest of REIMS, in the midst of a training period absorbing reinforcements and new equipment to fill the gaps created by the fifty-seven day campaign in HOLLAND and GERMANY which had ended five short weeks before. It was a cold Sunday night, the sort of night which makes a cherry red stove or a warm bed fill all of a soldier's needs. At 2000 the bombshell burst, and the change from chill tranquility to swift preparation was almost instantaneous. The staff and battalion commanders were assembled to learn that the tempo had changed in a moment from training to fighting. The Hun was on the march and we must move to beat him back.

382-17-583

All night long the lights burned in the barracks as equipment was assembled, personal effects were stored, and all the little details which go to make the big success were attended to. Weapons shortages were hastily filled, ammunition issued, movement tables compiled. Every man knew his job and did it. The team was clicking.

At 1100 the next day the convoys started to roll. Thirteen hours after the warning order the fighting machine which was to deny von Rundstedt his dream of victory was on the move. East through SEDAN, through the ARDENNES FOREST, past BASTOGNE, finally to WISLOLOUNT the column rolled. By 0600 on the 19th the regiment was tactically deployed. The last foot move to meet the enemy. That day von Rundstedt's columns were to cut the very road the 308th had travelled, but speedy movement had paid its premium.

CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMISSION

At 1800 on 19 December the regiment was alerted to move to a defensive position on the CHEVROU Hill Mass. The 1st and a half mile foot march sent to SIA to outpost the southern division flank, and there until dusk of the next day.

At 1630 on the 20th the battalions were alerted for a move to the ridge line south of GORONNE, presumably by motor. H Company started the ten mile march to its new position at 1830 with orders to seize and secure GORONNE and await the arrival of the remainder of the regiment. H Company reached the town and found it unoccupied. The 1st and 2nd battalions moved to their new location by truck. A shortage of transportation dictated that the planned motor movement of the 3rd battalion be changed to a foot march if all elements of the regiment were to be in position by dawn.

Jan 5

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27524
MASTER
6

On the THIER-DU-MONT a firm defensive position was established and preparations were made to meet the onrushing enemy. To our front elements of the 7th Armored and 106th Infantry Divisions were being pressed by the weight of enemy armor. Each report brought news of new advances by the foe.

The strength of the regiment was cut on the 21st when one battalion was detached as division reserve. From GRAND SART around the bulge at SALLCHATEAU to RASPAILLER two battalions were stretched over the five thousand yards. Late on the 22nd this battalion was returned to the regiment and reoccupied its positions overlooking VIELSAILLI.

Our patrols, both foot and motor, probing more than 3000 yards to the front, made contact with the enemy at 0330 on the 23rd as he moved along the PETITE LANGLIT-JOUJIEVAL road.

An outstanding example of reconnaissance patrolling is the story of Cpl. Mangors of the 3rd Bn 8-2 section. At 1000-21 December Cpl. Mangors, Pvt. Bancolin, Pvt. Behringer, Cpl. Goldstein with jeep driver Pvt. Dealey were sent on a motorized patrol to reconnoitre PROVEDROUX, PETITE LANGLIT, and BOVIGNE. Goldstein could speak excellent French. Behringer knew German. The patrol took along an SCR-300, one third of a K ration and two thirds of a D ration. At 1530 Cpl. Mangors reported PROVEDROUX clear of all troops. He also noted that his jeep was bogged down and that while Pvt. Dealey was getting the vehicle out he would continue on foot to PETITE LANGLIT.

At 1800 Mangors realized that PETITE LANGLIT and OTTRE were clear and volunteered to stay with the bogged jeep until morning when he would try to pull it out with a horse from a nearby farm. At 1820 the next day a message came back that the patrol had worked all morning on the jeep without success, and had been interrupted by a patrol from a Panzer Division moving into OTTRE. Cpl. Mangors directed artillery fire on the patrol.

Now that the enemy were nearby all work on the jeep was abandoned in favor of the mission of seeking out the enemy and reporting his movement, dispositions and strength. By 1500 German columns were moving north through PETITE LANGLIT and on to OTTRE in a steady stream. The bridge between LANGLIT and PROVEDROUX was being reinforced by enemy engineers. Cpl. Mangors observed the work and reported. At 1245 he sent his patrol back to our lines, remaining in position himself.

The next morning, December 23rd, Cpl. Mangors was able to report that the infantry passing his position were Panzer troops. He was less than ten yards from the road they were using and could identify them by their uniforms. By now his radio batteries were almost exhausted. At 0900 on the 23rd he was ordered to destroy his radio and return to his unit. Cpl. Mangors never came back. He is missing in action.

From PETITE LANGLIT the enemy turned northeast and on the afternoon of the 23rd a battalion of enemy infantry supported by tanks attacked SALLCHATEAU. From its hillside positions above the town the 2nd battalion brought a volume of fire upon the attackers which stopped the assault on the edges of the town. In front of D Company a PzKw III tank was knocked out.

The 106th Infantry and 7th Armored Divisions by now were moving back through our positions in increasing volume. Company D, 507th Engineer Battalion had been given the mission of preparing the bridges at VIELSAILLI, SALLCHATEAU, and BOIS DE CHENETREUX for demolition after the passage of the friendly elements. When the

enemy attacked SALICHAUTEAU on the 20rd the bridges at that point were blown, sealing the route North to VIELSALA. In turn all of the crossings at VIELSALA and the culvert at BOIS DE CIERREUX were demolished.

Task Force Jones, an element of the 7th Armored Division, was one of the last friendly elements to clear the area south of SALICHAUTEAU. Task Force Jones completed its evacuation of the BOVIGNY-CIERREUX area by moving north to SALICHAUTEAU and thence along the MTR in front of the THIER DU MONT ridge to the pass at GRAND SART. By 0200 on the 24th three hundred men and forty vehicles of the armored task force had been passed through our lines.

Christmas Eve, 1944 was memorable for the brilliant strategy which threw Von Runstedt off balance for many days to come. A captured order indicated that Christmas morning was to see a general attack by the II Panzer Corps. The regiment was facing the 9th SS Panzer Division on the south and the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division at VIELSALA on the East. At dark on the 24th the battalions began preparations for withdrawal to the line VILLETES-ERKLA-BASSE BOLEUX-RENCHOUX.

Field Order #4, Hq., 508th Frecht. Inf.: "At 11 hour on D night 82 Div withdraws to new defensive position. Covering force will consist of one platoon per rifle company." -- 1345 hr. 24 Dec. '44.

By 1500 hour 1st Battalion was alerted for the withdrawal. The Battalion C.O., Company C.O.'s and staff sped to the rear for a rapid reconnaissance and returned. Most of the CP and communications personnel were on their way back by 1700 hour. As the sky darkened the riflemen and machinegunners on the line made their packs and shouldered their equipment, and at 2045 hour they picked their way back from the front to platoon assembly and company assembly areas. At 2115 hour the Battalion was lined up on the winding, hilly road back, waiting on two platoons which had trouble slipping out of the line in the bright moon's glare. At 2135 hour the two platoons were safely out and the 1st Battalion headed west to the new line.

All but the covering force, the three platoons from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies, and Platoon, Co. A on the right; 3rd Platoon, Co. "B" in the center; 2nd Platoon, Co. "C" on the left, strung out to cover a battalion front. They were the covering force, the rearguard, the last to leave the abandoned line. When they left, then nothing would remain but the enemy and the dead. The men of the three platoons knew it, and they fingered their weapons with tense alertness. It was Christmas Eve, 1944, a silver white night with a star-spangled sky and moonlight glaring brightly on the snow. A beautiful white Christmas, but for the blood which would stain the snow before dawn.

Major (then Capt.) Benjamin Delmaster, Bn. Exec. and C.O. of the covering force, had two radiomen and a runner from each platoon with him, radio contact with Regt. and some anxious hours to sweat out. His CP remained at the western edge of the little Belgium town of RENCHOUX, and his instructions were to hold with the covering force until 0315 - just six hours, 360 minutes. His three platoons were spread thin, and the onrushing enemy was massed thick across the trickling SALLA RIVER.

The Division line along the SALLA, the line that was, pivoted at RENCHOUX, where a rail and a highway bridge spanned the river. And the 1st Battalion covering force held RENCHOUX. To be exact, the 1st Co. platoon held it, led by Lt. Teddy Baum, held RENCHOUX, with a thin line of positions in the houses at the far edge of town looking out over the little river. On Lt. Baum's left the "B" Co.

Platoon held a line of foxholes along a dirt hillside road, and beyond them the MG Co. platoon was strung out along yet another spur. Lt. Lamm could contact Co. "B" on his left and the 112 Inf's 3rd Bn elements were supposed to be on his right. Soon after dark at least three patrols of enemy came up to his position. (3rd Bn. 112th Inf. was attached to the 508).

Back at Major Delamater's CP the minutes dragged by. The Major sent some men across the road to the rows of red-brick barracks which the 10c Div had abandoned, to destroy what they could of the supplies left there intact. About 2200 hour Lt. Lamm reported that his men could hear German vehicles and voices across the river, that he thought they were trying to repair the blown-out bridge. Major Delamater notified Regt., and then walked into the town to see what he could. Slowly time passed and the main body drew further and further away.

Back at Lt. Lamm's CP, in an abandoned home, the men fondled a treasured bottle of champagne, long saved for the stroke of twelve on Christmas Eve. It was not destined to be drunk in peace. At 2340 hour all hell hit REACHÉUX - artillery, mortar, machinegun and direct fire from tank guns. Simultaneously the center squad reported a smoke screen drifting across the river, and Lt. Lamm knew this was it - a coordinated attack with artillery, engineers, smoke troops, infantry, an attack in strength.

He had 24 men, with two LMGs and two BARs. One LMG had been knocked out during the day by the German tanks across the river. Now the tanks were at it again, lined up on the opposite bank and blasting straight into his positions. But the men were manning their guns, firing all out at the solid mass of German Infantry swarming across the girders of the wrecked railroad bridge, at the Germans streaming up from the river out of the smoke, screaming and shouting. The LMGs and BARs were mowing them down, but more and more kept coming. Lt. Lamm sized up the attack and went back to his CP to send a runner off to Major Delamater.

Lt. Lamm and his assistant platoon leader, Lt. Gyami, stepped out of the house, and a stream of Schmeisser bullets tore into the door. The Germans, by sheer weight of numbers, had run right over his position. "Sergeant Booney" The "sergeant" answered with a burst of MP fire, and was promptly shot dead. About then Lt. Lamm began to fight. First he sent Lt. Gyami and a runner back to Bn. with the story, then he checked Sgt. Prestes' squad on the right. Sgt. Prestes could take and was taking everything that came up on his front, but MG 42's were rakin' his right.

Lt. Lamm told Prestes to hold as long as he could, then pull in slowly towards the center. Then he checked Sgt. Boone on the right. Flares were casting a Christmas glow on the snow, and troops were flashing off the brick homes of REACHÉUX. But Lt. Lamm contacted Sgt. Boone, whose BAR was tearing into two long files of Germans coming straight down the road from the bridge. When the files came close enough the squad tossed grenades between them, but still they came on. So the left squad was overrun too, and Lt. Lamm knew he had to withdraw in the next few minutes or never. It was then perhaps 0130, and neither Lt. Gyami nor the runner had come back. He could not know that they had started back from Major Delamater with orders for they had not been seen since.

Lt. Lamm called out to Sgt. Boone, and he came running through the Germans with three of his six men. And then Lt. Lamm started back, fighting off the Germans in front and fighting through the Germans who had infiltrated around and behind him. Sgt. Prestes had already pulled back, 80 and 50 yards at a time, pulling around through the houses and down the road leading west to the new line.

Sgt. Probst had led a squad of the platoon through two campaigns, and he knew: "When you get a good leader you get a good platoon, and when you get a good platoon you get a good leader. Even a good platoon couldn't hold back a battalion and more."

At about 0115 Major Delameter had received permission from Regt. to withdraw at will, and he sent out the platoon runners with the word to move out. Then he went down the road to the valley behind town, and waited for the platoons to come in. He sent men onto the hillsides on the right and the left to search for the platoons, and himself stood out on the road: "Baker Company assemble here; Able Company assemble here." Only German snats and screams answered. A barrage planned to catch the retreat shook the ground around the tiny CP group; it was nearing 0200 now, and still they waited for the "one platoon per rifle company."

On the other side of town, Lt. Kampe led the rest of his platoon - the center squad, three men from the 1st squad and platoon headquarters (all but the aid man) - around to the hills on the right; he knew he could not bull through the swarming Germans in the town. To the left Lt. Maclock disintegrated his platoon of Co. "D" as best he could and led them down the valley to the assembly point on the road out of town.

Lt. Maclock was new in the regiment and even newer as a platoon leader. He had taken command of the platoon at 1600 hours that day. A few hours later, at 2300 hours, his assistant platoon leader was killed while investigating a suspected enemy patrol to the platoon front. At a few minutes to midnight when the platoon was full, the Lt. and his CP personnel were moving down to the center squad position. The group was caught in the open by the barrage, and he never saw the others again. For just then the enemy infantry came charging up, close behind the artillery screen, and the fire fight was on. For Co. "D", it went well.

The left and right squads of the left and center squads ripped at the Germans as long as they came, and after a while no more came. But, within half an hour, the Germans who overran Co. "A" began hitting the right squad on the flank. The squad leader, his face torn open by a bullet, was carried out by Pvt. Paklewitz. Paklewitz went back, and opened up his BAR again. But he returned in a few minutes, with the runner came in then, with message from Major Delameter to withdraw, and Lt. Maclock led his platoon down the draw into the assembly point and toward the Bn. assembly point.

The wounded squad leader made it alright, and the other two squads were intact. But the platoon CP group and the 60mm mortar squad, also caught in the barrage, were missing. Lt. Maclock went back for them, but Germans were milling around the platoon position. So he went back to the platoon, back to Major Delameter and on to the Regt. assembly area at 0600hrs.

On the far left Co. "C"'s platoon caught the barrage, but no small arms fire and no direct attack. When the order came to withdraw, Lt. Stevens and Lt. Kampe led their men - intact, with but one man slightly wounded - across country past the Bn. assembly point and onto the road for 6000 yds. For from the heights they could see German rifles and German troops blazing around the Bn. assembly point where Major Delameter waited. The CP group there could see the Germans on the narrow road, could hear them chattering and calling to each other. Major Delameter and the other platoon leaders kept lights, apparently for assembly, within a few hundred yards.

So English speaking German had picked up his call and with a loud German accent shouted: "Baker Company assemble here, Baker Company assemble here." Part of Co. "A" had been sent on, and still

that was left of Co. "B". And so, about 0230 Major Delameter and his CP men started on the road back. Though he did not yet know it, his three platoons had withdrawn in the face of a better-than-expected coordinated attack with but 13 MIA in Co. "B", 7 MIA in Co. "A", all present in Co. "C". So he rejoined the Regt., and soon after so did Lt. Lama and the rest of his men.

Lt. Lama was well on his way out, on the hill right of the town, when he heard the unmistakable chatter of an American light .50 from his old platoon position. He had disengaged, he knew he could bring his men safely cross-country to the Regt assembly area and he did. But he could not leave that LMG crew behind. He knew who the LMG crewmen were: Pvt's Roblitt and Denario, new men both. They had been buried early in the fight by a shell burst at the edge of their position. Apparently they had dug themselves out and put their gun back into action. So he went back to search the town of HEN-CHOUA and called for them as loudly as he could, through the clatter of MG 42 and M2 fire. Then he waited.

The chatter of the US .50 stopped. A few minutes later two soldiers plodded towards him, carrying their equipment, their gun and tripod and two boxes of ammunition. The gun jacket was dented by shrapnel and the men were covered with dirt. They were Pvt's Roblitt and Denario, and they asked their platoon leader: "What we gonna do now?" He laughed and he answered: "We're withdrawing, of course."

"Oh", they said, "we gonna withdraw..." and fell in step behind him.

By 0415 the main body had closed in the HAUTE BOULEUX sector followed by the covering force at 0800 25 December. ↑

A regimental observation post overlooking ODMHONT spotted the advancing columns of enemy at 1800 and accurately adjusted artillery fire on them as they came through the town. Each battalion sent a combat group forward from the IIR on ambush missions. Co. E's group intercepted a four man patrol and captured two of the enemy, but the other patrols could find no enemy within five hundred yards of the outpost line.

On the 28th the enemy launched another night attack, this time against our new positions. At 2200 four halftracks came down the road toward RJ 629555 and one crossed the narrow stream in front of the junction. Two companies of infantry which formed the advanced guard for two battalions of enemy struck at the point on the boundary between A and D companies. The assault was beaten off by 0100 and the haste of the enemy withdrawal was evidenced by the litter of helmets, rifles, panzerfausts, gas masks and other equipment scattered over the area. At dawn the C.O. of Co. D, 807 Engr. captured five stragglers from the attackers in a building at 629553. They had remained behind when their unit withdrew, and were found sleeping in the building, with no security or interest in the status of the conflict.

On the 28th the enemy launched another night attack, this time on the front of the 3rd Battalion. A 2nd Battalion patrol had observed the enemy moving northeast from ANJONGHAT at 2300 on the 27th, and had brought the information back by midnight. At 0115 enemy aircraft strafed G and F companies and the 3rd Bn's 81mm mortar platoon position. Shortly before this, Company G's outposts had become engaged in a fight with the enemy. The enemy attack had overrun Company G's left platoon, and had almost surrounded the position in HENLA. The platoon stayed in position. Company E, less a platoon and one platoon of Co. F counterattacked and by 0400 the IIR and outpost line had been restored. From prisoner reports and later information it was learned that Company G had been attacked by two battalions of infantry. The count of enemy dead within and immediately in


front of the defensive position totalled over a hundred. Fourteen prisoners were taken. The regiment had eight killed, thirty four wounded, and nine missing in this action. It was estimated that the 1st Sqn, 19 PGR of the 9th SS Panzer Division had ceased to exist as a fighting unit after this attack.

On 24 December, the regiment had sent twenty four men to the 3rd Armored Division, presumably to infiltrate enemy positions on sabotage and harassment missions. This group operated with the 3rd Armored Division until 26 December and during that period completed twenty three patrol missions, set up sixteen mined roadblocks, provided local security for command posts, participated in an attack and established contact with isolated Task Force Hogan at HOTTEL. Of the twenty four men, one was killed and one wounded.

While the regiment was in the MAFB SODEUX sector the patrol work was of an exceptionally high caliber. Day after day groups moved through the enemy outpost lines and scouted his dispositions and movements.

Another typical patrol mission was executed by Lt. Hall and six men from Co. D. At 1430 December 31st the group left 3 D Co. outpost to reconnoitre the area to their front. When he reached KAHNHOFF, Lt. Hall saw one house burning but could observe no enemy movement. However he did see a beaten trail in the snow leading south. The patrol started along this path and as soon as he saw movement to his front Lt. Hall deployed his men in diamond formation and started forward firing. After advancing seventy five yards they came upon the first results of their work, a dead German artillery observer at a field telephone. The patrol continued on firing on and being fired at by enemy about a hundred yards away. As they advanced the Germans abandoned their machineguns and ran into the woods. When Lt. Hall reached the end of the clearing he had counted eleven additional dead enemy. His patrol had tripped three booby traps in the advance, but only one man had been wounded. After the enemy left their positions, they placed heavy mortar fire on the patrol's general area and on the company area. The group withdrew rapidly, stopping only long enough to take a satchel and some AT and AT mines from the dead Germans. The patrol was back in the company area by 1645 hour.

On 27 December, the mission of securing a prisoner. The leader, 2nd Lt. Weaver, formulated the plan of hitting the village from the north, south, and east with a squad at each point. As the patrol reached the outskirts of the village a proper angled 31mm mortar barrage was placed on KAHNHOFF. When it lifted all squads attacked simultaneously and started a systematic search of the village. The enemy opened fire, but upon seeing that they were being assaulted from three directions started running out of town to the woods on the south. The patrol gathered eleven prisoners, killed six Germans and fired the town. No casualties were suffered. It was a fine New Year's present for the Battalion Commander.



1
INITIAL POSITION OCCUPIED BY 508TH FRONT INF REGT MORNING OF 19 DEC 44. REGT REMAINED IN ASSY AREAS MOVED TO VIC OF OUFNY NIGHT 19 DEC 44

2
508TH FRONT INF REGT OCCUPIED DEFENSIVE POSITION VIC OUFNY 19 DEC 44 TO 20 DEC 44 MOVED TO VIC GORONNE NIGHT 20 DEC 1944

3
ON MORNING 20 DEC 44 H Co 508 FRONT INF REGT MOVED FROM VIC OUFNY TO VIC BIRA ESTABLISHED ROAD-BLOCKS. REMAINED IN POSITION UNTIL NIGHT DEC 20-44 THEN MOVED VIC GORONNE.

4
508TH FRONT INF REGT OCCUPIED STRONG DEFENSIVE POSITION VIC GORONNE 21 DEC TO 25 DEC. FIRST CONTACT WITH ENEMY WAS MADE WHILE IN THIS POSITION

5
AFTERNOON 23 DEC 44 ENEMY ATTACK WITH EST 2 BNS INF & ARMOR TOOK SALNCHATEAU. HEAVY LOSSES WERE INFLICTED ON ENEMY BY 2ND BN 508TH FRONT INF

6
ON MORNING 24 DEC 44 ELEMENTS EST 40 VEHICLES, 300 MEN OF TASK FORCE JONES, PASSED THROUGH REAR AREA IN EXECUTION OF WITHDRAWAL

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WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON

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XVIII Corps (Airborne) Report of Airborne Phase
of operation MARKET

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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

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17-27 Sep 44

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REPORT

of Airborne
phase (17-27 Sept., 44)

OPERATION
"MARKET"

XVIII CORPS

Incl 3 to
Incl 2 4551

AIRBORNE



AIR-O.B.O.

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THIS REPORT COVERS ONLY THE FIRST TEN DAYS
OF OPERATION "MARKET".

THE FINAL, COMPLETE REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED
THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS AT A LATER DATE.

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A GRAPHIC HISTORY OF THE 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION

SICILY

ITALY (I)



ITALY (II)

NORMANDY



HOLLAND, 1944

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Report
OF AIRBORNE
PHASE (17-27 SEPT., 44)

Operation
"Market"

101st.

DIVISION AIRBORNE



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Auth: CG, XVIII Corps
(Airborne) *13*

Init: _____

Date: Dec 19 _____

HEADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE)
Office of the Corps Commander

370 (CG)

AFO 109 - U. S. Army
04 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive.

TO: Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army, APO 740, U. S. Army.

1. For Operation MARKET, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions of this Corps were detached and placed under British operational control. The responsibilities of the XVIII Corps (Airborne), with respect to these two divisions, were therefore confined to certain administrative functions covered in Inclosure 3, and to general observation of the planning and conduct of operations.

2. To secure first-hand knowledge of the operation, the Corps Commander and some of the Staff participated in the D Day operation, observing the drops of some of the serials of both US divisions from a B-17 flying with and a few hundred feet above the Troop Carrier formations at the same speed. They remained in the NIJWAGEN area until approximately H plus thirty minutes to observe our initial assembly and enemy reactions on the ground. During the remainder of the operation, and beginning on D plus two, periodic visits were made to both divisions in the combat area.

3. Inclosures 1 and 2 are the reports respectively of the Commanding Generals, 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, for the period D to D plus ten, inclusive. The latter has been chosen as the terminal date of the essentially airborne phase of Operation MARKET. Thereafter, the continued participation of these divisions in the NIJWAGEN salient was a purely ground operation. In accordance with War Department instructions, a report on the whole operation, including the airborne phase, will be forwarded later.

4. The experience of Operation MARKET has produced no basic alteration of accepted principles respecting the employment of airborne forces. It has, in fact, ~~shown that the principles of employment of airborne forces are sound and~~ if accorded due consideration in the planning and execution of airborne operations, will offer the maximum prospect of success. All of these principles are enunciated in War Department Training Circular No. 113, 9 October 1943. Their incorporation in the processes of thought of commanders and staffs charged with planning and executing any phase of airborne operations will greatly contribute to the proper and effective employment of airborne forces.

5. Paragraph 9b of the War Department Training Circular deals with the responsibility for planning airborne operations. The manner of application of this principle in Operation MARKET is deserving of careful study. Since SKILLY there has been a steady trend toward vesting a single individual with

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SECRET Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), file 370 (CG), subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive," dated 4 Dec 44, cont'd.

direct command authority over participating airborne forces, and with operational control over associated air forces in an airborne operation. In Operation MARKET this trend took tangible form for the first time. Lieutenant General L. H. BRERSTON, commanding First Allied Airborne Army, had all participating airborne forces under his command. The extent to which he exercised operational control over associated air forces is beyond the scope of this report. I believe it pertinent, however, to invite attention to the far-reaching implications involved in the manner of application of the principle here discussed. Obviously the responsibility for planning is inherent in that of command, and the limitations placed upon command authority will impose identical limitations on the responsibility for planning. To what extent unified command is justified over all air and airborne forces participating in a single operation is a question to be answered in the light of the conditions obtaining in each particular situation. No single solution would satisfy all cases. I believe, however, the matter is one of fundamental importance, and deserves careful continuing study. It can exercise a major and perhaps a decisive influence on operations.

6. In addition to the foregoing, the following details are commented upon in view of the observations which the Commanding Generals of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions have included in their attached reports.

a. DAYLIGHT VERSUS NIGHT OPERATIONS.

Providing means are available to minimize danger of hostile air interception, and to avoid or adequately neutralize hostile ground fire up to and including the DZ and LZ areas, and providing the plan for coordination of the airborne effort with that of friendly ground forces permits, a daylight airborne operation presents decided advantages over the same operation conducted at night. In daylight our present enormous air superiority finds its most effective employment in preventing hostile air interception and in isolating the airborne battlefield before, during and after the troop delivery. A night operation may offer greater tactical surprise and create greater confusion and disorganization among enemy forces. On the other hand, it requires a far higher training level for both Troop Carrier and airborne forces, results in far greater dispersion, presents a much more difficult problem of ground assembly, and sacrifices most, if not all, of the advantage of air supremacy.

At night, air supremacy and air mobility are the major factors determining a night operation was the plan for coordination of airborne and seaborne efforts. In ITALY, with our fighters at the extreme limit of their range, the controlling factor in deciding upon a night operation was air power. In HOLLAND, for the first time, both our air supremacy and the plan for coordination of airborne and ground efforts were such that a daylight operation was feasible.

(2) None of our large-scale airborne operations to date warrant a conclusion that extensive hostile ground fire can be either ignored or adequately neutralized from the air. In SICILY, such fire was negligible.

SECRET Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), file 370 (CG), subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive," dated 4 Dec 44, cont'd.

It is significant, however, that in one night operation a loss of over fifteen per cent of participating Troop Carrier aircraft was inflicted by ground fire from our own forces. There is no reason to suppose that hostile fire, had it been available to first-class troops, would not have been at least as effective. In ITALY, no ground fire whatever was encountered, except on the one battalion operation at AVELLINO. In NORMANDY, ground fire encountered was generally light, and far less than anticipated. In HOLLAND, from the data so far available, it would be dangerous to conclude that strong and extensive AA ground defenses can be ignored or neutralized by air action alone. We do not yet know the density of enemy flak installations over which the Troop Carrier formations flew, nor do we have sufficient data on which to evaluate the effect of our neutralization from the air of those enemy defenses which did open fire. The amount of friendly combat aircraft available, the continuity of this support, the strength and location of hostile flak defenses and enemy ground forces, the morale of these forces, the duration of flight of troop carriers over such defenses, and weather will all greatly influence our ability to provide adequate neutralization from the air. Under favorable conditions there is good reason to expect that this can be achieved, but the MARKET Operation has by no means solved the problem presented by a daylight airborne operation over dense and extensive enemy flak defenses.

b. RATE OF BUILD-UP.

This will be a function of the available air lift, distance from base airfields, weather, and enemy interference. As in any military operation, the greatest possible rapidity of concentration is desired. Particularly is this true in an airborne operation, where enemy reactions will be as violent and as rapid as he can make them. The objective, in our airborne operations, should be to provide the strongest possible initial troop delivery, supported by the most rapid possible build-up in men and supplies.

c. TROOP CARRIER REPRESENTATION ON THE GROUND.

This has been repeatedly discussed, but never executed. It is believed that a unanimity of view now prevails, and that this will be provided in the future, coordinated with a command ship in the air capable of influencing the troop delivery, primarily regarding last minute deviations from planned flight routes and the use of alternate DZ's and LZ's.

d. CONSTRUCTION OF LANDING STRIPS.

No generalization is justified. In some situations it might be perfectly feasible; in others, not.

e. AIR RESUPPLY.

An evaluation of the importance of air resupply should be made at the outset of planning an airborne operation. Depending upon the estimated period during which the airborne force must sustain itself unsupported by

SECRET Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), file 370 (CG), subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive," dated 4 Dec 44, cont'd.

friendly ground forces, the importance of air resupply may vary from a very secondary element to an essential part of the operations plan, fully equal to that of the initial troop delivery. In the latter case, its importance must be accorded the full consideration it merits in all phases of planning. It is entirely conceivable that an estimate, duly arrived at, of the impracticability of air resupply might alone dictate the abandonment of an otherwise feasible airborne operation.

f. GROUND OPERATIONS OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION.

The conclusion of the Division Commander, that an airborne division is capable of a strong effort in only one direction, while sound when applied to Operation MARKET, is subject to the usual modification which the conditions of any particular situation may justify.

g. SEQUENCE OF PLANNING.

The Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, gives as his opinion that with certain provisos, the seven days elapsing between the receipt of his initial mission and the take-off from departure airdromes was sufficient. Through the intense combined efforts of the Command and Staff of a veteran division, this was sufficient for this operation, conducted against a retreating enemy whose troops disorganization and loss of control had then reached an advanced stage. In the event of an airborne mission against an unshaken enemy or strong ground defenses, a material increase in this time will be imperative to permit much more detailed planning, and probably rehearsals.

h. AIR SUPPORT PARTIES.

Action has already been initiated and recommendations forwarded to the War Department for the incorporation of Air Support Parties, under a different name, as organic elements in the airborne division and corps.

i. PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY.

The highly successful drop of the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel W. M. GRIFFITH Commanding, in this daylight operation fully justified the time and effort spent in the development of this type of unit. Its use at night is still of undetermined value.

j. SALVAGE.

The problem of salvaging the huge amounts of highly expensive air Corps equipment used in an airborne operation has been under study for some time. It presents great difficulties, but its importance is fully recognized.

k. GLIDER PILOTS.

I dissent from the view of the Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, that this personnel be placed under the immediate command of the

- 4 -
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SECRET Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), file 370 (CG), subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive," dated 4 Dec 44, cont'd.

airborne divisional commanders for full-time ground training. These men are airman, an integral and essential part of an Air Force unit, and an indispensable element of the glider-tug team. British practice to the contrary notwithstanding, I believe they are now where they belong - in the Troop Carrier squadrons. Such ground training as is desirable can be readily given by and within their associated airborne divisions.

1. WEAPONS.

Changes in individual and crew-served weapons within airborne divisions, to meet the special requirements of particular operations, have been a recognized necessity in this Theater throughout this war, and generous assistance in this regard has been provided both in NORTH AFRICA and the UNITED KINGDOM. I believe such changes will continue to occur, and that these needs should be met to the limit of our resources when requests are made.

7. I concur with the Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, in his view that Operation MARKET was marginal, and that the outcome hung in the balance for the first few days, but success is the ultimate criterion by which to judge a military decision, and the operation of the two divisions of this Corps achieved conspicuous success. However, there is a point here of such vital importance to future airborne operations in this theater in this war, that I wish to emphasize it in the strongest possible manner. At the time the decision to undertake MARKET was made we dealt with an enemy engaged in a hasty and somewhat disorganized withdrawal under powerful Allied pressure. This retrograde movement had been in progress for six weeks and over hundreds of miles of ground. During its course enemy command had been badly shattered, and his control severely crippled. All these conditions created favorable factors for the employment of airborne forces where risks commensurate with them and with the possible gains could well be justified. Now we face a different foe. His precipitated retreat has ended, his command has been restored and invigorated, his control reestablished, and he fights with the aid of strong ground defenses, closer to his sources of supply. What we were able to accomplish with two airborne divisions in MARKET is no indication of what we may expect to accomplish in certain situations now, and the measure of success of this operation must be appreciated under the pitiless light of cold-blooded analysis, lest these magnificent divisions be assigned a task wholly beyond their strength.


8. To the loyalty, fidelity, steadfast courage and fighting spirit of the ~~troops~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~brilliant~~ ~~leadership~~ ~~of~~ ~~their~~ ~~Commanders~~ Major General M. D. Taylor and Major General J. M. Gavin, respectively, and to the gallant support of their British comrades-in-arms full credit is due. My own admiration and that of this Corps for their achievements is unbounded.

9. The performance of the IX Troop Carrier Command was superior and an essential contribution to the over-all success.

10. I cannot too strongly urge the study, the mastery, and the application, by all upon whom devolves any degree of responsibility for the employment of airborne forces, of the principles enunciated in War Department Training

~~SECRET~~ Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), file 370 (60), subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive," dated 4 Dec 44, cont'd.

~~Circular No. 113, 9 October 1943.~~



M. B. RIDGWAY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:

- 1 - Report of 82d AB Div
- 2 - Report of 101st AB Div
- 3 - Administrative Functions, XVIII Corps (AB)

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Auth: CG, XVIII Corps
(Airborne)

Init: *[Signature]*

HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

Date: 3 Dec 1944

AGO 469, U. S. Army
3 December 1944

SUBJECT: Lessons of Operation MARKET.

TO : Commanding General, XVIII Corps (Airborne), APO 109, U. S. Army.

1. This letter is submitted in compliance with verbal orders, Commanding General, XVIII Corps (Airborne). There is also submitted herewith a copy of this Division's operational report for the period 17 September - 16 October 1944.

2. General: In general this operation served to emphasize the value of lessons learned in past airborne operations. Most of these lessons are well covered in Training Circular 113, War Department, 1943. The content matter of this circular is believed to be basically sound and it is not recommended that any changes be made in it. All of our past combat experiences and our analysis of our airborne operations and training were drawn upon to provide the background for the planning and execution of operation MARKET. Although our three previous combat operations were conducted under cover of darkness, training previously conducted enabled us to arrive at a sound plan for reorganization on the ground and prompt initiation of our ground action.

3. Sequence of Planning: On 10 September 1944, at 1600 hours, a conference was held at Headquarters, First Allied Airborne Army. The mission of the 82d Airborne Division to seize and hold the bridges over the MAAS and WAAL Rivers and the high ground dominating these bridges was given to the Division Commander at this time. The following twelve hours were devoted to intensive study of the terrain with a view to arriving at an outline ground tactical plan and the selection of proper landing zones. At 0800 hours, 11 September, Capt. HARRY BESTERBURTZE, Dutch Commando Officer and native of NIJMEGEN, HOLLAND, became available to assist the staff. At 0900 hours, 11 September, a conference was held at the operational headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, at which time the drop and landing zones were selected, full consideration being given to the accomplishment of the ground missions from the landing areas selected; the hostile flank likely to be encountered; capabilities of the Troop Carrier Command in relation to the desired locations, and the location of the drop zones in relation to the proposed line of flight over the operational area of the Troop Carrier aircraft. A division outline plan was prepared immediately following this and presented to the unit commanders of the division the following day, 12 September 1944. Troops began moving to the take-off airdromes on 15 September and were closed and sealed at the airdromes at daylight, 16 September. The period between 12 September and 15 September was devoted to planning and issuance of orders and preparation of individual unit loads. This time would have been more than adequate for this purpose, however, in this operation a number of changes in the basic plan, each vitally affecting the composition of the divisional

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lift and the location of units at take-off airdromes, made definite planning extremely difficult. The seven-day period allowed between the time a unit receives its mission until it stages an airborne operation is ample provided all supplies are in the hands of the troops and transportation is available to move troops to the take-off airdromes and provided that when the mission is given to the Division Commander he also be given the available lift, the take-off airdromes, and further that he be given an opportunity to select his drop zones within twenty-four hours after receipt of the mission, which presupposes the availability of good map and photo-coverage.

4. Conduct of the Operation: This, it is believed, is adequately covered in the accompanying operational report.

5. Lessons learned:

a. Mission:

(1) Objective: The practice of assigning an airborne division frontage far in excess of that normally given a ground division must be weighed very carefully and full consideration given to the probable enemy ground reaction. In this operation the staggering task of seizing crossings over three major waterways and dominating terrain, as well as occupying and holding approximately 25,000 yards of frontage, required the complete and rapid commitment of all the troops at the disposal of the Division Commander. As the battle developed in intensity, weight of German attacks debouching from the REICHSWALD made it impossible to commit a force of any size against the NIJMEGEN Bridge until D-plus-3. Even then it was an extremely marginal performance. The problem of mopping up the area within the perimeter of defense alone was sufficient to engage a great bulk of the division. If the civilians were openly hostile the problem would have been immeasurably more difficult. Holding key terrain in an airborne operation by seizing locations of high tactical value and covering the gaps between them with patrols and fire is practicable only so long as the enemy does not throw sufficient weight against the gaps to force an entry into your main battle position. In this operation, when the enemy undertook major attacks and penetrated the division's defensive area to about 1,000 yards, all weight that could be mustered was thrown against them at these points in vigorous, desperate counter-attacks supported by every means available within the division. This resulted in wide gaps, over 1,000 yards in some cases, of the front being unoccupied and undefended. A vigorous, alert enemy, with the proper means at his disposal, could have capitalized on these opportunities to seriously jeopardize the integrity of our defense set-up. Operation MARKET was a marginal performance as a ground operation from start to finish and should not necessarily be taken as a yardstick for the capabilities of an airborne division in a ground situation.

(2) Weather: Weather again proved to be a most important factor to consider in staging an airborne operation, especially when the accomplishment of the ground mission is dependent upon an airborne lift that is to build up for a period of several days after the initial landing. The failure of the 325th Glider Infantry to land in operation MARKET until D-plus-6 may have well caused the defeat of the entire force if the German counter-attacking forces had been stronger. The late or non-arrival of the air resupply lifts became a very serious matter by D-plus-3. If the successful execution of the ground mission depends upon troops and supplies that are to arrive subsequent to D-day, it must be appreciated that several days of bad weather may result in the

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failure to accomplish the mission and possibly the defeat of the airborne force. Therefore, the present methods of resupply, both troops and supplies, ~~must be modified to permit resupply by infiltration under any weather conditions by bombers or similar type aircraft with especially trained crews, held ready for commitment to assist an airborne force on the ground if it becomes necessary in the event of bad weather.~~

b. (1) Air Support: An airborne operation needs a maximum amount of air support, before, during and after the landings. The success of this operation as a daylight operation was due largely to the excellent pre-landing air support and to the support given during the landing. Friendly fighters accompanied Troop Carrier aircraft all the way into the landing areas and were frequently seen attacking ground flak positions. Spotty flak was received from the time the Troop Carrier aircraft crossed the hostile coast until the landings were made. It is believed that it would have been much heavier, with a consequent heavier Troop Carrier loss, if thorough fighter coverage had not been available. Support after landing in this operation was given by the RAF. Air support missions, therefore, had to be requested through Headquarters, Airborne Corps. The close air support available in operation NEPTUNE, in NORMANDY, could not be obtained. Direct radio communication for the purpose of calling in fighters on hostile targets was not available.

(2) Air Support Parties: Air support parties should be permanently assigned to a division so that they will become fully acquainted with the division personnel and airborne problems. To assign an air support party just before an operation is not a satisfactory solution to the air support problem. These assigned air support parties should be available to participate in all ground, as well as airborne operations during training of an airborne division. Just prior to an operation they should be given an opportunity to become acquainted with the air support squadrons that have been assigned the mission of supporting their division. Air support parties need much more experience than they have had to date in handling their particular type of equipment in airborne exercises.

c. Anti-Aircraft Fire: Enemy ack-ack did not prove too serious an obstacle, principally due to our own air support. Ack-ack crews at the drop zones were destroyed by the parachutists immediately upon their landing. It is believed, however, that the effects of enemy ack-ack could be more thoroughly neutralized by further exploitation and development of new preventative measures. It is believed, for example, that smoke could well have been used in the vicinity of NIEBACH and in the vicinity of the REICHSWALD on D-plus-1 to guarantee a more favorable airborne delivery and possibly reduce even further the actual losses suffered.

d. Drop & Landing Zones:

(1) The careful selection of drop and landing zones probably has more bearing on the successful outcome of the ground phase of an airborne operation than any other factor considered in operational planning. Their proximity to the objective, to cover and concealment, to water and similar hazards, and to terrain of high tactical value for dominating the enemy immediately upon landing all must be carefully considered. I believe that the parachute drop zones and the glider landing zones, and resupply drop areas

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should be identical whenever possible, or very close to each other. Even with a minimum of enemy resistance, it is impracticable to fight a mile outside of the perimeter of a defense in order to secure temporarily a resupply area or glider landing zone.

(2) Ground Glider Communications: Some method must be arrived at without delay for informing the glider pilots of the exact area in which they should land. In this operation D/L zones T and N were freed of all German troops an hour after our initial landings occurred on D-day. However, by daylight, D-plus-1, German armor, self-propelled guns and aggressive infantry units had overrun both landing zones because of our extensive commitments in other directions, principally cleaning up the area and seizing the three bridges. By 1000 hours, D-plus-1, every available man was organized into two main counter-attacking forces which, attacking shortly before noon, drove the Germans out of one landing zone where small arms, machine guns, mortar and anti-aircraft and under-artillery and mortar fires of all calibers. It was too late at this time to get information to the glider pilots to land on LZ O. Instructions were therefore sent to the glider pilots to land on the western side of the LZ's near the woods on the CROSSBEEK heights. These areas were entirely free of small arms fire and, in some cases, free of enemy observation and only under occasional artillery fire. It is believed that this information reached only very few of the glider pilots and many gliders and glider troops lost could otherwise have been saved if it had been possible to give them some ground-to-air signal, even after their arrival over the LZ's. This is a most important problem and training with a view to its solution will be conducted as soon as the means are available.

e. Parachute Field Artillery: The employment of the Parachute Field Artillery of this division as a parachute force more than justified the Troop Carrier lift expended in its commitment. The 376th Parachute Field Artillery engaged its targets shortly after landing and on D-plus-1, prior to the arrival of the gliderborne artillery, contributed, I believe decisively, to the success of the ground fighting.

f. Gliderborne heavy anti-tank weapons, such as 57 MMs should accompany a parachute infantry regiment whenever possible. In this operation two 57's were present with each parachute regiment shortly after landing.

g. Pathfinders: Navigation by Pathfinders under daylight conditions, although not as critically required as at night, still is essential to the success of an airborne operation. Generally, it is believed that daytime pathfinders should be dropped about ten minutes prior to the arrival of the first serial. A longer time might jeopardize the success of the entire operation. The area in which they drop must be very carefully selected.

h. Daylight operations are much easier to carry through to a successful conclusion than night operations, provided the enemy ground situation is favorable for a daylight operation. Despite the success of operation MARKET, it is believed however that a daylight airborne operation would meet with disastrous results if a highly organized ground defense, supported by armor, existed in the immediate locality of the landing.

i. Air Corps Equipment: Parachutes, parachute containers and gliders must be safeguarded for future operations. This has not been the case to date. A tremendous and unbelievable public loss occurs in an airborne operation due

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to the uncontrolled and willful destruction and misappropriation of gliders and parachutes by troops of all branches and nationalities. Generally speaking, it is believed that airborne troops give greater care to Air Corps equipment than other troops, possibly because of their familiarity with it and their appreciation of its value. It is most important that a Theater policy be established and published to all troops as soon as practicable on the safeguarding of equipment in airborne operations.

j. Replacements: Opportunity must be given for airborne units to absorb and train replacements before being committed to an operation. It is believed that eight weeks are a minimum for this purpose. All unit commanders and many soldiers of this division, in a combat questionnaire recently conducted, expressed the desire that more opportunity be given to them to train with their new replacements. The high individual initiative and skill and the superior unit and tactical teamwork required to carry an airborne unit through to a successful mission requires thorough, intensive, intensive of lowing training, as well as ground training. The machine-like execution of the missions of each battalion of this division in this operation, it is believed, resulted from thorough training and insistence upon prompt, positive action immediately upon landing. This can only be learned through proper training.

k. Glider Pilots: Glider-pilots must be well trained ground soldiers or they will not live long. At best they will be a liability to any airborne commander until they can be evacuated from the combat zone. It is recommended that they be put under immediate command of the airborne divisional commanders for full-time ground training, with necessary periods allocated to their glider pilot training.

l. Weapons:


(1) During the past year and a half of airborne operations unit commanders of this division have, through combat necessity, found it desirable from time to time to augment or otherwise modify the weapons that were authorized in order to meet specific tactical conditions. While this condition may, at first glance, appear unsound and, at best, unwise, it has nevertheless proven necessary and, I believe, an effective contribution to our combat success. It is believed to be sound, therefore, to establish as a guiding principle the fact that airborne units may require, and should have available, different weapons and equipment for different missions. In the dyke country of HOLLAND BAR's were at a premium. In this division each parachute rifle squad is now equipped with one BAR over and above its normal complement of weapons. Additional BAR's were obtained while in Holland.

(2) At one time every parachutist was armed with a Cal. 45 pistol. This was later replaced by the carbine. A weapon of this type was necessary because all rifles were dropped in squad containers and it was essential that the parachutists have a weapon on their person to be employed until they could obtain rifles. With the advent of the M-1 rifle container the folding stock carbine has come into disuse except where it is a primary hand weapon for crew-served weapon crews. It is impracticable for a parachutist to drop with both a folding stock carbine, for his immediate protection, and the M-1 or BAR in a container. It has therefore proven advisable in recent operations for the individual parachutist to drop with a pistol for his immediate protection,

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as well as his normal hand weapon, either rifle, BAR or carbine. Since authority does not now exist for obtaining these pistols, only a few fortunate individuals have been so armed. It is my belief that a number of LWAs could have been saved in this operation if the individual had been armed with a pistol upon landing, and it is certain that drops among hostile civilians will result in some loss of life from immediate attack upon landing unless our parachutists are armed with pistols. It is therefore recommended that steps be taken to provide every parachutist with a Cal. 45 pistol.

m. Resupply: Resupply continues to be one of our major unsolved problems. Although a solution exists at the present, it is not believed to be satisfactory as evinced in the accompanying operational report. Presuming that parachute resupply is accurately and compactly delivered in territory occupied by friendly natives, it still would require approximately one-third of the infantry forces of the division to recover and deliver to the firing line a unit resupply. Parachute resupply is an emergency means of resupply at best that can only augment a sound plan for resupply by other means. At present, troops of this division carry on their person sufficient small arms ammunition and rations for several days fighting. With proper training and good supply discipline, an airborne force can exist for several days on the supplies it brings with it, provided enemy resistance is not too intense. The resupply problem, therefore, is not as hopeless as it may first appear, but it is believed that this problem should be given more study and developed in training exercises. It is believed that resupply by glider would be a far more efficient method than by parachute.


JAMES M. GAVIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl - Copy of Operational Report.

- 6 -
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12

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82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

OPERATION MARKET


HISTORICAL DATA

PART I - SUMMARY

PART II - GRAPHIC PLATES

PART III - MAPS OF LANDINGS

PART IV - STATISTICS


JAMES H. GAVIN,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding

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NARRATIVE

Upon its return from Normandy on 19 July 1944 this Division was located in the Nottingham-Licester-Market Harborough area. There it remained and trained until its participation in operation MARKET on 17 September 1944. Twenty-four hours prior to take-off, all airborne elements of the Division were closed at seven airfields in the Grantham-Cottesmore-Lenger area. Briefings were conducted, loading plans formulated, airfinal checks made, and the Division took off for the Netherlands commencing at 170950 September 1944. The mission of the Division in this operation was as follows:

"Land by parachute and glider commencing D-Day South of Nijmegen; seize and hold the highway bridges across the Rhine River; organize, and hold the high ground between Nijmegen and Groenlo; deny the roads in the Division area to the enemy, and dominate the area bounded north by line running from Beek West through Hatert thence Southwest to Rindscheestraat, South by River Gass and the Look-Piethorst highway, West by Cleve-Nijmegen highway and Forst-Reichswald, and West by line running North and South through Rindscheestraat."

The first lift consisted of:

	<u>Parch</u>	<u>Glider</u>
Hq & Hq Co 82d A/B Div	9	20
Hq & Hq Btry Div Arty	3	2
82d A/B Sig Co		6
Btry A 80th A/B Lia Bn		22
307 A/B Engr Bn	27	
504 Parch Inf	137	
505 Parch Inf	126	
508 Parch Inf	130	
325 Glider Inf	2	
376 Parch Lia Bn	48	
Total	482	50

All units dropped as planned except two serials of the 505 Parachute Infantry. A mix-up in marshalling caused the 2d Battalion serial to drop before the 3d Battalion serial, and as a consequence the 2d Battalion serial was dropped two thousand yards northeast of its scheduled drop zone.

The entire flight was preceded by a utility team, which landed on D+ ten minutes prior to the arrival of the first elements of the main body. With the exception in the 505 Parachute Infantry indicated above, all units landed on the drop zones, or in the immediate vicinity thereof, on schedule. Flak enroute was spotty and light. Flak coming from LZ "C" was initially heavy but inaccurate. The first paratroopers to land destroyed all flak crews and took over their weapons. Enemy dispositions along the Gees-Raal Canal in the vicinity of all bridges and in the wooded country around the Nijmegen heights and in the Reichswald were, as anticipated, well organized and of about a strength of eight battalions. Harassing fire continued to come from the edges of the drop zones throughout all of the landings until overcast. Enemy reaction was prompt and appeared to follow a definite pattern. All local troops were committed immediately in place meal fashion. Nearby "homeguard" type troops were thrown in as quickly as they could be rushed to the operational area. This piece meal build up increased until a coordinated attack was made by the German 6th Para Division on D+4.

- 1 -
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14

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Local enemy units were initially overcome and destroyed or, except for those in the city of Nijmegen proper, they dispersed in the first several hours after landing.

Day by day summary of the activities of each unit of the Division follows:

D.D.Y. 17 SEPTEMBER

Division parachute elements in four hundred and eighty-two C-47's and a serial of fifty gliders left airports in the area of Grantham, England, between 0950 and 1040. All serials except those of 504 Parachute Infantry landed North, East, and South of Groesbeek, Holland, between 1200 and 1400. The 504 Parachute Infantry landed West of the Maas-Raal Canal and North of the Meas River. All drop patterns were excellent. Personnel and equipment losses enroute and during the drop were light, and assembly was the best in the history of the Division.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 82d Airborne Division, and Headquarters Company, 504 Parachute Infantry, landed in the landing zone South of Groesbeek, moved North through woods, and established Division Command Post at Groesbeek, about 1000 yards East of Groesbeek at 1700.

505 Parachute Infantry

Dropped after the Pithersdorp at 1300, seized Groesbeek, occupied its area of defensive responsibility from Camp Southeast to Hook, cleared its area of enemy, and contacted 504 Parachute Infantry at the Maas-Raal Canal bridge near Heumen. All initial missions were accomplished by 2000.

504 Parachute Infantry

Dropped beginning 1315 West of the Maas-Raal Canal on three drop zones, two North and one South of the Meas River. One battalion dropped Northeast of Overasselt and at 1600, after overcoming strong enemy resistance, captured West of the Maas-Raal Canal bridge at Heumen. The sites of the Canal bridges near Blinckenborg and Hatert, both of which had been destroyed by the enemy upon the approach of the battalion, were captured before dark. One battalion dropped West of Overasselt, blocked all southward movement along the Grave-Nijmegen highway, and cleared the enemy from the Western portion of the Division area. One battalion dropped one rifle company South of the Meas at Grave and the balance of the battalion North of the river and West of Overasselt. Both forces moved against the bridge at Grave immediately. Surprise was complete and the bridge captured at 1430. The town of Grave was occupied at 2300 after having been abandoned by 400 enemy. All initial missions of 504 were accomplished by 1930.

508 Parachute Infantry

Dropped Northwest of Groesbeek at 1328. Based on a report from the Dutch that the town and bridges were lightly held, immediately moved into Nijmegen to take the Meas River bridges. At 2000 the attack met heavy enemy resistance about 400 yards from the highway bridge and was stopped. The regiment occupied the area immediately East of the Maas-Raal Canal and established road blocks to prevent enemy movement South of a line running East and West through Hatert. One company moved to clear the glider landing zone Northeast of Groesbeek and met considerable enemy resistance. One battalion, less a company, occupied the important high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal without too heavy an opposition. One company advanced on the Nijmegen Bridges from the southeast and at 2400 had reached Hill 64.4 Northeast of Ubbendon. All initial missions of 508 were accomplished by 2030.

- 2 -
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376 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion

Dropped 1335 on drop zone South of Groesbeek, assembled the battalion with ten howitzers, and displaced 1000 yards to the position area. The battalion, initially in support of 505 Parachute Infantry, fired its first mission on call from the regiment at 1800.

307 A/3 Engineer Battalion

Companies B, C, and D, all parachute, dropped South of Groesbeek at 1320. Companies B and D furnished cover on route march to elements of Division Headquarters and protected Division Command Post when it was established at 1715. Company C moved out to contact 504 Parachute Infantry West of Maas-Waal Canal.

Battery A, 80th A/B Antiaircraft Battalion

Eight 57mm AT guns allotted as follows: Two, 505 Parachute Infantry upon making contact; Two, Division Reserve at vicinity of Division Command Post.

D PLUS 1, 18 SEPTEMBER

504 Parachute Infantry

Continued to hold the Maas River bridge at Grave and the Maas-Waal Canal bridge at Heuman. Vigorous patrolling was continued on the West and Northwest of the regimental area along the Grave-Nijmegen highway. At 1200 one platoon moved North along the West bank of the Maas-Waal Canal and assisted in the capture of the bridge on the Grave-Nijmegen highway near Honinghutie.

505 Parachute Infantry

Maintained its area of defensive responsibility; repelled enemy attacks at Horst, Grafwegen, and Fitcherst; captured an enemy patrol trying to work its way North to the Maas-Waal bridge at Heuman, and captured a train attempting to escape into Germany. At 1240 the regiment attacked and cleared the glider landing zone South and Southeast of Groesbeek.

508 Parachute Infantry

Withdrew battalion in Nijmegen and attacked to clear the glider landing zone Northeast and East of Groesbeek. The attack crossed the scheduled line of departure at 1310, completely surprised the enemy, and the landing area was swept by 1400. Sixteen anti-aircraft guns and 24 prisoners of war were captured. Maintained its defensive sector throughout the 18th. At 181200 a platoon, with the assistance of 504 Parachute Infantry which advanced up the Maas-Waal Canal from the West, captured the Maas-Waal Canal bridge at Honinghutie. Regiment held the high ground vicinity Berg en Dal throughout the 18th against enemy patrols and sporadic enemy artillery action. One company moved into Nijmegen at 0900, advanced to the same spot to which the regiment had reached on the 17th, fought against a strong enemy force through the entire day, and at 1500 was withdrawn into the sector near Berg en Dal.

Glider Elements

Between 1000 and 1100 a lift of 450 gliders carrying an anti-tank battery of the 80th A/B Antiaircraft Battalion, 319 Glider Field Artillery Battalion, 320 Glider Field Artillery Battalion, 456 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and 307 Airborne Medical

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Company departed from fields in the United Kingdom and flew the same route as the lift of the previous day. Gliders landed in zones cleared by the 505 Parachute Infantry and 508 Parachute Infantry in the vicinity of Groesbeek. Several gliders overshot the landing zone and landed beyond the Dutch-German border, but a substantial number of personnel made their way to the drop zone. The recovery of the personnel was very satisfactory. After landing and assembling, 319 Glider Field Artillery Battalion was put in direct support of 508 Parachute Infantry, 456 Parachute Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of 505 Parachute Infantry, and 320 Glider Field Artillery Battalion in general support of the Division.

Resupply

Following the glider lift by 20 minutes, a flight of 135 B-24 bombers dropped resupply on drop zone South of Groesbeek. Drop pattern was good. Recovery was estimated to be 80%.

Guards Armored Division reached Grave and the 504 Parachute Infantry at 0820.

504 Parachute Infantry

Regiment, less one company left to guard the bridge at Grave, one company left to guard each of the Maas-Waal Canal bridges at Heumen and Hovinghault, and one company left to patrol and guard the highway from Grave to the Hovinghault bridge, was moved East of the Maas-Waal Canal, relieved 2d Battalion 508 Parachute Infantry, and occupied the Jonker Bosch woods. 3d Battalion was moved to vicinity Milden as Division reserve.

505 Parachute Infantry

Regiment, less 2d Battalion, maintained its sector of responsibility on the South of the Division area throughout the 19th.

2d Battalion 505 Parachute Infantry

Attached to Guards Armored Division at 191100 and moved North to assault the Nijmegen bridges. The battalion reached the edge of Nijmegen without incident and, in moving through the outskirts of the town, received only artillery fire. When the battalion reached the center of the town, one company supported by seven tanks turned Northwest and moved against the railroad bridge. The balance of the battalion, the remainder of the British Armored Infantry advanced against the highway bridge. The assault was stopped at the Marie Ploin, about 400 yards South of the bridge. A violent engagement lasting throughout the evening and night of the 19th failed to break the strong enemy defensive arc, and at midnight activity consisted of patrolling into the strong point and mortaring it from the cemetery South of the friendly positions.

508 Parachute Infantry

Hold landing zone East of Groesbeek until 1900. Cleared enemy from and occupied high ground along Nijmegen-Gleve highway between Ubeer en and Wylar. Established road blocks at Wylar, Beck, and In Thal. Relieved by 504 Parachute Infantry in Jonker Bosch and occupied sector between Kapp and Voxall. Reinforced Beck road block with platoon of Company D, 307 th Engineer Battalion; repelled counterattacks against Teufels Berg throughout entire day.

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Attached Units

1st Goldstream Guards, Armored, and 5th Coldstream Guards, Infantry attached to Division and moved to Dekkerswald in Division Reserve.

Resupply

~~at 1500, approximately 300 lbs from excessively high altitude, recovery negligible.~~

D PLUS 3, 20 SEPTEMBER

504 Parachute Infantry

With 2d Irish Guards attached, cleared area between Jonker Bosch and Waal River. 3d Battalion relieved as Division Reserve. Regiment captured North end of railroad bridge over the Waal River, seized and cleared bridgehead North of Waal inspiring passage of Guards Armored Division. Hopped up western outskirts of Mijmegen and area South of railroad bridge.

505 Parachute Infantry

Regiment, less 2d Battalion, repelled sharp enemy attack at Horst and Heikent during morning. From 1300 to 2000 repelled at Hook enemy attack of an infantry regiment strongly supported by artillery after attack had penetrated Division perimeter to north of 1000 yards on a 1000 yard front. Division perimeter regained at 2000. Regiment reinforced with attachment of 135 glider pilots.

2d Battalion 505 Parachute Infantry

Attacked enemy strong points at Southern ends of Mijmegen bridges during morning. At 1400 stormed strong point South of highway bridge, cleared area of enemy, and reached bridge by 1700. First tank of Grenadier Guards crossed 1830.

503 Parachute Infantry

Attacked at 1000 at Myler by one company of enemy infantry moving North and two companies of enemy infantry moving South, all supported by artillery and armor. Forced to withdraw to high ground to West. Enemy immediately occupied In Thal and Lageveld. Attacked at Beek at 1200 by 2 battalions of enemy parachutists supported by armored vehicles, and forced to withdraw 1000 yards to high ground to South-west. By counterattack drove enemy from and recaptured Leek at 2140. ~~At 2100, 2d Battalion 503 Parachute Infantry was ordered to withdraw, leaving a detachment surrounded by the enemy in the town. Captured document from prisoner of war which revealed that enemy attacks at Hook, Beek, and Myler were part of a coordinated Division attack intended to split Division area and sever the Grave-Mijmegen highway.~~

Attached Units

Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry and one squadron of the Royals, its reconnaissance unit, attached to Division at 1700 and moved into Dekkerswald.

D PLUS 4, 21 SEPTEMBER

504 Parachute Infantry

Continued defense of bridgehead over Waal and on mission of mopping up South bank of Waal from outskirts of Mijmegen to Maas-Waal Canal.

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SECRET

505 Parachute Infantry (less 2d Battalion)
Continued to hold defensive sector on South of Division area from
Knap to Broek.

2d Battalion 505 Parachute Infantry
Relieved of mission of close in defense of Nijmegen Bridges and
assumed defense of line from Eastern exits of Nijmegen to Uebergen.

505 Parachute Infantry
Counterattacked Beck at first light from Northeast, East and South-
east. Initial attack failed, and enemy, pressing his temporary
advance, appeared to within 200 yards of Berg en Dal, but was
held there. Attack failed, enemy
enemy and all defenses reestablished.

Resupply
at 1500 supplies dropped from approximately 400 C-47's on drop zone
West of the Hars-Naal Canal. 2000 battal was six miles in length
by two miles in width. Recovery estimated at 60% was accomplished
with assistance of Dutch civilians.

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504 Parachute Infantry (less 2d Battalion)
Relieved of mission to Nijmegen bridgehead and displaced to Dekker-
swald as Division Reserve.

2d Battalion 504 Parachute Infantry
Relieved 2d Battalion 505 Parachute Infantry in sector between
Nijmegen and Uebergen and, upon Division order, with Royals, cleared
by 1700 area between Nijmegen-Cleve highway and Naal River East to
line Uebergen - Pals.

505 Parachute Infantry (less 2d Battalion)
Reestablished road block at Broek. With Royals, reconnoitered to
Rhetlorst and found road clear of enemy.

2d Battalion 505 Parachute Infantry
Relieved in Nijmegen. 2d Battalion 504 Parachute
Infantry reverted to regimental control, and relieved Coldstream
Guards at Nijmegen Bridge.

508 Parachute Infantry
Held Tylar Beck throughout day and night against persistent enemy
counterattacks. With one company Royals attached, effected a recon-
naissance in force to Venloerem and high ground West of Eriekom.
Met strong resistance and withdrew to high ground vicinity Berg en
Dal.

Attached Units
Coldstream Guards relieved to attached to this Division and moved
South to Vegel to restore line of communication of Second British
Army.

- 6 -

SECRET

19

SECRET

D PLUS 6, 23 SEPTEMBER

On this date the third glider lift of the Division took off from the airfields in the Caen area. The lift consisted of the 325 Glider Infantry; 8th A/B Antiaircraft Battalion, less Batteries A and B; Company A 307 A/B Engineer Battalion; and elements of Division Special Troops, and landed on and in the vicinity of LZ "O". A number of gliders did not land on the proper landing zone; two landed in England, and forty-three were released between the coast and the LZ. Ten gliders are still unaccounted for. Immediately upon landing, the 325 Glider Infantry was closed in the woods West of Groesbeek preparatory to taking up a sector on the front.

D PLUS 7 to D PLUS 30

The Division continued on its mission assigned by 30 Corps of holding the area between the Vesi River and the Macs River, with its front generally that of D plus 6. The 325 Glider Infantry cleaned out the larger portion of the Hiesberg Woods and advanced the right flank of the Division.

SUMMARY OF PERIOD 17 SEPTEMBER TO 16 OCTOBER

<u>a. Parachute Lift</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Planes committed	482	
Dropped on or within 1000 yards of DZ	430	89.2
Failed to drop on or within 1000 yards of DZ	52	10.8
Unaccounted for	0	0
<u>b. Glider Lifts</u>		
Glider committed	902	
Landed on or within 1000 yards of LZ	763	84.6
Failed to land on or within 1000 yards of LZ	102	11.3
Unaccounted for	37	4.1
<u>c. Our losses</u>		
Killed	469	3.4
Wounded	1933	14.0
Missing	610	4.7
<u>d. Enemy Losses</u>		
Killed	2490	
Prisoners of War	2977	
<u>e. Results of Operations</u>		
All missions accomplished		


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
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PLATE No 1
 D-DAY THRU D+1
 17-18 SEPT
 TO ACCOMPANY
 HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF 828
 AIRBORNE DIVISION'S PARTICIPATION
 IN OPERATION
 "MARKET"
 SCALE: 1/35,000
 LEGEND:-

504
 505
 508



SECRET



LAUNCHING POINT 504
 1ST WAVE: 38 BN STAFF, H&T
 Co's - 1451
 2D WAVE: 38 BN HQ & Co
 & "G" Co - 1515
 3D WAVE: "C" Co - 1530
 4TH WAVE: "A" Co - 1600
 5TH WAVE: 1ST BN HQ & Co - 1700
 6TH WAVE: "B" Co - 1700

28 BN 504 SUPPORTED CROSSING FROM HERE WITH MORTAR AND MACHINE GUN FIRE.

AREA SUBJECTED TO HEAVY ARTILLERY, MORTAR, AND TYPHOON BOMBARDMENT AND SMOKE PRIOR TO AND DURING CROSSING.

TANKS OF 2D IRISH GUARDS SUPPORTED CROSSING FROM THESE POINTS.

H&T Co's REACHED THIS DIKED ROAD, REORGANIZED, AND PUSHED ON.

FORT HOF VAN HOLLAND
 SEIZED BY "A" Co 201700.

SEIZED BY "N" Co 201700.

ROAD BLOCKED BY "C" Co 201800.

LINE OF 504 BRIDGEHEAD AT 202000.

FORT HET LAUWIK

"H" & "I" Co's 504 REACHED NORTH END OF BRIDGE 201915.

FIRST BRITISH TANK CROSSED 201830.

ATTEMPTS TO OUTFLANK ENEMY OF 18TH AND NIGHT OF 18-19 MET HEAVY RESISTANCE WEAPONS FIRE AND FAILED. PATROLS PENETRATED VALKHOF AND PARK DURING NIGHT, KILLING SEVERAL ENEMY AND TAKING PRISONERS. PRESSURE AT THESE POINTS MAINTAINED MORNING OF 19TH.

LINE OF DEPARTURE FIXED FOR COMBINED INFANTRY AND TANK ASSAULT AT 201400. SOUTH END OF BRIDGE AND AREA WITHIN THIS LINE UNDER CONTROL BY 201700.

4 TANKS OF GRENADIER GUARDS KNOCKED OUT TRYING TO FORCE PAST THIS SQUARE.

"D" Co 505 REACHED HERE 192200, MET STRONG ENEMY FORCES, AND WAS STOPPED.

Co's "A" & "E" 508 REACHED HERE 172300.

PATROL "C" Co 508 REACHED HERE 180300. "G" Co 508 REACHED HERE 181200. BOTH MET HEAVY RESISTANCE AND WERE WITHDRAWN. "E" & "F" Co's 505 REACHED HERE 191600, MET SMALL ARMS AND AT GUN FIRE, DEPLOYED - "E" Co ON RIGHT, "F" Co ON LEFT.

FROM HERE MORTARS 28 BN 505 POUNDED VALKHOF AND HUNNER PARK 191800 TO 201400.

28 BN 505 PASSED HERE AT 191600 EN ROUTE TO BRIDGES OVER WAAL.

ROUTE OF Co's "A" & "B" 508 & "D" Co 505.

ROUTE OF "E" & "F" Co's 505.

DETAILED SKETCH SUPPLEMENTING PLATE No. 2 SEIZURE OF NIJMEGEN BRIDGES 19-20 SEPT. SCALE: 1/7,500


LEGEND:-
 — ENEMY POSITIONS
 — CITY PARKS & PARKWAYS

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
PLATE No 4
 D+7 THRU D+14
 24 SEPT - 1 OCT
 TO ACCOMPANY
 HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF 820
 AIRBORNE DIVISION'S PARTICIPATION IN
 OPERATION
 "MARKET"
 SCALE: 1/35,000
 LEGEND: - 325
 - 504
 - 505
 - 508
 - 307 ENER BN



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
PLATE No 5
 D+15 THRU D+29
 TO ACCOMPANY
 HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF 82ND
 AIRBORNE DIVISION'S PARTICIPATION IN
 OPERATION "MARKET"
 SCALE: 1/35,000
 LEGEND:—
 325
 504
 505
 508
 307 ENGR BN
 NOTE: DIV ARTY AND DIV SP TRS ARE
 SHOWN AS OF THE END OF THE PER-
 100.




REPRODUCED BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAP SHOWING PARACHUTE LANDINGS
82d AIRBORNE DIVISION
OPERATION MARKET
D DAY - 171250 SEPT 1944

LEGEND:
STICKS SCHEDULED TO DROP ON
DROP ZONE "O" & OTHER TWO 804
DROP ZONES
STICKS SCHEDULED TO DROP ON
DROP ZONE "N"
STICKS SCHEDULED TO DROP ON
DROP ZONE "T"



AMS 5641-1-1




HEIGHTS IN METERS
SECRET

27

GROESBEEK, HOLLAND

SECRET



**MAP SHOWING GLIDER LANDINGS
82d AIRBORNE DIVISION
OPERATION MARKET**

LEGEND:

- D DAY LIFT - 171350 SEPTEMBER, 1944
- D + 1 LIFT - 181400 SEPTEMBER, 1944
- D + 6 LIFT - 231610 SEPTEMBER, 1944

NOTES:

- D-DAY LIFT -**
 1. NO OF GLIDERS IN LIFT - 50
 2. SHOWN ON MAP - 37
 3. 3 GLIDERS WENT DOWN BEFORE REACHING DIVISION AREA - ALL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR.
- D + 1 LIFT -**
 1. NO. OF GLIDERS IN LIFT - 450
 2. SHOWN ON MAP - 424
 3. 26 GLIDERS WENT DOWN BEFORE REACHING DIVISION AREA.
 4. 28 GLIDERS ARE UNREPORTED - ALL PERSONNEL ARE MIA, BUT 16 OF THESE GLIDERS HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY AERIAL PHOTOS.
- D + 6 LIFT -**
 1. NO OF GLIDERS IN LIFT - 402
 2. SHOWN ON MAP - 351
 3. 42 GLIDERS LANDED BEFORE REACHING DIVISION AREA.
 4. 9 GLIDERS UNACCOUNTED FOR - ALL PERSONNEL MIA.

SCALE:



SECRET

28

SECRET

HQ 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 469 31 October 1944 U.S. ARMY

STATISTICAL STUDY, BASED ON REPORTS OF
DIVISION PERSONNEL, OF GLIDER LANDINGS OF
82nd A/B DIVISION TROOPS IN OPERATION
"MARKET" 17, 18 & 23 SEPTEMBER 1944

GAVIN
COMMANDING

Table with columns: SERIAL NO, ORGANIZATION, TIME OF DROP, FIELD, BALDRYON, L2-N, ROUTE-N, GP NR, etc. Includes sub-sections for HQ Div Art, Div Rec, and HQ Div (A/B) Div.

Table with columns: SERIAL NO, ORGANIZATION, TIME OF DROP, FIELD, BALDRYON, L2-N, ROUTE-N, GP NR, etc. Includes sub-sections for HQ Div (A/B) Div, HQ Div (A/B) Div, and HQ Div (A/B) Div.

Table with columns: SERIAL NO, ORGANIZATION, TIME OF DROP, FIELD, BALDRYON, L2-N, ROUTE-N, GP NR, etc. Includes sub-sections for HQ Div (A/B) Div, HQ Div (A/B) Div, and HQ Div (A/B) Div.

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Table with columns: SERIAL NO, ORGANIZATION, TIME OF DROP, FIELD, BALDRYON, L2-N, ROUTE-N, GP NR, etc. Includes sub-sections for HQ Div (A/B) Div, HQ Div (A/B) Div, and HQ Div (A/B) Div.

Table with columns: SERIAL NO, ORGANIZATION, TIME OF DROP, FIELD, BALDRYON, L2-N, ROUTE-N, GP NR, etc. Includes sub-sections for HQ Div (A/B) Div, HQ Div (A/B) Div, and HQ Div (A/B) Div.

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SHEET No 2

SERIAL No A-7 ORGANIZATION	TAIL NUMBER	TIME OF GLIDER	PROP-1455 FIELD-LANGAR			PERSONNEL			L-2 SER	ROUTE-N SER	GP No 22/ GUN	DISTANCE FROM L-2
			NUM	DAM	DES	MIS	OK	KIA				
327 A/B Co	43-1144	X										
"	43-1145	X										
"	43-1146	X										
"	43-1147	X										
"	43-1148	X										
"	43-1149	X										
"	43-1150	X										
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"	43-1323	X										

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HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

APO 472, U. S. Army
15 October 1944

SUBJECT: Participation of the 101st Airborne Division in Operation MARKET for the period D - D + 10

TO : Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army
(Thru Commanding General, XVIII Corps (AB))

1. The attached report on Operation MARKET prepared by Brigadier General G. J. Higgins is forwarded approved with the following comments.

2. EFFECT OF THE DAYLIGHT DROP ON OPERATION MARKET. Operation MARKET differed from all other Airborne operations and exercises in the compactness and accuracy of the D day landings. Apart from the navigational skill and steadiness under fire shown by Troop Carrier pilots, the factor contributing most to this accuracy was the decision to stage the operation in daylight. Daylight allowed the operation to be performed successfully with a minimum of preparation. There was no special pointing for Operation MARKET on the part of Airborne Troops whereas a full-dress rehearsal would have been indispensable had the operation been in darkness. Daylight simplified the general landing procedure. Troop Carrier Command as well as the assembly of Airborne troops on the ground. The rapidity of this assembly permitted the accomplishment of the initial ground missions on schedule. Because of the accruing advantages it is felt that considerable boldness is justified in choosing daylight rather than darkness for an Airborne operation if, as in MARKET, the enemy is on the run and air supremacy complete.

3. RATE OF BUILD-UP OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION. It required seven days to bring in all the Airborne elements of the 101st Airborne Division. During this time the Division was obliged to protect the landing field with considerable forces while carrying out its ground missions. This requirement for landing field protection reduced the strength available for the essential tasks of the Division. This inevitable diversion of strength is a factor which must be borne in mind in assigning missions to an Airborne Division.

4. TROOP CARRIER REPRESENTATION ON THE GROUND. General Higgins in paragraph 4 f comments on the need of an Air Force control unit on the glider field. This would have been most useful in MARKET and should not be overlooked in future Airborne operations. A Troop Carrier officer on the ground could have radioed back local weather conditions and exercised air traffic control. Also, he could have relayed the latest information regarding the tactical situation on the ground, thus preventing air formations from flying over a battle-in-progress.

5. CONSTRUCTION OF LANDING STRIPS. Operation MARKET included plans for the construction of landing strips to bring in air transported units and supplies. This was never possible because of enemy action adjacent to the narrow corridor along the Eindhoven-Rnhem highway and the absence of adequate troops to clear and control the necessary landing field area. As the situation is always going to be extremely uncertain whenever Airborne troops land behind hostile lines, the construction and protection of a landing field does not appear feasible without an entire Airborne division with the sole mission of securing the field.

6. AIR RESUPPLY. Operation MARKET provided valuable lessons in air resupply. At present, the data are not complete so that conclusions are tentative. However, it was amply proved that glider resupply is much more efficient than supply by parachute. The latter was only about 50% effective and would have been inadequate in itself to maintain this Division for any considerable period. Experience in Operation MARKET emphasizes that air resupply remains an emergency method with a long way to go before it can be relied upon to support Airborne troops in number for an indefinite period.

7. GROUND OPERATIONS OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION. The initial ground mission of the Division required its dispersion in three areas along a corridor about fifteen miles in length. This disposition made the Airborne troops weak at every critical point and made necessary the most energetic shifting of troops to meet the numerous threats as they developed along this long corridor. Had anything less than a superior parachute drop been received the mission might well have failed, wholly or in part. As it was, the issue hung in a nice balance on

- 1 -
SECRET

34

SECRET

several occasions before the Airborne troops restored the situation. The experience gained by the Division gave renewed force to the conviction that an Airborne division is capable of exerting a strong effort in but a single direction at a given time.

Maxwell D. Taylor
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Major General, USA
Commanding

35

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HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Asst. Div. Comdr.

AGO 472, U. S. Army
12 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Operation MARKET.

To: Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division.

1. **GENERAL:** In accordance with verbal instructions Commanding General 101st Airborne Division, the following report on the participation of the 101st Airborne Division in Operation MARKET is hereby submitted. This report covers the operations of the 101st Airborne Division from D to D + 10 inclusive (September 17 to 27, 1944). The report is divided into three parts: First, the movement of personnel and equipment from the UK to the combat zone in a parachute echelon, a glider echelon, and a seaborne echelon; second, the tactical operations of the Division, and units thereof, from the initial landing by parachute until D + 10 inclusive, at which time the tactical situation became more or less stationary, and third, matters peculiar to an airborne operation.

a. **Parachute Echelon:** The parachute echelon of the 101st Airborne Division consisted of 436 C-47 transport planes carrying some 6,809 parachutists of the Division. Four hundred twenty-four planes dropped on D-Day, and 12 planes carrying Battery "B", 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, with 140 personnel and 6 guns, dropped on D + 3. Of the 436 planes which took off, 434 dropped parachutists in a highly satisfactory manner (center of impact was some 1,500 yards short of the selected DZ in one case and about 3 miles northwest of the selected DZ in another case. In both cases however, the drop pattern was excellent and all parachutists of the serials were dropped together). Only two planes failed to drop parachutists on the selected DZ's, and these two planes were shot down on the flight in and prior to reaching the DZ's. All parachutists jumped from these planes, and 8 from one plane and 2 from another eventually joined their units in the combat zone. Jump casualties were less than 2% of the total number jumped. The average time of assembly was about one hour for each battalion. All initial objectives were reached prior to darkness. Recovery of equipment averaged over 95%. Four Pathfinder planes preceded the serials by 15 minutes. Three of the planes dropped without incident on the selected DZ's. One plane was shot down several miles short of the DZ in enemy territory and no information is available on this plane. (For details of parachute echelon, see Annex No. 1).

b. **Glider Echelon:** A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from departure bases in the UK over a period of 7 days. Seven hundred and sixty-seven of these gliders landed without incident on the designated LZ. Approximately 5,000 men took off from the UK and some 4,800 eventually joined their units in the combat zone. Over 500 gliders were grounded on this date, practically all of which are assumed to have dropped in enemy territory. The glider lift on D + 2 was dispersed because of heavy fog encountered over the Channel and along the coast. Of some 384 gliders that took off on this date, only 209 landed safely on the designated LZ. Many others returned to the UK or landed on the continent in enemy or friendly territory. No further glider serials were flown after D + 6, but some 500 personnel and essential equipment were flown in by C-47 transport to the Brussels Airport and joined their units in the combat zone by D + 10. (For details of glider echelon see Annex No. 2).

c. **Seaborne Echelon:** The seaborne echelon of the Division consisted of 1077 personnel and 444 vehicles of all types. This echelon loaded on D + 1 and sailed from SOUTHAMPTON on D + 2. It arrived at OMAHA BEACH on D + 3, where it was divided into two serials. The first serial left the beach on the morning of D + 3 and arrived at BOURG-LEOPOLD on the evening of D + 4. It closed in the Division service area at ZON on the evening of D + 5. The second serial left OMAHA BEACH on the evening of D + 3, arrived at BOURG-LEOPOLD on D + 5, and closed in the Division service area on the evening of D + 6. (For details of seaborne echelon, see Annex No. 3).

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3. TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. The Division missions called for the seizure of the four highway and railway bridges over the Aa RIVER and WILLEMS VAART CANAL at VECHTEL; the seizure of the highway bridge over the BOGHEL RIVER at ST. OEDENRODE; the seizure of the highway bridge over the WILHELMINA CANAL at ZON; and the seizure of EINDHOVEN and the main highway bridges over the streams in that city. The Division objectives were spread over a road distance of some fifteen miles.

b. The 501st Parachute Infantry, landing on two DZ's near VECHTEL, seized all four bridges without incident. The 502d Parachute Infantry landed near ZON, and with one battalion seized the main highway bridge near ST. OEDENRODE. The 506th also landed near ZON and seized the Canal crossing, but only after the enemy had blown the bridge. The 506th seized EINDHOVEN shortly after noon the next day.

c. In an effort to secure an alternate crossing over the WILHELMINA CANAL, and also to block enemy traffic between EINDHOVEN and HERTOGENBOSCH, one company seized and held the bridge for a few hours, but was driven off just before dark. The enemy rushed strong reinforcements to this point, and heavy casualties were suffered by both sides in the stiff fighting that took place on D / 1 and D / 2 in the attempt to secure this crossing. The bridge was finally blown by the enemy before it could be captured, but the enemy force defending it was completely wiped out.

d. On the evening of D / 2 the enemy made a raid on the bridge at ZON with tanks and self-propelled guns. Some damage was caused, but the bridge was held intact. The next morning an enemy tank - infantry attack was made, but was held off. The 506th, riding British tanks, made an attempt to cut the attacking force off from the south, but the enemy held key points and eventually withdrew his forces in good order.

e. On the morning of D / 5 the enemy severed the main highway between VECHTEL and UDEM, and made a strong attempt to seize the town of VECHTEL and destroy the bridges. All available elements of the Division were rushed to the vicinity, and as they arrived throughout the day were formed into a task force under General McAULIFFE and disposed to meet the enemy threats. Confused fighting continued during the entire day and late into the night, with infantry and tanks attacking from several directions simultaneously. Enemy penetrations were made to within 500 yards of the bridges, but were eventually boated back. The attack was renewed the next morning, but the defense held firmly. The 2d Battalion 506th then attacked towards UDEM, and made contact with a patrol of the Guards Armored Division advancing on VECHTEL from UDEM. The enemy was forced to withdraw toward ERP, and the road reopened. By dawn the next morning the enemy had withdrawn from the VECHTEL area to the southeast.

f. On the morning of D / 7 the enemy attacked from the northwest, cut the main highway between VECHTEL and ST. OEDENRODE, and took up a defensive position astride the road. The 506, with tanks attached, attacked on the morning of D / 8 and by dark had driven the enemy from all but a portion of this position. The next morning the attack was continued, in conjunction with British Armor advancing in force from ST. OEDENRODE, and the road cleared.

g. From time of landing to D / 10, the enemy probed the Division sectors continuously, and many small skirmishes occurred each day. Defensive positions, the main highway, and the bridges over the Canals and rivers were subjected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire. The city of EINDHOVEN was heavily bombed on the evening of D / 2. (For detailed tactical operations, see Annex No. 4).

4. GENERAL COMMENTS:

a. Casualties: From D to D / 10 inclusive, the casualties of the 101st Airborne Division were as follows: Killed - 373; wounded - 1436; missing - 547; or a grand total of 2,356 non-effectives, of a total of 13,112 who entered the combat area. (For detailed report of casualties, see Annex No. 5).

b. Prisoners: A total of 3,511 prisoners were captured by the 101st Airborne Division from D to D + 10, inclusive.

c. Evacuation: The 326th Airborne Medical Company arrived in the combat area in two echelons. The first echelon, consisting of 52 medical personnel including an attached surgical team, arrived in 6 CG4A Gliders on the afternoon of D - Day. The second echelon consisting of 219 personnel in 54 CG4A Gliders, arrived on the afternoon of D + 1. Immediately upon the landing of the first echelon, a temporary hospital was set up on the southern edge of the glider landing field. First casualties were treated at 1500 and at 1700 the first major surgical operation was performed. At 1800 a hospital at ZON was taken over and personnel and equipment moved. The treatment of casualties was carried on under very good conditions. By 2400 D - Day, 107 casualties had been admitted and treated at this hospital. Upon the arrival of the second echelon, litter bearer and ambulance sections were sent to their respective regiments and evacuation from regimental and battalion aid stations was quite rapid. By the morning of D + 2, contact was established with the 501st at VECHHEL and an attached platoon of the 50th Field Hospital was sent to establish a station at VECHHEL. The 493rd Medical Collecting Company established contact with the Division Medical Company at 1500 on D + 2, and initial evacuation began to the 24th Evacuation Hospital at BOURG-LEOPOLD. Due to tactical requirements and the large amount of traffic moving north, little evacuation was accomplished until 0615 D + 3, at which time normal evacuation began. On D + 2, 20 ambulances and 424 tow trucks evacuated all available cases to the 24th Evacuation Hospital at BOURG-LEOPOLD. From D + 3 to D + 10, immediate evacuation of casualties took place.

d. Air Support: In general, requests for air support missions were handled satisfactorily by means of the Air Support Party which landed by Glider on D - Day. Bad weather, transmission difficulties, and higher priority missions resulted in many requests being rejected or unable to be flown. (See Annex No. 6 for detailed report).

e. Glider Reception: Anticipating considerable confusion in unit assembly when a large number of gliders landed on one field, a Division glider reception party consisting of 5 officers and 20 enlisted men from various units of the Division came in with the first glider echelon on D - Day. This party functioned extremely well and in great part was responsible for the rapid and orderly assembling of units. Despite careful briefing, it was found impracticable to expect gliders to land near predetermined points in the absence of guides. The most practicable solution appears to be to station guides at many points over the entire landing area and have these guides go to the nearest gliders when they land. This method worked very well and in all but a few cases, units assembled rapidly and without confusion.

f. Air Force Control Unit: It is believed desirable to have a senior officer from the Troop Carrier Command arrive with the first echelon of gliders in a situation of this kind. He should be provided with a radio set capable of direct communication with a control station at the departure airfields. In this way, he could transmit on-the-spot information as to weather conditions, the tactical situation, and the glider fields that are clear for the reception of that glider lift. It is believed that many planes were unnecessarily shot down by passing over enemy held strong points, and which could have been avoided had late information been given the pilots as to the tactical situation.

g. Use of Glider Pilots: The need for a regularly constituted tactical and administrative organization of glider pilots was quite apparent on this operation. Theoretically the pilots joined their tactical organization after landing and operated under the senior officer of that organization. Actually, it was impossible for any one officer to control the large number of glider pilots who arrived in the combat area. There were many instances of individual pilots leaving their assigned areas and disappearing. Glider pilots were used for local protection of various installations near the LZ, the Division CP, and the Division Service area, and in general, performed excellent work individually. Several voluntarily joined combat troops and participated in ground fighting in the vicinity. It is believed that an organization in which the chain of command is strongly forged is essential if glider pilots are to be used most efficiently in an airborne operation.

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h. Resupply: See Annex No. 7.

5. A final report will be submitted when the Division completes its participation in the Holland campaign.

G. D. Higgins
G. D. HIGGINS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Asst. Div. Comdr.

39

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ANNEX NO. 1

REPORT ON OPERATION MARKET IOI ST. A/B DIV.

PARACHUTE ECHELON

D-DAY- SEPT. 17, 1944

and

D+3 SEPT. 20, 1944

	HQ. IOI A/B DIV.	HQ. CO. IOI A/B DIV.	M.R. PLAT. CO. DIV.	327 GLIDER INF.	501 PRCHT. INF.	502 PRCHT. INF.	506 PRCHT. INF.	HQ. BTRY. DIV. ARTY.	321 GLI. F.A. BN.	(A) 377 PRCHT. F. BN.	907 GLI. F.A. BN.	811 A A AT BN.	326 A/B ENGR. BN.	325 A/B MED. CO.	426 A/B QM. CO.	801 A/B ORG. CO.	IOI SIGNAL CO.	IOI RECON. PLAT.	TOTALS	REMARKS
1	NO. OF PLANES ASSIGNED TO UNIT	7	0	0	129	135	132	3	0	12	0	0	16	0	0	0	2	0	436	
2	NO. OF PLANES TAKING OFF	7	0	0	129	135	132	3	0	12	0	0	16	0	0	0	2	0	436	(A) Bottom 500 only arrived on D+3.
3	NO. OF PLANES DROPPING ON CORRECT DZ	7	0	0	(B) 129	134	131	3	0	12	0	0	16	0	0	0	2	0	434	(b) Dropped on two DZ's, center of impact on DZ "A" was about 1500 yds due west of designated DZ, but drop was nicely concentrated and pattern excellent; center of impact on DZ "B" was about 1000 yds N of designated DZ, but again concentrated, and pattern excellent.
4	NO. OF PLANES KNOWN TO HAVE DROPPED LOADS	0	0	0	(C) 0	(D) 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(c) Plane shot down by flak near Rothy, Belgium (Enemy territory) all parachutists escaped safely from plane.
5	NO. OF PLANES UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6	NO. OF PLANES THAT DID NOT RETURN TO BASE-REPORTED BY AIR CORPS.	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(d) Plane shot down by flak near Esch, Belgium (Enemy territory) all parachutists escaped safely from plane.
7	NO. OF JUMPING PERSONNEL EMPLOYED	19	18	29	1958	2091	2183	8	18	42/140	18	0	252	2	0	0	31	0	6835	(e) A total of 42 jumped on D-Day and 140 on D+3. Six 75mm howitzers dropped with 81st Battery.
8	NO. OF PERSONNEL ACTUALLY JUMPED	19	18	29	1958	2091	2183	8	18	42/140	18	0	252	2	0	0	31	0	6809	(f) Four pathfinder planes took off to mark DZ's. Three dropped on designated DZ's without incident; one was shot down over enemy territory several miles short of DZ. Six personnel parachutes reported to have been observed in air; no further report on planes or occupants. Each plane carried 10 pathfinder personnel.
9	NO. OF PERSONNEL IN PLANES SHOT DOWN SHORT OF DZ (⊕ AND ⊙)	0	0	0	0	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	
10	NO. OF PERSONNEL IN PLANES ABOVE PLANES WHO EVENTUALLY REJOINED UNIT.	0	0	0	0	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	
11	NO. OF PERSONNEL INJURED BY FLAK IN PLANE AND RETURNED TO BASE.	0	0	0	0	1	I-K 3-1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	
12	NO. OF PERSONNEL INJURED AS RESULT OF JUMP	0	0	0	0	30	41	29	0	0	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	106	
13	NO. OF PERSONNEL RETURNED TO BASE SICK AND UNABLE TO JUMP	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	
14	NO. OF PERSONNEL WHO DID NOT JUMP DUE TO RESERVE CHUTE OPENING IN PLANE.	0	0	0	0	5	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	
15	NO. OF PERSONNEL REFUSING TO EMPLANE FOR FLIGHT	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
16	NO. OF PERSONNEL WHO RECEIVED GUN-SHOT WOUNDS PRIOR TO FLIGHT	0	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	
17	NO. OF PERSONNEL WHO RECEIVED GUN-SHOT WOUNDS (OTHER THAN FLAK) IN FLIGHT	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
18	NO. OF PERSONNEL KILLED BY PROPELLORS OF PLANE IN ACT OF FALLING.	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
19	NO. OF PERSONNEL KILLED BY REASON OF MALFUNCTION OF PARACHUTE.	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
20	NO. OF PERSONNEL WHO REFUSED TO JUMP AND RETURNED TO BASE	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	40

SECRET

REPORT ON OPERATION MARKET 101 ST. A/B DIV.
GLIDER ECHELON
D-DAY TO D+10
SEPT. 17 TO 27, 1944

SHEET 1 OF 2

	101 A/B DIV.	101 CO 101A/B DIV.	101 PLATOON 101	501 GLIDER INF.	501 PRCHT. INF.	502 PRCHT. INF.	506 PRCHT. INF.	NO ENTRY DIV. ARTY	501 GLIDER FA BN	507 PRCHT. FA BN	507 GLIDER FA BN	8 AA AT BN	316 A/B ENGR BN	386 A/B MED. CO.	426 A/B QM CO.	801 A/B ORD. CO.	101 A/B SIG. CO.	101 RCN PLATOON	TOTALS	REMARKS	
D - DAY																					
1	NO OF GLIDERS TAKING OFF FROM DEPARTURE AIRFIELD	0	8	0	0	8	8	6	3	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	14	15	70	ALL GLIDERS WERE CG-4 A ALL TUGS WERE G-47. TRANSPORT ALL SINGLE TOW 95% HAPNOG - PILOT ALL GLIDERS WERE TO LAND ON ONE LZ - 2 MILES NW OF ZON, HOLLAND	
2	NO OF GLIDERS LANDING ON LZ WITHOUT ACCIDENT	0	7	0	0	7	7	6	3	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	9	8	53	(A) (1) TUG PLANE SHOT DOWN, GLIDER LANDED OK 3 PERSONNEL & JEEP JOINED UNIT ON D+1	
3	NO OF GLIDERS CRASH LANDING ON LZ	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(2) SAME AS (1) 3 PERSONNEL & JEEP JOINED UNIT ON D+2	
4	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN ENGLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(B) TOW ROPE BROKE AND GLIDER MADE FORCED LANDING IN ENGLAND, TOOK OFF AGAIN D+2 BUT FORCED BACK BY FOG. TOOK OFF AGAIN ON D+6 AND ARRIVED SAFELY	
5	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN CHANNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(C) GLIDERS WING COLLAPSED AFTER BEING HIT BY FLAK & GLIDER PLUNGED TO GROUND ALL OCCUPANTS BELIEVED KILLED, 3 PERSONNEL & ONE JEEP.	
6	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED ON ENEMY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	(D) TWO BULLDOZERS BROUGHT IN	
7	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(E) 5 PERSONNEL RESCUED AND RETURNED TO ENGLAND OK. EQUIPMENT (TRAILER WITH RADIO) LOST.	
8	NO OF GLIDERS UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(F) TUG SHOT DOWN, GLIDER LANDED OK. 3 PERSONNEL & TRAILER REPORTED INTO DIV. C.P. WITH ALL EQUIPMENT.	
9	NO OF PERSONNEL TAKING OFF BY GLIDER AND LANDING SAFELY ON LZ	0	40	0	0	23	18	17	25	1	2	1	0	52	0	0	39	34	252	(2) AIRCORPS REPORTS GLIDER CRASHED AND ALL OCCUPANTS BELIEVED KILLED, 5 PERSONNEL & TRAILER.	
10	NO OF PERSONNEL INJURED	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	(H) (1) GLIDER CUT LOOSE, CAUSE UNKNOWN, AND LANDED SAFELY, 6 PERSONNEL REPORTED INTO DIV. C.P. D+7 TRAILER & EQUIPMENT TURNED OVER TO CANADIAN ARMY.	
11	NO OF PERSONNEL UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	6	14	(2) GLIDER CUT LOOSE, 3 MEN KNOWN RETURNED TO UK. NO INFORMATION OF OTHER THREE & TRAILER.	
12	NO OF TRAILERS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY	0	1/1	0	0	3/3	2/2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2/2	0	0	3/3	2/2	18/13	(I) FOUR PERSONNEL AND TRAILERS LANDED SAFELY AND RETURNED TO REAR BASE, CAUSE OF FORCED LANDING	
13	NO OF GUNS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(J) 3 MOTORCYCLES BROUGHT IN D-DAY, 6 MOTORCYCLES BROUGHT IN D+1	
14	NO OF JEeps DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	11	(K) TWO SUSPECTED MEN RECOVERED AND RETURNED TO UK. JEEP NOT RECOVERED.	
15	NO OF TRAILERS DAMAGED OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	(L) CUT LOOSE OVER READING, CAUSE UNKNOWN, LANDED SAFELY, 6 PERSONNEL AND TRAILER RETURNED TO BASE IN UK.	
16	NO OF GUNS DAMAGED OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(M) CUT LOOSE OVER SCHOJWEN ISLAND, CAUSE UNKNOWN, PERSONNEL AND JEEP ALL BELIEVED KILLED OR CAPTURED.	
D+1																					
1	NO OF GLIDERS TAKING OFF FROM DEPARTURE AIRFIELD	0	19	0	161	22	22	22	2	0	40	0	0	65	54	25	0	18	0	450	(N) CUT LOOSE NEAR HATFIELD, BECAUSE OF TAIL FLUTTER, 4 PERSONNEL AND JEEP ALL RETURNED TO BASE.
2	NO OF GLIDERS LANDING ON LZ WITHOUT ACCIDENT	0	18	0	147	21	22	22	2	0	38	0	0	62	54	25	0	17	0	428	(O) 3 MOTORCYCLES AND 2 SCOOTERS BROUGHT IN.
3	NO OF GLIDERS CRASH LANDING ON LZ	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	(P) (1) 3 PERSONNEL AND JEEP LANDED OK, RETURNED TO DEPARTURE BASE AND REMAINED THERE.
4	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN ENGLAND	0	(M)	0	(R)	6	0	0	0	0	(L)	1	0	(B)	1	0	0	0	10	(2) SAME	
5	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN CHANNEL	0	0	0	(S)	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	(Q) (1) 3 PERSONNEL AND JEEP WORKED WAY THROUGH ENEMY TERRITORY AND REPORTED INTO UNIT D+1.	
6	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN ENEMY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	(T)	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(G)	1	0	0	0	5	(2) SAME (3) SAME	
7	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(R) (1) GLIDER DAMAGED ON TAKEOFF, LANDED OK. (2) ALLERON CAME OFF ON TAKEOFF, CRASHED 3 KILLED, 8 INJURED.
8	NO OF GLIDERS UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(3) LANDED OK, REASON UNKNOWN, 14 EM RETURNED TO BASE.	
9	NO OF PERSONNEL TAKING OFF BY GLIDER AND LANDING SAFELY ON LZ	0	96	0	1525	45	47	53	4	0	167	0	0	302	219	50	15	56	0	2579	(4) CUT LOOSE, REASON UNKNOWN, LANDED OK 13 PER. (5) TAIL FLUTTER - LANDED OK, 14 PERSONNEL RETURNED. (6) CRASHED WHEN STRUT GAVED IN, 12 PERSONNEL STATUS UNKNOWN.
10	NO OF PERSONNEL INJURED	0	0	0	3-K 18-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(5) (1) 12 PERSONNEL PICKED UP AND RETURNED TO BASE OK. (2) 4 PERSONNEL, 1 JEEP, PERSONNEL PICKED UP AND RETURNED OK.
11	NO OF PERSONNEL UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	(M)	4	0	(C)	3	0	0	0	0	51	(7) NOREPORT
12	NO OF JEeps TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY	0	11/10	0	16/15	12/11	14/14	12/12	1/1	0	25/24	0	0	22/21	31/31	3/3	0	4/4	0	157/146	(U) NOREPORT - BELIEVE GLIDER AND TUG PLANE BOTH SHOT DOWN.
13	NO OF TRAILERS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY	0	7/7	0	12/12	10/10	8/8	10/10	0	0	15/14	0	0	21/21	23/23	0	0	5/4	0	111/109	
14	NO OF GUNS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY	0	(O)	0	4/4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(D)	0	(E)	0	(J)	0	44	
15	NO OF JEeps DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	(G)	1	0	0	0	0	5	
16	NO OF TRAILERS DAMAGED OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	
17	NO OF GUNS DAMAGED OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

ANNEX 2A.

REPRODUCED BY 3060 ENGR TOPG CO (CORPS)

SECRET

SECRET

GLIDER ECHELON

SHEET 2 OF 2

	HQ 101 A/B DIV.	HQ CO 101 A/B DIV.	MP PLATOON 101 A/B	327 GLIDER INF.	501 PRCHT. INF.	502 PRCHT. INF.	506 PRCHT. INF.	HQ BTRY DIV. ARTY	321 GLIDER FA BN	377 PRCHT. FA BN	907 GLIDER FA BN	B1 AA AT BN	326 A/B ENGR BN	326 A/B MED. CO.	426 A/B QM CO.	801 A/B ORD CO.	101 A/B SIG. CO.	101 RCN PLATOON	TOTALS	REMARKS
D+2																				
1	NO OF GLIDERS TAKING OFF FROM DEPARTURE AIRFIELD	0	0	0	98	0	0	0	22	71	22	89	81	1	0	0	0	0	385	(A) All landed safely and returned to proper departure bases.
2	NO OF GLIDERS LANDING ON LZ WITHOUT INCIDENT	0	0	0	61	0	0	0	20	55	20	6	47	0	0	0	0	0	209	(B) (1) 13 landed safely and reported to unit on D + 10. (2) Glider crashed - 4 personnel killed and jeep destroyed. (3) Glider crashed - 1 killed, 2 injured, 1 returned, jeep smashed. (4) Glider smashed - 2 injured, jeep damaged, but repaired, 2 personnel returned.
3	NO OF GLIDERS CRASH LANDED ON LZ	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
4	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN ENGLAND	0	0	0	(V)	0	0	0	(U)	(L)	2	0	57	9	1	0	0	0	82	(C) All rescued and returned to base.
5	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN CHANNEL	0	0	0	(W)	4	0	0	(P)	(M)	1	0	(F)	(C)	7	0	0	0	17	(D) Landed O.K. - All personnel and equipment reported in D + 9.
6	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED ON ENEMY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	(U)	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	(G)	6	0	0	0	0	16	(E) 2 crashed over home airdrome, 6 personnel killed, 1 howitzer and 1 jeep destroyed.
7	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	(X)	1	0	0	0	0	0	(N)	9	0	5	(B)	16	0	31	(F) All picked - O.K.
8	NO OF GLIDERS UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	4	0	11	2	0	0	0	0	0	26	(G) All landed safely, personnel of 4 have returned - 2 other loads reported safe in Belgium. 12 personnel returned by D + 10.
9	NO OF PERSONNEL TAKING OFF BY GLIDER AND LANDING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	554	0	0	0	77	337	190	24	159	0	0	0	0	0	1541	(H) All landed safely and reported in to unit by D + 10 - 15 personnel.
10	NO OF PERSONNEL INJURED	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	6-K	5-K	0	0	0	0	0	28	(I) 1 jeep damaged, 12 personnel returned by D + 10.
11	NO OF PERSONNEL UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	69	0	0	0	23	0	59	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	157	(J) (1) 2 jeeps arrived by D + 10. (2) 1 trailer arrived by D + 10.
12	NO OF JEEPS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	14/11	0	0	0	12/10	36/31	1/1	34/4	39/22	0	0	0	0	0	166/79	(K) Resupply.
13	NO OF TRAILERS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	9/8	0	0	0	12/12	21/18	0	21/1	12/10	0	0	0	0	0	81/49	(L) Landed O.K.
14	NO OF GUNS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	2/6	0	0	0	12/9	12/11	12/0	24/14	0	0	0	0	0	0	68/40	(M) Rescued O.K.
15	NO OF JEEPS DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	5	0	30	(Q)	11	0	0	0	0	51	(N) All personnel and equipment reported in by D + 10.
16	NO OF TRAILERS DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	20	(R)	4	0	0	0	0	0	28	(O) Landed O.K. and returned to departure bases.
17	NO OF GUNS DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	1	12	(S)	6	0	0	0	0	0	24	(P) Rescued O.K.
(NONE ON D+3, 4 & 5)																				
D+6																				
1	NO OF GLIDERS TAKING OFF FROM DEPARTURE AIRFIELD	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	59	11	1	0	0	1	3	0	84	(Q) 6 jeeps landed in Belgium, joined unit by D + 10.
2	NO OF GLIDERS LANDING ON LZ WITHOUT INCIDENT	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	54	9	1	0	0	1	3	0	77	(R) 2 trailers landed in Belgium, joined unit by D + 10.
3	NO OF GLIDERS CRASH LANDED ON LZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	(S) 4 guns landed in Belgium, joined unit by D + 10.
4	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN ENGLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(T)	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	(T) Reported in to unit by D + 10.
5	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN CHANNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(U) All personnel and equipment joined unit safely by D + 10.
6	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN ENEMY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(V) All landed safely.
7	NO OF GLIDERS KNOWN TO HAVE LANDED IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY ON CONTINENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(D)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	(W) All rescued.
8	NO OF GLIDERS UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(X) Personnel and equipment joined unit by D + 10.
9	NO OF PERSONNEL TAKING OFF BY GLIDER AND LANDING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	76	0	0	0	3	0	215	41	3	0	0	0	0	0	338	
10	NO OF PERSONNEL INJURED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3-K	9-I	0	0	0	0	0	12	
11	NO OF PERSONNEL UNACCOUNTED FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	
12	NO OF JEEPS TAKING OFF AND ARRIVING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1/1	0	16/15	5/4	1/1	0	0	0	0	0	23/22	
13	NO OF TRAILERS TAKING OFF & ARRIVING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10/9	3/3	0/0	0	0	0	0	0	13/12	
14	NO OF GUNS TAKING OFF & ARRIVING SAFELY ON LZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12/12	3/2	6/9	0	0	0	0	0	15/14	(K) (K)
15	NO OF JEEPS DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(T)	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	
16	NO OF TRAILERS DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
17	NO OF GUNS DAMAGED ON LANDING OR LOST ENROUTE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(T)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	

SUMMARY OF GLIDER ECHELON

NO OF GLIDERS TAKING OFF FROM DEPARTURE BASES IN UK (INCLUDES 83 TAKING OFF SECOND TIME)	988	NO OF GLIDERS DOWN IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY	34	NO OF PERSONNEL CARRIED SAFELY TO LZ	4505
NO OF GLIDERS ARRIVING SAFELY ON DESIGNATED LZ	767	NO OF GLIDERS CRASHED ON LZ	11	NO OF PERSONNEL LANDED OTHER THAN AT LZ & WHO EVENTUALLY JOINED UNIT	239
NO OF GLIDERS DOWN IN UK	97	NO OF GLIDERS CRASHED IN UK	6	NO OF PERSONNEL KNOWN KILLED IN CRASHES	29
NO OF GLIDERS DOWN IN CHANNEL	21	NO OF GLIDERS CRASHED ON CONTINENT	14	NO OF PERSONNEL KNOWN INJURED IN CRASHES	41
NO OF GLIDERS DOWN IN ENEMY TERRITORY	28	NO OF GLIDERS UNACCOUNTED FOR	30	NO OF PERSONNEL UNACCOUNTED FOR	225

ANNEX 2-B

REPRODUCED BY 3060 ENGR TOPG CO (GMP3)

SECRET

42

SECRET

SEABORNE ECHELON

D+1 TO D+7

SEPT. 18 TO 24, 1944

	HQ. 15 A/B DIV.	HQ. 101 A/B DIV.	M. P. PLAT. CO.	327 S.L. INF.	501 PARA. INF.	502 PARA. INF.	506 PARA. INF.	HQ. BTRY. DIV. ARTY.	321 CL. FA. BN.	377 PARA. FA. BN.	907 CL. FA. BN.	81 AA AT BN.	386 ENGR. BN.	326 MED. CO.	426 A/B OM. CO.	801 A/B ORG. CO.	101 A/SIG. CO.	101 A/RECON. PLAT.	TOTAL	REMARKS
NO. OF PERSONNEL	17	38	3	118	94	(B) 90	(A) 90	27	(C) 48	106	50	267	39	24	10	30	16	0	1077	(A) 1 EM wounded 2 EM missing Destroyed: 1 - 2 1/2-ton truck 1 - 1-ton trailer 1 - 3/4-ton truck
2 1/2 TON TRUCKS	0	6	0	24	26	25	26	4	8	11	8	16	11	3	2	1	5	0	176	(B) 1-ton trailer wrecked enroute.
1 1/2 TON TRUCKS	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	9	(C) 1 - 2 1/2-ton truck had break down enroute later picked up by 801st AB Ordnance Company.
3/4 TON TRUCKS	0	4	1	8	3	3	2	2	1	0	12	1	4	1	0	0	2	0	44	NOTE: See echelon boxed on D + 1, sailed from Southampton on D + 2, arrived Omaha Beach on D + 3; first half left on morning of D + 3 and arrived Bourg Leopold evening of D + 4, arrived Division Service Area at Z on evening of D + 5; second half left on evening of D + 3, arrived Bourg Leopold evening of D + 5, arrived Division Service Area evening of D + 6.
1/4 TON TRUCKS	7	2	2	5	0	0	2	2	2	15	2	18	0	0	0	14	0	0	71	
1 TON TRAILERS	0	4	1	14	0	15	16	5	8	11	8	0	8	0	0	0	2	0	88	
1/4 TON TRAILERS	5	1	1	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	14	0	0	45	
BULLDOZERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	
MOTORCYCLES	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
AMBULANCES	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	7	

ANNEX - 3

REPRODUCED BY 3060 ENGR TOPO. CO. (CORPS)

GRAND TOTALS

PERSONNEL - 1077

VEHICLES - 444

43

SECRET

TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF THE DIVISIOND - DAY

The parachute echelon of the Division began its drop at 1300 on D-Day, September 17, 1944. The 501st Parachute Infantry, with two platoons 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion attached, dropped on two DZ's; one 2 miles west of VECHHEL and the other some 3 miles northwest of VECHHEL. The Regiment, less the 1st Battalion, landed on DZ "A" west of VECHHEL, proceeded to that town and by 1500 had seized all initial objectives which were the two Highway Bridges and the two Railroad Bridges over the WILLEMS VAART CANAL and the KASTEEL. No resistance was encountered on this DZ. The 1st Battalion landed on DZ "A-1", in the vicinity of KASTEEL, assembled and reached VECHHEL by 1700. The 1st Battalion received some resistance from scattered enemy troops in the vicinity of the DZ. Some resistance from scattered enemy groups was encountered in the taking of VECHHEL, but no organized defense of the town was made by the enemy. At dark the regiment was well dug-in and set to defend the town against any enemy attack. All bridges were seized in tact. The Engineer Detachment immediately began the construction of a second bridge across the WILLEMS VAART CANAL in order to permit two-way traffic if the situation so required.

The 502d Parachute Infantry with three platoons 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion attached, landed on DZ "B" without enemy opposition and all battalions were assembled by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded to ST. OEDENHOEDE and after in tact. This Battalion then proceeded to dig in and at dark had the situation well in hand. Company "H" of the 3rd Battalion proceeded to the Highway Bridge at BEST, secured it initially against little enemy resistance, but was forced to withdraw just before dark by reason of a strong enemy force. The remainder of the 3d Battalion was then dispatched to join "H" Company, with orders to secure the bridge the next morning. The remainder of the Regiment went into Division Reserve in the vicinity of WOLFSEVINKL.

The 506th Parachute Infantry landed on DZ "C" without enemy opposition. Companies of the 1st Battalion departed immediately without formal assembly in an effort to secure the three bridges over the WILLEMINA CANAL in the vicinity of ZON before they could be blown by the enemy. Scattered enemy resistance was encountered before reaching the main bridge and forward elements were within 100 yards of this bridge when it was blown by the retreating enemy. (It was found that the other two bridges had been blown several days before). The Regiment began the crossing of the Canal by various expedients, and by 2400 the entire regiment was on the south side of the Canal and had a bridgehead extending some 2,000 yards.

The Command Echelon of Division Headquarters jumped with the 502d Parachute Regiment and established an initial Command Post at ZON. Some 70 gliders carrying additional Command personnel, the Reconnaissance Platoon, Signal and Medical personnel, and some transportation for the combat units, landed on the LZ about one hour after the parachute landings. Overall time of landing of all parachutists and gliders was one and one-half hours. Communication was established with all elements except the 501 by dark on this date.

D-1

The 501st Parachute Infantry continued the defense of VECHHEL throughout the day. Communication was established with Division at 0600. Several light enemy attacks were repulsed, but no major effort to retrieve the town was made. The 1st Battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry continued to hold ST. OEDENHOEDE and likewise repelled several light enemy attacks. The 3rd Battalion of the 502d attacked at first light in an effort to retrieve the Highway Bridge at BEST, but suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the enemy force which had been strongly reinforced during the night. The 2d Battalion was then ordered to assist the 3rd Battalion in securing the bridges. The Battalion penetrated to the outskirts of BEST, but was forced to withdraw by heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, and took up a defensive position on the left of the 3rd Battalion. At dark the entire regiment less the 1st Battalion was in a defensive position east of the highway facing the enemy defenses around the Highway Bridge at BEST.

44

SECRET

The 506th Parachute Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion leading, advanced on EINDHOVEN at first light. The 3rd Battalion was held up at WOBENSEL, one mile north of the city, by determined enemy resistance. The 2d Battalion made a wide envelopment to the east of the city, outflanked the enemy defenses, and seized the town at 1300. Contact was made with a British Reconnaissance Patrol at 1215 north of the city, and with the main British Forces at 1900 just south of the city. At dark the Regiment was in control of the entire city and was in position defending the important bridges in the city which were the main objectives.

At about 1530, some 428 gliders, carrying the 3rd Battalion of the 327th, the Engineer Battalion, the remainder of the Medical and Signal Companies, elements of the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and additional supply and administrative vehicles, arrived in the combat area. The 3rd Battalion of the 327th was assigned the mission of providing local protection for the LZ and the DIVISION service area.

British Forces reached the south side of the Canal at ZON at approximately 2100 and immediately began the construction of a bridge across the Canal.

D 72

The bridge across the Canal was completed during the night and at 0615 the 3rd Battalion of the 327th crossed the Canal and Division service area crossing. These same leading elements passed through ST. OEDENRODE and VECHTEL by 0645. One Squadron of the 15/19 Hussars was attached to the 506th at EINDHOVEN, and the remainder of the 502d Parachute Infantry.

"C" Company of the 501st was ordered to send one platoon to DINTER. Reports from this company indicated the enemy was in some force in and around this town. The 3d Battalion of the 501st was ordered to move from VECHTEL to EERDE and take up a strong defensive position at that point. The remainder of the 501st continued in a close in defense of VECHTEL and during the day the 2d Battalion repulsed an enemy attack from the northwest estimated at over 250 Infantrymen. During the late evening, Company "B" was driven back from its outpost position about 200 yards by a well executed night attack by enemy parachutists.

First Battalion of the 502d continued in the defense of ST. OEDENRODE. The 2d Battalion attacked at 0600 in another attempt to seize the highway bridge at BEST. This attack was repulsed by the enemy. At 1415 the Regiment, less the 1st Battalion, reinforced by one squadron of the 15/19 Hussars, launched a co-ordinated attack against the enemy position. This attack was very successful and the objective seized at 1800. Fifteen 88mm guns were destroyed, 1,056 prisoners taken, and over 300 enemy dead left on the field after this battle.

The 506th Parachute Infantry established strong points east and west of EINDHOVEN and continued extensive patrols with the squadron of the 15/19 Hussars attached.

A third glider lift began to arrive at about 1400 carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 327th, the 81st Anti-Tank Battalion, the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery "B"), and the 907th and 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalions. Due to fog encountered enroute, only a portion of these units arrived. Elements of the 327th were given the mission of protecting the glider landing field and assisting the attack of the 502d if necessary. At about 1700 enemy tanks were reported approaching ZON from the southeast and a few minutes later several tanks approached within a few hundred yards of the ZON bridge and shelled the bridge, the Division CP, and the town. Little damage was done and the tanks withdrew when AT guns arrived from the glider landing field. Two tanks were knocked out by AT fire.

D 73

Division Command Post moved to ST. OEDENRODE at 1200.

During the morning, the 1st Battalion of the 501st attacked and seized DINTER. Four hundred and twenty prisoners were taken in this action. The 2d

SECRET

SECRET

Battalion continued a close-in defense of VECHTEL. The 3rd Battalion conducted extensive patrolling to the north and west from a strong point at EERDE.

The 1st Battalion of the 502d continued the defense of ST. OEDENRODE. During the afternoon the 2d and 3rd Battalions were ordered to proceed to ST. OEDENRODE and the Regiment charged with the defense of the ST. OEDENRODE area. By 2100 the entire Regiment was closed in the area and had taken up strong positions.

During the night the 1st Battalion of the 506th was ordered to proceed to ZON in order to assist in the defense of the ZON bridge against the expected enemy attack. The Battalion went into position at 0600 and in conjunction with elements of the 1st Battalion of the 327th and one company of the 326th Engineers, repelled the attack on the bridge launched by the 107th Panzer Brigade at about 0630. The 2d Battalion of the 506th, riding tanks of the squadron of the 15/19 Hussars, attacked the enemy rear and a sharp engagement took place at MUNEN. The 3rd Battalion of the 506th remained in EINDHOVEN as Regimental Reserve. At 0900 the 4th Armored Regiment was attached to the Division and proceeded toward HELDOND in a further attempt to destroy the enemy attacking the ZON bridge. Intermittent tank and infantry fighting took place the remainder of the day.

The 2d and 3rd Battalions of the 327th relieved the 502d of the defense of the ZON bridge and Division service area. The 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the 327th and fired missions in support of that unit during the day. At 1500 Battery "B" of the 377th OEDENRODE in support of the 502d Parachute Infantry. Battery "A" of the 81st Anti-Tank Battalion was attached to the 327th and Battery "C" to the 502d. Battery "B" remained in defense of the ZON bridge.

The 1st Battalion of the 501st crossed the WILLEMS VAART CANAL in the early morning at NEESWIJK and conducted extensive patrolling during the day. At 1845 an attack was made on SCHIJNDEL and the northwest section of the town was seized at approximately 2215. The 2d Battalion remained at VECHTEL. The 3rd Battalion moved at 1745 to the west and cut the ST. OEDENRODE - SCHIJNDEL Road in the vicinity of the railroad station.

The 502d Parachute Infantry, with the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion attached, continued to expand its defensive positions in the ST. OEDENRODE area. "B" Company of the 1st Battalion received a strong enemy attack from the northwest in the early afternoon, but held its position.

The 1st Battalion of the 506th continued its defense of the ZON bridge. The 2d Battalion working with the 15/19 Hussars and the 44th Tank Regiment, attacked the enemy near NEDEWETTEN. The enemy withdrew in the face of this attack and the 1st Battalion contact was lost. The 2d Battalion went into a defensive position in the vicinity of TONGELRE for the night. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to ST. OEDENRODE as Division Reserve. The Regiment was given a warning order that it would probably move to UDEN on the following day.

D 75

At 0300 the 3rd Battalion of the 506th Parachute Infantry closed in the ST. OEDENRODE area, moving up from EINDHOVEN. At 0500 orders were received that this battalion, as well as all other elements of the regiment, would move to UDEN without delay. Movement was to be by motor and marching. The 3rd Battalion began its move to UDEN, by marching, at 0900. The 1st and 2d Battalions initiated their movements, piecemeal, as transportation became available during the day.

The advance detachment of the 506th, consisting of approximately 150 officers and men from Regimental Headquarters and other units of the regiment, passed through VECHTEL at 1000. Immediately after passing through the enemy cut the main highway between VECHTEL and UDEN, and this detachment became isolated in UDEN.

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The 107th Panzer Brigade, after withdrawing from its attack on the ZON bridge on D + 4, moved under cover of darkness to ERP, and in the late morning of D + 5 launched an all-out attack to seize the town of VECHSEL and destroy the bridges there. Enemy forces in this attack were estimated as three battalions of SS troops, supported by 30 to 40 tanks and artillery.

By 1200, the 2d Battalion 501st astride the VECHSEL - ERP Road, was being ~~replaced by the 1st Battalion 501st~~ ~~and the 1st Battalion 501st~~ ~~and General McAuliffe~~ was placed in command of troops in the area and charged with defense of the town and bridges. At about 1400 enemy tanks cut the highway northeast of VECHSEL and destroyed transport parked on the highway: Battery "B", 81st AT Battalion, arrived at the same time, went into action on the highway and immediately destroyed a Mark V tank leading the attack. The 2d Battalion 506 took position on the left of the 2d Battalion 501, with the 1st Battalion 401st Glider Infantry on its left. With the assistance of British artillery gathered from the highway, the attack from ERP was repulsed by dark. At about 1400 enemy infantry, with tank support, attacked astride the Canal from the northwest toward the highway bridge southwest of VECHSEL. Company "B", 506, which was in VECHSEL on its way to UDEN, was turned around, deployed near the bridge and repulsed the attack, with the assistance of elements of the 44th Tank Regiment.

During the afternoon the enemy launched an attack against the town from the north, and was finally held just short of the railroad bridge. At about 1600 of the 2d Battalion 501, and one platoon of "B" Company, 506, which had taken up a defensive position there a short time before.

The enemy renewed their attacks from the south and southeast during the late afternoon, but by now additional forces had arrived and enemy attack was stopped. By dark the 506 (less 1st Battalion and the detachment cut off at UDEN), the 327th Glider Infantry, the Division Reconnaissance Platoon, the 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion, Battery "B", 81st AT Battalion, the 2d Battalion 501st Parachute Infantry, and the First Squadron, 44th Royal Tank Regiment had arrived and formed the task force under General McAULIFFE charged with holding the VECHSEL area.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion of the 501 attacked at dawn and had occupied all of SCHLUNDEL by 0915. Some 400 prisoners were taken in this operation. About 1200 orders were received for the 1st Battalion to proceed to WEIBUSCH, seize the town, and provide northern flank protection for VECHSEL. The movement was completed by 1700, and the battalion took up a strong defensive position in and around the town. The 3rd Battalion, which had advanced toward SCHLUNDEL in the morning and joined forces with the 1st Battalion in seizing SCHLUNDEL, was ordered to ESSEN, where it took up a defensive position guarding VECHSEL from the west.

The 502d Parachute Infantry extended its defensive positions during the day. Elements of the 1st Battalion made contact with the 3rd Battalion 501 south of SCHLUNDEL, and joined forces in clearing out several enemy strong points along the SCHLUNDEL - ST. OEDENRODE highway.

The 327th Glider Infantry was ordered at 0930 to proceed to VECHSEL, and movement began at 1030, the 3rd Battalion by truck and the 1st and 2d Battalions by marching. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were committed on both sides of the bridge immediately upon arrival; the 2d Battalion continued into VECHSEL and became task force reserve. The town of VECHSEL was heavily shelled during the late afternoon and early evening.

D + 6

Soon after dawn the enemy launched small scale attacks against the defensive positions southeast of VECHSEL. These were held off without difficulty. During the night plans were drawn up which called for a British Armored Brigade, recalled from the NIJMEGEN area, to advance on VECHSEL from UDEN, join forces with the 2d Battalion of the 506, which was to advance from VECHSEL toward UDEN, and clear the road in order that the flow of traffic might be resumed. Following that, the Armored Brigade was to swing sharply south and cut off the enemy escape route through ERP.

SECRET

Due to communication difficulties, that part of the plan calling for the advance in force and encircling movement of the British Armored Brigade was not carried out. The 2d Battalion of the 506 made contact with a patrol of the Armored Brigade northeast of VECHSEL about 1700. By that time the enemy had begun his withdrawal, and soon thereafter contact was lost.

During the morning the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 501st readjusted their defensive positions west and north of EERDE, and at dark were deployed with the 3rd Battalion generally along the railroad from the Canal to MARRY, and the 1st Battalion from EERDE due south to the main highway. The 2d Battalion continued the close in defense of VECHSEL, with the 506 given offensive missions to the northeast and south. The 327th was assigned a defensive sector north of VECHSEL.

The 502d Parachute Infantry continued its defense of ST. OEDENRODE, with the 377th Parachute Field Artillery battalion in direct support.

During the day a 4th Glider serial arrived bringing remaining elements of the 327th Glider Infantry and the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion. These troops were moved immediately to the VECHSEL area, and the 907th Field Artillery Battalion was placed in direct support of the 501st Parachute Infantry. The 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the 506th Parachute Infantry,

D 4 7

At dawn reconnaissance as far as EOP indicated the enemy had made good his withdrawal to the southeast, and the area was clear of enemy troops. The 506th Parachute Infantry, with the 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion and Battery "B", 81st AB AT Battalion attached, was ordered to UDEM to take over the defense of that area.

The Division Command Post was moved from ST. OEDENRODE to VECHSEL at 1000.

The 327th Glider Infantry was assigned the task of defending VECHSEL, with the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion in general support. The 2d Battalion 501 was released from its defensive assignment in VECHSEL and joined its regiment in the EERDE area, as Regimental Reserve. Battery "A", 81st AT Battalion, continued attached to the 501st, with the 907th Glider Field Artillery in direct support.

The 502d continued the defense of the ST. OEDENRODE area. Batteries "D", "E", and "F", the Anti-aircraft Batteries of the 81st AT Battalion, arrived in the scabornie echelon and were assigned to protect the Division Service Area northwest of ZON.

At 1000 the enemy launched a series of probing attacks against the 501st defensive position, moving from SCHIJNDEL toward KOEVENING. Two companies of the 502d were dispatched to KOEVENING to intercept this force, reported to be two tanks and about forty infantrymen. The enemy force moved rapidly, however, and were almost in KOEVENING when companies "D" and "H" of the 502d arrived. The two companies held KOEVENING, but could not prevent the enemy from cutting the highway northwest of KOEVENING just before dark. Under cover of darkness the enemy built up his forces with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and fairly large infantry units using the corridor he had found between the 501st and the 502d.

D 4 8

During the night the 506th with Batteries "B" 81st AT Battalion, and the 321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion attached, was ordered to return to VECHSEL from the UDEM area. Movement began at 0300, and at daylight these units were just east of VECHSEL. At 0915 the 506, with one squadron 44th Royal Tank Regiment attached, attacked the enemy at KOEVENING. The attack progressed favorably for some 2,000 yards, when both attacking battalions (formation, 1st and 3rd Battalion abreast, astride the main road) were pinned down by well-directed artillery and small arms fire, and fire from tanks dug in along the road. The 2d Battalion was then ordered to execute a wide envelopment of the enemy's southern flank, and began its movement at 1400. In the meantime elements of the 50th British Division, with

SECRET

strong armored forces, began an advance from the south. The 501st and Companies "D" and "H" of the 502d assisted by providing bases of fire for the attacking forces. By darkness the enemy had been cleared from all but a very small area south of the road.

The 502d continued its defense of the ST. OEDENRODE area, the 327th its defense of the VECHER area, and the 501st its defense of the EERDE area. All three regiments had several small scale enemy attacks launched against their positions during the day.

D 9



The 506th resumed the attack soon after daylight, and by 0900 had driven the enemy north of the highway and made contact with the 501st on the right. The British forces continued the attack to the north, pinching out the 506th and Companies "D" and "H" of the 502d. At 1300 the 506, with attachments was ordered to return to the UDEM area. The movement was completed by 1700.


The 502d continued its defense of the ST. OEDENRODE area, Companies "D" and "H" returning to Regimental control at 1500.

The 501st and the 327th continued their defensive missions, both regiments repelling small scale enemy attacks during the day.


D 10

No change in unit dispositions. Several enemy infiltration attempts on front of 501st and 327th repelled.









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51





S E C R E T

**CASUALTIES OF 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD D TO D. PLUS 10**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
Division Headquarters	1	2	2
Hq Co & Hq Platoon	8	4	1
501st Parachute Infantry	108	338	65
502d Parachute Infantry	103	450	75
506th Parachute Infantry	74	304	43
327th Glider Infantry	39	137	159
401st Glider Infantry	12	64	26
321st Glider Field Artillery Bn.	2	17	23
307th Glider Field Artillery Bn.	10	17	25
377th Parachute Field Artillery Bn.	1	29	4
81st AB Antiaircraft Battalion	7	21	13
326th AB Engineer Battalion	13	41	12
101st Airborne Signal Company	0	1	8
426th Airborne Quartermaster Co.	0	1	0
801st AB Ord Maint Co.	1	0	2
326th AB Medical Company	0	2	2
Hq & Hq Btry, Div. Arty	1	7	5
101st AB Reconnaissance Platoon	1	1	12
TOTAL	373	1436	547

GRAND TOTAL - 2356

S E C R E T

Air Support Requests 101 A/B Division
Thru 26 Sept 1944

No.	Time of Request	Area and Nature of Target	Results
1.	20 Sept 0555	Armed Recon area Nunen, Neder- waten and Helmond. Tanks reported and attack expected on Zon.	Not reported
2.	20 Sept 1700	Tac Recon road C/E from Bokstal to Best and road E from Oirschut to Best. Tanks reported moving toward Best.	Not reported
3.	20 Sept 2305	Bomb area 4M222 S/W to 481217 E to 496215 N/W to 484222. (Nunen to Beekstraat): 200 tanks and vehicles.	Not reported
4.	22 Sept 1100	Bomb road from Boekel west to Erp. 400 tanks and vehicles.	1310 Target Completed Estimated time of arrival to follow. No later message.
5.	22 Sept 1315	Tac Recon area 5240 to 5840 to 5234 to 5834. (Erp, Boekel and S/W of Volkul). Concentration of tanks and vehicles.	Delayed on account of weather. No results reported.
6.	22 Sept 1522	Armed Recon road Uden to Vechel. 30 tanks and infantry on road.	Not reported.
7.	23 Sept 0810	Armed Recon area Heuvel, Erp, Boekel and Kraemecr. Concen- tration tanks and vehicles.	Position of our troops requested. We informed 1000 yd safety limit. Mission cancelled by G3 at 1655.
8.	24 Sept 0905	Armed Recon area 5632 to 5641 to 5932 to 5941. Tanks and vehicles.	Armed Recon of area impossible. Asked for pin-point targets. Later message said mission refused-friends in area.
9.	24 Sept 1740	Armed Recon 1000 yd radius E 425369. Tanks, vehicles and artillery moving S/E.	Not reported
10.	24 Sept 1745	Armed Recon area Schijndel	Postponed on account of weather. (1825).
11.	25 Sept 0645	Armed Recon area St. Michiels Gostel to Schijndel to Dinther to Berlicum, Tanks, vehicles, artillery and infantry.	Not reported

S E C R E T

Annex No. 6

55

SECRET

No.	Time of Request	Area and Nature of Target	Results
12.	26 Sept 0744	Bomb woods N of Canal in grid squares 4340, 4439 and 4539, also villages of Heug, Dinther and Heeswijk. Tanks, vehicles, artillery and infantry.	Asked for red smoke on targets. Could not comply. Fog too dense. ICS. Civilians report 8 Huns killed. Our witness described vehicles destroyed. Balance of targets not reported.

Note-- The hour in the time of request is the time the message was acknowledged by the Net Control Station. The time of origin in many cases was much earlier, but due to transmitting difficulties the NCS could not be reached or the message was not directly received. The message in task 26, Sept 0744 was handled thru British channels. Our NCS closed 30 Sept 2400.

SECRET

56

S E C R E T

RESUPPLY

1. Following is a report of all resupplies delivered by parachute and glider to the 101st Airborne Division in operation Market:

a. D / 1

QUARTERMASTER

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT DELIVERED</u>	<u>AMOUNT RECOVERED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE RECOVERED</u>
Rations, type "K"	7,668	7,668	100%

SIGNAL

Battery, BA-37	540	540	100%
Battery, BA-38	720	720	100%
Battery, BA-39	48	48	100%
Battery, BA-40	48	48	100%
Battery, BA-41	60	60	100%
Battery, BA-42	60	60	100%
Wire, W-110 on DR-4 (3 1/2 miles)	65	65	100%
Wire, W-130 on DR-4 (2 1/2 miles)	12	12	100%

ORDNANCE

Carbines, cal. .30	24,000	24,000	100%
Cal. .30, AP, 8/clip	64,512	64,512	100%
Cal. .30, AP-Tr (4-1) belted	80,000	80,000	100%
Cal. .45, SIG and Pistol	14,000	14,000	100%
60mm Mortar, HE	1,152	1,152	100%
81mm Mortar, (lt)	528	528	100%

MEDICAL

Dextrose, btl.	180	180	100%
Sodium, Citrate, box	120	120	100%
Sulfanilamide, box	240	240	100%
Water, dist. box	480	480	100%
Plasma, pkg.	360	360	100%
Bandage, gauze, box	2,040	2,040	100%
Cotton, absorbent, pkg.	360	360	100%
Plaster, adhesive, spl.	240	240	100%
Splint, basswood, set.	480	480	100%
Splint, Army Leg & King, ea.	60	60	100%
Splint, wire ladder, ea.	480	480	100%
Pentothal, sodium, box	240	240	100%
Alcohol, btl.	120	120	100%
Morphine, box.	240	240	100%
Sulfadiazine, pkg.	600	600	100%
Bandage, plaster of paris, ctn.	720	720	100%
Dressing, first-aid, large, ea.	480	480	100%
Dressing, first-aid, small, ea.	1,440	1,440	100%
Blanket, wool, OD, ea.	180	180	100%
Litter, folding, aluminum, ea.	60	60	100%

PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY OF GLIDER RESUPPLY FOR D / 1 100%

- 1 -

S E C R E T

56
57

S E C R E T

Ordnance (Cont'd)	DZ "W"			DZ "A"		
	AMT	AMT	PCT	AMT	AMT	PCT
	DEL	RCD	RCD	DEL	RCD	RCD
Cal. .30, tracer, AP belted	430,000	93,000	21.6	120,000	80,000	66.7
Cal. .45, SMG and Pistol	133,000	66,600	50.	33,000	10,600	32.7
Cal. 50, AP-T (2-2-1)	31,000	26,710	86.1	1,320	1,320	100.
37mm Gun, SV	360	64	17.7			
37mm, HE	180	0	0			
37mm Cannister	60	0	0			
57mm, BR SABOT	240	240	100.			
57mm, HE	600	352	58.6			
60mm Mortar, HE	5,850	1,078	18.4	1,350	900	66.7
60mm Mortar, Ill.	234	8	3.4	54	54	100.
81mm Mortar, Lt.	2,700	2,253	83.4	666	300	49.5
81mm Mortar, Hv.	540	540	100.	111	60	54.
81mm Smoke	162	162	100.	33	33	100.
75mm How. HE, M 54	1,680	500	29.7			
75mm How. HE, M48	1,200	505	42.			
75mm How. Smoke	144	0	0.			
105mm How. HE, M 54	810	358	44.1			
105mm How. HE, M48	540	0	0.			
105mm How. Smoke	100	0	0.			
105mm How. AT	160	0	0.			
Rocket, HE, AT	1,900	1,419	74.7	240	100	41.7
Grenade, hand, frng.	7,200	2,275	31.5	1,200	900	75.
Grenade, hand, off	3,600	0	0	600	0	0.
Grenade, rifle, AT	2,470	250	10.1	260	210	80.8
Grenade, rifle, frng.	1,000	150	15.	100	90	90.
Grenade, rifle, smoke	500	140	28.	50	50	100.
Signal, AC, AN, (3 colors)	300	0	0.	100	0	0.
Crt. rifle, grenade, M6	2,000	0	0.	200	150	75.
Crt. rifle, grenade, M3				200	150	75.
Crt. aux. grenade, M7				200	0	0.

PERCENTAGE OF AMMUNITION RECOVERED

	DZ "W"	32.7	DZ "A"	64.4
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	MEDICAL					
Dextrose, btl.	120	30	25.	18	6	33.3
Sod, Citrate, box	40	30	25.	6	4	66.6
Sulfanilamide, box	160	40	25.	24	8	33.3
Water, dist., box	40	10	25.	6	6	100.
Plasma, pkg.	240	60	25.	36	12	33.3
Bandage, gauze, box	40	10	25.	6	6	100.
Cotton, absorbent, pkg.	240	60	25.	36	12	33.3
Plaster, adhesive, spl.	160	40	25.	24	8	33.3
Splint, basswood, set	60	10	16.6	9	9	100.
Splint, Army Leg & Ring	40	10	25.	6	2	33.3
Splint, wire, ladder, ea.	150	30	20.	15	15	100.
Pentotnal, sodium, box	40	10	25.	6	6	100.
Alcohol, etnyl, qt.				2	0	0
Alcohol, denatured, pt.	12	1	8.3	6	4	66.6
Morphine, box	125	30	24.	25	8	32.
Sulfadiazine, pkg.	225	50	22.2	34	20	58.8
Bandage, plaster paris	40	10	25.	6	6	100.
Dressing, first-aid, large	300	70	23.3	45	16	35.5
Dressing, first-aid, small	960	240	25.	156	48	30.7
Blanket, wool, O.D.	120	30	25.	24	6	25.
Litter, folding, aluminum	40	10	25.	6	2	33.3
Splint, wire, gauze, roll	50	10	20.	7	0	0

PERCENTAGE OF MEDICAL SUPPLEMENT RECOVERED

	DZ "W"	23.1	DZ "A"	52.2	
CHEMICAL WARFARE					
Grenade, hand, smoke, HC, M6			25	25	100.
Grenade, hand, incendiary, AN-14			12	12	100.
Grenade, hand, smoke, HP, M-15			62	25	40.3

59

SECRET

Chemical Warfare (Cont'd)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DZ "A"</u>		
	<u>AMT DEL.</u>	<u>AMT RCD</u>	<u>PCT RCD</u>
Grenade, hand, smoke, colored, M-18, orange	12	12	100.
Grenade, hand, smoke, colored, M-18, green	6	6	100.
Grenade, hand, smoke, colored, M-18, red	6	6	100.
PERCENTAGE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE EQUIPMENT RECOVERED -			90.

ENGINEER

Composition, C-2	250	250	100.
Caps, blasting, special, non-electric	25	0	0.
Fuse, blasting, time, (100' roll)	1	0	0.
Fuse, lighters	25	0	0.
Prism-cord (100' roll)	2	0	0.
Bags, sand	500	0	0.
PERCENTAGE OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT RECOVERED			15.6

PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY OF RESUPPLY FOR D / 1

Glider resupply - 100%

Prcht. resupply - 39.6%

b. D / 3

(1) Thirty-five (35) C-47 planes to DZ "A" (By Parachute)

QUARTERMASTER

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMT DEL.</u>	<u>AMT RCD</u>	<u>PCT RCD</u>
Rations, type "K"	9,120	216	2.4
Bags, vinyl	285	30	10.5
PERCENTAGE QUARTERMASTER ITEMS RECOVERED			6.5%

MEDICAL

Blankets, wool, U.D.	2,700	600	22.2
Litters, folding	272	120	44.1
Bundles, Misc. medical supplies	12	5	41.6
PERCENTAGE OF MEDICAL ITEMS RECOVERED			35.9%

SIGNAL

Radio, SCR-694	4	2	50.
PERCENTAGE OF SIGNAL ITEMS RECOVERED -			50%

PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY OF RESUPPLY FOR D / 3

Parachute resupply - 30.8%

c. D / 4

(1) Thirty (30) C-47 planes to DZ "A". (By parachute)

QUARTERMASTER

Rations, type "A"	13,960	4,320	30.9
PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY OF RESUPPLY FOR D / 4			30.9%

Parachute resupply - 30.9%

d. D / 6

(1) Four (4) gliders CG-4-A to DZ "A".

- 4 -

SECRET

60

S E C R E T

SIGNAL

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMT DEL</u>	<u>AMT RCD</u>	<u>PCT RCD</u>
Wire, W-110-mi.	20	20	100.
Radio, SCR-536	4	4	100.
Radio, SCR-610	2	2	100.
Radio, SCR-694	4	4	100.
Batteries, Ba-30	1,000	1,000	100.
Batteries, Ba-39	150	34	22.6
Batteries, Ba-40	25	24	96.
Batteries, Ba-70	100	72	72.
Message Books, M-210	300	50	16.6
Tape, TL-83	100	100	100.
Tape, TL-94	100	100	100.
Flashlight, TL-122-a	100	100	100.
<u>PERCENTAGE OF SIGNAL EQUIPMENT RECOVERED</u>			83.9%

ORDNANCE

Launcher, 60mm, M2	2	2	100.
Launcher, grenade, M8	5	5	100.
Cloth, wiping, lbs.	200	200	100.
Patches, cotton, M	10	10	100.
Radiator, 1/4 ton truck	4	4	100.
Kit, tire repair, cold patch	6	6	100.
Rifle, U.S. Cal. .30, M1	20	20	100.
<u>PERCENTAGE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT RECOVERED</u>			100%

PERCENTAGE OF RESUPPLY RECOVERY FOR D / 6 = 91.9%

e. D / 8

(1) Thirty-four (34) C-47 planes to DZ "A". (By parachute)

ORDNANCE

75mm How. ammunition	2,800	1,800	64.2
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PERCENTAGE OF RESUPPLY RECOVERY FOR D / 8 64.2%

f. Percentage of recovery of resupply for entire operation.

Glider Resupply - 95.9%
Prnt. Resupply - 41.4%

2. Any resupply recovered by units and not delivered to Division dumps are not included in totals as figures were not reported.

3. The report is a clear indication that glider resupply is considerably more effective as practically 100% of the contents of gliders was recovered.

4. The last resupply by air on D / 8 gives the best gauge on effectiveness of parachute resupply. According to reports from the rear base, thirty-four (34) planes with six rack loads and three door loads each were delivered. All rack loads were dropped in a very small area and were recovered within a few hours. No door loads were seen coming down. This is either an indication that the door loads were discharged far from the target area or the door loads were actually not loaded.

5. Resupply by Parachute could be effective if only rack loads were used and all planes discharged their loads over the identification markers on the ground. It is believed that door loads should not normally be used as it causes too great a dispersion of supplies and might enable the enemy to obtain a very high percentage of the total supplies dropped.

S E C R E T

Incl No. 3 to Report: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

FUNCTIONS XVIII CORPS

For Operation MARKET, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were detached from VIII Corps and placed under British operational control. The responsibilities of the XVIII Corps (Airborne), with respect to these two divisions, was therefore limited to the following:

a. General.

- (1) Plans were formulated, and the Corps was prepared to enter the combat area as an operational corps to control such ground troops as it might be deemed necessary to assign to the Corps.
- (2) Corps monitored all messages between the forward echelons of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions and the base echelons, and a check was maintained to insure that proper action was taken in each instance requiring it.

b. Intelligence.

- (1) Corps distributed and disseminated to the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions all intelligence, other than that passing through the British Airborne Corps.
- (2) Corps prepared and delivered to both divisions, in bulk, a terrain study. A river and bridge study was prepared and delivered to the 82d Airborne Division.
- (3) Maps, town plan and defense overprint requirements were set up by Corps, and the Corps had the sole responsibility of processing from warehouses, breaking down, and delivery to the divisions. The following amounts were handled:

Item	Weight (lbs)	No. of Sheets
Maps	20,510	205,100
Town Plans (20 different towns)	1,990	19,897
Defense Overprints	139	1,890

- (4) An additional ten (10) tons of maps were on hand with arrangements made for resupply by air if they had been called for.
- (5) Corps set up aerial photography requirements, including mosaics in bulk, for both the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions; the same was gathered from developing and processing plants and delivery was made to the divisions.

c. Operational.

- (1) Corps accepted the responsibility for organizing and arranging the details for the movement of the sea-lifts of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions from the UK to the zone of action. The sea lifts arrived in the combat areas as planned and without incident. The

S E C R E T

sea lift of the 101st Airborne Division moved from OMAHA BEACH in two serials which closed in the ZON area on 22 and 23 September respectively. The sea lift of the 82d Airborne Division closed in the division's area on 23 September.

- (2) Liaison was maintained by a staff officer with the IX TCC, in order to insure rapid transmission of information relative to the operation.
- (3) An officer observer flew with and observed three lifts to report on the accuracy of the drops involved and enemy flak action.

d. Supply. The following specific supply responsibilities were accepted by Corps:

- (1) Air re-supply. To edit and transmit the requirements for the US divisions to Communications Zone and to follow through on these requests until such time as the supplies were dispatched to the units by IX TCC; to maintain contact with the British Division, Communications Zone and the Air Force to insure the fulfillment of all air re-supply requests; (for details of air re-supply operations see Annex No. 1).

- (2) Overland supply. To provide liaison officers who could give technical advice to the British on overland supply of US supplies to the US divisions.

(a) Brigadier General Theodore E. Buschler, Corps Artillery Commander, was detailed as liaison officer to XXX Corps (British); Major Curtis Y. Kimball, Assistant G-4, as liaison officer to Second (British) Army; and Major Benjamin Wetzel, Assistant Ordnance Officer, as liaison officer to Communications Zone Headquarters.

(b) These officers assisted materially in setting up the overland supply system for the divisions, supervising its mechanics and keeping XVIII Corps (Airborne) and First Allied Airborne Army informed as to supply status. The latter two officers functioned in that capacity until after the divisions were withdrawn from the line and in the later stages also assisted in the salvage of unconsumed supplies left over when the divisions were withdrawn.

1 Annex:
Administrative Functions XVIII Corps

4 Tables:

- No. 1 - Daily Requirements for Fixed Re-Supply
Class V (82d & 101st AB Divs) - C&S Items (82d & 101st AB Divs)
Class I & III (82 & 101 Divs) - Signal Equipment (82 & 101 Divs)
Medical Items (82 & 101 Divs) - Engineer Items (82 & 101 Divs)
- No. 2 - List of Supplies Held On-Call
QM Supplies at Departure Air Fields: Medical Items on Call
Ord Material on Call (82 & 101 Divs) - Engineer Items on Call
- No. 3 - Tonnages Delivered, Fixed Re-Supply (82 & 101 Divs)
- No. 4 - Tonnages Delivered, On-Call Re-Supply

INCL 3

- 2 -
S E C R E T

63

SECRET

Annex No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

Administrative Functions - XVIII Corps (Airborne)

1. Mission.

a. General.

To the limit of our capabilities to insure that food, ammunition, and other supplies were delivered to the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions.

b. Specific.

(1) Since this Corps was not part of the troops engaged in the operation, theoretically, we had no specific responsibilities.

(2) Because the Task Force Commander and his headquarters came from the British Army, and were, therefore, somewhat unfamiliar with re-supply procedures, this headquarters accepted the following specific responsibilities.

(a) To accept the fixed and on call air re-supply requirements from the divisions; to transmit these requirements to Communications Zone; to maintain active liaison between the divisions, Communications Zone, and the Air Forces; to follow through on these supplies until such time as the supplies were delivered to the Air Forces on the departure airfields.

(b) To assist in the movement of the seaborne echelons of both divisions from the United Kingdom to the forward combat area (G-3 Section).

(3) At the time of the operation, the consolidation of all Troop Carrying Forces and all Airborne Forces under one command had just been directed. The higher headquarters involved were new at their jobs. Because of this, and because these were our own divisions, this headquarters, although not accepting the responsibilities, actually performed the following additional functions.

(a) We set up liaison at the departure airfields and assisted the Air Force in planning and executing their air re-supply functions. This involved computing plane requirements; establishing flight schedules; establishing liaison between the divisions and the Air Forces and within the Air Forces (i.e. - Between Troop Carrier Command and the 490th Quartermaster Troop Company, Supply); notifying divisions of expected time of arrival of re-supply missions over the Drop Zone.

(b) Through the agency of liaison officers, we did all in our power to insure a smooth flow of supplies from ground sources after contact had been made with the ground forces.

2. Narrative.

a. Prior to the operation.

(1) The special staff of this headquarters made a detailed study of the fixed and on call requirements of both divisions and compiled an itemized list of requirements to be furnished daily and of requirements to be held at departure airfields, on call. A copy of this list was furnished to all interested agencies and is attached. (See

(2) Property on hand at departure airfields was carefully inventoried and the shortages revealed by this inventory were brought to the attention of the appropriate agencies.

S E C R E T

(3) Detailed plans were made and later supervised, to see to it that the property on hand, at departure airfields, was promptly cared for.

(4) Approximately four-fifths of the re-supply items were ammunition. Hence, the bulk of the work, involved in accomplishing the above, was done by the Ordnance Section, this headquarters. It was a tremendous task, involving meticulous attention to small, but important, details. The task was accomplished in an outstandingly successful manner by a section fresh from the United States and completely unfamiliar with airborne activities. The work of this section, during the operation, is deserving of the highest praise.

B. During the operation.

(1) Fixed re-supply.

(a) A table showing tonages actually delivered to divisions, under this schedule, is attached. In planning daily divisional tonnage requirements, the following estimates are as accurate as can be made, without knowing the exact divisional organization and the specific mission of the unit.

Class I	30 tons
Class III	10 tons
Class V	200 tons
All Others	10 tons

(b) On D plus 1, a fixed re-supply mission was flown by the Bomber Command of the 8th Air Force. B-24s were used. From 75 to 90 percent of the supplies delivered actually reached the troops on the ground. These are, probably, the best results which have ever been obtained in the field of parachute re-supply. Undoubtedly, even better results are possible, if the Bomber Command is given additional training in this type of work. The principal reason for such outstanding success on this, the first re-supply mission ever flown by the Bomber Command, and without previous training, is the fact that the bomber is a much better re-supply air-ship than the C-47. The bomber carries from 20 to 22 bundles and it is possible to drop the whole load in a very restricted area. On the other hand, a C-47 carries from 9 to 12 bundles, of which it is possible to drop 9 bundles in a fairly restricted area. Using equipment presently provided, it is not possible to avoid scattering the last three bundles.

(c) The IX Troop Carrier Command flew the remaining re-supply missions.

1. In setting up re-supply missions, the Troop Carrier Command informs the 497th Quartermaster Detachment Company Supply, the fields from which the planes will take off. These fields are not, in all cases, the same fields which contain the supplies. This means that after receiving notification of the takeoff fields, it is necessary for the 497th Quartermaster Detachment Company Supply to move the supplies from one field to another. This is a cumbersome system, involving an expenditure of needless time and effort. It could be corrected in the planning stage by co-ordination between the Troop Carrier Command, the Detachment Company, and the divisions engaged in the operation.

2. There was considerable last minute re-arranging of schedules, which caused some confusion. This was due to the Division Commanders making last minute decisions as to whether they would use the available planes for re-supplies or for bringing in additional troops. It is believed that such confusion is inevitable in an operation where the requirements for planes are greater than the actual supply of planes and where a rapidly moving tactical situation necessitates a hurried planning. All agencies involved must learn to expect this confusion and be prepared to deal with it at the time. It is particularly at this period that the ever present need for liaison becomes an urgent necessity, due to the fact that so many agencies, working semi-independently of each other, must be rapidly and thoroughly coordinated, when these changes occur.

SECRET

Annex No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", 3 December 1944.

(2) On-call re-supply.

(a) A table showing tonnage actually delivered to the divisions under this schedule is attached. (See Tables 2 & 4)

(b) The system used was analogous to the fixed re-supply system with the exception that requirements established prior to the operation were not strictly adhered to. At the time the operation was in progress, the headquarters of the divisions were in the rear quarters at the time the need occurred. Practically all administrative delay in furnishing these supplies was eliminated by the establishment of a liaison section with the 490th Quartermaster Depot Company Supply and physically located at the headquarters on one of the departure airfields. When requests for on-call supplies were received by the division base echelons, they were immediately telephoned to this section and direct arrangements for setting up the planes and loading the supplies were made on the spot. Arrangements were also made to have a liaison section from the Communications Zone established at the same point. Thus, when requests for supplies, not available on departure airfields, were received, immediately and direct action could be taken to procure the supplies from the Communications Zone Depots.

(c) It was found that supplies could be delivered to divisions with the following time limitations.

processed and supplies delivered the following day in a thoroughly efficient manner. This time limit allows opportunity for complete planning, complete co-ordination, and the most efficient use of necessary airplanes.

2. Requests received prior to 1000 hours can be handled for delivery the same day. Such a system involves the re-adjusting of flight schedules and last minute procurement of supplies, last minute co-ordination between the agencies involved, with the consequent risk of failure and, in general, an inefficient system. However, it is practicable and was used with satisfactory success.

3. Requests received after 1000 hours should not be considered for delivery that day, unless a critical emergency exists. The filling of these requests invariably results in a disruption of flight schedules, allows insufficient time for the proper briefing of pilots, and insufficient time for proper packaging and loading.

(d) There is an understandable tendency on the part of the divisions to insist on air re-supply after ground contact has been established and beyond the limits set up by the original plan. This is to be expected in an airborne operation, since the initial contact with the ground forces is almost sure to be made at a time when the ground supply system is stretched to the limit of its capabilities and at a time when transportation for hauling supplies is at a premium. It is, therefore, the line of least resistance for the division commander to dispatch a message to his base section calling for air re-supply. This means that his request will be considered separately and his needs will not be balanced against other units in the area. The base section, having no sure way of knowing the emergency of the need, quite properly feel that all such requests should be considered as operational emergencies. This works out very well for the divisions, but from the overall picture, it is an unsound method of operation. The use of airplanes for supply purposes is an expensive system, both in planes, canopies, and containers, and should be resorted to only during the time when troops are isolated from ground sources and during those times when the ground supply system has completely broken down. There were actually cases, during this campaign, when supplies were flown from France to England, unloaded in England, loaded again, and flown back to France for the use of the Airborne Divisions. There appears to be no solution of this waste and inefficiency, unless the division commander can sacrifice his immediate needs in favor of the overall needs of the entire expeditionary forces, or unless there is a higher commander on the ground who will filter the requests from the divisions and decide whether the supplies should be furnished from air or ground sources.

S E C R E T

Table No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report, Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive", 3 December 1944

DAILY REQUIREMENTS FOR FIXED RE-SUPPLY

Fixed Supply for 82d Division

ITEM	FIXED DAILY SUPPLY
Carbine, cal. .30, M1	168,000
Cal. .30, AP, 8/clip	427,000
* , Ball, 8/clip	
Cal. .30, AP, 5/clip	50,000
* , Ball, 5/clip	
* , Ball & AP, ctns	
Cal. .30, Tracer (ctn or clip)	20,000
Cal. .30, AP-Tr, Belted (4-1)	430,000
Cal. 45, SM& Pistol	180,000
Cal. 50, AP-L-T, 2-2-1	35,000
37mm Gun, SV	- - -
37mm M1	- - -
37mm Cannon	- - -
57mm Gun, Br, Sabot	300
* , 57mm Gun, AP-T or APC	
57mm Gun, AP-T or APC	600
57mm Gun, HE	600
* , 57mm AP-T or APC	
60mm Mortar, HE	5,850
60mm Mortar, Tll	234
81mm Mortar, Lt	2,700
81mm Mortar, Hv	540
81mm Mortar, Smoke	162
75mm How, HE, w/F, M54	2,160
75mm How, HE, w/F, M48	1,600
75mm How, HE, AT	340
75mm How, Smoke	210
105mm How, HE w/F, M54	810
105mm How, HE w/F, M48	540
105mm How, HE, AT	160
105mm How, Smoke	100
Rocket, AT, HE, 2.36"	2,000
Grenade, hand, frag	8,000
Grenade, Common Br	
* , Grenade, hand, offensive	4,000
Grenade, Rifle, AT-M9A1	2,730
Grenade, Rifle, Frag	1,092
* , Grenade, hand, frag, w/adaptor	
Grenade, rifle, smoke	550
Signal, AG, AN (3 colors)	300
* , Signal, ground, grenade launching	
Cart, rifle grenade, M6	3,450
Cart, rifle grenade, M3	2,000
Cart, aux grenade, M7	2,000
Adaptor, grenade, M1	576 (plus those subst-for rifle frag grenades)

Additional ammunition available on call.

* - May be substituted. Total Weight - 215 Tons. No of Bundles 1862

- 1 -

SECRET

FIXED SUPPLY FOR 101ST AIR DIVISION

CLASS V

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FIXED DAILY SUPPLY</u>
Carbide, cal. .30, M1	180,000
Cal. .30, AP, 8/clip	427,000
* , Ball, 8/clip	
Cal. .30, AP, 5/clip	
* , Ball, 5/clip	
* , Ball & AP, ctns	
Cal. .30, Tracer, (ctn or clip)	15,000
Cal. .30, AP-Tr, bolt & (4-1)	430,000
Cal. .45, S&G & Pistol	133,000
Cal. .50, AP-L-T, 2-2-1	31,000
37mm Gun, sv	360
* , 37mm AP-T	
37mm HE	180
37mm Cannonette	60
57mm Gun, Fr, Sabot	240
* , 57mm Gun, AP-T or APC	
57mm Gun, AP-T or APC	600
57mm Gun, HE	600
* , 57mm AP-T or APC	
60mm Mortar, III	234
81mm Mortar, Lt	2,700
81mm Mortar, Hv	540
81mm Mortar, smoke	162
75mm How, HE, w/F, M54	1,680
75mm How, HE, w/F, M43	1,200
75mm How, Smoke	144
75mm How, HE, AT	270
105mm How, HE, w/F, M54	810
105mm How, HE, w/F, M43	540
105mm How, HE, AT	160
105mm How, smoke	100
Rocket, HE, AT, 2.36"	1,900
Grenade, Hand, frag	7,200
Grenade, Gummer, Fr	
* , Grenade, hand, offensive	3,600
Grenade, rifle, AT, M9A1	2,470
Grenade, rifle, frag	1,800
* , Grenade, hand, frag, w/adaptor	
Grenade, rifle, smoke	500
Signal, AC, AN (3 colors)	300
* , Signal, ground, grenade, launching	
Crt, rifle grenade, M6	3,450
Crt, rifle grenade, M3	2,000
Crt, aux grenade, M7	2,000
Adapter, grenade, M1	576 (plus those subst for rifle frag grenades)

Additional ammunition available on call.

* May be substituted.

Total Weight - 200 tons No. of Bundles - 1760

TABLE NO. 1

SECRET

68

SECRET

Table No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report, Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D plus Ten Inclusive", 3 December 1944

FIXED SUPPLY FOR 2D DIVISION

CLASS I AND III

<u>ITEM</u>		<u>NO. DAILY</u>	<u>TONS DAILY</u>
K Ration	Ea.	16,000	27.5
Gasoline	Gal.	3,000	10.0
Oil, Engine	Gal.	120	.6
Gear Lube	Gal.	40	.2
Grease	Lbs.	40	38.4
		Total Tons	76.7

CLASS I AND III

<u>ITEM</u>		<u>NO. DAILY</u>	<u>TONS DAILY</u>
K Ration	Ea.	14,400	25.0
Five in One Ration	Ea.	10	.1
Gasoline	Gal.	1,200	7.0
Oil, Engine	Gal.	80	.5
Gear Lube	Gal.	13	.1
Grease	Lbs.	40	.1
		Total Tons	32.3

S E C R E T

Table No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject, "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", 3 December 1944.

One day of resupply of medical items for 82nd AB Div to be forwarded the first day and each succeeding day.

Stock No.	Item	Unit	Quantity	Wt(Lbs)
	1000 cc			
13835	Procaine hydrochloride, 20 cartridges, 2.5cc cartridge containing 2% sol	bx	1	.5
14305	Soc citrate, 6 amp, 50cc amp containing 4% sterile sol	bx	8	8
14636	Sulfanilamide cryst 12-5 gm envelopes USP	bx	12	3
16089	Plasma-normal human-dried 250cc	pkg	144	504
20050	B undae gauze roller, 3" x 10 yds 12	bx	12	14
20340	Plaster adhesive surg 1" x 5 yds	sol	12	2
37500	Splint Army-lee, 1/2 ring	ea	12	50
37540	Splint wire ladder 31" x 31"	ea	65	36
1330885	Pentthothol sodium 25-0.5 gm amp MNR with 25 - 20cc amp sterile dist water	bx	4	15
10480	Alcohol ethyl 1 qt USP	btl	8	21
91155	Morphine tartrate 5 tube	bx	25	2.5
92060	Dressing 1st aid small white	ea	96	12
92030	Bandage plaster paris 6" x 5 yds 12	ctn	12	36
99090	Blanket od	ea	240	960
99380	Litter folding alum	ea	120	2190
20350	Plaster adhesive surg 3" x 5 yds	sol	24	10
13340	Petrolatum 1 lb USP	can	2	2
16100	acid acetylsalicilic 1000 tablets USP 5 gr	btl	1	1.5
1413715	Soc amyl 500 cns MNR 3 gr	btl	1	1
93750	Splint wire gauze 51" x 1 yd	roll	10	20
11490	Cocaine sulfate 500 tabs USP 1/2 gr	btl	1	1
16622	Sulfadiazine 1000 tabs USP 7.7 gr	btl	6	15
11105	Caffeine & sodium benzoate injection 12 amps USP 2cc	bx	1	
71780	Towel hand	ea	6	1
16127	Tetanus toxoid plain 30cc USP	vial	6	.5
92125	Sponge surg, 4 x 4, 500	bag	4	16
92040	Banned triangular compressed white whole blood	btl	12	24
10123	Acid boric ointment 1 lb	jar	1	1
10845	Atropine 100 tabs 1/8 gr	btl	1	1
10860	Atropine sulfate 20 1/150 gr HT	tubs	2	
11380	Chloroform for anesthesia 1 lb	btl	1	1
11505	Compound cathartic 1000 pills or tabs	btl	1	15
91030	Cresol cap col 1 qt	tin	4	3
11790	Ether for anesthesia 1 lb	can	10	
11800	Ethyl chloride 3 oz	tube	1	
12290	Hydrogen peroxide col 3% 1 lb	btl	2	3
12452	Jelly lubricating 4 oz	jar	1	
12640	Magnesium sulfate 4 lbs	can	1	4
12854	Mercuric bichloride 250 Linn poison tablets	btl	1	5
12958	Morphine sulfate 20 - 1/2 gr HT	tube	2	
14295	Sodium chloride isotonic sol 1000cc	btl	8	16
14644	Sulfathiazole sodium sterile 6 vials USP 5 gr	bx	2	.5
14860	Typhoid emporated 1 pt	btl	2	4
1605015	Antitoxin gas gangrene polyvalent w-o tetanus antitoxin	vial	20	5
16068	Penicillin, sodium 100,000 oxford units dry powder	amp	5	1

TABLE NO. 1

- 4 -
S E C R E T

70

SECRET

Table No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject, "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D-Plus Ten, Inclusive", 3-December-1944.

Stock No.	Item	Unit	Quantity	Wt (Lbs)
17315	Dextrose 50% sol 50cc	btl	24	0
19380	Salt tablets 25 mg 200	bx	1	1
20022	Bandage elastic all-cotton 3" x 5 1/2 yds 12	ctn	2	5
20060	Bandage gauze roller 4" x 10 yds 12	bx	2	4
20420	Wedding sheet 5" x 6 yds roll	pkg	94	18
31390	Catheter urethral rubber 18 fr	ea	1	
33369	Knife ocer blade No. 10, 6	pkg	2	
33381	Knife ocer blade No. 20, 6	pkg	2	
36830	Gloves surgeon size 7 1/2	pr	4	
36840	Gloves surgeon size 8	pr	2	
37210	Razor safety blades 5	pkc	12	
37290	Suture catgut chromic size 1, 1 suture	tube	24	1
37969	Suture silk braided non-absorbible size 000			
	25 yds	sol	2	
37840	Suture catgut plain size 00 1 suture	tuba	30	1
37995	Suture silk chromic coarse 1 suture	pkg	3	
38460	Syringe luer 30cc	ea	1	.5
3870507	Tube duodenal 14 fr levin	ea	1	
38780	Tubing rubber 3/4" inside dia 1/16" wall	ft	6	.5
71770	Towel bath	ea	2	1
74560	Brush hand	ea	2	
74390	Soap laundry 1 lb	bar	2	2
74930	Soap white floating 6 oz	bar	8	4
77150	Basin sponge	ea	1	.5
77730	Cup paper collapsible 250	ctn	1	1
7786020	Oxygen tank 750 g.l filled	ea	2	132
92127	Sponge surgical 4" x 8" 130	b.g	3	12
99415	Pad heat refill	ea	6	6
79440	Urinal enamelware	ea	1	1

TOTAL

1182 4235

71

S E C R E T

Table No. 1 to Incl. No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", 3 December 1944

One day resupply of medical items for 101st AB Div to be forwarded the first day and on each succeeding day.

Stock No.	Item	Unit	Quantity	Wt. (lbs)
11650	Dextrosa, 5% physiological sod enl. sol, 1000cc	bt1	120	180
11630	Sulfanilamide, crvst, 12-5 gm envelopes, USP	box	160	40
14917	Water, dist 25, 50cc; amp; sterile pyrogen free	box	40	60
16089	Plasma, normal human, dried, 250cc	pkg	240	840
20050	Purpae, gauze, roller 3" x 10 yds, 12	box	40	45
20130	Cotton, absorbent, comy, 1 ct	pkg	240	15
20340	Plaster, adhesive, surg, 1" x 5 yds	Spl	160	27
37386	Solint, baswood, 10' an rox 18" lengths	set	60	30
37500	Solint, army leg, 1 rls	ea	40	165
37540	Solint, wire ladder, 3 1/2" x 31"	ea	150	160
1332805	Pentothal sodium, 25'0.5 gm, amp; NMR with 25-20cc amp sterile dist water	box	40	20
10480	Alcohol, ethyl, 1 qt USP	bt1	12	105
91155	Morphine tartrate, 5 tube	box	125	17
91204	Sulfadiazine, 8 tablets; USP 7.7 gr in waterproof pkg	pkg	225	12
92030	Bandage, plaster of paris, 6" x 5 yds, 12	ctn	40	120
92050	Dressing, lat aid large white	ea	300	88
92060	Dressing, lat aid small white	ea	960	114
99090	Blanket, wool OD	ea	120	430
99380	Litter, fold w, aluminum	ea	40	730
99750	Solint, wire gauze 5" x 1 yd	roll	50	190
91020	Alcohol, denatured 1 qt	tin	40	50
			TOTAL	3242
				3438

Fixed Daily Supply of C.E. Items for 32d AB Division

Item	Rds Per Day	Tons	Pounds Per Box
Grenade, smoke, Hand, HC M3	100	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
Grenade, Hand, Incand, AN M14	50	.1	75 lbs per box of 25
Grenade, Hand, smoke WP M15	1200	1.7	75 lbs per box of 25
Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M18			
Green	50	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
Blue	50	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
Orange	500	.3	50 lbs per box of 25
Red	50	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
Violet	50	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
Yellow	50	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
	TOTAL TONS	2.9	

Fixed Daily Supply of C.E. Items for 101st AB Division

Item	Rds Per Day	Tons	Pounds Per Box
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC M3	100	.1	60 lbs per box of 25
Grenade, Hand, Incand, AN M14	50	.1	75 lbs per box of 25
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP M15	250	.3	75 lbs per box of 25
Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M18			
Orange	50	.1	50 lbs per box of 25
Green	25		50 lbs per box of 25
Red	25		50 lbs per box of 25
	TOTAL TONS	.6	

TABLE NO. 1

- 6 -
S E C R E T

72

SECRET

Table No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report; Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, A to D Plus Ten Inclusive", 3 December 1944.

Fixed Daily Supply of Signal Equipment for 101st Air Division

Item	Quantity	Wt. Lbs (Per Day)
Wire, #110 on MR 4	20 miles	1640
" " #130 on MR 4	30 miles	2460
" " #130 on MR 8	30 miles	250
Dist Section, MS-49	10	20
" " MS-50	10	23
Radio Set, SCR 300-A	3	150
" " SCR-535	16	160
" " SCR-610	3	375
" " SCR-694	3	250
Mine Detector, SCR 625	4	200
Maintenance equipment, MR-53	1	350
Battery, B1-2	10	40
" " B1-23	10	30
" " B1-30	500	160
" " B1-27	10	7
" " B1-37	300	125
" " B1-38	500	600
" " B1-39	50	500
" " B1-40	50	550
" " B1-41	15	15
" " B1-43	20	120
" " B1-48	20	120
" " B1-70	60	750
" " B1-80	50	500
Coil, C-161	2	10
Telegraph Set, TG-5	1	6
Telephone, FE-8-A	15	150
Switchboard, SP-71	1	58
" " SP-72	1	103
Tax, HC-72	1250	1
Converter, L-209	2	16
Message book, M-210	200	4
Axle, AL-27-A	1	6
Roll equipment CE-11	2	50
Crank, CR-4-A	4	12
Tapc, TL-83	50 rolls	10
Taps, TL-94	25 rolls	5
Climbers, LC-6	1	7
Tool equipment, TF-33	40	80
Flash light, FL-122-A	50	75
Lamp, LM-55	100	2
Gloves, LC-10	10 Pr.	5

The following items to be delivered only once during the five day period.

Test set, I-56	1	50
Test equipment, TE-17	1	30

GRAND TOTAL, 6 Tons

SECRET

Table No. 1 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D-Plus Ten Inclusive", 9 December 1944

Fixed Daily Supply of Engineer Items for 82 AB Division

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Pounds</u>
Composition, C-2	1000	1000
Caps, blasting, special, non electric	100	1.0
Fuse, blasting, time (100' roll)	4	8.0
Fuse, lighters	100	0.8
Primacord (100' roll)	10	110.0
Bags, sand	2000	660.0
TOTAL		1779.8

Fixed Daily Supply of Engineer Items for 101 AB Division

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Pounds</u>
Composition, C-2	1000	1000
Caps, blasting, special, non-electric	100	1.0
Fuse, blasting, time (100' roll)	4	8.0
Fuse, lighters	100	0.8
Primacord (100' roll)	10	110.0
Bags, sand	2000	660.0
TOTAL		1779.8

75

SECRET

Table No. 2 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

Quartermaster Supplies at Departure Air Fields

Units	Received	Received	Total	Packed	Unpacked	Weight in Tons
	Since Aug 1 - for AB Units	Prior to 1 Aug for AB & Grnd units				
"K" Rations	409032	24960	433992	68400	365592	783.185
"D" Rations	432	None	432	None	432	.2268
5 in 1 rations						
10 in 1 rations	1300	None	1300	None	1300	4.3
Toilet paper (rolls)	1080	None	1080	None	1080	.4
Tobacco Ration	160000	None	160000	None	160000	5.
Candy Ration						
Toilet ration	160000	None	160000	None	160000	2.5
Gasoline V-80 (Gals)	62758	7746	70504	43351	27153	352.5
Diesel fuel (Gals)	5616	599	6215	2052	4163	31.075
Oil #30 (Gals)	4392	252	4644	None	4644	23.22
Grease #2 (Lbs)	1435	45	2440	None	2440	1.22
Gear lube. (Gals)	156	12	168	None	168	.84

76

- 1 -
SECRET

S E C R E T

Table No. 2 to Incl No. 32 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3-December-1944

The following Ordnance Materiel is on Call for the 82d AB Division:

Major Items and Accessories

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Carbine	212
Clasp, web	225
Clip, cart, cal. .30, M1	39000
Rifle, M1	175
Peyonet, M1, w/scabbard	225
Tool, Combination	250
Sling, gun, M1907	225
Browning Automatic Rifle	89
Pistol	50
Holster	50
Submachine Gun	151
Machine Gun, Light, w/mount	120
Machine, Belt filling, cal. .30, M1918	20
Machine Gun, cal. .50, w/mount	17
Mount, AA, M63	14
Mortar, 60mm, w/mount & sighting equipment	25
Mortar, 81mm, w/mount & sighting equipment	22
Launcher, Rocket, M9	100
Launcher, Grenade, M7	35
Launcher, Grenade, M8	35
Gun, QF, 6 pounder, Mk IV	15
How, Pack, 75mm, w/on carr sighting equipment	31
How, 105mm, M3	3
Circle, Aiming, M1	10
Telescope, sighting	9
Telescope, panoramic, M1	4
Mount, telescope, M16	3
Telescope, elbow, M62	1
Telescope, adapter, M9	7
Quadrant, range, M8	3
Sight, mortar, M4	8
Telescope, elbow, M61	3
Mount, telescope, M3, w/panoramic telescope M1	4
Telescope, elbow, M62	5
Quadrant, sunners, M8	3
Knife, trench, M3	150
Truck, 1/2 ton	16
Trailer, 1/2 ton	16
Tire, 600 x 16	60
Tube, 600 x 16	60
Tire, 750 x 16	9
Tube, 750 x 16	9
Tire, combat w/tube, 800 x 16	1

Cleaning and Preserving Material

Oil SAE #30	qt	90
Grease, OD, #0	lb	50
Cleaner, rifle bore	qt	1198
Cloth, crocus	sheet	450
Cloth, wintina	lb	3650
Grease, rifle	ea	3225
Oil, lub, pres, 1t.	qt	1150
Patches, cut, cotton	M	62
Enamel, svn, OD	gal	171
Jute, burlap	yd	8600
Oil, recoil, special	gal	42
Paper, lens tissue	quire	10
Primer, svn, rust prev	gal	42
Soda, ash, type I	lb	1297
Soda, caustic, 13B	lb	1043

SECRET

Table Nos. 2 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne. Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944

<u>Unit</u>		<u>Quantity</u>
Sponge, bore, coarse, cellulose	ea	1760
Twine, lute	lb	25
Waste, cotton, white	lb	1312
Fluid, brake, hydraulic	gal	2
Liquid, carbon tetrachloride	qt	109
Thone, cal. .30	ea	550
Thone, cal. .50	ea	70
Oil, peatsfoot	pt	220
Oil, buffer, br.	gal	48
Cloth, abrasive	sheet	96

NOTE: A stock of spare parts for Ordnance Materiel related to airborne operations is being reserved at a depot and can be supplied on call.

The following Ordnance Materiel is on call for the 101 AB Division

Major Items and Accessories

<u>Item</u>		<u>Quantity</u>
Carbine		243
Pouch, web		225
Clip, cartridge, cal. .30, M1		39000
Rifle, M1		175
Bayonet, M1, w/scabbard		235
Tool, combination		250
Sling, gun, M1907		225
Browning Automatic Rifle		90
Pistol		50
Holster		50
Sub Machine Gun		150
Machine Gun, light, w/mount		120
Machine, belt filling, cal. .30 M1918		20
Machine Gun, cal. .50, w/mount		18
Mount, AA, M63		14
Mortar, 60mm, w/mount & sighting equipment		25
Mortar, 81mm, w/mount and sighting equipment		23
Launcher, Rocket, M9		100
Launcher, Grenade, M7		35
Launcher, Grenade, M8		35
Gun, 37mm, w/sight equipment		6
Gun, QF, 6 rounder, Mk IV		15
How, Pack, 75mm, w/on carr sighting equipment		31
How, 105mm, M3		3
Circle, aiming, M1		10
Telescope, sighting		9
Telescope, panoramic, M1		4
Mount, telescope, M16		3
Telescope, elbow, M62		5
Telescope, adaptor, M9		7
Quadrant, range, M8		3
Sight, mortar, M4		8
Telescope, elbow, M61		3
Mount, telescope, M3, w/panoramic telescope M1		4
Quadrant, gunners, M8		3
Knife, trench, M3		150
Truck, 1 ton		16
Trailer, 1 ton		16
Tire, 600 x 16		60
Tube, 600 x 16		60
Tire, 750 x 16		9
Tube, 750 x 16		9
Tire, combat w/tube, 800 x 16		1

78

SECRET

Table No. 2 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to H Plus Ten, Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

Cleaning and Preservative Material

<u>Item</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Oil, SAE #30	qt	90
Grease, OD, #0	lb	50
Cleaner, rifle, bore	qt	1198
Cloth, cracos	sheet	450
Cloth, wiping	lb	3650
Grease, rifle	ea	3225
Oil, lub, gras, lt	qt	1150
Patches, cut, cotton	M	62
Enamel, syn, OD	gal	171
Jute, burlap	yd	8600
Oil, recoil, special	gal	42
Paper, lens tissue	quire	9
Primer, syn, rust prvx	gal	42
Soda, ash, type I	lb	1297
Soda, caustic, lye	lb	1044
Sponges, bore, coarse, cellulose	ea	1700
Twine, jute	lb	25
Waste, cotton, white	lb	1312
Fluid, brake, hydraulic	gal	20
Liquid, carbon tetrachloride	qt	109
Thong, cal. .30	ea	550
Thong, cal. .50	ea	70
Oil, neatsfoot	pt	220
Gil, buffer, Br	gal	48
Cloth, abrasive	sheet	96

NOTE: A stock of spare parts for Ordnance Material relative to Airborne Operations is being reserved at a depot and can be supplied on call.

79

SECRET

Table No. 2 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

Medical Items on call at Air Field

Item No.	Item	Unit	Quantity
11650	Dextrose 5% Phys. Sol-Chl-Sol 1000cc	btl	185
13875	Procaine Hydrochloride 20 cartridges 2.5cc cartridge containing 2% sol.	box	265
14305	Sodium Citrate, 6 amp, 50cc 4% sterile Sol	box	502
14636	Sulfanilamide Cryst, 12 5- <u>cm</u> envelope	box	889
14917	Water distilled, 25 50-cc amps, sterile, pyroecan free	box	897
16089	Plasma, normal human, dried, 250-cc	pkg	3679
20050	Bandage gauze roller, 3" x 10 yds 12	box	5730
23130	Cotton, absorbent, 1-oz, compressed	pkg	451
23340	Plaster adhesive, surr, 1" x 5 yds	spl	7619
37386	Splint Paswood, 10	set	29
37500	Splint, army lvs, 4-ting	ea	626
37540	Splint, wire ladder	ea	313
1330805	Pentothal Sodium, 25-0.5 cm amp with 25+20cc sterile distilled water	box	508
10480	Alcohol ethyl, 1 quart	btl	11
91155	Morphine tartrate 5-tube	box	122
91304	Sulfadiazine 8 tabs 7.7 gr in waterproof pkg	pkg	122
92030	Bandage elastic 6" x 5 yds 12	ctn	436
92060	Dressing, 1st aid small	ea	3398
99090	Blanket wool, OP	ea	2927
99380	litter, folding, aluminum	ea	1008
20350	Plaster adhesive surr 3" x 5 yds	sol	213
13340	Petrolatum 1-lb	can	129
10100	Acid acetylsalicylic 1000 tabs	btl	5
11190	Cocaine Sulfate 1/2 or 500 tabs	btl	8
14622	Sulfadiazine 7.7 gr 1000 tabs	btl	85
11105	Caffein Sodium Benzoate Injection 12 amp	box	15
71781	Towel, hand	ea	42
16127	Tetanus toxoid plain 30-cc	vial	36
92125	Spones surgical 4" x 4 500	bag	34
10845	Atabrine tablets 100	btl	15
10860	Atropine sulfate 20 - 1/150 gr HT	tubs	30
11380	Chloroform for anesthesia 1/4 lb	btl	5
11505	Compound cathartic 1000 pills or t blats	btl	5
91080	Creosol saponated sol 1 qt	tin	20
11799	Ether for anesthesia 1/4-lb	can	174
11800	Ethyl chloride 3-oz	tubs	15
12290	Hydrogen peroxide sol 3% 1 lb	btl	10
12452	Jelly lubricating 4-oz	jar	15
12647	Mercurium sulfide 4 lbs	can	15
12854	Mercury bichloride 250 large poison tablets	btl	5
12950	Morphine sulfate 20 - 1/8 gr HT	tubs	10
14295	Sodium chloride isotonic solution 1000cc	btl	112
14544	Sulfathiazone sodium sterile 6 vials 5 cm	box	10
14660	Tincture Onium Camphorated Pint	btl	10
1675015	Oxycodone antitoxin polyvalent	vial	100
17315	Dextrose 50% sol 50cc	btl	120
1301810	Nikethamide 25 amps	box	5
20032	Bandage elastic all cotton doz	ctn	2
21060	Bandage gauze roller 4" x 10 yds 12	box	43
20420	Bandage, sheet 5" x 6 yds	pkg	11
31090	Catheter urethral rubber 18 ft	ea	5
33369	Knife operating blades No. 10, 6.	pkg	10
33381	Knife operating blades No. 20, 6	pkg	10

77
80

SECRET

Table No. 2 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, B to D Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 Decemb34 1944.

Medical Items on call at airfield. (Continued)

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
36830	Gloves surgeons size 7 1/2	pr	20
36840	Gloves, surgeons size 8	pr	10
37210	Razor, safety blades 5	pkg	40
37790	Suture chromic catgut size 1	tube	120
37969	Suture silkbraided non-coilary size 000 25 yds	spl	760
37840	Suture catgut size 1	tube	130
37995	suture silk 3/8" 1 coarse	pkgs	45
38460	Syringe lucr 30cc	ea	18
3870507	Tube duodenal 14 f Levin	ea	17
38780	Tube rubber 1/4" di: inside	ft	90
71770	Towel, bath	ea	10
74560	Brush, hand	ea	10
74390	Soap, laundry 1 lb	bar	30
74930	Soap white floating 5 oz	bar	40
77150	Basin sponge	ea	5
77780	Cups paper collapsible 250	ctn	5
7786020	Oxygen tank, 750 gallon filled	ea	10
92127	Sponges surgical 4 x 8 189.	bag	15
99415	Pad heat refill	ea	57
79440	Urinal enameeware	ea	5
93750	Splint wire gauze 5 1/2 x 1 yd	roll	250
91020	Alcohol, denatured 1 pint	tin	140

Total Engineer Items on Call

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Pounds</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Device, firing, push pull	300	72	
Device, firing, pressure release	100	24	
Device, firing, pressure	300	72	
Roll, gelatin, duolocating, 22" wide, mod.	2	26	
Paper, map, lite finish 22" x 29"	500	90	
Composition, C-2	6000	6000	
Cratering charge	4000	4000	
Cap, blasting, special, non-electric	750	6	
Fuze, blasting, time (100' rolls)	3	6	
Fuze lighters	200	2	
Primacord (100' roll)	30	330	
Shape charge (10#)	10	100	
Shape charge (35#)	10	350	
T N T	10,000	1000	
Rags, sand	5,000	1650	
Cap, blasting, special, elect.	750	60	
TOTAL		22,288	11.144

TABLE NO. 2

- 6 -
SECRET

81

S E C R E T

Table No. 3 to Incl No. 3 to Report: Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D-Plus Ten Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

TONNAGES DELIVERED, FIVE RE-SUPPLY

D PLUS 1

<u>Type</u>	<u>82d Div</u>	<u>101st Div</u>	<u>Total</u>
Class I	27 Tons	24.7 Tons	51.7 Tons
Class III	10.9 "	7.7 "	18.6 "
Class V	217.1 "	200.1 "	417.2 "
Other	8.5 "	8.6 "	17.1 "
TOTAL	263.5 Tons	241.1 Tons	504.6 Tons
PLANES (P-24 Bombers)	121	121	252

D PLUS 2

Class I	1.1 Tons	-	1.1 Tons
Class III	-	-	-
Class V	63.0 "	-	63.0 "
Other	-	-	-
TOTAL	64.1 Tons	-	64.1 Tons
PLANES (C-47s)	60	-	60

D PLUS 3

Class I	27.5 Tons	9.5 Tons	37.0 Tons
Class III	10.9 "	-	10.9 "
Class V	397.7 "	-	397.7 "
Other	8.5 "	7.4 "	15.9 "
TOTAL	444.6 Tons	16.9 Tons	461.5 Tons
PLANES (C-47)	311	35	346
TOTAL (3 days)	772.2 Tons	258.0 Tons	1030.2 Tons

Table No. 4 to Incl No. 3 to Report, Subject: "Operation MARKET, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Ten, Inclusive", dated 3 December 1944.

D Plus	TONNAGES DELIVERED, FIVE RE-SUPPLY				Total Tonnage
	Class I 82 101 82 Corps 101	Air Force 101 82 101 (Parachute Drop)	Medical 32 101	Air Corps 82 101	
D Plus 1					3.0
D Plus 3			1		1.5
D Plus 4					2.5
D Plus 8	43				43.0
					1010 Tons
D Plus 1	14	12	32	3.8	41.8
D Plus 2			1.5		1.5
D Plus 3			1.5		1.5
D Plus 6			1	9	10.0
					54.8
					29.6
D Plus 5			24.5		25.0
D Plus 6			5	7.5	122.5
D Plus 8			1		25.1
D Plus 9					15.0
D Plus 12					50.8
D Plus 13					48.2
D Plus 14					50.5
D Plus 15					50.5

(Taken in with units by pliers)

(Air landed at Brussels)

TABLE NO. 4

to
14
13
12
11
10

83

P. 100
116

218-0

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

(23013)
Master



VTIT Corps (Airborne) - Mission Accomplished
(Summary of Military Operations in ETO)

DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

1944-1945

896

10942
Records Sec
Combat analysis Sec

HQ. XVIII CORPS
CAMP CAMPBELL
KENTUCKY

28 September 1945

MEMO FOR: Historian, War Department, Washington, D. C.

"Mission Accomplished," a brief record of the combat service of the XVIII Corps in the ETO, contains a major factual error on page 31, 3rd paragraph. The words "D minus 6" should be "D plus 6."

It would be greatly appreciated if you would make this correction in your copy in the interest of historical accuracy.

/s/ M. B. RIDGWAY
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Comdg.

OFFICIAL: *R. P. Eaton*

R. P. EATON
Brig. Gen., GSC
Chief of Staff

6818 334

"MISSION ACCOMPLISHED"

23013
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MASTER

XVIII




CORPS

18 SEP 1945

THE STORY
OF

"THE FIGHTING CORPS"



"MISSION
ACCOMPLISHED"

A SUMMARY of MILITARY OPERATIONS

of the

XVIII CORPS (Airborne)

IN THE

EUROPEAN THEATRE of OPERATIONS

1944—1945

PUBLISHED IN SCHWERIN, GERMANY.

BY THE

XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I	THE HOLLAND AIRBORNE ASSAULT	Page 3
Chapter II	THE ARDENNES	Page 7
Chapter III	THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT OF THE RHINE (Wesel Operation)	Page 17
Chapter IV	THE RUHR POCKET	Page 23
Chapter V	FROM THE ELBE TO THE BALTIC	Page 31
Chapter VI	CONCLUSION	Page 35

THE CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK ARE NOT
TO BE REPRINTED OR PUBLISHED.


"I desire to commend the XVIII Corps (Airborne) for its outstanding performance during the height of the German counter-offensive, and to extend to you and your *fighting Corps* my personal wishes for continued success."

LT: GEN. C. H. HODGES
Commanding General
First United States Army

A monument in EDINBURGH to the Scottish-American dead of the last war shows their young courageous faces uplifted toward their future as they marched toward it unafraid. Underneath are these immortal words:

"IF IT BE LIFE THAT AWAITS, I SHALL LIVE FOREVER
UNCONQUERED;
IF DEATH, THEN I SHALL DIE AT LAST, STRONG IN MY
PRIDE AND FREE"

To those of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) who died strong in their pride and FREE, we, its unconquered living, dedicate ourselves to a ceaseless fight for FREEDOM for their children and ours — for the UNITED STATES of AMERICA.



Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding
XVIII Corps (Airborne)

20 MAY 1945
HAGENOW, GERMANY

FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General M. B. Ridgway,
Commanding, XVIII Corps (Airborne)
APO 109, U. S. Army.

APO 740, U. S. Army

Dear General Ridgway:

XVIII Corps (Airborne) has passed from command of FAAA and I feel, at this time, that once more I must convey to you, to your staff, and to airborne units now, or in the past, under your command my warmest admiration for your great achievements.

Since its inception your Corps has been outstanding. You well know the many problems of organization that arose and were so successfully overcome. Exceptionally capable officers were assembled and welded into a highly efficient staff.

There have been moments of discouragement and perhaps even an occasional feeling of futility. Time and again planning for an operation was initiated, only to have the operation cancelled before the plans were completed. In a few instances plans progressed to the point of marshalling troops, gliders and aircraft, with again a last minute cancellation of the operation. Throughout you and your staff have labored cheerfully and efficiently, accepting the disappointment of cancellation and attacking each new problem with enthusiasm.

XVIII Corps was outstanding, in its achievements in a ground role both in the German Ardennes counter offensive of December 1944 and January 1945 and in the closing weeks of the campaign prior to the unconditional surrender of Germany.

The airborne assault across the Rhine will, I think, be remembered as an epic in the use of airborne power; a model of planning, training and execution. I have already expressed my tremendous admiration for the accomplishments of your Corps and Divisions in this operation; the smoothness of execution; the gallantry in action; the great contribution to the crossing of the Rhine by 21 Army Group and the further exploitation that ensued.

I take great pride in the fact that during the vital months which saw France, Belgium and Holland liberated, Germany invaded, the Rhine crossed and eventual surrender by the enemy, XVIII Corps was under command of FAAA. It is with a great sense of personal loss that I have seen XVIII Corps (Airborne) pass to another command. I can only hope that at some future date we will attack new problems and achieve new successes together.

To you and your staff and all units now, or in the past, under your command I send my hearty thanks and warmest congratulations. I know that all ranks will continue to be outstanding in the future as they have in the past.

(Signed) L. H. Brereton
L. H. Brereton
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding



13TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Elbridge G. Chapman
Commanding



17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
Maj. Gen. William M. Miley
Commanding



82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin
Commanding

XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE)
Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
Commanding

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
Commanding



XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE)

COMMANDING GENERAL

Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway

CHIEF OF STAFF

Brig. Gen. Ralph P. Eaton

CORPS ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Brig. Gen. Lemuel Matthewson

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Col. James E. Quill

Ass't Chief of Staff G-1
Col. Frederic M. Shellhammer

Ass't Chief of Staff G-2
Col. Whitfield Jack

Ass't Chief of Staff G-3
Col. Alexander D. Surles, Jr.

Ass't Chief of Staff G-4
Col. Frank W. Moorman

Ass't Chief of Staff G-5
Col. Harry P. Cain

Ass't Chief of Staff Air
Col. Jay G. Brown

Adjutant General
Col. Herbert L. Nelson

Chemical Warfare
Col. Edward J. Barta

Corps of Engineers
Col. Benjamin S. Shute

Finance
Col. Charles H. Martin

Inspector General
Col. Charles F. Barrett, Jr.

Judge Advocate
Col. Casimir D. Moss

Ordnance
Col. Charles W. Eifler

Provost Marshal
Lt. Col. Bennie A. Zinn

Quartermaster
Col. Charles H. Carfuthers

Signal
Col. Lee R. Williams

Special Service Officer
Lt. Col. Frank C. Schroeder, Jr.

Surgeon
Col. Wolcott L. Etienne

Chaplains

Lt. Col. (Ch) Robert L. Schock
Lt. Col. (Ch) Thomas E. Hayes

INTRODUCTION


Elsewhere in the military archives of the United States, Britain and France, are writ the statistics of conquest, the amazing logistics and the battle field tactics of this the first and only American Airborne Corps. Let this book concern itself with a stripped down flashback through nine short months of actions planned and missions accomplished.

By midsummer of 1944 it was evident that the 82nd Airborne Division and the IX Troop Carrier Command, veterans of Sicily, Italy and Normandy, the 101st Airborne Division, proven in the fires of Crete, plus the 17th and 13th Airborne Divisions, yet to arrive in the EUROPEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, needed unity of command in order to fully exploit their unique power. Corresponding British Airborne and Royal Air Force units found themselves in the same position. Accordingly, the FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, Lt Gen LEWIS H. BRERETON commanding, was created to assume immediate command of all British and American Airborne and Troop Carrier units in the European Theatre of Operations. Simultaneously the XVIII US Corps (Airborne) and the First British Airborne Corps were set up.

Children of the Battlefields, these units planned and fought while they worked out their basic problems of organization, tactics, supply and logistics.

On 27 August 1944, Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, XVIII Corps arrived from the United States at OGBOURNE ST. GEORGE, ENGLAND, to learn that as of that date it had been redesignated XVIII Corps (Airborne) and placed under command of Major General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, until then Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division. Under command were 82nd, 101st and 17th Airborne Divisions, the first two in England and ready for combat, the last named in process of disembarking in England from the United States.

Detailed Airborne operational planning was already in progress and continued through a kaleidoscopic series of targets including the SEINE River, the area RAMBOUILLET — CHARTRES — ETAMPES, the area LILLE — TOURCOING — Tournai, WALCHEREN ISLAND. In each instance the headlong dash of Allied armies across FRANCE and the LOWLANDS rendered Airborne participation unnecessary. Then, as swiftly as prior targets had appeared and disappeared, came the opportunity of TWENTY FIRST ARMY GROUP to employ an Airborne spearhead in a bold offensive through HOLLAND. Thus was the stage set for XVIII Corps (Airborne) initial active participation in European operations, only 20 days after arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM as a ground unit.



THE HOLLAND AIRBORNE ASSAULT
17 SEPT. TO 27 SEPT. 1944

CHAPTER I THE HOLLAND AIRBORNE ASSAULT

By early September 1944, the SECOND BRITISH ARMY had completed its rapid advance from the SEINE River and its elements were along the MEUSE-ESCAULT Canal. Before it lay HOLLAND. A dash to the ZUIDER ZEE would cut communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES and open up the excellent tank country of the NORTH GERMAN plain. Behind three great water barriers, the MAAS, the WAAL and the NEDER RIJN, all of which are branches of the lower RHINE River, the Germans were organizing their defenses.

A bold decision was reached. With supply and communications outrun, it was nevertheless determined to move offensively without delay to seize bridgeheads across the MAAS, the WAAL, and the NEDER RIJN, and push on to the sea.

The offensive was to be spearheaded by three airborne divisions, laying down a carpet in front of the ground troops, seizing the bridges across the rivers at GRAVE, NIJMEGEN, and ARNHEM, dropping from south to north in the order 101st, 82nd and 1st British Airborne Divisions. D-Day was set for 17 September 1944.



At a conference in England at 1800 hours, 10 September, the three divisions, 1st British Airborne Corps and XVIII Corps (Airborne) were given the situation, decision, and missions. 1st British Airborne Corps was given command. Responsibility of XVIII Corps (Airborne) was limited to setting up and insuring the air resupply of the US Airborne Divisions, arranging for the ground supply of the American Airborne divisions and providing pre-take off intelligence, maps, aerial photography, and all essential data for the American Airborne divisions.



In six days the three airborne divisions were marshalled on departure airfields in the UNITED KINGDOM, detailed plans evolved, maps, aerial photography, and essential data procured and distributed, all troops thoroughly briefed and ready to take off.

At 1600 hours on 17 September the first parachutist jumped. The weather was good, landing and drop zones excellent. Complete tactical surprise was achieved, the enemy offering little opposition to the initial drops. Later however, bitter fighting developed. All objectives were taken.


The great highway bridge at NIJMEGEN was captured intact in the course of a brilliant and daring attack in the face of strong resistance. In the REICHWALD



Forest strong enemy forces stubbornly contested every inch of ground. At ARNHEM the 1st British Airborne Division fought an epic action, remaining cut off and out of contact with friendly forces until reached by elements of SECOND BRITISH ARMY on 25 September, when what was left of that gallant unit was evacuated south across the NEDER RIJN.

While the General Officer Commanding, 1st Airborne Corps (British) exercised command of the three participating Airborne Divisions, the Commanding General, XVIII Corps (Airborne) accompanied the assault echelon by air to observe the two US divisions.

The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions remained in combat in HOLLAND, under command of SECOND BRITISH ARMY until relieved shortly before the German ARDENNES counter offensive in mid December 1944.



CHAPTER II THE ARDENNES

On 16 December 1944, the German High Command launched a daring counter-offensive against the FIRST and THIRD US ARMIES in the ARDENNES, BELGIUM. This assault was a desperate gamble to prolong the war by seizing the initiative and delaying the Allied resumption of the offensive for many months. The effort was most elaborately organized. The best of the German forces in the WEST, including the great bulk of its armor, were entrusted with the mission. All inclusive security measures were adopted to insure surprise. Overwhelming superiority in men and material was assembled by the enemy at his point of strike. His objective was to split the American forces, capture critical stores, push through to the MEUSE river, seize LIEGE and NAMUR and then drive on as far as PARIS and the NORTH SEA if possible. Success would have had far reaching effects upon the future course of the war.



Initially, the enemy offensive met with considerable success, and only through the heroic efforts of numerous American units was he first stopped and then expelled.

On the morning that the enemy attacked, the XVIII Corps (Airborne) comprised the 17th, 82nd, and 101st Airborne Divisions, Corps Hq and Hq Company, Hq and Hq Battery, Corps Artillery, 54th Signal Battalion (less Co "C"), and 3060 Engineer



Topographical Company. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, but recently disengaged from operations in HOLLAND, were training and retraining in base camps in the REIMS-SUIPPES-SISSONNE area, FRANCE. The 17th Airborne Division was in training at base camps in WILTSHIRE and SURREY, ENGLAND. Corps Headquarters and Corps troops were split between EPERNAY, FRANCE and OGBOURNE ST. GEORGE, ENGLAND.



The initial success of the enemy counter-offensive resulted in a decision by the SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, to detach the XVIII Corps (Airborne) from the FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY and attach it to TWELFTH ARMY GROUP. The earliest indication of this decision was received at that portion of Corps Headquarters stationed in ENGLAND at about 2100 hours 17 December 1944, when various warning messages began to arrive. The actual order attaching the Corps to TWELFTH ARMY GROUP, and directing its concentration on the continent without delay, was received by the Corps Commander in ENGLAND at 0215, 18 December 1944. By 0830, that same day, that part of the Corps Headquarters in ENGLAND was airborne in 55 planes, enroute to the continent. In spite of dangerous flying weather, it landed in the REIMS area that morning between 1100 and 1300 hours. Meanwhile, concurrent action had been taken to move the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions by truck, with destination the vicinity of BASTOGNE, BELGIUM, the concentration area assigned by FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY.



Through the superb initiative and cooperation of the COMMUNICATION ZONE, particularly OISE BASE SECTION, both of these Airborne Divisions were assembled, supplied with ammunition and cleared from their base areas in approximately eighteen hours. Enroute to the battle front, orders were received attaching the 101st Airborne Division to the VIII Corps, in the BASTOGNE-area, and directing 'XVIII Corps

Because the scope of this narrative is strictly limited to Corps Command Operations, we must at this point regretfully leave the 101st Airborne Division, which went on to win immortal fame in the defense of BASTOGNE. For the same reason, the ARDENNES operations of the 17th Airborne Division, which flew into action from ENGLAND and fought under THIRD US ARMY, are not here recorded.

(Airborne) Headquarters and the 82nd Airborne Division to proceed into action in the vicinity of WERBOMONT, BELGIUM.

The weather during the initial part of the Operation was overcast and cool, turning to bitter and intense cold at an early date. Visibility most of the time was poor. Not until the later stages of the campaign was strong air support received, and then it was frequently interrupted.



The ARDENNES Mountains form rugged broken terrain, characterized by deep ravines, narrow valleys and steep hills, with numerous intervening streams and cross compartments. Much of the area is heavily forested with evergreens. Blinding snowstorms, with resulting tremendous drifts, made going, cross country or on roads, in the face of bitter enemy resistance, a test of human endurance and ingenuity.

Under the above circumstances, the fight became a battle for roads as the German avalanche poured westward. Having broken through the American lines between MALMEDY on the north and BASTOGNE on the south the enemy sought to press his advantage by exploiting West towards PARIS, and North to capture huge American stores, particularly gasoline, at VERVIERS and LIEGE. To do so his problem was to force his salient open wider at its two shoulders — MALMEDY and BASTOGNE.

To the XVII Corps (Airborne) went the mission and the honor of first, holding back the rush of the German Armored Columns, and second, expelling the enemy from the northern part of his salient.



The three key road centers in the salient were ST. VITH, tenaciously held by the 7th Armored Division, reinforced by elements of the 9th Armored, and the 106th and 28th Infantry Divisions; HOUFFALIZE, already in enemy hands; and BASTOGNE, which was never captured.

The 30th Infantry Division, with elements of the 3rd Armored Division attached, was disposed westward from MALMEDY, deadlocked with the German 1st SS Panzer Division.



There was no contact between 7th Armored Division and 30th Infantry Division. Through this gap the enemy was pushing his armored columns westward preparing to strike through ST. VITH with overwhelming force, then whip around the exposed right flank of the 7th Armored Division.

Such was the situation when the Corps took command of the above United States units. The 82nd Airborne Division and the 7th Armored Division commenced attacking at once and by midnight of 20 December had established a bridgehead over the SALM River at TROIS PONTS. Contact was established with all elements of the Corps. The 84th Infantry Division was attached to the Corps, but to be committed only on EIRST.

US ARMY Order:

21-22 December. The 30th Infantry Division continued to defend the STAVELOT-MALMEDY sector against strong enemy attacks but was unsuccessful in its attempts to retake STOU MONT or LA GLEIZE. The 84th Infantry Division was committed on the Corps fight to prevent the enemy advancing west of the MARCHE-HOTTON Road. Thus, the Corps front had been made fairly continuous, but with the 7th Armored Division and associated units dangerously out in front, surrounded on three sides.

23 December. Its position before ST. VITH being no longer tenable, the 7th Armored, with elements of 106th and 28th Infantry Divisions and Combat Command B of 9th Armored Division attached, was withdrawn through the 82nd Airborne Division and given a defensive sector on the Corps right. Meanwhile, the enemy was flowing around the open right flank of the Corps and turning north along the general line HOTTON-VIELSALM.

The 84th Infantry Division was attached to the VII Corps which was moving in on the XVIII Corps (Airborne) right to shore up the north side of the salient. The situation was by now extremely critical. The enemy was making his bid, with all available forces, to break through the Corps front to VERVIERS and LIEGE.

24 December. Now the 82nd Airborne Division was dangerously out in front of a jagged irregular front line. To shorten this line, the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group ordered that division withdrawn. The withdrawal was executed under cover of darkness and Christmas morning saw the Corps disposed generally along a



straight line from MALMEDY through STAVELOT (STOUMONT and LA GLEIZE having been taken) and GRAND MENIL, with units in line from East to West as follows: 30th Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, 7th Armored Division.

25-26 December. These days marked the turning point and the high tide of enemy operations. Seeing desperately to pierce the American defenses, attack after attack was hurled northward. Fighting at the critical road center of MANHAY was particularly heavy. Every attack was repulsed. The line held. The enemy finally lay still to lick his wounds. The Corps readied itself for a counter-offensive of its own.

30 December - 2 January. The 7th Armored was relieved by the 75th Infantry Division in the line, the former reverting to Corps reserve. 3rd Armored Division having already been transferred to VII Corps. Preparations for the offensive, along with VII Corps on the right, were intensified.


3-10 January. With the 30th Infantry Division holding in place on the Corps left, the 82nd Airborne attacked to the south. Simultaneously, VII Corps attacked with HOUFFALIZE as its objective. By midnight of 10 January, 82nd Airborne Division had cleared the west bank of the SALM River to below VIELSALM. The 30th Infantry Division stood fast on order.

11-12 January. 82nd Airborne Division was moved to Corps Reserve. The stage was set for the capture of ST. VITH and the clearing out of the area between that town and the SALM River. The 30th Infantry Division was to fight its way straight south from the line MALMEDY-STAVELOT. On its right the 106th Infantry Division likewise planned to attack southward to a limited objective line. The 75th Infantry Division's direction of attack was fixed to the East, commencing with a crossing of the SALM River. On the left and behind 30th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division was poised to strike straight for ST. VITH once the 30th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division, V Corps, had cleared certain defiles southeast of MALMEDY.

13-24 January. The coordinated attack jumped off as planned, with the VII Corps continuing to make steady progress on the right. All units moved relentlessly forward, grinding the enemy down. By midnight of 23 January all Corps objectives, including ST. VITH, had been secured. The Corps front now faced generally East through ST. VITH.

24-27 January. These four days were spent in regrouping and readying for a resumption of the advance to the Northeast. This time the objective was to pierce





the SIEGFRIED Line and drive on towards EUSKIRCHEN. The Corps now consisted of four hard hitting divisions, the 1st, 30th, 82nd Airborne, and 84th. Advancing in a narrow zone with two divisions in assault, the 1st on the left and the 82nd Airborne on the right, with the 30th and 84th ready on call to effect a passage of lines, the Corps was prepared to maintain the full power of its initial assault through the SIEGFRIED defenses and on to the RHINE.

28 January—5 February. The drive to the SIEGFRIED Line got under way at 0400 hours on 28 January, gaining complete initial surprise. The enemy fought a stubborn rear guard action. Everywhere his counter-offensive had failed. Evacuation out of the Salient and into the SIEGFRIED Line was in progress. The now beaten enemy expected to hold in his fortifications while his field army reformed to the east. But so rapidly did the assault divisions press their advances through snow and ice that they were on top of and into the SIEGFRIED line before the enemy could adequately prepare it. However, very bitter fighting and stubborn resistance marked the action at the line of pillboxes. The first two belts of the SIEGFRIED Line were pierced in force, the West belt at all points in the Corps zone of action. Exploitation was halted when, on 2nd February, the 30th and 84th Divisions were ordered relieved from the Corps and the Corps was directed to prepare for operations in the HURTGEN Forest area, some 25 miles to the north.

6—12 February. The 99th Infantry Division (V Corps) took over the Corps zone as a defensive sector. The Corps, with 1st Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions, moved north to the west side of the ROER River, in the vicinity of the dams near SCHMIDT. Preparations were made and detailed plans drawn for a forced crossing of the ROER, with the 1st, 82nd Airborne and 78th Divisions.

13 February. On FIRST ARMY Order, Corps Headquarters relinquished its command to III Corps and returned to EPERNAY, FRANCE, to prepare for the airborne operations across the RHINE in conjunction with 2ND BRITISH ARMY.

During 60 days of action the XVIII Corps (Airborne) had engaged successfully in the following operations:

Concentration in the WERBOMONT area, and advance to contact with German forces thrusting westward.

Attack to establish contact with isolated friendly forces in the ST. VITH area.

Relief of these friendly forces, covering their withdrawal behind the Corps front.

Voluntary withdrawal by order of higher authority to a defensive position to screen the concentration of the VII Corps in the MARCHE—HOTTON area.

Active defense.

Attack.

Regrouping, change of direction, and renewal of attack, to include seizure of the first of the dual SIEGFRIED defense positions in the Corps zone.

Relief by other units.

Movement to and regrouping in the HURTGEN area, preparatory to forcing a crossing of the ROER River and continuing the attack to the northeast.

During the course of these operations this Corps took 10,737 prisoners, inflicted additional severe casualties in personnel, captured or destroyed 30 tanks and 138 artillery pieces, seized the first half of the SIEGFRIED defenses in its zone, materially and obviously reduced the effectiveness of enemy organization and control throughout the Corps zone, and accomplished, in full and on time, every

mission assigned, including the withdrawal without loss of personnel or equipment of the more than 15,000 friendly forces isolated in the ST. VITH area. The following major units served with the Corps during all or part of this period:

82nd Airborne Division — Maj. Gen. J. M. GAVIN.
1st Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) C. ANDRUS.
30th Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. L. S. HOBBS.
75th Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. F. M. PRICKETT.
84th Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. A. R. BOLLING.
99th Infantry Division — Maj. Gen. W. E. LAUER.
106th Infantry Division (less detachments) — Brig. Gen. H. P. PERRIN.
3rd Armored Division — Maj. Gen. M. ROSE.
7th Armored Division — Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) R. W. HASBROUCK.
Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division — Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) W. M. HOGE.

Maximum effective strength of this Corps during this period was ninety-seven thousand (97,000) troops.



Through error the insignia of the 3rd Armored Division was omitted from original editions of "MISSION ACCOMPLISHED." The Division was assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne) for the first few days of the ARDENNES Campaign, and played a vitally important role.



During the critical period of the German break-through from 19 December to 23 December, the Division fought along a wide front. Combat Command B operated in support of the 30th Infantry Division helping to create and eliminate the "LA GLEIZE Pocket." The Division (-CCA and CCB) was assigned the mission of holding the Corps right flank. At noon on 20 December the Division began securing the road from MANHAY to HOUFFALIZE. Actually one-third of the Division was responsible for covering an arc of 15 miles cut by more than 30 roads and trails. The Division fought on the most vital road junctions on the Corps right flank, which it protected until relieved by the 84th Infantry Division on 23 December.

Insert to
"MISSION ACCOMPLISHED"
Published by XVIII Corps (Airborne)

* * * * * "Yours is a hard hitting corps
which strikes swiftly and follows through relentlessly.
You have fought equally well in airborne operation
or as infantry. Your veteran troops have displayed
unusual courage and tenacity in following your forceful
leadership." * * * * *

(Signed) COURTNEY H. HODGES

COURTNEY H. HODGES
Commanding General
First U. S. Army



At that time it was contemplated that XVIII Corps (Airborne) would plan and command a two airborne division operation, likewise east of the RHINE, in support of the TWELFTH ARMY GROUP; this second operation to follow immediately after the operation at WESEL. Hence, it was directed that Corps Headquarters would be withdrawn from the WESEL operation not later than D plus 6. However, events prior to 24 March voided the second operation.

Along the East bank of the RHINE the enemy had carefully prepared his defenses in considerable depth and had massed a great array of anti-aircraft artillery. In the WESEL area he expected an airborne assault and carefully prepared for it. Daylight was chosen for the airborne operation, in order to take full advantage of the overwhelming Allied supremacy in the air and in artillery. Decision was made that the airborne strike would follow, rather than precede, the ground force assault crossing, the first time that this sequence of attack had been used.

Airborne planning, closely coordinated with SECOND BRITISH ARMY, proceeded smoothly. Alternate objectives and drop zones were provided for in detail. The employment of 13th Airborne Division was abandoned, due to insufficient air lift.



By 22 March, the two participating airborne divisions were on departure airfields, the 6th British in ENGLAND and the 17th US in FRANCE. XVIII Corps (Airborne) Headquarters was established near the west bank of the RHINE, ready to cross as soon as a link up could be effected. The ground forces were reaided and impatient, the enemy nervous and expectant. On 23 March a terrific and systematic coordinated aerial and artillery bombardment was commenced on key targets. That night British ground forces began their assault crossings. By 0800 hours on the 24th 12 Corps (Lt. Gen. RITCHIE) had a grip on the far shore, and the 1st Commando Brigade, passing to XVIII Corps (Airborne) later in the day, had cleared the major portion

of WESEL.

D-Day, 24 March 1945, dawned hazy over the drop and landing zones. It had not cleared to any great extent when the two converging air columns roared across the RHINE at 1000 hours. Enemy flak took a heavy toll both from the US Troop Carrier Command and 38 British Group, but not a pilot faltered. By noon, the two divisions were on the ground.

The impact of the vertical envelopment was tremendous. Instead of dropping just over the River, the selected landing and drop zones were deep in, well out in front of the ground forces. In fact, the air strike was of such depth that all enemy artillery and rear defensive positions in its path were included and destroyed, reducing in one (1) day and with far fewer casualties, a position that might have taken many days to overcome by ground action alone. The result was to achieve complete break-through of the German RHINE defenses in this area. Four thousand prisoners were captured before nightfall, and the defensive artillery destroyed or driven out.

By mid afternoon of D-Day, all Corps objectives, including bridgeheads across the ISSEL River, had been captured; the Corps Commander had crossed and assumed command, and firm contact had been established with 12 British Corps.

Exploitation of the gap torn through the enemy positions was relentless and decisive during the next five days. Orienting on MUNSTER, with an axis of advance to the east, the two airborne divisions pushed forward abreast. On 26 March, 6th Guards Armored Brigade was attached to the Corps. With 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment of 17th Airborne Division riding its tanks, it drove remorselessly east, up the main highway towards MUNSTER, with the 6th British and 17th Airborne Divisions pacing it on foot to the left.

The defiles at HALTERN and DULMEN were seized for the debouchment of 2nd US Armored Division, which passed through the 17th Airborne Division on 29 March and then pressed on through scattered and ineffective resistance to link up with FIRST US ARMY elements in the PADERBORN area, thereby forming the famous RUHR Pocket which broke the back of German resistance in the WEST.

On 30 March, at 0600, the XVIII Corps (Airborne) turned over its zone of action, closed its Command Post and headed for its base at EPERNAVY, FRANCE. The two airborne divisions carried on.



During the six day period, 24 to 30 March, in which this Corps was operational, it averaged a daily advance of over seven miles, took 8,000 prisoners, destroyed the 84th German Infantry Division, and, by verified but incomplete count, captured or destroyed 124 artillery and AA pieces and 26 tanks. The withdrawal of the Corps on D-Day plus 6 made it impossible to obtain full reports from the divisions. It is believed that the amount of material captured and destroyed greatly exceeds the above figures.

This relatively small operation, by a single corps, imparted to the SECOND BRITISH ARMY'S assault crossing of the RHINE a momentum which was maintained, substantially unchecked, until the BALTIC was reached and war ended. It thus made a decisive contribution to large scale operations — the true objective of airborne forces.



Units and personalities participating in the RHINE crossings were as follows:

21st Army Group — Field Marshal Sir BERNARD L. MONTGOMERY, KCB, DSO.

Second British Army — Lt. Gen. Sir MILES DEMPSEY, KCB, DSO, MC.

First Allied Airborne Army — Lt. Gen. LEWIS H. BRERETON.

XVIII Corps (Airborne) — Maj. Gen. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY.

Deputy Commander — Maj. Gen. RICHARD N. GALE, DSO, OBE, MC, (GOC, 1st British Airborne Corps).

8th British Corps — Lt. Gen. EVELYN H. BARKER, CB, CBE, DSO, MC.

12th British Corps — Lt. Gen. NELL RITCHIE, CB.

8th Bomber Command (B-24 Resupply) — Maj. Gen. FREDERIK L. ANDERSON.

IX Troop Carrier Command — Maj. Gen. PAUL E. WILLIAMS.

17th U. S. Airborne Division — Maj. Gen. WILLIAM M. MILEY.

6th British Airborne Division — Maj. Gen. ERIC L. BOLS, DSO.

6th Guards Armored Brigade — Brigadier W. D. C. GREENARCE, MVO.

1st Commando Brigade — Brigadier DERCK MILLS-ROBERTS, DSO, MC, Irish Guards.

SAS Ground Force — Lt. Col. BRIAN FORSTER MORTAN FRANKS, DSO, MC.

HEADQUARTERS

SECOND ARMY

29 March 1945

Dear Matt

I very much appreciated your letter of March 27th.

It has been a great honour and privilege to me to have had your Corps under my command.

The way in which your planning and preparations were carried out filled everyone at my Headquarters with complete confidence in the outcome of the operation.

Your magnificent success in the battle itself will live for ever as an example of the way in which Airborne forces should be handled.

I cannot tell you how much I appreciate and admire your achievements in Second Army.


From the personal point of view I have very greatly enjoyed working and fighting with you — and I hope that one day we may be associated again.

With my best wishes.

Your sincerely

Major General M.B. Ridgway,
Commanding General,
XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE).

M.B. Ridgway



CHAPTER IV THE RUHR POCKET

When armored spearheads of the NINTH and FIRST US ARMIES met in the PADERBORN area on 1 April the RUHR was surrounded and sealed off from the remainder of GERMANY.

On 30 March XVIII Corps (Airborne) was relieved from attachment to SECOND BRITISH ARMY in the WESEL area where it had been engaged in the Airborne assault across the RHINE. That afternoon the Corps commander and part of his staff flew to the Corps base at EPERNAY, FRANCE. On arrival at base it was learned that SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, had attached the Corps to TWELFTH ARMY GROUP for operations against the RUHR pocket. The Corps commander and staff left by air the next morning for the RUHR, reporting to Commanding General, FIRST US ARMY before midnight. The Corps Signal Battalion was engaged in retrieving wire in the WESEL area. It went directly to the RUHR. Headquarters Company and Corps Artillery were caught on the road to EPERNAY. All units were reoriented by air and vehicle towards the RUHR, where Corps CP was established at DILLENBURG.

The vast RUHR pocket, with its hundreds of thousands of enemy troops and enormous amounts of material, encompassing the heart of Germany's industry, was to be crushed out by the concurrent action of three US Armies. On the west



Right - the Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER visited the forward Command Post of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) during the height of the Ruhr Pocket Operation. From L to R are Gen. OMAR BRADLEY, Lt. Gen. COURTNEY H. HODGES, Gen. EISENHOWER and to the extreme right the Corps Commander, Maj. Gen. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY.

Below - A German Tank mounting a 120 mm gun, knocked out by an American bazooka team during the Ruhr Pocket Battle.



FIFTEENTH ARMY held the west bank of the RHINE to prevent nuisance raids and to poise a threat from the west. The cleansing of the pocket was to be executed from the North by NINTH ARMY attacking south from the LIPPE River to the RUHR River, while from the south and east the FIRST ARMY attacked to the North and Northwest.

The FIRST ARMY employed two Corps abreast, the III Corps on the right (east) and the XVIII Corps (Airborne) on the left (west).

Attacking on the SE-NW axis: SIEGEN-ESSEN, with its flanks on the RHINE and the LENNE Rivers, the XVIII Corps (Airborne) became operational on 1 April, with 8th and 78th Infantry Divisions abreast and generally along the line of the SIEG River on a 67 mile front.

Initially, the 78th Infantry Division executed a holding mission on the Corps left, guarding the RHINE-bridges in the vicinity of BONN. The 8th Infantry Division, pushing forward steadily on a wide front, met stubborn resistance, particularly in the vicinity of SIEGEN.

From 1 April to 8 April, the 86th and 97th Infantry Divisions were brought successively into the line, making a total of four Infantry Divisions in assault, from right to left the 86th, 8th, 78th and 97th. During these eight days the business of killing and capturing Germans continued at an even pace as relentless pressure, day and night, wore the enemy down and pushed him to the northwest. Though the final result was inevitable, the enemy fought stubbornly, employing many AA guns in ground roles and using his armor and self-propelled weapons skillfully. By now the attack was general along the entire Corps front, except on the left where the 97th Infantry Division held back its west flank to protect the BONN bridges.





FIRST US ARMY Commander on 8 April outlined the wishes of TWELFTH ARMY GROUP Commander that the RUHR pocket be reduced with the least practicable delay. Accordingly, the 13th Armored Division was made available to XVIII Corps (Airborne), to pass to Corps control as soon as it could be concentrated in the Corps Zone. 5th Infantry Division was assigned to III Corps on the right to add fresh impetus to its attack.



On 10 April the Corps Commander put into execution a double envelopment, which with maximum speed and exploitation of all available fire power overran and crushed enemy resistance in the Corps zone within seven (7) days. All troops were committed. The Corps withheld no reserve. The right (east) wing of the envelopment was executed by the 88th and 8th Infantry Divisions attacking abreast on a narrow three (3) regiment front, thus providing a powerful hardhitting force with unlimited sustaining power to envelop the hostile left. In the center, the 78th Infantry Division attacked on a broad front, keeping direct and ceaseless pressure on the enemy center. The 97th Infantry and 13th Armored Divisions comprised the left (west) wing of the envelopment, with the 97th Infantry division forcing crossings and seizing bridgeheads over the SIEG River for the debouchment of the 13th Armored. Once clear of the SIEG River the armor crushed through a maze of ground sited AA guns, and, supported by 97th Infantry Division on its right, carried the envelopment of the hostile right to a swift conclusion.



Power, applied without surcease, began to tell. Enemy resistance commenced to weaken and lose coordination. On the Corps right, regiments and battalions of the 8th and 86th Infantry Divisions pushed boldly northward with little regard to flank protection.

By 14 April the end was plainly in sight. Prisoners were being taken by the thousands.

On 15 April the RUHR River was reached on the Corps right and contact established with NINTH ARMY on the north bank of the river. This final thrust split the RUHR Pocket in two and undoubtedly influenced the mass surrender of the German forces opposing III Corps.

On 17th April the 13th Armored Division contacted 17th Airborne Division in DUISBURG.

During the course of these operations, the XVIII CORPS (AIRBORNE) captured one hundred sixty thousand eight hundred ninety two (160,892) prisoners, (including twenty-five (25) general officers); inflicted many additional casualties in personnel; captured or destroyed 56 tanks, 51 artillery pieces, 148 dual purpose AA/AT guns, 28 self-propelled guns and 444 trucks, half tracks and personnel carriers. The Corps advanced seventy-two (72) miles to overrun approximately five thousand (5,000) square miles of GERMAN soil, including the cities of SIEGEN, SIEGBURG, BERG-GLADBACH, LUEDENSCHIED, HUGKESWAGEN, WERMELSKIRCHEN, LEVERKUSEN, SOLINGEN, REMSCHEID HAGEN, WUPPERTAL, SCHWELM, ELBERFELD, and DUESSELDORF. Remnants of two (2) Armies, three (3) Corps, fourteen (14) Divisions and one hundred and fifty (150) miscellaneous units were destroyed. An estimated 200,000 Allied displaced persons were liberated from GERMAN slavery; five thousand six hundred and thirty nine (5,639) Allied Prisoners of War were freed. Every mission assigned the Corps was rapidly accomplished, and at 0630 hours, 18 April 1945 the last organized resistance within the RUHR Pocket had been eliminated.





Fighting in the Bahr encompassed the tactical extremes of vicious house-to-house street fighting shown to the right, and flushing enemy pockets of resistance in the deep forests that stud the hills and valleys south of the Bahr. The forest pictured above is typical of the terrain encountered through this area.

The following major units served with the Corps during all or part of this period:

8th Infantry Division — Major General (then Brigadier General) B. E. MOORE

78th Infantry Division — Major General E. P. PARKER, JR.

86th Infantry Division — Major General H. M. MELASKY.


97th Infantry Division — Brigadier General M. B. HALSEY.

1stst Armored Division — Major General J. B. WOGAN; and later

Major General JOHN MILLIKEN, when the former was wounded.

Maximum effective strenght of the Corps during this period was 84,859 troops.





CHAPTER V FROM THE ELBE TO THE BALTIC

By the middle of April 1945, the German war machine had been crushed and defeated. But it was not destroyed and it fought on. In the north, opposing SECOND BRITISH ARMY, the enemy prepared his last line of defenses on the north side of his last great water barrier, the ELBE River. Along the BALTIC from the East the Russians were closing fast. The jaws of a great international pincer were set.

Out of the RUHR and onto the NORTH GERMAN Plain came the XVIII Corps (Airborne) to fight once more under command of SECOND BRITISH ARMY and TWENTY FIRST ARMY GROUP. Relieved in the RUHR on 25 April, the Corps commenced concentrating on 27 April in the UELZEN-CELLE area just South of the ELBE River.

The SECOND BRITISH ARMY proposed to force a crossing of the ELBE at LAUENBURG, employing its 8 Corps. Behind the 8 Corps the XVIII Corps (Airborne) would cross one division on D ~~11~~ 6, turn southeast to uncover bridge sites at BLECKEDE and DARCHAU and at those two towns construct its own bridges.

On 28 April, after weighing the time element and evaluating the enemy's capabilities, a bold course of action was decided upon. The XVIII Corps (Air-

borne) would force its own crossings instead of waiting to cross on the bridges required for 8 Corps, thereby saving four to five precious days. At this time the 13th and 121st Regimental Combat Teams of the 8th Infantry Division were closed in their concentration area, so placed in rear of the 8 British Corps as to be readily available to move northward to the LAUENBURG area. None of the infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division, which was concentrating opposite the XVIII Corps (Airborne) bridge sites was available for the crossing. In fact, the lead battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division (1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry) was not due to arrive in the area until 0455 hours, 29 April, with the remainder of the Regiment completing concentration at 1700 hours, 29 April. The balance of the 8th Infantry Division completed concentration at 2300 hours, 28 April; the remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division and 7th US Armored Division completed their moves at midnight, 30 April.

Adaculous infantry action, herculean engineer effort, imaginative conception and relentless drive in execution — all combined to achieve a victory of which any military unit might be justly proud.

On 29 April the 8 British Corps crossed the ELBE in assault at LAUENBURG. The following day a single regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division likewise forced a crossing at BLECKEBE. It was quickly followed by other troops of the Corps. Under intense artillery fire Corps Engineers constructed a class 36 reinforced 1180 foot heavy ponton bridge in the record time of 15 hours.

Next day, 1 May 1945, the 6th British Airborne Division, which had crossed the ELBE on the 8 Corps bridge, was attached to the XVIII Corps (Airborne). With the 8th Infantry, 6th British and 82nd US Airborne Divisions on the north bank of the ELBE, a race was begun for objectives, straight through the middle of disheartened and stunned German troops. By the afternoon of 2 May, all Corps objectives had been reached. The 6th British Airborne Division was at WISMAR on the BALTIC, the 8th Infantry Division held SCHWERIN on the east, the 82nd Airborne Division was in possession of LUDWIGSLUST and GRABOW to the southeast. By midnight the 7th Armored Division was across the river in force.


The German forces in the Corps zone of action were overrun and bewildered. With the Russians closing in on them from the east, individual officers and men surrendered by the tens of thousands.

To the 6th British Airborne Division went the honor of first contact with the Russians, established at WISMAR at 2100 hours 2 May 1945. The following day Russian contact was made by the 8th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions.

In a single week the XVIII Corps (Airborne), moving some of its divisions and other units by rail and motor for distances exceeding two hundred and fifty (250) miles, concentrated south of the ELBE; forced a crossing of that formidable obstacle, establishing, it is believed, new records for rapidity and efficiency of major bridging operations; advanced sixty (60) miles through German territory; completed the elimination of all enemy resistance; and, protecting the SECOND BRITISH ARMY east flank, made contact with our gallant Russian Allies along the entire final objective, from the ELBE to the BALTIC. It is believed that never has the element of *TIME*, so vital a factor in military operations, been more completely nor more effectively exploited. It is believed that never have the efforts of individuals and of organizations, British and American, been more quickly and effectively combined into team-play. During the course of the operation, the Corps captured three hundred fifty nine thousand seven hundred ninety six (359,796) prisoners including fifty (50) General Officers, inflicted additional casualties in personnel, destroyed or captured twenty four (24) tanks, one hundred fifty two (152) artillery pieces, fifty seven (57) antiaircraft-antitank guns, twenty two (22) self-propelled guns, and seven thousand five hundred sixty three (7,563) miscellaneous vehicles. In the sixty (60) mile advance the Corps conquered approximately twelve hundred (1200) square miles of German soil, and cut off SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN and DENMARK when the BALTIC was reached at WISMAR. Every mission assigned the Corps was accomplished ahead of schedule. The speed and spirit exhibited by the divisions of this Corps so thoroughly disrupted the hostile forces that any remaining resistance they might have contemplated was rendered impossible.

The following major units served with the Corps during all or part of the period:
6th British Airborne Division — Major General E. L. BOLS, DSO.
7th US Armored Division — Major General R. W. HASBROUCK.
8th US Infantry Division — Major General (then Brigadier General) B. E. MOORE
82nd Airborne Division — Major General J. M. GAVIN

Maximum effective strength of the Corps during this period was sixty seven thousand three hundred and thirty one (67,031), of which number thirteen thousand four hundred and sixty three (13,463) were British troops.



CONCLUSION

"Troops of your corps have been with First Army three times; on the Normandy beaches, during the height of the German counter-offensive and in the Ruhr. Each time your decisive action has helped to score a brilliant victory over the enemy." * * * * *

(Signed) COURTNEY H. HODGES

COURTNEY H. HODGES
Commanding General
First U. S. Army

Arriving in this Theater on 27 August 1944, the XVIII Corps (Airborne) has, in 85 days of combat, within a period of nine months, fought one airborne and three ground battles, and participated in one other airborne assault. All contributed decisively to the over-all effort. By verified count the official toll exacted from the enemy is as follows:

Prisoners of War	539,425
(General Officers	75)
Tanks	126
Artillery pieces	283
Dual purpose AA/AT guns	352
SP guns	85
Vehicles	8,127

Versatility, imagination, daring courage, ceaseless driving energy, and speed, EVER MORE SPEED IN EXECUTION, were the characteristics through which God sent success to the XVIII Corps (Airborne). To those who have survived, who now see the bright pages of its history, and hear the merited approval of associates, come honored memories which shall remain with them through life — memories of comrades whose gallantry, loyalty and devotion to duty meet every challenge unto death.