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**AFTER ACTION
REPORT THIRD**

U.S. ARMY

1 AUGUST 1944

— 9 MAY 1945

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Roll 3

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ENGINEER

Petroff

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Engineer
APO 403

SUBJECT: Transmittal of After-Action Report of the
Engineer Section.

TO : Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403.

1. Transmitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Engineer Section, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, beginning with the arrival of the Engineer Section at Camp Peover, Cheshire, England, on 23 March 1944, and continuing through the planning phase, the pre-operational phase on the Continent, and the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France and Germany.


2. The work of the Engineers of Third U.S. Army during these campaigns covered all normal engineering work in support of an Army in combat, including breaching of enemy obstacles; location and removal of mines; assault crossings of rivers; floating and fixed bridging; road maintenance and construction; construction of prisoner of war enclosures; rehabilitation of damaged billets and hospitals; water supply; camouflage; fire fighting; mapping, including reproduction and distribution; furnishing of engineer intelligence data; furnishing of engineer supplies and maintenance of engineer equipment, and many other miscellaneous engineer tasks. Of all the engineer work done, the largest single item was bridging.

[Signature]
Signal Officer, U.S. Army

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ENGINEER SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

On 23 March the Engineer Section moved into the Forward Echelon of Headquarters Third U.S. Army at CAMP PROVER.

The Section, upon its arrival, consisted of twenty-eight officers, one warrant officer, and forty-three enlisted men, organized under T/O 5-200-1, dated 15 July 1942. Functional chart of the organization is shown on the preceding page.

Here began a period of intensive planning covering troop phasing requirements, terrain analyses, bridge requirements, river crossing sites, road studies, traffic circulation plans, computation of all engineer supply requirements up to D plus 90, and survey and mapping plans. Strategic terrain analyses were prepared from a study of all available data on the region of Northwest France, north of the LOIRE River and west of the SEINE River, and later extended to cover the area south of the LOIRE (Annex 1). A special study was also made of these same regions as to their suitability for tank warfare. Each of these studies was published by A.C. of S. G-2 in a series of Target Area Analyses.

In computing the bridging requirements for the operations contemplated by Third U.S. Army, an arbitrary roadnet of Class 70 and Class 40 roads was selected, in accordance with the policy established in "OVERLORD" for roads to be provided and maintained within the combat zone. This policy proposed the following as normal road requirements for planning purposes:

- One Class 40 road per front line division forward of Corps rear boundary.
- One Class 70 road and one Class 40 road per Corps in rear of Corps rear boundary.
- Lateral roads at 10 mile interval in rear of Corps rear boundary, alternately Class 70 and Class 40.

After selecting the most suitable roadnet based on the above policy, the bridging requirements were estimated on the assumption that all bridges would be destroyed and would require replacement. Where data on stream widths were not available, the probable bridge requirements were calculated from the size of the drainage areas above the crossing sites. It was estimated that during the period D plus 29 to D 90, 150 Standard 130-foot double-double Bailey bridges would be required.

All major rivers were carefully studied to determine the most suitable crossing sites. The widths of the river, depth of water, condition of the river bed and nature of the banks, as well as the adequacy of the roadnet leading to the crossing site, were taken into consideration.

Road studies comprised such items as road widths, surfacing, sharp curves, and other critical restrictions. From these road studies tentative traffic circulation plans were prepared, with the realization that the final traffic circulation plans must be based on actual ground reconnaissance.

Class II supplies were calculated logistically, based upon the troops to be assigned. Class IV supplies were calculated from intelligence data, map studies, and capabilities of engineer troops to be assigned. Requisitions were sent in to include supplies up to D plus 90. Four light ponton companies were equipped with Bailey bridges prior to embarkation and all combat battalions were equipped with D-7 tractors in addition to T/E.

In April the 1681st Engineer Survey Liaison Detachment was assigned to Headquarters Third U.S. Army and attached to the Engineer Section. This detachment of five officers and nine enlisted men was incorporated into the Engineer Section and was charged with the planning and supervision of map reproduction, supply and distribution; and surveys.

A plan for the recovery and extension of survey control by combined efforts of Survey Platoons and Field Artillery Observation Battalions during operations was adopted and published as an Operations Memorandum (Annex 2).

Map distribution on the Continent was covered by an Operations Memorandum published 11 June (Annex 3). This memorandum outlined the procedure for distribution of maps in the United Kingdom to troops leaving for the Continent, both build-up or in assault, as well as for distribution on the Continent. This depot closed operations at ALTRINCHAM on 3 July and opened on the Continent in France after the

arrival of Headquarters Third U.S. Army.

Several relief models were constructed for study of Western France and certain fortified islands. Third U.S. Army having no model making detachment, the models were constructed by three enlisted men of the Army Topographic Battalion. Photographs were made of these models and halftone reproductions made at a final scale of approximately 1/500,000. These models were used extensively by staff sections for planning and later in operations. They were forwarded to the War Department after operations extended beyond their area of coverage. The halftone "model mosaics" made from the originals were distributed down to and including regiments. They were also later used to supplement and illustrate G-2 Order of Battle reports and the "OVERLORD" War Report.

At about the same time the terrain models were being constructed, considerable interest was demonstrated in third dimensional topography and, at the request of the A.C. of S. G-2, an officer from the Topo Subsection was assigned the task of investigating facilities for their production in large quantities. Visits to LONDON and HIGH WYCOMBE, England, revealed a plant in the process of completion capable of producing 75,000 rectographs per month. These facilities were utilized by the G-2 Section for several orders of considerable size and the results were received with enthusiasm. However, the eventual fast pace of the campaign, coupled with the fact that rectographs could only be supplied from the United Kingdom, made their use impractical.

Prior to leaving the United Kingdom it was realized that there should be a reproduction unit with Army Headquarters to take care of the many small rush jobs required. It was believed that there would be many situations when the Engineer Topographic Battalion, because of its space requirements and relative immobility, would be located at a considerable distance from Army Headquarters. In forming this reproduction detachment, it was decided to take a press trailer with a Harris 20" x 22 1/2" lithographic press, a camera van and a 2 1/2-ton truck, together with the necessary personnel consisting of one officer and nine enlisted men, all from the Army Topographic Battalion. This detachment proved to be of immense value in turning out rush jobs for Army Headquarters and in relieving the Army Topographic Battalion of many small jobs which might have interfered with the larger reproduction work of the battalion.

During this entire planning phase the training of all Third U.S. Army engineer units in the United Kingdom was continuously checked and coordinated. Periodic inspections were made and deficiencies in training corrected as rapidly as possible. Training activities were largely concentrated on Bailey bridging, construction and maintenance of roads, mines and booby traps, including the use of the non-metallic mine detector, and waterproofing of vehicles. Training Memorandum No. 2, issued 17 April (Annex 4), covered the objective and scope of engineer training during this period. The Engineer Battalion of the 2nd French Armored Division was trained in the use of Bailey and U.S. Floating Bridging.

Procurement directives covering the acquisition of real estate, billeting, (Annex 5) and hiring of civilian labor (Annex 6) were drawn up in consultation with Headquarters European Theater of Operations memorandum (Annex 7).

On 27 June the 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team, consisting of three officers and six enlisted men, joined the Engineer Section, being attached to the Intelligence Subsection. The mission of this team was to search for and examine captured enemy material and to send to higher echelons for further examination and evaluation samples of any new type equipment located. The team was also immediately to disseminate to troops any information of value pertaining to new types of enemy engineer materiel.

After Headquarters Third U.S. Army moved to a concentration area near SOUTHAMPTON, the Engineer Section moved to SOUTHAMPTON on 4 July and embarked for the Continent.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

The Engineer Section landed on UTAH Beach in an LST the evening of 6 July, from which beach the Section moved to a bivouac area near NEHOU (T-1998) on 7 July.

The period from date of landing to the start of operations was principally devoted to final stages of planning. Reconnaissance of roads was made in the major portion of the captured region of France to acquire actual data for comparison with the road information used during preliminary planning stage in England. Although it was found that the Germans had not destroyed as many bridges as was contemplated no major changes were made in the estimated bridging requirements.

Bridging and other engineer material requirements were estimated for the period D plus 90 to D plus 120 during this final planning phase.

Shortly after arrival on the Continent, a reconnaissance of bivouac areas was made for the concentration of engineer units. The arrival of the units was coordinated and arrangements were made for guiding them from the beaches to bivouac in the concentration area in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (O-1304). During the period from 7 July to 1 August, the following engineer units arrived:

UNITS	ARRIVAL	UNITS	ARRIVAL
1092d Engr Util Det	7 July	993d Engr Trdw Br Co	22 July
1681st Engr Surv Ln Det	7 July	664th Engr Top Co	22 July
293d Engr C Bn	13 July	2898th Engr TIT	22 July
666th Engr Top Co	14 July	180th Engr Hv Pon Bn	23 July
2896th Engr TIT	14 July	528th Engr L Pon Co	23 July
133d Engr C Bn	14 July	159th Engr C Bn	24 July
652d Engr Top Bn	16 July	168th Engr C Bn	24 July
1137th Engr C Gp	16 July	991th Engr Trdw Br Co	24 July
1101st Engr C Gp	16 July	884th Engr Hv Pon Bn	24 July
970th Engr Maint Co	17 July	990th Engr Trdw Br Co	25 July
509th Engr L Pon Co	18 July	1303d Engr GS Regt	25 July
513th Engr L Pon Co	18 July	2897th Engr TIT	26 July
1277th Engr C Bn	18 July	997th Engr Trdw Br Co	26 July
998th Engr Trdw Br Co	18 July	871th Engr Hv Pon Bn	27 July
459th Engr Depot Co	18 July	1240th Engr FF Flat	27 July
1107th Engr C Gp	19 July	2890th Engr TIT	27 July
529th Engr L Pon Co	19 July	165th Engr C Bn	28 July
608th Engr L Equip Co	19 July	248th Engr C Bn	28 July
1511th Engr WS Co	19 July	553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	30 July
652d Engr L Equip Co	20 July		

These units concentrated on training in mines and booby traps and performing maintenance of equipment. The Technical Intelligence Teams under Army and corps gave lectures and demonstrations to all engineer units on new enemy mines and antipersonnel devices that were being encountered on the front of the VIII Corps, which corps was in operations at that time under First U.S. Army.

After arriving on the Continent but before becoming operational, the survey elements of the Army and corps were ready for action. But it appeared that the tactical situation would not require engineer participation to augment the observation battalions. However, plans were accomplished to make their services immediately available if and when the occasion arose.

The Army Map Depot opened on the Continent at BRICQUEBEC (O-1304) on 19 July for issuance of operational maps in limited quantities only, in that operational maps were not authorized Army prior to its becoming operational.

On 31 July, Forward "A" Echelon of the Engineer Section moved from the vicinity of NEHOU (T-1998) to an assembly area 1 1/2 miles northeast of MONTSURVENT (T-2064) prior to becoming operational on 1 August.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

When Third U.S. Army became operational, the engineer mission was to support the operation through normal engineer functions. Division, corps and Army engineer troops were to be responsible for all engineer work within their respective areas; with the exception of installation of bulk POL facilities, reconnaissance and reconstruction of rail and port facilities, which were responsibilities of engineer troops of Communications Zone; and the construction of air fields, which was the responsibility of the Air Force.

From the start the operations were characterized by rapid advances and equally rapid changes in attachments of engineer troops to meet the changing situation.

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Engineer Operational Instruction No. 1, defining areas of responsibility for Army engineer troops, was published as of 032000B August. At this time the disposition of engineer troops was as follows:

<p>VIII CORPS</p> <p>1102d Engr C Gp 1107th Engr C Bn 44th Engr C Bn 145th Engr C Bn 199th Engr C Bn 168th Engr C Bn 202d Engr C Bn 509th Engr L Pon Co 511th Engr L Pon Co 513th Engr L Pon Co 628th Engr L Equip Co 969th Engr Maint Co 990th Engr Trdwy Br Co 993d Engr Trdwy Br Co 665th Engr Top Co 2893d Engr Tech Int Team</p> <p>XV CORPS</p> <p>1101st Engr C Gp 113d Engr C Bn 165th Engr C Bn 1277th Engr C Bn 529th Engr L Pon Co 970th Engr Maint Co 978th Engr Trdwy Br Co 666th Engr Top Co 608th Engr L Equip Co 2896th Engr Tech Int Team</p>	<p>XII CORPS</p> <p>2897th Engr Tech Int Team</p> <p>XX CORPS</p> <p>664th Engr Top Co 2898th Engr Tech Int Team</p> <p>ARMY</p> <p>1117th Engr C Gp 248th Engr C Bn 528th Engr L Pon Co 87th Engr Hv Pon Bn 88th Engr Hv Pon Bn 180th Engr Hv Pon Bn 553d Engr Hv Pon Bn 613th Engr L Equip Co Co A, 603d Engr Cam Bn 293d Engr C Bn 1303d Engr GS Regt 764th Engr Dp Trk Co 652d Engr Top Bn 459th Engr Depot Co 994th Engr Trdwy Br Co 632d Engr L Equip Co 1511th Engr WS Co 1092d Engr Util Det 1681st Engr Surv Ln Det 1240th Engr FF Plat (Atchd 3933d JW Gas Supply Co) 2890th Engr Tech Int Team 997th Engr Trdwy Br Co</p>
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The 1117th Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of the VIII Corps, followed by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in the Army area.

On 5 August the four Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions under the 1117th Engineer Combat Group were detached in order to perform essential hauling of engineer Class IV supplies. The 764th Engineer Dump Truck Company was also detached from the 1117th Engineer Combat Group and attached to the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment to lend mobility and hauling facilities to the regiment.

By 7 August the XV Corps had become operational and the XX Corps was concentrating preparatory to becoming operational. Two combat groups, six combat battalions, three light equipment companies, one camouflage company, two dump truck companies, one light ponton company, and one treadway bridge company were assigned to Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army. On 7 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 2 was issued with the 1103d Engineer Combat Group being attached to XX Corps and the 1109th Engineer Combat Group concentrating under Army. The 1117th Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of XV Corps and the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of VIII Corps, both operating in the Army area.

On 9 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 3 was published. At this time the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment had concentrated on the Continent and was available for operations and was placed behind the 1117th Engineer Combat Group supporting XV Corps. The 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of VIII Corps and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was concentrating to support operations. The 1109th Engineer Combat Group was attached to XV Corps and the 1139th Engineer Combat Group was attached to XX Corps.

On 11 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 4 was published, placing the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment on the south flank and assigning the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, with four heavy ponton battalions, the mission of coordinating and effecting the movement of engineer Class IV supplies.

On 13 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 5 was published, at which time the 1117th Engineer Combat Group was attached to XII Corps. The 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was assigned the mission of supporting the XV Corps, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment the XX Corps, and the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of VIII Corps.

On 15 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 6 was published. At this time the VIII, XV, XX, and XII Corps were all in operation, and the bulk of engineer troops assigned Third U.S. Army had arrived on the Continent.

The 1301st, 1303d, and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment were placed in support of the XII, XV and XX Corps, respectively, and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group was actively engaged in moving forward engineer Class IV supplies.

On 19 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 7 was published, effecting the detachment of one combat battalion from VIII Corps and two combat battalions, one treadway bridge company and one light equipment company from the XV Corps and their attachment to XII Corps, 1134th Engineer Combat Group and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. Missions remained unchanged.

On 21 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 8 was published, effecting the attachment of Hq & Hq Co, 1135th Engineer Combat Group to XII Corps, one treadway bridge company to XV Corps and Hq & Hq Co, 1137th Engineer Combat Group to Army. The 1137th Engineer Combat Group was given the mission of concentrating prepared to support either XII or XV Corps. The mission of the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, 1301st, 1303d, and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiments remained unchanged.

On 24 August Engineer Operational Instruction No. 9 was published. At this time XV Corps reverted to First U.S. Army, together with all corps engineer troops. The 1137th Engineer Combat Group was assigned the mission of performing all engineer work in the zone of and supporting the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, respectively.

II - CONSTRUCTION

Roads and Bridges.

One of the most critical problems confronting the Engineer, Third U.S. Army, at the start of operations on 1 August was the selection and maintenance of an adequate network of north-south roads through a very narrow zone over which the entire Third U.S. Army and supporting supplies must pass. The zone of action established for this Army consisted of a narrow strip along the western coast of the COTENTIN Peninsula, varying in width from ten to twenty miles. This zone was cut deeply on the west by three tidal estuaries, one at the mouth of the SIENNE River near COUTANCES (T-2457), and the other two at the mouths of the SEE and SELUNE Rivers near AVRANCHES (T-2817). Only two principal north-south highways extend through this area and these converge on and follow the same route through COUTANCES (T-2457) and AVRANCHES (T-2817).

At COUTANCES (T-2457) it was found possible, by extensive bridging operations and continuous maintenance of a secondary road on the west of COUTANCES (T-2457), to separate these two routes and eliminate this first potential bottleneck.

In the town of GRANVILLE (T-1134) the existing highway followed narrow winding streets which were definitely unsuitable for military traffic. This condition was corrected by selection and repair of the two one-way by-pass routes immediately to the east of GRANVILLE (T-1134).

The greatest restriction through which this Army was forced to move all troops and supplies was at AVRANCHES (T-2817), where the zone narrowed to ten miles or less. All axial highways within this zone converged on AVRANCHES (T-2817) and then followed only one principal route south for five miles to FONTAUBAULT (T-3010). The town of AVRANCHES (T-2817) itself was badly demolished from bombing and the streets were full of debris, which engineer troops expeditiously cleared from the principal streets. The bridge over the SEE River at AVRANCHES (T-2817) was captured intact; however, the bridge at FONTS (T-2918) was demolished. This latter bridge was rapidly repaired to accommodate two-way Class 40 traffic by using a Bailey bridge on one-half of the roadway and sections of treads from a treadway bridge company on the other half of the partially demolished structure. These treads were removed as soon as possible by constructing a Class 70 fixed timber trestle bridge alongside the partially demolished structure. While this timber bridge was under construction by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment, one soldier was killed and five injured as a result of enemy bombing.

The enemy attempted nightly to bomb these critical bridges, including the bridge over the SELUNE River near FONTAUBAULT (T-3010). As a countermeasure to the possibility that one of these three vital structures might suffer a direct bomb hit, every possible crossing within the narrow zone of the Army was reconnoitered. The results revealed four north-south local gravel roads to the east of AVRANCHES (T-2817) on which the bridges were found intact. These alternate

routes were very narrow, winding and rough, but were considered usable in an emergency.

It was found impracticable to attempt to bridge these estuaries at any point west of AVRANCHES (T-2817) and west of Highway H 176 at FONTAUBAULT (T-3010), due to the extreme width and the large tidal fluctuations.

Realizing that the success of accomplishing the mission of Third U.S. Army depended upon the continued flow of troops and supplies through this narrow funnel, an existing railroad bridge over the SEE River at AVRANCHES (T-2817) was prepared to accommodate highway traffic. A treadway bridge was placed across the SELUNE River about 300 yards upstream from the existing masonry arch bridge near FONTAUBAULT (T-3010).

As soon as this defile was passed, the road net available to the Army extended to the west, south and east, providing excellent routes of advance in those directions.

Once the breakthrough was accomplished, the combat troops moved so rapidly that enemy destruction of bridges was only a small percentage of that contemplated in the planning stage. The town of FOUGERES (Y-3879) had been badly damaged by bombing and artillery fire, but the debris was rapidly removed from the more important thoroughfares, bomb craters filled and military traffic was kept rolling with a minimum of delay. FOUGERES (Y-3879), having eight principal highways radiating from the city similar to the spokes in a wheel and without suitable by-pass routes, was immediately recognized as a major traffic problem. A study was made of this city and a traffic circulation plan devised and submitted for approval. This plan was immediately adopted and its execution materially improved the flow of traffic through this city.

The BRITANNY Peninsula and the area south to the LOIRE River was exploited so rapidly that the majority of the bridges were captured intact and the roads were found in very good condition. Engineer road and bridge work in this area consisted principally of patrolling the roads with maintenance crews to check the condition of the roads and to make immediate repairs to critical spots, such as shell craters or bombed bridges. Very little enemy action of this nature occurred other than in the restricted area around AVRANCHES (T-2817).

In executing the movement to the east and southeast, it was found that the enemy had destroyed all the bridges across the MAYENNE River with the exception of two bridges south of LAVAL (Y-6846), one at HOUSSAY (J-7027), and the other at CHATEAU GONTIER (J-7219). Five Class 40 Bailey bridges were immediately placed across the river, two of which were in LAVAL (Y-6846), one at the crossing of GC 3 near ENTRAMES (Y-7638), one at CHAMBELLAY (J-7405), and one at LE LION (C-7197). With the mass of supplies flowing through LAVAL (Y-6846), it was decided to construct an additional Bailey bridge at LAVAL (Y-6846) of Class 70 to accommodate the Class 70 vehicles which were used to transport ammunition from one Army dump to another. A Class 20 one-way trestle bridge was also constructed in LAVAL (Y-6846) to accommodate the civilian traffic, thus permitting the Bailey bridges to be used to the maximum extent by military vehicles only. Many of the bridges over the SARTHE River were also destroyed or partially destroyed by the enemy. At LE MANS (V-4062) all bridges, except one two-way stone arch bridge, was destroyed. One Class 40 Bailey bridge was constructed in LE MANS (V-4062) to provide for a more complete utilization of the highway net leading through LE MANS (V-4062). By-pass routes to the north and south of LE MANS (V-4062) were also found and used on which existing bridges had not been destroyed.

In the drive to the SEINE River many of the major bridges were found demolished, but were rapidly replaced by first constructing Bailey bridges.

Because of the extended supply routes, every effort possible was made to replace the Bailey bridges with fixed timber bridges or steel T-beam bridges of local materials in order to keep pushing the Bailey bridges forward for re-use by the Corps and Division Engineers.

The reconnaissance information was consolidated and traffic circulation diagrams prepared and submitted for approval and execution. Throughout the rapid advance of this Army it has been impracticable to obtain current road and bridge information through normal intelligence channels. To offset this handicap, each engineer combat group and general service regiment under Army control, but in support of corps, were instructed to push their reconnaissance agencies forward through the zone of corps responsibility and report their reconnaissance data direct to the Army. In addition to these sources of information, three officers from Army engineer units were given the special mission of projecting road and bridge reconnaissance as far forward as enemy action would permit.

The normal bridging requirements were about two sixty-foot bridges

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
per day per corps. The destruction in the zone of advance was greatly in excess of three and probably averaged about four bridges of this type per day. But by judicious selection of routes, it was found that replacement of bridges on this scale fulfilled all tactical requirements.

Bailey and treadway bridges were the only type operational bridges used by the division and corps engineers in support of the moving situation. Most of these bridges were subsequently replaced by fixed timber bridges, using material procured locally, and the Bailey and treadway bridges were returned to depot stock by corps or Army engineers as soon as the situation permitted it. About fifty per cent of the time, however, these bridges were on the main supply route of corps and eventually Army, and the need for an uninterrupted flow of traffic prevented their removal. This particular schema worked very well and required only a relatively small number of operational bridges as compared with the total number of bridges constructed.

All engineer troops were conversant with these type bridges and normally spanned sixty-foot gaps in about three hours. The passage, however, of infantry and their equipment was seldom delayed at all, for expedients such as by-passes or alternate routes were, as a rule, almost immediately available.

The problem of bridges encountered in the crossing of major water gaps resolved itself into providing crossings over four rivers, each 200 feet or more wide. These streams were the MAYENNE, SARTHE, SEINE, and YONNE.

The initial crossings of the MAYENNE and SEINE were made by XV Corps units. Construction was accomplished expeditiously and followed the typical stream crossing problem plan of the text books. The crossing of the SEINE was particularly noteworthy in that it was the first crossing of the SEINE made by Allied troops.



Class 70 Double-Single Bailey Bridge constructed on barges across the SEINE River at MANTES-GASSICOURT. Built by the 1109th Engineer Combat Group.

The crossing of the MAYENNE, though less spectacular, being only 200 feet against 650 feet on the SEINE, was nevertheless an excellent example of close team-work between all concerned and the bridge was handling traffic about five hours after the enemy had been pushed off the river bank.

The plan for crossing these major streams was based on the expectation that all bridges would be blown and that the first crossing made would have to be on a floating treadway bridge. This expectation was justified at all places except at MAYENNE (Y-8172) on the MAYENNE River and LE MANS (V-4062) on the SARTHE, where the rapidly moving advance overran the existing bridges and saved them. At both places, however, treadway bridges were constructed nonetheless to speed the flow of traffic and to provide an alternate route in case the main bridge should be destroyed by bombings or by a delayed mine.

The second step in the crossing was to be the replacing of the treadway by either a fixed Bailey bridge on piers or a floating heavy ponton or floating Bailey. This was to be done so that, in most cases, the treadway could be picked up by the unit that built it within forty-eight hours, and then permit them to continue the advance with complete loads of equipment, since treadway bridges were an extremely critical item of supply. This plan was followed and worked very well.

The bridges that had been demolished on the Mayenne at LAVAL (Y-6846) were speedily replaced by Bailey bridges and within twenty-

four hours of their destruction very heavy traffic passed unceasingly over the Bailey bridges. At LAVAL (Y-6846) it became necessary for the 1301st Engineers to put in a Class 70 bridge so that tank recovery vehicles carrying huge loads of ammunition and tanks could cross. This problem in itself would not have been difficult had it not been for the fact that the tank transportation trailer wheels were so wide that they would not pass through the curbs on the Bailey bridge floor. These curbs had to be removed to permit the vehicles to pass; even then a soldier had to precede each vehicle across the bridge to guide the driver, since there was only four inches clearance on each side.

On the SARTHE River, an east-west route was needed north of LE MANS (V-4062) to avoid the congestion there; so a ford was constructed at BEAUMONT (Z-3661), as well as a Bailey bridge, which provided a successful crossing place.

As noted above, the first crossing of the SEINE was made by XV Corps with a treadway bridge. However, since an additional crossing was desired at a site adapted to the use of a floating Bailey bridge, an improvised floating Bailey was made, using river boats for flotation, since securing the floating Bailey equipment would have caused considerable delay.

Further crossings on the SEINE were made by XX Corps, and these constituted a major problem. The first crossing, 500 feet of treadway, was made at TILLY (U-3248), and little opposition was encountered at this point. However, when the corps reached the river in the vicinity of FONTAINEBLEAU (X-2819) and MONTEREAU (X-4687), very stiff opposition from small arms, artillery and air was encountered, first from the west bank, and finally from the opposite bank. A crossing, however, was forced at VULAINES SUR SEINE (X-9468) with the infantry crossing in boats and on rafts and the treadway being put in under shell fire. Fortunately, the shooting was poor and the bridge was completed satisfactorily.

The same situation existed in the vicinity of MONTEREAU (X-4687) and the infantry there again made an assault crossing in boats and on rafts, which was followed by the erection of a heavy ponton bridge by the 88th Engineers, since all the corps treadway was tied up on the other two bridges. Here, too, artillery, machine gun, and mortar fire were encountered during the bridge construction.




Heavy Ponton Bridge over the SEINE River at MONTEREAU. Length 400 ft. Built by the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion on 25 August 1944.

As soon as a bridgehead had been established on the east bank of the river, so that the bank from MONTEREAU (X-4687) to MELUN (S-2606) was in XX Corps hands, work was started on two long Bailey bridges at the demolished bridge sites at VULAINES (X-9468) and CHAMPAGNE SUR SEINE (G-4000). These bridges were 310 feet and 380 feet long, respectively, and were a major bridging task. Before work could start on the CHAMPAGNE (G-4000) site, however, the 206th Engineers cleared the far shore and took ninety-three prisoners remaining there when they cleared a pocket of resistance.



Class 40 Double-Single 320 ft. (4 - 80 ft. spans) Bailey Bridge over the SEINE River at VULAINES SUR SEINE. Built 25 - 26 August 1944 by 1139th Engineer Combat Group.



Class 40 Double-Double Bailey Bridge across the MARNE River at EPERNAY. Length 260 ft. Built by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment 30 August 1944.

Since the 5th Division planned to cross the YONNE River south of MONTEREAU (X-4687), it was necessary to have a suitable crossing over this stream, so a railroad bridge just south of MONTEREAU (X-4687) was plank and was used by the infantry and lighter vehicles and an old civilian pile bridge at MISEY SUR YONNE (Y-5684) was strengthened to carry heavier loads. This bridge was too weak for tank loads, and XX Corps ordered the 88th Engineers to construct another heavy ponton bridge near this site.

In support of this bridging the Army had a heavy ponton battalion and treadway bridge company standing by in close proximity of the corps and these were available for instant use. During the first three days, however, of their existence, the XX Corps bridge miraculously escaped being damaged by bombing, floating mine and shell fire, and the reserve was held uncommitted.

Other Construction.

Besides road and bridge construction the only other construction of any importance was prisoner of war enclosures.

On 4 August a work order was issued to the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment to construct a prisoner of war enclosure in an area approximately one mile north of AVRANCHES (T-2817). The area selected was then being used to collect prisoners of war. When construction was started, there were several thousand prisoners in the area, and it was necessary to build the fence around the prisoners. The prisoner of war enclosure consisted of a triple concertina perimeter fence and triple concertina interior fences dividing the enclosure into six pens. The entire area was about 200,000 square feet in size. Guard towers and a water stand were constructed. Carbide lights were furnished, which were later changed to electric. Shortly after the installation, however, the lights attracted a bombing and strafing raid, killing several prisoners and wounding many prisoners and some guards. This raid has established the general policy of furnishing lights for emergency use, but the lights are not used for standard guard functions. Construction was completed on 5 August. Water was supplied by the 1511th Engineer Water Supply Company by tanker.

The next prisoner of war enclosure constructed was located 2.7 miles west of SENS DE BRETAGNE (Y-1278). Construction was assigned to the 1117th Engineer Combat Group on 4 August. Reconnaissance was made on 5 August and a site selected along a lake shore. The general area was "U" shaped, approximately 620,000 square feet in size. Perimeter and interior fences were constructed of triple concertina wire. Guard towers, water stand, and gates were constructed. The electric generator was moved from the AVRANCHES (T-2817) site to this one, and the area wired for emergency lighting. Wire was strung to the hospital tent for night work. Work was started by "C" Company of the 248th Engineer Combat Battalion on 6 August and completed on the same day. Water was furnished by a standard water point installed at the lake shore.

Because of the rapid movement of all Third U.S. Army units during this period, the prisoner of war enclosure at SENS DE BRETAGNE (Y-1278) soon became so remote as to make prisoner evacuation difficult and costly in the use of truck transportation. Therefore, a new site was called for in the vicinity of BRULON (Z-0833). Construction was assigned to the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment on 11 August.

During this phase of the operations, VIII Corps turned west in the BRITANNY Peninsula and moved so far west of the prisoner of war enclosure at SENS DE BRETAGNE (Y-1278) that another prisoner of war enclosure was required in the vicinity of MUR DE BRETAGNE (X-0469). Reconnaissance was completed on 13 August. The constructing unit completed work on 15 August. This site was located along a creek and was small in size, totaling not more than 200,000 square feet.

By 16 August the necessity for a new prisoner of war enclosure east of the BRULON (Z-0833) site was indicated. The site was selected

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in the vicinity of COURTAINE (W-0964), approximately one mile north of the town. Reconnaissance was made on 17 August. The site was located on a stream in a large pasture. It was rectangular in shape and was approximately 750,000 square feet in size.

On 22 August the necessity for a new prisoner of war enclosure was indicated in the vicinity of NEMOURS (X-2676). Work was started on 24 August and completed on 26 August. Because of a lack of concertina wire, the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was given the task of dismantling and returning to the depot all wire contained in the BRULON (Z-0833) site.

III - SUPPLY

Class II and IV engineer supplies, for which pre-scheduled requisition had been submitted, were arriving on the beaches by 1 August and were being stock-piled by Advance Section Communications Zone. Requisitions for Class II and IV supplies for depot stocks were submitted to Advance Section and a representative of the Supply Subsection of that headquarters assisted in securing release of all available supplies. The most serious problem which presented itself was the question of transporting these supplies from beach dumps to the Army depot, which was to be located in the vicinity of LE REPAS (T-2030). The railroads as yet were not in operation. To overcome this situation, four Army heavy ponton battalions were organized under an engineer combat group into a Provisional Transportation Group, and by this means supplies were picked up at beach dumps and transported to the Army depot. By the afternoon of 2 August approximately 3,000 tons of engineer supplies were stocked at the depot in LE REPAS (T-2030). Two corps dumps were established primarily for storing Bailey bridging, and a small amount of other Class IV supplies. Heavy ponton transportation was used for hauling these supplies. No. 1 corps dump was located at ST. AUBIN DE TERREGATE (T-3103) and No. 2 in the BRITTANY Peninsula in the vicinity of ST. MALO (S-8014).

The next movement of the Army depot was from LE REPAS (T-2030) to LE MANS (V-4062). This movement was accomplished by heavy ponton battalions, which were at the same time continuing to pick up supplies at the beach dumps.

On 25 August the Army depot was advanced to PUISEAUX (X-1070). At this time Advance Section Communications Zone had been able to secure the assignment of sufficient trucks and rail facilities to transport supplies into CHARTRES (R-3802), and in some cases even up to the Army depot.

The average daily tonnage which was hauled by the four heavy ponton battalions was approximately 1,500 per day from 1 August to 25 August. One of the most serious problems encountered was securing replacements of treadway bridging. About 24 August Communications Zone shipped into Army area ninety Brockway trucks loaded with M-1 and M-2 treadway bridging. This bridging was short certain essential parts, and it was necessary to dispatch trucks to beach dumps to secure these parts. Another serious shortage of material was in water purification equipment. The front line combat battalions were losing equipment due to enemy action and replacements were very difficult to secure. By the end of August this situation had been relieved slightly. Electric lighting equipment was also short in the early stages. However, several German installations were found to be stocked with electric equipment and were taken over by the Supply Section, electric equipment being issued as required. Several large stock piles of lumber were also captured, which eliminated the necessity of transporting large quantities of lumber. In most cases, this captured lumber was in short lengths, and it was still necessary to bring in a certain amount required for bridging in the Army area.

IV - MAPS

From 6 July to 1 August, when Third U.S. Army was non-operational, the maps covering France were all controlled by First U.S. Army. Communications Zone had two advance depots at "UTAH" and "OMAHA" beaches, but these were also under First U.S. Army control.

The lack of access to these stocks by Third U.S. Army became at once a serious hindrance. Staff planning requirements could only be met by going to First U.S. Army, securing a release, then going to both of the depots for a pickup.

During this time every effort was made through Third U.S. Army G-2 and through Engineer and G-2 channels of Twelfth U.S. Army Group to secure the release of these maps in operational quantities. However, no maps were released in operational quantities until Third U.S. Army became operational. Map distribution on an operational basis started at 2100, 1 August, in the middle of a field located two miles northeast of MONTSURVENT (T-2064).

To expedite emergency mapping on the movement south in the event

that Army became operational arrangements had been made for divisional breakdown of maps separately carried on trucks as follows:

- 1 Armored Division } Covering Brittany Peninsula to its
- 1 Infantry Division } western edge (VIII Corps area).
- 1 Armored Division } Covering area south from COUTANCES (T-2457)
- 1 Infantry Division } to the general line of LORIENT (G-7231)-
- NANTES (O-0554) (XV Corps area).

In addition to receiving the above maps, as planned, there arrived from Communications Zone in the field referred to above eight truck loads of maps, scale 1/50,000 and 1/25,000, covering the BRITTANY Peninsula from ST. MALO (S-8014) west. With these maps on hand, the First Tank Destroyer Brigade was mapped in operational quantities for its initial mission. Approximately sixty per cent of these maps were delivered to the unit's bivouac area at 0300, 2 August, and the remainder at 1500 of the same day. Because of a change of mission, these maps were returned the following day. It later developed that this was but one of the many instances in which it became necessary, because of a change in the tactical situation, to remap the same unit.

During the time that the above was accomplished, the first Third U.S. Army Map Depot was set up in a residence located at MONTSURVENT (T-2064) under operational conditions.

During the month of August the following personnel were used to augment the regular Third U.S. Army Map Depot personnel:

- Four officers and two enlisted men from the 1681st Engineer Survey Liaison Detachment
- One platoon from the 293rd Engineer Combat Battalion from 1 to 8 August
- Survey Platoon of the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion from 9 August to September

The following movements were made by Third U.S. Army Map Depot:

- From BRICQUEBEC (O-1304) to MONTSURVENT (T-2064) - 2 to 4 August
- From MONTSURVENT (T-2064) to FOUGERES (Y-3879) - 7 to 8 August
- From FOUGERES (Y-3879) to LE MANS (V-4062) - 16 to 17 August
- From LE MANS (V-4062) to PUISEAUX (X-1070) - 23 to 24 August

A reproduction project consisting of twenty-six sheets, 1/25,000 topographic maps in the vicinity of COUTANCES (T-2457)-AVRANCHES (T-2817) commenced on 22 July, was completed and delivered to the Army Map Depot on 5 August in quantities ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 copies of each sheet.

On 6 August a reproduction project consisting of fifteen sheets, 1/25,000 topographic maps in the vicinity of BAIN DE BRETAGNE (X-9924), commenced on 21 July and completed and delivered to the Army Map Depot in quantities of 1,200 copies of each sheet.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

On 1 September the disposition of Engineer troops was as listed below, having been changed by Engineer Operational Instruction No. 10, published at 292000B August, and the assignment of two treadway bridge companies to First U.S. Army:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p><u>VIII CORPS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1102d Engr C Gp 1107th Engr C Gp 35th Engr C Bn 44th Engr C Bn 159th Engr C Bn 168th Engr C Bn 202d Engr C Bn 628th Engr L Equip Co 969th Engr Maint Co | <p><u>XX CORPS (contd)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 509th Engr L Pon Co 537th Engr L Pon Co 989th Engr Trdw Br Co 991st Engr Trdw Br Co 664th Engr Top Co 2898th Engr TIT (C) 1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn |
|--|---|

- 511th Engr L Pon Co
- 990th Engr Trdw Br Co
- 665th Engr Top Co
- 2893d Engr TIT (C)
- 2d Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn

- XII CORPS
- 1117th Engr C Gp
 - 1135th Engr C Gp
 - 133d Engr C Bn
 - 166th Engr C Bn
 - 167th Engr C Bn
 - 248th Engr C Bn
 - 613th Engr L Equip Co
 - 72d Engr L Pon Co
 - 513th Engr L Pon Co
 - 995th Engr Trdw Br Co
 - 997th Engr Trdw Br Co
 - 673d Engr Top Co
 - 2897th Engr TIT (C)
 - 4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn

- XX CORPS
- 1103d Engr C Gp
 - 1139th Engr C Gp
 - 135th Engr C Bn
 - 150th Engr C Bn
 - 160th Engr C Bn
 - 179th Engr C Bn
 - 204th Engr C Bn
 - 206th Engr C Bn
 - 623d Engr L Equip Co
 - 961st Engr Maint Co

- ARMY
- 1134th Engr C Gp
 - 1137th Engr C Gp
 - 1301st Engr GS Regt
 - 1303d Engr GS Regt
 - 1306th Engr GS Regt
 - 61st Engr C Bn
 - 145th Engr C Bn
 - 188th Engr C Bn
 - 249th Engr C Bn
 - 293d Engr C Bn
 - 609th Engr L Equip Co
 - 632d Engr L Equip Co
 - 528th Engr L Pon Co
 - 976th Engr Maint Co
 - 998th Engr Trdw Br Co
 - 572d Engr Dp Trk Co
 - 764th Engr Dp Trk Co
 - 770th Engr Dp Trk Co
 - 87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
 - 88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
 - 180th Engr Hv Pon Bn
 - 551st Engr Hv Pon Bn
 - 553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
 - 652d Engr Top Bn
 - 459th Engr Depot Co
 - 2890th Engr TIT (R)
 - 1511th Engr WS Co
 - 1512th Engr WS Co
 - 1239th Engr FF Plat
 - 1240th Engr FF Plat
 - 1681st Engr Surv Ln Det
 - 1092d Engr Util Det
 - Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn (a)

XX and XII Corps, which were abreast facing northeast, were being supported by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1137th Engineer Combat Group, respectively. These two units were, in turn, supported by the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment. The VIII Corps, which was cleaning up the BRITTANY Peninsula, did not require the support of Army engineer troops.

At 082000B September, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 11 was published, effecting the transfer of one combat battalion from XX Corps to XII Corps, one treadway bridge company and one heavy ponton battalion from Army to XII Corps and two heavy ponton battalions from Army to XX Corps. XV Corps, with supporting corps engineer troops, had reverted back to Third U.S. Army, and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was placed in support thereof. The VIII Corps, with all supporting corps engineer troops, was transferred to Ninth U.S. Army. The mission of the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, 1137th Engineer Combat Group, 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment, and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained unchanged.

At 212000A September, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 12 was published, effecting the transfer of one treadway bridge company from XII Corps to XV Corps, the attachment of one treadway bridge company to XII Corps, and the transfer of one light ponton company and one heavy ponton battalion from Army to XV Corps. Missions of Army troops remained unchanged.

At 300800 September, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 13 was published. At this time the XV Corps, with all supporting corps engineer troops, had been transferred to Sixth Army Group, effective 290001A, and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment, previously in support of XV Corps, was placed in support of the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. The missions of the remainder of the Army Engineer troops remained unchanged.

II - CONSTRUCTION

Roads and Bridges

The terrain over which Engineer units of Third U.S. Army were responsible for road and bridge work during the month of September was dissected by such major rivers as the MARNE, the MEUSE, and the MOSELLE, together with numerous smaller streams and canals. During this period of operations enemy bridge demolitions continued to improve both in quality and in the number of bridges destroyed. This was particularly true after Third U.S. Army operations, because of critical shortages of gasoline, were materially slowed down, allowing the enemy more time to prepare and execute bridge demolitions. As a result, practically every bridge over rivers, streams and canals were destroyed that would present an obstacle to our further advance. The

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road surfaces were not materially damaged other than a very few deliberate road craters and minefields. The roads in the vicinity of the MOSELLE River, where the enemy had prepared a strong defensive position were heavily mined. The road craters were expeditiously repaired by division or corps engineers and further improved by Army Engineers. Mines were removed by Engineers from road surfaces, and thus caused very little damage to the roads.

The network of asphalt or tar surfaced roads available for Third U.S. Army operations during September was entirely adequate. The surfacing on some sections of these roads was badly raveled, but was not of such a nature as to affect flow of military traffic. Surface treatment as a preventative maintenance would have been desirable; however, very little asphalt work was done other than to repair "chuck holes" and to improve bridge approaches.


Bridge demolitions were so intensive throughout the zone of action that it became necessary for the Engineer Section closely to coordinate all bridge construction within the Army area of responsibility. Traffic circulation diagrams were prepared showing the essential Army roadnet. These were approved by the A.C. of S., G-4 and published with G-4 Section Administrative Orders. Army Engineer units were instructed not to undertake any major bridge construction off these approved routes without prior approval. This was done for the dual purpose of conserving critical bridge materials and insuring maximum military benefit from bridging efforts expended.

The bridging operations during September continued at a rapid rate. During the month the following bridges were built:

Type	Number	Length in feet
Treadway	52	8,300
Heavy Ponton	6	1,155
Infantry Support	2	450
Timber Trestle	170	19,000
Bailey Bridge (Fixed)	67	6,800


The general replacement plan inaugurated at the beginning of operations was continued, and as a result the stock of tactical bridging was kept either mobile or in advanced depots ready for immediate use by the using troops. The replacement policy was carried on by either Army Combat Groups or General Service Regiments, which followed the corps troops so closely that many tactical bridges were in place for less than a week. This policy enabled a relatively small amount of bridging to cover all operational needs and materially reduced the amount that had to be carried in depot stock. However, the supply of bridging, particularly Bailey, was substantially improved during the month, since Communications Zone started delivering bridges in substantial quantities. This delivery was really of paramount importance, since all but one of the heavy ponton battalions that had been transporting the equipment were needed for operational purposes and the engineer transport facilities were thus reduced by 80 per cent.

At the beginning of the month work was in progress on both the SEINE and MARNE Rivers. On the SEINE replacement bridges were being constructed to free tactical bridges at VULAINES (X-9469), MONTEREAU (X-4687), NOGENT (X-8797), ROMILLY (Y-0499), MERY (Y-1697) and TROYES (Y-2873); and on the MARNE and MARNE Canal replacement bridges were being constructed at EPERNAY (T-2456), CHALONS (T-5445), and VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T-6919).



Class 70, 2-way Pile and Barge Bridge over the SEINE River at VULAINES SUR SEINE (X-9469). Water Gap 480 ft, total length 550 ft. Built by 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment 27 August - 3 September 1944.


The bridging at CHALONS (T-5445) was of particular interest because of the inherent difficulties of the site and the effectiveness of the demolitions executed. Here a reinforced concrete bridge 300 feet long had been blown, so that the work of replacing it could not be begun until the debris had been cleared for the site. The immediate problem of crossing here was overcome by the construction



Class 70 Two-Way Timber Trestle Bridge across the MARNE River at EPERNAY (T-2456). Length 220 ft. Built by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment 3 - 8 September 1944.

of a short treadway bridge just spanning the water gaps; but the problem of providing a semi-permanent crossing suitable for the heavy supply traffic and troop movement demanded the construction of a bridge that would not be affected by a rise in the water level. The rainy weather constantly threatened the water gap bridges. A further threat was a dam about 300 yards upstream of the crossing site, which, though it had been partially drained for safety, might be bombed out. Immediate relief was afforded by constructing a bridge high enough to provide a reasonable factor of safety should the water rise. This bridge carried Class 70 loads as well, since loaded tank recovery vehicles were until then required to cross the river at EPERNAY (T-2456).

As a further improvement in the situation, since both CHALONS (T-5445) and SOMMESOUS (T-4021) were slated to become railheads while the Army dumps were to be located east of the river, it was decided to construct a Class 40 Bailey bridge over the gap which the original bridge had spanned. This job was difficult, since piers thirty feet high had to be constructed. The work was executed by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment, and within seventy-two hours of starting, vehicles were using the bridge.



Class 40 Triple Single Bailey Bridge over the MARNE River at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-5445). Built by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment. The supporting piers are built of standard Bailey part. Length 320 ft. Built 7 - 12 September 1944.

Southeast of CHALONS (T-5445), in the XII Corps zone, bridging became a task of even greater magnitude than any yet encountered.

Every bridge over the main streams in the area was demolished, and though the streams were generally at a low level during this period, it was necessary to replace the axial highway bridges on the Traffic Circulation Net, since bottlenecks created at by-passes at these points made them undesirable for the movements taking place because enemy air activity was always a threat. The start of the rainy period was a further spur to get the traffic back on the roads.

The destruction in XI Corps zone was not so disruptive as that experienced in the south, since, with the exception of bridges at SUIPPES (T-6664) and minor crossings over the AISNE, which could be forded, the principal bridges as far east as VERDUN (U-2965) had been overrun and captured intact. This was particularly fortunate along the CHALONS (T-5445)-VERDUN (U-2965) road, since this highway was to become the corps and Army main supply routes and Red Ball route as well.

The MEUSE River running along the front from north to south was the next barrier encountered and, as before, all the bridges had been destroyed except, fortunately, the main highway bridge through VERDUN (U-2965). The crossing was expedited by the construction of treadway bridges north and south of the city. However, once this line had been reached, the shortage of gasoline limited any further advances.

In the XII Corps zone, again the destruction was very thorough on the MEUSE, but the advance was pressed with determination despite the nature of the terrain—made difficult by the many valleys traversed by small streams over which long bridges had been constructed to provide for the high water existing during the flood season.

The entire Army front was now in the region of famous names of World War I, and bridges were put in at COMMERCY (U-4320), ST. MIHIEL (U-3935), and VERDUN (U-2965).

When gasoline became available, the troops surged forward again to the MOSELLE, where the most bitter fighting yet encountered took place. It was in making crossings here that severe Engineer casualties in personnel and equipment were suffered as they forced their way across the stream.

In XI Corps zone, METZ (U-8758) on the MOSELLE River was the immediate objective, but the delay for gasoline had permitted the enemy to so strongly entrench that a direct approach was impossible. Therefore, encircling moves north and south were started in an attempt to outflank the city. An advance to the north was made and the ORRE River crossed at several points. But even after THIONVILLE (U-8686) was in our hands, the possibility of forcing a crossing of the MOSELLE at this point was not attempted, since the enemy held the east bank in great strength.

South of METZ (U-8758) a crossing was made at ARNAVILLE (U-7647) under direct enemy artillery fire from the hills east of the river, which were really a greater tactical barrier than the river. The initial waves of Infantry were put across in assault boats. As soon as an initial bridgehead was established, Infantry support rafts were used to bring over vehicles; but even some of these were hit by artillery fire. In spite of the continued artillery fire, a ford was constructed during the first hours following the crossing, since timed artillery bursts were so frequent that no bridge could have remained afloat. Tanks and tank destroyers crossed this ford to support the Infantry.

Smoke was used to cover the crossing site, but unfortunately the wind shifted at an inopportune moment and revealed the whole crossing force to the enemy, who immediately answered with intense fire.

This area was also naturally defensible for the enemy, since several high hills on the east bank of the river commanded the entire valley and the corps decided to try crossings further south at PAGNY (U-5112) and VANDIERES (U-7541). These crossings were successful despite heavy opposition, and it was then possible to move north up the valley again and put in the ARNAVILLE (U-7647) bridge. However, even then it was necessary to screen off the entire north end of the valley with smoke to prevent direct fire on the bridge. Despite this, bridges put in by the 551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion and the 989th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were hit and damaged by artillery fire. The policy of replacing tactical bridges, in preparation for the eventual movement, was begun by the 1306th Engineers, which pushed deep into the corps zone and started replacing the ARNAVILLE (U-7647) bridge. This job soon resolved itself into a matter of Engineer determination against enemy artillery, for once again, after a lull of several days, the enemy came back into action, injured some personnel and damaged both the existing floating bridges and some of the equipment of the 1306th Engineers.

However, to maintain adequate routes of communication to the troops east of the river who were then only a few miles away, it was

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

necessary to leave in all the bridges, since even a short interruption to communications might have been critical at this time.

South and west of NANCY (U-8611), the XII Corps objective, each of the many arms of the MOSELLE presented an individual crossing problem and the initial crossings had to be made by the Infantry in assault boats or by wading. The advances were made under direct artillery and small arms fire and as an indication of the intensity of the fighting, about seventy assault boats were damaged or lost in this area alone.

In the northern section of the corps area, a crossing was attempted near PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735), but it was unsuccessful. Subsequently, a successful crossing was made at DIEULOUARD (U-7828), where the MOSELLE flows through a long, wide flat valley, commanded on all sides by high hills. Successful Infantry crossings were made here and the crossing was exploited by putting in several floating bridges. After the bridges were pushed over, the task of defending the bridges was thrust upon the small Infantry force, the heavy ponton battalion, and some combat engineers. In this manner the bridgehead was held for several days until NANCY (U-8611) was finally captured and Infantry and Armored columns came in and cleared the area.

In NANCY (U-8611), destruction of bridges was complete. Not a single route over the canal and MEURTHE River was left intact, and in all eleven bridges had to be constructed to provide adequate traffic circulation through the town.

Following the fall of NANCY (U-8611), the project of putting in a bridge at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735) was again started, since it was planned to make this a main axial highway and possibly the Army main supply route. However, the east bank was still held by the enemy and one of the officers surveying the crossing was killed by a sniper. The area was finally cleared and an 800-foot bridge was erected at the town using existing piers. The bridge consisted of two Bailey bridges joined by a long stretch of I-beam bridging. An additional obstacle to the building was the fact that the vicinity of the bridge was heavily mined, and it was necessary to clear the area before work could begin. The project was completed in sixty hours of continuous work by the 249th Engineers, and as can be seen in the photographs, it was a major accomplishment.



800 ft Bailey and Steel I-Beam Bridge Constructed By 249th Engineer Combat Battalion at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735) across the MOSELLE River

Once the MOSELLE had been crossed in force, bridges again came into the picture east of the river, but no major obstacles blocked the way.

XV Corps entered the operational stage back with Third U.S. Army on 8 September, and had the MARNE, MEUSE and MOSELLE River to cross. The principal crossings were made at CHAUMONT (X-5979), NEUFCHATEAU (Z-4975) and CHARMES (Z-9376), respectively.

VIII Corps operations under Third U.S. Army on the BREST Peninsula were completed on 5 September, when this corps was transferred to Ninth U.S. Army. No major bridging operations were reported during this period, since the principal task was the siege of BREST (V-9599) and other cities in the BREST Peninsula.

Other Construction.

As during the month of August, the only other construction of any importance during September was prisoner of war enclosures.

On 1 September work was started by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment on a prisoner of war enclosure at REVIGNY (T-9829). At this site the standard prisoner of war enclosure, 750 feet square, was constructed. This standard was developed after experimentation as to size and arrangement of interior pens and was approved by the Provost Marshal Section.

Because of the shortage of barbed wire, all salvagable wire was picked up and delivered to Engineer Dump No. 6 at CHALONS (T-5445).

On 8 September the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was given a work order to construct a standard prisoner of war enclosure in the vicinity of FRESNES (U-4657). Reconnaissance was made on 9 September, construction started the following day, and work was completed 11 September.

Because of the approach of inclement weather and the availability of quarters, the next prisoner of war enclosure was located in the French artillery barracks in TOUL (U-6410). Buildings were encircled with wire of the triple concertina, with some exceptions, where four-strand wire was constructed. Box-type latrines were constructed over holes twenty-four inches in diameter by twelve feet deep. Two water tank platforms and four guard towers were constructed. This work was performed by the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment. The work order was issued on 18 September, reconnaissance was made on 19 September, and work completed on 21 September.

III - SUPPLY

As of 1 September two Army Engineer supply installations were being operated by the 459th Engineer Depot Company and two Quartermaster Service Companies. These were Engineer Depot No. 5, located in the vicinity of PUISEAUX (X-1070), stocked with Engineer Class II, IV and V supplies and spare parts; and Advance Engineer Supply Point No. 6, supporting XII, XX and XV Corps, located in the vicinity of CHALONS (T-5445), and stocked with Class IV Engineer supplies, consisting mainly of Bailey bridging. Class II and Class IV Engineer supplies, with the exception of Bailey bridging, were transported to Army Engineer depots by Advance Section Communications Zone and Army transportation. Bailey bridging was being brought into Army depots by Communications Zone truck transportation.

On 7 September a new supply procedure was instituted by Communications Zone whereby supplies furnished each service of the Army were based on a daily tonnage allocation. The Engineers were allocated forty-three long tons daily for all classes of supplies. Daily requisitions representing this tonnage were submitted to A.C. of S., G-4, Army, who forwarded them to the 24th Regulating Station. From there they were routed to the G-4 Section, Advance Section Communications Zone. Such items as were available in Advance Section Communications Zone Engineer depots were filled and the remaining items extracted to Communications Zone. Supplies were forwarded to Army truckheads and railheads by Communications Zone transportation. Items on the daily requisition which were filled by Advance Section Communications Zone were forwarded to Army Engineer depots by Advance Section Communications Zone transportation, augmented, when necessary, by Army transportation.

Daily tonnage allocation to the Engineers was increased to seventy-three tons on 12 September, since it was found that forty-three tons were not sufficient to supply Third U.S. Army units with Engineer supplies. A special allocation of 3,554 long tons for Bailey bridging was obtained from Communications Zone. This bridging was moved to the Army area by special bridge trains dispatched directly from the NORMANDY Base Section.

Third U.S. Army Engineer Depot No. 7 was established for all classes of Engineer supplies in the vicinity of FRESNES (U-4657) on 6 September. Since this depot was located well forward in the Army area, it was designed to service both corps and Army troops.



Engineer Depot No. 7 at FRESNES (U-4657)

All inter-depot movements of Engineer supplies continued to be performed by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached units. Because of the rapid movement of the Army, this work required the constant use of approximately 170 2 1/2-ton trucks. At all times priority was given to the movement of bridges. At no time was there a shortage of bridging available to the corps.

In the area occupied by the Army during this period, considerable quantities of captured Engineer materials were encountered. A system was established whereby all captured supplies would be used to the maximum extent. Units reporting captured supplies immediately placed guards and reported the location to the Army Engineer. In order to relieve corps of much of this work, teams made up from the 293d Engineer Combat Battalion were assigned to each corps for the purpose of making complete inventories and maintaining guards. Materials were issued to all troops on the approval of corps or Army Engineer. One officer and two enlisted men from Advance Section Communications Zone were attached to the Engineer Supply Section for the purpose of coordinating the transfer of captured Engineer material from Army to Advance Section Communications Zone, which also assisted in guarding captured dumps in the Army area. Captured Engineer supplies, particularly lumber, electrical supplies, and explosives were found to be extremely useful during this period of operations.

First rail shipments of Engineer supplies directly to the Army area were received at VERDUN (U-2965) railhead on 19 September.

Army Engineer Depot No. 8 was opened at TOUL (U-6410) on 26 September. Inside storage was available for Class II supplies. Prior to this time no inside storage had been used. Railway facilities were also available which enabled rail shipments to be received direct from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone.

In general, quantities of Engineer supplies received from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone were adequate to supply the Army. Principal shortages consisted of topographic supplies, paint, spare parts, and bridge flooring. By the end of September there was a decided shortage of bridge lumber because of the fact that most captured lumber dumps had been exhausted. Efforts were started to take advantage of local saw mills for the production of bridge materials.

A shortage of second and third echelon spare parts prevailed throughout the first two weeks in September. However, by 20 September second and third echelon coverage on approximately twenty types of Engineer equipment had been obtained. All spare parts were transported by Army transportation from Advance Section Communications Zone Spare Parts Depot at PARIS (S-0544). Because of the comparatively small demand for spare parts during the rapid advance of the Army, the shortage of spare parts was not a major problem.

Battle losses of equipment were confined primarily to river crossing equipment, such as Brockway bridge trucks, assault boats, treadway bridging and ponton bridging. This equipment was replaced from Army and Communications Zone depot stocks.

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Over the period 1 September to 30 September, inclusive, 618 long tons of Class II, 3,639 long tons of Class IV, and twenty-two long tons of Class V Engineer supplies were received into Army depots from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone.

During the month of September, the average stock on hand in all Army supply installations by classes and by days of supplies was as follows:

Type of Supplies	Tonnage (LT)	Days of Supply
Class II	305	2
Class IV	2,500	2½
Class V	341	3

IV - MAPS

A reproduction program was in progress during all the month of September. First priority was given to the map project of 1/25,000 series covering the SIEGFRIED Line in front of Third U.S. Army. The facilities of the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion, 666th Engineer Topographic Company and the 673d Engineer Topographic Company were used. The project consisted of 254 quadrangles of 12,000 copies each. In addition, defense overprints were run on sixty-nine quadrangles, 2,000 copies of each. With the movement of the Army less rapid, it was necessary to print 1/50,000 maps from the area covered by the SIEGFRIED project west to the position of the Army. This consisted of fifty-seven quadrangles of 12,000 copies each. During this period the situation became such that large scale maps were needed in the immediate area of fighting and a 1/25,000 map project was started. These consisted of thirty-one quadrangles of 8,000 copies each.

In addition to the reproduction work of the Army units, reproduction of 1/100,000 and 1/250,000 maps was carried on in PARIS (S-0544), with facilities obtained by the Engineer, Third U.S. Army, and supervised by an officer from this section. This was necessary because Third U.S. Army was rapidly approaching an area of which no coverage of these series were on hand, and it was felt that precautions had to be taken immediately to alleviate this condition. Several days after this project was started, maps covering the critical area began to arrive through normal channels and the PARIS (S-0544) plant was closed.

A planimetric map from air photos was made by the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion, as a test, in seventy-two hours.

A photomapping project of nineteen sheets covering the area around METZ (U-8758) was undertaken and completed during the month. Reproduction of these sheets amounted to 8,000 copies each.

A model was requested by the Army Commander covering the area east of VERDUN (U-2965). Work was undertaken by the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion and the model delivered in eight days.

To assist the Artillery, a project consisting of six 1/100,000 quadrangles was overprinted with trig data. The plotting and checking were done by Third U.S. Army and the production, consisting of 1,000 prints, was done by the Communications Zone plant in PARIS (S-0544).

A system for transposing German trig data to existing theater grid was worked out by Third U.S. Army in conjunction with Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Work on a graphic solution covering this transformation was carried on.

Several captured map and supply installations were visited during the month. Eight 2½-ton truck loads of paper and topographic supplies were sent to the Engineer depot.

Conferences were held in PARIS (S-0544), REIMS (T-3080), Twelfth U.S. Army Group and at this Headquarters on map supply and distribution. As a result of these contacts, map supply for Third U.S. Army for the entire month was adequate and complete. Maps were being received through normal channels by the end of the month.

Contacts were made with divisions. At the 5th Infantry Division, when the Commanding General desired 1/20,000 maps in an emergency, these were obtained through Twelfth U.S. Army Group and reproduced by the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion.

A letter was sent out cautioning various groups against the use of captured maps, calling their attention to the differences in grids and the possible complications which might arise from their use.

V - INTELLIGENCE

With the military situation moving rapidly, efforts were concen-

trated upon securing all available information of our interested area deep to our front in Eastern France and Southwestern Germany. The information in which we were mainly concerned was as follows:

a. Topography and Roads.

This was to include all terrain analyses indicating areas and roads which favored cross country movement of tracked vehicles and those areas which did not.

b. Rivers.

This was to include width of rivers, velocity, type of river bed, condition of banks, and those areas which were favorable for assault crossings, and those which were not. The rivers of main interest were the MOSELLE, the MEURTHE, the SAAR, and the RHINE.

c. Bridges.

This was to include the location, type, length, width and strength of each bridge, with water gap and existing road net.

All such information available was obtained, appraised, compiled and disseminated to all Third U.S. Army Engineer units. The source of such information was two-fold: higher headquarters and our own resources, which included the Photo Center, Third U.S. Army, and the 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team.

The following intelligence data were distributed to various units within this Army:

a. Topography and Roads.

There were fifteen terrain studies of various areas, including L.S.T.D. Reports and Terrain area maps, issued.

b. Rivers.

There were eleven different studies and reports issued.

c. Bridges.

There were three different bridge reports issued. With reference to bridge reports, it is to be noted that many of the river reports also contained reports on bridges. Bridge studies based on recent photography were issued on the SAAR and RHINE River bridges.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team prepared a mine chart, displaying the various types of German teller mines with the new non-removable igniter. Since this was based on the actual finding and examination of the igniter, a wide distribution throughout the Army was made. The unit was occupied also with the examination of enemy dumps at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-5445), CONFLANS (U-6565), and THIONVILLE (U-8676). Items of exceptional interest which were examined were the German seven-inch rifle grenade and the German "J" Heavy Ponton bridge.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

Nineteen Army water points and three water distribution points for Army troops were opened during the month of September.

Operation of eleven Army water points and one water distribution point, four of which had been opened in August, was assumed by the 487th Engineer Water Supply Battalion of Advance Section Communications Zone. Operation of an Army water supply mobile unit in the city of ORLEANS (W-6540) was discontinued on 2 September.

The 1512th Engineer Water Supply Company, assisted by the 487th Engineer Water Supply Battalion of Advance Section Communications Zone, started on 25 September supplementing the water supply of the city of ETAIN (U-4770) by hauling an average of 55,000 gallons of water per day and delivering it to the water system. Approximately one-half million gallons of water were added to the city supply.

The water supply system of the city of NANCY (U-8611) was inspected and the water was declared unsuited for Army use for drinking and cooking.

By the end of the month, five Army water points and two water distribution points were furnishing approximately 140,000 gallons of water per day, including that supplied to the city of ETAIN (U-4770).

Water supply points were located in the close proximity of Evacuation Hospitals, with the view of providing uninterrupted water supply to these units. Convalescent hospitals, Medical air evacuation holding units, and prisoner of war enclosures were supplied by haulage to their storage tanks.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

On 1 September the four platoons of "A" Company, 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion, were attached to the VIII, XII, XIV and XX Corps.

The operations of the platoons consisted of continuous inspection of corps units and divisions, making corrections, advising and assisting in camouflage matters. Their chief findings related to supply shortages. In order to correct deficiencies the supply situation was investigated and estimates submitted indicating material requirements for immediate use.

The company commander and technical sergeant camoufleur gave their attention to the camouflage of the area of Third U.S. Army Headquarters, making periodic aerial and ground inspections of the area. Interpretation of aerial photographs was the principal method of obtaining information relative to the camouflage of areas inspected, although during the latter part of the month, inclement weather made aerial inspection impossible.

On 5 September, a German camouflage net factory at SENS (X-6965) was investigated, but because of lack of supervising personnel, it was not reopened.

On 16 September the second platoon reverted to company control from VIII Corps and was used in improving the camouflage of Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters. Improvement in the camouflage of the area was achieved by continuous inspection. It was found that inspection personnel achieved best results when they could show the personnel of units inspected aerial photographs of their own area.

The Camouflage Coordinator, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, inspected units of XX Corps.

On 21 September the survey of Army camouflage requirements was completed and an estimate submitted indicating requirements for the month and for a sixty-day period following. During the month the supply of camouflage nets was greatly increased by shipments from Advance Section Communications Zone, nets being obtained through turn-in by Advance Section Communications Zone and by increased supply from England and the United States.

On 23 September inspection of Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters revealed improvement in camouflage practice, although inclement weather had caused the area to become unduly marred and muddy.

On 30 September the 3rd platoon returned to company control after attachment to XV Corps.

Under the conditions prevailing at the end of September, with units quartered in towns, a change in camouflage policy and practice was necessary. These changes were dealt with by individual contact by inspection personnel, so that units inspected would learn the new principles involved when camouflage was practiced in towns rather than in wooded terrain.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

The Headquarters Sections and Type No. 2 units of both Engineer Fire Fighting Sections remained attached to Ordnance Groups for protection of Class V depots. The six type No. 1 units assisted the Quartermaster Gas Supply Companies, to which they were attached, in setting up fire defense and remained with them for fire protection.

In addition to the fire protection furnished, the commanders of the units inspected all ammunition supply points and assisted, when necessary, in setting up fire defense. Careful attention was given to preventive measures and no fires occurred during the month.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

There were very few major changes in the disposition of engineer troops throughout the month due to the static situation. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1137th Engineer Combat Group remained in direct support of the XX and XII Corps and were, in turn, supported by the 1301st and 1303d Engineer General Service Regiments, respectively. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot hauling activities.

On 2 October the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the NORMANDY Beach and was attached to the 1137th Engineer Combat Group.

On 5 October the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion reverted from Seventh U.S. Army to the control of Third U.S. Army and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 8 October one platoon of the Light Equipment Company attached to the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was detached therefrom and attached to the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment to equalize the equipment available.

At 152000A October Engineer Operational Instruction No. 14 was published. At this time major disposition of engineer troops remained unchanged. The 528th Engineer Light Ponton Company, 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and the 3d Platoon, Company A, 602d Engineer Camouflage Battalion reverted from Seventh U.S. Army to the control of Third U.S. Army, effective this date, and the 1354th Engineer Dump Truck Company had arrived from the NORMANDY Beach.

Effective 18 October, changes in the attachments of the four Engineer Dump Truck Companies were effected to provide for the attachment of one Dump Truck Company to each of the three Engineer General Service Regiments and the Engineer Combat Group under Army.

At 231800A October Engineer Operational Instruction No. 15 was published effecting the above noted transfers and the attachment to the XX Corps of the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, which unit had been assigned Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army, effective 20 October.

Starting 25 October, a three-day school in floating equipage to include construction of the Class 70 floating Bailey bridge, use of storm boats, tandem M-2 assault boats (powered), rafts and ferries, was commenced. A schedule was drawn up for all Army Engineer troops to attend, taking one battalion, or the equivalent, each three day period.

Effective 27 October, the 551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army and assigned to Ninth U.S. Army.

The disposition of Engineer troops at 312400A October was as follows:

XII CORPS		ARMY	
1117th Engr C Gp	1134th Engr C Gp	609th Engr L Equip Co	632d Engr L Equip Co
1139th Engr C Gp	1137th Engr C Gp	976th Engr Maint Co	976th Engr Maint Co
1334 Engr C Bn	1301st Engr GS Regt	528th Engr L Pon Co	528th Engr L Pon Co
150th Engr C Bn	1303d Engr GS Regt	548th Engr L Pon Co	548th Engr L Pon Co
166th Engr C Bn	1306th Engr GS Regt	998th Engr Trdwy Br Co	998th Engr Trdwy Br Co
167th Engr C Bn	145th Engr C Bn	572d Engr Dp Trk Co	572d Engr Dp Trk Co
218th Engr C Bn	178th Engr C Bn	764th Engr Dp Trk Co	764th Engr Dp Trk Co
613th Engr L Equip Co	188th Engr C Bn	770th Engr Dp Trk Co	770th Engr Dp Trk Co
72d Engr L Pon Co	249th Engr C Bn	1354th Engr Dp Trk Co	1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
513th Engr L Pon Co	293d Engr C Bn	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
995th Engr Trdwy Br Co	609th Engr L Equip Co	88th Engr Hv Pon Bn	88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
997th Engr Trdwy Br Co	632d Engr L Equip Co	652d Engr Top Bn	652d Engr Top Bn
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	976th Engr Maint Co	459th Engr Depot Co	459th Engr Depot Co
673d Engr Top Co	528th Engr L Pon Co	1511th Engr WS Co	1511th Engr WS Co
4th Flat, Co A, 602d Engr	548th Engr L Pon Co		
Cam Bn	998th Engr Trdwy Br Co		
2897th Engr TIT (C)	572d Engr Dp Trk Co		

II CORPS

1105d Engr C Gp
1139th Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn

206th Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co
509th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
531st Engr Trdwy Br Co
996th Engr Trdwy Br Co
120th Engr Hv Pon Bn
664th Engr Top Co
1st Flat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

1512th Engr WS Co
Co A (-), 602d Engr
Cam Bn
2890th Engr TIT (R)
1239th Engr FF Plat
1240th Engr FF Plat
1681st Engr Surv In Det
1092d Engr Util Det

II - CONSTRUCTION

The road maintenance work performed by engineer troops during the month consisted of cleaning out ditches to improve drainage, removing mud from surface of asphalt pavements, patching of raveled areas in these paved roads and the construction of access roads into bivouac areas and supply installations.

Some sections of pavement on main supply routes became badly raveled and "chuck holes" developed, which necessitated patching to insure the safe and continued smooth flow of supply traffic over these vital arteries.

To accomplish this necessary extensive patching, two central mixing plants were operated, one in the vicinity of ETAIN (U-4770) and the other at TOUL (U-6410). These two asphalt mixing plants produced several hundred tons of premix asphaltic patching material which was used on road repairs within reasonable hauling distance from the plants. Several German rolling kitchens were utilized as melting pots for asphalt and tar and the aggregate mixed by hand with this hot binder to supplement the production of the central mixing plants.

After utilizing all available crushed aggregate at the TOUL (U-6410) plant and in the absence of any available rock crus. ar., an experimental patching mixture was developed, using pit-run sand-gravel and cement. The sand-gravel was excavated from a pit adjacent to the central mixing plant at TOUL (U-6410) and contained about the correct amount of water to hydrate and cure the cement. The only action necessary was to add cement to the pit-run sand-gravel and mix about forty-five seconds in the same rotary drum mixer as had previously been used for mixing asphalt and crushed gravel. Captured German cement was used for this purpose and proved successful as an expedient method of patching "chuck holes" in asphalt pavements.

The continued rainy weather during October necessitated a considerable amount of work at the entrances to bivouac areas and supply points, many of which had been located along main supply routes. This work was of two kinds: First, the mud carried onto the main highways had to be cleaned off continuously to prevent accidents resulting from the slippery roads; secondly, the access roads leading off the main paved highways had to be gravelled in order to prevent mud being carried onto the main roads and also to facilitate movement in and out of the otherwise muddy area. This work was a continuing task for all units because of the continued moving of units and the lack of sufficient engineer equipment to improve the situation at all points at once. In order to utilize the skills of engineer troops in more essential work, French civilians were hired to shovel the mud off the roads in most instances. Because of the vast amount of mud on the roads, it was also necessary to improvise plows and drags to help keep them clear. However, as the number of bridging projects was reduced toward the end of the month, more equipment became available for this purpose and good results were obtained by preparing access roads to areas ahead of occupancy.

Other engineer work consisted of removing mines and booby traps from roads and areas to be occupied by supply installations; also the repair of buildings and water systems of evacuation hospitals.

During the month, the following bridges were constructed by Army units:

Type	Number	Total Length-Feet
Bailey Bridges	17	2,300
Treadway Bridges	13	650
Timber Bridges	1	9,000
Infantry Support Bridges	1	200

Bridging operations in October required a relatively small amount of tactical bridging as compared with previous months, but a substantial amount of permanent bridging was constructed. The principal tactical bridges were the Bailey bridges constructed on the SEILLE River by XII Corps units. Since, however, the front line was so close to the MOSELLE River along the entire front, most of the bridges constructed to replace tactical bridging could well be called tactical

bridging. Of the bridges constructed over the MOSELLE, the pile bridge at ARNAVILLE (U-7647) is perhaps the most noteworthy. It was an unusual day when work could proceed without interruption by artillery fire directed at the site. Though accurate at first to the point of damaging some of the unit's equipment, work could proceed without direct interference from shelling by re-establishing a smoke screen across the valley north of the bridge site.



2-WAY PILE BRIDGE OVER THE MOSELLE AT ARNAVILLE (U-7647) SHOWING SMOKE SCREEN IN THE BACKGROUND

When the forward movement of the Army temporarily stopped, the bridging situation was surveyed and immediate steps taken to replace all tactical and temporary bridging with high level permanent bridging. This work was the major task of all Army units during the month. It was well worthwhile, since a short period of high water, late in the month, indicated that the temporary low-level bridges would not have been capable of permitting an uninterrupted traffic flow. Ponton and treadway bridging, however, were held available for any contingency.

All the permanent type bridges were of pile bent construction and each one represented a distinctly individual task in its construction, first, because the number of pile drivers available was relatively small; secondly, the policy was to use all possible local materials, such as I-beams, lumber, etc. This policy, though requiring some ingenuity, worked out satisfactorily.

One casualty occurred during the month. An existing concrete civilian bridge at ROMPEY (U-8221), to which a military bridge had been connected, failed by the collapse of a concrete pier brought about by the swift water during a rise. Debris from the demolished section of the original bridge which had fallen into the stream, blocking a substantial part of the water opening and therefore imposing an unusual and severe scouring action on the already weakened member, was a contributing factor to its collapse. A completely new pile bridge is being constructed at an adjacent site.

During the month three other projects were engaged in, namely, the floating equipage school; the destruction of ETANG DE LINDRE Dam (Q-2832); and the establishment of a flood warning system in the MOSELLE watershed. The destruction of the ETANG DE LINDRE Dam (Q-2832) was done to prevent the enemy from creating a flood on the SEILLE River. The destruction of the dam was so carried out that a controlled flood was created, thus not damaging any military installations. A large measure of credit in providing this protection is due to the 1135th Engineer Combat Group, which unit took a major part in controlling the waters by judiciously sandbagging critical spots.

Since the watershed of the MOSELLE River is subject to serious flooding, a system of gaging stations was established, to be used for providing information needed both for planning of bridging and tactical requirements.

III - SUPPLY

Third Army Engineer Depot No. 8 at TOUL (U-6410) and Depot No. 7 at FRESNES (U-4657) continued in operation during the month. All classes of engineer supplies were stocked in Depot No. 8, but only Bailey bridging in Depot No. 7.


Because of the static tactical situation and the nearness of the Army Depot to the corps, forward army engineer depots were not established. Forward engineer supply points containing bridging material were operated by both corps.

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Two railheads, one at RAMBUCCOURT (U-5529) for bridging materials, and one at TOUL (U-6410) for other Class IV and Class II engineer supplies were operated for the receipt of rail shipments from Communications Zone. At the height of operations, 650 tons of bridging were processed through the RAMBUCCOURT (U-5529) railhead daily. During the month, the majority of engineer supplies received from the rear were transported by rail.

Issues from Army engineer depots consisted primarily of materials for fixed timber bridges and replenishment of Class II engineer supplies expended during the active campaign just completed.

A shortage of bridge lumber continued to exist in the Army area. In order to build up a stock of lumber for future operations, a total of twenty-one civilian sawmills were placed under contract to saw lumber. On 14 October the 1391st Engineer Forestry Company was placed in operation in the Army area. This unit, though assigned to Advance Section Communications Zone, is producing bridge lumber exclusively for Third U.S. Army.



THIRD U.S. ARMY FORESTRY OPERATIONS

Lumber was also stock-piled in two lumber dumps, one in the XII Corps area and the other in the IX Corps area. The total output of civilian and Army sawmills was 55,000 board feet per day. A rigid control of all lumber was maintained by the Army Engineer. In order to maintain maximum production from civilian sawmills, transportation from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group was used to supply logs and to pick up sawed lumber for stockpiling.

Expendable items of Engineer Class II supplies continued to be short. A decided improvement in the supply of spare parts was noted. Second echelon parts were available only in quantities sufficient to repair deadlined equipment. The supply of heavy equipment continued to be adequate. A shortage of commercial gases was experienced during the month, but local procurement of gases prevented this shortage from becoming a critical one.

Third Army Engineer Depot No. 7 was closed on 30 October. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group, with attached units, was used as the transporting agency for inter-depot movement of supplies, movement of

supplies from railheads to depots, emergency movement of supplies from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone depots to Army Engineer depots, and collection of captured materials.

Storage and issue of engineer explosives, previously handled in engineer depots, were changed to Ordnance ammunition supply points, one point being designated for each corps. Two enlisted men from the 459th Engineer Depot Company were placed at each ammunition supply point to assist Ordnance in making issues of these explosives.

During the month 819 long tons of Class II, 7,677 long tons of Class IV, and 510 long tons of Class V Engineer supplies were received in Army depots from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone.

Average stock of engineer supplies on hand in all Army supply installations by classes during the month was as follows:

Type	Long Tons
Class II	820
Class IV	9,500
Class V	608
Total	10,728

IV - MAPS

The first week in October was the beginning of several new projects. A photomap project desired by G-2 Air was started on 1 October. This project covered considerable portions of the SIEGFRIED Line on Third U.S. Army front, with initial area of compilation centering around ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q-7372), Germany. This job was assigned to the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion. G-2 Air cancelled this project on 15 October.

A more or less stable condition on the Army front, plus the encountering of heavily fortified positions, brought numerous requests for terrain models. Two sets of terrain models, scale 1/10,000, requested by the Army Commander, were placed in the War Room. A model, scale 1/1,000, of the VERDUN (U-2965) forts was constructed for the 5th Infantry Division by the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion. The Engineer, XI Corps, requested construction of terrain models, scale 1/1,000, covering fifteen forts in the METZ (U-8758) area. The model covering FORT JEANNE (U-7859) was constructed by the Army Topographic Battalion and delivered on 19 October. The Topographic Branch, Engineer Section, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, agreed to construct four models, scale 1/1,000, of the FORTS L'AISNE (U-8747), L'YSER (U-9048), KOENIGSMACKER (U-9599), and L'ILLANGE (U-8782). Since in the time available it was impossible to complete them, all requests for model construction with the exception of a 1/250,000 scale model, constructed by the Army Topographic Battalion and delivered to the War Room on 26 October, were cancelled. Four terrain models, scale 1/50,000, were secured from the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone, for the Engineer, XI Corps.

In conjunction with the model construction program, a request for detailed topographic maps, scale 1/2,000, was made for the forts to be modeled. This request evolved six of the most important forts and at the close of the month the maps were being compiled and reproduced by the Army Topographic Battalion.

On 7 October a project was initiated for putting woodlines in green on 1/25,000 scale topographic maps, compilation to be accomplished from existing aerial photos, where available, and from existing monochrome maps where aerial photos were not available. Compilation and editing were completed on twenty-seven different sheets by the end of October.

A program for complete revision of certain areas in the 1/25,000 series maps was coordinated through Twelfth U.S. Army Group and the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone, to eliminate duplication of effort. Third U.S. Army was to revise only those falling within its proposed area. The largest revision block was to be accomplished by the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone.

Two radar sites were surveyed during the month, one for the Eighth Air Force and the other for the Royal Air Force.

Four graphical conversion charts for ready conversion of the German Gauss-Kruger rectangular grids to the Theatre Nord de Guerre grids were prepared and published. These graphs were furnished to Army survey units, Artillery units, and to Twelfth U.S. Army Group for transmission to adjacent armies.

A new map policy, consolidating the experience gained since becoming operational, was consolidated into Circular 70, Headquarters

Third U.S. Army and published 19 October (Annex No. 8). This circular contained new map distribution tables revised to accommodate new and special units.

Reproduction activities during October consisted mainly of printing 1/25,000 series topographic maps in the Army area. A total of 156 sheets of the 1/25,000 series were run. Sixteen of these sheets were overprinted with new defense overprints.

The Army Map Depot handled approximately seventy tons of maps during the month. During the month liaison was constant with the topographic units of the Army and with the Topographic Branch, Engineer Section, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, in order to coordinate effectively the topographic functions of Third U.S. Army.

V - INTELLIGENCE

As the situation remained stable during the month of October, the functions of the subsection delved into greater detail than previously. Demands were for specific areas and pin-points in our immediate front, rather than deep into enemy territory as theretofore experienced.

To supply information on the defenses of the MACINOT Line, numerous French documents were procured and supplied the corps. In addition French officers were secured for the corps to provide first-hand information, since they actually were engaged in the construction of the MACINOT Line and also were well versed with the documents used.

G-2 Auxiliary Agencies were called upon to supply personnel with knowledge on the ETANG DE LINDRE (Q-2832) Dam and various documents describing its construction in order to arrive at a decision whether or not the dam should be blown. This agency was also responsible for the procurement of needed data on the flood warning system used on the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers.

Considerable effort was expended during the month to compile dossiers on the RHINE River and specific bridge sites. This was accomplished and a complete index prepared covering all material on the RHINE River then available to this Army. Valuable studies in the way of photo interpretations were provided by the Third Army Photo Center on individual bridges and crossing sites.

The Photo Center also furnished its first Special Road Study as specified by this section, completing Sheet V-1, 1,000,000, which was a photo interpretation of proposed main supply routes from the present line to the RHINE River.

Normal and routine activities witnessed the issuance of Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 6 and Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 7 to all Third Army Engineer units. The arrival of III Corps called for a complete issue of all intelligence publications needed for their area and these were furnished immediately. The usual distribution of intelligence publications as received from higher headquarters was also carried out to our corps and divisions.

During the middle of October the Technical Intelligence Team left THIONVILLE (U-8785) and joined this Subsection. Through coordination with the Operations Subsection, they were made available and started a training program to be carried out with all Army Engineer units consisting of lectures and demonstrations of mines and booby traps. Sample sets of mines and igniters were also furnished engineer units so that future training could be decentralized.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

The supply of water in the Army area during the month presented problems that had not previously been encountered during operations. The continuous rains and consequent high water caused heavy pollution in all rivers and streams.

Because of the inability of the portable units to produce more than 12,000 gallons of water in twenty-four hours of continuous operation at ten gallons per minute, and because it was impracticable, in many instances, to operate over twenty-four hour periods, authorization was requested for additional water supply equipment for each portable unit. This additional equipment included two 3,000 gallon tanks, canvas, storage; one filter section, purification unit and two pumps, booster, fifty-five gallons per minute. For the mobile unit, two 3,000 gallon tanks, canvas, storage, and one pump, booster, 55 gallons per minute, were requested.

Twelve Army water points and four water distribution points for Army troops were opened during the month. The 487th Engineer Water

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Supply Battalion, of Advance Section Communications Zone, assumed operation of one water point and First U.S. Army assumed operation of another. By the end of the month, four Army water points and four water distributing points were furnishing approximately 95,000 gallons of water per day. These points were operated by the two Army water supply companies. Medical air evacuation holding units and prisoner of war enclosures were supplied by hauling water to their storage tanks.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

Camouflage inspections during the month were continuous. Failure to use wired paths and roads was one of the most common defects, with the result that some areas were badly treaded up. Most units showed need for additional garnishing in nets, and corrective measures were taken; however, because of the shortage of garlands, the process was slow.

Since most units other than front line were billeted, one of the principal functions of camouflage personnel was to render assistance in blacking out and in enforcement of blackout discipline.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

The Engineer fire fighting section's operations for the month were similar to those of previous months. Units remained attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies and Ordnance units operating Class III supply points, Class V supply depots, and railheads. They assisted in setting up fire defense at all of these types of installations and stayed at the installations to provide immediate protection. In addition to the fire protection furnished, the commanders of the sections inspected all ammunition supply points and assisted, when necessary, in setting up fire defense.

Advance Section Communications Zone moved the 1232d Fire Fighting Section into NANCY (U-8501) for protection of military installations established there during the month. One fire truck unit and one trailer unit were installed in the city, one on the west side of town and one on the east side. The other two trailer units of this section were located in TOUL (U-6410), mainly for protection of hospitals.

Arrangements were made for the NANCY (U-8501) civilian fire department to furnish assistance, if needed, in extinguishing fires in military installations. In turn, the military fire fighting units in NANCY (U-8501) were to assist the civilian fire department, when practicable, but would not assume responsibility for a civilian fire except insofar as it might affect a military operation or installation.

Careful attention having been given to preventive measures, no fires occurred in military installations during the month. Assistance in extinguishing fires was given to three trucks which caught fire from unknown causes near Class III Supply Point No. 41, located four miles southwest of NANCY (U-8501) on Highway N 74, and to one truck which caught fire while backing over smoldering trash at a trash dump located two miles west of TOUL (U-6410) on Highway N 4. Assistance was also given to extinguishing civilian fires consisting of a burning hay barn at ST. NICOLAS (U-9404), six miles south of NANCY (U-8501), a chimney fire in a civilian dwelling in NANCY (U-8501), and a burning shed in ST. MAI (U-8913), just northeast of NANCY (U-8501).

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of Engineer troops at the beginning of this period remained unchanged. The XX Corps was supported by the 1306th and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiments in that order, while the XII Corps had the 1137th Engineer Combat Group and the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment for support. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating hauling depot stocks and experimenting with special river crossing equipment and devices.

Tactical guarding of bridges over the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers from ARNAVILLE (U-7647) south to the Army boundary and a main supply route in the Army area, amounted to a considerable problem. Corps was made responsible for those bridges forward of its rear boundary, while

Army troops were given those designated by the Army Engineer. Guard personnel required for the fifty-four bridges during the second week of November aggregated sixty squads daily; for the last two weeks of the month for the twenty-odd bridges, approximately twenty squads were needed.

At 111200A November, Engineer Operations Instruction No. 17 was published, effecting the following transfers and attachments:

1369th Engineer Dump Truck Company attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group.
981st Engineer Maintenance Company attached to XII Corps.
88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion attached to XX Corps.
1000th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company to 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 15 November, Naval Unit N-2 reported to Army and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group the following day. At this time also the 632d Engineer Light Equipment Company arrived from the NORMANDEY Beach and the Company, less one platoon, was attached to the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment; the platoon was attached to the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment.

During the latter part of this month, XX Corps was successfully reducing and at the same time by-passing the METZ (U-8658) forts. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was actively engaged in bridging operations at THIONVILLE (U-8785) and METZ (U-8658) on the MOSELLE. To provide support for the advance of XX Corps to the east, the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was by-passed around the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and placed in support of the XX Corps; the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment meanwhile prepared to take the line of the MOSELLE and to support the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment. The missions of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group and the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment in the III Corps zone remained unchanged.

On 22 November, the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was attached to the XII Corps and on 25 November, the 1000th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was assigned to the Ninth U.S. Army.

Disposition of Engineer troops as of 302400A November was as follows:

<u>XII CORPS</u>	<u>ARMY</u>
1117th Engr C Gp	1134th Engr C Gp
1135th Engr C Gp	1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn	145th Engr C Bn
130th Engr C Bn	178th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn	188th Engr C Bn
167th Engr C Bn	249th Engr C Bn
248th Engr C Bn	293d Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co	1301st Engr GS Regt
72d Engr L Pon Co	1303d Engr GS Regt
713th Engr L Pon Co	1306th Engr GS Regt
995th Engr Trdw Br Co	609th Engr L Equip Co
997th Engr Trdw Br Co	632d Engr L Equip Co
998th Engr Trdw Br Co	633d Engr L Equip Co
673d Engr Top Co	548th Engr L Pon Co
981st Engr Maint Co	528th Engr L Pon Co
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	976th Engr Maint Co
2897th Engr TIT (C)	572d Engr Dp Trk Co
1st Flat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	764th Engr Dp Trk Co
	770th Engr Dp Trk Co
<u>III CORPS</u>	1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
2942d Engr TIT (C)	1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
	1370th Engr Dp Trk Co
<u>XX CORPS</u>	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
1103d Engr C Gp	652d Engr Top Bn
1139th Engr C Gp	459th Engr Depot Co
135th Engr C Bn	1511th Engr WS Co
160th Engr C Bn	1512th Engr WS Co
179th Engr C Bn	1239th Engr FF Plat
204th Engr C Bn	1240th Engr FF Plat
206th Engr C Bn	1092d Engr Util Det
623d Engr L Equip Co	1681st Engr Surv Ln Det
509th Engr L Pon Co	Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
537th Engr L Pon Co	2890th Engr TIT (B)
991st Engr Trdw Br Co	Naval Unit N-2
996th Engr Trdw Br Co	
664th Engr Top Co	
961st Engr Maint Co	
884th Engr Hv Pon Bn	
180th Engr Hv Pon Bn	
2898th Engr TIT (C)	
1st Flat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn	

II - CONSTRUCTION

Roads and Bridges

Bridging activities of Third U.S. Army during November exceeded those of any previous month. Unusually heavy rainfall during this period twice flooded the MOSELLE Valley, washing out some bridges and inundating approaches. This required the construction of 120 Bailey bridges, 111 treadway bridges, sixty-five timber spans and two heavy ponton bridges; Army units also built thirty-four culverts, light rafts and ferries, four Infantry support rafts and three foot bridges, a grand total of some four and one-half miles.

During the first week of this month, only semi-permanent timber bridging over the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers was required at various points between ARNAVILLE (U-7647), PONT ST. VINCENT (U-7902) and LANUEVILLE (U-8908). Bridges at VLAIGNY (Z-8698), TOUL (U-6410), VANDIERES (U-7541), PAGNY (U-7544) and ARNAVILLE (U-7647) were completed, and an excellent network of crossings was available throughout the Army area. It was during the three following weeks that the bulk of the November bridging activities took place.

When the drives of the XII and XX Corps were launched, tactical bridging requirements were again taxed heavily. In the XII Corps zone, crossings were made over the SAAR and SELLE Rivers, employing normal methods for such operations; however, the retreating enemy, capitalizing on the unusual precipitation, blew craters and culverts at such low spots that actual bridging was necessary to span these gaps. This resulted in an unusual expenditure of Bailey bridging, and at one time during the month, 3,500 feet of crossings of this type were in place in the XII Corps area alone.

In the XX Corps area, as part of the first phase of operations, the 5th Infantry Division was assigned the mission of encircling METZ (U-8658) from the south. This involved crossing the SELLE and MOSELLE Rivers, and at the beginning of the operation, existing bridges over the MOSELLE at ARNAVILLE (U-7647), PAGNY (U-7544), VANDIERES (U-7541) and PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735) appeared adequate. Continued rains, however, caused other rivers in the area to rise to flood heights, the greatest since 1920, flooding the entire plain across the MOSELLE Valley, and washing out all bridges except the one at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-7735), a high level structure. Even this bridge was temporarily out of use because of the unusual amount of rainfall, but this interruption was of short duration and did not materially affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission.



HIGH WATER ON APPROACH ROAD AT PONT-A-MOUSSON



DIKES USED TO CONTROL HIGH WATER AT PONT-A-MOUSSON

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PONT-A-MOUSSON BRIDGE DURING HIGH WATER



VANDIERES BRIDGE WITH WATER RISING



VANDIERES BRIDGE AFTER FLOOD HAD COVERED APPROACHES AND
BAILEY BRIDGE HAD BEEN PULLED BACK TO SAVE IT FROM DAMAGE



RIISING WATER PILE BRIDGE OVER THE MEUSE RIVER AT TOUL



PILE BRIDGE AT TOUL TAKEN OUT BY FLOOD



POMPEY BRIDGE OPENED TO TRAFFIC 8 NOVEMBER. WITHSTOOD
ALL HEAVY FLOODS

On the north flank of the corps, the 90th Infantry Division was to cross the river and meet the 5th Infantry Division east of METZ (U-8658). Because of the flood, this juncture was delayed several days; initial crossings in the north sector were made in storm boats at CATTENOM (U-9291) and MALLING (U-9593), while a feint was made by the 95th Infantry Division at UCKANGE (U-8679). At CATTENOM (U-9291), an attempt was made to put in an Infantry support bridge, but the current was so swift that it was swept away. Soon thereafter, the water rose to such a height at the bridge site that the approaches were submerged three feet, the river overflowing the country side as much as three miles in places.


Meanwhile, the 991st Engineers continued erecting a Treadway bridge at MALLING (U-9593) in spite of rising water and intermittent, well-placed artillery fire. With this bridge across and its abutment raised, trucks and supplies were loaded on trailers and towed across by prime movers with freeboards in excess of fifty-four inches until the water receded enough to allow normal passage of vehicles over the bridge.



TREADWAY BRIDGE AT MALLING

Enemy artillery, again firing on this crossing, destroyed eleven floats. Repair of the bridge was begun immediately, but the current tore it loose, carrying it a short distance away. Fortunately, only relatively minor damages resulted. Since the water was beginning to fall, it was then decided to construct a treadway ferry at this site, and approximately a battalion of armor was crossed by this means, when the ferry was hit by artillery fire and sunk.

Another bridge was then started, but since the water was now receding quite rapidly, a bridge at CATTENOM (U-9291) was begun and was finished before the one at MALLING (U-9593). Construction at MALLING (U-9543) proceeded uninterrupted by artillery fire until the bridge was completed. It was then fired upon by enemy artillery, but was not hit.



M-1 TREADWAY BRIDGE OVER MOSELLE RIVER AT CATTENOM
LENGTH 600 FT. - PICTURE TAKEN DURING PROTECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN



FLOATING BAILEY BRIDGE AT CATTENOM WHICH REPLACED
THE TREADWAY BRIDGE

During this period, with the water too high to permit use of bridges, supply and the evacuation of the wounded were effected by the use of storm, powered assault and utility boats, all of which proved invaluable expedients.


At THIONVILLE (U-8785), meanwhile, construction was started by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment on a 200-foot double triple Bailey bridge to span a gap on a destroyed highway bridge. The small bridgehead here was held chiefly by Engineer troops, but with their organic weapons they could not drive back the German mortars, long-range machine guns and artillery which kept up harrassing fire for thirty-six hours, despite a good smoke screen. This bridge was completed before two final bridges at MALLING (U-9593) and was used to cross part of the 10th Armored Division. To augment this crossing, and to provide a factor of safety, floating Bailey bridges were constructed at both THIONVILLE (U-8785) and at CATTENOM (U-9291).

At UCKANGE (U-8679), a heavy ponton bridge was built by the 88th Engineers to provide a crossing for the 95th Infantry Division. This site was the object of enemy artillery fire and actual construction was thus delayed for forty-eight hours.


After the fall of METZ (U-8658), the 180th Engineers built a heavy ponton bridge and several floating Bailey bridges over the MOSELLE to afford passage through the city.

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LAUNCHING THE DOUBLE TRIPLE BAILEY BRIDGE UNDER PROTECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN AT THIONVILLE




ABOVE BRIDGE NEARING COMPLETION




THE FLOATING BAILEY BRIDGE CONSTRUCTED AT THIONVILLE OVER THE MOSELLE - CLASS 40 - 600 FEET LONG




VIEW OF FLOATING BAILEY BRIDGE AT THIONVILLE AFTER THE SMOKE SCREEN WAS LIFTED




HEAVY PONTON BRIDGE OVER THE MOSELLE AT UCKANGE, TROOPS CROSSING UNDER PROTECTION OF A SMOKE SCREEN



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE UCKANGE BRIDGE



BLOWN BRIDGE AT METZ



ANOTHER BLOWN BRIDGE AT METZ SHOWING THE STARTING OF A BAILEY BRIDGE TO CROSS THE GAP

The above bridges had just been completed when a second flood, even greater than the first one, inundated the area. The crossings were maintained without loss, but their access roads were completely submerged and could not be used.

DUKW's were used in the crossing at MALLING (U-9593), but were not too successful, principally because the site was poorly suited to their employment. A steep hill rose from the river and made the construction of an adequate ramp impossible.

While actual bridge construction was the principal activity of Army engineer troops during this month, maintenance of roads was also a considerable problem. During this period, with excessive rainfall, mud on roadways constituted not only a hazard but did much to impede traffic.

The removal of mud tracked onto the surfaces of main supply routes by Army vehicles leaving bivouac areas, supply depots and parking lots was the largest single item under road maintenance. Road graders, improvised drags of logs and steel I-beam construction, were employed in this work. In some places, however, manual labor was required to shovel thin coats of mud from the road.

Although maintenance work on roads in the Army area consisted primarily in clearing mud from roads, repairing wearing surfaces, building new access roads and providing additional lateral and longitudinal drainage taxed the capabilities of general service troops.

Repairs to wearing surfaces of roads in the Army network were carried on as extensively as the weather and volume of traffic would permit. Excessively heavy traffic over most of the roads caused numerous pot-holes to develop and many of the edges began to ravel and crack. Such patching was accomplished by the operation of a "pre-mix plant," consisting of kettles improvised for mixing and heating asphalt and aggregate.

Access roads were constructed mainly in and near the military cemeteries at ANDILLY (U-6420) and LINEY (U-6533), in addition to several approach roads to crossings, to supply depots, and to hospitals. This consisted principally of spreading and rolling gravel and stone on roads and parking areas.

To release engineer troops for more essential employment, French civilian labor was used extensively.

III - SUPPLY

Third U.S. Army Engineer Depot No. 8 at TOUL (U-6410) continued to operate as the principal depot servicing the Army. Bridging and lumber dumps were operated by the XII Corps and XX Corps in their respective areas.

Army Engineer Depot No. 9 was established on 27 November in the vicinity of REDLACE (Q-1754), to be used as an advance storage area for Bailey bridging and Engineer Class IV supplies.

Engineer depot stock was replenished from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone Engineer depots by both rail and Army truck transportation. A total of 1,728 tons was transported by Communications Zone rail and 2,429 tons by Army truck. All rail shipments were made to the TOUL (U-6410) railhead. Truck transportation of Engineer supplies was coordinated by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group with transportation from the following Engineer units:

- 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
- 293d Engineer Combat Battalion
- 548th Engineer Light Ponton Company
- 528th Engineer Light Ponton Company
- 1369th Engineer Dump Truck Company
- 1370th Engineer Dump Truck Company

On numerous occasions it was found necessary, because of congested rail conditions west of PARIS (S-0545), to dispatch Army transportation to Communications Zone depots in the NORMANDY Base Section. This long distance hauling by truck was found to be unsatisfactory and was suspended. The maximum economical hauling distance from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone depots to Army depots was found to be from 100 to 150 miles. To expedite the release, shipping and loading of critical supplies in the Communication Zone depots, it was found necessary to send officers to Communications Zone depots.

In addition to hauling supplies forward from rear supply installations, the 1134th Engineer Combat Group was responsible for the movement of captured engineer supplies to collection points, the move-

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ment of lumber from civilian sawmills to engineer depots, and the movement of bridging materials to corps dumps. An estimated tonnage hauled of these items is as shown below:

Collection of captured material	844
Movement of lumber from sawmills	534
Movement of bridge material to corps dumps	2,100

The supply of bridge lumber remained critical. Twenty-nine civilian sawmills produced a total of 323,690 board feet measure of lumber for the Army. The 1391st Engineer Forestry Company, operating with two complete mill units, delivered 382,443 board feet measure of bridge lumber to the Army, while a total of 650,000 board feet measure was received from Communications Zone. This production was far below the requirements for the Army, which was estimated at 2,101,000 board feet measure per month. Efforts were then made to increase production of civilian sawmills. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group was assigned the mission of supervising all civilian mill operations. The 1391st Engineer Forestry Company began operating on a ten-hour-per-day basis to meet the Army requirements. Only meager supplies of captured lumber had been encountered during the month.

Issues from Engineer depots during the month were mainly items of assault river crossing equipment. As the result of battle losses, an acute shortage developed in the supply of assault boats, M-2, Infantry support rafts, foot bridges, wire rope, and wire rope clips.

The supply of spare parts and Class II Engineer items improved considerably. Spare parts for Brockway bridge trucks were still non-existent. Arrangements were made to supply spare parts to the IX Air Force. One officer and ten enlisted men were attached to the Spare Parts Platoon of the 459th Engineer Depot Company to assist in the storage and issue of additional spare parts.

RHINE River crossing requirements were compiled and assembling of equipment was begun. Contracts for the manufacture of the following special equipment was placed with civilian concerns:

- Bridge bolts
- Steel pickets
- Hook, spacing, treadway
- Steel bearing plates
- False bows, Bailey bridge, ponton
- Drift pins and bolts
- Metal signs
- Saddles, treadway bridge, M-2
- Wedges, treadway bridge, M-2

The 976th Engineer Maintenance Company, in addition to the normal maintenance of Engineer equipment, manufactured the following equipment:

- Assault boat pins
- Traffic signs
- Brackets for Bailey pontons
- Snow plows
- File driver attachments for 3/4 yard shovels

The principal problem of Engineer maintenance was that of maintaining generators in hospitals. To teach preventative maintenance, an inspection team was furnished by the 976th Engineer Maintenance Company and assigned the task of making periodic inspections of hospital generators.

Sufficient local supplies of steel "I" beams and piling were encountered to satisfy all fixed bridging requirements in these materials.

The 1038th Engineer Gas Generating unit, an Advance Section Communications Zone unit, was set up to generate oxygen and acetylene gas at Engineer Depot No. 8. This unit, together with civilian sources, supplied commercial gas to meet Third U.S. Army requirements and reduced a shortage which formerly existed.

Captured engineer material during the month consisted of steel "I" beams, sheet metal, utility supplies, hardware, wire rope, plywood, and electrical supplies. Reconnaissance parties continued to operate in corps and Army area. All usable supplies were concentrated in captured material collection points and placed under guard. One point was designated for each corps.

The average stock of Engineer supplies on hand in all Army engineer supply installations by classes during the month of November was as follows:

CLASS	TONNAGE (LT)
II	822
IV	12,396
V	573

IV - MAPS

Early in November recommendations were prepared for submission to the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, for providing each Army with map depot detachments similar to the one set up under T/O&E 5-500 on the basis of one per corps.

During the latter part of October specifications had been drawn up covering the revision of 1/25,000 maps, GSGS 4414 series, in the area assigned by Twelfth Army Group. This area covered the Army front east to the RHINE River, north of latitude 49° 36'. This project was turned over to the Army Topographic Battalion and covered the revision of the sheets with respect to woods, culture and major changes in hydrography. Intelligence photography at a scale of 1/10,000 was the main source of new information, supplemented by basic photo coverage at various scales ranging from 1/80,000 to 1/15,000. During the month twelve sheets were completed and reproduced and work was done on all the remaining fifty-three sheets. The addition of the woodland to the 1/25,000, GSGS 4411 series, in the Army area was completed during the month. This project was initiated in September, covered forty-seven sheets, and involved a color separation of the wooded areas.

Compilation and reproduction of a special road map, scale 1/250,000, was initiated during the month due to the lack of such a large scale road map in Germany. This map had many special features and is based upon the operational 1/250,000 GSGS 4345 series.

Requests for terrain models during the month were limited to the 1/50,000 scale pressed models secured through Twelfth Army Group.

Four conversion graphs for rapid conversion of German Gauss-Kruger rectangular coordinates to Theatre Nord de Guerre grid coordinates were prepared and published.

Total maps received during the month approximated thirty-five tons, or 779,000 sheets, while maps issued to Army units totaled fifteen tons, or approximately 285,600 sheets.

V - INTELLIGENCE

In the month of November the main concern was to obtain information on the SAAR Region for dissemination to all Army units concerned. Two original reports from the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, namely, "Selected Routes in SAAR Territory" and "Special Reconnaissance in SAAR Territory" were distributed to Army units. Another study, "Special Road Study, Sheet U1, NEUNKIRCHEN" was prepared and issued to Army units. In addition, the ISTD Report No. 477, "Crossings of the SAAR River," was received from the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, and distributed.

Since units in the field were encountering more and more enemy minefields, distribution of various mine and booby trap charts was made. Two charts on mines, one on the Tellermines and the other on the Anti-Tank Topfmine, were produced and issued.

Engineer Intelligence Notes Numbers 8 and 9, together with Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 7, were published and issued to all Army Engineer units.

In addition, for planning and future use, the section obtained and distributed various intelligence data and studies. Such studies included the "RHINE River Hydrology Study," "Effects of Snow on Roads in Southwest Germany Study," "Report on Water Supply of METZ," and "NL Ponton Gear Equipment Manual." Also, Technical Bulletin No. 132, Office of the Chief of Engineers, "The Snake M-2" and Training Bulletin No. 23, "The Mark 2 Conger" were reproduced and issued to all Engineer units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued to give lectures and demonstrations on German mines and booby traps to Third U.S. Army units for the first two weeks during the month. They then followed behind the advance of field units to examine captured German Engineer dumps. Upon discovery of the new German Anti-Tank Topf Mine, they proceeded to examine this mine and aided in the preparation of the Topf Mine Chart.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated sixteen water points. The total production was approximately 3,000,000 gallons. Water was delivered to Army hospitals and prisoner of war enclosures and supplying of water to the city of METZ (U-8658) was continued.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

The five platoons of Company "A", 602d Engineer Camouflage Battalion engaged in various activities during the month. Headquarters platoon remained attached to Army, the first platoon was with XII Corps, the second and third with Army, while the fourth platoon was attached to the XII Corps.

During this period, Headquarters platoon was engaged in re-gar-nishing, repairing and replacing camouflage nets belonging to Headquarters Third U.S. Army, and continued this project until all nets were brought up to the desired standard.

The first platoon was engaged principally in inspecting Field Artillery units. This included recommendations for improvement of concealment and suggestions for obtaining nets, of which there was found to be a shortage.

In addition to the above, the first platoon investigated the use of smoke, generated to screen engineer bridge building activities. The Commanding Officer of the 206th Engineer Combat Battalion was interviewed and his observations are reported here.

It was believed that better use could have been made of smoke screens than was possible with the limited equipment on hand at that time. Of eighteen smoke generators, twelve at a time were normally in operation for periods of from eight to ten hours. This small number of units, coupled with periodic shortages of fuel, was sufficient only to cover a small area; with a wind velocity in excess of two miles per hour, the screen thus produced was too thin to obscure observation.

The second platoon engaged in developing methods of snow camouflage for the 64th Fighter Wing. This method consisted of pattern painting organic shrimp nets with white and olive drab paint. The Wing had several radar installations on snowy ridges and had become definitely snow-camouflage-conscious.

The third platoon experimented with a two-piece hooded snow-camouflage suit of fabricated white muslin. It was estimated that the Army units would require 972 suits, based on one suit for each man of a twelve-man patrol per battalion.

The fourth platoon inspected Field Artillery units principally, checking especially on track-marks of organic vehicles. Nothing else of an unusual nature marked the activities of the unit during the month.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army fire fighting units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies and Ordnance units operating Class III, Class V and railroad installations. They assisted in setting up fire defense at these types of installations and furnished protection to gasoline, ammunition and other installations in the order of priority listed here.

The 1232nd Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon, assigned to Advance Section Communications Zone, furnished fire protection for NANCY (U-8501) and vicinity. This platoon also assisted Army in providing protection for Class III installations when they were too numerous and widely separated for immediate protection to be given completely by Army units.

With a view to requirements for closer protection of Class III and V installations when they are located in Germany, arrangements were made with Advance Section Communications Zone for them to assist in furnishing protection for these installations as required in future operations.

Seven fires occurred, none of which resulted in serious military damage.



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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of Engineer troops at the beginning of this period was essentially the same as in the past, with the exception that the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment completed by-passing the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and was in support of XII Corps and was, in turn, supported by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. In the XII Corps zone the 1137th Engineer Combat Group remained in support of the XII Corps and was, in turn, supported by the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment. The 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot haulage activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment. Complete disposition of troops was as follows:

XII CORPS

1117th Engr C Gp
1135th Engr C Gp
113rd Engr C Bn
150th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
167th Engr C Bn
248th Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co
72d Engr L Pon Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
995th Engr Trdw Br Co
997th Engr Trdw Br Co
998th Engr Trdw Br Co
673d Engr Top Co
981st Engr Maint Co
553rd Engr Hv Pon Bn
2897th Engr TIT (C)
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn

XX CORPS

1103d Engr C Gp
1139th Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
509th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
991st Engr Trdw Br Co
996th Engr Trdw Br Co
664th Engr Top Co
961st Engr Maint Co
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
180th Engr Hv Pon Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn

On 3 December the advance of both the XI and XII Corps was proceeding satisfactorily to the northeast and at 1800A that date Engineer Operational Instruction No. 19 was published, establishing new areas of responsibility for Army engineer troops. Missions remained unchanged.

On 5 December the III Corps became operational with the mission of completing the reduction of the remaining forts at METZ (U-8658). In order to provide Engineer assistance, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment, which was supporting the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment, was given the additional mission of supporting the III Corps.

On 9 December the push of the XI and XII Corps to the northeast continued and III Corps mission remained unchanged. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 20 was published on this date at 1800A establishing new areas of responsibility for Army engineer troops. Mission remained unchanged.

On 11 December the 1134th Engineer Combat Group started two-day schools for 22½ horsepower outboard motor operators to provide a minimum of 110 operators per letter company of at least two battalions of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group. Because of operational activities, only one company at a time could be sent to this school. The school closed 23 December after instruction had been provided to the lettered companies of the 188th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions of the 1137th Engineer Combat Group.

III CORPS

2942d Engr TIT (C)

ARMY

1134th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
145th Engr C Bn
188th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
293d Engr C Bn
1301st Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
609th Engr L Equip Co
632d Engr L Equip Co
633d Engr L Equip Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
528th Engr L Pon Co
976th Engr Maint Co
572d Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1364th Engr Dp Trk Co
1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
1370th Engr Dp Trk Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
652d Engr Top Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
1511th Engr WS Co
1512th Engr WS Co
1239th Engr FF Plat
1240th Engr FF Plat
1092d Engr Util Det
1681st Engr Surv Ln Det
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
2890th Engr TIT (B)
Naval Unit N-2

On 14 December the reduction of METZ (U-8658) had been completed, and the III Corps was assigned a zone of action in the center of the Army zone. On this date at 1800A Engineer Operational Instruction No. 21 was published establishing new areas of responsibility and shifting the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment from support of the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment to support the III Corps and attaching the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion to the III Corps.

On 15 December the 676th Engineer Light Equipment Company arrived from the beach and was attached to the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment. The 633d Engineer Light Equipment Company (less 2d platoon) was detached from the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment and attached to the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment.

By 19 December the drive of the Germans in the BASTOGNE (P-5558) area had split the First U.S. Army and reached such proportions that the III Corps, which had not yet become actively engaged on the SAAR River front, was shifted to the north in the ARLON (P-6122) area. To provide engineer support for its drive, the 1137th Engineer Combat Group with the 145th, 188th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions, the 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company, the 632d Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, and the 72d and 513th Engineer Light Ponton Companies from the XII Corps, were all attached to and moved into the zone of the III Corps. The 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment was placed in support of the XII Corps. The VIII Corps, had had been on the south flank of the first U.S. Army, was cut off and came under operational control of Third U.S. Army, together with its corps engineer troops of two Combat Group Headquarters, four Combat Battalions, one Light Equipment Company, two Light Ponton Companies, one Topographic Company and one Technical Intelligence Team (Combat). Two of the VIII Corps Combat Battalions, the 168th and 44th, were badly mauled, suffering fifty and seventy-two percent casualties, respectively, and were no longer effective.

On 20 December the 183rd Engineer Combat Battalion, which had arrived from the beach and had been temporarily attached to the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment, was detached therefrom and attached to III Corps. The 553rd Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion and the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were detached from XII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 20 December the German drive had reached break-through proportions, and the XII Corps was shifted from its eastward drive and moved to the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) area, facing north. The Sixth U.S. Army Group took over the area vacated by the XII Corps, and the 1117th Engineer Combat Group, with the 167th and 248th Engineer Combat Battalions, passed to their control.

On 21 December operational activities of the III Corps to the north in the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) area necessitated withdrawal from the XX Corps, which corps had the mission of holding the SAAR River line in their zone, of the 1103rd Engineer Combat Group, 160th Engineer Combat Battalion, 204th Engineer Combat Battalion, 509th and 537th Engineer Light Ponton Companies, and the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and their attachment to the XII Corps.

On 21 December the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was relieved of attachment to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to III Corps to support its operations. To provide haulage facilities for engineer Class II and IV supplies forward to the new area of operations, the 88th and Company "B" of the 180th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions were detached from the XII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

On 24 December the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company (less one platoon) was detached from XII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for refitting and placed in Army reserve.

On 25 December the situation had become somewhat stabilized and Engineer Operational Instruction No. 22 was published at 0900A effecting the above noted changes. At this time the VIII, III, and XII Corps were abreast on the ARLON (P-6122)-LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) line facing north and the XX Corps was on the right flank along the SAAR River facing northeast. The 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment was in support of the XII Corps, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was supporting both the VIII and III Corps and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was patrolling the majority of the Army area with priority of work being to support the XX Corps barrier plan. The 202d Engineer Combat Battalion reverted to Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army and was attached to VIII Corps.

On 26 December, the 974th Engineer Maintenance Company reverted from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army and was attached to VIII Corps.

On 27 December, the 243d Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1915) and was attached to the III Corps.

On 28 December, the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company (less

one platoon) had completed refitting and was attached to the VIII Corps.

On 29 December, the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion (less Company "B") was alerted and moved to III Corps, effective 31 December, to support contemplated operations.

On 30 December, the 44th and 168th Engineer Combat Battalions, which had been badly mauled during the initial break-through, were detached from VIII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for reorganization and refitting. To offset this loss and furnish Engineer support for projected operations, the 243rd Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from III Corps and attached to VIII Corps.

On 30 December, the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were interchanged between the XII and III Corps, respectively, in order to support an interchange of Armored Divisions.

On 31 December, the light equipage platoon of the 72d Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from the III Corps and attached to the XII Corps to build up engineer means of the XII Corps for contemplated operations.

II - BRIDGES AND ROADS

During December the amount of bridging constructed by Third U.S. Army engineer units was in excess of 20,000 feet, despite the fact that during the last fifteen days of the month very few bridges were put in, since the changed tactical situation existing after 15 December involved mass troop movements principally over bridges previously constructed. An analysis of the bridging is as follows:

TYPE	NUMBER	LENGTH IN FEET
Bailey Bridge (Fixed)	101	7,660
Heavy Ponton Bridge	2	700
Infantry Support Bridge	4	1,000
Timber Bridge	122	7,810
Treadway Bridge (Fixed)	80	2,810
Treadway Bridge (Floating)	7	1,210
Total	316	21,190

In addition to this construction more than a hundred culverts were repaired, over 1,000 feet of footbridges were constructed, and twenty or more rafts of various types were constructed and operated. Three floating bridges over the MOSELLE River constructed in November were also maintained during this period.

The chief water obstacles encountered during the month were the SAAR, NIED, and BLIES Rivers and their tributaries. All of these streams were more of an obstacle than would normally be expected, inasmuch as the incessant rains had raised them to flood stage. The flooding in XII Corps zone was further aggravated by numerous small lakes formed by the dams that had been constructed as part of the MAGNOT Line. To alleviate the flooding from this cause, many of these dams were destroyed when captured. The enemy utilized the high water by extensive cratering of the roads and destruction of culverts on a scale greater than any previously encountered.

The major assault river crossing operation of the month was that engaged in by XI Corps on the SAAR River. With the exception of the extraordinarily fortunate seizure of the main highway bridge at SAARLAUTERN (Q-2804) shown in photograph below, every other attempt to cross or to bridge the river was strongly contested by the enemy.



HIGHWAY BRIDGE ACROSS SAAR RIVER AT SAARLAUTERN

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The bridge at SAARLAUTERN (Q-2804) was taken in a secret night crossing by assault elements of the 90th Infantry Division, and though it was an excellent bridge, it was never of any great value as a crossing, since as soon as the Germans discovered that it had been captured, they began a barrage of direct observed artillery fire from the high ground on the east bank of the river of such intensity that practically no traffic could make the crossing.

To overcome this restriction, an Infantry support bridge and a footbridge were constructed at a nearby site, both both of these were destroyed by direct artillery fire before any value could be derived from them.


Concurrently, crossings were attempted at LISDORF (Q-2878) and Infantry troops were successfully crossed, but two attempts to put in a treadway bridge were repulsed by enemy artillery fire.

The only tactical bridge that remained in for any appreciable time was an Infantry support bridge at LINDORF (Q-2879), which remained in for thirty-six hours before it was knocked out by enemy artillery fire.

Similar bridging attempts were made at SAARLOUIS (Q-2882), PACHTEN (Q-2584), and DILLINGEN (Q-2784); but all were equally unsuccessful because of the intensity and accuracy of the artillery fire. Losses in personnel and equipment were extremely heavy at all these crossings.

During the entire operation, from the time the first troops were landed until the operation was suspended, because of the changed tactical situation existing after 15 December, rafts and boats, usually operated at night, served as the only supply and reinforcing link across the river.

Of the tactical bridges constructed during the month, the largest was the double-triple Bailey bridge at NIEDALTDORF (Q-1783) shown in the photograph below.



180-FOOT DOUBLE TRIPLE BAILEY BRIDGE OVER NIED RIV. AT NIEDALTDORF

At the end of the month, due to the changed tactical situation, activity in IX Corps consisted of maintaining and holding the bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN (Q-2882) and DILLINGEN (Q-2784). No further major crossings were attempted.

In XII Corps zone no single line proved to be so defensible as the SAAR line in XI Corps, but the crossing of the SAAR and BLIES were strongly contested at every point.


The most important bridge and the most difficult to build was the 160-foot double single Bailey bridge at SARREUNSIMING (Q-5454), shown in the photograph below. This bridge was built under direct artillery fire, and work had to be stopped many times because of the intensity of the fire.

At SAARALBE (Q-4844) a heavy ponton bridge was initially constructed for the crossing of the 35th Infantry Division, and a floating treadway was put in over the BLIES River at REICHEIM (Q-5959).

About 22 December, the XII Corps was shifted to a new area of operations as a result of the changed tactical situation, and from this time until the end of the month bridging did not play an important part in these operations.

Tactical bridging constructed by III and VIII Corps was incidental to other operations and did not involve any major tasks during

period. The bridge constructed over the SEMOIS River at FLOREN- (P-2626) is shown below:



BAILEY BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT SARREUNSIMING



BRIDGE OVER THE SEMOIS RIVER AT FLORENVILLE

The major part of new permanent timber bridging was contained generally in the areas between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers, though a small amount of bridging was accomplished in the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) area as the month drew to a close.

In the following photographs are shown typical examples of the bridges constructed:



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER MOSELLE RIVER IN METZ




PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER SELLE RIVER IN METZ



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER MOSELLE RIVER AT THIONVILLE

Since the river was about 500 feet wide at this point, the timber bridge was constructed from the remains of an existing timber bridge in the foreground at an angle, over to the remains of the old stone bridge to which the Bailey is connected. This solution saved a substantial amount of lumber and piling, since by doing this, the amount of bridging required was cut from 400 feet to 200 feet.



PILE BENT BRIDGE AT FALQUEMONT OVER NIED

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
TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER SEILLE RIVER AT DIEUZE



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER NIED RIVER AT PONT LA CHAUSSEY



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE AT DIEDENDORF OVER THE SAAR RIVER




PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT KESKASTEL



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGES AT FRIESTROFF OVER NIED RIVER



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT SAAR UNION



PILE BENT BRIDGE OVER SAAR RIVER AT SAARALBE



TIMBER TRESTLE BRIDGE OVER NIED RIVER AT LANDROFF

Maintenance work on bridges, for the most part, consisted of driving piles for ice fenders, replacing bracing members weakened by flood waters, depositing additional rip rap around the base of bents that had begun to scour; regrading and resurfacing approaches that had been damaged under the impact of excessively heavy traffic.

Most of the road work undertaken during the month consisted of maintenance of main supply routes. New roads constructed were mainly access roads to Ordnance depots, supply points, hospitals and military cemeteries. Mud on the highways did not constitute the problem it presented in November, since falling temperatures and frozen ground lessened the amount of mud tracked on the roads.

Maintenance work on roads included filling in craters, sweeping roads and shoulders for mines, repairing blown culverts, reconnaissance for new routes, stockpiling sand along main highways in anticipation of ice conditions and the preparation of drags and plows for removal of snow from the roads.

III - SUPPLY

During the first half of December major efforts were devoted to the accumulation of special equipment for the RHINE River crossings. A considerable number of items were procured from local sources. The status of certain issue items required for this project, however, remained critical. This was especially true of light equipment. The MOSELLE River crossings had proved extremely costly and all units were short this equipment to meet their requirements. During the latter part of the month some small shipments were received and some table of equipment shortages were filled.

A concerted effort was made by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to place all available civilian sawmills in production. A noted increase in output of bridge lumber was the result. Communications Zone furnished an officer for the purpose of assisting in the procurement of lumber and he proved to be a material help. A release was obtained from Communications Zone for two million board feet of lumber from Southern Line of Communications for the month of December. An Engineer platoon was dispatched the latter part of the month to load out by rail, and shipments against this release were started. Another release for three million board feet of lumber was received for January. Two corps dumps were taken over by Army, using depot personnel. These dumps were stocked with Bailey bridging and lumber.

As the result of the enemy penetration on 17 December, the axis of supply for Third U.S. Army was altered by approximately ninety degrees. This resulted in large quantities of supplies being shipped by rail and truck in order to meet the situation. A Class IV dump was selected in the vicinity of ESCH (P-7301) and a Class II and IV depot site was selected at ARION (P-6122). Supplies were generally moved in sufficient quantities and in time to satisfy the troops. Large demands for explosives and fortification materials were made. It is estimated that 400 tons of explosives were issued during this period. Several large stocks of captured fortification materials were available for immediate issue.

Large demands were received for snow suits and white camouflage paint. Production of suits by civilian mills was initiated, using the supervision of Company "A", 602d Engineer Camouflage Battalion. Carbide slag was found to be suitable for use as white paint. This slag is being supplied to all units from local sources.

IV - MAPS

During the month approximately sixty tons of maps were received. Approximately fifty-seven tons were issued to Army and corps units.

Sixty-three sheets of revised editions of the GSGS 4414 series, scale 1/25,000, were declared operational by Third U.S. Army during the month.

Because of the sudden breakthrough of enemy forces on the left flank of Third U.S. Army and the resulting change in the Army boundary, the following corps and divisions were mapped during the period 18 December to 28 December for an area previously north of Army boundary: III, VIII, and XII Corps; 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 35th, 80th, and 87th Infantry Divisions; 4th, 6th, 10th and 11th Armored Divisions; 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions.

On 19 December, III Corps opened their map depot at ARION (P-6122) with instructions from Army to temporarily service all units in the area, even though they were not under corps control.

On 20 December arrangements were made with Twelfth U.S. Army Group temporarily to use the Communications Zone Advance Map Depot

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at VERDUN (U-2865) for servicing directly Third U.S. Army troops. A standing operating procedure was established on 22 December for operating under this temporary arrangement without losing control of the critical stock available in the new Army area.

On 25 December the advance Third U.S. Army map depot was opened at LONGNY (P-5905) to service Third U.S. Army troops in the usual manner. The temporary arrangements for servicing Army units made with the III Corps map depot at ARLON (P-6122) and the Communications Zone Advance Depot at VERDUN (U-2865) were discontinued. Although the Army Map Depot at NANCY (U-8611) was closed as a distributing point on 29 December, it was retained as a temporary storage point for maps that were not of immediate interest to Army.

The recent change in Third U.S. Army operational area necessitated a considerable enlargement of the current reproduction program. No 1/25,000 map stocks were available in the new area, which meant that entire Army reproduction facilities had to be thrown into the task of providing immediately the sheets needed for the new operation. Difficulty was encountered during the first few days in obtaining complete sets of kodelines for sheets immediately required, and it was found necessary to reproduce some of them in monochrome only. In no case were these sheets printed with a green woodline, inasmuch as First U.S. Army did not make that color separation. To date, sixty-six sheets of this new area have been printed and distributed. Quantities printed ranged from 10,000 to 18,000 copies of each sheet.

During the month several requests for papier mache pressed models, scale 1/50,000, were received and filled. An order for three terrain models, scale 1/25,000, covering the RHINE River from BINGEN (M-1252) to MANNHEIM (R-5998) was placed with the Engineer, Twelfth U.S. Army Group. The first model of this series was received and later turned over to Sixth U.S. Army Group because of changes in the tactical boundaries.

V - INTELLIGENCE

For the major portion of the month this section was able to concentrate on engineer intelligence data on enemy equipment new to troops of Third U.S. Army. This new data took the form of enemy engineer equipment, such as the "J-Feder 504" (Time Delay Igniter), German Anti-Lifting Device (Entlastungsminder) and "Tarkohle" (Explosive Coal). The first two items were encountered in the area of the Seventh U.S. Army. Charts were produced and distributed to all Army units on these three items, while further details were given in Engineer intelligence notes and bulletins published by this section.

In the course of the rapid change of the tactical situation, information was obtained and disseminated to cover the Army's new area of responsibility. A road and bridge study, scale 1/500,000, covering eastern Belgium, Luxembourg and Western Germany to the RHINE River was also prepared and distributed.

To aid the corps engineers and commanding officers of Army Engineer Combat Groups in preparing for the crossing of the RHINE River, the section obtained and distributed such studies as "RHINE River Study (MI 10)", "RHINE River Hydrology Study (Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations)" and a "Study of Wind Characteristics Along the RHINE River." In addition, in conjunction with the Third U.S. Army Photo Interpretation Detachment, a dossier of certain bridge sites on the RHINE River was completed. This dossier included photo interpretations, traces, stereopairs and other data taken from French documents for each bridge site. This study was distributed to each corps engineer and commanding officer of the Army Engineer Combat Groups.

During the month Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 10 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 8, 9, and 10 were produced and distributed to Army engineer units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Research) concerned itself mainly with experimenting with equipment to detect the "J-Feder 504." In turn, it also gave lectures, prepared and distributed posters and charts to front line troops who were encountering these devices. Reports of these experiments were furnished the A.C. of S, G-2, Third U.S. Army, and to higher headquarters. Other items of enemy engineer equipment with which the team concerned itself were the Tarkohle (Explosive Coal), the adapters used with French Light Anti-Tank Mine Igniters, and the Artillery Shell Mine.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated twenty water points. The total water treated was approximately 4,000,000 gallons. Operation

of three Army water points was assumed by Advance Section Communications Zone. Deliveries of water to Army hospitals and prisoner of war enclosures were made by the 1511th and 1512th Engineer Water Supply Companies. Supplying of water to the city of METZ (U-8658) was continued.

Ever since arriving on the Continent, it has been realized that the standard method of treatment of water outlined in existing field manuals was not satisfactory on the Continent. Because of the danger of the presence of cysts of endamoeba histolytica in the water supply sources which were not completely removed in ordinary methods of treatment of water by the use of the Army water supply set, a modification of the sets and general treatment method were adopted. After considerable time and experimentation, this new method of treatment was adopted by the entire European Theater of Operations and is covered in Headquarters European Theater of Operations Technical Training Bulletin No. 30, dated 1 January 1945.

In this treatment, the first precautionary measure taken is to allow one hour for the coagulation, settlement and prechlorination of the raw water. Another precautionary step is the reduction of the output of the water purification units. The portable unit is operated at a rate of not more than ten gallons per minute, while the mobile unit may be operated at a rate of not more than sixty gallons per minute. The method of treatment of water, using the table of equipment portable unit, is as follows:

- (1) Raw water is drawn from the source by the pump and passed through the purification section, where it is chlorinated to at least two parts per million and placed in a flocc tank, a 3,000 gallon canvas tank, where flocc is formed by the addition of alum and soda ash.
- (2) The flocc tank is allowed to stand for one hour and then the water is drawn off through the filter by a booster pump at a rate not to exceed ten gallons per minute if one filter is used, or twenty gallons per minute if two filters are used.
- (3) The water is stored in a second tank for dispensation to units. The water being dispensed has a residual chlorine content of 1/4 parts per million or greater. The water being dispensed has a chlorine content of two plus parts per million. Rechlorination is performed at the clear tank if it is necessary in order to keep the content up to the required level.
- (4) All rates of flow are measured by watch and container, as the pressure gauges on the filter cannot be relied upon for accuracy. The sand in the filter unit is inspected at frequent intervals to insure the presence of the proper amount of sand. The filter is backwashed with water from the clear tank at a rate of fifteen to twenty gallons per minute. One filter unit has a maximum output of 12,000 gallons per day for twenty hours operation.
- (5) With the use of an additional flocc tank, it is possible to settle one batch of water for an hour in one tank while the other is being drawn through the filter.
- (6) If greater demand is placed on the water point, two units are used in parallel.
- (7) The optimum pH of the water is determined by the "jar test" and is used for determining the coagulation treatment required and to test for the presence of chemical warfare agents.
- (8) Samples of treated water are submitted to Medical Laboratories for analysis monthly or at least at each change of source of water supply.
- (9) Records of amount of water produced and the residual chlorine content at dispensing points are kept on an hourly basis. Mobile units are capable of producing 72,000 gallons in a twenty-hour period.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

The two primary missions of the Camouflage Company during the month were pattern painting of vehicles and production and distribution of snow suits.

Pattern painting of vehicles for snow camouflage was accomplished with the use of the residue from the generation of acetylene gas, a lime-like substance found in dump piles in a dry state which, when mixed with water and applied with brushes as a thick paste and allowed to dry, provides a white coat which is not injurious to metal or tentage. The material washes off with water and chips off to a certain extent, but is entirely satisfactory for the purpose. Three sources of supply were available: One operated by the 1st platoon, located

with the 664th Engineer Topographic Company at THIONVILLE (U-9785); one operated by the 4th platoon, located with XII Corps at LUXEMBOURG (P-8413); and one at Engineer Depot No. 13. Sufficient material was available at these sources to satisfy Army requirements.

A two-piece snow camouflage suit with hood and ties around the waist, wrists and ankles was designed, to be manufactured in two sizes in order to satisfy size requirements for the majority of men. Material was secured from civilian sources in Belgium, in addition to Army sources. Five civilian factories were employed; three located in NEUVES-MAISONS (U-7903) produced approximately 1,000 suits per day; one located at HAYANGE (U-7883) produced approximately 100 suits per day and was operated by XI Corps; and one located in LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and operated by XII Corps furnished 1,000 suits per day. In addition, three Quartermaster salvage companies were producing suits, together with two Chemical Warfare Maintenance units. Approximately 800,000 meters of material were obtained, enough to produce 130,000 suits. By the end of the month 7,847 suits had been produced, and 1240 suits were received from the Quartermaster which were considered satisfactory for issue. In addition, XII Corps had produced approximately 3,400 suits for their own use in the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) factory, from which Army received 50% of the output.

At the end of the month, the 1st platoon was attached to XI Corps, the 2nd platoon was split into two groups, one on duty with VIII Corps and one assisting in the camouflage of the 563d Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion; the 3rd platoon was split, one group with III Corps, and one group inspecting and assisting in camouflage of the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) area; and the 4th platoon was attached to XII Corps.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army Fire Fighting units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations to provide immediate protection. They also assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railroad installations.

The 1232d Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon (Advance Section Communications Zone) furnished fire protection for NANCY (U-8501) and vicinity. This platoon also assisted Army in providing immediate protection for Class III installations when they were too numerous and widely separated for immediate protection by Army units. Advance Section Communications Zone also assisted Army in giving immediate protection to some Class V installations.

Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and vicinity was furnished by the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) City Fire Department, which is very capable and cooperative, and by the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment of this headquarters.

One major fire occurred when enemy aircraft strafed decanting point No. 43B, located at MANGIRULLES (U-6678), France on 22 December. Approximately 100,000 gallons of gasoline were destroyed out of 800,000 gallons at the dump. Twenty minutes after strafing the dump, planes returned and strafed men fighting the fire.



SECRET

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of Engineer troops at the beginning of this period remained unchanged. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of the VIII and III Corps, the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the XII Corps, the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the XX Corps and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot hauling activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment.

On 2 January the 282d Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and the 993d Engineer Treadway Bridge Company reverted from Sixth U.S. Army Group and both units were attached to XII Corps to support its contemplated northward drive.

Effective 3 January the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company was detached from XII Corps and attached to III Corps to provide maintenance facilities for that corps. On the same date Company "B" of the 180th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to XX Corps to provide necessary heavy bridging. The 1123rd Engineer Combat Group arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and was attached to III Corps.

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 23 was published on 5 January establishing new areas of responsibility.

The 280th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and was attached to III Corps effective 7 January. The 187th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 281st Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) on 8 January and were attached to XX Corps effective 10 January to rebuild engineer means in that corps for the establishment of barrier zones.

The 1152d Engineer Combat Group arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) on 10 January and was attached to XX Corps. In order to provide necessary bridging support for a shift in armored divisions, the 993d Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from XII Corps and was attached to XX Corps effective 12 January, and the 1st Platoon of the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from XX Corps and attached to VIII Corps. In addition, the 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from III Corps and placed in Army reserve under the 1134th Engineer Combat Group on 13 January.

On 13 January the Light Equipage Platoon of the 72d Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from XII Corps and returned to its parent unit under III Corps, since the contemplated operation of the XII Corps failed to materialize.

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 24 was published on 15 January. The 245th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the port of ROUEN (M-1916) and was attached to XX Corps on 16 January. In order to provide maintenance facilities for XX Corps, the 2d Maintenance Platoon of the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company was temporarily attached to XX Corps.


Because of renewed operational activities of the XII Corps, the Light Equipage Platoon of the 72d Engineer Light Ponton Company was released to XII Corps on 16 January on a temporary basis. In order to provide bridging support for the 4th Armored Division, which was released to XII Corps on 16 January, the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company passed from the control of Third U.S. Army and was assigned to the Sixth U.S. Army Group on 19 January.

By 21 January the 44th and 168th Engineer Combat Battalions had refitted and reorganized to the extent that they were once again operational and were reattached to VIII Corps. The "bulge" was being effectively reduced and VIII and III Corps were pivoting to the east, with the XII Corps driving to the north. An inter-Army boundary between First and Third U.S. Armies on the north and inter-Group boundary between Twelfth and Sixth U.S. Army Groups were established effective 22 January. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 25 was published on the same date establishing new areas of responsibility.

On 22 January the 548th Engineer Light Ponton Company, which had been performing hauling, was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Battalion and attached to the XX Corps for tactical operations. To offset this loss of hauling facilities, the 72d Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from III Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 26 was published on 27 January.

II - ROADS AND BRIDGES

By far the largest single item of engineer road work performed was the maintenance required to keep the roads in the Army area open. Numerous, although light, falls of snow kept the road network covered for the entire month. Prompt and efficient snow removal from the main supply routes by Engineer units, using snow plows, drags, and borrowed civilian rotary plows, assured an uninterrupted circulation of traffic. This was of vital importance, since during the month there was a very large amount of regrouping and relocation of tactical units.



R-4 Caterpillar on Arsdorf-Boulaide Road Clearing Snow Drifts



R-4 Caterpillar Tractor Clearing Snow on Arsdorf-Boulaide Road

Sub-freezing temperatures were experienced throughout practically all of January. This necessitated constant and continued sanding of those stretches of road where icing conditions were most likely to prevail. Most of this sanding was done in the manner shown in the photograph below, where the sand was spread manually over the surface of the road by men walking behind the upraised body of slow-moving dump trucks.



Application of Sand to Road Just North of Rodt Les Ell, Luxembourg


In addition to this, roads were maintained, cleared and sanded many times on a twenty-four-hour basis of operation for Army supply points, air strips, hospitals, and ammunition depots.

A total of 1,100 miles of road was thus maintained. Concurrently with this snow and ice removal program, many road craters were filled, stretches of newly captured roads were swept for mines, and anti-tank ditches filled.

The amount of semi-permanent timber bridging erected during the month was considerably less than in December. A compilation of the total amount of all bridging is as follows:

TYPE OF BRIDGE	NUMBER	TOTAL LENGTH IN FEET
Fixed Bailey Bridges	50	3,770
Floating Bailey Bridges	2	960
Fixed Treadway Bridges	37	1,412
Floating Treadway Bridges	2	280
Timber Bridges	53	2,721
Heavy Ponton Bridges	1	160
Infantry Support Bridges	12	-

One of the most important timber bridges built was the one constructed by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment on Route N-51, north of FLORENVILLE (P-2525) over the SEMOIS River near MESNIL (P-3824). This was a 118-foot, one-way, Class 70 - two-way, Class 40 bridge that opened additional main supply routes for both III and VIII Corps.



Bridge Site Route N-51 Vicinity of Mesnil



Completed Bridge Route N-51 Vicinity of Mesnil

Other timber bridges were built in the area to the east of METZ (U-8658) in BOUZONVILLE (J-1378), and KEDANGE (U-9879), permitting the release of Bailey bridging. Two eight-foot Bailey bridges on the main supply route through ETTLEBRUCK (P-8240) were replaced by one-way, Class 70 - two-way, Class 40 timber spans by the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment.

Under construction at that time was a timber bridge to replace two Bailey bridges over the MOSELLE River in METZ (U-8658), and a timber trestle overpass on Route N-418 on the railroad tracks in THIONVILLE (U-8685).


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The principal streams encountered by the III and VIII Corps in their drive to close the ARDENNE salient were the SEMOIS and the L'OURTHE Rivers and their tributaries. Two of the largest tactical bridges built by corps engineer troops in this sector were the 100-foot triple-single Bailey bridge constructed by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment over the SEMOIS River in the vicinity of FLORENVILLE (P-2525) and the 110-foot triple-single Bailey bridge built over the L'OURTHE River near ORTHEVILLE (P-4366), built by the 202d Engineer Combat Battalion.


Because of the static condition of the front, an appreciably smaller amount of tactical bridging was placed in the XI Corps area during this month than during the previous month. The only bridge of any appreciable size erected in this sector was the floating Bailey bridge constructed at UCKANGE (U-8679) to replace the heavy ponton bridge at this point. The remainder of the bridges consisted mainly of short Bailey and treadway bridges of from twenty to fifty feet, built over road craters and blown culverts.

The bulk of tactical bridging of any outstanding size was accomplished by the XII Corps engineer units in their sector of the ARDENNE salient. These bridges were constructed principally over the SAUER and SURE Rivers and their tributaries in the vicinity of DIEKIRCH (P-8742) and ETTLEBRUCK (P-8240) to support the assault crossings of these rivers by elements of the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions. Every bridge in ETTLEBRUCK (P-8240) was destroyed by the retreating enemy, necessitating the construction of four Bailey bridges.


This system of bridges consisted of two eighty-foot, double-single Bailey bridges, one ninety-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge, and one 130-foot, double-double Bailey bridge.



Eighty-Foot Double Single Bailey Bridge South of Ettelbruck on Route N-26



Eighty Foot Double Single Bypass Bailey Bridges over Sure River



130 Foot Double-Double Bailey Bridge over Railroad Tracks and Ninety Foot Triple-Single Bailey Bridge over Sure River in Ettelbruck

Just north of ETTLEBRUCK (P-8240) in the vicinity of GOEBELSMUHE (P-7948), the 1135th Engineer Combat Group put three Bailey bridges over the SAUER River to support the advance of the 5th Infantry Division. These three tactical crossings consisted of one 110-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge, one 130-foot, double-double Bailey bridge, and one 140-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge.


At DIEKIRCH (P-8742), further east of ETTLEBRUCK (P-8240) on the SURE River, the 1135th Engineer Combat Group erected a 160-foot heavy ponton bridge, and in GILSDORF (P-8842), the next town on the same river, Engineer troops constructed a 144-foot Infantry support bridge and a 120-foot treadway bridge. This treadway bridge was damaged by artillery fire on the morning of 20 January, killing several men, and has since been replaced with a 140-foot, double-double Class 40 Bailey bridge.



160 Foot Treadway Bridge Over Sure River At Diekirch



144-Foot Infantry Support Bridge Over Sure River at Diekirch




120-Foot Treadway Bridge South of Diekirch over Sure River Damaged by Artillery Fire - Built by 1135th Engineer Combat Gp

Still further east additional tactical bridging was put across the river at MOESTHOFF (P-9242) to supplement the crossings upstream. They were a forty-foot, double-single Bailey bridge, a treadway bridge, a 160-foot, triple-single Bailey bridge and an Infantry foot bridge. In addition to the aforementioned bridges, numerous smaller ones were constructed over blown culverts and craters.

Tactical bridging was also necessary in such isolated towns as HEIDERSCHNEIDERGRUND (P-7246), ESCH SUR LA SURE (P-7047), and LUTZHAUSEN (P-6747), which towns are located in the mountainous area lying to the northwest of ETTLEBRUCK (P-8240).



Ninety-Six Foot Treadway Bridge on Route 15 at Heiderschneidergrund



Eighty-Foot Double-Single Bailey Bridge at Esch Sur La Sure



Seventy Foot Double-Single Bailey Bridge at Lutzhausen

Also during the month XII Corps engineer troops constructed a 360-foot Class 40 floating Bailey bridge at SCHENGEN (Q-0198) over the MOSELLE River to replace the ferry that had been in operation at this point.

III - SUPPLY

The supply of engineer equipment to the Army during the month of January consisted primarily of field fortification materials, replacing of combat losses and snow removal equipment. Approximately 275 tons of explosives were used to prepare bridges for demolition in forming a barrier in the face of the enemy breakthrough. Large quantities of barbed wire and concertina were issued for flank protection.

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As the result of battle losses, it was necessary to re-equip two divisions, four Engineer combat battalions, one Engineer light equipment company, two Engineer light ponton companies and a number of Field Artillery units.

Large demands were made on the Army depots for battle replacements for Class II Engineer supplies, particularly Engineer sets. Many of these requirements were filled with material evacuated from Advance Section Communications Zone Engineer Depot E-513 at LIBRAMONT (P-3149) at the time that this depot was in danger of being overrun during the enemy winter offensive. Without the supplies thus obtained, serious table of equipment shortages in combat units would have remained unfilled at a critical time in the tactical situation.

Good quantities of heavy equipment were released from Advance Section Communications Zone depots during the latter part of the month. After being issued to troops, this equipment-practically completed the reorganization of all combat battalions in the Army.

Lumber requirements and productive capacity of all Armies were discussed at a meeting held by Communications Zone. The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate the supply of lumber between Armies. It was decided that Third U.S. Army should continue to receive lumber from Southern Lines of Communication to augment other sources. The first shipments of previously allocated lumber from Southern Lines of Communication were received at Army depots during the last half of January.

Because of limited bridge building activities early in the month, depot stocks of tactical lumber increased to over a million board feet. However, toward the end of the month, heavy issues sharply reduced this stock.

Average stocks of engineer supplies on hand in all Army depots during the month were:

Class II - 625 long tons
Class IV - 13,500 long tons
Class V - 720 long tons

Class II and Class IV were issued from Depot No. 14 at ARLON (P-6122), while bridging and tactical lumber were issued from Depot No. 13 at ESCH (P-7901). An advanced dump, supporting III and VIII Corps and stocking bridging and lumber, was opened at BOURCOT (P-6264). For the first time during operations, civilian labor was employed in Army Engineer depots. A total of sixty men were continuously employed at Depots Nos. 13 and 14.

All Engineer supplies except heavy equipment were delivered to Army Engineer depots by rail. Heavy equipment was moved forward mostly by Army truck. In a few instances, movement of supplies was made by Advance Section Communications Zone truck. Inter-depot movement of supplies and delivery of lumber from sawmills to depots continued to be handled by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, to which unit the following organizations were attached:

87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
293d Engineer Combat Battalion
548th Engineer Light Ponton Company
528th Engineer Light Ponton Company
1369th Engineer Dump Truck Company
1370th Engineer Dump Truck Company

Approximately 1,630 tons of Engineer supplies were moved to Army Engineer depots from Communications Zone during the month. Army trucks transported 1,860 tons of Engineer supplies to Army Engineer depots, excluding inter-depot movements.

During the month the amount of maintenance required on Engineer equipment was gradually increasing. This was attributed to normal wear and tear resulting from continuous use of the equipment. At a meeting of all commanding officers of Engineer maintenance companies of Third U.S. Army, a standard procedure was established whereby Engineer maintenance companies would act in the capacity of sub-depots for second echelon spare parts for units which they serve. With the exception of certain components of second echelon spare parts and tools for repair sets, the supply of spare parts was adequate.

During the month, a total of fifty-nine contracts were processed. The majority of these were in connection with items necessary for camouflage, modification of bridges and RHINE River requirements. Contracts which involved the fabrication of any items were complicated by the fact that most contractors were lacking stock or raw materials.

In the fabrication of the M-2 treadway saddles, twenty-two separate contracts had to be processed in order to procure the materials

necessary for their construction. All of this material had to be hauled by Army transportation and delivered to the contractor. In addition to this, the contractor had to be supplied with coal for the forges, carbide for the production of acetylene, and welding rod. To procure these items, it was necessary to process additional contracts with civilian firms, using Army transportation for delivery to the contractor.

The fabrication of treadway supporting spacers involved additional problems. Since the production of these required overtime work, it was necessary to secure the approval of the French labor officials. Authority for the consumption of additional electric power for the contractors also had to be arranged for through French officials.

The production of oxygen, acetylene, nitrogen and carbon dioxide were less complicated, but still involved the procuring of raw materials and use of Army transportation. Either coke or carbide was required by the contractors for the production of these gases. The residual from the production of acetylene was found to be satisfactory for camouflaging of vehicles.

Materials for snow suits were procured from contractors in PARIS (S-0544), EPINAL (V-0413) and BRUSSELS (J-6255), together with some local firms.

IV - MAPS

No new mapping was undertaken during January. Work consisted primarily of revision of existing maps.

A color separation project of the GSGS 4414 series of maps in the Third U.S. Army zone of advance was undertaken. It consisted of seventy-nine sheets and involved the separation of woodlands. Eighteen sheets of this project were completed and prepared for reproduction.

Five sheets of the GSGS 4414 series were revised, color was separated, and the maps prepared for reproduction. The Army Topographic Battalion was plotting defense overprints from photographs annotated by the Army Photo Center. The plotting of this data with respect to the basic map was accomplished by means of reflecting projectors.

A map distribution table for an armored division was prepared on the basis of Third U.S. Army map allowances to facilitate distribution to divisional units by the division map depot.

The reproduction program consisted primarily of 1/25,000 scale maps. A total of 114 sheets were reproduced in quantities ranging from 10,000 to 18,000 each, a total of approximately 1,487,000 copies.

Ninety-four gelatin reproduction jobs were turned out for a total of 5,375 copies.

Terrain model requests were limited to the 1/50,000 scale pressed paper-mache type. These models were secured from the Office of the Chief Engineer, Headquarters Communications Zone.

The Army Survey Center performed several miscellaneous survey missions, including a telephone pole line and radar sites. The river gauges at TOUL (U-6410) and METZ (U-8658) were re-established on the normal null elevations.

V - INTELLIGENCE

The task of obtaining new data on bridges and bridge sites on a different sector of the RHINE River was commenced. This information was to be maintained in the form of a dossier with stereopairs of the bridge and bridge sites, photo interpretations and traces to include the road net on both the east and west banks of the river.

Various studies such as "Leveling System on or near the RHINE River," "Road and Bridge Study, East of the RHINE River," "Climate of Southern Germany," were distributed to interested units. Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 1 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were produced and distributed to Army Engineer units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Research) continued to search for and examine German engineer equipment. Such equipment as the new type magnetic shape charge, three kilogram demolition charge, "Brettstuckmine," and portable flamethrower were examined. The team also gave lectures and demonstrations on mines and booby traps to several Engineer units.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated fourteen water points and

five water distributing points. Army water points produced approximately 3,650,000 gallons of water during this period. The 1511th and 1512th Engineer Water Supply Companies delivered water to prisoner of war enclosures and Army hospitals. Supplying of water to the city of METZ (U-8658) for civilian consumption was discontinued after the city system had been repaired.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

Pattern painting of vehicles for snow camouflage was continued, and by the end of the month approximately ninety percent of all armored vehicles had been painted.

The production of snow camouflage suits was speeded up as much as possible so that by the end of the month approximately 50,000 snow suits had been issued.

The problem of camouflaging radar installations was difficult because such installations were of necessity situated in open fields on high ground. The best that could be hoped for was to make the site less conspicuous by paying particular attention to track discipline. In a typical case of camouflaging a Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion, the entire installation, except the sounding devices, was covered with a steel net, well garnished and spray painted white. The result was an inconspicuous white mound which gave ample room for movement, thus concealing tracks in the area. The sounding devices which rotated continuously and a few scattered sheds were painted white. Tracks leading to the area were kept to a minimum and vehicles were parked in the nearby woods. Additional snowfall was advantageous, because the snow piled up on the mound to add to the illusion.

Inspections were carried out continuously and reports submitted periodically. The units inspected show a marked interest in winter camouflaging and did their best to act upon all recommendations made. To effect camouflage in their areas, pattern painting, dispersion and strict track discipline were practiced.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army fire fighting units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations to provide immediate protection. They also assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railroad installations and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone provided only a very small amount of immediate protection to Army installations, since units formerly employed in the Army area were required for their own use during the German counterattack.

Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and vicinity continued to be furnished by the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) City Fire Department and the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment of this Headquarters.



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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of engineer troops at the beginning of this month remained unchanged. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of VIII and III Corps, the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the XII Corps and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot hauling activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment.

On 2 February, the 280th, 202d, 187th Engineer Combat Battalions, 180th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, 633d Engineer Light Equipment Company and the 1370th Engineer Dump Truck Company were relieved of assignment to Third U.S. Army and assigned to Ninth U.S. Army.

On 3 February one equipment platoon of the 676th Engineer Light Equipment Company was detached from the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment and attached to the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment to offset the loss of the 633d Engineer Light Equipment Company, which had been attached to the latter regiment.

On 4 February, the light equipment platoon of the 513th Engineer Light Ponton Company was temporarily detached from XII Corps and attached to XII Corps to support its tactical operations. Shortly thereafter XII Corps operations increased and turned to the east, and it was necessary to replace this light equipment platoon with that from the 511th Engineer Light Ponton Company under VIII Corps.

Effective 5 February, the 179th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the IX Corps and attached to XII Corps to support its continuing northward drive.

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 27 was published on 5 February establishing new areas of responsibility. On 9 February the 72d Engineer Light Ponton Company was relieved of assignment to Third U.S. Army and assigned First U.S. Army.

On 9 February the 1124th Engineer Combat Group arrived and was attached to XII Corps. Effective 11 February, the XII Corps was relieved of assignment to Third U.S. Army and all engineer supporting units with the exception of the 2942d Engineer Technical Intelligence Team were relieved of attachment to that corps and attached to VIII Corps.

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 28 was published on 12 February. On this date also the 184th, 284th and 1255th Engineer Combat Battalions, which had been employed in an Infantry role, were transferred to First U.S. Army.

On 16 February the XII Corps river crossing operations had been completed and the light equipment platoon of the 513th Engineer Light Ponton Company was returned to its parent organization.

The 1366th and 1367th Engineer Dump Truck Companies arrived on 20 February and were attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and VIII Corps, respectively. The 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group on 22 February, and the 160th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the XII Corps and attached to IX Corps at the same time.

Effective 24 February the 1124th Engineer Combat Group was relieved of assignment to Third U.S. Army and assigned to Ninth U.S. Army. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 29 was published on 26 February establishing new areas of responsibility. On 27 February the 632d Engineer Light Equipment Company and the 1103d Engineer Combat Group were attached to Ninth U.S. Army. To offset the loss of the 1103d Engineer Combat Group in the XII Corps, the 1137th Engineer Combat Group was transferred from VIII Corps to XII Corps effective the same date.

The disposition of engineer troops on 28 February was as follows:

VIII CORPS

1123d Engr C Gp
1103d Engr C Gp
1107th Engr C Gp
35th Engr C Bn
44th Engr C Bn
145th Engr C Bn
159th Engr C Bn
168th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
183d Engr C Bn
186th Engr C Bn
243d Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
1252d Engr C Bn
628th Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co (-)
974th Engr Maint Co
991st Engr Trdw Br Co
996th Engr Trdw Br Co
511th Engr L Pon Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
527th Engr L Pon Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1367th Engr Dp Trk Co
1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
665th Engr Top Co
2893d Engr TIT (C)

XII CORPS

1135th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn
150th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
282d Engr C Bn
285th Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co
995th Engr Trdw Br Co
997th Engr Trdw Br Co (-)
528th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn (-)
673rd Engr Top Co
4th Flat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn
2948 Engr TIT (C)

IX CORPS

1139th Engr C Gp
1152d Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
177th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
245th Engr C Bn
281st Engr C Bn
1258th Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
2d Flat, 961st Engr Maint Co
2d Flat, 997th Engr Trdw
Br Co
993d Engr Trdw Br Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
664th Engr Top Co
1st Flat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

ARMY

1134th Engr C Gp
1301st Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
293d Engr C Bn (-)
609th Engr L Equip Co
676th Engr L Equip Co
976th Engr Maint Co
909th Engr L Pon Co
972d Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
1366th Engr Dp Trk Co
Co B, 88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
554d Engr Hv Pon Bn
652d Engr Top Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
1511th Engr NS Co
1512th Engr NS Co
1237th Engr FF Flat
1240th Engr FF Flat
1681st Engr Surv Ln Det
1092d Engr Util Det
2890th Engr TIT (R)
Naval Unit N-2
Det B, 329th Harbor Craft Co
1407th Engr Mobile Slt Team

III - CONSTRUCTION

Bridges and Roads

During this month tactical river crossing operations exceeded those of any previous similar periods of time, inasmuch as the terrain encountered in the MOSELLE Valley and adjacent areas was dissected by numerous streams, all of which flow into the MOSELLE River, so that the advances made astride the river required a continuous series of crossings of the contiguous streams and several crossings of the MOSELLE itself to provide lateral communications. To support the operations, the following bridging was accomplished:

TYPE	NUMBER	TOTAL LENGTH
Bailey bridges (fixed)	88	8,965 feet
Bailey bridges (floating)	4	1,503 feet
Treadway bridges (floating)	11	2,632 feet
Treadway bridges (fixed)	49	1,650 feet
Heavy Ponton bridges	3	940 feet
Infantry support bridges	5	612 feet
Footbridges	19	3,000 feet
Timber trestle bridges	46	3,700 feet
Total	225	23,022 feet

Successful assault crossings were made, all against strong enemy opposition, over the OUR, SAUER, NIMS and FRUM Rivers on the north sector of the front and of the SAAR and MOSELLE Rivers on the south sector.

An interesting axiom as a basis for future supply planning was determined as a result of these operations; that is, that calculations for stream crossing equipment should not be based on a single river

crossing by a single division, but should be based rather on the crossing of a division for about every ten miles of river length. This was exemplified very well during the time, inasmuch as the OUR, SAUER, SAAR and the MOSELLE Rivers were crossed on about this basis, and indications were that the same situation could be expected to hold true on the FRUM, NIMS and the KYLL Rivers.

The most extensive operations were those engaged in by XII Corps, which corps crossed the SAUER, OUR, FRUM and NIMS River during this period. The crossings of the SAUER by the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions and the crossing of the OUR by the 80th Infantry Division were particularly worthy of note, as these rivers, normally mild rivers of widths from 100 to 200 feet, were made into raging torrents by rain and melting snow. The velocity of the current was estimated at from twelve to sixteen feet per second, and the six-man pneumatic floats and the assault boats were tossed around and overturned by the force of the water. In addition to the natural hazards encountered, the enemy was strongly emplaced on the far shore in pillboxes and natural rock formations, with the result that many of the boats which did cross successfully were lost to enemy fire before a return trip could be made.

The bridges constructed initially to support these three divisions, that is, Infantry support bridges, were knocked out by enemy artillery or by floating objects in the water before they could be secured by guide lines. Twelve Infantry and expedient foot bridges were lost and two of the three rafts tried were washed away after one night of use. A footbridge and ferry were finally established across the SURE River at ECHTERNACH (L-0535).

During the period 5 February to 10 February all supply, reinforcement and evacuation across the SURE River were carried on by boat under extremely hazardous conditions. Every means of getting boats across the river was tried—padding, pulling by rope, outboard motors, and towing and guiding with cables. At best, however, it was a dangerous operation.

Five days after the initial crossing, sufficient Infantry had been crossed to clear enemy observation of the river and treadway bridges were constructed and maintained, despite occasional damage to the floats by artillery fire. The treadway bridge at ECHTERNACH (L-0535) is shown below.



240-Foot Floating Treadway Bridge Across Sure River
At Echternach

However, once these bridges were in and armor was able to cross, the river valley was opened up and despite sporadic artillery fire, it was possible to construct Bailey bridges which secured the crossing.

Bailey bridges were quickly constructed at WEILERBACH (L-0338), DILLENGEN (P-9839), BETTENDORF (P-9143), WALLENDORF (P-9642), ECHTERNACH (L-0535), VIANDEN (P-9049) and ROH (P-9148).



230-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Weilerbach

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270-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Echternach




300-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Bettendorf



250-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Wallendorf



300-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Sure River at Echternach



140-foot Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Vianden




200-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Roth



120-Foot Bailey Bridge Across Our River South of Roth

Following this crossing, the advance was pushed eastward through extremely rugged country with steep-sided rocky cliffs toward the PRUM River. The advance in this area was impeded by numerous craters, and in some sectors as many as six fixed trestway or Bailey bridges had to be constructed in a single mile.

As the advance continued, Bailey bridges and footbridges were constructed over the PRUM River at OBERWEIS (L-0652), BETTINGEN (L-0450), and PEFFINGEN (L-0446).



Bailey Bridge Across Prum River at Bettingen



Bailey Bridge Across Prum River at Peffingen

A rapidly advancing column of the Fourth Armored Division overran and captured a bridge across the NIMS River at RITTERSDORF (L-1156), as shown in the photograph below:



Bridge Across Nims River at Rittersdorf


By the end of the month, the advance to the east had temporarily subsided and strong advances were being made astride the PRUM, NIMS, and SAUER Rivers toward the south. A heavy ponton bridge was constructed across the MOSELLE River at WORMELDANGE (L-0413) as a lateral route between XII Corps and XX Corps.

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Heavy Ponton Bridge Across Moselle River at Normeldange

On the north of the Third U.S. Army front, VIII Corps' direction of advance likewise ran perpendicular to the course of the OUR and FRUM Rivers, and though their assault crossings were not so costly, the rugged terrain with streams flowing in practically all of the valleys, required a large amount of Bailey bridging. Bailey bridges over the OUR River were constructed at GEMUND (P-8755), EISENBACH (D-8657), DASBURG (O-8502, OBERHAUSEN (L-8674), BURG-REULAND (O-8578) and three bridges at AUDEL (O-8880).



Timber Trestle Bridge which Replaced Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Gemund



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Eisenbach




Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Oberhausen



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Burg-Reuland



Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Auel



Second Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Auel



Third Bailey Bridge Across Our River at Auel

South of the MOSELLE River, XI Corps, which had been holding the SAARLAUTERN (Q-2380) bridgehead, suddenly crashed through the switch position of the SIEGFRIED Line running from METTLACH (L-1800) to REMICH (P-0106) and raced up the triangle between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers, crossed the SAAR, and at the end of the month threatened TRIER (L-2129).

The breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line by the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division was aided by a daring crossing of the MOSELLE River by the 5th Rangers, which unit crossed the stream near NORMELDANGE (L-0413) and made a very successful diversion of the main effort. Following this crossing a floating treadway bridge was constructed at REMICH (P-0106).



Floating Treadway Bridge Across Saar River at Remich


When the forces reached the SAAR, a crossing was attempted by the 94th Infantry Division near TABEN (L-1805) and SERRIG (L-1609). This was so successful that a treadway bridge could be put in at TABEN (L-1805) at an early hour.



Treadway Bridge Across Saar River at Taben


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Another trestle bridge was constructed at SERRIG (L-1609) and this bridge was successfully maintained intact in spite of enemy fire.



Treadway Bridge Across Saar River at Serrig

Farther north in the vicinity of SAARBURG (L-1513) and OCKFEN (L-1614), another assault crossing was executed. When the bridgehead had been expanded sufficiently, two heavy ponton bridges were constructed there.



One Way Traffic
Heavy Ponton Bridges Across Saar River at Saarburg

Hazardous bridging experiences during the month were the removing and salvaging of four floating Bailey bridges from the MOSELLE River. Because of the sudden breakup of the ice on the river, high flows stretching completely across the stream swept down and damaged several of the floats.

In addition to tactical bridging, timber trestle bridges were erected in close support of corps. The 1309d Engineer General Service Regiment built a number of permanent timber bridges to support XII Corps operations. At DIEKIRCH (P-8742) a fixed timber bridge was completed over the SAUER River on 3 February.


At BOLLENDORF (L-0140) a 285-foot timber trestle bridge over the SAUER River was completed and opened to two-way Class 40 traffic on 19 February.



285-Foot Timber Trestle River over Sauer River at Bollendorf

A 230-foot timber trestle bridge was constructed across the SAUER River at REISDORF (P-9442) in five days, the bridge being opened to all types of military traffic on 20 February.

At ECHTERNACH, even before the Bailey bridge was completed, a two-way pile bent bridge was started on 21 February. When completed, this was a 670-foot bridge.



Timber Trestle Bridge at Uckange

Roads

Road maintenance, repair and reconstruction work during the month was a much greater engineering task than that of any previous comparable period. Frost action during the early part of the month rendered many miles of roads impassable, particularly in the VIII Corps sector and the vital supply routes in support of this corps.

All available engineer troops were used on road maintenance and reconstruction work. In addition, approximately 3,000 civilian laborers and 550 prisoners of war were employed with hand tools to open drainage ditches and to assist in repair of road failures.

General Construction

General construction included building and maintaining liaison air strips and laying landing mats thereon; construction of prefabricated shelters and command posts for Infantry troops; constructing gun

emplacements and digging in searchlight units; clearing fields of fire for artillery; and leveling and sanding a firing range.

Repair and maintenance of buildings used by XX Corps Rest Camp, and buildings occupied by the 107th Evacuation Hospital, 110th Evacuation Hospital and by the 7th and 65th Field Hospitals were carried on.

Two hundred duckboards for M-1938 footbridge were constructed during the month. Road marking signs and traffic direction signs were made and painted.

III - SUPPLY

The change in the tactical situation from one of defense to that of offense resulted in the issue and expenditure of large quantities of river-crossing equipment. This reduced materially the Army reserve of this equipment being accumulated for the projected RHINE River crossing. Battle losses in assault boats and power utility boats contributed most in reducing the reserve.

As the result of the deterioration of main supply routes in forward areas, demands were made on depots for road materials, graders, rock crushers, road rollers and sheepfoot rollers. With the exception of rock crushers, most equipment was obtainable from Army and Advance Section Communications Zone. The shortage of rock crushers was generally offset by the production of crushed rock from civilian crushers.

Materials and equipment for the RHINE River crossing continued to be assembled. Shortages still existed, but indications were that the majority of equipment would be available in sufficient time for the operation.

As in the previous month, large quantities of heavy equipment were received from Advance Section Communications Zone depots and issued to troops. Sufficient shops, motorized, general purpose, were received to complete the equipping of all Engineer Combat Battalions, including Armored Battalions.

Four heavy cranes ranging in capacity from 1½ to 2 cubic yards arrived and were issued to General Service Regiments. They were primarily intended for use in the RHINE River crossing operation; however, they proved very helpful in the erection of fixed bridges currently under construction, in addition to giving the crews of these regiments a chance to become familiar with the operation of these cranes.

Heavy equipment not available in quantities required included rock crushers, small cranes, tar kettles and road graders, both towed and self-propelled. Requirements for these items were particularly high because of road deterioration.

Another effect of the bad road condition was a tremendous demand for picks and shovels used by civilians to supplement labor on the road program. Depot stocks of these items were soon exhausted; however, quantities sufficient to handle the situation were acquired by borrowing from Ordnance and by emergency pick-ups from Advance Section Communications Zone and Communications Zone depots.

To meet the requirements for crushed rock, three civilian crushers were operated at full capacity. These crushers all utilized blast furnace slag which was crushed and loaded in rail cars for shipment to forward railheads. Daily capacities of these plants were:

Plant No. 1	270 tons
Plant No. 2	460 tons
Plant No. 3	440 tons

Depot stocks of small Class II items, such as hammers, hatchets, files, welding and cutting sets and small tools in general, reached a dangerously low level. This condition was largely the result of the non-receipt of items requisitioned from Communications Zone. Toward the end of the month increasing quantities of supplies were being delivered from Advance Section Communications Zone Depot E-5137 and Depot No. E-514. This materially relieved the Class II shortage.

Quantities of lumber received and issued during the month were as follows:

Acquired from local civilian mills	534,792 BFM
Supplied by 1391st Engineer Forestry Company	216,547 BFM
Received from Southern Lines of Communications	102,350 BFM
Consumed in bridge construction	780,567 BFM

An increased demand for heavy I-beams (15" to 24" in depth with lengths up to 52 feet) was noted during the month. It was possible, however, to supply all requirements.

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The majority of engineer supplies were delivered to Army depots by rail. Rail facilities were available at Engineer Depot No. 13 for bridging and lumber and at Engineer Depot No. 14 for Class II supplies. Approximately 5,031 tons of engineer supplies were received by rail from Advance Section Communications Zone and Communications Zone Depots.

Considerable Army rail transportation was utilized for the movement of engineer supplies, consisting mainly of lumber, steel I-beams and road materials from Army Depots to Advance engineer depots serving corps.

Approximately 11,866 tons of engineer supplies were moved by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, using transportation of the following engineer units:

553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
509th Engineer Light Equipment Company
293d Engineer Combat Battalion
1366th Engineer Dump Truck Company

Transportation of supplies consisted of hauling logs to civilian saw mills, moving lumber from sawmills to engineer depots, transporting heavy engineer equipment from Advance Section Communications to Army depots, and moving supplies forward to advance engineer supply points.

The amount of maintenance required on engineer heavy equipment continued to increase, resulting in a large number of dead-lined machines. This situation was relieved considerably with the location of an engineer base shop company of Communications Zone approximately forty miles in the rear of the Army depot. Prior to this time it had been necessary to send equipment needing fourth and fifth echelon repairs approximately 200 miles to the rear. An adequate supply of spare parts and table of equipment replacement equipment were available to the Army.

During the month a total of sixty-one contracts were processed by the Purchasing and Contracting Section. The majority of these contracts were for RHINE River project material and modification of present bridging equipment. Contracts for a total of 11,000 treadway supporting spacer bars were placed with civilian firms. By the end of the month 2,500 had been delivered to engineer depots.

Contracts for the modification of seven Bailey bridges were placed with civilian firms. Two bridges were completed during the month. A total of 43,000 tons of crushed slag was contracted for. Approximately 10,000 tons were shipped to forward areas by rail.

A list of major items under contract at the end of the month follows:

ITEM	QUANTITY
anchors	253
Brackets, outboard, assault boat, M-2	100
Brackets, outboard, treadway ferry	50
Guard, finger, Bailey bridge	250
Modification of Bailey bridge parts:	
Clamps	294
Ramp, button	35
Ramp, plain	84
Sway Brace Extension	190
Tranoms	200
Parts for Bailey bridges:	
Bolt, chord	1,000
Pin, panel	1,000
Shoes, pile, cast steel	1,200
Supporting spacer bars, Treadway M-2	7,000
Tranoms packing blocks for Bailey bridge	100

IV - MAPS

No new mapping was undertaken during the month. All mapping consisted primarily of revision of existing maps.

The color separation project, GSGS 4414, was completed during the month. Third U.S. Army units now had available three-color maps throughout the entire Army area at a scale of 1/25,000. Two sheets were revised and prepared for reproduction during the month.

In the Army area east of the RHINE River a project consisting of the selection of operational editions was assigned to the Army Topographic Battalion. The project consisted of forty-two sheets, GSGS 4414.

Corps photomapping facilities produced numerous photomaps and large scale tactical maps.

A total of eighty-eight tons of maps was received during the month. Approximately eight tons were issued to Army units, eighteen tons to corps units, and the stock on hand at the end of the month was approximately 223 tons.

Recommendations were received from the army and corps topographic units for changes in existing tables of organization and equipment. These changes were submitted to higher headquarters, together with the recommendations of the Engineer Section. If approved, these changes would provide adequate facilities for map distribution and survey within the Army.

Terrain models, scale 1/50,000, of the papier-mache type were secured from the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone. Terrain models, scale 1/250,000 covering most of Germany were requested for staff planning by the G-2 Section of this headquarters. These models will be made by the Engineer Model-Making Detachment of the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone.

The Army Survey Center performed several survey missions, including radar sites. In addition, they supplied the III Corps Artillery with level data and rotated survey squads with the XII Corps engineer survey elements.

The reproduction program during the month consisted mainly of 1/25,000 and 1/50,000 scale maps. Seventy-five sheets of the 1/25,000 scale maps were reproduced for a total of approximately 1,041,000 copies. An additional thirty-four sheets were overprinted with additional colors. Ten sheets of the 1/50,000 scale GSGS 4507 series were reproduced in quantities averaging 7,500 copies each for a total of approximately 75,000 copies.

V - INTELLIGENCE

During the month information on the topography and rivers of the RPEL Region was gathered and disseminated. Also, information on the OUR, SAUER, FRUM, KYLL and LIESER-BACH Rivers was sent to interested units.

Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 2 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 4 were produced and distributed to Army engineer units. In addition, 10,000 booklets on German mines and booby traps were sent to Army units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued the policy of examining enemy engineer equipment, such as the 3 kg ball charge; the large Schu mine; adaptor for the "S" mine igniter; demolition conversion kit; Italian friction igniter, and a new type electric igniter. Samples of each of these devices were sent to the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone. A new method of minefield laying by the Germans was also discovered and information on this method was disseminated to all units. The team also continued to give lectures and demonstrations on booby traps to units of the Army.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated thirteen water points and six water distributing points. These water points produced approximately 3,560,000 gallons of water during this period. The 1511th and 1512th Engineer Water Supply Companies delivered water to prisoner of war enclosures and Army hospitals.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

With the advent of warmer weather and the melting of snow, the painting of armored vehicles for snow terrain was discontinued. The deactivated carbide residue used on the vehicles was removed by the use of water and brushes.

The manufacture of snow suits was discontinued toward the end of the month, all fabric previously cut having been processed, and the suits delivered.

Camouflage of the radar unit of the 563rd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was re-converted to summer type, using drapes and nets.

Posters, designed to awaken interest in and to promote consciousness of the need of camouflage, were produced and distributed. Camouflage face paint in green and brown of a theatrical grease paint type was distributed to troops.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army units were attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations during the month. Fire protection. In addition, they assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and rail-head installations and hospitals, and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone did not furnish any immediate protection for Army installations during the month. Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and vicinity continued to be furnished by the LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) City Fire Department and the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Utilities Detachment of this headquarters.

One trailer-pump unit pumped water from the OUR River over a 300-foot cliff to a regiment of the 76th Infantry Division for five days to relieve hand-carrying of water by the regiment.

IX - COMMENDATION

The following letter was received from the Army Commander and forwarded to all Third U.S. Army Engineers:

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 403

5 February 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : The Army Engineer Officer, Third Army.

1. Please accept for yourself and pass on to the officers and men of your units the sincere appreciation and admiration of all the other elements of the Third Army for the work you have accomplished.
2. Over countless rivers and tank ditches in flooded Lorraine you constructed and maintained innumerable bridges. You cleared and reconducted thousands of miles of road.
3. Your work in the recent operation in Belgium and Luxembourg has been equally outstanding and has been accomplished under still more intolerable conditions of weather and terrain.
4. Without the stimulus of combat, yet suffering losses from enemy fire, you have built the bridges lacking which the German penetration could not have been obliterated.
5. Each and every officer and man of the Third Army Engineer Units is hereby highly commended for the superior manner in which his tasks have been performed.
6. You will apprise all units concerned of the contents of this letter.

s/c/ G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.



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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

The major disposition of engineer troops at the beginning of this period remained unchanged. The 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment remained in support of the VIII Corps, the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the XII Corps, the 1301st Engr GS Regiment in support of the XX Corps and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued its mission of coordinating depot haulage activities and experimenting with special river crossing equipment.

In order to provide flexibility of Army support to the Corps the 1123d Engineer Combat Group, including the 145th, 183d, 188th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions and the 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company, was detached from VIII Corps and placed in support thereof under Army control, effective 2 March. To provide equipment for this group, one platoon of the 609th Engineer Light Equipment Company was detached 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment and attached thereto.

On 2 March the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group to be re-loaded and held in Army reserve.

On 2 March the 285th Engineer Combat Battalion, which had been operating in an Infantry role in the XII Corps, reverted to Engineer control and remained attached XII Corps.

At 031800A March Engineer Operational Instruction No. 30 was published effecting the above noted transfers and assigning new areas of responsibility. By this time the push of the VIII Corps to the east was proceeding satisfactorily and the 1123d Engineer Combat Group was in support thereof and in turn supported by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment. The missions of the 1303d and 1301st Engineer General Service Regiments and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group remained unchanged.

Effective 3 March the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company, less 1st maintenance platoon, was detached VIII Corps and attached XX Corps to provide maintenance facilities to that Corps.

Effective 4 March the 513th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached VIII Corps and attached to XX Corps, which corps was pushing steadily to the east.

Effective 7 March, the 2d platoon of the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XII Corps to support its operation which was progressing rapidly to the east, north of the MOSELLE River.

The 2d platoon, 729th Engineer Depot Company arrived on 071200A March and was attached to 459th Engineer Depot Company.

Effective 9 March the light equipage platoon of the 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and the remainder of the 996th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company from VIII Corps were attached to XII Corps to support its planned assault of the MOSELLE River.

On 10 March the 658th Engineer Light Equipment Company arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area. This company was not employed operationally as it was attached to Seventh U.S. Army by Twelfth U.S. Army Group to be moved by 15 March. The unit moved out of Third U.S. Army area on 15 March.

On 10 March, Company A, 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, and on 14 March the remainder of the battalion, were detached 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to XII Corps.

At 101800A March, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 31 was published effecting the above noted transfers and establishing new areas of responsibility. By this time the VIII Corps was being pinched out on the north and the XII Corps was moving rapidly to the east. In order to support the XII Corps operation the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was pulled out from behind the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and placed in support of the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment to permit them to push up into the XII Corps area. The missions of the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and 1134th Engineer Combat Group remained unchanged.

On 10 March the 178th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached VIII Corps and attached XI Corps effective 11 March.

By 12 March the drive of the XII Corps had reached break-through proportions, and it accordingly was given the mission of turning south across the MOSELLE to out-flank the German forces in front of the XX Corps, south of the MOSELLE. Once again Third U.S. Army engineers faced the task of providing engineer means to force the MOSELLE River. At 1800A March 12 Engineer Operational Instruction No. 32 was published assigning new areas of responsibility and pushing the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment well forward into the XII Corps area. Missions of all Army troops remained unchanged.

On 14 March the 1367th Engineer Dump Truck Company was detached VIII Corps and attached 1134th Engineer Combat Group to support its haulage activities.

Effective 16 March the 1st maintenance platoon of the 961st Engineer Maintenance Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XI Corps to complete the transfer of this company.

On 16 March the 1258th Engineer Combat Battalion, which had been operating in an infantry role in XX Corps, reverted to Engineer control and remained attached to XX Corps.

At 161800A March Engineer Operational Instruction No. 33 (Annex No. 9) was published assigning new areas of responsibility. By this time XII Corps had successfully crossed the MOSELLE River and was pushing aggressively to the south just west of the RHINE River. Engineer missions remained unchanged.

The 1700th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area on 17 March and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to assist in the salvage of tactical bridging and its return to depot stock.

Effective 18 March the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, less Company B, was relieved from attachment to XII Corps and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group in order to pick up tactical bridging in place and complete basic bridge load from depot stock.

On 18 March the 1010th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the XI Corps to support its operations.

Effective 20 March, the 511th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XII Corps.

By 20 March, the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion had completed loading and it was detached 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to XII Corps effective that date to provide additional bridging over the MOSELLE.

Effective 20 March, the 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company was detached 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group to provide increased depot haulage facilities to meet the moving situation.

By the night of 10 March the plans of the XII Corps for assault of the RHINE were being completed and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was alerted to move up necessary materials and erection crews for one anti-personnel boom over the RHINE River. On 20 March the Regiment was instructed to move up the remaining anti-personnel and anti-barge materials which had been assembled at AESP No. 8 to provide a total of four each.

By 20 March, the drive of the XII Corps had again reached break-through proportions and the 1123d Engineer Combat Group including the 183d, 145th and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions was attached thereto to provide adequate engineer support. The 2d platoon of the 609th Engineer Light Equipment Company was relieved of attachment from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment effective the same date.

The plans of the XI Corps for assault of the RHINE River were also being completed and the 188th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to XX Corps effective 20 March to provide additional engineer support.

The light equipage platoon of the 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached XII Corps and attached XI Corps effective 21 March.

On 21 March the 1535th Engineer Dump Truck Company arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to support its haulage activities.

On 22 March the 264th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 1270th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and were attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group, the advanced detachment of which had closed into the Army area 18 March with the main body

of the 1126th Engineer Combat Group closing in on 26 March. The 1126th Engineer Combat Group was placed in support of the VIII Corps.

The 1154th Engineer Combat Group arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area on 22 March and was attached to the XI Corps effective that date.

At 221800A March, Engineer Operational Instruction No. 34 was published establishing new areas of responsibility and placing the 1126th Engineer Combat Group in support of VIII Corps. By this time the VIII Corps on the north had been given the mission of crossing the RHINE in the vicinity of BOPFARD (L-8981), the XII Corps had completed its plan for assault of the RHINE in the OPPENHEIM (M-4439) area and jumped off at 222200A March and the XI Corps had been pinched out on the south by shift of inter-group boundary. Consequently, the 178th and 188th Engineer Combat Battalions were detached effective 22 March from XX Corps and attached VIII Corps to support its RHINE operations. The 1010th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached XI Corps and attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group as Army reserve and to complete reloading from depot stock. On 24 March this company was attached VIII Corps.

On 23 March the 2727th and 2728th Engineer Light Equipment Companies arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and were attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group and 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment respectively. Effective upon release by the 2728th Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 2d platoon of the 676th Engineer Light Equipment Company was detached 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and attached 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment.

On 23 March the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company closed into the Army area from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the VIII Corps to support its operations on the RHINE River.

Effective 24 March, the 2d platoon of the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached XI Corps and attached XII Corps to support its RHINE and MAIN River operations.

Effective 24 March, the 548th Engineer Light Ponton Company, less light equipage platoon, was detached XI Corps and attached VIII Corps to support its RHINE River operations.

Effective 24 March, the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was detached XII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for the purpose of hauling floating Bailey bridges from AESP No. 8 to the RHINE River.

Effective 24 March, the 287th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to 1125th Engineer Combat Group, which group closed into the Army area from LE HAVRE (L-4828) on 25 March. The 287th Engineer Combat Battalion closed into the Army area on 26 March.

On 26 March the 181st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion arrived from First U.S. Army and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group for the purpose of hauling floating Bailey bridging from AESP No. 8.

On 26 March, the 1266th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived from the LE HAVRE (L-4828) area and was attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group, which had been given a task mission of picking up rear area tactical bridging no longer needed for operations and hauling it forward.

By 26 March the XI Corps was given the mission of crossing over the XII Corps and crossing the RHINE in the vicinity of MAINZ (M-3856). To support its operations the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached XII Corps and attached XI Corps effective 26 March.

By 26 March the XII Corps had successfully crossed the RHINE and was pushing rapidly to the north and east. To provide for construction of three floating Bailey bridges over the RHINE at MAINZ (M-3856), OPPENHEIM (M-4439), and BINGEN (M-1252), the 1123d Engineer Combat Group with the 145th, 183d and 249th Engineer Combat Battalions were detached XII Corps and reverted to Army control for this mission.

At 282400A March Engineer Operational Instruction No. 35 was published effecting the above noted transfers and assigning new areas of responsibility and missions as follows:

a. 1123d Engineer Combat Group: Construct Class 40 floating Bailey bridges at MAINZ (M-3856), OPPENHEIM (M-4439) and BINGEN (M-1252) and maintain all bridges upon completion over RHINE River in zone.

b. 1125th Engineer Combat Group: Perform all engineer work in zone and support 1126th Engineer Combat Group.

c. 1126th Engineer Combat Group: Perform all engineer work in zone and support VIII Corps.

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d. 1134th Engineer Combat Group: Continue coordination of depot haulage activities and coordinate and control the delivery and operation of Naval LCV's and LCM's in the RHINE River operations.

e. 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment: Perform all engineer work in zone, support IX Corps, construct all anti-personnel and anti-barge booms in RHINE River in Army zone and construct fixed bridge over RHINE River at OFFENHEIM (M-4439).

f. 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment: Perform all engineer work in zone, support XII Corps, continue assistance to Naval Unit N-2 and construct fixed bridge over RHINE River at MAINZ (M-3856).

g. 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment: Perform all engineer work in zone, construct barge bridge over RHINE River and be prepared to support 1309d Engineer General Service Regiment.

h. Separate Army Units: No change.

Effective 27 March the 179th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached VIII Corps and attached 1123d Engineer Combat Group.

On 29 March, the 1130th Engineer Combat Group closed into the Army area. This group headquarters was not employed operationally, as it was relieved of assignment to Third U.S. Army, 31 March, and assigned Fifteenth U.S. Army.

By 29 March, VIII Corps had successfully crossed the RHINE and the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached therefrom and reverted to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group as Army reserve.

By 31 March the needs of the VIII and XII Corps permitted the re-grouping of the Light ponton companies. Accordingly, the 548th (-) Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached VIII Corps and attached XI Corps, the light equipage platoon of the 509th was detached VIII Corps and reverted to Army reserve with its parent organization and the 511th was detached XII Corps and attached VIII Corps.

As of 31 March the disposition of engineer troops was as follows:

VIII CORPS
1102d Engr C Gp
1107th Engr C Gp
35th Engr C Bn
44th Engr C Bn
159th Engr C Bn
168th Engr C Bn
188th Engr C Bn
243d Engr C Bn
1252d Engr C Bn
527th Engr L Pon Co
511th Engr L Pon Co
628th Engr L Equip Co
665th Engr Top Co
1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
974th Engr Maint Co
991st Engr Trdy Br Co
1010th Engr Trdy Br Co
2893d Engr TIT (C)

XII CORPS
1135th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn
150th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
282d Engr C Bn
285th Engr C Bn
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
528th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
613th Engr L Equip Co
673d Engr Top Co
981st Engr Maint Co
995th Engr Trdy Br Co
996th Engr Trdy Br Co
2949th Engr TIT (C)
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn

IX CORPS
1139th Engr C Gp
1152d Engr C Gp
1154th Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn

XX CORPS (contd)
245th Engr C Bn
281st Engr C Bn
1258th Engr C Bn
513th Engr L Pon Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
623d Engr L Equip Co
664th Engr Top Co
961st Engr Maint Co
993d Engr Trdy Br Co
997th Engr Trdy Br Co
2898th Engr TIT (C)
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn

ARMY
1123d Engr C Gp
1125th Engr C Gp
1126th Engr C Gp
1134th Engr C Gp
1301st Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
145th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
183d Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
254th Engr C Bn
287th Engr C Bn
293d Engr C Bn (-)
1266th Engr C Bn
1270th Engr C Bn
1700th Engr C Bn
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
509th Engr L Pon Co
609th Engr L Equip Co
676th Engr L Equip Co
2727th Engr L Equip Co
2728th Engr L Equip Co
652d Engr Top Co
572d Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
1366th Engr Dp Trk Co
1367th Engr Dp Trk Co
1535th Engr Dp Trk Co
976th Engr Maint Co

ARMY (contd)
1012th Engr Trdy Br Co
459th Engr Depot Co
2d Plat, 729th Engr Depot Co
1511th Engr WS Co
1512th Engr WS Co
1239th Engr FF Plat

ARMY (contd)
1240th Engr FF Plat
2890th Engr TIT (R)
Naval Unit N-2
Det B, 329th Harbor Craft Co
1407th Engr Mobile Sit Team
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn

II - CONSTRUCTION

Bridges and Roads

During the month of March river crossing operations engaged in by Third U.S. Army exceeded those of any previous month and were believed to have equalled or exceeded those executed by any other Army in the history of warfare. In addition to the crossings of such streams as the SAAR and the MOSELLE, the RHINE itself--the mightiest of Europe's rivers--was crossed by assault for the first time in modern history.

The RHINE was crossed not only once but four times in a succession of assault crossings that completely overwhelmed and smashed the enemy.

As an anticlimax to these crossings, the MAIN River, a river comparable to the MOSELLE, was crossed in a series of operations which, had it not been for the fact that the RHINE overshadowed all others, would have been looked upon as a major crossing operation.

The amount of bridging completed during the month was as follows:

TYPE OF BRIDGING	NUMBER	TOTAL LENGTH
Bailey bridge (fixed)	99	10,130
Bailey bridge (floating)	8	3,840
Heavy Ponton bridge	6	3,170
Infantry Support bridge	3	200
M-2 Treadway bridge (floating)	25	11,574
M-2 Treadway bridge (fixed)	96	3,744
Fixed bridges	104	11,415
Total	341	44,073

Further means of crossing were provided by the use of rafts, Naval craft (LWVP's and LCM's) and amphibious tanks on a scale never before used.


The initial crossings during the month were those made over the PRUM and KYLL Rivers by VIII and XII Corps, respectively, and of the SAAR and MOSELLE by XX Corps.

The crossings of the PRUM and KYLL were hard-fought, bitter battles over relatively minor streams. Since, however, they were strongly defended and were tied in with the Siegfried defenses, the relative importance of the crossings was high. These rivers bisected the path to the RHINE and it was through the bridgeheads established over them that the armored drive to the RHINE passed. Once these bridgeheads were established, and the 4th Armored Division started rolling eastward, bridging in the area to the north and east of KYLLBURG (L-1761) became relatively unimportant, since most of the bridges and overpasses from there to the RHINE were captured intact. Southwest of KYLLBURG (L-1761) to the MOSELLE River, a number of smaller bridges and overpasses were destroyed over the LIESER and SALM Rivers. However, since the advance proceeded at a slower tempo because of the fierce resistance encountered, these demolitions were not serious obstacles.

Simultaneously with the crossings of the PRUM and KYLL, the 10th Armored Division of XX Corps passed across the SAAR River over bridgeheads at SERRIG (L-1609), SAARBURG (L-1414), and OCKFEN (L-1715) and so swiftly overran TRIER (L-2129) that a fine 1,100-foot existing highway bridge was captured intact. They then continued on along the north bank of the MOSELLE, where a crossing of the KYLL River was forced.

These operations concluded the first of four phases of the stream crossing operations of the month and found Third U.S. Army in complete control of the north bank of the MOSELLE River, as well as the area to the east and south of it as far east as the RUMER River.

At this time the XII Corps turned to the south and in a beautifully executed river crossing operation smashed across the MOSELLE River between TREIS (L-6976) and HATZENPORT (L-7782). This crossing was executed by the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions.



Treadway Bridge Under Construction Under Cover of Smoke at Hatzenport on Moselle River

Initial crossings were made secretly at night in paddled assault boats and reinforcements were then poured over in storm boats, Infantry support rafts and treadway rafts. The commanding points of the terrain set up as targets for the Infantry to seize and to prevent enemy observation of the crossing sites were taken at an early hour in the first day, and by 1900 of the day the assault started, two Class 40 bridges had been constructed and ready for use, and still a third bridge was completed shortly thereafter. Through this bridgehead the 4th Armored Division again roared to the south, racing to BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938) on the NAHE River where, though the bridges had been destroyed, a crossing was made on a railroad bridge.




Bailey Bridge over Nahe River at Bad Kreuznach

In this dash, most bridges and overpasses on the way were captured intact and those that were destroyed were quickly spanned with either fixed treadway or Bailey bridges.


As the bridgehead over the MOSELLE was expanded to the west, still another crossing was made in the vicinity of BULLAY (L-5563), where a heavy ponton bridge was constructed, and over which the 11th Armored Division stormed to run along the flank of the 4th Armored Division. Then the 4th Armored, after consolidating, started again and practically cleaned the west bank of the RHINE as far south as WORMS (M-4515), with the exception of pockets at GERNSHEIM (M-5428) and MAINZ (M-3856). Simultaneously with these pushes, XX Corps troops forced a way down the east bank of the SAAR and rolled up the Siegfried Line in this sector. To support these operations, floating bridges were constructed over the SAAR at MERZIG (L-9295) and METTLACH (L-1701). The bridging east of here to the RHINE did not present any further unusual difficulties, since the advances were so fast that bridges and overpasses were either captured intact, or, since the GLAN, SIMMER and NAHE streams were either narrow or fordable in these reaches, no real delay was produced.

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Concurrently with this activity, VIII Corps executed still another assault crossing of the MOSELLE River, between HATZENFORT (L-7782) and KOBLENZ (L-9096). Here again the Infantry crossed in paddled assault boats and were reinforced by storm boats, powered assault boats and rafts. Treadway bridges were constructed at WINNIGEN (L-8491) and KOBERN (L-8090). The 87th Infantry Division crossed and quickly captured KOBLENZ (L-9096).



Treadway Bridge over Moselle River near Kobern



Floating Bailey Bridge over Moselle River near Kobern

This ended the second phase of the river crossings for the month and found Third U.S. Army holding the entire west bank of the RHINE from KOBLENZ (L-9096) to LUDWIGSHAFEN (R-5298). The crossing of the RHINE presented the next problem for the month, and there began for Third U.S. Army Engineers the task of the greatest technical and supply problems so far engaged in.

As early as August 1944, when it became apparent that the crossing of the RHINE might take place in the not too distant future, the Engineer Section established a special staff section to plan for the operation. By September preliminary estimates of equipment and materiel needed had been calculated and ordered, and a preliminary plan of action drawn up, based on the troops then available and the stretch of the river lying within the Army zone of advance. Later, when it was learned from conferences with higher headquarters that certain troops and equipment could be expected to be available, a plan of action providing crossings with FRANKFURT (M-6668) and DARMSTADT (M-6642) as the targets, was drawn up. Included in the plan was an analysis of all troop and equipment requirements which served as a guide for training specific troops to execute certain missions.

The crossings were to be made initially by XII and XX Corps, but XII Corps alone finally was committed to the task, and executed a crossing of such superior merit that it could well serve as a model for all future crossings. The plan called for a crossing in the vicinity of NIERSTEIN (M-4342) at a site selected many months before. Here a good network of roads intersected from the north, east, south and west, and a bridge with a floating center section and several ferry sites were located here.


The terrain was good from the XII Corps standpoint, since hills and a town masked approaches on the east side of the river, while a long, flat, open plain extended from the east bank several miles from the river, as can be seen from the photographs illustrating the crossing.

The plan for the crossing was that a single division would make the crossing and that all engineer work was to be executed by Corps Engineers or Army Engineers, depending generally upon previously planned tasks outlined in the Army plan.

Though the crossing was planned for 22 March, the SAAR area was only cleared of the enemy on 20 March, at which time the critical supplies raced eastward through a hitherto forbidden area over roads that had to be cleared and streams that had to be bridged as they came. An attempt to run convoys up the north bank of the MOSELLE following the path of XII Corps would have been still slower and more difficult.

The staging of the operation by the XII Corps was handled by the 1135th Engineer Combat Group, and in accordance with the Corps Engineer's plan, approximately 100 storm boats and motors, 300 assault boats and motors, life belts and other pertinent items were assembled by the corps in addition to the T/E equipment of approximately 500 boats and 100 motors. To back the operation with troops, one heavy ponton battalion (minus one company) was initially attached to the Corps for use in rafting operations, the remainder of the battalion and one other battalion having approximately 400 outboard motor operators, three treadway bridge companies, two light ponton companies, plus light equipment platoon and seven battalions, were attached as well. Still another unit, one-half of Naval Unit No. 2, consisting of twelve LCVP's and their crews, were attached and pioneered the use of Naval craft in assault river crossing operations.

The historic crossing action started at 2200 with the 11th Infantry Regiment, supported by the 204th Engineer Combat Battalion, making a secret crossing in paddled assault boats. Wave after wave was crossed, with over 200 assault boats shuttling continuously throughout the night. By dawn a substantial part of all the Infantry in the 5th Infantry Division had crossed. At this time the LCVP's of the Naval unit had arrived and by 0730 twelve LCVP's were in the water and ferrying personnel, light vehicle and supplies, and evacuating wounded at such a rate that assault boats were no longer needed.



Infantrymen Board LCVP at Nierstein



LCVP Loaded with Infantry Crosses Rhine near Nierstein



Five LCVP's in Action near Nierstein



Jeeps Debark on East Bank of Rhine at Nierstein
(Note type of beach - no work was required to permit vehicles to use it)



Ambulance Debarks from LCVP on East Bank of Rhine at Nierstein
(Note beach)



Infantrymen Board LCVP at Nierstein on West Side of the River
(Note Ferry Landing from which Boats Operate)

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
Artillery fire began to probe the site during the night and continued for about twenty-four hours and the Luftwaffe ventured out in force to strafe and bomb at daybreak.

During the night, work had begun by the 150th Engineer Combat Battalion on the shelter harbor extending from the river at OPPENHEIM (M-4439) on the assembly of parts of a treadway bridge, and though the artillery fire searched the harbor and continued to harass the crossing forces during the day, no substantial damage was done.



Sections of Treadway Bridge Being Assembled in Shelter Harbor at Oppenheim

This work on the bridge is worthy of special note, inasmuch as the practice previously developed by XII Corps of inflating the floats in a rear area and carrying them forward on 2 1/2-ton trucks demonstrated fully its value here. The unloading and assembling of the huge amount of material required was carried on with a minimum of confusion, as shown in the photograph above. At daybreak the sections were assembled into rafts and work started on constructing a bridge at an old ferry site just downstream of the entrance to the shelter harbor.



M-2 Treadway Raft Being Moved Out of Shelter Harbor at Oppenheim to Bridge Site




Treadway Bridge at Oppenheim Under Construction - View From Shelter Harbor where Parts of Bridge Were Assembled

Work continued during the day and by 1830 a Class 40 treadway bridge was taking traffic.



M-2 Treadway Bridge at Oppenheim - First Bridge Across the Rhine in Third U.S. Army's Area


Also during the night the heavy ponton company of the 88th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was unloaded and the construction of Class 40 rafts for ferrying was started. The first raft was in operation by 0700 and 0930 four rafts were ferrying over tanks, tank destroyers, and supply vehicles.




Tank Destroyer Boards Heavy Ponton Raft at Nierstein



Tanks Being Ferried on Heavy Ponton Raft at Nierstein




Supply Vehicles Ferried on Heavy Ponton Rafts at Nierstein



Prisoners are Carried Back on Heavy Ponton Raft at Nierstein

In addition five ponton Infantry support rafts were constructed and further supplemented the ferry capacity and about ten DD tanks walloped across the river.



DD Tank Enters Rhine River at Nierstein

A platoon of DUKW's subsequently joined the crossing forces and made 220 trips carrying ammunition, rations, and gasoline.




DUKW's Emerging from Rhine River at Nierstein

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During the day a heavy ponton bridge was started by the 87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion and by 240130 March, a 1280-foot Class 24 bridge was ready for traffic. By 0700 of the same date it had been reinforced to carry Class 40 loads.



Heavy Ponton Bridge Under Construction at Nierstein



Traffic Rolls Over Heavy Ponton Bridge at Nierstein

During the construction, a 150mm shell hit directly in the center of the bridge, but fortunately failed to explode. Aside from piercing the deck and a ponton and delaying the construction, it caused no important damage.

Through this bridgehead of the 5th Infantry Division, the 4th Armored Division raced off so swiftly to the east that HANAU (M-8571), thirty miles away, was reached in one day. To speed the traffic at still a faster rate, still another treadway bridge was ordered to be put in and work was started on 24 March and the bridge shown above was opened at noon on 25 March.



Treadway Bridge at Oppenheim

By 27 March five divisions had passed over these three bridges, as well as supplies and necessary supporting troops. The rate at which traffic crossed can be determined from the fact that the entire 6th Armored Division crossed in 16-3/4 hours. During the period from 24 March to 31 March, 60,000 vehicles crossed over these bridges at OPPENHEIM (M-4439).

Aside from the actual problem of building the bridges, the protection of them posed several problems which required special equipment and training, but this had been anticipated and fortunately the enemy was unable to halt the construction or damage the bridges. The following security measures were employed:

a. Air protection. For the initial nine days of the operation, air cover was constantly maintained over the bridges.

b. Waterborne assault. Anti-personnel nets of the British Admiralty netting type were installed to aid in the capture of "Gamma" swimmers who, intelligence sources had indicated, might be attacking the bridges.

Subsequent to the original tactical crossings, plans had been made to replace the floating treadway bridges by floating Bailey bridges and by 29 March, six days after the initial bridging had begun, sufficient material was on hand to permit a floating Bailey bridge to be started. This was opened for traffic on 31 March.




Floating Bailey Bridge at Oppenheim

Simultaneously, equipment and material were being assembled by the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment for the construction of a fixed bridge.

At the same time, in addition to the crossing of the XII Corps, plans were readied to support a crossing of the VIII Corps in the great gorge which runs from BINGEN (M-1252) to OBERLAHNSTEIN (L-9189). This stretch of the river presented difficult crossing problems and the problem of putting in a bridge caused some concern. Once ground reconnaissance had been made, however, the river did not seem so bad as studies had indicated.

The same base of supply as was used for XII Corps crossing operations was used here. The hundreds of boats and motors required had to make the long run over even more tortuous terrain--the HUNSRUCK Mountains--to put the supplies in the corps depot. Also, twelve of the twenty-four LCVP's of the Army had been allocated to the corps for the operation. Since they had been routed to the vicinity of ALZEY (M-2726)



LCM's on the Road to Participate in Assault Crossings of the Rhine

in the expectation of crossings being made as originally planned, they now had to be routed over the hills to the north. Fortunately, the time factor was adequate to enable them to make this move and they were ready and in position by H-hour, due to the excellent work of the Naval Unit staff and that of the 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

The crossing plan of VIII Corps called for an assault crossing to be made in padded assault boats by the 87th Infantry Division, with one crossing in the vicinity of RHENS (L-9287) and other crossing at BOPPARD (L-8981). The crossing at BOPPARD (L-8981), however, was to be the main crossing site and the bridge was to be put in here. The initial wave crossed satisfactorily in each place, but strong enemy resistance was encountered at the north crossing site from enemy artillery and small arms and this was subsequently abandoned when it became apparent that the BOPPARD (L-8981) crossing was successful. Though six LCVP's had been allocated by the corps to take part in this operation, none were actually committed until about twelve hours after the assault started, since the advisability of using them at all was being carefully weighed, especially since if they had been knocked out on the way to site, the only approach road might have been blocked by them. Once in the water, however, they performed excellently as ferries and moved over great numbers of men, light vehicles and equipment, as well as evacuating the wounded. Once these were in the water, the need for the powered assault boats and storm boats which had been used up to this time was ended. It is estimated that 5,000 men and 400 vehicles were carried by the Navy alone.



Equipment Being Loaded Under Smoke Screen on LCVP's During Assault Crossing of Rhine River at Boppard




Infantry Assault Troops Board an LCVP at Boppard on the Rhine River

Infantry support rafts and M-2 treadway rafts had been also constructed earlier in the day and these were used to carry over light vehicles and tanks respectively.

An M-2 treadway bridge was started by 0800 on the morning the assault crossing was made, and by 0930 of the following day it was completed.

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


Treadway Bridge at Boppard in the Rhine Gorge

As previously mentioned, the technical difficulties produced by the stream made construction difficult, inasmuch as two standard power utility boats and two horse power outboard motors could scarcely handle the five ponton M-2 rafts. The LCVP's proved to be invaluable here in supplementing the power boats, as their powerful engines were able to breast the swift current.

While this operation was still underway, another crossing was started by VIII Corps on the night of 25-26 March at ST. GOAR (L-9873) and OBERWESEL (L-9967).

The pattern of the previous crossings was followed at ST. GOAR (L-9773) with paddled assault boats, making the initial crossings with powered assault boats carrying the succeeding waves.



Assault Troops Crossing Rhine River at St. Goar

This crossing was strongly resisted, however, and since only negligible resistance had been encountered at OBERWESEL (L-9967), the main crossing forces were shifted to OBERWESEL (L-9967), where they crossed and outflanked ST. GOAR (L-9873). When finally captured, it was found that ST. GOAR (L-9873) had been held by a relatively small force, but it was well equipped with automatic weapons that were well placed and skillfully concealed in the steep cliffs which line the stream.


At OBERWESEL (L-9967), the crossing was made with relatively light resistance, though sporadic artillery fire fell intermittently in the area. The initial crossings here, too, were made by paddled assault boats, followed by powered craft. Here, however, though the Naval craft were available, because of the difficult approach roads, they were not put into action until the afternoon. In the meantime, a fleet of ten DUKW's did a heroic job of transporting troops and supplies and in all made 236 crossings.

However, as soon as six LCVP's and six LCM's had been put into the water, the entire complexion of the picture changed, for they passed troops and equipment over the river at such a rate that within forty-eight hours nearly an entire division with all its vehicles and equipment had been carried over.



DUKW Transports Assault Troops over Rhine River at Oberwesel

This ferrying operation quickly supplied enough troops and armor so that ST. GOAR (L-9873) was cleared by the morning of 27 March and a treadway bridge was started on the same day and completed about thirty-six hours later.



Tanks Cross Treadway Bridge at St. Goar on the Rhine River




Armored Car Debarks from LCM at Mainz


This operation was slow, but the swift current and the poor anchorage made it a most difficult job. To assist in anchoring a bridge and as in construction as well, a one-inch steel aerial anchor line was employed and the bridge initially fastened to this. Subsequently, the anchorage was supplemented by heavy barge anchors.

The fourth crossing was executed by IX Corps at MAINZ (M-3856) in a difficult and strongly resisted operation. The initial waves of

the 80th Infantry Division crossed secretly in paddled assault boats, while the succeeding waves crossed in double assault boats and storm boats powered with outboard motors. Flanking fire from 20mm flak weapons on the island had been completely cleared. It was here that the Navy again demonstrated its ability to be most useful and effective in a crossing operation by providing a crossing means so swift and of such capacity that the enemy can be quickly overwhelmed. Soon after the Naval craft hit the water, they poured over a continual stream of troops, vehicles and tank destroyers in the early crucial hours that the enemy artillery was silenced and further ferrying and bridging was able to proceed without interference.



Infantry Crossing in LCM at Mainz



Troops and Vehicles Disembark from LCM at Mainz



Supply Vehicles Boarding an LCM at Mainz

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From the time the first craft went into operation at H plus 3 1/2 until the treadway bridge was open at H plus 3 1/4, the Navy transported an estimated 7,000 troops and 600 vehicles. This was a magnificent performance, inasmuch as the river was about 2,000 feet wide at this point and the distance traversed from the loading point on the near shore to the unloading point on the far shore was nearly a mile. About fifteen minutes was required for a crossing cycle.



M-2 Treadway Bridge at Mainz - 1896 feet long; so far as known this was the longest tactical bridge ever built

Even after the completion of the bridge, the Naval craft were still used as ferries to carry empty vehicles and evacuate the injured, since the treadway bridge was used exclusively for one-way traffic heading toward the enemy.

The treadway bridge at MAINZ (M-3856) was a monumental structure, being 1,896 feet long and probably the longest tactical bridge ever constructed.

The crossing at MAINZ (M-3856) was coordinated with a simultaneous crossing of the MAIN River just east of the confluence of the MAIN and the RHINE at MAINZ (M-3856) by other elements of the division. The assault waves on the MAIN crossed in paddled assault boats with a build-up following in powered assault and storm boats and on Infantry support and M-2 treadway rafts which were able to be constructed at an early hour, since the enemy was quickly overwhelmed by the crossing forces. This crossing was not so strongly opposed as that at MAINZ (M-3856) and an M-2 treadway bridge was started at 0700 of the day the assault started and was completed by 1900 that evening. It was 624 feet long.



M-2 Treadway Bridge at Hochheim

This ended the assault phase of the Rhine operations. At this time, Third U.S. Army held the entire west bank of the RHINE River and the east bank as well from OPPENHEIM (M-4439) to KOELENZ (L-9096) with the exception of a pocket on the east side which, though little enemy activity had been noted, had not been physically cleared.

The following items were pertinent to all the crossings:

- a. The same pattern of executing the crossing and providing defensive measures described for the XII Corps crossing was, in general, followed at the other sites with minor modifications, as determined by the individual characteristics of the site.
- b. All crossings were made secretly without artillery preparation.


c. Outboard motor boats attracted enemy fire whenever used.

d. When LCVP's and LCM's are available, the quantity of troops and equipment that can be ferried in them is so great that very close coordination must be established between them and traffic control authorities in charge of the crossing, since much valuable transport time may be lost waiting for loads.

e. The standard power utility boats were not powerful enough efficiently to serve as general work boats in a stream as swift as the RHINE, though two of them, aided by two outboard motors, can readily navigate a five-ponton raft with M-2 pneumatic or heavy ponton. Because of their lack of power and to supplement the number which was available, both LCVP's and LCM's were used to aid in the construction of the bridges.


Immediately following the assault phase, the construction of the floating Bailey bridges to release the tactical bridging for use farther forward was begun. As previously noted, a floating Bailey bridge had been constructed at OPPENHEIM (M-4439) by 31 March and at the same time the general service regiment scheduled to construct a permanent type fixed bridge at OPPENHEIM (M-4439) started work at the site, even though the assault crossing had been made only seven days previous and the companies employed had to complete projects on the SAAR River—some eighty miles to the rear—on which they had been unable to start until 19 March, when the breakthrough was made.

Similarly at MAINZ (M-3856) a floating Bailey bridge was started on 29 March, the day after the assault crossing. This bridge was completed, but because of the extremely swift current—6.6 feet per second flowing at the site—its capacity was initially limited to Class 35, until extra pontoons could be placed in each bay in the swift water sections and false bows provided for all the boats. This swift water was not the normal rate of flow at MAINZ (M-3856), but it was caused when the three center spans of road bridge were dropped into the stream, causing a partial damming. This caused the water gap to be restricted and consequently the water about 100 yards from each shore about one-half mile downstream of the wrecked bridge flowed at a substantially faster rate than usual. However, because of the road network, this particular stretch was the most suitable for traffic flow and therefore both floating bridges were constructed at this point. Once additional anchorages had been provided, the bridges offered no unusual problems of maintenance other than could be expected on bridges of such length.



Floating Bailey Bridge on Rhine River at Mainz


On 30 March the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment began the construction of a 1,050 foot steel stringer pile bent bridge at OPPENHEIM (M-4439). On 29 March, the day following the assault crossing, the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment began construction of a timber bridge on the site of the destroyed bridge, with the wreckage of the former bridge being utilized, where practicable, as a foundation for the bridge. This site was selected primarily because it was felt that a bridge could be built here in about one-third of the time that would be required to construct an entirely new bridge, particularly since the length of an entirely new bridge would be close to 2,000 feet, whereas the gap in the damaged bridge was only 1,050 feet. Time was the deciding factor in this decision, since at any time after 1 May the start of the summer high water could be expected, and it was decided that a permanent structure should be finished by this date, since the usual accumulation of debris accompanying the flood would probably make it impossible to maintain floating bridges.




Partially Destroyed Highway Bridge at Mainz

As a further safety factor, the LCM's and LCVP's that had been used in the assault operation were still held on the river for emergency use. They still proved to be invaluable in assisting in the building and maintenance of bridges and the nets and booms, and present plans contemplate keeping them as emergency craft for ferrying if needed.

In addition to the bridges described above, another floating Bailey bridge was constructed at BINGEN (M-1252) and still another one was begun at LORCH (M-0561) to be used as a corps tactical bridge, but construction was subsequently halted when the advance of the forces progressed so far beyond the river that it lost its original importance.




Bailey Bridge over Rhine River at Bingen




Floating Bailey Bridge under Construction at Lorch


As noted previously, XII Corps plunged on across the RHINE at such a rate that its armor in the space of a few days had smashed across the MAIN River at HANAU (M-8771) and near FRANKFURT (M-6668) and at both places floating treadway bridges were constructed to aid the advance.




Bridges over Main River at Frankfurt



Fourth Armored Division Crosses Main River near Hanau




Treadway Bridge at Gras Auheim



Heavy Ponton Bridge at Mulheim

In addition a heavy ponton bridge was put in at MUHLHEIM (M-2166), and a fixed Bailey bridge over a partially destroyed bridge at FRANKFURT (M-6668). These delays were only momentary, however, and the forces then swept northward toward ALSFELD (H-0840).



Bailey Bridge over Main River at Frankfurt - Work on fixed bridge to replace it is being carried on without interference to traffic

Meanwhile, VIII Corps expanded east of the river and, in addition to usual tasks of replacing culverts and bridging small streams with Bailey and treadway, constructed a floating treadway bridge over the LAHN River, while XX Corps pressed out of its MAINZ (M-3856) bridgehead and joined up with VIII and XX Corps on the north and east, respectively, which concluded the bridging for the month.


In addition to the major tactical bridging operations accomplished during the month, Army Engineer troops continued to support corps by expeditiously constructing two-way fixed timber bridges to replace numerous one-way tactical bridges. During this period fifty-five fixed timber bridges (two-way Class 40, one-way Class 70) were constructed with total aggregate lengths of 7,155 feet. Six of these structures were bridges in excess of 250 feet in length, including three across the MOSELLE River, two across the SAAR and one across the SAUER. The MOSELLE River bridges were located at TREIS (L-6976), REMICH (P-0106), and MERZIG (Q-9295).

The TREIS (L-6976) bridge across the MOSELLE River constructed by the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment, consisted of the construction of a 500-foot timber trestle bridge. The MOSELLE River at this point had a maximum depth of nineteen feet with a rock bottom which precluded the use of pile bents. Rock-filled cribs were partially constructed on land, pushed into the water and floated to the site. As they were sunk, they were built up to the necessary height. The cribs were then filled with rock on which double timber bents were constructed to a height of twelve feet. Work on this project began 18 March and was completed 23 March.

The SAUER River bridges at KONZ-KARTHAUS (L-1622) and at SAARBURG (L-1414) were 600 feet and 416 feet in length, respectively, and both were constructed by the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment. The KONZ-KARTHAUS (L-1622) bridge was a pile bent bridge and the SAARBURG (L-1414) bridge a timber trestle placed directly on the gravel and rock bottom at the SAAR River.



Treis Bridge across the Moselle River under Construction



Two Views of Completed Treis Bridge across the Moselle

The MERZIG (Q-9295) bridge across the SAAR River was constructed by the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment. This bridge, 704 feet in length, was constructed in ten days.

The SAUER River bridge worthy of note was constructed at WASSER-BILLIG (L-1125) at the mouth of the river and was 285 feet in length. One pier consisting of crib filled with rock had to be constructed in unusually deep and swift water. On top of this a double timber bent, thirty feet in height, was constructed. This bridge was constructed by the 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment.


The construction of two major fixed timber bridges across the RHINE River began this month. On 30 March the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment began the construction of a 1,050 foot steel stringer pile bent bridge at OPPENHEIM (M-4439).

The capture of the stone arch bridge in good condition across the MOSELLE River in TRIER (L-2129) provided an immediate access for heavy supply traffic into the area southeast of the MOSELLE River.



Fixed Timber Bridge under Construction across Main River in Frankfurt

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Timber Trestle Bridge under Construction across Rhine River at Mainz

During the first half of this period, the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was still engaged in the maintenance, repair and reconstruction of main supply routes in the ARLON (P-6123)-BASTOGNE (P-5657) area. These roads were those damaged because of the sudden thaw in the early part of February. This regiment utilized 550 prisoners of war and 350 civilians in this work. Road base materials of crushed slag were brought in by rail from RODANGE (P-6306) mill and steel mill at LONGWY (P-5805).

Other road work included removing log obstacles at entrances to villages, filling over trench tank obstacles, and repairing craters, in addition to usual road maintenance and repairs.

III - SUPPLY

The rapid movement of the Army to the RHINE River and the tactical crossing of that river by three corps required the movement of enormous quantities of tactical and fixed bridging materials from assembly areas in Engineer Depot Nos. 8, 13 and 14, to forward depots supplying the corps and, at times, directly to bridge sites. At the final crossing of the RHINE, the supply line for engineer materials extended approximately 143 miles. The majority of equipment required was on hand in Army depots, but the principal problem was that of moving material forward at a rapid rate and at the same time displacing depots forward in time to receive these supplies. A total of 4,926 tons of engineer bridging, excluding fixed timber bridge material, was moved to forward areas by Army truck over the period from 22 March to 31 March. The tonnage was composed of floating Bailey bridge, fixed Bailey bridge, treadway bridge, and light floating equipage.


With the exception of truck-mounted cranes, the supply of heavy equipment was sufficient to satisfy demands. Four of these cranes were received from Advance Section Communications Zone on a loan basis for use during the RHINE crossing operation when rapid loading and unloading of bridging material were of prime importance.

Adequate stocks of tactical bridging were on hand in Army depots or en route from Communications Zone depots to support the RHINE operation. I-beams and lumber also were available in sufficient quantities.

The demand for crushed rock and equipment for repairing roads diminished during the month to practically zero due to a combination of better weather and the fact that the tactical situation moved out of the general area of bad roads in LUXEMBOURG (P-8411) to the more stable German roads. Production of crushed rocks from civilian sources was completely suspended.

Depot stocks of Class II items improved generally, but a definite shortage continued on specific small tools, such as hammers, hatchets and files.


The footage of fixed bridging material consumed during the month was approximately double that used for the previous month. A total of 3,090 tons of steel consisting of 14" and 20" steel I-beams was used. The majority of steel was acquired from local steel mills operated by Advance Section Communications Zone.



Steel Yard at Engineer Depot No. 13 at Esch

Listed below is pertinent information on Army depots in operation during the month:

Depot No.	Type	Average Tonnage
8	Rhine River Bridging	6,000
10	Class IV and Bridging	800
13	Class IV and Bridging	8,000
14	Class II and IV	3,200
16	Class IV & Bridging	400
17	Class IV and Bridging	400
18	Class IV and Bridging	200
19	Class IV and Bridging	400
20	Class IV and Bridging	600
21	Class IV and Bridging	675
22	Class IV and Bridging	150
23	Class IV and Bridging	600
24	Class IV and Bridging	400
25	Class V and Bridging	300
26	Class V and Bridging	400



Engineer Depot No. 13 at Esch

An acute shortage of cranes and depot personnel was experienced because of the large number of depots operated by the Army. A total of eighteen motorized and crawler cranes were used. These were augmented by a large overhead crane at Engineer Depot No. 13, which was used to handle steel I-beams, timbers and piling. One additional Engineer depot platoon was attached to the Army during the month. This unit was used to load out RHINE bridging at Engineer Depot No. 8.

All engineer supplies were delivered to Army Engineer Depots No. 13 and 14 from Advance Section Communications Zone and Communications Zone Depots by rail. Forward movement of practically all supplies from these two depots to Advance Engineer Depots supporting the corps was performed by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group, using the transportation of the following units:


87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
 181st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
 553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
 1700th Engineer Combat Battalion
 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company
 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 293d Engineer Combat Battalion (Less one company)
 1366th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 1367th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 1535th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 3459th Quartermaster Truck Company
 3999th Quartermaster Truck Company
 3988th Quartermaster Truck Company
 4051st Quartermaster Truck Company
 651st Quartermaster Truck Company

A total of 7,500 tons of engineer supplies was hauled by the above units during the month.

Engineer maintenance of heavy equipment continued at a high rate. However, a large amount of equipment requiring the 4th echelon maintenance and above was evacuated to the Advance Section Communications Zone base shop, thus relieving Army engineer maintenance companies of higher echelon maintenance.

A special maintenance crew operated in the bridge field at Engineer Depot No. 13 for the purpose of repairing light floating equipage. The repair work done by this crew contributed immensely in providing materials for river crossing operations. A summary of equipment repaired during the month is as follows:

Floats, pneumatic	374
Boats, reconnaissance	53
Boats, storm	41
Boats, assault, M-2	283
Boats, power, utility	10



Repairing Power Utility Boat

IV - MAPS

No new mapping was undertaken during the month. All mapping consisted primarily of revision, color separation, and checking existing 1/25,000 scale maps against available photography for discrepancies which would make the maps operationally dangerous.

Five sheets of the GSGS 4414, 1/25,000 scale maps were revised during the month. This revision consisted of various sheets throughout the Army area which were found to contain errors of sufficient magnitude to necessitate the action.

Color separation work on the 1/25,000 scale, GSGS 4414 series maps was continued in the Army area. However, because of the nature of the tactical operations, multi-colored maps were not printed beyond the bridgehead operations east of the RHINE River.

A compilation of a gazetteer from the 1/100,000 scale maps was assigned to the 652nd Engineer Topographic Battalion, but progress on this project was negligible because of other operational commitments of a more urgent nature.

The color separation of three sheets of the new 1/200,000 scale

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road maps of Germany was undertaken and completed. Specifications were outlined by the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone. This project was given top priority, in order that the maps might be completed in time to be of use to field units.

Eighty sheets, GSGS 4414 series, 1/25,000 scale maps were checked against available aerial photographs to determine their operational efficiency prior to reproduction. The photography was of such a small scale that only major topographic features could be accurately checked. No serious errors were noted.

The photomapping facilities of the Corps Topographic Companies were not utilized by the Army. Special maps and map substitutes and supplements were prepared under the direction of the Corps Engineers.

The Army Survey Center was assigned the mission of supplementing existing trig in the area north and east of BITBURG (L-1353). However, this area was immediately left in the rear by the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army and the project cancelled before completion. Enough control was established to substantially strengthen the trig in this area before the project was terminated.

During the month the Army Survey Center established geodetic control for five radar stations. One of these missions consisted of accurate location of targets on a bombing range for the XIX Tactical Control Group (Provisional).

Five survey technical targets were investigated. Only one of these, a captured German map depot at MAINZ (M-3856, Germany, yielded any data of importance.

A field check of sheet 6402, GSGS 4414 series, scale 1/25,000 map was undertaken. Results of this field check have not been compiled.

A survey party from the Army Survey Center, assigned the mission of furnishing astronomical azimuth for the XII Corps artillery, was maintained during the entire month.

A total of eighty-eight tons (approximately 2,017,000 sheets) of maps were received during the month. Over four tons (approximately 95,238 sheets) were issued to Army units and ninety-three tons (approximately 2,118,064 sheets) issued to corps units.

During the middle of the month, when Third U.S. Army was making rapid advances, corps and divisions changed areas of operations on short notice. Units had to be mapped well in advance of their immediate objectives with wide areas of coverage. The result was a daily consumption of maps greater than for any other operation since Third U.S. Army became operational.

The rapid advance of adjacent armies made liaison with adjoining Armies' Topographic Sections a matter requiring careful coordination in the exchange of kodalines, color pulls and printed stocks. In order to satisfy the enormous consumption of maps used during the month, it was necessary to utilize to the utmost all available reproduction facilities. Corps topographic companies used approximately 90% of their reproduction facilities to augment that of the Army Topographic Battalion in the reproduction of operational maps.

An additional phase in the reproduction program consisted in the initial printing of Third U.S. Army After Action Report. Since operational demands upon Army reproduction facilities did not permit full scale diversion to this report, it was necessary to farm out a portion of the work to two outside units.

V - INTELLIGENCE

During the month the rapid and ever-changing tactical front necessitated a more extensive coverage of intelligence data with respect to the topography, roads and rivers of Germany. With the exception of a study of the area in the vicinity of ST. GOAR (L-9873), data on the RHINE River was procured, prepared and distributed during a preceding month. However, a special assault crossing study was prepared and given to the Corps Engineer concerned.

A road and bridge study covering the general area from BONN (P-5537) on the north, to NEUNKIRCHEN (O-5983) on the south, to MERGEN-THIEB (M-4801) on the east, and to FULDA (H-2718) on the north, was prepared and distributed to corps, divisions and Army units. Additional publications such as the ISTD "Topography, Road and Bridge Studies" to cover the area from the German border east to WURZBURG (N-5925) and north to KASSEL (C-2203); "Terrain Appreciation Central Germany - Part A and B; "Terrain Diagrams of West Central Germany" and "Detailed Description of Crossing over the MAIN River" were issued to all interested units.

Such miscellaneous studies as the "Railways of Germany and Quar-

ries in Germany," were also distributed.

During the month Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 3 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletins No. 5 and No. 6 were produced and issued to corps, divisions and engineer units.

New engineer units coming in the Army area were given all available data and also booklets and posters on enemy mines and booby traps.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued to devote its time to the gathering of information on enemy engineer equipment of all types and the dissemination of such information as was deemed necessary to the engineer troops in Third U.S. Army. Also new items of interest which were desired by the Engineer Board at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, were located and subsequently forwarded to the Office of the Chief Engineer, Communications Zone, for shipment to the United States. Among these items were new type trestle pontoons, new large type schu mines, wooden anti-tank mines, German pontoons and a small German water pump. To keep up with the tactical situation, the unit moved to a forward command post in the city of TRIER (L-2129, Germany). From this point the unit broke up into small parties of three men each to explore installations and enemy dumps in and around that city. No new items of enemy engineer equipment were found; however, some quantities of equipment which were in short supply for training purposes were located and sent to the rear areas. Among these were Topfmine igniters, Riegel mines, Schu mines and light panzer mines.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

During the month Army troops operated thirty-one water points and four water distributing points, in addition to corps and divisional water points. These water points produced approximately 4,218,000 gallons of water during this period. Seven mobile units and sixteen portable units were used for producing water. Twenty-eight 700-gallon tankers and four 1,500 gallon trailers were used for hauling water to installations and six 1,500 gallon trailers were used for storage at installations. The ever-increasing number of prisoners of war and displaced persons greatly increased the amount of water hauled. Action was taken in getting municipal water systems to operate in sections of cities in which Army installations were located. This not only provided sufficient water for sanitary purposes but also reduced the amount of water to be hauled.

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

During the month the second in a series of camouflage posters, designed to awaken an interest in, and consciousness of, the need for camouflage, was distributed.

The first platoon inspected the bridge crossing over the RHINE at MAINZ (M-3856) during its early period of operation. Smoke screens were effectively used to conceal the bridge and concentration of approaching traffic. Additional operations of this platoon included the discovery in ALSFELD (H-0840), Germany of approximately 7,500 rolls of German camouflage grass-garnished chicken wire, colored in dark green and brown. The rolls were approximately three feet wide and thirty feet long, and are not considered useful, as the material is of the type that is normally used to conceal permanent installations and there is a sufficient supply of American materials on hand. The platoon further assisted units of XX Corps in inspection and assistance in camouflage problems.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army units remained attached to Quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class II installations to provide immediate protection. In addition, they assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and rail-head installations and hospitals, and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone did not furnish any immediate protection for Army installations during the month.

Fire protection for LUXEMBOURG (P-8413) and vicinity continued to be furnished by the Luxembourg City Fire Department and the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Utilities Detachment of this headquarters. The latter unit furnished protection for Third U.S. Army forward command post, while the 1240th Fire Fighting Platoon's fire truck unit located at gasoline supply point No. 94 in TRIER (L-2129) furnished protection for the rear command post in TRIER (L-2129) during the latter part of the month. No major fires occurred during the month.

CHAPTER II APRIL OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

At the beginning of this period, the VIII Corps was supported by the 1126th Engineer Combat Group, which unit was, in turn, supported by the 1125th Engineer Combat Group; the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment was in support of XX Corps; the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment was in support of XII Corps, and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continued coordinating hauling activities and delivery and operation of Naval LCVF's and LCM's in the RHINE River operations.

Agreement was made with Advance Section Communications Zone for their troops to take over designated routes of communications west of the line MAYEN (L-6392)-SIMMERN (L-8555)-OBERSTEDT (L-7123) effective 3 April. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 36 was published on 1 April establishing new areas of responsibility to be effective 3 April and placing the 1125th Engineer Combat Group in support of the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment in support of the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment.

On 3 April the 658th Engineer Light Equipment Company reverted to Third U.S. Army from Seventh U.S. Army and was attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group. Effective the same date the 1258th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from XX Corps and attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group and the 1252d Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from VIII Corps and attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group.

Effective 4 April the 995th and 1010th Engineer Treadway Bridge Companies were interchanged between the VIII and XII Corps. Naval Unit N-2 was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and was attached to the 1123d Engineer Combat Group. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 37 was published on the same date.

On 7 April the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and was attached to the 1123d Engineer Combat Group to support its mission of maintenance of the RHINE River bridges. The 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to the XX Corps.

Effective 9 April the 995th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company and the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were interchanged between the VIII and XX Corps. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 38 was published on 9 April. The 1125th Engineer Combat Group was placed behind XX Corps, relieving the 1126th Engineer Combat Group of the dual mission of supporting both XX and VIII Corps and the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment was placed in support of the 1126th Engineer Combat Group.

On 14 April the 183d Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and attached to the 1126th Engineer Combat Group in support of the VIII Corps. On 16 April the 1369th Engineer Dump Truck Company and the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were detached from VIII Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to assist in hauling.

On 17 April Third U.S. Army was assigned a new zone of action, necessitating regrouping of troops. The VIII Corps and supporting troops reverted to First U.S. Army effective 22 April and took over the area of the XX Corps. The XX Corps was crossed over both VIII and XII Corps and turned south, and the III Corps and supporting troops reverted from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army and placed on the right flank. Engineer troops supporting VIII Corps, consisting of the 1102d and 1107th Engineer Combat Groups, the 35th, 44th, 159th, 168th, 188th and 243d Engineer Combat Battalions, the 511th and 527th Engineer Light Ponton Companies, the 628th Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 997th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, the 665th Engineer Topographic Company and the 2893rd Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Combat) reverted to First U.S. Army and Engineer troops supporting III Corps, consisting of the 1111th and 1159th Engineer Combat Groups, 51st, 284th, 291st, 299th, 300th and 1262d Engineer Combat Battalions, 72d and 548th Engineer Light Ponton Companies, 629th Engineer Light Equipment Company, 998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, 672d Engineer Topographic Company and 2942d Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Combat) reverted from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army. The 249th Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and assigned the mission of maintaining the RHINE River bridges and removing tactical RHINE River bridges. Engineer Operational Instruction No. 39 was published on 17 April effecting the transfers referred to above.

On 19 April Naval Unit N-2 was detached from the 1123d Engineer

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Combat Group and attached to the 249th Engineer Combat Battalion.

Effective 20 April the 1126th Engineer Combat Group was interchanged with the 1152d Engineer Combat Group. Also, the 525th Engineer Light Ponton Company arrived from the port of LE HAVRE (L-4827) and was attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. Effective 23 April the 528th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to III Corps, and the 548th Engineer Light Ponton Company was detached from III Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. On 21 April the 991st Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was detached from the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached to III Corps to support its operations. On 22 April the 974th Engineer Maintenance Company was detached from VIII Corps and attached to III Corps.

Effective 24 April the 678th Engineer Light Equipment Company reported from Ninth U.S. Army and was attached to the 1123d Engineer Combat Group.

On 25 April the 1482d Engineer Maintenance Company arrived from the port of LE HAVRE (L-4827) and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. On 25 April Engineer Operational Instruction No. 40 was published establishing new areas of responsibility.

On 29 April the 183d Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and transferred to Fifteenth U.S. Army. On 29 April Engineer Operational Instruction No. 41 was published.

Disposition of Engineer units on 30 April was as indicated below:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| III CORPS | IX CORPS (contd) |
| 1111th Engr C Gp | 1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr |
| 1159th Engr C Gp | Cam Bn |
| 51st Engr C Bn | 2898th Engr TIT (C) |
| 281st Engr C Bn | ARMY |
| 291st Engr C Bn | 1123d Engr C Gp |
| 299th Engr C Bn | 1125th Engr C Gp |
| 300th Engr C Bn | 1134th Engr C Gp |
| 1262d Engr C Bn | 1152d Engr C Gp |
| 72d Engr L Pon Co | 1301st Engr GS Regt |
| 525th Engr L Pon Co | 1302d Engr GS Regt |
| 629th Engr L Equip Co | 1306th Engr GS Regt |
| 672d Engr Top Co | 145th Engr C Bn |
| 974th Engr Maint Co | 178th Engr C Bn |
| 991st Engr Trdw Br Co | 249th Engr C Bn |
| 998th Engr Trdw Br Co | 264th Engr C Bn |
| 2d Plat, Co A, 602d Engr | 287th Engr C Bn |
| Cam Bn | 293d Engr C Bn |
| 2942d Engr TIT (C) | 1252d Engr C Bn |
| XII CORPS | 1258th Engr C Bn |
| 1135th Engr C Gp | 1266th Engr C Bn |
| 1137th Engr C Gp | 1270th Engr C Bn |
| 133d Engr C Bn | 1700th Engr C Bn |
| 150th Engr C Bn | 609th Engr L Equip Co |
| 166th Engr C Bn | 658th Engr L Equip Co |
| 204th Engr C Bn | 676th Engr L Equip Co |
| 282d Engr C Bn | 678th Engr L Equip Co |
| 285th Engr C Bn | 2727th Engr L Equip Co |
| 613th Engr L Equip Co | 2728th Engr L Equip Co |
| 981st Engr Maint Co | 1012th Engr Trdw Br Co |
| 996th Engr Trdw Br Co | 548th Engr L Pon Co |
| 1010th Engr Trdw Br Co | 976th Engr Maint Co |
| 528th Engr L Pon Co | 1482d Engr Maint Co |
| 537th Engr L Pon Co | 572d Engr Dp Trk Co |
| 88th Engr Hv Pon Bn | 764th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| 679d Engr Top Co | 770th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| 4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr | 1354th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| Cam Bn | 1366th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| 2949th Engr TIT (C) | 1367th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| XX CORPS | 1369th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| 1126th Engr C Gp | 1535th Engr Dp Trk Co |
| 1139th Engr C Gp | 87th Engr Hv Pon Bn |
| 1154th Engr C Gp | 551st Engr Hv Pon Bn |
| 135th Engr C Bn | 553d Engr Hv Pon Bn |
| 160th Engr C Bn | 459th Engr Depot Co |
| 179th Engr C Bn | 2d Plat, 729th Engr Depot Co |
| 204th Engr C Bn | 652d Engr Top Bn |
| 245th Engr C Bn | Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn |
| 281st Engr C Bn | 1511th Engr WS Co |
| 623d Engr L Equip Co | 1512th Engr WS Co |
| 961st Engr Maint Co | 1239th Engr Firefighting Plat |
| 993d Engr Trdw Br Co | 1240th Engr Firefighting Plat |
| 995th Engr Trdw Br Co | 1681st Engr Surv in Team |
| 509th Engr L Pon Co | 1092d Engr Util Det |
| 513th Engr L Pon Co | Naval Unit N-2 |
| 664th Engr Top Co | 2890th Engr Tech Int Team (Research) |
| | 1407th Engr Slt Maint Det |

Effective 23 April, the 551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion closed into the Third U.S. Army area from Ninth U.S. Army and was attached to 1134th Engineer Combat Group.

II - CONSTRUCTION





Bridges and Roads

During April the bridging constructed by Third U.S. Army averaged nearly 1,500 feet per day, as is shown in the following table:


Type	Number	Length
Fixed Bailey Bridges	132	13,090
Floating Bailey Bridges	3	5,540
Heavy Ponton Bridges	3	430
Infantry Support Bridges	4	660
Fixed Treadway Bridges	83	4,620
Floating Treadway Bridges	23	6,624
Timber Trestle Bridges	146	13,706
Total	394	44,670
Daily average	13	1,489

Initially, the greater part of the bridging consisted in completing two fixed bridges across the RHINE and in providing passages over or around the numerous damaged overpasses and underpasses on the FRANKFURT (M-6860-DRESDEN, F-2090) Autobahn, since for the first half of the month this road was literally the backbone of the Army.


Most of the obstructions were individually inconsequential. They could either be by-passed or could quickly be spanned with a Bailey bridge. A few small floating bridges were required on the FULDA, WERRA, SAALE and ELSTER Rivers. But aside from a costly fire fight on the WERRA River, the crossings were accomplished rather easily and with dispatch. A contributory factor was that all of the streams were low at that time and nearly all were fordable. In the following photographs are shown representative bridges constructed during this period:



Four Views of Fixed Bridge Taken during Construction on Site of Demolished Highway Bridge at MAINZ (M-3856). This Bridge was Completed in Twenty Days.



Two Aerial Views of the Fixed Bridge across the Rhine River at OPPENHEIM (M-4439). This bridge was completed in Twelve Days.



Double Treadway Bridges over Saale River South of Jena



Treadway Bridge over Elster River at Zeitz, Germany



Bailey Bridge over Elster River at Zeitz

An interesting bridge encountered at this time was the bridge on the Autobahn JENA (J-7066) which is shown in the photo below. This bridge was over 1,000 feet long across the valley of the SULE River and, as can be seen, the Germans went to extraordinary pains to protect it by camouflage.



Camouflaged Bridge on Autobahn over the Sule River


In mid April, when the axis of advance was changed and the Army headed to the southeast into a region of greater rivers, major stream crossings were again encountered.

The first of these larger rivers, the Danube, was successfully assaulted by both the III and XX Corps in finely executed operations. In fact, so swiftly were the crossings exploited that the next major river in their path, the ISAR, 30 miles to the south, was reached and crossed before the Germans could bring any effective resistance to bear in its defense.


In the following photographs are shown some of the principal tactical bridges on these streams:




Treadway Bridge over Danube River at Regensburg



Bailey Bridge over Danube River at Regensburg



Treadway Bridge over Danube River at Ingolstadt



Treadway Bridge over Isar River at Plattling

In addition to the major crossings mentioned above, crossings of the NAAB and REGEN Rivers were also major operations. Since, however, the crossings were only lightly opposed, the construction of bridges involved no real problem.

The policy of replacing treadway bridges with Bailey bridges and Bailey bridges with permanent bridges was again followed. The Engineers were sorely pressed at times to provide permanent structures to replace the tactical bridges as quickly as needed. The change of direction of the Army, the large requirements for assault equipment in crossing the DANUBE River, and the very long distances involved between the main Army supply depots and the forward dumps made supply a difficult problem. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that bridging rolled some 200 miles from the dump to the construction site, it was always on time.

In addition to the previously described two fixed bridges and tactical bridges constructed across the RHINE River by units under Army control, sixty-one fixed timber bridges were constructed totaling 7,000 feet.

On the Autobahn highway east of BAYREUTH (O-7757) a two-way timber bridge, 120 feet long, was constructed, using Bailey bridge panels as steel truss stringers because of the shortage of steel I-beams for stringers. A special report has been prepared covering this unusual project, as illustrated by the pictures below.



View of Autobahn Bridge East of Bayreuth showing Roadway of Completed Bridge



View of Autobahn Bridge East of Bayreuth Showing Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers



View of Autobahn Bridge East of Bayreuth Showing Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers

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View of Autobahn Bridges East of Bayreuth Showing Close-Up View of Bailey Bridge Panel Stringers and Timber Bent Pier



View of Overpass under Construction Using V-Trestle Piers near Waldrach




View of Overpass under Construction Using V-Trestle Piers near Waldrach




View of Completed Bridge on N-40 West of Frankfurt




View of Strengthening Bridge in Hof




Bridge Under Construction at Eschwege



Bridge Being Completed in Hof




View of 330-foot Fixed Bailey Bridge Constructed on Autobahn near Leina



Fixed Timber Bridge Being Constructed under Bailey Bridge near Gelnhausen



Completed View of Fixed Timber Bridge Constructed near Gelnhausen



View of 392-foot Fixed Timber Bridge under Construction at Bingen on N-9




View of Bailey Bridge in Place at Kulmbach

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View of Fixed Timber Bridge Being Constructed under Bailey Bridge at Kulmbach



Picture Showing Method of Strengthening Damaged Autobahn Bridge with Cribs

With improved weather conditions and the rapidly moving tactical situation, road maintenance became an item of secondary importance during this period. The roads in the FRANKFURT (M-6868)-JENA (J-7066) axis area were generally in very good condition. The autobahn highway paralleling the army axis consisted of two twenty-eight foot concrete lanes, by-passing all towns and villages. The few major bridges that were demolished on this highway were by-passed by constructing detours. This arterial highway carried over eighty percent of the Army traffic.

Roads in the new area on the change of direction of attack were generally narrow with many traffic restrictions in the villages. Road maintenance consisted principally of filling craters, constructing by-passes around major demolished bridges, and eliminating traffic restrictions, such as narrow archways and buildings.

III - SUPPLY

The enormous job of moving Engineer bridging materials forward for the RHINE River bridges was completed by 5 April. Because of adequate quantities of fixed bridging materials being available locally, it was not necessary to move this material from the rear. However, the supply problem was by no means solved, since the Army moved out rapidly from the RHINE bridgehead. Thus, it required large quantities of both Bailey and treadway bridging to be moved forward to Engineer depots servicing the corps. The majority of this material was obtained from dismantled RHINE River floating bridges which had been replaced with fixed bridges.

A sudden shift of the Army axis from east to southeast disrupted the smooth flow of supply to the corps. However, bridging was immediately diverted to the new Army Depot No. 39, in the vicinity of NURNBERG (O-4200) and, with the services of additional truck transportation, uninterrupted supply of bridging was furnished the corps. In addition to Bailey and treadway bridges, it became necessary again to assemble large quantities of assault river crossing materials for the crossing of the DANUBE, ISAR, and INN Rivers. Immediate steps were taken to move forward light floating equipage from rear dumps on the RHINE River and from railheads by trucks.

Truck-mounted cranes and bridge construction trucks remained in short supply throughout the month. Crane requirements remained high because of the tremendous quantity of bridging being handled and also because many Third U.S. Army cranes had seen more than a year's continuous service and had to be evacuated to base shops for complete overhaul. Bridge construction truck requirements exceeded available supply for the same reason and also because rapid armored advances always caused high treadway bridge truck losses. At the end of the month, the total T/E shortages of these trucks had reached forty-two.

Because of the rapid advance of the Army, and urgent need to use all highway transportation to move tactical bridging, the bulk of Engineer Class II depot supplies remained on rail cars throughout the month. This did not delay the advance in any way because many captured enemy supplies were available to the troops all along the line of advance. Several emergency shipments of water supply chemicals were made by Advance Section Communications Zone in time to avert a shortage of these important items.

Depot stocks of both treadway and Bailey bridging reached low levels during the month and it was only by rapid replacement of tactical bridging with semi-permanent fixed bridging that Bailey and treadway were made available in sufficient quantities to support stream-crossing operations.

No demands were made on the Army depot for road repair equipment or materials. All requirements for barbed wire and concertina for prisoner of war enclosures were filled from captured enemy stocks. Many small captured German generators were issued as substitutes to fill T/O & E shortages of 1 1/2 KW and 3 KW sizes not available from Advance Section Communications Zone depots.

The only tactical lumber issued from the Army depot during the month was used in the construction of a fixed bridge across the RHINE River at MAINZ (M-3856) and amounted to 300,000 board feet. An additional 2,860,000 board feet, used in the construction of all other fixed bridging, was obtained locally from captured stocks.

Captured enemy dumps reported were turned over to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group. A general inventory was made and if the material was of any use to Army, guards were posted until all of the supplies were issued to Army units or removed to the Engineer depot. The dump was then turned over to Advance Section Communications Zone for further disposition. The following captured Engineer supplies were found to be of extreme value to the Army during the month:

Tactical lumber, EFM	2,860,000
Steel I-beams, all sizes (tons)	5,321
Generators, 3 to 15 KW (each)	150
Rope, manila (ft)	50,000
Rope, steel (ft)	75,000
Electrical supplies:	
Lamps (each)	5,000
Sockets and plugs (each)	3,000
Wire, copper (ft)	30,000

Rail shipments of engineer supplies from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone to Third U.S. Army and inter-depot shipments were held at railheads in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U-8786), France, due to higher priority for movement of Class I, III, and V supplies. By the end of the month, this backlog had been moved up to the railhead at MAINZ (M-3856). First shipments were received at the railhead at WURZBURG (M-5935), Germany on 25 April. This point was used as a transfer point from rail to truck. Bridging was given first priority in movement forward by rail.

Practically all movement of supplies within the Army area during the month was by truck, using the facilities of the following units attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group:

87th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
 553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
 1700th Engineer Combat Battalion
 293d Engineer Combat Battalion
 548th Engineer Light Ponton Company
 770th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 1367th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 1369th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 1366th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 1535th Engineer Dump Truck Company
 3909th Quartermaster Truck Company
 3999th Quartermaster Truck Company
 3988th Quartermaster Truck Company


During the month these units transported 15,140 tons of engineer supplies.

Engineer maintenance was featured this month by the large number of cranes and shovels requiring third and fourth echelon maintenance. Several cranes were evacuated to base shops. The supply of spare parts was adequate. The rapid displacement of units and maintenance facilities forward hindered, to a certain extent, smooth maintenance operation.


The 976th Engineer Maintenance Company fabricated a heavy machine shop, made from captured pieces of machinery. This equipment was found very useful in making critically short equipment parts.

During the month all contracts in France and Luxembourg were completed. Arrangements were made with several of the firms to store fabricated material in their plants. This material could not be carried forward because of transportation difficulties. A list of this material was to be forwarded to Advance Section Communications Zone along with a request that they pick them up.

Procurement in Germany was limited. To date only four requisition receipts were processed.




View of Fixed Timber Bridge under Construction Across the Werra River at Wartha



View of Completed Bridge across the Werra River at Wartha

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Heavy Shop Developed by 976th Engineer Maintenance Company

IV - MAPS

The photomapping facilities of the Army Topographic Battalion were engaged in miscellaneous revision and color separation work. Gazetteers compiled on the 1/100,000 scale GSGS 4416 series covering Sheets N-3, P-3, Q-3, R-3, P-4, Q-4 and R-4 were completed.

The remaining forty-five sheets of the 1/25,000 scale topographic maps in the color separation project were completed. This separation included the forestry and drainage.

Emergency road maps were prepared from captured German road maps at a scale of 1/300,000. Roads were numbered and marginal information changed to conform with existing policies in utilizing these maps. This project consisted of six sheets.

The Army Survey Center investigated approximately twenty reported survey targets. Assistance was furnished to the Houghton team in exploiting the targets which contained trig and map data. A system of cooperation was worked out between the Army Survey Center, the OSS Survey Target Team and the Houghton team, so that duplication of effort was eliminated.

Some valuable photomapping instruments were discovered and exploited. One officer from this unit spent four days getting this equipment ready for shipment to the United States.

Consumption of maps continued at a high rate. Army reproduction facilities were augmented by the Corps Topographic Companies who used approximately 50% of their facilities. Reproduction was further augmented by the Topographic Battalion assigned to Fifteenth U.S. Army, which unit ran nine 1/50,000 scale maps, for a total of 62,000 copies.

Approximately 300 different sheets of the 1/25,000 scale maps were reproduced for a total of 1,553,000 copies. Nine sheets of the emergency road map were reproduced for a total of 304,000 copies. Seventy-eight sheets of the 1/50,000 scale maps were run for a total of approximately 947,000 copies.

Total maps received during the month were 4,815,275; issued to Army units, 210,995; to corps units, 2,219,525; stock in depot at end of month, 2,838,400 sheets.

On 5 April a new program was outlined for the reproduction of the 1/50,000 Bavarian series for pending operations to the southeast. During the month, map depots were moved as follows:

Third U.S. Army Map Depot from MAINZ (M-3856) to GOTHA (J-1865) on 18 April and from GOTHA (J-1865) to BAMBERG (O-2549) on 22-24 April.

Communications Zone Advance Map Depot from TRIER (L-2129) to MAINZ (M-3856) on 5 April.

Arrangements were made on 19 April with Sixth U.S. Army Group for transferring to Third U.S. Army large stocks of 1/50,000 and 1/100,000 maps covering the eastern half of Bavaria.

V - INTELLIGENCE

A change in the tactical advance of Third U.S. Army necessitated a complete re-issue of Engineer intelligence data to Corps Engineers and to Army Engineer units.

Information on the terrain and topography in the Army area of advance was furnished by the distribution of studies such as the "Terrain Appreciation of Southeastern Germany," covering an area bounded on the west by a line PREMICH (W-6292)-STEDHEIM (S-7113); on the north by a line PREMICH (W-6292)-ADOLF (K-2201); on the east the Czechoslovakian and Austrian border; and on the south the frontier between Austrian Tirol Mountains and the Bavarian Alps; "Topography of Austria," and a terrain map of Western Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Information on crossing sites and bridges on the FULDA, SAALE, FRANKISCHE REZAT, SCHWABISCHE REZAT, REGWITZ, FEHRTITZ, DANUBE, ISAR and INN Rivers was furnished to all interested units. Also information on the rivers in Western Czechoslovakia and rivers and bridges in Austria was supplied to Corps Engineers.

In addition to the above-mentioned studies, a combined road and river study, "Southeastern Germany," was prepared and given a wide distribution throughout the Army.

Such miscellaneous studies as the "Topography of the Redoubt Area," and "Rapid Airfield Construction in Western Czechoslovakia and Austria," were also distributed.

During the month Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 4 and Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 7 were produced and issued to corps, divisions and engineer units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued its normal operational activities of reporting on new types of enemy engineer equipment encountered during the period, and the examination of pertinent enemy installations, including dumps, assembly plants, factories, etc.

Two new items of great interest were picked up by corps teams and forwarded to the team for research and dissemination, one being the new Topmine "B" and the other a completely new type of delay igniter. This igniter is a five-minute delay igniter which can be set to detonate from one to five minutes after the pin has been removed.

Numerous factories were investigated and reports were subsequently made to the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations. This unit also attempted to keep all headquarters informed as to the location of usable engineer supplies. Many large quantities were encountered and reported.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

Potable water was delivered to camps and enclosures containing many thousands of Allied prisoners of war, displaced persons and enemy prisoners of war, in addition to other installations. This additional load on water production and transportation, together with equipment tied up temporarily in other Army areas occasioned by the shifting zones of action, resulted in all available water production and equipment being utilized to the fullest extent. Sufficient mobile production units were not available; therefore, portable units using two filters or two portable units with one unit using two filters were used at a water point to meet the demand and operate within the allowable filter rate of 10 gallons per minute for portable unit filters. Fifty 350 gallon water tanks were located and placed in Allied prisoner of war camps and prisoner of war enclosures for storage. Platforms were constructed and 3,000 gallon canvas tanks placed thereon were also used for storage facilities in these installations.

During the month Army troops operated forty-five water points and ten water distributing points. These water points produced approximately 5,676,000 gallons of water during the month. A total of eight mobile units and twenty-six portable units were used for producing water. Thirty-nine 700 gallon tankers and fourteen 1,500 gallon trailers were used for hauling water to installations.



Three Views of Water Supply to Prisoner of War Enclosures

VII - CAMOUFLAGE

The mission of the Army Camouflage Company was to support the operation through the assistance, technical advice, and execution of camouflage missions in the Third U.S. Army sector. The first, second, and fourth platoons continued in support of the corps to which they were attached. The chief concern was supply, which suffered greatly because of the rapid movement and long supply lines. Camouflage materials were relocated at Engineer Depot No. 39, where two enlisted men continued to handle records and stocks of camouflage supplies. Materials remained in short supply, large quantities being in transit from rear dumps.

Two German camouflage installations were inspected. On 5 April a former partially concealed airport approximately five miles west of FRANKFURT (M-6868) was inspected, and on 12 April a dummy airfield near WALTERHAUSEN (J-O560) was inspected. This installation was a very good example of German camouflage. It was located in a steeply sloping ground.

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in the vicinity of WALTERHAUSEN (J-0560). It was constructed to draw the attention and fire of Allied planes and possibly to divert them from a real field nearby.

The oval track area was a noticeable area from the air because of its shape and position near the highway. Inside the track was an area that looked suitable for landing planes. To accentuate this dummy field two dummy bombers and three dummy ME 109's were placed along the edges and out in full view. One bomber with a wing missing was on the edge of the woods. In the hangar area a great variety of dummy effects were constructed. To create a realistic effect, there were several dummy 20mm AA guns and one real bomb shelter or dugout. Also, there were nine ME 109's and three bombers, giving the illusion that they were being repaired.

Piles of 500-pound bombs lay partially in the open and camouflaged along the hedges, but enough in view to be seen. Some of these bombs were still crated. They sounded hollow, but may have contained charges or incendiaries. There were two areas of shallow pits dug. There were also many piles of brush coated with tar that might appear from the air as trucks, carts or more piles of ammunition.

The hangars were merely outlined by lines of brush placed upright about six feet high. Near each angle in the outline was placed a box containing an incendiary which was wired on a circuit and could fire the hangar by remote control at the right moment. Several of the bombs were wired in on the same circuits. There were also several light reflectors which may have served to help the effect at night.

The third in a series of camouflage posters, designed to awaken an interest in and a consciousness of the need for camouflage, was distributed on 15 April. The posters were distributed to include companies.

VIII - FIRE DEFENSE

Army units remained attached to quartermaster gas supply companies operating Class III installations to provide immediate protection. In addition, they assisted in setting up fire defense at Class V and railroad installations and hospitals, and were available on call to give assistance throughout the Army area.

Advance Section Communications Zone furnished protection to rear Army Class III installations as forward Class III installations required forward movement of Army fire fighting units.

Fire protection for the Army forward command post was furnished by the fire truck unit attached to the 1092d Utilities Detachment of this headquarters and protection for the rear command post was furnished with a captured German fire truck kept with the 1239th and 1240th Fire Fighting Platoon Headquarters, which units remained in the vicinity of Army rear command post.

One major fire occurred during the month when a vehicle collided with filled gasoline cans on 1 April at Class III supply point No. 106, located in the vicinity of EMBELSHAUSEN (L-8773). Approximately 20,000 gallons of gasoline were lost out of about 200,000 gallons at the installation.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

I - OPERATIONS

At the beginning of this, the final period of the War with Germany, the major disposition of engineer troops remained unchanged with the 1123rd Engineer Combat Group in support of III Corps and, in turn, supported by the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment; the 1125th Engineer Combat Group in support of XX Corps and, in turn, supported by the 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment; the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment in support of XII Corps and, in turn, supported by the 1152d Engineer Combat Group; and the 1134th Engineer Combat Group continuing its coordination of hauling activities, salvaging of tactical bridging and special tasks. III Corps on the right flank was pushing rapidly to the south, with XX Corps in the center pushing to the southeast, confronted with the ISAR and INN Rivers in its immediate zone, and the XII Corps on the left flank pushing eastward into Austria.

Effective 1 May the 1024th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company closed into Third U.S. Army from First U.S. Army. To support the contemplated crossing of the DANUBE River at PASSAU (Q-2213) by the XII Corps, this unit was attached to XII Corps. In addition one engineer combat battalion of the 1152d Engineer Combat Group was placed in direct support; the 1123d Engineer Combat Group furnished one hundred 22 horse-power outboard motor operators and the 1301st Engineer General Service Regiment furnished one officer and trained personnel to provide technical assistance in construction of booms to assist in the XII Corps operation. On the same date, Naval Unit N-2 was detached from the 249th Engineer Combat Battalion and reverted to the control of Twelfth Fleet, Ports and Bases, France.

On 2 May the 551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion was attached to XX Corps and the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company was temporarily attached to the same corps to support its operations on the ISAR River.

On 3 May the 86th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, which had closed into Third U.S. Army area from First U.S. Army on 2 May, was also attached to XX Corps to support its operations.

Effective 5 May the 551st Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion and the 1012th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company were detached from the XX Corps and attached to the 1134th Engineer Combat Group to support its depot hauling activities. On the same date V Corps came under control of Third U.S. Army with its supporting corps engineer troops consisting of the 1121st and 1171st Engineer Combat Groups, the 20th, 112th, 146th, 254th and 1340th Engineer Combat Battalions, the 501st and 502d Engineer Light Ponton Companies, the 610th Engineer Light Equipment Company, the 990th and 994th Engineer Treadway Bridge Companies, the 668th Engineer Topographic Company and the 2891st Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Combat).

On 6 May the 1152d Engineer Combat Group was relieved of support to the 1303d Engineer General Service Regiment and was placed in support of V Corps within its zone of operation. The 1123d Engineer Combat Group and the 1125th Engineer Combat Group were relieved of their mission of supporting the III Corps and the XX Corps, respectively, and were assigned the mission of reconnaissance for the construction of prisoner of war enclosures and housing within their zones. The 1301st and 1306th Engineer General Service Regiments, supporting these two groups, took over the work projects of the 1123d Engineer Combat Group and the 1125th Engineer Combat Group.

Effective 7 May the 249th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to the 1125th Engineer Combat Group. The 249th Engineer Combat Battalion continued its mission of maintenance of the RHINE River bridges with one company.

Complete disposition of troops as of 082400B May was as follows:

III CORPS

1111th Engr C Gp
1159th Engr C Gp
51st Engr C Bn
284th Engr C Bn
291st Engr C Bn
299th Engr C Bn
300th Engr C Bn
1262d Engr C Bn
72d Engr L Pon Co
525th Engr L Pon Co
629th Engr L Equip Co
991st Engr Trdw Br Co
998th Engr Trdw Br Co
974th Engr Maint Co
672d Engr Top Co
2d Flat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2942d Engr TIT (C)

V CORPS

1121st Engr C Gp
1171st Engr C Gp
20th Engr C Bn
112th Engr C Bn
146th Engr C Bn
254th Engr C Bn
1340th Engr C Bn
501st Engr L Pon Co
502d Engr L Pon Co
610th Engr L Equip Co
990th Engr Trdw Br Co
994th Engr Trdw Br Co
668th Engr Top Co
2891st Engr TIT (C)

XII CORPS

1135th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn
150th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
285th Engr C Bn
#88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
528th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
613th Engr L Equip Co
996th Engr Trdw Br Co
1010th Engr Trdw Br Co
1024th Engr Trdw Br Co
981st Engr Maint Co
673d Engr Top Co
4th Flat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2949th Engr TIT (C)

XX CORPS

1126th Engr C Gp
1139th Engr C Gp
1154th Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
245th Engr C Bn
281st Engr C Bn
86th Engr Hv Pon Bn
509th Engr L Pon Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
623d Engr L Equip Co
993d Engr Trdw Br Co

XX CORPS (contd)

995th Engr Trdw Br Co
961st Engr Maint Co
664th Engr Top Co
1st Flat, Co A, 602d Engr Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

ARMY

1123d Engr C Gp
1125th Engr C Gp
1134th Engr C Gp
1152d Engr C Gp
1301st Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
145th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
219th Engr C Bn
264th Engr C Bn
287th Engr C Bn
293d Engr C Bn
1252d Engr C Bn
1258th Engr C Bn
1266th Engr C Bn
1270th Engr C Bn
1700th Engr C Bn
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
551st Engr Hv Pon Bn
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
518th Engr L Pon Co
609th Engr L Equip Co

ARMY (contd)

658th Engr L Equip Co
676th Engr L Equip Co
678th Engr L Equip Co
2727th Engr L Equip Co
2728th Engr L Equip Co
527th Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
1366th Engr Dp Trk Co
1367th Engr Dp Trk Co
1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
1535th Engr Dp Trk Co
1012th Engr Trdw Br Co
976th Engr Maint Co
1482d Engr Maint Co
652d Engr Top Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
2d Flat, 729th Engr Depot Co
1511th Engr WS Co
1512th Engr WS Co
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
1239th Engr FF Plat
1240th Engr FF Plat
2890th Engr TIT (R)
1092d Engr Util Det
1681st Engr Surv Ln Team
1407th Engr Slt Maint Det

#1st Flat, Co A, attached
XX Corps


II - CONSTRUCTION

During the last eight historic days of hostilities with Germany, tactical bridging operations by Third U.S. Army engineers continued at an extremely high rate. Although the assault crossings and tactical bridging operations were not resisted with the intense opposition that marked the crossings of the MOSELLE and the SAAR, the number and magnitude of the last crossings were as great as those during any comparable period. The enemy, in a last, futile, unavailing effort to stop a force that had smashed him back across a hundred previous rivers continued to destroy bridges to the last.

During the period 1 through 8 May, the following bridging was accomplished:

Type	Number	Length
Fixed Bailey Bridges	29	3,220
Heavy Ponton Bridges	2	1,185
Fixed Treadway Bridges	39	1,404
Floating Treadway Bridges	5	1,968
Timber Bridges	35	2,835
Total	110	10,612

The situation at the beginning of the month found both III and XX Corps partially across the ISAR River in southern Bavaria. To further support this advance, additional bridges were constructed at DINGOLFINZ (U-5114), LANDAU (U-6521), and MOOSBURG (Z-1194), as shown in the following photographs:



Treadway Bridge over the ISAR River at Dingolfins




Treadway Bridge across Isar River at Landau.




Treadway Bridge over Isar River at Moosburg

Thereafter, with one more big river to cross, the III and XX Corps speedily pushed on to the INN River, a formidable river 400 to 700 feet wide, for which plans for a major assault crossing were made. Fortunately, however, the speed of the advance had demoralized resistance and passages were possible over existing structures in each corps, a bridge being captured by III Corps and two dams by the XX Corps. Again bridges were quickly put in at PASSAU (Q-2213), SCHARDING (Q-2100), and BRAUNAU (Z-9377) and the march to the south continued by XX Corps alone, since III Corps had reached its final river to cross.




Heavy Ponton Bridge over Inn River at Passau

XX Corps pressed rapidly toward LINZ (V-8787), Austria, capturing most of the bridges over the TRAUN River intact on the way. At LINZ (V-8787) the existing highway bridge over the DANUBE shown in the photograph below was captured, though credit for this went to XII Corps which, abreast of XX Corps, had raced down the east bank of the DANUBE River to arrive at LINZ (V-8787) just before XX Corps. Also, while on the way, the heavy ponton bridge shown in the photograph below was put in over the DANUBE River at PASSAU (Q-2213) by XII Corps.




Highway Bridge over the Danube River at Linz




Heavy Ponton Bridge across the Danube River at Passau

From LINZ (V-8787) onward both corps pressed southeastward with but little hindrance from destroyed bridging until on 8 May, with XX Corps already partially across the ENNI River, the word of final victory halted tactical bridging operations of Third U.S. Army in the Battle of Germany.

The major fixed bridge construction included bridges across the DANUBE, ISAR, and INN Rivers. Fixed timber bridges were under construction across the DANUBE River on the Autobahn highway at INGOLSTADT (T-7125), on N-16 at VOHREBURG (I-8526), on N-8 and 15 at REGENSBURG, on N-11 at DEGGENDORF (U-8339), and on N-12 at PASSAU (Q-2213). The existing highway bridge across the DANUBE River at LINZ (V-8787) was captured intact. Construction was also begun on fixed timber bridges across the ISAR River at PLATTLING (U-7733) on N-8, at LANDSHUT (U-2505) on N-11, at MOOSBURG (Z-1194), and across the INN River at SCHARDING (Q-2100).



Bridge over Danube River in Linz Captured Intact



Bridge across the Inn River at Scharding. Bailey bridge across demolished spans.



Bridge across Danube River at Deggenndorf under construction



Bridge across the Danube River at Passau under construction

During this period a 200-foot fixed timber bridge was completed on the Autobahn highway south of NURNBERG (O-4300). Piers on this two-way bridge averaged fifty feet in height.

Road maintenance, which included asphalt patching, leveling and surfacing craters, and drainage improvement, was inaugurated to preserve the existing surfaced arterial highways. Prior to this time the movement of the Army was so rapid that very little attention could be devoted to this work, since the major task was constructing fixed timber bridges to improve traffic circulation and relieve tactical bridging for operations ahead.

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Other Construction

With the ever-increasing throngs of prisoners of war surrendering, and the inability of Communications Zone to remove them from the Army area as rapidly as before, because of the long distances to be covered and the huge numbers of prisoners to be transported, the problem of holding and providing for prisoners of war became a "must" mission of high priority.

Accordingly, Army engineer and corps engineer troops were called upon to construct enclosures to hold about 300,000 prisoners. Though the prisoners themselves were used to a maximum on the work, the mechanics of getting materials from local sources and providing water, lights and provisions for sanitary facilities required a considerable amount of engineer work and troops.

By this time it became known that Army and corps would eventually have several hundred thousand--possibly a million or more--prisoners of war on hand; consequently, a planning board to coordinate the setting up of permanent camps was established by the Engineer Section so that by 8 May Phase III of World War II, involving the Occupation of Germany and the provision for housing and making use of prisoners of war, was under way from the standpoint of the Engineers.

III - SUPPLY

Supplying forward bridge dumps with tactical bridging and assault equipment, and building up depot stocks of Class II, IV and bridging at Depot No. 39 were the major functions of the Supply Subsection during this period.

Ten new truck-mounted cranes were received from Advance Section Communications Zone in time to alleviate the critical shortage of this item. Total Table of Equipment shortage of Brockway bridge construction trucks remained at approximately forty vehicles.

Depot stocks of Bailey bridge, trestle bridge, and assault equipment, although low, were adequate to support the advance. There were no demands on the Army depot for tactical lumber.

Listed below is pertinent information on Army depots in operation during 1 May through 8 May:

Depot No.	Location	Type Supplies	Average Tonnage
39	Furth, Germany	II, IV and Bridging	5,000
43	Amberg, Germany	IV and Bridging	300
44	Chamu, Germany	IV and Bridging	350
45	Greding, Germany	IV and Bridging	200
46	Straubing, Germany	IV and Bridging	200
47	Mooseburg, Germany	IV and Bridging	200

Guards were posted on New Congress Hall, NURNBERG (O-4300), and an inventory taken on engineer supplies. Units under Army were guarding and inventoring dumps throughout the area.

The engineer railhead was moved from WURZBURG (N-5935) to FURTH (O-3602), where rail cars could be unloaded directly in the Army depot. Initial receipts were light, but increased materially as soon as requirements for higher priority materials had been met. Movement of supplies into forward dumps was handled by the 1134th Engineer Combat Group and attached units.

Engineer maintenance facilities were greatly increased by the addition of the 1482d Engineer Maintenance Company. This unit operated close to the Army depot and performed third and fourth echelon work, in addition to servicing captured enemy equipment, such as generators. Spare parts supply remained adequate.

IV - MAPS

The Army Survey Center investigated seven reported survey targets. A few of these targets yielded information on maps and survey data which were all turned over to the Houghton team. Two targets contained photogrammetric and survey instruments which were hauled to the rear through map distribution channels and turned over to the Houghton team.

Control was furnished for three different radar stations. As there were no existing trig lists for these areas based on the theater grid, it was necessary to use captured German data and convert the rectangular coordinates from German Gauss-Kruger to Nord de Guerre coordinates.

A revision program consisting of twenty-six sheets of the Bavarian 1/50,000 scale maps was assigned to Third U.S. Army by Twelfth Army Group. Photographs were secured and work was begun on this project.

A project was initiated to produce 1/50,000 scale maps of Bavaria with the political boundaries overprinted thereon. This entailed transposition of the boundaries from existing smaller scale maps onto the 1/50,000 scale maps. The facilities available limited the speed of this project and therefore no completion date was set.

Arrangements were made for town plan compilation of occupational area. G-2 listed the towns for which town plans were desired. G-5 and all corps were requested to aid in securing reproducible copies of these towns to be used as a basis for reproduction. The reproduction and consumption of operational maps abated somewhat. Pertinent statistics on maps received and issued during the period are listed below:

Total maps received during the period:

Scale	Tons	Sheets
1/25,000	0.0	- 0 -
1/100,000	11.7	233,950
1/50,000	26.3	525,500
1/200,000	6.0	120,750
Miscellaneous	1.7	34,440
Total	45.7	914,640

Scale	Tons	Sheets
<u>Issued to Army Units:</u>		
1/25,000	0.0	- 0 -
1/50,000	2.9	59,042
1/100,000	1.8	36,340
1/200,000	1.2	24,051
Miscellaneous	0.7	12,874
Total	6.6	132,307

Scale	Tons	Sheets
<u>Issued to Corps Units:</u>		
1/25,000	0.0	- 0 -
1/50,000	9.6	193,000
1/100,000	9.7	194,050
1/200,000	2.9	57,100
Miscellaneous	1.5	29,729
Total	23.7	473,879

Stock in depot - 9 May

1/25,000	22.1	530,400
1/50,000	40.4	808,000
1/100,000	42.2	844,000
1/200,000	11.1	222,000
Miscellaneous	19.2	384,000
Total	135.0	2,788,400

Three charts showing the reproduction and consumption of maps by Third U.S. Army since becoming operational on 1 August are shown in Annex No. 10. It is interesting to note the cycles of map consumption in relation to the tactical situation.

V - INTELLIGENCE


Studies on the Topography of Bavaria and Austria, Roads of Austria and Bridges of Austria were distributed to interested units.

Engineer Intelligence Bulletin No. 8 was produced and issued to Corps, Divisions and all Engineer units.

The 2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team continued to examine enemy engineer dumps and factories for the recovery of material necessary for technical research. An enemy Goliath Demolition tank was examined and a report rendered to higher headquarters.

VI - WATER SUPPLY

Because of the enormous numbers of displaced persons and prisoners of war in the Army area, it became necessary to supplement the water haulage facilities of the two water supply companies with improvised equipment. For this purpose, 2 1/2-ton trucks were mounted with captured German tanks and fitted with pumps. All available water production equipment was utilized to its fullest extent during this period. Platforms with 3,000-gallon canvas storage tanks were placed in prisoner of war enclosures.



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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

I. TROOP LIST.

For the type of operations encountered in this theater, the following list of Engineer troops is considered ideal for Field Army:

A. Troops attached to each Corps:

- (1) Two Engineer Combat Groups, each consisting of:
Engineer Group Headquarters
Three Engineer Combat Battalions
One Engineer Light Equipment Company
One Engineer Dump Truck Company
- (2) One Engineer Maintenance Company.
- (3) One Engineer Topographic Company.
- (4) Two Engineer Light Ponton Companies, loaded with fixed Bailey bridge.
- (5) One Engineer Treadway Bridge Company per each Armored Division of Corps, plus one additional Engineer Treadway Bridge Company per Corps, to provide bridging for Infantry divisions.

B. Troops assigned to Army:

- (1) One Engineer Combat Group directly in support of each front line Corps, each Engineer Group consisting of:
Engineer Group Headquarters
Three Engineer Combat Battalions
One Engineer Light Equipment Company
One Engineer Dump Truck Company
- (2) One Engineer General Service Regiment directly in support of each Army Engineer Combat Group in support of front line Corps. To each regiment should be attached one Engineer Light Equipment Company and one Engineer Dump Truck Company.
- (3) Two Engineer Maintenance Companies.
- (4) One Engineer Topographic Battalion.
- (5) One Engineer Depot Company.
- (6) Two Engineer Water Supply Companies.
- (7) Four Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions.
- (8) One Company of Engineer Camouflage Battalion.
- (9) Four Engineer Fire Fighting Platoons.
- (10) One Engineer Utilities Detachment.
- (11) One Engineer Survey Liaison Team.
- (12) An urgent need was found for an Engineer Service Group which can handle and coordinate Army supplies and their transportation.
- (13) One Engineer Forestry Company.
- (14) One Gas Generating Unit.

II. ENGINEER OPERATIONS.

A. Simplicity of Orders.

- (1) Attachment, detachment and movement orders issued by Army to Army Engineer troops were made simple and concise, usually by telephone or through liaison officer and confirmed by simple field message. Attachment and detachment orders were subsequently confirmed through command channels.

- (2) Instructions for Engineer work were best given by overlay, assigning areas of responsibility and containing instructions in five-paragraph field order form. Specific tasks were given by written job orders with priority of work indicated.

B. Sequence of Bridging.

- (1) Bridging operations best adapted to support a rapidly advancing Army are in the following sequence:
 1. Construction of floating treadway or heavy ponton bridges immediately following the initial assault crossing.
 2. Construction of fixed Bailey bridge to replace floating bridge which in turn can be moved forward to support future operations.
 3. Replace Bailey bridge with a two-way Class 40, one-way Class 70 fixed timber bridge. Bailey bridge is then removed and hauled forward to corps bridge dump.

C. Major River Crossings.

- (1) In making major river crossings, such as the MOSELLE or RHINE, corps should be assigned the task and necessary troops attached to accomplish the mission. Prior to the crossing, selected troops should be given special training in the erection of anti-barge booms and anti-personnel nets and booms.
- (2) When practical, especially during a rainy season, gaging stations should be established upstream of crossing sites to warn of impending rises. Reports on possible flooding should be available before the assault crossing is made, as well as for subsequent usage.
- (3) Supply of assault and bridging material is the most critical factor in all crossing operations. Because of the bulk of this type equipment, the moving of it is a time-consuming task, and it is imperative that, once a river crossing becomes imminent, every effort be immediately started to move the required equipment to the vicinity of the proposed crossing. Supplies should be based on providing a 100% reserve in assault boats and other items of assault equipment. Reserves of bridging can be smaller, but on strongly resisted crossings, losses up to 50% can be expected. The number of crossings made per stream is variable, but for planning, material to support a division crossing every ten miles of stream length should be provided.
- (4) In executing assault crossings, secret crossings, i.e., those made without artillery preparation, were, in general, more successful than those made with preparations.
- (5) Paddled assault boats, even in swift rivers, are the most suitable craft for crossing the assault troops. The noise of the motors in powered craft attracts the attention of the enemy and nearly always draws fire. Powered craft have been used successfully for feints, and can be used once small arms fire has been cleared from the crossing site; they are extremely valuable for evacuating wounded and for supply.
- (6) Naval craft LCVP's and LCM's are invaluable as a crossing means on major rivers 600 or more feet wide. The volume of troops and supplies that can be transported by them is far greater than that which can be supplied by any other practical means until a bridge is built. However, unless very close coordination is established between them and the traffic control authorities in charge of the crossing, much valuable transport time will be wasted waiting for loads.
- (7) Smoke is an invaluable adjunct in river crossings, but must be employed to screen a large area surrounding the exact crossing site to be most effective.

- (8) Before bridge construction is started, houses and other possible observation posts within sight of the crossing site must be definitely cleared of enemy observers.

- (9) "Shellrep" teams are valuable at bridging sites so that counter-battery artillery fire may be quickly employed.

D. Bridging.

- (1) Treadway bridges are the preferred tactical bridges because of their speed of erection, slight maintenance requirements, load capacity and ability to withstand swift currents. However, aggressive, intelligent traffic control is necessary to assure the complete utilization of the capacity of this type of floating bridge.
- (2) The Heavy Ponton bridge has a slightly higher traffic capacity than the treadway bridge, but because of the transportation required, the lower load capacity and its inability to take heavy loads in swift currents, it is definitely not the equal of the treadway bridge.
- (3) The floating Bailey bridge has a higher traffic and load capacity than the treadway bridge, but because of the transportation required and the time required for construction, it is not regarded as being as suitable a tactical bridge as the treadway, but is regarded as being a very desirable replacement bridge for the treadway.

III. SUPPLY.

Supply activities required the augmentation of the Engineer supply installations with an Engineer Combat Group to coordinate depot haulage. It was also necessary to utilize the hauling facilities of two or three Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions and several Dump Truck and Light Ponton Companies. To obviate utilizing combat engineer units on service functions, an Engineer service organization is urgently needed. Such an organization should consist of an Engineer Service Group Headquarters with attached transportation units equipped to haul Engineer depot stocks, and Engineer Service Companies for the operation of railheads, dumps, etc.

The present Depot Company T/O & E should be revised to include one more depot platoon and at least ten crane operating teams.

IV. MAPS.

Experience gained in operations on the Continent has proved that map supply and distribution can be adequately and efficiently accomplished within Army for either a fluid or static situation through the medium of an Army Map Depot, one Corps Map Depot for each Corps, and one Division Map Depot for each Division. To properly operate the Army Map Depot, it is recommended that the Map Storage and Distribution Section of the Headquarters and Service Company for an Engineer Topographic Battalion (Army) be increased. It is likewise recommended that a Map Storage and Distribution Section be added to the Engineer Topographic Company (Corps). Adequate personnel are available in the Engineer Combat Battalion of the Division to operate the Division Map Depot. By having the Army and Corps Map Depot personnel as part of the respective Army or Corps Topographic unit, overhead personnel for administration and messing can be absorbed by the parent unit. Furthermore, the parent unit provides a reserve of personnel and transportation during peak activities so characteristic of mapping during the more rapid advances of mobile warfare. Normally, all technical branches of the topographic units, survey, photomapping and reproduction, are not operating full capacity at all times.



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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

TOP SECRET
AUTH: CG, TUSA
INT: DHT
DATE: 5 Jun 44
TOP SECRET
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS:

This report is an extension of the Strategic Terrain Analysis - N.W. France previously prepared and included as Section I in Target Area Analysis No. 1, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, dated 23 April 1944. The additional area of France included in this study (see sketch No. 1) is bounded on the north by the LOIRE River from NANTES, 0554, to ORLEANS, 6823, and then by a line from ORLEANS, 6823, to PARIS, 0443. The southern boundary of the area is a line from LA ROCHELLE, 3134, to VICHY, 8125, thence to CHALON SUR SAON, 9202. The upper SEINE River south of PARIS, 0443, provides the eastern boundary for the area. (Principal sources of information: STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY NO. 87 - FRANCE TERRAIN INTELLIGENCE by U.S. Geological Survey and STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY NO. 71 - INLAND WATERWAYS OF FRANCE by Office, Corps of Engineers.)


2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA:

a. Drainage System. (See Sketch No. 1)

Practically the entire area is drained by the LOIRE River and its southern tributaries. The only exceptions being the area just southeast of PARIS, which is drained by the SEINE River and its tributaries, and the narrow coastal strip on the west which is drained into the Atlantic Ocean by several small and relatively short rivers.

The major rivers in the area are the LOIRE and the SEINE; however, a number of the tributaries of both these rivers are considered important streams with a mean discharge of over 800 second feet and are probably not fordable except in very dry seasons. Among these are the VIENNE, CREUSE and CHER Rivers, tributaries of the LOIRE River, and the YONNE and LOING River, tributaries of the SEINE. All of the tributaries generally flow in north or northwest direction and several are canalized or bordered by canal. (See Sketch No. 2). The LOIRE is considered navigable for flat bottom (60 to 80 ton capacity) barges from NANTES, 0554, through ORLEANS, 6823, to BRIARE, 3094, and is then bordered by a navigable canal from BRIARE, 3094, to ROANNE, 3418. The VIENNE River is navigable from its confluence with the LOIRE River to CHATELERAULT, 6302, a distance of 51 miles. The CHER River, a portion of which has been canalized, is navigable from VIERZON VILLE, 7947, to its confluence with the LOIRE, a distance of 95 miles. The ALLIERS River is navigable from FONTANNES, 8533, to the LOIRE River, a distance of 153 miles. However, the navigation on this stream is relatively unimportant as the average depth is only 1.3 feet.

SKETCH No. 1 DRAINAGE SYSTEM
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS - FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER



The SEINE River is navigable from its outlet at LA HAVRE to MERY SUR SEINE, 1697, a distance of 350 miles. The YONNE River, a tributary to the SEINE River, is navigable from MONTEBAU, 1818, on the SEINE River to AUXERRE, 9312. The YONNE River also forms a connection for the NIVERNOIS and BOURGOGNE canals with the SEINE River. The principal canal connecting the SEINE and LOIRE Rivers extends in a north-south direction from ST. MAMMES, 3688, on the SEINE River to BRIARE, 3094, on the LOIRE River, a distance of 65 miles. The CENTER Canal, extending from DIJON, 2766, to CHALON SUR SAON, 9202, connects the lateral canal of the LOIRE with the navigable SOANE River which flows southward into the Mediterranean Sea. This canal crosses the divide between the SOANE and LOIRE Rivers and is 72 miles in length. The only other canal of importance in this area is the BOURGOGNE canal which extends from LAROCHE, 1293, on the YONNE River southeasterly through DIJON, 0561, to ST. JEAN DE LOSNE, 2638, on the SOANE River. This canal provides a navigable waterway through the middle of France from the English Channel to the Mediterranean Sea.

Most of the streams in the area flow in level, narrow bottom lands bordered by steep bluffs 30 to 200 feet high. The area south of ORLEANS, 6823, and the area west of CHATEAURoux, 5201, are dotted with lakes and swamps which are partly drained by ditches.

b. Ridge System (See Sketch No. 3)

Within the area under consideration there is no distinct or predominant ridge line pattern. The terrain is generally comprised of broad plains and plateaus, interrupted in places by valleys and rough hilly areas. The low dissected plains of the LOIRE basin rise gradually in the south to merge with the central plateau. This plateau is dissected by the upper courses of the LOIRE tributaries to form broad flat-topped knobs and ridges trending toward the north and northwest. The streams have cut more deeply into the plains surrounding POITIERS, 4779, forming steep sided valleys 30 to 200 feet in height. The relatively high plateau country merges into rough and hilly country in the vicinity of MONTLUÇON, 2049. Broken and hilly terrain also exists east of NEVERS, 6321, in the extreme southeast portion of this area.

c. General Nature of the Terrain

There is no rugged mountainous country within the area under consideration. The altitude increases from about 50 feet in the valley bottom below TOURS, 7667, to about 800 feet in the extreme southeastern part. The terrain generally consists of low dissected plains extending from the LOIRE River Valley, southward approximately 60 miles where they merge into a high plateau area in the southeast. Exceptions to this general topographic pattern are the low marshy areas, south of ORLEANS, 6823, west of CHATEAURoux, 5201, and along the river valleys south of NEVERS, 6321. The coastal strip on the west contains several long beaches but most of these are backed by a low swampy area and are generally forested. All the beaches are exposed to prevailing westerly winds, Atlantic swells and a maximum tide of 17 feet. Principal ports are ST. NAZ-AIRE, 5762, and NANTES, 4554, both of which are situated on the estuary of the LOIRE River. In the LOIRE Basin, which comprises the central portion of the area, the soil is fertile and is cultivated extensively in most parts. The swampy area south of ORLEANS is about half covered by forests and is used principally as pasture land. The dry Champagne Country southeast of PARIS is relatively barren except for scattered forests and is used principally as pasture land. Principal cities are NANTES, 4554, with a population of 195,000, ORLEANS, 6823, and TOURS, 7667, each with a population in excess of 70,000 and PARIS, 0443, the largest city in France and the center of economic life. All the above named cities are located either on the LOIRE or SEINE Rivers, the extreme north boundary of the area under consideration. There are several other relatively important cities scattered throughout the area ranging in population from 20,000 to 40,000. Among these are NIORT, 8451, POITIERS, 4779, CHATEAURoux, 5201, BOURGES, 0432, MONTLUÇON, 2049, VICHY, 8425, and NEVERS, 6321. Each of these cities is a focal point for several of the principal highways.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN:

There is a closely knit, intricate network of roads covering the entire area as shown in Sketch No. 4, attached. Excellent, wide hard surfaced highways connect principal towns, while numerous hard-surfaced secondary roads offer possible alternate routes. Towns are rarely by-passed and are serious obstacles to through traffic because of narrow, irregular streets and closely spaced buildings of stone and masonry. Road blocks are not very effective as there is generally adequate space for detours and many alternate routes. Canalized rivers and canals are easily bridged by ponton and other types of temporary bridges. Tributary streams can be forded in many places during dry seasons, these are also easily bridged. LOIRE River is unfordable during highwater, but can be forded in a number of places during dry seasons. Cross country movement of mechanized equipment is generally unrestricted except south of ORLEANS, 6823, where marshy ground and extensive forest confine movement to roads and a few open areas. In the high plateau area along the southern boundary large forests afford ample concealment for parked vehicles. In addition to the excellent communication facilities afforded by the intricate network of good roads as indicated on Sketch No. 4, attached, there is also an extensive network of railroads throughout the area. Considerable destruction to these lines is anticipated. However, rehabilitation of several of these lines may be accomplished in time to permit their use in support of operations undertaken in this area.


4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES:

Principal terrain features are the marshy areas, the LOIRE River and its north-south system of tributaries. Some of these tributaries flow through narrow bottomlands bordered by steep bluffs from 30 to 200 feet high. The hedge and field line pattern in the agricultural region, the scattered forests throughout the area and the numerous small towns with narrow streets are additional critical terrain features.

DISTRIBUTION

Copies Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 to AC of S, G-2, TUSA.
Copy No. 5 to Engr, TUSA.

TOP SECRET




SKETCH No. 2 - NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS - FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER

Legend
CANALS
..... Main Canals (Min. Depth 8' 6" (2.60 m) Max. 14' 6" (4.45 m))
..... Secondary Canals
RIVERS
——— Main Rivers (Min. Depth 6' 0" (1.83 m) Max. 12' 6" (3.81 m))
——— Secondary Rivers


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SKETCH No.3 - TERRAIN DIAGRAM
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS - FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER



SKETCH No.4 ROAD NETWORK
To Accompany
STRATEGIC TERRAIN ANALYSIS-FRANCE
AREA SOUTH OF LOIRE RIVER



ANNEX NO. 2

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 June 1944

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 22:

RECOVERY AND EXTENSION OF SURVEY CONTROL BY
COMBINED EFFORTS OF ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS

1. REFERENCE

SHAEP Operations Memorandum Number 28, "Artillery and Engineer Survey", dated 25 April 1944.

2. AGENCIES INVOLVED

- a. Topographic Section (Engineer Section, Hq., Third Army).
- b. Army Survey Center (Survey Platoon, Engineer Topographic Battalion).
- c. Survey Information Center (Field Artillery Observation Battalion and Corps Survey Platoon, when attached).

3. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Topographic Section

- (1) Will assemble, evaluate and distribute the trig lists for the Army operational areas.
- (2) Will direct and supervise the activities of the Army Survey Center.
- (3) Will file copies of all new, revised and captured trig lists and lists of coordinates as obtained or produced by army units within this plan.

b. Army Survey Center

- (1) Will be responsible for the recovery and extension of points comprising the major net.
- (2) Will furnish Corps with points with which to start lower order nets.
- (3) Will establish azimuth and furnish to Corps the angles of declination between true azimuth and grid azimuth as required.
- (4) Will act as a reserve to help Corps SIC when necessary
- (5) Will tie in Corps nets where differences exist.
- (6) Will supply control to Artillery units retained under Army control. This may or may not be accomplished together with a FA observation battalion.

c. Survey Information Center

- (1) Will extend lower order survey, from the major net furnished by Army Survey Center, to Corps, Division and Battalion areas.
- (2) The SIC will be in charge of the CO of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The Engineer Survey Platoon (Corps) will be attached to the SIC only as needed. It will be the responsibility of the Corps Engineer to see that its functions are performed in accordance with the general scheme of this plan. It will be the responsibility of the CO, Field Artillery Observation Battalion, that the talent of the Survey Platoon be utilized in the mission set forth in paragraph 3c(1), above, and not used as a check on work done by Artillery personnel.

4. TECHNIQUE

a. The methods used by the Army Survey Center will conform to standard practice for 1:5000 accuracy or better.

- (1) Azimuths should be based on star observations which will be made during daylight whenever possible.
- (2) Computations by machine or logs will be made in the field with final check at headquarters.

b. Corps Survey Information Center

- (1) Triangulation will be carried out by these units whenever possible and will be same order as major net.
- (2) Transit traverse will probably be used in most

circumstances.

The order of traverse should be to an accuracy of 1:5000. This can be accomplished by double reading of the angles, single chaining with stadia checks, and star observations for azimuth.

- (3) With proper training, survey of this order can be obtained with a minimum of personnel.
- (4) Points where accuracy is below 1:5000 should not be furnished to units of Division or higher. However, this will not be construed to mean that points of slightly less accuracy will be withheld from units when there is combat need for them.
- (5) For work from Division to Battalions, control should be held to an accuracy of 1:3000 or better, and usually will consist of lines of transit traverse with either star or sun azimuths. Computations should be sufficiently accurate to maintain instrument accuracy.
- (6) In the event that time permits the establishing of lines from Battalions to gun positions, these can be run with a transit, with distances by stadia, or by graphic plane table methods. The accuracy to be held to 1:750 or higher and computation made by logs or slide rule.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

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ANNEX NO. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

5 June 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 11:

DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL MAPS

1. MAP TABLES. "Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps," inclosed herewith, lists the selection and quantities of operational maps and auxiliary material for initial issue in forthcoming operations. The quantities are based, in general, on map allowance tables in letter, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, 19 May 1944, file AG 061-GNMCB, subject: "Map Supply Policy". The inclosed table will be the basis for all future map requisitions required in operations to D plus 90, inclusive. Auxiliary mapping material listed in columns 14-17, inclusive, will be issued by the Army Engineer as soon as available direct to Corps Headquarters, Divisions, and Army and Corps separate units. All other maps and mapping material will be issued in accordance with instructions below.

2. DISTRIBUTION IN UK FOR BUILD-UP TROOPS. TUSA troops not landing in assault will be issued at a place and time after D-Day specified by the Army Commander all maps shown in columns 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 13 of inclosed tables, in addition to those maps listed in column 7 for Corps headquarters and divisions. These maps will be issued in the following manner:

a. Under supervision of the Army Engineer, personnel of the map storage and distribution platoon of the Army Topographic Battalion will draw bulk maps from an ETOUSA map depot for Army Headquarters and Army separate units, break down bulk stock to unit loads, and distribute "over the counter" to all Army separate units. To accomplish this, the Army Engineer will -

- (1) Submit to ETOUSA requisitions covering above bulk order forwarding copy to the Army Topographic Battalion.
- (2) Furnish the Army Topographic Battalion the necessary information for breaking down bulk stocks to unit loads.
- (3) Notify all Army separate unit commanders when and where to draw their bulk maps.

b. Under supervision of the Corps Engineer, Corps map depot personnel will draw bulk maps from an ETOUSA map depot for Corps Headquarters and Corps separate units (to include Army separate units attached to XX and XII Corps for movement to continent), break down bulk stocks to unit loads and distribute "over the counter" to all Corps separate units. To accomplish this, the Army Engineer will -

- (1) Submit to ETOUSA requisitions covering above bulk order forwarding copy to the Corps Engineer.
- (2) Notify the Corps Engineer when and where to draw his bulk maps.

c. Under supervision of the Division Engineer, the Division map depot personnel will draw bulk maps from an ETOUSA map depot for Division Headquarters and Divisional units, break down bulk stocks to unit loads, and distribute "over the counter" to all divisional units. To accomplish this, the Army Engineer will -

- (1) Submit to ETOUSA requisitions covering above bulk order forwarding copy through the Corps Engineer to the Division Engineer.
- (2) Notify the Corps Engineer when and where the Division Engineer is to draw his bulk maps.

3. DISTRIBUTION IN UK FOR ASSAULT TROOPS. TUSA troops landing in assault will be issued at a place and time after D-Day as specified in the order moving the unit to the concentration area all maps shown in inclosed table necessary for the assault. This will normally include those maps listed in columns 2-10, inclusive, 12, 13, and any special maps that may be available.

a. Requisitions.

(1) The Engineer of the Corps assigned an assault mission will immediately furnish the Army Engineer a list tabulating all Divisions and Corps separate units in the assault and the sheet number of maps, scale 1/100,000 and larger, required by each tabulated unit for the assault.

b. Distribution. All maps and auxiliary mapping material will be drawn from ETOUSA map depots as follows:

- (1) Officer representative of Army Engineer draws for Army Headquarters.
- (2) Officer representative of Corps Engineer draws for Corps Headquarters.
- (3) Officer representative of Division Engineer draws for the Division.
- (4) Unit S-2 draws for Army or Corps separate units.

4. SECURITY. An officer drawing operational maps in the UK, either for build-up or assault troops, will be required to identify himself to the officer in charge of the ETOUSA map depot by showing his AG identification card and a copy of the unit's requisition. Lacking details from higher headquarters, the unit loads for Army and Corps separate units and Divisional units will be classified Top Secret-Bigot and handled as such. Security responsibility is charged to commanders responsible for the unit breakdowns. No unit bundle will be broken for organizational use until the unit is in an area under rigid security control through which these maps and the information they contain cannot leak. The Marshalling Area or a ship from which NO debarkation will take place except in a similarly controlled area are cited as examples. In addition to the security precaution outlined above, the map rolls will not be opened and rearranged until briefing is about to take place.

5. DISTRIBUTION OF MAPS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

a. Army separate units will requisition direct to the Army map depot for "over the counter" delivery.

b. Corps separate units will requisition direct to the Corps map depot for "over the counter" delivery.

c. Division Engineer will submit consolidated requisitions to the Corps Engineer. These maps will be delivered in bulk by the Corps depot personnel to the Division depot.

d. Units mapped in the UK as build-up troops upon arrival on the continent will receive their initial issue of topographic maps, scale 1/100,000 and 1/50,000, without requisition, by "over the counter" delivery from their respective Army or Corps map depot. Army Engineer and Corps Engineer will inform their respective depots in advance sheet numbers of these maps required by newly arrived divisions and separate units for "over the counter" delivery.

e. Special issue maps, columns 9, 10, 11, and 12, will be issued to build-up troops upon arrival on the continent in accordance with procedure outlined in paragraphs 5a, b, and c.

f. Corps depot will be made operational on the continent upon arrival of the first organic Corps unit unless arriving in assault. Pending establishment of Army map depot, the Communications Zone advance map depot for Third U.S. Army will be functioning as an Army map depot.

6. LATE ARRIVAL ARMY UNITS. Army units arriving in the UK after Headquarters Third U.S. Army closes in the UK and opens in the continent, will be mapped in the UK in accordance with this Operations Memorandum by the Corps to which the unit is attached for movement to the continent.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AG of S, G-3.

1 Incl

Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps. (Not reproduced here. See revised tables Inclosure to Third U.S. Army Circular No. 70 19 October 1944.)

DISTRIBUTION:

"A" & "C"

Information copies to:

- 2 - CG, FUSAG
- 2 - CG, ETOUSA
- 2 - CG, COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
(Attn: Capt Noah, FECZ)

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ANNEX NO. 4

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

17 April 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 2:

TRAINING OF ENGINEER UNITS

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this directive is to furnish a guide to Engineer units so that the maximum utilization of the remaining time will be made for training.

2. OBJECTIVE: The objective of the training in the UK is to bring the units up to the standards which will enable them to perform their primary missions in an efficient manner.

3. SCOPE: a. Engineer units have completed basic, unit, and in most cases combined training in the United States. Further training should perfect the unit performances of the company, battalion and group in the various engineer operations.

b. All engineer units will attain the proficiency requirements as indicated in Training Bulletin No. 12, Hq ETO OCE, 15 February 1944.

c. Priority of proficiency requirements of divisional or corps engineers will be prescribed by the appropriate commander.

d. Army combat battalions will attain highest proficiency in the following priority:

- (1) Roads: Training in construction and maintenance of roads normal to missions of army engineer units will include: repair and maintenance of all types of existing hard surfaced roads, the construction of beach exit roads, by-passes, and the widening of roads. Training will stress maximum use of mechanical equipment and utilization of captured equipment and materials. Basis of training standards will be Chapter 1, FM 5-10.
- (2) Military Bridges: Training will consist of actual construction of the various types of bridges in the following priority: (a) Fixed Bailey (b) Floating Bailey (c) Treadway (d) 25-ton Pontoon (e) Fixed Timber (f) M-3 Pneumatic Pontoon. All officers will be trained to estimate bridge capacities using the British Classification System. See ETOUSA Operations Memorandum No. 7, dated 5 March 1943, as amended by G1, 14 May 1943 and C2, 27 May 1943.
- (3) Mine Warfare: Training will be in compliance with TM No. 9, Hq ETOUSA, 28 March 1944.

e. Army engineer units other than combat Battalions will become proficient in the specialty peculiar to the unit. Training will

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be scheduled so that the unit working parties will be attached whenever practicable to other units for operations applicable to their speciality. All units will be trained in the location and neutralization of enemy mines.

f. Engineer Reconnaissance: All officers and senior NCO's will be trained to conduct general engineer reconnaissance. Emphasis will be placed on road, bridge and material reconnaissance. Reference Chapter 3, FM 5-6.

g. Training programs will be prepared so as to incorporate appropriate subjects to meet the standards of the following publications:

ETOUSA TRAINING MEMORANDA

TM - 4	23 February 1943	Lessons from North Africa
TM - 18	29 June 1943	Training for Staff and Communications Personnel
TM - 25	7 August 1943	Conduct of Field Exercises
TM - 38	6 November 1943	Training
TM - 42	23 December 1943	Defense Against Chemicals in Combat
TM - 43	27 December 1943	Bomb Reconnaissance
TM - 44	29 December 1943	Aircraft Recognition Training
TM - 9	28 March 1944	Mines, Minefields, Booby Traps and Demolitions

h. Training will be conducted where possible in the form of field exercises under tactical conditions. Map reading, concealment and camouflage training will be incorporated into all training as well as being treated as separate subjects. Camouflage discipline will be continually stressed. Prevailing weather will not alter training programs. A minimum of 10 percent of training time will be scheduled at night. At least two replacements will be trained as operators of technical equipment.

4. GROUP RESPONSIBILITY: a. The Group Commander is responsible for the training of all units of his group and will coordinate training activities as follows:

- (1) Closely supervise all training within the group.
- (2) Schedule combined training exercises between subordinate units.
- (3) Coordinate the use of all special training aids and training sites available to the group.
- (4) Approve monthly training programs for compliance with this memorandum and directives of higher headquarters.
- (5) Allocate school quotas which will become available to the group.
- (6) Conduct training inspections and tests.

b. The Group Commander will establish necessary facilities and/or schools for the training of all communication personnel of the group and subordinate units.

5. SCHOOLS: a. Schools will be used to the fullest extent to train instructors within units and to provide qualified personnel for key positions. Officers and men who have graduated as instructors will be used to conduct training within their own units so that the greatest advantage will be obtained from the instruction that has been given to them. Special effort will be made to provide alternate personnel capable of filling key positions.

b. Corps, divisions and separate army units down to include battalions will provide their own unit schools as far as possible when a need for such instruction exists. If there are no competent instructors available within units, this headquarters will be notified so that the necessary instructors may be trained at existing schools. If the need for a school is acute and no instructors are available within the unit concerned, this headquarters will endeavor to assign instructors necessary to conduct the school.

6. TRAINING TESTS AND INSPECTIONS: a. At the conclusion of various phases of training, tests will be conducted by the unit commander for the purpose of determining proficiency.

- (1) Practical Work: A report will be rendered through engineer channels showing performance of the unit in the training as to type, quantity, rate, and quality.

(2) Written and oral tests will be given to determine individual qualifications.

b. Unit commanders will conduct training inspections a minimum of once weekly. These inspections will stress condition of individual equipment, vehicles, weapons and tools, as well as small unit efficiency.

c. Frequent inspections will be made by the Third Army Engineer and by the group headquarters. These inspections will be coordinated with the training tests and will stress the following:

- (1) Organization of training and/or work.
- (2) Combined tactical and technical training.
- (3) Officer and NCO leadership.
- (4) Use of training aids.
- (5) General condition of mess, barracks, latrines, and CP.
- (6) Condition of individual equipment, vehicles, weapons and tools.
- (7) Interest and enthusiasm of personnel.

7. REPORTS: Formal regular training reports are not contemplated. All unit commanders must realize the importance of and develop the habit of immediately reporting all changes of status which affect their unit's operational ability.

8. PUBLICATIONS: Requests for engineer publications will be made in accordance with the policy set forth in Circular 30, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 18 March 1944. All units and echelons are cautioned to review carefully all requests for publications. The need must be genuine and limited to actual useful requirements. The building up and maintenance of extensive libraries by engineer units is impractical and to be discouraged, particularly inasmuch as large quantities must be "jettisoned" prior to operations. Every effort will be made, however, to furnish pertinent information to interested units. It will be kept in mind that many of the publications which received widespread distribution in the United States are available only in limited quantities in this theater. When publications are pertinent only for infrequent references, the rule will be to borrow it from a higher echelon rather than place an unnecessary strain on critical shipping facilities (applicable to publications sent from the United States) or an unwarranted burden on reproduction facilities in this theater.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Engr, TUSA	5

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ANNEX NO. 5

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

12 June 1944.

PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE:

NUMBER 4:

ACQUISITION OF REAL ESTATE

1. DEFINITION

The term "real estate" as used herein, includes land, buildings, piers, docks and wharves; office and storage space, rights-of-way, or easements; billets, and any interests which may be acquired or held therein, together with such personal property as is taken and used in connection with the real property on which personal property is located.

2. REFERENCES

This Procurement Directive is based upon ETO Procurement Regulations, Headquarters ETO, U.S. Army, AG 400.12 dated 1 April 1944, (ETO SOP No. 10) and ETO Procedure for Acquisition of Real Estate, Headquarters ETO, U.S. Army, AG 601 dated 1 May 1944, (ETO SOP No. 37).

3. BILLETING

a. If a permanent Town Major is stationed in a locality, the Commanding Officer of the troops to be billeted will apply to the Town Major for the location of billets to be occupied. The Town Major will designate billets and will keep the necessary records thereof and make payment therefor.

b. If there is no Town Major in the locality, the Commanding Officer of the troops to be billeted will designate an officer from his command as Acting Town Major. The Acting Town Major will:

- (1) Apply to the Mayor for a list of available billets. When the Mayor of acting head of the local government does not supply information, the Acting Town Major will take such other steps as may be necessary to obtain such lists.
- (2) Assign billets as requested.
- (3) Keep a record of billets and of the time occupied.
- (4) Once a week, or earlier if the billets are surrendered, prepare a billeting distribution list in triplicate on forms prescribed for this purpose by the Chief Engineer, ETO. An initial supply of these forms will be furnished to units by Army. Additional supply may be obtained by requisition on Army Engineer through normal Engineer channels.
- (5) Certify the correctness of the lists, and obtain the stamp or signature of the Mayor attesting their correctness.
- (6) If a Purchasing and Contracting Officer is present, have him prepare and certify a local procurement voucher (FD ETO No. 1) and attach a copy of the billeting distribution list to the original and duplicate of the procurement voucher. The Mayor or local head of government should be paid for all billets. Payment should not be made directly to the inhabitants of a locality except when there is no recognized head of local government acting.
- (7) Obtain payment of the local procurement voucher by any authorized disbursing officer in the vicinity, or forward to the Engineer, Third Army, if there is no disbursing officer in the vicinity.
- (8) If a Purchasing and Contracting Officer is not present, send the certified billeting distribution lists, in triplicate, to the Engineer, Third Army.
- (9) When made available, prescribed billeting rates will be incorporated in subsequent Procurement Directives published by this headquarters.

4. REAL ESTATE

a. Under the provisions of paragraph 4, ETO - SOP No. 37, it is the policy of this command to acquire the use of real estate by requisitioning except in the case of real estate owned by an enemy state and real estate in the combat zone which has been vacated on account of existing or imminent combat, which will be seized without formality beyond actual seizure, occupation or use within the limitations prescribed by ETO Procurement Regulations and Procurement Directive No. 3, this headquarters.

b. Commanding Officers desiring the use of real estate will apply therefor to the Town Major or, if there is no Town Major, to the Division, Corps or Army Engineer having authority in the area.

c. Where immediate use of real estate is necessary and there is no Town Major or other Engineer representative available, the Commanding Officer of the troops or service concerned may requisition its use, provided such action has first been approved by a General Officer in immediate command of such troops or service in the field or his authorized representative or by higher authority. Where possession is necessary and there is no opportunity for securing approval by a General Officer or his authorized representative, the Commanding Officer

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concerned may act on his own initiative. In such case he will make immediate report of his action and of the circumstances to the Division, Corps or Army Engineer having authority in the area, or where there is no such Engineer in the area to the Engineer, Third Army, through channels.

- d. (1) Requisition receipt, GFA ETO Form No. 6 will be used for requisitioning.
- (2) The original of the receipt will be sent to the Engineer, Third Army.
- (3) The duplicate of the receipt will be given to the owner.
- (4) The triplicate of the receipt will be retained by the requisitioning officer.

e. The requisitioning officer will cause a survey of the premises to be made upon entry thereon, and have the survey signed in duplicate by the owner or his representative, or by the Mayor or other public official, and by the officer making the survey. A copy of the survey will be given the owner or his representative and a copy will be forwarded to the Engineer, Third Army, with the original of the requisition receipt.

f. When the premises are surrendered, a similar inspection of premises will be made and forwarded to the Engineer, Third Army, unless the owner shall in writing acknowledge return of the premises without damage. Such acknowledgment, if given, will be forwarded to the Engineer, Third Army.

5. PROCEDURE FOR PURCHASING AND CONTRACTING OFFICERS

It is desired that each headquarters appointing Purchasing and Contracting Officers consolidate reports and records called for in Section VII of SOP No. 37 and forward them to the Engineer, Third Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 6

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 June 1944.

PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 6

HIRING OF CIVILIAN LABOR

1. DEFINITION.

Civilian labor as used herein will mean any civilian residents of occupied or liberated countries employed by U.S. Forces.

2. POLICY.

a. Local civilian labor will be utilized to the greatest extent possible consistent with security for such tasks as will be appropriate.

b. In the combat zone, under the jurisdiction of Third U.S. Army, civilians will normally be employed on an emergency basis under authority granted in ETO-SOP No. 29 dated 26 May 1944.

3. AUTHORIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT.

Corps and divisions and all separate units in the Army area are hereby authorized to employ such civilian labor as they require to accomplish their missions. Any questions regarding priority in the hiring of labor will be referred to the Division, Corps or Army Engineer in their respective areas.

4. EMPLOYMENTS—HOW MADE.

Civilians may be procured by any unit from any available source in the area under control of Third U.S. Army. Prospective employees will be offered work at the established rates of pay and told the hours they will be expected to work and other conditions of employment. Those who accept employment under these conditions will be put to work. Those who refuse employment will not be forced to work. No written employment agreement is required. However, should a local employment office be available in the area, all employments will be made through this office, if practicable. Labor will not be procured by contract with a civil agent or labor contractor, or on the basis of a sub-contract, unless specifically authorized by this headquarters. Wages will be paid directly to the individual laborer.

5. HOURS OF SERVICE AND RATES OF PAY.

a. Upon entry into France and until firm official wages are published by this headquarters, it is the responsibility of units procuring and using labor to ascertain from existing local indigenous authorities the local wage rates paid by French (not German) employers immediately prior to entry into the country, and this rate will be the rate paid to all civilian labor in that vicinity. In case it is impracticable to obtain the local wage rates paid by the French immediately prior to our entry into the country, the rates shown in inclosure #1 will be used.

b. An eight-hour day shall constitute a full day's work and forty-eight hours a full week's work. All time over eight hours in a day or forty-eight hours in a seven-day week shall be considered overtime. Time allowed for meals and time required going to and returning from work shall not be counted as time worked. Recourse to overtime work should be avoided except where considered necessary.

c. Labor may be given one supplementary meal per working day at the place of employment. In establishing basic pay where this meal is given, deduction of 10 francs per meal is to be made. For example, if the wage rate is 8 francs per hour and one meal is furnished, the rate per hour will be reduced to 6.75 francs per hour, so that the worker will be paid 54 francs per eight-hour day, plus one meal.

6. ADMINISTRATION.

a. The officer or non-commissioned officer charged with the supervision of the civilian employees will enter each employee's name in a time book. Any kind of pocket note book may be used for that purpose. A book having columns for names, classifications, rates, dates and total earned is preferable. It is anticipated that each laborer will have his individual work book and identification with him. If so, his correct name will be taken from that record. In many cases the kind of work for which an employee is qualified can be determined from his work book. If requested by the employee, his services with the U.S. Forces should be entered in his work book. In doing this, names or numbers of military units should be omitted for security reasons. The date and hour an employee starts work should be entered on the time book. Employees on the job should be checked at least twice during each shift to see that all are present and working. At the end of each shift, the hours worked by each employee will be entered in the time book opposite the employee's name.

b. At the end of each pay period, which will not exceed two weeks, the hours worked by each employee will be totaled on the time book, multiplied by the rate per hour and the total amount earned entered on the time book. Time books should be retained by the unit or installation as permanent records. Payrolls will be made up from the time books, in quadruplicate, on Standard Form 1013. The hiring unit will retain one copy, one copy will be forwarded to the Army Engineer, and the original and one copy will be presented to the Agent Finance Officer who pays the labor (See par 6c). Except as covered in paragraph 6, below, these will be the only records kept. On the original copy of the payroll the signature of the individual employee will appear to indicate receipt of payment. Any employee unable to write will sign the payroll by his mark, which must be witnessed by a commissioned or warrant officer other than the Agent Finance Officer. No advance of pay will be made in any circumstances.

c. Unless other payment arrangements have been made with local Finance Officer, using units will designate an agent officer whose responsibility it will be to procure and disburse funds for the

payment of civilian labor. Such agent officers will anticipate their periodic cash needs and draw funds from their parent disbursing officer. Where circumstances are such that the preparation of a payroll for emergency labor is impracticable, the voucher (Local Procurement Voucher FD ETO Form #1) evidencing payment of such emergency labor need not be supported by a payroll, but in lieu thereof the voucher itself will be countersigned and certified correct by an officer or warrant officer who witnessed the payment other than the paying officer. Agent officers will adopt proper means of identifying labor in which has been employed under emergency conditions and will file, in support of the voucher, such evidence of employment whenever possible. In the absence of any identification slip bearing the signature of the individual, the officer will state on the voucher the means of identification adopted by him. Similarly, in the case of the payment of other labor, when conditions are such that the signature of all of the laborers cannot be obtained, an officer or warrant officer witnessing the payment, other than the paying officer, may sign the payroll as witness in place of the signature of the laborer. In lieu of the individual signatures on Standard Form 1013, there may be annexed to the payroll improvised receipts of any kind so long as they are signed by the payee or a witnessing officer. Isolated individual payment may be evidenced by individual Local Procurement Vouchers, in which case the agent officer will return to his parent disbursing officer the original and duplicate copies, signed by the employee in the two places marked "X".

7. INJURIES.

a. The word "injury" whenever used below shall mean the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injuries sustained while in the performance of his duties, but no compensation shall be paid if the injury or death is caused by the willful misconduct of the employee or by the employee's intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or another, or if intoxication of the injured employee is a proximate cause of the injury or death. Compensation claims will not be denied solely by reason of the fact that the injury or death resulted from enemy action.

b. "Injury Payroll". The term "injury payroll" means a special payroll to be made out in the same manner as the regular civilian employee payrolls on Standard Form 1013. It will only be used in the zone of the Army prior to the establishment of a rear boundary of the Army. Its purpose is to provide compensation for injuries prior to the time claim service is established. It will be plainly marked at the top in all capital letters with the words "INJURY PAYROLL". This injury payroll will be used exclusively for paying civilian employees during the period that they are incapacitated for work by reason of an injury. No individual on it will be paid more than a sum equal to \$116.67 per month, nor for a period of beyond 180 days, unless special written instructions are received in the individual's case from Division or Higher Headquarters. Compensation rates paid will generally be the rates of the country where the employee was hired, as determined from records of indigenous authorities. In general, the compensation rate should be about 50% of the wage rate.

c. ETO Compensation Form 124, "Report of Injury and Claim for Compensation," is a combination report of an injury claim, medical officer's report, and statement of facts. Requisitions for Form 124 will be sent to Engineer, Headquarters Third U.S. Army. It is to be employed for all injuries sustained by civilian employees. This form will be made out in triplicate and held pending the establishment of the rear boundary of the Army, at which time it will be turned over to the Advance Section or Base Section Claims Officer. Thereafter, no injury payroll will be used; but all injuries will be reported at once to the Advance Section or Base Section Claims Office on Form 124.

d. In all cases of injuries to civilian employees requiring more than first aid treatment, medical care or hospitalization will be furnished by the commanding officer. Local doctors or hospitals will be utilized when available in preference to Army facilities.

e. Bills for doctors and hospital services incurred as a result of civilian employee's injuries will be forwarded, together with Form 124 covering the case, to the nearest U.S. Claims Service Office. If Form 124 has previously been forwarded, notation to that effect will be made on the bill. Authorization will be granted only to doctors of hospitals for treatment not extending beyond a period of ten days. In a case where treatment is required beyond a period of ten days, it will be necessary for the commanding officer who hired the civilian to give a new authorization for additional treatment. If the commanding officer originally authorizing treatment has moved from the locality where the injured man is being treated, this authorization may be secured from the commanding officer near the locality, to whom the responsibility of the case had been transferred. The employee's commander will continue to discharge his responsibility in regard to an injured employee regardless of his movements, either by carrying on such responsibilities at his new station or by accomplishing the transfer of

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the necessary record and responsibility to a successive commander near the employee. If Form 124 has been sent to a Base Section Claims Office, the successive commander of the employee receiving the injured employee's case will immediately notify the Base Section Claims Office of the transfer.

f. In all deaths of civilian employees, where the death occurs as a result of injuries on the job, the commanding officer may, when necessary, provide burial. This is applicable where necessity dictates and confers no right or benefit. From 124, Report of Injury, will be made out in all cases of death.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl
Guide to Wage Rates.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"

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GUIDE TO WAGE RATES

1. Rates of pay and grading system for male workers (Figures represent francs per hour)

Grade	Zone 1		Zone 2		Zone 3		Zone 4	
	min	max	min	max	min	max	min	max
1 very skilled	11	15	13	16	14	17	18	22
2 skilled	9	12	11	14	12	15	15	19
3 semi-skilled	8	10	10	12	11	13	13	15
4 unskilled	7	9	8	10	9	11	11	13

2. Rates of pay - grading system for female workers (75% of pay for male workers)

1 very skilled	8	11	10	12	11	14	13	17
2 skilled	7	9	8	11	9	11	11	14
3 semi-skilled	6	8	7	9	8	10	10	12
4 unskilled	5	7	6	8	7	9	8	10

Note: Explanatory notes on schedules:

- Zone 1 - Communities of less than 20,000 persons.
- Zone 2 - Towns and cities of more than 20,000 but less than 100,000 persons.
- Zone 3 - All cities of 100,000 persons and over (except PARIS).
- Zone 4 - Metropolitan PARIS area.

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ANNEX NO. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

23 June 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 21:

FIRE DEFENSE

1. PURPOSE

This directive prescribes the operational fire defense policy

within Third United States Army.

2. FIRE DEFENSE

Fire defense consists of the measures required to prevent the destruction by fire of installations, supplies, equipment and communications essential to the operation whether caused by accident, carelessness or enemy action.

3. RESPONSIBILITY

a. Each unit under direct control of Third United States Army will have a definite fire defense plan suitable for instant employment during active overseas operations and will be responsible for fire defense within their areas. Companies or similar units will provide fire watchers and fire guards.

- (1) Fire watchers will be posted at convenient locations, so that they can see or hear bombs land. They will be equipped with a whistle and will report all incidents.
- (2) Fire guards consisting of three men each, equipped with a stirrup pump (or pump can), two buckets, hand axe and wrecking bar will be provided as required.

b. Corps and Division commanders are responsible for fire defense in their areas.

c. When necessary, assistance to accomplish the mission will be requested from adjacent units, civil fire defense organizations (through Civil Affairs) and from higher echelons.

4. FIRE DEFENSE CONTROL

a. In case of fire, the senior officer or non-commissioned officer present will control all available fire defense measures until arrival of the company commander, fire marshal or fire officer concerned, who will then assume command.

b. Engineer fire fighting sections assigned to the Third United States Army will be under control of this Headquarters (Fire Officer, Engineer Section) and will be employed in fire defense of supply dumps, railheads and communication centers.

5. FIRE REPORTING

a. Any fire which has resulted or may result in affecting the operation will be reported immediately to higher echelons by the most rapid available means, giving unit area, location and brief description and extent of the fire.

b. Reports will be made to the following in order of priority shown:

- (1) Engineer, Third United States Army.
- (2) FAD Control Center, Third United States Army.

c. All other fires will be reported to the officers indicated in paragraph "b" above. Reports will include the cause of fire and damage in addition to information indicated in paragraph "a" above.

6. EQUIPMENT

Class IV fire fighting equipment will be available at Engineer supply dumps and depots.

7. FIRE REGULATIONS

Fire prevention measures contained in paragraph 11, Fire Regulations, Headquarters ETQUSA dated 13 December 1943, and Inclosure No. 1 hereto will be observed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AG of S, G-3

1 Incl:
Copy of Annex "A" to Planning
Guide, OCE Hq ETQUSA, 20 Apr 44.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Inclosure No. 1 to Operations Memorandum No. 21, Hq Third U S Army,
dated 23 June 1944.

Copy of Annex "A" to Planning Guide, OCE, Hq ETQUSA, 20 Apr 44.

FIRE PREVENTION

INTRODUCTION:

The issue of clear Fire Prevention Instructions and advice on the siting of camps, dumps and depots from the fire prevention aspect should be considered in all operational fire defense planning.

PETROL REGULATIONS:

1. Shipment of Packaged Petrol. Petrol should always be shipped in vessels designed or converted for the purpose. Where packaged petrol has to be shipped as part of a mixed cargo, the fire hazard is extremely high. Leakage is inevitable, and all possible precautions must be taken to prevent fires and explosions. The storage of petrol with supplies of a combustible nature, must be avoided.

2. Loading and Discharging Petrol. When loading or discharging petrol, fire fighting appliances should be ready for immediate action during the whole period of the operation. "No Smoking" or "Naked Light" regulations on ships and docks must be rigorously enforced.

3. Jettisoning Fuel. Should the jettisoning of fuel become imperative, no lights, fires or other means of ignition should be allowed within a quarter of a mile or more downstream or leeward and 200 to 300 yards to windward, when low flash fuels are jettisoned. Tidal streams and currents should also be taken into consideration. Jettisoning bunker and diesel oil present no particular fire hazard, provided there is no admixture of vaporising oil.

4. Petrol Carried on Vehicles. Spare cans of petrol should be carried in carriers. Where cans have to be carried within the vehicle, they should be placed so that they can be easily removed should the vehicle or its load catch fire.

5. Filling and Decanting. Carelessness in handling cans when filling petrol tanks must be eliminated. Petrol will not be allowed to spill. Only one can should be opened at a time, the remainder being kept at a safe distance from the filling point. When decanting or draining tanks, each container should be removed to a safe distance from the filling point. When decanting or draining tanks, each container should be removed to a safe distance as soon as it is full.

SITING CAMPS, DUMPS AND DEPOTS.

1. The major problem confronting a Fire Defense Organization, is the supply of sufficient water for fire fighting. Those responsible for the reconnaissance of sites for camps, depots and dumps can ease this problem considerably if the water need is kept in mind.

2. Other conditions permitting, dumps and buildings of a combustible nature should be sited as near available water supply as possible.

3. The importance of dispersal, both of buildings and supply dumps, as a fire prevention measure must always be borne in mind when the selection of a site is being considered.

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ANNEX NO. 8

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

19 October 1944.

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 70)

MAP SUPPLY POLICY

1. GENERAL. Letter, this Headquarters, dated 19 May 1944, file AG 061-GSMCR, subject, "Map Supply Policy", and Operations Memorandum Number 11, this Headquarters, dated 5 June 1944, are rescinded.

2. RESPONSIBILITY. The unit engineer of Army, Corps, and Division is charged with the distribution of military maps under the policy of the unit commander and the supervision of the unit G-2 except such confidential or secret maps that may require special distribution. He will obtain maps not reproduced by himself from the engineer of the next higher unit.

3. DISTRIBUTION.

a. Agencies of Distribution. A map depot for Army, one for each Corps, and one for each Division will accomplish distribution.

- (1) Army Map Depot. Personnel of the map storage and distribution platoon of the Army Topographic Battalion, under the supervision of the Army Engineer, will operate the Army map depot. The duties of personnel of the Army map depot are as follows:
 - (a) Draw bulk stocks of maps from the Communications Zone advance map depot.
 - (b) Break down bulk stocks to Corps loads and deliver to Corps map depots.
 - (c) Operate map depot for "over the counter" delivery of maps to Army separate units.
- (2) Corps Map Depot. Personnel of the Corps map storage and distribution detachment, attached to the Corps Topographic Company and supervised by the Corps Engineer, will operate the Corps map depot. The duties of personnel of the Corps map depot are as follows:
 - (a) Break down bulk stocks received from the Army map depot to Division loads and deliver to Division map depot.
 - (b) Operate map depot for "over the counter" delivery of maps to Corps separate units.
- (3) Division Map Depot. The Division Engineer is responsible for operation of a Division map depot to provide for "over the counter" delivery of maps to divisional and attached units.

b. Basis of Distribution. "Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps" inclosed herewith are based on tables in FM 30-20 and give the quantities of maps and auxiliary material considered adequate for initial issue.

- (1) No issue in excess of these allowances is authorized without the approval of the Army Engineer.
- (2) Actual maps issued will depend on their availability.

c. Mechanics of Distribution.

- (1) Army separate units will requisition direct to the Army map depot for "over the counter" delivery.
 - (2) Corps separate units will requisition direct to the Corps map depot for "over the counter" delivery.
 - (3) The Division Engineer will submit consolidated requisition to the Corps Engineer for divisional and attached units. The attached units included will be listed on the requisition for editing purposes. The maps will be delivered in bulk by the Corps map depot to the Division map depot.
 - (4) The Corps Engineer will submit, in triplicate, consolidated requisition to the Army Engineer for replenishing Corps map depot stock. These maps will be delivered in bulk by the Army map depot to the Corps map depot. Consolidated divisional requisitions, as approved by the Corps Engineer, may be forwarded to the Army Engineer for processing. Maps will be stocked in Corps map depot primarily for "over the counter" issue to Corps separate units.
 - (5) Requisitions for "over the counter" delivery by Corps and Army map depots will be signed by an officer and submitted in duplicate direct to the issuing depot.
- d. Automatic Issue. Maps will normally be issued automatically, without requisition, to the Corps map depot in staff planning or operational quantities, whichever may be applicable, for: -

- (1) Distribution of new maps initially received by Army map depot.
- (2) Initial issue covering new operational areas.
- (3) Mapping a newly assigned Division which is not relieving another Division. (See paragraph 4c below).

4. USE AND DISPOSITION OF MAPS. The supply of materials required for map reproduction is critical and the reproduction facilities are at present overtaxed in the preparation of operational maps. Therefore, unit commanders are enjoined against viewing the problem of map supply complacently. It is their responsibility that maps issued to their units are used efficiently and that maps not immediately required are safely stored.

- a. Maps issued to units in operational quantities will be limited to their immediate operational area.
- b. When a unit has no further need for a certain series of maps, these maps will be sorted, packed, and returned with an itemized transmittal direct to the source of supply for that unit.
- c. Any Division being replaced by another Division will transfer maps, no longer required, to the replacing unit, pursuant to instructions issued by the Corps Commander.
- d. Maps worn beyond serviceability will be burned and the resulting ashes thoroughly pulverized.

5. CAPTURED AND LOCAL MAPS. Captured or local maps or reproduced copies of captured or local maps will not be issued to troops for operational use except in an emergency and then only with the approval of the Army Commander.

6. NEW MAPS AND MAP INFORMATION.

a. Whenever new maps or map substitutes are prepared by subordinate units, particularly a Corps or Army topographic unit, record copies will be required. These will include copies of all publications (including overprints) which can legitimately be classified as maps. Odd diagrams, tabulations, cards, etc. which may be reproduced lithographically, but which have no map significance, are not required. Distribution will be made as follows:

- (1) Two (2) copies through engineer channels to Engineer, Third US Army, APO 403, US Army.
- (2) Five (5) copies direct to Engineer, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, US Army, copy of letter of transmittal to be forwarded to Engineer, Third US Army.
- (3) Two (2) copies of each complete printing plus two (2) sets of color pulls direct to Chief, Map Reproduction and Distribution Section, Intelligence Division, OCE, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations United States Army, APO 887, US Army (Bigot material will be addressed directly to Colonel A. Milwit, same address); copy of letter of transmittal to be forwarded to the Engineer, Third US Army.
- (4) Two (2) copies of each complete printing plus two (2) sets of color pulls direct to Directorate of Military Survey, Survey 2(b), The War Office, Whitehall, SW1 (Bigot material will be addressed directly to Lieutenant Colonel WDC Wiggins, same address); copy of letter of transmittal to be forwarded to the Engineer, Third US Army.

b. All corrective or supplementary map information will be forwarded through engineer channels to the Engineer, Third US Army.

c. Except for local sketches all map reproduction will be coordinated with the Engineer, Third US Army.

d. Communications involving change of map policy, procurement of aerial photography, or issue of non-standard map material for staff intelligence studies will be sent through G-2 channels to AG of S, G-2, Third US Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - "Initial Issue Tables for Operational Maps".

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R E S T R I C T E D

S E C R E T

UNIT	INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS																			
	(COLUMN NO.) →	NO. OF UNITS	AIR MAPS							MISCELLANEOUS										
			G. S. S. 4072 1/500,000	C. S. S. 3982 1/250,000	ROAD MAPS 1/250,000	SMALL SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	INTER. SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	MEDIUM SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	LARGE SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/250,000	MISCELLANEOUS										
										PHOTO MAPS 1/250,000	COMMUNICATIONS C. S. S. 4072, 3982 1,000,000	TOWN PLANS	THRU-WAY TOWN PLANS	GAZETEERS 1/250,000	NOTES ON G. S. S. MAPS	TRIG. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19		
Army Hq. & Hqs. Co.		15	25	300	75	150	175	150	75	50	25	75	20	0	15	5	25			
Special Troops. (Army)		0	0	3	0	3	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1			
Corps Hq. & Hqs. Co.		10	15	200	45	100	150	100	50	30	15	30	10	0	10	5	20			
DIVISIONS																				
Airborne		15	10	450	45	200	300	600	550	150	10	150	45	15	10	5	30			
Armored		20	10	2250	50	300	600	800	500	150	10	150	200	15	10	5	30			
Cavalry		20	5	1400	55	450	200	725	590	150	10	150	140	15	10	5	30			
Infantry		20	10	1500	55	150	150	900	800	150	10	150	145	15	10	5	40			
Infantry (L)		20	5	300	40	100	100	650	500	150	10	150	30	15	10	5	30			
L Div. Pk. Transport		20	5	300	40	125	100	650	375	150	10	150	30	15	10	5	25			
L Div. Trk. Transport		20	5	275	40	120	100	650	375	150	10	150	30	15	10	5	25			
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY																				
Hq. & Hq. Btry., AAA Brigade		0	0	11	3	15	0	20	10	4	0	4	1	0	3	0	5			
Hq. & Hq. Btry., AAA Gp.		0	0	11	2	7	0	15	10	3	0	3	1	0	2	0	2			
AAA Auto Wpns. Bn., Mbl.		0	0	113	1	4	0	40	35	5	0	5	11	0	1	0	2			
AAA Auto Wpns. Bn., Sem.		0	0	37	1	4	0	40	35	5	0	5	3	0	1	0	2			
AAA Auto Wpns. Bn. SP.		0	0	123	1	4	0	40	35	5	0	5	12	0	1	0	2			
AAA Balloon B Bn. (VLA)		0	0	43	1	4	0	35	25	5	0	5	4	0	1	0	2			
AAA Gun Bn., Mbl.		0	0	120	1	4	0	35	27	5	0	5	12	0	1	0	2			
AAA Gun Bn., Sem.		0	0	42	1	4	0	35	25	5	0	5	6	0	1	0	2			
AAA Slt. Bn., Sem.		0	0	120	2	3	0	35	25	5	0	5	12	0	1	0	2			
AAA Operations Detachment		0	0	7	2	3	0	5	4	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1			
ARMORED																				
Hq. & Hq. Det., Tk. Gp. (M)		0	0	21	1	15	26	0	12	6	2	6	2	0	2	0	2			
Hq. & Hq. Co., Armd. Gp.		0	0	21	1	15	26	0	12	6	2	6	2	0	2	0	2			
Tank Bn. (L)		0	0	127	0	25	51	0	27	10	0	10	12	1	0	0	2			
Tank Bn. (CDL)		0	0	160	0	35	50	0	30	10	0	10	16	1	0	0	2			
Tank Bn. (Sep)		0	0	167	0	37	55	0	32	10	0	10	16	1	0	0	2			
CAVALRY																				
Hq. & Hq. Tr., Cav. Gp.		0	0	15	1	15	23	0	15	3	1	0	1	0	2	0	2			
Cavalry Brigade, Horse		0	0	400	4	170	266	0	160	15	0	0	40	0	8	0	2			
Cavalry Regt., Mezc.		0	0	471	1	75	111	0	75	10	0	0	47	0	3	0	2			
Cavalry Mezc. Rcn. Sq.		0	0	243	0	40	150	0	45	5	0	0	24	0	1	0	2			
CHEMICAL WARFARE																				
Chemical Mtz. Bn. (Sep)		0	0	161	0	5	0	54	0	0	0	0	16	1	0	0	2			
Chemical Decon. Co.		0	0	22	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1			
Chemical Depot Co.		0	0	12	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1			
Chemical Lab. Co.		0	0	3	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1			
Chemical Maint. Co.		0	0	10	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1			
Chemical Smoke Gen. Co.		0	0	37	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1			

RESTRICTED

UNIT	INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS																			
	(COLUMN NO.) →	NO. OF UNITS	AIR MAPS							MISCELLANEOUS										
			G. S. S. 4072 1/500,000	C. S. S. 3982 1/250,000	ROAD MAPS 1/250,000	SMALL SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	INTER. SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	MEDIUM SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	LARGE SCALE TOPOGRAPHIC 1/250,000	MISCELLANEOUS										
										PHOTO MAPS 1/250,000	COMMUNICATIONS C. S. S. 4072, 3982 1,000,000	TOWN PLANS	THRU-WAY TOWN PLANS	GAZETEERS 1/250,000	NOTES ON G. S. S. MAPS	TRIG. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19		
ENGINEER																				
Gen. Sv. Regt.		0	0	160	1	13	0	80	0	0	0	15	16	0	2	0	2			
Hq. & Hq. Co., Engr. C. Gp.		0	0	13	1	7	0	24	11	5	2	5	1	0	2	0	2			
Engr. Airborne Bn.		0	2	34	0	5	0	40	20	7	0	7	3	0	1	0	2			
Engr. C. Bn.		0	0	90	0	5	0	48	20	12	0	12	9	0	1	0	2			
Engr. Bn. (Sep.)		0	0	70	0	5	0	47	22	12	0	12	7	0	1	0	2			
Engr. Camouflage Bn.		0	0	55	0	5	0	45	20	10	0	10	5	0	1	0	2			
Engr. Hv. Pan. Bn.		0	0	118	0	5	0	33	15	6	0	6	11	0	1	0	2			
Engr. Top. Bn. (Army)		0	0	59	0	5	4	30	15	7	0	7	5	0	1	10	2			
Engr. C. Co. (Sep.)		0	0	21	0	0	0	6	4	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	1			
Engr. Depot Co.		0	0	17	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1			
Engr. Dp. Trk. Co.		0	0	51	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1			
Engr. L. Equip. Co.		0	0	56	0	0	0	5	3	1	0	1	5	1	0	0	1			
Engr. L. Pan. Co.		0	0	76	0	0	0	7	5	1	0	1	6	1	0	0	1			
Engr. Maint. Co.		0	0	47	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1			
Engr. Top. Co. (Corps)		0	0	17	0	0	1	5	4	1	0	1	1	0	1	10	1			
Engr. Treadway Bridge Co.		0	0	67	0	0	0	5	3	1	0	1	6	1	0	0	1			
Engr. Water Supply Co.		0	0	19	0	0	0	7	4	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1			
Engr. Utility Det.		0	0	6	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1			
FIELD ARTILLERY																				
Hq. & Hq. Btry., Corps Arty. (Mtz)		0	5	22	3	15	0	39	15	8	0	8	2	0	3	2	5			
Hq. & Hq. Btry., F.A. Brigade		0	5	20	4	10	0	30	15	5	0	5	2	0	3	2	5			
Hq. & Hq. Btry., F.A. Gp. (Mtz.)		0	5	19	1	7	0	26	12	6	0	6	2	0	2	2	2			
F.A. Obs. Bn.		0	0	98	0	5	0	39	21	5	0	5	9	0	1	20	2			
105 MM How. Bn. (S.P.)		0	4	106	0	5	0	48	29	5	0	10	10	0	1	2	2			
105 MM How. Bn. (Trk.)		0	4	86	0	5	0	47	28	5	0	10	8	0	1	2	2			
155 MM Gun Bn. (S.P.)		0	4	78	0	5	0	42	23	5	0	10	7	0	1	2	2			

INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS

UNIT	NO. OF UNITS																				
	AIR MAPS		ROAD MAPS	SMALL SCALE	INTER. SCALE	MEDIUM SCALE	LARGE SCALE	MISCELLANEOUS												LARGE SCALE	
	C. S. S. 4072 1/500,000	C. S. S. 3982 1/250,000	1/200,000 1/300,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/250,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/100,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/50,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/25,000	PHOTO. MAPS 1/25,000	COMMUNICATIONS C. S. S. 4439 1/800,000	TOWN PLANS	THRU-WAY/TOWN PLANS	GAZETTEERS 1/250,000	NOTES ON C. S. S. MAPS	TRIC. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES					
(COLUMN NO.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19		
Medical Coll. Co. (Sep.)	0	0	0	17	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Medical Depot Co.	0	0	0	10	0	3	13	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Medical Sanitary Co.	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Conv. Hosp.	0	0	0	18	0	3	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2				
Evac. Hosp. (750)	0	0	0	5	0	3	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2				
Evac. Hosp. Sem. (400)	0	0	0	25	0	5	14	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	2				
Field Hosp.	0	0	0	15	0	4	8	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2				
Vet. Co. (Sep.)	0	0	0	10	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1					
Vet. Conv. Hosp.	0	0	0	10	0	3	12	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2				
Vet. Evac. Hosp.	0	0	0	5	0	3	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2					
Vet. Gen. Hosp.	0	0	0	9	1	5	21	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2					
MILITARY POLICE																					
M. P. Bn.	0	0	0	250	0	5	0	50	0	0	0	2	8	1	0	0	2				
M. P. Bn. (Army)	0	0	0	250	0	5	0	50	0	0	0	2	6	1	0	0	2				
M. P. Co.	0	0	0	80	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1					
M. P. P. W. Proc. Co.	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1					
C. I. Squad	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	1				
M. P. Esc. Gd. Co.	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1					
ORDNANCE																					
Hq. & Hq. Det. Ord. Cp.	0	0	0	9	1	7	0	22	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	2				
Hq. & Hq. Det. Ord. Bn.	0	0	0	15	1	4	0	17	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2				
Hq. & Hq. Det. Ord. Am. Bn.	0	0	0	10	1	5	0	14	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2				
Ord. Maint. Co. (A.A.)	0	0	0	23	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Am. Co.	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Coll. Co.	0	0	0	35	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Depot Co.	0	0	0	25	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Evac. Co.	0	0	0	55	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	16	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Hv. Auto Maint. Co.	0	0	0	28	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Hv. Maint. Co. (F.A.)	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Hv. Maint. Co. (Tk.)	0	0	0	40	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Medium Maint. Co.	0	0	0	28	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Medium Auto Maint. Co.	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. M.V.D. Co.	0	0	0	17	0	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Ord. Bomb Disp. Sqd.	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
QUARTERMASTER																					
Traffic Reg. Cp.	0	0	0	38	1	7	0	54	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	2				
Hq. & Hq. Det., Q.M. Cp.	0	0	0	12	1	7	0	18	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	2				
Hq. & Hq. Det., Q.M. Bn.	0	0	0	2	1	5	0	15	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2				
Hq. & Hq. Det., Q.M. Bn. (Mbl.)	0	0	0	5	1	5	0	15	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2				
Q.M. Petroleum Products Lab.	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Gas Supply Co.	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Refrigeration Co. (Mbl.)	0	0	0	40	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Sales Co.	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Bakery Co.	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Car Co.	0	0	0	92	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	9	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Depot Co., Supply	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Laundry Co.	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Rhd. Co.	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Salvage Coll. Co.	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Salvage Repair Co.	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Service Co.	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Rmt. Squadron	0	0	0	48	0	5	0	41	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1				

INITIAL ISSUE TABLES FOR OPERATIONAL MAPS

UNIT	NO. OF UNITS																				
	AIR MAPS		ROAD MAPS	SMALL SCALE	INTER. SCALE	MEDIUM SCALE	LARGE SCALE	MISCELLANEOUS												LARGE SCALE	
	C. S. S. 4072 1/500,000	C. S. S. 3982 1/250,000	1/200,000 1/300,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/1,000,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/250,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/100,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/50,000	TOPOGRAPHIC 1/25,000	PHOTO. MAPS 1/25,000	COMMUNICATIONS C. S. S. 4439 1/800,000	TOWN PLANS	THRU-WAY/TOWN PLANS	GAZETTEERS 1/250,000	NOTES ON C. S. S. MAPS	TRIC. DATA SHEETS	MAP INDICES					
(COLUMN NO.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19		
Q.M. Pack Troop	0	0	0	22	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Trk. Co.	0	0	0	55	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Tr. Trans. Co.	0	0	0	65	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Gr. Reg. Co.	0	0	0	18	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Fmgt. & Bath Co. (Mbl.)	0	0	0	9	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
Q.M. Base Pet. Sup. Co.	0	0	0	13	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1				
SIGNAL																					
Signal Bn.	0	0	0	203	0	5	0	35	10	6	0	0	20	0	1	0	2				
Signal Constr. Bn.	0	0	0	114	0	4	0	60	18	6	0	6	11	0	1	0	2				
Signal Opn. Bn.	0	0	0	112	0	8	0	30	21	10	0	10	11	0	1	0	2				
Signal Constr. Co.	0	0	0	57	0	1	0	25	4	2	0	2	5	1	0	0	1				
Signal Depot Co.	0	0	0	26	0	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Signal Mbl. Broadcast Co.	0	0	0	29	0	2	0	20	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Signal Opn. Co.	0	0	0	50	0	4	0	11	7	3	0	3	5	1	0	0	1				
Signal Photo Co.	0	0	0	39	0	1	0	20	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1				
Signal Pigeon Co.	0	0	0	48	0	4	0	10	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1				
Signal Radio Intl. Co.	0	0	0	84	0	4	8	10	4	0	0	0	8	1	0	0	1				
Signal Repair Co.	0	0	0	35	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1				
Signal Service Co. (R.I.)	0	0	0	22	0	2	0	9	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1				
Air Ln. Squadron Det.	40	0	0	4	30	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
Enemy Equip. Ident. Unit	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
Signal Crystal Grnd. Team	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1				
TANK DESTROYER																					
Hq. & Hq. Co. T. D. Brigade	0	0	0	13	3	20	28	0	8	4	2	4	1	0	3	0	5				
Hq. & Hq. Co. T. D. Cp.	0	0	0	17	1	13	23	0	10	5	1	5	1	0	2	0	2				
T. D. Bn. (SP.)	0	0	0	153	0	23	50	0	31	5	0	5	15	1	0	0	2				
T. D. Bn. (Towed)	0	0	0	153	0	23	50	0	31	5	0	5	15	1	0	0	2				
MISCELLANEOUS																					
A. P. U.	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2					
Hq. Civil Affairs Regt.	0	0	0	27	1	17	0	0	0	2	8	4	1	0	1	0	2				
Civil Affairs Co.	0	0	0	21	0	80	0	0	1	12	1	1	1	0	0	1					
Finance Disp. Sect.	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0				
Hq. & Hq. Co. Repl. Depot	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2				
M. R. U. Type "Y"	0	0																			

ANNEX NO. 9

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Engineer
APO 403

161800A March 1945

ENGINEER OPERATIONAL
INSTRUCTION NO. 33

*MAPS: Series GSGS 4042, Scale 1:250,000, Sheets 6 & 9
Series GSGS 4346, Scale 1:250,000, Sheets K49, K50 & K51

1. Engineer boundaries (see overlay).
2. No change.

- DISPOSITION OF TROOPS -

VIII CORPS

1102d Engr C Gp
1107th Engr C Gp
35th Engr C Bn
44th Engr C Bn
159th Engr C Bn
168th Engr C Bn
243d Engr C Bn
1252d Engr C Bn
628th Engr L Equip Co
974th Engr Maint Co
991st Engr Trdw Br Co
511th Engr L Pon Co
527th Engr L Pon Co
1369th Engr Dp Trk Co
665th Engr Top Co
2893d Engr TIT (C)

XII CORPS

1135th Engr C Gp
1137th Engr C Gp
133d Engr C Bn
190th Engr C Bn
166th Engr C Bn
204th Engr C Bn
282d Engr C Bn
285th Engr C Bn
613th Engr L Equip Co
981st Engr Maint Co
995th Engr Trdw Br Co
996th Engr Trdw Br Co
997th Engr Trdw Br Co (-)

XII CORPS (Contd)

(t) 1E Plat, 509th Engr L Pon Co
528th Engr L Pon Co
537th Engr L Pon Co
87th Engr Hv Pon Bn
673d Engr Top Co
4th Plat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn
2949th Engr TIT (C)

XX CORPS

1139th Engr C Gp
1152d Engr C Gp
135th Engr C Bn
160th Engr C Bn
178th Engr C Bn
179th Engr C Bn
206th Engr C Bn
245th Engr C Bn
281st Engr C Bn
1258th Engr C Bn
623d Engr L Equip Co
961st Engr Maint Co
2d Plat, 997th Engr Trdw
Br Co
993d Engr Trdw Br Co
513th Engr L Pon Co
548th Engr L Pon Co
664th Engr Top Co
1st Plat, Co A, 602d Engr
Cam Bn
2898th Engr TIT (C)

ARMY


1123d Engr C Gp
1134th Engr C Gp
1301st Engr GS Regt
1303d Engr GS Regt
1306th Engr GS Regt
145th Engr C Bn
183d Engr C Bn
188th Engr C Bn
249th Engr C Bn
293d Engr C Bn (-)
609th Engr L Equip Co
676th Engr L Equip Co
976th Engr Maint Co
509th Engr L Pon Co (-)
572d Engr Dp Trk Co
764th Engr Dp Trk Co
770th Engr Dp Trk Co
1354th Engr Dp Trk Co
1366th Engr Dp Trk Co
1367th Engr Dp Trk Co
88th Engr Hv Pon Bn
553d Engr Hv Pon Bn
652d Engr Top Bn
459th Engr Depot Co
2d Plat, 729th Engr Depot Co
Co A (-), 602d Engr Cam Bn
1511th Engr WS Co
1512th Engr WS Co
1239th Engr FF Plat
1240th Engr FF Plat
1681st Engr Surv Ln Team
1092d Engr Util Det
2890th Engr TIT (R)
Naval Unit N-2
Det B, 329th Harbor Craft Co
1407th Engr Mobile Slt Team
(t) Temporary attachment.

3. a. 1123d Engr C Gps: No change.
b. 1134th Engr C Gp:
Additional Attachments: 88th Engr Hv Pon Bn (less Co B) and 1367th
Engr Dp Trk Co.
Detachment: 87th Engr Hv Pon Bn (less Co A).
Mission - No change.
c. 1301st Engr GS Regt: No change.
d. 1303d Engr GS Regt: No change.
e. 1306th Engr GS Regt: No change.
f. Separate Army Units: No change.
x. (1) Area assignments effective 170800A March 1945.
(2) No change.
(3) No change.
(4) No change.
4. a. AESP No. 10 - MORNHEREN on GC 58 (30434) Class IV and Bridging - IX Corps troops.
AESP No. 13 - BELVAL, 1 1/2 mi W ESCH (P7102) Class IV and Bridging - All troops.
AESP No. 14 - ARLON (P6122) Class II and IV Supplies - All troops.
AESP No. 18 - (11049) MESSERICH - Class IV and Bridging - Closed 16 Mar 45.
AESP No. 19 - (10680) PHIM - Class IV and Bridging - VIII Corps troops.
AESP No. 20 - (17385) MUNSTERMAIFELD - Class IV and Bridging - XII Corps troops.
AESP No. 21 - (17599) PLAIDT - Class IV and Bridging - VIII Corps troops.
Army Map Depot (P5704) LONGWY - All troops.
See Administrative Order No. 29 (not to accompany any FO) 112200A March
1945, Hq Third U S Army.
b. No change.

CONKLIN

DISTRIBUTION:

Engr 6th Army Gp	2	Engr XX Corps	1	Co B, 293d Engr C Bn	1
Engr 12th Army Gp	3	1123d Engr C Gp	3	Co A(-), 602d Engr Cam Bn	1
Engr ASCZ	2	1134th Engr C Gp	3	459th Engr Depot Co	1
Engr First US Army	1	1301st Engr GS Regt	3	G-3 TUSA	2
Engr Seventh US Army	1	1303d Engr GS Regt	3	G-4 TUSA	1
Engr VIII Corps	1	1306th Engr GS Regt	3	FM TUSA	1
Engr XII Corps	1	652d Engr Top Bn	1	Engr File TUSA	2



SECRET

Engineer Operational Instruction No. 33, shown on the preceding page, is an exact reproduction of the order as published with the exception of the overlay which has been superimposed on a 1:500,000 map. In order to provide coherence and present the complete instruction, the paragraphs headed "no change" are extracted from previous instructions and quoted below:

Paragraph 2. - The engineer mission is to support the operations through normal engineer functions.

Paragraph 3. a. - Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support VIII Corps.

Paragraph 3. b. - Coordination of engineer depot haulage activities.

Paragraph 3. c. - Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support XX Corps.

Paragraph 3. d. - Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support XII Corps. Establish and report forward boundary.

Paragraph 3. e. - Perform all engineer work in zone (overlay) and support 1303d Engr GS Regt.

Paragraph 3. f. - Support operations through normal functions.

Paragraph 3. x. (2) (a) - Engineer boundaries between Corps and supporting Army units will be as mutually agreed upon by Corps Engineers and supporting Army units. Such boundaries will be definitely delineated and will be reported promptly to the Army Engineer.

(b) - Engineer boundaries between mutually supporting Army units will be changed only upon approval of the Army Engineer.

Paragraph 3. x. (3) - Priority of routes for maintenance - see TRAF-FIC Section of current Administrative Order and accompanying Traffic Circulation Diagram. Two way Class 70 routes parallel to the axis of movement will be of first priority. All other routes will be of second priority.

Paragraph 3. x. (4) (a) - Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, dated 7 November 1944, subject: "Protection of the Line of Communications." The following delineation of responsibility between Army Engineer and Corps troops will be followed:




1. Army Engineer troops will be responsible, within their areas of responsibility, for the tactical guarding of such bridges in the Army area as may be designated by the Army Engineer.

2. Corps will be responsible for the tactical guarding of bridges forward of the Corps rear tactical boundary. Exceptions involving the use of Army Engineer troops will be made only on specific instruction of the Army Engineer.

Paragraph 4. b. - 976th Engr Maint Co (P-6023) 1 mi W of ARLON - Maintenance of engineer equipment.

Paragraph 5. - Changes in locations of headquarters charged with submission of Engineer Situation Reports (See Operations Memo No. 25, 27 June 1944, Hq Third U.S. Army) will be reported to the Army Engineer by the most expeditious means available.

ANNEX NO. 10





FINANCE

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Finance Officer
APO 1103

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO: Commanding General,
Third United States Army,
APO 1103, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After Action Report of the Finance Section, Third U. S. Army, beginning with March, 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapter.

2. This report presents a review of the operations of the Finance Section since its arrival in the European Theater of Operations, and includes the planning period in the United Kingdom, the pre-operational period on the Continent, and the operational period of Third U. S. Army.


3. The Finance story is told without attempt to detail the various technical procedures which are more or less standardized by regulations of the War Department, the Treasury Department, and the Comptroller General. It is believed that this concise narrative of operations and problems in the field will serve to present a better general picture of events than a mass of technical data which tends to cloud significant issues.

Charles B. Milliken
CHARLES B. MILLIKEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army,
Finance Officer.

SECRET

FINANCE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



DUTIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE - FISCAL SUBSECTION

Administrative and Fiscal Officer:

1. Supervises operation of Administrative and Fiscal Section.
2. Verifies Fiscal Reports.
3. Supervises suballotment of funds.
4. Supervises distribution of Finance information.
5. Supervises preparation and flow of correspondence.
6. Supervises consolidation of disbursing and personnel data.

Chief Clerk:

1. Effects flow of correspondence.
2. Supervises filing and reference system.
3. Checks all outgoing and incoming correspondence.

Principal Clerk:

1. Supervises sub-branches.
2. Audits Fiscal Reports.

Stenographic Branch:

1. Performs stenographic functions.
2. Handles all classified documents.
3. Maintains classified files.

Distribution Branch:

1. Maintains current rosters of Finance Officers.
2. Makes distribution of finance information.

Filing Branch:

1. Maintains unclassified files.
2. Posts all circulars and regulations.
3. Maintains office personnel records and rosters.

Fiscal and Report Branch:

1. Consolidates and forwards all administrative reports.
2. Maintains fiscal records.
3. Prepares necessary fiscal reports.
4. Effects proper suballotment of available funds.

MISSION

1. Advise Commanding General on fiscal and finance matters.
2. Supervise fiscal and finance activities within the Army.
3. Supervise payment of Army troops and commercial accounts.
4. Suballot funds to lower units.

DUTIES OF DISBURSING SUBSECTION

Disbursing Officer:

1. Supervises operation of Disbursing Subsection.
2. Verifies cashier and depository transactions.
3. Verifies accounting reports and records.
4. Inspects all vouchers paid.
5. Signs checks.

Deputy Disbursing Officer:

1. Acts as Deputy to Disbursing Officer.
2. Audits cashier's accounts daily.
3. Post-audits all vouchers.
4. Audits all accounting reports and records.

Principal Clerk:

1. Supervises branches.
2. Audits all vouchers before payments.
3. Informs personnel as to changes in regulations.

Cashier:

1. Assists in making cash collections.
2. Makes cash disbursements.
3. Exchanges funds.
4. Prepares daily Cashier's Report.

Accounting Branch:

1. Maintains accounting records.
2. Prepares accounting reports.
3. Prepares checks.

Pay and Allowances Branch:

1. Computes enlisted men's pay and allowances vouchers.
2. Computes officers' pay and allowances vouchers.
3. Prepares pay vouchers of headquarters officers.

Commercial Accounts Branch:

1. Computes commercial accounts vouchers.
2. Maintains Purchasing and Contracting Officers' ledger.

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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Organization.-- The Finance Section of Headquarters Third U. S. Army was organized under Table of Organization 200-1, dated 1 July 1942, which provided for five officers and twenty enlisted men. The general mission of the Finance Section was the administration and supervision of finance functions and services within the Army and the payment of troops and commercial accounts of Army Headquarters and assigned troops. To effectively perform this mission, the Finance Section was organized into an Administrative-Fiscal subsection and a Disbursing subsection.

Administration.-- Administrative activities entailed the following duties:

1. Distribution of technical finance information to subordinate disbursing sections, divisions and corps finance offices;
2. Consolidation of monthly reports of disbursements, personnel, etc., and monthly analyses of disbursements and collections for submission to higher headquarters;
3. Handling of technical questions;
4. Preparation of the finance plan for combat operations;
5. Inspection of finance offices under Army jurisdiction;
6. Preparations to effect purchasing and contracting on the Continent by processing the necessary agent officer orders, distributing foreign money to Purchasing and Contracting Officers, and issuing necessary GPA Forms.

Corps and divisions were provided with organic finance sections. Non-divisional troops, however, had no organic finance units; consequently, to effect payment of army and corps troops, recommendations were made for the attachment of fourteen Communications Zone Finance Disbursing Sections, on a basis of one section per 15,000 troops. Sections were attached as follows:

- 7 Sections to Army
- 1 Section to VIII Corps
- 2 Sections to XII Corps
- 2 Sections to XV Corps
- 2 Sections to XX Corps

The finance plan for mounting and for continental operations was prepared and published in Third U. S. Army Administrative Orders. The complete plan is included as Annex No. 1.

In order to determine the operational efficiency and the adequacy of personnel and equipment, inspections were made of Corps, Division, and Finance Disbursing Sections prior to movement to the Continent. A month's supply of franc currency was distributed to each Disbursing Officer prior to his departure from the United Kingdom; and authority was granted him to keep \$500,000.00 cash on hand.

For the cross-channel operation Finance Disbursing Sections were phased so that service could be maintained on the Continent according to troop strength. Since Finance Disbursing Sections had no organic transportation or messing facilities, it was necessary to phase the sections with other units to assure the availability of such facilities. Section equipment was shipped from home stations to the Continent by Communications Zone.

During their stay in the United Kingdom, Corps, Divisions and Finance Disbursing Sections performed regular finance functions. A summary report of operations for all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is presented as Annex No. 2.

Fiscal.-- Upon arrival in the United Kingdom, an unlimited allotment of Finance Department General Allotment funds was issued to the Army Commander. Specific allotments of Contingencies of the Army funds in amount of \$1,500 for entertainment and \$10,000 for military intelligence were received. The Army was designated a procurement agency with

authority to suballot funds to Corps and Divisions. Corps and Divisions were appointed procurement agencies and suballotments were made on the following approximate basis:

	Contingencies of Army Funds		All other Funds
	Military Intelligence	Entertainment	FDGA 60-136
Each Corps	\$750.00	\$100.00	Unlimited
Each Division	\$300.00	\$ 50.00	Unlimited

Fiscal records were set up to record obligations of Army units and to consolidate the obligation reports submitted by Corps and Divisions. The monthly consolidated obligation reports were submitted to the Fiscal Director, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Funds obligated by Third U. S. Army Units are shown in Annex Number 3.

In view of continental operations an increase of \$160,000 in Contingency of the Army funds for Military Intelligence purposes was requested and received. Corps Military Intelligence funds were increased to \$10,000 and Divisions to \$5,000.

Disbursing.-- The Disbursing subsection consisted of fourteen men. It was organized into Accounting, Pay and Allowances, and Commercial Accounts Branches.

Inasmuch as the section equipment was not available until several weeks after the arrival of the personnel in the United Kingdom, the Fiscal Officer, Western Base Section provided finance service for Headquarters, Third U. S. Army through a Class "B" Agent Office consisting of one warrant officer and two enlisted men from the 71st Finance Disbursing Section.


In order to obtain actual experience in problems and policies of European Theater of Operations, two officers and thirteen enlisted men were placed on temporary duty with Base Section Finance Disbursing Sections. In addition three enlisted men were sent for a short period to the Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director to learn its requirements regarding the preparation of vouchers, daily reports and capital papers.

Prior to the opening of the Army Disbursing Account, it was necessary to take care of certain technical matters pertaining to the account. These were as follows:

1. Obtained all necessary finance instructions pertaining to disbursing in the European Theater of Operations; these instructions were contained primarily in Finance Circular Letters issued by the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.
2. Reported total accountability to the Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.
3. Forwarded signature cards of Disbursing Officer and Deputy Disbursing Officer to Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for transmittal to the Guaranty Trust Company, of New York, London Branch, a general depository of the Treasurer of the United States, and to Barclays Bank, Ltd., local depository, to be used in verifying indorsements on deposits.
4. Reduced balance with the Treasurer of the United States to \$5,000.
5. Forwarded surplus Treasury Checks to Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for storage.
6. Secured the Appointment of Deputy Disbursing Officer as Sterling Deputy.
7. Obtained sufficient sterling funds for one month's disbursements from Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.
8. Opened checking account with Barclays Bank, Ltd., and obtained supply of checks.

The Disbursing Account was opened in the European Theater of Oper-

ARMY FISCAL ORGANIZATION CHART



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ations on 8 April. The usual functions of disbursing were performed thereafter.

Prior to the departure of Headquarters for the Continent, one set of franc invasion currency was distributed to Disbursing Officers of Corps, Divisions and attached Finance sections as follows:

Boxes	Denomination	No. of Notes Per Set	Franc Set Value
2	2 francs	128,000	256,000
1	5	64,000	320,000
1	10	64,000	640,000
1	50	32,000	1,600,000
1	100	32,000	3,200,000
1	500	32,000	16,000,000
Total 7			22,016,000

Francs were distributed also to Purchasing and Contracting Officers appointed by Headquarters Third U. S. Army to be used for purchases on the Continent. These funds were distributed in sealed boxes, each box containing a total of 40,000 francs as follows:

Denomination	No. of Notes	Franc Value
5 francs	1,000	5,000
100 francs	350	35,000
Total		40,000

To facilitate the computation of exchange on the Continent, conversion tables were compiled based on the rate of exchange set by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. These tables showed the conversion of Dollars and Sterling to Francs.

Inasmuch as Forward Echelon of Headquarters was scheduled to precede the Rear Echelon by two weeks, an Agent Finance Officer and three enlisted men from the Finance Section were designated to accompany the Forward Echelon. The mission of this group was to pay Headquarters personnel and convert personal funds to francs.

Before actual departure for the Continent American and British funds on hand were deposited, and the treasury balance and Barclay's balance were transferred to the Central Disbursing Officer in London. Surplus Treasury checks were forwarded to the Accounts Branch, Office of the Fiscal Director for safekeeping, and Barclay's checks were returned to the local depository.

Military personnel retained only a small portion of the pay and allowances they received while in the United Kingdom, most of it being returned to the United States in the form of allotments, personal transfer accounts or war bond purchases. The disposition of pay and allowances received by military personnel is shown in Annex No. 4.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

As Finance Disbursing Sections arrived on the Continent, they were bivouaced according to troop density. A study was made of the tactical plan of operations in order that sections could follow up the main attack.

Upon receipt of final obligation reports for the fiscal year 1943-1944, 1944-45 funds were suballotted in amounts equal to the unobligated balances reported for 1943-44. Instructions were issued to Corps and Divisions to include obligations of purchasing and contracting officers in future monthly obligation reports. Funds obligated during July, 1944 by units of Third U. S. Army are shown in Annex No. 5.

For the month of July approximately 1200 officers and 22,000 enlisted men were paid by the disbursing subsection assisted by the 11th Finance Disbursing Section. Of over \$700,000 cash disbursements, more than \$300,000 was returned in cash collections. A summary report of operations for July, 1944, of all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is presented in Annex No. 6; and the Disposition of Pay and Allowances of Third U. S. Army Military Personnel is shown in Annex No. 7.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

After the Third U. S. Army became operational administrative duties became too voluminous to permit the Headquarters Finance Section to continue disbursing. Disbursing functions, consequently, were turned over to the 11th Finance Disbursing Section which was attached to Headquarters Special Troops; and later the 78th Finance Disbursing Section also was attached to assist in providing finance service to Army troops.

The Headquarters Finance Section was divided into two subsections, Administrative and personnel. The personnel subsection prepared officers vouchers for the Headquarters and assigned troops and submitted them to the 11th Finance Disbursing Section for payment.

With the breakthrough of Third U. S. Army below Avranches, no trucks were available to move finance sections. In an effort to solve the transportation problem, Army Disbursing Sections were attached to other units with organic transportation as shown below:

Disbursing Section	Unit To Which Attached
11th Finance Disbursing Section - Headquarters Third U S Army	
58th Finance Disbursing Section - 101st Evacuation Hospital	
71st Finance Disbursing Section - 48th Replacement Battalion	
75th Finance Disbursing Section - 104th Evacuation Hospital	
78th Finance Disbursing Section - Headquarters Third U S Army	
81st Finance Disbursing Section - 103rd Evacuation Hospital	
88th Finance Disbursing Section - 106th Evacuation Hospital	
94th Finance Disbursing Section - 53rd Replacement Battalion	

Rapid movement over a large area made communications between this office and Finance sections, and between Finance sections and the units they were serving, extremely difficult. Keeping the units advised of the movement of Finance Disbursing Sections was solved by publishing locations in Administrative Orders. Maintaining service for corps troops was relatively simpler because Finance Disbursing Sections attached to Corps remained with, or near, the Corps Rear Echelons. Authority was obtained to issue one captured vehicle to each section in order to alleviate the transportation problem.

The amount of funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army during August 1944 is shown in Annex No. 8; and a summary report of operations for the month for all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is given in Annex No. 9.

Third U. S. Army personnel retained only 11 per cent of their pay during the month of August, the balance being returned to the United States. Annex No. 10 shows the disposition of pay and allowances of military personnel.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

The number of Finance Disbursing Sections servicing Army and Corps troops was reduced to two sections for Army troops and two sections for each Corps. All other Disbursing Sections originally attached to Third U. S. Army reverted to the control of Advance Section, Communications Zone, but continued to assist in servicing Army and Corps troops. The locations of Finance Disbursing Sections were published periodically in Administrative Orders.

As a means of increasing mobility, each Corps Finance Disbursing Section was allocated one weapons carrier. Advance Section, Communications Zone Disbursing Sections operating in Army area were furnished two personnel carriers with trailers.

Allied Military Marks totalling 165,296,000 were distributed among Disbursing Officers. Each Disbursing Officer received one set of the following composition:

Boxes	Denomination	Number Of Notes Per Set	Mark Value
1	100 marks	32,000	3,200,000
1	50 marks	32,000	1,600,000
1	20 marks	32,000	640,000
1	10 marks	40,000	400,000
1	5 marks	64,000	320,000
1	1 mark	64,000	64,000
1	½ mark	64,000	32,000
TOTAL		7	6,256,000

In addition, Belgium francs totalling 61,032,000 were distributed to those Disbursing Officers attached to Third U. S. Army and paying troops in Luxembourg. Rates of exchange between the Dollar, the German Mark and the Belgian Franc were set by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces as follows:

One Dollar equals 10 German Marks
One Dollar equals 43.7732 Belgium Francs

The finance plan for continental operations was revised and published in Third U. S. Army Administrative Orders. The revised plan is shown in Annex No. 11.

Original specific suballotments of Military Intelligence and Entertainment funds were issued to each new division and corps; they were designated also as a procurement agency to use all other overseas appropriations. Monthly Obligation Reports were received, consolidated, and forwarded to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations. Funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army are shown in Annex No. 12.

The per cent of pay retained by Third U. S. Army personnel during the month of September was only 6.3 per cent, which partially accounts for the fact that the aggregate cash collections of all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army exceeded the total amount disbursed. A summary report of operations of all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army is included as Appendix No. 13; and the disposition of pay and allowances of military personnel is shown in Annex No. 14.

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

A supply point was established in Third U. S. Army area for supplying currency and finance forms and for accepting sterling, dollars, negotiable instruments and surplus marks and francs. This supply point was located at TOUL (U6410 - Northwest Europe 1:250,000) and was operated by the 88th Finance Disbursing Section.

The 92nd Finance Disbursing Section was attached to Army and further attached to III Corps Headquarters. The Finance Officers of both units conferred with the Army Finance Officer regarding technical procedures and administration. Two weapons carriers were secured and issued to the 92nd Finance Disbursing Section for transportation unprovided in the Table of Organization for such a unit.

Instructions were issued to Finance Officers that until such time as German-issued "Reichsmarks" and "Rentenmarks" were placed in general circulation by Disbursing Officers, German-issued marks would not be accepted in denominations of 100 marks or greater; and German-issued marks that gave a date of issue prior to 1 September 1944 were not acceptable currency. No restrictions were placed on the use of Allied Military Authority Mark Notes.

Finance Officers serving Third U. S. Army troops in Luxembourg were advised of the program announced by Luxembourg authorities to withdraw German marks as legal tender and substitute therefor new Belgium francs and Luxembourg francs at the rate of one mark for 4.38 Belgium or Luxembourg francs. A special rate of exchange was provided for those military personnel who had received German marks as change in commercial transactions when the mark was legal tender and enjoyed a high rate of exchange. This special rate was one mark for 12.5 Belgian franc or Luxembourg franc; however, only a maximum of 50 marks per person could be exchanged at this rate.

In order to afford military personnel a means of safeguarding their funds during periods of duty in combat zone "Spearhead Deposits" were made available. "Spearhead Deposits" were temporary deposits made by military personnel with Finance Officers and repayable by any Finance Officer upon presentation of a proper voucher. These deposits were non-interest bearing.

During the month several reassigned corps and divisions reported Military Intelligence and entertainment funds for withdrawal and the balances were withdrawn and reissued to new units as necessary. Instructions were issued stating that upon reassignment of a corps or division cumulative totals of obligations and expenditures under general suballotments Finance Department General Allotment 60 funds would be reported to the new suballotting agency and a final report to this office was unnecessary.

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New procurement regulations for France were distributed to all Purchasing and Contracting Officers with the necessary forms for processing through French authorities. Purchasing and Contracting Officers were instructed to purchase for cash in emergencies only and to include only cash purchases upon their procurement action report to this office.

Obligation reports for September were consolidated and forwarded to Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations. A report of funds obligated during the month is shown in Annex No. 15.

Technical finance information was distributed to Finance Officers of lower units and monthly reports of operations were received and consolidated. A summary report of operations is presented in Annex No. 16; and the disposition of pay and allowances to military personnel is given in Annex No. 17.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Finance Officers were advised of the program of the French government to withdraw all German marks in the Department of Moselle in western France and to substitute therefor French francs. For this exchange a special rate of 15 francs for 1 mark was established. Authority was granted to Finance Officers to redeem at this special rate German marks received as change by military personnel in the Department of Moselle. The amount that could be redeemed, however, was limited to 50 marks per individual.

Sign-up sheets for Soldiers' Deposit, Purchase of War Bonds, and Personal Transfer of Funds were distributed to Army troops. This was done in order to provide military personnel an added opportunity for savings and in order to facilitate the reduction of cash funds available for expenditure.

Before Third U. S. Army troops entered Germany proper, instructions were issued regarding German currency and exchange procedure for German marks. It was assured that an adequate supply of German marks were in the hands of all Third U. S. Army Finance Officers before the start of the German campaign.

Description of the new Belgium and Luxembourg currency and instructions regarding Netherland florins were issued to all Finance Officers. The exchange rate for the Swiss franc was set at 4.29 Swiss francs for \$1.00.

In order to eliminate duplication of work and to more efficiently service Army troops, personnel of the Headquarters Disbursing Sub-section, the 11th Finance Disbursing Section, and the 78th Finance Disbursing Section were organized into one finance disbursing unit. All payments were processed through the disbursing account of one Finance Officer.



ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION IN OPERATION
AT ESCH, LUXEMBOURG

Specific suballotments of military intelligence and entertainment funds and a general suballotment of Finance Department General Allotment 60 funds were issued to newly assigned divisions. Recommendation of a simplified method for obligation reporting on general suballotments was submitted to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for adoption as uniform policy. Obligation reports for October were consolidated and forwarded to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. A summary of this report is presented in Annex No. 18.

Instructions and General Purchasing Agent forms continued to be distributed to Purchasing and Contracting Officers and subordinate units. Procurement action reports of cash purchases were received and incorporated in the monthly obligation report. The bulk of procurement, however, was processed through French authorities.

Annex No. 19 gives a summary report of operations for all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army for the month of November, 1944. The disposition of pay and allowances of military personnel for November, 1944 is shown in Annex No. 20.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

All Third U. S. Army Numbered Finance Disbursing Sections were reorganized in accordance with Table of Organization and Equipment No. 14-500, dated 2 April 1944. After reorganization each of the Disbursing Sections consisted of the following elements:

Element	Authorized Strength		
	Off.	WO	EM
1 Section Headquarters (Type 2)		1	4
1 Pay and Allowance Unit (Type 6)	2		9
1 Commercial Accounts Unit (Type 1)			1
1 Accounting Unit (Type 3)			3
Total	2	1	17

An estimate of the War Department Forms and Standard Forms required by Division, Corps, and Army Troops was submitted to the Third U. S. Army Quartermaster, in order to assure that an adequate supply of forms would be available at Third U. S. Army supply depots. These forms were to supplement those issued by Funding Officers.

Numerous instances of counterfeit supplemental French Francs of 500 and 1000 denominations were reported; consequently, all Finance Officers were ordered to replace their supply of supplemental 500 and 1000 French Franc notes with bank of France notes of the same denomination. Exchange was made at the nearest branch of the Bank of France.

The 88th Finance Disbursing Section, the funding office for Third U. S. Army, was moved to NANCY, France (08521), so that it would be more centrally located to the finance offices it was serving. Later as the zone of operations of Third U. S. Army shifted toward the countries of Luxembourg and Belgium, the 46th Finance Disbursing Section in the City of LUXEMBOURG (p8444) was used as a funding office.

Arrangements were made to provide all Finance Officers with an adequate supply of Belgium and Luxembourg Francs, inasmuch as the zone of operations shifted to Belgium and Luxembourg. French francs and German marks in the hands of personnel going to these countries was exchanged prior to departure.

The 11th Finance Disbursing Section was relieved from attachment to Headquarters, Third U. S. Army and was replaced by the 144th Finance Disbursing Section. The latter section, together with the 78th Finance Disbursing Section, provided finance service for all Army troops. For efficient operation both sections were consolidated into one section and disbursed from one disbursing account.

A uniform procedure for reporting obligations under specific and general suballotments was adopted for divisions and corps upon transfer to another Army. In accordance with Theater directive, corps and divisions transferred from jurisdiction of the Army to another, were required to submit final obligation reports closing their old account, and to open a new account with the Army to which transferred.

New procurement regulations and forms for Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Belgium were distributed to all purchasing and Contracting Officers. Reports of Survey were processed in accordance with War Department and Theater directives.

Funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army during December, 1944 are shown in Annex No. 21, and a summary Report of Operations for December, 1944 for all Finance Officers is presented in Annex No. 22. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army military personnel is given in Annex No. 23.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Finance Officers paying troops stationed in Germany were authorized to disburse German Allied Military Currency or the currency of the adjoining country if the particular command considered the latter currency more desirable. Only Allied Military Currency, and not German indigenous currency, was to be used.

Three additional Finance Disbursing Sections were attached to Third U. S. Army in order to assist with the increased finance load. One disbursing section was further attached to III Corps to assist in paying Corps troops, while the other two sections were used to service Army troops.

The 11th Finance Disbursing Section and the 78th Finance Disbursing Section were awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque. The award was based on the superior performance of duty and the high standard of discipline achieved and maintained by these Disbursing Sections.

In order to fill the need for finance trained commissioned personnel, several qualified Warrant Officers and enlisted men on duty with the various Finance Sections of Third U. S. Army were recommended to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations for direct commission as Second Lieutenants in the Finance Department. After being commissioned these men were to activate Finance Disbursing Sections for duty with Station Hospitals.

Military Intelligence funds and ETO open allotment funds were suballotted to new divisions assigned to Third U. S. Army with instructions as to utilization. Monthly Reports and Analysis of Disbursements and Collections were consolidated and forwarded to Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations. Technical Finance Information was distributed to all Finance Officers. Procurement regulations and forms were distributed to Purchasing and Contracting Officers. Reports of Survey were processed, reviewed, or approved and proper disposition made.

Funds obligated during the month by units of Third U. S. Army are shown in Annex No. 24. A summary report of operations for all Finance Offices is presented in Annex No. 25; and the disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army military personnel for the month of January is shown in Annex No. 26.



AWARDING OF MERITORIOUS SERVICE UNIT PLAQUE
TO 78TH FINANCE DISBURSING SECTION

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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The 153rd Finance Disbursing Section opened at the 6th Convalescent Hospital at METZ (U8658) for the purpose of servicing Army troops in that area. As the 153rd Finance Disbursing Section had arrived recently on the Continent and was unfamiliar with Continental Disbursing, an officer and an enlisted man from the Headquarters Finance Section were attached for temporary duty with the section in order to assist it in the activation of its account.

The limitation against exchanging Continental currencies used by the Third U. S. Army for sterling and dollar currency by personnel leaving the Continent was removed. A revised directive on German money and exchange procedure was issued. The information contained in this directive is shown in Annex No. 27.

Old issue Belgium notes in denomination of 100 francs and above were found to be in the possession of some Finance Officers. These notes were no longer negotiable, as they had been withdrawn from circulation by the Belgium authorities in October, 1944; consequently, it was necessary to arrange a redemption procedure for these notes with the National Bank of Belgium.

Finance Officers were ordered to accept old issue Belgian notes in denomination of 100 francs and above only upon presentation of a certificate from the individual stating that the notes were acquired through the source of pay and allowances received on or before 30 November 1944. This precaution was necessary, because reports had been received that large quantities of old issue Belgian notes were in the possession of Germans captured during the recent German offensive in Belgium and Luxembourg.

All Finance Officers were informed that counterfeit Belgian Five Franc coins were in circulation. Instructions as to the means of differentiating between the counterfeit and the real coins were issued.

The distribution of procurement directives and forms for requisition and purchase through civilian channels were turned over to the Third U. S. Army Adjutant General. Only the procurement forms involving cash payments were retained by the Third U. S. Army Finance Office for distribution to Purchasing and Contracting Officers requiring them.

Military Intelligence funds and ETO open allotment funds were sub-allotted to new divisions assigned to Third U. S. Army. Funds were withdrawn from divisions and corps relieved from assignment to Third U. S. Army.

Monthly Reports and Analysis of Disbursements and Collections were consolidated and forwarded to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Technical Finance information was distributed to all Finance Officers. Reports of Survey were processed, reviewed, or approved and proper disposition made in accordance with new Theater directives.

Annex No. 28 shows the amount of funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army. A report of the operations of all Finance Officers is summarized in Annex No. 29. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army Military Personnel is given in Annex No. 30.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Finance Officers of Third U. S. Army were informed of the program of the French Ministry of Finance to exchange all holdings of Reichsmarks in the Departments of Haut Rhin and Bas Rhin in eastern France at the rate of 15 French Francs for 1 Reichsmark. Finance Officers were authorized to exchange at this favorable rate Reichsmarks acquired by military personnel as change in these departments; however, the amount that could be exchanged by military personnel was limited to 50 Reichsmarks per individual.

An estimate of the quantity and kind of Finance forms required by Third U. S. Army units was submitted to the Fiscal Director, Advance Section, Communications Zone, in order that an adequate supply of forms would be available at all times. The 46th Finance Disbursing Section located at LUXEMBOURG, Luxembourg (P8313) continued to be the supply point for Finance forms, as well as the funding office, for the Third U. S. Army Zone.

Third U. S. Army Finance Officers were ordered to pay troops serving in Germany in Allied Military Marks only and to exchange all currencies, other than marks, in the possession of troops in Germany for Allied Military Marks. This was done in order to prevent the illegal acquisition and return through military and civilian channels of currencies illegally obtained and to prevent black market activities in currencies.

Descriptions of additional valid Netherlands Banknotes were issued. The exchange rate for the Swedish Krona was set at 11.19375 Swedish Kronors equal \$1.00.

Change List Guides for pay rolls computed in German marks were prepared and issued to all Finance Officers for optional use. Technical finance information was distributed to all finance units.

Reports of funds obligated by units of Third U. S. Army were prepared and forwarded to the Fiscal Director. A summary report of funds obligated is given in Appendix No. 31.

Operations of all Finance Offices of Third U. S. Army for the month are summarized in Appendix No. 32. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army military personnel is presented in Annex No. 33.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

The advance of the Third U. S. Army through Germany was so rapid and so extensive that contact with the Funding Office of Advance Section, Communications Zone was impracticable. It became necessary, consequently, for the Headquarters Finance Section to take over the funding of all Finance Officers assigned to Third U. S. Army. It also was necessary to maintain an emergency supply of blank finance forms on hand for Finance Officers inasmuch as the usual Advance Section, Communications Zone supply point was inaccessible.

Conversion into Allied Military Marks of all approved currencies other than Marks was made for military personnel in Germany. All accumulated surplus currencies of allied countries were returned to the Funding Officer for return to the various governments of liberated countries.

In order to provide Belgium civilians employed in Germany by the United States forces an opportunity to transmit to their families funds received as wages, an agreement was reached with the Belgian Government whereby the wages of the Belgium nationals could be credited to a personal account or remitted to their families by the Belgian Government. The part of their pay that was to be retained by the civilian employees was to be paid by the using service. Similar agreements were being negotiated with the French, Luxembourg, and Netherlands Governments.

Five tons of Allied Military Austrian Shillings were requisitioned for the payment of the Third U. S. Army troops who had fought their way into Austria. The rate of exchange was set at ten Austrian Shillings for one U. S. Dollar.

A conference of Corps Finance Officers was held for the purpose of discussing the finance plan to be inaugurated in the Third U. S. Army Zone of Occupation in Germany.

Plans for the payment of repatriated United States and British Prisoners of War were formulated. Several tons of currency, personal effects, and records belonging to United States and Allied Prisoners of War were captured in overrun Prisoner of War Camps. The currency, records and personal effects were forwarded to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force for processing and return to their rightful owner.

An investigation was made of the pay status of enlisted personnel of the Third U. S. Army. This survey covered the extent of pay delinquency, the reasons therefor, and the possibilities of eliminating pay delinquency. The report is presented in Annex No. 34.

The 144th, 153rd, and 154th Finance Disbursing Sections were reorganized under Table of Organization and Equipment No. 14-500, dated 2 April 1944. The new Table of Organization provided for 2 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 17 enlisted men and resulted in a net loss of 2 enlisted men from each section. The surplus enlisted men were assigned to other Finance Disbursing Sections.

Finance instructions for Third U. S. Army troops were revised and published. These instructions are shown in Annex No. 35.

Action reports submitted by Purchasing and Contracting Officers revealed that procurement by cash was practically non-existent since operations were almost entirely in Germany where all necessary unused items were procured through requisition or seizure. Cash payments, however, were made to civilian employees for labor performed. Proper

Finance procurement forms were distributed to Purchasing and Contracting Officers as needed. The list of Army Purchasing and Contracting Officers was brought up to date and the General Purchasing Agent, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, notified.

The shift of corps and divisions to and from Third Army command increased considerably the withdrawals and suballotments of funds during the month. In some cases divisions were reassigned before the funds could be used. This fluidity of units made the procedure requiring final obligation reports upon reassignment on open allotments of Finance Department General Allotment funds impracticable in many instances. For maximum utilization of funds withdrawals were executed before final reports were received and proper adjustment made later upon receipt of the obligations incurred. A summary of the consolidated obligation report of April for the entire Army is shown as Annex No. 36.

Monthly Reports and Analysis of Disbursements and Collections for April were rendered to the Fiscal Director, European Theater of Operations. A summary report of operations for all Finance Officers of Third U. S. Army is presented in Annex No. 37. The disposition of pay and allowances of Third U. S. Army military personnel is given in Annex No. 38.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

A revised currency policy for Germany was formulated. This policy provided that troops in Germany would be paid in Allied Military Authority Marks only. All currencies other than Allied Military Marks held by troops stationed in Germany were to be exchanged for Allied Military Authority Marks not later than 25 May 1945. After the deadline date, Finance Officers were to exchange other currencies only upon presentation of official orders which legitimized possession of such currencies, or by a full explanation by a unit commander of field grade of the special circumstances which made the exchange necessary and proper.

A shipment of 146,320,000 Schillings of Allied Military Austrian Currency was received for funding the Finance Officer paying Third U. S. Army troops stationed in Austria. The Austrian Currency was distributed to Finance Officers in sets of eight boxes of the following composition:

Boxes	Denomination	No. of Notes Per Box	Schillings Value
1	100 Schillings	30,000	3,000,000
1	50 Schillings	40,000	2,000,000
1	20 Schillings	40,000	800,000
1	10 Schillings	50,000	500,000
1	5 Schillings	50,000	250,000
1	2 Schillings	60,000	120,000
1	1 Schilling	60,000	60,000
1	50 Groschen	60,000	30,000
Total 8			6,760,000

Fiscal procedures for Redeployment and Readjustment after the cessation of hostilities in the European Theater of Operations were formulated. A copy of the basic plan is included as Annex No. 40.

The stabilization of the Third U. S. Army Area made it necessary to reassign the finance disbursing sections for better geographical troop coverage. The three sections situated at Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon and working as one unit opened their respective disbursing accounts and were attached to III Corps. They were located as follows:

78th Finance Disbursing Section at ERLANGEN (O-3627), Germany
144th Finance Disbursing Section at BAMBERG (O-2719), Germany
154th Finance Disbursing Section at WEISSENBURG (T-3653), Germany

In addition, the 153rd Finance Disbursing Section was relieved from attachment to the 6th Convalescent Hospital, attached to XII Corps, and located at AMBERG (O-9901), Germany. It was found advisable for security reasons to place these installations in bank buildings near other troops. The 78th Finance Disbursing Section dispensed with disbursing duties and acted solely as a funding agent for Finance Officers in the Third U. S. Army Zone. The Army Headquarters Finance Section ceased funding and resumed disbursing duties, paying headquarters personnel and units attached as special troops.

In order to facilitate finance service, 1 truck, 3/4-ton (Weapons Carrier) was authorized the 144th, 153rd, and 154th Finance Disbursing Sections. The 78th Finance Disbursing Section because of its specialized funding activity was authorized two trucks, 3/4-ton (Weapons Carrier).

Due to the rapid reassignment of divisions a considerable number of suballotments and withdrawals of funds were effected.

An additional report of unliquidated obligations under Finance Department General Allotment funds as of 30 April 1945 was submitted in compliance with a request from the Fiscal Director. A survey of all Purchasing and Contracting Officers within the Army revealed no outstanding obligations under these funds.

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. The Finance Disbursing Sections assigned to the Third U. S. Army were organized under Table of Organization and Equipment No. 14-500. During field operations these organizations were found to have certain limitations which are listed below.

a. No cashiers are provided in the Table of Organization, although in combat all business is in cash and three or four cashiers are required at all times.

b. Finance Disbursing Sections are not self sufficient for mess and transportation; consequently it was necessary to attach the sections to other units with organic mess and transportation.

c. Table of Equipment provides only one $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck. This was found insufficient to transport large volumes of cash to and from the Funding Office.

2. One Finance Disbursing Section is required in close support of each Army to act as a Funding Office (clearing house) for the Army, Corps and Division disbursing offices. Although this service was provided by Advance Section, Communications Zone, often times the Funding Office was so far to the rear that there was an unnecessary waste of time, transportation and gasoline. It would be more efficient to have a Funding Office assigned to each Army.

3. One Finance Disbursing Section should be attached to each Corps Headquarters for the purpose of rendering disbursing service to all Corps troops. The size of the section should be determined by the number of Corps troops to be served.

4. In order that Finance Disbursing Sections may be located easily by the units being served, they should be in the vicinity of Rear Echelons of Army and Corps Headquarters when the Army is operational. In a static situation, they should be located according to troop density.

5. In the invasion of Europe four different types of invasion currencies were used; namely, French, German, Austrian, and Italian Allied Military Notes. This required the conversion and reconversion of funds in the hands of troops each time that they entered or left an European country. Most of this exchange could have been eliminated if one type of invasion currency had been issued for use in all of the countries. The equivalent of the currency of the invaded countries would have to be stated on each invasion note; for example, there would be stated on a One Dollar (\$1.00) Invasion Note that it was worth 50 French Francs, 10 German Marks, 10 Austrian Schillings or 100 Italian Lire. The Invasion Note would circulate at par with the currency of the country in which the troops were stationed.

6. The suballotment of funds to Corps and Divisions was a function of the Finance Section of Army Headquarters. As long as Corps and Divisions were static the system worked well, but the numerous interchanges of Corps and Divisions during combat made contact with suballottees and control of funds from Army level impracticable. There was a continual process of suballotting, withdrawing, and resuballotting to the same Corps and Divisions as they were shifted back and forth between Areas. Considerable paper work and confusion would be eliminated if all funds were suballotted by one central office in the Theater of Operations.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

FINANCE PLAN FOR MOUNTING AND CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS

1. General. French currency only will be used on the Continent. The rate of exchange is 49,5663 francs equals \$1.00 or 200 francs equals one pound. Neither dollar nor sterling will be legal tender. All personnel are prohibited from accepting British or American currency. Personnel violating this order will be subject to court-martial. All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and all exports and imports of currency by any member of the armed forces, is prohibited except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Initially all payments by Disbursing Officers will be in cash.

2. Mounting Operations.

a. Disposition of Surplus Funds.

- (1) Unit commanders will be responsible that all sterling and dollar currency, except a sum not exceeding 10 shillings to cover purchases in the concentration and marshalling areas, is disposed of or exchanged by all members of their command. Facilities of static SOS Finance Units will be utilized insofar as possible.
- (2) Military personnel may dispose of their excess funds by one of the following methods:
 - (a) Soldiers' Deposits (Enlisted personnel only)
 - (b) Purchase of War Bonds.
 - (c) Transmission of funds to the United States by PTA.

b. Partial Pay and Currency Exchange.

- (1) Personnel officers will prepare partial payment payrolls (WD Form 366a) by organizations in sufficient copies to provide an original and two copies for each part of his organization called forward from the concentration area or home station. Such payrolls will include the names of all officers and enlisted men, attached and assigned, and one copy for each part of the organization will be properly signed before leaving the concentration area. The amount to be paid each man will be \$4.05.
- (2) One signed and two copies of payroll will be furnished the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of each part of the organization which departs from the concentration area or home station or which will be detached from the organization prior to briefing. The names of all personnel not included in that part will be red-lined.
- (3) On the triplicate, or retained copy, of the payroll, the amounts turned in for conversion will be entered opposite each name under the column general heading "Collections" or "Analysis of Collections" changed to read "Personal Funds". Separate columns will be used for pounds and shillings, and dollars (if any) and the last collection column will be left blank for use by the Finance Officer in entering therein the converted amounts.
- (4) All 3 copies of the payroll, together with the personal funds collected for exchange will be entrusted to the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of each detached party who will deliver payrolls and total cash to be exchanged to the Finance Officer assigned to his camp in the marshalling area, as soon as the camps are sealed. The Finance Officer will turn over to the unit or detachment commander, currency in proper denominations to cover the partial payments and a separate amount to cover the exchange of personal funds. The unit or detachment commander will complete the certificates as to payments on the original and duplicate copies of Form 366 at the time he obtains the funds. Triplicate copy, on which are shown the amounts to be exchanged for each man, will be retained by him and used for the purpose of paying the men the amounts due. The triplicate copy of the payroll will be turned over by the unit or detachment commander to his personnel officer at the earliest

opportunity. Partial payments and exchange of currency will be made to troops immediately after briefing and prior to the further breakdown of units or detachments into unit parties (components of craft loads).

c. Unit and Hospital Funds.

- (1) Custodians of Unit or Hospital Funds will turn over funds held in cash to their organizational or other Disbursing Officer who will issue a receipt (WD Form 38), or issue a Sterling Check for the amount of the funds.
- (2) Repayment will be made by any Disbursing Officer upon surrendering the receipt (WD Form 38) or check.
- (3) Funds deposited in registered bank accounts in the United Kingdom will not be withdrawn prior to embarkation. After the completion of the movement, the custodian of the funds will present a Sterling Check covering the balance of the registered bank account to his organizational or other Disbursing Officer who will effect payment in the appropriate currency.

3. Continental Operations.

a. Technical Finance Operating Procedure. Technical Finance Operating Procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Finance", Hq ETOUSA, dated 20 April 1944, as amended. Disbursing Officers should consult the SOP concerning their duties in regard to the following subparagraphs. Disbursing Officers should carry sufficient supplies to operate for sixty (60) days.

b. Currency Supply. Initial re-supply of currency for all troops on the Continent will be through the Fiscal Officer, Advance Section, Communications Zone. When Forward Echelon, Communications Zone becomes operational, supply of currency for all troops on the Continent will be through the Fiscal Director, Communications Zone.

c. Army Exchange Funds. Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with Disbursing Officers.

d. Postal Funds. Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to Disbursing Officers.

e. Special Service Funds. Stars and Stripes Routemen (enlisted men who are authorized to sell Stars and Stripes) and officers will turn in funds received from sale of Stars and Stripes and Yank, to Disbursing Officers.

f. Fiscal Procedure. See Annex No. 5 (Procurement Directive No. 1).

g. Procurement Procedure. See Annex No. 5 (Procurement Directive No. 1).

h. Enemy Funds. Any funds captured or received belonging to the enemy government or any of its departments or agencies which comes into the possession of military personnel will be promptly remitted without deduction to the nearest Disbursing Officer with full information as to the source from which the funds were received.

i. Funds of U S military personnel officially reported dead, killed in action, missing in action, missing, interned or captured by the enemy, and funds of deceased Allied personnel will be turned in to the nearest Disbursing Officer with full information as to name, rank, serial number, status (KIA, MIA, etc.), organization and amount pertaining to each individual.

j. Repatriated Prisoners of War. Payment of repatriated Prisoners of War will be in conformity with directive to be issued by SHAEP.

k. Advances of Funds to Civil Affairs Officers. Civil Affairs Officers in need of funds during the early stages of the operation and later in emergency situations, may secure such funds from Disbursing Officers.

1. Finance Service for duly accredited US War Correspondents and British War Correspondents attached to American units.

- (1) Disbursing Officers are authorized to cash US Post Office Money Orders or Travelers' Checks for all duly accredited US War Correspondents.
- (2) The privilege of Personal Transmission Accounts most afforded military personnel will be extended to duly accredited US War Correspondents.

(3) Accredited US Correspondents may have additional funds transmitted to them from the UK by making arrangements with their home office in the UK, who will be required to deposit in advance, such sums as they desire with the Central Disbursing Officer, APO #887.

(4) Disbursing Officers will make advances of pay to British War Correspondents on British advance of pay forms W-3241.

m. Vouchers covering travel and allowances to Allied personnel. Disbursing Officers will not make payment of vouchers covering allowances for travel, subsistence or quarters, presented by personnel of the Allied Forces. Such vouchers should be submitted through proper channels of the force concerned.

n. Troops departing from the Continent. No exchange of currency will be made for troops or civilian personnel when leaving the Continent. The exchange of currency for the appropriate currency of the country which troops or civilian personnel are to enter will be made on arrival at the port of debarkation.

ANNEX NO. 2

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MARCH, 1944 TO JUNE, 1944

	March	April	May	June
Collections	\$ 891,469	\$ 925,982	\$ 3,913,169	\$3,599,371
Disbursements	\$3,830,373	\$4,455,352	\$10,336,431	\$9,080,859
Vouchers Processed	6,641	7,926	21,195	20,308
Personnel Paid	*	*	245,391	216,900
Finance Personnel on Duty	191	234	504	459
Officers	25	30	60	48
Warrant Officers	7	8	21	21
Enlisted Personnel	161	196	423	370

*Data not available

ANNEX NO. 3

FUNDS OBLIGATED BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MARCH, 1944 TO JUNE, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/40102	\$2,851.15
Special Field Exercises, Army	212/40310	192.24
Supplies and Transportation, Army	212/40502	3,707.09
Signal Services of the Army	212/40605	140.51
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/40805	5.65
Engineer Services, Army	212/40905	354.14
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/41005	20.42
Total		\$7,271.20

ANNEX NO. 4

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL MARCH, 1944 TO JUNE, 1944

	March	April	May	June
Total Pay & Allowances	\$7,619,150	\$9,014,926	\$20,920,997	\$18,787,403
Disposition (in percent)				
Family & Individual				40.3%
Allotments	37.2%	38.9%	39.3%	6.7
Government Insurance	7.2	7.1	7.0	6.9
War Bonds	5.6	5.1	6.4	1.2
Soldiers' Deposits	.9	.7	1.3	14.7
Personal Transfers	8.4	7.3	11.5	2.3
Other Collections	1.8	1.8	2.3	27.9
Retained	38.9	39.1	39.2	100.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 5

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JULY, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$ 345.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	120.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	17.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	433.00
Total		\$1215.00

ANNEX NO. 6

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JULY, 1944

Collections	\$ 3,890,052
Disbursements	7,600,330
Vouchers Processed	17,947
Personnel Paid	169,300
Finance Personnel on Duty	279
Officers	12
Warrant Officers	18
Enlisted Personnel	319

ANNEX NO. 7

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
JULY, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	\$15,765,223
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	40.6%
Government Insurance	6.8
War Bonds	7.5
Soldiers' Deposits	1.4
Personal Transfers	19.5
Other Collections	2.9
Retained	21.3
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 8

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
AUGUST, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$2,214.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian		
Employees Military Headquarters	212/50125	56.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	418.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	233.00
Total		\$2,921.00

ANNEX NO. 9

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
AUGUST, 1944

Collections	\$7,097,115
Disbursements	9,523,274
Vouchers Processed	17,253
Personnel Paid	193,659
Finance Personnel on Duty	522
Officers	58
Warrant Officers	24
Enlisted Personnel	140

ANNEX NO. 10

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
AUGUST, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	\$21,527,000
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	42.1%
Government Insurance	7.2
War Bonds	6.8
Soldiers' Deposits	2.0
Personal Transfers	27.4
Other Collections	3.2
Retained	11.0
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 11

THIRD U. S. ARMY
FINANCE PLAN FOR CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS

1. Rates of Exchange.

19.5663 French francs equals	\$1.00
43.7732 Belgian francs equals	\$1.00
1 pound Sterling equals	\$4.035
10 German marks equals	\$1.00

2. Legal Tender.

a. Personnel are prohibited from having British or American currency in their possession on the Continent. All such currency will be exchanged for legal tender of the country in which serving.

b. Legal tender for continental countries is as follows:

France	French francs
(including Alsace, Lorraine and Moselle)	French francs
Belgium	*Belgian francs
Luxembourg	*Belgian francs
Germany	German marks

*Luxembourg may issue its own currency at a later date.

3. **Financial Transactions.** Except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and exports and imports of currency by any member of the Armed Forces is prohibited.

4. **Technical Finance Operating Procedure.** Technical Finance Operating Procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Fiscal Procedures", Volume I, Headquarters ETO, dated 31 August 1944.

5. **Funding Service.** The Disbursing Officer, Headquarters Third U. S. Army will act as funding officer for Corps, Divisions and separate Disbursing Officers. This service will include (1) supply of currency, (2) acceptance of sterling and dollar currency, (3) supply of blank forms, etc. Checks and postal money orders will be accepted for transmission to the Central Disbursing Officer, provided "Invoice of Funds Transferred" WD Form 326, is made out to Lt. Colonel C. C. Neely, FD, symbol number 210-930. Similar funding service is also maintained by the Fiscal Officer, Advance Section, Communications Zone, for those Disbursing Officers located closer to Advance Section, Communications Zone.

6. **Army Exchange Funds.** Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with Disbursing Officers.

7. **Postal Funds.** Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to Disbursing Officers.

8. **Funds Captured or Seized from the Enemy.** Funds captured or seized from the enemy (declared as State funds by G-2) which come into the possession of United States or attached allied forces will be remitted promptly, without deduction, to the nearest finance officer with full information as to the source from which funds were received.

9. **Personal Funds of Casualties.** Funds of United States military personnel officially reported dead, killed in action, missing, interned or captured by the enemy, and funds of deceased allied personnel will be turned in to the nearest finance officer with full information as to name, rank, serial number, status (KIA, MIA, etc.), organization and amount pertaining to each individual.

10. **Repatriated Prisoners of War.** Payment of repatriated prisoners of war will be in conformity with a directive to be issued by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

11. **Troops Departing from Continent.** No exchange of currency will be made for troops or civilian personnel leaving the continent. Exchange will be made upon arrival at port of debarkation.

ANNEX NO. 12

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
SEPTEMBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$2,897.00
Special Field Exercises	212/50310	40.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian		
Employees	212/50125	146.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	1,606.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	914.00
Ordnance Service & Supplies, Army	212/51005	617.00
Total		\$6,220.00

ANNEX NO. 13

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
SEPTEMBER, 1944

Collections	\$7,791,144
Disbursements	7,725,325
Vouchers Processed	7,802
Personnel Paid	173,059
Finance Personnel on Duty	302
Officers	34
Warrant Officers	14
Enlisted Personnel	255

ANNEX NO. 14

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
SEPTEMBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	\$17,973,146
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.1%
Government Insurance	7.3
War Bonds	6.2
Soldiers' Deposits	1.6
Personal Transfers	27.0
Other Collections	7.5
Retained	6.3
Total	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 15

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
OCTOBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$ 9,747.00
Special Field Exercises	212/50310	11.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	3,698.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	1,628.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	47.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	32,719.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	2,615.00
Total		\$50,465.00

ANNEX NO. 18

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
NOVEMBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$5,237.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	1,160.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	1,368.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	29.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	17.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	995.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	1,154.00
Total		\$9,962.00

ANNEX NO. 21

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
DECEMBER, 1944

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$ 9,029.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	3,645.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	2,132.00
Signal Service, Army	212/50605	1.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	181.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	499.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	558.00
Total		\$16,045.00

ANNEX NO. 16

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
OCTOBER, 1944

Collections	\$ 8,079,996
Disbursements	10,157,843
Vouchers Processed	4,406
Personnel Paid	227,638
Finance Personnel on Duty	377
Officers	42
Warrant Officers	17
Enlisted Personnel	318

ANNEX NO. 19

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
NOVEMBER, 1944

Collections	\$ 7,784,176
Disbursements	11,040,364
Vouchers Processed	20,448
Personnel Paid	250,578
Finance Personnel on Duty	381
Officers	42
Warrant Officers	17
Enlisted Personnel	322

ANNEX NO. 22

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
DECEMBER, 1944

Collections	\$ 9,659,522
Disbursements	11,672,272
Vouchers Processed	23,376
Personnel Paid	283,102
Finance Personnel on Duty	493
Officers	51
Warrant Officers	22
Enlisted Personnel	417

ANNEX NO. 17

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
OCTOBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	\$25,068,968
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	41.7%
Government Insurance	8.1
War Bonds	5.9
Soldiers' Deposits	1.7
Personal Transfers	24.7
Other Collections	5.9
Retained	10.0
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 20

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
NOVEMBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	\$25,489,816
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	43.3%
Government Insurance	7.1
War Bonds	6.6
Soldiers' Deposits	1.6
Personal Transfers	24.8
Other Collections	3.8
Retained	12.8
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 23

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
DECEMBER, 1944

Total Pay and Allowances	\$26,651,180.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.0%
Government Insurance	7.0
War Bonds	6.3
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.5
Other Collections	7.3
Retained	10.8
Total	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 24

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JANUARY, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$ 719.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	3,315.00
Quartermaster Service Army	212/50502	874.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	199.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	546.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	765.00
Total		\$6,418.00

ANNEX NO. 25

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
JANUARY, 1945

Collections	\$ 9,556,887.00
Disbursements	12,598,373.00
Vouchers Processed	25,195
Personnel Paid	309,083
Finance Personnel on Duty	550
Officers	58
Warrant Officers	25
Enlisted Personnel	467

ANNEX NO. 26

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
JANUARY, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	\$29,905,087.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.8%
Government Insurance	7.0
War Bonds	6.7
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.2
Other Collections	7.3
Retained	9.3
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 27

GERMAN MONEY AND EXCHANGE PROCEDURE
FEBRUARY, 1945

1. Upon entry into Germany, or as soon thereafter as local commanders consider it advisable, dollar, franc and sterling (English) currency in the hands of troops will be exchanged for Allied Military Authority Marks at the following rates:

1 mark equals 4.95663 francs
1 mark equals 10 cents (US)
1 mark equals 6 pence (English)

2. Corps and division commanders will prescribe the exchange procedure for units under their command.

3. The exchange procedure for Third United States Army troops is as follows:

a. Each company and detachment will prepare a duplicate list of the names of each member of the organization. The amount collected from each individual will be shown opposite his name, leaving sufficient space for entry of the mark value of the money turned in. The funds collected and one copy of the list will be turned in to the Finance Officer normally paying the unit. The Finance Officer will furnish marks to the organization representative in the correct amount to pay each individual.

4. Allied Military Authority marks, in all respects equivalent to valid German-issue marks, are paper money printed in the following denominations:

½ mark (50 pfennig)
1 mark
5 marks
10 marks
20 marks
50 marks
100 marks
1000 marks

Allied Military Authority marks bear the words "Alliierte Militarbehörden" and "In Umlauf Gesetzt in Deutschland". The value is expressed in German words and figures.

5. Valid Reichsmarks are issued by the Reichsbank in denominations of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 1000. They bear the word "Reichsbanknote" and the value in German words and figures.

6. Valid Rentenmarks are issued by the Rentenbank in denominations of 1, 2, and 5. They bear the word "Rentenbankscheine" and the value in German words and figures.

7. The following bank notes are known to be invalid, and will not be accepted by finance and postal installations:

a. Mark notes bearing decess date prior to 30 August 1924, issued by either the Reichsbank or the private banks.

b. Reichsmark notes issued by the private banks.

c. Rentenbank notes of Rentenmark 10 and upwards.

d. Reichskreditkassenscheine and Verrechnungsschein notes of all denominations.

e. German paper currency in denominations larger than 1000 marks.

f. Army auxiliary currency (Wehrmachtbehelfsgeld).

8. The smallest denomination coins are the Reichspfennig and Rentenpfennig. One hundred pfennigs equal one mark. There are no coins of greater value than five marks.

9. Until further order, military personnel in Germany are not authorized to have in their possession German-issue notes in denominations of 100 marks or larger.

ANNEX NO. 28

FUNDS OBLIGATED
BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
FEBRUARY, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$ 4,060.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian Employees	212/50425	1,166.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50502	3,633.00
Signal Service of the Army	212/50605	65.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	94.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/50905	1,113.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	1,495.00
Total		\$11,621.00

ANNEX NO. 29

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
FEBRUARY, 1945

Collections	\$ 8,065,532.00
Disbursements	11,912,223.00
Vouchers Processed	23,187
Personnel Paid	270,350
Finance Personnel on Duty	511
Officers	51
Warrant Officers	22
Enlisted Personnel	438

ANNEX NO. 30

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
FEBRUARY, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	\$28,753,895.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	45.0%
Government Insurance	7.1
War Bonds	6.5
Soldiers' Deposits	1.8
Personal Transfers	20.1
Other Collections	5.7
Retained	13.8
Total	100.0%

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ANNEX NO. 31

FUNDS OBLIGATED BY
UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
MARCH, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$1,203.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian	212/50125	2,170.00
Employees Military Headquarters	212/50502	1,060.00
Quartermaster Service, Army	212/50905	326.00
Engineer Service, Army	212/51005	456.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	2152109	20.00
Transportation Service, Army		
Total		\$5,235.00

ANNEX NO. 32

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS
OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY
MARCH, 1945

Collections	\$ 8,284,396.00
Disbursements	11,573,653.00
Vouchers Processed	21,472
Personnel Paid	264,416
Finance Personnel on Duty	474
Officers	49
Warrant Officers	20
Enlisted Personnel	405

ANNEX NO. 33

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
MARCH, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	\$31,798,679.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.5%
Government Insurance	7.2
War Bonds	6.6
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.7
Other Collections	4.6
Retained	12.3
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 34

PAY STATUS OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
OF THE THIRD U. S. ARMY AS OF
28 FEBRUARY 1945

1. This report presents an analysis of the pay status of enlisted personnel in combat and service units of divisions, corps troops and Army troops assigned to the Third U. S. Army. It analyzes the pay status as of 28 February 1945 of 269,470 enlisted men, approximately 95% of the total assigned enlisted strength of the Third U. S. Army. It discusses the reasons for delinquency in pay and submits suggestions for the elimination of pay delinquency. The information upon which this report is based was obtained from 413 organizations assigned to the Third U. S. Army.

2. Approximately 87 percent of all Third U. S. Army enlisted personnel were paid in full on the 28 February 1945. The enlisted men not paid at the end of February were practically all combat troops who could not be paid on the last day of the month because of the tactical situation; however, they did receive pay as soon as the tactical situation permitted. Among units who did not undergo front line conditions the percentage of troops not paid was less than 1 percent.

3. Of the personnel unpaid at the end of February, many were paid on supplementary pay rolls or received partial payments during the first half of March. In most cases of non-payment a complete settlement of the enlisted man's account was not feasible, because excessive indebtedness and courts-martial fines made settlement impossible; consequently, only a partial payment could be given. Many enlisted men in this category, however, refused even partial payments because they preferred to settle their accounts completely as early as possible. The following are the reasons advanced by the various units included in this survey for nonpayment of enlisted men on the last day of the month:

Tactical situation
Insufficient funds to cover indebtedness
Hospitalization of enlisted man
Enlisted man transferred into unit after pay roll prepared
Enlisted man not present on pay day
Personnel records not received
Enlisted man in confinement or awaiting trial
Enlisted man reduced in grade after pay roll prepared
Enlisted man did not desire to sign pay roll
Service Record incomplete
Enlisted man's allotment in process of adjustment
Enlisted man AWOL
Clerical errors
Pay roll erroneously signed

4. The Finance Department was not held at fault for the non-payment of troops. In only two instances was the failure to pay enlisted men attributed to errors on the part of the Finance Department.

5. The personnel system was considered as one of the principal causes of non-payment of enlisted men. The haphazard way records of enlisted men were kept was severely condemned. There were many cases of poorly kept service records with incomplete and questionable entries which made the enlisted man's pay status questionable and which necessitated time and correspondence in clearing such accounts.

6. The personnel policy in effect at Reinforcement and Hospital Units was criticized, because these organizations were paying enlisted men partial payments in amounts larger than the enlisted men were entitled. The result was that when these men were given an assignment or were returned to duty, their organization found them overpaid; and their insolvency often lasted through two pay periods.

7. Various proposals were offered for the elimination of pay delinquency. The suggestions listed below are quoted remarks from Corps and Division reports and represent an adequate cross section of the proposals offered by all units.

a. "More cooperation from Reinforcement Depots in promptly furnishing Service Records of men transferred promptly.

"More complete financial data on Service Records or temporary service records of men transferred from Reinforcement Depots.

"Consideration should be given to having Service Records or temporary Service Records accompany men upon transfer or return from hospitalization."--XII Corps.

b. "A better system of obtaining records of Reinforcements who are assigned to organizations with only affidavits for service records. It often requires two or three months before said records are located.

"Partial payments should be kept to a minimum and should not be made without some information regarding pay status of individual."--90th Infantry Division.

c. "More emphasis on proper entries in Service Records of enlisted men at staging areas in the United States, and while in the replacement system would aid materially in effecting prompt payment of enlisted men after they arrive at new organizations.

"Personnel officers and disbursing officers of mobile units are overburdened at critical times because the equipment issued to such sections is not designed for mobile operation, with the result that such sections become inoperative for a considerable number of hours before each move, during each move, and after each move. These inoperative periods are usually the very periods during which their services are needed most because the administrative processes that must be accomplished in connection with movements and payments, or concurrently with movements, keep increasing. Frequently this results in accomplishment of only the most urgent processes, and payment of troops is generally not as urgent as some other matters. Delay in payment could be minimized by any of the following:

(1) "Creating a trend toward reducing administrative processes instead of increasing them.

(2) "Specifically designed and built boxes which house office records and equipment without wasting space, and which fit compactly in standard type vehicles.

(3) "Provision for 'rolling' offices in specially designed truck bodies or trailers, or both, for personnel sections and other offices.

(4) "Not recommended at this time, but recommended for consideration after termination of the present war is a system providing for partial payments only to be made outside the United States upon signature of a cash receipt in the amount the individual desires to draw, with all other payments, including settlements of pay accounts in full when desired, to be made by a central pay office in the United States at which a pay card on each individual in the Army would be maintained."--6th Armored Division.

d. "A more efficient system of paying men while absent from their units and a more thorough check made on all records passing through each Port of Embarkation and Replacement Depot, as otherwise the Personnel Officer has to write for pertinent information required after the man has been assigned, causing delay in making prompt payment."--5th Infantry Division.

e. "Discontinuance by the Reinforcement Command of their compulsory partial payment policy. Most casualties have temporary records when returning to their parent unit and a true picture cannot be ascertained of their financial status. Cases have been reported of Enlisted Men being made to take partial payments at 3 or 4 Depots or Battalions as part of their processing before being allowed to continue further on their way back to the division."--4th Armored Division.

f. "Adequate supply and distribution of pay roll forms at all times to facilitate preparation of rolls and thus take advantage of short breaks in tactical operations.

"Prompt transmittal of permanent Service Records by hospitals and reinforcement Depots."--4th Infantry Division.

g. "To refrain from paying enlisted men at reinforcement depots unless soldiers original service record is available. If service record is not available, make a partial payment to the soldier.

"To require hospitals and reinforcement depots to adhere to TM 12-230 as pertains to financial status and entries in service record. (A common practice is to omit transferring to financial page record of courts-martial fines collected). Forwarding indorsements made too frequent reference to "see previous indorsements" which invariably give little or no information. It is not uncommon to receive notice from two disbursing officers that an enlisted man has been paid by both officers for the same period or portion thereof. This necessitates inquiry as to exact periods covered and deductions made in each case. In these cases considerable difficulty is encountered when making inquiry in that APO number of disbursing officer is not indicated.

"Closer supervision of enlisted men when they make affidavits in lieu of service record. Date of last payment and amount of allotments carried are often incorrect.

"Closer supervision by reinforcement depots and hospitals as to total partial payments made in a given period. Many enlisted men receive so many partial payments that they are overpaid and not due for payment until this indebtedness is settled.

"Stress the importance of all allotment applications accompanying service record at all times so that financial status can be determined.

"Stress the importance of the original Service Record accompanying the enlisted man upon transfer, especially when through reinforcement channels."--80th Infantry Division.

h. "Reinforcement depots should secure permanent records from unit to which the enlisted man was last assigned or attached and forward them promptly.

"Reinforcement depots and hospitals should not give partial payments in excess of accrued pay. WD AGO Form #28 should be checked for allotments before partial payment is made.

"Reinforcement depots should record accurate information as to pay status on the Service Record indorsement as required by paragraph 68H, TM 12-230, instead of using stock entry. "See Remarks Financial"---26th Infantry Division.

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1. "It is apparent that Personnel Officers are not making full use of temporary service records, as covered by paragraph 12 and 13, AR 345-155; also many Personnel Officers are not stating a man's account on the pay roll if his debits exceed his credits. This prevents the payment of a statutory partial payment. Also full use is not being made of supplemental pay rolls."--VIII Corps.

ANNEX NO. 35

THIRD U. S. ARMY FINANCE INSTRUCTIONS

1. Finance.

a. Rates of Exchange.

10 German marks equals	\$1.00
49.5663 French francs equals	\$1.00
43.7732 Belgian francs equals	\$1.00
1 pound Sterling equals	\$4.035

b. Legal Tender.

(1) Personnel are prohibited from having British or American currency in their possession on the continent. All such currency will be exchanged for legal tender of the country in which serving.

(2) Legal tender for military personnel in Continental Countries are as follows:

- Germany - Allied Military Marks
- France (including Alsace, Lorraine and Moselle) - French francs
- Belgium - Belgian francs
- Luxembourg - Luxembourg or Belgian francs

(3) As soon as practicable after entry into Germany, approved currencies, other than marks, possessed by personnel will be exchanged for Allied Military Marks.

c. Financial Transactions.

(1) Except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, (in Germany by specific instructions from Supreme Headquarters) foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and exports and imports of currency by any member of the Armed Forces is prohibited.

(2) Commanders of all echelons will take continuing and vigorous steps to prevent the securing of funds by military personnel from unlawful sources, including captured enemy currency, barter with prisoners of war, black market operations and similar methods.

d. Technical Finance Operating Procedure: Technical Finance Operating Procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Fiscal Procedures", Headquarters European Theater of Operations, dated 23 March 1945.

e. Army Exchange Funds: Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with disbursing officers.

f. Postal Funds: Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to disbursing officers.

g. Funds Captured or Seized from the Enemy.

(1) Currency captured or seized from the enemy which comes into the possession of United States or attached allied forces will be promptly remitted, without deduction, to the nearest Finance Officer, with full information as to the source from which such currency was received.

(2) The procedure for the handling of funds that are the personal property of prisoners of war is set forth in Par 3c (4) (d), ETO-SOP No. 16, "Evacuation, Processing and Handling of Prisoners of War", 3 December 1944.

h. Personal Funds of Casualties: Funds of United States military personnel officially reported dead, killed in action, missing in action, missing, interned or captured by the enemy, or evacuated to the hospital, and funds of deceased allied and enemy personnel will be turned into the nearest finance officer with full information as to name, rank, serial number, status (KIA, MIA, etc.), organization and amount pertaining to each individual.

1. Transmission of Funds.

(1) The transmission by military personnel of funds, other than amounts less than one dollar (\$1.00) for souvenir purposes, to any point outside the theater utilizing means other than those afforded by U. S. Army Finance Officers, Army War Bond Officers, or through the Army Postal Service, is prohibited.

(2) Any person (excluding officers of field grade and above) desiring to transmit funds by Personal Transfer Account, postal money order, or by purchase of war bonds, will first submit application in appropriate form to the unit personnel (or comparable administrative) officer, for countersigning.

(3) The unit personnel officer is charged with maintaining a record in respect to each such individual in the unit, indicating the date, amount, and method of every transmittal of funds by such person.

(4) Unit commanders will examine the unit record of fund transmittals in conjunction with individual deposits entered on WD, FD Form No. 33 (Soldiers' Deposit Book) and individual records of currency exchanges at frequent intervals to detect disproportionately large sums of money in the possession of individuals. All such instances will be investigated, and if unlawful possession is indicated, appropriate action will be taken.

j. Upon presentation of proper travel orders, Finance Officers are authorized to convert currencies for military personnel upon change of station or leave to another country.

ANNEX NO. 36

FUNDS OBLIGATED BY UNITS OF THIRD U. S. ARMY APRIL, 1945

Fund	Symbol	Amount
Contingencies of the Army	212/50102	\$ 878.00
Finance Service Army, Pay Civilian		
Employees	212/50125	3,712.00
Quartermaster Service Army	212/50502	2,376.00
Medical and Hospital Department, Army	212/50805	37,410.00
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army	212/51005	3.00
Total		\$44,379.00

ANNEX NO. 37

SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF ALL FINANCE OFFICES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY APRIL, 1945

Collections	\$10,425,544.00
Disbursements	14,763,784.00
Vouchers Processed	25,683
Personnel Paid	344,399
Finance Personnel on Duty	587
Officers	59
Warrant Officers	24
Enlisted Personnel	504

ANNEX NO. 38

DISPOSITION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF THIRD U. S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL APRIL, 1945

Total Pay and Allowances	\$35,391,798.00
Disposition (in percent)	
Family & Individual Allotments	44.8%
Government Insurance	7.2
War Bonds	6.5
Soldiers' Deposits	2.1
Personal Transfers	22.3
Other Collections	4.1
Retained	13.0
Total	100.0%

ANNEX NO. 39

THIRD U. S. ARMY FISCAL PROCEDURE FOR REDEPLOYMENT AND READJUSTMENT

1. GENERAL.

a. Personnel. Finance administrative personnel, Finance disbursing sections and/or Finance teams will be located at assembly and staging areas to make payments, assist in reduction of funds in possession of troops, exchange currency, and otherwise provide finance service for troops embarking for the United States or for other theaters.

b. Application. All procedures required to be accomplished in the assembly area by the following paragraphs will be accomplished at the unit station if the organization proceeds directly to a staging area or port from the unit station.

2. PROCEDURES IN ASSEMBLY AREA.

a. Payment of Troops.

(1) The Soldier's Individual Pay Record, WD AGO Form 28, will be completed and in the hands of each enlisted individual prior to his departure from this theater. Enlisted personnel travelling separately from their units will be advised that they may draw partial payments through any personnel officer from any finance officer upon presentation of their individual pay record and upon proper identification.

(2) Officer's Pay Data Card (WD AGO Form 77) will likewise show complete and current information.

(3) All military personnel will be paid in full through the last day of the month preceding their departure from the assembly area. In the absence of the service or pay records, personnel officers will not omit enlisted personnel from payrolls, but will accept their affidavit for payment as prescribed in AR 345-155, 24 January 1945.

(4) All necessary partial payments will be made in the assembly area as no such payments will be made in the staging areas.

b. Reduction of funds. All military personnel in the assembly area will be encouraged to dispose of all excess funds by the purchase of or investment in war bonds, soldiers' deposits, spear-head deposits, allotments, National Service Life Insurance, or personal transmission accounts. No such service will be available in staging areas, except for the purchase of war bonds through the static finance office.

c. Unit funds (Non-appropriated funds). Unit funds will be disposed of in the assembly area in accordance with AR 210-50, 20 January 1945, and current theater directives. Units departing this theater may deposit their funds as spearhead deposits or exchange them for postal money orders for safekeeping during the movement. Money order fees may be deducted from unit funds as an authorized expenditure. Government bonds owned by and in the possession of departing units should be forwarded by registered mail and deposited with the U. S. Treasury Department for safekeeping. Where a unit is demobilized within the theater, a postal money order will be secured for the transmission of the unit funds to the ETOUSA Central Welfare Fund.

3. PROCEDURES IN STAGING AREAS.

a. Currency conversions. Currency conversions for troops will be accomplished in the staging areas from rosters prepared by unit and group commanders prior to departure from the assembly area. Each unit and reception station group commander will prepare a list in duplicate of the individuals under his control and will include the names of officers and enlisted men. Spaces should be allowed opposite each name for two columns headed respectively, "local currency collected" and "dollar equivalent". Such lists will be turned in with the local currency collected from individuals to the Finance officers at the staging areas for conversion, and the (blue or) yellow seal currency will be delivered to such commanding officers for payment to the persons concerned together with a copy of the roster on which the conversions are shown.

(1) Military personnel departing direct to another theater will be required to exchange all local currency in their possession for United States yellow seal currency. This will be accomplished in staging areas. Upon arrival at destination, yellow seal currency will be exchanged through disbursing officers for local currency of the country concerned.

(2) Military personnel departing to the United States will be required to exchange all local currency in their possession with disbursing officers for regular blue seal U. S. Currency. This will be accomplished in staging areas.

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(3) No limit will be placed on sums of money that individuals may carry so long as the amount requested for conversion does not exceed the amount that the individual could have received through normal pay and allowances. Where excessive amounts are presented for conversion, disbursing officers will require the execution of certificates establishing the source as pay and allowances and in the event that the certificate is not satisfactory, a request for an investigation should be made to the individual's commanding officer.

b. Bank accounts. Prior to departure all personnel are advised to close their bank accounts in the United Kingdom or on the Continent. This may be accomplished by:

(1) Cashing a personal check at the bank or requesting the bank to transfer the balance by cable or mail to a given address.

(2) Obtaining a cashier's check which should be cashed prior to departure from this theater and converted into blue or yellow seal U. S. Currency.

4. PROCEDURES EN ROUTE.

a. Partial payment. Partial payments necessary for military

personnel due to lack of funds at time of departure for other theaters or the United States will be accomplished on board ship. Administrative instructions will direct each unit and reception station group commander to prepare and have signed, a partial payment payroll for his organization or group prior to its departure from the assembly area.

(1) The partial payment payroll will be prepared for every member of the organization in the amount of \$10.00 for each individual.

(2) Where the journey exceeds 30 days, additional partial payments of \$10.00 for individuals may be made.

(3) Such payrolls, properly completed and signed, will be turned in immediately after sailing to the Class "B" Agent Finance Officer on board who was previously appointed by order of the commanding officer at the staging area, as agent to a Finance Disbursing Officer at the same location.

(4) Funds necessary for such payments will be secured by the officer appointed to act as Class "B" Agent on shipboard from his parent disbursing officer.

(5) The payrolls will be paid in yellow or blue seal

United States currency, dependent upon the destination, by the Class "B" Agent. If the number of payrolls is large, unit or group commanders may be appointed Class "A" Agents to the Class "B" Agent Finance Officer by the senior US Army officer commanding the troops on board ship, for the purpose of paying their organizations or groups.

(6) The Class "B" Agent Officer will make his returns to the first available Finance Disbursing Officer after arrival at destination or, if an opportunity arises, to any Finance Disbursing Officer enroute.

b. Currency conversion. All necessary conversions of currency for local currency at stop-over ports of call enroute will be accomplished by a procedure corresponding to that outlined in paragraph 3a above.

5. FULL SETTLEMENT OF PAY AT DESTINATION.


a. Administrative instructions will direct each unit and reception station group commander to prepare and have signed, prior to arrival at final port of debarkation, payrolls for full settlement of pay to be submitted to Finance Officer at destination.

ANNEX-NO. 40

PICTORIAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCE FUNCTIONS



ADMINISTRATIVE-FISCAL: Preparation of Correspondence and Reports; Maintenance of Files and Fiscal Records; Suballotment of Funds.



ACCOUNTING: Processing of Paid Vouchers; Maintenance of Accounting Records.



PAY AND ALLOWANCES: Computation of Pay Vouchers and Commercial Accounts.



FUNDING: Shipment of Funds to Finance Officers



CASHIER: Conversion, Collection, and Payment of Funds.



PAY ROLLS: Preparation of Funds for Payment of Troops.

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ANNEX NO. 41

FINANCE FIELD OPERATIONS




FINANCE BIVOUCAC: "Open for Business"



CASHIER: "Balancing Out"




AGENT FINANCE OFFICERS: "Check Your Cash, Sir!"



ADMINISTRATION: "Keep that Paper Moving!"




ACCOUNTING: "Check and Balance!"



PAY AND ALLOWANCES: "Get 'em paid!"

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ANNEX NO. 42




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
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BELGIAN


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
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


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


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
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ENGLISH



ENGLISH



HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Headquarters Commandant
APO 403

Subject: After Action Report, Headquarters Commandant's Section.
To : Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After Action Report of the Headquarters Commandant's Section, Third U. S. Army, beginning with the date of alert for overseas service on 1 January, 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. It has been written with two objectives:

- a. To report the operations of the section.
- b. To be as helpful as possible to future commandants of large headquarters in campaigns: during summer, autumn, winter and spring; in fast moving tactical situations over great distances, and during periods of relative stability of the front; under canvas in the field, or utilizing covered accommodations in communities both large and small; in combat, and perhaps (the future will tell) during the occupation of enemy territory after hostilities have ceased.


3. The Commandant's task is not easy, and little source material is available to assist him to visualize his work and to prepare to get it done. It is hoped that this report may fill a portion of this void.

Frank Kelley
FRANK KELLEY
Colonel, Infantry
Headquarters Commandant


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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



TROOP ATTACHMENTS



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FOREWORD

FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

On 1 January, 1944, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, stationed at FORT SAM HOUSTON, Texas under the command of Lieutenant General COURTNEY H. HODGES, was alerted for movement through the NEW YORK Port of Embarkation to the European Theater of Operations.

An advance party consisting of thirteen officers and twenty-six enlisted men left FORT SAM HOUSTON on 12 January. Upon docking near GLASGOW, Scotland it was met aboard ship by the newly designated Army Commander, Lieutenant General GEORGE S. PATTON, JR., and entrained immediately for PEOVER CAMP, about three miles from KNUTSFORD, Cheshire, England, (sixteen miles south of MANCHESTER) where it arrived on 29 January and began preparing PEOVER CAMP and TOFT CAMP, about two miles distant, for the reception of the main body. During the next few weeks a number of staff officers, most of whom had served with the Seventh U. S. Army, joined the Headquarters.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Special Troops, Headquarters Company, and Medical Detachment, Special Troops, Third U. S. Army (less the advance party), after being relieved of command responsibilities by Headquarters Fourth U. S. Army, entrained at FORT SAM HOUSTON, Texas on 15 February and arrived at CAMP SHANKS, New York, 19 February. On 12 March the Headquarters boarded the ILE DE FRANCE at a Manhattan pier and sailed without escort the following day. The vessel anchored in the FIRTH OF CLYDE opposite the port of GREENOCK, Scotland on 21 March. The troops debarked 22 March, entrained immediately, and reached the KNUTSFORD area on 22 and 23 March.

ORGANIZATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS FOR COMBAT

When the Headquarters arrived in the United Kingdom, it was at the exact strength prescribed in Tables of Organization 200-1, 200-2, and 200-3. Additional attachments were made by higher Headquarters commencing the early part of April and continuing for many weeks. This, and the nature of the forthcoming operations, necessitated the enlargement of Headquarters Special Troops, Headquarters Company and many of the General and Special Staff Sections.

The dual function of the Headquarters Commandant and Provost Marshal set forth in T/O 200-3 was eliminated by appointing an Army Provost Marshal in the grade of colonel and creating for him a special staff section.

The G-5 Section was constituted (Civil Affairs).

The G-6 Section was constituted (Publicity and Psychological Warfare).

An Army Exchange Officer was appointed to operate under the Special Service Section.

An American Red Cross Field Director joined the Headquarters to operate in conjunction with the Special Service Section.

Within the G-3 Section, the Accommodations Sub-section was constituted. Its mission was to receive and billet incoming Army troops, working in conjunction with the British authorities and with the Western Base Section, United States Army. It became the G-3 Liaison Sub-section when its former mission ceased upon arrival on the continent.

Within the G-4 Section, the Transportation Sub-section was constituted. Its mission was to coordinate and control transportation and motor routings within the Army area.

By 1 July the following teams and units, by attachment, had become an integral part of the Headquarters:

G-2 Attachments:

G-2 Air Sub-section
Special Liaison Unit
Counter Intelligence Detachments
Military Intelligence Interrogation Teams
Photo Interpreter Detachments
Order of Battle Unit
Interrogators of Prisoners of War Teams
Escape and Evasion Unit
OSS (Secret Intelligence) Team
OSS (Secret Counter Intelligence) Team
Field Interrogation Detachment
Enemy Documents Section
Advance Documents Section

G-3 Attachments:

G-3 Air Sub-section
G-3 Air Liaison Sub-section
Third Army Historical Team
Special Operation Detachment and Signal Section (redesignated No. 11 SF Detachment, G-3 Section)
11th Liaison Squadron (Army Air Forces)

G-6 Attachments:

3rd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (Note: Transferred to Headquarters 12th United States Army Group 6 August 1944)
Detachment, 72nd Publicity Service Battalion (This unit established the Press Camp and provided complete housing, messing and transportation facilities for a group of approximately fifty war correspondents)

Adjutant General Attachments:

39th Machine Records Unit
572nd Army Postal Unit

Engineer Attachments:

1681st Engineer Liaison Detachment
Detachment, 652nd Engineer Topographical Battalion
2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team

Finance Attachments:

71st Finance Disbursing Section (Note: Relieved by 11th Finance Disbursing Section 7 August 1944)

Provost Marshal Attachments:

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 511th Military Police Battalion (Note: 13th Military Police Criminal Investigating Section attached 17 August 1944)

Signal Attachments:

ZY Detachment, 21st Weather Squadron, and ZY Detachment, 40th Mobile Communications Squadron
166th Signal Photo Company (Note: Enemy Equipment Identification Service Team No. 8 attached during late July)

Medical Detachment, Special Troops Attachments:

Medical Detachment, 511th Military Police Battalion

ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL TROOPS FOR COMBAT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Table of Organization 200-2 (Headquarters Company, Army) proved to be inadequate for service in the field. The need for utility engineers, carpenters, masons, plumbers, sign painters and electricians was met by attaching to Headquarters Company, Third U. S. Army, the 1092nd Engineer Utility Detachment. The number of generators assigned was insufficient for 24-hour operations in the field, and a considerable number of additional generators was obtained.

To insure mobility to the Headquarters, two Quartermaster Truck Companies (3597th and 3805th) were attached to Headquarters Special Troops, as was the 502nd Quartermaster Car Company. In addition, Headquarters Company was provided with three additional 3/4-ton Command and Reconnaissance Trucks and fifty additional 1/4-ton 4 x 4 Trucks. Fifteen of the latter were needed for the G-3 Air Liaison Sub-section alone. Three 2 1/2-ton 6 x 6 K-60 van type Trucks were secured and fitted up as quarters for the General Officers, and an M-20 Armored Car was obtained for the use of the Army Commander. It was found advisable to provide trailers, either 1/4-ton or 1-ton, for practically all vehicles.

To service this motor transportation, the 3457th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company was attached to Headquarters Special Troops.

The 6th Cavalry Band (later redesignated 61st Army Ground Force Band) was attached to Headquarters Special Troops to serve as the Headquarters Band.

ARMY AIR FORCE

Headquarters, XII Tactical Air Command was designated by higher Headquarters to support the Army. Subsequently in combat it physically joined the Forward Echelon at some of its Command Posts, but did not displace forward with each move made.

OTHER TROOPS

The following Troops habitually served the Headquarters:

301st Signal Operations Battalion
33rd Signal Construction Battalion
34th Signal Construction Battalion
503rd Military Police Battalion

(Note: After arrival on the continent, the following Troops were added to the above):

546th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (Mobile)
293rd Engineer Combat Battalion (less two companies)
Headquarters, 6th Cavalry Group (with varying detachments from 6th Cavalry Squadron and 43rd Cavalry Squadron to provide security in the field)

Unit had its own Mess.

DISPOSITION OF THE HEADQUARTERS

Early in April a Third U. S. Army Liaison Office was established in Bryanston Square, LONDON. It consisted of the Deputy Chief of Staff and a group of approximately eleven officers and eight enlisted men. Its mission was to maintain contact with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, and Headquarters First Army Group. The Liaison Office rejoined the Headquarters in the SOUTHAMPTON area.

On 1 May the Headquarters Commandant was directed to plan for the establishment of the Headquarters in three echelons as follows:

a. An advance command group, consisting of representatives of those sections of the general and special staff which would be indispensable in combat operations, together with the necessary troops to provide for their security and housekeeping. This group, known as "Forward Echelon, Group A," would be entirely mobile, and be capable of proceeding ahead of the regular forward echelon to conduct operations.

b. "Forward Echelon, Group B," that portion of the forward echelon remaining after the departure of "Forward Echelon, Group A."

c. The Rear Echelon.

It was planned to move the Headquarters to the continent over the beaches, in the event no major port was available. Therefore loading lists for all three echelons were published on 23 and 31 May to facilitate loading the Headquarters on landing craft.

On 22 May the BUCCO (Build Up Control Organization) Section of the Headquarters, consisting of four officers, four enlisted men and two vehicles departed for PORTSMOUTH, where it operated under BUCCO West, supervising the priorities and loading of Third U. S. Army units moving to the continent. (Note: This section rejoined the Headquarters in early August in the BEAUCHAMP (T 23) area).

Shortly after D Day, two liaison groups left to take station as follows:

a. With Headquarters VIII Corps: Representatives from G-2, G-3, Provost Marshal, Quartermaster and Signal Sections -- eight officers, nine enlisted men and five vehicles.

b. With Headquarters Advance Section, Communications Zone: Representatives from G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Engineer, Medical and Quartermaster Sections -- eight officers, four enlisted men and three vehicles.

The Forward Echelon was phased in to be lifted to the continent on D plus 29 days; the Rear Echelon, on about D plus 44 days. On 10 June (D plus 4 days) it became apparent that there was a possibility the Forward Echelon might become operational while the Rear Echelon was still in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, on D plus 29 the great bulk of the troops assigned to the Army would still be stationed in the United Kingdom -- indeed, many were still to arrive from the United States. Their equipping and preparation for combat was a task of considerable magnitude. Accordingly, the following decisions were made:

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a. The Commanding General, XII Corps, was designated as Deputy Army Commander, to assume command of Third U. S. Army troops in the United Kingdom upon the departure of the Army Commander for the continent.

b. The normal Forward Echelon of the Headquarters to be provided with operational groups from the following sections normally in the Rear Echelon: G-5, Adjutant General, Chaplain, Finance, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster.

This new grouping of the staff was known as Forward Echelon, Group "X".

c. The Rear Echelon of the Headquarters to be provided with operational groups from the following sections normally in the Forward Echelon: G-1, attached G-2 teams, G-4, Artillery, and attached Engineer teams. This grouping was known as Rear Echelon, Group "Y".

d. To reinforce the staff of the XII Corps so it could perform the Army mission given it, in addition to its own responsibilities, another group of personnel, designated as Group "Z", was formed consisting of twenty-four officers and twenty-nine enlisted men, with three vehicles and a number of impressed British civilian sedans. Sections represented were: G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, Adjutant General, Artillery, Chemical Warfare Service, Engineer, Inspector General, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Sections. It was planned to have Group "Z" rejoin the Headquarters when the XII Corps arrived on the continent. Actually, while most of them did so, a few of the officers and men remained in the United Kingdom dealing with problems of personnel and supply long after the XII Corps had been committed to action.

Loading Lists for Groups "X" and "Y" were published on 19 and 20 June, 1944.

On 3 July the Headquarters was organized for combat operations, and was disposed as follows:

- Forward Echelon, Group "X" in the SOUTHAMPTON area.
- Rear Echelon, Group "Y" and Group "Z" in the KNUTSFORD (MANCHESTER) area.
- The BUCCO Section at PORTSMOUTH.
- Liaison group with Headquarters, Advance Section, Communications Zone, on the continent.
- Liaison group with Headquarters, VIII Corps, on the continent.

CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

On 25 March all officers and enlisted men of the Headquarters were massed on the grounds of PEOVER HALL, the Army Commander's residence, and addressed by him. The Headquarters became operational a few days later, and was established as follows: At PEOVER HALL and PEOVER CAMP, the Army Commander, the Command Group, and the Forward Echelon; at TOFT CAMP, the Rear Echelon.

Both PEOVER and TOFT camps were British camps containing semi-permanent and temporary buildings. Officers of field grade were billeted in KNUTSFORD and vicinity. Even with the erection of a great many additional buildings for staff section offices, officers quarters, messes, latrines and bath houses, it was necessary to quarter the majority of the enlisted men under canvas. Some units were billeted in KNUTSFORD; the G-5 Section was housed at THE HERMITAGE, a large manor house several miles distant; the truck companies and Utilities Detachment camped on the Heath in KNUTSFORD.

Messes for the Headquarters proper were established as follows: At PEOVER HALL and PEOVER CAMP, the Army Commander's mess, a colonel's mess, an officers' mess and an enlisted mess. At TOFT CAMP, an officers' mess and an enlisted mess.

The War Room and Top Secret Control Office were established in PEOVER HALL. As a security measure, the office buildings of the Forward Echelon were surrounded by a high barbed wire fence and guarded day and night. Special passes were required to secure admittance to these areas.

This was a period of intense activity. Organization of the Army, planning its part in the coming invasion, receiving advance parties of all Army troops arriving in the United Kingdom, visits of distinguished visitors, schools for officers, conferences, and visits to higher headquarters consumed much time. A few ceremonies were held for the purpose of awarding decorations, and, on Flag Day, 14 June, for the blessing of the Army Colors by the Chaplain.

With the advent of D Day on 6 June, all activities were intensified. On 15 May the Headquarters Commandant had been directed to reconnoiter south of the line LONDON-BRISTOL for suitable accommodations for the Headquarters in order to be nearer the designated embarkation area and to the bulk of the troops assigned to the Army. Several trips were made and the area within a 10-mile radius of BRAEMORE HALL (VU 53), Hampshire (west of SOUTHAMPTON) was finally selected.



PEOVER HALL

On 14 and 15 June advance detachments proceeded to BRAEMORE HALL to prepare for the reception of Forward Echelon, Group "X". On 24 June the Chief of Staff directed Group "X" to move by motor to the new area and designated the Army Provost Marshal as the Commander of the columns. The march was made on 29 June; distance traveled was 218 miles.

On 2 July, Forward Echelon "X" was ordered to be prepared to embark at SOUTHAMPTON on 5 July; destination, UTAH BEACH, NORMANDY, France. All vehicles were to be prepared to land in four feet of water, and the waterproofing of the vehicles was rushed day and night.

On 031200 July, loading lists and Ship Sheets were received indicating that two military transports (Liberty Ships) and six LST's were to be used to transport the Headquarters. The Chief of Staff arranged with the Commanding General, Southern Base Section, to have the 301st Signal Operations Battalion and one company of the Military Police lifted with the Headquarters on LST's.

On 4 July Forward Echelon, Group "X", the 301st Signal Operations Battalion, the 33rd Signal Construction Battalion and the 503rd Military Police Battalion closed messes at 1300, entrucked starting 1300, and moved to SOUTHAMPTON, a distance of twenty miles, during 4 and 5 July. Embarkation was accomplished during the 5 and 6 July.

Meanwhile, the advance detachment of Rear Echelon, Group "Y" arrived at BRAEMORE HALL 041500 July. On 7 July Rear Echelon "Y" moved by motor to NINE YEWIS (BRAEMORE area). PEOVER and TOFT CAMPS were turned over to Western Base Section by 9 July. Group "Y" began to move to SOUTHAMPTON on 14 July. By this time, the waterproofing of vehicles had been discontinued. The Group was loaded on three military transports and one LST.

Group "Z" moved to the BRAEMORE area with Group "Y" and joined Headquarters, XII Corps, which moved into BRAEMORE HALL as soon as Forward Echelon "X" cleared the area on 4 July.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

During the period 5-7 July, Forward Echelon, Group "X" sailed from SOUTHAMPTON for UTAH BEACH, covering a distance of approximately 150 miles in convoy; average time for transit was fourteen hours. The military transports were anchored offshore and their loads transferred to small landing craft and amphibious trucks for unloading on the beach. The LST's were beached at high tide; left dry when the tide ebbed, debarkation was carried out and all vehicles moved inland about eight miles to a transient area, where vehicles were initially de-waterproofed (after coming ashore on dry land) and each convoy proceeded a distance of twenty-eight miles to the Headquarters Bivouac Area near NEHOU (O 19) fifteen miles south of CHERBOURG and eight miles from the front lines of the VIII Corps. The Commanding General and Chief of Staff flew to France and joined the Headquarters, which was set up entirely under canvas in the orchards and fields of Normandy, lined by the now famous hedgerows. Two officers' messes and two enlisted messes, in addition to the Army Commander's mess, were established, and the first hot meal was served the evening of 7 July. Overnight visitors were accommodated in pyramidal tents supplied with cots and blankets.

Canvas immediately became a critical item of supply; tables of Basic Allowances proved to be entirely inadequate, and the Headquarters Supply Officer exerted every effort during the next six weeks to procure a sufficient stock of heavy tentage. Passenger vehicles, notably 1/4 ton 4 x 4 Trucks were also insufficient in number and more were procured.

The Army was not yet operational, but on 10 July it established two control points, one on UTAH BEACH and the other on OMAHA BEACH to receive and direct to assembly areas all arriving troops assigned to Third U. S. Army. This proved to be a task of considerable magnitude during the remainder of the month.

By 19 July, Rear Echelon "Y" closed with the Forward Echelon "X" in the NEHOU area.

During the remainder of July, the Headquarters continued receiving and organizing Army troops and preparing for the forthcoming operations.

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

Headquarters Third U. S. Army became operational for combat for the first time at noon on 1 August 1944, under the Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

The subsequent displacements forward of the Forward and Rear Echelons are covered below. In general, the Forward Echelon moved forward by bounds of from thirty to seventy miles; the Rear Echelon moved less frequently, locating in the vicinity of the Forward Echelon about every second move the latter made. The rapidity of the Army's advance necessitated frequent and long displacements.

At 0030 on 7 August the Headquarters, then in the BEAUCHAMPS area, was bombed and strafed. One stick of bombs fell into a Headquarters Company area but caused neither casualties nor damage.



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Group L, American Red Cross Clubmobile Service (thirty-two women and nineteen vehicles) joined the Headquarters 25 August to serve doughnuts and hot coffee to troops within a twenty-five mile radius of the Rear Echelon.


At the end of August, the strength of the Headquarters and of the units which habitually displaced with it and messes and bivouacs in its immediate vicinity (exclusive of liaison officers and drivers) was 790 officers, 6171 enlisted men and 82 civilians. These figures are not all-inclusive, for several group headquarters and many attached service troops, such as medical, ordnance and quartermaster units, were usually located within a five-mile radius of the Headquarters and changed location with it.

In occupying sites for the command post, consideration had to be given to the Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command which had an average strength, with attached units, of 123 officers and 1063 enlisted men.

DISPLACEMENTS OF THE HEADQUARTERS

The initial location of the Headquarters, occupied by the Forward Echelon, Group "X" on 5-7 July and by the Rear Echelon, Group "Y" on 17-19 July was (O 19) near NEHOU, fifteen miles south of CHERBOURG. Subsequent displacements were as follows:

FORWARD ECHELON			REAR ECHELON		
Date	New Location	Distance Traveled	Date	New Location	Distance Traveled
31 July-1 Aug	T 26 le BIGNARD, 19 mi W of ST LO	25 mi			
2-3 Aug	T 23 BEAUCHAMPE, 11 mi N of AVRANCHES	36 mi	3 Aug	With Fwd Ech	59 mi
8 Aug	Y 39 FOILLEY, 8 mi NW of FOUGERES	32 mi	10-11 Aug	With Fwd Ech	32 mi
12 Aug	Y 65 ST OVEN des TOITS, 7 mi NW of LAVAL	35 mi			
14-15 Aug	Z 34 la BAZOGE, 10 mi N of le MANS	67 mi	17-18 Aug	With Fwd Ech	102 mi
20 Aug	W 18 BROU, 22 mi SW of CHARTRES	73 mi			
25 Aug	W 95 COURCY-aux-LOGES, 8 mi S of PITHIVIERS	68 mi	27 Aug	With Fwd Ech	139 mi
30 Aug	X 87 la CHAUME, 13 mi NE of SENS	80 mi			



BOMB DAMAGE AT NANCY CP

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

On 1 September the 3597th and 3805th Quartermaster Truck Companies were relieved from attachment to Headquarters Special Troops, Third U. S. Army.

On 3 September the last of the personnel of Group "Z" joined the Headquarters.

The month of September saw the Headquarters move, for the first time during combat, into buildings. The Forward Echelon went into ETAIN (U 47), a town with a normal population of 2300. Here also was set up the Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command. The Rear Echelon of this Headquarters remained in the field because no suitable accommodations could be found within a reasonable distance of the Forward Echelon, and an early move to NANCY (U 81) of both echelons was anticipated.

On 1 September the Forward Echelon was located at (X 87) la CHAUME, thirteen miles east of SENS. The Rear Echelon was at (W 95) COURCY-aux-LOGES, eight miles south of PITHIVIERS. Subsequent moves were as follows:

FORWARD ECHELON			REAR ECHELON		
Date	New Location	Distance Traveled	Date	New Location	Distance Traveled
4 Sept	T 64 MARSON, 8 mi E of CHALONS- sur-MARNE	99 mi	6 Sept	With Fwd Ech	150 mi
15 Sept	U 46 BRAQUIS, 11 mi E of VERDUN	68 mi	18 Sept	Vic ROUVRES, near Fwd Ech	70 mi
22-28 Sept	U 47 ETAIN, 9 mi E of VERDUN	5 mi			

On 25 September the chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to reconnoiter NANCY (U 81), a city with a normal population of 123,000, for suitable accommodations for both echelons of the Headquarters. Located in the city at this time were Headquarters XII Corps, the Rear Echelons of the 35th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division and many units of Corps troops and Division service troops.

A Billeting Sub-section of the Headquarters Commandant's Office was formed, consisting of eight officers and sixteen enlisted men, which proceeded to NANCY on 27 September. A battalion and two companies of Combat Engineers together with large details of prisoners of war, began clearing the debris and repairing the facilities in the CASERNE BLANDAN, CASERNE LANDREMONT and CASERNE MOLITOR.

These casernes (large groups of stone barracks) were originally built and occupied by the French Regular Army. German troops had occupied them since 1940. They were damaged by our dive bombers and by subsequent street fighting when our troops captured the city, but by the second week of October had been made ready for occupancy by the Headquarters.

The move to NANCY took place during 5-12 October.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Continued bad weather impelled many units of the Army to seek shelter in towns. To meet this situation the Accommodations Sub-section of the G-3 Section was reactivated to control the assignment of all covered accommodations.

Meanwhile, preparations for the move to NANCY were being rushed. In this connection, the report of Headquarters, 1137th Engineer Combat Group, indicating the magnitude of the task of rehabilitating the three casernes selected as the site of the Command Post, is quoted herewith as a matter of interest:

"1. Work accomplished by this headquarters in clean-up and repairs to buildings for occupancy by Third Army consisted of principal tasks summarized as follows:

a. Electrical Repairs: Wiring, new fixtures, switches, fuses, bulbs, etc., were replaced or repaired and tie-in with city current completed. Work consisted of installing 6200 feet of various types of wire; 1200 fuses; 2000 sockets; 1500 light bulbs; 2800 switches; etc.

b. Roof Repair: This work accomplished by civilian and military personnel. Materials were on the site.

c. Plumbing: Repairs to plumbing in place and installation of two toilet bowls complete; 13 toilet seats; 85 faucets; 104 feet of galvanized pipe; and miscellaneous tees, unions, elbows, etc., was completed by military personnel assisted by two civilian French plumbers.

d. Blackout Curtains: Approximately 750 windows provided with blackout shades, requiring acquisition of materials, framing of several sizes, covering and hanging by troop labor.

e. Window Panes: Six thousand window panes requiring acquisition of materials, clean-up old frames, glass-cutting and installation completed almost entirely by troops.

f. Building Clean-up: Before plumbers, carpenters, or electricians could start work all buildings, thoroughly sabotaged by Germans upon evacuation, were cleared of debris and rubbish; toilets, latrines and plumbing fixtures cleared of obstructions; and damaged furnishings and rubble removed from premises.

g. Clearing Grounds: Wrecked German vehicles, radar equipment, bedding, garbage removed by troop labor, bulldozers and wreckers.

h. Map Removal: Approximately 350 tons or 100 truck loads of German maps removed from premises.

2. Man-hours of personnel required amounted to approximately 25,000 troop; 12,000 PW; 50 civilian plumber; 72 civilian electrician; 250 civilian carpenter; and 80 interior decorator and painter."

On 5 October the Rear Echelon moved from ROUVRES (U 46) to NANCY (U 81), a distance of sixty miles, occupying office and barracks space in CASERNE LANDREMONT. The Supply Group of the Forward Echelon moved from STAIN (U 47) into CASERNE MOLITOR on 11 October, followed by the Command Group, as well as by the Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command, on the following day.

It is interesting to note that on 12 October, the Forward Echelon had been operational for seventy-three days. It had traveled from the COTENTIN PENINSULA to NANCY, forty miles from the German frontier, covering a distance of 648 miles, and had occupied thirteen different sites. The Rear Echelon had occupied eight different sites in the same length of time over the same distance.

The many problems incident to locating the Headquarters in a city, instead of in the field, can best be appreciated when it is realized

that the Headquarters Commandant, on the last day of October, had taken over under leases from the respective owners and was operating the following establishments:


Three large casernes.
Five hotels quartering 324 officers, and providing accommodations for sixty overnight visitors.
Five apartment houses quartering 122 officers.
Twelve other billets quartering thirty officers.
A tailoring and dry-cleaning establishment for all personnel.
Seven garages.
Fourteen other buildings.

The following messes were in operation:

The Army Commander's Mess.
Grand Hotel Mess for seventy-six officers of all grades.
Hotel Thiers Mess for 155 officers of field grade.
Cafe de Deux Hemispheres Mess for 276 officers of company grade.
An enlisted mess for 1450 men.

In addition, a bus line was chartered and operated to provide transportation for officers between the Headquarters, their messes and their billets.

Finally, approximately 125 French civilians were employed as chefs, waiters, and interpreters on the staffs of the hotels, and as janitors and charwomen for the apartment houses.



Forward Command Post in City of LUXEMBOURG

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

On 21 November the Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to reconnoiter the front for new locations for the Forward Echelon, as the Army's attack which started on 8 November was making steady progress northeastward. Among the sites reconnoitered during the balance of November were CHATEAU SALINS (Q 12), MORHANGE (Q 23), PAULQUEMONT (Q 15), and ST AVOLD (Q 25), all of which lie from fifteen to thirty-five miles northeast of NANCY.

On 26 November announcement was made of a revised division of Staff Sections into Forward and Rear Echelons. Relative strength (exclusive of Headquarters Commandant's Section, Headquarters Special Troops, Headquarters Company, the Aid Stations and all attached troops) was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	VEHICLES
Forward Echelon	235	506	323
Rear Echelon	190	500	242
Other Areas	110	311	202

On 6 November the Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to be prepared to move and quarter a Mobile Command Group consisting of thirty-five officers, 167 enlisted men and fifty-four vehicles from these sections:

Command Section
G-2
G-3
G-4
Artillery
Engineer
Signal

together with small detachments of signal troops, military police, Utility Engineers, the Aid Stations, and Headquarters Company. One mess was to feed all personnel.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Early in December the Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to prepare ST AVOLD (Q 25) for occupancy by the Forward Echelon.

On 11 December, the advance party of the Headquarters Commandant's Section, with accompanying signal, engineer and service troops proceeded thereto and commenced repairs on all installations. However, following the German attack in the ARDENNES commencing in 16 December, the Chief of Staff directed on 19 December that this work cease and all troops return to NANCY. On 20 December the Mobile Command Group (see Chapter 6) proceeded to the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). During the next week many officers and men of the Forward Echelon proceeded to LUXEMBOURG, and on 28 December the remainder of this echelon closed. Distance traveled was ninety miles.

The Headquarters was comfortably located in one large modern building housing all staff sections.

Messes were established as follows:

The Army Commander's Mess.
Two Officers' Messes (239 members).
One Enlisted Mess (750 members).

Because of the shift north, reconnaissances for a location for the Rear Echelon were made, starting 21 December, in the towns of METZ (U 85), THIONVILLE (U 88), LONGVY (P 50), and ESCH sur ALZETTE (P 70). The latter place was selected by the Chief of Staff on 29 December, and the advance party proceeded thereto immediately. The actual move of the Rear Echelon to ESCH was initiated on 7 January, 1945.

SECRET

CHAPTER 10 MARCH OPERATIONS

Early in the month the Headquarters Commandant reconnoitered the cities of TRIER, GERMANY (122) and ECHTERNACH, LUXEMBOURG (113) for possible sites for the Forward Echelon.

On 11 March, at 0220 hours, a German shell, estimated to be 280mm, struck and exploded within ten yards of the building housing the Forward Echelon in LUXEMBOURG CITY, killing two enlisted men and causing considerable damage to the building.

The Headquarters Commandant's working party, reinforced by two engineer companies and 300 prisoners of war, left for TRIER (122) on 16 March and commenced work on a large Kaserne on the eastern end of the city. However, due to the rapid progress of the Army's attack in the SAAR - PALATINATE area, further reconnaissances were made on 21 and 22 March of ST. WENDEL (Q59), KUSEL (L70), WOLFSSTEIN (L90), KAISERSLAUTERN (M09) and IDAR OBERSTEIN (L72). On 25 March the last named place was designated as the next site, and the working party proceeded thence to TRIER, leaving the latter area under guard pending reaching a decision about locating the Rear Echelon.

On 26 March the working party from the Rear Echelon moved to TRIER.

On 27 and 28 March the Forward Echelon moved to IDAR OBERSTEIN, occupying the KLOTZBERG KASERNE, a large modern German establishment. Officers were quartered in barracks. The distance traveled was eighty miles through very hilly country. A nearby kaserne was occupied by the Forward Echelon, XIX Tactical Air Command.

On 29-30 March the Rear Echelon moved to TRIER. On the same two days, the Headquarters Commandant reconnoitered the cities of HANAU (M87), OFFENBACH (M76) and FRANKFURT am MAIN (M66). The latter city was designated as the new location and on 31 March the working party of the Forward Echelon, reinforced by two companies of engineers and 400 prisoners of war, began to prepare the barracks for occupancy. On the same day the reconnaissance party of the Rear Echelon moved to FRANKFURT am MAIN (M66) to survey another kaserne for its needs.

The month of March saw the initial establishment of Army Headquarters in hostile territory, and succeeding months were to witness a number of moves to other cities. The measures adopted to make the headquarters adequate were in general:

1. The Headquarters Commandant's advance working party consisted of the following:
 - a. The Headquarters Commandant, with one assistant. The Commandant selected and laid out the entire area, and allocated office and working space to each section and unit.
 - b. The Billeting Officer of the Commandant's Office, who procured and laid out officers quarters, evicted civilians where necessary through the Office of Military Government, secured and distributed furniture for the quarters, and cleaned the quarters.
 - c. An officer from Headquarters Company, who planned the establishment of messes, quartering of the enlisted men of Headquarters Company and Detachment, the location of the Aid Station, Barber Shop, etc.
 - d. A representative from the G-3 Accommodations Section, who usually took with him a Town Major for duty in the city into which the Headquarters was to move. He assigned all covered accommodations in the area.



LOCATOR SIGNS IN CP AREA

CHAPTER 8 JANUARY OPERATIONS

On 1 January the advance party of the Rear Echelon Headquarters Commandant's Office, accompanied by the newly-appointed Town Major, proceeded to ESCH sur ALZETTE (P 70) and commenced surveying the town and preparing the selected accommodations for occupancy.

The Rear Echelon moved from NANCY (U 81) to ESCH as follows:

7 January -- 50% of the Supply Group, 50% of Headquarters Company, and the Officers' Mess.

8 January -- Balance of Supply Group, and the Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Finance and Chaplain Sections.

9 January -- Remainder of Rear Echelon.

The distance covered was 65 miles.

It was necessary to establish the Headquarters in three large schools (using two more as barracks), a 5-story office building, and numerous stores and apartments. One small hotel was used for overnight guests. Officers were billeted with private families after city and steel plant officials had conducted a door-to-door survey for available rooms. Motor Parks were all in open lots due to lack of garage space. One Officers' Mess (245 members) and one enlisted mess (850 members) were established in the Supply Group building.

By 19 January the Purchasing and Contracting Officer completed the bulk of the turn-in of covered accommodations in NANCY (U 81) and the return of requisitioned furniture; the last turn-ins were made ten days later. This proved to be a large task, and prior to the vacating of the city, the Inspector General had inspected each installation that had been occupied by the Headquarters to insure that it was in proper condition to return it to the Town Major.

On 28 January, following the Chief of Staff's instructions, the advance party of the Rear Echelon Headquarters Commandant's Office moved to LUXEMBOURG (P 81) to prepare to move the Rear Echelon thereto. The movement actually took place on 6-7 February.

CHAPTER 9 FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

During 6-7 February, the Rear Echelon moved a distance of twelve miles to join the Forward Echelon in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P 81), occupying two office buildings, three schools, several residences and stores, and five hotels. By 10 February, messes were established as follows (for the combined Headquarters):

The Army Commander's Mess.

Four Officers' Messes, each in a separate hotel.

Two Enlisted Messes.

A bus line was chartered to transport officers from offices to billets and mess.

By 19 February the Purchasing and Contracting Officer completed the turn-in of covered accommodations and requisitioned furniture in ESCH sur ALZETTE.

At the end of the month, there were 250 civilians employed by the Headquarters Commandant, principally as hotel staffs, waiters, cooks, firemen, and laborers.

e. A representative of the Army Signal Officer, who supervised the installation of communications.

f. A representative of the Army Engineer, who supervised all engineering activities.

g. The Headquarters Utilities Officer, who worked with both the Commandant and the Engineer Officer in repairing utilities.

h. A Military Police Officer, who commanded a small detachment to guard the working party.

i. A representative of the Provost Marshal, who prepared the plans for the security of the Headquarters, including perimeter defense, patrols, employment of a reserve, and the eviction of civilians to form a "sterile" belt around the Headquarters proper.

j. A representative of the Army Surgeon, who inspected buildings which were to be occupied for any evidence of contagious diseases or vermin.

k. A representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who checked on the general security plan to insure the safety of the headquarters.

2. The troops which accompanied the group were usually as follows:

- a. Clerks for the officers.
- b. A work detail from Headquarters Company, and a small mess detail.
- c. Detachments from the 301st Signal Operations Battalion.
- d. One or more companies from Engineer Combat Battalions or Engineer General Service Regiments, and a detail from the 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment.
- e. A detail of about fifteen Military Police.

The tasks were usually the same in each new city. They included the repair of facilities to bring water, electricity, and sometimes gas into the area; the checking for booby traps, mines and demolition charges; the clearing of buildings and grounds of unimaginable amounts of furniture, bunks, wardrobes, clothing, wrecked vehicles, and debris and trash of every description totalling as much as 1500 truck loads; the repair of buildings, including replacing hundreds of panes of glass and blackouts; the placing of concertinas of barbed wire around the headquarters; the establishment of a traffic circulation plan and facilities for parking (under cover wherever possible) of three to four hundred vehicles; the posting of all exterior and interior signs; the publication of plans of the area, and floor plans and directories of each building; the preparation of the plan for unloading the Headquarters without traffic congestion; the distribution of individual billet assignments for officers and enlisted men; the eviction of civilians from areas, either because of security reasons or because further accommodations were required; the guarding of the Headquarters and of the civilian areas which had been selected; the guarding and messing of prisoner of war details.

The magnitude of the task, applied to only the Forward Echelon, can be appreciated when it is realized that a large Signal Center, 150 office rooms, quarters and messes for 220 officers and 600 enlisted men, transient's quarters, garage space, and the like were required. The Rear Echelon's task was larger because of its greater strength; however, it was destined to make fewer displacements than the Forward Echelon.

The other troop units which habitually moved with the Headquarters were ordinarily billeted in close proximity to the Command Post. These included Antiaircraft batteries, Military Police Companies, a company of Engineers (Combat), a Tank Destroyer Battalion, an Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance platoon, and the Signal Troops who provided the communications.

In nearly every instance the areas to be occupied had been damaged by air bombardment or combat, and were occupied by large numbers of displaced persons - German civilians who had been bombed out of their former homes, escaped allied prisoners of war, or allied civilians, both male and female, whom the Germans had used as laborers, all of whom had to be evicted from the barracks which the Headquarters was to occupy.

In general, the average sized kaserne which was prepared for occupancy could be made ready in from sixty to seventy hours after the working party commenced its task.

SECRET

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

On 1 April the Rear Echelon working party left for FRANKFURT am MAIN (M66). On 3 April, the Forward Echelon moved to FRANKFURT am MAIN (M66), a distance of eighty-five miles, and located with all installations inside of the EHMALIGEN 63rd KASERNE and the BLEIDORN KASERNE. Officers were quartered in barracks buildings.

The next day the Headquarters Commandant reconnoitered ALSFELD (H44) and, on 5 April, LAUTERBACH (H37), BAD SALZSCHLIEF (H22) (which was entirely occupied by wounded soldiers of the German Wehrmacht) and HERSFELD (H35). The latter place was designated and the Forward Echelon working party, reinforced by one Engineer Combat Battalion and 600 prisoners of war moved out on 6 April.

On the same day the Rear Echelon closed in the FRIEDBERGER WARTÉ KASERNE in FRANKFURT am MAIN, traveling a distance of 135 miles. Just north of this area was located the Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command.

The Forward Echelon moved to HERSFELD (H35), a distance of eighty-five miles, on 11 April, occupying the KRAFTFAHRER KASERNE east of the city. Officers were quartered in the apartments and dwellings formerly occupied by German officers and non-commissioned officers. The Forward Echelon of XIX Tactical Air Command moved into buildings inside the city itself.

On 12 April the cities of OHRDRUF (J15) and GOTHA (J06) were reconnoitered and, the following day, WETMAR (J57). The Chief of Staff designated the latter place and on 14 April the working party, with a battalion plus a company of combat engineers and 600 prisoners of war left for the site and commenced work. On the same day the rear echelon selected an adjoining kaserne area in WETMAR (J57).

However, because of a major change of direction in its zone of advance which was given to Third Army, all work at WETMAR (J57) was cancelled the afternoon of the 16th, and the working party returned to HERSFELD (H35).

The Chief of Staff directed the Headquarters Commandant to reconnoiter the area WURTZBURG (N53) - NURMBERG (O40) - BAMBERG (O24), which was done by air on 18 April. ERLANGEN (O35) was designated and on 19 April the working party, with a battalion plus two companies of combat engineers and 800 prisoners of war proceeded thereto. Two days later the working party of the Rear Echelon arrived in the same city to prepare the RHINELAND and ST. MIHEL kasernes for occupancy.

The Forward Echelon moved to the new location on 22 April, occupying the VILLERS HERONNEAUX KASERNE, a former German Panzer establishment, plus various private residences and the former quarters of German officers and non-commissioned officers. This move was the longest one the Forward Echelon ever made under combat conditions - 150 miles.

The Rear Echelon started to displace to ERLANGEN (O35) on 24 April, closing thereat two days later.

The Forward Echelon of the XIX Tactical Air Command also moved to ERLANGEN (O35), occupying office and factory buildings in the city itself.

On 28 April the Headquarters Commandant reconnoitered REGENSBURG (U15) by air, and the next day inspected several kaserne areas. The city and kaserne had been badly damaged by heavy air strikes and a very large amount of rehabilitation was necessary in any area selected. The Chief of Staff ordered the working party to proceed to REGENSBURG (U15) on 30 April. It was reinforced by a battalion plus a company of combat engineers and 800 prisoners of war.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

What was destined to be the last displacement of the Forward Echelon in combat in Europe commenced on 2 May, from ERLANGEN (O35) to REGENSBURG (U15), a distance of 87 miles, and was concluded on the next day. In this move the Headquarters crossed to the south bank of the Danube River.

The Army Headquarters proper, at the end of the war, was disposed as follows:

At REGENSBURG, GERMANY (U15)

- a. Forward Echelon of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Special Troops, Medical Detachment Special Troops, and 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment.
- b. 502d Quartermaster Car Company (less 1 1/2 platoons).
- c. 1st Platoon, 3457th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.
- d. Attachments of various sections.

At ERLANGEN, GERMANY (O35)

- a. Rear Echelon of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Special Troops, Medical Detachment Special Troops, and 1092d Engineer Utilities Detachment.
- b. 1 1/2 Platoons, 502d Quartermaster Car Company.
- c. 3457th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, less 1st Platoon.
- d. 61st Army Ground Forces Band.
- e. 572d Army Postal Unit.
- f. 39th Machine Records Unit.
- g. Attachments of various sections.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. The Headquarters must be able to displace and set-up ready for operation on very short notice - as little as a day - in any season of the year, regardless of weather or existing facilities.

2. The primary minimum needs of the Headquarters from this Staff Section are food, shelter and light.

3. Personnel and equipment must be organized to enable the Forward and Rear Echelons to function either separately, or together, and so that either or both Echelons can be temporarily split for short periods.

4. Next to mess personnel, the utilities personnel (electricians, plumbers, carpenters, masons, mechanics, sign painters) is one of the most important groups for which to provide.

5. Canvas must be kept on hand ready for instant use where covered accommodations are not available.

6. A control of both the officers and enlisted messes, designed to exclude the large number of unauthorized personnel "stopping-in", is imperative. The solution at this headquarters in October 1944, was the issue of mess cards to all personnel, and the issue of guest cards by the interested sections to all authorized visitors.

7. The personnel assigned was adequate to perform its missions. On 8 May it consisted of the following:


	Off	WO	EM
Hq Sp Trs	7	1	22
Hq Co (less Postal Section)	10	2	368
1092d Engr Utilities Det	2	0	38


8. The following materials should be carried on hand in ample stocks:

- a. Electric Supplies: Lamps, wire, fuses, plugs, switches, etc.
- b. Pipe, tees, els, and other fittings.
- c. Blackout materials.
- d. Hardware - nails, screws, bolts, angles, etc.
- e. Lumber - All types of medium and light thicknesses.
- f. Paint - all colors for signs, touch-up, etc.

9. This section must be augmented for any special tasks, such as preparing new covered accommodations in minimum time. Engineer troops and prisoners of war proved the best solution to this problem.

SECRET





SECRET ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

19 June 1944

LOADING LIST

(Supersedes Loading List, Groups "A" and "B",
dated 23 May 1944, as revised).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Forward Echelon, Headquarters Third United States Army Group "X"						
1.	2060 B3 a.	Commanding General	13	8	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, van K-60 1 Car, armored Util, M-20	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co
2.	2060 B3 b.	Chief of Staff	7	5	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, van K-60 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co
3.	2060 B3 c.	Deputy Chief of Staff	5	5	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, van K-60 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co
4.	2060 B3 d.	Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations)	2	1	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R	502 QM Car Co
5.	2060 B3 e.	Secy, General Staff and Top Secret Control Sec	19	7	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co Hq Co Hq Co
6.	2060 B3 f.	A C of S, G-1	22	8	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
7.	2060 B3 g.	A C of S, G-2	46	24	7 Trk, 1/2 ton 7 Trlr, 1/2 ton 5 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	5-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 5-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
8.	2060 B3 h.	G-2 Air Sub-sec	3	2	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
9.	2060 B3 i.	Special Liaison Unit	14	4	3 Trk, 1 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, amb	Organic Organic
10.	2060 B3 j.	Counter Intelligence Det	32	30	16 Trk, 1/2 ton 14 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
11.	2060 B3 k.	Military Intelligence Interpreters	6	3	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
12.	2060 B3 l.	Photo Interpreters	3	2	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
13.	2060 B3 m.	Order of Battle Unit	3	2	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
14.	2060 B3 n.	Interrogators Prisoners of War	12	6	4 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
15.	2060 B3 o.	Escape and Evasion Unit	6	3	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R	Organic Organic Organic
16.	2060 B3 p.	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	8	6	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
17.	2060 B3 q.	OSS (Special Counter- Intelligence)	5	3	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic

Hq, TUSA, Loading List 19 June 1944, (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Forward Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "X" (cont'd)						
18.	2060 B3 r.	Field Interrogation Det	4	4	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
19.	2060 B3 s.	Enemy Document Sec	5	3	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
20.	2060 B3 t.	A C of S G-3	97	25	6 Trk, 1/2 ton 6 Trlr, 1/2 ton 3 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 5 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	3-502 QM Car Co; 3-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co; 3-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
21.	2060 B3 u.	Third Army Historical Team	2	1	1 Trk, 1/2 ton	Hq Co
22.	2060 B3 v.	Special Ops Det & Signal Sec	62	24	10 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton 5 Trk, 1 1/2 ton, PC (2 - Mcoyle)	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
23.	2060 B3 w.	A C of S, G-4	40	18	5 Trk, 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton (1 - Mcoyl)	3-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co Hq Co
24.	2060 B3 x.	A C of S, G-5	10	3	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 1 1/2 ton	Hq Co Hq Co
25.	2060 B3 y.	A C of S, G-6	15	----		
26.	2060 B3 z.	72 Publicity Service Bn	141	62	21 Trk, 1/2 ton 21 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 10 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 7 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, wrecker	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
27.	2060 B3 aa.	3rd Mbl Radio Broad- casting Co	24	6	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
28.	2060 B3 bb.	P & PW Det, FUSAG	35	----		
29.	2060 B3 cc.	Adjutant General	26	9	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
30.	2060 B3 dd.	Anti-Aircraft	37	10	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 1-502 QM Car Co; 1-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
31.	2060 B3 ee.	Artillery	52	19	4 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 5 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	2-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
32.	2060 B3 ff.	Chaplain	7	8	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
33.	2060 B3 gg.	Chemical Warfare Service	10	3	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co

Hq Comdt

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Hq, TUSA, Loading List 19 June 1944 (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Forward Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "X" (cont'd)						
34.	2060 B3 hh.	Engineer	64	18	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 5 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	2-502 QM Car Co; 1-Hq Co 1-502 QM Car Co; 1-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
35.	2060 B3 ii.	1681 Engr Survey Liaison Det	15	6	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
36.	2060 B3 jj	Det, 652 Engr Topo Bn	12	6	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 1 ton 1 Trk, 5-6 ton, tractor 1 Trk, 10 ton, semi-trlr	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
37.	2060 B3 kk.	Finance	7	3	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
38.	2060 B3 ll.	Inspector General	10	4	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
39.	2060 B3 mm.	Judge Advocate	6	3	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
40.	2060 B3 nn.	Medical	22	6	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
41.	2060 B3 oo.	Ordnance	24	16	4 Trk, 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	1-502 QM Car Co; 3-Hq Co 3-502 QM Car Co; 2-Hq Co 502 QM Car Co 3597 QM Trk Co 3597 QM Trk Co
42.	2060 B3 pp.	Provost Marshal	6	---	---	---
43.	2060 B3 qq.	Hq/Hq Det 511 MP Bn	41	18	10 Trk, 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1/2 ton 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton (5 - Mcoyls)	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
44.	2060 B3 rr.	CID Sqd	11	3	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton	Organic Organic
45.	2060 B3 ss.	Quartermaster	37	10	2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
46.	2060 B3 tt.	Signal	72	21	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 7 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 7 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
47.	2060 B3 uu.	14 Liaison Sqd	114	47	14 Trk, 1/2 ton 9 Trlr, 1/2 ton 5 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 7 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 7 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, amb 2 Trk, fuel, F-3 2 Trlr, fuel, A-3	Organic Organic Organic Organic 6-3805 QM Trk Co; 1-Organic 6-3805 QM Trk Co; 1-Organic Organic Organic Organic

Hq, TUSA, Loading List 19 June 1944 (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Forward Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "X" (cont'd)						
48.	2060 B3 vv.	*27 th Det 21 Wea Sqd, *27 th Det 40 MB1 Comm Sqd	27	9	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 3 Trlr, 1 ton 2 Trk, 1 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, K-53	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
49.	2060 B3 ww.	Fwd Ech, Hq Sp Trs Third Army	18	9	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
50.	2060 B3 xx.	Fwd Ech, Hq Co Third Army	179	51	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 4 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 20 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 21 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, wrecker	1-3805 QM Trk Co; 2-Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co 3805 QM Trk Co 20-3805 QM Trk Co; 1-Hq Co Hq Co
51.	2060 B3 yy.	Fwd Ech, Med Det Sp Trs Third Army	6	3	1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, amb	3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co Hq Co
52.	2060 B3 zz.	Med Det 511 MP Bn	8	2	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, amb	Organic Organic
53.	2060 B3 aaa.	1st Plat, 3457 Ord MM Co	41	10	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 4 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 4 ton, wrecker	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
54.	2060 B3 bbb.	572 Army Postal Unit	15	7	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic 3805 QM Trk Co 3805 QM Trk Co
55.	2060 B3 ccc.	Fwd Ech, 1092 Engr Utility Det	32	12	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 4 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 6 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton, dump	Organic 1-Organic; 3-3805 QM Trk Co 3-3805 QM Trk Co; 3-Hq Co Organic
56.	2060 B3 ddd.	502 QM Car Co (-)	57	10	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
57.	2060 B3 eee.	3597 QM Trk Co	57	15	4 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 5 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
58.	2060 B3 fff.	3805 QM Trk Co	60	14	3 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 6 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
59.	2060 B3 ggg.	Special Service	3	2	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1/2 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co
60.	2060 B3 hhh.	39 Machines Record Unit	2	---	---	---
61.		TOTAL, Personnel	1729			
62.		TOTAL, Vehicles		619		

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Hq, USA, Loading List, 19 June 1944 (cont'd)

FORWARD ECHELON "X", THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Recapitulation, Personnel and Vehicles

1 Item No.	2 List Index No.	3 Unit Serial No.	4 Unit	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19 Remarks	
				0	WO	EM	Total Personnel	Trk 1/4 T	Trlr 1/4 T	Trk 3/4 T C&R	Trk 3/4 T WC	Trk 2 1/2 T Cgo	Trlr 1 T	Trk 1 1/2 T Cgo or PC	Trk 3/4 T amb	Trk Misc	Total veh		
1.	2060 B1	48622	Fwd Ech, Hq/Hq Det Third Army	178	14	355	547											a. Trk, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, wrecker.	
2.		48622	G-2 Air Sub-section	2		1	3	1	1									b. Reproduction Eqpt, utzd, 1 ton, 6 x 6, standard trk chassis w/van body.	
3.	2062 B7	48622	Special Liaison Unit	4		10	14							3	1			c. Reproduction Eqpt, semi-trlr, mounted, 10 ton, w/van type body.	
4.	2062 B6	49616/77	Counter Intelligence Det	4		28	32	16	14									d. Trk, 5-6 ton, 4 x 4, tractor.	
5.	2062 B3	48622	Mil Intel Interpreter Team No. 406	2		4	6	2	1									e. Trk, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, fuel servicing, 750 gal, F-3.	
6.	2062 B11	48622	Photo Interpreter Det No. 37	1		2	3	1	1									f. Trlr, fuel, 4-wheel, A-3.	
7.	2062 B2	48622	Order of Battle Unit No. 1	1		2	3	1	1									g. Trk, van, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, K-53.	
8.	2062 B1	48622	Interrogators of P & W Teams Nos 2&7	4		8	12	4	2				1	1				h. Trk, van, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, K-60.	
9.	2060 B7	48622	Escape and Evasion Unit	4		2	6	1	1	1								i. Car, armored, utility, M-20.	
10.	2060 B8	48622	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	4		4	8	2	2			1	1					j. Trk, 4-ton, 6 x 6, wrecker.	
11.	2060 B9	48622	OSS (SCI) Team No. 54 (-)	2		3	5	2	1									k. Trk, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, dump.	
12.	2060 B5	48622	Field Interrogation Det	2		2	4	2	2										
13.	2060 B6	48622	Enemy Documents Section	1		4	5	2	1										
14.		48622	Third Army Historical Team	1		1	2												
15.	2062 B9/10	48622	Special Opns Det & Signal Sec	15		47	62	10	2	1		2	4	5				2 - motorcycles	
16.	2062 B8	47752	72 Publicity Service Bn	52*		85	137*	21	21		2	7	5			a 1	57		
17.		49583	3rd Mbl Radio Broadcasting Co	9		15	24	3			1	1	1					6	
18.	2060 B12		P & FW Det FUSAG	23		12	35												
19.	2070 B1	48730	1681 Engr Survey Liaison Det	5		8	13	1									b 1	1	
20.	2070 B2	47192-A	Det, 652 Engr Topo Bn	2		10	12	1				1	1				c 1 d 1	6	
21.	2076 B	47164/5	Hq/Hq Det, 511 MP Bn	6	1	34	41	10	30			3	2					18	5 - motorcycles
22.	2068 B	48622	Criminal Investigating Sqd	1		10	11	2				1						3	
23.	2063 B	52972	14 Liaison Sqd (Ground Echelon)	8		98	106	14	9		5	1	1		1		e 2 f 2	35	
24.	2062 B4 2062 B5	50159 50224	"ZY" Det, 21 Weather Sqd "ZY" Det, 40 Mbl Comm Sqd	3		24	27	1	1		1		3	2			g 1	9	
25.	2060 B3	48624	Fwd Ech, Hq Sp Trs Third Army	5	1	11	17										a 1		
26.	2060 B2	48623	Fwd Ech, Hq Co Third Army	2	1	168	171	33	25	4	4	2	9	1	1		h 3 i 1	84	1 - motorcycle
27.	2060 B4	48625	Fwd Ech, Med Det Sp Trs Third Army	1		4	5												
28.	2076 B	47169	Med Det, 511 Military Police Bn	1		7	8				1							2	
29.	2076 B3	47296	1st Plat, 3457 Ordnance MAM Co	1		40	41	1			1	4	3				j 1	10	
30.	2061 B	48677	Fwd Ech, 1092 Engr Utilities Det	1		28	29				1	1					k 1	3	
31.	2072 B	31573	572 Army Postal Unit	1		11	12	1										1	
32.		32900	39 Machine Records Unit	1		1	2												
33.	2058 B	45886	502 QM Car Co (-)	3		91	94	25	26	26	5	1	1					84	
34.	2065 B	47301	3597 QM Trk Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49					104	
35.	2057 B	46022	3805 QM Trk Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49					104	
36.			TOTAL	360*	17	1390	1727*	165	144	32	23	125	129	11	4		16	619	* Includes 50 war correspondents

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ANNEX NO. 2

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

20 June 1944

LOADING LIST

(Supersedes Loading List, Rear Echelon, dated
31 May 1944)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Rear Echelon, Headquarters Third United States Army Group "Y"						
1.	2789 B a.	A C of S, G-1	8	4	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
2.	2789 B b.	Advance Documents Sec	3	2	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
3.	2789 B c.	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	14	6	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trlr, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
4.	2789 B d.	OSS (SCI) Team No. 54 (-)	5	2	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
5.	2789 B e.	MII Teams Nos. 403 & 436	12	6	4 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
6.	2789 B f.	Interrogators P of W Teams Nos. 62 &	12	6	4 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
7.	2789 B g.	Escape & Evasion Unit	5	2	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
8.	2789 B h.	Counter Intelligence Corps	32	24	16 Trk, 1/4 ton 8 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
9.	2789 B i.	A C of S, G-4	15	8	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trlr, 1/4 ton 2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
10.	2789 B j.	A C of S, G-5	67	15	8 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 1 1/2 ton, PC	Hq Co Hq Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co Hq Co
11.	2789 B k.	3rd Mbl Rad Broad- casting Co	142	70	9 Trk, 1/4 ton 4 Trlr, 1/4 ton 10 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 3 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 24 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 13 Trlr, 1 ton 3 Trk, 1 1/2 ton, PC 4 Trk, 3/4 ton, amb	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
12.	2789 B l.	P & PW Det, FUSAG	19	---		
13.	2789 B m.	Adjutant General	66	20	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trlr, 1/4 ton 8 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 8 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
14.	2789 B n.	Artillery	5	1	1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton	445 QM Tr T Co
15.	2789 B o.	Chemical Warfare Service	13	4	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
16.	2789 B p.	Engr Intelligence Team (Research)	9	4	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton	Organic Organic Organic
17.	2789 B q.	Engr Intelligence Team (Combat)	4	3	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic

Hq TUSA, Loading List 20 June 1944, (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Rear Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "Y" (cont'd)						
18.	2789 B r.	Finance	23	8	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
19.	2789 B s.	71 Finance Dis- bursing Sec	22	4	2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
20.	2789 B t.	Inspector General	8	2	1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
21.	2789 B u.	Judge Advocate	7	3	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
22.	2789 B v.	Medical	43	14	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 2 Trlr, 1/4 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 4 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
23.	2789 B w.	Ordnance	22	11	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 4 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
24.	2789 B x.	Provost Marshal	1	---		
25.	2789 B y.	Hq/Hq Det, 511 MP Bn	8	4	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic 445 QM Tr T Co 445 QM Tr T Co
26.	2789 B z.	Quartermaster	28	9	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 502 QM Car Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
27.	2789 B aa.	Signal	5	3	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
28.	2789 B bb.	Det, Ground Echelon, 14 Liaison Sq	7	6	3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
29.	2789 B cc.	Special Service Office	8	4	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1 ton	502 QM Car Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
30.	2789 B dd.	American Red Cross	1	2	1 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trlr, 1/4 ton	Organic Organic
31.	2789 B ee.	Rear Echelon, Hq Sp Trs, Third Army	8	3	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Hq Co 3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
32.	2789 B ff.	Rear Echelon, Hq Co Third Army (Less Postal Sec)	138	45	2 Trk, 1/4 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 6 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 18 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 18 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic 6-Org; 12-3345 QM Trk Co 6-Org; 12-3345 QM Trk Co
33.	2789 B gg.	Postal Sec, Hq Third Army	19	6	3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co
34.	2789 B hh.	Rear Echelon, 1092 Engr Utility Det	24	8	3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 3 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 1 1/2 ton, No. 325, Pumper 1 Grader, Road, Mtzd, DFD	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co Organic Organic
35.	2789 B ii.	Rear Echelon, Med Det Sp Trs Third Army	11	3	1 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, amb	3345 QM Trk Co 3345 QM Trk Co Hq Co

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Hq, TUSA, Loading List 20 June 1944 (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Item Number	List Index Number	Section	Personnel	Vehicles	Number & Type of Vehicle	Source of Vehicle
Rear Echelon, Hq, TUSA Group "Y" (cont'd)						
36.	2789 B Jj.	39 Machine Records Unit	67	20	1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 3 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 5 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Semi-trlr, 10 ton, Van Mbl 5 Trk, 4-5 ton, tractor 4 Semi-trlr, 10 ton, 2 W Mbl	Organic Organic 3345 QM Trk Co 3-Organic; 2-3345 QM Trk Co Organic Organic Organic
37.	2789 B Kk.	3457 Ordnance MAM Co (Less 1st Plat)	79	26	1 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, C & R 10 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 11 Trlr, 1 ton 1 Trk, 4 ton, wrecker 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC	Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic Organic
38.	2789 B ll.	61 AGF Band	29	3	2 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 1 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic
39.	2789 B mm.	3rd & 4th Plats, 502 QM Car Co (-)	28	6	2 Trk, 1/2 ton 2 Trlr, 1/2 ton 2 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC	Organic Organic Organic
40.	2789 B nn.	445 QM Tr T Co	81	44	4 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton, WC 20 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 19 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
41.	2789 B oo.	3345 QM Trk Co	80	42	4 Trk, 1/2 ton 1 Trk, 3/4 ton WC 19 Trk, 2 1/2 ton 18 Trlr, 1 ton	Organic Organic Organic Organic
42.		TOTAL, Personnel	1178			
43.		TOTAL, Vehicles		453		

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REAR ECHELON, THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Recapitulation, Personnel and Vehicles

Hq, TUSA, Loading List 20 June 1944, (cont'd)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Item No.	List Index No.	Unit Serial No.	Unit	C	WO	EM	Total Personnel	Trk 1/4 T	Trlr 1/4 T	Trk 3/4 T C&R	Trk 3/4 T WC	Trk 2 1/2 T Cgo	Trlr 1 T	Trk 1 1/2 T Cgo or PC	Trk 3/4 T Amb	Misc	Total Veh	Remarks
1.	2787 B	48622	Rear Ech, Hq/Hq Det Third Army	69	8	193	270											a. Trk, 1 1/2 ton, 4 x 4 #325, pumper.
2.		48622	Advance Documents Section	1		2	3	1	1								2	b. Grader, Road, mtd, DFD, 12' mold board.
3.		48622	OSS (Secret Intelligence)	5		9	14	2	2			1	1				6	c. Trk, 4-5 ton, 4 x 4, tractor.
4.		48622	OSS (SCI) Team No. 54 (-)	1		4	5	1	1								2	d. Semi-trlr, 10-ton, van, mbl.
5.	2794 B	48622	XII Team No. 403 & 436	4		8	12	4	2								6	e. Semi-trlr, 10-ton, 2W mbl record.
6.		48622	Interrogators P of W Teams Nos. 62 & 4	4		8	12	4	2								6	f. Trk, 4-ton, 6 x 6, wrecker
7.		48622	Escape & Evasion Unit	5			5	1	1								2	
8.	2795 B	49616/7	Counter Intelligence Det	4		28	32	16	8								24	
9.		48622	Attachment to G-5 Sec	5			5											
10.		49583	3rd Mbl Rad Broadcasting Co	13		129	142	9	4	10	3	24	13	3	4		70	
11.			P & PW Det FUSAG	19*			19*											
12.			Engr Intelligence Team (Research)	3		6	9	2	1			1					4	
13.			Engr Intelligence Team (Combat)	1		3	4	2	1								3	
14.	2798 B	33385	71 Finance Disbursing Sec	2	1	17	20											
15.		47164/5	Det, Hq/Hq Det, 511 MP Bn	1		6	7	2									2	
16.		52972	Det, Ground Echelon, 14 Liaison Sq	1		3	4											
17.			American Red Cross	1			1	1	1								2	
18.	2789 B	48624	Rr Ech, Hq Sp Trs Third Army	2		5	7											
19.	2788 B	48623	Rr Ech, Hq Co Third Army	6	1	130	137	10		2	8	6	6	1	1		34	
20.		48677	Rr Ech, 1092 Engr Utilities Det			21	21									a - 1	2	
21.		48625	Rr Ech, Med Det Sp Trs Third Army	2		8	10									b - 1		
22.	2803 B	32900	39 Machine Records Unit	3		61	64			1	1		3			c - 5	15	
23.	2796 B	47216	3457 Ord MAM Co (Less 1st Plat)	3		76	79	1		1	2	10	11			d - 1	26	
24.		90506	61 Army Ground Forces Band		1	28	29					2	1			e - 4	3	
25.	2791/2 B	45886	3rd & 4th Plat, 502 QM Car Co (-)	2		35	37	13	13		10						36	
26.	2086 B	33666	445 QM Tr T Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49				104	
27.	2854 B	33507	3345 QM Trk Co	5		110	115	4			1	50	49				104	
28.			TOTAL	167*	11	1000	1178*	77	37	44	26	144	133	4	5	13	453	* Includes Civilians

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INSPECTOR



GENERAL

Office of the Inspector General
AGO (AG)

Subject: Section Reports in Volume II, War Report.
To: Commanding General, Third U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Inspector General's Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning August, 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals in chapters.

2. Throughout the entire campaign, the Inspector General's Section assisted the Army Commander and the general and special staff sections in processing and effecting the following:


- a. Numerous and sundry investigations.
- b. Inspections of units and organizations throughout the Army.
- c. Recommendations on proposed Army policies and drafts of appropriate action.

3. In all of the above the underlying principle of the Inspector General's Section was the promptness of the action and the execution of the command.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER 1 PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

The Inspector General's Section arrived in England 23 March with the main body, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, and was quartered at KNUTSFORD until 17 July.

During this period the Section made "Alert Inspections" and "Contact Visits." "Contact Visits" were made to insure that Army units were receiving publications issued by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, and complying with Theater policies. Special attention was given to the matter of "Indoctrination" of troops. "Alert Inspections" were conducted in compliance with "Preparation for Overseas Movement," Short and Long Sea Voyage. This Section worked closely with other sections in the Headquarters to determine supply shortages existing in the units alerted for continental operations. Based on Priority Schedules published by the G-4 Section, units were contacted and checked for Tables of Organization and Equipment shortages. Reports were submitted to the Chief of Staff and appropriate action taken.

On 5 July the Chief of Section left SOUTHAMPTON, England, and embarked for the Continent. He was accompanied by two officers, one warrant officer, and four enlisted men. On 17 July the second contingent, consisting of three officers and four enlisted men, left SOUTHAMPTON, England, and embarked for the Continent. Effective the same day (17 July) one officer and two enlisted men were attached to XII Corps and remained in England to assist in processing Army units to the Continent. This concluded the first phase of operations.

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

On 18 July the Section was reunited and complete, except for those who had remained in England attached to XII Corps. The Section was bivouacked at NEHOU, France (019).

While in bivouac (awaiting arrival of units) the Section made inspections of Third U.S. Army Supply Distributing Points which were then set up and functioning.

During this period a study was made of the problem of self-inflicted wound cases and neuropsychiatric casualties. This problem had caused considerable apprehension in some echelons. Visits were made by senior assistants to the Army Inspector General to Headquarters First U.S. Army and hospitals, in connection with this study. It was concluded after preliminary investigation and study that this problem could be solved under existing regulations.

CHAPTER 3 AUGUST OPERATIONS

Visits were made by the Army Inspector General to the Headquarters of each Corps to discuss personnel and procedure in preparation for active operations.

The Section was stationed in its entirety in the Army Rear Echelon from which visits were made to the Forward Echelon and other Army installations and units, and to establishments outside the Army area, as necessary.

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The principal functions performed were the following:

1. Investigations directed by the Army Commander or higher authority.
2. Inspections of units with respect to compliance with directives on Soldier Voting.
3. Inspections (with Medical Corps Sanitary Inspectors) of areas as vacated by the various parts of the Headquarters and supporting units.
4. Numerous pretrial investigations preparatory to further action on Court-Martial charges.
5. Required periodic inspections of disbursing accounts of Finance Sections.
6. Check inspections of Army service establishments.
7. Studied and advised with respect to administrative problems presented by subordinate units and sections of the Army Headquarters.
8. Investigation of accidents and claims pertaining to the Headquarters.
9. Provided personnel for six different Court-Martial boards of the Army Headquarters.
10. Instructed hospitals and units as to application of existing regulations and instructions to neuropsychiatric cases and self-inflicted wounds.
11. Visited Headquarters of VIII and XV Corps in regard to voting matters.

The widespread operations and rapid movements of units made it necessary to obtain a total of four motor vehicles for the Section to accomplish its tasks.

The extent of the administrative matters referred to the Section for recommendation is indicated by the following statistical summary:

	In	Out
Action papers	501	517

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

On 2 September one officer and two enlisted men rejoined the Section at PITHIVIERS, France.

During the month the Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander. Special emphasis was given to Soldier Voting, and, in all, 136 Army units (companies) were contacted and checked on Soldier Voting.

During this period Special Inspections were made as follows:

1. Three required periodic inspections of disbursing accounts of Army Finance Sections.
 2. Five inspections of areas vacated by Army Headquarters upon change of bivouac locations.
 3. One Special Inspection directed by the Army Commander.
- Investigations completed during this period were as follows:
1. Four Formal Investigations.
 2. Four Pretrial Investigations.
 3. One Informal Investigation.

This Section provided personnel for six different Court-Martial boards of the Army Headquarters.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively handled 238 action papers referred for recommendation.

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

During the month the Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander.

During this period Special Inspections were made as follows:

1. Six inspections of Army Postal Units and Army Post Offices.
 2. One inspection of area vacated by Army Headquarters upon change of bivouac locations.
 3. Two Special Inspections directed by the Army Commander.
- Investigations completed during this period were as follows:
1. Seven Formal Investigations.
 2. One Informal Investigation.
 3. One Pretrial Investigation.

Continual emphasis was placed on Soldier Voting. Seventy-four Army Units were contacted and checked on Soldier Voting.

Fifty-five Army Units were contacted and checked on Conservation of Supplies and on Maintenance of Personnel Records (Section II, Circular 99, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944).

This Section provided three officers for three different Courts-Martial of the Army Headquarters.

During the period covered by this report, the Section administratively handled 155 action papers referred for recommendation.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

During the month of November the Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander.

On 22 November three additional officers were assigned to the Section by Headquarters European Theater of Operations for special training in the Inspector General Department, with a view to filling existing vacancies in subordinate commands.

During this period the Section prepared Administrative Check-Lists to be used in connection with inspection of administrative records of subordinate units.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:


1. One Special Inspection directed by the Army Commander.
2. Ten Special Inspections on Maintenance of Personnel Records (Section II, Circular 99, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1944) and Conservation of Supplies.
3. Six Inspections of Army Postal Units and Army Post Offices.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Seven Formal Investigations.
2. Twenty-eight Formal Investigations were conducted on Unauthorized Federal Ballots directed by the Theater Commander.
3. Three Informal Investigations.

This Section provided three officers for three different Courts-Martial of the Army Headquarters.

During the period covered by this report, the Section administratively handled the following number action papers, referred for recommendation: In - 268, Out - 317.



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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of December.

One Captain from this headquarters was assigned to fill the existing vacancy as Assistant Inspector General in the 26th Infantry Division.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. One Special Inspection directed by the Army Commander.
2. Twenty-one Inspections on Maintenance of Personnel Records (Section I, Circular 111, ETO US Army, 1944) and Conservation of Supplies.
3. Five Army hospitals were inspected as directed by the Chief of Staff relative to the preparation, serving, quality, and quantity of food.
4. Inspection of office quarters and billets vacated by Forward Echelon, Army Headquarters, and three subordinate units upon change of location.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Seven Formal Investigations.
2. One Informal Investigation.
3. Five Pretrial Investigations.

This Section provided three officers for three different Courts-Martial of the Army Headquarters.

Chief of Section was appointed President of Board of Officers for the purpose of making recommendations to the Army Commander for Awards and Decorations.

Two officers were appointed on two separate Boards of Officers for conducting investigations as required by AR 420-5.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number action papers referred for recommendation: In - 145, Out - 165.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of January.

On 11 January three additional officers were assigned to the Section by Headquarters European Theater of Operations for special training in the Inspector General Department, with a view to filling existing vacancies in subordinate commands.

One Lieutenant Colonel assigned this headquarters was placed on Detached Service as Acting Inspector General of the 5th Infantry Division.

Two Captains, IGD, assigned to this headquarters from subordinate units were placed on Detached Service with European Theater of Operations for assignment to position vacancies of the next higher grade in the Communications Zone.

Four Captains from this headquarters were assigned to fill existing vacancies as Assistant Inspectors General in subordinate units, namely, 35th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, 80th Infantry Division, and 87th Infantry Division.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Four Special Inspections directed by the Army Commander.
2. Messes of three Army Hospitals were inspected as directed by the Chief of Staff with particular attention to the preparation, serving, quality, and quantity of food.
3. Inspections of accommodations vacated by Rear Echelon, Army Headquarters, and seven subordinate units upon change of location.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Six Formal Investigations.
2. Five Informal Investigations.
3. Three Pretrial Investigations.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

One officer and one enlisted man were provided to take inventory of accommodations occupied by the Forward Echelon, this headquarters, in the City of LUXEMBOURG (VU 8513).

The Chief of Section served as President of Board of Officers for the purpose of making recommendations to the Army Commander for Awards and Decorations.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number action papers referred for recommendation: In - 200, Out - 204.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of February.

On 19 February three additional officers were assigned to the Section by Headquarters European Theater of Operations for special training in the Inspector General's Department, with a view to filling existing vacancies in subordinate commands.

Two Captains from this headquarters were assigned to fill existing vacancies as Assistant Inspectors General in subordinate units, namely, 4th Infantry Division and 26th Infantry Division.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Two Special Inspections as directed by the Army Commander.
2. Messes of four Army Hospitals were inspected as directed by the Chief of Staff with particular attention to the preparation, serving, quality, and quantity of food.

3. Inspections of accommodations vacated by Rear Echelon, Army Headquarters, and five subordinate units upon change of location from ESCH (P70) to LUXEMBOURG (P81).

The 706th Railway Grand Division and one of its battalions, the 718th Railway Operating Battalion, were visited and inspected.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Three Formal Investigations.
2. Three Pretrial Investigations.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

One officer was provided to take inventory of accommodations occupied by this headquarters in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P81).

The Chief of Section served as President of Board of Officers for the purpose of making recommendations to the Army Commander for Awards and Decorations during the entire month of February.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 132; Out - 138.

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CHAPTER 10 MARCH OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of March 1945.

The following personnel changes were effected during the month:

1. One officer and one enlisted man returned to United States on temporary duty.
2. One Lieutenant Colonel was assigned as Inspector General of 6th Armored Division.
3. One Lieutenant Colonel on detached service as Acting Inspector General of the 5th Infantry Division returned to this headquarters.
4. Two Captains from this headquarters were assigned to fill existing vacancies as Assistant Inspectors General in subordinate units, namely, XI Corps and 28th Infantry Division.
5. Two Captains were assigned to this headquarters from subordinate units to fill existing vacancies in this command.

Inspections of accommodations vacated by the Forward and Rear Echelons, Army Headquarters, and 9 subordinate units upon change of location from LUXEMBOURG (F81).

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Four Formal Investigations.
2. One Informal Investigation.
3. Three Pretrial Investigations.

One officer of this Section served as President of a General Courts Martial Board appointed by this headquarters.

During the period covered by this report this Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 121; Out - 126.

CHAPTER 11 APRIL OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during the month of April 1945.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Inspections of accommodations vacated by the Forward Echelon, Army Headquarters, upon changes of locations from OBERSTEIN (W71), FRANKFURT (W66), and HERSFELD (W35), GERMANY.
2. Inspections of accommodations vacated by the Rear Echelon, Army Headquarters, upon changes of locations from TRIER (W21), and FRANKFURT (W66), GERMANY.

3. Inspections of accommodations vacated by thirteen subordinate units.

4. Five inspections on maintenance of personnel records (ETO Cir 111 and 30, 1944 and 1945, respectively) and conservation of supplies.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Two Formal Investigations.
2. Two Informal Investigations.

One officer visited the Displaced Persons Camp, Allied Prisoner of War Camp, and Prisoner of War Camp, located at TRIER (W21), GERMANY.

The Buchenwald Concentration Camp near WEIMAR (J51), GERMANY, was visited and report of observations rendered.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 121; Out - 123.

CHAPTER 12 MAY OPERATIONS

The Section performed regularly assigned duties as directed by the Army Commander during this period.

Inspections made during this period were as follows:

1. Inspections of accommodations vacated by Forward Echelon, Army Headquarters, upon change of location from ERLANGEN (W36), GERMANY, and thirteen subordinate units.
2. Three Special Inspections.
3. Administrative records of Headquarters Third U.S. Army and the 474th Infantry Regiment (Sep) were inspected in compliance with Staff Memorandum Number 12, this headquarters.

Investigations completed during this period were as follows:

1. Two Formal Investigations.
2. One Pre-Trial Investigation.

One officer from this Section served as a member of a General Court-Martial appointed by this headquarters.

During the period covered by this report the Section administratively processed the following number of action papers referred for recommendation: In - 36; Out - 34.

CHAPTER 13 LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

Lessons Learned: No material changes in method or procedure were found necessary or desirable.

Conclusions: That currently prescribed methods and procedures of the Third Army generally are sound.

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JUDGE ADVOCATE

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Judge Advocate

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third US Army, APO 403, US Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Judge Advocate Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with March 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.


2. Included in this report are the various problems faced by the Section during the Third U. S. Army's campaign, and statements of how these problems were met. Difficulties of an inadequate Table of Organization and the procurement of skilled personnel on temporary duty assignments to supplement the regular T/O were among the primary problems, and the report indicates how the Section reacted to the unforeseeable events as they developed. The types of cases handled, and the volume and nature of the work performed, are herein described, in order to indicate all the aspects of an Army Judge Advocate Office in time of war.

Charles E. Cheever
CHARLES E. CHEEVER
Colonel, U. S. Army
Judge Advocate

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JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER 1 PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Prior to leaving the United States the enlisted personnel of the Judge Advocate Section had been selected with a view to their competence as court reporters as well as other matters. While this Headquarters was stationed in the United Kingdom the training in court reporting, previously begun by the enlisted personnel, was continued.

During the time the Headquarters was in the United Kingdom, an effort was made to increase the officer strength of the Section, as experience of other armies had shown the inadequacies of the officer strength (three) prescribed by the Table of Organization. As a result of the endeavors made, two officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department were placed on detached service with this Section shortly before the rear echelon left the United Kingdom.

In anticipation of such problems arising during operations, this Section began in the United States an intensive study of the laws of warfare and military government, which was continued in the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

7 July - 18 July: Advice was given on various legal problems and charges were prepared in a number of cases.

19 July - 1 August: From the time the rear element of the Section joined the forward element, 19 July until 1 August, ten general court-martial cases were tried at the Headquarters. Since the regular heavy duties of the other officers of the Headquarters and army units prevented the expeditious handling of the charges, officers of this Section were detailed as Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel. This policy also promoted the fair, professional presentation of the serious charges referred to the general courts-martial. In all cases the proceedings were reported by enlisted men of this Section.

CHAPTER 3 AUGUST OPERATIONS

1 August - 10 August: Five general court-martial trials involving eight accused were tried at the Headquarters during this period. All proceedings were reported by enlisted men of this Section and in all but one case both the Prosecution and the Defense were presented by officers of the Section.

Two enlisted men were attached and another vehicle was secured in order to facilitate the task of finding and assembling witnesses from the various, rapidly-moving units and to give the regularly assigned enlisted men more time for reporting and transcribing court proceedings and for other stenographic duties. The smaller units ordinarily having no telephone, personal visits were found to be the most practical and expeditious means of interviewing witnesses and accused during this period when the area held by units of the Third U. S. Army was small.

10 August - 17 August: Seven general court-martial trials were held at this Headquarters during this period, all being reported by enlisted men of this Section. Officers of this Section represented the

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Prosecution in all cases and presented the Defense in all but two cases. Since the officers appointed as Assistant Trial Judge Advocate and Assistant Defense Counsel were ordinarily unable, in addition to their regular duties, to assemble the witnesses and produce the accused for trial with sufficient expedition, those tasks were performed by the Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel. Also, in the interests of technical accuracy of procedure and to insure the quick punishment of those committing crimes of violence, such as rape, murder, and aggravated assaults, against French civilians, this Section, in this and later periods, prepared the charges and arranged for the formal pre-trial investigation in such cases. As an example of the expedition achieved, two soldiers were on 15 August tried and convicted of a serious offense committed on 9 August.

Since the then existing officer strength of the Section (five officers and one warrant officer) was insufficient to handle the extraordinary volume and variety of work, another officer was placed on temporary duty with the Section. Additional tentage was requested, but pending receipt thereof the courts sat, during the good weather prevailing in this and the next period, in the open air in the bivouac area of this Section.

17 August - 27 August: Ten general court-martial cases were held at this Headquarters. Personnel of this Section participated in all these trials, the officers acting as Trial Judge Advocate, Defense Counsel and Law Member and the enlisted men serving as court reporters. Of the ten trials, three involved aggravated assaults or other offenses against civilians by five soldiers. In order to relieve the Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel, so far as possible, of the burden of assembling witnesses and producing the accused, now that units of the Third U. S. Army were operating over such large areas of France, radio messages were sent to the accused's unit requesting the commanding officer thereof to produce the accused and necessary military witnesses for trial at earliest practicable date. The attendance of civilian witnesses and interpreters continued to be secured by personal contact. Completion of trial preparations were made upon arrival of the accused and the witnesses and the cases were then tried.

In the interests of expedition and in accordance with the Theater policy that crimes against civilians should be tried near the scene of the offense and the residence of the witnesses, three other sets of serious charges relating to six accused and three cases involving aggravated assaults upon French civilians were processed during this period

and sent to the appropriate general court-martial authority of the Communications Zone for trial.

During this period, also, a letter was prepared for the signature of the Commanding General informing all troops under his command of the extreme punishment which had been and would be imposed upon those committing crimes of violence against French civilians.

Another officer and another enlisted man, previously requested reported for duty with this Section during this period.

27 August - 31 August: During this four day period, the personnel of this Section arranged for and otherwise participated in six general court-martial trials. Another officer reported for duty with the Section.

1 August - 31 August: In addition to serving as Trial Judge Advocate, Defense Counsel, and reporter in nearly all the general court-martial cases tried at this Headquarters during the month of August, as law member of the court in many cases and as investigating officer in some, personnel of this Section wrote reviews of fifteen general court-martial proceedings. The regular flow of work relating to military affairs, laws of warfare, legal assistance to military personnel, review of proceedings of inferior courts, and similar matters was also handled.

CHAPTER 4 SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

1 - 6 September: Six cases were tried at the Headquarters by general court-martial. Officers of this Section participated in the Prosecution and Defense of all six cases, and an officer of this Section sat as Law Member in three of the cases. The enlisted men of this Section acted as court reporter in three of the six proceedings.

Two new officers, captains of infantry, reported for detached service with this Section during this period.

6 - 18 September: Sixteen general court-martial cases were tried at the Headquarters. Officers of this Section represented the Prosecution in all cases and participated in the Defense of all but two. In a number of instances the Law Member of the court was furnished by this Section; and in a majority of the cases the proceedings were reported by the enlisted men of the Section.

The military justice activities of the Section during this period also included the preparation of a procedural guide for the summary court officers appointed by the Headquarters Commandant for the trial of traffic, uniform and other minor offenses occurring within the operational area of the Third U. S. Army. These summary courts tried 535 cases from 10-30 September.

During this period two additional officers, first lieutenants of infantry, reported for temporary duty with this Section. An increase in the enlisted strength of the Section to ten was also authorized during this period. Two enlisted men reported for temporary duty with the Section at this time, both of whom were subsequently assigned to the Section.

18 - 30 September: Thirteen general court-martial cases were tried at the Headquarters before the end of the month. One of the cases involved a common trial of twenty-three soldiers accused of rioting. One case concerned civilians residing in or near PARIS, and in accordance with Theater policy, their testimony was given before a court sitting in PARIS, the military witnesses being heard before the court sitting at the Headquarters. Officers of the Section participated in the prosecution and defense of all the cases and in some instances the Section furnished the Law Member for the court. Enlisted men of the Section acted as court reporter in the riot case and most of the more difficult cases tried during this period.

One officer, lieutenant colonel, infantry, reported for duty with this Section during this period while one officer, a major in the Judge Advocate General's Department, left to assume his new duties as Assistant Judge Advocate of XX Corps.

1 - 30 September: In addition to the military justice activities above set forth, personnel of this Section wrote reviews of twenty-one general court-martial proceedings, reviewed the proceedings of many inferior courts-martial, formally investigated numerous charges, and made recommendations with respect to the trial of many charges. Concurrently with these matters of military justice, the Section dealt with various questions of military affairs, rules of land warfare, military government, and legal assistance to military personnel. Personal liaison and contact was established with the officers of the Communication Zone with respect to matters of military justice, military affairs and allied matters.

Of the total cases tried by general court during the month of September, only one, charges of robbery and larceny, involved an offense against civilians.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Thirty-two general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of the Section participated in the Prosecution and Defense of all of them and as Law Member in thirty. They also served as additional members of the court in a substantial number of the trials. Twenty-six of the cases were reported by enlisted men of the Section.

The first trial of spies in the Third U. S. Army was held this month before a Military Commission at this Headquarters. The trial judge advocate, one member of the commission, and the reporter were furnished by this Section. Both Defense Counsel were attorneys and in addition the two accused were aided throughout every stage of the proceedings by individual interpreters. The two accused were convicted of acting as spies and sentenced to be shot to death with musketry.

Of the Thirty-two general court-martial cases tried in October, nine were of officers and one of a warrant officer as compared with thirty-five cases tried in September, seven of which were of officers and one of a warrant officer. Only two of the cases in October and one in September involved offenses against civilians, while during August, seven were for crimes of violence against civilians. The death penalty was imposed upon four accused, including the spies, during October.

During this month two general courts-martial were in session at the same time on several occasions. In a number of cases interpreters of French, German or Polish were used.

Numerous questions were submitted to the Section for advice to the summary court officers appointed for the trial of traffic and uniform violations within the territorial limits of Third U. S. Army by the Headquarters Commandant and for which this Section had previously prepared a procedural guide. Eight hundred sixty-seven cases were tried by these courts during October.

In addition to the activities recounted above, personnel of the Section performed the following work:

1. Wrote twenty-three general court-martial and one military commission reviews.
2. Reviewed several hundred special and summary court-martial records.
3. Wrote eighteen reprimands and admonitions.
4. Conducted eleven pretrial investigations.
5. Referred fifty-one charges for trial by general court-martial.
6. Made many recommendations with respect to trial of charges by inferior courts.
7. Processed numerous claims and reclassification matters.

8. Rendered opinions of various questions concerning military justice, military affairs, rules of land warfare, and military government.

9. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately seventy-five instances.

The Section continued to operate on a seven day work week, and in addition inaugurated the policy of maintaining an officer on duty each night to handle such matters of an emergency nature as might arise. After moving into permanent billets, the night guard previously necessary was discontinued.

Three enlisted men who were stenographers reported for temporary duty with the Section during the month. During this period the staff judge advocate of the III Corps spent ten days in the Section observing its functioning and holding conferences with the judge advocate and the chiefs of the sub-sections in order to familiarize himself with the Third U. S. Army policy.

The Section moved into buildings previously used by the German Army, occupying thirteen rooms, four of which were used as courts-martial and witness rooms. In addition, all its enlisted personnel were quartered in the same building. This improvement in the physical setup made a division of work feasible, resulting in the establishment in addition to the executive sub-section of separate sub-sections for military justice, military affairs, international law and rules of land warfare and miscellaneous matters. It also permitted increased efficiency in the operation of the chief clerk's office by the assembling of the enlisted personnel and all records in one large room.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Thirty-two general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of the Section participated in the prosecution and defense of all but one of them and contributed the court's law member in all but three of the cases. In several instances, an additional member of the court was furnished by this Section. All but one of the proceedings were reported by enlisted men of the Section.

The second trial of spies in the Third U. S. Army was held before a military commission at this Headquarters. The trial judge advocate, one member of the commission and the reporters were furnished by this Section. Both defense counsel were attorneys and the accused were aided throughout every stage of the proceedings by individual interpreters of

their own choice. In addition, there were the official German and French interpreters for the commission. The two accused were convicted of acting as spies and sentenced to be shot to death with musketry. The accused were members of the 1st and 3rd Companies, 73rd Regiment, 19th Division, German Army.

The two German soldiers convicted of spying during the month of October were executed this month. Moreover, four U. S. Army soldiers, convicted of rape during the month of August and sentenced to death by hanging, were executed this month, following due approval and confirmation of their sentences. These six executions were the first carried into effect pursuant to sentences imposed by courts and commissions of the Third U. S. Army.

The thirty-two general court-martial cases tried in November involved five officers and thirty-four enlisted men. Nine officers and one warrant officer were involved in the same number of cases in the preceding month. One trial of two officers and one noncommissioned officer for several offenses including the sale by the accused of French champagne at prices in excess of those established pursuant to French law, was held in the court room in the local Palais de Justice in the presence of many civilian spectators. The officers were sentenced to dismissal, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for five years and the noncommissioned officer to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor for three years, the results of the trial being published in the French press. The publicity given the trial served as a dramatic demonstration of American cooperation with the French in the protection of the French economy against inflation.

An examination of eighty general court-martial orders and fourteen actions under Article of War 48 covering general courts-martial on which action had been taken by the Commanding General between 1 August 1944 and 18 November 1944, disclosed that the following personnel were concerned:

White 61
Colored 60

These proportions are to be interpreted in light of the following figures respecting the total number of colored and white troops under direct control of this Headquarters as shown below:

	Colored EM & Officers	White EM & Officers
31 August 1944 . . .	10,991	63,758
30 September 1944 . .	9,965	68,746
31 October 1944 . . .	12,663	54,752
18 November 1944 . .	<u>12,641</u>	<u>55,992</u>
Total	46,260	243,248

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Numerous questions were submitted to the Section for advice to the Summary Court Officers appointed for the trial of traffic, uniform, and other minor offenses within the territorial limits of the Third U. S. Army by the Headquarters Commandant and for which this Section had previously prepared a Procedural Guide. 866 cases were tried by these courts during November.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, personnel of this Section performed the following work:

1. Wrote nine reprimands and admonitions.
2. Referred thirty-one sets of charges for trial by general court-martial.
3. Referred twenty-nine sets of charges for trial by inferior courts.
4. Reviewed 700 records of trial by summary court-martial and 135 records of trial by special court-martial.
5. Prepared 54 reviews of trials by general court-martial, and one review of a trial by a military commission, the most reviews prepared by this Section in any single month.
6. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.
7. Prepared a circular letter respecting the place of non-commissioned officers in the enforcement of military discipline. A copy of the circular is attached as Annex 2.
8. Caused the distribution for divisional and special troops of the Third U. S. Army of Soldier's Handbook of The Rules of Land Warfare, prepared by the Chief of this Section. A copy of the pamphlet mentioned is attached as Annex 4.
9. Investigated the report of a number of related violations of the Geneva Convention and processed various other reports of violations.
10. Reviewed for legal accuracy a guide prepared for military government legal officers operating under the jurisdiction of the Third U. S. Army, its Corps and Divisions.
11. Reviewed for legal sufficiency memoranda prepared in other sections pertaining to the exchange of currencies, the processing of enemy soldiers captured in civilian clothing and other administrative matters involving questions of international law.
12. Rendered legal advice in a number of cases pertaining to looting and pillaging.
13. Processed numerous claims.
14. Caused the distribution of a circular letter previously prepared in this Section covering the investigation of automobile accidents, a copy of which is attached as Annex 1.

15. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately 75 cases.

16. A field officer of the Section served as a member of the War Decoration Board.

A memorandum of the Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General, European Theater of Operations, reporting on general court-martial records received by the Branch Office during the month of November 1944 gave the following figures respecting the military justice operations of three of the United States Armies operating in the theater:

	No. Accused Tried	No. Cases Tried
First U. S. Army	14	13
Third U. S. Army	63	38
Seventh U. S. Army	9	9

The authorized personnel of the Section was augmented by the allotment of the following officers and enlisted men for use in connection with investigations of violations of the Geneva Convention: 1 Colonel, 2 Majors, 2 Captains, and 5 Privates.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Thirty-two general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of this Section represented the prosecution and the defense in all but seven of the general court-martial cases and contributed the court's law member in all but one of the cases. In several instances an additional member of the court was furnished by this Section. All these proceedings were reported by enlisted men from this Section, and an enlisted man from this Section acted as interpreter in two of the cases.

Of the 32 general court-martial cases tried in December only two involved crimes against French civilians. The attendance of civilian witnesses was secured by personal contact, and transportation was supplied by this Section.

Four murder cases, none of which involved civilians, were tried during this period, whereas none was tried during the previous month and only three since the start of the year. In one of the cases, the offender was sentenced to be hanged and in two others the offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment. The fourth case resulted in an acquittal. Four officers were tried, three of them being sentenced to dismissal and confinement and one to dismissal only.

For the first time since arrival on the Continent several cases involving long absences without leave were tried. Previous cases under the 61st Article of War had consisted of absences of brief duration tried in conjunction with other more serious offenses.

Two German soldiers convicted of spying during November were shot to death with musketry after the sentences were confirmed by the Commanding General of the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. There were no trials by Military Commission during the month of December, but study of war crimes was intensified and the ground work has been laid for the eventual trial of war criminals and violators of the Geneva Convention.

Eleven officers from the 2nd European Civil Affairs Regiment, who were awaiting assignment in Germany, were appointed members of a general court-martial. This court was so constituted in order to reduce to a minimum the disruption inherent in calling officers away from important duties in other sections of the Headquarters and in subordinate units while at the same time giving court-martial experience to officers of the 2nd European Civil Affairs Regiment at a time when their regular duties were light. One enlisted lawyer, a Technician Fifth Grade, was newly assigned to the Section.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, personnel of this Section performed the following work:

1. Wrote five reprimands and admonitions.
2. Referred nine pre-trial investigations, three of which were referred to officers from this Section.
3. Referred forty-five sets of charges for trial by general court-martial.
4. Referred nineteen sets of charges for trial by inferior courts.
5. Wrote sixteen letters directing redrafting or withdrawal of charges.
6. Reviewed 534 records of trial by summary courts-martial, and 123 records of trial by special courts-martial, taking necessary corrective action.
7. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.
8. A circular letter, previously prepared by this Section respecting relations with the German people, was signed and distributed. A copy of this letter is attached as Annex 3.
9. Processed numerous matters concerning accidents and claims.
10. Prepared thirty reviews of trials by general court-martial.
11. Numerous miscellaneous legal opinions were given to other sections in the Headquarters.
12. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately 70 cases.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Fifty-five general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. Officers of this Section represented the prosecution in 48 of the cases and the defense in the vast majority. This Section contributed the court's law member in 51 of these cases, and in several instances an additional member of the court was also furnished. All these proceedings were reported by enlisted men of this Section, in courts held contemporaneously at both NANCY (U8512) France, and ESCH (P7301) Luxembourg. An enlisted man from this Section acted as French interpreter in four of the cases.

The number of cases tried this month exceeded by more than 60 per cent the number tried by this Headquarters during any previous month, and placed a considerable strain on all the personnel of the Section. Of the 55 general court-martial cases tried, only six involved commissioned officers, two of which resulted in an acquittal, whereas one officer was sentenced to dismissal and confinement for 10 years for selling captured liquor for his personal gain, and another officer was sentenced to dismissal and confinement for five years for being drunk in public and absent without leave for a total of 30 hours. Of all the cases tried, there were only six acquittals. The one case of rape brought a sentence of life imprisonment, while two soldiers convicted of assault with intent to rape were sentenced to 20 years. There were two murder cases tried during the month, one of which resulted in life imprisonment and the other in imprisonment for 25 years. There were severe sentences imposed in several cases which involved black-market operations. In all cases, where required, the attendance of witnesses was secured by personal contact, and transportation was supplied by this Section.

Although no trials of war criminals were held in this Headquarters, a circular, previously prepared, was distributed to Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Counter Intelligence Teams, advising them of the procedure to be followed at prisoners of war enclosures to detect war criminals and to bring them to justice.

A memorandum on discipline was prepared, listing the results of significant courts-martial cases tried in the European Theater of Operations during the month, and distributed for publicity throughout the command for its deterrent effect.

A member of this Section who had done outstanding work, was given a direct commission as a second Lieutenant in the Army of the United States to fill an existing vacancy in the Section. A candidate for the Judge Advocate Officer Candidate School was attached to this Section for about two weeks so that his qualifications could be determined.

When the Headquarters moved to its new position at ESCH (P7301), Luxembourg, this Section occupied 10 rooms on two floors of a large office building. In addition, there were two large court-rooms with adjoining witness rooms. This improvement in the physical set-up permitted increased efficiency in handling the mounting volume of cases.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, personnel of this Section performed the following work:

1. Received, reviewed, and passed on 33 general courts-martial cases.
2. Received, reviewed, and passed on 485 cases tried by summary courts-martial.
3. Received, reviewed, and passed on 147 cases tried by special courts-martial.
4. Referred 23 charges to jurisdictions not under the Third United States Army.
5. Referred 25 sets of charges to trial by general courts-martial.
6. Referred 16 sets of charges to inferior courts.
7. Wrote 24 letters regarding irregularities in trials by special and summary courts-martial.
8. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third United States Army.
9. Wrote 85 letters requesting confinement and transfer of prisoners.
10. Wrote 8 reprimands and administrative restrictions.
11. 53 letters were written regarding accidents and claims.
12. 17 letters were written on various matters concerning violations of the Geneva Convention.
13. 21 miscellaneous legal opinions were given to other sections in the Headquarters.
14. Legal assistance was furnished to military personnel in approximately 85 cases.
15. In addition, 256 miscellaneous letters, indorsements, and book slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Throughout February the bulk of general courts-martial appointed at this Headquarters was made up of officer personnel from nearby civil affairs detachments who were awaiting assignment to active operations in Germany. This policy was begun in December, 1944, for the use of these officers had the advantages of permitting staff officers at this Headquarters to devote a maximum amount of their time to matters of an operational nature, and also gave the civil affairs officers practical training in disciplinary problems which would be encountered in their work in Germany.

Forty-four general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters, and officers of this Section represented the prosecution in 33 of the cases and the defense in 13 of them. A member of this Section sat as Law Member in 32 of the cases, and all but five of the cases were reported by enlisted men of this Section.

The three murder cases tried during the month resulted in two death sentences and one sentence to life imprisonment. One mutiny case, involving 7 accused, resulted in acquittal of two of the accused and a sentence of 15 years for each of the other five. Two enlisted men were sentenced to imprisonment for 30 years for sleeping on post and leaving post before being properly relieved, respectively, and a lieutenant colonel was fined a total of one thousand dollars for violating censorship regulations. Forty-seven enlisted men and three officers were tried during the month.

The nucleus of a War Crimes Branch was enlarged within the Section and investigation of reported war crimes continued. The object in each case was to obtain sufficient evidence, as soon after the violation as practicable, to establish a prima facie case against the malefactors. Persons, regardless of nationality, who had personal knowledge of violations of the Geneva Convention and the Laws and Usages of War were interviewed, in their native tongue, by officers through enlisted interpreters, from the Section, and their sworn statements were taken. Among the cases investigated during February were the torturous murder of a wounded American aviator by enraged German women, the inhuman treatment of civilians by Gestapo and SS troops, and the murder of French children by a retreating Panzer Division. Though crimes against all allied nationals were examined, the main emphasis was placed upon offenses committed against U. S. troops and U. S. nationals, and a growing portion of the work of the office was concerned with crimes committed by the enemy.

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Two officers were transferred from the Section to assume responsible assignments in other Sections of this Headquarters where their training heretofore acquired was utilized, and a chief warrant officer, who was a lawyer in civilian life, was brought into the Judge Advocate Section from a combat unit where he had rendered outstanding service for the past several years, for seasoning and training in Judge Advocate work. In addition, three enlisted men, two lawyers and a court reporter were attached to the Section on temporary duty for training, giving the Section 6 officers, 1 warrant officer, 10 enlisted men and 5 attached enlisted men, as compared to the 5 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 5 enlisted men who comprised the Section when it arrived on the continent.

The following work was also performed by personnel of this Section:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 30 general court-martial cases.
2. Received, reviewed and passed on 126 special court-martial cases.
3. Received, reviewed, and passed on 904 cases tried by summary court-martial.
4. Referred 56 charges to jurisdictions not under Third U. S. Army.
5. Referred 34 sets of charges to inferior courts.
6. Wrote 29 letters regarding irregularities in records of trial by summary and special court-martial.
7. Handled the correspondence to effect release or evacuation of all prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.
8. Wrote 90 letters requesting release from confinement or transfer of general prisoners.
9. Wrote 6 reprimands or punishment under the 104th Article of War.
10. 57 letters were written regarding accidents or claims.
11. Several investigations were made by officers of this Section regarding violations of the Geneva Convention and reports thereon were submitted to higher headquarters. 25 letters were written regarding such violations.
12. A circular letter requiring court-martial action against all military personnel who sustain self-inflicted wounds was prepared for distribution through the command.
13. Numerous legal opinions were given to other sections of the Headquarters.
14. Legal assistance was furnished to military personnel in approximately 80 cases.
15. In addition, 175 miscellaneous letters, indorsements, and buck slips were prepared.

Throughout March the military justice work of the office was stabilized and an increasing emphasis was placed upon crimes committed by the enemy in violation of the Geneva Convention and the Laws and Usages of War. There were 47 general courts-martial cases tried by this Headquarters during this period, and all but 2 of them resulted in a conviction. Forty-four enlisted men and three officers were tried. The one murder case resulted in a sentence to life imprisonment and the one rape case brought the death penalty. Seven soldiers were tried for looting and severe penalties were imposed.

The War Crimes Branch was faced with reports of 42 violations of the Geneva Convention. An immediate problem was the procurement of trained personnel who were capable of coping with the language difficulties that would be involved in a thorough investigation of these cases. Two interpreters of the Dutch Army were assigned to this Headquarters on temporary duty. One enlisted man who had a knowledge of French, German and Russian was assigned to this Section. Teams consisting of an officer, an interpreter and a driver were dispatched from this Headquarters to the scene of the various crimes and a thorough investigation was made. Many of the offenses involved the murder of Allied pilots. Wherever possible, the bodies were disinterred, and after being identified, were removed to an American cemetery for proper burial. Evidence was taken of crimes committed against any Allied nationals, and reports were prepared which would establish the prima facie case against the malefactors. Sworn statements, in the witnesses' own handwriting, were taken and all the details were included. One of the problems of the office was liaison with other sections of the Headquarters. G-2 and G-3 were very helpful in providing information to identify the German units which were present at a particular place where a war crime occurred. The Signal Section furnished photographers to take pictures wherever they were necessary as evidence. Graves Registration helped in the identification of unknown victims and disinterred the bodies. CIC, Psychological Warfare and Military Intelligence sent in many clues to show a violation of the Laws of War, and the Provost Marshal took custody of all the German civilian prisoners apprehended. Most of the crimes investigated during this period took place in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the western part of Germany. The offenses covered mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war and the murder of individual Allied soldiers by members of the SS and Gestapo. It was expected that with the advance of Allied armies into Germany a greater variety and number of cases would be encountered

and plans were being made for a further extension of the War Crimes Branch.

The following work was also performed by personnel of this Section:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 35 general courts-martial.
2. Received, reviewed and passed on 803 cases tried by summary courts-martial.
3. Received, reviewed and passed on 156 cases tried by special courts-martial.
4. Reviewed 26 charges, jurisdiction not under the Third United States Army.
5. Referred 62 sets of charges to inferior courts.
6. Wrote 27 letters regarding irregularities in records of trial by special and summary courts-martial.
7. Wrote 91 letters requesting release, confinement or transfer of prisoners.
8. Wrote many reprimands and notifications of punishment under Article of War 104.
9. Fifty-five letters were written regarding accidents and claims.
10. Seventy letters were written expediting final disposition of cases being held for investigation as self-inflicted wounds.
11. Numerous legal opinions were given to other sections of this Headquarters and legal assistance was rendered in about 100 cases.
12. A circular letter, regarding looting, pilfering and pillaging was prepared for distribution throughout the command (Annex 1).
13. In addition, about 300 miscellaneous letters, indorsements and buck slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

The Military Justice work of the Judge Advocate Section continued to set new records in the volume handled, while the War Crimes Branch reached its peak in intensity and volume of investigations. There were 38 general court-martial cases tried by this Headquarters during April and all but 2 resulted in convictions. In addition, there was a total of 890 records of trial by special and summary court which were reviewed for legal sufficiency. The War Crimes Branch has to this date investigated or are in process of investigating a total of 129 cases involving violations of the Geneva Convention and/or Rules of Land Warfare by Enemy Forces and/or Enemy Nationals. Many large prisoner enclosures in which American and other Allied Prisoners of War were maintained and a

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number of concentration and extermination camps for allied nationals required intensive investigations by War Crimes teams which were composed and sent out from this office. Included in these camps were those of Buchenwald (Weimar) Germany, Arnstadt Concentration Camp, Ohrdruf Concentration Camp, and the extermination camp at Mauthausen, Austria. The investigating teams were composed of varying numbers of officers, interpreters, typists and photographers needed to cover the particular assignment in question. Moving pictures and still pictures were taken in order that the conditions at each establishment might be recorded as they were left by the enemy. Almost every type and form of cruel and inhuman treatment was discovered to have been committed upon the prisoners. Often bodies were disinterred in order that photographs and autopsies might be made to determine cause of death and to show the evidence of mistreatment. A number of arrests were made of war criminals following these investigations to insure their presence in court at the proper time.

The following work was also performed by personnel of this Section:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 38 general court-martial cases.
2. Received, reviewed and passed on 740 cases tried by summary courts-martial.
3. Received, reviewed and passed on 150 cases tried by special courts-martial.
4. Referred 51 charges to jurisdictions not under the Third United States Army.
5. Referred 62 sets of charges to trial by general court-martial.
6. Referred 28 sets of charges to inferior courts.
7. Wrote 44 letters regarding irregularities in trials by special and summary courts-martial.
8. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate the release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third United States Army.
9. Wrote 138 letters regarding confinement and transfer of prisoners.
10. Wrote 15 reprimands and administrative restrictions.
11. Sixty letters were written regarding accidents and claims.
12. Twenty-three letters were written on various matters concerning violations of the Geneva Convention.
13. Seventeen miscellaneous legal opinions were given to other sections in the Headquarters.
14. Legal assistance was furnished to military personnel in approximately 85 cases.
15. In addition, approximately 300 miscellaneous letters, indorsements, and buck slips were prepared.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

Ten general court-martial cases were tried at this Headquarters. This Section furnished the Trial Judge Advocate and Defense Counsel in five of them while the Law Member and court reporters were furnished by the Section in all of the cases. The formal pre-trial investigation was conducted in several of the cases by officers of this Section and all interpreters were furnished for the investigations and the trials where there were any civilian witnesses involved.

Of the ten general court-martial cases tried during this period, all resulted in convictions. Two of these cases involved commissioned officers as the accused, while the remaining eight pertained to enlisted men as accused. One officer was sentenced to dismissal from the service and the other officer case resulted in a sentence by the court to forfeit from his pay \$50.00 per month for six months. In all the cases, the civilian witnesses were secured by personal contact and transportation was furnished by the Section.

The War Crimes continued to require much administrative and investigative attention. Fifteen new cases of War Crimes were reported during the period, and at the cessation of hostilities, this Section had six investigating teams operating in the field. These cases involved the investigation of mass atrocities and murders committed at liberated concentration and extermination camps, as well as cases involving mistreatment and murder of individual Allied Prisoners of War and Allied Nationals. One of the cases investigated during this period involved an offense against the Geneva Convention in the illegal use by the enemy of the red-cross emblem by displaying it on barges in which were stored poisonous gas materials.

Fourteen officers and twenty-nine enlisted men are engaged in the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate Section in the capacities of Investigating officers, interpreters of German, French, Russian, Polish, Italian, Dutch and Czechoslovakian languages, stenographers, typists, photographers, and drivers. In addition eleven officers and eighteen enlisted men devote their full time to the Military Justice Branch of the Judge Advocate Section. This total of twenty-five officers and forty seven enlisted men represents a substantial growth in the Section as it was constituted, when embarking overseas on 13 March 1944. At that time, the Section was composed of three officers, one warrant of-

ficer and five enlisted men.

In addition to the activities recounted above, personnel of this Section performed the following work during the period:

1. Received, reviewed and passed on 14 general court-martial cases.
2. Received, reviewed and passed on 289 cases tried by summary court-martial.
3. Received, reviewed and passed on 65 cases tried by special court-martial.
4. Referred with a view to trial 18 charges to jurisdictions not under Third U. S. Army.
5. Referred 15 sets of charges to trial by general court-martial.
6. Referred 15 sets of charges to inferior courts.
7. Wrote 25 letters regarding irregularities in trials by special and summary court-martial.
8. Handled the correspondence necessary to effectuate release or evacuation of all general prisoners in the hands of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army.
9. Wrote 25 letters requesting confinement or transfer of prisoners.
10. Prepared 21 letters regarding accidents and claims.
11. Prepared 18 letters of various violations of the Geneva Convention and Rules of Land Warfare.
12. Rendered six written legal opinions to other Sections in the Headquarters.
13. Furnished legal assistance to military personnel in approximately 25 cases.
14. Prepared 95 miscellaneous letters, indorsements and buck slips.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. Court reporters are almost as essential in the trial of general court-martial cases as the court itself. Experienced court reporters are rarely available in the Army. Court reporters are consequently developed and trained from the most alert and efficient stenographers.
2. In an active campaign, the front-line soldier should know the more important Rules of Land Warfare and the main points covered by the Geneva Convention. The Judge Advocate Section prepared a booklet on this subject and approximately 35,000 copies were distributed to units of the Third Army during the campaign.

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3. Skilled interpreters are often needed in court-martial cases, particularly where there are civilian witnesses appearing before the court. This Section has learned during the European campaign the importance of having immediately at hand interpreters among enlisted men of the Section.

4. The necessity of the Judge Advocate Section working closely with Sections of the forward echelon of the Headquarters and supporting troops and services caused considerable loss of efficiency during those periods when the forward and rear echelons of the Headquarters have been separated by great distances. At times the rear echelon was so far behind the units that unit commanders and other personnel were required to make long trips to the rear in connection with Judge Advocate activities.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Court reporters are essential to the Judge Advocate Section during an active campaign and the tables of organization of the Army Headquarters should be increased so as to provide eight court reporters. The present enlisted strength authorized makes no provision for court reporters.

2. All soldiers in the field during an active campaign should know the principal Rules of Land Warfare and the main points covered by the Geneva Convention for their protection and guidance.

3. Skilled interpreters should be procured and included among the enlisted personnel of the Judge Advocate Section prior to an active campaign in a foreign country.

4. The Judge Advocate Section should be included in the forward echelon of the Headquarters.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General

AGO 403
31 October 1944

AG 537.5
GNMCJ

SUBJECT: Automobile Accidents.

TO : See Distribution.

The number of motor vehicle accidents in this command indicates the existence of negligence and the failure to obey directives of this and higher headquarters. Consequently, the following procedure will be effective immediately:

a. Every accident involving vehicles of this command driven by military personnel will be immediately investigated. Charges will be preferred against both the driver of the vehicle and the senior officer or noncommissioned officer riding therein when the investigation reveals negligence, disobedience of directives, or any misconduct.

b. In aggravated cases, the charges will be referred for the formal investigation required by paragraph 35a, Manual for Courts-Martial, with a view to trial by general court-martial.

c. Any military driver involved in a vehicle accident resulting in his conviction by court-martial will have his driver's permit suspended for not less than three months or revoked, depending on the circumstances.

d. Action as outlined above will in no way change or modify standing operating procedure as to the processing of claims.

e. The commanding officer of each unit is charged with the responsibility of compliance with the foregoing.

f. Commanders will maintain a careful record of all accidents occurring within the units and organizations of their respective commands. This record will be carefully considered when preparing the Efficiency Reports of the unit and organization commanders concerned.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ L. L. Manly
L. L. MANLY,
Lt. Col., A.C.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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"A" & "G"

ANNEX NO. 2

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General

AGO 403
18 November 1944

AG 250 - GNMCJ

SUBJECT: Noncommissioned Officers.

TO : See Distribution.

1. It has been clearly demonstrated in this war, as in past wars, that noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the Army. All unit commanders must give their personal attention to improving the quality and prestige of noncommissioned officers, especially those who exercise command responsibility. Attention is directed to the means for attaining this desired result suggested in Circular 70, War Department, 16 February 1944, particularly the necessity for delegating to noncommissioned officers all authority that is rightfully theirs, and the necessity for creating increased opportunity for noncommissioned officers to exercise command and initiative.

2. In general, officers must deal with enlisted men through the appropriate noncommissioned officers. The proper utilization of noncommissioned officers will result not only in the development of their initiative and leadership, but will result also in a corresponding improvement in overall discipline and efficiency. The innumerable situations in which noncommissioned officers may be used to advantage range from the handling of a disorderly soldier to the execution of a combat mission. The success and effectiveness of every commander is due largely to the degree he develops and maintains a thoroughly competent corps of noncommissioned officers.

3. The great number of courts-martial cases in which private soldiers are charged with offenses against commissioned officers committed while under the influence of liquor, including disobedience of orders or disrespect, indicates that the proper use of noncommissioned officers is not being made.

4. Each unit commander is charged with the responsibility of carrying into effect the views herein expressed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ L. L. Manly
L. L. MANLY,
Lt. Col., A.C.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 3

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
AGO 403

12 December 1944

AG 091

SUBJECT: Relations With the German People.

TO : See Distribution.

1. The friendship and cooperation of the French people will be replaced in Germany by universal hostility, which will require that we regard all Germans, soldiers and civilians, men, women, and even children, as active enemies. It is expected that we shall encounter sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and treachery. Everyone must be warned of these probabilities and prepared to take all possible protective measures. Particular care must be taken to insure the proper performance of guard duty.

2. Fraternalizing or friendly association with any German is absolutely forbidden and will be punished. Any pretense of friendship must be viewed with the utmost suspicion. Individuals claiming to have escaped from German prisoner of war camps or to be non-German members of the German Army or forced laborers will be considered as enemies until cleared by careful investigation.

3. German inhabitants who behave peacefully and refrain from hostile acts will not be molested and their lives, persons and property will be respected. All German inhabitants will be required to fulfill requisitions duly made upon them for military purposes, but anyone within this command who takes food, occupies billets or makes any demands for property, public or private, without proper authority, who engages in looting, or who commits any other offense against the persons or property of German inhabitants will be punished. Immediate action, appropriate to the circumstances, will be taken against German civilians who wrongfully commit hostile acts against us. Those who are taken prisoner will be tried by military courts.

4. Each unit commander at a special formation held as soon as practicable after the receipt of this communication will personally impress upon all members of his command this information. Should military circumstances make a formation of an entire unit at one time impracticable, a number of formations of smaller groups may be utilized, provided all members of the unit are included in one such formation.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" and "G".

ANNEX NO. 4

SOLDIER'S HANDBOOK ON THE RULES OF LAND WARFARE

By
CHARLES E. CHEEVER

*Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department,
United States Army*

The combat soldier very often knows little, if anything, of the rules which even in war not only control what may be done against an enemy, but also set up certain rights which the enemy must respect. This pamphlet does not contain an extensive treatment of these rules. It is intended to provide a general knowledge of the most important ones, without attempting to decide the great number of specific or doubtful questions which will come up in the field and be decided on the basis of orders and interpretations of superior authority.

BASIS OF RULES

The rules for carrying on war on land are called the Rules of Land Warfare. These rules are found both in agreements between nations and in so-called unwritten rules which are so established by custom, although perhaps not included in a written agreement, that they are generally followed. The rules which are considered as binding upon United States forces in the field have been published in War Department Field Manual 27-10, dated 1 October, 1940.

The rules of land warfare are based on the principles of military necessity, humanity, and chivalry. Generally, it may be said that it is proper to use any amount and kind of force to compel the complete surrender of the enemy at the smallest possible cost of time, life, and money, provided that violence not actually necessary is not used and dishonorable means or conduct are not involved.

Some rules are binding only on the nations which have signed the agreements in which they are included. However, in general, the enemy's soldiers and people are expected to live up to the same rules as the Allied soldiers and population. If they do not, the severe penalties which the laws of war permit may be imposed upon them.

DIVISIONS OF ENEMY POPULATION

The laws of warfare divide the population of a country at war into its armed forces and its civil or peaceful population. Ordinarily soldiers do not attack civilians unless the civilians have attacked them. However, it is not necessary to avoid firing at enemy troops only because civilians will be unavoidably injured by such fire. In turn, enemy civilians are not permitted to attack soldiers except in very limited cases. If a soldier violates this rule he would not have the right to be treated as a prisoner of war by the enemy in the event he were captured and he might also give the enemy grounds for not complying with the rules of war. Naturally he would also provide ammunition for propaganda to counteract the enemy's own violations. The enemy civilian who improperly attacks a member of the armed forces can of course be counter-attacked and, if captured, may be tried as a war criminal and perhaps put to death. He also might provide grounds for action against the enemy population in reprisal which otherwise would not have been proper.

Some members of the armed forces, particularly medical personnel and chaplains, are entitled to special protection and are not subject to attack as long as they are doing their special jobs and do not actively fight. However, if an attack on combat soldiers incidentally kills or wounds medical soldiers or a chaplain it is not an offence against the rules of war.

TYPES OF WEAPONS

There is no unwritten rule definitely forbidding the use of poisonous gas. The United States is not a party to any agreement now in force which forbids its use. The possibility of the use of gas by the enemy must always be kept in mind since the failure to use it during the present war is not because there is a rule against it. The use of all types of mines is common and ordinarily not illegal. Poisoning of a water supply or of abandoned food is considered as a violation of the rules of war. Water supplies can be made unfit for use, however, by means which can be seen, such as placing dead animals in the water.

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

The rules with respect to bombing from the air had not been fully developed before the present war. Probably the heavy bombings of this war are making new rules as well as history. Civilians, of course, are not proper targets for bombs. However, the presence of civilians will not protect a proper military objective. Nor is there a ground for complaint because civilians are killed or injured unavoidably as the result of an attack upon military objectives. The same is true as to civilian property. The enemy, as well as the Allied forces, have regarded such privately owned property as shipyards and plants producing war materials as proper military objectives.

ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT

Shelling of undefended towns, villages, or dwellings is forbidden. A city protected by combat troops, by forts, or similar means, is not undefended. Very often the question of whether a town or city is defended or undefended is doubtful. These cases are decided by the proper officer or commander, or even by the commander-in-chief, depending on the circumstances involved and after considering all the facts and obtaining legal advice if necessary.

Private as well as public property may be destroyed in the shelling of a defended place. Churches, museums, libraries, hospitals, and historic monuments should not be fired upon deliberately, assuming, of course, they are not being used for military purposes by the enemy. Damage to such buildings, accidentally or because they are near proper targets, is not a violation of the rules of war. It is the policy of the Allied forces to take all measures consistent with military necessity to avoid damage to all structures, objects, or documents of religious, cultural, architectural, archaeological, or historical value. President Roosevelt himself said some time ago, speaking of the war in Italy, that: "We have tried scrupulously—often at considerable sacrifice—to spare religious and cultural monuments, and we shall continue to do so."

TREACHERY AND QUARTER

All is not fair even in war. It is unfair and illegal for a soldier who throws down his rifle and holds up his hands in surrender to pick up his weapon and shoot the soldier who has just spared his life. A soldier, however, cannot rely on the law to protect him against a trick. Even though it is forbidden to play dead or wounded in order to surprise a careless enemy, some soldiers who seem to be dead or wounded may not be. The rules of war are not always followed by everyone. They do not do away with the combat lessons which soldiers have been taught. Soldiers cannot take chances on the basis that the enemy will always do what the rules of war say he should. A soldier must be practical and obey the orders which will be given on the basis of the situation at the time. A soldier must not shoot an enemy who has laid down his arms and surrendered, but he can keep a very close watch on him. It is forbidden to kill an enemy soldier who is disabled or wounded and has stopped fighting or to mutilate a body by gunfire or in any other way. This does not forbid, however, making certain that the enemy soldier who seems to be dead or wounded is not playing a trick.

When a soldier or a group of soldiers offers to surrender and stop fighting, which is sometimes called asking for quarter, the offer should ordinarily be accepted. Sometimes it is impracticable, however, to give quarter when some of the enemy continue to fight and then it is proper to deny quarter. Refusal of quarter may be authorized if the enemy has previously refused to give quarter.

RUSES AND STRATAGEMS

A battle is a contest of wits as well as of force and violence, but tricks which involve treachery or bad faith are forbidden.

The following quotation from paragraph 40 of United States War Department Field Manual 27-10 shows in general the means which can be used to fool the enemy:

"Among legitimate ruses may be counted surprises, ambushes, feigning attacks, retreats, or flights, simulating quiet and inactivity, giving large outposts or a strong advance guard to a small force, constructing works, bridges, etc., which it is not intended to use, transmitting false or misleading signals and telegraph messages, and sending false dispatches and newspapers, with a view to their being intercepted by the enemy, lighting campfires where there are no troops, making use of the enemy's signals, bugle and trumpet calls, watch words, and words of command, pretending to communicate with troops or reinforcements which have no existence, moving landmarks, putting up dummy guns or laying dummy mines, removing badges from uniforms, clothing the men of a single unit in the uniform of several different units so that prisoners and dead may give the idea of a large force."

The use of the enemy's flag, insignia, and uniforms is permitted under some circumstances. They are not to be used during actual fighting, and if used in order to approach the enemy without drawing fire should be thrown away or removed as soon as fighting begins. It is definitely a war crime to use a flag of truce or the Red Cross emblem improperly.

Spies, that is, persons who disguise themselves for the purpose of obtaining information, may be sentenced to death if captured. However, a soldier acting as a spy is not a war criminal. He may be put to death not because he has violated a rule of law but in order to discourage the enemy's use of spies.

ENEMY PROPERTY

The rules of land warfare forbid pillage, that is, taking property both private and public from the field of battle or occupied areas. Taking property such as watches and money from the enemy sick or dead, or articles for personal use from enemy civilians, or from civilians of a free country temporarily held by the enemy, is forbidden.

Military equipment left on the battlefield may not be taken for the personal use of individual soldiers. Such property ordinarily goes to the soldier's government. The United States Articles of War in Article 79 declare that all public property taken from the enemy is the property of the United States and shall be secured for the service of the United States, and directs punishment of persons subject to military law who wrongfully take such property. The right to seize or destroy private property on enemy territory depends on the military needs of the Army. Destruction simply for the sake of destruction is forbidden, but buildings may be used for shelter, or wood cut for fuel or to clear a field of fire. The proper military authorities will decide what may be done.

COMMUNICATION WITH THE ENEMY

There are times when communication with the enemy is necessary. For example, the enemy may wish to arrange a surrender or to ask for a truce in order to bury the dead. Such communication is permitted under certain conditions. A white flag may show merely a wish to arrange for a surrender or for a meeting. It does not necessarily mean a surrender. The force which sends a messenger with a white flag should stop firing. If it does not stop firing it is not safe to believe that the enemy commander has authorized the use of the white flag and the messenger may be simply an individual soldier trying to surrender. If the enemy stops firing as the white flag advances and there are no suspicious circumstances, a group of not more than four people approaching in daylight with the white flag should not be shot at. Ordinarily communication in this way at night should not be permitted. It is entirely proper to insist that a messenger approach in such a way that any surprise or trick can be prevented.

SICK, WOUNDED AND DEAD

After a battle, the force in possession of the field is required to make a search for the sick and wounded and to take care of the sick and wounded of the enemy as well as they take care of their own men. Sick and wounded soldiers in the enemy's hands, aside from their right to care and protection, are generally subject to the same treatment as other prisoners. When sick and woun-

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ded must be left behind, medical soldiers should be left with them if at all possible.

MEDICAL UNITS AND CHAPLAINS

It has already been mentioned that medical soldiers and chaplains must not be attacked if they are not taking part in actual fighting. They also have the right to be returned to their own forces as soon as practicable, if they are captured, instead of being held as prisoners of war. While waiting to be returned, medical soldiers may be used to take care of the sick and wounded with preference being given to members of their own forces. The proper military authorities decide when the return of medical soldiers or chaplains can be permitted without danger of their taking back valuable information. The authorities will also decide when the military situation makes such a return possible.

The equipment of a mobile hospital unit such as its ambulances, litters, surgical instruments and hospital equipment, if captured, will be returned at the same time as those who belong to the unit. The building and material of a more or less permanent hospital may under some circumstances be used for other purposes if captured, but only after arrangements have been made to take care of the sick and wounded being treated in that kind of hospital.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Prisoners of war had no rights until fairly recently in the history of war. They could be killed and were often made slaves. The rights of prisoners of war in the present war are found principally in the Geneva Convention of 1929, an agreement which is binding upon most of the nations in the war.

An Allied soldier who is captured is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war unless he has lost the right to be so treated by violating one of the rules of war. This means, among other things, that he has the right to be treated decently and protected against violence, insults and public curiosity. He must not be confined as a criminal except in punishment for a crime. He cannot be forced to give information other than his true name and rank, or else his serial number, and it is unlawful for the enemy to use force, refusal of privileges, or any other means to make a prisoner of war give any other information. Of course, a prisoner of war can be questioned about anything, but he cannot be made to answer. He may keep personal things, such as his gas mask, uniform, toilet articles, and jewelry such as a watch. His money may be taken from him if a receipt is given. All weapons, ammunition and military equipment and papers, personal or not, may be taken from him.

The names of captured soldiers are exchanged through neutral nations, such as Switzerland. Generally, prisoners of war are removed from combat zones as soon as possible. They are not confined in jails or cells like common criminals, but are usually placed in enclosed and guarded areas. They are entitled to adequate and healthy camps, proper heat, ventilation and bedding, and air space and food equal to that of troops at base camps of the nation which holds the prisoners. Prisoners of war are entitled to freedom of religion and to send and receive mail and parcels. Of course, mail is limited and censored. Sick and wounded prisoners must be cared for in the same way as troops of the army which has captured them.

Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers and persons entitled to be treated as officers, such as war correspondents, may be required to do some work. The management, cleaning, and upkeep of camps and farm labor are included in the type of work permitted. Work which is degrading, unhealthy or dangerous or directly related to war operations is improper. A prisoner of war cannot be legally required to do work for which he is not physically fit. Noncommissioned officers can be required to do only supervisory work.

Prisoners of war are not paid for work in connection with the maintenance, administration, and management of the camps. They usually receive for other work the same pay as is received for similar work by soldiers in the army of the government by which they are held, or if there is no such rate of pay they are paid according to the work they do. Where work is done for a private employer, such as a farmer, the government may keep amounts which the private employer pays over the amount which it would pay the prisoner for similar work. A prisoner is not entitled to receive all of the money he earns as he earns it. Some of it can be held back to be given to the prisoner when he is released.

Officers usually are held in separate camps or at least separate quarters. They cannot be forced to work, but are entitled, unless there are other agreements, to be paid an amount equal to an officer of similar rank in the army by which they were captured, but not above the amount they are paid by their own country.

Certain neutral nations have been appointed as "protecting powers" to enforce the rights of prisoners of war. Their agents are entitled to visit and inspect camps and prisoners and to receive complaints and requests. Prisoners of war may also complain to the nation holding them, individually, or through an officer or agent whom they have selected, if such selection is permitted by the authorities in charge of the prisoners. A prisoner of war cannot be punished for making a complaint even if there is no basis for it. If improper treatment of prisoners of war is found, protests are made, as has been done in the case of American prisoners held by the Japanese, and everything possible is done to obtain the treatment to which prisoners of war are entitled.

Prisoners of war are subject to the same laws and regulations as the soldiers in the army of the country by which they are held. They are subject to the same punishment for crimes, except that bodily punishment and cruel treatment are forbidden. The military rank of a prisoner of war cannot be taken away or a number of men punished for the action of one man. Prisoners of war must salute officers of the army by which they are held. Officer prisoners must salute enemy officers of a higher rank. Punishment for minor offenses by prisoners of war may not be for a period of more than 30 days. Such punishment is like company punishment and as to prisoners held by the United States would usually be given under Article of War 104. Serious offenses are tried by military courts. A number of things have been done to make sure that a prisoner of war receives a fair trial in such cases, including a notice of the trial to the nation which is acting as the "protecting power". Death sentences can be imposed.

A prisoner of war who attempts to escape is guilty only of violating disciplinary regulations and his punishment cannot be for a period of more than 30 days. However, a prisoner of war who committed another offense while attempting to escape, such as killing a guard, would be subject to trial and punishment for that offense. A prisoner may be confined temporarily to prevent his escape.

The armistice or treaty ending a war usually controls the release of persons of both sides held as prisoners of war. The rule in general is that prisoners of war will be returned to their own countries. However, the return of prisoners of war does not always begin as soon as combat has ended. For example, many French soldiers are still being held as prisoners by the Germans, and Italian prisoners of war were not released as soon as the armistice between the Allied forces and the Badoglio government was made in Italy. Prisoners of war serving sentences for violations of the laws of war, for ordinary crimes, such as murder, or awaiting trial for ordinary crimes, are not always returned. The release and return of prisoners of war in the present war will no doubt be fully provided for in the armistices and final treaties of peace.

Prisoners of war may be released under some circumstances even before the war has ended. Return of sick and wounded prisoners who are not likely to be able to take part in further fighting has already taken place. The types of wounded or sick prisoners who are entitled to be returned are set out in detail in the Geneva Convention. Of course, nations at war may make special agreements for the exchange of prisoners at any time.

PAROLE

A parole is a promise made by a prisoner of war in return for his release. As a rule, the prisoner will be required to agree not to take part for a certain time, or not at all, in further fighting against the enemy. Soldiers in the United States Army are generally not permitted to give parole and cannot be forced to do so by the enemy. The giving of a parole for limited purposes only, such as medical treatment, is permitted in the United States forces. Enlisted men will, if possible, give their parole through an officer and an officer will not give his parole without the permission of a military superior if one is present. A soldier or officer who without authority promises not to take part in further fighting against the enemy in exchange for his release may be sent back to combat. If he is captured by the enemy, he may be punished for breaking his promise, since it is no

excuse to the enemy that his promise is not recognized by his own army.

ARMISTICES

An armistice suspends the fighting for a particular time and at a particular place. It may be general, such as the armistice which ended the fighting in World War I, or it may be local, affecting only some of the forces engaged in the war. The kind most often used in the field is that known as a suspension of arms, which is a truce entered into for local military purposes, such as the bringing in of the wounded and burying of the dead. All troops concerned will be notified of the terms of the armistice. Violation of these terms must be avoided because the soldier who commits the violation will be subject to punishment by the enemy if he is captured and the violation may also give the enemy an excuse to break the armistice.

MILITARY OCCUPATION

The military occupation of enemy territory or friendly territory regained from the enemy is a complicated matter which will be handled by the special forces assigned to that task. Generally, the lives, religious convictions and practices, family honor and private property of the inhabitants will be respected. The relationship of the armed forces to the people of occupied territory and the requirements which will be made of these people will no doubt be fully set out by the proper authorities.

PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR

Penalties for violations of the laws of war are severe. They may affect not only the person guilty of the violation, but many others as well. The nation against which the violation was committed may punish the individual if he is captured, protest to the enemy, and demand the punishment of the individual offender, publish the facts to influence public opinion or make reprisals. The penalty of death is provided for many violations. It should also be remembered that offenses against laws of war by a soldier may also result in a trial under the articles of war provided for United States forces or similar articles in other forces.

As has already been indicated, the orders of superior officers are to be obeyed at all times in combat with the enemy. It is declared to be the rule in paragraph 347, Field Manual 27-10, provided for the armed forces of the United States, that individual members of the armed forces guilty of a violation of the rules of land warfare will not be punished for these offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders. Those ordering the act have the responsibility and will be subject to punishment if it is illegal.

Reprisals are the most serious results of violations of the rules of land warfare. They are actions taken against the enemy to prevent him from gaining an advantage from his offenses and to cause him to stop his wrongdoings. Reprisals include acts such as taking hostages and burning towns or houses under some circumstances, which except as a reprisal would not be permitted.

Reprisals are not a matter for the individual soldier. In general the highest available military authority must be consulted before a reprisal is made. Revenge is not the reason for reprisals and they must not be out of proportion to the acts of the enemy, although they need not be the same as the act of the enemy.

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

All persons accused of violations of the rules of land warfare are entitled to trial. Executions without trial are not permitted. Usually these trials are before courts-martial, military commissions, provost courts or similar courts. In the Army of the United States, courts-martial are most often used for the trial of soldiers and other persons subject to the military law of the United States, while others are tried by military commissions, provost courts or specially established courts of similar jurisdiction.

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VIEWS OF THE AUTHOR

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ANNEX NO. 5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

14 March 1945

AG 250.1
GMAJ

SUBJECT: Looting, Pilfering and Pillaging.

TO : All Corps, Divisional and Separate Unit Commanders.

1. I am much displeased with the numerous reports which have reached this Headquarters of acts of looting, pilfering and pillaging by American soldiers in France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany. Even if committed in enemy countries, looting and pilfering are reprehensible crimes, indicative of a relaxation of necessary standards of discipline on the part of our troops. Condonation of such violations, wherever committed, will tend to destroy the discipline and morale of our soldiers as well as the good reputation of the American Army.

2. All commanders will immediately institute and maintain the most forceful measures to stop these derelictions and breaches of discipline. Particular attention will be paid to the guarding of areas and buildings, in which there is a likelihood that looting may occur, as well as to the censoring of outgoing packages.

3. All military personnel will be warned that offenses of this character will not be tolerated and will be strictly dealt with and that failure on the part of any officer, regardless of rank, to take the strongest measures necessary to prevent these crimes will result in his trial by courts-martial.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

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MEDICAL



HEADQUARTERS THIRD U. S. ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
APO 403

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Medical Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

To: Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After Action Report of the Medical Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, beginning with 24 March 1944, and continuing at properly designated intervals by chapters.


2. Essentially, the major effort of the Third U. S. Army Medical Service has been to save lives, to conserve military strength and to insure the earliest possible return to duty of all casualties. This, in turn, has called for the provision of prompt medical attention and surgery in forward areas, coincident with expeditious and efficient evacuation to Army hospital units, where more adequate facilities are available. Operating under all types of weather conditions, terrain, and tactical situations, the Medical Service of this Army has been able to achieve a mortality rate in its installations of consistently less than two percent each month from all causes. This has constituted one of the lowest mortality rates achieved by the Medical Service of any Army in military history.

[Signature]
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Surgeon

SECRET

MEDICAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Upon its arrival in the United Kingdom, the Medical Section was composed of the following number of officers, by branch:

- 14 - Medical Corps Officers
- 2 - Dental Corps Officers
- 2 - Veterinary Corps Officers
- 1 - Sanitary Corps Officer
- 6 - Medical Administrative Corps Officers

In addition, the section included one warrant officer and thirty-five enlisted men.

Headed by the Army Surgeon and the Executive Officer, the Medical Section is broken down into seven sub-sections. To these sub-sections were delegated specific duties involved in discharging the responsibilities of the Army Surgeon. A description of the functions of each sub-section will be found in the accompanying organizational and functional chart. The Liaison Sub-Section, shown in the chart, was added on the Continent, but for purposes of completeness is included here.

As the result of efforts to reduce the number of personnel in all staff sections to an absolute minimum in April, the Medical Section was reduced to an allotment of thirty-four enlisted men instead of the thirty-five called for under Table of Organization 200-1. This enlisted man was taken from the Personnel and Administrative Sub-Section and is not accounted for in the personnel shown in the chart as assigned to that sub-section.

A further change in the organizational setup of the Medical Section occurred during the latter part of May when the Medical Consultant assumed duties as Assistant Executive Officer of the Medical Section. This change was due to pressure of work throughout the Medical Section in the consummation of plans for operations on the Continent and was due also to the comparative scarcity of purely medical problems, as distinct from surgical, which were being encountered. The Medical Consultant, however, was held available at all times in his advisory capacity should major medical problems arise within the command.

Top Secret Control Procedure

Due to a necessity for the maximum amount of secrecy concerning planned operations a "Top Secret" room was set aside in one of the buildings occupied by the Medical Section, to which room entrance was denied to all except classified officers and enlisted men. In this room all "Top Secret" papers were kept in a locked safe, and access to this safe was possible to classified officers only after clearance with the Executive Officer of the section. Suitable furnishings were available in this room to allow study of all "Top Secret" documents within the room itself. No "Top Secret" documents or extracts from same were allowed to be carried from this room.

Nine officers of the Medical Section were "Complete Knowledge" officers, and seven additional officers had "Limited Knowledge" of the impending Operation "OVERLORD". The warrant officer of the section, as well as six enlisted men, were classified as "Top Secret Security Clerks" in order to assist with preparation of details concerning the operation itself.

Though the above entailed considerable lack of knowledge on the part of the remaining officers and enlisted men of the Medical Section during the planning phase, it was felt that the secrecy required justified such a procedure.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

During the entire period spent in the United Kingdom no Army medical units actually functioned as such with the exception of a few which were placed in operation under Southern Base Section shortly prior to and after D-Day. This period was therefore devoted primarily to inspection of medical units, to the training of same and to the preparation of plans for operation of these units on the Continent.

As of 23 March there were forty-one medical units assigned to Third U. S. Army which had just previously been under the control of Headquarters VIII Corps prior to the arrival of this Headquarters in the United Kingdom. Numbers of units by types assigned at this time and totals to be assigned were as follows:

	Units Assigned	Total to be Assigned
Medical Collecting Company	9	18
Ambulance Company, Mtr	7	21
Clearing Company	6	10
Hq & Hq Detachment, Med Bn	7	17
Hq & Hq Detachment, Med Gp	3	5
Medical Gas Treatment Bn	1	3
Evac Hosp (750 bed)	1	1
Evac Hosp (SM) (400 bed)	5	14
Field Hospital	0	8
Convalescent Hospital	2	3
Medical Depot Company	0	3
Medical Laboratory	0	1
Medical Auxiliary Surg Gp	0	1
	41	105

Appraisal of all units was necessary. This was done immediately in the case of those medical units already in the United Kingdom, and the process was continued with regard to all other medical units as they arrived. The inspections were conducted by one or more officers primarily with a view to ascertaining the training status of these units, but in addition, each inspection included appraisal of related matters such as personnel, supply, mess, motor maintenance and administration.

After several inspections it was noted that certain deficiencies in training were common to the majority of units. The most prevalent of these were lack of training in bomb disposal, mine detection and airplane identification. To correct these deficiencies and to include in one document all Theater training directives a brief training memorandum for medical units was published. (See Training Memorandum Number 17, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, Subject: "Training in Medical Units," dated 30 April 1944, attached hereto as Annex I.) Master training schedules submitted to this Headquarters by all Army medical units were an additional means of maintaining close supervision of the training of the various units. When a unit was rated "unsatisfactory," it was reinspected within ten days. At all times high standards were required.

Training inspections of Army medical units, including division medical service, was a continuous process during the stay in England. These, combined with many personal visits by the Surgeon, kept the Surgeon constantly informed of the efficiency and capabilities of medical units.

All training of hospitals in the United States, including Third U. S. Army maneuvers, had stressed wide dispersion of tents and camouflage. All reports indicated that the German Army observed the provisions of the Geneva Convention with respect to medical units. This necessitated a change in the physical setup of hospitals. After consultation with Third U. S. Army hospital commanders and with commanders of hospitals which had been in combat in the Mediterranean Theater, a basic hospital setup was devised. The 34th Evacuation Hospital (SM) demonstrated this to all hospital commanders and their staffs. Tents were placed immediately adjacent to one another with several ward tents laced together for greatest functional value. At a later date, a demonstration setup for convalescent and field hospitals was conducted for commanders concerned.

Medical battalions and medical companies were attached to medical groups on the basis of former command attachments in the United States, where possible, and on geographical location in England. This did not make the medical group a balanced unit. It was realized that this would have to wait until arrival on the Continent. Medical groups and medical battalions were active in supervising the functions and training of their sometimes widely dispersed companies.

One week after arrival in England the Medical Section sent a liaison officer to LONDON to work closely with First U. S. Army Group in planning the forthcoming operations. Constant interchange of information aided greatly in all phases of the planning. Medical units were phased in with combat troops in the correct proportion to support them. Many changes occurred before the Troop Priority List was published in final, unalterable form. The Medical Plan (Annex No. 16 to Third U. S. Army Plan for Operation "OVERLORD") was published 11 May.

At the request of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, certain medical units were selected for use in the Southern Base Section before and after D-Day. These units included Headquarters & Headquarters Detachments of medical battalions, medical collecting companies, ambulance companies (Mtr), clearing companies, one 400-bed evacuation hospital and one 750-bed evacuation hospital. These units obtained valuable experience in the handling of actual battle casualties as they came back from the Continent on Landing Ships, Tank. The two evacuation hospitals handled a total of 2,400 casualties during the eighteen days they were in operation under Southern Base Section. Ex-

amination of patients returning from the Continent demonstrated that even during the first few days of the invasion, the medical care had been excellent.

Twelve general surgical teams, less nurses, were loaned to First U. S. Army to secure experience relative to the handling of battle casualties, as well as to provide additional surgical service for that Army's operations subsequent to D-Day. To augment naval medical personnel on Landing Ships, Tank, forty-five general surgeons and ninety surgical technicians from Third U. S. Army medical units were loaned to European Theater of Operations before D-Day for use until approximately D plus 20. The majority of the general surgeons was furnished by hospital units, as were the surgical technicians. This also constituted important training for the personnel involved. Four of this number became casualties.

A number of courses were offered at the American School Center at SHRIVENHAM, England, which were calculated to enhance the value of field services rendered by officers of the Medical Department. Approximately one hundred Medical Corps officers attended Medical Field Service School at this location, as well as a more specialized course in the treatment of gas casualties.

The Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, likewise provided facilities for field training for Army Nurses at the 15th Medical Center, GIRENCESTER, England. Approximately 250 nurses attended this course, commencing in the latter part of May. Due to the advent of D-Day and the alerting of many hospital units, this course did not run the entire thirty days originally planned for it.

To supplement courses available in this particular field at the American School Center and in order to provide intensified instruction to as many personnel as possible, a two-day course in the treatment of gas casualties was organized to be conducted by members of a company of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. Practical demonstrations were given to practically all Medical Department personnel as well as to line units on the principles and techniques involved in the handling of gas casualties. Every effort was made in this connection to drive home the need for early treatment of all such cases, thereby eliminating the necessity for mass evacuation of such casualties. All divisions received this training.

After liaison had been established with medical personnel of the Ninth U. S. Air Force, special attention was given to the training of personnel in the medical groups in the technique of loading patients on airplanes for evacuation by this means. Fine cooperation on the part of the Air Force made possible the actual use of airplanes for demonstration and application of this important phase of training.

2. Evacuation

This problem was not faced from an actual operational standpoint during the planning phase in the United Kingdom. Those medical units which were loaned to Southern Base Section for use in operations immediately subsequent to D-Day performed under the control of Southern Base Section. However, preparation of plans for evacuation on the Continent consumed a considerable portion of time. A brief description of these plans follows.

It was planned that medical groups would be assigned to certain definite sectors from front to rear in the Army area. In the particular sector assigned the medical group commander would be in charge of all evacuation. In addition to furnishing evacuation facilities for division and corps clearing stations by Army, the groups would also be concerned with furnishing medical service to Army troops in the Army area.

Specifically, it was planned that Army medical groups, in so far as practicable, be reconstituted with "normal" medical battalions to consist of two medical collecting companies, one ambulance company and one clearing company as the units arrived on the far shore. Medical groups, after being assigned to sectors from front to rear, would be responsible for their respective sectors for:

- a. Evacuation of division and corps clearing stations and field hospital platoons to evacuation hospitals.
- b. Evacuation from evacuation hospitals or field hospitals to air fields, entraining points or beaches.
- c. Providing reinforcements for corps and division medical service requested by the Army Surgeon.
- d. Providing holding units at air fields.
- e. Augmenting litter bearers at evacuation hospitals, air fields, and train loading points, when required.

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- f. Furnishing prophylactic teams, when required.
- g. Providing the Army Surgeon with operational information.
- h. Providing courier service for transmission of periodic reports on request of the Army Surgeon.
- i. Providing medical service for Army prisoner of war enclosures.
- j. Providing clearing stations and dispensary service, where needed, for Army troops.
- k. Delivering reports of status of division and corps clearing stations to the Army Surgeon by phone or courier, daily, as of 2400, indicating:
 - (1) Number of patients in clearing stations.
 - (2) Number of patients capable of being evacuated.
 - (3) Number of patients in active field hospital platoons.
 - (4) Number of patients transportable in field hospital platoons.
 - (5) Potential bottlenecks in any installation serviced.
- l. Reporting ambulance losses - number destroyed; number dead-lined and approximate time when reavailable.

Since it was felt that the Communications Zone would have only a limited amount of transportation at its disposal, it was considered likely that Third U. S. Army would have to furnish its own evacuation transportation, possibly directly back to the ports or beaches. It was stressed throughout this planning that constant contact and liaison between Army Headquarters all the way to divisions, as established and maintained by medical groups, was the keynote to the solution of all evacuation problems that might arise.

It was planned that the entire evacuation system should be made as flexible as possible. It was contemplated that collecting companies, for instance, might be attached to evacuation hospitals, thereby making available evacuation by ambulance, as well as the physical presence of personnel of the litter bearer platoons for intra-station and inter-station transportation. Possible use of clearing platoons or of an entire clearing company as holding units at air evacuation strips was also foreseen, as well as the need for at least one ambulance section at each such holding unit.

Flexibility was the guiding principle in all planning concerning evacuation of casualties on the Continent. The medical groups setup was relatively untried in military history, and it was for this reason that their function and use was stressed during the all too brief period of training allotted in the United Kingdom.

3. Hospitalization

The 400-bed Evacuation Hospital and 750-bed Evacuation Hospital loaned to Southern Base Section for use in the Southern Base Section before and after D-Day were not under Third U. S. Army control at the time. No other hospital units were in operation prior to their embarkation for the Continent.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

Upon its arrival in England, each new unit of Third U. S. Army was informed of the location of the nearest station hospital; it was also provided with dispensary service from a nearby unit, if none existed within its command.

Medical service, in some instances, was furnished to units not provided organically with such service by Tables of Organization and Equipment. This was particularly true of such separate companies as Signal Radio Intelligence Companies, the nature of whose duties involved some degree of isolation from other units in the United Kingdom. In such cases "medical detachments", consisting of one or more medical officers together with enlisted technicians and necessary equipment, were placed on temporary duty with these units.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

During the planning stage the professional staffs of the evacuation, field and convalescent hospitals assigned to this Headquarters were thoroughly investigated. The experience of the unit as a whole, as well as the professional abilities of its individual members, were evaluated.

To evaluate the professional staff of each of the units, questionnaires were sent to all officers and record made in this Headquarters of their experience and professional qualifications. Through these questionnaires and through personal interviews it was determined that in some staffs there was a shortage in particular specialties, and that in other staffs there were duplications of personnel qualified in similar specialties. Through transfers among Third U. S. Army medical units it was possible to balance many of the hospital staffs. When this source of qualified talent was exhausted, help from the European Theater Medical Staff was requested. Help was particularly needed from the Theater in the specialties of x-ray, anesthesia and neurosurgery.

In addition to constant effort toward rearrangement of the professional staffs of the various hospital units assigned to this Army, an effort was made to train hospital units to establish compact practical physical setups in the field in contrast to the dispersion and camouflage which had been practiced by these units on maneuvers in the United States. Demonstrations were arranged, put on by units with combat experience, for the benefit of Third U. S. Army hospital units in this connection.

In order to provide a maximum amount of background to personnel performing duties in the surgical and medical specialties of Army hospitals, a seven-day conference was held at KNUTSFORD, England, to which were invited Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Army Nurse Corps personnel of the various hospital units assigned to this Army. At these conferences the Chief Consultant of the European Theater of Operations in each specialty (i.e.: surgery, medicine, neuropsychiatry and the like), as well as other professional speakers with combat experience, addressed the medical commissioned personnel interested in the particular subjects discussed on a given day. It was felt that much benefit accrued as a result of these conferences, and that a proper background was provided on which medical commissioned personnel could base further study of the difficulties which they were about to face in operations on the Continent.

During this planning phase, also, a comprehensive directive covering Medical Policies for Planned Tactical Operations was prepared and distributed to all Third U. S. Army medical units. This directive constituted a downgraded extract of pertinent material which may be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD".

During the planning phase there was opportunity to train a large number of medical officers and nurses in a variety of professional subjects. All existing facilities in the Army, as well as in European Theater of Operations installations were used for this purpose. Among those offered were courses in anesthesia, neuropsychiatry, orthopedic surgery, laboratory technique (especially darkfield interpretation), x-ray, treatment of gas casualties, and combat exhaustion.

The course attended by the largest number of medical officers was the instruction offered at the 312th Station Hospital by European Theater of Operations in the early recognition and management of combat exhaustion. This course was attended by approximately 275 medical officers of hospital and line units assigned to Third U. S. Army.

A course for the Army Nurse Corps, designed specifically for the training of Chief Nurses and other key nurses, was conducted at the American School Center, SHRIVENHAM, England. Instruction in shock and transfusion at the British Blood Supply Depot, BRISTOL, was also available for a small number of medical officers.

By arrangement with the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations a four-day course in anesthesia for medical officers and nurses and a one-day course in plaster technique was conducted at the 10th Station Hospital, in the MANCHESTER area. These courses were designed to precede a thirty-day period of temporary duty in those specialties in station and general hospitals.

Many difficulties were encountered as the date for Continental operations approached. However, it was possible during a three months' period to train approximately 1,000 officers and 300 nurses in a number of professional and military subjects.

2. Surgery

For details of surgical procedures planned for use in operations, see Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD".

3. Neuropsychiatry

The field of neuropsychiatry is relatively new and untried in military experience and will, therefore, bear some discussion in the body of this chapter.

The policy of this Headquarters in regard to the handling, treatment and disposition of neuropsychiatric casualties was based on the

concept that the essential functions of medical officers are to preserve the health of the command, to conserve manpower and to keep as many men at the fighting front as possible. Emphasis was therefore placed on preventive neuropsychiatry. Since virtually all preventive measures are command functions, the division neuropsychiatrists, by virtue of their assignments, were in a position to disseminate pertinent information to officers of the line. Especial importance was placed on the necessity for differentiation between cases of physical fatigue and neuropsychiatric casualties. Provision was made to handle these in unit rest areas at the regiment or battalion level to prevent their being placed in medical evacuation channels. The Army policy included the statement "no such case will be evacuated unless he has unmistakable symptoms which are neither mild nor transient. The decision (to evacuate) is essentially one of command unless the medical aspects are clear and pronounced." Levels of therapy were to be placed, in echelon, at:

- a. The line.
- b. The unit rest area.
- c. The battalion aid station.
- d. The clearing company, from which point the division psychiatrist was to work.
- e. The evacuation hospital.
- f. The convalescent hospital.

The avoidance of indiscriminate evacuation and the proper selection for treatment on the spot were considered to be imperative. Formal neuropsychiatric diagnosis leaves in the mind of the soldier the firm conviction that he will never again perform combat service. It was directed, therefore, that no diagnosis other than "exhaustion" would be placed on the Emergency Medical Tag except in the case of the obviously psychotic.

Each evacuation hospital and each division had its assigned neuropsychiatrist. This group of men had an average of five years' formal training and experience in neuropsychiatry. All were sent to the Theater course in combat neuroses. Division medical officers were systematically sent to this highly practical course at the rate of twenty per week. Each evacuation hospital neuropsychiatrist chose and trained two nurses and six enlisted men as narcotherapy teams.

Because of the tactical necessity for relatively short periods of therapy in the evacuation hospitals (due to their expected admission rates and probable rapid moves) it was anticipated that many neuropsychiatric casualties who might otherwise be returned to full combat duty would be lost to the Army. The convalescent hospital was equipped with a clinical section and a comprehensive, intensive and graded rehabilitation program. It seemed ideally adapted for handling this particular group of casualties. Therefore, each convalescent hospital was assigned one neuropsychiatrist and six enlisted medical technicians who had been trained as a narcotherapy team.

4. Dental

On 21 April a dental directive was published which, among other matters, ordered that upon arrival of troops in the United Kingdom an immediate dental survey should be made and that routine dental work be accomplished as soon as possible.

Plans were also formulated during this period for adequate dental service to be furnished on the Continent, including emergency dental work, routine treatment wherever possible, repair and replacement of dentures which might be lost or broken in combat and the proper treatment of maxillo-facial injuries prior to evacuation of such casualties to the Communications Zone.

In many instances separate companies were too far removed from a unit having assigned dental personnel to make practical their treatment by dental personnel of such a unit. Dental service was furnished by placing a dental officer and an enlisted assistant from either a medical battalion or field hospital on temporary duty for a period of from fourteen to twenty-one days with the separate company requiring dental service.

Dental laboratory trucks for the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group prosthetic teams did not arrive until 1 June. During the interim permission was obtained from the Dental Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, to place the nine technicians comprising a part of these prosthetic teams on temporary duty with Central Dental Laboratory Number 1 in LONDON for duty and training in that laboratory. During the first week of June three dental laboratory trucks arrived and the prosthetic teams to operate them were assigned to the XII, XV and XX Corps to be placed at the disposal of the corps surgeons in furnishing prosthetic treatment, where necessary, to the respective corps units.

Two more dental laboratory trucks were shortly thereafter made available for an indefinite length of time to Third U. S. Army; the personnel to operate these two trucks to be furnished by this Army.

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The fourth truck with its dental prosthetic team was dispatched to VIII Corps on 15 June to remain with them until they left for the Continent. The fifth dental laboratory truck was assigned on 1 July to duties at PACKINGTON CAMP (northeast of BIRMINGHAM, England) at which there was a considerable concentration of units assigned to this Army.

A consolidated report of dental service furnished to Third U. S. Army during the period March 1944 to June 1944 is shown below:

	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Strength (Reported)	64939	149074	171762	163152
Admissions Routine	3683	8053	12119	10068
Admissions Emergency	454	1307	1763	1498
Sittings	6944	17096	21816	17564
Officer Personnel	117	242	266	239
Enlisted Personnel	115	239	263	238
Restorations	2947	11427	15511	14270
Dentures	129	347	520	594
Gingivitis	319	905	1397	1087
Gingivitis Treatment	624	1803	3019	2188
Stomatitis, Vincent's	113	448	485	521
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	315	1434	1595	1330

5. Veterinary

With the establishment of four messes in Headquarters Third U. S. Army the Headquarters Commandant requested the veterinary services of the Medical Section to supervise their sanitation and cleanliness. They were inspected daily until departure from the United Kingdom of this Headquarters.

On 29 March inspection of Class I distributing points was inaugurated. These inspections were largely confined to the supply points located at WINSFORD and ALTRINCHAM (southwest of MANCHESTER). Even though these supply points were under Western Base Section control, the veterinary service of this Headquarters was authorized by the Depot Quartermaster to point out deficiencies when noted, and to offer constructive advice to railhead personnel. Most common deficiencies noted were:

1. The failure to issue individual pieces of meat and cheese with protective covering.
2. Insanitary dividing of meat and cheese.
3. Issue of bread without any protective covering.

Lack of an adequate number of bread sacks was common throughout the entire period of stay in the United Kingdom.

From 5 April until departure from the United Kingdom, over 200 Third U. S. Army troop messes were inspected. Many of these were joint-messes and therefore represented many more troops than would have been the case if each mess had been operated separately. The mess problem was largely of a sanitary and mechanical nature.

Personnel of many messes were not properly informed regarding the use of lemon crystals. This matter was discussed at each mess inspection and instructional material was published as a Third U. S. Army directive.

6. Personnel

As new medical units arrived in the United Kingdom from the Zone of the Interior, they were not completely at Table of Organization strength. This was true particularly in regard to Medical Corps officers. A shortage of Medical Corps officers, therefore, gradually developed, and as of the end of June the following shortages existed throughout the Third U. S. Army:

Medical Corps	- 25
Medical Administrative Corps	- 18
Dental Corps	- 7
Army Nurse Corps	- 5

By means of continuous shifting of medical personnel, all units had embarked for the Continent prior to the end of June with full Table of Organization strength. The above shortages were only partly filled in medical units phased in later, prior to their departure for the Continent.

Shortages of commissioned officers qualified in the specialties, particularly x-ray, neurosurgery, and anesthesia, existed throughout this period. Through constant survey of the professional qualifications of all medical personnel, together with resulting transfers, the shortages in these specialties were minimized to some extent.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

During this phase problems involving medical supply resolved themselves into three major and distinct efforts.

1. Procurement of initial T/E and T/BA equipment for medical units.
2. Improvisation of substitutes for T/E and T/BA medical equipment not available in sufficient quantities in this theater for distribution to all units.
3. Preparation of a medical supply plan for operations on the Continent.

The provision of T/E and T/BA equipment for medical units was a continuous process from the time this Headquarters reached the United Kingdom until approximately the end of August, two and a half months after D-Day. Over 100 Army medical units were so equipped prior to their embarkation for the Continent. In addition, T/E and T/BA medical equipment was procured for line units, including major commands, such as divisions.

Three general depots, under the control of Western Base Section, were primarily utilized as sources for Third U. S. Army medical equipment. These depots were located in the general area between BRISTOL and MANCHESTER. The modus operandi included close coordination with the G-4 Section of this Headquarters, AC of S G-4 of First U. S. Army Group, AC of S G-4 of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, and the various general depots concerned.

To increase the facility with which medical items could be handled and distributed to Third U. S. Army medical units, provision was made, in the middle of April, for the use of Army medical depots as distributing points for equipping and supplying these units. The two depot companies set up distributing points in the LIVERPOOL area. At approximately the same time, the Army Medical Supply Officer was appointed Purchasing and Contracting Officer for all types of medical supplies for Third U. S. Army.

Requisitions for pre-scheduled medical supply requirements were submitted to Headquarters European Theater of Operations for approximately 300 tons. Pre-scheduled medical supply requirements for Civil Affairs units for Third U. S. Army were also computed and submitted, at this time.

Among items which proved difficult to procure for medical units were tentage of all types and pioneer tool sets for vehicles. The shortages in tentage alone resulted in a requisition, on 3 May, for 1,504 pyramidal tents and 477 hospital ward tents. Essential expendable medical supplies such as aspirin, ammonia chloride troches, terpin hydrate and other drugs used in the treatment of upper respiratory diseases, were comparatively non-available.

Particular difficulty was experienced in equipping the 8th Convalescent Hospital and the 79th Infantry Division. As of the end of April, the 8th Convalescent Hospital had still received none of its equipment. It was learned that no equipment for a convalescent hospital was, at that time, in the United Kingdom. It was therefore necessary that a radiogram be sent to the United States to have complete equipment for this unit placed on the next available transport. The equipment arrived just prior to the scheduled departure of that unit for the Continent.

Due to a sudden change in the priority of the 79th Infantry Division early in June, it became necessary to equip this unit immediately. The major shortage of this division was lack of assault medical pack equipment in accordance with recent changes in Tables of Equipment. The only source in the United Kingdom for this equipment proved to be in the 28th Infantry Division. Trucks from one of the Army medical depot companies were dispatched immediately to the 28th Infantry Division to pick up this equipment and transport it to the docks where it was turned over to the 79th Infantry Division just prior to its departure. Shortly thereafter the priorities of the 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions were also raised and it was necessary to institute considerable transfer of medical supplies between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland for the purpose of completely equipping these units in time.

It was learned early in June that the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, had not been able to furnish Red Cross ground markers for Third U. S. Army medical units, and also that sufficient flies, for marking them properly, would not be available as substitutes. It was thus necessary to secure 60,000 square yards of canvas, and contract was initiated with a local firm in LIVERPOOL to sew 548 fly-type markers and forty-eight, fifty-foot-square ground markers on which to paint the Red Cross.

Since certain medical units were phased in under VIII Corps, which was attached to First U. S. Army in its assault wave on the Continent, it was necessary that certain medical units be provided with means of amphibious packing of medical supplies. In this connection, 400 65-mm shell cases were secured from an ordnance ammunition company and one of the Army medical depot companies was given the assignment of changing the markings of these cases, and packing and sealing them so as to be watertight. In addition, 5,000 British-made packing boxes were secured for use by hospital units in packing equipment for movement to the Continent.

In addition to procurement of T/E and T/BA equipment for medical units assigned to Third U. S. Army, PROCO (Project for Continental Operations) units were secured for use by the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group under PROCO Project No. 1 and PROCO Project No. 2.

Under PROCO Project No. 1, one PROCO unit consisted of three 1 1/2 ton 6x6 trucks, cargo, complete with special surgical equipment and one, 250-gallon water trailer. Ten such units were procured for the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group.

Under PROCO Project No. 2, one PROCO unit consisted of one 2 1/2 ton truck, specially fitted with x-ray equipment. Three of these units were ultimately received by the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group.

A Blood Bank Detachment consisting of eight 2 1/2 ton trucks, for use in transporting blood was also secured and attached to one of the Army medical depot companies.

In connection with the procurement of complete unit assemblies for hospital units, adequate storage facilities were not always available at locations occupied by the various units. In instances such as these, efforts were made to obtain tentage, or in the event that failed, recommendations were made to move the unit to a new location or to obtain local storage facilities.

Preparation of a medical supply plan for operations on the Continent was submitted to Headquarters First U. S. Army Group, early in April, and was subsequently approved. Details of this plan will be found in Annex 16 to Operation "OVERLORD."

Under Operation "OVERLORD", an advance platoon of the 32d Medical Depot Company was attached to First U. S. Army for operation on the OMAHA BEACH. Advance Section No. 2, of the 33d Medical Depot Company was attached to VIII Corps for initial operation on the OMAHA BEACH. Initial planning in regard to Third U. S. Army operations included the furnishing of the two medical depot companies at an early stage.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Upon arrival of Headquarters Third U. S. Army in the United Kingdom, it was evident that five major problems were to be considered from the standpoint of Preventive Medicine.

- a. Venereal disease control.
- b. Communicable diseases.
- c. Medical reports and records.
- d. Non-battle injuries.
- e. Sanitation.

As a basis for all plans in this particular field, considerable data was assembled and studied from experiences of troops on maneuvers in the United States, other troops based in Iceland and in the United Kingdom, results accruing from the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns, and information secured from United States Army Air Force operations in the European Theater of Operations. It became obvious, early in the planning phase, that much of the above data would not apply in the case of proposed Continental operations. During the planning period, constant coordination was in effect with observers from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, North African Theater of Operations, First U. S. Army Group, and First U. S. Army. As a result of this constant study and coordination, repeated changes were made in policies and procedures as the planning period progressed. All available medical intelligence reports from the above mentioned headquarters were carefully studied and evaluated in the light of their applicability to the needs of this Army.

The details of all plans and policies promulgated in the field of Preventive Medicine will be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD." Pertinent extracts from this Plan were downgraded and published in the form of directives, for use in the medical service of this Army.

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2. Venereal Disease Control

Available intelligence reports indicated that there was a great increase in venereal disease incidence among the civilian population in Nazi occupied countries; therefore, it was anticipated that the control of venereal disease amongst Third U. S. Army troops during Continental operations would be a definite military problem. With this in mind, a Venereal Disease Control Officer was designated as such, on a full time basis, on 1 May.

A comprehensive venereal disease program was instituted while troops were still located in the United Kingdom, this program becoming a basis for similar control on the Continent.

During this period also, preparations were made for the operation of venereal prophylactic stations in towns and cities on the Continent by institution of training whereby medical collecting and clearing companies would become qualified to operate such stations.

The control of venereal diseases during the stay of Third U. S. Army troops in the United Kingdom, at no time constituted a serious problem. The various base sections had established venereal disease prophylactic stations in all large cities in the United Kingdom. Most venereal disease cases occurring among Third U. S. Army troops originated from contacts in LONDON, BIRMINGHAM, MANCHESTER, and LIVERPOOL. A summary of the statistics shown in Annex II to the Medical Section report, for the period 24 March to 7 July, reveals that for an average strength of 138,364 officers and men, a weekly average of sixty-eight new cases were reported, this being a rate of 16.49 per 1,000 per annum. A complete breakdown by weekly periods will be found in the above referred to Annex.

3. Communicable Diseases

In general, communicable diseases presented no problem to Third U. S. Army troops during their stay in the United Kingdom; upper respiratory diseases were widespread, but mild in nature. Predisposing to this type of infection was the cold, damp, foggy English weather, as well as heating and housing facilities to which United States troops were unaccustomed.

Figures shown in Annex II to the Medical Section report, reveal that during the period 24 March to 7 July, on an average total strength of 138,364 officers and men, 1,023 cases of communicable diseases occurred weekly, or an average weekly rate of 384 per 1,000 per annum. Weekly breakdown of figures on which this summary is based will be found in Annex II.

Common respiratory diseases revealed high seasonal rates during April and May and a few cases of pneumonia were reported.

Diarrheal diseases were few and sporadic, with the exception of a small outbreak during the weeks of 7 April and 16 June.

The incidence of influenza was low throughout the entire period.

Both measles and mumps were fairly prevalent during the first eight weeks of the period. Scarlet fever cases were extremely low, one small outbreak occurring in a medical unit on 30 May. The total personnel affected in this outbreak consisted of ten cases.

Sporadic cases of recurrent malaria, epidemic hepatitis and meningococcal meningitis, were seen.

The daily non-effective rate gradually decreased from 18.04 per 1,000 per annum, at the beginning of the period, to 6.68 per 1,000 per annum at the conclusion of this phase.

4. Medical Reports and Records

The projection of medical policies and plans and the attainment of results in the field of preventive medicine, are largely dependent upon the assembly and analysis of an enormous number of statistical reports. Therefore, interwoven with every aspect of the Medical Section's activities during the planning phase in the United Kingdom, was the necessity for the setting up of a system of accurate medical reports and records, whereby conclusions could be properly drawn and plans promulgated and effected. The details of the system evolved will be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD", and amendments thereto.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

During the period 24 March to 7 July, inclusive, an average of 216 cases per week of non-battle injuries occurred among an average strength of 138,364 officers and men. This constituted an average weekly rate of seventy-five cases per 1,000 per annum, as will be seen by reference to

Annex II of the Medical Section report. The highest rates were experienced from the fifth through the thirteenth weeks of this period. The high rate of non-battle injuries was at least partially due to heavy traffic on narrow winding roads, foggy days and nights which reduced driving visibility, and the necessity for driving on the left hand side of the road.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 May. It was the only medical laboratory assigned to Third U. S. Army. No actual laboratory work was performed during the period of its stay in the United Kingdom. Professional training of the personnel of the unit, together with orientation courses calculated to better its performance of its mission on the Continent, procurement of necessary equipment, and study of the operations of other Army medical laboratories in the North African Theater of Operations, and in the Pacific Theater, occupied the unit during this entire phase.

7. Sanitation

U. S. Army troops were housed in the United Kingdom under a wide variety of conditions, varying in degree from field bivouac areas to shelter in requisitioned buildings. In many respects, standards of sanitation were quite different from those to which our troops had been accustomed in the United States. This called for the use of some temporary expedients, compromises, and in some instances, changes in standards, to meet local conditions.

Water supplies for troops in the United Kingdom were obtained largely from municipal sources, practically all of which provided some degree of artificial treatment, including chlorination. The capacity for which English water systems were designed, was approximately one quarter that of American practice for a comparable number of people. In addition, the presence of a large number of Allied troops throughout the entire United Kingdom necessitated conservation measures in order to prevent the overtaxing of local systems and the occurrence of serious shortages.

Due to the overcrowded conditions throughout the United Kingdom, it was frequently expedient to utilize halls and large buildings on estates, for the housing of various troops. These estates were provided with a private water supply in most instances and a policy was followed of artificial chlorination of such water.

The disposal of sewage and human wastes varied from fairly satisfactory flush-toilet installations, almost invariably connected to sewer systems having sewage facilities, to the less satisfactory "bucket-latrines" method commonly used in many British camps.

Disposal of garbage and other waste materials presented few problems. Local collection and use of garbage for stock feeding was reasonably satisfactory, depending on the capability and care exercised by the individual collector.

Insect control was greatly facilitated by climatic conditions. Cool weather precluded any appreciable or serious development of flies or mosquitoes. Routine local control measures were effective in most instances.

A review of reports and authoritative accounts of experiences in other theaters of operations, indicated that sanitation could become a major military problem unless commands were thoroughly instructed in the difficulties which might be encountered and methods of handling them. Expected conditions on the Continent, as made available through medical intelligence and related channels, were taken into account in the preparation of directives relating to sanitation. The principles involved in these directives will be found in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD."

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The following officers of the Medical Section accompanied the movement of the Forward Echelon of this Headquarters to the Continent, preceding the main body of the Medical Section:

Army Surgeon
Surgical Consultant
Neuropsychiatric Consultant
Operations and Training Sub-section:
Chief of Sub-section
Hospitalization Officer
Air Evacuation Officer
Administrative Assistant
Venereal Disease Control Officer
Chief of Finance and Supply Sub-section
Assistant, Veterinarian
Assistant, Personnel & Administrative Sub-section

Nine enlisted men also accompanied this movement.

Upon arrival of the main body of this Headquarters on the Continent, the organization of the Medical Section remained essentially unchanged. However, two officers and two enlisted men of the Medical Section remained behind in the United Kingdom as representatives of this section, with Headquarters XII Corps, Medical Section. Of this personnel, one officer was from the Finance and Supply Sub-section, one officer was from the Operations and Training Sub-section, and one enlisted man each, was from those respective sub-sections.

An additional 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, was placed on temporary duty with Headquarters XII Corps, to aid the representative of the Finance and Supply Sub-section, Medical Section, this Headquarters, in equipping medical units still in the United Kingdom.

A 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, was also placed on temporary duty with the Finance and Supply Sub-section, on the Continent, due to the necessity for locating equipment of various medical units as they arrived on the Continent, which often arrived separately from the personnel of the units.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

As of 6 July, all Third U. S. Army medical units already on the Continent were attached to Headquarters VIII Corps, which was in operation under the control of First U. S. Army. These units were:

Hq & Hq Det, 167th Medical Battalion
Hq & Hq Det, 169th Medical Battalion
429th Medical Collecting Company
455th Medical Collecting Company
635th Clearing Company
16th Field Hospital
34th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
35th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
33d Medical Depot Company

In addition, the Advance Depot Platoon of the 32d Medical Depot Company was in operation for First U. S. Army on the OMAHA BEACH.

Due to the fact that Third U. S. Army did not become operational for some time and it was found that hospitalization facilities would be required by First U. S. Army in excess of that possessed by hospitals already in operation under that Army, Twelfth U. S. Army Group directed that all evacuation hospitals upon their arrival on the Continent would be attached to First U. S. Army. These hospitals were to be moved and operated by that Army as the need arose, until Third U. S. Army became operational. A total of eleven evacuation hospitals assigned to Third U. S. Army operated for varying lengths of time under First U. S. Army during the period 6 July to 31 July. At the end of this period all evacuation hospitals except the 106th Evacuation Hospital and the 109th Evacuation Hospital were returned to Third U. S. Army control, the latter two being relieved of their attachment at a later date.

One field hospital was used during this period by First U. S. Army. On 19 July the 54th Field Hospital moved to the vicinity of LA HAYE DU PUIITS (T-18) to support the 8th and 79th Infantry Divisions. The units of this hospital remained in this vicinity during the period 19 to 31 July.

In addition to the above-mentioned medical units, occasional need arose for operation of other units by First U. S. Army. For example, the 438th Medical Collecting Company was utilized to augment the 34th Evacuation Hospital which was receiving a large volume of casualties in the CARENTAN (T-98) area. There was especially a need for the litter bearer platoon and less urgent necessity for the station platoon. The ambulance platoon was used to supplement evacuation of the hospital. A need for another unit arose when the 83d Infantry Division arrived in France with only one platoon of its clearing company. The other pla-

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toon had become separated in the marshalling area in England and did not rejoin the unit until three weeks after the division reached the Continent. The 664th Clearing Company was attached to the 83d Infantry Division to supplement the one platoon. It operated with the division until about 25 July.

The majority of Army medical units, as they arrived in sporadic groups, were concentrated in bivouac in an area several miles north of BARNEVILLE (T-09). From one to seven units would arrive in a day's time. As the units arrived on the beach, they were directed to a transit area and from there guided to BRICQUEBEC (O-10) or to ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19) by a Military Police escort. The AC of S G-4, of this Headquarters, was notified in advance of the units scheduled to debark on the beach and in turn notified the Medical Section. An officer guide from the Medical Section was then dispatched to the designated town to meet the unit and guide it to the concentration area. As more units arrived, officers were designated from units in the concentration area to lead in the new arrivals. Difficulties were encountered. Most of the units arrived in more than one serial, some in four or five. At times only one vehicle of a unit would arrive. Moreover, because of the large volume of units arriving on the beach and the relatively limited communication facilities, the notification of a unit's arrival often came after the unit had already reached the rendezvous point. Nevertheless, with reasonable facility eighty-two of 105 medical units assigned to Third U. S. Army arrived on the Continent during the pre-operational period 9-31 July. The principal units which had not arrived were:

- 12th Evacuation Hospital
- 108th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 110th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 59th Field Hospital
- 7th Convalescent Hospital
- 8th Convalescent Hospital
- 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
- 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
- 95th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion

2. Evacuation

During the pre-operational period of Third U. S. Army on the Continent, definite plans were made for the tactical employment of medical units. In brief, they were as follows:

a. Each corps was assigned a corps battalion consisting of one battalion headquarters, one clearing company, two collecting companies and one ambulance company. The corps battalion was to be under the control of the corps surgeon with the mission of providing corps medical service.

b. Each medical group was to evacuate a corps zone from division clearing stations to an Army installation. Groups were organized to consist of two medical battalions similar in so far as possible, to the corps medical battalion. Advance Section Communications Zone was to evacuate as many evacuation hospitals as possible.

c. From the division clearing stations, where triage of patients was performed, non-transportable patients were to be sent to an adjacent platoon of a field hospital. The transportable patients requiring further evacuation were to be sent to an evacuation hospital.

3. Hospitalization

Hospitalization facilities were needed for the care of Third U. S. Army troops during the pre-operational phase on the Continent. The 101st Evacuation Hospital was therefore opened on 13 July at a location two miles northwest of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19), and authority was obtained for Third U. S. Army to retain control of this hospital during the entire pre-operational period.

The following plans were made covering the use of hospital units when Third U. S. Army became operational:

a. Evacuation Hospitals: Evacuation hospitals were to be used in the accepted orthodox manner.

b. Field Hospitals: By attaching field hospitals to the various corps, the corps surgeon was further enabled to attach one hospitalization unit (one platoon of a field hospital) to each division clearing station. Platoons of field hospitals were to be used, in addition, as holding units at air strips, augmented by one or more clearing companies of a medical gas treatment battalion.

c. Convalescent Hospitals: Convalescent hospitals were to be used for those patients not requiring more than a fifteen-day convalescent period.

d. Army Clearing Companies: Army clearing companies were not to be employed in the orthodox manner. The clearing companies (or platoons of same) were to be attached to the evacuation hospitals to provide medical service for the less seriously wounded, and also to act as holding units for non-transportable patients when evacuation hospitals displaced forward.

e. Army Collecting Companies: It was also planned to attach one Army collecting company to each evacuation hospital with the exception of the ambulance platoons of those companies. It was felt that such an attachment to an evacuation hospital would aid in the transporting of patients within the hospital area and free the personnel of the evacuation hospital for more intensive medical care of the patients.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

A few Signal and Ordnance companies, as well as a number of Quartermaster companies, located in the vicinity of ST MAURICE (T-09), were without medical service. An Army collecting company was therefore given the responsibility of establishing and maintaining a roving dispensary and ambulance service for these companies from the middle to the end of July.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

The pre-operational phase of Headquarters Third U. S. Army on the Continent, in so far as the professional services of the Medical Section were concerned, was one primarily of orientation and study of results already obtained in First U. S. Army.

2. Surgery

In the field of surgery, through constant contact with First U. S. Army, it was noted that frequent transfers of auxiliary surgical teams from one hospital unit to another were the rule rather than the exception; such transfers depending almost exclusively upon the tactical situation and the surgical backlog of the hospitals concerned. This problem was watched very closely in as much as it was felt that Third U. S. Army hospitals would be faced with fundamentally the same circumstances upon becoming operational. Several surgical teams from the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group (a Third U. S. Army unit), attached to First U. S. Army hospital units to supplement their surgical services, benefited considerably from their experience.

3. Neuropsychiatry

A high percentage of the neuropsychiatrists in Third U. S. Army units had intensive experience in the combat zone during a month or more prior to Third U. S. Army becoming operational, through work with First U. S. Army.

The Third U. S. Army divisions attached to First U. S. Army experienced a variable rate of neuropsychiatric casualties. From the standpoint of predictability concerning such casualties when Third U. S. Army became operational, a consideration of the factors involved led to the conclusions that:

a. A high percentage of replacements would have already taken place in officers and men in these divisions. A higher incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties might be expected in this group of replacements than had occurred in the various divisions' original assigned strength.

b. The remaining troops (including replacements) would be seasoned, but tired.

c. Many seasoned troops would enter combat under officers who had little or no battle experience.

d. To offset the above considerations remained the fact, that men who should never have originally been sent to foreign service, would, to a great extent, already have been weeded out in actual combat.

4. Dental

During the month of July, of the five dental laboratory trucks available to Third U. S. Army, two were attached to First U. S. Army for duty with the 4th Convalescent Hospital, and two were attached to the 101st Evacuation Hospital, which was the only evacuation hospital servicing Third U. S. Army troops during the pre-operational period. The remaining dental laboratory truck was attached to Headquarters Third U. S. Army to perform necessary prosthetic work among personnel of the Headquarters.

Due to the experience of First U. S. Army, it was decided to attach the dental prosthetic teams (dental laboratory trucks) of the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group to evacuation hospitals when Third U. S. Army became operational, rather than to corps or division headquarters. It was also decided to enlarge the dental services of the 6th Convalescent Hospital in order to provide routine treatment for all patients admitted to that hospital and to treat those who had lost or broken their dentures, the latter to be held in this hospital until treatment was completed. Necessary equipment was requested to be ready for issue at such time as the 6th Convalescent Hospital became functional.

A consolidated report of dental service rendered to Third U. S. Army troops during the month of July is shown below:

	July
Strength (Reported)	132569
Admissions Routine	5950
Admissions Emergency	99A
Sittings	1575C
Officer Personnel	226
Enlisted Personnel	22A
Restorations	6681
Dentures	255
Gingivitis	726
Gingivitis Treatment	1A69
Stomatitis, Vincent's	520
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	935

5. Veterinary

It was the function of the veterinary service to advise concerning possible purchases of local excess foodstuffs to augment Army rations and to inspect Class I supply points.

During this early period on the Continent it was felt that the purchase of local foods should be prohibited, particularly butter, because of:

a. Failure of the local products to meet sanitary requirements of the Army.

b. The impracticability involved in attempts by a fast moving force to procure and inspect large quantities of foodstuffs and to distribute same to the troops.

This position was later compromised by agreement that certain foodstuffs could be purchased locally and served to the troops, provided that a germicidal rinse had been used to wash same prior to consumption.

Between 16 July and 1 August, a total of three Class I supply points were placed in operation for Third U. S. Army units. These were inspected regularly, particular attention being paid to the handling of perishable rations and the avoidance of waste. It was directed that all ration trucks be made spotlessly clean before rations were loaded. The initial supply of "C" and Ten-in-One rations were continually inspected, this being in addition to the inspection of "B" rations and perishable substitutes.

Each of the three bakeries of these supply points were also inspected during this period. Bread prepared by Quartermaster mobile bakeries, in general, was handled in a satisfactory manner. Bread sacks were usually available and it was found that care was necessary in stacking the bread at the supply points to avoid crushing.

6. Personnel

Shortages in Medical Department commissioned personnel continued to exist throughout the month of July. As of the end of that month, the following deficiencies existed:

Medical Corps	35
Medical Administrative Corps	20
Dental Corps	5

Shortages were due partially to casualties which had occurred in Third U. S. Army units while attached to First U. S. Army, and partially to the inability of replacements to report physically to our units. The previous shortage of nurses, mentioned in Chapter 1, had been adjusted by the end of July.

Shortage of qualified personnel in the specialties, particularly that of anesthesia, continued to exist, both in regard to Medical Corps officers and Army Nurse Corps. Constant survey of qualifications possessed by commissioned personnel in all medical units were made, in an attempt to reduce the extent of this deficiency.

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Section 4 - Medical Supply

Medical supply problems experienced in July involved three major efforts:

1. Completion of equipping medical units still in the United Kingdom, prior to their departure for the Continent.
2. Coordination of the arrival of medical units in a bivouac area with the arrival of their equipment, which in many instances had been shipped separately from the United Kingdom.
3. Deployment of the two medical depot companies in the most advantageous manner for actual use in impending operations by Third U. S. Army.

Medical units still in the United Kingdom were equipped through the efforts of a Medical Administrative Corps officer and an enlisted man left on temporary duty with Headquarters XII Corps, by the Medical Section of this Headquarters.

Upon departure of the 32d and 33d Medical Depot Companies, for the Continent, Company "C" of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion was set up to operate a supply point for Army medical units at ASHBOURNE, England. This company functioned as such until the completion of the equipping of all medical units of Third U. S. Army.

When this Headquarters arrived on the Continent, the advance platoon of the 32d Medical Depot Company, attached to First U. S. Army, was in operation with the 1st Medical Depot Company on the OMAHA BEACH. The advance section, 33d Medical Depot Company (attached to VIII Corps) was operating with the advance platoon, 1st Medical Depot Company, on the UTAH BEACH.

Problems were encountered in finding organizational equipment of units which arrived on the Continent separately from the personnel. A plan was set up with the Medical Supply Officer, Advance Section, Communications Zone, to have an officer assigned to the specific job of checking each ship as it arrived at either beach, to determine whether or not the equipment was unloaded, and when it would be ready to pickup.

On 18 July, Third U. S. Army was notified by the Advance Section, Communications Zone, that medical depot companies assigned to the latter, had not yet arrived on the Continent; that they did not have the necessary personnel to operate a depot at CHEF DU PONT (T-39), which was to relieve the UTAH BEACH medical dump. It was agreed that the 33d Medical Depot Company (assigned to Third U. S. Army) could well be attached for this purpose. Over 900 tons of medical supplies were handled and processed swiftly and efficiently.

On 18 July, the 32d Medical Depot Company was moved into BRIQUEBE (O-10), immediately upon its arrival, in order to supply Third U. S. Army medical units, which were then arriving on the Continent in increasing numbers and going into operation for First U. S. Army.

As the VIII Corps started its drive toward COUTANCFS (T-25), the advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company moved in to directly support the troops at LA HAYE DU PUITTS (T-18). The depot was established two and one half miles from the front line.

Due to imminent operations by the Third U. S. Army, the 33d Medical Depot Company was moved by shuttle to BESNEVILLE (T-19), having been relieved of its assignment at CHEF DU PONT (T-39) by the arrival of an Advance Section, Communications Zone medical depot company. BESNEVILLE was selected as being the southernmost point within the Army boundary that could support the Army when it became operational.

In view of the fact that the Advance Section, Communications Zone, had been unable to fill the requisitions to stock Third U. S. Army medical depots, it was agreed by the Third U. S. Army and the Advance Section, Communications Zone, to place ten medical maintenance units in the 33d Medical Depot Company at BESNEVILLE. This provided medical supplies for 200,000 men for fifteen days.

The experience of First U. S. Army, and known planned operations of Third U. S. Army, made it apparent that the minimum of supplies in a medical maintenance unit would not meet the demands of Third U. S. Army hospitals. Therefore, Advance Section, Communications Zone, was requested to release immediately all supplies arriving on the Continent bearing markings for Third U. S. Army units. Advance Section, Communications Zone, agreed to this, thereby providing a ten percent reserve of T/E and T/DA non-expendable items.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

After the establishment of this Headquarters in France, all the various phases of Preventive Medicine were again gone over in detail with unit medical officers in all Third U. S. Army units. Many of the anticipated problems did not materialize and liaison was constantly maintained with various corps and division surgeons, Civil Affairs, and with the First U. S. Army, as many of our troops were fighting under its command.

2. Venereal Disease Control

The problem of venereal disease control was at its minimum. Troops were being moved from the United Kingdom to the Continent, and the venereal disease rates among troops still in the United Kingdom remained low.

On the Continent the incidence of venereal disease among troops was also quite low. This was primarily due to the fact that all towns, cities and homes were placed "off limits", and these restrictions were rigidly enforced. In addition, most troops were committed to action under First U. S. Army, soon after arrival.

3. Communicable Diseases

No real problems or epidemics were encountered during this period despite intimate contact with French civilians in the NORMANDY sector. One small outbreak of gastro-enteritis occurred during the week ending 21 July. All other cases of communicable disease were small in number and sporadic in nature. (See Annex III to the Medical Section report).

4. Medical Records and Reports

These continued to be an administrative problem due to the rapid movement of all units over the beach from the United Kingdom and due to the frequent changes of assignment and attachment of these units. Repeated conferences were held with unit and medical officers, with a view to attaining accuracy and efficiency in the handling of these reports.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

Such injuries were reduced by fifty per cent, with the establishment of various unit headquarters in France and with the reduction of movement over the beaches by large convoys and large numbers of troops. (See Annex III to the Medical Section report).

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory, with partial equipment, reached France on 16 July and went into bivouac. The rest of the period was devoted to unpacking equipment and setting up the necessary supplies and equipment for an operational mobile section. The bulk of the essential equipment failed to arrive in France before Third U. S. Army became operational, but this one small section had sufficient equipment and supplies to go into immediate operation.

7. Sanitation

Experience on the Continent during this phase showed that, although some of the anticipated and possible sanitary problems did not materialize, previous planning was justified. Only in relation to water supply control was any modification deemed desirable. In as much as water from Engineer water supply points would be the only water approved generally, for the use of troops, greater reliance was placed on chlorine residual tests to determine potability at the point of consumption.

Greater emphasis was found necessary on mess and field sanitation, with a view primarily to putting into routine practice standard procedures set forth in current operational directives.

CHAPTER 3 AUGUST OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Early in August the Medical Section was split into a Forward and a Rear Echelon. Originally the Forward Echelon consisted of five officers (including the Army Surgeon) and nine enlisted men. However, due to the speed of advancement of Third U. S. Army, it was found necessary to move

the Executive Officer and the entire Operations and Training Sub-section to the Forward Echelon. Approximately one week later, the Finance and Supply Sub-section was also moved to the Forward Echelon. This left the following sub-sections in the Rear Echelon:

Personnel and Administrative Sub-section
Consultant Sub-section (less Surgical Consultant)
Preventive Medicine Sub-section
Dental Sub-section
Veterinary Sub-section

The Medical Consultant was appointed Surgeon of the Rear Echelon. The Surgical Consultant was the only consultant in the Forward Echelon.

Due to the rapidity with which events moved, it was found necessary to bring in a 1st lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, on temporary duty with the Operations and Training Sub-section to perform statistical duties connected with the bed status of various hospital units and the placement of hospital surgical teams with these units.

It was also found advantageous to place a major, Medical Corps, on temporary duty with this Section, as Liaison Officer with the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. This was a full time job and it was not considered possible to spare an officer already assigned to the Section for this duty.

During this period, also, the Chief of the Operations and Training Sub-section, Medical Section, Headquarters Ninth U. S. Army, was on temporary duty with the Forward Echelon of the Medical Section, this Headquarters, for purposes of orientation.

Late in the month the Army Veterinarian was transferred to the Communications Zone, at the request of that headquarters. From that time and during the ensuing month the Medical Section had only one Veterinary Corps officer assigned.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Practical application of months of training now ensued. As in other departments of the Army, this type of training is the most beneficial in its results.

2. Evacuation

Soon after the Third U. S. Army became operational it became evident that evacuation was to become the most serious problem faced by the Medical Service during the month of August. Prior to the onset of operations, attachment of subordinate units to Medical Groups had been accomplished and Corps Zone responsibilities had been assigned in accordance with projected plans made in the United Kingdom and during the pre-operational phase on the Continent previously discussed in this history in Chapters 1 and 2.

The Corps Zone responsibilities were assigned as follows:

64th Medical Group to support the VIII Corps
65th Medical Group to support the XV Corps
66th Medical Group to support the XX Corps
67th Medical Group to support the XII Corps

The group commanders were given the responsibility of preparing medical plans of evacuation. For this purpose fifteen ambulance companies and eighteen collecting company ambulance platoons were available.

The 69th Medical Group was given the mission of evacuating all Army evacuation hospitals, until such time as Advance Section, Communications Zone, could take over this function.

Constant leapfrogging of the evacuation hospitals during the first ten days was inadequate to keep hospital units close to the front lines. Long ambulance hauls were therefore necessary. Excellent care in the forward area was very effective in counteracting possible deleterious effect of these hauls.

Daily contact was maintained with the commanding officers of the medical groups, and a station list showing the location of all Army medical units was published as of 0600 daily. Wide distribution of this publication through medical channels eliminated undue delay which might otherwise have been caused through rapid changes in location of evacuation hospitals and consequent inability of ambulance drivers to locate them.

The success of the evacuation system during this period was due in

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no small measure to the activities and initiative exerted by the medical groups. Theirs was the problem of evacuating division clearing stations, which might move two and three times a day; theirs also was the problem of constant liaison with this and subordinate headquarters in order to obtain up-to-date information with regard to locations of medical installations and advice concerning the over-all picture.

Fortunately the long ambulance hauls did not disturb the basic availability of ambulances for evacuation purposes. During the rapid advance of the Third U. S. Army a very low casualty rate was experienced. Seldom, therefore, was there a lack of sufficient ambulances.

Air evacuation constituted a major problem. During the first ten days of the month the only means of evacuation available to this Army from its hospital units was by its own ambulances to the Advance Section, Communications Zone air evacuation holding unit located at BINIVILLE (T-29).

On 12 August an air strip at GAEL (X-65) was made available to this Army for a period of two days. One platoon of an Army clearing company was dispatched to serve as a holding unit at this air strip until relieved by an Army medical gas treatment battalion. On this date 242 patients were evacuated from the air strip at GAEL (X-65). In all, twenty-four planes reported to the field.

On the following day seventy patients were evacuated from GAEL (X-65). Information had been received that no C-47 planes would arrive at GAEL (X-65). The holding unit was advised to hold all patients until 131200 August, at which time evacuation by ambulance should commence to an air strip at COURTILS (T-21), operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone. Some planes did arrive in the afternoon, but 125 patients had already been evacuated from GAEL to COURTILS by ambulance.

The above, it was considered, constituted the birth pains of air evacuation in so far as Third U. S. Army was concerned. The same difficulties continued to exist to a lesser degree as time progressed, and in addition was added the problem of weather. Evacuation by plane was comparatively light until 19 August when an air evacuation holding unit was set up by Third U. S. Army at an air strip in the vicinity of BEILLE (V-66). In this instance only one plane of the many that arrived with cargo carried medical personnel to care for casualties. Through augmentation of this team by a nurse and medical officer who were ambulatory patients, two planes carrying fifty patients actually took off. On the following day 496 patients were evacuated by air in spite of the extremely muddy condition of the strip.

Because of the fluid situation, it became normal for Army to set up its own air evacuation holding units, as air strips became available. These Army holding units would operate only until they could be replaced by units of Advance Section, Communications Zone. The Army holding unit would then be moved forward to a new air strip and the procedure repeated.

Air evacuations continued at the BEILLE (V-66) air strip through 24 August, at which time an air evacuation holding unit of Advance Section, Communications Zone took over operation of that strip. On the following date Third U. S. Army set up an air evacuation holding unit at BEICY (W-51), approximately seventy-two miles nearer the front lines. During the last five days of the month an air evacuation holding unit was operated at MORLAIX (R-41), on the BRITANNY PENINSULA, in support of the VIII Corps.

A total of 6,397 patients were evacuated by air from Third U. S. Army to the Communications Zone. In the same period 7,825 were evacuated by ambulance and 644 by boat, for a grand total of 14,866. Of this grand total 3,367 were prisoners of war and 106 were civilians.

A reproduction of a sketch showing locations of medical groups and of air evacuation holding units during the month of August will be found in Annex IV to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

As Third U. S. Army became operational, ten 400-bed evacuation hospitals were available for immediate use and deployed as follows:

- 32d Evac Hosp (SM), vic ST SAUVEUR LENDELIN (T-26) - open.
- 34th Evac Hosp (SM), vic CARENTAN (T-48) - prepared to move south on order.
- 35th Evac Hosp (SM), vic CARENTAN (T-48) - open.
- 39th Evac Hosp (SM), vic ST SAUVEUR LENDELIN (T-26) - open.
- 100th Evac Hosp (SM), vic ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19) - open.
- 101st Evac Hosp (SM), vic ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19) - open.
- (This hospital had been used as a station hospital for Third U. S. Army troops while concentrating prior to 1 August 1944 and was to continue to operate as such until all troops had moved south).
- 102d Evac Hosp (SM), vic LESSAY (T-17) - in bivouac, prepared to

- move south on order.
- 103d Evac Hosp (SM), vic CARENTAN (T-48) - open.
- 104th Evac Hosp (SM), vic LESSAY (T-17) - in bivouac, prepared to move south on order.
- 107th Evac Hosp (SM), vic ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19) - prepared to move south on order.

The further use of the 106th Evacuation Hospital and 109th Evacuation Hospital was desired by First U. S. Army. This was authorized by Twelfth U. S. Army Group. The 12th Evacuation Hospital, the only 750-bed evacuation hospital assigned to the Third U. S. Army, was in bivouac at UTAH BEACH, its equipment not having yet arrived. The 108th Evacuation Hospital had also just arrived from the United Kingdom, lacking three truckloads of equipment. However, it was ready to go into operation if absolutely necessary.

Seven field hospitals were on the Continent, of which two were actually available for use. The 54th Field Hospital was in operation north of LA HAYE DU PUITIS (T-18) in support of VIII Corps, which corps had previously been in operation under First U. S. Army. The commanding officer of that unit was ordered to transfer all patients to one platoon and to be ready to move the rest of the unit the following day. The 53d Field Hospital was in bivouac north of BARNEVILLE (T-09) prepared to move south on order. The 30th, 48th, 59th and 60th Field Hospitals were in bivouac north of BARNEVILLE (T-09) awaiting arrival of their equipment on the Continent. The 16th Field Hospital was being employed by First U. S. Army, providing medical service for patients with self-inflicted wounds.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital was the only convalescent hospital on the Continent available to Third U. S. Army. Its unit equipment had not completely arrived, but its immediate use had not been contemplated.

As can be seen from the above, there were two evacuation hospitals open at ST SAUVEUR LENDELIN (T-26). Of these the 39th Evacuation Hospital accumulated a large surgical backlog early on the second day. It was therefore necessary to arrange with the 32d Evacuation Hospital in the same vicinity to alternate loads of ambulances in order to more evenly and more adequately distribute the incoming casualties. In addition, a clearing company was attached to the 39th Evacuation Hospital and set up to perform minor surgical and medical care. On the other hand, evacuation hospitals located farther north in the COTENTIN PENINSULA had very few admissions.

Originally, all military patients who could not be returned to duty within ten days were to be evacuated further to the Communications Zone.

During these early stages German casualties predominated on the admission list together with a large number of French civilians. Disposal of French civilian casualties was often a problem, inasmuch as many French hospitals had been destroyed and those that remained did not have facilities for extensive treatment. All French civilians were held until convalescent. It became normal procedure to locate a French civilian hospital as quickly as possible in order to take the burden away from Army hospital units.

A difficult situation was posed by the narrow bottleneck in the vicinity of AVRANCHES (T-21). However, the rapid expansion of Third U. S. Army to the west necessitated the forward displacement of as many hospital units as possible in order, (1) to eliminate long ambulance hauls, and (2) to provide adequate skilled surgical care as far forward as possible. By 4 August two evacuation hospitals had moved south of this bottleneck, and by the end of another ten days ten evacuation hospitals were supporting the large movement to the west and the east of the base of the BRITANNY PENINSULA.

Shortly after the breakthrough at AVRANCHES (T-21) approximately 600 Allied patients were reported to be in a French civilian hospital at RENNES (Y-05), 100 of whom needed evacuation at once. An ambulance company was ordered to move to this location and in the meantime nine ambulances were sent to RENNES (Y-05) to start the evacuation until the above ambulance company arrived. Upon investigation, 585 Allied patients were found in the hospital, which had been operated by the Germans. Of these, 385 were American, the remaining being British, Canadian, and others. Some of the casualties had been in the hospital since D-Day. The hospital was found to be an unsatisfactory installation in which to continue treatment. The medical staff consisted of two British medical officers and a few French doctors who had been prisoners of the Germans for about four years. Many of the patients had septic wounds and about 100 fractures needed immediate application of casts and the administration of penicillin before they could be moved. No penicillin had been available and practically no sulfa drugs had been used. Later reports indicated that common medicine must have been available and a reasonably good diet, but cigarettes and toilet articles were practically nonexistent. One of the two evacuation hospitals which moved south of AVRANCHES (T-21) on 4 August was sent on to RENNES (Y-05) to open there as soon as possible, equipped with penicillin and other badly needed supplies. During this move that evacuation hospital was sub-



An Evacuation Hospital Operates in the Field

jected to enemy air activity, but no damage to personnel or vehicles resulted. It moved into RENNES (Y-05) on the same day that that city was taken.

The main obstacle encountered in the use of evacuation hospitals during the month of August was their maintenance within good supporting distance of the front line. During the first ten days of the month, as might be anticipated, the situation was most difficult. Lack of transportation contributed to this obstacle. At first the aid of Quartermaster Truck Companies was utilized in the movement of hospitals. In many instances this method proved ineffective due to the time element involved and the fact that these truck companies could not always be obtained when requested. The practice was therefore resorted to of borrowing transportation from one or more evacuation hospitals to effect the movement of a particular evacuation hospital. In the latter part of the month even greater flexibility was obtained through the use of organic transportation of medical gas treatment battalions.

Fourteen evacuation hospitals were ultimately available during the month of August, including one of 750-bed capacity. These evacuation hospitals averaged approximately five moves each during the month, the distances varying from ten miles to as much as one hundred miles per move. The 750-bed evacuation hospital did not receive its equipment until 23 August, at which time it was located at BOUNNEVAL (W-27). On this date also the 100th, 102d, 107th, and 108th Evacuation Hospitals were all attached to VIII Corps, the employment of these units becoming the responsibility of that corps. The remaining evacuation hospitals, as well as the 6th Convalescent Hospital, were retained under Army control.

Of the seven field hospitals on the Continent, the 16th Field Hospital became available for use by the Third U. S. Army on 8 August 1944. The 30th Field Hospital had received its equipment early in the month but remained in bivouac northeast of BARNEVILLE (T-09) until 12 August. All other field hospitals, with the exception of the 48th Field Hospital, received their equipment before the end of the third week in August. They were employed in accordance with previous projected plans, namely, by attachment of platoons in support of division clearing stations and as air evacuation holding units. In no case was an entire field hospital employed as a unit while under Third U. S. Army operation.

The 7th and 8th Convalescent Hospitals did not function under this Army, but were attached to Communications Zone. The 6th Convalescent Hospital had opened at VITRE (Y-35), and on 25 August it was ordered to

make reconnaissance in the vicinity of MONTEREAU (X-48) for the purpose of operating this unit in two echelons. On the following day a change in evacuation policy was effected in accordance with the following message sent to all evacuation hospitals and medical groups:

"Patients requiring more than fifteen days' hospitalization before return to duty will be sent to the BRICY (W-51) air evacuation holding unit. Patients who require further hospitalization, but who can be returned to duty within fifteen days will be sent to the 12th Evacuation Hospital north of BONNEVAL (W-27). Convalescent patients, ambulatory patients who will require more than fifteen days' care before return to duty will be sent to the 12th Evacuation Hospital until the 6th Convalescent Hospital opens at MONTEREAU (X-48). In estimating the fifteen days' time do not count time before transfer or evacuation from the evacuation hospital where the patient was originally admitted."

A reproduction of a sketch showing details of respective locations of evacuation hospitals and the convalescent hospital during the month of August will be found in Annex V to the Medical Section report. A reproduction of the situation map showing the locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals as of 22 August, in relation to the G-3 Section situation map as of that date, is shown in Annex VI to the Medical Section report.

A detailed analysis of wounded in hospitals during the month of August is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer).

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	9198
(2) British Army Troops	218
(3) French Army Troops	737
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	6
(5) British and French Navy	2
(6) Enemy forces personnel	3670
(7) Civilians	487
(8) Others - specifically F.F.I.	19

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army Troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	4894
(2) Slight	4304

c. Anatomical classification of wounds: (Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).


(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	344	68
(b) Thoracic	360	71
(c) Maxillo-facial	679	9
(d) Neurologic	712	80
Head	(613)	(76)
Spine	(80)	(4)
Nerve	(19)	
(e) Extremities		
Upper	2526	11
Lower	3021	37
(f) Buttocks	422	8
(g) Other	388	16
Sub-total	8746	300
(2) Burns - all locations	252	6
Total	9198	306

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds:

	3649	25
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e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

	Admissions	Deaths
(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	3013	124
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	4593	133
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby-trap, or mine)	487	17
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	225	7
(5) Wounds from Secondary Missiles	25	1
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flamethrower, phosphorus, etc.)	257	5



A Chief Nurse of a Field Hospital Platoon Makes Out the Daily Report on Patients.

(7) Others (NBC and unclassified missiles)	598	19
Total	9198	306

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Primary	Secondary	
FCC left femur	Thrombosis arterial	1
Amputation left foot traumatic		1
Concussion cerebral	Shock	3
Pen W buttocks	Hemorrhage	2
Perf W occipital region		1
Contused W head		1
Wf Chest, arms and thighs		2
Pen W lumbar region	Shock	3
Extensive W head		1
Pen W sacroiliac	Shock	1
GSW Pen W abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	18
Pen W left mastoid	Shock	1
FCC left scapula	Shock	1
GSW right hip	Shock	1
Perf W neck and shoulder	Hemorrhage & shock	2
Concussion of lungs	Shock	2
HE W chest	Hemorrhage	2
GSW abdomen	Peritonitis	1
HE W abdomen	Gas gangrene	1
HE W skull	Pen W chest	9
GSW skull	Hemorrhage & shock	2
GSW lower extremities	Fractured skull	2
Mine explosion lower extremities - booby trap	Pen W	27
	Pulmonary embolus	2
	Pen W	13
		2

Wounds of lower extremities - hand grenade	Hemolytic crisis	1
HE W lower extremities	Gas gangrene	1
Pen W FCC right humerus		1
Crush W left thigh		3
GSW Pen W		12
Vehicle accident		6
Drown, accidental		1
Concussion (Mine)		1
Fracture skull		1
GSW chest	Hemorrhage & shock	8
GSW Pen W chest		2
GSW Perf abdomen		3
MW right thigh, LW both legs		1
SW (HE) Perf W abdomen		5
GSW Pen W abdomen		4
Pen W (Bomb chest)		1
SW (HE) Pen W chest		7
Blast injury lungs		1
GSW Pen W chest	Respiratory embarrassment	5
		1
FCC skull	Shock & hemorrhage	1
FCC arm	Gas gangrene	1
Pen W		6
GSW Perf both thighs		1
Pen W buttocks		1
Amputation traumatic left leg	Shock	4
Burn generalized	Toxemia & uremia	2
Pen W chest	Shock	1
Fractured skull	Subdural hemorrhage	2
Pen W	Shock	27
Pen W	Hemothorax	13
Pen W	Atelectasis	2

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FCC	Hemorrhage	2
FCC	Shock	4
Brain injury	Shock	1
Perf W, spleen & omentum	Hemorrhage	1
MW Pen W chest	Respiratory failure	2
Pen W buttock, rectum & sigmoid mesocolon	Hemorrhage	2
Pen W left infra orbital region	Shock	3
Pen W scalp, chest wall & abdomen		2
MW Pen W right leg, buttock & back		2
FCC skull		14
Pen W abdomen	Hemorrhage	5
Pen W left lateral perforation diaphragm & spleen	Pneumonia	1
GSW Pen head		2
Perf W chest	Hemorrhage	4
DOA fractured skull		2
DOA mutilation of chest		2
DOA mutilation of chest & abdomen		2
DOA Pen W chest & abdomen		2
DOA FCC of maxillae facial bones with loss of tissue		1
DOA Perf W abdomen	Hemorrhage	8
DOA Pen W forehead		3
DOA Pen W		7
Shell fragment	Shock	9
GSW	Shock	8
Pen W skull		3
FCC right femur		6
MW chest & abdomen		5
Pen W peritoneum		3
Lac W buttocks MW face		1
GSW lower lumbar		3
MW arm & thigh		3
Burns, face, legs and arms		2
Lac W scrotum		3
GSW back & left thigh		2
GSW spine		1

Note: Items g, h, and i pertain to all military and civilian patients in hospital.

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	334
(2) Stored blood	3135
(3) Dry plasma	7695
(4) Other blood substitutes:	
Serum albumen	9
British Saline	4
Total	16267

h. Number of units of penicillin administered 1,668,636,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	132
(2) Lower extremity	159
Total	291

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	75
(2) Other	113
Total	188

Based on total dispositions of all hospitals and clearing stations totalling 27,860 during the month of August, a mortality rate of only two percent occurred. Twenty-three percent of these were returned to duty and thirty-six percent were evacuated to the Communications Zone. The remaining percentage is accounted for in transfers of patients from one Army hospital unit to another, which are included in the above figure covering total dispositions.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

No additional temporary medical service was provided during this month to separate units organically lacking such service. Additional aid was given, however, to prisoner of war enclosures through attachment of "medical detachments" whenever the necessity arose.


Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

This was the first month of operations for Third U. S. Army. Pertinent references to the specialized services will be found under the sub-sections dealing with surgery, neuropsychiatry, dentistry, veterinary and personnel.

2. Surgery

When Third U. S. Army became operational, the hospital units, along with the auxiliary surgical teams previously loaned to First U. S. Army, were returned to this Army. At the time of the breakthrough in the NORMANDY PENINSULA the hospital staffs distinguished themselves in caring for large numbers of casualties which were brought to the hospitals within a few hours of the time of injury, so that there was little delay in carrying out early and proper surgical treatment. Within a week after the breakthrough, hospitals had been established just above AVRANCHES (T-21) at three places and below AVRANCHES (T-21) at ST JAMES (Y-39), ST MALO (S-71), and RENNES (Y-50), and just outside of BREST (Y-99) and LORIENT (G-72). In spite of the fact that these points are very widely separated, surgical care was not delayed, and all of the separate fronts were adequately supported with well qualified surgeons.



X-Ray Technicians at Work in an Evacuation Hospital

Because casualties often came in large numbers as a result of localized actions, in some sectors the surgical backlogs in hospital units did build up at times. Through the use of auxiliary surgical teams it was possible to prevent delay in definitive surgery from extending over a twenty-four hour period, and there is no evidence to indicate that the slight delays that occurred caused any increase in morbidity or mortality.

The very high standard of surgical care that has been reached in Third U. S. Army hospital units is emphasized when the results attained are compared to the group of Allied casualties found in a hospital at RENNES (Y-50), previously referred to under "Hospitalization" in this chapter. The 585 casualties had occurred at the time of the original landing, were taken as prisoners and treated in German medical installations, reinforced with French surgeons. Of these, a high percentage had infected wounds, osteomyelitis was the rule in compound fractures, and numerous cases showed evidence of malnutrition and secondary anemia. In direct contrast to this group, streptococcal and staphylococcal infections on our surgical services were practically nonexistent and, in spite of the fact that many of the wounds were extremely mutilating in type, the incidence of gas gangrene was extremely low.

It was felt that the three great factors which contributed to these results were: first, early skilled surgical care given to all casualties; second, chemotherapy, using routinely both penicillin and sulfonamides; and, third, early adequate shock therapy, using both whole blood and plasma. In spite of the very rapid advance made by Third U. S. Army units during the month of August, the supply of all critical items was adequate, whole blood being flown in, along with penicillin, from England, and only in a few instances, when weather was impossible for flying, were there shortages of these items for even a period of a few hours.

A total of 27,860 dispositions of Allied patients were made in Third U. S. Army medical installations during August. Of this number 19,603 (or seventy-five percent) were surgical cases; 16,475 of this number were battle casualties and 3,128 (or eleven percent) were non-battle injuries, the majority of which were caused by vehicle accidents. On the surgical service there were 570 deaths. Of these, 522 (or ninety-one percent) of all deaths were due to battle casualties and forty-eight (or eight percent) were due to non-battle accidents. The mortality rate in all surgical patients from the battalion aid stations on back through the evacuation hospitals was two and eighteen one hundredths percent.

It is felt that such a low mortality figure was only possible because skilled surgeons treated all casualties early, often within a few miles of the front lines. This was accomplished through the use of field hospital platoons, which were installed at the same level as the clearing stations in order to care for the non-transportable types of casualties. The field hospital platoons were reinforced with surgical teams from the auxiliary surgical group. The importance of early surgical care of battle casualties is emphasized when a comparison of the results obtained in our own casualties is made with the 7,051 enemy wounded handled in our hospitals during the month of August. These casualties received the same type of surgical care in our installations as our own wounded. However, due to the fact that, in many instances, they were not brought to our hospitals for several days after their original injury, the incidence of infection was high and the mortality in this group exactly doubled that of our own battle casualties. Even this figure of four percent is relatively low, but it must be remembered that many of the enemy's wounded died in their own installations before being transferred to our Army installations and the enemy's overall mortality rate was much higher than this.

3. Neuropsychiatry

This period was characterized by a "breakthrough" and the sweep of a conquering Army across France. Objectives were clearly delineated and quickly taken. Morale was exceptionally high. The average soldier had implicit confidence in his leaders. He had enormous pride in his outfit and day to day progress convinced him that this was an invincible Army, superior in leadership, training and material to any army which could be brought to face it. Instead, then, of the relatively high neuropsychiatric rate which had been expected, neuropsychiatric casualties represented seven and four-tenths percent of the total non-fatal casualties.

It was found that the neuropsychiatric casualty rate was lower in those divisions which utilized unit rest areas to the fullest extent. In the armored divisions the psychiatrist worked most efficiently when placed with a treatment platoon of a medical company, with the reserve combat command.

No accurate statistics could be obtained on the number of neuropsychiatric casualties returned to duty from unit rest areas and aid stations. However, 1,461 such cases were admitted to division clearing stations and hospital installations between 1 August and 31 August, inclusive. Of these, 417 were returned to duty at the division level and 612 from the hospital level. These 1,029 cases which were returned to duty from division and hospital levels represent seventy and five-tenths percent of the total neuropsychiatric casualties for this period. It is noteworthy that of 200 neuropsychiatric casualties sent from evacuation hospitals to the convalescent hospital, 125 were returned to duty. This could not have been possible had not two additional psychiatrists been placed on temporary duty in this installation.

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Although the type of warfare accounts in great part for the low incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties, the results of therapy reflect the training of the neuropsychiatrists in their respective echelons.

4. Dental

During the first week of August the five dental prosthetic teams were attached as follows:

one each to - 101st Evacuation Hospital
102d Evacuation Hospital
104th Evacuation Hospital
107th Evacuation Hospital
35th Evacuation Hospital

A letter was distributed to all units advising them of these attachments so that all personnel would know where prosthetic treatment was available.

A dental clinic was set up at the 6th Convalescent Hospital through the attachment of six additional dental officers and an equal number of enlisted technicians together with the following equipment:

3 - MD chests, No 61
3 - MD chests, No 62
2 - Ward tents
1 - 750-watt generator
1 - Motor polishing lathe
Other prosthetic equipment

The above was augmented with captured supplies and improvised equipment as the need for them developed. During the month of August the prosthetic clinic was in operation for approximately ten days, and during this time fifty-two cases were processed.

Of the reports received approximately seven and three-tenths percent of battle injuries admitted to Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of August were maxillo-facial injuries. The death rate was a little over one percent of those admitted with maxillo-facial injuries.

A consolidated report of dental services rendered throughout Third U. S. Army during the month of August is shown below:

Strength (Reported)	245036
Admissions Routine	7434
Admissions Emergency	4464
Sittings	15025
Officer Personnel	377
Enlisted Personnel	371
Restorations	2877
Dentures	788
Gingivitis	976
Gingivitis Treatment	1732
Stomatitis, Vincent's	549
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	1036

5. Veterinary

During the month of August a total of twenty-nine Class I supply points were operated for varying periods of time. These supply points were inspected as often as time and circumstances permitted; a total of thirty inspections were made during the month. By paying close attention to the handling of foodstuffs, even recommending increased issue of certain perishable items, the bulk of the food received was issued. The amount of food condemned was negligible. It was clearly obvious that regular, detailed inspections of the Class I supply points reduced waste to a minimum.

Inspections of the Quartermaster Mobile Bakeries were continued. Large quantities of captured potatoes, beef and pork and frozen green beans were inspected and passed prior to issue to troops. Also, large quantities of captured flour, canned beef, odd lots of cheese, rice, salt, ersatz coffee and tea, biscuits, peas, beans and sauerkraut were inspected and passed. The bulk of this material was later disposed of through Civil Affairs.

6. Personnel

During the month of August a total of seventy-five Medical Administrative Corps officers were furnished to Third U. S. Army units under the provisions of War Department Circular No. 99, 1944. These officers had received special training as Assistant Battalion Surgeons, and their arrival tended to relieve the shortage in Medical Corps officers which had existed since arrival in the United Kingdom and had been increasing monthly.

In order to relieve hospital units from the necessity of using

their enlisted technicians on labor details, a considerable percentage of time, particularly in a fast moving situation, prisoners of war were furnished to each evacuation hospital for use on labor details. In the beginning these were furnished on the basis of twenty prisoners of war per evacuation hospital. Later in the month this number was increased to forty per evacuation hospital (SM), fifty being furnished to the one 750-bed hospital and eighty to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. It was felt that this labor assistance was of considerable advantage in that it released the trained personnel of the hospital units for care of the sick and wounded a maximum amount of time.



A Mobile Dental Laboratory Truck in France

Section 4 - Medical Supply

As the Third U. S. Army became operational, the locations and status of medical supply installations were as follows:

32d Med Dep Co
(BRICQUEBEC)(O-10)

This depot had on hand only the items of equipment which were transported from the United Kingdom.

33d Med Dep Co
(BESNEVILLE)(T-19)

A total of ten medical maintenance units were on hand (equivalent to medical supplies for 200,000 men for fifteen days) which had just been moved in by Advance Section, Communications Zone.

Adv Sec, 33d Med Dep Co
(LA HAYE DU PUIITS)(T-18)

This depot had on hand only a three-day stock of medical supplies with which to perform its function of supporting the VIII Corps.

Medical supply problems during the first month of operation divided themselves roughly into three categories:

1. Warehousing and distribution of medical supplies and equipment.
2. Transportation of supplies from rear to forward installations.
3. Reclamation and handling of captured medical equipment.

The rapid advance of the Army necessitated the placement of medical supplies as far forward as possible. The fact that operations of this Army proceeded westward on the BRITTANY PENINSULA and eastward, simultaneously, increased the difficulties experienced in proper deployment of the two medical depot companies available. In addition, the existence of only a narrow corridor in the vicinity of AVRANCHES (T-21) necessitated initial leapfrogging of these depots until such time as they could be properly disposed on the flanks. One was moved to the vicinity of COUTANCES (T-25) and the other to the vicinity of DUCEY (T-30), both movements being completed by the end of the first week after sufficient transportation had been obtained.

Subsequently the depots were located at FOUGERES (Y-37) and VITRE (Y-35), with an advance section of one of these depots remaining at DUCEY (T-30). These locations began to take form as positions on the left and right flanks of the Third U. S. Army movement eastward and at the same time had the advantage of servicing activities on the BRITTANY PENINSULA to the west. To help the latter operations, an advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company was established at ROSTRENN (W-77), thereby providing more adequate support for VIII Corps units on the peninsula.

Warehousing facilities effectively disposed, but without adequate stock to fill them, are of little use. Through liaison with Advance Section, Communications Zone, it was early established that there was not sufficient stock of medical supplies on the Continent to fill requisitions submitted by the respective depot companies. Steps were therefore taken to transport directly from the beach all medical supplies that had been phased in for Third U. S. Army on pre-scheduled requisitions. This further increased medical supplies within the Army to include ten per cent of T/E or T/DA items of equipment, which were being consumed at a rapid rate. To procure these supplies, it was necessary for Third U. S. Army to use its own transportation and personnel to proceed to the dump and haul these supplies to its depots.

Rapid advances to the east made necessary the displacement to IE MANS (Z-33) of the depot company at FOUGERES (Y-37) during the second week of August, the advance section of this depot company remaining at DUCEY (T-30), to continue issuing supplies until such time as the bulk of the stock could be moved forward.

During the third week of this month, the stock level of the Advance Section No. 2, 33d Medical Depot Company at ROSTRENN (W-77), operating in support of the VIII Corps, was raised from three days to seven days for 100,000 men. This was necessary inasmuch as this Corps would be operating separately and was far removed from a base of supply. Two blood trucks were also attached to this advance section to serve hospital units on the BRITTANY PENINSULA, an allocation of twenty per cent of all blood furnished to Third U. S. Army being diverted to this VIII Corps sector. One blood truck which had been dispatched to the vicinity of BREST (V-99) on 17 August was reported lost. It was believed that the truck and driver had been captured. Another truck was obtained, and through improvisation, two four-cubic-foot refrigerators were mounted in it, giving that truck a total capacity of 140 pints. This was sixty pints more than the normal capacity of a blood truck.

Upon completion of twenty-two days of operations in a fast moving situation, the status of medical supplies within Third U. S. Army was surveyed. The locations, days of supply, and tonnage involved for each medical depot, as of 23 August, are shown below:

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Unit	Location	Days of Supply	Tonnage
32d (-) Med Dep Co	LE MANS (Z-33)	10	400 tons
33d (-) Med Dep Co	ORLEANS (F-62)	5	200 tons
Adv Sec, 32d Med Dep Co	DREUX (R-33)	3	120 tons
Adv Sec, 33d Med Dep Co	ROSTRENEH (W-77)	7	100 tons (for VIII Corps only)

The above figures represent maximum requirements. It was considered that at the then present rate of casualties and demands for medical supplies, there was sufficient stock within Third U. S. Army supply installations to make the Army self-sufficient for twenty to thirty days.

Further disposition of medical depots during August, resulted in establishment of depots at FONTAINEBLEAU (W-29) and TROYES (Y-27) with plans completed for the movement of one of the depots to VERDUN (U-26).

Transportation of medical supplies, as well as of depot companies themselves, constituted a major problem during the entire month of August. Considerable ingenuity was required in many instances in order to get critical items to their point of consumption. During the second week of August it was found that Army medical supply depots were constantly running short of certain Class III items of medical supply. These items consisted mostly of sutures, needles, intravenous solutions and sheet wadding. Since a shortage of such items was considered critical, arrangements were made with the Chief of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, whereby the items were made available at an airport in the United Kingdom. A pilot of the Ninth U. S. Air Force made a special trip to the United Kingdom, upon the recommendation of the Air Liaison Evacuation Officer attached to Third U. S. Army. While this procedure by-passed all channels of supply, the action enabled Third U. S. Army to meet all demands of hospitals for these items.

When Twelfth U. S. Army Group became operational, it functioned to allocate critical items on a priority basis. Status reports on all critical items were submitted to Twelfth U. S. Army Group, as well as a daily report on the amount of whole blood received, on hand, and required.

During the third week of August, 200 tons of medical supplies were actually backlogged in Communications Zone medical depots. In order to supplement the efforts of the Communications Zone in this regard, fifty trucks were made available from Third U. S. Army hospitals to haul these supplies from Communications Zone depots at CHEF DU PONT (T-39) and near LONGUEVILLE (T-68), involving a roundtrip of several hundred miles. The situation was further alleviated by the simultaneous arrival of cargo trucks, weapons carriers, and ambulances from Communications Zone depots, as well as twenty ambulance loads of medical supplies loaded in the United Kingdom and shipped direct to Army medical depots.

A notable achievement in the history of air transportation occurred on 26 August when 407 C-64 planes landed at the BRIGY (W-51) air strip with cargoes including eighty tons of medical supplies such as blankets, litters, plasma, and surgical supplies. These planes were unloaded in less than ten hours.

Use of trucks from Army medical gas treatment battalions for movement of medical depot companies was frequent. Due to higher priorities exercised on Quartermaster truck companies that might otherwise have been available, the latter source for movement was not advantageous in view of time elements involved in the entire operations.

During the month of August, a large quantity of German medical supplies and equipment was captured. Wherever possible, these supplies were turned over to Army medical depot companies and reclaimed for use by this Army. However, in certain instances, it was impossible to carry all of the equipment captured, and in such instances, medical units were notified of the location of the captured supplies and instructed to help themselves. Following is a list of captured medical equipment and supplies:

- 6 August 44 - location RENNES (Y-05); estimated amount, valued at \$1,000,000.00.
- 10 August 44 - location ST MALO (S-71); estimated amount, 10 tons.
- 12 August 44 - location LAVAL (Y-64); estimated amount, 4 tons.
- 15 August 44 - location ALENCON (Z-38); estimated amount, 10 tons.
- 22 August 44 - location ORLEANS (F-62); estimated amount, 15 tons.
- 25 August 44 - location DREUX (R-33); estimated amount, 15 tons.
- 25 August 44 - location FONTAINEBLEAU (W-29); estimated amount, 20 tons.
- 26 August 44 - location SENS (X-66); estimated amount, 15 tons.
- 26 August 44 - location ETAMPES (W-89); estimated amount, 20 tons.
- 28 August 44 - location east of SENS (X-76); estimated amount, 12 tons.
- 31 August 44 - location SOMMESSOUS (T-42); estimated amount, 10 tons.

In instances where captured equipment was of no particular value to Army hospital units, such supplies were released to Civil Affairs personnel for distribution to French hospitals, since Civil Affairs reported an urgent need for all medical items in this category.

A sketch will be found in Annex VII of the Medical Section report of the various locations of Third U. S. Army medical depots during the month of August.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Due to the speed with which operations of the Third U. S. Army progressed during the month of August, Preventive Medicine measures became secondary to the more important phases of medical care for wounded troops.

2. Venereal Disease Control

Incidence of venereal disease during the month of August is shown in Annex VIII to the Medical Section report. An analysis of these figures reveals that with an average mean strength of 248,196 officers and men, an average of twenty-four cases per week occurred, being an average weekly rate of 5.89 per 1,000 per annum.

During this month, almost all towns and cities remained "off limits". Due to the large and rapidly expanding area occupied by Third U. S. Army troops, it was difficult to enforce these off limits restrictions. The low venereal disease rate, therefore, was largely due to the fact that most troops were in direct contact with the enemy during this month.

3. Communicable Disease

All communicable diseases (including venereal disease) and daily non-effective rates for the month of August revealed an unprecedented low for Third U. S. Army. (Figures supporting this statement will be found in Annex VIII to the Medical Section report). These figures reveal that for an average mean strength of 248,196 officers and men, a daily non-effective rate from all diseases of 1.15 per 1,000 per annum occurred.

4. Medical Reports and Records

The speed of advance and the tempo of the warfare carried on during the month of August, posed serious problems and barriers to the ability to keep medical reports and records current. Due to the fact that channels of communication were strained to the limit, and forward combat elements and rear administrative elements were continuously changing locations, many instances occurred in which it was almost impossible to prepare the required reports. Continuous front-line liaison by representatives of the Medical Section was necessary to provide such information. Due to constantly changing attachments and assignment of units, there was a considerable tendency towards confusion, inadequacy and unreliability of all medical reports. Every effort was made by unit medical officers of all levels (Division, Corps, and Army) to remedy this situation, and during the last week of August, it became somewhat less confused. As an indication of the volume attained by the medical reports and records referred to, following is a brief summary of the reports handled during this month:

MD Form 51	303
MD Form 52 series	16,331
MD Form 86ab	507
ETO U S Army, MD Form 310	310
ETO U S Army, MD Form 323	937
Monthly Venereal Disease Reports	99
Monthly Sanitary Reports	200
Miscellaneous	1,500
Total	20,187

5. Non-battle Injuries

Concurrent with the lightning-like advance of this Army, and the mass movement of armor and all types of supply and liaison vehicles, there was a marked increase in all non-battle injuries incurred during this month. The average rate per 1,000 per annum was 110 (details can be found in Annex VIII to this report). The increase in non-battle casualties was undoubtedly due to the presence of heavy traffic on the roads, together with long hours of driving and maximum efforts to keep essential supplies flowing forward to the fighting troops.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

An advance section of the 7th Medical Laboratory set up in VITRE (Y-35) on 9 August. Complete equipment for this laboratory did not ar-

rive until two days following, so that the base section did not begin operation until 12 August. One mobile section was dispatched to investigate an outbreak of diarrhea in the Rear Echelon of VIII Corps, on 14 August, returning to the organization two weeks later. Minor sanitary deficiencies were corrected and the outbreak controlled.

A venereal disease diagnostic section was established at the 6th Convalescent Hospital on 16 August, consisting of one Medical officer and two enlisted men. The section was established for diagnosis of primary syphilis and treatment of primary syphilis, chancroid, and complicated gonorrhea. The section also acted as a collecting point for laboratory specimens. From the commencement of its operation to the end of the month, this section performed twenty dark field examinations, eighteen urethral smears, and consulted in fifteen cases of venereal disease.

The highly mobile nature of the tactical operations made it necessary to divide the base laboratory into two sections performing similar functions, except where duplicate equipment or trained personnel were not available (e.g. pathology and complement fixation). Requisitions were submitted to obtain the necessary additional equipment to provide for this inadequacy.

Observations showed that the use of copper sulfate kits or solutions which had been distributed to evacuation and field hospitals was not completely understood by these units. An officer from the 7th Medical Laboratory was therefore assigned to cooperate with the surgical staff of one of the evacuation hospitals in evaluating this method as a guide to diagnosis and treatment of shock hemorrhage.

A breakdown of laboratory tests completed by the 7th Medical Laboratory during the month of August, is given below, the breakdown being by the section of the laboratory performing these tests.

SECTION	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	477	67.6
Bacteriology (Including water analysis)	145	20.6
Pathology (Including Dark Fields)	50	7.1
Chemistry	25	3.6
Parasitology	6	0.8
Hematology	2	0.3
	705	100.0

It must be pointed out that procedures in bacteriology and pathology consume a great deal more time and material than in serology and can not be evaluated on test-unit basis. Moreover, the chemistry section in addition to its technical work was charged with the function of supplying solutions and reagents to other sections of this laboratory and to all field units.

A breakdown of the same tests, by type of unit requesting same, is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	13	442	62.7
Convalescent Hospitals	1	93	13.2
Engineer Units (Water Points)	15	62	8.8
Other Medical Installations	5	14	2.0
Tactical Organizations	22	94	13.3
	56	705	100.0

7. Sanitation

With the frequent and sometimes daily movement of water points, further revision of water supply control was found necessary. It became impractical to attempt submission of samples for bacteriological examination from each water point in accordance with principles set forth in Annex 16 to Operation "OVERLORD." Accordingly, a directive was issued requiring inspection and submission of samples from each engineer water point at least monthly and whenever, in the judgment of Army, corps, and division surgeons such samples were deemed necessary to insure a proper supply of potable water.

As a result of bacteriological analyses of eighty-five water samples performed by the Army medical laboratory during the month of August, it was found that twenty-six of these samples were raw, untreated water, and therefore non-potable. Of the forty-nine remaining samples examined (treated), sixteen (thirty-three percent) were found to be non-potable due to fecal contamination; eight (sixteen percent) were found to be questionable; and twenty-five (fifty-one percent) were found to be potable. Though no serious outbreak of disease had occurred due to consumption of non-potable water, it was felt that the above analyses were indicative of a situation which might develop at some time to serious proportions.

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Insect control required no more than minimum attention. A large number of hornets were constantly present at all messes throughout the Third U. S. Army area, but this constituted a nuisance problem rather than one of health. Absence of flies was noted in the presence of hornets and bees.

Other sanitary problems, such as sewage and waste disposal, were negligible, inasmuch as prior static conditions of the troops were now changed to rapid advance on all fronts.

CHAPTER 4 SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The organization of the Medical Section remained essentially unchanged from that set up during the previous month.

An additional Medical Administrative Corps officer, however, was ordered to this Headquarters on temporary duty with the Preventive Medicine Sub-Section to assist in the handling of the voluminous statistical details of that Sub-Section.

There was only one Veterinary Corps officer on duty with the Medical Section during the month of September, due to the fact that replacement for the Army Veterinarian, transferred to the Communications Zone in August, had not arrived.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Enlisted Medical Department replacements were not consistently available in the replacement system. There were, however, numerous basics present in the replacement battalions, who had had no Medical Department training. Under the supervision of the Surgeon's Office, XII Corps, a school was established in the replacement battalion attached to that corps, for the purpose of training these basics as medical and surgical technicians. Several divisions also provided similar courses for Medical Department replacements as they arrived in the division areas.

2. Evacuation

The basic plan for medical service in use since Third U. S. Army became operational remained essentially the same for the month of September. The 65th, 66th and 67th Medical Groups continued throughout the month to evacuate the divisions and corps clearing stations in their respective corps zones. The 69th Medical Group retained the mission of evacuation of Army hospitals to Army air or rail holding units and to Communications Zone installations. As the month progressed, additional evacuation facilities were made available by Advance Section, Communications Zone, to aid the 69th Medical Group.

As of 5 September 1944, the following type units responsible for evacuation were transferred from this Army to Ninth U. S. Army:

- 1 - Hq & Hq Det, Medical Group
- 3 - Hq & Hq Det, Medical Battalion
- 4 - Ambulance Companies, Motor
- 4 - Medical Collecting Companies
- 3 - Clearing Companies
- 1 - Medical Gas Treatment Battalion

In addition, four ambulance companies, motor, were transferred to First U. S. Army as of 9 September 1944.

With the exception of the four additional ambulance companies mentioned, all of the above units had been previously attached to VIII Corps on the BRITANNY PENINSULA, where Ninth U. S. Army began operation. The additional four ambulance companies transferred to First U. S. Army were actually committed by Third U. S. Army and were evacuating units of this Army. It was, therefore, necessary to relieve them immediately and rearrange units within the medical groups in such a way as to prevent any break in the medical service as a result of this loss.

By the end of the first week in September the gasoline situation had become so acute that it was necessary to assign first priority on gasoline to units of the Army medical service. This priority was necessary particularly in regard to the medical groups evacuating Army hospitals to air strips in view of the distances involved. Evacuation of divisions was comparatively unaffected by the gasoline shortage inasmuch as Third U. S. Army hospitals were in very close support of the divisions.

In the early part of the month a policy was established whereby Advance Section, Communications Zone, would take over the evacuation of the Army evacuation hospitals located in the rear of the Army area; they were also to continue to evacuate the clearing platoon attached to each of these hospitals as a holding unit for non-transportable patients when the hospital displaced forward.

The constant forward movement of evacuation hospitals resulted in almost daily changes in the evacuation plan. Advance Section, Communications Zone, would be evacuating five hospitals on one day, and perhaps a single hospital on the next, with only the holding units remaining to be evacuated by Advance Section, Communications Zone, at the sites of the other four.

Shortly afterward, with the hospitals lining up along the MEUSE River, the 12th Evacuation Hospital (behind XX Corps) and the 101st Evacuation Hospital (behind XII Corps) took over the holding function for the Army area, and Advance Section, Communications Zone, began evacuating these two hospitals.

Air evacuation continued to play a major role as a means of evacuation of Third U. S. Army hospitals. At the beginning of the month Third U. S. Army was not operating an air evacuation holding unit. The 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion was bivouacked at VILLENEUVE - RENNEVILLE - CHEVIGNY (T-34), for the purpose of setting up an air evacuation holding unit in the event that an air field became available at that point. At this time Army was evacuating all of its own hospitals to an air evacuation holding unit in the vicinity of ORLEANS (W-64) operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone.

On 5 September 1944, the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion opened an air evacuation holding unit at VILLENEUVE - RENNEVILLE - CHEVIGNY (T-34). This unit was moved five days later to an air field at ETAIN (U-57) after accomplishing the evacuation of 569 patients. At this time a decision was made by higher headquarters to hospitalize the French military patients at Val de Grace Hospital, PARIS. This information came in time to be incorporated in the triage of patients at the Third U. S. Army air evacuation holding unit at ETAIN. The opening of an air evacuation holding unit at this latter location represented a forward movement of air evacuation facilities of approximately seventy-five miles. This location was also ten to fifteen miles ahead of the general line of evacuation hospitals. The previous use of holding hospitals in the rear was therefore obviated, and all evacuation proceeded directly to the forward air evacuation holding unit.

Coincident with opening of the airfield at ETAIN the medical officer attached to this Headquarters as Air Liaison Officer from Troop Carrier Command was called away on official business. Since the presence of an Air Corps Flight Surgeon was necessary before planes could leave the ground with patients, the immediate result was that patients could not be evacuated by air from ETAIN. Fortunately, a Flight Surgeon accompanied the first planes that arrived at that field with medical personnel, and his services were utilized until he was relieved.

On 13 September word was received that few or no C-47 aircraft would be available for air evacuation for an indefinite period. Attempts were made by AC of S G-4 of this Headquarters to secure a number of planes daily for air evacuation. A few planes were loaded each day, but the census in the holding unit continued to rise. No planes arrived on 15 and 16 September.

On 18 September the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion opened a Third U. S. Army air evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61), the holding unit at ETAIN having been taken over by an air evacuation holding unit of Advance Section, Communications Zone, on 16 September. The establishment of this new unit greatly shortened the lines of evacuation from hospitals supporting XII Corps on the south. It now became possible to evacuate a northern group of hospitals behind XX Corps to the air strip at ETAIN and the southern group behind XII Corps to the air strip at TOUL.

Weather and lack of planes prevented any air evacuation. The air evacuation holding units therefore soon reached their capacity and it was necessary to divert patients to the 750-bed Army evacuation hospital and an evacuation hospital of Advance Section, Communications Zone, established in the rear of the Army area. The arrival of a hospital train on 18 September at VERDUN (U-26) eased the crisis to a slight ex-

tent; however, by 23 September the hospitals and holding units had reached capacity. Through gradual augmentation of the air evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) this unit now consisted of:

- 1 - Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
- 2 - Field Hospitals (less one platoon each)
- 1 - Ambulance Company, Motor
- 1 - Litter Bearer Platoon (Reinforced)

At this critical juncture fifteen C-47 planes arrived at TOUL and evacuated 374 patients. A hospital train also arrived and evacuated 358 patients. Air evacuation on 25 September further relieved the Third U. S. Army air evacuation holding unit at TOUL of 506 patients, enabling that unit to reopen—that unit having closed at 1900 on 22 September.

After the arrival of the hospital train at VERDUN on 18 September,



A Receiving Tent of an Evacuation Hospital

a train continued to return to VERDUN every few days. By the end of the month a hospital train was stabled at that location for use in emergencies when air evacuation holding units reached capacity with no air evacuation available. By the end of the month, also, rail evacuation had been established at TOUL for use in similar emergencies.

The evacuation of Army during the month included a constantly shifting employment of all agencies of evacuation—road, rail and air. There was no evacuation to Communications Zone general hospitals by ambulances. Essentially the evacuation was by air with some rail assistance, and each emergency was met by expansion of holding facilities, use of hospital trains or diversion of the casualty flow to an Advance Section, Communications Zone evacuating hospital supporting the area.


Also during the month two patients were evacuated to PARIS by C-64 planes from the ETAIN (U-57) air field as emergency cases. This was the first time that C-64 planes had been used for air evacuation in Third U. S. Army. Both patients were poliomyelitis cases in respiratory distress.

For graphic illustration of the locations of evacuation facilities throughout the Army area during the month of September, see Annex IX to the Medical Section report.

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An Evacuation Hospital Ward in September, 1944



A Convalescent Hospital as Seen From the Air

3. Hospitalization

Field hospitals continued to be employed in accordance with principles established during the previous month. The 30th Field Hospital, 54th Field Hospital, and 60th Field Hospital supported the divisions of the XX, XV, and XII Corps respectively. In addition, the first platoon of the 16th Field Hospital was attached to XII Corps, and the third platoon of the 59th Field Hospital was attached to XV Corps. At the beginning of the period the second platoon of the 16th Field Hospital was in reserve but was later attached to the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, together with the third platoon, to augment the air evacuation holding unit that this battalion was operating at TOUL (U-61). The first and second platoons of the 59th Field Hospital remained inactive until 19 September, at which time they were attached to the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion to further augment that unit at TOUL.

The Third U. S. Army transferred three field hospitals during the month. The 48th Field Hospital was assigned to First U. S. Army on 5 September and on the same day the 53d Field Hospital was assigned to Ninth U. S. Army. The 54th Field Hospital was transferred to Seventh Army on 29 September. Thus, the close of the month found Third U. S. Army with four field hospitals.

The field hospitals, or platoons thereof, attached to various corps were moved on corps order with the transportation furnished by corps or division. In the early part of the month these units experienced difficulty in operating in close support of the division clearing stations. This was due in part to lack of gasoline and transportation, and in part to immobilization of some of the platoons by reception of non-transportable patients, often just before the division clearing station moved. To offset the latter difficulty, one field hospital platoon was attached to each corps, as reserve, to be committed in such circumstances. Toward the end of the month this arrangement was working very well and each division was closely supported.

As of 5 September, Third U. S. Army transferred four evacuation hospitals to Ninth U. S. Army. These hospitals had been attached to VIII Corps on 23 August and consisted of the 100th, 102d, 107th and 108th Evacuation Hospitals (SM).

At the beginning of the month evacuation hospitals were being moved to such positions that two hospitals would be available to support a specific sector. Prior to this time rapid advances simultaneously in two or three directions had made difficult the pairing of hospitals with a view to leapfrogging them as the front advanced. All movements of hospitals during this month were accomplished by use of the transportation of medical units only. At times it was necessary for a unit to move by shuttle with its own organic transportation. When possible, however, the vehicles of the nearest evacuation hospital or medical gas treatment battalion were made available to the unit requiring them. By maintaining strict control of this pool of approximately 210 two and one-half ton trucks and 150 one-ton trailers, the Army Surgeon was able to make the most economical use of the vehicles available. The critical shortage of gasoline affected the movement of hospital units only indirectly, inasmuch as the less rapid and shorter advances of the combat elements required fewer movements of hospital units. In two instances, hospitals were required to delay their moves twenty-four to forty-eight hours as a result of the gasoline shortage. As in the past, the movement of the 750-bed evacuation hospital and the 6th Convalescent Hospital placed the greatest strain on transportation facilities.

In order to expedite further the movement of evacuation hospitals, which were in all instances seeking new locations in one of the respective corps zones, the commanding officer of the hospital involved dealt directly with the corps surgeon and corps G-4 under instructions from Army as to the approximate site desired to be used. This resulted in the saving of twenty-four to forty-eight hours, in many instances. By the end of the first week of September all evacuation hospitals, with one exception, were generally along the line VERDUN-COMMERCY and

east thereof. The 103d Evacuation Hospital remained behind at NORMEE (T-33) and was acting as a holding hospital.

The advent of inclement weather was foreseen and reconnaissance for suitable buildings was begun. The 34th Evacuation Hospital was the first of the hospitals to utilize a building and opened for operation in the military hospital at VERDUN (U-26) on 9 September. Further use of buildings was made towards the end of the month. In view of the tactical situation, with expectation of limited advances, hospitals would be able to remain in buildings for a sufficient time to make their utilization profitable. The 35th Evacuation Hospital and the 101st Evacuation Hospital were therefore moved respectively from their locations east of NANCY to Hopital Villemin in NANCY (U-81) and to the Seminary in VILLERS-LES-NANCY (U-81) southwest of NANCY. The 12th Evacuation Hospital meanwhile moved from its location west of VERDUN to Hopital Militaire in NANCY. At the close of the month, the 35th Evacuation Hospital was open and the other two hospitals were prepared to open. In addition, the 39th Evacuation Hospital began, on 30 September, to move from southwest of COMMERCY (U-22) to the Hopital Gama, in TOUL (U-61).

For a short period during September, elements of the 6th Convalescent Hospital were in three locations, namely VITRE (Y-45), MONTREAU (X-48) and in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U-44) on 8 September, and the entire unit was finally assembled there on 23 September. The chief obstacle to moving the rear echelon at VITRE was the lack of transportation required to return patients back to duty. For example, on 5 September there were 690 returnees to duty in the hospital with no transportation available to move them. However, the rear echelon was finally emptied and movement completed.

A reproduction of a sketch showing the locations of all evacuation hospitals and the convalescent hospital during the month of September will be found as Annex X to the Medical Section report.

SECRET

A detailed analysis of wounded in hospitals during the month of September is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer).

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	10,671
(2) British Army Troops	25
(3) French Army Troops	794
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	0
(5) British and French Navy	1
(6) Enemy forces personnel	1,836
(7) Civilians	366
(8) Others - specifically FFI	21

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army Troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	3,303
(2) Slight	7,368

c. Anatomical classification of wounds: (Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	392	85
(b) Thoracic	1,003	95
(c) Maxillo-facial	583	5
(d) Neurologic		
Head	589	96
Spine	142	12
Nerve	4	1
(e) Extremities		
Upper	2,760	11
Lower	3,870	41
(f) Buttocks	569	13
(g) Other	632	7
Sub-total	10,544	366
(2) Burns - all locations	127	4
Total	10,671	370

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds

	3,201	39
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e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	3,009	119
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	6,368	209
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby-trap, or mine)	319	9
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	290	1
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	24	
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flamethrower, phosphorous, etc.)	115	4
(7) Others (NBC and unclassified missiles)	546	28
Total	10,671	370

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Fracture, right Basilar and zygoma	Shock	1
Perf W chest and hemothorax	Shock	1
FCC right femur with amputation right thigh	Gas gangrene	1
FCC HE skull		12
FCC ischium and amputation of left hand	Shock	1
GSW amputation left arm	Gas gangrene	1
GSW left ilium		1
FC HE temporal bone		3
Pen W buttocks		6
FCC bomb, right mandible		1
FC right thigh		2
Pen W HE left thigh	Shock and pulmonary edema	2
FCC HE femur	Shock	6
Pen W skull		5
Pen W chest, Perf W left leg with amputation		1
Pen W hand, thigh and chest	Shock	1
FCC mandible	Strangulation	1
Pen W parietal region	Shock	3
Perf W chest and hemothorax	Shock and circulatory failure	1

Perf W face, FCC mandible, laryngeal obstruction with respiratory difficulty, lobar pneumonia		2
Perf W neck IW trachea	Shock	1
Pen W abdomen	Shock	6
Perf W thigh	Shock	1
Pen W chest and abdomen	Shock	5
Pen W skull and abdomen	Shock	2
Pen W chest and right hip	Shock	2
FC mandible FCC clavicle	Shock	1
Perf W skull	Circulatory failure	2
Pen W lumbar with cord injury	Shock	2
Pen W neck injury to cervicle spine	Circulatory failure	1
Pen W left thigh	Pulmonary embolism	1
FCC left femur	Shock	3
FCC tibia and fibula	Pulmonary embolism	1
DOA Pen W arm MW arm and back	Hemorrhage	1
DOA drown		1
DOA Pen W FCC left leg		1
DOA FC basal of skull	Hemorrhage	1
DOA FC skull with brain damage	Shock	3
DOA traumatic amputation of both legs	Shock	1
Pen W chest, FCC ribs	Hemorrhage	2
Perf W right leg		2
GSW Perf W right chest, FCC of 10th vertebra	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W left thigh	Dilation of right ventricle of heart	1
Perf W left buttocks	Pulmonary edema	2
GSW right chest with paralysis of spinal cord		1
Perf W chest		21
Perf W abdomen	Shock	24
HE shell of head		12
HE shell of lower extremities		6
Perf W spine		2
FCC left tibia and fibula	Gas gangrene	1
Pen W brain FCC skull	Pneumonia	1
MW traumatic amputation left leg, burns of face		1
Pen W brain FCC skull, brain abscess		1
Shrapnel wounds	Shock	10
GSW	Shock	24
FC skull	Shock	13
GSW head	Shock	4
FC skull	Hemorrhage	1
Perf W spinal cord damage	Respiratory failure	1
Perf W shoulder	Shock	3
Pen W chest and neck		2
FC skull	Shock	3
MW head and body		2
GSW severance of spinal cord	Circulatory failure	1
MW body	Shock	17
Perf W HE chest		18
Perf W HE head		23
DOA shell HE back, shoulder		2
FCC left arm		1
FCC HE shell right femur, tibia and fibula		1
Pen W chest and back		1
GSW skull		4
GSW		21
Burn	Toxemia	1
GSW chest		6
Perf W shell HE		18
Perf W chest	Pulmonary Hemorrhage	2
Traumatic amputation both feet		1
Traumatic amputation arm and leg		1
MW abdomen and intestines		8
MW buttocks and intestines		2
FCC tibia and fibula		1
Pen W arm and leg		1
Burn 3d degree face and hands		1
Pen W chest and scalp		1
Pen W neck	Shock	1
Pen W right groin and abdomen		2
Perf W intestines	Pulmonary embolism	1
FC spine	Shock	1

Perf W chest, hemothorax and pericardial	1
Perf W abdomen, lac of liver	1
Pen W scapula and spinal cord severed.	1

Note: Items g, h, and i pertain to all military and civilian patients in hospital.

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	408
(2) Stored blood	3615
(3) Dry plasma	5701
(4) Other blood substitutes (do not include crystalloids) Normal Saline	24
Total	9748

h. Number of units of penicillin administered 3,091,010,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	87
(2) Lower extremity	126
Total	213

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:


U. S. Army 73 Other 77

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

U. S. Army 9272 Other 2293

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

An innovation in the Medical Service during the month was the use of one platoon of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion as a center for exhaustion cases of the 5th Infantry Division. The platoon was attached to the clearing company of the division and the results of its efforts will be more fully discussed in this history under the section devoted to Neuropsychiatry. However, it is noteworthy here that despite the fact that this arrangement was very satisfactory, it was looked upon as a purely emergency function of this unit. It was felt that proper treatment of these patients should be carried on within unit areas and that rest of line troops was a command function and not a medical problem.



The First Hospital Train Leaves VERDUN with its Load of Patients (19 Sep 1944)

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

The wisdom of keeping hospitals as close as possible to the combat troops has been proven repeatedly.

During the month of August, as a by-product of the rapid advances of Third U. S. Army troops, the length of time from injury until admission to a hospital averaged between three and ten hours. However, in September, with the line becoming more constant along the MOSELLE River, the hospitals were moved as close to the troops as clearance could be obtained from the various corps involved. During this month the length of time from injury until admission to the hospital was cut to from one and one-half to three hours.

2. Surgery

With the fighting becoming more static, it was noted that there was a marked increase in September in the casualties from high explosive missiles, with the number of gunshot cases remaining fairly constant. In August there were 3,013 gunshot wounds as compared with 3,009 in September; but in August there were only 4,593 casualties from high explosives as compared with 6,368 for September. In spite of an over-all increase in the number of battle casualties the mortality rate was further reduced from two and one-tenth percent to one and eight-tenths percent in September.


The high standards of surgery performed among Third U. S. Army medical units is reflected not only in the low mortality rate but also in the handling of wounds of the extremities. During September there were 6,630 wounds of the arms and legs, many of them extremely mutilating. Among this number of cases only 213 amputations were performed, for all causes.

Anesthesia has always constituted a major problem in the handling of a large number of battle casualties. In addition, a continuous shortage of trained anesthetists has been a definite cause of concern, both in pre-operational planning and subsequently during operations of Third U. S. Army. In spite of these difficulties, the results obtained in this field during the month of September reflected definite progress toward solution of the problem, through judicious choice of methods and anesthetic agents. There were 7,811 anesthetics administered during the month. Of these, 3,292 were regional or local blocks, 3,190 were intravenous and the remaining 1,329 were inhalation or a combination of inhalation with one of the two previous methods. The complications reported were two deaths in which pentothal was the anesthetic agent, four cases of postoperative pneumonia and six cases of atelectasis.

3. Neuropsychiatry

The month of September opened a new type of warfare for the Third U. S. Army. From 1 September to 7 September, inclusive, the tactical situation was fairly static. There were relatively few casualties of all types, and the incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties was extraordinarily low.

On 8 September a drive was made to cross the MOSELLE River. The enemy had had an opportunity to reorganize and dig in to resist this assault. As a result there was a very marked increase in all types of casualties admitted to division clearing stations. The highest casualty rates occurred in the 10th, 11th, and 2d Infantry Regiments of the 5th Infantry Division. On 10 September the clearing company of this division admitted 558 casualties of all types and the following day admitted 468. Due to the difference in type of warfare, the types of objectives, strong enemy opposition, the beginning of cold weather and the onset of heavy rains, there was also a proportionate increase in neuropsychiatric casualties in all divisions. Those divisions which had made every effort toward handling physical exhaustion and combat exhaustion cases in battalion and regimental areas, such as the 35th Infantry Division, 79th Infantry Division and 90th Infantry Division, continued to have a relatively low incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties. The 5th Infantry Division which had little or no provision for treatment of neuropsychiatric casualties at aid station level, and the 80th Infantry Division which had emphasized treatment of these cases at clearing station level showed a marked increase in neuropsychiatric casualties during this phase. In the 80th Infantry Division, neuropsychiatric casualties represented fifteen and eight-tenths percent of total admissions to the clearing station, and in the 5th Infantry Division twenty-four and four-tenths percent of all clearing station admissions for the month of September. The 80th Infantry Division created a convalescent station at clearing station level to prevent this influx of patients, including the lightly wounded, from leaving the division area so that they would not be lost to the division. In the 5th Infantry Division the division evacuation system and the clearing station were swamped with patients, which resulted in large numbers of patients being evacuated to evacuation hospital level. This resulted in overloading the Army evacuation



A Laboratory Technician at Work in the Clinical Laboratory of an Evacuation Hospital

system and in an inundation of the evacuation hospitals supporting this division.

On 12 September, one platoon of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion was placed by Army at the clearing station, 5th Infantry Division, level. This unit had tentage and litters to accommodate 150 cases of combat exhaustion and was equipped with bath and laundry facilities. The additional personnel and physical equipment working under the supervision of the division neuropsychiatrist resulted in the return of 274 neuropsychiatric patients to combat duty. Toward the end of the month the necessity for treating such patients at aid station level was demonstrated to this division. Increasing efforts were made by the division to treat neuropsychiatric casualties in forward areas with a resultant drop in the number of soldiers lost to the division from this source, an increasing number returned to full combat duty and a decreasing number admitted to the clearing station.

Although the situation was comparatively static throughout the month of September, there were approximately 4,000 more casualties than in the month of August. Neuropsychiatric casualties increased from seven and four-tenths percent to ten and five-tenths percent of all admissions to division clearing stations. On the other hand, a higher percentage of neuropsychiatric casualties was returned to duty from both clearing station and hospital levels.

There were 2,950 neuropsychiatric casualties admitted to division clearing stations and Army hospital installations. A total of 2,183 were returned to duty during the month. The latter figure constitutes seventy-four percent of all neuropsychiatric casualties for September.

4. Dental

At the beginning of the month the five dental prosthetic teams each remained attached to an evacuation hospital. During the first week, however, orders were received from higher headquarters to return to Ninth U. S. Army the two dental prosthetic trucks loaned to Third U. S. Army in June. As a result three dental prosthetic teams remained available to this Army.

The dental clinic established in August, at the 6th Convalescent Hospital, was enlarged during September, due to an obvious need for an increase in these facilities. By the end of the month the dental clinic consisted of ten dental officers and twelve enlisted technicians, together with the following equipment:

- 3 - MD chests No. 61
- 3 - MD chests No. 62
- 3 - Ward tents
- 1 - 2½ KV generator
- 2 - Motor polishing lathes

In addition to the above, captured supplies and dental laboratory equipment were used.

During September the dental clinic processed ninety-seven prosthetic cases and performed 436 restorations. This compared with fifty-two prosthetic cases handled during the last ten days of August and 256 restorations performed during the entire previous month. The lack of an even greater increase in the number of cases treated during September was due partially to the fact that the 6th Convalescent Hospital was split during this month until 23 September, at which time the hospital was again assembled in one location. Prior to 23 September, therefore, the dental clinic was faced with the necessity of traveling around to the respective echelons of the hospital. In addition, the fact that medical units were being transferred rapidly from one Army to another resulted in the necessity for replacement in the dental clinic of some of the dental officers placed there on temporary duty.

Due to the fact that the 6th Convalescent Hospital was normally located in the rear of an Army area, it became evident that other facilities would have to be provided as many units were over one hundred miles from this clinic. It had been estimated that approximately twenty percent of the military personnel of this Army wear some type of dental prosthetic appliances. It was found that, during combat, many dentures were lost and broken, making necessary their repair or replacement; others were distorted and some adjustment was necessary. The adjustments could usually be accomplished by the dental officer of the

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patient's own unit. Those broken or lost, however, required more skilled care and equipment than was feasible organically in forward units. At the end of September an additional dental clinic was established at the 32d Medical Depot Company for the purpose of providing prosthetic treatment in a location more accessible to a large number of troops than that normally afforded by the 6th Convalescent Hospital. It was possible to send these troops to the medical depot on trucks proceeding there for medical supplies.

On 8 September an additional dental prosthetic team reported to this Headquarters and was immediately placed on temporary duty with the 4th Armored Division, which was badly in need of assistance in repairing and replacing the dentures which had been broken and lost since that division arrived on the Continent.

Also during this month one of the three remaining dental prosthetic teams was transferred from its location at an evacuation hospital and attached to the 6th Armored Division.

The consolidated monthly report for September, shown below, indicated a considerable increase in September in the treatments rendered over the previous month:

	Sept
Strength (Reported)	215747
Admissions Routine	9709
Admissions Emergency	2979
Sittings	16610
Officer Personnel	306
Enlisted Personnel	301
Restorations	10882
Dentures	982
Gingivitis	911
Gingivitis Treatment	1443
Stomatitis, Vincent's	451
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	1770

Of the reports received, approximately five and four-tenths percent of battle casualties admitted to Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of September were maxillo-facial injuries. The death rate was approximately eight-tenths of one percent of those admitted with maxillo-facial injuries.

5. Veterinary

During the month of September thirty-five inspections were made of a total of fourteen Class I Supply Points, which were operated for varying periods of time during the month. The most common deficiency found was the failure to thoroughly police the areas of ration dumps. This was complicated by the arrival and departure of convoys at all hours of the day or night and by frequent rains. Government owned foodstuffs continued to arrive in a highly satisfactory condition. Only in the case of oranges and shell eggs was it necessary to recommend an increased basis of issue to avoid loss through spoilage.

Early in the month, approximately 1,200 metric tons (2,600,000 pounds) of German frozen carcass beef and 174,000 cans of roast beef (each weighing 850 grams), were found at a large, modern refrigeration and meat packing plant at HOMECOURT (U-72). Through contact with the owner of the plant, it was established that this food had been shipped from Germany to escape bomb damage and that the beef had been processed in the plant for the German Army. There was no evidence of sabotage.

During the month of September, in excess of 1,400,000 pounds of this captured beef was approved by the Army Surgeon and made available for issue to Third U. S. Army personnel. Large quantities of this meat were consumed by combat troops and provision was also made for distribution of generous quantities to medical installations handling patients. Distribution of the remainder of this meat was made to U. S. Army troops during the following month.

6. Personnel

During September the substitution of Medical Administrative Corps officers as assistant battalion surgeons, under the provisions of War Department Circular No. 99, 1944, was completed. Although it had been contemplated that substitution would result in the existence of a surplus of Medical Corps officers, such a surplus did not in fact result. After transfers of Medical Corps officers from units under Third U. S. Army with surpluses to units with shortages, it was found that the entire Third U. S. Army was almost exactly at an even Table of Organization strength with regard to Medical Corps officers. This was due to the absorption of the originally contemplated surplus by battle and non-battle casualties among Medical Corps officers.

Preliminary reports from division surgeons, concerning the efficiency and usefulness of the Medical Administrative Corps officers

furnished as assistant battalion surgeons, were highly favorable. Only in isolated instances was it found that these officers were unequipped for the duties assigned to them.

Preliminary plans were made toward a rotation of Medical Corps officers. The plans were designed to effect permanent transfers of Medical officers with combat units to hospital units and vice versa. Due to the nature of the contemplated operations of Third U. S. Army, the rotation was planned to affect only the most deserving cases.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Coincident with the decrease in forward movement of the combat elements of Third U. S. Army during the month of September was a lack of necessity for frequent movements of the two medical depot companies assigned to this Army. As of the end of August the 32d Medical Depot Company was located at FONTAINEBLEAU (X-29) and the 33d Medical Depot Company at TROYES (Y-27). During the first week of September an advance section of the 32d Medical Depot Company moved forward to VERDUN (U-26) to support corps and Army troops in that area. Immediately subsequent to this movement, steps were taken to move the entire depot consisting of approximately 350 long tons of medical supplies into this location. The entire depot opened in VERDUN at 081800 September.

At 201800 September, the 33d Medical Depot opened at TOUL (U-61), the movement having been accomplished by rail transportation consisting of thirty-five boxcars supplemented by two passenger cars.

The two depot companies remained at the above locations during the remainder of the month of September.

With the locations of the depots comparatively static a major effort was devoted to the actual procurement and distribution of medical supplies of all types. The Communications Zone had allocated a specific tonnage of supplies of all types which were to be transported to this Army by Communications Zone vehicles. As part of this total tonnage, approval was secured for the allocation of eighteen long tons daily of medical supplies. This allocation did not include supplies transported by Army transportation or supplies delivered by air. The railroad for Army medical supplies was designated by Communications Zone as SEZANNE (T-05). The modus operandi for reception of medical supplies was as follows:

Army requisitions were accepted by the Regulating Group who in turn forwarded them to Advance Section, Communications Zone. Requisitions reaching Advance Section, Communications Zone were sent out on daily telegram to the Communications Zone. Requisitions were filled by Communications Zone and forwarded to the Army railroad by Red Ball Express. The following tonnages were received from the Communications Zone by this method on the dates indicated:

13 September 1944	-	15 tons
14 September 1944	-	10 tons

By the middle of the month it became evident that the daily requisition for eighteen long tons of medical supplies for Army was not working out satisfactorily. Arrangements were therefore made to discontinue this procedure and requisition a ninety long ton maximum each ten days.

Delivery of medical supplies to the Army railroad, now located at SOMMESOUS (T-42) improved considerably during this period. Medical supplies in the amount of 128 tons were received on 16 September, ten tons on 18 September and 361 tons on 19 September.

Among items on which particular effort was necessary for procurement during this month were blankets and litters. These had become critical, largely due to losses sustained regarding such items in the process of air evacuation of patients. After it became apparent that emergency requisitions for these two items were becoming far too frequent, steps were taken to set a definite figure on the number of each item to be kept in reserve at each air strip. The figures arrived at were 4,000 blankets and 1,500 litters. All litters and blankets above these amounts were to be stocked in Army medical depots. A policy was also established with the Chief of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, whereby blankets and litters used in air evacuation would be replaced daily on the basis of the number of patients evacuated and the number of blankets and litters needed to replace those lost. The Army Surgeon was to report this information each day by telephone, to Communications Zone, and Communications Zone, in turn, was to make arrangements to have replacements flown to the Army air strips.

In order to prepare the medical service for proper operation in winter, requirements were estimated and requested involving 28,400

blankets, 10,150 woolen pajamas and 800 stoves, tent.

Due to the fact that hospital messes, in general, were expanded to sizes not contemplated by Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment, it was necessary that additional immersion water heaters be furnished for proper handling of the messes. Information was secured that these items were not available in this theater in quantities sufficient to warrant issues in excess of Tables of Equipment allowances. It was further stated, however, that efforts were being made to procure them and that hospital units would receive first priority when sufficient stocks were received.

During the latter part of the month it was also learned that practically all biologicals were now stocked on the Continent. A list was therefore procured of depots where stocks were maintained, and it was estimated that the movement of these biologicals to the points of consumption would now be greatly facilitated.

Lack of spare parts also became a major supply problem during this period. Maintenance sections of Army medical depots were unable to make some repairs on certain items due to this shortage. The difficulty was solved through agreement with the Communications Zone whereby a representative from Communications Zone medical depots, well qualified in maintenance and repair of medical equipment, was sent to the Army medical depots with a stock of maintenance equipment and spare parts. This aided materially in the program of repair and conservation of items of medical equipment.

Captured German medical supplies were found in the following locations:

Location	Type of Material and Equipment	Disposition
MONTEREAU (X-48)	1 Ton of miscellaneous medical supplies	Stocked in 32d Medical Depot Company.
VERDUN (U-26)	20,000 pairs of pajama trousers	Stocked in 32d Medical Depot Company for reissue to hospital units.
COMMERCY (U-22) and vicinity.	20 Tons miscellaneous Medical supplies	1-1/2 tons stocked in 33d Medical Depot Company, remainder to Communications Zone.
NANCY (U-81)	4 Tons miscellaneous Medical supplies	Stocked in 33d Medical Depot Company.

In addition to the above, twenty-two 15-KVA generators captured at TOUL (U-61) were taken over by the 32d Medical Depot Company for reissue to hospital units. Also, approximately 150 tons of coal captured at TROYES (Y-27) and BOUY (T-54), and fifteen tons of coal captured at NANCY were made available to hospital units.

The locations of Third U. S. Army medical depots during the month of September will be found in Annex VII to the Medical Section report.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Due to the fact that the month of September was characterized by a slowing down of tactical operations, preventive medicine problems approached equal importance with those posed by the care of actual battle casualties.

2. Venereal Disease Control

"Off Limits" restrictions on troops entering towns and cities were lifted on 1 September. The presence of brothels, street walkers, and casual "pickups" in these towns and cities, therefore, resulted in an increase in the number of venereal disease contacts made by troops. A rise in the venereal disease rate was therefore to be expected. The rate rose from 8.82 per 1,000 per annum in the first week of the month to 32.56 per 1,000 per annum during the last week of the month.

During September, Army prophylactic stations were established at ORLEANS (W-64), CHATEAUDUN (W-45), PITHIVIER (W-21), FONTAINEBLEAU (X-29), ST DIZIER (U-12), BAR LE DUC (U-13), VERDUN (U-26) and COMMERCY (U-22). Approximately 5,000 prophylactic treatments were given in these stations during this month. In addition, prophylactic stations were established by corps surgeons in the larger towns in their respective areas.

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Owing to supply difficulties, rubber prophylactics and individual prophylactic kits were not available for issue at Quartermaster Depots during the early part of the month. The former became available for issue by the middle of the month and the latter toward the end of the month.

Veneral disease contact reports were received on 354 individuals during the month. In most cases these reports did not give sufficient information for the location and treatment of female contacts. Those reports which gave sufficient information were turned over to the Civil Affairs Public Health Officer for physical examination of contacts and treatment, if necessary. Forty-six percent of these cases claimed that contacts were made outside of the Army area, indicating PARIS as the location, in most cases.

Letters directing that more adequate veneral disease control measures be put into effect were sent to all units with veneral disease rates above fifty per 1,000 per annum.

Incidence of veneral disease during the month of September will be found in Annex XI to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

For an average mean strength of 269,310 officers and men during the four-week period, a daily non-effective rate of 0.79 per 1,000 per annum from all diseases, occurred. This figure is well under the figure of 1.15 per 1,000 per annum resulting in the month of August, which in itself was an unprecedented low. The number of cases continued to be few in number with the exception of upper respiratory infections, which showed a seasonal increase.

For a detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases for this month, see Annex XI to the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Reports and Records

Continuous efforts gauged toward the attainment of a high standard of accuracy and promptness with regard to the submission of all medical department reports showed definite results during September. The reports, in general, were more adequately prepared and were submitted more promptly. A twenty-five percent increase in the total number received was noted, there being a total of 26,997 processed as compared to a figure of 20,187 during the previous month. The volume of work and the man hours required in handling and processing these reports increased proportionately.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

The average rate per 1,000 per annum remained approximately the same as during the previous month—the rate being 108 per 1,000 per annum for a weekly average strength of 269,310 officers and men.

Details regarding non-battle injuries may be found in Annex XI to the Medical Section report.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The two sections into which the base laboratory of the 7th Medical Laboratory had been divided during the previous month operated in the following locations during the month of September:

Section 1

PROVINS (S-73) - 1 September to 12 September
ST MIHIEL (U-39) - 13 September to 17 September
SAMPIGNY (U-36) - 18 September to 30 September

Section 2

SUIPPES (T-67) - 1 September to 21 September
NANCY (U-85) - 22 September to 30 September

There were 3,238 tests performed during this month as compared with 705 in the month of August, an increase of approximately 460 percent. This is divided into groups as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	1816	57.0
Bacteriology	447	13.8
Chemistry	91	2.8
Pathology	67	2.0
Hematology	18	0.6
Parasitology	7	0.2
Sub-total	2476	76.4

MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Veneral Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hospital)	592	18.3

Shock Section (39th Evacuation Hospital)	170	5.3
Sub-total	762	23.6
Grand Total	3238	100.0

A review of these figures shows that the mobile sections have accounted for approximately twenty-four percent of the work and that the veneral disease section has more than justified its establishment.

A breakdown of the same tests by type of unit requesting them is shown below:

Type of Unit	No. of Units	No. of Tests	Percentage of all Tests
Evacuation Hospitals	15	1583	48.8
Convalescent Hospital	1	1057	32.7
Other Medical Installations	9	29	0.9
Tactical Organizations	86	569	17.6
	111	3238	100.0

Compared with the month of August the significant rises were in the amount of work done for the convalescent hospital where "chronic" cases accumulated. Another was the use made by the tactical units (569 requests for tests), which shows that there is a definite need for laboratory work by the forward areas if the services can be brought sufficiently close. This relieves the out-patient burden on the evacuation hospitals, which are occupied with the more serious cases.

7. Sanitation

Few sanitary problems were encountered during the month of September. Inspection and sampling at water points was continued by representatives of the Army, corps, and division surgeon's offices in accordance with current directives. Some improvement was noted. Bacteriological analysis of ninety-six water samples from Army, corps, and division Engineer water points revealed that sixty-nine of these samples (or seventy-two percent) were potable. Twenty-one (or twenty-two percent) were non-potable, and six (or six percent) were questionable.

During this month, plans were made by the Army Surgeon and Army Engineer to set up an experimental water purification unit to demonstrate the possibility and practicability of producing potable water by a modified operating technique.

An investigation of the water supply of the city of NANCY showed that the water was not potable. Raw MOSELLE River water was being used in the mains throughout the city. Lack of power prevented operation of the treatment plant consisting of sedimentation, filtration, and ozonation. Even with power available, the water was not considered safe for human consumption because of lack of chlorination. Proper directives were recommended accordingly.

The need for insect control remained insignificant. In some areas flies were more numerous than during the month of August, but in general there were fewer insect problems. The bee or yellow hornet nuisance of the previous month practically disappeared.

Cooler weather and an increase in rainfall resulted in an accentuation of muddy areas and a pressing need for overshoes, winter clothing, and bedding. During the latter part of the month requisitions were being partially filled and additional supplies were en route.

The effect of unfavorable weather conditions on the health of the command was comparatively slight. The limited increase in rates of upper respiratory infections that occurred, would have been considered seasonal even under normal living conditions.



(Above) Litter Carry Over Hedgerow Near ST LO, France

(Below) Application of Shoulder Spica in an Evacuation Hospital



CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

The relatively static situation of Third U. S. Army during the month of October was reflected in the lowest number of battle casualties since the commencement of operations. The fact that there were only four movements of Army hospitals was a further indication of a comparative lull.

A month such as this was of definite benefit to the medical service. It afforded well-earned rest in some instances, and in all cases it was possible to allot time for actual study of the results of the previous two months of action. Most advances in medicine and surgery are attained through proper evaluation of methods. This, then, was a major effort during October. Due to the small number of casualties, it was possible without any interference with the primary mission of the medical service.

Due to unseasonal cold and heavy rains, attempts were made to utilize buildings for evacuation hospitals. By the end of the month all except two were so situated. The convalescent hospital remained under canvas, due to difficulty in finding proper accommodations for its 3,000 bed capacity.

A sharp seasonal increase in upper respiratory infections and a smaller increase in diarrheal diseases were of minor military importance, due to the fact that the troops as a whole were not actively engaged with the enemy. However, and particularly with regard to the latter factor, definite measures were taken to eliminate the causes by adoption of a new and modified method of water treatment, made necessary by the turbidity of the swollen streams.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The Medical Section continued to be divided into Forward and Rear Echelons. The specific setup is shown below:

<u>Forward Echelon</u>	<u>Rear Echelon</u>
Army Surgeon	Personnel and Administrative Sub-section
Executive Officer	Consultant Sub-section (less Surgical Consultant)
Surgical Consultant	Preventive Medicine Sub-section
Operations and Training Sub-section	Dental Sub-section
Finance and Supply Sub-section	Veterinary Sub-section

By the middle of the month, only the distance of a city block separated the two echelons.

The Medical Section continued to operate with the services of one Veterinary Corps officer. A replacement for the Army Veterinarian, who had been transferred to the Communications Zone in August, did not arrive during this month.

An additional Medical Administrative Corps officer was placed on temporary duty with the Finance and Supply Sub-section for the purposes of special investigations of matters relating to Army, Corps, and Division medical supply.

The additional Medical Administrative Corps officers on temporary duty with the Medical Section now included the following:

- Operations and Training Sub-section - One (placed on TD in August)
- Preventive Medicine Sub-section - One (placed on TD in September)
- Finance and Supply Sub-section - One (placed on TD in November)

The continued availability of an extra Medical Corps officer on temporary duty as Liaison Officer between the Army Surgeon and the Surgeon, Twelfth Army Group, brought the total of officers on temporary duty with the Medical Section to four.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

The Surgeon's Office, XII Corps, continued its practice of giving Medical Department training to enlisted basics present in the reinforcement battalion supporting that corps. The divisions under XII Corps also continued their practice of affording further Medical Department training to Medical Department enlisted reinforcements as they arrived

in the division area. It was felt that the combination of both courses of instruction was of material benefit in the attainment of a better qualified group of reinforcements for the Medical Department. It was estimated that several hundred enlisted men received this training during the month.

2. Evacuation

The facilities for medical evacuation remained essentially the same as during the previous month. As of 1 October the following type units were available in the Army area:

- 4 - hq & hq det, medical groups
- 11 - hq & hq det, medical battalions
- 8 - medical collecting companies
- 13 - ambulance companies, motor
- 5 - clearing companies

In the case of the clearing companies, the platoons of these companies were in actuality split up as medical holding units and attached to evacuation hospitals.


In addition to the above, one medical battalion, each, remained attached to XII and XX Corps, consisting of:

- 1 - hq & hq det, medical battalion
- 2 - medical collecting companies
- 1 - clearing company

These functioned as corps medical battalions.

One ambulance company, motor, was relieved of assignment to Third U. S. Army during the month. This was the only medical evacuation unit lost to the Army during the month of October. On the other hand, six medical collecting companies and one clearing company were assigned to Third U. S. Army. However, none of these arrived in the Army area before the end of the month.

The plan for evacuation of division clearing stations and field hospital platoons, normally attached to divisions, remained unchanged. Since this Army had only two corps in operation, the services of two medical groups were sufficient for medical evacuation of the respective corps. The 66th Medical Group supported the divisions of XX Corps and the 67th Medical Group provided medical evacuation for divisions of XII Corps.



Medical Soldiers Loading Wounded American On Jeep After His Half-track Has Been Knocked Out.

The 65th Medical Group was employed for a two-week period in the Seventh U. S. Army zone, with a two-fold function. Until relieved on 14 October, it evacuated the divisions of XV Corps (a Seventh U. S. Army corps) to the 103d Evacuation Hospital located near the Army boundary. It likewise evacuated the 103d Evacuation Hospital to a Seventh U. S. Army air evacuation holding unit. On 14 October the 65th Medical Group was relieved of its double mission by Seventh U. S. Army medical units.

Somewhat similar circumstances involved part of the 66th and 67th Medical Groups on the northern flank of Third U. S. Army, when the 83d Infantry Division was assigned to Ninth U. S. Army. For a short time the 66th Medical Group continued to evacuate the 83d Infantry Division, largely to the 110th Evacuation Hospital, located the greater part of the time in ESCH (P-70). The 69th Medical Group continued to evacuate the 110th Evacuation Hospital until that group and the 66th Medical Group were relieved by the 64th Medical Group, then a Ninth U. S. Army unit.

The evacuation of Third U. S. Army evacuation hospitals continued to be a joint responsibility of the 69th Medical Group and medical units of the Advance Section, Communications Zone. The latter remained responsible for evacuation of the hospitals located in the rear of the Army area and evacuated no more than four evacuation hospitals at any one time during the month of October. The remainder of the hospitals were evacuated by the 69th Medical Group. Due to the fact that few units moved during the month, there was little change in evacuation.

Air evacuation became a day to day proposition. From the beginning of the month it was apparent that the air field at TOUL (U-61) would not remain available indefinitely for supply and evacuation. The field was finally closed for air evacuation on 22 October. However, Third U. S. Army continued to operate a medical holding unit at this point for rail evacuation. During the greater part of the month this medical holding unit consisted of the following:

- 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
- 16th Field Hospital (less first platoon)
- First Platoon, 59th Field Hospital

In addition, an Advance Section, Communications Zone field hospital was nearby for use as needed. As the month progressed, the medical holding unit at TOUL (U-61) was reduced to the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion and the first platoon of the 59th Field Hospital, attached. The entire unit functioned under the 69th Medical Group. Trains were available at TOUL (U-61) as needed throughout the entire month, but rail evacuation increased proportionately when the airfield was closed for supply and evacuation toward the end of the month.

Availability of air evacuation at ETAIN (U-47) continued to exist during the first three weeks of October. At this location, the Advance Section, Communications Zone was operating an air evacuation holding unit, generally in support of XX Corps. On 22 October this airfield was closed for supply and evacuation, but it was reopened for these purposes on 29 October.

Early in the month it was determined that smoother operation in evacuation of casualties from the Army zone could be attained through centralization of this responsibility in the Commanding Officer, 24th Regulating Station (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit). Heretofore, the Surgeon, Third U. S. Army, had been dealing with numerous individuals almost daily in making the arrangements for air evacuation, with resulting duplication of work and expenditure of time. Centralization of this responsibility was accomplished through an agreement worked out between the Surgeon and AC of S, G-4, Twelfth Army Group, the Surgeon and AC of S, G-4, Third U. S. Army and the corresponding personnel of Advance Section, Communications Zone. Thereafter, all necessary arrangements for air and/or rail evacuation from both the Third U. S. Army medical holding unit at TOUL (U-61) and the Advance Section, Communications Zone medical holding unit at ETAIN (U-47) became the responsibility of the Commanding Officer, 24th Regulating Station.

A total of 8,017 patients were evacuated from the Army area during October. Of these, 2,649 were evacuated by air from the medical holding unit operated by Third U. S. Army at TOUL (U-61), 2,329 were by road and 3,039 by rail.

The locations of evacuation facilities in the Third U. S. Army during the month of October will be found in Annex XII to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

As of 1 October, four field hospitals were available for use by this Army. The 60th Field Hospital was attached to XII Corps, together with the first platoon of the 16th Field Hospital. This arrangement afforded one field hospital platoon for each of the four divisions assigned to XII Corps. The 50th Field Hospital, together with the third platoon of the 59th Field Hospital was attached to XX Corps. Four field hospital platoons were, therefore, available for the three divisions of that corps.

During the month a plan similar to that previously in existence for the use of field hospitals remained in force. Field hospitals continued to be attached to corps as shown above and platoons of the field

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hospitals were attached by corps to divisions. Most of the platoons made few or no moves and the problem of their employment became relatively simple. In addition, the 16th Field Hospital (less the first platoon) and the 59th Field Hospital (less the third platoon) augmented the air/rail evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) for a time. Later in the month, all but one platoon were relieved of this mission. The second platoon of the 59th Field Hospital augmented the 12th Evacuation Hospital at NANCY (U-81) during the latter part of the month. At the close of the month XX Corps had two complete field hospitals, the 16th and 60th, while XX Corps had attached to it the 30th Field Hospital and the 59th Field Hospital (less the first platoon).

With the arrival of III Corps, it was planned to attach the 16th Field Hospital to this corps when it became operational. This was to depend, however, on where and when this corps went into action. The 65th Field Hospital was assigned to this Army but did not arrive in the Army area before the end of October.

Third U. S. Army commenced the month with one 750-bed and ten 400-bed evacuation hospitals. These consisted of the following:

- 12th Evacuation Hospital (750-bed)
- 32d Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 34th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 39th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 59th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 101st Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 103d Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 104th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 106th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 109th Evacuation Hospital (SM)
- 110th Evacuation Hospital (SM)

The 110th Evacuation Hospital was relieved of assignment to this Army on 22 October and assigned to First U. S. Army.

The relative inactivity of combat troops during October was reflected in the comparatively slight changes in location of Army hospitals. Movement of hospitals, only four in number, was easily accomplished with available pooled transportation of medical units, as necessary. The decreased number of casualties likewise permitted two evacuation hospitals to remain closed for almost the entire month, thus providing a well-earned rest for these units. At the end of the month five 400-bed evacuation hospitals were in reserve, prepared to open in the same location or move, as the tactical situation required.

The locations of all evacuation hospitals and the convalescent hospital during the month of October will be found in Annex XIII to the Medical Section report.

During this month buildings were utilized to great advantage for housing of evacuation hospitals. The 12th Evacuation Hospital and the 34th Evacuation Hospital operated for the entire month in buildings. The 39th, 59th, 101st, and 104th Evacuation Hospitals made similar use of buildings during the greater part of the month. Toward the latter part of the month the 103d Evacuation Hospital had a portion of its station in buildings at BRIBY (U-67) and the remainder under tents in the adjacent grounds. The 106th Evacuation Hospital was in reserve most of the month and remained under tentage. The 32d Evacuation Hospital was in reserve and for part of the month occupied buildings in STAIN (U-47) where it operated a small (25-bed) hospital. Only the 109th Evacuation Hospital remained in operation under tentage during the entire month, except during a short movement from DOMCOURT-AUX-TEMPLIERS (U-55) to THIAUCOURT (U-64).

There were 3,000 beds available in hospital buildings in the vicinity of NANCY (U-81) and TOUL (U-61) supporting XII Corps. Toward the end of the month, when the 35th and 39th Evacuation Hospitals closed in these respective locations, there still remained 2,000 beds available which could be readily increased by expansion of existing facilities. Similarly, there were 1,600 beds available in the XX Corps zone. Considering the number of casualties, the bed space available in both corps was more than ample.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U-44) and on 30 October began to move to higher ground about two miles away. As there were less than 800 convalescent patients in the hospital it was expected that the move could be accomplished without difficulty.

A detailed analysis of battle casualties hospitalized during the month of October is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	3584

(2) British Army Troops	14
(3) French Army Troops	300
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	250
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	250
(7) Civilians	174
(8) Others - specify (FPI)	0

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General Classification of Wounds:

(1) Serious	917
(2) Slight	2567

c. Anatomical Classification of Wounds: (Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	183	22
(b) Thoracic	292	28
(c) Maxillo-facial	246	4
(d) Neurologic		
Head	262	27
Spine	58	2
Nerve	1	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	894	1
Lower	1287	19
(f) Buttocks	213	7
(g) Other	98	1
Sub-total	3584	111
(2) Burns - all locations	60	6
Total	3584	117

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 1054 26

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	1025	27
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	1921	71
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby-trap, or mine)	237	8
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	161	1
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	1	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame-thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	61	6
(7) Others (NBC and unclassified missiles)	178	4
Total	3584	117

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Pen W abdomen	Shock & Hemorrhage	3
Pen W thorax	Pulmonary Edema	2
Pen W Chest	Pulmonary	2
GSW LK Left Flank		1
GSW Buttocks, FCC iliac Crest		1
lac wall sigmoid colon	Respiratory Failure	1
FCC Tibia and Fibula		2
Pen W Shell Thigh and FCC Femur		1
Pen W Thigh and Hip	Shock	1
GSW Both Legs and Chest and traumatic amputation left leg and GSW abdomen and chest		1
Pen W Both Legs	Shock	3
Perf W Chest, Pleura, Diaphragm		1
Liver, Kidney		1
Perf W Chest FCC Clavicle		1
GSW Neck and Forearm		1
FCC HE Skull		5
GSW Head		6
FC Skull, Herniation Brain		2
FC Mandible with Head Injuries		2
GSW Head	Secondary Shock	1
Perf W Pelvis, Femur, Ilium	Traumatic Shock	1
Perf W Chest, Lung and Spinal Cord	Traumatic Shock	1

Perf W Buttocks, Scrotum, Abdomen	Traumatic Shock	1
Pen W Legs and Arms	Circulatory Failure	1
Pen W Head with Brain, Exsiccation	Traumatic Shock	3
Pen W Chest, FCC Tibia & Fibula	Hemothorax	1
MW Both Legs	Irreversible Shock	1
FS Humorous and Chest	Traumatic Shock	1
FC Both Legs	Traumatic Shock	1
Stat Wound, Chest	Hemorrhage	1
MW KIA Chest		1
HE (Electric Mine) KIA		4
Pen W HE Buttock	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W HE Fact FC Maxilla	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (Bomb) Abdomen	Shock	1
FC (Mortar) Skull	Hemorrhage & Shock	3
FC HE Mandible		1
GSW Abdomen	Bronchial Pneumonia	1
Pen W HE Head	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W HE Thorax	Secondary Shock	1
Pen W HE Spine	Secondary Shock	1
Pen W HE Thorax	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W HE Liver, Stomach and Colon		1
GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	2
Perf W HE Chest	Hemorrhage and Shock	3
Perf W HE Abdomen	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Perf W HE Head	Hemorrhage and Shock	4
Perf W HE Buttocks	Hemorrhage and Shock	2
Pen W Chest	Hemorrhage and Shock	3
Pen W HE Buttocks	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
GSW Abdomen	Nephritis	1
FCC Skull		5
GSW Lower Lumbar	Renal Insufficiency and Shock	1
Pen W HE Skull Lac of Brain		3
FCC (Teller Mine) Skull	Shock	1
Pen W HE Chest	Shock	3
Pen W Neck	Shock	1
Perf W (Booby Trap) Thigh	Embolism, Thrombus, Pulmonary	1
FC HE Foot	Shock	1
Pen W HE Leg	Anemia, Hemolytic due to Transfusion reaction	1
Pen W Abdomen	Fat Necrosis due to pancreatitis lac of Pancreas and Liver	1
Pen W Abdomen and FCC Vertebrae	Hemorrhage, Paralysis and Shock	1
Burn, Thermal third Degree Generalized		2
Perf W Abdomen and Colon	Hemorrhage	1
FCC HE Tibia, Fibula and Radius	Anuria Due to Blood Transfusion reaction	1
DOA BC Shell HE Abdomen		2
Pen W Chest	Atelectasis right Lung	1
Pen W Shoulder and Neck	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Pen W Chest and Thoracic Wall	Hypertension Complicated by Anuria and Uremia	1
Pen W Chest	Cardiac Decompensation	1
MW Abdomen, Extrusion of Bowel HE lac of Lung	Surgical Shock	1
HE Lac of Liver, Diaphragm and Kidney		1

Note: Items g, h, and i pertain to all military and civilian patients in hospital.

g. Number of Transfusions of:

(1) Fresh Whole Blood	488
(2) Stored Blood	1502
(3) Dry Plasma	1880
(4) Other Blood Substitutes (do not include crys-talloids) Normal Saline	0
Total	3870

h. Number of Units of Penicillin Administered 1,545,604,000

i. Number of Amputations:

(1) Upper Extremity	36
(2) Lower Extremity	46
Total	82

j. Number of Cases Showing Clinical Evidence of Gas

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Gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	16
(2) Other	2

k. Number of Wounded Evacuated to Other Hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	4,62
(2) Other	432

4. Additional Temporary Medical Services:

No additional service in the form of attached medical detachments was necessary during the month to units not organically provided with medical service. Naturally, hospitals and other medical installations often furnished dispensary service to troops in areas adjacent to them.

The 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion (less the second platoon of Company "B") was held in mobile reserve for use in the event of employment of chemical warfare by the enemy.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

During the relatively static situation on the Third U. S. Army front during October, with action more or less limited to offensive patrolling, there was a sharp decrease in the number of battle casualties. The total number decreased from 10,671 in September to 3,584 in October. These figures reflect only casualties involving wounds and burns due to enemy action and are exclusive of accident injuries and diseases.

Based on total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations, there was a mortality rate of eight tenths of one percent during the month of October. This was a decrease of one percent from the mortality rate in September, and when considered in connection with the mortality rates for both August and September, pointed to the fact that the medical service of this Army was well on its way to establishing the lowest mortality rate in military history.

2. Surgery

The period of lessened activity was well utilized in Third U. S. Army hospital units inasmuch as it provided an opportunity for rest of surgical personnel, many of whom had been working long hours almost continuously, in some instances since D-Day. It also gave the hospital units needed time to evaluate results of the work they had been accomplishing and to make minor changes in surgical procedures based on results which were making themselves apparent in the general hospitals to the rear.

During October a meeting of representatives of the medical staffs of all Allied Armies was held in PARIS (S-04) to discuss the care of battle casualties. It was disclosed at this meeting that the surgeons in the rear areas were well satisfied with the condition of patients arriving at their general hospitals from the Army area. There were only minor criticisms of the improper application of casts in a few instances.



Administration of Anesthesia During Operation.

Information obtained at the above meeting was passed on to various representatives of surgical staffs of Third U. S. Army hospitals in a subsequent meeting. Such problems, of general interest, as blood transfusion reactions were thoroughly considered at this latter meeting and a system of recording and evaluating these reactions was evolved. Another meeting was held of neurosurgeons from the various Army evacuation hospitals. At this meeting the handling of neurosurgical injuries was reviewed with emphasis placed on recent advances such as the use of fibrin foam and fibrin film in controlling hemorrhage in brain injuries. End results in the handling of maxillo-facial injuries were also thoroughly discussed, with an interchange of ideas effected between the specialists in this field.

On 13 October a directive was issued to all hospital units incorporating some changes in surgical procedures which had been covered only generally in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to "Operation OVERLORD". (Pertinent extracts from Annex 16 concerning surgical procedures had been downgraded and published in the form of directives, early in May). A summary of the new directive will be found in Annex XIV to the Medical Section report.

Battle casualties admitted to the Third U. S. Army units during October amounted to 3,584, of which 917 were seriously wounded and 2,667 had slight wounds.

3. Neuropsychiatry

During the month of October the tactical situation remained relatively static; the weather on the whole continued to be cold and wet.

The total of non-fatal casualties dropped from 26,578 in September to 16,779 in October. With the drop in total casualties there was also a proportionate decrease in the neuropsychiatric casualties.

The 6th Armored Division was almost wholly pulled out of the line on 9 October and the proportion of neuropsychiatric casualties to total non-fatal casualties immediately decreased to fourteen and four-tenths percent in that division, a drop of eleven and eight-tenths percent from that which occurred in September.

The 4th Armored Division was gradually relieved by the 26th Infantry Division, resulting in a gradual decline in total non-fatal casualties and a corresponding drop in neuropsychiatric casualties. Toward the end of this period, the 4th Armored Division evacuated through medical neuropsychiatric channels a number of men who had reached the point where the division considered that they were incapable of further combat service, but were capable and anxious to do non-combatant duty. Evacuation of this group of patients, who had been in combat for more than three months, caused a proportionate increase toward the end of the month.

Infantry divisions which had emphasized treatment at battalion aid station level, continued to exhibit extraordinarily low instances of neuropsychiatric casualties. For example, during the month of October the incidence in the 90th Infantry Division was three and five-tenths percent and in the 35th Infantry Division, two and nine-tenths percent of total non-fatal casualties. Of these, approximately forty-five percent were returned to duty from clearing station level. The 5th Infantry Division had strongly emphasized the care of such casualties in forward areas with a resultant graphic drop in neuropsychiatric casualties, although the total non-fatal casualty rate remained fairly high during this month. At the end of the month this division was temporarily relieved from combat for rest and recreation. The 80th Infantry Division continued to follow a policy of caring for neuropsychiatric casualties at clearing station rather than at battalion aid station level. For the month of October, neuropsychiatric casualties represented sixteen and nine-tenths percent of the total non-fatal casualties in this division. The results of experience gained in this field by the 5th Infantry Division and the 80th Infantry Division has demonstrated that a policy of handling neuropsychiatric casualties in the rear of the division leads to an unnecessary inundation of the rear installations and that the majority of such cases can be handled more effectively in forward areas.

The above statement is supported by similar experiences in the 79th, 35th, and 90th Infantry Divisions, where the policy was instituted of handling these patients at aid station level. It was found that a higher percentage were returned to duty and an actual decrease occurred in the number of men handled for neuropsychiatric causes even at aid station level.

Many of the Army infantry divisions had been in combat almost since D-Day. Division surgeons and line officers, alike, expressed the feeling that many soldiers who had been in combat since the divisions were committed, amounting in some instances to 120 days, had been "worn out" for combat service, even as equipment may be worn out and be of no further service. Throughout the month of October, there was an

increase in psychiatric repeaters and a moderately higher percentage of neuropsychiatric casualties returned to non-combatant service within the divisions.

During October, divisions were rested in whole, or in part, by being drawn completely out of the line or by resting companies within the division area. In addition, a policy was instituted of sending five percent of each command into cities and towns for brief rests, as well as to areas where baths, clean clothing, and entertainment could be provided. A small percentage of each command was sent to PARIS (S-04) for similar purposes.

The neuropsychiatric rate, compared to total non-fatal battle casualties, dropped only five-tenths of one percent below that for the month of September, principally because of the group evacuated during the month as "used up". There were 1,718 neuropsychiatric casualties admitted to division clearing station and Army hospital installations during the month. Of these, 1,444 were returned to duty, the latter figure representing seventy-four percent of all neuropsychiatric casualties for October.

4. Dental

As of 1 October, two of the dental prosthetic teams were attached to evacuation hospitals and one to an armored division. In addition, the dental prosthetic team loaned by the Communications Zone to Third U. S. Army was attached to the 4th Armored Division for necessary prosthetic work. Since experience proved that there was need of prosthetic work as far forward as possible, the two dental prosthetic teams attached to the evacuation hospitals were brought forward and attached to the 5th Infantry Division and to the 80th Infantry Division during the month.

On 19 October, a dental prosthetic team consisting of one dental officer and five enlisted technicians was placed on detached service with this Army by Headquarters European Theater of Operations. This team operated in an English type bus, which was unable to leave hard surface roads because of its low construction. Due to this handicap and in view of a large amount of prosthetic treatment needed in the WANCY (U-81) area, this team was attached to the 12th Evacuation Hospital at that location. Since this particular prosthetic team was larger than the other teams, it was capable of processing approximately ten cases per day, or twice as many as the average prosthetic team.

During the month specific efforts were directed toward enlarging the out-patient services of all hospital dental clinics. The results of these efforts are reflected in the figures shown toward the end of this section of the report.

The success of the prosthetic dental clinic established at the 32d Medical Depot Company during September led, in October, to the formation of a similar clinic at the 33d Medical Depot Company. This was in line with the effort to make prosthetic facilities available to as many forward combat troops as possible.

In addition to the large expansion of prosthetic facilities of this Army, there were a greater number of admissions, sittings, restorations, and other treatments, than had been reported in any like period since the arrival of Third U. S. Army in the United Kingdom. The number of restorations during October was approximately double the number inserted during September, and the number of dentures processed showed a like increase. The increase in the number of restorations could be attributed to the relatively static military situation and to improved working conditions, while the rise in number of prosthetic cases could be attributed to the same cause, as well as to the increased facilities for this work made available during the month.

The consolidated monthly dental report for October, upon which the above comments are based, is shown below:

Strength (Reported)	236554
Admissions Routine	16319
Admissions Emergency	5209
Sittings	28899
Officer Personnel	324
Enlisted Personnel	336
Restorations	19006
Dentures	1939
Gingivitis	1113
Gingivitis Treatment	2164
Stomatitis, Vincent's	479
Stomatitis, Vincent's (Trmt)	2118

Of the reports received, approximately seven percent of battle casualties admitted to Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of October were maxillo-facial injuries. The death rate was approximately one and one-half percent of those admitted with maxillo-facial injuries.

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5. Veterinary

A total of twenty-seven inspections were made of Class I supply points during the month. Food stuffs continued to arrive at the distributing points in excellent condition. The most important problem was the prevention of damage and waste occasioned by inclement weather. This was largely prevented through adequate use of dunnage.

The inspection and issue of the captured German beef in storage at HOMECOURT (U-72), FRANCE, was completed during the month. A total of 22,150 pounds was condemned.

6. Personnel

Early in the month a directive was issued by this headquarters to commanders of evacuation hospitals, the convalescent hospital, and the two medical depot companies, clarifying the uses to which prisoners of war labor were to be put. Their attention was called to the fact that they must be maintained under strict military discipline, that routine inspections of prisoners of war and their quarters were to be conducted and that all like matters involving military discipline should be rigidly enforced. Conversations between American or Allied military personnel and prisoners were forbidden except in line of official duty. Separate messing hours, separate details and all similar countermeasures were to be taken, in order to avoid fraternization of any sort whatsoever.

The numbers of prisoners of war present in hospitals remained approximately the same as during the month of September. However, during October the medical depot companies were authorized to utilize fifty prisoners of war each, for labor details.

During August and September, considerable difficulty had been experienced in the filling of requisitions by this Army for nurses. Since the tables of organization of evacuation and field hospitals had out the number of nurses allotted to a minimum, it was vital that when a nurse was lost to a unit, she be replaced immediately. On 17 October, therefore, ten nurses were assigned by Headquarters European Theater of Operations to Third U. S. Army for use as a pool, to fill present and future requisitions. These ten nurses were assigned for duty by this headquarters to various evacuation and field hospitals. In the event that requisitions for nurses were received, the requisitions could be filled rapidly from this pool. Under the plan, as the available pool of nurses diminished, they were to be reinforced by the further assignment of sufficient nurses to maintain the pool at a constant number of ten nurses.

It was tentatively planned that Third U. S. Army would make available five medical officers weekly for permanent transfer to Communications Zone general hospitals under a rotation policy being projected by the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army. Under the plan, preference would be given by this Army to medical officers over forty years of age who have had the longest service in line units under combat conditions. The Communications Zone would furnish replacements under thirty-five years of age, of company grade and fit for general service.

Shortages which accrued during this month due to battle and non-battle casualties among Medical Department commissioned personnel were as follows:

Medical Corps	11
Medical Administrative Corps	19

Commissioned reinforcements of both categories continued to be difficult to obtain.

In order to aid in the ability to select proper assignments for patients of the Army medical installations being returned to duty, a directive was issued on 1 October, placing in effect the following classifications of duty status of patients being released from hospitals to reinforcement installations:

Class I - Full duty
 Class II - Limited duty, but meeting the minimum requirements of MR 1-9, as amended.
 Class III - Limited duty, but below the minimum standards as prescribed by MR 1-9, as amended.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Due to the relative inactivity of combat troops during October, it was not necessary to move either of the two medical depot companies. The 32d Medical Depot Company remained at VERDUN (U-26) and the 33d Medical Depot Company remained at TOUL (U-61). The 33d Medical Depot Company continued to be minus its Advance Section which had been at-

tached to Ninth U. S. Army in September.

A system was set up whereby one copy of tonnage allocation requisitions was furnished by courier direct to the Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, European Theater of Operations, where immediate action could be initiated. It was felt that such a procedure would alleviate occasional slowness in processing requisitions through normal supply channels.

During the month the following deliveries of supplies were received from the Communications Zone:

2 October	20 1/2 Long Tons
5 October	5 Long Tons
8 October (by air)	3 Long Tons
8 October	10 Long Tons
9 October (by air)	2 Long Tons
10 October	2 1/2 Long Tons
11 October	23 Long Tons
13 October	10 1/2 Long Tons
14 October	37 1/2 Long Tons
15 October	56 1/2 Long Tons
16 October	5 1/2 Long Tons
17 October	2 Long Tons
18 October	7 1/2 Long Tons
19 October	4 1/2 Long Tons
22 October	8 1/2 Long Tons
23 October	6 Long Tons
25 October	11 Long Tons
26 October	5 Long Tons
27 October	11 1/2 Long Tons
30 October	3 Long Tons
Total	239 1/2 Long Tons

In order that complete knowledge of the status of medical supplies would be available, Army medical depot companies were directed to submit semi-monthly physical inventories to the Army Surgeon. These inventories were to show maximum and minimum levels of supply.

During this month, a requisition was placed on the Communications Zone for 100,000 ccs of typhoid vaccine, in order to meet requirements of current directives in the Theater, that all personnel receive booster shots.

Of the scarce items which had existed during the months of August and September, it was learned that brassards, Geneva Convention, and terpin hydrate would be made available in the near future, the latter being an important ingredient of a cough mixture made up by Army pharmacists in connection with the treatment of upper respiratory diseases.

Major efforts were directed toward provision of Army medical units with supplies necessary for winterization. All hospital units were authorized to increase the number of blankets per bed, to five; the requisition covering this increase was to be based on total bed capacity. This authorization was ultimately extended to all medical units throughout the Army. In addition, 10,000 winter pajamas were requisitioned from the Communications Zone. Stoves and extra tentage were also authorized for use by the few hospitals still remaining under canvas and by other medical units. It was necessary to provide 125 additional ward tents in view of the approach of winter.

The 106th and 109th Evacuation Hospitals, still under canvas, were given lumber for experimental purposes to floor one ward tent each. Due to the problem of transporting the flooring, complete equipping of these hospitals was considered impractical at this time.

During October a pharmacy was established at each Army medical depot company for the preparation of pharmaceutical items to be issued to units not authorized the personnel or equipment to prepare these types of medicinal products.

Also during this month, transfusion sets, direct, were made available to Army hospitals on the basis of forty per evacuation hospital and thirty-six per field hospital.

Captured medical supplies during the month included approximately thirty tons captured at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-61) and NANCY (U-61). Equipment deemed of value to the Army was removed and placed in depot stock and the remainder, approximately fifteen tons, was released to the Communications Zone for further use and study.

Due to difficulties which had constantly occurred in medical units, in respect to generators, it was decided during October that procurement, storage, issue, maintenance, and repair of this item would henceforth be accomplished by engineer units rather than by the repair and maintenance sections of the two Army medical depots.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

The month of October was characterized by a moderate amount of rest and rehabilitation of combat units. During this period local contact with the enemy was maintained, but comparatively little hard fighting or sustained progress was made. As a result, battle casualties decreased and preventive medicine problems increased.

The month was characterized by heavy and frequent rains, and unseasonal cold, including snow and sleet. The rains were the heaviest in many years, causing the MOSELLE River and its tributaries to flood the lowlands. This increase in rain and cold made preventive medicine standards difficult to maintain. The subject will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 7, below.

2. Veneral Disease Control

During October, many line troops were given rest periods and the opportunity to visit some of the larger towns. This fact and the fact that many service troops were billeted in or near towns, were important factors in the rise of the venereal disease rate.

Army prophylactic stations were established in ST MIHIEL (U-44), BAR-LE-DUC (U-12), NANCY (U-81), COMMERCY (U-42), and TROYES (Y-27). Stations set up during September in TOUL (U-61) and NEUFCHATEAU (Z-47) continued in operation throughout October. During this month, 9,755 prophylactic treatments were given.

The supply of mechanical prophylactics was adequate. Two units reported an inadequate supply of individual chemical prophylactic kits. An investigation revealed that there were no individual chemical prophylactic kits on hand for issue during the last week of October.

Individual venereal disease contact reports were received in 462 instances during the month. Only in rare cases was the information on these reports adequate for the specific location of female contacts. Those reports having the necessary information were turned over to the Civil Affairs Public Health Officer for necessary action with the local authorities. The reports indicated a very low incidence of venereal disease among troops taking station prophylactics.

As during previous months, letters were sent to all units with venereal disease rate above 100 per 1,000 per annum, calling the attention of the unit commanders to the fact that the control of venereal disease is a command responsibility.

During the four-week period ending 27 October, the average venereal disease rate was 31.65 per 1,000 per annum, based on an average mean strength of 211,409 officers and men.

The incidence of venereal disease during the month of October will be found in Annex XV to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases continued to be relatively few in number with the exception of upper respiratory diseases, which showed a slight increase, and venereal diseases which rose sharply.

During the third and fourth week of the period, approximately fifty percent of Third U. S. Army troops of all echelons had a mild form of bacillary dysentery and/or gastro-enteritis, which was apparently due to consumption of non-potable water. This outbreak was not serious, very few cases requiring hospitalization, and all responded quickly to proper sanitary measures and the use of sulfadiazine therapeutically. The extent of the outbreak and number of cases involved are not accurately reflected in Annex XV to the Medical Section report, inasmuch as over ninety-five percent of the cases were treated on a duty status. One division (the 80th Infantry Division) suffered the most cases of bacillary dysentery, and Third U. S. Army Headquarters was the hardest hit with gastro-enteritis.

There were 568 cases of bacillary dysentery found in the 80th Infantry Division during the period 1 October to 14 October, exclusive. Since the observation was somewhat limited, this does not reflect the total number of cases. The organisms recovered in nineteen percent of the cases (expected recovery, fifteen to twenty-five percent) were of the Shigella paradysentery group. Water consumed by the troops was non-potable upon analysis and showed evidence of fecal contamination.

The outbreak of gastro-enteritis in Headquarters Third U. S. Army represented a percentage incidence of forty-seven and five-tenths percent of the personnel. Investigation of this outbreak by the 7th Medical Laboratory resulted in the conclusion that it was also water borne.

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For a detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases during October, see Annex XV to the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

A total of 27,623 Medical Department reports were processed during the month, representing a substantial increase over the two previous months. As the result of continued efforts along these lines, the quality of these reports and the promptness of their rendition continued to improve.

5. Non-battle Injuries

A slight reduction in the incidence of non-battle injuries occurred during this month, the rate being 101 per 1,000 per annum, based on a weekly average strength of 241,409 officers and men.

Detailed statistics regarding non-battle injuries may be found in Annex XV to the Medical Section report.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The base laboratory continued to be divided into two sections for operational purposes. Section I remained at SAMPIGNY (U-32) and Section II remained at NANCY (U-81) during the entire month. There were 8,526 tests performed during this month compared to the 3,238 during the previous month, an increase of approximately two hundred and sixty-three percent. Since the capacity of an Army medical laboratory is estimated at 6,000 tests per month, this represented an operational load of forty-two percent over its estimated capacity.

The total work is broken down for comparison with the previous month, as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	1815	57.0	5237	61.4
Bacteriology	447	13.8	1360	16.0
Chemistry	91	2.8	369	4.2
Pathology	67	2.0	174	2.0
Hematology	18	0.6	65	0.8
Parasitology	7	0.2	70	0.9
Sub-total	2476	75.4	7275	85.3
MOBILE SECTIONS:				
Veneral Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hosp	592	18.3	1023	12.0
Shook Section				
39th Evac Hosp	170	5.3	228	2.7
Sub-total	726	23.6	1251	14.7
GRAND TOTAL	3238	100.0	8526	100.0

The significant changes are shown in the Veneral Disease Section where the volume of work doubled and in the Serology Section where the work practically tripled over that of the previous month. The increase in work in other sections reflected the relatively static phase of the Third U. S. Army, with consequent demand for more detailed medical service. The three-fold increase in bacteriology, however, was the result of water-borne dysentery, which is seasonal in character due to heavy pollution of streams. It is noteworthy that precipitation in the Army area for the month of October was thirty percent above the average.

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of October is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	13	3276	38.6
Convalescent Hospital	1	2496	29.2
Other Medical Installations	24	731	8.5
Tactical Organizations	142	2023	23.7
Total	180	8526	100.0

7. Sanitation

The comparatively static tactical situation during the month, together with unseasonal weather, accentuated problems in sanitation and environment factors among the troops. Rain and cold weather, with occasional snow and sleet predominated, resulting directly or indirectly in problems affecting the health and well-being of the command. Rain fell in the Army area on twenty-eight of the thirty-one days of the month.

During the month many of the troops moved into buildings. The Army Headquarters itself, moved into buildings in the city of NANCY (U-81). Occasional bedbug infestation of buildings formerly occupied by German

personnel were successfully combatted by proper housekeeping and the use of DDT Powder, as well as a kerosene DDT spray.

Insects other than bedbugs did not constitute a problem. Flies, reported in a few instances during the first part of the month, practically disappeared with the advent of colder weather.

The disposal of wastes, including garbage and refuse, became a nuisance problem in some instances due to the limited number of sites available for this use. It became necessary to establish a few additional approved sites, with constant regulation and maintenance by military personnel, in the vicinity of troop concentrations. Instructions were issued in Administrative Orders of this headquarters forbidding the establishing of dumps within the Army area without the approval of the Army Surgeon.

A continued shortage of overshoes increased the health hazards to the troops from water and mud throughout the area. Efforts of the Army Quartermaster were continued unremittingly and toward the end of the month receipts of this item were increasing, and the shortage was alleviated.

The outbreaks of diarrhea, gastro-enteritis, and/or bacillary dysentery, discussed in a previous section of this report, were concluded to be, to a large extent, water-borne. In this connection, work had been in progress for sometime to change the standard military method of treatment of water because of conditions present in water sources throughout this Theater. Water on the Continent had been found to be more turbid and more contaminated with organic matter than that found under similar conditions in the United States. Efforts were being made to provide a method of water treatment which would include a one-hour period for coagulation, settling and pre-chlorination, followed by filtration at reduced rates in order to insure the availability of water more closely approaching medical standards. The change in procedure recommended was calculated to give greater assurance of the removal of the cysts of endamoeba histolytica where the water source was so contaminated. The results obtained by the new method of treatment led eventually to adoption of this method throughout the entire Theater.

It was felt that the increasing incidence of diarrheal diseases was by no means entirely due to heretofore imperfect methods of water treatment. In view of this fact, a directive was also issued toward the end of October emphasizing again the constant need for water discipline among the troops, to the end that water for drinking and culinary purposes would be obtained only from an engineer water point or distributing point and from no other source, unless adequately treated and approved by competent medical authorities. Disinfection and sterilization of all water containers was also directed.

A summary of analyses of water collected from engineer water points during October continued to show marked improvement in the qualities of the water processed and non-potable samples dropped from twenty-one percent in September to twelve percent in October. With adoption of the recommended new method of operating the engineer water units, further improvement was confidently expected.



Evacuation Hospital Occupying a French Military Hospital in NANCY (U-81).

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

November was a welcome month for Third U. S. Army, and the Medical Department was no exception in this regard. The attitude of this Army has been characterized by restlessness since its first commitment in action, and progress in some direction is its only cure. On 8 November, amid some of the most violent storms and floods that had raged for over three decades in the sector assigned to Third U. S. Army, it began the arduous push from the MOSELLE River to the SAAR and the German Border.

The encirclement of METZ (U-85) by XX Corps on the northern flank and progression by the XII Corps toward the SAAR on the southern flank necessitated river crossings of the MOSELLE and smaller rivers, under flood conditions of an unprecedented nature. Under such conditions troops were often exposed to water, snow and sleet for days at a time. All precautions possible from a tactical standpoint were taken, but in spite of these, Third U. S. Army had its first cases of trench foot in significant numbers. Extraordinary measures taken will be described elsewhere in this report.

The enemy had had time to dig in, and the results are reflected in the fact that battle casualties quadrupled over those of the previous and relatively static month.

The locations of Army medical units, particularly of hospitals, had been established so far forward by the end of October that only five additional moves of evacuation hospitals were required during November to support our advance.

November was a welcome month, but a hard one.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Although the Medical Section continued to operate with a Forward and Rear Echelon in the same manner as during the three previous months, in November these echelons were located within approximately a city block of each other.

On 9 November a new Army Veterinarian joined the Medical Section, having been transferred from Headquarters Ninth U. S. Army. This officer replaced the previous Army Veterinarian who was transferred in August to Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Impetus was given to extensive training in means and methods of prevention of trench foot. This was definitely considered to be a command function, and energetic and primary effort was directed toward proper education of personnel with command responsibilities.

An officer from the Medical Section attended the course on "Information and Education" offered by Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

2. Evacuation

There was no change in the general plan for evacuation. The 66th and 67th Medical Groups continued to evacuate the divisions of XX and XII Corps respectively. Plans were made for evacuation of III Corps by the 65th Medical Group. However, this corps did not commence operations during the month of November. The 65th Medical Group was therefore held in reserve and many of its units reattached to other medical groups during the month. On 30 November the 67th Medical Group was relieved of assignment to Third U. S. Army and its mission was given at that time to the 65th Medical Group.

The 69th Medical Group continued to evacuate the majority of Army hospitals. Advance Section, Communications Zone ambulance companies did not evacuate more than three Army hospitals at any one time during November. They did, however, provide ambulance service at the Army air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) as well as at air and rail medical evacuation holding units operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone in support of the Army area.

Many new medical units, including six medical collecting companies and two clearing companies, had been assigned to Third U. S. Army during the previous month. Two of the collecting companies arrived in the Army area by the end of November.

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The use of facilities for evacuation by road from Army hospitals increased markedly. More than two-thirds of a total of 18,587 patients were evacuated by road, with 5,413 being evacuated by rail and only 504 by air. The change in these statistics was largely a technicality. During November general hospitals were opened in much closer support of the Army, and by the end of the month all medical holding units for purposes of evacuation from Army areas were being operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone units. Since statistics on evacuation from Army are based on the type of conveyance used from the Army installation to the supporting "service" installation, it was only natural that with general hospitals in such close support the majority of the evacuation from the Army area should be by road. As a matter of general information, it must be pointed out that many of the patients included in the total for road evacuation were further transported by rail or air from the Advance Section, Communications Zone medical holding unit in the Army area.

At the beginning of the month of November, the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit operated by the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion remained adjacent to the air field at TOUL (U-61). Air evacuation was actually available at this field on only four days during the month. Repeated efforts were made to increase air evacuation from this field, but the use of the field by tactical fighter units, coupled with many days of poor weather, hampered all such attempts. It was impossible on most days for planes based in the United Kingdom to make a round trip in the few hours of good flying weather. The policy of higher headquarters prohibited the use of Continental based planes and also the evacuation of patients to the PARIS (S-04) area by air. Evacuation of patients to PARIS (S-04) by air was also not feasible because of the fact that the unloading personnel and capacity of the medical holding unit there were not adequate to handle incoming traffic in addition to the large volume of patients being evacuated by air from the general hospitals in the PARIS (S-04) area.

On 21 November, the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) closed. During the remainder of the month, Advance Section, Communications Zone operated the three medical holding units at NANCY (U-81), TOUL (U-61), and ETAIN (U-47). At the latter location both air and rail evacuation were available throughout November. At NANCY (U-81) and at TOUL (U-61) the medical holding units operated by Advance Section, Communications Zone were purely for purposes of rail evacuation.

Minor alterations in evacuation policy were made as needs arose, especially following the offensive begun by Third U. S. Army on 8 November. During the week 8 to 14 November, facilities were seriously taxed. A peak was reached of more than 2,100 patients evacuated from division clearing stations to evacuation hospitals in one day.

Slightly wounded casualties were burdening the hospitals, and arrangements were made to send these patients directly from the ambulance regulating post operated in NANCY (U-81) by the 67th Medical Group to the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U-61) still operated at that time by the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. More than 800 slightly wounded patients were admitted directly to this holding unit without being treated or processed at an evacuation hospital. Wounded prisoner of war casualties were evacuated in the same manner, and in addition, many prisoner of war casualties who had been treated at Army evacuation hospitals were sent from those units direct to the 58th General Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) at COMMERCY (U-42), by-passing the holding unit at TOUL (U-61). Daily quotas were given to each Army hospital for evacuation back to the Communications Zone and to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. This was necessary to regulate the flow from the Army area and to prevent flooding of rear installations.

The locations of evacuation facilities in the Third U. S. Army during the entire month will be found in Annex XVI to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The use of field hospitals remained much the same as in the past but was given greater flexibility through greater use of auxiliary units.

Each corps had available a field hospital platoon for each of its divisions and an additional platoon for corps reserve. The XII Corps employed the 16th and 60th Field Hospitals and the XX Corps employed the 30th and 59th Field Hospitals (less the first platoon). The First Platoon, 59th Field Hospital remained attached to the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, augmenting the medical holding unit operated by that battalion at TOUL (U-61). The facilities of field hospital platoons in support of divisions were augmented by several means. Both corps used some type of holding unit to take over the non-transportable patients from the field hospital platoon when it displaced forward. This prevented undue immobilization of the platoons due to the presence of post-operative patients requiring several days' care before they

would become transportable. The holding units were formed in XII Corps from the two medical collecting companies of the corps medical battalion. The XX Corps personnel were obtained from the two clearing platoons attached to the corps. In each instance the field hospital platoon augmented the holding unit with surgical and nursing personnel according to the number of patients left behind when it moved forward.

In addition to the use of holding units, it was possible for XII Corps to leapfrog field hospital platoons. The fact that an armored division and an infantry division were frequently operating in the same sector made it possible to permit only one field hospital platoon in support of both divisions, holding the remaining platoon in readiness for movement.

Transportation for movement of field hospital platoons was furnished in many instances by Army medical units. In other cases, it was obtained from corps medical units. A few divisions, however, were able to utilize division transportation to effect the movement of the field hospital platoon attached to them. In every case the source of transportation depended on other operational considerations. Most movements were planned at least twenty-four hours in advance, and transportation from some source could then be more easily arranged.

As of 1 November, Third U. S. Army had assigned to it the same evacuation hospitals as on 1 October with the exception that the 110th Evacuation Hospital had been relieved of assignment and transferred to First U. S. Army.

All evacuation hospitals operated in buildings during this month with the exception of the 109th Evacuation Hospital which remained under tents throughout the month. The use of buildings by hospitals was considered essential for the welfare of the patients, and hospitals were given priority in the choice and selection of available buildings, wherever possible.

It was found that the operation of a hospital in buildings was less economical in the use of personnel than when functioning in the field. As previously, the hospitals were augmented by collecting and/or clearing company personnel. The usual attachment to an evacuation hospital consisted of a litter bearer platoon of a medical collecting company and one platoon, where possible, of a clearing company. Quartermaster service troops were attached to seven of the hospitals and civilian help was likewise employed where necessary. Prisoner of war labor was used only in those hospitals which remained located more than twelve miles from organized enemy resistance.

During the period immediately following 8 November surgical backlog as high as 200 were encountered in some hospitals. A total of four surgical and eight shock teams were obtained on temporary duty from the 58th General Hospital in COMMERCY (U-42) and the 90th, 95th, and 100th General Hospitals in BAR-LE-DUC (U-12), through arrangement with the Surgeon, Advance Section, Communications Zone. Likewise, thirty-four additional nurses from Communications Zone hospitals were attached to Army hospitals for a short period of temporary duty. When their parent hospitals opened later in the month these teams and nurses were returned and a group of four surgical and four shock teams and thirty-five nurses was obtained from the 50th General Hospital in COMMERCY (U-42) which was not yet operational.

The peak hospital census was reached on 18 November when all Third U. S. Army hospitals, including the 6th Convalescent Hospital, had a total of 6,752 patients. At that time the hospitals had an expanded capacity of 8,921, although their normal capacity without additional personnel would have been 7,350. One evacuation hospital expanded on 17 November to 857, more than twice its normal capacity.

There was no difficulty encountered in the movement of hospitals since the ten evacuation hospitals occupied only fifteen locations during the month. However, the location of suitable new sites presented some difficulty. In accordance with the policy of using covered accommodations, reconnaissance for new sites was done with a view to finding suitable buildings. In XX Corps zone of advance such buildings were scarce. In XII Corps zone there were a number of towns with barracks which could be converted to accommodate evacuation hospitals. Although hospitals were given priority over other service units, the availability of some buildings was delayed due to occupation by tactical units. On other occasions, a change in plans was necessitated. Where buildings were not immediately available, consideration was given to moving a hospital to the field in order to maintain close support. However, representatives of the Engineer Section who accompanied reconnaissance parties strongly advised against this because of the poor terrain which would require considerable road construction and maintenance. Fortunately, with few delays, buildings were found in all new locations.

Transportation for movement of evacuation hospitals was obtained exclusively from Army medical units. The gradual accumulation of more personnel and more equipment by all hospitals continually raised the

transportation requirements. For example, the 34th Evacuation Hospital which moved from VERDUN (U-26) to METZ (U-85) transported ninety two-and-one-half-ton truckloads and eighty one-ton trailer loads of equipment and personnel. Besides this, some personnel were moved by ambulance. In all, the hospital hauled about four and one-half times the amount that could be carried on its organic vehicles.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained in operation in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U-44) until 27 November. Reconnaissance was made for a new site and a large group of barracks was found at ZIMMING (Q-15). Movement to the new site was not made during the month. Meanwhile, though officially closed, the convalescent hospital continued to receive patients with venereal diseases.

Locations of hospitals during November are shown in Annex XVII to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded personnel by types hospitalized during the month of November is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	13,406
(2) British Army Troops	4
(3) French Army Troops	28
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	0
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	14,099
(7) Civilians	183
(8) Others - (Russians 3, FFI 5)	8

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General Classification of Wounds:

(1) Serious	2,928
(2) Slight	10,478

c. Anatomical Classification of Wounds: (Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns:	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	684	82
(b) Thoracic	1,117	84
(c) Maxillo-facial	712	7
(d) Neurologic		
Head	757	60
Spine	251	3
Nerve	0	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	3,636	9
Lower	4,879	13
(f) Buttocks	583	11
(g) Others	704	11
Sub-total	13,223	228

(2) Burns - all locations	83	1
Total	13,406	327

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds

	4,069	77
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e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	3,702	102
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	7,779	190
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap, or mine)	511	16
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	341	3
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	51	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame-thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	62	1
(7) Others	940	15
Total	13,406	327

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Lao W (HE) Lung and liver	2
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Pen W and FC frontal bone	1
Lac W (HE) blast, jejunum	1
Wounded (HE) cerebral	1
Lac W (HE) ileum and mesentery	1
GSW abdomen	1
GSW transection of liver	2
GSW lung and abdomen	4
W (bomb) traumatic amp lower leg	1
FCC skull	21
Pen W chest and abdomen	6
Pen W neck and spinal cord	1
Pen W shoulder and arm	1
Perf W chest	4
Pen W thigh	1
FC radius, ulna, femur, and fibula	1
FCC femur	1
FCC mandible	1
Traumatic amp both feet	2
GSW groin, traumatic amp leg	1
Perf W forearm, contusion of medial nerves	1
Perf W abdomen	4
Perf W buttocks Hematoma	1
Pen W chest	2
Pen W groin FC femur	1
Pen W abdomen and legs	1
Shell W	3
Shell W	4
GSW	5
Shell W	4
Shell W	1
Shell W	1
Shell W	1
Pen W GSW chest	4
Pen W (HE) chest	9
Perf W (HE) abdomen	12
Perf W (HE) head	1
Perf W (HE) buttocks	4
Pen GSW abdomen	1
Pen GSW abdomen	6
Perf GSW chest	4
Pen W (mortar) chest	5
Perf W (HE) thigh, rupture of bladder	1
DOA electrical shock	1
GSW chest	2
Pen W both thighs	1
Pen W (HE) thigh traumatic amp hand	1
Pen W GSW leg	1
Pen W (HE) arm and face	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen	2
Pen W (HE) buttocks	2
Traumatic amp (mine) both feet	1
Pen W (HE) buttocks	1
Pen W GSW abdomen	3
Pen W (HE) chest and buttocks	1
FCC GSW left radius	1
Pen W (shell) skull	3
GSW skull	2
FCC (shell) left tibia	1
Pen W (shell) scrotum	1
Pen W (shell) skull	2
Pen W GSW thigh	1
Pen W (shell) chest	3
Pen W (shell) chest	2
Pen W (shell) left leg	1
Pen W (shell) leg	3
FCC (shell) skull	3
GSW neck	1
Lac W (shell) neck	1
Pen GSW left thigh	1
FCC cervical spine	1
Perf GSW skull	1
DOA	10
Traumatic amp leg	1
FCC tibia and fibula	2
Pen W right cheek	1
Perf W shoulder, arm, MW chest	1
FCC forearm and thigh	1
HE (shell) traumatic amp left leg and left arm at wrist	1
HE (mine) amp traum foot, left	1

Pen W wrist and arm left	Pulmonary edema	1
HE (art) Pen W epigastrium with viscous damage, severe cont hip, right - mod severe	Shook - severe	1
GSW (rifle) Pen W abdomen, sv	Shook - severe	1
HE (mortar) BW back with FC vertebrae and abdomen Pen		1
HE (Type ?) FC tibia, left and scapula	Biliary peritonitis from large perf of liver	1
GSW (MG) Pen W chest rt severe		1
GSW (Type ?) Pen W chest, sv		1
HE (Mortar) MWs face & Pen W arm, rt, FC skull, Pen W brain, thorax	Pulmonary edema	1
HE (shell frag) Pen W left flank involving spinal cord at level T4	Shook and hemorrhage	1
HE (Mortar) Perf W chest with fracture ribs rt side, fracture sternum	Respiratory failure	1
HE (Mortar) Pen W abdomen sv		1
Pen W thigh, left - sv LMs thigh left and right	Generalized peritonitis	1
Burns (enemy mine) hands, face, arms and legs	Respiratory failure	1
GSW (Rifle) Perf W rt thigh with perf femoral, artery	Massive hemorrhage	1
GSW (MG) perf W chest, lt, sv Perf W kidney, lwr lobe left lung & diaphragm	Pneumothorax	1
HE (Mortar) Pen W left thorax, posterior	Shook - severe	1
GSW (rifle) FC skull - severe		1
WIA (Type ?) Pen W left hip w/extra peritoneal Perf rectum and bladder	Diffuse peritonitis	1
HE (Type ?) cerebral conc. sv LW chin, Pen W chest, rt	Shook - severe	1
HE SFW FCC Skull - severe		1
HE (Shrap) Puno W abdomen - sv left arm KIA		1
HE (SFW) Pen W right chest and abdomen		1
GSW Perf left costal margin	Hemorrhage	1
Perf W shell head	Shook	1
Pen W shell head	Pulmonary edema	2
Pen W shell right arm, FCC	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell, chest	Pulmonary edema	3
GSW, Pen right leg, FCC	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, both thighs	Secondary shock	1
Pen W, shell, left thigh and ischium, FS both	Post-operative atelectasis	1
Pen W, shell abdomen	Irreversible shock	2
Pen W, shell buttocks	Irreversible shock	2
GSW, Pen right leg, FC	Secondary shock	1
GSW, Pen chest	Secondary shock	1
Pen W, shell, chest	Hemothorax	1
Pen W, shell, left thigh	Irreversible shock	1
GSW, Pen, head	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, head	Respiratory failure	3
Pen W, shell, left leg	Secondary shock	1
GSW, Pen abdomen	Aspiration pneumonia	1
Pen W, shell, right thigh	Renal failure	1
Pen W, shell, both legs, FCC	Renal failure	1
Pen W, shell, right arm, FCC	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, right thigh, FCC	Pulmonary edema	1
FC, base of skull	Intracranial hemorrhage	1
Traumatic amputation, foot right	Shook, hemorrhage, pulmonary edema	2
FCC, skull	DOA	1
FCC, skull	Severe brain injury	1
FCC, depressed walls of right sinus	Shook, hemorrhage	1
Traumatic amp, right & left foot	Shook, toxemia	1
Traumatic amp, left foot and right hand	Shook	1
Electric shock	DOA	1
FCC, skull	Shook	1
Perf W, chest	Shook, internal hemorrhage	1
Perf W, abdominal	Generalized peritonitis	1
Perf W, buttock, left and right	Shook	1
Pen W fronto-parietal area	Shook	1
Pen W parieto-occipital region	Shook	1
FCC skull with brain evisceration	Shook	2
Perf W FCC right thigh	Shook	1
Pen W lumbar region	Shook	1

Pen W chest, wrist and arm	Shook	1
MW arm, eye and cerebral injury	Shook	1
MW chest and abdomen	Shook	1
Pen GSW chest	Shook	8
Perf W (mine) chest	Shook	1
Pen GSW head	Shook	3
Pen W (HE) chest	Shook	7
Pen GSW abdomen	Shook	6
Perf W (HE) abdomen	Pneumonia	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen	Shook	1
Traumatic amp left arm	Shook	1
Perf W lunge	Respiratory failure	1
Pen GSW chest	Shook	3
MW (HE) head	Pulmonary embolus	1
Pen W (HE) spine	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (HE) pelvis	Pulmonary embolism	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	306
(2) Stored blood	1298
(3) Dry plasma	5710
(4) Other blood substitutes - Saline 3/7	610
(Do not include crystalloids) Dextrose 5%	283

h. Number of units of penicillin administered: 4,533,620,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	94
(2) Lower extremity	160

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	48
(2) Other	17

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	11206
(2) Other	1085

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

The 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, less certain elements, continued to be held in reserve for use in the event of the employment of chemical warfare by the enemy.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

With the resumption of the offensive beginning on 8 November there was an expected increase in total battle casualties. The number increased from 3,584 in October to 13,406 in November. However, in addition to this total for November, which involves actual wounds and/or burns, there were during the month 4,587 cases of trench foot, almost all of whom were evacuated to the Communications Zone.

The percent of deaths to total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations during this month was one percent, representing a very slight increase over the previous month.

2. Surgery

Of the 13,406 battle casualties admitted during the month the number of serious injuries totalled 2,928 and slightly injured 10,478 men.

The addition of 4,587 cases of trench foot to the total number of battle casualties did not reflect an accurate total of all battle casualties inasmuch as many cases with battle wounds developed this complication because of the cold and rain and the fact that because of these conditions it was at times difficult to evacuate casualties early from the battlefield. With a campaign to stress the command responsibility in the proper care of the feet and the prevention of trench foot, the number of casualties from this source was reduced. It was found in regard to trench foot that surgical measures were not of any great value and paravertebral block was found to be of little use in those cases where the condition was well established.

In some sections of the front, large mine fields were encountered and this fact was reflected in an increase in injuries to the lower extremities, with a higher number of amputations being necessary than in any previous like period. There were 160 amputations of the lower extremities required as against forty-six during the previous month.

A higher incidence of gas gangrene also occurred, there being six

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teen cases in October and forty-eight in November. The majority of such cases were present in wounds of the extremities, and the increase was undoubtedly a result of the combination of factors involving unfavorable weather and consequent slower evacuation.

3. Neuropsychiatry

The incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties in Third U. S. Army during the month of November was influenced by several factors. This Army, which had swept across France and engaged in prolonged and static warfare along the MOSELLE River and before METZ (U-85), now began the slow and arduous push from the MOSELLE River to the SAAR and the German border. The weather had become extremely cold with sleet, snow, and ice. Water crossings were necessary, and the Third U. S. Army had been unable to obtain enough overshoes to equip it completely. Many divisions had been in combat since D-Day; others since the Third U. S. Army became operational on 1 August 1944. Each division had instituted rest areas at the battalion bivouac areas, regimental train areas, or the division rear, to which tired men were sent for one to three days to rest and reequip themselves. A Third U. S. Army rest center in NANCY (U-81) was functioning in a more than adequate manner for units of the XII Corps. Soldiers of the line, divisional officers, and nurses were being sent for three-day rest periods in PARIS (S-04) at the rate of 500 per month from the Army. Every effort was being made from the standpoint of command to combat cold and fatigue. The combat soldier was supplied with one hot meal or some hot elements with one meal daily wherever humanly possible, which resulted in hot foods being brought to his position after dark. The 10th Armored Division was placed in the line ready for its first combat. The entire 90th and all or a part of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were placed in reserve between 1 November and 9 November.

On 8 November and 9 November, Third U. S. Army attacked on a front extending from STERC (Q-09) to a point half-way between NANCY (U-81) and CHARLES (Z-97). Enemy opposition was fierce along the entire line, and particularly in the never-conquered city of METZ (U-85). Casualty rates pyramided as of 8 November, and by the end of the month of November, the total non-fatal casualties (including diseases) amounted to 36,492, which was an all-time monthly high for this Army.

The incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties compared to the total non-fatal casualties have been for four months as follows:

August	7.4	Percent
September	10.5	"
October	10.3	"
November	9.1	"

The influx of more than 36,000 patients in a period of thirty days resulted in shorter periods of care at aid stations, clearing stations, evacuation hospitals, and the convalescent hospital. Of the 3,338 neuropsychiatric casualties, 911 were returned to duty at division clearing station level, this being somewhat fewer than were returned from the same level in previous months. This was due to the fact that clearing companies were highly mobile, frequently moved, and fewer patients could be held at that level. Evacuation hospitals each received from 1,100 to 5,900 patients, and the convalescent hospital was, in many instances, filled to capacity. As a result, only 2,220, or sixty-six and five-tenths percent of the neuropsychiatric casualties were returned to duty. The divisions sustained from 2,000 to 4,800 non-fatal casualties; however, the neuropsychiatric rate was lower than it had been since August.

4. Dental

The three prosthetic dental teams assigned to the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group, as well as an additional prosthetic team loaned to this Army by the Communications Zone in October, were used throughout November in division areas. During this month it was also demonstrated that the mobility of these trucks was of a high order and that little working time was lost due to movements of division units.

The English bus-type dental laboratory truck placed on detached service in October with this Army continued to work at the location of the 12th Evacuation Hospital in NANCY (U-81).

The dental clinic previously established at the 6th Convalescent Hospital now consisted of a total of seven dental officers, together with appropriate enlisted assistants. Although the clinic was closed for an entire week, it processed 156 prosthetic cases, and 161 restorations were inserted during the month of November, in addition to routine examinations and other treatments.

During the first week of the month an investigation was made into a new anti-concussion device being made for personnel in a 155-mm field artillery gun battalion by a dental officer of that unit. Approximately thirty of these devices had been made and were being tried under

actual firing conditions. Praise for them was unanimous by all individuals who used them. The devices were being made of dental-type acrylic, and through a process of successive molds with a dental material were constructed to fit the individual ear.

Facilities were provided in the 32d Medical Depot Company to complete these devices for the entire field artillery battalion in order that a more comprehensive survey could be made concerning the results that accrued. In order to economize on the time of the men assigned to the field artillery battalion the impressions of the ears were made in the battalion area, were processed in the medical depot company laboratory, and the devices were then brought back to the battalion where they were individually fitted. It was found that when the men were made readily available in the battalion area it was possible for the dental officer and his two assistants to take impressions of the ears of approximately 100 men in one day. Laboratory work necessary for processing that many devices required approximately five days. Thus it was possible to complete anti-concussion devices for 100 men in six to seven days, or approximately two weeks for a battalion.

Dental clinics at the two medical depot companies operated for approximately three weeks during the month. One clinic treated ninety-five prosthetic cases, and the other clinic 107 prosthetic cases, completing the laboratory work on sixty-two additional cases.

Approximately five and three-tenths percent of battle casualty admissions to hospitals during the month were maxillo-facial injuries, there being a total of 731 such cases. Among these cases there were seven deaths, or ninety-eight one-hundredths of one percent of the maxillo-facial cases admitted.

Following is a chart showing the number of dental treatments accomplished throughout the Army during the month of November:

Strength Reported	236117
Admissions Routine	11268
Admissions Emergency	2802
Sitings	22091
Officer Personnel	302
Enlisted Personnel	321
Restorations	12562
Dentures	1479
Gingivitis	806
Gingivitis Treatment	1052
Stomatitis, Vincent's	374
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatment	716

5. Veterinary

Inspections were made of forty-four Class I supply points, five division ration breakdown areas, five messes and two quartermaster bakeries during November. It was again noted that food usually arrived at the railroad in good condition and that major efforts must be toward the prevention of waste and deterioration after arrival. Inclement weather and the sanitary conditions which result, continued to be the major problem. Dunnage and paulins were the chief means employed to avoid damage.

Subsequent to the fall of METZ (U-85), approximately 100 tons of carcass fresh beef and twenty tons of carcass fresh pork were discovered frozen in the city abattoir which belonged to the civilians. German garrison stores consisted of canned beef, canned corned beef, cheese and sardines. This supply was issued to Third U. S. Army troops after being carefully inspected. In addition to meat, there was flour, canned plums and dehydrated vegetables.

6. Personnel

In response to a letter from the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, recommendations were made to the Chief of Staff, through the AC of S, G-1, this headquarters, regarding a proposed policy for rotation of Medical Department officers between Communications Zone installations and Army installations. It was recommended that five Medical Department officers weekly be recommended for permanent rotation from this Army based on the age of the officer, his length of time in his parent unit, length of service in combat, professional and military qualifications. These officers were to be replaced by the Communications Zone with officers under thirty-five years of age and fit for general military service. Emphasis was to be placed on the permanent rotation of medical officers from combat units such as divisions. It was further recommended that two medical officers from each 400-bed evacuation hospital, three from the 750-bed evacuation hospital, and six from the auxiliary surgical group be made available for temporary rotation to Communications Zone hospitals for a sixty-day period only; these officers to be replaced temporarily by medical officers of like professional qualifications during each sixty-day period. The above recommendations were incorporated later in the

month in an indorsement to the letter from the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

Due to a high rate of casualties in this Army as a result of its offensive commenced on 8 November, it was necessary to secure the additional surgical and shock teams as well as nurses on temporary duty from general hospitals, mentioned previously in this report.

Shortages in Medical Corps officers increased from eleven during the previous month to seventeen by the end of November. Shortages also continued to exist in Medical Administrative Corps officers, in which there was a shortage of twenty-one at the conclusion of the month. Since the establishment of a pool of ten nurses assigned to this Army in October, to be kept at a constant level, tables of organization shortages did not exist in the Army Nurse Corps. However, as will be noted from the above, tables of organization no longer provide adequate nursing personnel during a period of extended military operation.

During this month a directive was issued to the effect that all medical units would turn back all prisoners of war being used as labor to Advance Section, Communications Zone prisoner of war inclosures prior to entering Germany. Several hospitals had already turned in prisoners of war due to the fact that they were operating close to the front lines and to the German border. Two quartermaster service companies were placed at the disposal of the Army Surgeon in lieu of prisoner of war labor and their use in hospitals was projected during this month.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Movements of the Army medical depot companies were again at a minimum. On 7 November Advance Section Number 1 of the 32d Medical Depot Company opened in METZ (U-79) to support more closely the troops of XX Corps. No other movements of medical depots occurred.

Delivery of medical supplies by Communications Zone had fallen off shortly after the middle of October. On 10 November, a survey was made and it was discovered that of 106 tons requisitioned since 15 October only twenty-two and one-half tons had been received. This was resulting in a critically short supply of many back-ordered items. During the month a total of 238 long tons of medical supplies was actually delivered to Army medical depots. However, the majority of these supplies was secured by sending Army transportation to the Communications Zone depots which involved long trips by forward transportation.

In the middle of the month, 250,000 ccs of typhus vaccine were secured from Communications Zone medical depots to be used in typhus inoculations throughout Third U. S. Army.

Among other unusual items which were procured were 215 sets of litter brackets to be used in making litter attachments on jeeps within Third U. S. Army divisions. These brackets were distributed to medical detachments of forward elements of divisions, to engineer battalions, and to other similar units. The Army Engineer made available 300 rolls of captured "Hessian" matting and these were placed in stock at the 33d Medical Depot Company for issue to hospitals and air/rail medical evacuation holding units for use as flooring. Action was also initiated during this month to increase the allowance of pajama suits, winter, to 1,000 per evacuation hospital. Also, 4,400 copper sulfate pads were made available to each division. These were issued to individual soldiers for their protection against white phosphorous burns.

Disproportionate exchanges of blankets were being effected at air evacuation holding units. Steps were taken during the last week of November to remedy this situation and a proper method of exchange was finally consummated early in the following month through the timely cooperation of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

During the month a new plan for delivery of blood to hospitals was instituted. Under this plan, two blood trucks serviced each corps zone daily, one of these carrying blood for evacuation hospitals only, and one for field hospital platoons only. The truck destined for field hospital platoons would report to the corps medical battalion, a representative of which would accompany and guide the truck to its destination. In addition, each corps medical battalion was to keep on hand thirty or forty pints of blood and several hundred units of penicillin. Necessary refrigerators for this purpose were authorized to the corps medical battalions.

A small quantity of captured medical supplies was found in two military hospitals and the police hospital in METZ (U-85) toward the close of the month. A small percentage of this was placed in stock in Army medical depots and the rest released to Civil Affairs and Advance Section, Communications Zone. A representative of the Medical Intelli-

SUCCESSIVE STAGES IN PROCESSING ANTI-CONCUSSION DEVICES



1. Injection of Impression Material into Ear.




2. Individual Ear Impressions Prepared for "Flasking".



3. "Flasking" Individual Impressions.



4. Flask being Placed in Processing Bath.



5. Completed Acrylic Anti-concussion Devices.



6. Insertion of Anti-concussion Device into Ear.

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gence Branch, Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations visited this office to investigate new items of captured medical materiel. Most important of the items studied were a new type gas casualty kit, several types of roach and insecticide powder, and some anti-frostbite ointment. Samples of these items were shipped to the Medical Equipment Laboratory, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for further investigation.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

During this month there was heavy fighting throughout the Third U. S. Army area, characterized by difficult river crossings over the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers and the assault of METZ (U-85). Heavy and frequent rains continued, with temperatures ranging from the low thirties to the low forties. The tactical situation and frequent troop movements throughout the period made preventive medicine standards difficult to maintain.

2. Venereal Disease Control

The venereal disease rate remained high for the first two weeks of November. However, with the onset of heavy fighting beginning on 8 November a moderate decrease in the incidence of venereal disease was noticeable. During the period the weekly rates varied between 31.61 and 18.64 per 1,000 per annum. The average for the period was 24.67 per 1,000 per annum, based on an average mean strength of 240,288 officers and men.

Prophylactic stations were established in TOUL (U-61), ST NICHOLAS (U-90), and ESCH (P-70). During the month 13,830 prophylactic treatments were given in Army operated prophylactic stations. The supply of mechanical and individual chemical prophylactic units was adequate.

Venereal disease contact reports were received on 512 individuals. The reports showed an increase in the number of cases of syphilis. Those reports which contained the necessary information for identification of the contact were turned over to Civil Affairs and the Provost Marshal for necessary action.

The practice of sending letters to commanders of units with rates above 100 per 1,000 per annum was continued.

For a weekly breakdown of figures showing the incidence of venereal disease during the month of November see Annex XVIII to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases continued to constitute a minor problem. Upper respiratory infections showed a sharp seasonal increase.

Diarrheal diseases rose moderately during the fourth and fifth weeks of the period. No single factor was responsible and there was no clinical or bacteriological evidence of a new disease entity such as "virus diarrhea" as was reported by the First and Ninth U. S. Armies. Investigations (chemical and laboratory) revealed that most of the cases were of bacillary origin or due to food poisoning. It was felt that lowered sanitation standards under difficult conditions of active combat and consumption of unauthorized food, drink and water were responsible for the increase. No specific outbreaks occurred, the cases being uniformly spread throughout Third U. S. Army.

A detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases in November will be found in Annex XVIII of the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

The total number of records and reports processed during the month reached a new high of 44,450. Their quality and promptness of rendition continued to improve.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The rate in this category increased to 14.5 per 1,000 per annum, based on a weekly average of 240,288 officers and men. Exclusive of the above figures, however, there also occurred a tremendous increase in the number of trench foot cases. From 8 November to the end of the month trench foot constituted a serious and major problem to this Army. Due to the necessity for constant exposure of the men's feet to water and cold, a sharp increase in this type of casualty occurred.

In this connection it was estimated that ninety-five percent of all men developing trench foot would probably be of no further value for combat during, at least, the winter months. However, the experience

of this Army with trench foot was not extensive enough to be absolutely certain on this point.

A policy was established of evacuating patients with trench foot to the Communications Zone for further treatment and evaluation.

All possible efforts were made toward prevention of trench foot inasmuch as specific treatment has not yet been developed for this condition. All echelons of command were made fully cognizant of their responsibilities in this respect.

Daily statistics showing the incidence of trench foot as revealed by total admissions to division clearing stations is shown below:

DATE	CASES
8 November	11
9 November	21
10 November	129
11 November	387
12 November	501
13 November	432
14 November	424
15 November	433
16 November	431
17 November	126
18 November	193
19 November	104
20 November	78
21 November	92
22 November	98
23 November	199
24 November	225
25 November	81
26 November	159
27 November	152
28 November	70
29 November	76
30 November	165
Total	4587

The downward trend of these statistics after the peak had been reached reflects the beneficial results of instruction and education toward prevention and superhuman efforts of all concerned to keep the men supplied with dry socks and arctics.

Differences between the figures given above and those shown in Annex XVIII to the Medical Section report are due to the fact that the latter are based on reports from the respective organizations in which the cases occurred. Later changes in diagnoses accounts for the fact that the above figures reflect a greater number of cases, being based on reports from evacuation agencies.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory continued to operate throughout the month in two sections as follows:

Section I - SAMPIGNY (U-32)
Section II - NANCY (U-81)

There were 8,177 tests performed during the month, or 349 less than the tests performed in October. This represented only a five percent drop from the peak load and was surprisingly small considering the mobile state of the tactical situation. The total remained well over the estimated capacity of an Army Medical Laboratory of 6,000 tests per month.

The above total of tests, by section performing them is broken down below:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	5272	64.4
Bacteriology	1110	13.6
Chemistry	467	5.7
Pathology	169	2.1
Hematology	53	0.7
Parasitology	105	1.3
Sub-total	7176	87.8
<u>MOBILE SECTIONS:</u>		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hosp)	746	9.1
Shock Section (60th Field Hosp)	255	3.1
Sub-total	1001	12.2
GRAND TOTAL	8177	100.0

The drop largely occurred in the mobile venereal disease section due to the temporary closing of the 6th Convalescent Hospital. Also the elimination in the laboratory itself of unnecessary water examinations. There was also a drop in the number of stool samples submitted.

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of November is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	11	2259	27.6
Convalescent Hospital	1	2519	30.8
Other Medical Installations	23	790	9.7
Tactical Organizations	172	2609	31.9
TOTAL	207	8177	100.0

7. Sanitation

The cumulative effect of continuous rains during the month, with abnormal precipitation during the latter phase of this period, resulted in aggravated mud conditions and record floods in practically all of the streams. These conditions of the terrain, coupled with heavy type fighting and low temperatures throughout the Army area, contributed to the high incidence of upper respiratory infections and trench foot discussed above.

Problems from insects and rodents were at a minimum during the month. Only a few instances of bedbug infestation were encountered and prompt correction was effected through the use of DDT preparations.

Garbage and refuse disposal presented few problems. Authorized military dumps were established in areas having a concentration of troops.

A shortage of overshoes which was acute during the month of October was corrected during November to a great extent.

During the month there were sporadic cases of diarrhea, but a definite total reduction over the previous month. In no instance could the cases be proven attributable to a specific cause. In two instances frozen fowl was suspected, and in one instance discrepancies in water discipline and mess sanitation were indicated. Steps were taken in every instance to reemphasize sanitation in all its phases. The summary of analyses of water samples from engineer water points showed further gratifying improvement in the potability of the water produced. Non-potable samples dropped from twelve percent in October to six percent of those examined in November. General applications of the modified method of operating water purification units projected in October was in actual effect in Army, Corps and Division engineer units during November.

Representatives of the Office of the Chief Surgeon and the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, visited the area to investigate the modified water treatment policy in effect throughout Third U. S. Army. The methods employed were favorably considered for adoption throughout the European Theater of Operations.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The progression of the Third U. S. Army in an easterly direction up to and across the German Border and constant preparation for a major attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE led to a consequent disposition of medical units to support these operations. Relentless efforts in regard to the problem of cold injuries (trench foot and frostbite) on the part of the respective commands produced definite results and decreases in this type of injury.

In December, for the first time, Third U. S. Army overran German enclosures which contained a mixture of Allied prisoners of war and Allied displaced personnel. The medical care of these abandoned personnel who were sick or wounded became the responsibility of the Medical Department. Since there was a high percentage of morbidity among them, the Medical Department assumed responsibility for a large proportion.

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Late in the month, the movement of medical units to the north, in order to support the attack of the Third U. S. Army on the southern flank of the ARDENNES bulge, was achieved with a speed as incredible as the shift of the combat elements involved.

The details of all of the above circumstances will be found below in this chapter.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

There was no change in the physical organizational setup of the Medical Section during this month.

Shortly after the breakthrough of the Germans in the ARDENNES area, an officer from this section was placed on temporary duty with Headquarters III Corps, and one with Headquarters VIII Corps for liaison purposes. This action was necessitated by the fact that operations were somewhat nebulous during the first few days, and were also initially being carried on at a considerable distance from the location of this headquarters.

Four enlisted men from the Medical Section were furnished for training as riflemen. These men were not replaced in the section.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

One officer, each, from the 65th and 66th Medical Groups attended the course on "Information and Education" offered by Headquarters European Theater of Operations at Cite Universitaire, PARIS (S-04). Requests were also submitted during the month to the AC of S, G-3 for allotment to medical units of a proportionate share of future quotas for attendance at other courses to be held at the Army Information-Education Staff School.

Officers and nurses of the 65th Field Hospital were placed on temporary duty with various hospitals for orientation purposes. The 65th Medical Group was given the responsibility of training this unit.

2. Evacuation

When the III Corps became operational on 6 December with the mission of mopping up in METZ (U-85), the 66th Medical Group assumed the responsibility for medical evacuation of this corps, in addition to its responsibility for evacuation of XX Corps. This was possible due to the fact that the latter corps was assigned a front on the SAAR River, stretching roughly from SAARBURG (L-11) to SAARBRUCKEN (Q-47), although the former had not yet been approached closely. The sector surrounding METZ (U-85) covered by III Corps was geographically in the rear of this area; and the 66th Medical Group, which was located in METZ (U-85), was in an admirable position to combine evacuation of both corps. By 15 December, the reduction of all isolated forts at METZ (U-85) had been completed, and III Corps was assigned a sector on the SAAR River front to the south of XX Corps, and responsibility for its evacuation was at that time taken over by the 65th Medical Group, located at MERHANGE (Q-23). A corps medical battalion had been attached to III Corps prior to its commencement of operations, consisting of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 182d Medical Battalion, 414th Medical Collecting Company, and the 606th Clearing Company. This battalion was later augmented by the attachment of the 467th Medical Collecting Company. On 22 December, the 606th Clearing Company was relieved by the 624th Clearing Company.

Exciting days prevailed for this Army beginning 20 December, when it was given the mission of bringing pressure on the southern flank of the German bulge in the ARDENNES area to crush the German counter-offensive. The III Corps moved north to the vicinity of ARLON (P-62), and became operational in the area north of that point on 20 December. XII Corps followed two days later, moving to the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). The 65th Medical Group continued to support both of these corps during the movement of the corps and their units, establishing its own headquarters at ESCH (P-70).

VIII Corps was established west of III Corps, and was being evacuated by the 64th Medical Group. This corps was assigned to Third U. S. Army, effective 21 December. The 64th Medical Group was not actually assigned by order until 26 December, but continued to evacuate this corps, except that it was relieved of the responsibility of evacuating the evacuation hospitals in its area. The latter function was assumed by the 69th Medical Group, which moved north to ESCH (P-70). Close cooperation between the 64th and 65th Medical Groups during this period resulted in smooth evacuation in situations where

the division of responsibility was not always clear.

Units attached to the 64th Medical Group, in support of VIII Corps, included the following:

Hq & Hq Det, 170th Med Bn	595th Amb Co, Mtr
Hq & Hq Det, 240th Med Bn	623d Clearing Company
580th Amb Co, Mtr	42d Field Hospital
581st Amb Co, Mtr	107th Evac Hosp (SM)
590th Amb Co, Mtr	110th Evac Hosp (SM)

An unusual problem developed as a result of the isolation at BASTOGNE (P-55) of the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. Evacuation of casualties from these forces was not possible for a period of about six days; and, as a result of the capture of the medical company of the 101st Airborne Division, the units isolated were supported essentially by first echelon medical personnel, only. Intensive liaison activity by representatives of the Army Surgeon and of the III and VIII Corps Surgeons, under particularly difficult conditions, early established the fact that approximately 1,000 casualties were present in BASTOGNE (P-55), who would require third echelon medical care when the breakthrough to that town was completed. As an initial step, medical supplies were dropped to the besieged forces on 23, 24, and 25 December. Meanwhile, alternate plans were developed for the provision of third echelon medical care, as well as evacuation in the event that the breakthrough by the 14th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division occurred on any given day. The former aspect will be discussed below under the heading, "Surgery". The breakthrough actually occurred on 26 December, and on the following day, 652 of the 1,150 casualties in the town were evacuated by units of the 64th Medical Group.

To support the 101st Airborne Division and its attached units, a provisional medical battalion was formed. It included the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 436th Medical Battalion, the 495th Medical Collecting Company, and Company "A", 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. These units were gathered from their various and distant locations and dispatched to the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P-55) on 27 December. The first two units mentioned were relieved of this attachment on 31 December, and Company "A" of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion continued its mission of operating a clearing company for the relieved forces until transfer of that division, early in January, to the Seventh U. S. Army.

To regulate casualty flow to hospitals supporting VIII, III, and XII Corps, the 64th Medical Group established an ambulance regulating post at VIRTON (P-41), and the 65th Medical Group established similar posts at ARLON (P-61) and at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81).

The 69th Medical Group, assisted by ambulance companies of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, continued its mission of evacuating Army hospitals. Advance Section, Communications Zone, gradually assumed responsibility for evacuation of a total of five evacuation hospitals, as well as the provisional hospital operated by the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion at THIONVILLE (U-88). In addition, Advance Section, Communications Zone, furnished ambulance service to all medical holding units supporting this Army.

The movement of Army medical troops to the southern flank of the bulge constituted a transportation achievement comparable to that of the mass movement of armor and infantry units to the same point. Movement was accomplished by infiltration, and generous credit is due to the respective Sections of G-3 and G-4 of this headquarters, without whose cooperation the achievement would not have been attained.

Four new medical collecting companies (the 413th, 460th, 467th, and 487th) and two new clearing companies (the 606th and 624th) arrived in the Army area during the month. At the end of this period, there were still four medical collecting companies and one clearing company assigned by order to Third U. S. Army which had not yet arrived.

On 26 December, the 606th Clearing Company was attached to the 64th Medical Group, which had its headquarters at SEDAN (P-25). The platoons of this clearing company were subsequently employed to operate two Army clearing stations west of the MEUSE River in support of tactical units, which included the 17th Airborne Division then protecting that river. This constituted the first orthodox use of an Army clearing company since Third U. S. Army became operational. Patients from these clearing platoons were evacuated directly to the 178th General Hospital (a Communications Zone unit) located at REIMS (V-05). Prior to the assignment of this mission to the 606th Clearing Company, the evacuation of the 17th Airborne Division and the 11th Armored Division in this area had been provided by two provisional clearing companies formed from a Communications Zone hospital located in REIMS (V-05).

The Army air/rail medical evacuation holding unit, operated by

the 64th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, was located throughout the month at THIONVILLE (U-88). The unit opened at this location on 6 December, and two days later railroad facilities, as well as air evacuation, became available at that point. During the month, 1,741 patients were evacuated from this unit by air. This represented a minority of those evacuated, but was a considerable increase over the month of November. It was also accomplished during a period marked by snows and murky weather. When the axis of the Army turned north, the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit was still in an excellent position to support the hospitals.

Advance Section, Communications Zone continued to operate an air/rail evacuation holding unit at ETAIN (U-47) and NANCY (U-81). The latter unit, however, had only rail evacuation facilities available. An additional field hospital of Advance Section, Communications Zone moved to NANCY (U-81) early in December, and operated an auxiliary rail evacuation holding unit until the end of the month when it was closed and prepared for movement to the north.

A total of 24,092 patients were evacuated from Third U. S. Army during the month. In addition to the 1,741 evacuated by air, 12,886 were evacuated by road to Advance Section, Communications Zone medical holding units, or to general hospitals, and 9,465 were evacuated by rail.

The locations of evacuation facilities throughout the month are shown in Annex XIX to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The attachment of field hospitals and their platoons remained rather stable until after 15 December. The 65th Field Hospital arrived in the Army area early in the month, and was attached to the 65th Medical Group for orientation purposes.

The mass movement of divisions which occurred after the third week of the month resulted in considerable changes in the attachment of field hospital platoons. Some of the platoons accompanied the divisions to which they were attached on all movements, but others remained behind to support new divisions. One platoon, the 3d Platoon of the 60th Field Hospital, completed the following odyssey of attachments during December: XII Corps, III Corps, XX Corps, XII Corps and III Corps. At the end of the month, the following attachments of field hospitals were in effect:

III Corps	XII Corps	IX Corps
16th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	
	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	
64th Medical Group	65th Medical Group	69th Medical Group
1st Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	65th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp		
1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp		

The 42d Field Hospital was assigned to Third U. S. Army concurrently with the assignment of VIII Corps, and its various units. It had been attached to the 64th Medical Group, and was supporting the divisions of VIII Corps at the time of the German counteroffensive. The first platoon was in support of the 28th Infantry Division at WILTZ (P-75) with twenty-two non-transportable patients on hand. On 18 December, trucks were obtained and the bulk of the equipment and personnel of this platoon was removed to BASTOGNE (P-55). However, two officers, including the platoon commander, and sixteen enlisted men of the platoon, plus one general surgical team (minus nurses) from the 3d Auxiliary Surgical Group remained with the non-transportable patients. All of these personnel were captured. On the following day, the remaining personnel were removed from BASTOGNE (P-55), but it was necessary to leave the equipment behind. The third platoon of this hospital was in support of the 106th Infantry Division at ST VITH (P-88). On 17 December, the majority of the personnel withdrew, and on the following day all patients and remaining personnel, except two enlisted men, left to guard the equipment, withdrew from ST VITH (P-88). The equipment and two enlisted men were also presumed to have been captured.

In general, field hospital platoons were employed in accordance with past procedure. Through the use of holding units, consisting of a headquarters and station platoon of a medical collecting company, it was possible to free these platoons for earlier movement in support of division clearing stations when the latter displaced forward.

An innovation in the use of a field hospital in Third U. S. Army was the employment in the latter part of the month of the 65th Field Hospital as a single unit. This hospital actually opened on 31 Decem-

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ber at ARLON (P-62) with a capacity of approximately 200 beds. The capacity was limited by the size of the building available to this unit. The attachment of the 65th Field Hospital to the 65th Medical Group continued in its new operation.

During the first two weeks of December, movements of evacuation hospitals were deemed necessary to support an impending attack eastward by Third U. S. Army through the SIEGFRIED LINE. The 35th and 109th Evacuation Hospitals had moved east to TETING (Q-25) and BOULAY-ROSELLE (Q-06) respectively. The 103d Evacuation Hospital was closed at BRIBY (U-67) and prepared to move east to CREUTZWALD (Q-26). The 104th Evacuation Hospital began a move to OERMINGEN (Q-51), a move which was never completed due to subsequent radical changes in plans.

Following the German counteroffensive, the great majority of the evacuation hospitals and other medical units had to be moved north to support the Army effort in that direction. The 103d, 39th, 104th, 109th, and 101st Evacuation Hospitals moved in that order to respective new locations at LONGUYON (U-49), VERTON (P-41), LUXEMBOURG CITY (U-81), MONTMEDIY (P-20) and ARLON (P-62). The 12th Evacuation Hospital remained open at NANCY (U-81), and was the only Third U. S. Army hospital south of METZ (U-85) at the end of the month. Meanwhile, arrangements were being made for a new site for the 12th Evacuation Hospital in LUXEMBOURG CITY (U-81).

Two additional evacuation hospitals became Third U. S. Army units during the month. The 107th Evacuation Hospital, located in the vicinity of CLERVAUX (P-86) on 16 December was closed and prepared to move. The 110th Evacuation Hospital was open at ESCH (P-70) and remained there throughout the month. The 107th Evacuation Hospital was required in a period of seven days to make three retrograde movements and was located during this period at LIBIN (P-25), CARLSBOURG (P-04) and at SEDAN (P-25). This hospital, in an eighty-two-hour period at LIBIN (P-25) admitted 784 patients and performed 326 surgical operations. There were 400 patients in the hospital when the next move became necessary. In a space of three hours, 300 patients were loaded in ambulances for evacuation to the 130th General Hospital at CINEY (P-19). Several times during this period the hospital was directly in the line of advance of the enemy forces and hasty departures were in order. On the move from LIBIN (P-25) it was necessary to leave a volunteer detachment of five officers and fifty enlisted men with the remaining patients and equipment. However, all the personnel and the greater part of the equipment were recovered later.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital was reopened early in December at ST MIHIEL (U-44) with a capacity of 1,500 beds. It opened in ZIMMING (Q-15) on 15 December. Due to subsequent changes in the tactical situation after 16 December, the location at ZIMMING (Q-15) became far from ideal, and a new site was selected at MOULINS-LES-METZ (U-85) in the vicinity of METZ (U-85). By the end of the month, the unit completed its movement to the new location, but had not yet opened.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in the month of December is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

(1) U. S. Army Troops	11195
(2) British Army Troops	0
(3) French Army Troops	25
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	1
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	1674
(7) Civilians	235
(8) Others	23

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	3796
(2) Slight	8118

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:

(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns:	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	559	82
(b) Thoracic	1125	70
(c) Maxillo-facial	603	3
(d) Neurologic:		
Head	787	77
Spine	213	6
Nerve	10	0

	Admissions	Deaths
(e) Extremities:		
Upper	2830	10
Lower	3795	40
(f) Buttocks	561	11
(g) Others	671	12
Sub-total	11358	313
(2) Burns - all locations	137	1
Total	11495	314

d. Number patients with multiple wounds

	3183
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e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol, or machine gun)	2977	83
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar, or cannon)	6981	204
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap, or mine)	417	7
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	388	8
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	61	1
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame-thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	128	2
(7) Others	583	9
Total	11495	314

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Shock	7
Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Uremia	1
Perf W (HE) Chest and Abdomen	Shock	6
Pen W Abdomen, FCC Lumbar Vertebrae	Autolytic Peritonitis	1
Pen W Head, Buttocks and Chest		1
GSW Pen W Abdomen	Shock	3
Shell (HE) Head	Shock	8
Shell (HE) Arm	Shock	1
GSW Buttocks	Pneumonia	1
FCC (Shell) Skull		3
FCC (Shell) Skull	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) Left Arm	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) Chest	Pulmonary Edema	1
Concussion (HE) Cerebral	Hemothorax	1
FCC Skull	Internal Injuries	3
FCC Right Ilium	Internal Injuries	1
Pen W Neck	Shock	1
Pen W Chest through Diaphragm	Shock	1
Pen W Buttock	Hemorrhage	3
Pen W Lower Abdomen	Shock	2
Pen W Abdomen	Peritonitis	1
GSW FCC Skull	Pneumonia	1
Perf W Abdomen	Pulmonary Edema	1
Perf GSW Abdomen	Shock and Hemorrhage	3
Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Pen W GSW Abdomen	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Pen W (HE) Thigh	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Perf GSW Chest	Empyema Thoracis	1
Perf GSW Chest	Shock, Paralysis, Nerve of Spinal Cord	1
Lac W (mine) Buttocks	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Burn 1st & 2d Degree Generalized	Shock	1
Lac W Abdomen and Liver	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Perf GSW Left Thigh	Shock and Hemorrhage	3
FCC Right Femur	Shock	1
Pen W Abdomen and Both Legs	Pneumonia	1
Pen W Abdomen, Perf or Jejunum, Colon and Bladder	Shock	1
Perf Chest	Shock and Hemorrhage	2
Pen W Skull	Respiratory Failure and Shock	1
Pen W Buttocks	Shock	1
Pen W Brain	Shock	1
Pen W Brain	Cerebral Edema and Hemorrhage	8
FCC Maxilla	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
FCC Femur with Lac of Artery	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W Buttocks	Hemorrhage and Shock	5
Pen W Lumbar, Kidney and Liver	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Perf W Abdomen	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Transection of Spinal Cord	Respiratory Failure	1
Blast Injury to Brain and Lungs	Shock	2
Blast Injury to Brain and Lungs	Pulmonary & Cerebral Edema Shock	2

Pen W Thigh	Blood Transfer Reaction	1
Transection of Spinal Cord	Shock	1
Pen W Brain	Cerebral Edema and Shock	1
Blast Injury Chest	Respiratory Failure	3
Concussion Blast (HE) of Brain	Hemothorax	1
FCC Femur	Shock	1
Perf W FCC Skull	Cerebral Hemiatosis	1
Pen W FC Tibia and Fibula	Pulmonary Embolism	1
Pen W (Shell) Hips	Pneumonitis	1
Pen W Thigh, Perf W Shoulder	Shock	1
Pen W Abdomen, FC Knee and Foot with Traumatic Amp of Right Foot		1
Lac W Molar Region, FCC Zygoma		1
Pen GSW Skull		1
Pen W Head, FCC Skull		1
Pen W Face and Forehead	Shock	2
Perf W Right Buttocks FC Sacrum	Shock	1
Perf W Arm and Head, FCC Skull	Shock	2
Traumatic Amp Left Leg	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W (HE) Lower Extremities	Hemorrhage and Shock	3
FCC GSW Skull	Shock	1
FCC (HE) Mandible	Atelectasis of Lungs	1
Pen W (HE) Neck and Shoulder	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W (HE) Arm and Thigh	Dilation of Right Ventricle of Heart	1
Pen W (HE) Lower Extremity	Pulmonary Edema	4
Pen W GSW Abdomen	Hepatic Hemorrhage	1
FCC GWS (MG) Skull		1
FCC Crushing (Vehicle) Skull		1
Perf & Pen W (HE) Lower Extremities, Chest and Face	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen and Perf W (S Mine) Lower Extremities	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W GSW, Abdomen, Lac Kidney	Uremia	1
Pen W (HE) Upper and Lower Extremities	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W FCC Skull		15
Perf W Abdomen, Colon, and Kidney	Shock	1
Pen W (HE) Chest, Avulsive Type	Shock	1
Perf W Forearm, FCC Radius and Ulna	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Traumatic Amp Hand, FCC Humerus	Pulmonary Embolism	1
Pen W MW Chest (Shocking)	Shock and Hemorrhage	4
Pen W MW Extremities with FCC Femur	Shock and Hemorrhage	9
Perf W Loin through Abdomen and Kidney	Progressive Anuria and Shock	1
Pen W Chest Lac Spinal Cord and FCC Dorsal Spine	Paraplegia	1
Pen W Chest, Spinal Injury, Complete Paralysis and Anesthesia	Shock and Hemorrhage	1
Perf W Neck with Cord Lesion	Myelitis	1
Perf W Neck with Transection Spinal Cord		1
Asphyxia, due to Aspiration of Vomitus		1
Pen W (HE) Chest	Hemorrhage and Shock	1
Pen W (HE) Abdomen, Lac of Spleen Diaphragm	Peritonitis and Shock	1
Pen W Lower Lumbar	Sub-hepatic Abscess, Pneumonia	1
Perf W Arm, Pen W Chest		2
FCC Skull, Occipital Region		1
Pen W, Chest and Back	Shock	4
Pen W, Abdomen, Contused W Foot	Anuria and Uremia	1
Perf W Upper Arm, Pen W Thigh and Abdomen	Anuria and Uremia	1
Perf W Stomach and Back	Shock	1
Perf W Chest	Gas Gangrene	1
Perf W Abdomen	Surgical Shock	1
Pen W Lumbar Region		1
Pen W Neck, Flank, Left Hand, Arm and Leg		1
Pen W Abdomen	Peritonitis	1
Pen GSW Abdomen	Shock	6
Pen GSW Chest	Shock	7
Pen W (HE) Chest	Shock	4
Perf GSW, Neck	Shock	2
Pen W (HE) Abdomen	Shock	7
Perf GSW Abdomen	Shock	8
Pen GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	4
Pen W (HE) Chest	Shock	4
Pen W (HE) Buttocks	Shock	3
Blast, Cerebral	Shock	2

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Pen W (Shell) Traumatic Amp Right Leg	Shock	1
MW (Shell) Lower Extremities	Hemorrhage and Shock	6
MW (Shell) Chest	Pneumonia and Peritonitis	1
Pen W (Shell) Head	Shock	7
Perf W (Shell) Thigh	Acute Dilation of Heart	1
Perf W (Shell) Lower Extremities	Pulmonary Embolism	1
Perf W GSW Chest	Meningitis, Pneumococci	1
Traumatic Amp (Shell) Left Leg	Pulmonary Edema	1
Perf GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	3
Pen W (Shell) Head	Cerebral Edema	1
Traumatic Amp (Shell) Right Leg	Shock	1
MW (Shell) Upper and Lower Extremities	Shock	2
Extensive W (Shell) Left Thigh	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) Head	Pneumonia	1
Pen W (Shell) Chest	Pulmonary Edema	1
Pen W (Shell) Lower Extremities	Pulmonary Embolism	3
MW GSW Lumbar Spine	Meningitis Acute Generalized	1
Perf GSW Chest	Pulmonary Edema	1
GSW Lower Leg	Gas Gangrene	1
Pen W (Shell) Abdomen	Pulmonary	2
Pen W (Shell) Traumatic Amp of Both Legs		1
Pen GSW Abdomen	Pulmonary Infarot	1
Pen W (Shell) FC Skull	Cardiac Failure	1
MW Pen (Bomb) Chest		1
Pen W Chest and Abdomen	Hemothorax	4
FCC Upper Femur, Pen W Abdomen	Shock and Uremia	1
Perf W Right Epigastrium, Lac Liver and Spleen		1
Pen W Abdomen, Large Perf of Ascending Colon	Hemorrhage and Peritonitis	5
Perf W Head, FCC Skull		6
FCC, Skull, Herniation of Brain		3
Pen W Chest	Massive Pulmonary Hemorrhage	6
MW Pen Abdomen, Intra-peritoneal W	Shock	5
Pen W Chest (Suoking)	Respiratory Failure	2
Pen W Neck, Lac of Carotid Artery	Hemorrhage	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh Whole Blood	529
(2) Stored Blood	5282
(3) Dry Plasma	7841
(4) Other Blood Substitutes	144

h. Number of units of Penicillin Administered: 3,986,221,000

i. Number of Amputations:

(1) Upper Extremity	115
(2) Lower Extremity	151

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of Gas Gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	59
(2) Others	16

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	8595
(2) Others	1189

Locations of hospitals during December will be found in Annex XI to the Medical Section report.

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

The 69th Medical Group provided medical care and evacuation for three groups of Allied military prisoners recovered during the month at DENTING (Q-16), CREUTZWALD (Q-26) and SARREGUEMINES (Q-55). On 12 December, the Commanding Officer, 69th Medical Group assumed command of the camp at DENTING (Q-16). There were approximately 800 Russian and Italian prisoners at CREUTZWALD (Q-26), about 110 being bedridden, eighty-five percent of these with nutritional deficiencies. At SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) there were 100 prisoner patients who required immediate evacuation because the prisoner of war enclosure was under enemy artillery fire. Arrangements were made to evacuate these patients to the 34th Evacuation Hospital at METZ (U-85), and the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion at THIONVILLE (U-88). The bedridden patients at CREUTZWALD (Q-26) were transferred to the camp at DENTING (Q-16) which was being operated as a medical installation. Arrangements were com-

pleted with Advance Section, Communications Zone for evacuation of about 300 patients from DENTING (Q-16) and for eventual operation of the camp there by Advance Section, Communications Zone. Conforming with this plan, 300 patients were evacuated to the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at THIONVILLE (U-88) to await rail evacuation to the Communications Zone. On 19 December, these patients were still at THIONVILLE (U-88). Because of an expected flood of battle casualties, these 300 patients were, therefore, returned to DENTING (Q-16) to give the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit necessary bed space for battle casualties.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

Total battle casualties during the month of December, involving actual wounds and/or burns amounted to 11,495. In addition to this total, there were 2,852 cases of trench foot and twenty-one cases of frostbite admitted to all division, corps, and Army clearing stations during this month. Approximately 600 cases were returned to duty at clearing station level, and an additional estimated 300 cases returned to duty from hospitals.

Based on total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations, there was a mortality rate of one percent during this month.

2. Surgery

As will be seen from the above figures, the surgical services of Army hospital units were extremely busy in December. The fact that only 314 deaths occurred among the total battle casualties mentioned above reflects a high degree of experience and skill attained by the entire Army Medical Service.

A study of the detailed statistics presented in the paragraph devoted to "Hospitalization" in Section 2 of this report reveals an interesting breakdown of these figures according to regions of the body affected. The largest group comprises wounds of the extremities and involves 6,625 cases, or approximately sixty percent of the total battle casualties. Of these cases, only fifty died, and the great majority of the remaining cases will eventually return to duty. It is in this salvage role that the Army evacuation hospital is doing its greatest service in the present war. However, the low mortality rate in the entire Army is a great accomplishment, and is a result of a combination of the efforts of all medical personnel, from the battalion aid station on back to the rearmost hospital.

Mortality rates were as low as any in military history. The figures which support this conclusion are shown below:

TYPE OF WOUND	NUMBER	NUMBER OF DEATHS	MORTALITY
			RATE
Wounds of the Abdomen	559	82	14%
Chest Injuries	1129	70	6%
Head Injuries	787	77	10%
Gunshot Wounds of the Spine	213	6	2.8%
Wounds of the Buttocks	561	11	2%
Burns	137	1	0.7%

One of the episodes of this war was the magnificent stand of the 101st Airborne Division, together with one combat command each of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, at BASTOGNE (P-55), where they were out off for approximately ten days until the 4th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division broke into the pocket to relieve them. When these divisions were out off, they were completely without surgical personnel. The only medical personnel available to them were in the various medical detachments of the divisions concerned. These medical officers were equipped neither with experience nor instruments for major surgical procedures.

Outside of the pocket a field hospital platoon, with surgical team attached, was held in readiness to rush into the besieged town as soon as a corridor was established. In addition, another field hospital platoon with its surgical teams was set up just outside the encircling ring to care for those casualties which could be transported out after relief of the forces. Other measures taken are described in Section 2 of the Medical Section report, under the sub-section devoted to "Evacuation".

With the relief of the forces not yet established, a general surgeon flew into BASTOGNE (P-55) by liaison plane on 25 December. On the following day three more general surgeons, an orthopedic surgeon, an anesthetist, and four enlisted technicians were flown in by glider. In both cases, enemy fire was encountered, but all personnel and their

equipment arrived safely.

The make-shift hospital consisted of a large garage with one very large room and a small adjoining room. Approximately 150 seriously wounded men were in the large room on litters and straw pallets. Four battalion aid station surgeons, who had treated all casualties until the arrival of this medical relief, were completely exhausted. The general surgeon who had flown in by liaison plane had set up an operating room in the small adjoining room. All casualties other than the most seriously wounded were scattered throughout the town in cellars, basements, and other buildings. In the garage there was no heat, and there was only one light in the larger room.

The supply of blood was very low, as most of the containers had been broken when dropped by parachute on the previous day. However, the supply of plasma was plentiful. The garage had apparently been the site of a field hospital that had hastily withdrawn prior to encirclement. Part of the hospital equipment had been left behind. An operating lamp and an autoclave were available. The surgical teams which had flown in had on hand all the surgical instruments necessary to go into immediate operation.

Within one and one-half hours, all the patients in the garage were carefully triaged by the surgical teams. Those cases that required immediate surgery were selected, and priority for surgery was thereby established. Four operating tables were set up in the small room by placing litters on tables. Two anesthetists, one of whom had accompanied the surgical teams, and the other of whom was a battalion aid station surgeon with the 10th Armored Division, alternated between the operating tables. The medical officers from the 101st Airborne Division medical detachments provided medical care for those patients in the large room. Operations were begun by 261830, and continued throughout the night until the following noon.

Concurrent with the arrival of relief on 27 December, which included twenty-three ambulances of the 64th Medical Group, a truckload of blood also arrived early in the afternoon. After a few hours' rest, the surgeons were back at work. With the evacuation of part of the casualties, the situation was greatly alleviated. The hospital was then organized into a pre-operative and post-operative section with a consequent improvement in the post-operative care. The surgeons again operated throughout the entire night until the following afternoon (28 December), when all patients were evacuated and a field hospital platoon (1st Platoon, 60th Field Hospital) went into operation in the area. In all, fifty major operations were performed, with only three post-operative deaths occurring.

During this period, bombing and shelling of the hospital area was intermittent. On the night of 27 December, a bomb landed near the hospital and blew in the door of the hospital room, and considerable plaster fell from the ceiling. For a time, operations had to be continued by flash light.

The services of three Belgian women were secured to assist in the care of the wounded. No drapes or gowns were available, and sterile towels were used about the wounds. The wounds of the patients were from two to eight days old, with the average case about three days old.

Mortality rates were gratifyingly low in spite of the handicaps encountered. It is noteworthy that casualties in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area are included in the figures quoted in the beginning of this section.

3. Neuropsychiatry

During the first week of December, slow but steady advances were continued until Third U. S. Army was disposed along the SAAR River and within the boundaries of Germany along that river on a front of sixty miles. SAARLAUTEREN (Q-28) and SARREGUEMINES (Q-55) were taken.

Enemy resistance was, at all times, stiff, and our casualties high. It had been the experience of this Army that a tactical situation which included severe artillery fire from the enemy, resulting in more or less pinning down our own troops, usually resulted in a higher neuropsychiatric rate. A slight increase during the first two weeks of December was therefore to be expected. By the end of the second week the situation again became somewhat static, and at the end of the third week, Third U. S. Army divisions were drawn from their positions and moved rapidly northward. The number of neuropsychiatric cases, therefore, evened itself off and resulted, for the entire month, in a percentage less than that which occurred during the previous month.

The figures for the month of December revealed that there were 33,222 non-fatal casualties, which was a reduction over those suffered in November. Of these, 2,587 were neuropsychiatric cases, or seven and seven-tenths percent of the total non-battle casualties. Seventy-five percent of these were returned to duty from either division clearing station or hospital level.

THE FLIGHT



(1. Looking Over the Transportation.)



(2. The Glider is Packed.)

TO BASTOGNE



(3. Surgical Personnel Before the Take-off.)



(4. Departure for BASTOGNE.)

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A survey revealed that from 1 August to 31 December, there had been 139,895 total admissions to medical installations from all causes. Eight and nine-tenths percent of these, or 12,512, were admitted for neuropsychiatric reasons. No other Allied Army reports a neuropsychiatric incidence as low over a similar period. Of the 12,512 neuropsychiatric cases, 8,811 were returned to duty, either from a division or similar clearing station level, or from Army hospitals. Of the 3,701 cases which were not returned to duty, but were evacuated from the Army area, psychoses, epilepsy, constitutional psychopathic states, mental deficiencies, and chronic progressive neurological diseases constituted the primary causes.

4. Dental

The dental service for the month of December followed much the same course as it did in November. In spite of difficulties attending the movement of troops as they advanced into the SAAR region during the first two weeks, and the subsequent major movements of units northward into LUXEMBOURG to the southern flank of the ARDENNES bulge during the latter part of the month, more dental treatments were accomplished than during the month of November. A chart showing the breakdown of these treatments follows:

Strength (Reported)-----	280670
Admissions, Routine-----	15993
Admissions, Emergency-----	3604
Sittings Given-----	27975
Officer Personnel-----	391
Enlisted Personnel-----	404
Restorations-----	18721
Dentures-----	1701
Gingivitis-----	1164
Gingivitis Treatments-----	1614
Stomatitis V-----	329
Stomatitis Treatments-----	801

The processing of acrylic anti-concussion devices had been further refined so that they were more comfortable and more effective than before. Previously, the thickness and size of these devices had resulted in their bumping against the helmet during strenuous exertion by the wearer. Another change in the device consisted of shortening the part which fits in the meatus of the ear. This improvement allowed a longer column of air between the device and the eardrum, and offered greater protection against the shock wave produced by the blast effect of heavy artillery, which normally causes damage to the inner ear. With improvements also made in the design of flasks and presses used in the processing of the devices, together with the production of a smaller size, it was possible to speed up the processing to the point where the production could be completed for the firing personnel of an entire battalion, consisting of approximately 175 officers and enlisted men, within ten days.

The percentage of maxillo-facial injuries to the total casualties admitted to hospitals during the month was six and nine-tenths percent, there being a total of 803 such cases. Three deaths occurred as the result of maxillo-facial injuries, constituting thirty-seven one-hundredths of one percent of all maxillo-facial cases admitted during December.

5. Veterinary

Inspections were made of twenty-one Class I supply points, four division ration breakdown areas, ten messes, and one quartermaster bakery. Some improvement was noted in the proper utilization of dunnage. Sanitary conditions were also better, due to the advent of freezing weather, with a consequent diminishing in the mud. The problem of fresh supplies freezing, however, arose during December and caused some difficulty.

On 10 December 2,500 pounds of fresh beef was inspected, which had been captured by liberating troops. This beef was found to be in good condition, and was turned over to Civil Affairs representatives.

6. Personnel

The names of five Medical Corps officers were submitted to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, for permanent rotation to general hospitals in the Communications Zone. All of these officers had been in combat units for over two years, and had served in actual combat with these units since D-Day.

The names of twenty-seven Medical Corps specialists from evacuation hospitals, the convalescent hospital, and the auxiliary surgical group were also submitted to the Chief Surgeon for temporary rotation of sixty days to Communications Zone hospitals for educational purposes.

Due to the battle casualties in this Army, as well as to shortages occasioned by the assignment of VIII Corps and its units to Third U. S. Army on 21 December, which units had suffered losses in the German counteroffensive, a total shortage of Medical Corps officers existed as of that date of approximately fifty. This shortage was a serious one, but was alleviated somewhat by the arrival of fifteen Medical Corps officers furnished by the Communications Zone. To expedite their arrival in the Army area, Headquarters European Theater of Operations directed general hospitals to cut orders placing these officers on temporary duty for a period of seven days with Headquarters Third U. S. Army. Upon their arrival, further orders were immediately issued by this headquarters placing them on temporary duty with the divisions in which the most serious shortages existed. Transportation was furnished largely by the Medical Section of this headquarters down to the corps level, where corps either furnished subsequent transportation, or had division transportation call for them at that point. Subsequent orders by Headquarters European Theater of Operations assigned these officers to this headquarters, and additional orders were then cut assigning them to the division in which they had previously been placed on temporary duty. Approximately fifteen additional Medical Corps officers were placed on temporary duty with divisions from Army medical units, pending the arrival of further reinforcements.

Simultaneously, there also existed a shortage of twenty-five Medical Administrative Corps officers. Approximately sixty applications for appointment as Second Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps, had been forwarded from this Army to Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

Due to a high rate of casualties in Third U. S. Army, which had begun in November and continued during the first two weeks of December, the nursing service of the Army was extremely hard pressed. Fifty nurses were secured on temporary duty from a Communications Zone general hospital, and were distributed among Third U. S. Army hospitals to the best advantage, thereby augmenting our own organic nurses. These nurses replaced thirty-five nurses secured previously in a similar manner who were returned to their parent unit on the same date.

On 6 December, 311 Medical Department enlisted reinforcements arrived at the reinforcement depot supporting this Army. This was the first group of Medical Department enlisted men received by Third U. S. Army since the opening of the offensive on 8 November, though constant efforts had been made to secure them.

Also during this month ten additional shock teams were borrowed from Advance Section, Communications Zone medical units. These teams were of inestimable value in handling the large flow of casualties which was being received in Army hospitals, and properly preparing these casualties for surgery.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

There were more movements of the depot companies during the month of December than there had been since the month of September. During the first week, Advance Section Number One of the 32d Medical Depot Company moved from AUMETZ (U-79) to METZ (U-85) to join its parent unit. After several days of reconnaissance, on 17 December the 33d Medical Depot Company moved from TOUL (U-61) and became operational in CHATEAU-SALINS (Q-02), prepared to support Third U. S. Army's expected push to the East.

Due to the German breakthrough in the ARDENNES area, and the subsequent absorption by Third U. S. Army of VIII Corps, provision was made for the return to this Army of the Advance Section, 33d Medical Depot Company, which had been transferred to Ninth U. S. Army in September. This Advance Section became operational at LONGUYON (U-49) on 26 December. The remainder of the 33d Medical Depot Company moved from CHATEAU-SALINS (Q-02) to LONGUYON (U-49) and became operational there on 30 December.

With the 32d Medical Depot Company located throughout the month at METZ (U-85), the two depot companies were disposed toward the close of the month in the most advantageous positions to support both flanks, as well as the center, of this Army.

A sketch, showing the disposition of the medical depot companies throughout the months of October, November, and December, will be found in Annex XXI of the Medical Section report.

Difficulties continued to exist in the way of actual reception of medical supplies at the Army medical depot companies. During the first two weeks of December, approximately a dozen trips were necessary on the part of Army transportation to Communications Zone depots to obtain items that were in great demand. There were fifty or sixty of these items in critical shortage. The majority were Class I and

Class III items. This condition was to some extent alleviated by the end of the month. In cases where transportation was sent to Communications Zone depots from Army, coordination was effected between the Surgeon's Office and AC of S, G-4 of this headquarters.

During this month, the allowance of anesthesia apparatus, portable, was increased from two to three per evacuation hospital, and field hospitals were authorized an additional three apparatus, suction, foot pump, vacuum type, Item NSB-3.

The 65th Field Hospital arrived in the Army area short a considerable percentage of its T/E equipment. Items that were not available at Army medical depot companies were extracted to the Chief Surgeon's Office, Communications Zone by telephone for purposes of expediency.

Losses among VIII Corps units incident to the German counter-offensive shortly after the middle of the month included the following:

12d Field Hospital-----	All equipment of 1st and 3d Platoons was lost.
101st Airborne Division-----	All equipment of the medical company was lost.
28th Infantry Division-----	All equipment of one platoon of the clearing company was lost; in addition, all medical equipment for one complete infantry regiment and one artillery battalion was lost.
107th Evacuation Hospital-----	Miscellaneous Class I, III, and IX items were lost, but no major items of medical equipment were lost. The majority of the tentage and quartermaster equipment, however, was lost.

Replacement of a majority of the above equipment was attained in an expeditious manner largely through arrangements by this Army to proceed to Communications Zone medical depots for purposes of picking up the equipment and speeding up delivery of same. In the case of medical equipment for the 101st Airborne Division medical company, it was flown into the Army area by air, and transported to the 32d Medical Depot Company where it was picked up by division transportation.

Arrangements were also made with the 61th Medical Group and the 107th Evacuation Hospital, while operating in the VIII Corps Zone, to set up a provisional medical depot for VIII Corps units, to fill emergency requisitions from those units. Eight truckloads of such supplies were dispatched from the 32d Medical Depot Company to the 107th Evacuation Hospital for further distribution.

The displaced Allied personnel found in concentration camps, and referred to under Section 2, Sub-section 4 of the Medical Section report for December, required considerable amounts of supplies for their care. Blankets, heaters, coats, and stoves were issued to the 69th Medical Group, which was in charge of those personnel who needed treatment. Arrangements were also made with the Army Quartermaster for additional mess equipment and fire units. German medical supplies in the Army medical depot companies were set aside and issued to the 69th Medical Group for this project. Difficulty was experienced in securing DDT Powder for delousing purposes, but within forty-eight hours, 2,000 two-ounce cans were located in a Communications Zone depot and shipped to the 33d Medical Depot Company for immediate issue to the 69th Medical Group. Two days later, a release was obtained for 1,400 pounds of DDT Powder for the same purpose.

Though discussion is made elsewhere in this report of events incident to the relief of the besieged forces in BASTOGNE (P-55) on 26 December, it is pertinent to mention here that supplies were in fact furnished to these forces by air on 23, 24, and 25 December. These supplies included whole blood, blood plasma, Carlisle dressings, and morphine syrettes, among other items.

Also toward the close of the month, it was arranged in conjunction with Advance Section, Communications Zone, that VIII Corps units might draw their medical supplies from either Depot M-408 (Communications Zone), at REIMS (V-05), from the 33d Medical Depot Company at LONGUYON (U-49), from the Advance Section, 32d Medical Depot Company at AUMETZ (U-79); or, for those for which it might be closer, from First U. S. Army depots.

Captured enemy medical supplies during the month were inspected at METZ (U-85). These approximated ten tons of miscellaneous supplies, about half of which were deemed of value to this Army and placed in depot stock. The remainder was turned over to Communications Zone

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depots.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Variations in the tactical situation, which ranged from the establishment of a bridgehead in the SARREGUMINES (Q-55) and SAARLAUTERN (Q-28) areas to the dash northward to the southern edge of the ARDENNES bulge, had little effect on preventive medicine problems, compared to those of the previous month. Some problems associated with the production of potable water did arise, and these are discussed in this report under the paragraph dealing with "Sanitation". Temperatures ranged from near zero to the low thirties throughout this period.

2. Venereal Disease Control

The fact that the latter half of December was characterized by a mass movement of many troops resulted in the discontinuance of past privileges for many, and was the main factor in reducing the venereal disease rate for the month.

Army prophylactic stations were established in FONT-A-MOUSSON (U-73), VILLERUPT (U-69), and in the rest center at NANCY (U-81). In addition to these three, eight other Army prophylactic stations were in operation. During December, these stations gave 16,728 prophylactic treatments.

All units reported an adequate supply of individual chemical and mechanical prophylactics.

Individual venereal disease contact reports were received in 128 instances. During the period, 25 November to 29 December, inclusive, an analysis of these reports shows some decrease in the number of cases of syphilis in comparison to the month of November.

Special letters continued to be sent to commanders of units with venereal disease rates over 100 per thousand per annum, directing their attention to the excessive rates within their units and calling for more stringent action on their part.

Weekly statistics on venereal disease incidence during the month of December may be found in Annex XXII to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases continued to be relatively few in number; and, in fact, a slight decrease occurred from the total number reported in November. Upper respiratory diseases also showed a low incidence during this period. Diarrheal diseases showed a slight increase. A few scattered cases of infectious hepatitis were reported.

Other than the minor changes reflected above, no significant outbreak occurred during the period.

A detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases occurring during the month of December will be found in Annex XXIII of the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

Due to the assignment of an additional corps to this Army during the latter part of the month, the number of reports and records processed increased over those of the previous month. There were 45,972 processed during December.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The conditions making up this type of injury remained approximately the same as during the month of November. A slight increase in accidents was noted, but a decrease occurred in the incidence of trench foot. Twenty-one cases of frostbite made their appearance. Non-battle injuries represented twelve percent of the total direct admissions for the month of December, as well as for the month of November.

Annex XXII of the Medical Section report affords a detailed analysis of non-battle injuries during the month.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

During the month of December, the 7th Medical Laboratory continued to operate in two base sections as follows:

Section I-----METZ (U-85)

Section II-----NANCY (U-81)

There were 7,698 tests performed during this month, constituting a slight decrease over the number performed during the previous month. The five percent decrease was caused, in part, by the suspension of the shock section and in part by a drop in serological requests.

The total work for the month of December is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO. OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	4814	62.5
Bacteriology	1270	16.5
Chemistry	361	4.7
Pathology	228	3.0
Hematology	85	1.1
Parasitology	117	1.5
Sub-total	6875	89.3
MOBILE SECTIONS:		
Venereal Disease Section, (6th Convalescent Hosp)	823	10.7
Shock Section, 60th Fld Hosp	Not Operating	
Sub-total	823	10.7
GRAND TOTAL	7698	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during December is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	11	2453	31.9
Convalescent Hospital	1	2065	26.8
Field Hospitals	7	270	3.5
Miscellaneous Medical Installations		273	3.5
Miscellaneous Tactical Installations		267	3.5
TOTALS	19	7698	100.0

7. Sanitation

Intermittent rains continued during the first part of the month, and the resulting muddy terrain and camp sites increased problems of sanitation and living conditions. With the advent of consistently lower temperatures about the middle of the month, frozen ground and a snow-covered terrain improved general sanitary conditions. In spite of the varied elements, the health of the command was not noticeably affected.

Only a few insect problems were noted during the month, and those were primarily concerned with other than United States military personnel. A few cases of louse infestation were treated in accordance with current directives.

No garbage or refuse disposal problems were encountered. Rapid and fairly constant movement of units and colder weather during the month precluded any difficulty in disposing of such wastes.

There were only four minor incidents of diarrhea reported during the first part of the month. The incidence reached a peak during the last week in November and dropped rapidly in December, reaching a minimum during the continued freezing weather.

The standard of water supplies furnished troops reached a new high during the month. Over ninety-five percent of all water tested met Army standards in December, compared with fifty-one percent in August, which had increased to eighty-nine percent during November.

Some difficulties were experienced due to freezing of the tanks, filters, valves, and hose lines during the extremes of cold weather. Such difficulties were not insurmountable and were ameliorated by one or more of the following methods:

Installation of the filter and pumping equipment in a pyramidal tent heated by a Sibley stove or other heating units.

Draining of the filter, hose lines, and pumps when not actually in use.

Recirculation of the water in the settling tank and clearing well at intervals.

Installation of an immersion type heating unit in the settling tank.


One of the major difficulties was the freezing of the canvas tanks

to the ground, with ice reaching a thickness, at times, of more than six inches around the base of the tank. Movement of the tanks under such conditions was impossible and, when attempted, damage to tanks and resulting leaks developed. It was strongly recommended that an immersion type heater, a water pipe heater using gasoline engine exhaust, or some similar heating unit be provided or devised to combat the above condition.

In a few instances, it was possible and practical to permit modification of the standard treatment method to include only chlorination, after investigation of the source, as follows:

When the raw water was obtained from a protected ground water source (not including shallow dug wells or unprotected springs) available in some few municipalities.

When the raw water was consistently coagulated and filtered in a municipal treatment plant.



A New Method of Water Treatment in Operation.

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CHAPTER 8 JANUARY OPERATIONS

The month of January was characterized by relatively few major changes in the deployment of medical units. The gradual reduction of the bulge in the ARDENNES area eventually resulted in an eastward movement by Third U. S. Army, along a wide front, stretching roughly from ST VITH (P 98) on the north to the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (Q 38) on the south. Changes in medical evacuation and hospital units were made to support the new direction.

Freezing weather, snow and ice, and extremely bitter fighting prevailed throughout the month. The combination of these factors resulted in the largest number of casualties yet suffered by this Army since the commencement of its operations. The large casualty figure, however, can be tempered by the fact that the Third U. S. Army was employing a larger number of divisions than during any previous month.

The problems of trench foot and frostbite, with which this Army had been so much concerned since early November, were further alleviated, from a medical standpoint, by the use of a provisional hospital in the Army area, which had as its goal the return to duty of these cases, on a fifteen day policy for that hospital. The problem, from a command standpoint, remained one of definite concern. An increase in frostbite cases counterbalanced a decrease in trench foot, an overall increase in cold type injuries accruing thereby.

Because of the cold and inclement weather, icy road surfaces and short daylight hours, this was a particularly difficult month for all elements of the medical service, as well as for all other arms and services. In spite of these handicaps the mortality rate among U. S. Army personnel in medical installations was one percent of all those admitted.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

With the accomplishment of the move of the Medical Section from NANCY (U 81) to ESCH (P 70) on 7 January 1945, the Medical Section was consolidated for the first time since 31 July 1944. The Surgical Consultant, as well as one captain, Medical Corps, and two enlisted men continued liaison duties with the forward echelon of this headquarters in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81).

Also during the first week of January, the Medical Corps officers previously placed on temporary duty for liaison purposes with Headquarters III Corps and Headquarters VIII Corps, respectively, rejoined the Medical Section at ESCH (P 70).

On 30 January 1945, the most notable change occurred in the organization of the Medical Section since the commencement of operations on 1 August 1944. As of this date, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, the following were returned from temporary duty with the Medical Section to duty with their own organizations:

- 1 Lt Colonel, Medical Corps (Heretofore performing liaison duties between this headquarters and Twelfth Army Group)
- 1 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps (Heretofore on temporary duty with the Finance and Supply Sub-section)
- 1 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps (Heretofore on temporary duty with the Preventive Medicine Sub-section)
- 1 1st Lieutenant, Medical Administrative Corps (Heretofore on temporary duty with the Operations and Training Sub-section)

In addition, orders were initiated transferring one captain, Medical Corps, from the Operations and Training Sub-section and one captain, Veterinary Corps, from the Veterinary Sub-section to units of Third U. S. Army.

The above was in accordance with the Army Commander's desire that all sections of this headquarters conform to Staff Memorandum Number 73, this headquarters, dated 16 December 1944.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

The training program for Information-Education officers of medical units was continued. Four officers from Army medical units attended the Information-Education Course at the Staff School in PARIS (S 04). In addition, one officer attended the Educational Advise Course, and one officer attended the course in Instructor Training offered at that location.

2. Evacuation


January was marked by a gradual, steady reduction of the enemy salient into BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. There were no sudden or spectacular changes in the tactical situation, and no radical changes in evacuation policies were required. However, as the month progressed, a number of medical units were transferred from Third U. S. Army with a consequent reduction in the number of evacuation agencies available. The 64th Medical Group, 170th Medical Battalion, and the 240th Medical Battalion were assigned to First U. S. Army on 10 January. Their missions were assumed by elements of the 65th Medical Group. On 21 January, the 573d Ambulance Company, Motor, was assigned to Sixth Army Group. In addition, on 28 January, a temporary attachment to Sixth Army Group of the following units was effected:

416th Medical Collecting Company
460th Medical Collecting Company
587th Ambulance Company, Motor
606th Clearing Company


Some of the units previously assigned or attached to Third U. S. Army by order of higher headquarters had not arrived by 15 January. On that date the 475th Medical Collecting Company, the 476th Medical Collecting Company, and the 661st Clearing Company were assigned to Fifteenth U. S. Army. On 23 January the 64th Field Hospital, which had not yet arrived, was relieved of its attachment to Third U. S. Army.

Exclusive of Corps medical battalions, there were assigned and in operation with Third U. S. Army, eleven medical collecting companies, twelve ambulance companies, and six clearing companies when the month ended. The medical collecting companies continued to perform a number of vital functions, furnishing litter bearer platoons for evacuation hospitals, providing holding units for field hospital platoons and augmenting ambulance facilities. Platoons of the clearing companies were augmenting evacuation hospitals as in previous months. Ambulance companies were employed in the orthodox manner with one exception. The 101st Airborne Division and 17th Airborne Division had inadequate facilities organically for evacuation, and Army ambulance platoons were attached for purposes of second echelon evacuation in these divisions, during the litters' deployment as infantry divisions.


The 64th Medical Group supported the VIII Corps until 10 January. The 65th Medical Group supported VIII and XII Corps until 10 January, and thereafter supported VIII and XII Corps. The 66th Medical Group supported IX Corps until 10 January and the XII and IX Corps thereafter.



Improvised Litter-Sled in Folded Position



Litter-Sled in Opened Position



Simplicity of Runner Mounting on Litter



Demonstrating Method of using Litter-Sled

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At the beginning of the month, the 69th Medical Group was evacuating seven evacuation hospitals and the 65th Field Hospital. Advance Section, Communications Zone units were evacuating five evacuation hospitals and the provisional hospital being operated by the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. During the month, Advance Section, Communications Zone units gradually took over the evacuation of all but three evacuation hospitals. Third U. S. Army was responsible for supply and evacuation of a maximum of eighteen divisions during January.

The air/rail medical evacuation holding unit operated by the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion and attached units remained at THIONVILLE (U 88) during the entire month. The limitation imposed on air operations by poor weather, restricted the number of patients evacuated by this medium during the month to 2,650, which, however, constituted an increase over the previous month. Using hospital trains, rail evacuation evacuated 18,873 patients. Ambulance evacuation, including the utilization of Advance Section, Communications Zone ambulances, was responsible for 7,330 patients being moved to the rear of the Army Zone. The total number evacuated during the month of January thus totalled 28,853 patients. An air/rail medical evacuation holding unit was also operated by the 7th Field Hospital (Advance Section, Communications Zone) at ETAIN (U 47) in support of Third U. S. Army.

Reproduction of a sketch showing the locations of evacuation facilities in Third U. S. Army during the month of January will be found in Annex XXXIII to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The use of field hospitals continued along lines previously instituted in Third U. S. Army. Although some effort had been made toward placing all three platoons of a field hospital in one corps (or, failing that, with units that were geographically adjacent), some platoons were still widely separated from their parent organization. This was permitted in order to preserve the harmonious arrangement between a field hospital platoon and the division which it supported. The use of the field hospital was generally in accordance with previously established Third U. S. Army policy. Occasionally, exception was made in order to meet the exigency of some special requirement.

The 65th Field Hospital, reinforced with surgical teams, continued to function as an evacuation hospital in ARLON (P 62), providing 200 beds during a period when they were urgently needed for support of units eradicating the bulge.

The first and third platoons of the 42d Field Hospital were re-fitted while attached to the 64th Medical Group. Ten trucks were used to transport equipment of this unit from BASTOGNE (P 55), where it had been abandoned due to lack of vehicles when the unit made a retrograde movement to avoid capture during the counteroffensive. The remainder of necessary equipment was requisitioned and supplied through normal supply channels.

At the end of the month, the attachments of field hospitals were as follows:

<u>III Corps</u>		<u>VIII Corps</u>	
2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp		2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	
3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp		3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	
		1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	
		2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	
		3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	
<u>XII Corps</u>		<u>XI Corps</u>	
1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp		2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	
1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp		3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	
1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp		3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	
2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp			
<u>65th Med Gp</u>			
1st Plat, 42d Fld Hosp			
65th Fld Hosp			

The month of January saw the efforts of Third U. S. Army directed toward the reduction of the bulge and restoration of the lines in effect before the German counteroffensive. At the start of the month, all Third U. S. Army evacuation was in a southerly direction. The 12th Evacuation Hospital closed at its site in NANCY (U 81) and moved to the Casernes Volontaires in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). With the arrival of this unit, three evacuation hospitals were located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) -- the 104th, 35th, and 12th. As the reduction of the bulge progressed, the drive of the combat troops was in a north-northeast direction. It was apparent that the previously favorable positions of the evacuation hospitals on the southern flank were rapidly lengthening ambulance hauls over roads that became almost impassable due to the

damage by armored vehicles, snow and ice. With this in mind, several of the hospitals were moved to new sites. The 107th Evacuation Hospital moved from SEDAN (P 25) to HACHY (P 52).

In January the First U. S. Army reverted to the command of Twelfth Army Group. When this was accomplished, the boundary line between the First and Third U. S. Armies was also reestablished. The VIII Corps was on the northern flank of Third U. S. Army. In order to minimize the problems of evacuation previously mentioned, it was necessary to move two evacuation hospitals to support the units in VIII Corps. The 39th Evacuation Hospital closed at VIRTON (P 41) and moved to ST HUBERT (P 36). Likewise, the 109th Evacuation Hospital closed at MONTMEDI (P 20) and opened in the vicinity of LAVACHERIE (P 46).

An evacuation hospital was requested by Sixth Army Group for temporary attachment to the Seventh U. S. Army. The 103d Evacuation Hospital closed at LONGUYON (U 49) and was moved to a bivouac site in NANCY (U 81) by Third U. S. Army transportation for this purpose.

During January the enemy succeeded in projecting rocket shells into the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). These shells evidently were designed for anti-personnel use. Although the overall dispersion was erratic and the arrival was sporadic, the 104th Evacuation Hospital was hit by several of these during the night of 13 January. The blast effect and flying fragments broke many windows. There were no casualties among the hospital personnel, but several members of the quartermaster laundry platoon attached to the hospital sustained injuries from the flying fragments and one soldier was maimed to an extent requiring amputation of his right arm. The 12th Evacuation Hospital also suffered some damage, but no personnel casualties resulted.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital opened at its new site in MOULINS-LES-METZ (U 85), west of METZ (U 85) and remained there during the entire month. Despite the fact that a maximum capacity of about 2,800 beds was utilized, there still were more patients ready for evacuation to the convalescent hospital each day than could be accommodated. This necessitated a revival of the daily quota system for each evacuation hospital, which had been used previously and had proved satisfactory. The allocation of daily quotas to various Third U. S. Army hospitals was made by telephone by the Operations and Training Sub-section of the Medical Section.

For locations of hospitals during the month of January, see Annex XXIV to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of January is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer).

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	16035
(2) British Army Troops	5
(3) French Army Troops	48
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	0
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy forces personnel	1483
(7) Civilians	185
(8) Others - specify	3

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	4140
(2) Slight	11895

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:
(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	745	103
(b) Thoracic	1276	108
(c) Maxillo-facial	763	8
(d) Neurologic		
Head	977	80
Spine	292	35
Nerve	20	5
(e) Extremities		
Upper	3681	9
Lower	6461	13
(f) Buttocks	897	20
(g) Others	813	22
Sub-total	15925	433

(2) Burns - all locations

	110	3
Total	16035	436

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 4691 104

e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot Wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	3199	88
(2) Shell Wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	9793	317
(3) Bomb Wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	578	14
(4) Blast Injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	441	1
(5) Wounds from Secondary Missiles	154	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	116	3
(7) Others (specify)	1754	13
Total	16035	436



Adjustment of Drainage Tube in Battle Casualty Recovering from

Abdominal Wounds

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4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

In an attempt to salvage some of the valuable trained personnel of the Army who were afflicted with trench foot, the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion established a provisional hospital for the treatment of this condition in THIONVILLE (U 88). This hospital, which previously had been established to care for minor medical and surgical cases, now devoted its entire facilities to caring for cases of trench foot. The policy was to treat them for fifteen days. Those who could return to duty at the expiration of an additional fifteen days were sent to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. The remainder were evacuated to the Communications Zone. The original capacity of 200 was found to be inadequate and was increased to 440 patients.

Company "A", 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, remained attached to the 101st Airborne Division to replace the medical company of that unit which was captured by the enemy when the Proud Eagle Division was encircled at BASTOGNE (P 55). It was relieved from this attachment when the 101st Airborne Division was relieved from Third U. S. Army on 19 January, and the company reverted to its battalion at that time.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

A combination of bitter fighting, very rough terrain, and sub-freezing temperature, which kept snow on the ground throughout the period, produced the highest number of battle casualties in a single month since the commencement of operations of Third U. S. Army.

There were 16,035 battle casualties (wounds and/or burns) treated in Third U. S. Army hospitals in January. Of these patients, 436 died.

Based on total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army medical installations, there was a mortality rate of one percent among U. S. Army personnel.

2. Surgery

It is interesting to note that 332 of the 436 deaths among battle casualties, were due to high explosive shelling, and only eighty-eight were caused by small arms fire. It is obvious from these figures that close-in fighting was not the rule, as the majority of deaths from long range fire constituted a ratio of almost four to one.

Cold injuries caused much concern, and it was necessary for all medical installations to be on the alert for combinations such as frostbitten feet or hands occurring in patients brought in for battle wounds. When the wounded could not, for tactical reasons, be almost immediately evacuated from the battlefield, frostbitten feet or hands were likely combinations.

There were eight deaths during January from anuria. These patients had responded well after surgery, but the kidney complications caused death in three to five days. All of these cases had serious wounds which were multiple in type, and were associated with rather severe shock. They all received multiple blood transfusions. Alkalinization was attempted in all instances to no avail. A team from the Army medical laboratory was given the problem of investigating the possible causes of such complications, and initiated rather extensive studies in this connection, including laboratory work and post-mortem on all deaths in which anuria was associated.

3. Neuropsychiatry

The previous five months of varying types of combat had demonstrated that good leadership is a prime factor in the prevention of neuropsychiatric casualties. The incidence of such casualties is also influenced by such factors as operational conditions, including the type of operation, terrain, climatic conditions, and the ability from a tactical standpoint to rotate combat troops. Morale is particularly important. The type of leadership and type of operation have a great bearing on morale.

During the month of January, the bulge produced by the German breakthrough in the ARDENNES area was reduced to the German border. This battle resulted in the greatest number of total non-fatal casualties yet sustained by Third U. S. Army. During this period, there were 47,409 admissions to hospitals of Third U. S. Army from all causes. Five and five-tenths percent of these were neuropsychiatric casualties. There were 3,672 actual neuropsychiatric cases admitted to division clearing stations and/or hospitals in January. Of these, 2,836 or seventy-seven percent were returned to duty, 929 being effected at clearing station level and the remainder at hospital level.

Although Third U. S. Army had consistently had the lowest inci-

dence of neuropsychiatric casualties of any Allied Army, the incidence in January was the lowest of any of its six months of combat. Outstanding leadership, plus the fact that Third U. S. Army was again "on the move", and the awareness of every soldier that Germans were losing this battle and being forced back into Germany contributed to the exceptionally high level of morale throughout the Army.

4. Dental

The amount of dental work accomplished continued to increase over that of previous months. Following is a chart showing the breakdown of dental treatments for the month of January:

Strength (reported)	298280
Admissions (routine)	20772
Admissions (emergency)	4584
Sittings	35569
Officer Personnel	417
Enlisted Personnel	433
Restorations	2564.1
Dentures	2342
Gingivitis	1136
Gingivitis Treatment	2113
Stomatitis, Vincent's	548
Stomatitis, Vincent's (Treatment)	1138

By this time, it had been proved that the anti-concussion devices being constructed from dental acrylic had definite merit, and the Artillery Section of this headquarters was anxious to obtain devices for the gun crews of all field artillery battalions using the 155 millimeter gun. Through slight revision in methods and provision of additional equipment, it was possible to process 200 pairs of these devices in approximately a week.

The dental clinic established at the 6th Convalescent Hospital now included six assigned officers and ten dental technicians. In addition, two dental officers and four enlisted technicians were on detached service with the clinic during the month of January. Each patient of the hospital was examined by a dental officer upon his transfer from the clinical section of the hospital to a convalescent company. During the month of January, 6,740 patients were examined, of which 702 received dental treatment. All patients were placed in dental Class IV before they were discharged from a convalescent company to duty. During the month, 927 restorations were accomplished, together with 122 new prosthetic cases and eighty-one dentures repaired.

During the same period, the 32d Medical Depot Company dental clinic processed 180 denture cases. Of these, seventy were new cases, and the others were repairs, rebases, and reconstructions. In the same dental laboratory, the processing of 185 pairs of acrylic anti-concussion devices was completed. This laboratory was instrumental in caring for the prosthetic cases of one division which was in a rest area near the depot company location. In addition to this work, the clinic furnished dental treatment necessary for the smaller units in the same area.

The number of maxillo-facial cases reported for the month decreased slightly from those admitted during the previous month. Third U. S. Army medical installations had 763 admissions with maxillo-facial injuries, with eight deaths resulting from these wounds. The percentage of admissions with maxillo-facial injuries was four and seventy-five one-hundredths percent of the total battle casualties admitted during January. Of these, one and four-tenths percent died.

5. Veterinary

Nineteen inspections of Class I supply points were made during the month. Owing to the prevailing freezing weather, many problems usually encountered were eliminated. The need for damage was not acute, and the danger of spoilage in fresh meat products by defrosting was at a minimum. The greatest difficulty encountered was the freezing of vegetables. The problem was finally solved by erecting ward tents where buildings were not available, and by covering the products with straw. In some instances, stoves were used. In spite of all precautions, considerable loss through freezing of these products occurred.

Eight bakeries were inspected during the month, which provided bread for the supply points mentioned above. Six civilian establishments processing food, such as bakeries and ice cream manufacturing plants, were also inspected.

6. Personnel

The names of nineteen additional Medical Corps officers were submitted to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for permanent rotation to general hospitals in the Communications Zone. During January, permanent rotation was actually effected on four Medical Corps officers to Communications Zone units. This was the first

permanent rotation effected between Army and Communications Zone.

During the month, thirty-five Medical Corps officers were received as reinforcements. It helped to absorb an original shortage of fifty Medical Corps officers existing on 31 December 1944. Additional casualties and the arrival in Third U. S. Army area of new divisions which were short Medical Corps officers, resulted in a continuing shortage of approximately twenty-five Medical Corps officers.

The shortage of twenty-five Medical Administrative Corps officers was not rectified during January. Twelve of these officers were received from the Reinforcement System during the month, but only six second lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps, were appointed out of approximately sixty applications sent to the Office of the Chief Surgeon with recommendations for their appointment. Every effort was made to have these appointments made immediately, in order to absorb the serious shortage in Medical Administrative Corps officers in Third U. S. Army.

Approximately 1,000 Medical Department enlisted men were received from the Reinforcement System during the month. The shortage at the conclusion of the month, however, remained well over 500, and constant efforts were made to expedite the reception of additional Medical Department enlisted men through the Reinforcement System.

Approximately fifty nurses were on detached service with Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month, on loan from general hospitals which were not in operation. Similarly, a number of surgical and shock teams were also on detached service with Army hospitals during the month. These teams rendered invaluable assistance in handling the high flow of casualties which took place during the month.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

At the beginning of the month, the 32d Medical Depot Company (minus one advance section) continued in its location at METZ (U 85). The Advance Section, 32d Medical Depot Company was at AUMETZ (U 79). The 33d Medical Depot Company was also continuing in its location at LONGUYON (U 49).

No movement of the medical depots occurred during the month, with the exception of the setting up on 29 January of an advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company at BASTOGNE (P 55).

At the beginning of the new year, the overall medical supply situation was satisfactory. Medical depot stocks were balanced, and approximately a sixteen-day supply of medical supplies was on hand. During the first two weeks, the supply picture continued to improve, and shipments were received regularly. A constant and vigorous follow-up policy was maintained on items which were on requisition and not yet received. The reequipping of units whose equipment had been lost due to enemy action during the ARDENNES breakthrough in December was completely completed by the middle of the month.

Where shipments of medical supplies were received by rail, considerable difficulty had previously been experienced in identifying particular shipments in subsequent dealings with Communications Zone which might pertain to them. During this month, therefore, the Medical Section initiated a report to be submitted to this section by the Army medical depot companies subsequent to the receipt of each shipment. This report contained the following information:

1. Rail car or truck number.
2. Consignor.
3. Waybill number.
4. Requisition number, against which it was shipped.
5. Time and date received.
6. Date unloaded.
7. Tonnage.
8. Discrepancies in markings and documentation.

These reports proved invaluable in proper identification in the case of any contingency which might arise with reference to a particular shipment.

Approximately 635 long tons of medical supplies were received from the Communications Zone in Third U. S. Army medical depots during this month. Shipments were being received in a more satisfactory manner than at any time during the previous months. In an effort to expedite the shipment of medical supplies, a new system was initiated in the middle of the month. Under this plan, carload shipments were to be attached to hospital trains at PARIS (S 04) and destined for THIONVILLE (U 88) for the 32d Medical Depot Company, and PERTANGE (P 60) for the 33d Medical Depot Company. Less than carload shipments were to be placed in hospital train litter cars and delivered to the above places.

SECRET

Initially, during the month, whiskey was authorized for medicinal purposes on the following basis:

Divisions----- 2 1/2 quarts per week
 Medical Detachments----- 4 quarts per week
 Army and Corps Ctr Cos (non-divisional)----- 4 quarts per week

Later in the month, and after a survey had been made among the divisions, it was decided that the above allowance of twenty-four quarts per week was not sufficient. The allowance was therefore increased to a maximum of forty-eight quarts per week.

The Medical Section was notified by the Office of the Chief Surgeon European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, that stocks of Medical Department blankets and litters were becoming exceptionally low and were rapidly disappearing from continental reserves. Conservatory measures were therefore undertaken by this Army, and the fact that these items were in critical shortage was emphasized to all medical units under this command. A letter was prepared directing that all Medical Department blankets and litters not actually required be returned to the nearest Army medical depot, and that necessary action be taken to prevent loss and wastage of these items.

A total of 2,000 vials of diphtheria antitoxin and 1,000 vials of smallpox vaccine, on which the expiration date had passed, were turned over to Civil Affairs personnel for their use.

In the middle of the month, the problem of deadlined ambulances first arose. It was found that, as of 16 January, thirty-seven ambulances were in Ordnance for repair, and eleven others had been captured or destroyed and required replacement. The Ordnance Section of this headquarters was contacted, and arrangements were made to give first priority to ambulances in the shop for repair. In addition, information was received that approximately forty ambulances could be expected by the end of the month, or shortly thereafter.

Approximately 16,000 packets, first aid, parachute, modified by the addition of one tube of boric acid ointment, were received from the Communications Zone during this month. These packets were issued to all armored divisions on a basis of 2,000 per division. This item had been issued to troops of armored units prior to D-Day, and had been used successfully in early invasion days. The tubes of boric acid ointment were included in place of tourniquets.

Around the middle of the month two maintenance teams were formed, each consisting of one Medical Administrative Corps officer and two enlisted men, for the purpose of checking the maintenance of equipment and status of medical supply in Army medical laboratories, in Army hospital units, and Army medical gas treatment battalions. One of these teams was attached to each of the two medical depot companies, and operated from those locations. These teams, in addition to inspecting equipment, were responsible for making repairs of a minor nature and instructing unit maintenance men in proper methods of maintenance and repair. Reports on each unit inspected were submitted to the Medical Section of this headquarters.

Toward the close of the month, the Army Quartermaster informed the Army Surgeon that stoves, tent, M-1941 were now available, and that a limited quantity of burner, oil, stove, tent, M-1941 would be available in the near future. All Army medical units were therefore requested to submit a report to the Medical Section, showing the amounts authorized, on hand, and required of these items.

As of 31 January, it was determined by a survey that there were approximately 160,200 Medical Department blankets and 20,000 litters on hand in units and medical depots of Third U. S. Army. This information was forwarded to Headquarters European Theater of Operations.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Preventive Medicine problems consisted of the production of potable water, the prevention of cold type injuries to the feet and an increase in upper respiratory diseases.

2. Venereal Disease Control

Army prophylactic stations were established in LONGWY (P 50), FRANCE, VIRTON (P 41) BELGIUM, and ESCH (P 70) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), LUXEMBOURG. Army prophylactic stations gave 11,072 prophylactic treatments during the month.

Individual venereal disease contact reports were received in 374 instances. Of these, thirty-six and eight-tenths percent were contacts

made outside the Army area.

The supply of individual chemical and mechanical prophylactics remained adequate throughout the month.

The fact that most divisions were in the line, favorably affected the venereal disease rate for the month of January. Weekly statistics on venereal disease during this month may be found in Annex XIV to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

These diseases showed a slight increase over the previous monthly period. A marked increase was experienced in upper respiratory diseases, with the rate of diarrheal diseases remaining approximately the same as during the previous month.

The incidence of epidemic hepatitis increased from approximately four cases per week during December to sixteen cases per week in January.

No outbreaks of significant proportions were encountered.

A detailed breakdown of statistics on communicable diseases occurring during the month of January will be found in Annex XIV to the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

A new high for these reports was reached in January. A total of 55,483 were processed, representing an increase of approximately 10,000 over those processed in December. The quality continued to be good.

5. Non-Battle Injuries

The rate of these injuries increased from 165 to 194 per thousand per annum. The increase was mainly attributable to the icy, dangerous condition of roads, and poor visibility throughout the Army area.

Non-battle injuries represented fifteen percent of the total direct admissions as compared with twelve percent for December.

Cold type injuries, especially of the feet, increased from 128 to 264 per thousand per annum. A number of factors contributed to this tremendous increase, especially of frostbite (128 per thousand per annum). These factors included constant exposure to bitter cold, heavy snow, the emergency of the tactical situation, and the fact that practically all combat troops were committed continuously during the period.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

In January, the two base sections of the 7th Medical Laboratory operated throughout the month in the following locations:

Section I - METZ (U 85)
 Section II - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81)

The combined sections performed 9,535 tests, an increase of approximately 2,000 tests over those performed during December. This was the heaviest month of operations, in so far as the 7th Medical Laboratory was concerned.

The total work for the month of January is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	5678	59.5
Bacteriology	1532	16.1
Chemistry	485	5.1
Pathology	246	2.6
Hematology	87	0.9
Parasitology	96	1.0
Sub-total	8124	85.2
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Venereal Disease Section (6th Conv Hosp)	1411	14.8
Sub-total	1411	14.8
GRAND TOTAL	9535	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during January is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	12	2907	30.5
Convalescent Hospital	1	3165	33.2
Field Hospitals	9	334	3.5
Misc Medical Installations		443	4.6
Misc Tactical Installations		2686	28.2
Totals	22	9535	100.0

The increase in total work is reflected primarily in an increase of requests from the 6th Convalescent Hospital (plus 1,100), the evacuation hospitals (plus 454), and the Venereal Disease Section (plus 588). Roughly, one-third of the work continued to come from the tactical units, which used the laboratory consultations and diagnoses of the 7th Medical Laboratory.

7. Sanitation

With continued cold and a snow-covered terrain throughout the month, environmental sanitary conditions remained satisfactory. The health of the command was generally satisfactory during the month.

Sanitary problems due to insects, rodents, garbage and refuse disposal were practically non-existent during the period.

Difficulties in operation of water units continued during the extreme cold weather. As indicated in the December report, many improvisations were necessary to combat freezing of the tanks, filters, pumps, valves and hose lines. Treatment results were, however, better than in any previous month.

Requests for approval of modified and simplified operating procedure for water treatment units because of the cold weather conditions were approved in only three instances after determination that the water supply was being obtained from protected ground water sources.

The summary of the results of 164 bacteriological analyses of treated water from engineer water points showed an all time high for potable water samples. Less than two percent (1.83%) of the samples were non-potable as compared with forty-nine percent questionable or unsafe for human consumption during August, 1944.

Following is the summary of improvement during the past six-month period, expressed in percentage of samples:

	AUG	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan
Potable	51%	72%	85%	89%	95%	98%
Non-potable	49%	28%	15%	11%	5%	2%

Change to the recommended new method of operation of water treatment units was effected during the latter part of October and the month of November throughout the Third U. S. Army.

During the month a new directive was issued from the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, embodying the Third U. S. Army method of water treatment for adoption throughout the Theater.

CHAPTER 9
 FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Highlights of the month included the presence of roads which, as a result of spring-like thaws, became almost impassable. Medical evacuation was difficult under such circumstances. Heavy snow in the early part of the month posed similar difficulties. Unorthodox methods of evacuation, plus the fact that a lower number of casualties was being experienced, eased the situation to some extent.

Difficulty was encountered in the location of suitable covered accommodations for hospitals. Changes in Army boundaries had left Third U. S. Army with an area containing fewer suitable sites.

An innovation in February was the setting up of a provisional hospital to care exclusively for patients with self-inflicted wounds.

Unusual procedures in the field of internal medicine were instituted and are covered in a new sub-section to Section 3 of this report.

SECRET

The last week of the month saw the 4th Armored Division push to the vicinity of BITBURG (L-15) and the fall of TRIER (L-12) with a period of rapid movement of all units soon to be in the offing.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

One captain, Medical Corps, from the Operations and Training Sub-section, and one captain, Veterinary Corps, departed from the Medical Section to their new assignments with medical units of Third U. S. Army. This was in conformity with Staff Memorandum Number 73, this headquarters, dated 16 December 1944.

The Medical Section now consisted of a total of twenty-four officers (including one Army Nurse Corps), one warrant officer, and twenty-eight enlisted men.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

The training program for Information-Education officers was continued. Two officers from Army medical units attended the Information-Education Course at the Staff School in PARIS (S-04). In addition, two officers attended the Educational Adviseement Course, and one officer attended the course in Instructor Training at the Staff School.


2. Evacuation

By 1 February, the concentrated efforts of the Allied Armies had reduced the "German Bulge" to its former proportions, and they were ready for an offensive of their own. The First and Ninth U. S. Armies and the Armies of the British Twenty-First Army Group were to furnish the impetus for the proposed push. Third U. S. Army was designated to confine its activities, at least up to a certain point, to limited objectives. By the middle of the month, however, with the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle clear of the enemy, the VIII and XII Corps continued to push forward in a north, northeasterly direction, over terrain which was next to impassable. Road conditions were due partially to the heavy traffic which was brought about by the see-saw battles preceding this offensive, and partially to the melting snow which left the roadbeds a mass of mud and slush.

With roads which were too soft and slippery to accommodate fast traffic, evacuation of casualties became one of the major problems of the offensive. Movement of ambulances was extremely slow, and the majority of the evacuation hospitals were located too far to the rear to permit expeditious delivery of patients by road. On 14 February the 110th Evacuation Hospital was opened at CLERP (P-87) to partially alleviate the situation. However, due to the condition of the roads, it was decided to try a new plan of evacuating patients by transporting them from SIERCK-LES-BAINS (Q-09) to THIONVILLE (U-88) in boxcars. The 172d Medical Battalion, G-4, XX Corps, and the Railway Operations Battalion of that sector formulated the plans for this venture. Faster transportation of patients developed, and it required only about one hour and fifteen minutes, or one-half the time which it had taken to move these patients by road. This scheme was continued for three days (21-23 February), and a total of 182 casualties were evacuated by such means. Of these, 104 were ambulatory patients, and seventy-eight litter patients. On 23 February, the 94th Infantry Division uncovered a more suitable road net leading into LUXEMBOURG, and rail evacuation from SIERCK-LES-BAINS (Q-09) was discontinued on that date.

During February several units were transferred from Third U. S. Army. The 417th and 588th Ambulance Companies were assigned to Ninth U. S. Army, the 587th Ambulance Company and the 606th Clearing Company were assigned to Sixth Army Group, and the 460th Medical Collecting Company continued in its status of attachment to Sixth Army Group. The 416th Medical Collecting Company was relieved from its temporary attachment to Sixth Army Group and returned to Third U. S. Army. There were assigned to and operating with Third U. S. Army eleven ambulance companies.

When III Corps was assigned to First U. S. Army on 13 February, the units of the corps medical battalion, consisting of one battalion headquarters, two medical collecting companies, and one clearing company remained with Third U. S. Army. Exclusive of units attached to corps medical battalions, this brought the total number of collecting companies to thirteen and the clearing companies to six. Ambulance and collecting companies were employed as in the past, except in the case of ten ambulances of the 419th Medical Collecting Company. These remained attached to the 17th Airborne Division for second echelon medical service until 10 February, at which time that division was relieved of attachment to Third U. S. Army and returned to the First Allied Air-



"Weasel" Carrying Two Litter and Three Ambulatory Patients

borne Army. Station and litter bearer platoons of collecting companies and clearing companies were employed to augment the staffs of the evacuation hospitals. Holding units were also organized from headquarters and station platoons of collecting companies to care for non-transportable post-operative patients when field hospital platoons moved forward.

Until the assignment of III Corps to First U. S. Army, the 65th Medical Group was supporting it and the VIII Corps; the 66th Medical Group supported XII and XI Corps; and the 69th Medical Group evacuated the 35th, 12th, and 106th Evacuation Hospitals. Advance Section, Communications Zone was responsible for the evacuation of the remaining hospitals.

The 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion continued to operate the air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at THIONVILLE (U-88) for the entire month, though this unit was forced to operate under weather conditions which seriously hampered potential air evacuation. The number of casualties evacuated by air was limited to 2,473, as compared to a total of 3,061 evacuated by rail.

It was during this month that the first hospital train to use LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) was loaded with patients directly from Third U. S. Army hospitals. On 17 February, 238 litter and sixty-four ambulatory patients were evacuated by rail from the 12th, 34th, 35th, and 104th Evacuation Hospitals in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81), the 101st Evacuation Hospital at BERG (P-83), and the 58th Field Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) at PETANGE (P-61) to the Hospital Center at BAR-LE-DUC (U-12). As operations proceeded, however, the use


of this station for the evacuation of patients was discontinued because of the fact that the number of patients did not justify its operation for such a purpose. Likewise, the small number of casualties requiring evacuation prompted the closing on 23 February of the 58th Field Hospital which had been operating as a holding unit for Third U. S. Army at PETANGE (P-61). It was the original plan to employ the 7th Field Hospital (also an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) as a holding unit for Third U. S. Army at BASTOGNE (P-55), but this plan was thwarted when fire destroyed the buildings which the unit was to occupy and by certain rail traffic difficulties.

The seriousness of the problems which confronted the Army Medical Service with respect to the evacuation of patients is amply reflected by the fact that, because of heavy snow and practically impassable roads, extreme measures were initiated to continue the normal flow of casualties within the division areas. Regardless of the comparatively small number of casualties during February, the fact remained that satisfactory evacuation was extremely difficult. To illustrate the urgency of a suitable means of carrying out proper evacuation of patients in the division areas, it is only necessary to review some of the methods employed in an attempt to overcome the obstacles brought about by the elements. After a trial with litters on sleds and track-laying cargo carriers (weasels), it was decided that the use of dog teams would prove more desirable in the evacuation of casualties within the division echelons. Hence, it was determined to order thirteen dog teams of the Air Rescue Service from Labrador. The final contingent of a total of 130 dogs, fourteen enlisted men, and thirteen officers arrived at THIONVILLE (U-88) on 13 February. During the ensuing period between the request and the delivery, however, the snow had melted, and the teams were never employed.

Total evacuations for the month follow:

Air-----	2,473
Rail-----	3,061
Road-----	10,105
Total	15,639


For locations of evacuation facilities during the month, see Medical Annex XXVI.



"Weasel" Carrying Three Litter Patients


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


1. Display of Equipment used in each Car for Evacuation of Patients

from SIERCK to THIONVILLE



Top of Box Cars Marked to Show Transportation of Wounded




2. Placing of Wounded in Box Car

BOX CAR EVACUATION FROM DIVISION AREA

FEBRUARY

1945



3. Removing Wounded from Cars



4. Transferring Wounded from Train to Ambulances



SECRET

SECRET

3. Hospitalization

With the exceptions of using the 65th Field Hospital as a provisional evacuation hospital and attaching the first platoon of the 42d Field Hospital to the 34th Medical Battalion, the field hospitals were utilized in the same manner as Third U. S. Army had previously employed them. At the end of the month, the attachments of the field hospitals were as follows:

VIII Corps		VII Corps	
3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp

IX Corps	
2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp

With the complete reduction of the bulge, resulting from the German counteroffensive, Third U. S. Army continued the attack. In the early stages of the attack, VIII Corps on the northern flank was making the principal effort. There was considerable difficulty in locating covered accommodations for evacuation hospitals in this sector because the fierce fighting had reduced the majority of the buildings to rubble and ventilated them to an extent that was considered extreme. The 101st Evacuation Hospital was established in the GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG's Summer Palace in BERG (P-83), and on 8 February patients were received at that installation. Six days later, the 110th Evacuation Hospital was moved from ESCH (P-70) to CLERP (P-76) to augment the 101st Evacuation Hospital. With the former unit only four miles from the front, and the 101st Evacuation Hospital relatively close to enemy activity, the critical situation which had existed for several days began to assume a more normal aspect. With these two hospitals established in the north and central area of the front, immediate plans were made and executed to bring others nearer to the zone of activity. The 65th Field Hospital, still functioning as an evacuation hospital, moved from ARLON (P-62) to ETTEBRUCK (P-95), and the 34th Evacuation Hospital moved from METZ (U-85) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). A total of four evacuation hospitals were now located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81); namely, the 12th, 34th, 35th, and 104th.

Advantage of this ample support was taken to close the 35th and 104th Evacuation Hospitals at different times, in order to rest the personnel, who had been furnishing medical support from the beginning of the reduction of the bulge.

The 103d Evacuation Hospital, which had been temporarily attached to Sixth Army Group, was assigned to First U. S. Army on 26 February.

During the month of February, extensive use was made of civilian labor for the essential duties of housekeeping in Army hospitals. As in previous months, this aid was secured through civilian agencies on a reverse lend-lease basis.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained at its location in MOULINS-LES-METZ (U-85) during the entire month. The large number of upper respiratory infections, brought on during the month by exposure to freezing temperatures, placed a tremendous strain on the convalescent hospital. The daily quota system continued to be employed. In order to relieve the burden on the 6th Convalescent Hospital, a provisional hospital was formed by the 436th Medical Battalion and put in operation at MONDRUP-LES-BAINS (P-90) to care for convalescent medical cases which would otherwise go to the 6th Convalescent Hospital.

At MONDRUP-LES-BAINS (P-90) seven hotels in the famous Spa provided a 900-bed capacity for the hospital proper. Four more hotels, and several boarding houses and villas, were used as accommodations for organic and attached hospital personnel. The beautiful parks and surrounding environs provided an ideal locale for convalescent patients. The baths of MONDRUP-LES-BAINS (P-90) perfected the setup.

The location of Third U. S. Army hospitals during February will be found in Medical Annex XIVII.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of February is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e. not by transfer).

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	10631
(2) British Army Troops	3

(3) French Army Troops	12
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	0
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	1056
(7) Civilians	13
(8) Others	27

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	2957
(2) Slight	7674

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:

(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	500	67
(b) Thoracic	939	67
(c) Maxillo-facial	719	4
(d) Neurologic		
Head	683	43
Spine	241	9
Nerve	3	1
(e) Extremities		
Upper	2624	9
Lower	3898	41
(f) Buttocks	443	9
(g) Others	509	3
Sub-total	10559	253
(2) Burns - all locations	72	2
Total	10631	255

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds:

	3500	46
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e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:

(1) Gunshot Wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	2440	61
(2) Shell Wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	6302	157
(3) Bomb Wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	721	22
(4) Blast Injuries (bomb, shell or mine)	455	6
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	81	2
(6) Burns (petrol, flash, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	81	1
(7) Others	531	6
Total	10631	255

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Pen W abdomen	Hemorrhage	2
Perf W chest	Hemorrhage	2
Perf W chest	Lac W liver and ascending colon	1
Pen W abdomen	Mult lac of ascending colon	1
Pen W abdomen	Mult lac stomach & colon	1
Pen W chest	Hemorrhage cerebral concussion	1
Pen W scalp	Intracranial & abdominal injuries	1
Perf W abdomen	Mult lac of ileum & sigmoid colon	1
Pen W chest	Mult lac of lung, diaphragm spleen, & colon	1
Pen W chest	Mult lac of small intestine & bladder	1
Pen W chest	Hemothorax-severance of spinal cord at D-6	1
Pen W chest	FGC thigh right	1
Pen W chest	Lac of liver and superior pole kidney right	1
Pen W abdomen	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W chest	Perf W abdomen with ileus, FGC femur	1
Pen W chest	Pen W abdomen with lac of splenic artery	1
Pen W shell (HE) head	Cerebral injury & shock	2
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with multiple lac of small intestine, transection of small	Mesenteric thrombosis & gangrene of entire small intestine	1

intestine & descending colon	Right pneumothorax, pneumonia left base, shock of wound disruption & secondary operation	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with lac ascending colon	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W shell (HE) lower extremities traumatic amputation left leg, Frac C mult right leg at ankle tibia, fibula, femur, FCC right humerus	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with mult lac small intestine & transection descending colon & retroperitoneal hematoma	Hemorrhage, shock & pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell (HE) spine with complete diplegia of lower extremities	Continued hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with transection duodenum, lac right kidney & transection left ureter	Shock & pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell (HE) abdomen with lac cecum intestinal evisceration, mult intestinal perforation	Anuria & icterus	4
Pen W (HE) abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Pen W GSW abdomen	Pulmonary edema	2
Perf W, SFW (HE) abdomen	Pulmonary edema	2
Pen W GSW abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Pen W, SFW abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Pen W (mine) abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Amputation, traumatic, incomplete, ankle right	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	2
Amputation, traumatic, complete, thigh right	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Perf W, SFW (HE) head	Shock severe, trauma & pulmonary edema	1
Perf W, SFW (HE) chest left	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Perf W GSW chest left	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
Pen W, SFW (HE) chest right	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	1
GSW Pen severe, right chest W with extensive lac of right lung involving large bronchus & branch of pulmonary artery	Hemorrhage, severe	1
GSW Pen right chest, lac pulmonary artery	Shock & hemorrhage	1
SFW, severe, chest left with lac of diaphragm	Irreversible shock	1
SFW, Perf left chest, FCC skull	Shock	1
SFW, Perf severe neck	Shock	1
SFW, mult Pen severe neck mediastinum, abdomen	Shock and hemorrhage	1
SFW, Pen left chest with lac of left lung, lower lobe	Acute pulmonary edema	1
SFW, severe lac left shoulder & chest	Shock & hemorrhage	2
SFW, Pen right thorax with Perf right lung	Pulmonary edema & shock	1
SFW, Pen right chest	Shock & hemorrhage	1
GSW, Pen right subinguinal region to upper right abdomen	Irreversible shock	1
GSW left flank, Pen	Exsanguination	1
SFW, Pen chest	Shock & hemorrhage	1
GSW, Pen W of left chest	Irreversible shock & exposure	1
SFW, Pen upper third left forearm with FGC radius, SFW, Pen severe upper third of left thigh	Broncho-pneumonia, right upper & middle lobes, Pulmonary edema	1
SFW, Pen right chest with lac of upper lobe, right lung	Shock & hemorrhage	4
SFW, chest	Shock & hemorrhage	12
SFW, abdomen	Shock & hemorrhage	4
GSW chest	Shock & hemorrhage	1
GSW abdomen	Shock & hemorrhage	1
SFW lower extremities	Shock	1
Burns	Hemorrhage, shock	1
Pen (GSW abdomen	Shock, traumatic	1
Pen (mine frag) W left thigh	Shock, DOA	1
Pen GSW buttocks	Shock	4
Pen GSW chest	Atelastasis, lobar	1
Pen shell frag W left buttock	Anuria, complete	1
Pen shell frag W abdomen		1

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Perf GSW left buttock	Oliguria severe	1
Pen shell frag W chest	Shock	1
Pen shell, frag W chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Skull frac	Eosanguination	1
Terminal anuria & edema, lungs	Mult wounds	1
Perf W abdomen LIQ	Irreversible shock	1
Blast injury, cerebral & pulmonary mult W	Circulatory failure	1
Pen W shrap W abdomen	Shock	3
Pen W shrap W chest	Shock	2
Perf GSW chest	Shock	2
Perf W GSW abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W neck	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W neck	Shock	1
Cerebral concussion	Shock	2
Perf W abdomen	Shock	1
Perf W abdomen	Peritonitis	1
FCC skull	Herniation of brain	3
FCC skull	Meningitis	1
Perf W elbow joint left	Hemorrhage	1
Coronary occlusion		1
Perf W shell (HE) abdomen, head, thoracic	Hemorrhage	12
Frac compound (bomb, mortar, mine)		1
Traumatic amputation SW (HE) left leg	Shock	1
Pen W, SW (HW) skull, extrusion of brain	Shock	2
Perf and Pen W, GSW right upper arm, right chest	Hemorrhage, hemothorax & shock	1
Pen W, FCC, SW (mortar) right arm & right humerus	Dilation right ventricle of heart partial atelectasis & congestion of lungs	1
Blast injury burns third degree SW (HE) thighs	Contusion of lungs, hemothorax LW, spleen kidneys	1
Pen W, GSW, left thigh FCC, left femur severe left femoral artery	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W, SW (HE) left elbow, buttocks, abdomen	General peritonitis, atelectasis of lungs, Empyema left, toxic myocarditis shock	1
Pen W, SW, (rocket) skull, extrusion of brain	Shock	1
Perf W, SW (HE) left knee	Hemorrhage, shock, hydrothorax	1
Traumatic amp, SW (HE) right foot, severe lac left forearm	Hemorrhage & shock	1
FCC, unknown force, skull with intracerebral hemorrhage	Shock	1
Pen W, SW (HE) chest, left forearm & pericardiac effusion	Shock	1
Traumatic amp SW (HE) right lower thigh	Hemorrhage, shock	1
Pen W, SW (HE) abdomen	Peritonitis	1
Pen W shell, thigh	Shock	1
Pen W shell left buttocks	Shock	1
MW shell left shoulder	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Shock	2
MW, shell left leg	Shock	1
MW shell left leg	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Pulmonary edema	1
MW shell right hip	Shock	1
Pen W shell skull	Pulmonary edema	1
MW shell right hip	Shock	1
Pen W shell abdomen	Shock	1
Perf W chest, LW right forearm	Traumatic shock & pneumonia	1
Perf W left arm		1
DOA frac skull, left shoulder & arm	Skull injury	1
Pen W lower lumbar region over 1st sacral body	Cardio-respiratory failure	1
Pen W back with FCC spine & lamina of thoracic 3d & 4th incomplete cord lesion thoracic 2d & hemothorax right	Traumatic shock with pneumonia	1
Pen W both legs, FCC right femur, Pen W right forearm with FCC radius	Traumatic shock with progressive circulatory collapse	1
Traumatic amp left upper thigh with gas gangrene & traumatic amputation left forearm, FCC	Irreversible shock	1

right femur & avulsion W right thigh		
FCC right femur & pelvis, avulsion of right buttock & rectus femur muscle of right thigh	Traumatic shock & hemorrhage	1
Pen W left buttock, Perf W sigmoid & jejunum	General peritonitis with small bowel obstruction	1
Gutter W buttock, deep to sacrum with FCC sacrum & coccyx	Traumatic shock	1
Pen W, GSW, left thigh	Shock	1
Pen W shell left cheek	Cerebral anemia	1
Pen W shell left & right thighs	Pneumonia, broncho	1
Traumatic amp, shell left leg	Pneumonia, lobar	1
Perf W shell upper extremity	Pneumonia, broncho	1
Perf W shell chest	Pneumothorax, hemothorax, atelectasis	1
Pen W back GSW	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell chest	Pulmonary edema	1
Perf W shell right thigh	Blast injury with pneumonia, broncho	1
Pen W shell head	Cerebral edema	1
Mult Pen W shell upper extremities	Uremia	1
Pen W, GSW, head	Massive subdural hemorrhage	1
Perf W, GSW, chest	Pneumonia, broncho, extensive	1
Perf W shell right thigh	Shock	1
Pen W shell head	Cerebral edema	1
Pen W shell spine	Uremia	1
Pen W shell face & neck	Shock	1
Traumatic amp (mine) right leg	Pulmonary embolism	1
Perf W shell chest	Shock	1
GSW Pen spine	Shock irreversible	1
Pen W shell chest	Shock irreversible	1
GSW, MW, Pen right shoulder	Respiratory failure	1
Concussion cerebral	Respiratory failure	1
Extensive avulsion mandible & maxilla		
Pen W shell head	Respiratory failure	3
Pen W, MW, right leg	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, MW, shell, FC left leg	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, MW, shell, abdomen	Respiratory failure	2
Pen W shell left buttock	Acute liver insufficiency	1
Pen W, MW, shell face	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W shell traumatic amputation left leg		
Pen W shell head	Respiratory paralysis	1
Traumatic amputation, left leg	Shock, pulmonary edema	1
FCC skull	Shock, extreme	2
Pen W chest	Shock, extreme	1
Extensive W base of skull (bomb) booby trap	Shock & hemorrhage	1
Multiple Pen & Perf W right lower extremity (bomb) land mine	Massive pulmonary edema congestion generalized capillary engorgement of all viscera due to shock from severe blast effect	1
Extensive W of head with brain damage shell (HE)	Shock	2
Extensive W of lower extremities (bomb) land mine	Shock, severe	1
Extensive W of lower extremities shell (HE)	Uremia & pulmonary edema	1
Pen W skull with herniation of brain tissue & FCC skull, Pen W right arm, Pen W left leg		
Pen W abdomen, Pen W left parietal region skull with FC parietal bone		
Pen W neck through trachea & apex of right lung	Pneumonia, broncho, bilateral, pneumothorax & atelectasis, right, mediastinitis	1
Perf W abdomen with transection of jejunum, FCC L-5 with spinal cord involvement		
FCC skull Pen W neck Perf W right arm	Pen W (sucking) right axilla DOA CRO	1
Pen W left chest, FCC right arm & forearm, MW right arm & right thigh, intracranial injury (no external head wound)		
Pen W skull, left parietal region		

with FCC skull with appearance of cerebral tissue, Pen W left neck, DOA CRO		
Gas gangrene right leg, FCC left knee joint, MW Pen W legs & thighs, multiple, LW hands, FC middle phalanx, left 2d finger & proximal phalanx left 5th finger	Shock, irreversible, nephrosis tubular, edema, pulmonary	1
Perf W extensive, left arm, FCC left humerus, lower third, Pen W base left thumb, LW left index finger, DOA CRO	Shock	1
Pen W right chest, pneumo & hemothorax; pneumoperitoneum secondary to perforation of diaphragm; lac of right kidney with hematuria; FCC laminae & transverse processes of 2,3,4 lumbar vertebrae; impact fracture left ilium, foreign body traumatic imbedded in left iliac bone		
Pen W face, right side	FCC skull with herniation of brain tissue	1
Pen W shell (HE) brain	Cerebral edema & respiratory paralysis	1
Perf W shell (HE) brain	Cerebral edema & respiratory paralysis	1
Pen W (bomb) mine, chest & abdomen	Blast concussion of lung	1
Perf GSW chest & abdomen	Shock, traumatic	1
Burns, 2d degree & 3d degree of face, neck & extremities	Shock & blast concussion of brain & lungs	1
Frac, simple (bomb) left femur	Blast concussion of brain & lungs	1
Perf GSW neck	Shock, traumatic	1
Pen W shell (HE) left buttock & anus	Shock & cardiac failure	1
Pen W shell (mortar) right buttock with Perf of rectum	Shock, traumatic	1
Perf W (bomb) W head	Cerebral concussion	1
Shell wound	Blast injury to lungs	1
Bomb wounds (mine)	Asphyxia, caused by aspiration	1
GSW	Respiratory paralysis, due to cervical cord injury	1
Shell wound	Uremia	1
Bomb wound	Irreversible shock	1
Shell wound	Irreversible shock	1
Skull frac	Irreversible shock	1
GSW	Pulmonary edema	1
GSW	Shock	1
GSW	Aspiration with respiratory collapse	1
GSW	Massive hemothorax	1
Mult W both legs, mult W chest, abdomen	Shock, profound, sustained irreversible	1
GSW through abdomen, left	Shock, irreversible, circulatory	1
Pen W abdomen	Shock, irreversible, circulatory	1
Mult W chest, extremities, Pen W of penis with urinary extravasation, hemothorax bilateral, pneumothorax, lt serve	Shock, profound, irreversible	1
Partial traumatic amp of right ankle & foot	Pulmonary embolism, severe	1
Mult Pen W abdomen (mine)	Shock	1
Pen W abdomen GSW	Peritonitis; bronchial pneumonia	1
g. Number of transfusions of:		
(1) Fresh whole blood		946
(2) Stored blood		4834
(3) Dry plasma		6210
(4) Other blood substitutes (Do not include crystalloids)		0
h. Number of units of penicillin administered		
		4,075,450,000
i. Number of amputations:		

(1) Upper extremity 72
 (2) Lower extremity 215

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

U. S. Army 79 Other 14

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

U. S. Army 7947 Other 698

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

The 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion continued to operate its provisional hospital at THIONVILLE (U-88) for cold injury (trench foot and frostbite) cases, on a fifteen-day basis.

In accordance with the policy of the Army Commander, all patients with self-inflicted wounds were held in Army hospitals, pending investigation and/or trial by courts-martial. Investigations of many of these cases were not completed for as long as four to six weeks. In order to relieve the burden on evacuation hospitals of caring for such patients during their extended hospitalization, and to release these beds for normal use, it was decided to form a provisional hospital to be specifically charged with the care of patients with self-inflicted wounds. On 14 February, the 34th Medical Battalion opened a provisional hospital at the former site of the 110th Evacuation Hospital in ESCH (P-70). Company "A" of the 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, the first platoon, 42d Field Hospital, and the 623d Clearing Company were attached to the 34th Medical Battalion as augmentation for this purpose. On the first day of operation, ninety-five cases of "SIN's" were admitted by transfer from Third U. S. Army hospitals.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

During the month of February, 10,631 battle casualties were treated in Third U. S. Army medical installations. Of this number, 255 died.

Based on total dispositions from all causes in Third U. S. Army personnel, once again the mortality rate was only one percent.

2. Surgery

February, 1945 marked the end of six months of operation in Third U. S. Army. Throughout this period the activity of the Army was clearly reflected in the battle casualties which varied with the intensity of the offensive then in progress. The intensity of the offensive is definitely factual, as not once was this Army actually on the defensive. With our lines always being pushed forward, it was possible to maintain very close medical support. During the half-year period, 64,389 battle casualties were admitted to our medical installations.

Of these casualties, 16,885 or twenty-six percent were caused by small arms fire, i.e. rifle, machine gun, or pistol; and 46,735 or seventy-three percent were wounded with fragments of high explosive shells, mortars, mines, or bombs. Only 769 or one percent were burn casualties. It is interesting to note that only one out of every four wounds resulted from small arms fire. Some thirty percent or 19,847 battle casualties had multiple wounds.

The evaluation of the results obtained in the treatment of the casualties gives an idea of the excellent surgical care which was administered during the six months. There were only 1,870 deaths in all types of installations from battalion aid stations on back through the evacuation hospitals, and including those cases that were dead upon arrival. This gives a mortality rate of two and nine-tenths percent for battle casualties alone. When all admissions, non-battle casualties and medical, are included, the mortality rate for the Army over the six-months' period is found to be one and seven-tenths percent.

A further study of the battle casualties during this period revealed that 5,075 or eight percent were neurosurgical cases, involving the head and spine. Most of these cases were treated in the evacuation hospitals. It was found that these cases withstood transportation very well; and, for that reason, the neurosurgical teams were maintained at the evacuation hospital level. The mortality rate in this group of cases was nine and four-tenths percent.

Most maxillo-facial injuries were also treated at the evacuation hospitals and numbered 3,770 or five percent of the total. The mortality rate in this group was only one percent. Not only is this mortality rate remarkable, but the shortened period of morbidity and the prevention of many of the terrible facial deformities of the last war,

through early surgical care by skilled plastic surgeons, is even more noteworthy.

Wounds of the chest totaled 5,677, or about ten percent, while abdominal wounds accounted for an additional 2,907 cases or five percent. Many of these cases were operated upon in the field hospital platoons by trained surgical teams. These units functioned at the same level as the division clearing stations, where they treated all non-transportable casualties. Through this arrangement, shock therapy was administered and surgery accomplished within a few hours of the time of injury. Following operation, these cases were held in the field hospital for a week or ten days to allow recovery from surgery before being transported to the rear. As a result of this type of care, the mortality in chest wounds was approximately eight percent and in abdominal wounds fifteen and five-tenths percent.


The highest percentage of wounds involved the extremities. There were 16,327 patients or twenty-five percent of the total battle casualties with injuries of the upper extremities and thirty-five percent or 23,273 patients with injuries of the lower extremities. The mortality rate was only three percent of the former and one percent of the latter group. Wounds of the buttocks accounted for 3,745 of the casualties or six percent with a mortality of two percent, and wounds of the genitalia and other parts of the body not listed above accounted for 3,615 or six percent with a mortality of one and four-tenths percent.

The chart shown in Medical Annex XVIII to this report graphically illustrates the above discussion.

2a. Medical Services

Prior to the month of February, policies of medical, as distinct from the surgical, services of Third U. S. Army were so adequately covered in Appendix Number III to Medical Annex 16 of the Third U. S. Army Outline Plan for "OPERATION OVERLORD" that a section relating to internal medicine has not previously been set up in this after action report. During the month of February, two changes of policy were made with reference to the medical services, both of which were calculated to enhance the medical services and conserve many men within the Army area who would otherwise be lost to Communications Zone hospitals.

In the first place, authority was obtained from the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations for the Chief Radiologist of the 12th Evacuation Hospital (a 750-bed hospital) to administer x-



Debridement of Muscle Tissue on the Leg Wounds of a Casualty

ray therapy. This officer was a professionally qualified radiologist and a member of the American Board of Radiology. Prior to the initiation of x-ray therapy in the 12th Evacuation Hospital, the machine was calibrated by the Victoreen r meter to insure standardized radiation dosage. It was contemplated that x-ray therapy would be utilized only in selected cases which required small dosage, and in which treatment could be completed in a matter of a few days. This would obviate returning a considerable number of cases to rearward installations, and thereby conserve their services within the Army area. One restriction was placed on the use of this superficial x-ray therapy. It was not to be used on plantar warts, and would be administered only by the single officer designated, and not by the 12th Evacuation Hospital as a unit.

Secondly, the Venereal Disease Center which had been set up some months previously at the 6th Convalescent Hospital was implemented by the addition to that staff of a qualified urologist. All cases of gonorrhea which failed to respond to two courses of penicillin and/or sulfonamides, or which were diagnosed as chronic, with or without stricture, were to be channeled from other Third U. S. Army hospitals to this designated center for treatment. The enlargement of the center through the addition of the urologist was specifically directed toward successful treatment of all cases of chronic and penicillin and/or sulfonamide resistant gonorrhea. It was estimated that between fifty and 200 men could be returned to full duty from the Army level each month, who might otherwise be lost to Communications Zone medical installations.

The month was characterized by a gradual decline in the overall incidence of medical, as distinct from surgical, conditions. There was a distinct decline in cold type injuries, as well as in upper respiratory infections. The general medical picture tended to approach approximately twenty-five percent of all admissions, as contrasted to fifty percent to fifty-five percent in the preceding three months.

There were no diseases of epidemic importance, the closest approach being an outbreak of epidemic hepatitis in the 26th Infantry Division. During the month, there were approximately 105 cases of this disease scattered throughout the division. The majority of these cases were mild, and most of them were returned to duty within eleven to twenty-one days, with very few being evacuated from the Army area. The incidence was equally distributed among the combat and administrative personnel of the division. Although these cases represented a rise above the normal to be expected within a single unit, it was not considered that the incidence in any way approached epidemic proportions.

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3. Neuropsychiatry

With the ARDENNES bulge eliminated during the month of January, the Third U. S. Army confined its efforts in February to what might be called an aggressive defensive. The enemy's counteroffensive, extending into January, which resulted in a record number of casualties within Third U. S. Army for any one month, was replaced by a type of warfare somewhat similar to that employed by this Army; that is, primarily a holding operation. The result was that Third U. S. Army's total non-fatal casualty admissions for the month of February dropped to approximately 15,000 less than those for the previous month. Five and seven-tenths percent of the total of 32,189 non-fatal casualties admitted during February were neuropsychiatric, and seventy-three percent of the 1,847 cases of this type were returned to duty as compared to seventy-seven percent returned to duty during the previous month. The percentage of neuropsychiatric casualties to the total admissions showed a two-tenths percent increase over the five and five-tenths recorded during January. A comparison of the two months' percentages and ratios shows no marked variation with relation to neuropsychiatric casualties.

The fact that proper rotation of troops to division rest areas is a command function was stressed as heretofore, and continuous emphasis was placed upon the fact that this rotation is very definitely a contributing factor to the reduction of neuropsychiatric conditions.

4. Dental

During February, five prosthetic dental detachments were activated by Headquarters Third U. S. Army upon authority received from Headquarters European Theater of Operations. These detachments, based upon the T/O and E in column BH, 8-500, consisted of one captain, Dental Corps, and three enlisted dental technicians. The organization provided for each detachment to operate from a dental prosthetic truck. Since only three trucks would ultimately be available, one detachment each was attached to the two Army Medical Depot Companies. The Surgeons of each of the three corps requested that a detachment be assigned to them for operation with the clearing company attached to the corps headquarters. These assignments were made since the prosthetic treatment available to Army troops would thus be distributed where the greatest numbers of troops could best be served.

It was believed that the addition of the five prosthetic detachments would supplement the already excellent denture service available in Third U. S. Army to the point where all echelons could receive attention with a minimum of time lost from duty.

Officer and enlisted personnel were drawn from experienced, well qualified groups so little time would be lost in establishing a well-rounded and smoothly-functioning detachment. The headquarters of the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group was chosen to administer the five detachments and serve as their headquarters.

The Army Dental Surgeon's inspections of dental installations revealed that evacuation hospitals were receiving many maxillo-facial cases which were being well-handled prior to evacuation. All clinics were devoting much of their time to the treatment of routine operative cases who were being placed in Class IV without delay. The latter cases were receiving the necessary prosthetic attention upon completion of the required operative and surgical procedures.

Although there were a fewer admissions for routine dental treatment during the month of February, a greater number of restorations were completed than during any month since October, 1944. The incidence of Vincent's infection was lower than it had been since March, 1944.

A chart is shown below giving the breakdown of dental treatments for the month of February:

Strength (Reported)-----	374493
Admissions Routine-----	22303
Admissions Emergency-----	4065
Sittings-----	32698
Officer Personnel-----	343
Enlisted Personnel-----	369
Restorations-----	25626
Dentures-----	2128
Gingivitis-----	1364
Gingivitis Treatment-----	2076
Stomatitis Vincent's Treatment-----	469

5. Veterinary

Seventeen inspections were made of Class I supply points. Thawing weather and rain, together with rapid movement of the Army, made it difficult to find proper sites for supply points. Constant check was necessary to prevent loss from moisture.

Five bakeries supplying the above points were inspected and found to be satisfactory.

6. Personnel

Names of Medical Department Officers and enlisted men were submitted to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, for permanent rotation to general hospitals in the Communications Zone, in the following numbers:

Medical Corps officers-----	6
Dental Corps officers-----	4
Medical Administrative Corps officers-----	2
Enlisted men-----	25

Permanent rotation was actually effected in February of eleven Medical Corps officers. In addition, rotation was offered within Army on a much larger scale than heretofore, in an attempt to salvage the services of Medical Department personnel, particularly in division areas. Nine Medical Corps officers were so rotated. Division Surgeons were apprised of the fact that rotation was available to Army units of Medical Department officers, on forty-eight hours' notice.

During the month, ten Medical Corps officers were received as reinforcements. Shortages among Medical Department commissioned personnel, as of the end of the month, were as follows:

Medical Corps-----	32
Dental Corps-----	9
Medical Administrative Corps-----	40

Consistent efforts were continued to obtain proper reinforcements from the Communications Zone. However, Theater shortages, particularly in regard to Medical Corps officers, continued to exist and made difficult the obtaining by Third U. S. Army of sufficient reinforcements in this category to bring it up to T/O strength. There were still sufficient applications for appointments as second lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps, which had been approved by this headquarters and forwarded to Headquarters European Theater of Operations during January, to make up the deficit existing within Third U. S. Army in that branch. Appointments, however, were slow in coming through.

Shortages in enlisted men continued to approximate a consistent total of more than 500. Constant efforts were made to secure such a number in a block from Communications Zone general hospitals, with the thought in mind that this would even out the shortage curve to a point closely approaching zero. Reinforcements of Medical Department enlisted men were being sent to Third U. S. Army in sufficient numbers to counteract current casualties and losses.

Approximately fifty nurses remained on detached service with Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month. These nurses were on loan from general hospitals which were not in operation. As the general hospitals to which the particular nurses were assigned went into operation, exchange was effected for a similar number of nurses from other general hospitals, not yet in operation.

A number of surgical and shock teams were also on detached service with Army hospitals during the month, on loan from general hospitals.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Few changes occurred in the locations of the medical depot companies during February. The 32d Medical Depot Company (minus one advance section) continued in its locations at METZ (U-85). The advance section of this company remained at AUMETZ (U-79) throughout the month. The 33d Medical Depot Company also continued in its location at LONGUYON (U-49). At the close of the month, however, the 33d Medical Depot Company closed at that location in preparation for a movement to ETTLEBRUCK (P-84). An advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company remained at BASTOGNE (P-55) until 26 February. It became operational on 27 February at ETTLEBRUCK (P-84).

There was little change in the overall medical supply situation. Through extraordinary shipments of medical supplies from Communications Zone in January, an adequate stock of medical supplies had been accumulated. During February, shipments were received regularly, and a total of 380 long tons of medical supplies were actually received from Communications Zone during this month. The major difficulty encountered was the continued inability of hospital trains to make an even property exchange on blankets. This problem had been a bothersome one for several months, and further corrective action was initiated.

Due to the poor condition of roads to the rear in the vicinity of REIMS (T-37), caused by February thaws, restrictions were placed by

appropriate authorities in the Communications Zone, barring these roads from travel by two and one-half ton trucks, or heavier vehicles. As a result, an excessive amount of salvage material accumulated at both Army medical depots. On 10 February, two highways to REIMS (T-37) were opened, and twelve trucks were obtained from the 24th Regulating Station (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) to carry salvage material from the Army medical depots to Depot M-408 at REIMS (T-37).

Also during the early part of the month, Twelfth Army Group requested the Army Surgeon to prepare a list of medical items to be used for an emergency air drop, in the quantity required to support 15,000 men for one day. This list consisted of fourteen items, and weighed approximately 18,377 pounds, occupying a space of approximately 10,798 cubic feet.

In the middle of the month, information was received that the air field Y-33 at THIONVILLE (U-86) was closed for cargo and that all shipments of supplies by air would be sent to A-82-C at ETAIN (U-47) until further notice.

Approximately 200 cases of captured liquors were released by AC of S, G-4, for issue to Army medical units for medicinal purposes. Distribution was made to the units on a strength basis from one of the Army medical depot companies.

Among unusual items received during the month were 20,000 bags, patients' effects. Basis of issue from the Army level included one for every two beds in units other than divisions and for divisions, not to exceed an estimated seven days' consumption. Sufficient quantities of tray, food, six compartment, were received from the Communications Zone to allow each evacuation hospital 300 of this item. Limited quantities of markers, Red Cross, nine feet, six inches by twenty-one feet, six inches, and burners, oil, stove, tent, were available. Distribution was made on the oil burners on the following basis:

50 per Evacuation Hospital and Medical Gas Treatment Battalion
60 per Field Hospital
100 per Convalescent Hospital

Four additional stoves, two-burner, gasoline, were authorized each division for use in battalion aid stations.

Due to previous difficulties involving the use of Army transportation to pick up emergency supplies from Communications Zone depots, as well as to deliver salvage materiel to those depots, corrective measures were instituted. Arrangements were made with the 24th Regulating Station (Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) whereby that station would furnish trucks to the Army medical depot companies for the purposes outlined.

During the last week of the month, an extract of Medical Department Supply Catalogue - 1944, listing only items stocked in Army medical depot companies was sent to all divisions and to separate battalions of corps, as well as to Army medical units. The extract was reproduced and printed through the efforts of the Army Surgeon's Office.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

February was marked by continued hard fighting, with the additional problem of successfully executing several river crossings in prevailing temperatures which, though somewhat elevated in comparison with those of the previous month, were contributing factors toward the continuing prevalence of cold type injuries (trench foot and frostbite) and upper respiratory diseases. At the same time, temperatures rose to a sufficient level to permit the ice and snow to melt, thereby creating sanitary problems resulting in an increase in diarrheal diseases and infectious hepatitis. Water pollution again demanded serious attention.

2. Veneral Disease Control

There was a slight increase in the venereal disease rate over the month of January, despite the fact that heavy fighting continued. Ordinarily, this increase would not be expected; however, the policy of issuing passes to cities outside the Army area was credited with the venereal disease increase. New Army prophylactic stations were established in ARLON (P-52), BELGIUM, CONPLANS (U-66), FRANCE, and ESCH (P-70), LUXEMBOURG. There were 4,734 prophylactic treatments given by Army prophylactic stations during the month.

The supply of new type individual chemical and mechanical prophylactic units was adequate.

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During this period, 350 individual venereal disease contact reports were received, of which approximately one-half represented contacts made outside the Army area--ninety-two of them originating in PARIS (S-04). Statistics, by weeks, on venereal disease during February may be found in Annex XXIX to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Infectious hepatitis showed the sharpest increase of any malady in the communicable disease category with a weekly incidence of thirty-one cases, as compared to sixteen per week during January. There was a slight increase over the previous month in upper respiratory infections, and the diarrheal rate was almost doubled. The majority of the infectious hepatitis cases originated in the 26th Infantry Division. Annex XXIX to the Medical Section report shows a detailed breakdown of the communicable diseases occurring during the month of February.

4. Medical Records

A total of 48,072 reports were processed during the month, a decrease over the previous month. This decrease was expected in view of the fact that in February a number of units were transferred from the Third U. S. Army.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The melting of the ice and snow which resulted in less slippery roads was responsible for a decrease in non-battle injuries during the month. During the first week, the rate was 228 per 1,000 per annum, with a subsequent progressive decrease to 137 for the last week of the month. Non-battle injuries represent fifteen percent of the total direct admissions for the month. Although there was a slight increase in the trench foot rate, due to the mud following the thaw, the frost-bite rate dropped so sharply that the total cold injury rate per 1,000 per annum decreased to approximately fifty percent of that for the month of January.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

During the month of February the 7th Medical Laboratory continued to operate in two sections as follows:

Section I - METZ (U-85)
Section II - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)

The combined sections performed 9,829 tests during the period, which represented a slight increase over the 9,535 tests performed during January, and established an all-time high for any one month since the commencement of operations.

The total work for the month of February is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	6113	62.3
Bacteriology	1508	15.4
Chemistry	454	4.6
Pathology	218	2.2
Hematology	122	1.2
Parasitology	129	1.3
Sub-total	8544	87.0
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Conv Hospital)	1120	11.3
Shock Section (30th Field Hosp, 1st Plat)	165	1.7
Grand Total	9829	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during February is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	12	2821	28.7
Convalescent Hospital	1	2918	29.7
Field Hospitals	10	620	6.3
Misc Medical Installations		625	6.3
Misc Tactical Installations		2845	29.0
Total	25	9829	100.0

There was no appreciable variation in the distribution of work between this and the preceding month.

7. Sanitation

Weather conditions were the influencing factor which brought about an increase in the problems of sanitation, including water supplies, mess sanitation, and personal hygiene.

There were scattered instances of louse infestation, but these were effectively dealt with by the use of DDT Powder. There was a definite absence of bedbug, rodent, garbage, or refuse disposal problems. A continuation of the policy of establishing military dump sites in troop centers brought favorable results.

Pollution of the soil from animal and human wastes was extensive in the occupied villages. There were twelve reported instances of a high diarrheal rate, and undoubtedly there were many which escaped reporting due to the comparatively mild and short-lived nature of the outbreaks. Sporadic cases continued generally throughout the month with diminishing frequency. The source or cause of the diarrhea was not determined, although investigations were carried out in several instances.

The operation of water treatment units when treating grossly polluted sources by the new method of treatment received a thorough test. Out of a record of 201 samples of treated water analyses, only three were found polluted during the month, which is considered exceptionally low in view of the stream conditions at that time.

A new directive on water supply was received from the European Theater of Operations (Section II, Circular No 17, dated 10 February 1945) incorporating Third U. S. Army's policy on water treatment and sampling.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The Assistant to the Army Dental Surgeon, a captain, Dental Corps, who had been with Headquarters Third U. S. Army since before its embarkation for ENGLAND, was transferred to an evacuation hospital. A replacement reported to the Medical Section.

No other changes occurred during the month in the organization of the Medical Section.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

Two officers from Army medical units attended the Information-Education Course, and one officer attended the Instructor Training Course at the Army Information-Education Staff School in PARIS (S-04).

2. Evacuation

The problems of evacuation in March provided a repetition, more or less, of the difficulties faced in the sweep across FRANCE in August, 1944. Following its breakthrough on the SIEGFRIED LINE east of the GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG, Third U. S. Army's rapid advance was broken only for short periods by the natural obstacles offered by terrain and rivers. The Army faced the tactical problem of establishing bridgeheads across three rivers - the MOSELLE, the RHINE, and the MAIN. However, except for the retarding effect of these river assaults, the advances were sweeping. The speed with which the advances were executed, for the most part, placed a heavy burden upon evacuation facilities, since patients had to be hauled longer distances than normal speeds of advance would require. Fortunately, however, more favorable weather conditions had resulted in improved roads which permitted more successful evacuation by road.

There were only two changes in Army evacuating units for the period. The 580th Ambulance Company, Motor, was attached to Sixth Army Group about the middle of the month; and, subsequently, the 583d Ambulance Company, Motor, was relieved from First U. S. Army and assigned to this Army.

The 65th Medical Group supported the VIII and XII Corps, and the 66th Medical Group supported the XX Corps. The 69th Medical Group, with the additional aid of ambulances from Advance Section, Communications Zone, provided evacuation for Third U. S. Army hospitals.

A grand total of 23,192 patients were evacuated from the Army area during March. Of this number, seventy-five percent were evacuated by road, due to the fact that Third U. S. Army was not operating an air medical evacuation holding unit after 13 March. Nevertheless, 5,698 patients were evacuated by air, and 2,081 were evacuated by rail from the Third U. S. Army medical holding unit during the month.

The 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion operated the Third U. S. Army air/rail medical evacuation holding unit at THIONVILLE (U-88) during the first half of the month. That unit was then alerted to prepare itself for the role of furnishing medical support in the event of chemical attack by the enemy. Both rail and air facilities were utilized during its operational period. The 28th Field Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) replaced the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion at THIONVILLE (U-88) when the latter unit closed on 13 March. The 28th Field Hospital was then closed on 23 March, and one of its platoons was moved to ST WENDEL (Q-59) to care for Allied prisoners of war recovered from the camp at BAUMHOLDER (L-71).

The 7th and 58th Field Hospitals (both Advance Section, Communications Zone units) also operated air/rail medical evacuation holding units in support of Third U. S. Army. The 7th Field Hospital moved to Airfield Y-62 at NIEDERENDIG (L-69) on 14 March. However, the field could not be used for air medical evacuation until 27 March because of the fact that the field was under observation of the enemy, who was deployed on the east bank of the RHINE River prior to that time. The 58th Field Hospital opened a rail medical evacuation holding unit at ETTLEBRUCK (P-84) on 12 March, where it remained for five days. The unit then moved to TRIER (L-12) to operate an air/rail medical evacuation holding unit for the remainder of the month.

Locations of evacuation agencies of Third U. S. Army during March will be found in Annex XXX to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The field hospitals continued to operate in the support of division clearing stations as they had in the past. The 65th Field Hospital was the only exception; this unit functioned as an evacuation hospital. At the end of the month, the attachments of the field hospitals were as follows:




VIII Corps	XII Corps	XX Corps
3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp	1st Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
	1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
	3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp	2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
	1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp	

Third U. S. Army completed its penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE; and by the middle of the month had advanced to the RHINE River in that part of its sector north of the MOSELLE River. This rapid advance left the hospitals a considerable distance to the rear of front line operations. To correct this undesirable situation, the 101st and 107th Evacuation Hospitals were established in the vicinity of MAYEN (L-69), where they could give excellent support to both the VIII Corps, operating in the vicinity of KOBLENZ (L-89) and XII Corps, which was changing direction to cross the MOSELLE River for a drive south. At the same time, the 104th and 109th Evacuation Hospitals had moved to TRIER (L-12) to support XX Corps, which was launching an attack toward the East in the sector south of the MOSELLE River. The 65th Field Hospital, functioning as an evacuation hospital, was brought up to SIMMEREN (L-85) to support the southward drive of XII Corps; and, subsequently, the 110th, 39th, and 121st Evacuation Hospitals were moved to BAD KREUZNACH (M-03) in rapid succession. This marked the initial operational opening of the 121st Evacuation Hospital, which had become a unit of this Army on 9 March. Meanwhile, the 106th Evacuation Hospital followed up the advance of XX Corps, and moved to ST WENDEL (Q-59). Shortly thereafter, the 32d Evacuation Hospital moved to ALZEY (M-22).

Hospitals were limited to buildings in their choices of new sites until after Third U. S. Army crossed the RHINE River. The assault of the RHINE River by Third U. S. Army was carried out without serious op-

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MEDICAL
AIR EVACUATION
HOLDING UNIT
AT THIONVILLE, FRANCE



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position, and was adequately supported by the hospitals at BAD KREUZNACH (M-03) and at ALZEY (M-22). Immediately following the establishment of a secure bridgehead east of the RHINE, the 109th and 35th Evacuation Hospitals made reconnaissance to the East. The 109th Evacuation Hospital had the distinction, by setting up in the vicinity of NEUHEIM (M-55) on 28 March, of being the first Third U. S. Army evacuation hospital to open east of the RHINE River, and it was also the first to go under canvas since the commencement of winter. The 35th Evacuation Hospital opened the next day at Paul Zander Krankenhaus in DARMSTADT (M-64).

The 6th Convalescent Hospital remained at MOULINS-LES-METZ (U-85) throughout the month. This unit, however, closed on 22 March, pending a move forward. The non-availability of transportation during this time immobilized the hospital, except for the Venereal Disease Section which moved to the site of the 39th Evacuation Hospital in BAD KREUZNACH (M-03), where it opened on 31 March.

For several weeks prior to the first of March, the 6th Convalescent Hospital had been operating at capacity. To alleviate this situation, and prevent patients from leaving the Army area, due to capacity having been reached at the 6th Convalescent Hospital, a provisional convalescent hospital was organized. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 436th Medical Battalion, was charged with the operation of the provisional convalescent hospital. Attached to it were: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 182d Medical Battalion; 2d Platoon, 623d Clearing Company; and the 624th Clearing Company. The hospital was set up at MONDORF-LES-BAINS (P-90) and opened on 3 March to care for ambulatory convalescent medical cases less neuropsychiatric cases. This unit operated for nineteen days and was closed on 22 March.

For one week during the last half of the month, there were no convalescent hospital facilities available, and convalescent patients were evacuated to Communications Zone. Though this was disadvantageous, it was deemed necessary to empty the 6th Convalescent Hospital and the 436th Medical Battalion (provisional convalescent hospital) which were falling far behind, due to rapid advances of the Army. The latter was able to move and was established at GONSENHEIM (M-35) on 29 March.

The 34th Medical Battalion (provisional hospital) continued to operate at ESCH (P-70), providing care for self-inflicted wound cases who were being retained in the Army area awaiting investigation and/or courts-martial. This unit closed on 28 March in preparation for a move eastward.

Locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of March will be found in Annex XXXI to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in March is given below:

a. Number of wounded admitted to medical installations:

(1) U. S. Army Troops	11072
(2) British Army Troops	22
(3) French Army Troops	37
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	3
(5) British and French Navy	3
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	4791
(7) Civilians	634
(8) Others	28

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	2853
(2) Slight	8219

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:

(Patients with multiple wounds are classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns:	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	518	85
(b) Thoracic	933	62
(c) Maxillo-facial	862	6
(d) Neurologic		
Head	813	66
Spine	174	9
Nerve	16	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	2585	4
Lower	2929	33
(f) Buttocks	463	11
(g) Other	645	1
Sub-total	10968	277

(2) Burns - all locations	104	4
Total	11072	281
d. Number of patients with multiple wounds	3307	50
e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:		
(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	2805	80
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	6389	171
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	540	18
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell or mine)	420	1
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	115	1
(6) Burns (petrol, flak, flamethrower, phosphorus, etc.)	96	3
(7) Others	707	7
Total	11072	281

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

Perf W lt, eye	Hernia of the brain	1
Pen W back	Shock	1
FCC Skull	Herniation of brain	5
Pen W neck	Hemorrhage	1
FCC lt L-8	Hemorrhage	1
FCC lt radius and ulna	Shock	1
Pen W brain	Edema pulmonary	5
LW pupliteal artery and vein	Pulmonary embolism	1
Mult flak wounds	DOA	5
Pen W, SFW (HE) abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	4
Pen W, SFW (HE) abdomen	Perforation of ventral & caud hemorrhage	2
Pen W, SFW (HE) buttocks	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	2
Pen W, SFW (HE) chest	Shock severe, sucking wound, hemorrhage	6
Pen W, SFW (Mine) abdomen	Eviscerations small intestine, hemorrhage	2
Pen W, GSW abdomen	Shock severe, trauma & hemorrhage	16
Pen W, SFW (HE) chest	Shock severe, hemorrhage	6
Crushing W, chest (crushed by truck)	Shock severe, contusion severe	1
Pen W, buttock with entrance into abdomen, lac W's at jejunum and ileum, severe	Shock profound, irreversible	3
Perf W lt anterior chest	Shock severe, irreversible	10
Perf W, abdomen severe	Shock profound, irreversible	5
Lac W, mid buttock, herniation of rectum	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Pen W, sucking, back rt side	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Perf W, lt thorax	Shock severe, irreversible	2
Pen W, left upper abdomen	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Pen W, lt chest, sucking	Pulmonary collapse, consolidation, toxicity due to liver damage	4
Pen W, rt upper abdomen	Shock severe, irreversible	17
Perf W, abdominal wall, severe	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Perf W, thorax rt severe	Shock severe, irreversible	1
Mult puncture W's of the thighs, perineum & anal region	Shock severe, irreversible	2
Pen W, buttock with abdominal penetration	Shock severe, irreversible	2
Ruptured spleen, severe, lac W of rectum due to fall	Shock profound, irreversible	1
Extensive Perf W's rt shoulder blast injury, lungs, bilateral severe	Shock severe, irreversible	1
FCC rt humerus, hemathorax, rt side & paralysis spine complete at D2	Shock severe	1
FCC vault of skull, occipital region, severe	Shock	4
Perf W neck through lt arm upper third perf spinal cord at level of about D2 & 3	Shock & hemorrhage	1
FCC skull, orbital & occipital	Shock & hemorrhage	6

bone, perf head with cerebral evisceration		
Burns, 2d & 3d degree, over face, neck, rt hand & forearm, lt hand, rt leg, rt thigh, lt thigh & perineal region	Shock	1
SFW, left chest	Cerebral anoxemia due to shock, Pulmonary edema	9
LW & FC secondary missile, skull	Intracranial hemorrhage	1
Pen W, GSW lt lumbar region & through abdominal cavity	Perf of liver, diaphragm & intestines	1
Pen W, SW (mortar) abdomen, traumatic amputation of lt arm	Generalized peritonitis	1
Pen W, SW (HE) thighs, legs	Pulmonary congestion & edema. Dilation of rt ventricle of heart	2
Pen W, skull	Shock	7
Pen W, neck	Shock	1
Lac W (Shell) spine	Shock	1
Perf W (Shell) rt arm	Shock	1
Pen W (Shell) both legs	Shock	1
Burns (at shell) face	Shock	2
Perf W, chest with sucking W rt chest, lac lower lobe, rt lung, rt diaphragm	Circulatory collapse	1
Pen W, lt thigh, FCC femur, Pen W lt leg	Shock	2
Pen W, upper lt abdomen & lower lt chest	Shock, hemorrhage & traumatic secondary to injuries	10
Pen W, abdomen, division complete jejunum, lac & contusion sigmoid colon	Circulatory collapse secondary to shock, hemorrhage	6
DOA Pen W, lt leg, FCC lt tibia & fibula, Pen W chest	Shock	1
DOA Perf W xiphoid process of sternum	Shock, hemorrhagic	1
LW jejunal complete with generalized peritonitis		1
Evisceration abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W of back	Congestive heart failure	1
3d degree white phosphorus burns face, chest, hands & arms DOA	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W (HE) abdomen with lac colon	Hemorrhage & shock	1
FCC rt lower leg with impairment blood supply		1
Mult Pen W shell (HE) head, chest, upper and lower extremities	Shock & cerebral edema	3
GSW Pen W lt abdomen	Surgical shock	1
SF Pen W rt abdomen	Peritonitis	1
FCC rt tibia, GSW lt upper abdomen & thorax		1
GSW Pen W lt upper abdomen & kidney lac	Surgical shock	1
Perf W (GSW) abdomen	Lobar pneumonia	1
GSW Pen W abdomen	Shock	1
Shrap W Pen W chest	Shock	2
Shrap W Pen W abdomen	Shock	5
Shrap W Perf W abdomen	Shock	1
Shrap W Perf W chest	Shock	1
Shrap W Perf W flank	Pulmonary embolism	1
Shrap W Perf W abdomen	Uremia	4
Shrap W FCC tibia, fibula	Shock	1
Pen W shell, head	Cerebral edema	5
Perf W shell head	Subdural hemorrhage	2
Traumatic amputation, mine, both legs	Secondary shock severe	2
Pen W (shell) spine	Broncho pneumonia	1
Pen W (shell) chin	Shock, severe DOA	1
Pen W GSW rt chest	Hemothorax, rt	1
Traumatic amputation, mine, rt foot	Acute dilation of heart	5
Pen W MW shell FCC both legs	Cardiac failure	1
Pen W (shell) FCC rt leg MW	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W shell chest MW	Severe asphyxia	5
GSW MW pen both thighs, FCC	Shock	1
Pen W shell, head MW	Irreversible shock	2
Pen W shell, head FC	Respiratory failure	4
Pen W shell rt leg, FC		1
Pen W shell, spine MW	Meningitis, secondary	1
Amputation, traumatic thigh	Gangrene, gas	1

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Perf W hip and buttock	Division complete, artery	1
Perf W abdomen	Peritonitis	2
Extensive W's of spine region shell (HE)	Myelitis	1
Extensive head W's with brain damage	Cerebral hemorrhage	3
Extensive head W's with brain damage	Respiratory failure	1
Extensive head W's with brain damage	Uremia	4
Extensive head W's	Extensive subarachnoid hemorrhage. Embolus rt superior temporal artery	1
Extensive abdominal W's	Internal hemorrhage	1
Extensive maxillo-facial & chest injuries (plane crash)	Hemothorax, broncho pleural fistula with subcutaneous emphysema	1
Extensive W's upper and lower extremities (grenade)	Atelectasis (massive) left lung, blast effect	1
MW Perf W legs, FCC rt tibia, perf W foot, FC metacarpals, lt foot amputated	Gas gangrene lt leg, shock & splenitis	1
MW both feet, Pen wounds foot left hip area into abdomen with perf of ileum	Bile peritonitis	1
Pen GSW's head and extremities	Shock	1
Perf GSW, cheek	Shock	1
Pen W shell (HE) rt leg, lt arm	Shock	1
FCC (shell) lt tibia & fibula	Shock	1
Perf GSW brain	Respiratory paralysis cerebral edema	2
Pen W shell (HE) brain	Blast concussion of brain & lungs shock	1
Cheek & Pen W chest & abdomen	Shock	1
FCC (GSW) jaw	Shock	1
GSW Perf W lt shoulder, severed axillary artery	Gross exsanguination	1
HE Pen W lt hip	Blast injury, lungs	1
HE Perf W rt thigh	Amputation & shock	1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	964
(2) Stored blood	4842
(3) Dry plasma	7243
(4) Other blood substitutes (does not include crystalloids)	

Serium Albumin	2
Saline	310
Dextrose 5%	193

h. Number of units of penicillin administered: 6,429,912,000

i. Number of amputations:

(1) Upper extremity	115
(2) Lower extremity	244

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	38
(2) Other	48

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	9282
(2) Other	4611

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

During the early part of the month, there were reports of the possible use of chemical agents by the enemy. To be adequately prepared, the 92d and 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalions were alerted for support of the Army in the event of such attack. The 92d Medical Gas Treatment Battalion closed its provisional hospital for cold injury cases at THIONVILLE (U-88) and the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion ceased its function as an air and rail evacuation holding unit.

For the remainder of March, these battalions were mobilized in close support of the divisions and conducted refresher training for all personnel, as well as checking all equipment for serviceability. Radio equipment was furnished each battalion and the 65th and 66th Medical Groups to facilitate communication. Fortunately, these battalions were not required to perform their primary mission during this period.

As the Army progressed through Germany, more and more German hos-



A Nurse Prepares a Laparotomy Pack with Forceps, Retractors, Scalpels and Hemostats, for the Sterilizer

pitals came under Third U. S. Army control. During the latter part of March, the medical group supporting the particular sector in which a hospital was uncovered assumed control and became responsible for supervision and supply of the installation. It soon became apparent that many more such installations were to be found, and it was deemed advisable to place the responsibility for supervising all German military hospitals on a single medical group. Plans to that end were being made as the month ended.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

There were 11,072 battle casualties during March. Based on total dispositions from all causes among Third U. S. Army personnel, there was a mortality rate of one and two-tenths percent.

2. Surgery

Surgical units were kept close up behind the rapid advance of the Third U. S. Army columns during the month. The problem was made more difficult by a number of major river crossings. However, through the use of surgical trucks and PROCO units attached to the field hospitals, the armored columns were well supported. The distances to evacuation hospitals were greater than had been the rule, but no harm was done, as the non-transportable cases were cared for well forward. Through the

proper use of PROCO units, it was felt that the problem of handling the casualties of armored divisions was solved. The armor of the Third U. S. Army moved fast and over great distances, and the commanders of the divisions were well satisfied with the surgical support they were given. The method by which these results were accomplished is as follows:

A field hospital platoon was attached to the armored division. The organic personnel of this platoon was reinforced with two general surgical teams and two shock teams. These surgical teams were furnished with two two-and-one-half-ton trucks with sufficient tentage, instruments, and supplies to function in conjunction with the clearing company of the division. The trucks also carried the surgical personnel; and, as the division moved forward, they went with it. They set up with the clearing station and did the non-transportable cases encountered. The field hospital platoon later moved up and established itself at the same level and took over the job of nursing and caring for these casualties. The PROCO unit was then free to move forward again. The field hospital platoon, in turn, was relieved by a holding unit made up from collecting company personnel. The hospital platoon could move up very quickly to again join the surgical teams. Such moves were possible every few days, and great distances were covered, thus shortening the ambulance haul and lowering the mortality.

In addition to the 11,072 battle casualties from our own troops, there were eighty-two Allied wounded and 5,425 of the enemy who received surgical care in Third U. S. Army medical units. In spite of this relatively high number of casualties and the distances involved, the surgical standards of the Army were maintained at their usual high level.

2a. Medical Services

Medical trends during the month of March were toward a gradually decreasing medical admission rate, although the percentage relationship of medical admissions to battle casualties remained far in favor of the former. There was no particular illness which appeared in a degree to remotely suggest epidemic conditions. In general, serious illness was totally absent from the picture. A sharp increase in infectious hepatitis was noted, which was generally distributed throughout the Army, but the majority of cases were of a mild type with only thirty percent requiring evacuation from the Army Zone. Meningitis and diphtheria were noted to be on the wane, but a few virulent cases of the latter were in evidence. Atypical pneumonia continued to appear in a ratio of four to one to bacterial pneumonias, but pneumonia as a disease entity declined over the preceding month. There was a mild seasonal increase in the incidence of mumps, most of which was mild in nature and necessitated little or no evacuation from the Army area. With the liberation of numerous Allied Prisoner of War enclosures, a marked increase in the incidence of nutritional disease appeared in the Army hospitals; this being due to admissions in the above mentioned category.

3. Neuropsychiatry

Casualties continued to be comparatively light during the month of March, while great tactical strides were being made, which included the cleaning out of the RHINE-MOSELLE-SAAR triangle and the crossing by Third U. S. Army troops of the RHINE River. Crossing of this largest of European rivers was expected to prove one of the costliest assignments of the war; but, as things turned out, this feat caused an insignificant number of casualties. The rapid progress of the troops and the capturing of vast numbers of enemy prisoners of war were factors which no doubt contributed to the high morale which prevailed among the officers and men of the various divisions. The incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties had been less than six percent of the total non-fatal casualties since the first of the year. Of the 22,066 non-fatal casualties for the month of March, 1,779, or five and five-tenths percent were neuropsychiatric. Of these, 1,508, or eighty-four and seven-tenths percent were returned to duty. The exceptionally large number returned to duty was accounted for by the fact that the number of admissions was low; and, therefore, the psychiatrists in each installation had ample time for therapy.

Toward the end of the month, there was a moderate increase in chronic alcoholism and of hospital admissions for psychiatric opinion prior to administrative action in disciplinary cases.

4. Dental

Dental installations in Third U. S. Army were augmented by the addition of six mobile prosthetic detachments. Five of these were activated and equipped within the Army, and the sixth (Advance Section, Communications Zone Dental Team Number 471) was assigned for operation within the Army area. Each detachment was commanded by a captain, Dental Corps, who was particularly well qualified for prosthetic work. To assist him were three enlisted technicians who composed the balance of the personnel. Prosthetic trucks were obtained for only three of the five detachments activated within Third U. S. Army, and these teams spent the first five days of the month preparing their equipment for mobile operation. The two remaining teams were assigned to the two Army medical depot companies for duty in the laboratories which had already been in operation, but which had been reduced in strength through the assignment of their technicians to duty with other prosthetic detachments. By 7 March, the detachments were in operation at the following assignments:

- 456th - 32d Medical Depot Company
- 457th - 33d Medical Depot Company
- 458th - 664th Clearing Company
- 459th - 635th Clearing Company
- 460th - 613th Clearing Company




Communications Zone Team Number 471 was assigned to duty with the reserve medical company of the 11th Armored Division where prosthetic assistance was greatly needed.

Notification was received from the Office of the Chief Surgeon that four dental operating trucks were being sent to Third U. S. Army. Four Dental Corps officers were selected and assigned to the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group in anticipation of providing these operating trucks with properly qualified personnel. Several Dental Surgeons of newly assigned units had conferences with the Army Dental Surgeon for purposes of orientation as to the dental policies within this Army, and these conferences were subsequently followed up, where possible, by inspections of the units by dental personnel of Third U. S. Army Headquarters. Trips of inspection were made weekly to hospitals and laboratories in the vicinity of Army headquarters, and more distant installations were visited when the opportunity presented itself.

Dental Clinic with Normal Field Equipment


Operates at an Army Medical

Depot



A Dental Clinic at an Army Medical Depot

uses "Acquired" Equipment



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A manuscript, "Dental Alloy Dispensing Device", was submitted by a dental officer of the 104th Evacuation Hospital for the Army Dental Surgeon's consideration and recommendation. The device was of simple construction, and utilized materials contained in Chest Number 60. It made possible the proportioning of alloy in amounts required for small, medium, and large fillings, thus effecting a saving of filling material. The manuscript was forwarded to the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, with a recommendation from Third U. S. Army's Dental Surgeon that its publication be considered.

A decreased number of admissions, restorations, and treatments resulted from the rapid movement of the Army, in that dental officers and their potential patients were following the advance across GERMANY, with no opportunity to give or receive treatments other than those of an emergency nature.

A chart is shown below giving the breakdown of dental treatments for the month of March:

Strength (Reported)-----	249770
Admissions, Routine-----	14799
Admissions, Emergency-----	5348
Sittings-----	26800
Officer Personnel-----	359
Enlisted Personnel-----	383
Restorations-----	16872
Dentures-----	1610
Gingivitis-----	1130
Gingivitis Treatments-----	1579
Stomatitis, Vincent's-----	338
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatments--	812

5. Veterinary

Due to lengthening supply lines and shortage of transportation during the month of March, inspections of Class I Supply Points continued to be relatively low in number. However, no difficulty was encountered with respect to sanitary conditions. The commanding officers of the various Class I Supply Points were instructed to replace old stock with new, and especially was this policy stressed in the case of corned beef.

Thirteen messes and one quartermaster bakery were visited during March, and corrective action recommended where indicated.

Two divisions were visited for the purpose of investigating the method of food handling in the Division Class I Dumps.

6. Personnel

Shortages continued to exist in the approximate numbers of previous months in Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and Medical Administrative Corps officers. Though constant efforts were made to obtain sufficient reinforcements to bring Third U. S. Army units up to T/O strength, Theater shortages continued to prevent attainment of this end. Approximately fifteen Medical Administrative Corps officers were appointed from the ranks in March. These appointments were authorized as the result of applications forwarded to Headquarters ETO, U. S. Army in January. Further efforts were maintained to secure approval of a sufficient number of these applications to afford appointments of second lieutenants, Medical Administrative Corps, in the number calculated to relieve the entire shortages of Third U. S. Army in this category.

Approximately fifty nurses and a number of surgical and shock teams continued on detached service with Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month, on loan from general hospitals.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Despite the fact that March ushered in one of this Theater's most active periods from a tactical standpoint, a period in which the problem of long supply lines developed, definite progress was made toward a better medical supply situation within Third U. S. Army. Improved road conditions, more favorable flying weather, and the increasing regularity of train hauls all contributed to the receipt of many more tons of medical supplies during the month. Especially was there a marked improvement in the delivery of supplies by air from the Communications Zone. There were approximately 643 long tons of medical supplies received from Communications Zone depots during March; whereas, during the previous month, only 380 long tons were delivered. In this connection, the Chief of Air Medical Supply from the Chief Surgeon's Office visited this headquarters during the month to discuss and check on shipments of medical supplies by air. He left information with the Army Surgeon that all future shipments of medical supplies destined for


Third U. S. Army originating from depots in the PARIS (S-04) area would be shipped by air to Airstrip Y-33 at THIONVILLE (U-08).

The Commanding Officers of the 32d and 33d Medical Depot Companies attended a conference in PARIS (S-04) with representatives of the Chief Surgeon's Office and Depots M-407 and M-408. The meeting was called in the interest of fostering more efficient procedures with relation to the proper steps necessary in marking and documenting shipments of medical supplies. The results attained were most gratifying to all concerned, and it was expected that in the future, fewer discrepancies would thereafter arise between the records of the Army depots and Communications Zone depots. The primary purpose of the meeting was to adjust "due in" and "back order" records, in order that those of Army depots would agree with those in the Chief Surgeon's Office. A definite procedure was agreed upon by all representatives present regarding records and shipments.

The great distances between the base sections of Army medical depots and the front lines threatened to create serious problems; but, fortunately, the casualties during the month were relatively light, a fact which, in part, accounts for the ability of the Army Supply to meet the situation satisfactorily. In addition to the light casualties, there is another factor well worth consideration--the advance sections of the two depot companies were kept well forward so that medical supplies could be drawn from installations near the source of need. With the good fortune of light casualties, this scheme worked out successfully, thereby eliminating the necessity of moving the base sections of the two medical depot companies more than once during the entire month. Locations of the medical depot companies during the months of January, February, and March are shown in Annex XXXII to the Medical Section report.



Penicillin in Storage



Oxygen Cylinders Being Handled at a Medical Depot

The ample support which the two advance sections were rendering the forward elements within the Army also allowed simultaneous moves on the part of both main depot companies--the first time this had occurred since Third U. S. Army became operational. The end of the month found the 32d Medical Depot Company at ST WENDEL (Q-59) and the 33d Medical Depot Company at KASTELLAUN (L-76). The advance sections made two moves each, and at the close of the month, the Advance Section, 32d Medical Depot Company was located at WORRSTADT (M-23), and the Advance Section, 33d Medical Depot Company was at MAYEN (L-69). Shortage of transportation prompted the simultaneous moves of the two main depot companies, and when three truck companies (one from Communications Zone and two from Army G-4) became available, the decision was made to take advantage of the opportunity to move these units.

Two newly-arrived infantry divisions (the 65th and 89th) were assigned Third U. S. Army during the month, neither of which reported any major shortage of medical equipment. In addition, the 121st Evacuation Hospital was assigned, and the few shortages of medical equipment which existed in that unit were filled from Army medical depots.

There was a decided increase in air evacuation during the month, and it was necessary to call upon Communications Zone for an additional 10,000 blankets and 1,500 litters. Prompt delivery was effected by air, and the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion was the recipient.

As a result of the "gas alert", all units were ordered to check their respective medical gas casualty equipment and submit requisitions immediately for replacements of all shortages of this equipment. In addition, a special requisition was submitted to the Chief Surgeon's Office for additional gas casualty equipment. The requisition received an immediate response, and delivery was expedited by air transportation.

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Releases were obtained from the Communications Zone on two dental laboratory trucks, four dental operating trucks, and four surgical operating trucks. Also notification was received from the Chief Surgeon's Office that release had been secured on six M-7 Generator Trailers which would come to Third U. S. Army through Ordnance channels.

One additional anesthesia apparatus, portable, was authorized each evacuation hospital, bringing the total on hand to four in each hospital.

The problem of handling the increasingly large stores of enemy medical supplies uncovered by Third U. S. Army's rapid-moving forces was becoming one of great import.

To deal effectively with the situation, a captured enemy materiel team was organized, which consisted of one officer and ten enlisted men whose duty it would be to investigate, inventory, and guard all captured German medical supplies. The team was placed on detached service with the captured enemy materiel platoon, operated by Quartermaster Field Service. As the Army moved deeper into GERMANY, a number of large medical supply depots were captured, resulting in the immediate functioning of this valuable addition to the Army Medical Service.

Reproduction of a sketch showing the locations occupied by medical depot companies during January, February and March will be found in Annex XXXII to the Medical Section report.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

With the exception of an increase in the incidence of infectious hepatitis, preventive medicine problems of every category were reduced during the month of March. Rising temperatures, accompanied by a number of sunny days, was one of the factors which contributed in large measure to the decrease in non-effective rates within Third U. S. Army. By the end of the month, however, the incidence of infectious hepatitis, which showed a monthly increase over February of almost three hundred percent, was causing some concern.

2. Venereal Disease Control

As a result of the advance of large numbers of combat troops into GERMANY, where the rules of non-fraternization applied, the rate of venereal disease contacts dropped among this type of troops; thereby bringing about an overall reduction in the Army rate, despite the continuing abundance of contact reports issuing from PARIS (S-04) and other areas outside the Army Zone. Out of 419 individual venereal disease reports received, 132 of them originated in PARIS (S-04), and more than one-half of the total number received for the month showed locations outside the Army area as the points of origin. In connection with the subject of venereal disease, an analysis of the reports for March revealed a relative decrease in the incidence of syphilis. A statistical breakdown by weeks on venereal disease is shown in Annex XXXIII to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

Exclusive of the increase in infectious hepatitis, there was a decrease in all communicable diseases. Diarrheal disease cases dropped from February's rate of thirty-eight per thousand per annum to seventeen, and upper respiratory diseases showed an incidence of ninety-two per thousand per annum, as compared to February's 152 cases.

4. Medical Records

There were 42,485 reports processed during the month. When comparing this figure with the 48,072 reports processed during the previous month, it is obvious that here again is reflected the considerable reduction in admissions of almost every type.

5. Non-battle Injuries

Cold type (trench foot and frostbite) injuries, which had previously taken terrific tolls, were practically non-existent during the month of March, as the favorable weather conditions removed the necessity of exposing the troops for long periods to snow, cold rains, and freezing temperatures. The non-battle injury rate dropped from 170 per thousand per annum recorded in February to 129 per thousand per annum for March to establish a figure which represented thirteen percent of the total direct admission during the latter month. Improved road conditions, as the result of less rainfall, was a factor in the monthly reduction in non-battle injuries.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory continued its policy of operating in two sections which were located as follows:

- Section I - 1 to 30 March - METZ (U-85);
30 to 31 March - BAD KREUZNACH (M-03)
- Section II - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)

The combined sections performed 9,168 tests during March as compared with 9,829 for the previous month.

The total work for the month of March is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	5209	56.8
Bacteriology	1801	19.6
Chemistry	506	5.5
Pathology	206	2.3
Parasitology	195	2.1
Hematology	66	0.7
Sub-total	7983	87.0
<u>MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS</u>		
Veneral Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hospital)	1185	13.0
Grand Total	9168	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of March is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	14	2738	29.9
Convalescent Hospital	1	2826	30.8
Field Hospitals	11	344	3.8
Misc Medical Installations		416	4.5
Misc Tactical Installations		2844	31.0
TOTAL	26	9168	100.0


The total figure of 9,168 marks a decrease by several hundred when compared with the totals for the two previous months.

7. Sanitation


Improved environmental conditions brought about by clearing weather resulted in fewer instances of diseases associated with poor sanitation. Insects did not present a problem during the month. Reports of louse infestation were numerically insignificant, as they represented less than thirty cases throughout the entire Army. Bedbugs were frequently reported but effectively dealt with through the prompt and proper use of DDT Powder, the means which also was utilized in the eradication of lice. Liberal issues of DDT Powder were effected for the protection and disinfection of American and Allied prisoners of war, displaced persons, political prisoners, and prisoners of war found in the many camps which had been overrun or established during the month.

With the advent of improved sanitation, a noteworthy decrease was registered in the incidence of diarrhea. There were only two outbreaks during the entire month, as compared with the twelve occurring during the month of February.

The summary of water analyses for the thirty-one-day period showed no non-potable samples out of a record total of 237 samples analyzed. This compares with three non-potable samples found in the previous month's total of 201.



Medical Personnel Being Awarded the Silver Star Medal



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CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

In April, the medical picture changed from one largely concerned with treatment of battle casualties among our own forces to one of control over captured German hospitals, displaced persons camps, Allied prisoner of war encampments, and the like. In no instance was there time to devote the desired complement of attention to the almost indescribable things which were uncovered. In all instances there was the desire to accomplish better the tasks which unfolded.

There was confusion. Third U. S. Army, as well as other Armies, was burdened with the two-fold task of carrying on its tactical operations and, at the same time, giving semblance to some of its occupational duties. People were homeless; people were sick. Operations proceeded with such rapidity that it was reminiscent of August, 1914; occupational problems were like hundreds of huge disasters rolled into one. The scope of governmental problems, including much needed treatment of the sick, both Allied and enemy, were the most complex that have been faced, perhaps, in all history; the operational end of the war was a dire necessity. Each problem was huge in itself. The dual role into which this and other Allied Armies were forced was unimaginable.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

Two Medical Corps officers from the Operations and Training Sub-section were transferred to units under this command. This constituted a reduction in personnel for the Medical Section, in conformity with Staff Memorandum Number 73, this headquarters, dated 16 December 1944.

The Army Surgeon was promoted from the rank of Colonel to Brigadier General. The Army Surgeon was evacuated through medical channels, during the month to the Zone of the Interior. Colonel Thomas J. Hartford, Medical Corps, reported for duty as the Army Surgeon.

Also during April, under a directive from Twelfth Army Group, public health activities were placed directly under the Army Surgeon. One Medical Corps officer, one French medical officer, and one enlisted man, formerly with the G-5 Section, were transferred physically to the Medical Section, with a view to attaining a closer degree of coordination and control of such matters.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

The training of officers from Army medical units in the fundamentals of the "Army Education Program - Post Hostilities" was given more emphasis, in view of the apparent certainty that the end of hostilities was approaching. Eight officers attended the Information-Education Course, and one officer attended the Instructor Training Course at the Army Information-Education Staff School in PARIS (S-04).

2. Evacuation

The disintegration of the German defenses was quite evident in April; the advances of the Army were extended and were accomplished at maximum speed. As in the past under similar tactical situations, there was a great strain placed on the evacuation facilities as a result of long ambulance hauls. This handicap, however, was offset to some extent by the simultaneous reduction in the number of casualties. Longer hauls of fewer patients has been the general rule during all fast-moving situations.

By the middle of the month, Third U. S. Army had advanced as far east as it was permitted to go under the then existing tactical plan. Because of past experiences under like conditions, a complete change in the Army's mission and direction came as no great surprise. The new plan called for an attack toward the South and the reputed German Redoubt. Though a certain disruption of carefully-laid evacuation and hospitalization plans was unavoidable, the change was accomplished without a great deal of difficulty.

Several evacuation problems arose during the month. Three new armored divisions (the 13th, 14th, and 16th) were assigned to Third U. S. Army. All were short at least sixty percent (60%) of their authorized number of ambulances, and the 65th Medical Group was required to furnish ambulances to these divisions for intra-division evacuation. Since the 65th Medical Group was now evacuating all divi-

sions of the Army, its ambulances were scattered throughout the entire Army area with a minimum effective strength at all points.

Road evacuation accounted for most of the total of 15,312 patients who were sent out of the Army area during the month. Of this number, 11,978 went by ambulance to Advance Section, Communications Zone units. The Advance Section, Communications Zone units which operated evacuation holding units for Third U. S. Army were the same as in previous months. They were the 7th, 28th, and 58th Field Hospitals.

Air and rail medical evacuation holding units functioned in the orthodox manner with one exception. Consequent to the overrunning of large areas of Germany, many Allied military personnel were recovered from German prison camps, a great number of whom were sick. The Americans, British, and French required evacuation through normal medical channels. In addition, however, large numbers were not sick, but suffered only from malnutrition. These, too, required evacuation. In two areas, they were evacuated through the Third U. S. Army air medical evacuation holding unit operated by the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion. Located at Airfield Y-67 in ROTHENBERGEN (M-97), this unit evacuated 5,956 American and British non-patient military personnel. At R-29 in HERZOGENAURACH (O-21) several more thousands of this type personnel were evacuated by air from that unit. In addition, the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion cleared 2,998 U. S. Army patients through its holding unit.

Third U. S. Army and Advance Section, Communications Zone holding units were located at five airfields during the month. At the end of the month, the 7th Field Hospital was located at R-26, BAYREUTH (O-75), the 28th Field Hospital was at R-29, HERZOGENAURACH (O-21), and the 58th Field Hospital was closed at R-26, BAYREUTH (O-75), awaiting a move forward.

There was no rail evacuation from Third U. S. Army holding units during the month of April. However, 319 patients were evacuated from the 34th Medical Battalion (provisional hospital for self-inflicted wound cases) at ESCH (P-70) to the 193d General Hospital in VERDON (U-26). Seventeen other patients were evacuated directly to a train from the 104th Evacuation Hospital in TRIER (L-12).

The locations of evacuation facilities during the month of April will be found in Annex XXXIV to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

During this period, the field hospitals continued to operate in support of division clearing stations, with the exception of the 65th Field Hospital. This unit was relieved from attachment to the 65th Medical Group and attached to the 66th Medical Group to provide assistance to the latter group in giving necessary care to German military hospitals and Allied prisoner of war hospitals and camps.

On 1 April, a report was received that the First Platoon, 16th Field Hospital, attached to the 14th Armored Division, was ambushed by troops of the SS Heinrich Heydrich Division. Two members of the platoon were wounded, the remainder captured intact. The Commanding Officer, 106th Evacuation Hospital and his Chief of Surgery were accompanying this platoon while on reconnaissance for a new site for the 106th Evacuation Hospital. The Chief of Surgery was killed during the initial shooting. The captured personnel and equipment were removed from the scene at ALSENSOUT (M-88) to ENGETHAL (O-60). In that area were about twenty wounded soldiers from the 6th Armored Division. The platoon was placed in operation at that location by the Germans.

On 2 April, the platoon was recaptured by American troops. While in German hands, the unit had cared for fifty-nine patients, of whom thirty-three were American and twenty-six were German. Losses in equipment included the x-ray truck and equipment, one jeep and most of the personal clothing and equipment.

At the end of the month, the attachments of the field hospitals were as follows:

III Corps

1st Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 42d Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp

XX Corps

2d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 30th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
2d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp

XII Corps

2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp
1st Plat, 59th Fld Hosp
3d Plat, 59th Fld Hosp

66th Medical Group

65th Fld Hosp

As Third U. S. Army continued its advance into GERMANY, the month of April was characterized by rapid movements of the evacuation hospitals. As always in a rapidly-changing situation, hospitals had difficulty in keeping pace with the advancing troops, thereby necessitating longer ambulance hauls for evacuation. Light casualties, however, removed the necessity of hauling large numbers of patients over long distances, thereby creating a compensating effect upon what would have otherwise proved to be a critical situation.

With the advent of warm spring weather, a policy was adopted which provided that hospitals would set up for operation in the field. This facilitated movement and decreased the time required to open in a new site.

The major difficulty encountered during the period occurred toward the middle of the month when Third U. S. Army changed direction and proceeded southward. The subsequent change in Army boundaries left the 32d, 34th, 35th, 107th, 120th, and 121st Evacuation Hospitals in First U. S. Army Zone, with the result that it was necessary for these units to move. The 101st Evacuation Hospital at KRONACH (O-58) was just outside the Army area, but the location was deemed satisfactory for a short period. Most of the evacuation hospitals were closed, pending movement to the south, and on 22 April, only four hospitals were open, including the 12th Evacuation Hospital at FRANKFURT (M-66), which was operating generally as a "station hospital". The 106th and 109th Evacuation Hospitals were open in the new Army area, and the 101st Evacuation Hospital was open just outside the Army area.

The change in Army boundary also resulted in the shift of VIII Corps to First U. S. Army and the assignment of III Corps to Third U. S. Army.

On 23 April, the 35th Evacuation Hospital moved to SCHONBRUNN (O-91); the 39th Evacuation Hospital moved to WEIDEN (P-12), while the 107th and 121st Evacuation Hospitals planned to move to bivouac sites in the same vicinity as the 39th Evacuation Hospital. The 104th Evacuation Hospital opened at BAERSDORF (O-32).

The 34th Evacuation Hospital began to move into III Corps Zone, and on 29 April opened at SANDERSDORF (T-84). The 107th Evacuation Hospital moved into XX Corps Zone at BURLENGENFELD (U-17) prior to setting up north of REGENSBURG (U-15).

An unusual incident occurred on 14 April when the 32d Evacuation Hospital was strafed by a single German plane attacking a convoy on the nearby autobahn. One officer of an ambulance platoon, stationed at the hospital, was wounded in the attack.

At the close of the month, another temporary change in boundary left the 35th, 39th, and 110th Evacuation Hospitals in the new First U. S. Army Zone. The 110th Evacuation Hospital closed then, but the other two remained open, pending establishment of First U. S. Army hospitals in the area.

In view of transportation shortages and frequent moves over long distances, the G-4 Transportation Section provided three truck companies, one on each of three separate occasions, for movements of the evacuation hospitals. This represented the largest number of vehicles required during any similar period, in addition to the resources of the various hospitals.

The 6th Convalescent Hospital, which had remained at MOULINS-LES-METZ (U-35) throughout March, had been closed since 22 March. Non-availability of transportation immobilized the unit, except for the Venereal Disease Section. On 8 April, the unit was moved by rail to MAINZ (M-35), and from there to a field site east of EISENACH (L-13), where it opened with 1,000 beds on 16 April. Uninterrupted treatment was administered to 117 patients who moved to the new site, even though a large percentage of the patients were receiving penicillin therapy.

On 21 April, the hospital was closed in preparation for movement southward, the Venereal Disease Section having moved to the 104th Evacuation Hospital at BAERSDORF (O-32), where it opened on 20 April.

Toward the end of the month, reconnaissance was made in the vicinity of NURNBURG (O-40); although, due to lack of transportation, the unit was again immobile. However, rail transportation was expected to be available within ten days. There were 200 tons of the unit equipment at MAINZ (M-35) and the same amount at EISENACH (L-13), to be moved.

Locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of April will be found in Annex XXXV to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in April is shown below:

a. Number of wounded admitted to medical installations "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

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Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	5362
(2) British Army Troops	215
(3) French Army Troops	21
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	5
(5) British and French Navy	3
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	820
(7) Civilians	237
(8) Others	59

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:		
(1) Serious	1291	
(2) Slight	1071	
c. Anatomical classification of wounds: (Patients with multiple wounds will be classified according to most extensive wounds).		
(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	278	53
(b) Thoracic	471	38
(c) Maxillo-facial	345	5
(d) Neurologic		
Head	295	37
Spine	70	2
Nerves	17	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	1383	2
Lower	1927	7
(f) Buttocks	212	5
(g) Other	295	3
Sub-total	5294	152
(2) Burns - all locations	68	0
Total	5362	152
d. Number of patients with multiple wounds: 1745 36		
e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:		
(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	2486	80
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	1912	51
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	259	8
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell, or mine)	95	0
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	98	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flak, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	68	0
(7) Others	144	13
Total	5362	152
f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:		

GSW, FC rt leg and lt arm	Terminal shock	1
Internal injuries	DOA	1
FCG skull	Meningitis	1
Perf W lt chest	DOA	1
FC skull	Hemorrhage	1
Poisoning (undetermined type)	Neuritis, optic acute	1
GS wound	Damaged cerebral tissue	1
GS wound	Irreversible shock	4
Shell wounds	Hemorrhage	1
GS wound	DOA	1
GS wound	Peritonitis	1
Shell wounds	Hemorrhage	1
Pen W abdomen	Shock, profound, irreversible	1
Pen W abdomen	Shock, profound, irreversible, sustained	1
Perf W abdomen	Anuria	1
Perf W abdomen	Uremia	1
GSW, perf, severe	Hemorrhage and shock	1
GSW, pen, abdomen	Shock	1
GSW, Pen Severe, lt shoulder with lt humerus & extensive blast injury to both lungs	Extensive blast injury to chest	1
GSW, perf, left maxillary	Shock, severe	1
line 11th rib		

FC, FBI, skull	Pulmonary edema & congestion	1
Perf W, GSW (rifle) skull	Herniation of brain & shock	2
Pen W, SPW (HE), abdomen	Shock	1
amputation lt leg		
Multiple Pen W, bomb W, head, arms	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Perf W, GSW, abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W, GSW, neck	DOA	1
Pen W, SPW, chest & abdomen	Pulmonary edema and congestion	1
Pen W, GSW, chest	DOA	1
MW (shell) face	Shock	1
Perf W (shell) abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W (GSW) scapular area	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) skull	None	2
MW (shell) lumbar region	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Perf W (GSW) buttocks	None	1
Pen W (shell) abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W (shell) skull	Shock	1
Pen W (GSW) buttocks	Shock	1
Pen W, skull, FCG skull with brain injury	Shock and respiratory failure	7
Perf & pen W, chest, multiple with hemorrhage	Traumatic shock	4
Pen W, thigh, perf W, small bowel, urinary bladder, FCG pubic ram-superior and inferior	Peritonitis	1
FCG both lower extremities, FCG skull	Extensive brain damage	1
LN face, FCG maxilla, FCG mandible	Acute dilation of stomach	1
DOA avulsion of rt side of face	Shock and extensive tissue damage	1
Perf W of abdomen	Anuria	1
Pen W of abdomen	Shock	1
Pen W of abdomen	Uremia	1
Pen W of chest	Pneumonia	1
Peritonitis	Shock	1
Perf W of chest	Pulmonary embolism	1
Perf W of abdomen	Irreversible shock	1
Perf W of back	Irreversible shock	1
Perf W of chest	Irreversible shock	1
GSW chest	Shock, hemorrhage	2
SPW Chest	Shock, hemorrhage	2
SPW abdomen	Shock, hemorrhage	3
SPW chest, spinal cord injury	Shock	1
Pen GSW, abdomen with eversion	Shock	1
Pen W, abdomen, chest, head, both lower extremities with FCG rt ankle	Hemorrhage	1
GSW, pen W, lt chest	Transsection of spinal cord	1
SPW, perf W, rt abdomen	Peritonitis	1
GSW, PS rt femur, FCG rt tibia	DOA	1
GSW, perf W, abdomen	Cardio-vascular collapse	1
Pen GSW, abdomen	Shock	2
Lao SPW face	Shock	1
Pen GSW lumbar region	Shock	1
Amputation, traumatic, thigh	Hemorrhage and shock	1
Pen SPW rt buttock	Shock	1
Pen GSW chest	Shock	1
SP, perf W abdomen	Shock	2
GSW perf W abdomen	Shock	1
SP, LN buttock	Shock	1
Internal injuries	DOA	1
Perf W, GSW, abdomen	Pulmonary edema	1
Pen W, shell, abdomen	Shock, secondary, severe	1
Perf W, GSW, lt chest	Massive hematoma	1
Perf W, GSW, head	Shock	1
Perf W, GSW, lt thigh	Crush syndrome	1
Pen W, shell, rt shoulder	DOA	1
Fracture, cervical vertebrae	DOA	1
Perf W, GSW, abdomen	Shock, secondary, severe	1
Pen W, shell, chest	Uremic convulsions	1
Pen W, bomb, PS skull	Cardio-vascular collapse	1
Pen W, shell, chest	Pulmonary embolism	1
Pen W, shell, abdomen	Irreversible shock	1
Pen W, shell, abdomen	cardio-respiratory collapse	1
GSW, pen head, NBI	Respiratory failure	1
FCG, skull, GSW	Shock	1
FCG, skull, SW	Shock	2
Pen W, chest, GSW	Hemorrhage	2
Extensive W of head, HE	Hemorrhage	1
Extensive W of abdomen HE	Internal hemorrhage	2
Extensive W of head, bomb	Blast effect	1

Extensive W of abdomen	Massive edema and congestion both lungs; congestive heart failure; generalized congestion of all viscera	1
Pen W, abdomen (2 DOA)	None	4
Perf W, abdomen, GSW	None	1
FCG skull, shell	None	1
Trau amp thighs & lt forearm	Gas gangrene and nephrosis	1
FC skull, mine	Pelvic abscess	1
Perf W, shell (HE) paralysis	Shock, respiratory paralysis	1
Pen gunshot W, abdomen	Peritonitis	1
Rupture of spleen and liver	Hemorrhage	1
Pen gunshot W maxillary region	Hemorrhage	1
Perf gunshot W chest	Hemorrhage	1
Perf gunshot W chest	Pulmonary embolus	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Hemorrhage and skull	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Pneumothorax	1
Fracture, simple, skull	Hemorrhage, cerebral	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Penetrating W lt chest wall with penetrating lung	1
GSW, penetrating, occipital region with FCG skull	Exophthalmos & hemorrhage (DOA)	1
Fracture, compound, skull	Hemorrhage and shock	2
Skull, fracture severe	None	1
Lao wounds, multiple	Ileum and colon	1
Pen W, chest (DOA)	Shock	2
Pen W, skull (DOA)	DOA	2
Shock, Pen W, lt thigh and lt arm	DOA	1
Pen thoraco-abdominal W, rt	Shock	1
with perf of colon		
Pen W, buttock, rectum, bladder	Shock	1
Transsection of spinal cord, level 11th thoracic	Uremia	1
Multiple lacerations colon and jejunum	Hemorrhage	1
Lao W, colon, duodenum	None	1
g. Number of transfusions of:		
(1) Fresh whole blood		311
(2) Stored blood		2595
(3) Dry plasma		1256
(4) Other blood substitutes (does not include crystalloids)		387
h. Number of units of penicillin administered 3,721,460,000		
i. Number of amputations:		
(1) Upper extremity		63
(2) Lower extremity		61
j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gas gangrene:		
(1) U. S. Army		16
(2) Other		12
k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:		
(1) U. S. Army		4710
(2) Other		981


4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

Ever-increasing numbers of German military hospitals were being uncovered during the advance of Third U. S. Army. At the beginning of the month, the mission of supervising and controlling these installations was given to the 66th Medical Group. In addition, the group became responsible for the medical care of all Allied prisoners of war camps. The 65th Medical Group assumed responsibility for evacuation of IX Corps, in order to free the 66th Medical Group for its important task.


Because of the large number of German medical installations which were being overrun by the Third U. S. Army, a directive was issued on 11 April, effective 1 April, defining the specific responsibilities of the Army Medical Service in regard to such installations.

Under the terms of this directive, German prisoners of war uncovered on the field of battle were to be treated and evacuated through normal medical channels. In the case of German prisoners of war un-

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Concentration Camp Inmate Being Carried Into
The Receiving Tent of an Evacuation Hospital.



U. S. Army Medical Corps Officer Examining Tattoo Identifying Patient as a Former Concentration Camp Inmate.



Blood Plasma Being Administered to Patient From Concentration Camp.

MEDICAL FOR CONCENTRA

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Patient Too Weak to Eat is Being Fed Intravenously.



Concentration Camp Inmates Awaiting Medical Treatment.



Medical Aid Being Administered to Concentration Camp Inmate.

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covered in German military or civilian hospitals, a "stay put" policy was to be followed, the tactical situation permitting. At such time as the latter individuals were ready for discharge from the hospital, evacuation to a prisoner of war enclosure was to be permitted. Consolidation of German patients in military or civilian hospitals was to be accomplished wherever possible, and maximum use of German Medical Department personnel, equipment, and supplies was to be made.

With regard to sick and injured Allied prisoners of war which were being uncovered, the directive established a "stay put" policy, with the exception of United States and British prisoner of war patients, which patients were to be transferred to a U. S. hospital and evacuated normally as rapidly as the chain of evacuation load would permit.

Other instructions contained in the directive referred to the policies to be followed in regard to captured German Medical Department personnel, and specific instructions to the Commanding Officers of the 66th and 69th Medical Groups, which were responsible in the forward and intermediate Army area, respectively.

The job of the 66th Medical Group included responsibility for provision of rations and medical supplies which, where possible, were obtained from captured stocks. Necessary fuel was also provided. The German installations were checked frequently to assure proper sanitation, correct triage of the patients, and evacuation of the well prisoners of war to prisoner of war enclosures. Where the situation permitted, smaller hospitals were closed and the patients transferred to other hospitals with available space. By decreasing the number of installations, better control could be maintained.

During this period, it was established that no German patients in these hospitals would be evacuated out of the Army area; only those German wounded uncovered on the field of battle could be evacuated through normal U. S. Army medical channels. Even these patients were sent to German hospitals if their condition permitted and the hospitals were available.

On 15 April, Advance Section, Communications Zone, assumed responsibility for twenty-two of the rear-most German hospitals, and established a Medical Center at BAD NAUHEIM (M-69). Two days later, the 69th Medical Group took over the German hospitals in an intermediate zone between the 66th Medical Group and Advance Section, Communications Zone. A total of twenty-six hospitals were taken over by the 69th Medical Group at that time.

The notorious concentration camp (Camp EICHENWALD) was uncovered at ETTERSBERG (J-47) during April. Approximately 21,000 persons were in the camp when it was overrun, living under most horrible conditions. The 120th Evacuation Hospital, newly arrived in the Army area, was dispatched on 15 April to this camp to provide medical service for the large number of sick, estimated to be 5,000. This unit, plus a clearing platoon, operated for about ten days until relieved by First U. S. Army units. During this time, the hospital did outstanding work in caring for the sick and improving the sanitation of the camp. The 120th Evacuation Hospital was attached to the 66th Medical Group during this period, which attachment continued throughout the month. At the close of the month, the 120th Evacuation Hospital was moving to the vicinity of CHAM (U-68) to care for a large number of displaced persons there.

On the last day of the month, a camp was overrun at MOOSBURG (Z-19). This camp was reported to contain approximately 30,000 Allied military personnel, with many thousands of them sick. The 130th Evacuation Hospital, which had recently arrived, was immediately dispatched to MOOSBURG (Z-19) to take over the situation.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

The type of warfare waged during the month of April was definitely reflected in a change in emphasis with the category of professional services rendered. With the uncovering of captured German hospitals, displaced persons camps, and Allied prisoner of war enclosures in large numbers, the medical services, as distinct from the surgical, became of greater relative importance.

2. Surgery

With the crumbling of German resistance, the number of casualties in Third U. S. Army dropped to less than half of the number reported during the previous month. Of a grand total of 5,362 wounded and processed through Army medical installations, 4,071 were minor injuries, leaving only 1,291 seriously wounded cases. There were 152 deaths, and of this number, fifty-three were suffering from abdominal

wounds, thirty-eight from thoracic wounds, and thirty-seven from wounds of the head. About one-third of these casualties received multiple wounds.

The character of the fighting is further reflected in the types of casualties, in that, for the first time during this campaign, the number of casualties resulting from small arms fire (rifle, pistol, or machine gun) outnumbered those which were incurred as a result of shell fragments. There was considerable sniping, ambushing along the roads, and road block skirmishes where small arms were employed. Small arms fire accounted for 2,486 casualties and eighty deaths, while, 1,912 casualties and fifty-one deaths resulted from shell fragment wounds. In previous months of this campaign, this ratio had been between three and four casualties from shell fragments to one from small arms fire.

2a Medical Services

General medical problems among Third U. S. Army troops presented little change when compared with those encountered during the previous month. There was an overall ratio of medical admissions to surgical admissions of approximately sixty-five to thirty-five, favoring the latter. Medical admissions were largely composed of the type individuals seen in station hospitals and on daily sick call, there being very few of a type to present distinct and difficult diagnostic problems among U. S. Army personnel. Careful and exhaustive study of the latter cases was required.

The most serious problem confronted by the Medical Service was in the form of scattered outbreaks of typhus fever among Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons. This illness appeared in several camps and increased rapidly until adequate sanitary measures were initiated and all personnel, buildings, and clothing were deloused. Within a very short period after the delousing procedures were instituted and made constant regimen, the incidence of the disease began to wane. In addition, malnutrition was very pronounced among the personnel of these categories. To meet the malnutrition malady, small feedings of high caloric and high protein content were given these patients. In these groups also there was a high incidence of open cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, which required expert medical and nursing care and early evacuation to proper hospital facilities. Probably the greatest problem in this group was that of educating the patients in proper sanitation and of preventing them from expectorating wherever they might choose, thereby spreading the disease. As a rule, camps were initially dirty beyond description, and the police and institution of proper and adequate sanitation was time-consuming, as well as difficult. The large numbers of individuals of various nationalities in these camps complicated the problems.

During the month of April, a survey of all field artillery liaison pilots was accomplished to determine those suffering from flight fatigue and to make such recommendations as deemed necessary for the adequate conservation of personnel in this group. It was found that out of 290 pilots, only four were suffering from marked fatigue and fourteen from moderate fatigue. These men were recommended for leaves to rest areas, and it was the opinion of the surveying officers that all would be salvaged. The only recommendations forthcoming from this survey was that pilots receive their yearly examinations at Air Corps dispensaries, and that rest and recreation centers be established in the Army Zone for men in this group so that some degree of rotation could be carried out.

Contagious diseases were not prevalent to any appreciable degree during the period. Scattered cases of diphtheria and mumps made their appearance throughout the command; but, in no instance, was anything approaching an epidemic found in any single organization. There were three diphtheria deaths during the month, all of which were of an extremely virulent type, and which resulted from complications rather than the disease itself.

3. Neuropsychiatry

Rapid advances by troops of Third U. S. Army in the face of light resistance was the prime factor in elevating the morale of combat troops to a degree which was probably unapproached at any time since D-Day, with the possible exception of the period which involved the dash across FRANCE in August.

Records of past performances prove that high morale and low neuropsychiatric casualties go hand in hand, and the relationship between these two factors during April, with its light resistance, rapid advances, and consequent high morale, is emphasized more than ever. Out of a total of 21,314 direct admissions during this period, 706 were diagnosed as neuropsychiatric casualties. This marked an all-time low in Third U. S. Army from a percentage standpoint. Seventy-eight and six-tenths percent (78.6%) of the neuropsychiatric casualties were returned to duty, which left an accumulation during the month of only

151 non-effective neuropsychiatric individuals out of the total direct admissions.

With the low record of neuropsychiatric cases, a relatively new problem arose--that of rendering neuropsychiatric opinions on an increased number of administrative and disciplinary cases. In general, these were admitted from combat units for further neuropsychiatric opinion; and, in many instances, with the request that administrative and disciplinary cases be evacuated through medical channels. There was also an increase in the number suffering from chronic alcoholism. This type of individual was, of necessity, returned to a parent unit for administrative or disciplinary action.

4. Dental

The month of April found the Army Dental Surgeon again faced with the necessity of providing dental service to combat units which had driven far in advance of most units where provision of dental facilities was normally available. The laboratory facilities provided in the two medical depot companies and in most of the evacuation hospitals were rendered ineffective because of their inability to follow closely behind the Army's forward elements. Their mission became that of servicing supply and service echelons behind the combat divisions. The extreme value of the mobile type of prosthetic unit was proved beyond all question, once the lines had become extended beyond the point at which semi-fixed installations were effective. Mobile prosthetic teams were sent forward with the combat divisions to insure that dentures would be constructed or repaired without the necessity for evacuating men from the division area.

In the interest of mobility and economy of transportation, the Army Dental Surgeon directed that evacuation hospitals rid themselves of all heavy dental equipment in excess of the Tables of Basic Allowances, retaining only the items necessary to provide an efficient dental service. Hydraulic chairs, dental cabinets, and units which had been used during the winter months when the hospitals operated in buildings were stored with the medical depot companies, to be held until such time as the hospitals could again function in fixed accommodations. The elimination of this heavy equipment expedited movement without impairing the service rendered in the field.

By 14 April, four dental operative trucks which had been attached to Third U. S. Army were completely equipped and manned so that they could begin operation at their respective corps headquarters to work with the medical clearing companies assigned to corps headquarters. The operative teams worked in conjunction with the mobile prosthetic units which had previously been assigned to the medical clearing companies. It was found that this combination permitted complete preparation of all patients for prosthetic appliances, thus accomplishing a most efficient service. The fourth truck was attached to Headquarters Third U. S. Army (Rear) to provide dental service for personnel of headquarters and attached units. No dental officer is provided in Tables of Organization to service troops of the Army Rear Echelon.

Units which had received captured German field equipment were found, upon inspection, to be employing it to its maximum advantage. Of particular value was the combination electric and foot engine and the electric operating light contained in Chest Number 2. Distribution was made chiefly to evacuation hospitals where generators were available for the employment of electrical equipment.

Interest in the newly devised acrylic anti-concussion device, which had been produced under the direction of the Third U. S. Army Dental Service increased to the point that the Artillery Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, submitted a request to the Army Dental Surgeon for information relative to the fabrication, use, and results of this invention.

Statistical information relative to dental treatments in Third U. S. Army for the month of April is shown below:

Strength (Reported)	309947
Admissions, Routine	15277
Admissions, Emergency	4205
Sittings	26273
Officer Personnel	417
Enlisted Personnel	441
Restorations	19087
Dentures	1330
Gingivitis	1100
Gingivitis Treatments	1167
Stomatitis, Vincent's	482
Stomatitis, Vincent's Treatments	580

5. Veterinary

UNIFORMS WORN BY THIRD U. S. ARMY NURSES



ETO Battle Suit With Slacks and Boots



Herringbone Twill Uniform For
Field Use With Leggings and G.
Bandana For Operating Room Etc.



ETO Battle Suit With Skirt,
Used in Lieu of Service Uniform.



Seersucker Uniform for Buildings



ATS Battle Suit,
a Substitute for the ETO Battle Suit.



Combat Suit with Overshoes and Wool Gloves.

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The absence of rain and the abundance of sunshine during April assisted in the maintaining of excellent sanitation at the Quartermaster Class I Supply Points. Ideal weather conditions made the complete utilization of old stools possible. The greatest losses were sustained in fruits and vegetables. These losses were attributed partially to the extreme perishability of such items as oranges, potatoes etc., and partially to the fact that the packing and handling procedure was not up to the desired standards.

The captured enemy materiel team was notified of numerous newly discovered stockpiles of captured enemy materiel. Included in these stores were two cold storage plants, well filled. One plant, located at FRANKFURT (M-66), contained considerable quantities of tub butter, cheese, frozen beef, pork, veal, and fowl. The other, uncovered at NURNBERG (O-40), was filled with a large supply of frozen beef, pork, canned meat, and frozen vegetables. None of this food was issued to Army troops, but was made available for feeding prisoners of war and displaced persons, the latter through Military Government.

Other captured stores of less perishable nature, such as canned beef, canned pork, and dried vegetables, were placed under guard by the officer in charge of the captured enemy materiel team. These food supplies were issued to prisoners of war and displaced persons, by order of the Military Government, and were conveyed to and issued from six depots, located at FURTH (O-30), BAMBERG (O-24), WURZBURG (M-53), HEGENSBURG (U-15), LINZ (V-88), and PILSEN (L-04). Condition of the items referred to above was generally good. About thirty percent (30%) of the butter at FRANKFURT (M-66) was very rancid, and was reworked by a local dairy. Fowl in cold storage at NURNBERG (O-40) was moldy and very badly dressed, but was not otherwise decomposed.

6. Personnel

As the war approached its close, the situation with respect to availability of Medical Corps officers became more and more untenable. New divisions assigned to Third U. S. Army were invariably ten Medical Corps officers short; new evacuation hospitals were eight Medical Corps officers short, each. Accumulation of a number of new divisions and evacuation hospitals during the month resulted in a shortage of approximately 100 Medical Corps officers throughout the Third U. S. Army. Twenty-five Medical Corps officers were secured from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, to help alleviate the shortage. This was all that could be furnished.

Fortunately, casualties were relatively light. Had it not been for this fact, it is possible that there would have been a serious breakdown in the medical service available. In spite of the handicaps involved, all operations/divisions were kept up to full strength in Medical Corps officers.

Previous shortages in Medical Administrative Corps officers were absorbed through completion of appointment as Second Lieutenants of a number of applicants whose applications had been pending since January, 1945.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

The rapid advances of Third U. S. Army during April is amply reflected by the number of moves which were required by the units of the two medical depot companies, which are outlined as follows:

- Adv Sec No 2, 32d Medical Depot - from ST WENDEL (Q-59) to HERSFELD (H-35) on 4 April
- Adv Sec No 1, 33d Medical Depot - from MAYEN (L-69) to KASTELLAUN (L-76) on 8 April
- 32d Medical Depot - from ST WENDEL (Q-59) to EISENACH (H-76) on 13 April
- Adv Sec No 1, 32d Medical Depot - from WORNSTADT (M-23) to GERA (K-06) on 17 April
- 32d Medical Depot - from EISENACH (H-76) to WEIDEN (P-12) on 26 April
- 33d Medical Depot - from KASTELLAUN (L-76) to FURTH (U-30) on 30 April
- Adv Sec No 2, 33d Medical Depot - from KASTELLAUN (L-76) to FRANKFURT (M-66) on 5 April

Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining transportation for depot movements. As a result, supply lines were sometimes stretched to distances up to 200 miles or more. With a comparative shortage of available transportation, the delivery of supplies to the Advance Sections of the depot companies became a taxing problem. To add to the handicaps mentioned above, notification was received from the Chief Surgeon's Office that, due to the critical nature of air life, only "battle urgency" supplies would be flown across the RHINE

River. In addition, all air lift had to be approved by the Army AC of S, G-4, who in turn was required to set up the air lift with SHAEF. This policy resulted in a decided decrease in tonnage received by air. On the 15th of the month, rail facilities were established across the RHINE, and an allocation of five rail cars per day (approximately eighty tons) was made for medical supplies.

The close support rendered the combat troops in the face of long supply lines and minimum transportation is explained by two factors; first, the advance sections of the depot companies were kept in proximity to the fighting troops; second, the relatively small numbers of casualties sustained by the combat troops resulted in a reduction in medical supply requirements.

Three large German medical depots were uncovered during April at TREUEN (K-22), KASSEL (C-20), and LAUTERRACH (H-12), respectively, with a combined stock of approximately 11,050 tons. The largest of these depots, located at TREUEN (K-22), carried a stock of approximately 10,000 tons. On 18 April, arrangements were made with Advance Section, Communications Zone whereby they took over all captured medical supplies at FRANKFURT (M-66), WIESBADEN (M-36), HAINSTADT (M-86), DARMSTADT (M-64), and MUNSTER (M-84). Three days later, all other captured medical supplies located in the Army area were released to First U. S. Army, as a result of a change in the Army boundaries.

In order to meet the increasing demand for captured medical supplies by prisoner of war enclosures, displaced persons camps, and German hospitals, it was found necessary to establish captured enemy medical supply dumps. Advance Section Number 2, 33d Medical Depot Company, was assigned the task of operating these dumps, and it followed that supply dumps were opened at FRANKFURT (M-66), LAUTERRACH (H-12), and FURTH (O-30) during the month. The substitution of captured enemy supplies proved invaluable, in that it conserved Army supplies in large quantities.

At a conference with the Chief of the Supply Section, Office of the Chief Surgeon, it was decided to build up the 33d Medical Depot Company at FURTH (O-30) with an additional 1,500 tons of medical supplies and have them operate as a Communications Zone medical depot until such time as a Communications Zone depot could move in. Plans were made for shipment of approximately 300 tons of medical supplies by rail to this depot weekly.

At the end of April, the 32d Medical Depot Company was located at WEIDEN (P-12) in support of XII Corps, while the 33d Medical Depot Company was at FURTH (O-30) supporting III and XX Corps. There was an estimated 1,000-ton total of medical supplies in Army depots, with no critical shortages existing.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

Rising temperatures and fair weather were favorable for military operations, and did not increase preventive medicine problems for Third U. S. Army troops. However, the uncovering of thousands of displaced persons camps, Allied prisoner of war camps, and German military and civilian hospitals gave rise to new and multitudinous problems of sanitation, water supply, lice infestation, malnutrition, tuberculosis, scabies, furunculosis, and avitaminosis. The squalor, the magnitude of human misery and the bestiality of planned Nazi atrocities were appalling and defied adequate description. Over 1,000 cases of typhus fever were discovered in the Third U. S. Army area during the period.

2. Venereal Disease Control

A fast-moving tactical situation is invariably accompanied by a low venereal disease rate, and the month of April, with its "blitz" type warfare, was no exception to the rule. No new prophylactic stations (chemical) were established during the month; however, the supply of chemical and mechanical prophylactic materials was adequate. There were only 362 cases of venereal disease reported within the Army, as compared with 449 for March. Of these, over fifty percent (50%) were contracted in PARIS, BRUSSELS, and the RIVIERA. Fifty-seven cases of syphilis were reported. A statistical breakdown by weeks on venereal disease is shown in Annex XXXVI to the Medical Section report.

3. Communicable Diseases

There was a moderate decrease in the weekly rate of these diseases among Third U. S. Army troops from the last period, a drop from 173 to 328 per 1,000 per annum. Diarrheal diseases decreased from seventeen to seven, and upper respiratory diseases from ninety-two to fifty-five per 1,000 per annum. Infectious hepatitis, however, rose slightly

from eighty-six to 110 cases for the month. Diseases represented fifty-two percent (52%) of the total direct admissions. A weekly breakdown of communicable diseases will be found in Annex XXXVI to the Medical Section report.

4. Medical Records

A total of 37,980 reports were processed, a decrease of approximately 4,000 reports, when compared to those of the month of March. The decrease was incident to the decrease in total casualties.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The average weekly rate remained unchanged from the previous period. Non-battle injuries represented eighteen percent (18%) of the total direct admissions for the month.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

The 7th Medical Laboratory made no deviation from its policy of operating in two sections. Locations during the month of April were as follows:

Section I - 1 to 10 April - BAD KREUZNACH (O-03)
11 to 30 April - BEBBA (H-16)

Section II - 1 to 3 April - LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81)
4 to 25 April - FRANKFURT (M-66)
26 to 30 April - LAUF (O-50)

The number of tests performed by the two sections continued to drop, and there were only 7,953 completed for this period, as compared with 9,168 for the month of March.

The total work for the month of April is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	4833	60.8
Bacteriology	1084	13.6
Chemistry	292	3.7
Pathology	106	1.3
Hematology	24	0.3
Parasitology	8	0.1
Sub-total	6347	79.8
MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hospital)	1606	20.2
GRAND TOTAL	7953	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the month of April is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	15	3256	40.9
Convalescent Hospital	1	2635	33.1
Field Hospitals	9	134	1.7
Miscellaneous Medical Installations		265	3.3
Miscellaneous Tactical Installations		1663	21.0
TOTAL	25	7953	100.0

7. Sanitation

The prevalence of moderately cool temperatures during the month of April precluded any appreciable visitation by flies and other warm weather insects to the extent that they created a menace to the health or welfare of the troops. Few cases of lice infestation were reported among U. S. troops, and those cases which were reported were adequately dealt with by the proper use of DDT Powder.

The completion of organization of additional facilities and personnel for delousing and disinfection of the camps of Allied nationals, overrun during the month, was effected and work carried out on an extensive scale. Diarrheal outbreaks were minor, and only three such cases were reported during the month. In no case was any definite causative agent found, but emphasis was continuously placed on the practical aspects of mess sanitation, personal sanitation, and water discipline.

Due to the rapidity of movement and the difficulty of travel to the laboratory, there was a great reduction in the number of water

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German Barracks Being Burned at FRANKFURT, GERMANY, Due to Insanitary Conditions.

samples from Engineer Water Points examined during this period. The number of samples dropped to sixty-eight, of which two, or three percent (3%) were found to be non-potable.

8. Public Health

With progressive increase in public health problems, Twelfth Army Group directed that the Army be vested with the responsibility for all public health activities with the Army. Accordingly, Public Health (G-5) moved physically into the Medical Section, and the Army Surgeon assumed direct control over all Public Health personnel, establishing a separate Public Health Sub-section. Teams, consisting of one Medical Corps officer, one Sanitary Corps officer, one British nurse, and one driver, were organized and equipped with three-quarter-ton trucks and one-ton trailers.

Teams were placed under the operational control of Corps Surgeons. They made every effort to be in constant touch with civilian public health problems through Military Government officers and unit surgeons so that they could take immediate action when necessary. Their chief functions were as follows: to organize and supervise the medical and sanitary services of displaced persons camps, with particular reference to delousing procedures; to re-establish the German civilian medical and public health organizations in the larger towns and districts uncovered by corps, with emphasis on the care of displaced persons; to act as a specialist consultant group on medical and sanitary problems encountered by corps, particularly from a civilian public health standpoint; and to act on divisional or regimental problems of public health and sanitation.

With thirty detachments reporting from an area involving a population of approximately 4,000,000 persons, the following communicable diseases among civilians were noted: diphtheria 135, scarlet fever 265, tuberculosis 231, typhoid fever 27, dysentery 9, gonorrhoea 209, syphilis 101, chanoroid 7, cerebrospinal meningitis 6, and typhus fever 617.

Typhus fever continued to be reported in increasing numbers. The disease was confined to displaced persons in centers and concentration camps. Of particular note were twenty-two cases reported at the political prison in ROCKENBERG (G-70). These people had been marched from prisons at SIEGBURG (F-61) and at RHEINBACH (F-42) near BONN (F-53). All attendants were vaccinated with typhus vaccine and all inmates deloused with DDT insecticide powder. At Camp BUCHENWALD (J-47) there were sixty cases. A shipment of 1,500 pounds of DDT Powder was delivered to this camp, and twenty dusting teams were organized under the supervision of public health officers. The concentration camp at FLOSSENBERG (P-33) reported 176 cases.

A "ordon sanitaires", for the prevention of the spread of typhus fever to west side of the RHINE, was established along the east bank. Teams were assigned at exit points to delouse Western Europeans with DDT powder before their movement across the river and repatriation. Exit points were established at KASTEL (L-40) and WURZBURG (N-53).

A dusting team, equipped with a power duster, was placed with the displaced persons transit point at KASTEL (L-40), located on the east side of the RHINE near the bridge. All Western Europeans passed through this camp and were accordingly deloused.

Western Europeans were evacuated by train directly from WURZBURG (N-53) to FRANCE. Therefore, this locality was considered an exit point; and, consequently, all displaced persons were deloused before entraining.

There was not much demand upon Army for medical supplies for either displaced persons camps or civilians. Necessary supplies were procured from local sources or captured German medical supplies. Ordinarily, German towns or cities had enough medical supplies for about four weeks, which interval was beyond the period of jurisdiction. There was much demand for DDT powder and hand dusters, however. These demands were met in every instance.

The uncovering of thousands of displaced persons and political prisoners presented a severe medical problem. Many of these were extremely malnourished, and many suffered from tuberculosis and other ailments. Public health and Military Government personnel emphasized to the local Burgomasters their responsibility in the case of sick and wounded displaced persons admitted to their hospitals. They were warned that all hospitals would be inspected for proper care of displaced persons. Camps, when deficient in doctors and nurses, were provided with this personnel through local German medical sources and from medical personnel among displaced persons.

In special instances, such as in Camp BUCHENWALD (J-47), the Army Surgeon established an evacuation hospital for the care of political prisoners therein. Similarly, an evacuation hospital was set up at CHEM (U-68) to care for many sick displaced persons, who had been political prisoners and were subsequently scattered in the fields, barns, and houses in numerous small towns.

Wherever possible, special hospitals were set up for displaced persons staffed by Allied doctors and nurses. Such hospitals were established at EISENACH (H-76), where one hospital was reserved for Russians, another at TAUNUSHEIM (M-36) near WIESBADEN (M-36), at FISCHBACH (T-59) near NURNBERG (O-40), and at LEBACH (Q-49). Improvised hospitals were organized at STAMSERIED (U-48) and NEUNBERG (U-39) for the same type individuals.

CHAPTER 12 MAY OPERATIONS

The problems incidental to the first eight days of May were similar to those which faced Third U. S. Army during April. The confusing complexities of simultaneous operational and occupational considerations continued to arise and exist.

The uncovering of even larger numbers of displaced persons, as well as the capture of additional German hospitals and provision of dispensary and hospital service for prisoner of war enclosures demanded a maximum of attention.

At the conclusion of hostilities Third U. S. Army was approximately 100 Medical Corps officers short. With the dual functions which the Medical Service was forced to assume, such a shortage was fast approaching a serious situation.

Section 1 - Organization of the Medical Section

The transfer on the first day of May of the Hospitalization Officer of the Medical Section, brought the section down to a total strength of twenty-one officers (including one Army Nurse Corps officer). This was in accordance with Staff Memorandum Number 10, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 11 April 1945.

Section 2 - Operations

1. Training

On 8 May, a conference was held at the G-3 Section, Third U. S. Army, regarding the Army Education Program - Post Hostilities. The

aims of the program were outlined, and as much information as was then available was given to representative Information-Education officers. Instructions were given that all units must submit complete plans for this program not later than 20 May; and, at the same time, submit requisitions for the contemplated textbook requirements.

2. Evacuation

The 65th Medical Group continued to be responsible for the evacuation of all divisions in three corps; its ambulances, therefore, continued to be scattered throughout the Army area. The 131st Medical Group was evacuating V Corps. The 69th Medical Group, in addition to its other duties, had one of its units, the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, operating the Army air medical evacuation holding unit. This group also was evacuating two of the evacuation hospitals to holding units.

No particular evacuation problems presented themselves during the period 1 to 8 May. With the war in Europe very obviously terminating, with the mass surrender of large bodies of German troops, and the resulting light casualty rate, evacuation facilities were never over-taxed. A total of only 3,017 patients were evacuated from the Army area during the period. Of this total, 1,684 were evacuated to Communications Zone by air, while 1,333 went by ambulance to Advance Section, Communications Zone units.

Air medical evacuation holding units were dispersed as follows: one company of the 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion was located at Airfield R-66, REGENSBURG (U-15); the other two companies were still at Airfield R-29, HERZOGENAURACH (O-21) at the beginning of the month, holding non-patient recovered Allied military personnel. As soon as they were cleared, these latter units proceeded to Airfield R-66. The 7th Field Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) was located at Airfield R-26, BAYREUTH (O-75). The 28th Field Hospital (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) was functioning at Airfield R-29, and the 58th Field Hospital (also an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) was at Airfield R-73, LANDSHUT (U-20). The latter three units were all assigned to Advance Section, Communications Zone.

The locations of evacuation facilities in Third U. S. Army during the first eight days of May will be found in Annex XXVII to the Medical Section report.

3. Hospitalization

The field hospitals were employed as previously, operating in conjunction with the clearing companies of the divisions.

As the month opened, the evacuation hospitals, as a whole, were dispersed to adequately support the various corps. The 12th Evacuation Hospital remained open at FRANKFURT (M-66) in the rear portion of the Army area where it furnished "station hospital" type care for the troops in that vicinity. The 34th Evacuation Hospital at SANDERSDORF (7-84) and the 106th Evacuation Hospital, which was moving to LANDSHUT (U-20), were in position to support III Corps. The 107th Evacuation Hospital at REGENSBURG (U-15) and the 121st Evacuation Hospital at SCHNACH (U-44) were in support of IX Corps. The 101st Evacuation Hospital was at OB-PARKSTETTEN (U-54) in XII Corps Zone, and the 110th Evacuation Hospital was moving to TITTLING (Q-13) in that zone. Farther back in the Army area were the 104th Evacuation Hospital at BAIERSDORF (O-32) and the 109th Evacuation Hospital at LANGENZENN (O-20). The 35th Evacuation Hospital at SCHONBRUNN (O-91) and the 39th Evacuation Hospital at WEIDEN (P-12) were both still in First U. S. Army area. Both of these hospitals were closed by 2 May.

The III Corps was pinched out in the first few days of the month so that the 106th Evacuation Hospital at LANDSHUT (U-20) would not be required. When the change in the tactical situation became apparent, this hospital had already moved fifty percent (50%) of its equipment to the new site. Further movement was halted, and the hospital was directed to make reconnaissance far to the east in the vicinity of REGEN (U-95) in XII Corps Zone. At the same time, the 32d Evacuation Hospital which had located a site at EGGENFELDEN (Z-79), was directed to by-pass that location and move about twenty-five miles directly east to the vicinity of POKING (V-19).

On 4 May, the area occupied by V Corps reverted to Third U. S. Army from First U. S. Army, and the 35th and 39th Evacuation Hospitals were reopened. The next day, however, the 128th Evacuation Hospital at GRAFENWOER (P-05), assigned to First U. S. Army, opened, and the 35th Evacuation Hospital was again closed. The 39th and 128th Evacuation Hospitals, together with the 106th Evacuation Hospital at REGEN (U-95) and the 110th Evacuation Hospital at TITTLING (Q-13), proved adequate to support the drive into CZECHOSLOVAKIA by the V and XII Corps. The 109th Evacuation Hospital was bivouacked at KOTTING (O-77) awaiting a move to PILSEN (L-04).

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On 6 May, the 67th Evacuation Hospital at BAYREUTH (O-75) and the 128th Evacuation Hospital were relieved of assignment to First U. S. Army and assigned to Third U. S. Army.

On 8 May, when the war ended, several evacuation hospitals were in the process of making reconnaissance for semi-permanent sites where they might occupy suitable accommodations in the occupation zone of Third U. S. Army. The following hospitals were making reconnaissance in the areas indicated below:

- 34th Evacuation Hospital - LANDSHUT (U-20)
- 35th Evacuation Hospital - WURZBURG (N-53)
- 39th Evacuation Hospital - MUNICH (Y-85)
- 101st Evacuation Hospital - REGENSBURG (U-15)
- 110th Evacuation Hospital - PASSAU (Q-21)
- 121st Evacuation Hospital - AUGSBURG (Y-37)

The 6th Convalescent Hospital was closed throughout this period. Reconnaissance was being made for a site in the vicinity of REGENSBURG (U-15) which would be a suitable semi-permanent location. Suitable buildings were not available, however. Therefore, the unit prepared to set up in the field in the vicinity of NURNBERG (O-40).

Locations of Third U. S. Army hospitals during the month of May will be found in Annex XXXVIII to the Medical Section report.

An analysis of wounded hospitalized in May is given below:

a. Number of wounded admitted "direct" (i.e., not by transfer):

Designation	Number
(1) U. S. Army Troops	576
(2) British Army Troops	44
(3) French Army Troops	19
(4) U. S. Navy and Marine Corps	4
(5) British and French Navy	0
(6) Enemy Forces Personnel	94
(7) Civilians	199
(8) Others	26

Note: All of the following in b through f pertains to U. S. Army troops only.

b. General classification of wounds:

(1) Serious	182
(2) Slight	394

c. Anatomical classification of wounds:

(Patients with multiple wounds will be classified according to most extensive wounds).

(1) Wounds other than burns	Admissions	Deaths
(a) Abdominal	44	7
(b) Thoracic	22	4
(c) Maxillo-facial	32	0
(d) Neurologic		
Head	29	6
Spine	6	1
Nerve	0	0
(e) Extremities		
Upper	123	0
Lower	211	0
(f) Buttocks	17	0
(g) Other	30	0
Sub-total	575	18
(2) Burns - all locations	21	0
Total	576	18

d. Number of patients with multiple wounds

	128	7
e. Classification of wounds by causative agents:		
(1) Gunshot wounds (rifle, pistol or machine gun)	265	44
(2) Shell wounds (HE, flak, mortar or cannon)	182	2
(3) Bomb wounds (aerial, grenade, booby trap or cannon)	16	1
(4) Blast injuries (bomb, shell or mine)	10	1
(5) Wounds from secondary missiles	16	0
(6) Burns (petrol, flak, flame thrower, phosphorus, etc.)	19	0
(7) Others	68	0

Total 576 18

f. Number of deaths by primary and secondary causes:

FCC, skull, parietal region, mid-line, perf W mult, left forearm and left arm. FCC left ulna. Pen W feet. LW nose. GSW	Evulsion of brain	1
Pen W bomb, head, FC	Cerebral hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W brain, SW (HE)		
Perf W neck with transection spinal cord - gunshot	DOA	1
Perf W, GSW, neck	Shock	1
Perf W, GSW, chest	Perf W of liver	1
Pen W of abdomen	Peritonitis, acute, fibropurulent with sv toxemia & terminal pulmonary edema	1
SF Pen W abdomen	Hemorrhage & shock	2
Pen & perf W abdominal cavity, GSW	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W thoraco-abdominal GSW	Hemorrhage & shock	1
Pen W chest GS	Cerebral hemorrhage extending to spinal cord	1
Basal skull fracture, NBI GSW	Pulmonary hemorrhage	1
Pen W chest, GSW	DOA	1
Pen W chest, GSW	Peritonitis & gangrene of abdominal wall	1
GSW, perf sv, abdomen with mult perf of jejunum & ascending colon	Urinary suppression with uremia	1
GSW, Pen W abdomen		
No cause listed		1

g. Number of transfusions of:

(1) Fresh whole blood	18
(2) Stored blood	555
(3) Dry plasma	982
(4) Other blood substitutes (do not include crystalloids)	96
Total	1651

h. Number of units of penicillin administered

	771,316,000
i. Number of amputations:	
(1) Upper extremity	6
(2) Lower extremity	13
Total	19

j. Number of cases showing clinical evidence of gangrene:

(1) U. S. Army	1
(2) Other	1

k. Number of wounded evacuated to other hospitals:

(1) U. S. Army	426
(2) Other	105

4. Additional Temporary Medical Service

As in the previous month, the 66th Medical Group had the mission of supervising and controlling all German military hospitals in forward areas and also furnishing medical care for recovered Allied military personnel and displaced persons camps. The 69th Medical Group had the same mission in the intermediate Army area; while, in the rear, Advance Section, Communications Zone had control.

For use in recovered Allied military personnel and displaced persons camps, the 120th, 130th, and 131st Evacuation Hospitals were attached to the 66th Medical Group. The 137th Evacuation Hospital was being assigned to Third U. S. Army from Fifteenth U. S. Army, but some of its personnel and equipment had not arrived. The 120th Evacuation Hospital was operating a hospital for displaced persons at CHAM (U-68). The 130th Evacuation Hospital at MOOSBURG (S-19) was operating a hospital for recovered Allied military personnel. Camps in that vicinity contained 28,748 American, British, and French personnel, as well as an unknown number of Russians and Poles. About 2,000 of these were patients in the hospital. The 131st Evacuation Hospital was operating a displaced persons hospital at MAUTHAUSEN (W-08). The five concentration camps for political prisoners in that area contained approximately 16,000 persons, 6,000 of whom were patients.

Other camps uncovered and requiring medical services were located as follows:

- LANDSHUT (U-20) - 5,500 recovered Allied military personnel, with an unknown number of patients.
- NEUBAU (V-77) - approximately 16,000 persons, with 5,000 sick.
- EBENSEE (V-52) - approximately 16,000 persons, with 5,000 in need of medical care.

The 34th Medical Battalion, attached to the 69th Medical Group, continued to operate at its location in BAMBERG (O-24) as a provisional hospital for self-inflicted wound patients.

Section 3 - Professional Services

1. General

Battle casualties were comparatively insignificant during the first part of May. In fact, there were only 576 among U. S. Army troops during that period. Of these, 182 were classified as serious and 394 as slight wounds.

2. Surgery

Gunshot wounds predominated during the first eight days of May, as they had tended to do in April. Of the total of 576 wounded, 265 were classified as having received gunshot wounds. Another 182 suffered shell wounds; the remainder were from miscellaneous sources.

The surgical services were not particularly hard pressed by reception of Third U. S. Army casualties. The high quality of the service, however, remained the same.

2a. Medical Services

The early days of May presented problems to the Medical Service which heretofore had not been encountered. Foremost among these problems was the initiation of physical profiles for all personnel. The profile system was something entirely new to all medical officers and required considerable study and interpretation before the actual examinations could be accomplished. The Medical Consultant, in conjunction with the Supply Sub-section, formulated equipment lists for the establishment of a number of Phase IV hospitals for prisoners of war. These hospitals were predicated upon the Table of Equipment for a platoon of a field hospital, with minimum utilization of equipment.

Coordinating with the Artillery Section, arrangements were completed whereby observers in the various liaison squadrons would be examined at XIX Tactical Air Force installations to complete requirements for their return to the Zone of the Interior for pilot training.

3. Neuropsychiatry

The previously established fact that light resistance, favorable weather conditions, and high morale are all contributing factors to a low neuropsychiatric rate was borne out very conclusively during the first eight days of May, with the crumbling of the German armies facing the combat troops of Third U. S. Army. The all-time low rate for Third U. S. Army of three and three-tenths percent of total admission during the month of April was reduced still further in May to the remarkably low figure of two and two-tenths percent. Out of a total of 5,391 total admissions, 123 were neuropsychiatric, and eighty-eight, or seventy-one and five-tenths percent of the latter number were returned to duty. Throughout the entire operational period from 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, inclusive, seven percent (7%) of all admissions were neuropsychiatric, and of these seventy-two and four-tenths percent (72.4%) were returned to duty.

4. Dental

Arrangements were made with the Surgeon, V Corps, to provide prosthetic service to the corps forward units through the assignment of a mobile prosthetic detachment. The Corps Surgeon made provisions for the assignment of this truck and team to the medical clearing company supporting the corps, thereby placing the services within range of all units in the corps area.

The Army Dental Surgeon inspected dental supplies from the Sismien's factory, ERLANGEN (O-31) with the officer in charge of captured medical supplies. Certain items, such as lathes, x-rays, transformers, and lathe chucks, were requisitioned for certain units of Third U. S. Army which required them. All supplies were placed in stock at

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the 33d Medical Depot Company for later issue.

5. Veterinary

On 3 May, a report reached the Army Veterinarian that there were 150 cases of foot and mouth disease at WEIGELSHOFEN (O-13). A Veterinary Corps officer was immediately dispatched to the scene; and, upon investigation, found that there were 150 cattle at that location infected with the disease. Necessary serum (fifty liters) was secured at NURNBURG (O-10) and sent to WEIGELSHOFEN (O-13) for use in vaccinating the infected animals.

An inspection was made of a civilian bakery, located at LANDSEUT (U-20), for the Quartermaster. This bakery is to be used to produce bread for displaced persons and prisoners of war.

6. Personnel

As is indicated in the preface to this month's report, the shortage of Medical Corps officers increased considerably. This was not the result of battle casualties among Medical Corps officers. Rather it was the result of the continued assignment of new divisions and new hospital units to Third U. S. Army, which were short Medical Corps officers. It was indeed fortunate that the cessation of hostilities was imminent. Divisions were being shipped to the European Theater of Operations from the UNITED STATES consistently short ten Medical Corps officers, and evacuation hospitals were being sent short eight Medical Corps officers.

Section 4 - Medical Supply

Demands for supplies destined for displaced persons camps, prisoner of war enclosures, recovered Allied military personnel camps, and German hospitals continued to increase. Requirements for the troops of Third U. S. Army were negligible because of the fact that casualties were light, and epidemics were absent from the picture, as far as the Army troops were concerned.

In order to conserve American medical supplies, special emphasis was placed on the consolidation of captured German medical equipment and supplies and evacuating them to the depots for reissue. With this plan in mind, arrangements were made with the Chief Surgeon's Office and the Surgeon's Office, Advance Section, Communications Zone, whereby approximately 2,000 tons of captured medical supplies would be transferred from the captured German depot at FREUEN (K-22) to the 33d Medical Depot Company. Six German officers, formerly attached to the German depot at FREUEN (K-22), were dispatched to the 33d Medical Depot Company to work in the Captured Medical Supply Section as assistants in the segregation and inventorying of the German stock.

Coincident with the plan of setting up station-type hospitals at the prisoner of war camps, equipment lists were drawn up, and the 33d Medical Depot Company began assembling this equipment in unit assemblies.

The 24th Regulating Station (an Advance Section, Communications Zone unit) informed the Army Surgeon that there were thirty-two rail cars loaded with medical supplies en route from Communications Zone depots. However, they were tied up between the RHINE River and HANAU (N-87). A priority was obtained from the AG of S, G-4, Third U. S. Army to have these cars released and moved to the rail siding at FURTH (O-50).

Two newly assigned evacuation hospitals (the 131st and 139th) reported a shortage of fifteen KV generators. To alleviate this shortage, arrangements were made with the Army Engineer to release two generators to each hospital. No other major shortages of equipment existed in those units.

Approximately eighty-six long tons of medical supplies were received from the Communications Zone during the first eight days of May.

Locations of Third U. S. Army medical supply depots during April and the first eight days of May will be found in Annex XXXII to the Medical Section report.

Section 5 - Preventive Medicine

1. General

The health of Third U. S. Army troops continued to be exception-

ally good during the closing days of the European campaign. There was a notable increase of almost one hundred percent (100%) in the venereal disease rate, and the increasing incidence of infectious hepatitis carried over from the previous month to again demand the attention of the Medical Service. The ratio of non-battle injuries to battle injuries increased, as would be expected, in view of the radical reduction of the latter. Complete medical statistics covering the period will be found in Annex XI to the Medical Section report.

2. Venereal Disease Control

The venereal disease rate for the first eleven days of May jumped from thirteen and ninety-seven one-hundredths per thousand per annum recorded for the month of April to twenty-four and thirty-one one-hundredths per thousand per annum. The slackening off of operations during the first days of May, with an accompanying lack of occupation on the part of the troops, coupled with the fact that more passes were issued for trips to PARIS (S-04) and other rest areas, accounted for the fact that venereal disease began to take a heavier toll among the troops of Third U. S. Army. Nine new prophylactic stations were set up in the Army area during this period.

3. Communicable Diseases

Communicable diseases increased from a monthly average of 328 per thousand per annum in April to 336 per thousand per annum during the first eight days in May. The increase in the incidence of venereal disease and infectious hepatitis, accounted for the overall increase in communicable diseases during this period.

4. Medical Records

From 1 through 8 May, a total of 2,988 Medical Records were processed. This represented a decrease when compared with the same period during the previous month, a fact which was expected, as a consequence of the very few battle casualties being reported, and no epidemics prevailed in the Army area.

5. Non-battle Injuries

The average weekly rate for non-battle injuries showed a slight increase over the average weekly rate for April, and this type of injuries represented twenty-five percent (25%) of the total direct admissions for the first eight days of May.

6. Army Medical Laboratory Service

During the period 1 to 8 May, the 7th Medical Laboratory operated as a combined section at LAUF (O-50). A daily average of 290 tests were completed during this period, as compared with a daily combined average total of 265 completed by the separate sections during April.

The total work for the first eight days of May is broken down as follows:

BASE LABORATORY SECTIONS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Serology	1432	61.7
Bacteriology	209	9.0
Chemistry	64	2.3
Pathology	28	1.2
Hematology	7	0.3
Parasitology	5	0.2
Sub-total	1745	75.2
<u>MOBILE LABORATORY SECTIONS</u>		
Venereal Disease Section (6th Convalescent Hospital)	574	24.8
Grand Total	2319	100.0

A breakdown of the above tests by type of unit requesting them during the first eight days of May is shown below:

TYPE OF UNIT	NO OF UNITS	NO OF TESTS	PERCENTAGE OF ALL TESTS
Evacuation Hospitals	15	782	33.7
Convalescent Hospital	1	740	32.0
Field Hospitals	5	33	1.4
Miscellaneous Medical Installations		103	4.4
Miscellaneous Tactical Installations		661	28.5
Total	21	2319	100.0

7. Sanitation



Arriving at Reception Area for Dusting.



Dusting Line



Closeup of Dusting Operation

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Spraying of Blankets



Receiving D. D. T. Certificate



Final Inspection of Dusting Treatment by Medical Officer



Entering Camp Gate - Showing Dusting Certificates



Spraying Barracks (D. D. T. Spray) Before Occupancy

The weather continued favorable for ground operations and satisfactory environmental sanitation.

There was an increase in fly breeding noted, but the presence of other insect pests continued to remain at a minimum among American troops.

The supervision of delousing programs and control of insect control supplies was continued. A critical situation developed in louse control supplies, due to the unexpected retention of some 760,000 prisoners of war in the Army area. Previous planning had been on the basis of evacuation of such personnel before delousing or disinfection was carried out.

During the first eight days of the month, seven water samples from Engineer water points were analyzed, and all were found to be potable.

8. Public Health

The problems which highlighted the public health phase of the Medical Service concerned themselves with the continued uncovering of concentration camps within the Army area. The largest ones included the camps at EBENSEE (V-53), NEUBAU (V-77), and MAUTHAUSEN (W-08). The immediate problem was one of medical care for extremely emaciated individuals. Evacuation hospitals were sent to cover all these camps in the care of approximately 10,000 patients, with medical supplies procured from local sources.

The nutritional status of the victims of concentration camps was extremely bad. There was no adipose tissue on these people, and nutritional edema of the ankles and dependent parts was present in all individuals. Ulcerated gums and glossitis was universally prevalent. Although tuberculosis was undoubtedly present in a considerable percentage, the principle cause of their condition was starvation, as food consisted of one bowl of turnip or potato soup per day. Occasional crusts of bread were obtained by stealing. All of the remaining people in the camps were malnourished, or starved, but to lesser degrees. Obvious severe loss of weight, pallor, sore gums, and swollen feet were the external manifestations.

Typhus fever continued to be reported, but still only in displaced persons. Most of the cases developed in people who formerly were located in camps where Typhus fever existed. There were 202 cases reported during this period. Constant efforts were made to delouse all displaced persons, especially in concentration camps. Another exit point for Western Europeans was established at BAMBERG (O-21) for those enroute for repatriation centers. Dusting teams, with power duster and five enlisted men, facilitated delousing at MAUTHAUSEN (W-08), EBENSEE (V-53), NEUBAU (V-77), and WURZBURG (N-53).

Public health teams were augmented by additional nurses, vehicles, and drivers; two more public health nurses were attached to each team.

Ambulance teams were made available by the French Red Cross for administering to the needs of displaced persons. Five of these ambulances were utilized in assisting the 120th Evacuation Hospital at OAM (U-68) in collecting sick displaced persons. Ambulance teams were also located at REGENSBURG (U-15), NURNBERG (O-14), and WURZBURG (N-53). These ambulances were used to evacuate sick displaced persons by relay to displaced persons hospitals from where they were located and eventually to repatriation centers in FRANCE and BELGIUM.

Some statistics of interest, covering the entire period of operation, are shown below:

TOTAL PATIENTS TRANSFERRED BY ARMY AMBULANCES FROM DIVISION CLEARING STATIONS AND SIMILAR LEVELS TO ARMY HOSPITALS

Months	U. S. Army	Allies	U. S. Navy	P. W.	Civilians	Total
August	16392	1519	8	7051	895	25895
September	22432	1098	0	2616	509	26655
October	14347	116	0	322	339	15124
November	29662	56	0	1964	291	31973
December	23566	720	1	1599	352	26238
January	43016	99	0	1531	270	44916
February	36099	86	0	1142	230	37557
March	22981	268	3	5895	847	29992
April	16977	1707	10	1241	587	20522
May (1-8)	8291	942	0	177	905	10315
TOTALS	233763	6641	22	23536	5225	269187

NUMBER OF PATIENTS EVACUATED FROM ARMY AREA

Months	Air	Road	Boat	Rail	Total
August	4574	9648	644	0	14866
September	3454	6863	520	1313	12150
October	3100	2329	0	3347	8776
November	504	12670	0	5413	18587
December	1741	12886	0	9465	24992
January	2650	7330	0	18872	28852
February	2473	10173	0	2987	15633
March	5700	15309	0	2081	23090
April	2976	11714	0	336	15026
May (1-8)	1654	2083	0	0	3737
TOTALS	28826	91005	1164	43815	164810

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NUMBER OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT FORMS PROCESSED

Months	No Forms
August	20637
September	27147
October	28073
November	44900
December	46242
January	55933
February	48372
March	42785
April	38280
May (1-8)	3339
TOTAL	356008

PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS, ALL CAUSES, TO DISPOSITIONS

Months	Deaths	Dispositions	Percentage
August	573	17199	3.3%
September	564	20228	2.7%
October	161	19370	.8%
November	437	30406	1.4%
December	422	36601	1.2%
January	589	44893	1.3%
February	319	31886	1.0%
March	421	34445	1.2%
April	239	21678	1.1%
May (1-8)	44	5157	.85%
TOTALS	3769	261863	1.4%

NUMBER OF U. S. ARMY PATIENTS RETURNED TO DUTY WITHOUT EVACUATION FROM THE ARMY AREA AS COMPARED TO TOTAL DISPOSITIONS, U. S. ARMY PATIENTS

Month	Returned to Duty	Dispositions	Percentage
August	6493	17199	37.5%
September	9424	20228	46.6%
October	11254	19370	58.1%
November	12623	30406	41.5%
December	13809	36601	37.7%
January	16877	44893	37.5%
February	16680	31886	52.3%
March	16080	34445	46.6%
April	8356	21678	38.5%
May (1-8)	2428	5157	47.0%
TOTALS	110241	261863	43.5%

TOTAL DIRECT ADMISSIONS TO THIRD U. S. ARMY MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS

Month	U. S. Army	U. S. Navy	Allies	Enemy	Civilians	Total
August	26137	8	1549	7051	895	35640
September	27142		1098	2616	509	31365
October	16940		116	322	339	17717
November	36452		56	1964	291	38763
December	33222	1	720	1599	352	35894
January	47409		99	1531	270	49309
February	32189		86	1142	230	33647
March	32066	3	268	5893	847	39077
April	21314	10	1707	1241	587	24859
May (1-8)	3391		942	177	905	7415
TOTALS	276262	22	6641	23556	5225	315686

TONNAGE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES RECEIVED BY MONTH, BY AIR, TRUCK, AND RAIL FROM THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

Month	Air	Rail	Truck	Total
August	50	0	440	490
September	40	75	690	805
October	42	113	115	300
November	39	100	195	334
December	21	320	279	620
January	19	371	241	631
February	49	134	183	366
March	75	44	627	746
April	0	78	255	333
May (1-8)	34	0	0	34
TOTALS	369	1285	3025	4679

APPROXIMATE TONNAGE ISSUED BY MONTH FROM ARMY DEPOTS TO THIRD U. S. ARMY UNITS

August	233 Long Tons
September	520 Long Tons
October	370 Long Tons
November	340 Long Tons
December	850 Long Tons
January	525 Long Tons
February	561 Long Tons
March	525 Long Tons
April	292 Long Tons
May (1-8)	96 Long Tons
TOTAL	4521 Long Tons

NUMBER OF REQUISITIONS FILED PER MONTH BY ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS

August	1964
September	3555
October	3204
November	3120
December	2834
January	3234
February	2933
March	2866
April	1237
May (1-8)	638
TOTAL	7674

CAPTURED MEDICAL SUPPLIES - TONNAGE ISSUED PER MONTH TO DEPOT COMPANIES

August	32
September	15
October	47
November	12
December	3
January	4
February	5
March	12
April	500
May (1-8)	375
TOTAL	1005

NUMBER OF TRANSFUSIONS

Type	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	1-8
Fresh Whole Blood	334	408	488	396	529	432	946	964	311	18	
Stored Whole Blood	3415	3615	1502	4848	5382	7541	4834	4842	2995	555	
Dried Plasma	7695	5701	1880	5710	7844	9406	6240	7243	4256	982	
Other Blood Substitutes	13	24	0	875	441	0	0	0	387	96	

TOTAL TRANSFUSIONS

Fresh Whole Blood	4826
Stored Whole Blood	39529
Dried Plasma	56957
Other Blood Substitutes	1834

NUMBER OF UNITS OF PENICILLIN

Months

Months	Number of Units
August	1,668,636,000
September	3,091,010,000
October	1,545,604,000
November	4,533,620,000
December	3,986,221,000
January	5,562,446,000
February	4,075,450,000
March	6,429,912,000
April	3,721,460,000
May (1-8)	771,316,000
TOTAL	35,385,715,000

CASES OF GAS GANGRENE

Month	U. S.	Other
August	75	113
September	73	77
October	16	2
November	48	17
December	59	16
January	40	15
February	79	113
March	38	48
April	16	12
May (1-8)	1	1
TOTALS	445	444

ANALYSIS OF 92,030 U. S. BATTLE CASUALTIES TREATED IN THIRD U. S. ARMY MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS - 1 AUGUST 1944 to 8 MAY 1945

Anatomical Location	Number Cases	Percent of Total Battle Casualties	Mortality Rate For Each Group
Head and Spine	7332	8.0%	8.9%
Face and Neck	5730	6.2%	.9%
Chest	8082	8.8%	7.8%
Abdomen	4247	4.6%	15.6%
Buttocks	4380	4.8%	2.2%
Upper Extremity	23042	25.0%	.3%
Lower Extremity	33268	36.1%	.9%
Total Extremity	56310	61.1%	.7%
Other	5947	6.5%	1.8%
TOTALS	92030	100.0%	

MORTALITY FROM ALL TYPES OF BATTLE CASUALTIES TREATED IN THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALS FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 - 8 MAY 1945 AMOUNTED TO 2.78%

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SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS

Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum

Month	Mean Strength	All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-effective Rate	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
February (5 Wks)	302056	40846	14.06	20818	7.17	4971	1.71	15057	5.18	4454	1.53	535	18.42	1109	3.8	6147	0.58
March (4 Wks)	309558	24878	10.45	11241	4.72	3082	1.29	10555	4.43	2175	0.91	398	16.71	404	1.7	2453	0.28
April (4 Wks)	325544	16881	6.74	8224	3.28	3224	1.29	5433	2.17	1363	0.54	354	14.14	161	0.6	3181	0.35
May (2 Wks)	367896	7985	5.64	4769	3.37	1916	1.35	1300	0.92	706	0.50	348	24.59	87	0.6	1934	0.38
Total 15 Wks Above		90590		45052		13193		32345		8698		1535		1761		13715	
Total 26 Wks		165369		72355		18748		74266		9849		2592		1832		43270	
Total 41 Wks	285973	255959	11.35	117407	5.21	31941	1.42	106611	4.73	18547	0.82	4227	18.75	3593	1.6	56985	0.69

Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum

Month	Mean Strength	Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trenchfoot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
February (5 Wks)	302056	2	.07	86	3	14	.48	33	1	1086	37	2600	90	2041	70	3	.10	156	5
March (4 Wks)	309558	2	.08	54	2	16	.67	27	1	37	2	589	25	1219	51	14	.59	342	14
April (4 Wks)	325544	4	.16	43	2	16	.64	25	1	10	.40	47	2	471	19	12	.48	439	18
May (2 Wks)	367895	1	.07	41	3	4	.28	12	.85	6	.42	16	1	97	7	13	.92	134	9
Total (15 Wks Above)		9		224		50		97		1139		3252		3828		42		1071	
Total 26 Wks		33		276		13		32		4863		9283		12144		28		102	
Total 41 Wks	285973	42	.19	500	2	63	.28	129	.57	6002	27	12535	56	15972	71	70	.31	1173	5

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CHAPTER 13 LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. Operations

a. Medical Group

(1) Evacuation

(a) There should be a single agency with which the Army Surgeon accomplishes all evacuation and miscellaneous medical service. The headquarters and headquarters detachment, medical group, is an admirable instrument for this purpose. By means of headquarters and headquarters detachments, medical battalions, attached to the medical group headquarters, one per corps, all evacuation can be controlled centrally without administrative difficulty and with greater economy of personnel and ambulances.

(b) In a rapid advance, such as took place in August and September, 1944, it is impossible for Communications Zone to evacuate Army hospitals. Initially, at least, the Army should plan to evacuate its own hospitals to Communications Zone. For this purpose, the medical group headquarters serves admirably to operate such evacuation and provide central control by the Surgeon.

(c) A complete kitchen and mess section should be included in the T/O and T/E for the headquarters and headquarters detachment medical group. It is impractical for the medical group headquarters to mess with either a hospital or with one of its attached units. Hospitals are not located where the medical group headquarters must be established in a war of movement. Medical group headquarters messing with an attached unit unavoidably immobilizes the unit or a part thereof. To meet the demands of the tactical situation, the medical group headquarters, as currently organized, may often find itself with a choice of non-strategic location or a place with nothing to eat. A mess team, "A", T/O and E B-500 should be added in combat to the headquarters and headquarters detachment, medical group, and also to headquarters and headquarters detachment, medical battalion.

(2) Medical Services for Displaced Persons, Recovered Allied Military Personnel, and Captured Military Hospitals:

(a) Where an advancing Army uncovers huge numbers of political prisoners and displaced persons in concentration camps, Allied prisoners of war, and enemy military hospitals, the Army Medical Service is bound to be severely strained. To provide medical service for these overrun installations, it is necessary to have a single Army agency make early contact and provide the necessary medical service and supervision. Such an agency is the medical group headquarters with the necessary units and hospitals attached to perform the mission. Such a task is too complicated and extensive to be combined with the mission of normal Army evacuation. Thus it is necessary to assign this responsibility alone to a single medical group headquarters when confronted with such a problem.

b. Air Evacuation:

(1) Communications Zone must not be expected in a rapid advance to provide medical evacuation holding units at airfields within reach of Army hospitals. Army must have at least one such unit organized and ready. The capacity must be at least 600, and preferably 1,000 patients. The large capacity is necessary when communications with hospitals are difficult and flying weather uncertain. Under such circumstances, the medical air evacuation holding unit must be provided with surgical facilities such as a field hospital platoon. This will provide for surgical emergencies which arise when patients must of necessity be held longer than desirable, due to bad weather precluding air lift. Surgical emergencies also arise in normal evacuation, i. e., hemorrhage under a cast, etc. Nursing care for certain patients is almost essential even though patients are perfectly transportable, e. g., cord transection cases. A complete ambulance company must be provided for such a holding unit to permit rapid loading of planes. Less than this number of ambulances seriously slows the clearing of patients to planes with resulting delay in clearing runways and loading ramps. Weather and season modify the number of flying hours in the day so that rapid loading of planes becomes a very important factor. It is necessary to have eight-man litter squads available

to load planes. Necessary litter bearers should be obtained by attaching the litter bearer platoon of a medical collecting company. There should be a Theater reserve of evacuation aircraft set up which will not be affected by supply and tactical demands such as airborne operations.

(2) The air medical evacuation holding unit must be capable of splitting and sending a part to the next advanced field while the remainder of the unit continues to operate. Throughout the campaign, there was no constant system of communication with agencies from which planes were dispatched. Radio communications between airfield and the dispatching agency in Communications Zone is the only practical method, basing requests on actual patients remaining at the holding unit.

(3) The fundamental lesson of air evacuation, which was learned early in the campaign, is that patients must be transportable, as with any means of evacuation. Flying a patient out of the Army area when he is too sick to travel is lethal rather than life-saving. Under the stress of large numbers of battle casualty admission to hospitals, a very careful check on transportability of each patient must be made prior to his trip to an air medical evacuation holding unit.

c. Medical Collecting Companies:

(1) The Army has no use for the medical collecting company as a whole. This does not mean such a unit should be discontinued; however, until such time as a litter bearer platoon is included in the T/O for the evacuation hospital (SM), the litter bearer platoons of collecting companies should be attached to evacuation hospitals, one per hospital. The company headquarters and the station platoon provide the source of medical officers and technicians necessary for medical holding units for field hospital platoons employed as surgical hospitals at division clearing stations to treat non-transportable patients.

(2) The field hospital platoon was of no continued use to the division after the clearing station displaced forward, since it had to remain with the non-transportable patients on hand. The use of the headquarters and station platoon of a collecting company as a holding unit to retain the non-transportable patients made it possible to free the field hospital platoon for movement with the clearing station for continuous support.

d. Clearing Companies:

(1) In rapidly advancing open warfare with a limited number of Army clearing companies available, it is inexpedient to establish Army clearing stations for Army troops. The distance Army troops must evacuate in such situations to obtain second or third echelon medical service is not great enough to warrant the dispersion of Army medical service. Evacuation hospitals must, on the other hand, be augmented to handle unpredictably large inflows of casualties. This is best accomplished by attaching platoons of clearing companies to the hospitals. The clearing platoon may function as a separate unit in conjunction with the hospital, receiving only slightly wounded and sick. The personnel and equipment of the platoon may, on the other hand, be incorporated in the hospital giving it additional capacity for such cases.

(2) The clearing company, as a unit, proved very valuable in the provision of hospitalization for recaptured Allied prisoner of war enclosures and displaced persons camps. When an airborne division was employed as an infantry division, it was found that the second echelon medical service was inadequate. It was necessary to attach a clearing platoon or clearing company to such a division.

e. Evacuation Hospital (SM):

(1) The 400-bed evacuation hospital is not semi-mobile. Given only the organic equipment, this unit could not move the entire T/O and T/E personnel and equipment with its organic transportation by shuttling the organic transportation in two echelons. It was necessary to augment the T/O and T/E with additional equipment, and additional personnel were also required to handle the load when such a hospital was supporting a division. This was due to the fact that, in a war of movement, approximately half of the available evacuation hospitals had to be constantly closed and in movement in order to maintain any close support of combat troops. Thus, an evacuation hospital had to be prepared to expand to at least fifty percent above its rated capacity. The additional transportation required to move such an augmented unit complete at one time was approximately twice its organic motor transport. Only in rare instances was it possible in this type of warfare to expect transportation from the Army G-4. It was discovered that the application of available transportation of other evacuation hospitals, or the medical gas treatment battalion, was the

only means by which this type hospital could be moved. An important factor, which had to be considered in regard to the availability of transportation from other hospitals to move one of their number, was the hospital's requirements for normal housekeeping and supply functions. Such necessities as hauling of Class I, II, and III supplies, bodies to Graves Registration Section, shifting of surgical teams to other hospitals, returning patients to duty, motor maintenance, etc. often reduced the availability twenty-five to seventy-five percent. All these transportation requirements involved the factor of distance, which was consistently great. The factor of returning to duty of patients remained a fairly constant one, averaging about twenty percent of admissions. It was found that the difficulties of procuring transport of these cases forced hospitals to use their organic transportation in returning personnel to reinforcement installations.

(2) It was proved conclusively that the T/O authorization of skilled surgical personnel was inadequate to handle either the constant volume of surgery or the peak loads. Hence, it was necessary to provide attached surgical teams which might be shifted from hospital to hospital to cope with the demands. This was met by the use of the auxiliary surgical group. During peak load periods, usually immediately after opening of a hospital as the most forward in a sector, the minimum requirement of such teams was two general surgical and two shock teams.

(3) When faced with the necessity for forward displacement the disposition of non-transportable patients presented a problem, since the hospital had insufficient personnel and equipment to leave behind as a holding unit for a week or more and still carry on at capacity in the forward location. This required the attachment of a platoon of a clearing company as a holding unit. It was necessary to leave little or no organic personnel or equipment with such a unit, particularly if the unit had been attached and was working with the hospital to gain familiarity with the type of patient and required care.

(4) Close contact had to be maintained with the Corps Surgeon when an evacuation hospital made reconnaissance for a new site. The evacuation hospital reconnaissance party had to be sent to the Corps Surgeon to obtain or confirm a suggested location, the aim being to get the evacuation hospital within ten miles or less of the front line in offense. This insured evacuation hospitals being placed well forward within adequate support of divisions. The Army level view could not very often locate an evacuation hospital as far forward as necessary.

f. Field Hospitals:

(1) The field hospital had most value in the employment of individual platoons with each division clearing station giving adequate surgical and nursing care for non-transportable casualties. The early surgical care thus provided saved many which would not have survived the longer trip to an evacuation hospital. Here, as in the evacuation hospital (SM), the unit required augmentation of surgical personnel by surgical teams from the auxiliary surgical group. The minimum number of teams to provide round-the-clock operation was two general surgical and two shock teams.

(2) The field hospital platoon is not a mobile unit, unfortunately, and must be attached to the division which must utilize medical battalion transportation and/or quartermaster truck company transportation to move it. Minimum additional transportation was twelve trucks, 2 1/2-ton. A completely mobile surgical hospital of this general type, but with additional surgical staff, was a necessity for the support of a division. To keep the field hospital with the division clearing station in forward displacement, it was necessary to attach the headquarters and station platoon of a medical collecting company as a holding unit for the post-operative patients. This type of emergency should be provided for in the T/O of such a surgical unit to support the division by a two-platoon organization which would permit leap-frog movement of the platoons or forward displacement of one while the second retained the post-operative cases until they become transportable.

(3) It is absolutely essential that this type unit be trained under tactical or ground force supervision rather than by Army Service Forces to insure field and maneuver training. The field hospitals assigned for this operation were trained for operation as station hospital type units and not prepared for field operation.

(4) With field hospital platoons attached to corps and/or divisions, the life-saving value of them was soon apparent. Knowing this, the corps or division kept the field hospital platoon close to division clearing station with no urging on the part of the Army Surgeon. Division Surgeons know better than the Army Surgeon could ever know what his present and future needs are.

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g. Evacuation Hospital (750-bed):

(1) This type unit has little or no place in a field Army in a war of rapid and extreme movements, especially when the axis of advance of the Army is frequently and violently changed. The evacuation hospital (750-bed), as presently organized, has barely sufficient transportation to maintain its own housekeeping. In static or semi-static conditions of warfare, and where casualties are heavy, this unit has distinct advantages and can well be utilized by the field Army.

h. Convalescent Hospital:

(1) The convalescent hospital, large and immobile though it may be, was a highly important institution for an Army when well trained replacements were not available from the rear. The size and amount of transportation required to move the unit required that a site be chosen, and movement thereto initiated, which was as far advanced as the most forward evacuation hospital in a rapid advance. The hospital must be closed prior to the time that the evacuation hospitals have out-distanced it to the extent that the ambulance trip reaches the fifty-mile mark. To allow the convalescent hospital to remain open longer, unnecessarily delayed the forward displacement of a portion of the hospital and hence the reopening. In a rapid advance, it was essential that the hospital be closed prior to attaining full capacity in order that one or more sections of the hospital might displace quickly to a forward site.

(2) Prior to initial opening, arrangements must be made to provide transportation through G-1 for return of patients to reinforcement installations as soon as the first increment of such patients become ready for discharge. This transportation should be allowed to remain at the hospital throughout its period of operation. Failure of such transportation not only causes the hospital to become quickly filled, due to inability to clear space for more admissions, but renders the hospital less mobile since it must clear some patients before any section can move.

(3) Shortage of qualified medical personnel for diagnosis of syphilis made it necessary to establish a center for diagnosis and treatment of the disease. This is best located at the convalescent hospital. Here sulfa-resistant or chronic gonorrhea is also treated by specialized personnel. This was expedient to lighten the census of evacuation hospitals and also prevent evacuation of such cases to Communications Zone.

(4) Commanding Officers of convalescent companies within the convalescent hospital should be combat veterans of the line, who have been reclassified for such work as the result of physical disability incurred in combat. The type of patient handled in the convalescent hospital, men fresh from combat, demands the leadership of combat trained line officers, rather than non-combat trained medical administrative officers of junior grade. Personnel fresh from the battle field resent the leadership of the latter type of officer.

i. Rail Evacuation:

(1) Rail evacuation is only practical when a medical evacuation holding unit can be established within a short distance, not to exceed five miles, of the rail siding to be used. Sufficient ambulances are not likely to be available for rapid loading if the holding unit is more distant or if trains are loaded directly from several distant hospitals. The holding unit must have a capacity of approximately two hospital trainloads. A lesser capacity inevitably results in overcrowding and repeated interruption of the normal flow of evacuation. Here, as in air evacuation, patients must be carefully screened for transportability before transfer from evacuation hospitals lest the holding unit become clogged with non-transportable cases which it will be obliged to hold. Like the holding unit for air evacuation, surgical facilities must exist.

j. Covered Accommodations:

(1) When weather conditions became sufficiently rigorous to require hospitals such as evacuation hospitals and field hospitals to abandon tentage and occupy buildings, a number of problems arose. The procurement of such accommodations itself became a complicated administrative procedure and one which retarded the prompt opening of the hospital in a new location. To speed up the procurement of the necessary approval by the Army authorities, it was imperative that all concerned be thoroughly acquainted with the administrative procedure and a uniform system adopted. The reconnaissance of an evacuation hospital for a building site had to be coordinated directly with the corps in which conducted. It was most expedient to have the reconnaissance party secure the approval of the division controlling the area. Next, clearance of the site had to be obtained from corps. The final Army approval was then obtained in writing by sending the necessary papers

to the Surgeon. All this was handled through medical channels, with the Surgeon at each level obtaining the clearance from his proper general staff section.

k. Evacuation:

(1) The old concept that the higher echelon will evacuate the lower "on call" proved completely incompatible with open warfare and rapid movement. Communications are too poor and distances too great to permit any such system to work. It is necessary for each echelon of medical service to place the necessary evacuation with the next lower echelon so that a system of constant contact and constant evacuation remains in effect throughout operations. It was found that the Army must provide a minimum of ten ambulances for evacuation of infantry division clearing stations at all times. This increased during certain operations to as much as thirty ambulances. An armored division requires an entire ambulance company of thirty ambulances at all times when operational. As soon as a new division enters the Army area, contact must be made by evacuation agencies and some ambulances allowed to remain at division clearing station to cover the lag between initiation of operations and the provision of the full ambulance requirement, which is a function of communications. To wait until the clearing station has received battle casualties before requesting ambulance evacuation would result in overloading that installation, thereby jeopardizing the patients awaiting evacuation.

(2) This same concept of constant evacuation carried down to the first and second echelon medical service. Collecting company ambulances were kept at or near battalion aid stations where possible or the one-quarter-ton truck ambulance was used. Litter bearers of the medical detachments were kept available near company CP's and aid stations, rather than waiting for someone to locate the aid stations prior to sending up litter bearers.

(3) When an airborne division was employed with a field Army as an infantry division, it was necessary to attach ambulances from Army for use in second echelon evacuation within the division. The T/O and T/E for such an organization provides only one-quarter-ton, 4 x 4 trucks for this purpose which are unsuitable for winter or for anything but short distance evacuation in fair weather. As many as thirty ambulances may be required in certain situations.

(4) Evacuation of evacuation hospitals or clearing stations by ambulance convoy is obsolete. It is impossible for such installations in combat to retain patients a long enough period to make up ambulance convoys. Patients must be evacuated as rapidly as necessary and as ambulance loads are ready for evacuation.

2. Medical Supply:

a. Pharmacy Section in Medical Depots: During the first part of November, a pharmacy was established at each Army medical depot for compounding, storing, and issuing of a limited number of pharmaceuticals. This service was intended for and made available to units, particularly divisions and small medical detachments who were not authorized either personnel or equipment to prepare such pharmaceuticals. Units obtained these by presenting a prescription, signed by a medical officer, to the pharmacy. A few of the more common preparations stocked were paragoric and bismuth, elixir of terpin hydrate with codlaine, Brown's mixture, one percent ephedrine sulfate, mixture of green soap, Whitfield's ointment, and calamine solution. The pharmacy sections of the depots proved most popular and beneficial to these units, as can readily be seen by the number of prescriptions filled the first three months; an average of approximately 1,550 prescriptions were filled during the months of November, December, and January.

b. Employment of Advance Sections of Medical Depots: During a fast-moving operation, it was found advantageous to have two and sometimes three advance sections well forward of the base depot. In this type of warfare, transportation was usually very critical and sufficient trucks were seldom available to move the base depot. Locations of advance sections were always coordinated with the corps headquarters, and continuous liaison was maintained between the Corps Surgeon's Office, the depot, and the Medical Section of the Army Headquarters. This resulted in the advance sections always being located where they could service the maximum number of troops. When picking out or selecting a site for an advance section, a large enough place to accommodate the base depot was invariably sought. By so doing, a location was readily available for the base section to move into if the tactical situation demanded.

c. Purchasing and Contracting: A purchasing and contracting section was established at each depot for procuring supplies not available through normal channels, and for payment of civilian personnel hired by hospitals of Third U. S. Army. Each section was made up of one officer and two enlisted men, one of whom could speak the native language fluently. Such needs must be anticipated by having available

in the company, personnel familiar with this type of work, and linguists who can perform in this capacity.

d. Prosthetic Dental Laboratories in Medical Depots: A prosthetic dental laboratory and clinic was established at each medical depot. It was found through several months' experience, that a laboratory of this type and mechanism had facilities which would better service Corps and Army troops, than mobile dental laboratory trucks. During the period 29 October to 31 December, 1944, approximately 900 prosthetic jobs were completed, which indicates that this section of the depot performed more work with limited personnel than could have been accomplished under mobile conditions.

e. Captured Supplies: Since a field Army is faced with the problem of collecting, classifying, sorting, and disposing of large quantities of captured enemy materiel, it was found necessary to organize a captured enemy materiel platoon, consisting of one officer and fifteen enlisted men. This team investigated, guarded, and evacuated captured medical supplies. In addition, it was later found necessary to set up a captured materiel section in the depot to take charge of sorting and issuing these supplies to displaced persons camps, prisoner of war enclosures, and captured German hospitals. This proved of great value, in that large amounts of American supplies were conserved by the substitution of this captured materiel.

f. Maintenance Teams: A maintenance team consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, was attached to each medical depot. These teams visited all hospitals bi-monthly to check the maintenance of equipment and status of supply. In addition, they made minor repairs and instructed the personnel in the units on methods of repair and maintenance of their equipment. First and second echelon preventive maintenance in the units is most important in combat when equipment is used to the maximum and replacements of equipment are not always available. Teams of this nature can help immeasurably in keeping equipment in the hospitals in good condition and at the same time keep the Army Surgeon and the medical depots informed as to spare parts and replacement requirements.

g. Maintenance Factors: Depot stock record cards were prepared, which in addition to indicating amounts received, issued and balance remaining, indicated what were issued and amounts issued to all type units. This, in turn, was compiled in a report which indicated the amount of each item that was issued to each different type of unit over a monthly period. From this report and from items authorized by T/E, T/BA etc., and from the recommendations of the Army Medical Laboratory, Consultant Sub-section and Dental Sub-section, a list of essential items to be stocked in Army depots was determined. Therefore, only essential items in required amounts were stocked in depots; which, in turn, rendered these installations much more mobile. Mobility is of extreme importance in this type warfare.

3. Professional Services:

a. Surgery:

(1) Early skilled surgical care of the wounded proved its worth. Close-up support with trained surgical teams working in the platoon of a field hospital at the same level as the division clearing station was a big factor in lowering mortality and morbidity in battle casualties in this campaign.

(2) The best support for armored division casualties was achieved through the use of two surgical teams and two shock teams equipped with a PROCO unit, i. e., (sufficient tentage, surgical instruments, and supplies in two trucks) which could move along with and set up next to the collecto-clearing company of the armored combat command. A field hospital platoon then followed to take over the casualties that had been operated upon and the teams were free to move forward again.

(3) Surgical teams were also found to be of value in bridgeheads, across rivers where the wounded could not be readily evacuated. With troops on the offensive, it was found that definitive surgery could be accomplished by surgical teams much farther forward than previously realized.

(4) Adequate shock therapy, using stored whole blood, was one of the most important factors in lowering mortality and morbidity in battle casualties. Blood plasma was of value as a temporary expedient, but was not a substitute for whole blood.

(5) Shock, if not treated early and vigorously, soon becomes irreversible. Some cases which did not respond readily to shock therapy developed anuria and subsequently died. In a series of casualties which developed anuria, deep shock seemed to be the one constant factor. Transfusion reactions seemed to be of no particular importance as a cause of anuria in these cases. Alkalinization was not found to be of value in the prevention or treatment of anuria.

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(6) Injuries to the extremities comprised sixty percent of all battle casualties. These injuries were often very mutilating in character. A policy of extreme conservatism in regard to amputations was followed. Sympathetic blocks were performed routinely in those cases where the blood supply had been interfered with. In the majority of cases, this procedure was not found to be of a great deal of value as often the collateral circulation had also been interrupted by the injury. Sixty-five percent of the amputations were traumatic in type, with mutilation often involving the bone, blood vessels, nerves, and muscles. Fifteen percent of the amputations were due to gas gangrene, and twenty percent to major blood vessel injuries.

(7) The repair of major blood vessels was encouraged and various materials for anastomosis, including Blakemore tubes, glass tubing, and plastic tubing, were used. None of these methods were found to be universally applicable in the field. However, the incidence of gangrene was twenty percent less in those cases in which vascular repair was attempted than those in which ligation of the injured vessel was practiced.

(8) Surgical measures such as sympathetic block, sympathectomy or injection of heparin preparations seemed to be of no particular value and contributed little toward lowering the morbidity in cases of cold injuries to the extremities (frostbite and trench foot).

(9) The use of sulfanilamide crystals in battle wounds was found to be of little value and in fact contra-indicated where the drug was being administered by mouth or vein. It was felt that wound healing was delayed in those cases where the crystals were used, in some cases the wounds broke down when activity was resumed, and reactions were not uncommon.

(10) The incidence of infection in wounds was very low. The routine use of penicillin by injection coupled with early adequate debridement is felt to be the most important contributing factors.

b. Medical Services:

(1) Penicillin proved effective in the treatment of certain spirochetal infections; namely, syphilis and Leptospirosis (Weil's Disease). While it was known before the onset of the campaign that penicillin was a specific for treatment of syphilis, it was during the campaign that the drug was found to cure Leptospirosis.

(2) A well established blood bank is essential in treating any large numbers of battle casualties. There is no substitute for fresh whole blood in treating the severe shock seen in the wounds of modern warfare. Blood banks should be near enough to the combat zone, to assure delivery of blood with an expiration date of at least seven and preferably ten days. All units hospitalizing patients should have a small refrigerator, so that fresh blood can be available at all times in the most forward areas.

(3) The treatment of venereal disease, other than acute gonorrhoea, is best carried out in the detention section of the convalescent hospital. This centralizes patients and conserves personnel and supplies.

c. Neuropsychiatry:

(1) All of the measures which can be instituted to prevent neuropsychiatric casualties are command prerogatives. First and foremost, the psychotic, mentally deficient, severe psychoneurotic, epileptic, and those with chronic progressive neurological diseases not only are incapable of fighting, but require the time and interest of others who should be in combat. These are unsatisfactory for any form of military service and should not be retained in service in the interest of manpower conservation. When such individuals reach foreign duty and combat units, they constitute a severe liability in their respective units and on the medical evacuation system.

(2) It is necessary for line officers to exercise judgment in evacuating men through medical channels. Soldiers should not be evacuated unless, to the line officer, the medical aspects are clear and unmistakable and not transient in character. The avoidance of indiscriminate evacuation and the selection of proper treatment on the spot is considered imperative.

(3) Neuropsychiatric casualties which can be returned to duty in a period of twelve hours should not be evacuated from the battalion aid station. Those who can be returned to duty with an additional thirty-six hours of rest and treatment should be handled at the regimental aid station. Only those which require a longer period of treatment should be evacuated to clearing station level.

(4) Because of the nature of their assignment, division

neuropsychiatrists are in a position to disseminate pertinent information to officers of the line and act in a consultant capacity to Battalion Surgeons. The division neuropsychiatrists must be provided the transportation which they require. In view of the fact that he personally treats from five to thirty percent of total admissions to the clearing station, it is necessary that an adequate T/O and E be provided. Supplies, personnel, and equipment necessary to the psychiatrist were obtained at the expense of the division clearing company, which has an adequate T/O and E for its own needs, but none for others, including the neuropsychiatrists.

(5) The importance of assigning well trained neuropsychiatrists to the divisions cannot be over-emphasized. Those divisions have such men assigned continually exhibited a lower neuropsychiatric incidence and a higher return to duty rate than those in which an individual without such training was arbitrarily assigned as neuropsychiatrist.

(6) On becoming operational, several divisions attempted to treat all neuropsychiatric problems at division rear. It was the invariable experience that the more men sent to the rear the more it was necessary to return to the rear. All divisions eventually instituted therapy in forward areas and found that the fewer evacuated, the smaller the number necessary to evacuate. This was graphically demonstrated particularly in those divisions which first set up an exhaustion center in the division rear and then changed the therapeutic policy to the treating of such patients at battalion aid station level.

(7) It was notable that every effort to prevent trench foot and to provide warm clothing contributed to a low neuropsychiatric incidence.

(8) Armored divisions are so constituted that it was at times difficult and sometimes impossible to handle neuropsychiatric casualties at aid station level. This was particularly true in rapidly moving tactical situations. It was necessary to set up a clearing element in each armored division in which the division neuropsychiatrist could treat all neuropsychiatric casualties evacuated from the aid station. The neuropsychiatric incidence rose in armored divisions when the men felt that their objectives were not essentially armored objectives and when they developed a feeling that they were "orack troops" and would therefore be used for the duration without a rest. For every such case among the tankers, there were six in the armored infantry. The rate pyramided among the tankers on one occasion when it was necessary for them to function as foot troops.

(9) Rumors were found to contribute to peaks in the incidence of neuropsychiatric casualties.

(10) Terrain, climatic conditions, type of enemy opposition, and quality of leadership were all found to influence the neuropsychiatric incidence. Those divisions which rotated units whenever the tactical situation permitted had a lower incidence than those which could not or did not.

(11) It was found that after 120 days of continuous combat, riflemen and particularly key noncommissioned officers, through the process of normal wear and tear began to exhibit less initiative, lower efficiency, and decreased ability to lead troops into battle. This was even more marked at the end of six months of combat. Several divisions found that only three percent of the riflemen who had been in combat for 180 days still remained in the division. Those who did remain were key men and in general repeatedly decorated. These divisions estimated that half of this group had become useless for combat in the same manner that equipment may be worn out to the extent that it is of no further service. These individuals, although numerically present, represented liabilities.

(12) Although many neuropsychiatric cases to all intents and purposes were well when returned to duty, there was, in many instances, lack of confidence, which returned only after the individual had again engaged in combat. Many of these after return earned awards for heroism, some received battlefield commissions, and a high percentage were promoted.

(13) Soldiers who had been wounded and who had been returned to duty were more apt to become neuropsychiatric casualties when returned to duty than those who had not been wounded, or those who had been wounded and not returned to combat duty because of the severity of the wound.

(14) Neuropsychiatric patients who were ready for return to combat when sent directly to combat, in general, did not recur. Among those retained for several days in replacement areas a high percentage tended to recur.

(15) A divisional increase in neuropsychiatric casualties

can usually be traced to one regiment and ordinarily to one battalion. As a rule, the increase occurs in the unit which is experiencing the most severe combat.

(16) If the individual needs positive command or encouragement, the line officer should give it to him without evacuation through medical channels. If he needs rest, his commanding officer should provide it.

(17) It was found necessary to permit neuropsychiatrists in all echelons to have facilities for the practice of medicine. At division clearing station level the psychiatrist had an opportunity for mutual consultation with other doctors and access to x-ray service in the field hospital platoon assigned to his division. A psychiatrist functioned at each evacuation hospital. As a result, neuropsychiatric casualties did not cross normal channels of evacuation. On leaving the division, they went directly to the nearest evacuation hospital. Here the neuropsychiatrist was called in consultation on a minimum of five percent of all admissions other than neuropsychiatric. He had at hand every facility for x-ray and laboratory diagnosis and consultation with other specialists. This contributed to more accurate diagnosis and therefore a higher rate of return to duty.

(18) Because of the fairly frequent moves of the evacuation hospitals, and the Army evacuation policy, neuropsychiatric casualties could be retained in the evacuation hospitals an average of six days. At the end of this time, neuropsychiatric cases were found to fall roughly into four groups:

(a) Those which had other medical or surgical conditions and in whom there was little or no evidence of nervous or mental disease.

(b) Those cases which could be returned to duty within the six-day period.

(c) Those who in the opinion of the psychiatrist were incapable of further duty because of psychosis, epilepsy, mental deficiency, severe prolonged psychoneurosis.

(d) Those who could be returned to duty with two or three weeks of additional therapy.

The first group was transferred to other hospital services. The second was returned to duty. The third was evacuated to Communications Zone. If the fourth group had been evacuated out of the Army area, many of the individuals would have been lost if they had been transferred to Communications Zone hospitals. It was found necessary to provide an additional echelon of therapy for this group. Three competent neuropsychiatrists and eighteen trained enlisted men were placed in the convalescent hospital for the practice of good clinical medicine. There were facilities for mutual consultation with other specialists and for x-ray and laboratory diagnosis, as well as intensive individual and group physiotherapy, recreational and occupational therapy and a graded intensive physical training program. Eighty-five percent of this group returned to duty of all types within the Army, and fifty percent to full combat duty.

(19) The necessary echelons of therapy were found to be:

- (a) The line.
- (b) Battalion aid station.
- (c) Regimental aid station.
- (d) Division clearing station.
- (e) Evacuation hospital.
- (f) Convalescent hospital.

d. Dental:

(1) Dental officers assigned to field hospitals have the opportunity to do very little professional work in the combat zone. The T/O of field hospitals should be changed to include only one dental officer assigned to the headquarters of the field hospital. By rotation among the platoons of the hospital, one dental officer can provide dental care for all hospital personnel. Patients are held in field hospitals for too short a time to permit definitive dentistry.

(2) Convalescent hospitals offer the opportunity for establishing large dental installations. Convalescent hospitals move less frequently than evacuation hospitals, hence the dental service is operative for longer periods of time without interruption. The T/O should be changed to include eight dental officers and fourteen en-

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listed technicians to provide operative, surgical, and prosthetic service for patients and out-patients. Experience in the Third U. S. Army proved that this increase in personnel and the augmentation of MD Chests No 61 and 62 is required to eliminate the necessity of holding patients in excess of the normal convalescent period.

(3) The assignment of dental officers to group headquarters (i. e., Quartermaster, Engineer, Ordnance, Field Artillery, etc.) proved unsatisfactory. Due to a constant change in the number of battalions assigned to groups, the great distances between battalions and lack of close contact, dental officers assigned to group headquarters were unable to fulfill their mission of providing adequate treatment for the troops of the command. Mobile dental teams, assigned to Army or Corps headquarters would provide more adequate treatment for Corps and Army troops.

(4) Excellent prosthetic facilities may be established in Army medical depots. Army medical depots, because of their location in the Army area, and the necessity for all units to send transportation for supplies, offered the most ideal location for dental prosthetic service. The depots moved with the Army's advance, remaining accessible to combat units. Transportation used for supplies was used also for carrying patients to and from troop areas. Prosthetic facilities can usually be provided from a fixed medical depot for Corps and Army troops, with divisions being serviced by mobile units.

(5) Field units authorized an electric generator should be furnished electrical dental equipment. Field dental dispensary equipment lacks electrical appliances (operating lights, dental engines, and sterilizers). It was found that a combination electric and/or foot engine is desirable for use with combat troops. The efficiency of dental service with field units was impaired by the absence of a field operating light as a standard item of equipment.

(6) Infantry division dental officers were best employed with the division medical clearing company during combat. In combat, one dental officer could render emergency dental treatment at the regimental aid station. The second of the two regimental dental officers should operate with the division medical clearing company to do definitive dentistry during commitment to action. This employment of dental personnel permits those troops who are not committed to action to receive dental attention.

(7) Experience has shown that a dental surgeon is required on the staff of a Corps Surgeon. The employment of such large numbers of organizations within the Army prevents the Army Dental Surgeon from keeping in close contact with, and inspecting, all dental facilities throughout the command. The Army Dental Surgeon could coordinate the dental service much more efficiently if a Corps Dental Surgeon were provided.

(8) A greater number of mobile dental laboratories and operative teams are required in warfare involving rapid movement. It was found that mobile dental units (prosthetic and operative teams) offer the maximum service to forward units. These trucks, when attached to division medical battalions, provide uninterrupted dental care and eliminate the evacuation of troops from divisional areas.

(9) Field Dental Prosthetic Chests, MD No 61 and 62 require supplemental equipment. Additional denture flasks are required since only a limited number of cases can be processed in the three flasks contained in MD Chest No 61. An electric dental lathe is essential to prosthetic dentistry. The hand lathe contained in MD Chest No 62 requires an additional man for operation, thus preventing his employment for other work. A Coleman, gasoline, two burner, stove is required for the processing of acrylic dentures.

(10) Replacement troops arrived at combat units from reinforcement depots in need of Class I dental treatment. Many combat hours lost because of the necessity for providing reinforcements with dentures or emergency dental treatment, would have been saved if this work had been done on all troops before assignment to combat units, from reinforcement depots.

e. Veterinary:

(1) During the later phases of the campaign and particularly during the last two months, transportation was at a premium, and it was frequently not possible to secure transportation for all personnel requiring it. Each Veterinary Corps officer should be assigned a car, since his work must be done in the field.

(2) Perishable products, such as fresh eggs, oranges, all fresh vegetables, etc. were, particularly during the winter and during wet periods, in very poor condition upon arrival in the Army area. Assuming that sound products were purchased, but have deteriorated, they should be re-sorted, or boxed if necessary, before being forwarded

to the Army area.

(3) It was frequently necessary to break down the fifty-pound cans of powdered milk, thirty-seven-pound lard cans, and twenty-five or seventy-pound cheeses to smaller units in order to issue them. Under conditions which usually prevail in supply points, this is an insanitary procedure. The products become soiled and wet. Milk, lard, and cheese should be processed into units of not more than ten pounds, except for bakery use.

4. Preventive Medicine:

a. Veneral Disease Control: The veneral disease control program in Third U. S. Army was very satisfactory as evidenced by monthly veneral disease reports. However, certain lessons were learned as follows:

(1) That Army chemical prophylactic stations must be established in the larger cities and towns in Army area, regardless of whether or not the area is liberated or conquered; i. e., where women are, there is veneral disease.

(2) That chemical prophylaxis (Station Pro) is the most effective method for prevention of veneral disease.

(3) That all prophylactic stations must be equipped with necessary material to provide hot water, especially during winter months.

(4) The present-day V packette contains a picric acid compound that irritates and is painful to the urethra and because of this, soldiers do not use them after the first experience.

(5) Much of our mercurial ointments have a lanolin or wax base which will not spread in cold weather. All ointment bases should be similar to bases of our better cold creams.

(6) Each prophylactic station team should be equipped with a small generator and a two-burner stove for setting up stations in areas where heat and light are not available. Light metal collapsible equipment is necessary for setting up a prophylactic station in any place where needed.

(7) Re-emphasis should be made on cartoons, posters, and training films as a part of the veneral disease control program.

b. Immunizations: Field experience proved that the U. S. Army policies and procedures are without equal in the world today. However, typhus fever immunization should be given in the late fall or early winter rather than at other times of the year. This insures maximum protection during months when troops are apt to be more lousy or come in contact with louse infested civilians.

c. Personal Hygiene: During combat personal hygiene, change of clothing and bathing were always far below Army standards. This was especially true during the winter months. This can be remedied to a great extent by providing ample numbers of one and two burner stoves in forward echelons on the basis of one gas stove (one or two burner) per four officers or men.

d. Food supplies and the nutrition of troops during this period were adequate. Monotony of diet is one of the vicissitudes of war. However, the need for hot drinks (coffee and bouillon) in aid stations must be emphasized. In addition to hot drink, ample supplies of whiskey are needed in aid stations during the winter months for use by patients passing through such installations. A small drink helps to relieve tension, and is useful in combatting shock.

e. Transportation: The Medical Inspector of each division must have transportation twenty-four hours per day to accomplish his job in combat.

f. Sanitary Corps Officers: There is a definite need of Sanitary Corps officers--one per division as Assistant Division Medical Inspector, and two per Corps as members of the Corps Surgeon's staff. These officers are essential for the handling of sanitary problems, thus relieving the Medical Inspector for medical activities alone.

g. Preventive Medicine and Public Health: Every line officer, regardless of rank, in command of troops should have formal practical education in public health medical problems. The G-5 and Military Government officers of all categories should especially receive adequate instruction in these matters.

h. Trench Foot (Cold Type Injuries):

(1) It was self-evident that cold type injuries were preventable in seventy-five to ninety percent of the cases. Prevention depends upon a combination of factors:

(a) Adequate, properly fitting winter clothing.

(b) Adequate, properly fitting foot gear or combination of foot gear (shoepacs, regulation shoes, combat boots, and overshoes).

(c) Adequate, proper sized socks.

(d) Continuous, daily sock exchange to combat troops during the winter months.

(e) Rotation of small and large units of combat troops out of the line at frequent regular intervals to enable warming, drying, and changing of individual soldier's wet shoes and socks. Providing tents, huts, dugouts, etc., wherein these things may be done.

(f) Instruction and training of troops in the early recognition of signs and symptoms preceding injury of tissues due to cold and dampness and the individual precautions necessary to prevent frostbite.

(g) Continued emphasis of the command responsibility for the above items.

(h) Frequent inspections (at least once weekly) of feet and foot gear of the command. Necessary corrective action, insofar as possible, being taken on the spot.

(2) Peaks of cold type injuries occurred in very instances when the tactical situation was most acute--units making river crossings against opposition, units pinned down by fire before fortifications, where both the supply of equipment and the normal disciplinary care was difficult to maintain.

(3) New divisions in combat invariably had higher rates of cold injuries for the first few weeks. This was due to the negligence of ordinary personal hygiene with a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the results.

(4) A way of preventing a breakdown in individual foot care and therefore a mass development of cold injury at such a time, is rotation of small groups (ten to twenty) to rear areas daily for short periods of time to allow change of socks, massage, and other methods of warming the feet.

(5) Trench foot control teams at Army and Division levels are worthwhile and necessary in combat during the winter months.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) That a more thorough comprehensive training program in cold type injury prevention be instituted at all command levels, augmented by the use of actual photographs and training films of the results of cold type injuries to the feet and hands.

(b) That all shoepacs be manufactured with steel arch supports, regular heels and high toes.

(c) That continually increasing emphasis be placed upon the command responsibility for cold type injury prevention.

1. Army Medical Laboratory:

(1) Field laboratory experiences in the European campaigns, 1944-45, have shown certain operational problems which were not anticipated in the T/O and E training manuals. Some of these problems and their improvised solutions are presented below.

(2) The medical laboratory as organized and equipped is limited in the scope and of necessity had to be augmented in personnel and equipment to perform satisfactorily.

(3) Mission:

(a) The general mission of the laboratory is to perform such investigations as will protect the health of the Army, determine the cause of epidemics, and provide such laboratory service to medical installations as will aid in rapid diagnosis, minimize evacuation, and speed up restitution of personnel to duty.

(b) It is not possible to provide research facilities and to perform tests which are of theoretical rather than prac-

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tical value. It is therefore essential that such tests be held to a minimum.

(4) Location and Movement: The immediate problems arising in operation were to first, locate the laboratory close enough to the medical installations so that it was accessible, and second, to have the laboratory in operation at all times so that the performance of needed tests would not be delayed. This was solved by dividing the laboratory into two sections, each able to perform bacteriology and serology. It was felt that pathology and toxicology could be temporarily closed for movement to new locations without impeding essential operations; so these sections were not duplicated. The sections were located near the center of each flank, one thirty to forty miles in advance of the other. As the front advanced, the rear section was closed and reopened on the new location ahead of the other section. During the period of movement, the open section carried on the entire work for the Army without interruption. This two-section arrangement was possible by addition of extra equipment and clerical personnel. The alternate solution in stable situations was to have the smaller units send their specimens to the evacuation hospitals. The latter, in turn, sent the specimens to the base laboratory, through the medical group couriers. This procedure minimized transportation problems for the units, but produced a delay in getting the specimens to the laboratory and the reports to the units.

(5) Added Technical Procedures:

(a) To expedite closing out of syphilitic registers, a complement fixation technique for spinal fluids was established at one of the sections. There was no provision for this originally; and, as a result, additional equipment, animals, and typhoid complement had to be provided.

(b) Many accidental deaths and medico-legal cases required toxicological examinations; and, as a result, the chemistry section had to be expanded to meet these needs. This was essential, since in combat areas board actions could not be delayed while awaiting reports from the medical general laboratories. A similar limited service had to be provided for the Criminal Investigation Department, since no other facilities were available. Personnel trained in toxicology and certain minimal equipment should be an integral part of the medical laboratory.

(c) Veneral Disease Section: In order to expedite the early diagnosis of syphilis by trained personnel, a detachment consisting of one officer, two technicians, and one clerk was detailed to the 6th Convalescent Hospital. This group more than justified its existence. Its duties called for doing darkfields (as many as fifty a day) urethral smears, and drawing blood for serology.

(7) Personnel:

(a) Additional clerks were essential to maintain the records and send out the reports. Three additional clerks were added, including one for the Veneral Disease Section.

(b) No provisions have been made in the T/O for trained personnel qualified to do medical supply and maintenance work. The highly specialized and complicated apparatus and chemicals required skilled individuals for their classification and maintenance. Often, unless repairs could be made at the laboratory, technical sections would be paralyzed while the equipment was sent to the Medical Depot for repairs, which usually required several weeks. One sergeant and one assistant were assigned to do this work, which also included sterilization and maintenance of generators.

(c) Due to the fact that water outlets were not numerous, central washing facilities were established under the supervision of one man. This was augmented by hiring civilian help to do the actual work.

(8) Mobile Sections:

(a) Mobile sections are set up at present under impractical plans. Most investigations can be done by an officer in

a one-quarter-ton truck and the specimens sent to the laboratory for technical work.

(b) A different type of mobile section to do routine Kahns, bacteriology, and some clinical pathology is needed for servicing an Army Corps operating separately or at a distance from the Army laboratory; e. g. HREST Campaign, KUKH Pocket. Here a laboratory truck equipped as a small laboratory would have been of great value. Such trucks were not available, though authorized.

J. Sanitation:

(1) Water Supply:

(a) Experience showed conclusively that the Army water purification units, as generally operated at the start of combat, were unsatisfactory for producing adequate potable water from the grossly polluted streams encountered. In order to produce potable water, it was necessary to provide additional treatment by coagulation and sedimentation before filtration, and reduce the filter rate of portable units to ten gallons per minute.

(b) At a rate of ten gallons per minute, the filter in the portable water purification unit becomes the limiting factor in the production of water. The maximum amount of potable water which could be safely produced in a twenty-four-hour operative day was approximately 13,000 gallons, or about 6,000 gallons during daylight hours (winter). An additional filter unit, or a new filter with increased capacity should be provided.

(c) Training of water unit operators should include more of the basic principles of water treatment and care in the maintenance of pumps and equipment.

(d) Serious operating difficulties were encountered during cold weather. Many temporary expedients were required. Study should be made of practical methods and means of protection and operation of water units during below-freezing weather.

(e) With the use of ammonia-alum as currently practiced a chlorine contact period of at least two hours is considered necessary for disinfection of the water. The normal thirty minute period of chlorine contact has been found insufficient to produce potable water based on bacteriological examination of samples.

(f) Consideration should be given to the use of potassium alum as the coagulant in view of the reduced chloramine formation and greater disinfecting value of the residual chlorine content, as measured by the orthotolidin test.

(g) The use of the sodium arsenite-orthotolidin method for determining effective residual chlorine should be considered for adoption in Army water treatment control.

(h) Daily residual chlorine tests of the water supply at the point of consumption (spot-checks) should be carried out under supervision of unit surgeons and records of the results of such tests maintained.

(i) Halazone tablets are not completely effective in treatment for disinfection of water supplies. Borsoline should be made available for all troops.

(j) All water for military personnel used for drinking and culinary purposes should be obtained from Engineer water points, or, in extreme emergency, treated by boiling or with halazone or hypochlorite ampules.

(2) Mess Sanitation:

(a) Greater emphasis on personal and mess sanitation is necessary under adverse weather and combat conditions to prevent the all too frequent breakdown in sanitation leading to sporadic and even epidemic diarrheal outbreaks. Responsibility for such is one of command, but can only be carried out by frequent and forceful exercise of the essentials of sanitary practices, even under the rigors of combat.

(b) There are two primary purposes of a mess gear washing line. One is the washing and physical removal of all food materials, and the second is the sterilization of the mess gear. Third U. S. Army has consistently recommended sterilization of mess gear immediately before being served, carried out preferably in boiling water; or, in emergency, in a solution of compound, germicidal rinse. The pre-sterilizing dip at the entrance to the mess serving line is considered the most important single point for carrying out sterilization of mess gear. Army regulations should be amended to require such treatment and an additional immersion type heating unit should be included in T/O and E's for each 200 men or fraction thereof.

(3) Insect and Pest Control:

(a) DDT insecticides, judiciously used, proved effective in treatment and control of insect infestations.

(b) In the delousing and disinfecting of personnel in camps, particularly Allied prisoner of war and displaced persons camps, the use of insecticide powder alone was not effective in eradicating lice from the camps. Reinfestations occurred in periods as short as eight days. "House cleaning" and treatment of blankets, bunks, and bedding with a DDT insecticide (liquid) should be included in the delousing program for persons who are not to be immediately evacuated.

(c) In the Army Surgeon's Office, there should be at least two Sanitary Corps officers with wide experience in military sanitation, sanitary engineering, and administrative work relative thereto. Liaison and supervisory functions of the Army Sanitary Engineer should be facilitated in the field while one Sanitary Corps officer devotes most of his time to the large volume of routine work.

5. Public Health:

(a) Personnel for the performance of Public Health field operations was not freely available because they were pin-pointed with Civil Affairs/Military Government detachments. There was considerable difficulty of transfer of personnel where the need was greatest, and there was no security in personnel, especially when Army boundaries shifted. The number of Public Health officers were also inadequate.

(b) Indigenous medical personnel and facilities were not able to cope with the problem of the care of civilian sick and wounded. The Civil Affairs/Military Government directives were dependent upon local medical services to handle this problem.

(c) There was no organic transportation for the use of Public Health officers in their field operations. Transportation was procured only by request from Military Government detachments, who were themselves deficient in transport, or by accompanying other officers on missions, which limited the Public Health officers' activities. Without transportation, Public Health officers' value is almost entirely nullified.

(d) A. K. B. basic medical units were too bulky, and breakdown for issue, which was necessary many times, was difficult. They were not well balanced units. Many items included were not desired by civilian health officials. They could not meet the demand of displaced persons camps or small institutions.

(e) Public Health personnel should be attached to Army Headquarters in adequate numbers in the form of a Public Health Group, to be deployed when the need arises. They should be attached to the Medical Section for better coordination of all military and civilian problems.

(f) Civil Affairs/Military Government planning should have made medical units available by Army for specific purposes of caring for civilian emergencies when the situation warranted it.

(g) Adequate organic transportation for Public Health officers with drivers should be available to carry out field operations.

(h) Smaller emergency medical units should be provided for distribution to civilian institution and displaced persons camps.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. I

COPY HEADQUARTERS COPY
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

30 April 1944

TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

NUMBER 17 :

TRAINING OF MEDICAL UNITS

1. **PURPOSE:** The purpose of this memorandum is to furnish a general guide for the training of medical units.

2. **OBJECTIVE:** The objective of the training in the United Kingdom is to insure that all medical units can efficiently perform their primary missions in combat.

3. **SCOPE:** Further training should perfect the technical training of individuals and perfect the functioning of the unit in the field. Unit commanders should conduct frequent training inspections to determine which subjects require emphasis in training. Practical application will be emphasized; lectures will be reduced to a necessary minimum.

a. All medical personnel will receive training in the following subjects as directed by Hq, ETOUSA:

- (1) Mines, Minefields, and Booby Traps. (Tng Memo No 2, Hq ETOUSA, 10 Jan 44 and Tng Memo No 5, Hq TUSA, 21 Apr 44)
- (2) Camouflage Training. (Tng Memo 25, Hq ETOUSA, 7 Aug 43)
- (3) Defense against chemicals in combat. (Tng Memo No 42, Hq ETOUSA, 23 Dec 43)
- (4) Bomb Reconnaissance. (Tng Memo 43, Hq ETOUSA, 23 Dec 43)
- (5) Aircraft Recognition Training. (Tng Memo 44, Hq ETOUSA, 29 Dec 43)

b. In addition, training in the following subjects will be included as required:

- (1) **Physical Conditioning:** To develop and maintain the individual's ability to participate in combat.
- (2) **Discipline:** Develop alertness, neatness, and courtesy.
- (3) **Technical Training:** Perfect the technical proficiency of each enlisted man. Wherever possible at least two (2) replacements should be trained for each technical assignment.
- (4) **Tactical Training:** Each unit will set up its complete equipment in the field at least once each week, except evacuation, convalescent and field hospitals, which will set up in the field at least twice each month.
- (5) **Night Training:** At least one (1) night per week will be devoted to night training.
- (6) **Treatment of Gas Casualties:** All personnel will be thoroughly trained in the recognition and treatment of the various types of chemical casualties (Reference OCS ETOUSA, Med Bul No. 17, 15 Mar 44).
- (7) **First Aid:** All personnel will be proficient in rendering first aid treatment to all types of casualties.

(8) **Map and Aerial Photograph Reading:** All personnel will be proficient in map reading, in the use of the compass and in the use of foreign maps. Application in the field will be emphasized.

(9) **Defense Against Mechanized Attack:** Identification of friendly and hostile mechanized vehicles and passive protective measures should be stressed.

(10) **Defense Against Air and Parachute Attack:** Personnel should know the defensive measures which can be used by Medical Department troops.

c. Training will be conducted whenever possible, in the form of field exercises under tactical conditions. Prevailing weather will not alter these field exercises

4. **TRAINING AREAS:** Training areas may be obtained as outlined in Training Memorandum II, Hq ETOUSA, 10 Apr 44. Units having difficulty obtaining training areas will notify this headquarters.

5. **REPORTS:** Formal training reports will not be submitted. Each Army medical unit (except detachments) will forward one (1) copy of each master program to this headquarters. Weekly training programs will not be submitted.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ R. W. HARTMAN
R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. II

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 23 March Through 7 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate per 1000 Per Annum												Daily Non-Effective Rate			
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 31 Mar 44	61972	768	843	678	567	90	76	0	0	288	248	14	11.75	3	3	7825	16.04
2 Wk ending 7 Apr 44	65475	752	597	661	541	71	56	0	0	360	286	14	11.12	55	44	8017	17.49
3 Wk ending 14 Apr 44	75581	843	580	751	517	92	63	0	0	308	212	16	11.01	5	3	8366	15.51
4 Wk ending 21 Apr 44	161524	1516	485	1319	422	197	63	0	0	482	154	26	8.38	11	4	14700	13.00
5 Wk ending 28 Apr 44	157818	1538	507	1310	432	228	75	0	0	390	129	37	12.19	10	3	14459	13.09
6 Wk ending 5 May 44	173290	1598	480	1290	369	308	92	0	0	448	134	41	12.30	12	4	14957	12.33
7 Wk ending 12 May 44	162780	1680	538	1404	449	278	88	0	0	445	142	52	16.61	7	2	16204	14.22
8 Wk ending 19 May 44	167542	1535	476	1219	378	316	98	0	0	374	116	44	15.66	10	3	15825	13.49
9 Wk ending 26 May 44	166279	1430	447	1199	375	231	72	0	0	368	114	61	19.08	7	2	15563	13.20
10 Wk ending 2 Jun 44	193031	1560	420	1283	345	277	75	0	0	380	94	81	21.79	5	1	16188	11.98
11 Wk ending 9 Jun 44	177633	1424	417	1157	339	267	78	0	0	307	90	91	26.63	19	6	14905	11.99
12 Wk ending 16 Jun 44	162879	1318	420	1002	320	316	101	0	0	231	74	101	32.22	60	19	11627	10.21
13 Wk ending 23 Jun 44	167698	1173	364	914	283	259	80	0	0	216	67	60	18.60	6	2	11413	9.72
14 Wk ending 30 Jun 44	156639	930	311	743	248	187	62	0	0	158	53	55	18.37	15	5	10397	9.54
15 Wk ending 7 Jul 44	136053	533	204	405	155	128	49	0	0	76	29	31	11.84	1	.38	6363	6.66
Average for period	138364	1239	458	1023	384	216	75	0	0	319	129	68	16.49	15	6.76	12440	12.72

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 23 March Through 7 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum												Epidemic Hepatitis					
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles all types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 31 Mar 44	61972	9	8	7	7	6	36	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
2 Wk ending 7 Apr 44	65475	1	1	10	8	13	10	18	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
3 Wk ending 14 Apr 44	75581	2	1	9	6	8	6	24	17	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
4 Wk ending 21 Apr 44	161524	1	0	7	2	39	12	29	9	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	2
5 Wk ending 28 Apr 44	157818	7	2	7	2	37	12	20	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
6 Wk ending 5 May 44	173290	4	1	0	0	24	7	28	8	1	0	0	0	11	3	2	1	0	0
7 Wk ending 12 May 44	162780	2	1	10	3	19	6	38	12	5	1	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0
8 Wk ending 19 May 44	167542	1	0.3	5	2	11	5	22	7	0	0	0	0	11	3	1	0.3	0	0
9 Wk ending 26 May 44	166279	2	1	9	3	15	5	8	3	0	0	0	0	12	4	0	0	0	0
10 Wk ending 2 Jun 44	193031	1	.27	12	3	9	2	10	3	1	.27	0	0	6	2	9	2	4	1
11 Wk ending 9 Jun 44	177633	2	1	4	1	7	2	37	9	2	1	0	0	13	4	6	2	3	1
12 Wk ending 16 Jun 44	162879	1	.32	1	.32	4	1	14	4	0	0	0	0	6	2	0	0	2	1
13 Wk ending 23 Jun 44	167696	3	1	6	2	2	1	6	2	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	4	1
14 Wk ending 30 Jun 44	156639	1	.32	1	.32	8	3	11	4	1	.32	0	0	6	2	1	.32	3	1
15 Wk ending 7 Jul 44	136053	0	0	0	0	7	3	1	.38	1	.38	0	0	8	3	0	0	4	2
Average for period	138364	3	1.19	6	2.64	11	5	19	8.63	1	.33	0	0	5	2	2	.95	1	1

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ANNEX NO. III

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 14 July Through 28 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		521	287	413	212	108	55	0	0	102	52	27	13.85	3	2	5109	7.21
1 Wk ending 14 Jul 44	101249	521	287	413	212	108	55	0	0	102	52	27	13.85	3	2	5109	7.21
2 Wk ending 21 Jul 44	73107	333	237	256	182	77	55	0	0	44	31	25	17.78	37	26	2517	4.92
3 Wk ending 28 Jul 44	112941	523	241	380	175	143	66	0	0	70	32	49	22.54	7	3	3044	3.85
Average for period	95932	459	248	350	190	109	59	0	0	72	38	34	18.08	18	10	3556	5.33


SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 14 July Through 28 July 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis			
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles all types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis				Malaria	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		1	1	3	2	2	1	6	3	0	0	0	0	6	3	1	1	2	1
1 Wk ending 14 Jul 44	101249	1	1	3	2	2	1	6	3	0	0	0	0	6	3	1	1	2	1
2 Wk ending 21 Jul 44	73107	1	1	0	0	2	1	4	3	0	0	0	0	6	4	0	0	2	1
3 Wk ending 28 Jul 44	112941	1	.46	0	0	1	.46	1	.46	0	0	0	0	7	3	0	0	3	1
Average for period	95932	1	1	1	1	2	1	4	2	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	2	1

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ANNEX NO. V

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION AUGUST 1944



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ANNEX NO. VIII

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 Aug Through 1 Sep 1944


THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate			
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases					
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 4 Aug 44	119978	691	299	258	112	221	96	212	92	38	16	28	12.12	4	2	2373	2.63		
2 Wk ending 11 Aug 44	263777	6117	1205	1337	264	714	141	4066	801	97	19	15	2.96	19	4	1877	1.02		
3 Wk ending 18 Aug 44	251438	3804	784	1066	220	603	124	2135	440	53	11	19	3.91	21	4	1217	0.69		
4 Wk ending 25 Aug 44	293552	3941	698	1101	195	565	100	2275	403	81	14	19	3.36	37	7	1186	0.58		
5 Wk ending 1 Sep 44	312239	5793	962	1509	250	623	103	3661	608	81	13	43	7.14	35	6	1324	0.61		
Average for period	248196	4060	789	1054	208	545	110	2469	468	70	14	24	5.89	23	5	1595	1.15		

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 Aug Through 1 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis			
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles all types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Dysentery all types				Malaria	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 Wk ending 4 Aug 44	119978	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	.43	0	0	0	0	32	14	0	0	3	1.0
2 Wk ending 11 Aug 44	263777	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	1.00	0	0	0	0	331	65	3	1	1	.20
3 Wk ending 18 Aug 44	251438	0	0	2	.41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	138	28	0	0	2	.41
4 Wk ending 25 Aug 44	293552	0	0	2	.35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	180	32	3	1	3	1.0
5 Wk ending 1 Sep 44	312239	0	0	2	.33	0	0	2	.33	0	0	0	0	459	76	1	0.17	1	.17
Average for period	248196	.2	.04	1.2	.21	0	0	1.2	.35	0	0	0	0	228	43	1.4	.43	2	.56

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THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION SEPTEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XI

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 Sep Through 29 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS																	
1 wk ending 8 Sep 44	339979	4585	697	1671	254	562	85	2352	358	96	15	58	8.82	49	7	1167	0.62
2 wk ending 15 Sep 44	223004	5416	1262	1639	382	482	112	3295	768	85	20	67	15.61	23	5	974	0.62
3 wk ending 22 Sep 44	255783	6482	1316	2575	523	576	117	3331	676	163	33	133	27.00	53	11	1506	0.84
4 wk ending 29 Sep 44	258473	5358	1077	2173	437	580	117	2605	524	201	40	162	32.56	35	7	1910	1.06
Average for Period	269310	5460	1088	2015	399	550	108	2896	582	136	27	105	21.00	40	8	1464	0.79

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 Sep Through 29 Sep 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis			
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis				Malaria	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS																			
1 wk ending 8 Sep 44	339979	0	0	3	.46	0	0	1	.15	0	0	0	0	275	42	1	.15	1	.15
2 wk ending 15 Sep 44	223004	8	2	6	1	0	0	2	.47	0	0	0	0	594	129	1	.23	2	.47
3 wk ending 22 Sep 44	255783	4	1	3	1	0	0	1	.20	0	0	0	0	568	115	3	1	1	.20
4 wk ending 29 Sep 44	258473	2	.40	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	509	102	3	1	3	1
Average for Period	269310	4	.35	5	1.12	0	0	1	.21	0	0	0	0	477	97	2	.60	2	.46


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ANNEX NO. XII

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES OCTOBER 1944




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ANNEX NO. XIII

THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION OCTOBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XIV

On 13 October a directive was published by this headquarters incorporating some changes in surgical procedures and detailing other surgical procedures only generally covered in Annex 16 (Medical Annex) to Operation "OVERLORD".

The changes and further details concerning certain of the surgical procedures are summarized below:

1. Debridement of Wounds: Emphasis was again placed on the wide excision of all damaged muscle, the thorough mechanical cleansing of wounds and the removal of minimal amounts of skin with particular stress on forbidding the excision of circular sections of skin around small wounds, which results in prolonged convalescence and difficulty in making secondary closure.

2. Fractures: Field and evacuation hospitals are responsible for the debridement of compound fractures, and the preparation of the patient for early evacuation in comfort and safety.

a. Fractures of the Femur: It was recommended that these be immobilized in a double circular plaster of paris spica bandage from the toes of the affected leg and from the knee of the sound leg; this should be reinforced by a strut placed posteriorly, with legs spread no more than litter width, with knee slightly flexed. The use of the Toubruk splint for selected fractures of the femur will be permitted.

b. Fractures of the Tibia and Fibula were to be immobilized in the circular plaster of paris bandage from toes to groin.

c. Fractures of the Humerus were to be immobilized by a plaster of paris spica bandage with arm held forward and medially rotated so that the forearm rested in front of the body, with elbow flexion no less than ninety degrees. A plaster of paris velpeau bandage was considered a less satisfactory substitute for the spica. Hanging casts were prohibited.

d. Fractures of the Arm, Wrist and Hand were to be immobilized by circular plaster of paris, extending to the mid-brachial region.

e. For Fractures of the Feet and Ankles a circular plaster of paris boot was to be used, extending from the toes to just below the knee. All plaster dressings were to be split to the skin and spread.

f. Compression Fractures of the Spine were to be reduced by hyper-extension, and a plaster of paris jacket applied with the patient in this position. For fractures of the lumbar or lower dorsal vertebrae, the jacket must extend from the symphysis pubis to the sternal notch, with an extension of the jacket to and including the head, in the case of cervical and upper dorsal spine fractures.

g. Gunshot Wounds with Fractures of the Spine and Involvement of the Spinal Cord: All spinal injuries with neurologic involvement were to be transported to the nearest evacuation hospital for examination by the neurosurgeon and orthopedist. If the patient could be transported to a general hospital so that surgery could be accomplished

there within thirty-six hours he was to be immediately evacuated. If this were not possible all cases in which there was any doubt as to the complete severance of the spinal cord would be given the benefit of exploratory laminectomy by the neurosurgeon. The use of casts for the transportation of these cases was prohibited.

h. Thomas Splints: Thomas full or half-ring splints were to be used only in emergencies by forward medical installations and replaced as soon as possible by plaster of paris circular splints.

1. Metallic External Fixation of Fractures: The use of Steinman pins incorporated in plaster of paris bone plates and metallic external fixation splints were prohibited.

3. Wounds Involving Major Joints: The earliest possible closure of wounds by secondary suture or skin graft was recommended. The synovia was to be closed at time of debridement, with removal of all foreign bodies in the joints effected. Penicillin solution was to be placed in the joint following closure of the capsule.

4. Amputations: Circular amputation, as described in Circular Letter 101, Office of the Chief Surgeon, dated 30 July 1944, was directed with skin traction applied to effect closure of all stumps.

5. Injuries to the Hands:

a. Danger of prolonged immobilization was stressed. Their treatment as soft tissue injuries with effort directed toward closure of the wound by suture or skin graft, and early active motion was insisted upon. In cases where tendons and bone fragments were exposed, transfer to the nearest plastic center was directed. In selected cases, where skeletal traction was required to secure reduction and immobilization of the metacarpal fractures, its application was to be made through the proximal phalanges, with emphasis on early active motion; this procedure to be employed for a maximum of two weeks and the remaining phalangeal or metacarpo-phalangeal joints left free. Pulp traction was prohibited.

b. Amputation of hands or fingers were to be performed only in extreme cases and then at the most distal point possible.

c. In the case of compound fracture of the digital portion of one finger accompanied by destruction of the flexor and extensor tendons, a prompt amputation of this digit and early active motion of the rest of the hand and fingers were recommended.

6. Neurosurgical Problems:

a. Peripheral Nerve Injuries: A close neurologic examination of all cases in which there are lacerations, no matter how small, of the extremities, was stressed. The ultimate end to be attained was early repair of nerves at special treatment hospitals for neurosurgery. When there was evidence of a nerve injury, the nerve ends were to be approximated as soon as possible and where loss of tissue made this impossible, the ends were to be marked with silk and the patient evacuated promptly to the special treatment hospital in the Communications Zone.

7. Care of the Bladder in Patients with Injury of the Spinal Cord:

a. In the cases of suspected spinal injury and inability by the patient to void, catheterization was recommended, with the catheter left indwelling.

b. Tidal Drainage was recommended as early as possible, to be continued until complete neurological evaluation, with proper ascertainment that the bladder was properly emptying. After neurological evaluation, it was to be continued if there was evidence of early bladder recovery.

c. Early High Suprapubic Cystostomy was recommended in the following conditions:

- (1) Cord bladder secondary to permanent cord damage.
- (2) Absence of early bladder recovery.

d. Care of Suprapubic Cystostomies:

- (1) Use of large Mushroom or Malecot catheter.
- (2) Frequent changes of tubes to prevent infection and encrustation.
- (3) Daily bladder irrigations.

8. Care of Nasal Mucosa:

a. In facial wounds where the missile possibly penetrated the nasal mucosa, a complete preliminary examination was directed, to determine possible mucosal damage. If found, the cavity must be packed with gauze strips impregnated with sulfa ointment at the site of injury, to insure healing on both surfaces of the mucosa, and not across the airway at the site. Protusion of the gauze from the nose was recommended, and replacement at least every five days to ten days.

b. Prior to discharge, transfer, or evacuation from the hospital of any patient with facial injury which could have penetrated the nasal mucosa, a complete nasal examination for adhesions was directed; any adhesions to be severed and gauze placed to prevent re-forming.

9. Management of Colostomies:

a. Performance of Colostomy: Immobilization of the large intestine, when possible, to permit approximation of two and one-half to three inches of bowel within the peritoneal cavity in the formation of the double-barrelled colostomy, was directed.

b. Initial opening in the loop type of colostomy, not exceeding one inch in length and made through the region of the presenting tenia, parallel to the long axis of the presenting bowel, was recommended. Stress was placed on the necessity of a severance of the bowel to completely interrupt the fecal stream in injuries of the rectum or sigmoid below the colostomy site.

10. Litter cases were not to be evacuated to the convalescent hospital.

11. All cases of elective surgery were to be sent to Communications Zone hospitals.

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ANNEX NO. XV

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 OCT THROUGH 27 OCT 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate			
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases					
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate		
ALL TROOPS																			
1 wk ending 6 Oct 44	228,452	4238	962	2303	523	457	106	1168	333	294	67	151	34.28	25	6	1694	1.06		
2 wk ending 13 Oct 44	227,251	4307	982	2103	479	455	104	1749	399	339	77	145	32.60	42	10	1825	1.15		
3 wk ending 20 Oct 44	252,274	2995	617	2069	426	494	102	432	89	369	76	126	25.96	32	7	1548	0.88		
4 wk ending 27 Oct 44	257,658	3485	700	2354	473	448	90	683	137	407	82	168	33.77	53	11	1735	0.96		
Average for Period	241,409	3756	815	2207	475	446	101	1083	240	352	76	147	31.65	38	9	1702	1.01		

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 OCT THROUGH 27 OCT 1944


THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis					
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Typhus Fever		Psycho-neurosis				Malaria			
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate		
ALL TROOPS																					
1 wk ending 6 Oct 44	228,452	5	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	640	145	0	0	2	0.15
2 wk ending 13 Oct 44	227,251	1	0.23	6	2	0	0	1	0.23	1	0.23	0	0	0	0	204	47	0	0	1	0.23
3 wk ending 20 Oct 44	252,274	3	1	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	175	36	0	0	0	0
4 wk ending 27 Oct 44	257,658	0	0	10	2	1	0.20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	177	36	0	0	2	0.40
Average for Period	241,409	2	0.56	7	2	0.25	0.05	0.25	0.06	0.25	0.06	0	0	0	0	299	66	0	0	1	0.27

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ANNEX NO. XVI

THIRD U.S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES NOVEMBER 1944




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ANNEX NO. XVII

THIRD U. S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION NOVEMBER 1944



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ANNEX NO. XVIII

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 3 NOV THROUGH 1 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum															
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases		Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS																	
1 wk ending 3 Nov 44	240024	2786	602	1952	422	415	90	419	91	394	85	141	30.24	39	8	1072	0.64
2 wk ending 10 Nov 44	237785	5952	1298	2483	541	668	146	2801	611	397	87	145	31.61	58	13	1149	0.69
3 wk ending 17 Nov 44	231940	12955	2902	6133	1374	868	194	5954	1334	595	133	104	23.90	47	11	1484	0.91
4 wk ending 24 Nov 44	239704	8202	1772	3842	830	691	149	3669	793	509	110	91	19.66	106	23	1596	0.95
5 wk ending 1 Dec 44	251989	8100	1669	4125	850	701	144	3274	674	510	105	90	18.54	211	43	1303	0.74
Average for Period	240288	7599	1649	3707	803	669	145	3223	701	481	104	114	24.67	92	20	1321	0.79

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 3 NOV THROUGH 1 DEC 1944


THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS																			
1 wk ending 3 Nov 44	240024	2	.43	10	2	0	0	1	.22	0	0	0	0	122	26	0	0	2	.43
2 wk ending 10 Nov 44	237785	0	0	10	2	1	.22	0	0	1	.22	0	0	135	95	1	.22	2	.44
3 wk ending 17 Nov 44	231940	0	0	15	3	1	.22	0	0	0	0	2532	581	1347	302	2	.45	1	.41
4 wk ending 24 Nov 44	239704	0	0	6	1	0	0	1	.22	0	0	991	211	663	143	1	.22	2	.43
5 wk ending 1 Dec 44	251989	1	.21	41	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	854	172	901	186	0	0	2	.41
Average for Period	240288	.60	.13	16	3	.40	.09	.40	.09	.20	.04	883	193	694	150	.90	.18	2	.54

(Average for 3 weeks) 1472 322

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ANNEX NO. XIX

THIRD U.S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES DECEMBER 1944




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ANNEX NO. XX

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION DECEMBER 1944




ANNEX NO. XXI

ANNEX NO. XXII

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS

OCTOBER - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1944



SCALE 1:3,000,000 1 in = 47.34 mi

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 DEC THROUGH 29 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate		
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases				
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate			
ALL TROOPS																		
1 wk ending 8 Dec 44	24,842	6369	1331	3313	699	597	125	2429	508	400	84	106	22.15	140	29	1054	0.61	
2 wk ending 15 Dec 44	24,680	6559	1377	3274	688	875	184	2410	506	484	102	108	22.68	123	26	1069	0.62	
3 wk ending 22 Dec 44	25,247	5627	1118	2494	509	834	170	2299	469	383	78	109	22.24	97	20	904	0.51	
4 wk ending 29 Dec 44	31,579	9624	1578	4411	723	1121	184	4092	671	687	113	100	16.47	91	15	1378	0.64	
Average for Period	26,630	7045	1359	3381	655	857	166	2808	539	489	94	106	20.89	113	23	1101	0.60	


SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 8 DEC THROUGH 29 DEC 1944

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis			
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Scarlet Fever		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis				Malaria	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate			Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS																			
1 wk ending 8 Dec 44	24,842	2	.42	19	4	1	.21	2	.42	0	0	498	104	550	115	0	0	3	1
2 wk ending 15 Dec 44	24,680	0	0	11	2	1	.21	1	.21	0	0	861	181	370	78	0	0	3	1
3 wk ending 22 Dec 44	25,247	0	0	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	364	74	324	66	2	.41	5	1
4 wk ending 29 Dec 44	31,579	1	.16	21	3	1	.16	2	.33	0	0	936	154	793	130	2	.33	3	.49
Average for Period	26,630	1	.15	15	3	1	.15	1	.24	0	0	665	128	509	97	1	.19	4	.87

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ANNEX NO. XXIII

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES JANUARY 1945




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ANNEX NO. XXIV

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION JANUARY 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXV

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 5 THROUGH 26 JAN 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 5 Jan 45	345599	10593	1589	4503	675	1398	210	4692	704	802	120	127	19.11	102	15	1472	0.61
2 wk ending 12 Jan 45	338502	12278	1879	5304	812	1123	172	5851	895	798	122	126	19.36	106	16	5393	2.28
3 wk ending 19 Jan 45	349860	10406	1540	3997	592	1458	216	4951	733	750	111	123	18.28	136	20	2507	1.02
4 wk ending 26 Jan 45	353851	8706	1271	4336	633	1209	177	3161	462	836	122	102	14.99	148	22	2263	0.91
Average for Period	346953	10496	1570	4535	678	1297	194	4664	699	797	119	120	17.94	123	18	2909	1.21


SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 5 THROUGH 26 JAN 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 5 Jan 45	345599	0	0	20	3	1	.15	2	.30	591	89	521	78	874	131	0	0	11	2
2 wk ending 12 Jan 45	338502	0	0	25	4	3	.46	1	.15	1835	281	656	100	633	97	4	1	18	3
3 wk ending 19 Jan 45	349860	2	.30	20	3	1	.15	2	.30	1712	253	476	70	490	73	1	.15	11	2
4 wk ending 26 Jan 45	353851	1	.15	16	2	2	.29	9	1	725	106	554	81	400	58	0	0	22	3
Average for Period	346953	.75	.11	20	3	2	.26	4	.44	1216	182	552	82	599	90	1	.29	16	3

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ANNEX NO. XXVI

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES FEBRUARY 1945





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ANNEX NO. XXVII

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION FEBRUARY 1945



SCALE: 1in = 10.52 mi.

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
ANNEX NO. XXVIII

Analysis of 64,389 U. S. Battle Casualties Treated in Third U. S. Army
Medical Installations - 1 Aug 1944 to 1 Feb 45

<u>Anatomical Location and No. of each type</u>	<u>% of Total No. of Battle Casualties</u>	<u>Mortality for each sep group</u>
Head & Spine 5075 cases	8%	9.4%
Face & Neck 3770 cases	5%	1%
Chest 5877 cases	10%	8%
Abdomen 2907 cases	5%	15.5%
Buttocks 3745 cases	6%	2%
Upper Extremity 16327 cases	25%	3%
Lower Extremity 23273 cases	35%	1%
Total Extremities 39600 cases	60%	
Others 3615 cases	6%	1.4%
Total 64,389 cases	100%	

Mortality from all types of battle casualties
treated in Third U. S. Army for six month period 2.9%

The overall mortality including medical and
non-battle casualty admissions for same period 1.6%



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ANNEX NO. XXIX

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 2 FEB THROUGH 2 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 2 Feb 45	324427	7266	1164	3991	639	1422	228	1853	297	1148	184	89	14.27	146	23	2300	1.01
2 wk ending 9 Feb 45	299837	8649	1500	4636	804	1107	192	2906	504	1151	200	96	16.65	290	50	1212	0.58
3 wk ending 16 Feb 45	299421	8264	1435	4639	805	911	158	2714	471	959	166	105	18.24	227	39	1355	0.65
4 wk ending 23 Feb 45	297984	7380	1288	3667	640	772	135	2941	513	591	103	120	20.94	283	49	662	0.32
5 wk ending 2 Mar 45	288609	9287	1672	3885	700	759	137	4643	836	605	109	125	22.52	163	29	618	0.31
Average for Period	302056	8169	1412	4164	718	994	170	3011	522	891	152	107	18.52	222	38	1229	0.57



SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 2 FEB THROUGH 2 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Epidemic Hepatitis			
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis				Malaria	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 2 Feb 45	324427	0	0	12	2	1	.16	15	2	660	106	424	68	246	39	0	0	19	3
2 wk ending 9 Feb 45	299837	0	0	13	2	3	.52	7	1	286	50	436	76	352	61	1	.17	21	4
3 wk ending 16 Feb 45	299421	1	.17	16	3	0	0	2	.35	95	16	903	157	373	66	1	.17	19	3
4 wk ending 23 Feb 45	297984	1	.17	32	6	4	.70	4	.70	28	5	334	58	500	87	0	0	40	7
5 wk ending 2 Mar 45	288609	0	0	13	2	6	1	5	1	17	3	503	91	570	103	1	.18	57	10
Average for Period	302056	.40	.07	17	3	3	.48	7	1	217	36	520	90	408	71	.60	.10	31	7

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ANNEX NO. XXX

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES MARCH 1945




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ANNEX NO. XXXI


THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION MARCH 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXXII

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS JANUARY—FEBRUARY—MARCH 1945



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ANNEX NO. XXXIII


SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 9 MAR THROUGH 30 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-Effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 9 Mar 45	304194	7940	1357	3804	650	867	148	3269	559	698	119	109	18.63	187	32	671	0.32
2 wk ending 16 Mar 45	308668	6424	1082	2975	501	755	127	2694	454	640	108	130	16.85	134	23	574	0.27
3 wk ending 23 Mar 45	322540	5772	930	2423	391	797	128	2552	411	501	81	90	14.51	48	8	636	0.28
4 wk ending 30 Mar 45	302829	4742	814	2039	350	663	114	2040	350	336	58	99	17.00	35	6	572	0.27
Average for Period	309558	6220	1046	2810	473	771	129	2139	444	544	92	100	16.75	101	17	613	0.29

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 9 MAR THROUGH 30 MAR 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trench Foot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
ALL TROOPS		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
1 wk ending 9 Mar 45	304194	0	0	23	4	1	.17	10	2	33	6	364	62	477	82	1	.17	78	13
2 wk ending 16 Mar 45	308668	1	.17	15	3	4	1	5	1	4	1	163	27	312	53	2	.34	67	11
3 wk ending 23 Mar 45	322540	0	0	9	1	6	.97	4	.64	0	0	60	10	257	41	5	.81	97	16
4 wk ending 30 Mar 45	302829	1	.17	7	1	5	.86	8	1	0	0	2	.34	173	30	6	1	100	17
Average for Period	309558	.5	.09	14	2	4	.75	7	1	9	2	147	25	305	52	4	.58	86	14

THIRD U. S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES APRIL 1945



SECRET

ANNEX NO. XXXVI

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 APRIL THROUGH 27 APRIL 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		4032	673	1666	273	774	129	1592	266	353	59	65	10.86	39	7	608	0.28
1 wk ending 6 April 1945	311360	4032	673	1666	273	774	129	1592	266	353	59	65	10.86	39	7	608	0.28
2 wk ending 13 April 1945	317859	4646	760	1989	325	837	137	1820	298	349	57	89	14.56	40	7	691	0.31
3 wk ending 20 April 1945	295236	3723	656	2084	367	818	144	821	145	332	58	76	13.39	42	7	795	0.38
4 wk ending 27 April 1945	377720	4480	616	2485	342	795	109	1200	165	329	45	124	17.07	40	6	1087	0.41
Average for Period	325544	4220	767	2056	328	806	130	1358	219	341	55	89	13.97	40	7	795	0.35


SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 6 APRIL THROUGH 27 APRIL 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trenchfoot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		0	0	12	2	3	.50	2	.33	1	.17	1	.17	119	20	1	.17	86	14
1 wk ending 6 April 1945	311360	0	0	12	2	3	.50	2	.33	1	.17	1	.17	119	20	1	.17	86	14
2 wk ending 13 April 1945	317859	0	0	6	.98	4	.65	8	1	0	0	1	.16	132	22	3	.49	92	15
3 wk ending 20 April 1945	295236	2	.35	6	1	8	1	6	1	0	0	2	.35	87	15	4	.70	123	22
4 wk ending 27 April 1945	377720	2	.28	19	3	1	.14	9	1	9	1	43	6	133	18	4	.55	138	19
Average for Period	325544	1	.16	11	2	4	.57	6	.83	3	.29	12	2	118	19	3	.48	110	18

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ANNEX NO. XXXVII

THIRD U.S. ARMY EVACUATION AGENCIES 1-8 MAY 1945




Map
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ANNEX NO. XXXVIII

THIRD U.S. ARMY HOSPITALIZATION 1-8 MAY 1945




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ANNEX NO. XXXIX

THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPOTS APRIL - MAY 1945



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Map XXXVI

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ANNEX NO. XL

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 MAY THROUGH 11 MAY 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum														Daily Non-effective Rate	
		All Causes		Diseases Only		Injury		Battle Casualties		Common Respiratory Diseases		"Old" & "New" Venereal Diseases		Diarrheal Diseases			
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		3741	576	2112	325	797	123	832	128	293	45	136	20.93	40	6	1024	0.43
1 wk ending 4 May 1945	337872	3741	576	2112	325	797	123	832	128	293	45	136	20.93	40	6	1024	0.43
2 wk ending 11 May 1945	397919	4244	554	2657	347	1119	146	468	61	413	54	212	27.69	47	6	910	0.33
Average for Period	367896	3993	565	2385	336	958	135	650	95	353	50	174	24.31	44	6	967	0.38

SUMMARY OF WEEKLY STATISTICAL REPORTS FOR PERIOD 4 MAY THROUGH 11 MAY 1945

THIRD U. S. ARMY	Mean Strength	Admission Rate Per 1000 Per Annum																	
		Cerebro-spinal Fever		Influenza		Measles All Types		Mumps		Frostbite		Trenchfoot		Psycho-neurosis		Malaria		Epidemic Hepatitis	
		Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
ALL TROOPS		0	0	15	2	2	.31	6	1	5	.77	15	2	75	12	1	.15	102	16
1 wk ending 4 May 1945	337872	0	0	15	2	2	.31	6	1	5	.77	15	2	75	12	1	.15	102	16
2 wk ending 11 May 1945	397919	1	.13	26	3	2	.26	6	1	1	.13	1	13	22	3	12	2	32	4
Average for Period	367896	.5	.07	21	3	2	.29	6	1	3	.45	8	8	49	8	7	1	67	10





O R D N A N C E

EVERETT

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 105

SUBJECT: Transmittal of After-Action Report, Ordnance Section, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

TO: The Commanding General, Third U.S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Ordnance Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters, beginning with 23 March 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.


2. This report endeavors to portray the history of Ordnance Service in the Third U.S. Army. Many details have necessarily been omitted but the report describes the more important features of Ordnance Service and the outstanding problems which were met and solved in providing the ammunition, supplying replacement equipment, and maintaining the weapons and vehicles essential for successful combat. The report covers the planning phase in the United Kingdom, the pre-operational phase on the Continent, and finally, the highly successful campaigns in Normandy, Brittany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Rhineland, and the ultimate defeat of the enemy in Germany.

J. E. Wilson
J. E. WILSON,
Ordnance Dept.,
Ordnance Officer.

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ORDNANCE SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER I
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Ordnance Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, at the time of their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM on 23 March 1944, had no indication as to their ultimate destiny. As time went on and plans of the Army were being formulated, it became apparent that the day of actual commitment to combat was near at hand. Some of the numerous problems confronting the Ordnance troops are mentioned in the sections that follow. The outstanding responsibilities were the initial planning phase and the equipping of the Army prior to actual commitment.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The Ordnance Section, Third U. S. Army, arrived in the UNITED KINGDOM with complete authorized strength of eighteen officers, two warrant officers (Junior grade), and thirty-three enlisted men. The entire section was in the rear echelon. The section was located at TOFT CAMP near KNITSFORD, CHESHIRE, ENGLAND, with other service sections of the headquarters and was housed in three small frame buildings.

Immediately upon arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM files were started on all Ordnance officer personnel assigned and attached to Third U. S. Army. As officers of the headquarters visited Ordnance units, pertinent statements were made on the units concerned in order that the Army Ordnance Officer would be familiar with their capabilities.

All sub-sections began operations on 24 March. Instructions were issued directing them to maintain telephonic records in their respective sub-sections. These would be periodically forwarded to the Administration Section for consolidation. A weekly report was required from each sub-section which was consolidated by the Administration Section into a diary.

On 14 April, a bomb disposal officer was attached to the section from the theater headquarters for the purpose of passive air defense organizing and planning of schools for training of personnel in same.

Staff Memorandum 37, this headquarters, dated 6 May, reduced Ordnance Section authorized enlisted personnel to twenty-eight men and one warrant officer; increased officer strength to nineteen. Five enlisted men were transferred to other staff sections in accordance with this directive.

At the request of the Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, a weekly informal letter was prepared emphasizing various technical problems with which the Ordnance Section had dealt during that week. This letter proved to be very valuable since it kept the Chief Ordnance Officer constantly familiar with current problems of supply and maintenance of Ordnance materiel.

Headquarters, 178th Ordnance Battalion and 317th Ordnance Battalion were reorganized as the First and Second Ordnance Provisional Group Headquarters respectively on 20 May. The complete battalion personnel was placed on detached service with the provisional groups and the balance of Group T/O brought up to authorized strength by augmentation from attached units.

On 25 May, Ordnance Bulletin Number 1 was prepared and distributed to all Third Army Ordnance units. (See Annex I). This initial bulletin contained Ordnance technical information and a brief analysis of the plan for future bulletins of a similar nature. On 12 June, Ordnance Bulletin Number 2 was published and distributed. (See Annex II). On 23 June, Ordnance Bulletin Number 3 was published and distributed. (See Annex III).

The 69th Ordnance Group was activated on 23 June. Personnel for this group was obtained from the First Ordnance Provisional Group Headquarters which was disbanded. On 26 June, the 70th Ordnance Group was activated. Personnel for this group was obtained from the Second Ordnance Provisional Group Headquarters which was disbanded.

On 29 June, the Ordnance Section was divided into three echelons. The "X" Echelon consisted of ten officers and seventeen enlisted men; the "Y" Echelon consisted of seven officers, one warrant officer, and nine enlisted men; the "Z" Echelon consisted of two officers and two enlisted men. The "X" Echelon departed from TOFT CAMP on this date and proceeded to NINE YEWES, in southern ENGLAND, southwest of SALISBURY. On 4 July, this echelon moved from NINE YEWES to SOUTHAMPTON and proceeded to the Continent, arriving there 6 July and was camped three miles north of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICHEPTE, FRANCE, (T-19).

In order to accomplish the required work during this planning period, it was found necessary to augment the Ordnance Section with attached personnel as follows:

Dates	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
April	3	1	15
May	4	0	5
June	6	0	6
July	6	0	6

The maximum number of personnel attached at any one time was three officers, one warrant officer, and fifteen enlisted men. The average was five officers and eight enlisted men which indicates that the Ordnance Section of an Army Headquarters is too small, particularly during a planning phase.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

An operating journal was started and an operations log was set up for recording telephonic conversations and the results of conferences. This log was used as a source of information for the compilation of the historical record.

The location of Ordnance units was spotted on a map in order to determine their geographical location with respect to each other. As a result of this study, recommendation was made to G-3 to attach Ordnance companies to Ordnance battalions for administrative control on a geographical basis.

A study was made to determine if Ordnance units were located to provide Ordnance service to tactical and other service units. It was found that the Ordnance units were not located with respect to the maintenance and supply load but apparently had been placed where billets were available. Recommendations were submitted to the G-3 Section for immediate movement of these units in order to insure Ordnance service to all units. New units arriving in the UNITED KINGDOM were immediately notified of their supporting Ordnance unit.

Upon completion of a study of the administrative requirements of Ordnance units, a request was submitted to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for the assignment or authority to activate two Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Ordnance Groups (T/O & E 9-12, 15 April 1944) in order to expedite the organization, administration, training, and operations of Ordnance battalions. Authority was received to organize two Provisional Group Headquarters. This was accomplished by reorganizing the Headquarters 178th Ordnance Battalion and 317th Ordnance Battalion as the First and Second Provisional Groups, respectively. These Provisional Groups were later disbanded by General Order No. 35, dated 3 July 1944, and then activated as Ordnance Groups, per T/O & E 9-12, 15 April 1944. The 69th Ordnance Group which was activated on 23 June was given the mission of operating all forward battalions in direct support of Corps. The 70th Ordnance Group which was activated on 26 June was given the mission of supply for the entire Third U. S. Army, as well as maintenance support to the 69th Ordnance Group and any other Army troops assigned. The 70th Ordnance Group Headquarters was to be the only contacting agency for supply and maintenance with the Advance Section, Communications Zone.

Prior to the activation of the Ordnance Groups, a meeting was conducted by the Army Ordnance Officer which was attended by all Corps Ordnance Officers, all Provisional Group Commanders and their executives, and all Ordnance Battalion Commanders and their executives. During this meeting the Army Ordnance Officer and his staff discussed the Ordnance Plan for Continental operations. Copies of "Instructions to Ordnance Units", which in itself was the Ordnance Plan, were distributed with accompanying Ordnance forms reproduced as Annex IV of this report,

to be used for the submission of Ordnance reports required by this headquarters. (For complete text of "Instructions to Ordnance Units" see pages 94 through 97 of OVERLORD PLAN) Copies of the Maintenance Plan for Continental operations were also distributed. (See Annex V) Battalion commanders were informed of the companies to be attached to their battalions for this operation. Copies of these plans were furnished to the Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, Ordnance Officer, First U. S. Army Group, and Ordnance Officer, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone.

A tentative troop list for Third U. S. Army was studied and then broken down into the types of tactical units. Estimates were made of the number of Ordnance companies and battalions necessary to support these tactical units. After the number of Ordnance units required had been determined, they were phased in with the tactical units in order to furnish adequate Ordnance support.

The Army Ordnance Officer attended a conference at Headquarters First U. S. Army Group with reference to the number of Ordnance units that would be necessary to support Third U. S. Army, by type, and the required phasing of these Ordnance units with the tactical units. For this necessary support, a shortage was found to exist of depot companies, evacuation companies, ammunition companies, heavy maintenance tank companies, and ammunition battalion headquarters.

The Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, called a meeting of Army Ordnance Officers, representatives of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, and First U. S. Army Group, and Ordnance units were assigned based on availability. This list was later revised since units expected from the states had not arrived. The final Ordnance troop list is shown in Annex VI.

Ammunition battalion headquarters shortages were eliminated by taking three Ordnance battalion headquarters and making ammunition battalion headquarters out of them.

It was planned that the Ordnance companies being lifted to the Continent during the period up to D+41 for the Continental operation would take with them vehicles and towed artillery to establish a replacement pool for the tactical units then ashore. Therefore, a driver training program was immediately drafted for the purpose of training Ordnance personnel to drive half-track and track-laying vehicles.

The Ordnance Section, Communications Zone, was contacted and arrangements were made for Ordnance personnel to attend training courses for waterproofing of armored vehicles and artillery at Ordnance Depot O-617, located at BIDDEFORD. Training courses for general purpose vehicles at Ordnance Depot O-616 was located at WALLESEY.

Quotas for training in Waterproofing at Ordnance Depot O-616 and O-617 were not in sufficient quantity to complete training prior to movement date. Therefore, a school was established at CONGLETON by Third U. S. Army. This school was first placed under the operation of VIII Corps to train students in waterproofing of all types of general purpose vehicles. Students who had completed training at the Communications Zone Ordnance depots were selected from units within the Corps to act as instructors in this school. Upon completion of training of the VIII Corps, this school was then placed under control of the Army. Training courses were then allocated to Army units. Corps instructors were relieved as Army instructors were trained.

As more armored units were assigned to Third U. S. Army, it was necessary to immediately establish another school to train the necessary number of instructors in the waterproofing of combat vehicles and artillery before the movement date of the Army units.

The Ordnance Section, Communications Zone, was contacted with reference to waterproofing of vehicles and the availability of materials to be used for training. A training program was drafted whereby all drivers and their assistant drivers would be taught the correct method of waterproofing. This plan was submitted to the AG of S, G-3, for approval, together with a plan for the establishment of a waterproofing school. Communications Zone agreed to provide a limited number of combat vehicle instructors and the waterproofing material for instructional purposes. Communications Zone instructors would be used until such time as Army instructors could be trained. This school was established in the vicinity of MARLBOROUGH and placed under XX Corps for operation.

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This school trained instructors for Army units in combat and general purpose vehicles and artillery. As instructors were developed, they were returned to their units and the units in turn established waterproofing schools for their drivers. By this pyramid method all drivers and their assistants were instructed in waterproofing within a period of two months.

Considerable trouble had been reported from other combat areas on vehicles becoming disabled during beach landings. Subsequently, instructions were drafted for trouble-shooting vehicles which stalled on the beach due to mechanical troubles. These instructions were distributed to students and proved valuable as a training aid since similar troubles developed as a result of wading during waterproofing tests.

A memorandum was submitted to the Chief of Staff for the reorganization under T/O & E 9-7, dated 28 February 1944, with Change 1, dated 28 February 1944, of all Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies under control of Third U. S. Army. All Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squads (Separate) were reorganized under T/O & E 9-500.

It was recommended that all Ordnance units be attached to Corps for movement to the Continent and to revert to Army control upon arrival. Furthermore, Third U. S. Army units that had been attached to First U. S. Army were likewise to revert to Third U. S. Army control. One unit was excepted, the 3457th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, which was attached to Headquarters Special Troops for administration and supply.

A list of Third U. S. Army maintenance and depot companies which were in actual operation in the UNITED KINGDOM was submitted to the Ordnance Officer, Southern Base Sector, so that they could be placed in the same supply priority as Communications Zone shops for spare parts. The 3457th, 8374th, and 9848th Ordnance Depot Companies were designated as the main depot companies.

A copy of Third U. S. Army troop priority list, dated 5 June 1944, was forwarded to Western Base Sector, Services of Supply, for use in the distribution of waterproofing materials to Third U. S. Army units in order of priority.

SECTION IV
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM, the Supply Sub-Section immediately initiated an intensive study of Services of Supply administrative orders and policies currently in effect in the European Theater of Operations.

The supply portion of the Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 1 was immediately prepared. Policies were set forth as indicated in FM 9-5, 11 July 1942, Ordnance Service In The Field, and coordinated with those already set up by the Services of Supply for the UNITED KINGDOM.

The supply of major items of T/E and T/BA equipment to units upon arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM were issued automatically by the Services of Supply. "Misc" items listed in the pertinent Standard Nomenclature Lists were shipped with the major items to which they pertained. First echelon tools and spare parts kits for general purpose vehicles were issued with the vehicles. Likewise, organizational spare parts, tools, and equipment for combat vehicles were issued with the vehicle.

Units dealt directly with the Services of Supply base section concerned regarding the availability of initial issue of T/E and T/BA equipment. When trouble was experienced by the units in obtaining critical items of T/E and T/BA equipment, they contacted the supply section of Army who in turn contacted Headquarters Services of Supply as to the availability, and at times specified priority of units to be equipped on critical items of supply.

The supply of material other than the initial T/E and T/BA was made through the following channels:

1. Divisions were supplied through their ordnance companies.
2. Army and Corps troops were supplied through the ordnance depot company of the battalion furnishing ordnance service.

3. Units without organic ordnance support, or without Army or Corps ordnance units to provide supply, submitted their requisitions to the nearest Services of Supply ordnance installations.

Three Army depot companies were put in operation in the UNITED KINGDOM. All other depot companies were completely involved in the task of setting up their vans and requisitioning basic loads.

Tactical units were instructed to submit requisitions for organizational spare parts and accessories direct to Services of Supply depot installations rather than to Army depots first for consolidation. This method was found to be more satisfactory as units were being moved during this period to the concentration area and trouble had been experienced, because of lack of communications, by Army depots in contacting tactical units when their requisitions were filled. Services of Supply experienced the same difficulty on a reduced scale therefore Army liaison officers and enlisted men were placed in all Services of Supply depots for the purpose of notifying units when their requisitions were filled.

Forms that were furnished to Army by Services of Supply to be used in the requisitioning of organizational spare parts and accessories by tactical units were found to be incomplete and outdated and were discontinued after being used a short period of time.

Requisitions for controlled expendable items were submitted through Corps Ordnance Officer (or Army Ordnance Officer in case of Army troops) approved and forwarded to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Headquarters Services of Supply, for action.

Requisitions for controlled non-expendable items were submitted through the Army Ordnance Officer after approval by the Corps Ordnance Officer (for Corps troops) and after approval and consolidation by the Division Ordnance Officer (for Divisional troops). Army troops submitted such requisitions to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Services of Supply, through the Army Ordnance Officer.

Immediately before the shipment of Army to the Continent, arrangements were made by the Army Ordnance Officer with Headquarters Services of Supply to simplify the requisition channels so that troops remaining in the UNITED KINGDOM could continue to be supplied without so much paper work coming through the "Z" Echelon of Army.

Instructions for the preparation of requisitions were also included in the Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 1, and complete information was given as to the form and stock numbers necessary to expedite these requisitions through Services of Supply depots.

All units in the Army were required to submit to the Army Ordnance Officer as of the twentieth of each month a "Special Material Status Report" of all authorized and on hand major items. A card system was set up by the supply section for the purpose of recording these figures so that information as to the status of equipment of units in the Army would be available. Between reports, items released by Services of Supply on shipping orders were posted on these cards so as to keep this information current.

Shortly before Army left for the Continent this form was changed to the "Ordnance Material In The Hands of Troops and Combat Loss Report" and made to include additional information necessary for combat operations.

A project to provide items above T/E necessary for the efficient operation of ordnance companies was completed and submitted for approval. Approval was not obtained in time for the items to be issued to the ordnance units while in the UNITED KINGDOM.

Work was started on the requirements of all ordnance items for Continental operation. An extensive study was made of requirements submitted by other Armies in previous operations.

Requirements for vehicles and towed artillery for Phase II (D / 42 to D / 42) were set up by First U. S. Army Group based on fourteen days of maintenance with a reserve of seven days. These major items were phased in by days for transportation to the Continent. The supply section in turn phased these items in accordance with ordnance units ability to carry them to the Continent during this period. Requirements were not put in for Phase III (D / 42 to D / 90) as Headquarters Services of Supply informed Army that depots would be in operation on the Continent to handle requirements during this period. In connection with this a letter was written to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, a copy of which is reproduced as follows:

AG 475 (Ord)

15 May 1944

Subject: Ordnance Supplies, Operation "Overlord".

To: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 887, U. S. Army.

1. References.

a. Letter, AG 475 (Ordnance), Headquarters Third United States Army, APO 403, 10 May 1944, Subject: "Ordnance Class II Operational Supply Requirements (Phase III)".

b. Joint Administrative Plan for Operation "Overlord" to Accompany Joint Operations Plan, United Forces, 19 April 1944, Paragraph 1. General, a(4) and (6); Paragraph 2. Supply, a. General, (1)(b) and 2.

c. "Neptune" Initial Joint Plan, WJC 1004, 1 February 1944, Section II, Paragraph 2, Supply, a. General (1)(c).

2. It is the understanding of this headquarters that the Commanding General, Communications Zone, for Operation "Overlord" is prepared to assume normal supply functions for all types of Ordnance Supply by D / 41.

3. Based on this assumption, only tonnage was bid in for the maintenance requirements and a seven (7) day reserve for the Third U. S. Army units ashore as of D / 41 (inclusive). First U. S. Army was responsible for bidding in tonnage for the VIII Corps for the same period. In addition, the major items ashore by specific periods was furnished in letter referred to in paragraph 1 a., from D / 42 to D / 90. No ordnance tonnage has been bid in for the period D / 42 to D / 90 for any Third U. S. Army units. The assumption is that the Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, or Communications Zone, will bid in the necessary tonnage for maintenance requirements and the establishment of a seven day reserve for Third U. S. Army units ashore as of D / 90. This reserve to be in addition to any reserve to be established by the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to support the Ground Forces.

4. To confirm the above assumption, it is requested that the following question be answered:

a. Will the Advance Section of the Communications Zone or the Communications Zone be prepared to meet the maintenance and Third U. S. Army operational reserve demands including the replacement of major items for Class II, Class IV, and Class V Ordnance Supply for all Third U. S. Army troops ashore after D / 41?

For the Commanding General:

/s/ R. L. SLOSSON, JR.,
Capt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

AG 475 (Ordnance)

1st Ind.

7 June 1944

Headquarters European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U. S. Army.

To: Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, U. S. Army.

1. For the period of contemplated operations D plus 42 to D plus 90, calculations of maintenance and reserve supply requirements were made on the basis of all troops ashore and not broken down into supplies for any one command.

2. However, the Ordnance Service has advised that its provision of supplies for all troops ashore beginning at D plus 41 is adequate to meet the maintenance and authorized reserve demands of the Third U. S. Army.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/ T. I. HARRIMAN,
Capt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Requirements for major items other than rolling stock were set up in chart form based on modified War Department replacement factors for a fifteen day supply for all ordnance maintenance and depot units in the Army. A chart was prepared allocating these items to the various types of ordnance companies as basic loads.

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Authorized spare parts basic loads for divisional ordnance companies were in accordance with the appropriate Standard Nomenclature Lists. Because of the critical nature of supply, basic loads of major items, as listed in appropriate Standard Nomenclature Lists for divisional ordnance units, were not authorized.

Basic load basis for spare parts for non-divisional ordnance maintenance companies was compiled. A chart was produced showing the number of each type major item to be supported by the various types of maintenance companies. These figures were arrived at by taking the total number of each type major item in the Army and dividing by the number of maintenance units that could support these items. This gave each maintenance company a percentage share of each type major item they would support and meant that each company would have a balanced stock of parts for everything they could support. A fifteen day supply was requisitioned in accordance with pertinent Standard Nomenclature Lists Addendas. Restrictions were added by the Army Ordnance Officer that basic loads must be mobile and ordnance units were authorized to vary basic loads to comply with this requirement.

Basic load basis for spare parts for depot companies was compiled. In coordination with this project, the depot companies were divided into two distinct classes: Forward and Main Depots. The forward depots were in turn divided into two types: Forward General and Forward Armored. The forward general depots to carry a preponderance of general purpose parts for the support of infantry divisions. The forward armored depots to carry a stock of combat vehicle and general purpose parts in order to support armored units. The main depots were in turn divided into three types: Main General Purpose, Main Combat Vehicle, and Main Armament. These depots were to stock parts as their titles indicate. The main depots were also to operate the main Army vehicle and towed artillery pool.

The basic load basis for spare parts for forward depot companies was based on a fifteen day supply in accordance with the quantities of various type major items to be supported which was figured on the same basis as for the maintenance companies. The main depot companies were to carry a thirty day supply based on the total number of each type of item that they would support in the Army.

Restrictions were again added that forward depot loads must be mobile and units were authorized to vary basic loads to comply with this requirement. The main depots were to transport reserve pool vehicles and were to load these vehicles with parts. Additional transportation was to be obtained by use of Ordnance Evacuation Companies, to carry a portion of their load to the Continent.

A cleaning and preserving requirement chart was reproduced and distributed to all tactical units and ordnance units to be used in the requisitioning of fast moving cleaning and preserving materials. This chart was based on figures compiled by the Ordnance Board, Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Basic load charts for the stockage of tires and tubes were compiled and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply for automatic issue to ordnance units. No figures were available as to replacement factors on these items and the only limiting factor was space needed to carry them. Consequently only a small part of these needs of the Army were carried to the far shore by ordnance units.

Basic loads for the stockage of tools for replacement purposes were compiled and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply for automatic issue to the main general purpose depot. No figures were available as to replacement factors on these items and again the limiting factor was space to carry these items.

Requirements for artillery tubes, recoil mechanisms, equilibrators, and gas check pads were prepared and submitted to Headquarters Services of Supply for shipment to the Continent. The figures used as a basis were obtained from those developed by other Armies in previous campaigns. (See Artillery Tube Chart on Page 118 of OVERLORD PLAN)

The supply section prepared, for the use of ordnance maintenance and depot companies in requisitioning spare parts loads, a special requisition form for each Standard Nomenclature Lists subgroup. A crew of one officer and twelve enlisted men, all parts specialists, were brought into the Army supply section for this purpose. Two thousand stencils were prepared in two weeks time for the production of these special forms.

The prepared requisition forms reduced, by a large percentage, the man hours normally necessary for the preparation of basic load requisitions. All available interchangeability information was listed with each item on the face of the requisition. Cross-reference between the many ordnance parts numbers was included with each item listed. Complete nomenclature description, and where applicable, size information was given. On sub-groups, such as GMC, requisitions were broken down into many separate requisitions. For example, GMC Number 1 requisition was for parts that are common to all GMC vehicles. Numbers 2 to 10 inclusive were requisitions for parts peculiar to the various models of GMC vehicles. Separate requisitions were prepared for Auto-Lite and Delco-Remy electrical parts and anti-friction bearings using the unit manufacturer's number and interchanging into all the various ordnance numbers that might be used.

Use of the prepared requisition forms did not stop with the requisitioning of a basic load. A retained copy was used by the ordnance unit as follows:

1. Reference list of items stocked by main depots.
2. Quick reference interchangeability list.
3. Cross-reference of various ordnance part numbers.
4. Check list in the editing of requisitions.
5. Parts numbers used for the stocking of all groups.
6. Items stocked in parts common under Federal stock numbers.

Favorable comment was made by Services of Supply depots in regard to these requisitions because much time was saved in the filling of basic loads. Copies were sent to Services of Supply depots to be used in extracting requisitions to other depots. Request was made by the Chief Ordnance Officer, Washington, D. C., for a copy of these requisitions so that they could be studied for use in other theaters.

The supply section interchangeability personnel compiled interchangeability charts on anti-friction bearings, Auto-Lite and Delco-Remy electrical parts. These charts were distributed to all ordnance maintenance and depot companies.

Upon completion of all basic load charts, a meeting was held with battalion supply officers, depot commanders, and depot officers in order to disseminate this information. The general supply layout was discussed showing channels of supply and naming depot companies designated as forward general, forward armored, main general purpose, main combat vehicle, and main armament. A complete explanation was given as to the use of the specially prepared requisition forms. A simplified and standardized method of depot operation was set forth for use by Third U. S. Army depots.

From this time until the movement of Army to the Continent, the supply section efforts were devoted to expediting critical items of T/E and T/BA equipment and spare parts loads.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The Maintenance chapter of the Ordnance Annex to Third U. S. Army Administrative Order Number 1 was completed on 7 April.

Ordnance units having been located where billets were available resulted mostly in using units being too far removed from proper supporting maintenance units. A study was made to determine the feasibility of relocating the maintenance units so they could support the same using units in the UNITED KINGDOM as planned for Continental operations. Such a rearrangement was found to be too impracticable because tactical units of different Corps were so intermingled that separate maintenance to each Corps could not be furnished in any given area. Another plan, which was also feasible, was finally adopted and put into use. In this, the UNITED KINGDOM was divided into maintenance areas and a maintenance battalion was assigned to each with the responsibility of contacting all Third U. S. Army troops within it and arranging for ordnance service.

The XV Corps at this time was located in the NORTH IRELAND Base Section and operating according to the desired plan of having supporting maintenance units within their area.

At this time Ordnance maintenance units did not have sufficient equipment or material to adequately maintain all the equipment in the respective areas. Arrangements were made for the maintenance units to do as much of the work as was possible and to refer any overflow to the proper Services of Supply installations.

A standard operating procedure for spot inspections was compiled and check forms prepared in order to facilitate and standardize all maintenance inspections.

Interchangeability charts for automotive spare parts, bearings, starters, generators, etc., were prepared and distributed to all Third U. S. Army Ordnance units. These charts, in many instances, enabled units to consolidate their stockages of spare parts and conserve valuable storage space, as well as their initial intent of showing what parts were interchangeable.

During the latter part of April, instructions were prepared on waterproofing vehicles for an amphibious landing on the Continent. This program was so arranged that all drivers and assistant drivers would receive adequate training in the waterproofing and de-waterproofing of vehicles. It was necessary to construct wading pools for testing waterproofed vehicles and this was accomplished with the assistance of the Third U. S. Army Engineer Section.

A series of check charts for required modifications throughout the Army were prepared and distributed to all Ordnance maintenance units. With the charts as a guide, the units checked the status of modifications on all Ordnance equipment of the using units and in turn accomplished the necessary requisitions for modification kits. This method of requisitioning kits was decided upon as it enabled the maintenance section to keep a constant check on the status of modifications.

In practically all cases units that were authorized 1/4-ton and 3/4-ton trucks with 12-Volt ignition systems were issued trucks with 6-Volt ignition systems in lieu thereof. A project had been approved authorizing additional radios in Third U. S. Army in connection with an artillery net. The radio sets required 12-Volt ignition systems and the supply of the required modification kits for conversion of these vehicles was critical. It was found necessary for the Army Ordnance Officer to control the release of these kits on a priority basis.

Early in June, the 2nd French Armored Division was assigned to the Third U. S. Army. This organization presented many maintenance problems as the type of equipment it had was different from that issued in the UNITED KINGDOM. Due to the unavailability of a heavy maintenance tank company, the 7th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company was assigned in direct support of the division to facilitate maintenance and supply and to acquaint the division with the Third U. S. Army maintenance and supply channels. Later this company was augmented by combat vehicle repair teams from a heavy maintenance tank company and by supply teams from a depot company.

A survey of the equipment in the division disclosed that a great percentage of its combat vehicles had been driven over many miles of desert and considerable maintenance was necessary. Difficulty had been experienced with its W-670 Engines in the M3A3 Light Tanks, and with the final drives of the Motor Carriage, MB. The MB deficiencies were corrected by maintenance personnel of the division and 105 model W-670 Light Tank Engines were ordered from the UNITED STATES. All 2 1/2-ton trucks requiring fourth and fifth echelon repairs were turned in to Services of Supply and were repaired or replaced. In general, the division was able to supply its own maintenance and the supporting medium maintenance company then acted primarily as a supply agency.

In order to insure a standard procedure for the keeping of maintenance, as well as supply and evacuation records, a system was devised and forwarded to all Ordnance maintenance companies. A copy of subject letter, which is self-explanatory, is shown in Annex VIII.

Reports from the Continent indicated that the enemy was stringing wire across the roads at about a height of four feet. This action resulted in wrecking a number of 1/4-ton and 3/4-ton vehicles. Instructions were immediately prepared for mounting a wire cutter on the front of these types of vehicles.

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A general plan for the disposition of ammunition battalions and companies, as well as bomb disposal squads into forward, intermediate, and rear areas was formulated. Also, a tentative command channel for assignment of ammunition units was established. This plan was based on the employment of one battalion headquarters as an ammunition group headquarters which would act as the operating agency for the Army Ordnance Officer. This plan is diagrammatically illustrated by a chart. (See Annex IX).

Tonnage charts, indicating the amount of ammunition, in number of containers and number of rounds, that could be carried in each type standard vehicle were prepared. These tonnage charts were distributed to all combat troops as well as to ammunition units. A copy of the chart is shown in Annex X.

The ammunition portion of the Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 3, dated 20 June 1944, (For Continental Operations) was prepared and is covered in Section I, paragraph 1 a-(3), Section II, paragraph 2 a, 2 b, and Section IV, paragraph 13 c. (See Annex XI) Resupply to combat units was to be based on the replacement of expenditures from basic loads. To further eliminate unnecessary paper work, no requirement for the submission of daily expenditure reports by combat units was included in this directive. Instead of cumbersome written allocations, the only requirement placed upon combat units to obtain ammunition at ammunition supply points was the submission of a transportation order containing a certificate to the effect that amounts requested were to replace expenditures from basic loads.

In mid-June, as this headquarters was making final preparations for the supply of ammunition to those Army units still remaining in the UNITED KINGDOM, the Ordnance Officer, XII Corps, was charged with the responsibility of maintaining this supply until all such units departed for the Continent. In order to avoid leaving excess stocks of ammunition in supply points when Army ammunition companies were moved to the Continent, only minimum amounts of ammunition to meet basic load requirements of small units were stocked. Arrangements were made whereby large units would be authorized to draw basic load requirements direct from Services of Supply depots on the basis of transportation orders approved by XII Corps.



Waterproofed Armor

SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

Conferences were held with Headquarters Services of Supply and units already established in the UNITED KINGDOM relative to current policies and procedures in the supply of ammunition.

The initial problem was to supply training ammunition to meet current requirements of units assigned to the Third U. S. Army. As no Army ammunition supply points were in existence, it was necessary to make arrangements with the Ordnance Office, Headquarters Services of Supply, to effect supply of ammunition from their installations until such time as Army installations could be established.

As units of the Third U. S. Army moved into areas originally occupied by First U. S. Army troops, ammunition installations formerly operated by the latter were taken over. At the same time new installations were established in strategic locations. The three principal installations were located near CARMANTHEN (WALES), BRWDLEY and BUCKLAND.

After the supply procedure for ammunition had been firmly established, work was started on the preparation of basic load data to serve as the basis for combat loading of Third U. S. Army units. Conferences were held with representatives of various type units and with general and special staff sections in order to obtain a sound basis of combat loading. Upon approval by the interested staff sections, this basic load data was incorporated into basic load charts which were published as a directive to all troops. Third U. S. Army units then submitted requisitions to the Ordnance Officer and necessary steps were taken to furnish required amounts and types from Army or Services of Supply installations.

Concurrently with the supply of basic load ammunition, it was necessary to prepare and submit estimates of operational requirements on the Continent. These estimates were to include the ammunition necessary to build up an authorized reserve in addition to current maintenance requirements at such time as the Third U. S. Army became operational on the Continent. These estimated requirements were broken down into two phases, D / 29 to D / 42, and D / 42 to D / 90. As these estimated requirements were limited within tonnage allocations to the Third U. S. Army, several revisions were necessary. Basis of requirements was the unit of fire prescribed by the European Theater of Operations in a letter of 10 December 1943. A reserve of seven units of fire for units on the Continent by D / 41 was planned and a maintenance requirement of one-third unit of fire per day was estimated from D / 29 to D / 90 broken down in two phases as indicated above.

Several weeks after the submission of these pre-scheduled supply requirements, new information was received concerning consumption of ammunition as experienced in other theaters; hence, requirements were revised and extended to include D / 104. These requirements submitted on 25 May were subsequently revised again on 22 June with respect to anti-aircraft ammunition in view of additional new information received regarding consumption of that type of ammunition. (See chart - Annex VIII).

Ammunition companies of unknown ability were arriving in the UNITED KINGDOM from time to time. In order to insure that these companies were properly trained, the Army Ordnance Officer caused frequent visits and inspections to be made. Arrangements were made whereby those companies not operating Army installations were placed on duty in Services of Supply ammunition depots in order that they might become thoroughly familiar with handling of service types of ammunition. The training of these units was closely supervised in order that they might operate more efficiently upon arrival in the combat area.

As only one ammunition battalion headquarters was available in the Third U. S. Army, it was necessary for the Army Ordnance Officer to convert maintenance battalion headquarters into ammunition battalion headquarters for Continental operations. Courses of instruction were provided by a representative of the Ordnance Section to assist the battalion commanders in training their detachments for their new functions. A study was made of existing War Department publications and of directives which were published by various theaters of operation then active. On the basis of this study, a standard operating procedure for Ordnance ammunition groups, battalions, and companies was prescribed.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I
GENERAL

The pre-operational phase on the Continent was largely a matter of maintenance liaison between combat troops, ordnance units and supply agencies in order to coordinate ordnance support for the proposed operation. Once again the major problem was supply and it was necessary to have expediting personnel on this matter at all times. To this end, the "Z" Echelon was left at CHELTENHAM and proved invaluable in expediting supplies to the Continent and in equipping the units still in the UNITED KINGDOM.

As Ordnance units were being broken in to field conditions during this period, frequent inspections were made for the purpose of stressing field sanitation, guard duty, dispersion, and camouflage discipline.

SECTION II
ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

On 8 July, the "Y" Echelon proceeded from TOFT CAMP to NINE YEWS.

On 11 July, Ordnance Bulletin Number 4 was published and distributed to Ordnance units. (See Annex Number XII).

The "Y" Echelon arrived on the Continent 18 July, disembarking at OMAHA BEACH. This made the section complete on the Continent except for two officers and two enlisted men ("Z" Echelon) remaining at CHELTENHAM.

Plans were drawn up to divide the Ordnance Section into two echelons, forward and rear. The original plan called for a small forward command group consisting of the Ordnance Officer, the operations subsection complete, and one officer and one enlisted man from the ammunition sub-section. The Executive Officer, together with the administration, supply, maintenance, and the balance of the ammunition subsections were to be contained in the rear echelon. This plan was later modified (as shown in Chapter III) during operations since the rapid movement of the Army prevented adequate communications between the two echelons.

During this pre-operational period of 6 July to 1 August, it was necessary to augment the Ordnance Section with attached personnel consisting of six officers and six enlisted men to assist meeting operational requirements.

SECTION III
OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

After arriving on the Continent contacts were made with Ordnance units that were to be under Third U. S. Army control and as additional units arrived on the Continent they were assigned bivouac areas. Companies were assigned to battalions and battalions to groups in accordance with the general maintenance and ammunition plan for Third U. S. Army.

At this time the VIII Corps was operational under the First U. S. Army and supported by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 24th Ordnance Battalion with the following Ordnance companies:

839th Ordnance Depot Company.

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488th Ordnance Evacuation Company.
501st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank).
531st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank).
3525th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.
3530th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.
16th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.
3168th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.
300th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA).

As a result of a conference between the Ordnance Officers of the First and Third U. S. Armies, the Ordnance Officer of the latter agreed to furnish Ordnance support to the tactical units loaned to the First U. S. Army. In general this support consisted of one medium maintenance company for each Infantry Division and one heavy maintenance company (tank) for each Armored Division.

Ordnance troops of the Third U. S. Army were organized into three groups. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 69th Ordnance Group headed the forward maintenance and supply battalions and their attached companies, while the rear maintenance and supply battalions were controlled by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 70th Ordnance Group. The 313th Ordnance Battalion acted as a provisional group headquarters, controlling ammunition and bomb disposal activities.

About the last of July, a check list was received for Ordnance observers which included questions pertaining to information which was desired by the Military Training Division, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, and the Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground. The purpose of this questionnaire was to collect information which could be used to train replacements of both officers and enlisted men from the Ordnance schools in the UNITED STATES.

A situation map and maps showing locations of Ordnance units were prepared and plans were made for the support of tactical units in accordance with various tactical plans then being considered. Many changes in the plans and utilization of Ordnance units were discussed. These changes were made necessary because many of the units were not as yet present on the Continent, and their availability was more or less indefinitely postponed. Furthermore, since the Order of Battle was changed completely before the Army became operational and frequently thereafter, regrouping of Ordnance units to furnish adequate support was a continuous problem.

On 26 July, in anticipation of the rapid changes in the disposition of Ordnance troops, a daily station list was established and distributed to all units. This list gave the coordinates, road location, and attachment. On 31 July, fragmentary changes of administrative orders were also published after being submitted to AG of S, G-4, by 1800, daily.

At the close of this period the personnel status was as follows:

Personnel assigned and present on the Continent		
Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
500	50	9197
Personnel assigned but not yet arrived		
Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Men
231	21	5569

(The above figures include those of the units attached to the First U. S. Army.)

SECTION III
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The supply section, after arrival on the Continent, made numerous visits to the Ordnance Section, First U. S. Army, and the Advance Section, Communications Zone, for the purpose of discussing supply procedures. Since First U. S. Army controlled Advance Section Communications Zone and all Ordnance supply during the initial stages of our pre-operational period, it was necessary to go through that office to obtain urgently needed items which our depot companies were unable to supply from the stock brought over. Arrangements were made with Advance Section Communications Zone and First U. S. Army for certain of their depots to support Third U. S. Army until Communications Zone arrived on the Continent and took over supply responsibility. These conferences and visits continued throughout the month of July. The method used by the First U. S. Army of controlling issues of major items and

and certain critical items was studied, but it was decided that the procedure for the Third U. S. Army would be as outlined in Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order Number 3, i.e., items would be obtained on properly authenticated requisition, certificate of combat loss, or direct exchange.

During the pre-operational period much difficulty was experienced because units arrived on the Continent short initial T/E equipment and organizational spare parts and accessories. Individual requisitions for the shortages were approved and forwarded to Communications Zone for action through Advance Section Communications Zone. During a visit to the Ordnance Section, Communications Zone Headquarters at a later date, a representative of the supply section was advised that it was impossible for Communications Zone to handle the requisitions on an individual basis and requested that they be consolidated for T/E shortages and one requisition submitted to cover all shortages regardless of whether they were initial issue or replacement. This was accomplished and units were instructed to submit new requisitions for shortages on supporting Ordnance units.

Many Ordnance units arrived on the Continent with shortages of major items such as shop trucks, tool sets, and shortages in basic load of spare parts. These shortages were relieved to a great extent by the action taken by the representative of the Army Ordnance Officer in CHELTENHAM who was able to obtain releases for most of the shortages which were lifted to the Continent by Ordnance units arriving at later dates. The evacuation companies were used to good advantage in this respect. Several truck companies were utilized to deliver spare parts to the Continent for the Second French Armored Division and Third Army Ordnance depots and maintenance companies.

During the month of July the Army Ordnance Officer made two visits to the UNITED KINGDOM to further expedite the supply of tools and equipment to Ordnance units remaining there, and to expedite equipping of the Second French Armored Division inasmuch as plans had been formulated to commit this division earlier than originally anticipated.

Ordnance units were assigned to support specific tactical organizations both in supply and maintenance. Divisions were authorized to contact depot companies through their respective maintenance battalions or companies, whereas other tactical organizations were supported by the proper type maintenance unit which was responsible for their supply and maintenance.

At the request of the Ordnance Officer, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, figures were compiled on major assemblies and major item reserves required to fill the Army "pipeline", i.e., within Army maintenance and supply units, and that which the Army Ordnance Officer considered necessary for the Communications Zone to maintain earmarked for the Third U. S. Army in order to give proper support.

Much of the time of the supply section was spent on reports, the responsibility for the preparation of which was charged to that section. The most important of these reports were:

1. Consolidated Monthly Status Report on major Ordnance items showing "Authorized" and "On Hand" quantities, compiled from "Ordnance Material in the Hands of Troops and Combat Loss Reports" received from units as of the 20th of each month. Units submitted reports in quintuplicate for distribution, one each to Chief Ordnance Officer, Communications Zone; Ordnance Officer, Twelfth U. S. Army Group; Army Ordnance Officer; AG of S, G-4; and supply file. The same distribution was made on the consolidated report except that three additional copies were furnished AG of S, G-4, for forwarding; two to AG of S, G-4, Communications Zone; and one to AG of S, G-4, Twelfth U. S. Army Group.
2. Weekly Ordnance Supply Activity Report to Army Ordnance Officer based on reports from forward and rear Ordnance groups listing major items and tonnage received and issued.
3. A Daily Report on the Status of Stocks included only those items of a critical nature and was rendered to AG of S, G-4, for consolidation and submission to Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

SECTION V
MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

As maintenance units arrived on the Continent they were assigned to either the forward (69th) Group or the rear (70th) Group. The forward Group was to be composed of forward and intermediate battalions with the forward battalions in direct support of combat units. Medium maintenance companies were to be in support of Infantry Divisions and heavy maintenance tank companies for armored divisions. The intermediate battalions were to receive the overflow of work from the forward battalions and would either repair the material or evacuate it to the rear Group, depending upon the tactical situation and the time element involved. The intermediate battalions would also be responsible for the evacuation of unserviceable equipment from the forward collecting points operated by the maintenance companies of the forward battalions. The rear Group having mainly heavy maintenance companies was to evacuate from the forward Group. Major items, major and minor assemblies, and parts were repaired and returned to depot stock. Unrepairable material was stripped of serviceable accessories.

During the latter part of July, the hedgerow cutter, to be placed on medium tanks, light tanks, and self-propelled 105mm Howitzers, was developed and tested. The Commanding General witnessed the tests and directed that all tank units be equipped with this device.

The first target was one per platoon and when this target had been accomplished, then two per platoon. Some of the steel was procured at the beaches from tetrahedrons that had been placed there by the Germans as beach blocks. One wrecker was lost during this operation as a result of a land mine exploding.

The Navy was approached and asked to procure welding rod and oxygen as all available stocks on the Continent were exhausted. The Navy cooperated fully in this situation and also obtained from their own stocks many bottles of oxygen and acetylene in addition to tons of welding rod. This material was delivered by them to CHEERBOURG for the Third U. S. Army. Upon completion of this fabricating mission 1147 hedgerow cutters had been constructed.

SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival on the Continent it was realized that even though all units arriving should have complete basic load of ammunition in their possession and that all personnel should have been qualified in the use of their personal arms, there would be many calls for ammunition to fill shortages in basic loads. The Ammunition sub-section of the Advance Section Communications Zone was contacted in order to learn the source of supply to meet these anticipated demands.

As Advance Section Communications Zone had not yet become operational, First U. S. Army controlled all ammunition supply points on the NORMANDY Peninsula, and it was therefore necessary to obtain approval from the Ordnance Officer, First U. S. Army, for any issues made to Third U. S. Army units. First U. S. Army Ordnance agreed to Third U. S. Army units being supplied from ammunition depot #101 until this headquarters became operational.

In most instances the quantities of ammunition requested from Depot #101 were negligible, the only major issues being to the 6th Armored Division. This division obtained permission to turn in the basic load of anti-tank mines and to displace tonnage space on vehicles with other types of ammunition, principally small arms. Due to hedgerow fighting it was also permitted to draw a considerable amount of 37mm canister ammunition in excess of its basic load.

As no ammunition supply points or depots were required during the month of July, ammunition companies were assigned the duties of collecting abandoned United States ammunition and storing enemy ammunition located in the Army area. After collection and segregation, this ammunition was delivered to Communications Zone depots.

Even though the Army was non-operational, bomb disposal squads were indispensable, as unexploded bombs, artillery duds, and booby traps were plentiful.

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CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

About the 25th of July it was evident that due to inadequacy of port facilities and the slowness of unloading ship cargo over the beaches, previous plans for ammunition supply to the Third U. S. Army must be disregarded. On 28 July, a revised plan covering immediate and future minimum requirements was submitted to the Commanding General, Advance Section Communications Zone. In general this plan, which was approved by higher headquarters, provided for sufficient ammunition to fill the pipelines to the Army and to maintain a reserve of three units of fire in Army and Communications Zone depots and ASPs. A copy of the letter requesting these requirements was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS :
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY :
APO 403 :
: AUTH: CG, TUSA :
: INIT: TNN :
: DATE: 28 July 1944 :
: :

AG 471 GIMCO

28 July 1944

Subject: Ammunition for Future Operation.

To : Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, APO 113, U. S. Army.

1. In order that Third Army may be prepared to undertake a future operation, it is considered necessary that a sufficient amount of ammunition to charge the army "pipe lines" be readily available to the Army.

2. There is attached hereto a list of ammunition, marked Inclosure #1, which it is desired be placed north of the probable area of entry into combat of the Third Army. It is suggested that the area in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC is highly desirable for this purpose. This list does not include sufficient ammunition to charge the entire "pipe line" of the Third Army but includes that which based on present forecast will be sufficient to charge the "pipe line" of the troops engaged in initial Third Army operations. The amount of artillery ammunition is definitely predicated on the probable mission and the anticipated expenditure rate. Such additional ammunition should also be available in Advance Section Communications Zone hands to maintain a level of the quantities listed on the attached chart so as to replace daily expenditures. In this connection, for initial operation, the Army Ordnance Ammunition Group (313th Ammunition Battalion) will be the sole agent of the army in drawing such ammunition.

3. There is inclosed herewith a list of ammunition, marked as Inclosure #2. The ammunition listed on this inclosure has a weight of approximately 7,000 tons. It is requested that immediate releases be given for this ammunition so that Third Army may place it in a static dump to be immediately available to form an Advance ASP when Third Army becomes operative. Upon receipt of approval of this request, information will be furnished as to the location to which delivery of ammunition should be made.

4. It is requested that this headquarters be informed at the earliest practicable date when Third Army may start drawing ammunition against these requirements.

For the Commanding General:

2 Inclosures:

- #1 - Ammunition List (for area north of combat)
- #2 - Ammunition List (for static dump)

Ammunition companies of Third U. S. Army were loaned to Advance Section Communications Zone for the purpose of giving them field training in the handling of ammunition and also to help the Ordnance Officer, Advance Section Communications Zone, handle the large quantities of ammunition being moved from the beaches to depots.

The Army Ordnance Officer and the Ordnance Officer, VIII Corps, agreed to expand VIII Corps ASPs in order to have a small Army reserve of ammunition properly located when operations commenced. Army ammunition companies were loaned to the VIII Corps in order to handle this ammunition.

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Third U. S. Army became operational at noon on 1 August 1944. Its rate of advance was considerably faster than had been anticipated and a great deal of adjustment was necessary in order to maintain close ordnance support. A good example of this was the placing of heavy maintenance tank companies in support of armored divisions. In such a rapidly moving situation it was almost impossible for this type of unit with its heavy equipment to keep pace with the division and still perform its primary mission. Subsequently, companies of this type were attached to ordnance collecting points, which arrangement proved more satisfactory to all concerned.

The supply of ammunition was a major problem at this time and a considerable amount of transportation was needed. To this end the Army Ordnance Officer had tank transporters utilized as auxiliary transportation.

A standard system of requesting transportation from the AC of S, G-4, for transporting ammunition was attempted but failed because trucks were not always available at the moment they were needed. Therefore, eight Quartermaster Truck Companies were attached to the Ordnance Section for this purpose, and in addition all Evacuation Companies were made available.

Movement of units and supplies during this period was very difficult. The long main supply roads were heavily loaded with traffic and were bottle-necked at AVRANCHES where the fighting was heaviest. This exceedingly rapid movement of the Army necessitated equally rapid displacement of Ordnance maintenance and supply in order to maintain close Ordnance support.

SECTION II
ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

Upon becoming operational the Ordnance Section commenced functioning in two echelons, with the forward echelon moving to a new location near BEAUCHAMPS (T-22). The forward echelon consisted of the Ordnance Officer, the Operations Section, and part of the Ammunition Section. Later it became necessary to augment the officer personnel of this forward group with three officers from the rear group. These included an executive for the forward echelon and two officers for the Ammunition sub-section. On 3 August, the rear echelon moved to a new location at BEAUCHAMPS (T-22). On 8 August, the forward echelon moved to a location west of POLLEY (Y-39), one mile off Highway N798 on G615. On 11 August, the rear echelon moved to a location two miles east of POLLEY (Y-39).

On 12 August, an Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit assigned to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, and attached to Headquarters Twelfth U. S. Army Group was further attached to the Ordnance Section, Third U. S. Army. This intelligence unit, consisting of four officers and four enlisted men, sent one copy of its reports directly to the following: Headquarters European Theater of Operations, Headquarters Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, and Headquarters Twelfth U. S. Army Group. Two copies were sent to the Army Ordnance Officer, one of which in turn was sent to the AC of S, G-2. All information available to the Army Ordnance Officer as to enemy installations, enemy equipment, and other technical data of interest was furnished to the intelligence group.

The forward echelon moved to a location approximately five miles north of LE MANS (Z-30) on 15 August and the rear echelon moved to a location north of LE MANS (Z-30) at ST. SABINE (Z-32) on 17 August. On 20 August, the forward echelon moved to a location northwest of BROU (W-13) on G615. On 25 August, the forward echelon moved to a location near COURCY (W-85) and on 27 August, the rear echelon moved to the same location. On 30 August, the forward echelon moved to a location five miles northeast of SENS (X-62) on G6 25 near THORIGNY (X-77).

SECTION III
OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

At a section conference, final plans for the commencement of operations were reviewed. At the same time, the Ordnance Officer instructed each sub-section to submit a weekly report of their activities, as of 1800 each Saturday. These reports were consolidated and presented to the Commanding General for his information. They furnished a brief summary of Ordnance activities for the preceding week, hitting only the highlights which could affect tactical decisions.

A Scoreboard Section, consisting of two officers and two enlisted men, was set up to keep a record of captured, destroyed, and lost material. This scoreboard was corrected by factual evidence once a week.

Fragmentary changes to Administrative Orders were prepared by the Operations Section and submitted to AC of S, G-4, showing supply points opened as of 011200 August, as follows:

ASP 801 - Three and one-half miles east of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19) on Highway G615.

ASP 802 - On Highway N803, three miles west of CARENTAN (T-18).

ASP 803 - On G6101, six miles southwest of PERIERS (T-27), one mile from road junction G653 and G668.

34th Ordnance Depot Company (Main Armament Depot) - three miles southwest of BRICQUEBEC (Q-10) on Highway N802.

98th Ordnance Depot Company (Main General Purpose Depot) - three miles southwest of BRICQUEBEC (Q-10) on Highway N802.

837th Ordnance Depot Company (Main Combat Vehicle Depot) - one mile southwest of road junction N802 and G650.

839th Ordnance Depot Company (Advance Depot) - 1 mile southwest of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T-19) off Highway N800 near CATTEVILLE.

The Group Commanders submitted plans for the operation of their organizations, and after discussion with the Army Ordnance Officer, in the light of the current tactical situation, were adopted. These plans resulted in rearrangement of units within the Groups.

Personnel of the Maintenance Section implemented the Supply Section. This was made necessary since the rapid movement of the Army during this period required that emphasis be placed on supply of major items rather than maintenance work. This personnel was employed particularly to expedite critical supply items.

As in previous months, it was necessary to augment the number of personnel in the various sub-sections to assist in meeting operational requirements. Attachments were made to the extent of thirteen officers and sixteen enlisted men. The specific needs for this personnel were as follows:

Officers

- 4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit
- 1 - Liaison, from Ninth U. S. Army
- 1 - Liaison, from Twelfth U. S. Army Group
- 1 - Liaison, from French Forces.
- 2 - Attached and then assigned to complete T/O strength.
- 4 - Assist in sub-sections.

Enlisted Men

- 4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit.
- 12 - Assist in sub-sections.

During this period the following awards were given to personnel of Third U. S. Army Ordnance units:

Purple Heart.....32

First casualties (killed and wounded) among personnel in Army Ordnance units due to enemy action occurred during this period and totaled seventy.

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4. The 69th Ordnance Group is now constituted as follows:

<p align="center"><u>Supporting</u> <u>VIII CORPS</u></p> <p>320th Ordnance Battalion 16th Ord MM Co (83rd Inf Div) 104th Ord MM Co (29th Inf Div) 128th Ord MM Co 293rd Ord MM Co (2nd Inf Div) 300th Ord Maint Co (AA) 531st Ord HM Co (Tk) (6th Armd D) 839th Ord Dep Co 3468th Ord MM Co (8th Inf Div) 3530th Ord MAM Co</p>	<p align="center"><u>Supporting</u> <u>XII CORPS</u></p> <p>24th Ordnance Battalion 7th Ord MM Co 47th Ord MM Co (35th Inf Div) 129th Ord MM Co (80th Inf Div) 299th Ord Maint Co (AA) 501st Ord HM Co (Tk) (4th Ind Div) 545th Ord HM Co (PA) 838th Ord Dep Co 3447th Ord MAM Co 3448th Ord MAM Co</p>
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Supporting
XX CORPS

193rd Ordnance Battalion
15th Ord MM Co (90th Inf Div)
116th Ord MM Co
256th Ord MM Co (5th Inf Div)
281st Ord Maint Co (AA)
596th Ord HM Co (Tk) (7th Armd Div)
840th Ord Dep Co
3445th Ord MAM Co
3511th Ord MAM Co

INTERMEDIATE BATTALIONS

<p>314th Ordnance Battalion 534th Ord HM Co (Tk) 841st Ord Dep Co</p>	<p>14th Ordnance Battalion 521st Ord HM Co (PA) 3450th Ord MAM Co (AM Trk) 3514th Ord MAM Co 3519th Ord MAM Co 3463rd Ord MM Co</p>	<p>316th Ordnance Bn. 305th Ord Maint Co (AA) 520th Ord HM Co (PA) 853rd Ord HAM Co 3446th Ord MAM Co 3515th Ord MAM Co</p>
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10th Ordnance Battalion
184th Ord Dep Co
275th Ord MM Co (AA) (38th AA Brigade)
537th Ord HM Co (PA)
902nd Ord HAM Co
3482nd Ord MAM Co
3525th Ord MAM Co

EVACUATION

185th Ordnance Battalion
464th Ord Evac Co
471st Ord Evac Co
472nd Ord Evac Co
482nd Ord Evac Co
483th Ord Evac Co

5. The 70th Ordnance Group is now constituted as follows:

19th Ordnance Battalion
3522nd Ord MAM Co
26th Ord MM Co
547th Ord HM Co (PA)
985th Ord Dep Co

26th Ordnance Battalion
3444th Ord MM Co
889th Ord HAM Co
465th Ord Evac Co
837th Ord Dep Co
984th Ord Dep Co
3444th Ord Dep Co

70th Ordnance Battalion
550th Ord HM Co (PA)
464th Ord Evac Co
904th Ord HAM Co
381st Ord MM Co (AA)
501st Ord HM Co (Tk)

66th Ordnance Battalion
553rd Ord HM Co (Tk)
510th Ord HM Co (PA)
286th Ord MM Co
3510th Ord MAM Co
3537th Ord MAM Co

312th Ordnance Battalion
910th Ord HAM Co
911th Ord HAM Co
447th Ord HAM Co
851st Ord HAM Co
911th Ord HAM Co

317th Ordnance Battalion
3075th Ord MVD Co
3508th Ord MAM Co

6. ASPs and Ammunition Depots are still being kept well forward. Reconnaissance is made well in advance so that the installations are set up immediately as needed. The following installations are now open:

ASP #805	ASP #14	ASP 16
ASP #6	ASP #8	ASP #11
Armo Dep #13	Armo Dep #19	Armo Dep #17
ASP 18		

7. Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent are as follows:

Officers:	717
Enlisted Men:	14,836
T/E Vehicles:	3,328
Total Vehicles:	3,790

SECTION IV
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

In order to conserve track, particularly of the medium tank chassis type, from unnecessary wear and tear, the Commanding General directed that no heavy track laying vehicles except light tanks would be issued to units operating on the BREIST Peninsula until they started east and had passed a North-South line through RENNES (Y-02). The armored divisions (4th and 6th) were to be refitted in the FOUGERES area but because of the rapid movement of the Army, the refitting of these two divisions actually took place further east. All types of track were critical and every effort was made to conserve them.

At a conference held by the Chief Ordnance Officer, Communications Zone, about the middle of August, arrangements were made whereby major items and major unit assemblies would be supplied to the Third U. S. Army based upon a daily status report furnished by the Third U. S. Army. Replenishment requisitions for spare parts stockage were to be submitted three times a month: on the fifth, fifteenth, and twenty-fifth. Any emergency requisitions would be filled by Advance Section, Communications Zone. This basis was agreed to providing that the Third U. S. Army pipeline would be filled with parts since the Army was still not fully equipped with initial issue of second echelon parts.

In response to a request from the Communications Zone for reports of battle losses of materials, the following reports were submitted:

Consolidated Report, 1 to 14 August.
Consolidated Report, 15 to 20 August.
Daily Report, beginning 21 August.

The Daily Report on the Status of Stocks was discontinued and AC of S, G-4 Periodic Report substituted therefor. This report was submitted each Sunday for the preceding week and included the following supply information:

Critical Items.
Battle Losses of Vehicles and Artillery.
Adequacy of Artillery, Small Arms and Combat Vehicle Replacement.
Enemy Equipment Released.
Tonnage received in Army Area.

The Daily Ordnance Status Supply Report compiled from daily reports received from each Ordnance battalion was revised to include the following information:

Authorized Reserve.
Available.
Repairable but not ready for issue.
Backorder (Main battalions only).
Shortage of established level.
Battle losses previous 24 hours.

As of 8 August, axes of supply from the FOUGERES area extended in several directions: to the BREIST Peninsula, to ST. NAZAIRE, to ST. MALO, and to ALENCON through LAVAL and LE MANS. By the end of August, the latter axis had been extended eastward and branched to REIMS, CHALONS, and VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS.

On 21 August, the BRITANNY Base Section was charged by the Communications Zone with the supply of all units operating on the BRITANNY Peninsula. Thus the VIII Corps, which was in action on the peninsula, was authorized to deal directly with the base section depots at RENNES since the Main Army Supply Battalions had been moved to the east and supply from that source was impracticable.

Battle losses at this time were considerable, particularly of M8 Armored Cars and Medium Tanks. Much difficulty was encountered in the replacement of this equipment since great distances were involved and tank transporters had to be used in order to conserve track. Lack of rail transportation, and heavy traffic on the main supply roads, further aggravated the situation.

Ordnance units continued to lift to the Continent major items, tools, spare parts and rolling reserve. The release of these items had been obtained by the representative of the Army Ordnance Officer at CHELTENHAM to fill shortages in units already on the Continent.

The Operations Section at this time assumed the duties more nearly conforming to its normal function. Furthermore, constant liaison with G-3 was established to maintain situation maps indicating the disposition of tactical and service troops.

To move the large amount of tonnage carried by the Main Depot Companies, Quartermaster Truck Companies were used. A portion of a depot was moved forward to a new area and set up before the remaining portion left the old area, thus continuous operation was maintained.

The 24th, 314th, and 193rd Ordnance Battalions were placed in direct support of VIII Corps, XV Corps, and XX Corps, respectively. These were the "Forward Battalions", supported in turn by the Intermediate Battalions, and the 70th Ordnance Group.

The total number of Army Ordnance troops under the command of the Army Ordnance Officer at this time, in FRANCE, were:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
717	14,836

The number of troops assigned but not yet arrived were:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
88	2,028

During the second week of August the combat loading of vehicles was begun. This was accomplished by certain units in the 70th Ordnance Group. This procedure was according to the Ordnance Plan for operations on the Continent.

Various and rapid changes of the tactical situation made it necessary to keep the organization of battalions in the 69th Ordnance Group very flexible. As a result, no using unit was without adequate ordnance support at any time.

Following is a copy of the Operations Report as of 26 August:

1. In the BREIST area, one battalion, with attached companies, is providing maintenance and supply for the VIII Corps. The BRITANNY Base Section supplements this battalion with maintenance and supply, and, as the situation develops will take over all collecting points, captured depots, ammunition dumps, and other similar installations. BRITANNY Base Section is providing maintenance to the VIII Corps to the maximum of their ability. After the reduction of BREIST and LORIENT, Ammunition Depot #13, and any other Third Army ASPs, will immediately revert to the BRITANNY Base Section, and all Third Army Ordnance Troops will be withdrawn from this area.

2. It was necessary to again move the 70th Ordnance Group, with its three heavy depots, further east to the FOUNTAINEBLEAU FOREST. Because of widely separated operations, the responsibility for maintenance and supply has been divided as follows:

(a) The area between the N and S line through STE CALAIS and the N and S line through ORLEANS has been made the responsibility of the 70th Ordnance Group.

(b) The 69th Ordnance Group is responsible for the area forward of the N and S line through ORLEANS.

(c) The area from the N and S line through STE CALAIS, west of the support battalion of VIII Corps, is now the responsibility of the Advance Section Communications Zone or BRITANNY Base Section.

3. Group Commanders have been charged with providing the following in their respective areas:

1. Maintenance and supply of all troops within the area.
2. Maintenance and supply of all troops passing through the area.
3. Provision of Ordnance Road Patrols.
4. In conjunction with Corps, where applicable, provision of Collecting Points.
5. Salvage of useable Ordnance materiel - either repair or evacuate to the rear echelon.

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Replacement personnel being sent to the Continent were organized into companies and utilized to transport replacement vehicles loaded with spare parts and towed artillery destined for Third U. S. Army depots and replacement pools.

For the period of August the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	150	117
Medium Tanks	319	269
Combat Vehicles	525	237
Artillery (over 57mm)	135	77
General Purpose Vehicles	2,869	2,794

It was necessary during this month to move the three main depots as follows:

Armament--344th Ordnance Depot.

Closed in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (Q-10) and opened in vicinity of LANDEAN (Y-48), 6 August.

Closed in the vicinity of LANDEAN (Y-48) and opened in the vicinity of STE. SABINE (Z-25), 17 August.

Closed in the vicinity of STE. SABINE (Z-25) and opened in the vicinity of FONTAINEBLEAU (X-28), 27 August.

General Purpose--964th Ordnance Depot.

Same as Armament Depot.

Combat Vehicles--837th Ordnance Depot.

Same as Armament Depot.

These depots performed the mission of supplying Army Ordnance Depots.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

As a means of expediting and controlling maintenance, the 70th Ordnance Group was directed to establish a Control Point. This was accomplished and a battalion within the group was designated to operate it.

As all equipment and materiel, that was meant for maintenance, repair, exchange or salvage, was directed to this point, the flow of work to the maintenance companies in the battalion was controlled and regulated. In this way a large volume of work was systematically and efficiently handled. It was found that by locating maintenance companies close to the control point the amount of work that could be handled was further increased.

To assist in salvaging, sorting, and distributing the work to the various maintenance units, a number of qualified mechanics were taken from the companies and stationed at the control point.

During the first half of August, hedgerow cutters were still being constructed. Up to 4 August, the 2nd French Armored Division had received a total of forty-nine of these devices. The cutters had not been produced in sufficient quantities to meet the total requirements of the 5th Armored Division but production was continued on a twenty-four hour basis and all requirements were eventually met. By the end of August, the mission of fabricating the cutters was completed and the following totals had been constructed: for Light Tanks - 230; for Medium Tanks - 874; for Self-Propelled 105 Howitzers, M7 - 43.

After the break-through at AVANCHES and the subsequent rapid advance of the Army, it was found unnecessary to have a heavy maintenance tank company in support of an Armored Division. The divisions had adequate support from the organic maintenance battalion and the tank companies were required to support self-propelled artillery, separate tank battalions, and tank destroyer battalions.

During the month of August the Maintenance Section, in addition to its normal duties, also assisted the Supply Section in expediting critical items of supply and maintained close contact with the Ordnance Control Points. Maintenance was controlled by the Army Ordnance Officer by means of daily meetings with the Group Commanders, Maintenance personnel, and other personnel concerned.

The Maintenance axes on 27 August were as follows:

1. The area between the North and South line through STE. CALAIS (V-7849) and the North and South Line through ORLEANS was made the responsibility of the 70th Ordnance Group.

2. The area forward of the North and South Line through ORLEANS (V-6723) was made the responsibility of the 69th Ordnance Group.

General locations of Headquarters of Maintenance Battalions were as follows:

Date of Opening	Location	Coordinates
4 August 1944	W of LA HAYE PESNEL	T-22
9	SE of POILLEY	T-39
13	SE LA BACCONNIERE	Y-65
16	SW STE SABINE	Z-35
21	NW BROU	W-07
26	N COURCY-AUX-LOGES	W-85
31	NE THORIGNY	X-87
<u>10th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	SW PERIERS	T-26
6	Vicinity of LA HAYE PESNEL	T-22
9	SE POILLEY	T-39
12	NW of VALGES	Y-84
17	N of ALENCON	Z-38
19	SE LA LOUPE	R-00
26	W FONTAINEBLEAU	X-29
<u>11th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	Near LES PENQUES	Y-10
12	S LA BACCONNIERE	Y-65
21	NE NOCENT	V-99
26	W of SENS	X-56
27	NE MONTARGIS	X-24
<u>185th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	N of RJ GC127-GC12	O-10
9	E ST JAMES	Y-30
13	SE LAVAL	Y-74
18	E BOULAIRES	Y-75
19	SE LA COLOMBE	F-21
26	NE CONLIE	Z-35
31	SW FONTAINEBLEAU	X-29
<u>193rd Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	Near LE VALDECIE	T-10
6	Vicinity of ST MARTIN DE LANDELLES	T-40
9	SW VITRE	Y-34
16	N ST AUBINS	V-65
18	NW COURVILLE-SUR-EURE	R-10
24	NW GRANDVILLE	W-79
25	NW MILLY	X-09
30	SW DONNEMARIE	X-59
31	Vicinity of HAUVILLERS	T-26
<u>24th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	W of LA HAYE PESNEL	O-22
6	E of PONTORSON	T-20
9	SW LA VOGOMITE-SUR-RANCE	X-89
22	SE LA COLOMBE	F-21
23	S of CHILLEURS-AUX-BOIS	W-85
25	NW COURTENAY at ENJAUVILLE	X-45
26	W SENS	X-56
27	N VILLERAY	X-66
31	Vicinity of VATNY	S-43

Date of Opening	Location	Coordinates
<u>314th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	W of CARENTAN	T-38
6	S of ST JAMES	Y-39
9	NW LE BOURGNEUF	Y-56
10	N of VALGES	Y-84
12	SW of BEAUFAY	Z-57
16	NW ALENCON	Z-38
22	S of VERDES	W-24
27	E of MONTARGIS	X-34
<u>316th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	Near LES PENQUES	O-10
6	VILLEDIE LES POELES	T-33
9	W of ALAND AIRE	T-33
10	W of HAMELIN	T-30
16	E of CONLIE	Z-25
25	W of FUISEAUX	X-08
<u>320th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
Date of Opening <th>Location</th> <th>Coordinates</th>	Location	Coordinates
4 August 1944	Near LE VALDECIE	T-19
9	SE POILLEY	T-39
12	E of VALGES	Y-84
16	N of ALENCON	Z-38
22	E of GAULVEN near BREST	R-12
<u>590th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
19 August 1944	N of ALENCON	Z-38
20	N CHATRAUNEUF	Z-22
24	N GRESSEY	R-44
<u>70th Ordnance Group</u>		
Date of Opening	Location	Coordinates
4 August 1944	Near BRICQUEBEC	O-00
9	Vicinity of FOUGERES	Y-48
18	W of ST. SABINE	Z-35
27	SW of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28
<u>19th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	SW of BRICQUEBEC	O-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	Y-48
26	N of CHATEAUDUN	W-26
<u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	Near LES PENQUES	O-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	Y-48
18	W of ST. SABINE	Z-35
30	SW of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28
<u>79th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	Near LES PENQUES	O-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	Y-38
18	E of ST. SABINE	Z-35
30	W of FONTAINEBLEAU	X-28
<u>312th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	Near LES PENQUES	O-10
9	SW of LANDEAN	Y-38
18	W of St. SABINE	Z-25
23	W of COURTALAIN	W-16
<u>317th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4 August 1944	SW of BRICQUEBEC	O-00
9	SW of LANDEAN	Y-48
18	W of ST SABINE	Z-35

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SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

As the Third U. S. Army became operational it immediately assumed control of four ammunition supply points which had been previously established by the VIII Corps. As three of these installations were too far to the rear to adequately serve the using units they were turned over to Advance Section Communications Zone on 5 August. In one retained installation, namely, Ammunition Supply Point #805, in the vicinity of BRSE (T-20), storage was built up to 3,000 tons and continued to serve VIII Corps. At the same time Army Ammunition Depot #1 was established in the vicinity of FOLLIGNY (T-22). The original target level of this depot as established by previously prepared charts was 10,000 tons, predicated on serving three Corps. As the tactical situation developed, it became impracticable to serve more than two Corps from this installation so the target was reduced to 7,000 tons of balance stock.

Ammunition Supply Points were stocked by Army without any reference to Corps because of lack of communications and transportation resulting from the rapid rate of advance. However, these were later adjusted to meet the Corps requirements. Bear depots were used to good advantage at this time for completing and replenishing basic loads.

On the night of 6 August, the Army ammunition units received their first real combat experience as Depot Number 1 was heavily bombed by the enemy. Approximately 600 tons of ammunition was destroyed (about 6%), principally by direct hits and as a result of fires caused by numerous incendiary bombs. Little ammunition was lost by sympathetic detonation; however, to insure against possible future losses, the Army Ordnance Officer prescribed that safety distances would be increased to the extent that it would be uneconomical for the enemy to attack other installations. The following safety distances were established on 7 August:

1. Maximum of six tons per stack and minimum of ten yards between stacks.
2. Maximum of thirty tons per group (groups contain stacks) and minimum of thirty yards between groups.
3. Maximum of 100 tons per bay (bays contain groups) and a minimum of 150 yards between bays. The bay is defined as a single line of ammunition, i.e., along a road.
4. Maximum of 1,000 tons per area and minimum of 1/2 mile between areas.

As a result of cool-headed leadership and many instances of individual heroism, the personnel in and near this area were evacuated with only a small number of casualties. No lives were lost and only four men were seriously injured.

About 22 August, roadside storage of ammunition was tried and found to be an efficient method for a rapidly moving Army. Furthermore, it proved to be a comparatively safe method inasmuch as it was stored according to the safety regulations set up by the Ordnance Officer, and enemy aircraft activity was not very prevalent.

At times it became necessary to augment the ammunition companies for the purpose of transporting ammunition. This was accomplished by utilizing personnel and vehicles from Ordnance maintenance companies and organizing special provisional companies. Maintenance during such periods was sacrificed as all available transportation had to be used, including tank transporters.

As Advance Section Communications Zone was responsible for the hauling of ammunition to Army depots only, it was necessary when selecting sites for ammunition supply points that appropriate sites be chosen in anticipation of their eventual expansion into Army depots.

For the month of August the Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
Depot 1	2 August	15 August	ASPs	FOLLIGNY (T-22)
Depot 2	12 August	17 August	ASPs	NE FOUGERES (J-37)
ASP 805	12 August	29 August	VII Corps	NE BRSE (T-20)
ASP 3	12 August	17 August	XV Corps	S ST JAMES (Y-39)
ASP 5	13 August	17 August	XX Corps	E VAIGES (Y-84)
ASP 6	13 August	23 August	XX Corps	N MARANS (U-50)
Depot 7	14 August	23 August	ASPs	E SAVEGNE (V-46)
ASP 8	15 August	29 August	VIII Corps	E ST SALEN (X-78)

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
ASP 9	18 August	25 August	XX Corps	CHAMPRAND EN GATINE (R-00)
ASP 10	18 August	22 August	XV Corps	W CHATEAUNEUF (R-11)
ASP 11	19 August	29 August	XII Corps	SW ECOMAN (W-11)
ASP 12	19 August	22 August	Prov. Corps	S SEES (V-12)
ASP 13	22 August	24 August	VIII Corps	N LANDIVISIAU (R-21)
ASP 14	23 August	29 August	XII Corps	N ORLEANS (W-64)
ASP 15	23 August	27 August	XV Corps	S LOUGNES (R-55)
ASP 16	23 August	29 August	XX Corps	S RAMBOUILLET (R-60)
Depot 17	23 August	29 August	ASPs	N BOURDEVILLE (R-68)
ASP 18	27 August		XII Corps	N SALIGNY (X-76)
Depot 19	27 August		ASPs	E DONNEMARIE (X-69)
Depot 22	31 August		XII Corps	SW CHALON (T-54)

Due to long supply lines, shortages of transportation, traffic congestion, and the speed with which the Army was moving forward, there were times when truck convoys of ammunition were diverted to points ten to twenty miles in advance of their original destination. ASPs and ammunition depots were kept well forward. Reconnaissance for suitable sites was made well in advance and often close behind combat units so that installations could be immediately set up as needed. On several occasions ammunition convoys were temporarily halted while a particular area was being cleared of remaining enemy troops. In other instances, because of similar situations, the initial stockage for forward ammunition supply points remained on wheels for a period of three to four days.

There was one instance during the month when stocks in forward ammunition supply points dropped to a dangerously low level due to a four day period when practically all Army transportation was immobilized because of a serious gasoline shortage. However, from an ammunition standpoint, this shortage of gasoline did not affect the combat efficiency of the fighting troops as long supply lines had been anticipated and troops had been previously authorized to carry ammunition in excess of prescribed basic loads. The only limitation placed on the amount of ammunition to be carried was the capacity of the unit to transport the quantities on hand without shuttling. The quantity handled in this month totaled 105,185 tons, and the mileage traveled by the Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting it totaled approximately 1,000,000 miles.

On 27 August the greater portion of Army ammunition supply was established in Depot Number 19 in the FONTAINEBLEAU Forest (X-25). By foreseeing a possible curtailment of ammunition supply from the rear, this depot was stocked to take care of the Army requirements during the time supply lines from the beaches would be overloaded.



CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL

The rapid advance of the Army caused supply lines to be stretched from a distance approximating fifty miles on 1 August to more than 100 miles by 1 September. The problem of supply became increasingly more difficult as the troops moved forward. By mid-September the forward elements were meeting stiff resistance along the MOSELLE RIVER. At this time Army ordnance maintenance units were grounded and their organic transportation, together with evacuation companies, were used to bring ammunition forward to the Army area. As a result Class II and IV supplies became extremely critical and the Armored Divisions and Corps furnished both drivers and transportation to move these classes of supplies from the beaches. The lack of replacement units and major assemblies caused maintenance units to perform many major repairs that normally would have been evacuated.

During this period a new plan of maintenance was evolved to guarantee continuous and efficient maintenance support to the forward units. The Advance Section Communications Zone stationed at least one maintenance company in each of the control points of the 70th Ordnance Group to assist in the work and to take over the operation of the points when the Group moved forward. Likewise, the 70th Ordnance Group maintained at least one maintenance company at each of the collecting points of the 69th Ordnance Group. When the forward group (69th) established a new collecting point, then the company which had been operating the 70th Ordnance Group Control Point in conjunction with the Advance Section Communications Zone, was leap-frogged to the most forward collecting point. In this manner, companies were able to work on the control point stock piles of materials for the longest possible time.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The forward echelon of the Ordnance Section moved to a location twelve miles southeast of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T-54) near LEFINE (T-64) on 4 September. The rear echelon joined the forward at this location on 6 September, but continued to function separately as in the past. On 15 September, the forward echelon moved to a location south of ETAIN (U-47) near NOUVRES (U-57). The forward echelon moved into permanent buildings in Stain (U-47) on 22 September for the first occupation of buildings by the Ordnance Section since arrival on the Continent.

On 25 September, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 82nd Ordnance Group was activated per General Order No. 61, this headquarters, under T/O & E O-12. This unit was designated to function as the ammunition group headquarters which previously had been a provisional operation carried on by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 313th Ordnance Battalion. Personnel for this newly activated group was transferred from Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 313th Ordnance Battalion and supporting ammunition companies. Sufficient personnel to form a nucleus for reorganizing the 313th Ordnance Battalion Headquarters was transferred in from other ammunition companies.

The following priority list for the issue of winter clothing and equipment to Ordnance units was recommended to the Quartermaster on 30 September:

- Ammunition Companies.
- Evacuation Companies.
- Maintenance Companies.
- Depot Companies.
- Battalion Headquarters.
- Group Headquarters.

SECRET

Casualties (killed and wounded) among personnel of Army Ordnance units due to enemy action during this period totaled five. Accumulative total to date numbered seventy-five.

Status of awards to Ordnance personnel were as follows:

For the current month

Purple Heart.....4
Bronze Star.....7

Accumulative totals to date

Purple Heart.....36
Bronze Star.....7

The various sub-sections continued to be augmented with the same personnel as in the previous month except that one more enlisted man was added as a driver for the liaison officer from the French Forces.

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

As a means of controlling the movement of Ordnance troops into new areas, the following procedure was used: After a thorough reconnaissance by Group Commanders or their representatives, recommendations as to the displacement of units forward were submitted to the Army Ordnance Officer. Upon his approval it was then necessary to receive the further approval of the desired areas from the Town Major (if in a town), from each AC of S, G-4, of the major tactical units controlling the areas, and finally the approval of the AC of S, G-3, Accommodations Section. After completion of the move, the Ordnance Operations Sub-Section furnished fragmentary orders to be published as amendments to the current administrative orders.

Due to the loss of so many units to the First and Ninth U. S. Armies, complete reorganization of the 69th and 70th Ordnance Groups was necessary. Companies were transferred between Groups, and Groups themselves reorganized their battalions as follows:

Units of 69th Ordnance Group

<u>24th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>193rd Ordnance Battalion</u>
7th Ord MM Co	15th Ord MM Co
47th Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
129th Ord MM Co	256th Ord MM Co
501st Ord HM Co (Tk)	556th Ord HM Co (Tk)
838th Ord Dep Co	840th Ord Dep Co
3447th Ord MAM Co	3445th Ord MAM Co
3448th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co

<u>316th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>10th Ordnance Battalion</u>
299th Ord Mt Co (AA)	184th Ord Dep Co
520th Ord HM Co (FA)	275th Ord Mt Co (AA)
3446th Ord MAM Co	537th Ord HM Co (FA)
3515th Ord MAM Co	3482nd Ord MAM Co
	3525th Ord MAM Co

<u>314th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>14th Ordnance Battalion</u>
13th Ord MM Co	281st Ord Mt Co (AA)
32nd Ord MM Co	3463rd Ord MM Co
534th Ord HM Co (Tk)	3514th Ord MAM Co
841st Ord Dep Co	3519th Ord MAM Co
3524th Ord MAM Co	

Units of 70th Ordnance Group

<u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>79th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>26th Ordnance Bn.</u>
444th Ord Evac Co	889th Ord HAM Co	837th Ord Dep Co
471st Ord Evac Co	904th Ord HAM Co	984th Ord Dep Co
472nd Ord Evac Co	911th Ord HAM Co	344th Ord Dep Co
482nd Ord Evac Co	902nd Ord HAM Co	347th Ord Dep Co
488th Ord Evac Co	914th Ord HAM Co	3444th Ord MM Co
465th Ord Evac Co	853rd Ord HAM Co	
489th Ord Evac Co	851st Ord HAM Co	
	305th Mt Co (AA)	

317th Ordnance Battalion 19th Ordnance Battalion

3076th Ord MWD Co	552nd Ord HM Co (Tk)
286th Ord MM Co	531st Ord HM Co (Tk)
560th Ord HM Co (Tk)	550th Ord HM Co (FA)
	510th Ord HM Co (FA)
	521st Ord HM Co (FA)
	3510th Ord MAM Co
	3508th Ord MAM Co

Ordnance units lost to First U. S. Army were as follows:

910th Ord HAM Co	304th Ord Mt Co (AA)
182nd Ord Dep Co	26th Ord MM Co
185th Ord Bn (Hq/Hq Det)	590th Ord Bn (Hq/Hq Det)

Units lost to Ninth U. S. Army are listed below:

Hq/Hq Det 178th Ord Bn	Hq/Hq Det 312th Ord Bn
Hq/Hq Det 65th Ord Bn	Hq/Hq Det 320th Ord Bn
3530th Ord MAM Co	3537th Ord MAM Co
3532nd Ord MAM Co	447th Ord HAM Co
300th Ord Mt Co (AA)	547th Ord HM Co (FA)
545th Ord HM Co (FA)	553rd Ord HM Co (Tk)
839th Ord Dep Co	985th Ord Dep Co
91st Ord ED Squad	657th Ord Am Co
599th Ord Am Co	570th Ord Am Co
665th Ord Am Co	16th Ord MM Co
104th Ord MM Co	128th Ord MM Co
293rd Ord MM Co	3468th Ord MM Co

The responsibility for maintenance and supply was designated as follows: east of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE - 69th Ordnance Group. The area west of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-54) - 70th Ordnance Group.

It was projected to move the 70th Ordnance Group and its three main depots forward to an area in the vicinity of VERDUN (U-26). This was necessary because of the Army's rapid advance.

Troops and vehicles then present on the Continent were as follows:

Officers	984
Enlisted Men	18,555
T/S Vehicles	4,449
Total Vehicles	5,111

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

Instructions were issued by the Army Ordnance Officer that the 70th Ordnance Group would have complete control over the technical operation of all depot companies in the Third U. S. Army. The 26th Ordnance Battalion (Supply Battalion in the 70th Ordnance Group) was authorized by the 70th Ordnance Group to balance and transfer stocks, or take any other action necessary to accomplish control of the technical functions of the depot companies. The Armored divisions were authorized to draw replacement of parts and major items from the 70th Ordnance Group (26th Ordnance Battalion and 317th Ordnance Battalion) by-passing the forward supporting Ordnance Battalions. This was considered desirable for two reasons in particular. First, the mobile depots in the forward group could not carry the large volume of supplies required by Armored divisions, and second, the armored divisions could supply their own transportation for hauling the heavy units peculiar to their organization. Forward ordnance battalions had insufficient transportation to perform this function. However, the Armored units were allowed to draw small amounts of supplies from these forward depots.

Instructions were received from the Twelfth U. S. Army Group that whenever there was a transfer between armies, divisions or other organizations all battle losses of materiel and equipment would be replaced to the extent practicable prior to the effective date of transfer. These instructions would not act to delay the effective date of transfer.

In addition to the usual reports, AC of S, G-4, was advised daily as to the tonnage of Class II and IV supplies received in the Army area and the method of delivery, i.e., air, Communications Zone transportation or Third U. S. Army transportation.

Agreement was made with the office of the Chief Ordnance Officer, Communications Zone, whereby the Daily Ordnance Status Supply Report would be used as the basis for issue of major items to the Third U. S. Army.

XII Corps requested that a major items replacement pool consisting of the following items be established in the 24th Ordnance Battalion to support Corps operation:

- 10 - Tank, Medium.
- 10 - Tank, Light.
- 200 - Launcher, Grenade, M7.
- 200 - Launcher, Grenade, M8.
- 12 - Car, Half-Track.
- 5 - Car, Scout, M8A1.
- 25 - Truck, 1/4-ton.
- 10 - Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Cargo.
- 25 - Gun, Submachine, Cal. .45.
- 10 - Gun, Machine, Cal. .50, M2, HB, Flexible.
- 10 - Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, M1917A1, Flexible.
- 3 - Engine, Tank, Medium, M3 975.
- 6 - Sets, Track, Medium Tank.
- 6 - Sets, Track, Light Tank.

The pool was established, but it was only possible to supply a few of these items due to overall shortage in the Army.

Medium tanks were in short supply during this period principally because of the heavy losses inflicted in two divisions. Every effort was made to obtain replacements for these two combat organizations. As a result when they left Third U. S. Army's control practically all their shortages had been replaced.

Further replacement of battle losses on medium tanks for armored units of the XII, XV, and XX Corps, during the week ending 16 September completely depleted the reserve at that time in the Third U. S. Army.

Maximum use of transportation was made by utilizing replacement vehicles released by Communications Zone to transport spare parts and major items destined to Third U. S. Army Ordnance depots. Extra track was strapped to tanks being delivered to the replacement pool. Evacuation units, due to their large carrying capacity, were of great assistance when transportation was at a premium.

A request was made on the Twelfth U. S. Army Group for various types of equipment, which it was anticipated would be required for crossing rivers and making attacks on fortified positions. It was contemplated that approximately 150 Assault Tanks, M4A3E2, 400 Cargo Carriers M29, and 200 Landing Vehicles, Tracked, would be required.

Instructions were received from Headquarters Communications Zone that it would be unnecessary for the Third U. S. Army to go west of PARIS to secure replacement combat vehicles. Communications Zone would make the transfer to Army transportation at Depot O-644 in the vicinity of PARIS.

For the period of September the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	83	109
Medium Tanks	150	143
Combat Vehicles	387	392
Artillery (over 57mm)	21	30
General Purpose Vehicles	1,667	1,550

By the end of the month the three main supply axes of the previous month were changed and extended as follows:

Main Supply Road No. 1 - REIMS (T-38), MENEHOLD (T-95), and VERDUN (U-26).

Main Supply Road No. 2 - VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS (T-61), ST. DIZIER (T-50), LIGNY (U-21), TOUL (U-60), and NANCY (U-81).

Main Supply Road No. 3 - TROYES (Y-27), JOINVILLE (Z-08), NEUFGRAND (Z-43), and EPINAL (Y-01).

In order to keep supply abreast of the rapid changes in the tactical situation it was necessary for the three main supply depots to move frequently during this period as follows:

Vicinity of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-55), 13 September.
Vicinity of AUBE (T-75), 19 September.
Vicinity of THIAUCOURT (U-63), 25 September.

SECRET

SECTION V
MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

In an effort to reduce the number of disabled vehicles on the main supply routes, a network of Ordnance road patrols was formed. To conserve gasoline, wreckers used for this work, were placed at central points and 1/4-ton trucks were used to patrol the roads. Each patrol had qualified mechanics equipped with hand tools and many on-the-spot repairs were made. This system was quite successful, both in reducing the time lost on repairs and in keeping many minor maintenance jobs out of the Ordnance shops.

A large German Ordnance depot was captured at SAMPIGNY and was found to contain a huge quantity of ball and roller bearings. A detail from the maintenance section was sent to classify these bearings and to list interchangeability with American stock numbers. Approximately thirty tons of bearings valued at two hundred and fifty thousand dollars were boxed and turned over to the 70th Ordnance Group for stock in Army depots.

During September several interesting maintenance problems arose. In one instance, much trouble was experienced with the over-riding clutch on the Tractor, High Speed, M. As replacement assemblies were not available at this time, several methods of field repair were tried. One successful method was finally developed and information regarding it was disseminated to all other Ordnance troops. A considerable number of the captured German bearings were used in this repair, as well as some materials that had been locally procured.

Reports of voltage deficiencies on the M7 Generator were investigated and it was found that installation of the Silverstat Voltage Regulator (PSMVO F-226-W2) only partly corrected the condition. The chief cause of low voltages was discovered to be the lack of compression in the Hercules VXL Engine. No parts or unit replacements were available for this type of engine. However, parts were obtained through local purchase and by the modification of captured enemy equipment.

Because of the lack of replacement units it became necessary to rebuild all types of engines. An arrangement was made through the Communications Zone, Ordnance Section, for all radial type engines to be rebuilt commercially while general purpose engines were rebuilt by Communications Zone Ordnance installations. Commercial contracts resulted in an average of twelve rebuilt jobs per day. In many instances, of necessity, engines were rebuilt in the field.

The maintenance report on certain reconditioned major Ordnance items was as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles Repaired.....	4,631
Total Combat Vehicles Repaired.....	472
Total Artillery Repaired.....	630
Total Small Arms Repaired.....	4,997
Total Instruments Repaired.....	1,750

By 8 September the axes of maintenance responsibility were as follows:

East of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-55) to the 69th Ordnance Group. The area west of the North and South line through CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T-55) to the 70th Ordnance Group.

During the week ending 16 September the above axes changed as follows:

West of the North-South line through VERDUN (U-26) was the responsibility of the 70th Ordnance Group.

East of the North-South line through VERDUN (U-26) was the responsibility of the 69th Ordnance Group.

General locations of the headquarters of maintenance battalions were as follows:

Opening Date	Location	Coordinates
September	<u>69th Ordnance Group</u>	
5	7 Miles E CHALONS-SUR-MARNE	X-28
15	5 Miles SE STAIN	U-56

	<u>10th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
5	10 Miles SW VERDUN	U-25
30	5 Miles W FORT-A-MOUSSON	U-63
	<u>14th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
1	5 Miles NE VILLENAUXE	S-91
2	7 Miles SW SEZANNE	S-91
17	Vicinity BAR-LE-DUC	U-01
18	Vicinity VOID	U-40
29	W of NANCY	U-71
	<u>24th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
1	Vicinity of VASTRY	T-43
5	Vicinity MENIL-AUX-BOIS	U-32
16	Vicinity TOUL	U-61
27	Vicinity NANCY	U-71
	<u>195th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
1	Vicinity of HAUTEVILLIER	T-26
7	Vicinity of VADELAINCOURT	U-15
11	Vicinity of HANNONVILLE	U-65
	<u>314th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
1	5 Miles N VILLENAUXE	S-91
13	6 Miles SE WASSY	Z-09
16	5 Miles N MIRECOURT	S-87
27	Vicinity of BAYON	V-08
	<u>316th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
1	Vicinity of SEMMESOUS	T-42
17	6 Miles E VERDUN	U-36
	<u>590th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
1	Vicinity of ROZAY-EN-BRIE	S-42
	<u>70th Ordnance Group</u>	
14	Vicinity of AUBE	T-75
25	Vicinity of BENEY	U-54
	<u>19th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
8	Vicinity of FOUNTAINEBLEAU	X-28
20	Vicinity of HARVILLE	U-55
	<u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
26	Vicinity of ST. MIHIEL	U-43
	<u>79th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
14	Vicinity of AUBE	T-75
19	Vicinity of HARVILLE	U-55
	<u>178th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
4	Vicinity of FOUNTAINEBLEAU	X-28
	<u>317th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
20	Vicinity of ST BENOIT-IN-WOSVIE	U-54

SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

As the Army continued its rapid movement east, all supply services were handicapped by a lack of transportation to move their respective supplies. The Army Ordnance Officer diverted all organic vehicles from Ordnance maintenance and supply units in order to move the vital ammunition supply forward. Tank transporters, as well as cargo trucks,

were used in this movement. A railroad was opened near MONTREAU (X-44) and ammunition was also moved by rail from that point to the vicinity of CHALONS (T-54). As traffic across the SEINE River was congested, it was necessary to establish priority for the movement of ammunition trucks from Depot Number 19 in the FOUNTAINEBLEAU Forest (X-25) to the railroad. Through the combined efforts of all concerned 19,000 tons of ammunition were moved in a period of approximately five days. In addition to hauling ammunition, the loaded vehicles were routed through replacement depots and thereby furnished transportation for personnel replacements going to the front line units.

During the rapid movement across FRANCE, expenditures of small arms, tank, and light artillery ammunition were relatively high. At the same time it was necessary to move all medium and heavy artillery ammunition forward to insure a supply of these items being available when the tactical situation dictated their use.

As the supply lines became extended the amount of tonnage authorized to be moved to the Army area from the Communications Zone was restricted. Ordnance supplies were allocated a total of 1,280 tons per day, all of which was used for ammunition supply. This small tonnage, together with the fact that the supply of most artillery types of ammunition, particularly 105mm Howitzer, had become critical, made it evident that restrictions on the amounts authorized for expenditure would be necessary.

In September the rationing of critical types of ammunition was put into effect. However, the tonnage allocation authorized for ammunition supply was not adequate to bring in to the Army area the entire amount of critical types authorized for expenditure. As a fairly large stock of non-critical items had previously been established, it was necessary to move forward only those items which had become critical. By careful planning only minimum quantities of these critical items were requested within the authorized tonnage allocation. Rail transportation was augmented by Ordnance truck transportation thus keeping up the flow of supplies.

The attack on the MOSELLE River line was imminent and requests were submitted to the Twelfth U. S. Army Group by the Army Ordnance Officer indicating the ammunition requirements for the XX Corps and to carry out the mission assigned.

Throughout the month of September, the ammunition situation remained critical. It was necessary to establish a system whereby Corps reported daily on the status of critical types in the basic load of units. With this information, the Army Ordnance Officer was able to control the flow of ammunition in such a manner to insure that available supplies were placed in the most strategic place. In many instances battle emergencies necessitated the transfer of ammunition from trucks hauling into the ammunition supply points direct to those of the using units.

During the rapid advance of the Army, careful consideration was given to the use of mobile ammunition supply points, or rolling reserves. However, this plan could not be carried out due to the limited amount of truck transportation available. In one instance, during the advance of the XX Corps from DONNEMARIE (X-65) to DOMBASLE (U-70) a rolling reserve of approximately 500 tons was maintained behind the Corps. This reserve was accompanied by an ammunition company; the personnel riding with the ammunition. After four intermediate stops were made, at which time units were resupplied, the remaining rolling reserve was unloaded at DOMBASLE (U-90) and provided the initial stock-are for Ammunition Supply Point Number 23.

For the month of September Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
ASP 18	27 August	13 September	XII Corps	N of SALIGNY (X-76)
Depot 19	27 August	20 September	ASPs	N LA CHAPELLE (X-18)
Depot 20	29 August	7 September	XX Corps	R DONNEMARIE (X-61)
Depot 22	31 August	20 September	XII Corps	SW CHALONS (T-54)
ASP 21	2 September	10 September	XII Corps	NE HOUSSINENT (T-32)
ASP 25	4 September	20 September	XX Corps	DOMBASLE (Y-16)
ASP 24	4 September	XII Corp	XII Corps	SW COMBERCY (U-41)
Depot 25	9 September		ASPs	E VERDUN (U-36)
ASP 26	11 September	30 September	XV Corps	SE GONDRECCOURT (Z-38)
ASP 27	15 September		XX Corps	E HARVILLE (U-55)
ASP 28	22 September		XV Corps	E BAINVILLE (Z-98)
ASP 29	25 September		XII Corps	W NANCY (Z-98)
Depot 30	29 September		ASPs	E TOUL (U-70)

During this period 142,228 tons of ammunition were handled and the mileage traveled by the Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 755,000 miles.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Ordnance Class II and IV supply had greatly improved in October although a few items remained critical. The development of local resources and the formulation of a purchasing plan indicated some relief was at hand.

Class V supply was extremely short and rationing of artillery ammunition became necessary. During this rationing period much effort was directed toward consolidating Army ammunition stocks for the purpose of supporting any possible operation on either of the two Corps fronts. Further economy resulted within the line units by self-rationing when the total availability of ammunition was made known to them.

A decision to equip all medium tanks with extended end connectors resulted in a huge program of local purchasing. The extended end connectors, also known as "duck feet", provided greater flotation for tanks enabling them to negotiate muddy terrain.

SECTION II
ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The rear echelon of the Ordnance Section moved to the city of NANCY (U-81) on 5 October. The forward echelon moved to the city of NANCY (U-81) on 11 October.

Twelfth U. S. Army Group informed this headquarters that upon request of the Army Ordnance Officer qualified personnel would be supplied for any special problems or difficulties that would arise.

By direction of the Ordnance Officer, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, requisitions were forwarded to his office for five recent graduates of West Point in the grade of Second Lieutenant to be assigned to the 69th Ordnance Group.

Casualties (killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled seven, thus making the accumulative total to date eighty-two.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star	1	1
Soldier's Medal	1	1
Purple Heart	13	19
Bronze Star	3	10

Augmentation of the number of personnel in the various sub-sections to assist in meeting operational requirements continued as in previous months, however, slight reductions were made and resulted in the following total personnel being attached:

Officers	Enlisted Men
4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit	4 - Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit
1 - Liaison, from French Forces	1 - Liaison from French Forces
	10 - Assist in sub-sections

SECTION III
OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

October found the tactical troops engaged along the MOSELLE River where stiff resistance was encountered. Ordnance troops were moved into buildings during this period and as a result maintenance capabilities were greatly improved.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent are as follows:

Officers.....	562
Enlisted Men.....	11,181
T/E Vehicles.....	2,408
Total Vehicles.....	3,890

The following units were lost by Third U. S. Army to Ninth U. S. Army:

164th Ordnance Evacuation Company
162nd Ordnance Evacuation Company
588th Ordnance Ammunition Company
598th Ordnance Ammunition Company
3510th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
3525th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company

SECTION IV
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

During October many items of equipment were obtained from various captured enemy installations. Material deemed usable included jacks, paints and brushes, floor cranes, motorcycle parts, engine blocks, and other items. This material was turned in to Army depots for issue.

Battlefield recovery of small arms was emphasized and a collection drive throughout the Army was instigated. All units were instructed to turn in excess weapons. Unit commanders were held responsible that unauthorized weapons were not retained by personnel under their control. Recovery squads were designated by commanders of all companies, the duties of these squads being to collect and turn in all abandoned small arms. Periodic visits, by Ordnance personnel, were made to all aid stations, hospitals, collection points, and cemeteries for the purpose of collecting weapons. Excess reserves of small arms in Army depots were turned in to Communications Zone depots.

The overall supply picture in the Army indicated that local purchase would be necessary. A representative of the Army Ordnance Officer visited the Advance Section, Communications Zone, the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, and the Communications Zone to enlist their services in the development of local purchases.

The Army representative obtained the concurrence of the above-mentioned agencies and arrangements were made for the Communications Zone, Ordnance Purchasing Section, to let contracts for a number of items of critical supply for the Third U. S. Army. These first items were of simple construction and therefore easy to manufacture. If these were successfully procured then more difficult items were to be added at a later date.

Ordnance Class II and IV supply had been a decided hand to month existence since the Army became operational, with steady loss of ground among certain critical items. Infantry automatic weapons and fire control equipment were in extremely short supply. By the end of October the supply situation had greatly improved although there were a few remaining chronic shortages. Comparative figures of some of the critical items for the month of October are shown in the table below:

Item	On Back Order 6 October	On Back Order End of October
Sub-Machine Gun	1200	None (700 on hand)
Cal..30 Machine Gun	800	90
Cal..30 B.A.R.	750	152
Cal..45 Pistol	1500	None (1997 on hand)
M3 and M3 Binoculars	4250	246
60mm Mortar	327	177
81mm Mortar	6	0
Compass, M2	366	190
Tanks, Medium	40	10
Launcher, Grenade, M7	1921	350

The improvement in the status of small arms was attributed in part to the recovery drive mentioned in the second paragraph. However, the situation on fire control equipment remained critical and it was understood that no immediate relief was in sight.

By the end of the month the status of tires and tubes had become critical. Communications Zone informed the Army that they would release to them a proportionate share of an anticipated shipment, which was inadequate to supply current needs. Other than this issue, the prospect for future deliveries was not bright. It was not expected that tires and tubes would be received in quantity before sixty days.

U. S. Army registration numbers were assigned and releases written for 257 captured enemy vehicles during the month.

For the period of October the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	90	62
Medium Tanks	116	88
Combat Vehicles	524	416
Artillery (over 57mm)	127	106
General Purpose Vehicles	2988	2433

The changes in the tactical situation caused the supply lines to be moved more to the North so that the supply axes by the close of this period were as follows:

- LIGNY (U-21), TOUL (U-60), to NANCY (U-81).
- BAR-LE-DUC (U-12), ST. MIHIEL (U-43), to FORT-A-MOURSON (U-75).
- VERDUN (U-26), to METZ (U-86).
- VERDUN (U-26), STAIN (U-47), BRIEY (U-77), and THIONVILLE (U-89).

The three main supply depots were relocated by 7 October to COMBERCY (U-42), and SAMPIIGNY (U-32), the 96th Ordnance Depot Company (General Purpose) being located at the latter.

SECTION V
MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

During October the maintenance section was primarily engaged in routine inspections of maintenance installations and collecting points. No major deficiencies were noted and minor on the spot corrections were made. The principal problem was to correct minor dislocations in service and operating methods incident to movement from field conditions into billets.

The maintenance officer contacted the Ordnance Officer, the division ammunition officer and the G-4 of the 26th Infantry Division, newly arrived in the Theater, and explained to them the principal features of Third U. S. Army Ordnance support.

Arrangements were made to bring additional tank and heavy automotive maintenance companies forward to support the XII Corps and forward Collecting Point No. 2. This move eliminated the necessity of evacuating heavy major units for repair and salvage.

On 16 October the 70th (rear) Ordnance Group put a new plan of maintenance in effect for the rear Army area. A copy of the plan which is self-explanatory, is attached as Annex No. XIII.

Many items of Ordnance equipment being in short supply it became increasingly important for Ordnance maintenance units to develop the resources at hand. Several instances of ingenuity and diligent experimentation on the part of Ordnance personnel are given below:

a. GMC transfer cases were on deadline for lack of high and low range shifting forks. The maintenance section instructed the units to build up the worn surfaces with weld and machine them down to the correct size. This method worked satisfactorily and the information was disseminated to Ordnance maintenance troops.

b. Experiments conducted by the 69th Ordnance Group proved that medium tank brake lining can be used as a satisfactory substitute for light tank brake lining with a minimum of modification.

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c. Utilising captured motorcycle parts, a program of rebuilding German motorcycles was inaugurated. It was anticipated that a large percentage of T/S shortages on these items would be made up by issuing the German cycles.

d. A jig was developed for remachining the threads on captured German spark plugs for use in M-4 Tank Engines. Approximately 11,000 of these plugs were rethreaded and put into stock during October.

Operational necessity dictated the immediate procurement of extended end connectors (duck feet) for medium tank track. A target of 200,000 was set for 10 November. An order was placed with Advance Section, Communications Zone on operational priority and 25,000 were received. It was evident that local contracts would have to be let in order to meet the target. Local resources were developed by the Ordnance Section in cooperation with representatives of the XII Corps and Advance Section, Communications Zone. Several local contracts were let to manufacture the duck feet with Army to supply the end connectors. All tank track in Ordnance installations was evacuated to Collection Point No. 2 or to the Control Point at VERDUN (U-26) operated by the 19th Ordnance Battalion. At these points Ordnance crews removed the end connectors from worn or damaged track for shipment to local foundries or to Advance Section, Communications Zone, who meanwhile had made arrangements for some of the "feet" to be manufactured in their area. By the end of October, Third U. S. Army Ordnance was turning over approximately 11,000 connectors a day to the manufacturers. There were no figures available on completed and installed extended end connectors at the end of the month but it was believed that the target would be reached. While the above program was getting under way the representative from the XII Corps suggested, as an emergency measure due to the time element involved, that reinforced channel iron duck feet be welded to the track while it was still on the tank. Welding crews were immediately assigned this task on tanks belonging to XII Corps units.

The maintenance report on certain reconditioned major Ordnance items was as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles Repaired-----	8,156
Total Combat Vehicles Repaired-----	432
Total Artillery Repaired-----	1,125
Total Small Arms Repaired-----	15,859
Total Instruments Repaired-----	3,573

The general locations of the headquarters of maintenance battalions were as follows:

Opening Date October	Location	Coordinates
12	60th Ordnance Group In VERDUN	U-81
	10th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
16	11th Ordnance Battalion Vicinity of CHAMPIGNESVILLE	U-81
6	24th Ordnance Battalion In NANCY	U-81
19	193rd Ordnance Battalion In St JEAN LES BOIS	U-56
5	314th Ordnance Battalion In DOMBAULE	U-90
11	316th Ordnance Battalion In POIT-LA-MOISSON	U-73
6	70th Ordnance Group Vicinity of COMMERCY In MAREY-SUR-VAISE	U-42 2-49
8	19th Ordnance Battalion In VERDUN	U-26
6	26th Ordnance Battalion Vicinity of COMMERCY	U-42
	66th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	70th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
13	317th Ordnance Battalion In STAIN	U-36
9	326th Ordnance Battalion 5 Miles SW of NANCY	S-40
11	332nd Ordnance Battalion In Third U. S. Army	U-42

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

The month of October found the rate of advance of the Army slowing down as the German border was approached. This made it possible to consolidate existing ammunition stocks into one main depot, Depot Number 25, in the vicinity of VERDUN (U-26). However, as the combat units were being regrouped and future tactical plans were being formulated, it was evident that a division of supplies would be advantageous. Foreseeing a possible requirement for close support of an attack along either of two lines of advance, part of the existing and incoming ammunition stocks were diverted into a second depot, Depot Number 31, in the vicinity of NANCY (U-81). This division of supplies provided close support to each of the two Corps. It further provided a safety factor to the extent that probable damage to both depots by a single action of the enemy would not be possible.

During the time that Advance Section depots were being stocked, shipments to the Army were curtailed and very little ammunition was received at the Army depots. This lull in operations afforded an opportunity to segregate artillery ammunition by lot numbers, particular emphasis being placed on 105mm Howitzer ammunition.

An example of the necessity for this lot number segregation is the situation found in one supply point. Inspection of 7,115 rounds of 105mm Howitzer ammunition revealed a total of 308 different lot numbers. To cite extreme situations, there were 101 lot numbers consisting of from one to five rounds per lot and only in one instance were there more than 200 rounds of the same lot number found. Ammunition received from Communications Zone contained mixed lot numbers, so a letter was prepared to the Ordnance Officer of that headquarters advising him of the situation. Immediate steps were taken by all concerned to improve the condition and in a short time great improvement was in evidence.

Further advantage was taken of this relative lull to review past methods of operation for the purpose of instituting any changes which would improve the supply of ammunition to combat troops. One of the principal developments resulting from the study was the establishment of a system whereby all ammunition on credit to the Army could be accounted for from the time requisitions were submitted until it was actually received at the ammunition supply points or depots.

For the month of October Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
ASP #21	1 September	8 October	XII Corps	5 mi SW COMMERCY (U-41)
Depot #25	9 September		ASPs	5 mi E VERDUN (U-36)
ASP #27	15 September		IX Corps	E HAINVILLE (U-55)
ASP #28	22 September	7 October	XV Corps	E HAINVILLE (2-98)
ASP #29	25 September		XII Corps	W NANCY (U-71)
Depot #30	29 September	13 October	ASPs	S TOUL (U-70)
Depot #31	3 October		ASPs	4 mi S NANCY (U-80)

During this period 124,361 tons of ammunition were handled and the mileage traveled by the Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 450,000 miles.


On 12 October a very critical situation in ammunition supply developed as allocations from the Twelfth U. S. Army Group for the period 5 October to 13 October were cancelled and expenditure authorizations for that period were rescinded. In lieu of these allocations, revised amounts were authorized for the period 5 October to 7 November. In several instances the amounts authorized for the new period of thirty-three days were less than those authorized for the original eight day period. This unfortunate situation caused practically all field artillery weapons to be silenced immediately.

Plans were made for the possible future curtailment in the authorized expenditures of ammunition for field artillery weapons by building up relatively large stocks of ammunition for the 75mm, 76mm, 81mm, and 90mm tank and anti-tank guns. Thus, when the supply of ammunition for field artillery weapons became critical, it was possible to employ tank and anti-tank weapons in their secondary role as artillery. The use of the latter weapons as supporting artillery proved very valuable as the Army continued its advance and took limited objectives despite curtailed expenditures of ammunition for field artillery weapons. Meanwhile, to insure that enough ammunition for tank and anti-tank weapons was on hand at all times to permit their use in their primary mission, minimum Army reserve levels were established. These reserve levels served to maintain a minimum of an estimated three day supply in Army installations.


The accumulation of captured enemy weapons and ammunition of major calibers had been encouraged and as a result a fairly large stock of these items were available to the combat troops. This supply of weapons and ammunition proved valuable as it was very effectively employed against the enemy during the time our own supplies were curtailed. In addition to causing enemy casualties, the employment of his own weapons against him was of great morale value to our troops.

Immediately following the drastic reduction in expenditure authorizations, several conferences were held by representatives of the Twelfth U. S. Army Group, Communications Zone, and the Armies. The primary purpose of these meetings was to develop a supply procedure which would prevent future recurrences of the situation that the Armies had just faced.

On 21 October, the credit system of ammunition allocations was put into effect by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. Under this system allocations would be made to the Armies on the basis of overall availability and the missions assigned the Armies. Only ammunition on hand in Advance Section, Communications Zone, depots would be available to the Armies on credits established by Communications Zone.



(Above) Medium tank equipped with duckfeet traveling through mud at high speed.



(Left) Close-up of medium tank track showing duckfeet (extended end-connectors).

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**CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS**

SECTION I - GENERAL

The supply situation, as a whole, at this time was brighter than it ever had been although some items were still critical. On the other hand, certain items that had constantly been on the critical list were removed for the first time and depots were stocked to a much greater extent than ever before.

The lack of sufficient amount of anti-freeze caused much concern but a temporary relief was brought about by use of alcohol obtained through channels and from French sources, pending the receipt of a supply of Prestone from the UNITED STATES.

The shortage of ammunition had been relieved to a limited extent by this time although heavy artillery ammunition was still critical. Formal letters of allocation were compiled and forwarded to Corps Commanders specifying the maximum number of rounds per weapon per day that could be expended. Those authorized amounts were based on the status of ammunition in the Army area and on anticipated receipts from Advance Section, Communications Zone.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The forward and rear echelon of the Ordnance Section remained in the city of NANCY (U-81) during this entire period.

Two officers assigned Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit were relieved from attached to the headquarters thereby reducing to three the number of officers attached. The augmentation of enlisted personnel amounting to fifteen remained the same as in the previous month.

Ordnance Bulletin Number 5 was published and distributed. (See Appendix 14)

Casualties (Killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled six, thus making the accumulative total to date eighty-eight.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	<u>Current</u>	<u>Accumulative to Date</u>
Silver Star		1
Soldiers Medal	1	2
Bronze Star Medal	20	30
Purple Heart	7	55

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

Units, within the Groups, were reorganized in November as follows:

	<u>69th Ord Group</u>	
10th Ord Bn	11th Ord Bn	311th Ord Bn
Personnel now being utilized in other Bns.	257th Ord M Co (AA) 3511th Ord M Co 3519th Ord M Co	32nd Ord M Co 562nd Ord M Co (TK) 811st Ord Dep Co 3524th Ord M Co 520th Ord M Co (FA)

24th Ord Bn	193rd Ord Bn	316th Ord Bn
7th Ord M Co	15th Ord M Co	275th Ord M Co (AA)
17th Ord M Co	116th Ord M Co	3526th Ord M Co
129th Ord M Co	256th Ord M Co	181th Ord Depot Co
501st Ord M Co (TK)	556th Ord M Co (TK)	281st Ord M Co (AA)
838th Ord Depot Co	840th Ord Depot Co	3482nd Ord M Co
3447th Ord M Co	3444th Ord M Co	537th Ord M Co (FA)
3448th Ord M Co	3511th Ord M Co	
3463rd Ord M Co	3515th Ord M Co	

70th Ord Group

19th Ord Bn	26th Ord Bn	66th Ord Bn
551st Ord M Co (TK)	341th Ord Depot Co	165th Ord E vac Co
550th Ord M Co (FA)	347th Ord Depot Co	171st Ord E vac Co
853rd Ord M Co	837th Ord Depot Co	172nd Ord E vac Co
904th Ord M Co	984th Ord Depot Co	188th Ord E vac Co
		189th Ord E vac Co
		889th Ord M Co
79th Ord Bn	317th Ord Bn	326th Ord Bn
521st Ord M Co (FA)	285th Ord M Co	305th Ord M Co (AA)
552nd Ord M Co (TK)	560th Ord M Co (TK)	510th Ord M Co (FA)
851st Ord M Co	3076th Ord M Co	3537th Ord M Co
902nd Ord M Co		
914th Ord M Co		

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent were as follows:

Officers.....	562
Enlisted Men.....	11,245
T/E Vehicles.....	2,452
Total Vehicles.....	4,493

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

By 1 November, of the 114,500 gallons of Prestone requisitioned on 8 September, only 2,000 gallons of this critical item had been received. Of the initial requisition 66,000 gallons had been requested for immediate shipment to fill requirements of troops. As time went on, the number of back-orders continued to rise and totaled 69,000 at this time. Since no immediate relief was in sight, the Chief of the Supply Section contacted the Supply Officer of the Communications Zone and requested that the possibilities be investigated of purchasing alcohol for use as an anti-freeze pending the receipt of Prestone. This was successfully accomplished but the problem of transporting it arose as tank cars were not available. This was overcome, however, by the Ordnance Section by use of 200 fifty-gallon metal containers transported by trucks. By the close of the month an additional 5,000 gallons of alcohol were received. Prestone was still in short supply and only 38,500 gallons had been received while back-orders totaled 68,000 gallons.

Tires and tubes of all sizes had by this time been placed on the critical list for a long period and the situation was steadily getting worse. In order to help alleviate this condition the Commanding Officer of the 70th Ordnance Group was instructed that all spare tires and tubes, sizes 7:50 x 20 and 6:00 x 16, on replacement vehicles in the 317th Ordnance Battalion, and all spare tires and tubes of the same size on Ordnance Shop trucks, should be removed and placed in depot stock for issue against back-orders. Replacement vehicles equipped with 6:00 x 16 and 7:50 x 20 tires would be issued less spare tires and tubes as long as those items remained critical. Information was received from the Communications Zone that it was expected that 7:50 x 20 tires would be available within a short period of time in sufficient quantities to fill all existing back-orders but it was not expected that issues of total requirements (approximately 4,500) could be met for sixty days.

The shortage of hot patches was another item of concern during this period. By the middle of the month all back-orders had been filled and the situation was no longer critical but before the end of the month they were back on the critical list again and the back-orders continued to increase in number.

The additional amount of tonnage on hand in the three main depot companies made it desirable to eliminate all stock in excess of current or anticipated requirements. Therefore, instructions were issued to the main depot companies to submit to the Army Ordnance Officer, on the 15th and 30th of each month, a list of items which were considered ex-

cess. Actual turn-in of the items would be made only upon instructions from the Ordnance Officer.

At the request of the Chief of the General Supply Division, Ordnance Section, Communications Zone, it was agreed to submit the periodic requisitions on the 3rd and 18th of each month, instead of on the 5th, 15th, and 25th, as had been the practice for the past several months. It was also agreed that no tonnage bid would be submitted by us inasmuch as our requirements were stated in periodic requisitions and in our daily Major Items Report.

For this period the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	<u>Received</u>	<u>Issued</u>
Light Tanks	28	18
Medium Tanks	118	161
Combat Vehicles	691	678
Artillery (over 57mm)	103	52
General Purpose Vehicles	1,955	1,962

The Supply Axes and locations of the Main Supply Depots remained the same as in the previous month, except the Armament Depot which moved to the vicinity of TOUL (U-60).

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The manufacturing program on extended end connectors was in full swing and deliveries of light connectors from local sources was approximately 3,500 per day. All contracts for the medium type connectors were handled by the Advance Section, Communications Zone, while all Third U. S. Army contracts were switched over to the production of light type connectors. The current status of delivered connectors by type is given below:

	<u>Light</u>	<u>Medium</u>
Advance Section, Communications Zone Contracts	0	100,000
Third U. S. Army Contracts	15,000	5,000
TOTAL	15,000	105,000

Due to the complete lack of certain types of spare parts and equipment, it was necessary once again for the maintenance section to resort to local purchase and improvisation. Several examples of this condition are given below:

a. There were no spare parts of any kind for the Chevrolet Truck, 1-1/2 ton, w/earth borer, used by the Signal Construction Battalions. A number of these vehicles were on deadline for lack of rear axles when some English Bedford axles were located and found to fit after being turned down on a lathe. Local contracts were let for the manufacture of pinions and shafts for the earth borer on these trucks.

b. A quantity of blank engine valves and piston rings were supplied to Ordnance maintenance units for the repair of M-7 Generators currently on deadline. The only source of supply for these Generators was from captured materials or local purchase.

Operational needs for tanks were quite high during this period, and in an attempt to alleviate this condition the following method of tank resupply was followed: The 552nd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Tank Company was set up in NANCY, FRANCE (U-81), an ideally located city in view of the current tactical situation, and operated as a provisional base tank repair shop. All tanks brought into this company were repaired and placed in the Army pool. When a using unit turned in a tank for repair they were issued a tally which authorized them to pick up a new or repaired tank from the pool. In this manner the tactical units were kept up to 7/E on tanks with scarcely any loss of time.

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The following individuals visited Ordnance installations on the afternoon of 28 November:

- President, American Locomotive Company.
- President, Oldsmobile Company.
- President, Thompson Products Company.
- President, Sohlgate Lock Company.
- Brigadier General, Representative from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance.
- Colonel, from Visitors' Section, Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

The party visited the 11th Ordnance Battalion in the vicinity of CHAMPIGNULLES (U-81) where they witnessed the maintenance of general purpose vehicles, small arms, and artillery. They visited the 552nd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company where they witnessed maintenance and repair of tanks. They further visited the collecting point in the vicinity of NANCY (U-81) where they noted the character of battle damage and the 837th Ordnance Depot Company in the vicinity of TOUL (U-61) where they observed the tremendous quantities of parts required to service the armored vehicles of the army. The party was accompanied by the Army Ordnance Officer, the Army Maintenance Officer, Commanding Officer of the 69th Ordnance Group, and the Executive Officer of the 70th Ordnance Group.

They observed several tanks being repaired by cutting out sections of the hull or turret and inserting similar sections cut from salvaged tanks. They also were very much interested in the home made extended end connectors which were welded on so many of our medium tanks before local manufacture of them was begun. At the 837th Ordnance Depot Company, they watched the installation of new type end connectors on medium tank track by the use of an inclined roller table and some extemporized pneumatic equipment.

Major items repaired during the month of November were as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles.....	9,147
Total Combat Vehicles.....	3,018
Total Artillery.....	1,413
Total Small Arms.....	11,654
Total Instruments.....	3,364

The axes of Ordnance Maintenance for November was unchanged.

The general locations of the Headquarters of Maintenance Battalions were as follows:

<u>Opening Date</u> <u>November</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
	<u>69th Ordnance Group</u> No change	
	<u>10th Ordnance Battalion</u> No change	
	<u>11th Ordnance Battalion</u> No change	
16	<u>24th Ordnance Battalion</u> In PESTONCOURT	Q-02
26	In DALHAIF	Q-13
17	<u>193rd Ordnance Battalion</u> In HAYANGS	U-78
<u>Opening Date</u> <u>November</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
16	<u>31st Ordnance Battalion</u> In NANCY	U-81
27	In PESTONCOURT	Q-02
	<u>316th Ordnance Battalion</u> No change	
	<u>70th Ordnance Group</u> No change	
29	<u>19th Ordnance Battalion</u> Vicinity of BACH	F-70
	<u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u> No change	
	<u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u> No change	

26	<u>79th Ordnance Battalion</u> Vicinity of NANCY	U-81
	<u>317th Ordnance Battalion</u> No change	
3	<u>326th Ordnance Battalion</u> In VAUCOULEURS	U-40
27	In PORT-A-MOUSSON	U-75
18	<u>332nd Ordnance Battalion</u> In GONDRESCOURT	Z-39

SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

By early November the flow of ammunition from the Communications Zone had increased and the critical shortage in the Army area was relieved to a limited extent. On the first day of the month an informal compilation of the status of critical items was prepared and furnished to Corps Commanders to be used as a guide in the formulation of plans for future operations. This informal information was followed on 5 November by a formal letter to each Corps Commander specifying the maximum number of rounds per weapon per day that could be expended during the period 8 November to 17 November, inclusive. The amounts authorized were based on the status of ammunition in the Army area and on anticipated receipt at that time.

On 15 November a similar letter for the period 18 - 30 November was prepared and forwarded to the Corps Commanders. The amounts specified for this period were considerably less than for the preceding period. The amounts of ammunition which the Army Ordnance Officer obligated was in excess of that physically present in the Army area, but sufficient credits had been established by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group to meet this obligation. This procedure necessitated the expeditious calling forward of ammunition from Advance Section, Communications Zone depots as soon as credits were established by the Communications Zone.

In order to provide close support to the XII Corps for the impending attack to the East, it was decided to establish an ASP well forward in the Corps area. The site selected was East of the MOSELLE River between NANCY (U-81) and CHATEAU SALINS (Q-12). This entire area was extremely difficult for operations due to promiscuous and patterned mine fields which had been planted by the enemy before retreating. In addition to the hazard of mines, the ASP was subjected to enemy artillery counter battery fire directed at Corps artillery batteries located within the ASP boundaries. In spite of these unusual hazards this ASP, No. 33, opened as scheduled, on 8 November.

Based on the disposition of troops and the tactical situation, the Army Ordnance Officer decided to establish a second ASP East of the MOSELLE River to support XII Corps and specific XI Corps units located on the south flank of the latter Corps. This installation ASP No. 34, with an initial stockage of 1,195 tons, opened on 8 November. Resupply to the ASP was suspended for approximately 24 hours due to the flooding of all main supply routes leading to the site. However, alternate routes were located and supply was resumed on 10 November. This ASP was used for a period of approximately three weeks and during this time had the greatest rate of turnover of stocks.

As the XI Corps advanced the Army Ordnance Officer ordered the establishment of a new ASP for the Corps East of the MOSELLE River. This was done in order to eliminate the necessity for using units to cross the river to obtain their resupply. In keeping with the Army policy this ASP, No. 35, was located well forward in the Corps area. As in the case of other installations East of the MOSELLE River extensive mine fields were encountered. In addition to the removal of mines, it was necessary for the ASP commander to call on the Graves Registration Section of the 90th Infantry Division to remove numerous enemy dead from some areas before ammunition could be placed on the ground.

During the month of November a total of approximately 117,863 tons of ammunition were handled by ASP personnel. This tonnage represented the greatest turnover of ammunition for any similar period of time since the Army became operational. The mileage traveled by the attached Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 1,081,468 miles.

For the month of November the Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:


<u>Installation</u>	<u>Open</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Serving</u>	<u>Location</u>
Depot 25	9 Sep	16 Nov	ASPs	E VERDUN (U-36)
ASP 27	15 Sep	25 Nov	XX Corps	E HANVILLE (U-55)
ASP 29	25 Sep	16 Nov	XII Corps	W NANCY (U-71)
Depot 31	3 Oct		ASPs	S NANCY (U-84)
Depot 32	7 Nov		XX Corps	In DUMFRIK (U-58)
ASP 33	8 Nov		XII Corps	SE CHAMPENOUX (Q-01)
ASP 34	10 Nov		XII Corps	E PORT-A-MOUSSON (U-83)
ASP 35	21 Nov		XX Corps	DISTROFF (U-98)



M10 Tank Destroyer being towed from M25 Tank Transporter.



(Above) Ordnance crew in first stage of replacing track on M-7 Motor Carriage, 105m Howitzer. This self-propelled weapon is better known as "The Priest".



(Right) Crew completes operation by pulling tread over idler wheel.

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

An enemy break-through of the front line in the First U. S. Army area on 16 December caused many changes in the tactical situation, proposed plans, use and method of issue of Ordnance materiel of the Third U. S. Army. Ammunition that had been located in preparation for an attack by the Army had to be immediately re-located to the northern flank of the Army boundary. Special ammunition that was scheduled to be used on a certain date was used ahead of time. Formal letters authorizing specific amounts of ammunition that could be expended were discontinued and informal letters issued as expenditure guides. Ammunition depots that were about to be placed under control of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, were re-stocked and again became very active installations. In order to maintain close support, mobile rail distribution points were necessary. As another expedient, ammunition from the Advance Section, Communications Zone depots was issued regardless of existing credits. Such a deviation from the usual channels was in cooperation with the efforts being made to expedite supplies in the existing emergency.

Due to the extreme shortage of spare parts and replacement assemblies, the maintenance section resorted to all manner of procurement with emphasis on systematic salvage and local purchase. As a result, many items of ordnance were speedily returned to the using units.

Manpower shortage was alleviated in many instances by the employment of civilians to supplement military personnel. This arrangement proved to be helpful but necessitated additional tools and equipment for the units concerned with this labor.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The forward and rear echelon of the Ordnance Section remained in NANCY (U-81) during the entire month, except that on 28 December personnel consisting of two officers and one enlisted man, to function as a forward liaison group, moved north with the command echelon of the headquarters to the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81). Another officer was added to this group on 30 December. The balance of the Ordnance Section remained in NANCY (U-81) with the rear echelon which consisted of AC of S, G-4, and other supply services.

Two quotas for transfer of enlisted men to Infantry units were accomplished and resulted in losses in personnel from Army Ordnance units totaling 998. Two enlisted men from the Ordnance Section were also lost to the Infantry as part of the headquarters quota.

One officer from the Ordnance Section and each group headquarters attended a one week course of instruction for Information-Education Officers at the Cite Universitaires in PARIS. This school was for the purpose of postwar planning and activities.

Staff Memorandum Number 73, this headquarters, 16 December 1944, increased the number of enlisted personnel authorized the Ordnance Section to thirty. A requisition was immediately placed with AC of S, G-1, to increase assigned personnel to equal this amount. The augmentation of personnel in the Ordnance Section remained as reported previously.

Casualties (killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled sixteen, thus making the accumulative total to date 104.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star	0	1
Soldiers Medal	0	2
Bronze Star	32	62
Purple Heart	8	64

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to the following Army Ordnance Units:

2nd Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
275th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)
837th Ordnance Depot Company
984th Ordnance Depot Company

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

Due to the rapidly changing tactical situation, the 69th Ordnance Group was reorganized as follows:

VIII CORPS	III CORPS	XII CORPS
590th Ordnance Bn	24th Ordnance Bn	311th Ordnance Bn
181th Ord Dep Co	838th Ord Dep Co	811st Ord Dep Co
271th Ord MM Co	3463rd Ord MM Co	2nd Ord MM Co
256th Ord MM Co	129th Ord MM Co	47th Ord MM Co
553rd Ord MM Co (Tk)	562nd Ord MM Co (Tk)	501st Ord MM Co (Tk)
342th Ord MAM Co	3524th Ord MAM Co	32nd Ord MM Co
484th Ord Coll Co		3447th Ord MAM Co
306th Ord Mt (AA) Co		3448th Ord MAM Co
	14th Ordnance Bn	316th Ordnance Bn
	131st Ord MM Co (FA)	537th Ord MM Co (FA)
	520th Ord MM Co (FA)	281st Ord Mt Co (AA)
	299th Ord Mt Co (AA)	275th Ord Mt Co (AA)
	3514th Ord MAM Co	3482nd Ord MAM Co
	3519th Ord MAM Co	

XX Corps
193rd Ordnance Bn
810th Ord Dep Co
15th Ord MM Co
344th Ord MM Co
556th Ord MM Co (Tk)
116th Ord MM Co
3515th Ord MAM Co
3511th Ord MAM Co

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent was as follows:

Officers	564
Enlisted Men	10,176
T/E Vehicles	2,474
Total Vehicles	4,097

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The supply picture for the first half of the month was mostly one of expediting and coordinating shipment of class II and IV supplies. In addition, necessary reports were submitted which provided the basis of re-supply, from the Communications Zone, of stocks in the Army depots and replenishment of theater stocks in the Communications Zone, from the Zone of the Interior.

The break-through of the enemy caused many First U. S. Army tactical and service troops to become separated from their commands. As a temporary solution to the situation, these units were placed under the command of the Third U. S. Army with the Ordnance units being placed directly under control of the Army Ordnance Officer. Battle losses of these organizations were such that with additional losses resulting from accidents caused by ice and snow covered roads the problem of re-supply became great. Army reserves of stock were soon depleted but with the cooperation of the Supply Section, Communications Zone, urgently needed items were forwarded and the critical situation was eased. The supply of combat vehicles became favorable once again but General Purpose Vehicles continued to remain critical; more so than at any other time in the entire campaign.

To expedite re-supply at this time, two officers from the Ordnance Section were dispatched to the III and VIII Corps to get all possible information on troops, installations, shortages, and any other data deemed necessary.

As a result of the counter offensive, traffic circulation was directed northward and the main supply roads became as follows:

a. TOUL (U-61) to WARCQ (U-46), to STAIN (U-47), to ARLON (P-62).

b. TOUL (U-61) to ST. BENOIT (U-54), to CHAMBLEY (U-65), to COMPIANS (U-66), to AUMETZ (U-79), to BUCH (P-70), to LUXEMBOURG (P-81), to STELBRUCK (P-84) to HEINERSCHIED (P-86).

c. NANCY (U-81) to PORT-A-MOUSSON (U-75), to ARNAVILLE (U-74) to METZ (U-85), to FRISANGE (P-80), to LUXEMBOURG (P-81), to ECHTERNACH (L-03), to BITBURG (L-15).

By 17 December the three main supply depots had moved to METZ (U-85).

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

Local purchasing and the placing of contracts had become a very large part of the maintenance picture at this time. It was necessary to maintain almost daily contact with local manufacturers in the NANCY (U-81) region in order to expedite production. In addition to the contracts placed for the manufacture of extended light end connectors, production of which was currently running about 3,500 per day, many other items of a critical nature were being turned out for the Third U. S. Army Ordnance Section.

The increase in deadlined equipment in Ordnance shops was attributable to the extreme shortage of replacement parts and major unit assemblies. Thus, the maintenance section resorted to all manner of procurement in order to get ordnance equipment off the deadline and back into the hands of the troops. Representatives of this section were dispatched to LYONS (X-98) and PARIS (S-04) where they procured fan belts from the Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company. These belts were urgently needed in order to get medium tanks and tank destroyer units back into action. An officer of the section flew to the UNITED KINGDOM to obtain releases on other vitally needed spare parts and assemblies.

A magnetic road sweep was designed with the cooperation of the Engineer Section, and was completed in less than one month. This device was tested and found to be highly successful in sweeping shrapnel and nails from the highways. The plans and specifications were forwarded to Communications Zone with a request that a number of these units be made available to Third U. S. Army for the purpose of sweeping all main roads in the Army area. The great reduction in tire trouble that was noted by the use of this device was sufficient to warrant its manufacture. In many instances there was evidence that the enemy had deliberately thrown nails upon some of the main roads.

The maintenance section conducted a demonstration of a "Cox Submerged Bolt Driving and Punching" gun (also known as the "Dynamite" gun), which had been obtained from the BRITISH Royal Navy salvage crew at TOULON, FRANCE. This weapon was to be used to seal up the doors on captured enemy pill boxes to prevent the reoccupation of them by the Germans after our first wave of troops had passed. Twenty such guns with sufficient ammunition were kept available in the Third U. S. Army depots.

Approximately 10,000 extended end connectors for medium tanks were given to the Southern Line of Communications for the Seventh U. S. Army. In return, that headquarters made available from their stocks many items of supply that were extremely short in this section of the theater.

Many tanks had been rendered hors de combat in the battles raging in the BELGIAN bulge and ordnance maintenance shops were overloaded with tank repair jobs. Through an arrangement with Advance Section, Communications Zone, one of their Ordnance Maintenance Battalions was made available for tank repairs, and to give direct support to our reserve troops along the MEUSE River line. All tanks repaired by this battalion were returned to Army for the replacement pool. Maximum capacity of the battalion shops was fourteen major tank repair jobs at any one time.

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SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

The enemy break-through in the north necessitated exceptionally fast movement of Ordnance Maintenance Battalions in order to maintain ordnance service in the new tactical situation. This was accomplished with no major interruptions of service to the troops.

The maintenance axes for 1 December through 16 December was as follows: The area West of the MOSELLE-MUERTHE River to the 70th (rear) Ordnance Group. The area East of the River to the 69th (forward) Ordnance Group. When the Third U. S. Army was committed on the southern flank of the BELGIAN bulge, the axes of maintenance was changed as follows: Area West of the MOSELLE-MUERTHE River and South of the line through ESCH-SUR-ALZETTE (P-70), LUXEMBOURG, to the 70th Ordnance Group. Road patrols were maintained on all principal roads in these areas. Radio repair teams were attached to Ordnance Control Points for the installation and repair of radios.

General locations of the headquarters of Ordnance Maintenance Battalions for the month were as follows:

Opening Date December	Location	Coordinates
29	69th Ordnance Group In DUELANGE	U-98
20	11th Ordnance Battalion In MORHANGE	Q-23
11	24th Ordnance Battalion 5 miles SW of SARRE UNION	Q-14
19	Vicinity of TRITTLERLING	Q-15
25	In ATRUS	P-60
2	193rd Ordnance Battalion In KEMANGE	U-97
8	311th Ordnance Battalion In MORHANGE	Q-23
20	In LE GND HARAS	Q-14
24	In DUELANGE	U-89
26	In LUXEMBOURG	P-81
4	316th Ordnance Battalion In HAYANGE	U-78
22	590th Ordnance Battalion In SEMAN	O-92
21	70th Ordnance Group METZ	U-85
	19th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
16	26th Ordnance Battalion In METZ	U-85
17	66th Ordnance Battalion In METZ	U-85
	79th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
19	317th Ordnance Battalion In METZ	U-85
	326th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
22	332nd Ordnance Battalion In METZ	U-85


The number of major items repaired in ordnance shops for the month of December was as follows:

Total General Purpose Vehicles Repaired.....	9,031
Total Combat Vehicles Repaired.....	1,719
Total Artillery Repaired.....	1,445
Total Small Arms Repaired.....	22,013
Total Instruments Repaired.....	4,121

During the early part of December 1944, emphasis was placed on the establishment of a large well balanced supply of ammunition in ASP No. 36 to provide close and adequate support for the proposed attack of the SIEGFRIED Line by the XII Corps. By 15 December this ASP contained 7,640 tons of well balanced stock. In addition to this supply on the ground, the "pipe line" between the Advance Section, Communications Zone Depots, and the Army area was filled with an approximately equal quantity to provide the necessary re-supply as the attack progressed. Included in the stockage of this ASP was a large amount of specially prepared high explosive shell with a red colored smoke mixture for 90mm anti-aircraft guns. This special ammunition was intended to provide a "flak line" which could be easily identified by aircraft in a closely coordinated ground and air attack. As the requirement for such special ammunition was not known until a few days before the anticipated use, a special request was made to the Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, to expedite the shipment of this item.

The change in the tactical situation on 16 December necessitated a complete revampment of the ammunition supply plan. To meet this radical change, all incoming shipments were diverted to the northern flank of the Army boundary. In addition, a large amount of ammunition already on the ground was ordered moved to more appropriate locations. Advantage was taken of every conceivable means of transportation to move ammunition to the new front. As an expedient, an entire maintenance battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment was utilized to help coordinate intra-Army rail shipments of ammunition.

By 19 December ammunition was readily available not only to Third U. S. Army troops, but to any and all units that had been cut off from their previous sources of supply by the enemy counter offensive. The



Loading 75mm Ammunition from roadside ASP.

focal point in the new ammunition plan was Depot No. 32, located near AUDUN-LE-ROMAN (U-69). This installation, subsequent to the counter offensive, was scheduled to be turned over to the Advance Section, Communications Zone, but was immediately restocked and again became a very large and very active installation. As Depot No. 32 would not provide close enough support to all troops engaged in halting the enemy drive, mobile rail distribution points were established at ATRUS (P-60), FOUCHES (P-52), and FLORENVILLE (P-22). As the situation at the forward part of the enemy drive was unstable, it was deemed advisable to move the ammunition at the latter point to VIKTON (P-41). The exact composition of the troops which had become dependent on Third Army for support was unknown and it was therefore necessary to provide all types of ammunition at as many points as possible. In addition to these new installations, re-supply was maintained to ASPs 35 and 38, in direct support of the XX, III, and XII Corps. To meet this sudden increase in demands, arrangements were made with Advance Section, Communications Zone, Depot O-611 to make issues to the Army, regardless of existing credits. Through full cooperation of Depot O-611 personnel, it was possible to establish this procedure and then later make all necessary adjustments of records to re-establish the credit system.

On 20 December a recommended air lift was prepared and submitted to the Army G-4. This air lift was provided to supply ammunition, as well as other classes of supplies, to the troops that were out off in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area. The timely arrival of these supplies played an important part in the ability of the troops in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area to not only survive, but to defeat the enemy.

An outstanding development, the "Posit" Fuse, was introduced to the Army during the month of December. On 9 and 10 December, demonstrations of field artillery firing, using "Posit" fused ammunition, were conducted for the XII and XI Corps. Representatives of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance were on hand to advise and to aid in technical instructions during and after these demonstrations. This entirely new and revolutionary fuse was well received by Commanders and gun crews alike. The original plans provided for this new fuse to be first used on 25 December, however, this date was changed to 17 December in order to take full advantage of its characteristics as an aid in stopping the enemy counter offensive.

The only change in ammunition supply policy introduced during the month was the discontinuance of formal letters authorizing specific amounts of ammunition per weapon that could be expended. In lieu of these letters, an informal status of critical ammunition items was prepared and furnished Corps Commanders, the Army Artillery Officer, and Corps Ordnance Officers as an expenditure guide for planning future operations. The initial study was prepared on 1 December and was based on physical quantities of ammunition in the Army area, allocations of credit currently on hand, and amounts of ammunition predicted by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group to be available in the future. Revised studies were prepared every ten days, or at such time that there was a radical change in the predicted future supply status.

For the month of December the Third U. S. Army ammunition installations were as follows:

Installation	Open	Closed	Serving	Location
Depot 31	3 Oct	25 Dec	ASPs	S NANCY (U-80)
Depot 32	7 Nov		ASPs	AUDON (U-68)
ASP 33	8 Nov	27 Dec	XII Corps	SCRENVILLE (Q-01)
ASP 34	8 Nov	4 Dec	XII Corps	E PONT-A-MOUSSON (U-83)
ASP 35	21 Nov		XX Corps	DISTROFF (U-98)
ASP 37	3 Dec		XX Corps	HAREFOURINE (Q-16)
ASP 38	26 Dec		III & XII Corps	MAMER (P-71)

During this period 151,705 tons of ammunition were handled and the mileage traveled by the attached Quartermaster Truck Companies in transporting this tonnage totaled 1,183,090 miles.



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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

As in the previous month icy and snow covered roads continued to exist and greatly added to the hazards of vehicles in the combat area.

The enemy counter-offensive gave rise to many problems. Facilities of maintenance shops became heavily laden with work. Salvage became extremely vital as it was a means of obtaining critical materials for reclamation and repair of major units and assemblies.

The volume of issues of ammunition were still great during the earlier part of the month and it was necessary to continue the use of a railhead for direct issue to using units.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The Ordnance Section moved from the city of NANCY (U-81) to ESCH (P-70), GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG on 7 January 1945. The liaison group of three officers and one enlisted man remained on duty with the command echelon in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81). At this time the French liaison officer on duty with the Ordnance Section was relieved from attached. A Belgian liaison officer later reported for duty with the section on 26 January and was immediately assigned to the Maintenance Sub-Section to assist in purchasing and contracting functions being carried on with Belgian firms. Other augmentation of personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as previously reported.

On 8 January the 6937th Corps Fuse Team (Provisional), consisting of two officers and six enlisted men, were placed on temporary duty with the section from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, for the purpose of instruction, in an advisory capacity, to troops in the use of "POZIT" fuses.

During this period three officers and three enlisted men were added to the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team, attached to the section, thereby completing authorized strength of five officers and seven enlisted men in the unit.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information-Education Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS (S-14) as follows:

Educational Adviseent.....1
Information-Education.....4
Instructor Training.....2

Quotas for thirty day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

69th Ordnance Group.....5
70th Ordnance Group.....5
82nd Ordnance Group.....2

Casualties (killed and wounded) due to enemy action during this period totaled eleven, thus making the accumulative total to date 115.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative to Date
Silver Star	0	1
Soldiers Medal	1	3
Bronze Star	43	105
Purple Heart	3	67

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to following Army Ordnance Units:

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 150th Ordnance Battalion
281st Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA)
552nd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
575th Ordnance Ammunition Company
576th Ordnance Ammunition Company
81st Ordnance Depot Company
3511th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
3519th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company

Accumulative total to date.....12

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

The rapidly changing tactical situation and the interchanging of divisions within Corps made three reorganizations of the 69th Ordnance Group necessary during the month. At the close of the period the 69th Ordnance Group was as follows:

III CORPS	VIII CORPS	XII CORPS	XX CORPS
24th Ordnance Bn	10th Ordnance Bn	314th Ordnance Bn	193rd Ordnance Bn
838th Ord Dep Co	2nd Ord MM Co	32nd Ord MM Co	47th Ord MM Co
3463rd Ord MM Co	7th Ord MM Co	129th Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
3524th Ord MAM Co	15th Ord MM Co	81st Ord Dep Co	116th Ord MM Co
	306th Ord Mt Co (AA)	3447th Ord MAM Co	840th Ord Dep Co
	3424th Ord MAM Co	3448th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co
	3444th Ord MM Co	257th Ord MM Co	
	3515th Ord MAM Co		

14th Ordnance Bn

184th Ord Dep Co
297th Ord HM Co (PA)
299th Ord Maint Co (AA)
510th Ord HM Co (PA)
553rd Ord HM Co (Tk)
562nd Ord HM Co (Tk)
3511th Ord MAM Co
3519th Ord MAM Co

316th Ordnance Bn

275th Ord Maint Co (AA)
281st Ord Maint Co (AA)
501st Ord HM Co (Tk)
520th Ord HM Co (PA)
537th Ord HM Co (PA)
3482nd Ord MAM Co

The loss of Ordnance units to Third Army was as follows:

Hq & Hq Det., 19th Ordnance Battalion
472nd Ordnance Evacuation Company
3526th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
256th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
131st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (PA)
657th Ordnance Ammunition Company

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Ordnance Battalion opened in LIBRAMONT (P-34) on 27 January and was placed on temporary duty with the 82nd Ordnance Group as a railroad battalion operating ammunition trains into Third U. S. Army Depots and Ammunition Supply Points.

ASPs and Ammunition Depots are now located as follows:

a. Ammunition Depot No. 32 - In AUDUN-LE-ROMAN On IC 15⁶ (U-663872) - Operated by 583rd Ordnance Ammunition Company.
b. ASP No. 35 - In DISTROFF (U-930826) on GC 73 - Operated by 574th and 576th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving XX Corps.

- c. ASP No. 38 - In MAMER on No. 6 (P-763155) - Operated by 573rd, 575th, 592nd, 596th, and 657th Ordnance Ammunition Companies and 3076th Ordnance Motor Vehicle Distributing Company. Serving II & XII Corps.
d. ASP No. 39 - In MELLIER on Highway 190 (P-405322) - Operated by 619th and 620th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving VIII Corps.
e. ASP No. 40 - In BRAS on P34 (P-626559) - Operated by 570th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving III Corps.
f. ASP No. 41 - In WELER (P-720689) off Highway No. 12 - Operated by 575th, 584th, and 620th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving VIII Corps.

Personnel and Vehicles present on the Continent is as follows:

Officers..... 655
Enlisted Men..... 12,351
T/E Vehicles..... 2,668
Total Vehicles..... 2,984

Total Quartermaster personnel and vehicles attached are as follows:

Officers..... 79
Enlisted Men..... 2,015
Vehicles..... 780

Civilians employed with Third Army Ordnance is as follows:

Machinists and Mechanics... 153
Laborers..... 150

No change in Quartermaster units attached to the 82nd Ordnance Group.

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

On 5 January a TWK was received from European Theater of Operations requesting a report on the status of tanks as of the 5th, 12th, 20th, and 28th of each month. This report was to be dispatched prior to 2400 of the succeeding day and to be marked to the attention of the "Armored Fighting Vehicles and Weapons Section". The report was to include the following information:

- The designation of all armored divisions, tank battalions, and armored field artillery battalions under the jurisdiction of the Army.
- The number of serviceable Medium Tanks (with the 75mm and 76mm Guns) on hand.
- The number of unserviceable but repairable tanks (with 75mm and 76mm Guns) on hand.
- The number of serviceable Medium Tanks (with 105 Howitzer) on hand.
- The number of unserviceable but repairable Medium Tanks (with 105 Howitzer) on hand.
- The number of battle losses on Medium Tanks (with 75mm and 76mm Guns) during the last period.
- The number of battle losses for Medium Tanks (with 105 Howitzer) during the last period.
- All types of Medium Tanks including DD's are to be included.

Icy and snow covered roads, as in the latter part of the previous month, continued to be the main cause of many accidents, particularly among general purpose vehicles. This greatly aggravated the already critical supply of these vehicles.

Except for a number of critical major items and unit assemblies, supply activities during this period were normal and consisted mostly of expediting and coordinating shipment of Class II and IV supplies. Some of the more critical items were as follows:

Light Machine-Guns	Fire Control Equipment
Pistols	General Purpose Vehicles
Grenade Launchers	Tires and Tubes
Rocket Launchers	Hot Patches

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Prestone which had previously been on the list was finally received in sufficient quantity to fill all requirements.

For the period of January the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	33	36
Medium Tanks	152	385
Combat Vehicles	369	322
Artillery (over 57mm)	184	199
General Purpose Vehicles	3,469	3,426

By the end of the month as the "Belgian Bulge", caused by the enemy counter-offensive, was practically eliminated the supply lines were as follows:

- a. PLAINEVAUX (P-14), to LIBRAMONT (P-34), to HOUFFALIZE (P-67).
- b. MOMMEY (P-20), to FLORENVILLE (P-22), to NEUFCHATEAU (P-34), to BASTOGNE (P-55), to HOUFFALIZE (P-67).
- c. LONGUYON (U-49), to LONGWY (P-50), to ARLON (P-62), to BASTOGNE (P-55) to MALSCHIED (P-77), to GRUFLANGE (P-88).
- d. BRIEY (U-67), to ADMETZ (U-79), to LUXEMBOURG (P-81), to DIEKIRCH (P-84), to CLERVAUX (P-56), to PRUM (L-07).
- e. METZ (U-85), to FRISANGE (P-80), to LUXEMBOURG (P-81), to ECHTERNACH (L-03), to BITEBURG (L-15).
- f. METZ (U-85), to THIONVILLE (U-88), to SAARLAUTERN (Q-28).

The location of the three main supply depots at this time remained the same as in the previous month.

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The facilities of ordnance maintenance shops were severely taxed as a result of the large scale enemy counter-attack in the BELGIAN bulge. The addition of the 607th Ordnance Base Armament Maintenance Battalion to Third U. S. Army Ordnance did much to relieve this strain. This battalion, located in NANCY, FRANCE (U-81) had considerable experience in previous campaigns and was a very valuable addition to the Ordnance at this particular time. They were given the responsibility of maintaining and supplying all Third U. S. Army using units in the area south of METZ (U-85) and west of the MOSELLE River. The battalion turned over all their major items and unit assemblies to companies of the 70th Ordnance Group who were currently engaged in repairing ordnance equipment in the collection point in NANCY (U-81). In addition to alleviating a serious shortage of spare parts and unit assemblies, the presence of this organization enabled the 70th Ordnance Group to move several companies from the areas of PORT-A-MOUSSON (U-83), NANCY (U-81), and TOUL (U-60) to the north where they were needed to assist in the great amount of work engendered by the break-through.

Maintenance units and collection points were carefully inspected to insure proper handling and care of repairable equipment. Ordnance troops were instructed to thoroughly check for salvage all unrepairable items in order that the maximum amount of critical materials be made available for reclamation and repair of major units and assemblies. Instructions were issued to promptly evacuate and classify all ordnance materiel uncovered in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area and to report all cases of unnecessary cannibalization to this headquarters.

An artillery calibration team was assigned to check over all condemned major artillery tubes where time and the tactical situation permitted. Their findings enabled Ordnance to better analyze artillery tubes and allow maximum use of the tubes before being condemned.

All track-like vehicles were in danger of being immobilized due to the hazardous condition of the roads caused by ice and snow. This problem was solved by welding manganese steel lugs on every fifth block of steel type track or on rubber type track, by replacing every fifth block with a steel block equipped with a lug. This enabled the vehicles to obtain the necessary traction on icy terrain and to be put back into action. Additional manganese steel was obtained for one of our armored divisions to help them with the speedy modification of their tank track.

A GERMAN trigger adapter that fitted into the trigger housing of a rifle, machine-gun, etc., making it possible to operate the trigger, without removing gloves or mittens, was captured. The idea was adopted by the maintenance section and a similar gadget was designed

and local contracts placed for the manufacture of 95,000 pieces. Deliveries at the rate of 5,000 a day were effected.

A local contract was placed for the manufacture of a strap wrench to facilitate the removal of 105mm fuses. The strap material used was salvaged from a Quartermaster salvage point.

Close liaison was maintained with all contractors in order to expedite deliveries of the many critical items being manufactured for the Third U. S. Army Ordnance Section.

The maintenance axes for January remained the same as that for the period 16 through 31 December.

The number of major items repaired in ordnance shops were as follows:

	January	Accumulative to Date
General Purpose Vehicles	8,537	39,482
Combat Vehicles	2,092	7,733
Artillery	1,927	6,540
Small Arms	19,760	77,283
Instruments	1,234	17,042

The general location of Third U. S. Army Ordnance Maintenance Battalions during January were as follows:

Opening Date	Location	Coordinates
January	<u>59th Ordnance Group</u>	
	<u>24th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
21	In NIEDERCOLPACK	P-63
	<u>193rd Ordnance Battalion</u>	
12	In BASSE YUTZ	U-88
	<u>590th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
2	In CHARLEVILLE	O-83
10	In NEUFCHATEAU	P-34
19	In LIBRAMONT	P-34
	<u>70th Ordnance Group</u>	
	<u>326th Ordnance Battalion</u>	
17	Vicinity of METZ	U-85

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

By the first of January, the enemy counter-offensive had been sufficiently contained to permit the establishment of a formal ASP to replace the railhead distributing points which had been serving VIII Corps. Even though the Corps would not occur in the establishment of an ASP close to the front lines, the Army Ordnance Officer ordered ASP No. 39 to be opened at NEUFCHATEAU (P-34) on 4 January. This extremely close support contributed much to the restoration of confidence in the troops that had previously been forced to withdraw during the enemy attacks. In one instance, armored units passed through this ASP enroute to the active front lines.

The volume of issues at ASP No. 38 (P-71) serving both III and XII Corps, was so large during the early part of the month that it was necessary to continue the use of the ATRUS railhead (P-67) to assist in the support of using units. During the first week of January approximately 65% of the ammunition received at this railhead was issued directly to using units, the remainder being placed in ASP No. 38.

As the combat troops advanced, constant reconnaissance for suitable ASP sites and railheads was maintained in forward areas in order to continue the close support policy of the Army. Thus, during the first week of the month daily reconnaissance trips north and northwest of the city of LUXEMBOURG (P-81) were made to find suitable locations to support the III and XII Corps.

As the Third Army attack continued and swung toward Germany, decision was made to provide new ASPs for the III and VIII Corps. These ASPs, Nos. 40 and 41, were located southeast and northeast of BASTOGNE (P-66) respectively, and were served from the railhead located in that city. These installations were established under the most adverse weather conditions yet encountered by the operating personnel, as practically all roads were covered by deep snowdrifts and ice. Snowplows and bulldozers were used throughout the area to clear roads and spaces in the snowbanks where ammunition could be stacked. In order to eliminate the truck haul across the MOSELLE River a new railroad was opened at DALSTEIN (Q-07) to serve ASP No. 35 in support of XX Corps.

At the end of January, as the tactical situation changed, the Army Ordnance Officer initiated action to gradually deplete Depot No. 32, which with its important railhead at AUDUN-LE-ROMAN (U-68), had been a focal point in the ammunition supply system during this period. This railhead not only served Depot No. 32, but was used as a transfer point to route ammunition trains to vital areas during the battle against the German offensive.

Two Armored Divisions held in Army reserve, the 8th and 9th, required special assistance during the middle of the month. Since they had no ASP to service them nearby, action was taken to increase the basic load of each division by 400 tons. Thus, in the event of emergency, each unit could enter into combat with a comfortable margin of safety pending establishment by Army of an ASP behind them.

Another unit requiring special assistance during January was the 101st Airborne Division. Upon being relieved after its epic stand at BASTOGNE, it was attached to the Seventh U. S. Army. Consistent with the policy of having troops leaving Third Army being well supplied, the Army Ordnance Officer directed that this division be furnished 200 tons of ammunition over and above their basic load. This was accomplished 19 January 1945.

During the month there were two serious mishaps. On 2 January several tons of explosives in Depot No. 31 detonated, resulting in some casualties and damage. Investigation revealed the probable cause to have been action by enemy aircraft. On 10 January forty-four rail cars loaded with ammunition for ASP No. 39 were involved in a train wreck at MESSANCY (P-61). Most of the ammunition either exploded or burned, and all but thirteen cars were destroyed. The Army Ordnance Officer visited the scene of the wreck shortly after it occurred and instructed that every effort be exerted to salvage maximum amounts of ammunition. Four bomb disposal squads, one provisional collecting squad, one ammunition company, and a platoon of a quartermaster truck company worked forty-eight hours removing unserviceable ammunition and salvage, thereby enabling the railroad maintenance crews to immediately repair the damaged tracks.

The First U. S. Army ASP No. 128, which had been overrun by the Germans during their offensive, was recaptured by Third U. S. Army during the latter part of January. Its stocks were prepared for demolition by the Germans, but only a small portion was actually destroyed. In order to protect using units from unnecessary danger due to the probability of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines having been left by the Germans, this ASP was not reopened. Instead, an ammunition company and three bomb disposal squads were assigned to clear the area, inventory the ammunition, and incorporate it in ASP No. 41.

Another reclamation job, that of gathering up ammunition left unused by the 101st Airborne Division in the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P-66) was given to ammunition collecting squads. This ammunition had been previously supplied to that unit by "air lift".



Roadside Ammunition Supply Point.

SECRET

**CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS**

SECTION I - GENERAL

The efficiency with which Army Ordnance units had normally operated during past campaigns was greatly hampered during this period by conditions throughout the Army road net which made travel practically impossible in some areas. Transportation of heavy equipment and supplies and evacuation by tank transporter was prohibited except when deemed highly necessary due to the tactical situation.

Modification of medium tanks with additional armor on forward hull was accomplished and proved highly successful when committed to actual combat. Equipping of all medium tanks with 76mm guns was also stressed to provide additional fire power.

Ammunition was moved forward as far as possible by rail in order to relieve haulage by truck transportation. The expenditure of artillery ammunition during the last two weeks of the month surpassed all previous records for a similar period.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

The Ordnance Section moved from the City of ESCH (P-70) to the City of LUXEMBOURG (P-81) on 6 February 1945. The entire section was consolidated at this point when the small liaison group, three officers and one enlisted man, rejoined the section from the Command Echelon, thereby making the Ordnance Section complete in one location for the first time since the start of operations in August. Personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as in previous months, with five enlisted men being attached from Army Ordnance units, and attached teams remaining as previously reported.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS as follows:

Information-Education..... 4
Educational Advancement..... 1
Instructor Training..... 1
On-The-Job-Training..... 2

Quotas for thirty days furlough in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

69th Ordnance Group..... 8
70th Ordnance Group..... 8
82nd Ordnance Group..... 4

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to the following Army Ordnance Units:

3450th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
550th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Field Army)
129th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
88th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
Detachments "b" and "c", 158th Ordnance Tire Repair Company

Accumulative totals of this award to date were:

Group Headquarters.....None
Battalion Headquarters..... 1
Companies..... 13
Detachment, Tire Repair..... 1
Bomb Disposal Squads..... 2
Total to date..... 17

Casualties due to enemy action during this period were as follows:

	Current		Accumulative Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Officers	0	0	3	2
Enlisted Men	2	5	34	66

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

Officers:	Current		Accumulative Total	
Silver Star	0		2	
Soldiers Medal	0		0	
Bronze Star	11		55	
Purple Heart	0		5	
Enlisted Men:				
Silver Star	0		0	
Soldiers Medal	2		4	
Bronze Star	25		89	
Purple Heart	2		100	

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

The following Ordnance units were assigned to Third U. S. Army during the month of February:

3562nd Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
565th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
256th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
131st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Field Army)
877th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
657th Ordnance Ammunition Company
51th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
231st Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
267th Ordnance Service Detachment (Mess)

The following units were relieved from assignment to Third U. S. Army during the month:

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 19th Ordnance Battalion
472nd Ordnance Evacuation Company
3526th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
7th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
553rd Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
583rd Ordnance Ammunition Company
853rd Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company

The 607th Ordnance Base Armament Maintenance Battalion was relieved from attached to Third U. S. Army and returned to control of Communications Zone.

The rear vehicle replacement pool of the 70th Ordnance Group, operated by the 317th Ordnance Battalion, was moved from STAIN (U-47) to METZ (U-85) due to the fact that the rear Army boundary was moved forward and Rest of STAIN (U-47).

When the III Corps was lost to First U. S. Army, the 24th Ordnance Battalion, which was supporting III Corps, moved back as an intermediate battalion supporting the 314th Ordnance Battalion, which in turn was supporting XII Corps.

At the close of the month, Ordnance Groups providing supply and maintenance to the Army were organized as follows:

69th Ordnance Group		
10th Ord Bn	314th Ord Bn	193rd Ord Bn
2nd Ord MM Co	32nd Ord MM Co	47th Ord MM Co
15th Ord MM Co	129th Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
18th Ord Dep Co	257th Ord MM Co	256th Ord MM Co
3424th Ord MAM Co	841st Ord Dep Co	840th Ord Dep Co
3444th Ord MAM Co	3447th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co
3515th Ord MAM Co	3448th Ord MAM Co	3524th Ord MAM Co
	3463rd Ord MM Co	

14th Ord Bn	24th Ord Bn	316th Ord Bn
297th Ord HM Co (FA)	131st Ord HM Co (FA)	275th Ord MM Co (AA)
306th Ord Mt Co (AA)	299th Ord Mt Co (AA)	281st Ord Mt Co (AA)
510th Ord HM Co (FA)	501st Ord HM Co (TK)	537th Ord HM EA Co
562nd Ord HM Co (TK)	520th Ord HM Co (EA)	565th Ord HM Co (TK)
3514th Ord MAM Co	838th Ord Dep Co	3482nd Ord MAM Co
3519th Ord MAM Co	3562nd Ord HAM Co	

70th Ordnance Group		
26th Ord Bn	66th Ord Bn	79th Ord Bn
344th Ord Dep Co	145th Ord Evac Co	521st Ord HM Co (FA)
347th Ord Dep Co	471st Ord Evac Co	552nd Ord HM Co (TK)
837th Ord Dep Co	485th Ord Evac Co	902nd Ord HAM Co
984th Ord Dep Co	488th Ord Evac Co	914th Ord HAM Co
Det B, 158th Ord Tire Rep Co	489th Ord Evac Co	877th Ord HAM Co
Det C, 158th Ord Tire Rep Co	889th Ord HAM Co	
317th Ord Bn	326th Ord Bn	
286th Ord MM Co	305th Ord MM Co (AA)	
556th Ord HM Co (TK)	531st Ord HM Co (TK)	
3492nd Ord MAM Co	550th Ord HM Co (TK)	
560th Ord HM Co (TK)	904th Ord HAM Co	
	3537th Ord MAM Co	
	851st Ord HAM Co	

The 82nd Ordnance Group was operating ammunition installations at the close of the month as follows:

Ammunition Depot No. 32 - In AUDUN-LE-ROMAN on IC156 (U-663872), Operated by 576th Ordnance Ammunition Company.

ASP No. 35 - In DISEROFF on G073, (U-930826), Operated by 619th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving XX Corps.

ASP No. 38 - In MAMER on No. 6, (P-763155), Operated by 573rd, 575th, 592nd, 596th, and 626th Ordnance Ammunition Companies. Serving XII Corps.

ASP No. 39 - Closed 271200 February 1945.

ASP No. 40 - In BRAS on N34 (P-626559), Operated by 570th, 574th, 575th Ordnance Ammunition Companies, and 3076th Ordnance Motor Vehicle Distributing Company. Serving VIII Corps.

ASP No. 41 - In WELER off Highway No. 12 (P-720689), Operated by 620th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving VIII Corps.

ASP No. 42 - In STEGEN off No. 14 (P-875380), Operated by 657th Ordnance Ammunition Company. Serving XII Corps.

The following Ordnance units were reorganized during the month:

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies under T/O & E, 9-7, 30 September 1944.
Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squads under T/O & E, 9-500, Column EB, 14 October 1944.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the close of this period were as follows:

Officers..... 626
Enlisted Men..... 11,768
T/E Vehicles..... 2,594
Total Vehicles..... 2,906

Due to the increasing demands for Ordnance Service, it was necessary to employ the following civilian personnel in Army Ordnance units:

Machinists & Mechanics..... 381
Laborers..... 1,026

SECRET

SECTION IV
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

Poor road conditions due to sudden thaw during this period necessitated orders by the Commanding General prohibiting the travel of tank transporters over the Army road net, thereby preventing deliveries of heavy equipment, principally tanks and combat vehicles, to the using units. This ban, which permitted necessary repairs, was lifted on special occasions as required by the tactical situation.

Further action was taken on the conversion of all separate Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons from M59 to M24 Light Tanks. This provided a faster, more maneuverable tank mounting a 75mm Gun instead of the former vehicle mounting a 37mm Gun.

The previous shortage of all light machine guns was relieved by receipts from Communications Zone in sufficient quantities to fill existing back orders.

Requirements for brake parts and brake fluid were heavy due to the generally poor road conditions throughout the Army. Communications Zone was requested to expedite requisitions on these items which had been placed by main Army supply depots.

A survey of procurement activities in which the procurement section of Army Ordnance and 70th Ordnance Group were engaged, revealed that contracts for over 300 items, ranging from automotive to small arms, artillery, combat vehicle, fire control, and other sundry items, had been negotiated within Third U. S. Army Ordnance Service. This extensive program was necessary in order to fill requirements on materiel in critical supply throughout the Army.

The situation on 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, trucks continued critical during this month, except 2 1/2 ton dump trucks which was critical during the early stages but was relieved near the close of the month.

The supply of combat vehicles was in excellent condition throughout the month.

For the period of February, the total receipts and issues of the following major items were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	165	102
Medium Tanks	295	152
Combat Vehicles	1,401	1,115
Artillery (over 57mm)	184	164

The equipment of Tank Destroyer Battalions was converted from the Carriage, Motor, 3" Gun M10, to Carriage, Motor, 90mm, M36, in order to supply M10 equipment to Sixth U. S. Army Group as per instructions of Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

A limited stock of 76mm guns was received for the purpose of modifying medium tanks equipped with the 75mm gun. This was deemed desirable since the tank equipped with 75mm gun was not considered by the using units to have sufficient fire power to perform assigned missions.

Action was taken to obtain 200,000 stock record cards that were in critical supply and were affecting the operation of Third U. S. Army Ordnance Depots. Contact was made with U. K. Base Sector and they shipped via air express 50,000 of these stock record cards immediately. Wire was also dispatched to Headquarters Communications Zone regarding this critical shortage and action is being taken to supply the total amount required.

A critical shortage of hot patches continued to exist in Third U. S. Army units. Requirements due out to using units were approximately 20,000 boxes. Total receipts during this period amounted to 6,000 boxes, which was highly inadequate to cover requirements.

The chronic shortage of all fire control and sighting equipment was improved somewhat by receipts during the month, but numerous items of this type continued in critical short supply.

By the end of the month the supply lines were as follows:


- (a) N26 from LIBRAMONT (P-34) to SCHONBERG (P-98) - 158 to PRUM (L-07).
- (b) N18 from LONGUYON (U-19) to ANLON (P-62) - N4 to HOUFFALIZE (P-67) - N26 to ST VITH (P-88).
- (c) N406 from BRIEY (U-67) to AUMETZ (U-79) - 664 to RJ No. 4 to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 12 to WILTZ (P-85).
- (d) N53 and No. 3 from UDKANG (U-87) to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 7 to DIEKIRCH (P-84) - No. 17 to SINSPELLEN (P-95) - L43 to BIEBURG (L-15).
- (e) N53 and No. 3 from UDKANG (U-87) to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 11 to ECHTERNACH (L-03) - NR257 to BIEBURG (L-15).
- (f) N53 and No. 3 from UDKANG (U-87) to LUXEMBOURG (P-81) - No. 1 to OBERSEILLING (L-12) - NR 49 to TRIER (L-22).
- (g) N53 to UDKANG (U-87) to THIONVILLE (U-88) - N418 to SAARLAUTERN (C-27) - NR 269 to NOEFELDEN (L-51).

The location of the three main supply depots remained unchanged during the month and were located in METZ (P-85).

SECTION V
MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

The Commanding General directed that all M4A3 Medium Tanks equipped with 76mm Gun and all M4A3E8 Medium Tanks in the Army, not presently equipped with heavy armor plate on the forward hull similar to that on the M4A3E2, be modified with the least practicable delay. A completed model was submitted to the Commanding General which was approved and instructions given to proceed with the modification.

Army Ordnance personnel were assigned the task of removing armor plate from wrecked tanks in collection points and in the field. Many such tanks were found in the area of BASTOGNE (P-55) and elsewhere in the Belgian bulge. Contracts were made with three local factories for the modification as the eighty-five man hours required per tank would have seriously hampered normal Army Ordnance maintenance. The actual modification consisted of welding an additional two and one half inches of armor on the front hull of all M4A3 and M4A3E8 medium tanks in the hands of the troops. The tanks in three Armored Divisions were modified in three weeks time with an estimated average of thirty-six tanks per division. The rapid procurement of extra supplies of oxygen, acetylene, and welding rod by Third U. S. Army Ordnance enabled the local contractors to maintain a schedule of ten tanks per day.



Medium Tank from which armor plate has been removed to provide additional armor for modification of other tanks.

Proof of the practicability of this modification was not long in coming. A report was received from the 6th Armored Division that one of their recently modified M4A3E8 medium tanks had suffered a direct hit from a German 75mm shell with the only resulting damage being the complete separation of the additional middle section of armor from the hull. The tank continued in action and succeeded in "knocking out" the opposing vehicle. The crew whose lives were saved by this additional protection were loud in their praises of this modification.

The M4A3E2 medium tank, although equipped with additional armor plate, was still mounted with a 75mm gun. In order to make this tank a more effective assault vehicle, a program was initiated to supply this vehicle with more fire power. 76mm gun tubes were obtained through normal supply channels and the salvage of medium tanks equipped with 76mm tubes. The modification was performed in the Armored Divisions by their organic Ordnance Maintenance Battalions while the tubes in all separate tank battalions were changed over by Army Ordnance Maintenance personnel.

An Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Field Army) from the Advance Section, Communications Zone, was assigned to work in conjunction with Army Ordnance units in the collection point operated by the 326th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion in ESCH (P-70). The sole mission of this unit was the disassembly of salvage materiel, thus obtaining many useful assemblies and spare parts critically needed in maintenance activities.



Closeup of forward hull of modified medium tank showing results of direct hit by German 75mm Gun.



M4A3E8 Medium Tank, w/76mm Gun, Modified w/additional armor on forward hull. Center section received direct hit by 75mm shell and was separated from tank which continued attack successfully.

SECRET

Ordnance materiel reconditioned by Third U. S. Army Ordnance maintenance units during February was as follows:

	FEBRUARY	ACCUMULATIVE TO DATE
General Purpose Vehicles	9,411	18,893
Combat Vehicles	3,218	10,951
Artillery	1,811	8,354
Small Arms	27,040	104,323
Instruments	4,589	21,631

The maintenance axes for February remained the same as that for the period 16 through 31 December.

Location of the main maintenance battalions during the month of February were as follows:

Opening Date	Location	Coordinates
February	69th Ordnance Group No Change	
1	10th Ordnance Battalion In RECOGNE	P-56
21	In COURMIL	P-78
1	11th Ordnance Battalion 10 MI NW BASTOGNE	P-46
16	In NIEDERFELDEN	P-74
16	24th Ordnance Battalion In KEHLEN	P-72
	193rd Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	314th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
	316th Ordnance Battalion No Change	
9	70th Ordnance Group In RODANGE	P-60
12	79th Ordnance Battalion In RODANGE	P-60
1	326th Ordnance Battalion In ESCH	P-70

**SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION**

During the month of February ammunition supply was faced with situations that at first appeared to be impossible to overcome. As the frozen ground began to thaw many roads became impassible due to the heavy traffic necessary to move troops and supporting supplies. As all railyards had been either partially or completely destroyed by the retreating enemy these facilities were not immediately available for use. The most seriously affected area was the WILTZ (P-75)-BASTOGNE (P-55)-ST VITH (P-88) sector occupied by the VIII Corps.

In order to place ammunition in locations accessible to using units, a new area East of the ST VITH (P-88)-BASTOGNE (P-55) road was opened in ASP No. 41 and stocked from the railhead at BASTOGNE (P-55), even though a large stock of the same items were on hand but not accessible.

The Army Ordnance Officer, faced with the possibility of road conditions becoming more acute, ordered the establishment of an Army reserve of approximately 1,000 tons of carefully selected items east of ST VITH (P-88). This reserve was to be used only in an emergency and in the event that it was impossible for using units to reach other supply installations. Toward the latter part of the month, the tactical situation had progressed satisfactorily and road conditions had improved somewhat so this reserve supply was opened to using units for normal issues.

Road conditions in the XX Corps sector were also bad and in order to conserve what few roads were still open, while necessary repairs were in progress, priority was placed on the rehabilitation of railheads in this area. Incoming rail shipments at the DALSTEIN (Q-07) railhead were divided and appropriate wagons shunted to each of three forward small railheads in division areas. This railroad method of supply to forward units was not considered as being very satisfactory, however, as an expedient to relieve the road conditions, it proved valuable.

Work in Army installations was further complicated by the fact that approximately 50% of all ammunition which had been stacked on snow and frozen ground toppled over as the snow and ground thawed. A large amount of personnel were used to restack this ammunition, thereby reducing the amount of personnel available for issuing and receiving ammunition in installations and railheads. During this period of time it was determined that available storage space was so limited to justify the change in existing safety distances. The size of stacks was increased from 6 tons to 8 tons in order to obtain maximum storage on the limited ground and road space available.

By the 11th of the month, strategically located dumps and installations had been built up to provide adequate supplies for the assault of the Siegfried Line. The penetration of this line completed, the Army was ready to resume its advance to the RHINE. During the last two weeks of February, expenditures of artillery ammunition exceeded amounts expended during any previous similar period since the Army became operational.

Many requests for training ammunition were processed during the early part of the month to provide training for reinforcements and for units that had no opportunity to fire for several months. Another unusual requirement was the increased demand by the Psychological Warfare Section for 105mm Howitzer M2 HC Smoke Shell for reloading with propaganda leaflets. In order to eliminate the day to day basis for supplying this type of ammunition, a request was submitted to Twelfth U. S. Army Group for 30,000 rounds for the exclusive use of Psychological Warfare. This request was approved and the ammunition placed in Army installations earmarked for that purpose.

Total ammunition received from Advance Section, Communications, Zone, during this period amounted to 39,767 long tons. Total ammunition handled by all Third U. S. Army installations amounted to 137,179 long tons.

Total truck mile haulage by trucks under Army Ordnance control for the month was 994,103. Accumulative total to date since 18 November 1944 is 4,494,103.

**CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS**

SECTION I - GENERAL

Activities in Third Army Ordnance Service during the month of March were headlined by a continual forward movement in the wake of the highly successful combat troops of the Army. The problem of transportation of supplies and ammunition once again became paramount and was highly comparable with operations during the liberation of FRANCE. However, through the utilization of all available means of transportation, which included M25 Tank Transporters, M25 Trailers and provisional trucking companies composed of other organic vehicles of Army Ordnance units, this problem was successfully coped with and the vital supplies moved forward.

The movement of the main army supply depots into GERMANY and across the RHINE to the vicinity of FRANKFURT was initiated in the latter part of the month to further shorten Ordnance supply lines of the Army.

The Ordnance supply situation in general was very favorable due to receipts from Communications Zone and the elimination of many items from the critical list. The supply of combat vehicles, in particular, was excellent and afforded an opportunity to furnish immediate replacement to divisions on combat losses.

Ammunition supply under the fast-moving tactical situation into GERMANY and across the RHINE necessitated the continual establishment of ASPs further forward in support of combat units. Mileage covered by the transportation of this vital item during the latter part of the month exceeded all previous records within the Army.

**SECTION II
ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION**

Five teams consisting of one officer and one enlisted man each, which were made available from the Zone of Interior through the Ground Force Reinforcement System for the purpose of instructing on the operation, care and maintenance of the M29C Cargo Carrier, were distributed as follows in order to locate them with proper unit to carry out their primary mission:

4 Teams - 69th Ordnance Group
1 Team - 70th Ordnance Group

A liaison group consisting of two officers and the Operations Sub-section complete moved forward with the Tactical Echelon from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81) to OBERSTEIN (L-72), GERMANY on 27 March.

A quota for seven day leaves of absence at the UNITED STATES RIVIERA Recreational Area, CANNES, FRANCE, for personnel of Army Ordnance units was received on 28 March and allocated as follows:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
69th Ordnance Group	2	20
70th Ordnance Group	2	20
82nd Ordnance Group	1	10

On 29 March, the Ordnance Officer and Forward Ammunition Sub-section moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) to OBERSTEIN (L-72), GERMANY to join the forward tactical echelon. On this same date the Assistant Ordnance Officer, Supply, Maintenance, Administration, and rear Ammunition Sub-sections moved with the rear supply echelon to the city of TRIER (L-12), GERMANY. This resulted in the Ordnance Section being again divided into two echelons similar to the setup used in operations across FRANCE.

Personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as in previous months, with five enlisted men being attached from Army Ordnance units, and attached teams remaining as previously reported.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS as follows:

Information-Education.....	5
Instructor Training.....	3

Quotas for thirty (30) day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
69th Ordnance Group	7	20
70th Ordnance Group	6	19
82nd Ordnance Group	3	9

Casualties due to enemy action during this period were as follows:

	Current		Accumulative Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Officers	0	2	3	4
Enlisted Men	1	8	35	74

No Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to Ordnance units during the month.

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The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
Officers:		
Silver Star	0	2
Soldiers Medal	0	0
Bronze Star	13	68
Purple Heart	2	7
Enlisted Men:		
Silver Star	0	0
Soldiers Medal	2	4
Bronze Star	7	96
Purple Heart	9	109

French decorations for services rendered in the liberation of FRANCE were awarded Ordnance personnel as follows:

Legion of Honor.....	1
Croix de Guerre.....	25

**SECTION III
OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION**

On 10 March 1945, the 283rd Ordnance Ballistic and Technical Service Detachment was activated at DUDELANGE (U-89), LUXEMBOURG per authority received from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations through Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group. The unit was attached to Third U. S. Army from Headquarters, Communications Zone and further attached to the 69th Ordnance Group for operations and administrative control. Personnel for this unit was derived from a provisional ballistic team which was operating in the Army area.

The great volume of Prisoners of War captured by advancing troops at this time presented the Provost Marshal with a serious transportation problem and arrangements were made whereby all trucks from Army Ordnance units returning from forward installations, would pick up prisoners from the Division and Corps concentration areas and return them to Prisoner of War enclosures in the rear Army area.

Movement of the 26th Ordnance Battalion, which incorporates the three Main Army Supply Depots, and has been located in METZ (U-85), was started during this period in order to shorten supply lines to the rapidly advancing combat troops of the Army. It was originally planned to locate these depots in the city of MAINZ (M-35), GERMANY, but due to the highly successful forward movement of the Army, and to further shorten the supply lines, it was decided to advance even further to the City of FRANKFURT (M-67) GERMANY. It was anticipated that at least two weeks would be required to complete the movement of these large depot installations which were stocked with approximately 12,000 tons of Ordnance material.

Forward movement of the vehicle replacement pool, operated by the 317th Ordnance Battalion, from METZ (U-85) to ALZEY (M-22) was also started during the latter part of the month. Relocation of this installation, consisting of approximately 2,200 general purpose vehicles, presented a major task due to the distance of 125 miles to be traveled, plus the exceedingly heavy traffic already placed on highways by the forward movement of the Army. Combat vehicles were given priority in this movement as they were currently needed for replacement of battle losses.

The following Ordnance units were assigned to Third U. S. Army during the month:

88th Ord HM Co (FA)	163rd Ord Bn
886th Ord HAM Co	164th Ord Bn
3433rd Ord HAM Co	1624th Ord Evac Co
125th Ord HM Co (Tk)	271st Ord MM Co
674th Ord Am Co	847th Ord Depot Co
3434th Ord MAM Co	

At the close of the month, Ordnance Groups providing supply and maintenance to the Army were organized as follows:

69th Ordnance Group		
10th Ordnance Bn	314th Ordnance Bn	193rd Ordnance Bn
32nd Ord MM Co	15th Ord MM Co	2nd Ord MM Co
184th Ord Dep Co	47th Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
271st Ord MM Co	257th Ord MM Co	129th Ord MM Co
3444th Ord MM Co	841st Ord Dep Co	840th Ord Dep Co
3463rd Ord MM Co	3447th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co
3515th Ord MAM Co	3448th Ord MAM Co	3524th Ord MAM Co
3519th Ord MAM Co		

70th Ordnance Group		
163rd Ordnance Bn	14th Ordnance Bn	316th Ordnance Bn
297th Ord HM Co (Fa)	131st Ord HM Co (Fa)	125th Ord HM Co (Tk)
306th Ord Maint Co	299th Ord Maint Co (AA)	275th Ord Mt Co (AA)
562nd Ord HM Co (Tk)	501st Ord HM Co (Tk)	281st Ord Mt Co (AA)
	520th Ord HM Co (Pa)	510th Ord HM Co (Pa)
	838th Ord Dep Co	537th Ord HM Co (Fa)
	3434th Ord MAM Co	565th Ord HM Co (Fa)
	3511th Ord MAM Co	847th Ord Dep Co
	3562nd Ord HAM Co	3433rd Ord HAM Co
		3482nd Ord HAM Co

70th Ordnance Group		
326th Ordnance Bn	66th Ordnance Bn	26th Ordnance Bn
305th Ord Mt Co (AA)	155th Ord Evac Co	344th Ord Dep Co
531st Ord HM Co (Tk)	471st Ord Evac Co	347th Ord Dep Co
550th Ord HM Co (Fa)	485th Ord Evac Co	837th Ord Dep Co
851st Ord HAM Co	489th Ord Evac Co	984th Ord Dep Co
904th Ord HAM Co	889th Ord HAM Co	Det. B, 158th Fire Repair Co
3437th Ord MAM Co	877th Ord HAM Co	Det. C, 158th Tire Repair Co
	944th Ord HAM Co	

332nd Ordnance Bn		
317th Ordnance Bn	332nd Ordnance Bn	164th Ordnance Bn
286th Ord MM Co	No attached units	88th Ord HM Co (Fa)
556th Ord HM Co (Tk)		902nd Ord HAM Co
560th Ord HM Co (Tk)		
3492nd Ord MAM Co		
521st Ord HM Co (Fa)		
552nd Ord HM Co (Tk)		

At the end of March, ASPs, Ammunition Depots, and Railheads were located as follows:

ASF No. 35	In DISTROFF on GC 73 (U-930826) - Operated by 576th, 619th Ord Am Cos - Serving XX Corps.
ASF No. 38	In MAIER on No. 6 (P-763155) - Operated by 573rd, 575th, 592nd Ord Am Cos - Serving XII Corps.
ASF No. 45	In MUNSTERHAEFELD on Highway L-262 (L-733831) - Operated by 675th Ord Am Co - Serving XII and VIII Corps.
Am Dep No. 46	In WOLLSTEIN on Highway L-118 (M-160350) - Operated by 574th, 626th Ord Am Cos - Serving XII Corps.
RHD A-8	In MONDORF (Q-165920) - Operated by 620th Ord Am - Serving XX Corps.
ASF No. 48	In HOLLRICH off Highway 327 (L-823639) - Operated by 570th Ord Am Co - Serving VIII Corps.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the close of this period were as follows:

Officers.....	611
Enlisted Men.....	12,697
T/E Vehicles.....	2,678
Total Vehicles.....	3,000

Due to the increasing demands for Ordnance Service, it was necessary to employ the following civilian personnel in Army Ordnance units:

Mechanists and Mechanics.....	386
Laborers.....	1,042

**SECTION IV
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION**

As a result of improved weather conditions and repairs to roads and highways throughout the Army road net, it became possible to increase the use of tank transporters and heavy equipment for the movement of combat vehicles and supplies to forward installations.

The supply of combat vehicles, particularly medium and light tanks, was very good throughout the month and the status of medium tanks permitted prompt replacements of battle losses, plus an opportunity to use new tanks on hand in the combat vehicle pool to replace tanks which have been in the hands of troops during all of the past operations in FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM, and GERMANY and require a complete overhaul.

The critical shortages of tires (all sizes), tubes (all sizes), hot patches, brake parts, and brake fluid from the previous month were relieved during this period as the result of incoming shipments from Communications Zone.

In anticipation of future fast-moving operations, requirements were placed on Communications Zone for a reserve supply of 200 sets of medium tank track and 500 bogie wheel assemblies for medium tanks.

Army Ordnance procurement activities were curtailed during this period due to the limitation placed on procurement at Army levels by The General Purchasing Agent, European Theater of Operations. This permitted only contracts which were not in excess of \$1,000 to be negotiated by Army Ordnance personnel. However, the Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater of Operations, granted special permission to the Army Ordnance Officer to negotiate contracts at the Army level not to exceed \$2,000. Contracts in excess of that amount were to be submitted to the Chief Ordnance Officer for approval and possible consolidation with total requirements for similar items in the entire theater.

Supply of fire control and sighting equipment, which had previously been critical, showed improvement and continued to do so during the remainder of the month due to receipts of items on back order.

The situation on 2 1/2 ton trucks was critical at times during the month but was relieved by receipts from Communications Zone to meet necessary requirements.

Two Carriages, Motor, T-41, were issued to the 6th Cavalry Group, in excess of authorized allowances for the purpose of testing to determine desirability for reconnaissance work with the Cavalry. Forty of these motor carriages were allocated by Twelfth Army Group for issue to Tank Destroyer Battalions (Towed) equipped with 3" Guns.

The conversion of seven separate cavalry squadrons and the reconnaissance squadrons of three armored divisions from M5A1 to M24 Light Tanks was completed. This provided a faster, more maneuverable tank mounting a 75mm Gun instead of the former vehicle mounting a 37mm Gun.

Total receipts and issues of the following major items during the month were:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	109	162
Medium Tanks	311	345
Combat Vehicles	369	397
Artillery (over 57mm)	107	100

Movement of the main army supply depots from METZ (U-85), FRANCE to MAINZ (M-35), GERMANY was started in the latter part of the month. The vehicle replacement pool was also placed in the process of being moved forward from METZ (U-85) to a new location in ALZEY (M-22), GERMANY at this time.

**SECTION V
MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION**

All forward Ordnance maintenance units were moved into GERMANY with the exception of one company which was scheduled to move at an early date in the following month. This unit has been assigned to set up a main Army Ordnance control and collection point east of the RHINE River.

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In order to facilitate movement in support of current operations, Ordnance mobile tire repair teams were organized to constantly patrol all main and auxiliary supply routes. These teams were equipped with hot patches, tubes, tires, and air compressors. To the extent of availability, tires and tubes were mounted on wheels in order to effect a direct exchange with vehicles having flat tires.

A repair and replacement program on all two and one-half ton trucks in the Quartermaster Truck Companies was initiated. An Army Ordnance maintenance company was designated to receive, repair, and re-issue trucks to these companies at the rate of approximately two companies per week.

A maintenance service station was set up in ST WENDEL (Q-59) for the servicing of replacement vehicles being driven forward from the rear Army Ordnance supply depots. Vehicles were refueled, provided with a maintenance check, and the drivers were messed and billeted at this installation.

The M7 Generator, used with the 90mm AA Guns, was in critical supply due to the shortage of spare parts for the Hercules engine powering this unit. An experiment was conducted in which an M7 Generator was modified to operate with a Cadillac V-8 tank engine. The results were most satisfactory to date and further experiments were being conducted to determine whether or not it would be desirable to substitute the Cadillac or a White half-track engine in lieu of the Hercules.

Through an arrangement with the Seventh U. S. Army, a number of their salvaged M43 medium tanks were made available to Third U. S. Army Ordnance. This enabled the continuance of the modification of medium tanks with additional frontal armor plate as mentioned in Chapter IX.

At the direction of the Chief of Staff, a survey of approximately 100 tank casualties, both American and German, was completed. The tanks selected for this survey were those that had been damaged in the BASTOGNE (P-55) area. The final report as submitted contained specific data as to the ratio of American versus German tanks rendered inoperative, caliber of projectiles causing damage, and the angle of impact.

Among the items received on local contracts, placed by the maintenance section, were 116,000 brass valve caps, 4,000 electrical contact mechanisms for T-34 Rocket Launchers and 150 adapter plates for tank periscopes heads.


The project of installing 76mm guns in lieu of 75mm guns in medium tanks, M43E2, was continued with a total of forty-five tanks being completely modified. The added weight due to the longer, heavier 76mm gun tube made it necessary to place a counterbalance on the rear of the gun and on the outside rear of the turret. Lead for the counterbalance on the rear of the gun was obtained from salvage storage batteries, while the counterbalance on the rear of the turret was affected by means of heavy steel plate procured from civilian sources. Gun tubes were supplied through normal channels of supply and from salvage tanks. Sighting equipment for the 76mm Gun was not available, therefore 3" gun telescopic sights were substituted to eliminate this problem. The main difficulties encountered were the modification and rearrangement of the ammunition rack and the relocation of the radio which was removed from the turret and placed in the drivers compartment. The bustle in the turret in which the radio was originally located was converted to provide storage for seven "ready rounds" of ammunition. Approximately seventy-five man hours were required to complete the modification.

Ordnance materiel reconditioned by Third U. S. Army Ordnance maintenance units during March was as follows:


	MARCH	ACCUMULATIVE TO DATE
General Purpose Vehicles	11,437	60,330
Combat Vehicles	3,491	14,442
Artillery	1,882	10,236
Small Arms	36,758	141,091
Instruments	3,926	26,557

Maintenance responsibility was divided as follows:


East of the RHINE River to the 69th Ordnance Group and West of the RHINE to the 70th Ordnance Group. Road patrols and radio repair teams were available in all areas.




Rear view of modified turret showing counterbalancing required for the installation of the longer and heavier 76mm gun.



M43E2 Medium Tank shown with 75mm gun before being modified.



M43E2 Medium Tank completely modified with 76mm gun. Note the complete rounds on hull showing comparison between 75mm and 76mm shells.



Interior view of turret showing bustle with radio removed and ammunition rack for seven "ready rounds" of 76mm installed.

The location of main maintenance installations during March were as follows:

Opening Date	Location	Coordinates
<u>MARCH</u>		
<u>69th Ordnance Group:</u>		
<u>10th Ordnance Bn</u>		
15	In HAUSEN	L-69
26	In BUCH	L-76
31	In ZOLLEHAUS	M-28
<u>11th Ordnance Bn</u>		
8	In HASINGEN	P-85
15	In TRIER	L-12
21	Near CASTELLAUM	L-76
23	In SCHWEPPEHAUSEN	M-04
29	Near DARMSTADT	M-64
<u>24th Ordnance Bn</u>		
5	In FELS	P-93
<u>163rd Ordnance Bn</u>		
21	In BELL	L-69
29	In HASSELBACH	L-76
<u>193rd Ordnance Bn</u>		
8	In REMICH	L-00
20	In WEISKIRCHEN	L-30
26	In ST WENDEL	Q-59
29	In BAD KREUZNACH	M-03
<u>311th Ordnance Bn</u>		
5	In BOLLENDORF	L-04
11	In ORSFELD	L-25
14	Near UTZERATH	L-48
19	Vicinity of CASTELLAUM	L-78
21	In BAD KREUZNACH	M-03
29	In GROS GERAU	M-54
30	In OFFENBACH	M-76
31	In SULZEIM	M-76
<u>316th Ordnance Bn</u>		
13	In BESCH	L-00
21	In NUNKIRCHEN	Q-39
29	In SCHWEPPEHAUSEN	M-04
<u>70th Ordnance Group:</u>		
<u>26th Ordnance Bn</u>		
31	Vicinity of MAINZ	M-35
<u>79th Ordnance Bn</u>		
8	In METZ	U-85
<u>164th Ordnance Bn</u>		
21	In METZ	U-85
26	In MELLACH	L-10
<u>317th Ordnance Bn</u>		
No Change		
<u>326th Ordnance Bn</u>		
No Change		
<u>332nd Ordnance Bn</u>		
No Change		

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CHAPTER II
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The rapid forward movement in support of the highly successful combat troops of the Army continued to create a problem of transportation of vitally important supplies as in the previous month. This was further abetted by the movement of the Army boundaries to the southeast and the mission assigned Third U. S. Army for the drive into the RE-DOUT area.

Numerous small pockets of enemy troops throughout the Army area resulted in Ordnance personnel being involved in actual combat with the enemy on several occasions, the outstanding action taking place when an ASP was captured by the enemy, held for two days, and then recaptured.

The extremely large quantity of enemy Ordnance installations and material captured as the Army advanced presented a serious problem and necessitated the utilization of a great number of Ordnance troops in maintaining security.

The policy of establishing small ASPs well forward during the fast moving tactical situation was continued. The number of ASPs established and operated during this month exceeded all previous figures for a like period since the Army became operational.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

On 3 April the forward echelon of the Ordnance Section moved from OBERSTEIN (L-72) to FRANKFURT (M-56), GERMANY. On 6 April the rear echelon moved from TRIER (L-12) to FRANKFURT (M-56), GERMANY, and set up in a caserne located about one mile from the forward echelon. The forward moved again on the 11th to HERSFELD (H-35) and thence to ERLANGEN (O-31) on the 22nd. On 26 April the rear echelon moved to ERLANGEN (O-31) where they were set up with the supply services about one half mile from the caserne housing the now combined forward and tactical echelons.

Personnel in the Ordnance Section remained the same as in previous months, with five enlisted men being attached from Army Ordnance units, and attached teams remaining as previously reported.

Officers from Army Ordnance units attended courses at the Army Information Staff School at Cite Universitaire in PARIS, FRANCE, as follows:

Information-Education..... 1

Quotas for thirty day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 21 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
69th Ordnance Group	3	23
70th Ordnance Group	2	21
82nd Ordnance Group	2	11

Quotas for seven days leave of absence at the UNITED STATES RIVIERA Recreational Area, CANNES, FRANCE, for personnel of Army Ordnance units were received and allocated as follows:

	April		Accumulative to Date	
	Officers	EM	Officers	EM
69th Ordnance Group	5	40	7	60
70th Ordnance Group	5	38	7	58
82nd Ordnance Group	2	19	3	29



"Jeeps" MFI (ready for issue) in Main Army Vehicle Pool.

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

During the early part of March the tactical situation was such that the establishment of large ASPs was not deemed advisable. A large part of the Army was located North of the MOSELLE River and indications were that the eventual axis of the Army's advance would be south of this river. However, to relieve the combat troops of the burden of transporting supplies over almost impassible roads, two temporary ASP Nos. 43 and 44, were established in close support of the troops north of the MOSELLE.

The next ammunition problem confronted was that of providing support for a crossing of the MOSELLE for XII Corps which would attack up the west bank of the RHINE River to out off the enemy between the German border and that water barrier. In order to provide this support, ASP No. 45 was established a short distance northwest of the confluence of the RHINE and MOSELLE Rivers. This installation while only short lived, proved very valuable as it adequately supported this highly successful drive up the RHINE. Also, it later provided a source of supply for the VIII Corps when that Corps crossed the RHINE.

The fast-moving tactical situation, plus the status of rail lines in the forward Army area, presented the Army Ordnance Officer with problems highly reminiscent of the August campaign in FRANCE. Tank transporters, M-23 Trailers and additional provisional truck companies, formed from organic transportation of Army Ordnance units, were diverted to hauling Class V supplies to ASPs No. 46 and 48, which were newly established close to the RHINE River. One other ASP, No. 47, was started west of the RHINE, however, after approximately 200 tons of ammunition had been installed, the Army boundary was changed and this ASP never opened; all ammunition enroute was diverted to ASP No. 46.

As the Army made its historic crossings of the RHINE and plunged deeper into enemy territory, it became necessary to establish an ASP across this river. ASP No. 49 was opened near ASSENHEIM (M-78). This installation was soon too far to the rear for the fast-moving armor, therefore ammunition enroute to restock the ASP was diverted further east to a new location which would become ASP No. 50.

During this historic month Third Army ammunition units handled a total of 136,582 long tons of ammunition. Class V receipts by Third Army from the Communications Zone totaled 31,272 long tons. Trucks hauling ammunition to ASPs accumulated a total of 1,608,789 truck miles during the month. Of this total, 585,819 miles were traveled during the week 25 to 31 March, which is probably the greatest mileage accumulated by any Army for ammunition supply during a comparable period. Accumulative mileage total to date since 18 November 1944 is 6,102,892.

Casualties due to enemy action during this period were as follows:

	Current		Accumulative Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Officers	0	0	3	4
Enlisted Men	10	22	45	96

In addition two enlisted men were reported as missing in action.

The status of awards by the close of the month were as follows:

	Current	Accumulative Total
	Officers:	
Silver Star	0	2
Soldiers Medal	0	0
Bronze Star	4	72
Purple Heart	0	7
Enlisted Men:		
Silver Star	0	0
Soldiers Medal	0	4
Bronze Star	15	111
Purple Heart	32	141

French decorations for services rendered in the liberation of FRANCE were awarded Ordnance personnel as follows:

Croix de Guerre..... 4

Accumulative totals of French decorations awarded were:

Legion of Honor..... 1
Croix de Guerre..... 29

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to the following Ordnance Units:

344th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
90th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
914th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company

Accumulative totals of this award to date were:

Group Headquarters.....	None
Battalion Headquarters.....	1
Companies.....	16
Detachment, Tire Repair.....	1
Bomb Disposal Squads.....	2

TOTAL 20

SECTION III

OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

The 26th Ordnance Battalion, operating the three main army depots, was still engaged in making the move from FRANKFURT (M-56) to a new location in the vicinity of EISENACH (H-76) when the tactical plan of the Army was changed. The new direction of attack caused the entire Army to execute a ninety degree turn to the southeast. The forward elements of the Army moved so swiftly that it was again necessary to relocate the depots and the main Army combat vehicle pool. The depots were set up at FURTH (O-30) and the main vehicle pool, operated by the 317th Ordnance Battalion, was established in the vicinity of NURNBERG (T-39).

During the month of April all Third U. S. Army ammunition companies were reorganized under T/O & E 9-17, dated 17 February 1945.

Personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the close of this period were as follows:

Officers	661
Enlisted Men	13,344
T/E Vehicles	2,815
Total Vehicles	3,179

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The following Ordnance units were assigned to Third U. S. Army during the month:

Hq. & Hq. Det., 161st Ordnance Battalion
 134th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
 188th Ordnance Evacuation Company
 699th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tk)
 928th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company

Civilian employees working for Third U. S. Army Ordnance had decreased considerably due to the shifting of Ordnance units into GERMANY. The total employed at the end of April was as follows:

Machinists and Mechanics 94
 Laborers 250

At the close of April ASPs were located as follows:

ASP No. 35 - 1 1/2 mi SW KULMBACH (O-610731) off Hwy 85 - Operated by 574th, and 596th Ord Am Cos - Serving XII Corps.

ASP No. 56 - 3/4 mi SW BAIERSDOFF on Hwy 4 (O-390320) - Operated by 576th, 592nd, 619th, and 674th Ord Am Cos - Serving XX and III Corps.

ASP No. 57 - In HILFOLSTEIN off Hwy A3, (T-516713) - Operated by 570th and 575th Ord Am Cos - Serving III Corps - Open.

ASP No. 58 - In NURNBERG, N off Hwy 85, (U-374935) - Operated by 620th Ord Am Co and 3076th Ord MVD Co - Serving XII Corps.

At the close of the month, Ordnance Groups providing supply and maintenance to the Army were organized as follows:

69TH ORDNANCE GROUP

<u>10th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>31st Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>193rd Ordnance Bn</u>
184th Ord Dep Co	15th Ord MM Co	2nd Ord MM Co
271st Ord MM Co	32nd Ord MM Co	116th Ord MM Co
344th Ord MM Co	47th Ord MM Co	129th Ord MM Co
3463rd Ord MM Co	811st Ord Dep Co	840th Ord Dep Co
3515th Ord MAM Co	3447th Ord MAM Co	3511th Ord MAM Co
3519th Ord MAM Co	3448th Ord MAM Co	3524th Ord MAM Co

<u>163rd Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>14th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>316th Ordnance Bn</u>
125th Ord HM Co (Tk)	131st Ord HM Co (FA)	275th Ord Mt Co
257th Ord HM Co	299th Ord Mt Co (AA)	(AA)
297th Ord HM Co (FA)	501st Ord HM Co (Tk)	281st Ord Mt Co
306th Ord Mt Co (AA)	520th Ord HM Co (FA)	(AA)
562nd Ord HM Co (Tk)	838th Ord Dep Co	510th Ord HM Co
886th Ord HAM Co	3434th Ord MAM Co	(FA)
	3514th Ord MAM Co	537th Ord HM Co
	3562nd Ord HAM Co	(FA)
		565th Ord HM Co
		(Tk)
		817th Ord Dep Co
		3433rd Ord HAM Co
		3482nd Ord MAM Co

70TH ORDNANCE GROUP

<u>326th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>26th Ordnance Bn</u>
305th Ord Mt Co (AA)	88th Ord HM Co (FA)	344th Ord Dep Co
531st Ord HM Co (Tk)	424th Ord Evac Co	347th Ord Dep Co
550th Ord HM Co (FA)	465th Ord Evac Co	837th Ord Dep Co
851st Ord HAM Co	471st Ord Evac Co	984th Ord Dep Co
904th Ord HAM Co	485th Ord Evac Co	Det B & C, 158th
3537th Ord MAM Co	488th Ord Evac Co	Ord Tire Repair
	489th Ord Evac Co	Co
	521st Ord HM Co (FA)	
	552nd Ord HM Co (Tk)	
	889th Ord HAM Co	
	902nd Ord HAM Co	
	914th Ord HAM Co	

<u>317th Ordnance Battalion</u>	<u>332nd Ordnance Battalion</u>
286th Ord MM Co	No attached units.
556th Ord HM Co (Tk)	Working with 70th Ord Group
560th Ord HM Co (Tk)	
877th Ord HAM Co	
3492nd Ord MAM Co	

SECTION IV
SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The supply situation was very critical during this period due to the lengthened supply lines, caused by the exceedingly swift advances of the combat troops, and the continuous movement of the main army supply depots. It became necessary to move the three main army depots and the main army combat vehicle pool twice in less than thirty days. As a minimum of ten days was required for the complete movement of these heavy installations all the main supply depots were on the move practically twenty days out of the month. To ensure that sufficient replacement vehicles would be readily available to the using units, a number of full track vehicles were transported directly to the forward depot companies bypassing the new location of the vehicle pool then being established at NURNBERG (T-39). Thus using units were enabled to draw replacement vehicles with a minimum of time and travel.

The assignment of the III Corps to the Army necessitated a long road march as this Corps had previously been engaged in the RUHR. Hence, many III Corps units were suffering from a serious shortage of tank track and bogie wheels upon arrival in the Third U. S. Army zone. Some relief was obtained by shipments from the Communications Zone and by stripping salvaged tanks in the collection points. However, these items were still in short supply at the close of the month.

A number of M24 light tanks were issued to replace losses on the light tank M5A1 and as replacement on battle losses of the M24 where such issues would not jeopardize the minimum required reserve levels.

Ninety heavy tanks, the new T26E3 (Pershing), were released to the Third U. S. Army at this time. On the orders of the Chief of Staff, forty of these were delivered to the 11th Armored Division and the remainder held in the main army combat vehicle pool. Ten modified tank transporters, for hauling the T26E3 tank, were also released at this time.



15-TON HEAVY TANKS (PERSHING) READY FOR ISSUE



The unprecedented number of enemy ordnance installations, overrun in the rapid advance of the Army, presented many complex problems. Sufficient personnel were not available to handle all the details involved in processing, investigating, and guarding such captured enemy ordnance as factories, ammunition dumps, abandoned weapons, and large warehouses. Such items of abandoned equipment that presented a threat to security were reported to the 82nd Ordnance Group for immediate action. Arrangements were completed at the end of the month for the assignment of an Ordnance Battalion to assume control of all captured enemy ordnance materiel.

The status of GMC trucks and major unit assemblies, already critical, was further aggravated by the great distances traveled by Army vehicles due to the long supply lines and the constantly shifting Army boundaries. Back orders on GMC trucks had reached the total of 700 by the end of April.

Total receipts and issues of major items for the month were as follows:

	Received	Issued
Light Tanks	61	72
Medium Tanks	142	235
Combat Vehicles	415	845
Artillery (over 57mm)	29	44
General Purpose Vehicles	3,377	3,528

SECTION V
MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

All Ordnance maintenance units and installations had moved east of the RHINE by the first week in April. The continued rapid advance of the Army necessitated the constant shifting of maintenance troops throughout the month. Many of the companies moved as often as seven times in the thirty day period. Ordnance service was constantly pushed forward and at no time were the tactical troops without adequate and close Ordnance support.

The Army having been allocated a quota of the new T26E3 (Pershing) heavy tanks, a school was set up at the Army main combat vehicle pool for the purpose of training tank crews in the maintenance and operation of this vehicle and the firing of the 90mm gun mounted therein. This school was conducted by personnel from the Aberdeen Proving Ground and the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, WASHINGTON, D. C. The training of thirty tank crews was completed during this period.

Suspension system parts for the medium M4 tanks being on the critical list. Ordnance personnel were returned to the old Third U. S. Army collection point in ESCH (P-70), LUXEMBOURG, to obtain these parts from salvage. This installation had been turned over to the Seventh U. S. Army and the Continental Advance Section. Their full cooperation was obtained in removing bogie wheels, idlers, and readily repairable Ford GAA V-8 tank engines from salvaged tanks. The securing of these critical tank parts enabled the Third U. S. Army Ordnance to keep many medium tanks off deadline.

A survey, similar to that conducted in the previous month, was conducted on all enemy tanks located in the Third U. S. Army area east of the RHINE. All tanks were thoroughly checked to ascertain the extent of damage, type and caliber of weapon causing damage, and the angle of impact. The results of this survey were turned over to the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army.

Ordnance materiel reconditioned by Third U. S. Army maintenance units during April was as follows:

	April	Accumulative to Date
General Purpose Vehicles	11,305	71,635
Combat Vehicles	2,820	17,262
Artillery	1,066	12,302
Small Arms	8,994	150,085
Instruments	3,174	29,731

Maintenance responsibility was changed twice during the month. The zone of responsibility from 1 through 10 April remained the same as the previous month. Axis from 10 April to 23 April was as follows: Line running from GIESSEN (H-63) to HANAU (M-87). Area east of this line to the 69th Ordnance Group and west of the line to the 70th Ordnance Group. Axis from 23 to 30 April was as follows: Route 14 running through ANSBACH (T-18), NURNBERG (T-40), SULZBACH (O-80) to CZECH Border (P-42). Area north of Route 14 to 70th Ordnance Group and the area south of the line to the 69th Ordnance Group. Road patrols were maintained on all main routes in the areas and radio repair teams were available for the repair and installation of radios.

The location of the main maintenance installations during April was as follows:

Opening Date	Location	Coordinates
69th Ordnance Group		
April		
4	In OFFERBACH	M-76
10	In BEBRA	H-46
23	In ERLANGEN	O-31
10th Ordnance Battalion		
7	In NECHLAR	H-45
12	In WITHA	H-85
15	In ICHTERSHAUSEN	J-25
26	In ROTH	T-47

5
12
14
20
25
30

1
7
12
14
23
25
30

1
4
12
16
20
23
30



PERSHING TANK WITH 90MM GUN IN FIRING POSITION.

14th Ordnance Battalion

In BAD SALZCHLIFF	H-22
In IMMELBORN	H-74
In HILBURGHAUSEN	J-10
In KULMBACH	O-67
In WEIDEN	P-12
In CHAMERAU	T-47

163rd Ordnance Battalion

In NIEDERWEISEN	M-29
In BREITENBACH	H-46
In GUMPELSTADT	H-75
In PLAUE	J-24
In BURGGRACH	O-11
In STEIN	T-39
In WOLFSEICH	T-74

193rd Ordnance Battalion

In LICH	G-71
In NEUKIRCHEN	O-15
In MOLSCHLUBEN	J-17
In EISENBERG	J-97
In EBBEN	O-17
In ROTHENBACH	O-50
In KOPFERING	U-24

314th Ordnance Battalion

In SCHLITZ	H-23
In IMMELBORN	H-74
In WASUNGEN	H-83
In BRATTENDORF	J-21
In NEUHAUS	O-49
Vicinity of BINDLACH	O-76
Vicinity of BINN	O-76
In WEIDEN	P-12
In WEGEN	U-95

Opening Date
April

2
7
12
14
17
21
26

Location

316th Ordnance Battalion

In HUNGEN	G-80
Vicinity of RIEBELSDORF	H-05
In MIHLA	H-87
In LANSENSALZA	J-08
In EISENBERG	J-97
In EYRICHSHOF	O-17
Vicinity of LAUF	O-50

SECRET

<u>70th ORDNANCE GROUP</u>		
1	In NOMBACH	M-55
3	In ZEILSHEIM	M-56
4	In BAD SODEN	M-57
26	In FURTH	O-30
<u>26th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
3	In HOCHST	M-56
26	In FURTH	O-30
<u>164th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
7	In BAD HOMBERG	M-86
<u>317th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
8	In METZ	M-87
28	In NURNBERG	T-39
<u>326th Ordnance Battalion</u>		
1	Vicinity of ST WENDEL	Q-59
7	Vicinity of BUTZBUCH	G-60
16	In EISENHACH	H-86
27	In FURTH	O-30
<u>332nd Ordnance Battalion</u>		
4	In BAD SODEN	M-57
26	In FURTH	O-30

SECTION VI
AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

On the first day of April, ASP No. 49, which was operated by the 620th Ordnance Ammunition Company and situated near a large pocket of enemy troops, was overrun by the enemy when they attempted to escape to the East. The enemy troops made prisoner the one officer and seventy enlisted men who were operating the ASP and continued to hold the installations until the following day when a task force was sent in to clear the pocket. The ammunition in the ASP was not tampered with nor bothered in any manner while under enemy control, but two stacks were damaged by artillery fire during the activities. Losses to Ordnance personnel as a result of this action amounted to a total of eleven enlisted men killed and wounded.

As the Army continued the rapid advance into the heart of GERMANY the problem of supporting the combat units over long supply lines was accentuated. In the first week of April no railhead had been established east of the RHINE. The policy of establishing small ASPs well forward and leapfrogging these installations was continued. The most forward railhead was at GAU ALGESHEIM (M-25) west of the RHINE and from this point all ammunition was hauled by trucks. Road and bridge conditions did not permit the use of heavy tank transporters across the RHINE.

Rail service up to the RHINE was adequate but ammunition was arriving at the forward railhead in quantities that could not be handled by the available trucking. This was partly due to the long turn around time in hauling to forward ASPs. To relieve the rail situation and to have a balanced stock of ammunition in the Army rear area, Depot No. 46 at WOLLESTEIN (M-13) was built up from the overflow at the railhead. This depot proved extremely valuable as a source of supply for specific items that were needed to supplement the normal stocks of the forward ASPs.

On 10 April, ASP No. 50 at KIRCHHEIM (H-25) near HENSFELD (H-35) was attacked by a small enemy force. The object of the attack was apparently an attempt to obtain vehicles. Five men were hospitalized with minor wounds and one truck was missing as a result of this raid.

The change in the Army boundary on 17 April caused a quick shifting of ammunition installations. The flow of stocks was immediately diverted to the southeast and ASPs 55, at KULMBACH (O-67), and 56, at BAIERSDORF (O-32), were opened in support of the XII and XX Corps respectively. The latter proved to be a very valuable installation in the ensuing operation. As the Army completed its ninety degree pivot to the southeast, this ASP was in the advantageous position of being able to serve the III Corps, recently assigned to the Army for the drive into the area of the REDOUBT.

The shift in Army boundaries found three Third U. S. Army ASPs in the First U. S. Army zone of operations. Two of these installations, Numbers 51, at SCHWARZBACH (H-82), and 52 at BERTERODA (H-87) were depleted by the transfer of stocks to the new ASPs in support of the XII and XX Corps. The third ASP, number 54, at HIRSCHFELD (K-16), was built up to an approximate 1,500 ton level in order to provide support to the VIII Corps until such time as the First U. S. Army could take over the supply of the Corps.

The tactical troops continued the swift advance towards the REDOUBT area and ammunition supply was once again pushed forward. ASP 57 at HILFOLSTEIN (T-57) was opened in support of the III Corps and number 58 at NEUNBERG (U-39) was established to serve the XII Corps. A new railhead, east of the RHINE, was established at ZELL (H-53), near WURZBERG (H-53). The new railhead greatly reduced the hauling distances to the forward ASPs.

The month of April found Third U. S. Army Ordnance personnel operating more ammunition installations at any one time than they had since the Army became operational. This was caused by the fast movement of the tactical troops, the constantly shifting Army boundaries, limited rail facilities and the fact that Advance Section Communications Zone were not operating ammunition installations in GERMANY. A total of ten ASPs had been opened and operated during the month.

A resume of the ASPs in operation at the end of April follows:

<u>Installation</u>	<u>III Corps</u>	<u>XII Corps</u>	<u>XX Corps</u>
Depot		46	
ASP		51	52
ASP		55	54
ASP	57	58	56

A new record for truck miles traveled was established as a total of 2,519,426 miles were accumulated by vehicles hauling ammunition. The total ammunition handled by Third U. S. Army Ordnance units amounted to 97,388 long tons while receipts from Advance Section Communications Zone amounted to 11,725 long tons for the month of April.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The closing period of the campaign in GERMANY resulted in considerably light combat losses of Ordnance materiel, thereby decreasing replacement requirements and subsequent forward movement of general supplies and combat vehicles. However, main depot units in the process of advancing were continued in movement. Maintenance units continued to be very active in furnishing Ordnance service on general purpose vehicles.

Enemy Ordnance installations and materiel continued to be a serious problem which required utilization of Ordnance troops for security purposes.

The rapid disintegration and final defeat of the Wehrmacht was reflected in the exceptionally low figures on receipts, issues, and handling of ammunition during this final period.

SECTION II
ADMINISTRATION SUB-SECTION

Upon movement of the forward echelon of Third U. S. Army Headquarters from ERLANGEN (O-31) to WEGENSBURG (U-25), a small Ordnance Section liaison group, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, were sent forward. The balance of the Ordnance forward echelon joined the rear echelon and remained in ERLANGEN with the other supply services.

Quotas for thirty day furloughs in the UNITED STATES for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, under the provisions of European Theater of Operations Circular 124, 24 December 1944, were allotted to Army Ordnance units as follows:

	<u>Current</u>	<u>Accumulative Total</u>
69th Ordnance Group	2	25
70th Ordnance Group	1	22
82nd Ordnance Group	1	12
Total	4	59

Final figures on Ordnance casualties due to enemy action during the period 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945 were as follows:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
Officers	3	4
Enlisted Men	45	96
Total	48	100

In addition, two enlisted men were reported as missing in action.

The totals for decorations awarded Ordnance personnel during the campaign were as follows:

<u>Decoration</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Silver Star	2	0
Soldiers Medal	0	5
Bronze Star	77	118
Purple Heart	7	141

Meritorious Service Unit Plaques were awarded to Ordnance units during the campaign as follows:

Group Headquarters.....	None
Battalion Headquarters.....	1
Companies.....	16
Detachment, Tire Repair.....	1
Bomb Disposal Squads.....	2
Total	20

Total French decorations for services rendered in the liberation of FRANCE were awarded Ordnance personnel during the campaign as follows:

Legion of Honor.....	1
Croix de Guerre.....	29

The authorized strength under which the Ordnance Section was operating at the close of hostilities was:

Officers	19
Warrant Officers	1
Enlisted Men	30

In addition five enlisted men were attached from Army Ordnance units to augment the above. Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team No. 3 from Headquarters Communications Zone, consisting of four officers and seven enlisted men, was also attached for intelligence work on enemy equipment.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION III
OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

During this period the addition of the V Corps to Third U. S. Army resulted in Third U. S. Army receiving the following Ordnance units which were attached to the 69th Ordnance Group:

- 86th Ordnance Battalion
- 177th Ordnance Battalion
- 127th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 292nd Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 293rd Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
- 463rd Ordnance Evacuation Company
- 526th Ordnance Evacuation Company
- 3478th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company
- 202nd Ordnance Depot Company
- 304th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (AA)
- 548th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (FA)
- 557th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tk)
- 897th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company
- 587th Ordnance Ammunition Company
- 16th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
- 17th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad

Ordnance personnel and vehicles present on the Continent at the completion of operations were as follows:

Officers	777
Enlisted Men	15,952
T/E Vehicles	3,354
Total Vehicles	3,846

Civilian employees in Third Army Ordnance Service were as follows:

Machinists and Mechanics	94
Laborers	329

Operations under Third Army Ordnance Service at the cessation of hostilities were organized as follows:

69TH ORDNANCE GROUP

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <u>10th Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>14th Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 184th Ord Dep Co | 131st Ord HM Co (FA) |
| 271st Ord MM Co | 299th Ord Mt Co (AA) |
| 344th Ord MM Co | 501st Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| 3463rd Ord MM Co | 520th Ord HM Co (FA) |
| 3515th Ord MAM Co | 838th Ord Dep Co |
| 3519th Ord MAM Co | 3434th Ord MAM Co |
| | 3514th Ord MAM Co |
| | 3562nd Ord MAM Co |
| <u>86th Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>163rd Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 304th Ord Mt Co (AA) | 125th Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| 526th Ord HM Co (Tk) | 297th Ord HM Co (FA) |
| 548th Ord HM Co (FA) | 306th Ord Mt Co (AA) |
| 557th Ord HM Co (Tk) | 562nd Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| 897th Ord HAM Co | 886th Ord HAM Co |
| <u>177th Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>193rd Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 127th Ord MM Co | 2nd Ord MM Co |
| 202nd Ord Dep Co | 116th Ord MM Co |
| 292nd Ord MM Co | 129th Ord MM Co |
| 293rd Ord MM Co | 840th Ord Dep Co |
| 463rd Ord Evac Co | 3511th Ord MAM Co |
| 3478th Ord MAM Co | 3524th Ord MAM Co |
| <u>314th Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>316th Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 15th Ord HM Co | 275th Ord Mt Co (AA) |
| 32nd Ord MM Co | 281st Ord Mt Co (AA) |
| 474th Ord MM Co | 510th Ord HM Co (FA) |
| 297th Ord MM Co | 537th Ord HM Co (FA) |
| 841st Ord Dep Co | 565th Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| 3447th Ord MAM Co | 847th Ord Dep Co |
| 348th Ord MAM Co | 3433rd Ord HAM Co |
| | 3482nd Ord MAM Co |

70TH ORDNANCE GROUP

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| <u>26th Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>66th Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 344th Ord Dep Co | 88th Ord HM Co (FA) |
| 347th Ord Dep Co | 424th Ord Evac Co |
| 837th Ord Dep Co | 465th Ord Evac Co |
| 984th Ord Dep Co | 471st Ord Evac Co |
| Det B & C, 158th Tire Repair Co | 485th Ord Evac Co |
| | 488th Ord Evac Co |
| | 489th Ord Evac Co |
| <u>161st Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>521st Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| No units attached - newly arrived. | 521st Ord HM Co (FA) |
| | 522nd Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| | 889th Ord HAM Co |
| | 902nd Ord HAM Co |
| | 914th Ord HAM Co |
| <u>326th Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>317th Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 305th Ord Mt Co (AA) | 286th Ord MM Co |
| 531st Ord HM Co (Tk) | 566th Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| 550th Ord HM Co (FA) | 560th Ord HM Co (Tk) |
| 699th Ord HM Co (Tk) | 877th Ord MAM Co |
| 851st Ord HAM Co | 3492nd Ord MAM Co |
| 904th Ord HAM Co | |
| 928th Ord HAM Co | |
| 3537th Ord MAM Co | |
| | <u>332nd Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| | No units attached - operating with 70th Ord Group Hqs. |

82ND ORDNANCE GROUP

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <u>41st Ordnance Battalion</u> | <u>150th Ordnance Battalion</u> |
| 570th Ord Am Co | 574th Ord Am Co |
| 573rd Ord Am Co | 576th Ord Am Co |
| 575th Ord Am Co | 596th Ord Am Co |
| 587th Ord Am Co | 620th Ord Am Co |
| 657th Ord Am Co | 2nd Ord BD Squad |
| 16th Ord BD Squad | 7th Ord BD Squad |
| 17th Ord BD Squad | 114th Ord BD Squad |
| 19th Ord BD Squad | 123rd Ord BD Squad |
| 29th Ord BD Squad | 3076th Ord MVD Co |
| 54th Ord BD Squad | |
| 88th Ord BD Squad | |

313th Ordnance Battalion Units attached to 82nd Gr Hqs

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| 592nd Ord Am Co | 3450th Ord MAM Co |
| 619th Ord Am Co | 231st Ord BD Platoon |
| 626th Ord Am Co | 267th Ord Mess Detachment |
| 674th Ord Am Co | |
| 5th Ord BD Squad | |
| 18th Ord BD Squad | |
| 89th Ord BD Squad | |
| 90th Ord BD Squad | |
| 113th Ord BD Squad | |

SECTION IV

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

The rapid disintegration and final defeat of the German Army during this concluding period of operations was marked by considerably light combat losses of Ordnance materiel, thereby decreasing replacement requirements and subsequent forward movement of general supplies and combat vehicles. However, main depot units in the process of movement were continued forward to the general vicinity of NURNBERG (T-49) and FURTH (O-30).

For the purpose of portraying the tremendous task involved in Ordnance general supply to the Army, the following figures representing the issue of major items for the period 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945 are presented:

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>Total Issued</u>
General Purpose Vehicles	26,905
Combat Vehicles	7,581
Artillery Pieces	4,482
Small Arms	197,910
Spare Parts (long tons)	47,611

SECTION V

MAINTENANCE SUB-SECTION

During the closing period of hostilities maintenance units located in the FRANKFURT (W-56) area were being moved forward to the vicinity of NURNBERG (T-49).

Maintenance work on general purpose vehicles was extremely heavy due to the extensive use of truck transportation over extended supply lines during the final weeks of the campaign.

A summary of Ordnance materiel repaired by Army Ordnance units during the period 1 August 1944 - 8 May 1945 is shown below:

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>Repaired</u>
General Purpose Vehicles	99,114
Combat Vehicles	21,761
Artillery Pieces	11,613
Small Arms	125,083
Instruments	32,740

SECTION VI

AMMUNITION SUB-SECTION

As previously reported, Third U. S. Army Ordnance personnel were operating the largest number of Ammunition Supply Points in the history of the campaign. To alleviate this situation as the Army advanced, ASPs Numbers 48, 51, 53, and 55 were closed out and the ammunition transferred to forward installations. The ZELL (W-53) railhead was replaced by a new railhead at NURNBERG (T-49) which reduced the hauling distance in supplying ammunition to the forward ASPs.

During this period operational control of V Corps was assumed by Third U. S. Army. ASP No. 62, stocked by First U. S. Army with approximately 750 tons of ammunition, supported this new Corps for the remainder of the campaign. Units located in the southern sector of V Corps were permitted to draw from ASP No. 58, which improved ammunition supply for these troops.

Two new Class V installations, ASPs Nos. 60 and 61, opened on May 1st to support the III and XII Corps in the final stages of the campaign. The assignment of heavy artillery units to police details and the light resistance being offered by the enemy resulted in an extraordinarily low expenditure rate.


At the time of cessation of hostilities, the following is a resume of Ordnance Class V installations in operation:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CORPS</u>		
			<u>III</u>	<u>XII</u>	<u>IX</u>
ASP	BAIERSDORF	O-390220	56		56
ASP	HILFOLSTEIN	T-516713	57		
ASP	NURNBERG	U-375235		58	
ASP	TRUBLING	U-240505			59
ASP	UNTEN-WANGERRACH	T-992167	60		
ASP	TITLING	Q-150300			61
ASP	FURSTHAUS	P-007282		62	

The following ammunition statistics are offered in closing as evidence of the mission accomplished by Ordnance personnel in the support of Third U. S. Army during the period 1 August 1944 - 8 May 1945:

Long Tons Received.....	533,825
Long Tons Issued.....	182,345
Tons Handled.....	1,549,993
Total Truck Mileage.....	14,101,977

SECRET



SALVAGE MATERIEL IN ORDNANCE COLLECTING POINT
NURNBERG STADIUM



SECRET

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. CONTROL OF ARMY ORDNANCE UNITS.

- a. Since the best planning information is available in the Army Headquarters for any operation, it is necessary that all non-divisional Ordnance troops remain under the control of the Army Ordnance Officer so that the greatest efficiency can be derived from Ordnance Maintenance, Supply, and Ammunition troops. The Army Ordnance Officer's staff, which comprises the Army Ordnance Section, is inadequate to handle the actual operation and administration of the large number of troops required to maintain and supply a Field Army. It is therefore necessary that at least three Group Headquarters be furnished as follows: (a) One Group Headquarters to operate and administer those Maintenance and Supply units in direct support of the forward combat elements; (b) One Group to operate and administer the Main Army Supply and higher echelon maintenance installations; (c) One Group to administer all of the Army Ammunition Supply.
- b. That at least three Ordnance Groups, TO/E 9-12, be furnished to administer and operate directly under the Ordnance Officer, in control of the Ordnance troops assigned to a Field Army.

2. MOVEMENT OF ORDNANCE SUPPLIES.

- a. Because of the great bulk of Ordnance supplies required to maintain a Field Army, it is necessary that they be moved as infrequently as possible and that they be placed in a strategic position along the main axis of the advance at all times so that no reverse movements will be required to place them in position to support combat troops.
- b. The Ordnance Officer should be constantly advised as far in advance as possible of the main axis of advance and any anticipated changes of direction.

3. LOCAL PROCUREMENT OF CRITICAL ITEMS.

- a. Numerous items of Ordnance Class II and IV are always in short supply. Supply of these items can often be obtained by direct purchase on local industry.
- b. It is necessary that the personnel of the Group Headquarters charged with operating and administering the main supply installations be supplemented with a Purchasing Section approximately the size of a Battalion Headquarters, under TO/E 9-76, for the purpose of procuring locally those items which are not immediately available through normal supply channels.

4. DIRECT SUPPLY TO COMBAT UNITS.

- a. Ordnance Depot Companies in direct support of combat units must be completely mobile.
- b. TO/E 9-57 should be amended to provide four 5-ton Trucks, tractor, for each 6-10 ton van, in order that the entire company can move without shuttling.

5. TRANSPORTATION - ORDNANCE DEPOT COMPANIES.

- a. Equipment authorized by TO/E 9-57 is inadequate for Depot Companies operating Main Army Depots.
- b. Ordnance Depot Companies operating Main Army Depots should each be equipped with twenty additional semi-trailers, 10-ton, Animal and Cargo, and twenty additional 4-5 ton, Truck, tractors. Also required are two each heavy engineer type cranes for use in handling heavy material.

6. COMMUNICATIONS ZONE DEPOTS.

- a. Communications Zone Depots must be advanced as the Army moves forward.
- b. Communications Zone Depots at ports should be used only as bulk distribution points and the major portion of Communications Zone Class II and IV supplies should be kept in Depots immediately in the rear of the Army boundaries.

7. SHUTTLE SERVICE - COMMUNICATIONS ZONE TO ARMY.

- a. The routine system of delivery of Class II and IV supplies to Army by Communications Zone is not dependable or satisfactory for insuring quick receipt of critical items.
- b. Authority must be granted and transportation furnished to the Main Army Depot to maintain continuous shuttle service between itself and Communications Zone Depots for the purpose of delivering urgently needed items.

8. LIAISON OFFICER IN COMMUNICATIONS ZONE DEPOTS.

- a. The best service for Army can be had only if a commissioned Army representative or liaison officer is placed in each Communications Zone Depot serving the Army.
- b. Main Army Depots should be authorized to place one officer and the necessary enlisted assistants in each Communications Zone depot serving Army for the purpose of expediting Army requisitions, establishing priority for movement of Army supplies and arranging for movement in Army transportation of critical items.

9. MOVEMENT OF MAIN ARMY DEPOT.

- a. Movement of Main Army Depot must be held to the minimum.
- b. Due to the time required to pack, transport, and set up the large stock of supplies carried by the Main Army Depot, movements of less than 50-75 miles should not be made. Much better service can be rendered by a depot well established than by one continually upset by changing location. The more efficient service rendered offsets the advantage of a shorter turn around distance to supported organizations.

10. MOVEMENT OF MAINTENANCE COMPANIES.

- a. Maintenance Companies cannot operate efficiently when moving frequently.
- b. Movement must be held to the minimum, dependent upon the tactical situation. Maintenance units operating fourth and fifth echelon shops and not in direct support of using units should not move unless they are 75 miles or farther behind forward maintenance units.

11. OPERATION OF COLLECTION POINTS.

- a. Army rear collection points are most efficiently operated by a heavy maintenance company and the number of collection points are kept to a minimum.
- b. Army collection points should be operated by a heavy maintenance company because they have the personnel and equipment required to properly inspect, classify, preserve, and guard and perform all salvage operations in connection with unserviceable ordnance material evacuated to Army collection points. One centrally located forward collection point is operated in each Corps by a Medium Maintenance Company. The Corps collection point is moved forward as the forward maintenance companies advance. Intermediate Corps collection points are discouraged. As Corps collection points move forward they are taken over by a rear maintenance battalion and evacuated to the central point. Two maintenance battalions in the rear are designated as collection point battalions. This permits "leap-frogging" battalions and more completely working each point to derive the most from it.

12. SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT IN EVACUATION COMPANIES.

- a. Ordnance Evacuation Companies do not have sufficient light mobile equipment needed for the evacuation of general purpose vehicles, major units, and assemblies.
- b. Ordnance Evacuation Companies should have 4-5 ton tractors and suitable low flat bed trailers for hauling unserviceable general purpose vehicles, engines, power train units, tires, etc. The only source of such equipment at present is from Army reserves.

13. CANNIBALIZING.

- a. Unserviceable but repairable and salvage ordnance material was found to be wastefully cannibalized by using units.

b. Troops must be trained and educated that repairable ordnance equipment must not be cannibalized and that cannibalization of salvage material must be kept to an absolute minimum. Whenever cannibalization is resorted to, unserviceable item(s) removed must be replaced by unserviceable like item(s). The greatest waste caused by cannibalization is not the removing of a serviceable item, but the failure to replace it with the unserviceable item. A salvage truck from which the carburetor has been removed and not replaced results in exposing the internal parts of the engine to the elements and in all probability rendering a serviceable or repairable engine complete salvage.

14. MOBILITY OF MAINTENANCE COMPANIES.

- a. All maintenance companies must be mobile.
- b. Heavy maintenance companies should be issued a tractor for each authorized van. In order to provide sufficient tractors to make the companies mobile the equipment must be taken from Army reserve.

15. DIRECT SUPPORT OF ARMORED DIVISIONS.

- a. Armored divisions do not require direct support of Army maintenance or supply units.
- b. No Army Ordnance units should be placed in direct support of Armored divisions.

16. SUPPORT OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS.

- a. The organic maintenance of Infantry divisions is inadequate to furnish the required maintenance and supply support.
- b. An Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company should be placed in direct support of each Infantry division to insure adequate Ordnance support of its elements.

17. COORDINATION WITH CORPS ORDNANCE OFFICER.

- a. Movement of forward ordnance maintenance troops must be closely coordinated with the Corps Ordnance Officer.
- b. Close liaison must be maintained between forward maintenance units and the Corps Ordnance Officer. The Corps Ordnance Officer is always abreast of the immediate tactical situation and his recommendation as to the deployment of ordnance troops directly supporting the Corps is very closely followed. Generally two ordnance maintenance battalions are in support of each Corps.

18. REAR THIRD AND FOURTH ECHELON OPERATIONS.

- a. Rear Ordnance third and fourth echelon can be efficiently operated on a production basis.
- b. Controlled salvage and reclamation operations provide lucrative sources of supply and makes for efficient and complete salvage and prompt evacuation to base shops of unserviceable but repairable items. A large number of civilian laborers can be used in this operation. Specific ordnance maintenance companies are designated for repair of ordnance specialized equipment (tank transporters, etc.), high mortality vehicles (2 1/2-ton trucks, etc.), and unit assemblies. Small area sections, as an example, from a number of maintenance companies are pooled to make a sizeable working unit.

19. REPORTING OF FIELD EXPERIENCE.

- a. The combat zone is the best proving ground for ordnance material.
- b. Ordnance maintenance personnel must be alert to observe and report deficiencies which develop in the field. Any field expedients used to overcome deficiencies and recommendations should accompany all reports.

20. AMMUNITION DEPOT COMPANY.

- a. One ammunition depot company per Army should be trained as an ammunition depot company to serve as a nucleus in the operation of depots or large ASPs. One such company is capable of operating two large installations when supplemented by additional ordnance and quartermaster service troops.
- b. A unit of this type should be provided to accomplish this mission.

SECRET

21. ENEMY AMMUNITION COLLECTING COMPANY.

a. A minimum of one "enemy ammunition collecting company" per Army is necessary to deal with the enormous quantities of enemy ammunition encountered.

b. This organization is essential and should receive special training for this mission.

22. CONTROL OF CLASS II AND IV.

a. It is impractical and involves too much administrative detail to allocate Ordnance Class II and IV items to the using units. Control of issues of Class II and IV should be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with the availability of the items.

b. Where sufficient supplies are received by the Army to cover normal combat losses, resupply should be effected upon the certificate of the unit that the items required are necessary to complete TO/E authorizations.

23. AMMUNITION COMPANY PERSONNEL.

a. The quality of the ammunition company personnel must be improved if adequate and accurate control of the enormous number and variety of ammunition items (including complications caused by component parts) is to be maintained.

b. The highest type of personnel available should be provided.

24. AMMUNITION INSTALLATIONS.

a. The actual size and number of ammunition installations is a problem which is governed by the tactical situation.

b. It has been found desirable, in general, to have one ASP well forward supporting each Corps, with at least one large army depot located along the main army axis, generally behind the center Corps. Intermediate ASPs for Corps and Army artillery are impractical. In fast moving situations, forward ASPs of 750 - 1,000 tons are desirable, while in slow moving situations, forward ASPs of 2,500 or 3,000 tons are desirable. In general, larger installations can be run more efficiently than small ones and should therefore be favored whenever possible. It has been found in actual practice that small ASPs (750 tons) could be established and ready for operation within 24 hours after location of ASP site.

25. ROADSIDE STORAGE OF AMMUNITION.

a. Roadside storage is preferable to area storage.

b. Roadside storage should be utilized due to the fact that it offers a less profitable target to enemy air attacks, permits faster operations, prevents bogging down in mud, and presents fewer hazards to safety.

26. STOCKAGE OF AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS.

a. Stockages and priorities in stocking of ASPs should be determined by Army, after a study of recommendations by Corps.

b. It is essential that this be done to insure maximum use of limited transportation over long supply lines and prompt arrival of necessary items to combat units.

27. LOT NUMBER SEGREGATION.

a. Lot number segregation of ammunition is impractical in the Army area.

b. If issues to using units are to be made in separate lots, shipments into the army area must be in large, unbroken lots. Lot number records cannot practically be kept in forward Army ASPs; hence, the importance of receipt of segregated ammunition which will permit storage and issue by separate lots.

28. HANDLING OF HEAVY ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

a. The use of mechanical devices for lifting heavy artillery shells is highly desirable.

b. The development of lifting devices as portrayed in previous chapters should be given immediate consideration.

29. TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION.

a. Transportation of ammunition supplied by Quartermaster Truck Companies often proves inadequate during a fast moving campaign involving extended supply lines.

b. In fast moving situations, additional transport can be made available by temporarily immobilizing ordnance maintenance and supply units as well as some combat units not currently active.

30. TOPPLING OF STACKS - ROADSIDE STORAGE.

a. It has been noted when employing roadside storage in frozen areas that there is a tendency for the stacks of ammunition to topple over as the ground thaws.

b. This problem can be overcome by stacking the ammunition on the verges close to the roads where, ordinarily, a firm foundation is available.

31. LOCATION OF AMMUNITION INSTALLATIONS.

a. Ammunition installations should always be situated so that subsequent troop movement will not interfere with the traffic routes used in supplying said installations.

b. Where the tactical situation permits, the combat troops, particularly armored units, in moving up to the line should not use the same roads being utilized for storage of ammunition. The majority of troop movements occur at night and frequently the ammunition becomes damaged and the life of the roads reduced due to the heavy traffic.

32. PERSONNEL FOR RAILHEAD ACTIVITIES.

a. Sufficient Ordnance personnel have not been trained in the operation of a Class V railhead.

b. In training ordnance personnel in the Zone of Interior more emphasis should be placed on all phases of the operation of a Class V railhead. This is a very important step in ammunition supply and deserves more consideration in training programs.

33. ALLOCATIONS BELOW ARMY LEVEL.

a. Allocations below the Army level are impractical. They are too slow and involve too much paper work. They are effective only when particular items become critical.

b. Ordinary supply should have as its guiding principle automatic resupply to combat units to maintain their basic loads intact. Where a generally short supply exists relative to demands, expenditure control by limiting the number of rounds fired to prescribed limits is feasible.

34. AMMUNITION REPORTS.

a. In general, the Army Ordnance Office requires no reports from Corps or from Army units. Reports on basic load status of selected items may be required at times, but can be called for as necessary. Artillery and other tactical sections of the Army Headquarters may require expenditure reports for specific purposes, but can obtain such reports through their own channels. For Ordnance purposes, with ammunition resupply based on maintenance of basic loads, ASP issues to combat units may be considered equivalent to expenditures.

b. For efficient control of ammunition supply, reports should be kept to a minimum as outlined above.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

Ordnance Bulletin Number 1

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)
NUMBER 1) 25 May 1944.

SECTION I

Administration

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD ARMY ORDNANCE BULLETIN:

a. The Third Army Ordnance Bulletin will be periodically published by the Army Ordnance Officer for the dissemination of Ordnance Technical information and instructions to Ordnance units and personnel.

b. (1) The Bulletin will be divided and indexed into the special sections below noted:

- I - ADMINISTRATION
- II - OPERATION
- III - MAINTENANCE
- IV - SUPPLY
- V - AMMUNITION

c. (2) For convenient reference, each section will bear its own sequence of paragraph numbers; reference to a subject will be by those numbers.

c. Changes, deletions, and cross-references will be published as additional paragraphs in the usual manner and will have reference to the previous paragraph which is to be changed, deleted, or modified. Certain paragraphs will make timely reference to other directives of importance to Ordnance units. Changes and deletions so indicated will be immediately posted.

d. An index will be published at intervals with the bulletin.

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

1. CARRYING RACKS, GAS CAN: To enable use of both Jerri-Can and Ameri-Can in present carrying racks on vehicles, it will be necessary to install in the bottom of each rack, a wooden board of about 3/4" in thickness, to fit securely. These boards should be painted O.D. color.

2. PERTINENT DIRECTIVES: Attention is directed to the following Ordnance Technical bulletins as published by Headquarters SOS, ETUSA, pertaining to theater modification and maintenance of Ordnance materiel, copies of which may be obtained by requisition upon publication section of SOS Depot G-25, while units are stationed within the U. K.

a. TB No. 12 dated 19 April 1943, Abuse of Motor Vehicle Engines.
b. TB No. 1 dated 3 January 1944, Adjustment of Shock Absorbers for M3 armored car.

c. TB No. 2 dated 5 January 1944, pertaining to modification of 57mm Gun--Spare Striker (Firing) Case Assemblies.

d. TB No. 7 dated 3 February 1944, Pre-starting Inspection of Light Tanks M5A1 and Carriage, Motor, Howitzer, M3.

e. TB No. 9 dated 1 March 1944, Charts of U. S. and British Lubricants Equivalent.

f. TB No. 10 dated 2 March 1944, Tank, Light, M5A1 and Carriage, Motor, 75mm Howitzer, M3. New Type Transmission Band Adjustment.

g. TB No. 14 dated 13 March 1944, covering correct wiring on Turret Fan, FSMWO G104-788 of Medium Tank.

h. TB No. 16 dated 16 March 1944, Modification of Left Auxiliary Shield on 105mm Howitzer Carriage M2A2, to prevent interference of shield with line of sight when sighting on aiming stakes to the front.

i. TB No. 18 dated 24 March 1944, and Change 1 dated 8 May 1944, pertaining to Modification of Handle Latch (B150944) on Gun, Machine, Cal. .30, M1919A1, and M1919A5, to prevent difficulty in retracting the cover latch on subject guns when mounted in light and medium tanks and armored car M3.

j. TB No. 17 dated 25 March 1944, Pre-starting instructions for Vehicle with Radial Engines which cannot be hand-cranked.

k. TB No. 20 dated 29 March 1944, pertaining to repair of carriages, Howitzer 105, M2, on which the weld of bracket C72460 and body D36739 of Support D36740 has failed; also lubrication of Swivel Nut on traversing mechanism on Carriage Gun 3", M1, and Carriage Howitzer, 105mm, M2A2, equipped with enclosed screw traverses.

l. TB No. 22 dated 30 March 1944, Modification of Launcher, Rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1, to prevent shearing of wire A313621-D by sharp edges of battery compartment Hasp, B261129.

m. TB No. 21 dated 31 March 1944, pertaining to Test Firing of Small Arms weapons after repair. Ammunition for Third Army units will be obtained in the same manner as training ammunition.

n. TB No. 25 dated 7 April 1944, Modification of Chute, Metallic Belt Link (G61331) for Gun, Machine, Cal. .50, Browning, M2HB (Fixed and Flexible) to prevent difficulty in assembling the chute, metallic belt link to the gun.

o. TB No. 26 dated 8 April 1944, Prescribing American Wheel Bearing Lubricants and outline procedure for repacking wheel bearings.

p. TB No. 31 dated 17 April 1944, Instructions for installing Elevating Quadrant M9, on 3" Gun M7, Mount M5, on M10 and M10A1 Motor Carriages.

q. TB No. 33 dated 22 April 1944, pertaining to correct marking of Gage, Low and Reverse Transfer Unit Band Adjusting for Tank, Light, M5A1 and Carriage Motor Howitzer M3. Gages properly marked show the upper mark for Low Series and the lower mark for the Reverse.

r. TB No. 34 dated 27 April 1944, Correct tire pressure for 14.00 x 24-20 ply tires as used on truck trailer 40-ton Tank Recovery M25 is 75 lbs. per square inch.

s. TB No. 35 dated 28 April 1944, covers the Installation of Armor Plate in the driver compartment of the M3 and M20 armored cars.

t. TB No. 39 dated 4 May 1944, Modification of Carriage, Gun, 57mm, M1A2 and M1A3 to install a firing handgrip bracket to provide a means of "squeezing" instead of pulling the firing lever to overcome difficulty in holding firmly on target while firing.

u. TB No. 40 dated 3 May 1944, Pertaining to MWO Ordnance C36-w4 of Gun, 57mm, M1, pertaining to firing pin (8226315).

v. TB No. 43 dated 6 May 1944, Modification of Mount, 60mm, Mortar, M2, to reduce backlash in traversing mechanism.

w. TB No. 45 dated 11 May 1944, pertaining to correction in procedure of transmission band adjustment of Light Tank M5A1 and Gun Motor Carriage M3 as shown in TM 9-732 dated 27 November 1943 and TM 9-732B dated 31 January 1944.

SECTION IV

Supply

1. BASIC LOADS FOR ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANIES:

a. Attention of all Ordnance Maintenance units is directed to

Annex 1 to this section, listing basis for basic load of spare parts for Ordnance Maintenance units. (See OVERLORD PLAN, Page 110) Prepared requisition forms will be supplied by the Army Ordnance Officer. Immediate action will be instituted to requisition 15 days supply of spare parts when prepared forms are made available.

b. The alert order to units specifies the number of vehicles which the units will have available to transport equipment. The vehicles specified in the alert order include T/E vehicles, addition to T/E vehicles, and TUSA reserve vehicles. If it is found impossible to carry 15 days basic load for vehicles assigned in the alert order, then one requisition will be made up for the parts that can be carried, and an additional one be prepared for later presentation to COMZ for immediate action, so that basic load of 15 day supply will be available for combat. In case vehicles are not made available as specified in the alert order, the unit will immediately contact the Army Ordnance Officer and request instructions. Priority will be given in requisitioning parts for the basic loads in the U.K. as follows:

- (1) Major items.
- (2) Binned parts.
- (3) Large and/or heavy unit assemblies.

2. BASIC LOADS FOR ORDNANCE DEPOT COMPANIES:

a. Attention of Ordnance Depot Companies is directed to Annex II to this section. (See OVERLORD PLAN, Page 111)

b. Action outlined for Maintenance Companies in paragraph 1a above will be followed for the number of days supply noted in the annex for type Depot Company. As in 1b above, as much of this load as possible will be carried in all available transport.

3. PREPARED REQUISITION FORMS:

a. The Ordnance Section, TUSA, has prepared, for use of Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies in requesting spare parts and supply loads, a specially prepared requisition form for each SNL sub-group.

b. The prepared requisition forms will reduce by a large percentage the man hours normally necessary for the preparation of basic load requisitions. All available interchangeability information has been listed with each term on the face of the requisition. Cross-reference between the many Ordnance parts numbers has been included with each item listed. Complete nomenclature description and where applicable size information has been given.

c. On sub-groups such as GMC, the requisitions have been broken down into many separate requisitions. For Example: GMC No. I requisition is for parts that are common to all GMC vehicles. Numbers II to X, inclusive are requisitions for parts peculiar to the various models of GMC vehicles. Separate requisitions have been prepared for Autolite and Delco Remy electrical parts and anti-friction bearings using the unit manufacturer's number and interchanging into all the various Ordnance numbers that might be used.

d. Use of the prepared requisition forms will not stop with the requisitioning of a basic load. The retained copy can be used by the Ordnance unit as follows:

- (1) Reference list of items stocked by main depots.
- (2) Quick reference interchangeability list.
- (3) Cross-reference of various Ordnance part numbers.
- (4) Check list in the editing of requisitions.
- (5) Parts numbers used for the stocking of all groups.
- (6) Items stocked in parts common under Federal Stock Number.

e. Supplementary requisitions on Form 400 will be submitted for basic load requirements where prepared requisition forms are not furnished, as for tires, cleaning and preserving, etc.

f. Distribution of prepared requisition forms will be made according to the unit's priority. Units will be notified by Army Ordnance Officer when forms are available.

4. MAJOR ITEM REPLACEMENTS:

Listing of Major Item Replacements to be carried by type Ordnance Unit is published in Annex 3 to this section for the information and guidance of all concerned. These Major Items will be made available to units on automatic issue as current stocks permit; no action by organization is necessary.

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5. T/E 9-76, REVISED:

a. Pending receipt of revised T/O and E 9-76, dated 31 March 1943, the following additions and substitutions are being made available. (Authority 3rd Indorsement, File AG 400.34 Op G-D, Hq. ETOUSA, 13 May 1944, to letter subject "Equipment in Excess of T/O", Hq. 313th Ordnance Battalion, dated 27 March 1944) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Ordnance Battalions will submit requisitions for this equipment immediately, citing above letter as authority.

(1) Additional equipment to be issued to Headquarters Detachments, Ordnance Battalions is one (1) screen, latrine, one (1) typewriter, non-portable, one (1) truck 1/4-ton, lxd; and one (1) truck, 3/4-ton, lxd, weapons carrier, to be substituted for one (1) truck, 3/4-ton, lxd, command.

(2) Substitutions in vehicle allowance for the Medical Detachment, Ordnance Battalion are one (1) truck, 1 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo, for one (1) truck, 3/4-ton, lxd, weapons carrier; and one (1) trailer, one ton, two wheel cargo, for one (1) trailer, 1/4-ton, two wheel cargo.

ANNEX NO. 2

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 403

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)

12 June 1944.

NUMBER 2)

SECTION I

Administration

2. "INSTRUCTIONS TO ORDNANCE UNITS" - recently issued by this office will be dated 1 June 1944.

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

3. TOW BAR FOR TANK, LIGHT, M5A1, AND CARRIAGE, MOTOR, 75MM HOWITZER, M51

A tow bar has been designed for use with the subject vehicles for towing Ammunition Trailer, M10, which does not give ramp interference in connection with loading or unloading on LCT's. Drawings of this tow bar are available upon request from the Army Ordnance Officer.

4. ENGINE FAILURE - ARMORED CAR, M5.

Engine failure in Armored Car, M5, is in many cases caused by failure of the gasket which seals the passageway for the oil returning from the filter to crankcase and the water passage from the engine water jacket to the water pump. Failure of this gasket allows the pump to pull the oil from the oil passageway and thus eventually pumping all of the oil into the cooling system. This condition can be corrected by installing a new oil filter mounting gasket (Part No. HM-42852A), tightening the mounting bolts; and periodically checking to ascertain that the bolts remain tight. Two gaskets (used as one) may be required if the mounting has warped. Reference: Letter, 902nd Ordnance HAM Company, APO 403, dated 13 May 1944, Subject: Defect in Engines in Armored Car, M5, and 2nd Indorsement, Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA, APO 871, dated 28 May 1944, file AG 451 OPOD.

5. TECHNICAL INFORMATION LETTER NO. 13 FROM OFFICE CHIEF OF ORD-NANCE:

This letter contains the following questions upon which information is desired by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. It is requested that replies be submitted to the Army Ordnance Officer, attention Maintenance Section, where they will be tabulated and forwarded.

a. Is there excessive fire dispersion when firing to the front of Half-Track vehicles with the .50 Cal. Machine Gun as it is presently mounted?

b. Is the new water sealing process now being used on combat vehicles satisfactory? The new process has eliminated the use of water-proof tape whenever possible and substituted calking compound. Also, is the internal rustproof process satisfactory? If deficiency reports are submitted, give all details possible.

c. The 1 1/2 ton, lxd, Truck, (Chevrolet) dump, is no longer in production. It has been replaced by the 2 1/2 ton 6x6 dump (GMC). The reason for the change from the 1 1/2 ton, lxd, to the 2 1/2 ton, 6x6 was because the rear axle assemblies of the 1 1/2 ton were not adequate to withstand the loads carried. Recent reports received indicate that the rear two axle assemblies of the 2 1/2 ton truck are giving trouble. Complete detail information is requested covering any rear end failures which have been experienced with the 2 1/2 ton truck, dump.

d. Is any excessive trouble being experienced with the rear front spring shackle assemblies on the 1/4 ton, lxd, Trucks?

e. Reports are still being received that the GMC 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, Trucks, are subject to frame sagging, due to their particular use. It is requested that in each case of such failure a careful check be made to see if any of these vehicles have already been reinforced in accordance with TB 1801B-2.

f. What failures are being experienced with the differential of Truck, 3/4 ton, lxd?

g. Are failures being experienced with the new repairable type shock absorbers on Truck, 1/2 ton, lxd (Willys)? How does the percentage of failures compare with the non-repairable type?

h. Is the spring breakage on the Trucks, 1/2 ton, lxd, considered above normal?

i. What failures have been experienced in the front flexible brake hose on the trucks, 1/2 ton, 3/4 ton and 2 1/2 ton, and 1 1/2 ton?

j. Scattered reports of failure have been received from theaters concerning the hubs on the T28 Recovery Trailer, 30 ton. This hub has been changed from cast iron to cast steel and information is desired on any further reports of failure, as to whether the latest type cast steel hub has been involved.

6. BOMB DISPOSAL VEHICLES:

Paragraph 3, from Ordnance Weekly Letter No. 23, dated 3 June 1944, Hq. ETOUSA, quoted as follows:-

"Bomb Disposal Vehicles. All Ordnance Officers should call to the attention of their Bomb Disposal Officers the theater regulations on the maintenance, use and operation of military motor vehicles. Due to the red paint on parts of their vehicles, Bomb Disposal organizations now operate the most conspicuous vehicles in the U. S. Army. Since their vehicles are so conspicuous and since they are Ordnance troops, Bomb Disposal organizations must set the example to other U. S. troops by proper care and operation of their vehicles."

SECTION IV

Supply

6. COMMISSARY ROLL FOR HQ & HQ DET., ORDNANCE BATTALION: Ordnance Bn. Headquarters are authorized in addition to T/O & E 9-76, one (1) Toll, Commissary. Subject equipment may be obtained by submitting properly authenticated requisition on Chief Quartermaster, APO 871, citing as a basis 3rd indorsement, Hq. ETOUSA, file AG 320.3 Op 77, dated 20 May 1944, to letter 24th Ordnance Battalion, dated 16 April 1944, subject: Change to T/E 9-76.

7. BASIS FOR STOCKAGE OF TIRES AND TUBES IN NON-DIVISIONAL ORD-NANCE MAINTENANCE AND DEPOT COMPANIES: As listed in Annex I. These items will be issued automatically. Ordnance units will not submit requisition for tires and tubes.

SECTION V

Ammunition

TUBE REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC LOAD		ORDNANCE COMPANIES						
F.S.N.	SIZE	Type tube	Ord. AM Co.	Ord. AM Co (AA)	Ord. MAN Co.	Depot Co. (Fwd Arm)	Depot Co. (Main Gen)	G.P.V.
8-T-14215	600x16	R	2	2		8	16	
8-T-15286	750x18	R					1	
8-T-15310	750x20	R	8	4	16	32	32	60
8-T-15332	900x20	R	4	4	16	16	32	32
8-T-15329	900x16	R	4	4	8	16	16	32
8-T-15460	1000x22	R				2	2	4
8-T-15462	1100x20	R				2	2	4
8-T-15465	1200x20	R						4
8-T-16230	400x12	R						2
8-T-16285	400x18	R	2	2	2	8	8	16
8-T-17614	600x20	C	2	2		8	8	16
8-T-17630	750x16	C	2	2		8	8	16
8-T-17665	825x20	C	4	4		16	16	32
8-T-17775	1400x20	C	2	2		2	2	6
8-T-17785	1400x24	C	2	2		4	4	8

NOTE: These tubes will be issued automatically to Ordnance units and will not be requisitioned.

TIRE REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC LOAD		ORDNANCE COMPANIES								
F.S.N.	SIZE	Type tread	Ply	Ord. AM Co.	Ord. AM Co (AA)	Ord. MAN Co.	Depot Co. (Fwd Arm)	Depot Co. (Fwd Arm)	Depot Co. (Main Gen)	G.P.V.
8-T-2510	600x20	RC	6	2	2		8	16		
8-T-2595	750x16	RC	8	2	2		8	16		
8-T-2860	1400x20	RC	16	2	2		2	2	6	
8-T-2880	1400x24	RC	16	2	2		4	4	8	
8-T-3200	825x20	C	12	4	4		8	16	32	
8-T-3250	900x20	MS	12	4	4		4	16	32	
8-T-3470	1400x24	MS	20					4	8	
8-T-8588	750x18	RT	10						1	
8-T-8978	600x16	MS	6	8	4	16	32	32	60	
8-T-9060	750-20	MS	8	8	4	16	32	32	60	
8-T-9062	750-20	MS	10	2	2	2	4	4	8	
8-T-9094	900x20	MS	10	2	2	2	4	4	8	
8-T-9087	900x16	MS	8	4	4	8	16	16	32	
8-T-9105	975x22	MS	12						4	
8-T-9105	1000x22	MS	12						4	
8-T-9123	1100x20	MS	12				2	2	4	
8-T-9150	1200x20	MS	14						4	
8-T-13650	400x18	RNC	4	2		2	8	8	16	
	400x12		2						2	

NOTE: These tires will be issued automatically to Ordnance Units and will not be requisitioned.

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)

NUMBER 3)

22 June 1944

SECTION I

Administration

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

7. STANDARDS OF SERVICEABILITY: Standards of serviceability for shipment of equipment overseas will be as prescribed in OBSE 4-17, dated 4 February 1943, and changes thereto, for combat serviceability. In addition, the following standards will apply.

a. Vehicles: After engine tune up or servicing, vehicles must satisfactorily meet the conditions outlined below before being considered serviceable for overseas operation:

- (1) At idling speed with engine at normal operating temperature, the intake manifold pressure must equal or exceed 16" of mercury. This vacuum must be steady and show no great fluctuation between maximum and minimum.
- (2) Compression pressure of each cylinder shall not differ from that of any other cylinder by more than 10 lbs. per square inch. This test will be made immediately after the engine has operated from 20 to 30 minutes, and is still at normal operating temperature. The test will be made with all spark plugs removed and the throttle fully opened. The engine crankshaft shall be rotated at least six revolutions per reading.
- (3) At a road test including operation in all gear ratios:
 - (a) No apparent engine overheating must be experienced.
 - (b) Clutches must function without slipping, grabbing, chattering, or binding.
 - (c) There must be no unusual noises that cannot be readily corrected.
- (4) Wheel and Brake Inspection:
 - (a) Tire rims that revolve free of the ground must be concentric to the axle or hub center line within 1/4" per 10" of radius, and must not have a sidewise run out greater than 3/16" per 10" radius.
 - (b) Wheel, wheel rims, and wheel ring flanges must be free of indentations and cracks.
 - (c) Wheel bearings and wheel bearing grease seals must be in good condition.
 - (d) Brake drums must be free of cracks and not badly ridged.
- (5) All pneumatic tires must be free of cuts, fabric breaks, or other damage likely to cause early failure, and must have minimum mileage life remaining as shown:
 - (a) CM Truck Companies: 2,000 miles
 - (b) Other units: 1,000 miles
- (6) Electrical accessories, such as ignition coils, condensers, spark plugs, etc., must be capable of meeting minimum performance requirements as specified by the manufacturer in pertinent Technical

- Manuals.
- (7) Each cell of the battery must contain electrolyte having a specific gravity equal to or greater than 1.200.
- (8) Continuous band and block type rubber tracks must not have been run more than 500 miles.
- (9) Steel tracks must not have been run more than 500 miles on medium tanks and 800 miles on tractors.
- (10) Rubber bogie wheels must present a smooth appearance without serious cuts or large pieces torn off. Bogie wheels should be examined for heat blisters or separation of rubber and steel.

SECTION IV

Supply

9. DESIGNATION OF ORDNANCE DEPOT COMPANIES AS TO TYPE:

a. The following depot companies have been designated as Forward General Depots:

838th
839th
985th

b. The following depot companies have been designated as Forward Armored Depots:

810th
811st
182nd
181th
333rd

c. The following depot companies have been designated as Main Army Depots:

837th - Main combat vehicles
984th - Main general purpose
344th - Main armament

All depot companies designated as to type will immediately take necessary steps to requisition basic load and prepare personnel for the operation of type depot designated.

SECTION V

Ammunition

1. Ordnance Technical Bulletin No. 54, Hq. ComZ, ETOUSA, is quoted in its entirety for information on FUZE, NOSE, CONCRETE PIERCING, T105. Corps and Division Ordnance Officers will bring the characteristics and usages of this type fuse to the attention of commanders and staffs involved:

"1. PURPOSE. This bulletin is intended to furnish all concerned, especially Artillery Personnel, with information concerning the design, construction and tactical purpose of the fuze, nose, C.P., T105. It includes all available information including ballistics and instructions for assembly to the particular shell required.

"2. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION. Considerable development work has been done during the past year in the Zone of Interior on methods of effectively destroying concrete structures and fortifications. The tests included firings of all types of field weapons from .50 caliber thru the 240mm Howitzer. Important conclusions resulting from these tests were made:

a. H.E. shells fired with standard type F.D. fuzes were effective in concrete destruction because with fuze set at delay they shattered on impact against the hard surface. On super-quick setting only surface damage resulted.

b. S.A.P., A.P., and A.P.C. type projectiles were effective against reinforced concrete because of their penetrating qualities but lacked sufficient explosive punch to do much destruction other than making a hole in the concrete.

"3. From these considerations, it was apparent that an ideal anti-concrete projectile would be one which had the penetrating properties of an AP shot and the detonating force of an HE shell. With this viewpoint in mind, additional experiments were conducted which resulted in the development of a fuze with a hardened steel

nose that would strengthen a standard H.E. shell sufficiently to withstand the force of impact against the concrete and reach satisfactory depths of penetration before the functioning of the delay element. This fuze was designated the Fuze, Nose, Concrete Piercing, T105.

"4. The Fuze, Nose, C.P., T105, consists of a hardened steel nose plug with approximately standard fuze contour and containing the delay element assembly of the fuze F.D. M48 fuze (.05 sec. delay). The fuze with solid nose is made from WD 4140 steel or equivalent, heat-treated to have a Brinell hardness of from 300 to 340. The base of the fuze is threaded to screw directly into the nose threads of the shell body. Standard type boosters cannot be used with this fuze. The T1 booster, which is a 221A2 type booster modified by removal of most of its 2" threads, must be used with the C.P. T105 fuze.

"5. ASSEMBLY AND USE. The fuze, nose, C.P., T105, can be used with standard H. E. ammunition from 75mm to 240mm without any modification to the loaded shell, and is interchangeable with any standard contour fuze (M43, M48, M51, M54, M55, and M67).

"6. For all HE projectiles which contain the standard booster (fixed and semi-fixed ammunition), the standard booster must be replaced by the T1 booster. This is accomplished by removing the booster retaining set screw on the nose end of the shell and replacing the standard booster with the T1. The T1 booster is screwed into the shell body as far as it will go hand tight, and the T105 fuze is then screwed in on top of it. The fuze must be securely tightened so that its shoulder is flush against the nose of the shell. It should be noted that both the fuze T105 and the booster T1 engage the nose threads of the shell.

"7. H.E. shells with fuze C.P. T105 are effective against earth or sandbags as well as concrete. Most earthen cover must be removed before good effect is obtained against reinforced concrete. Shells with fuze T105 are superior to standard AP projectiles in removing reinforcing bars and debris from the impact area. Experience has indicated that embasures are the most vulnerable parts of pillboxes and should be selected as targets in preference to exposed or covered walls. When it is impracticable or unnecessary to obtain direct hits on embasures, fire should be directed at the edges of the structure. Shells of 105mm caliber and larger which strike the earth in front of an embasure will pile sufficient earth in the line of fire to interfere with operation of enemy gun. In order to obtain complete penetration with the least number of rounds, it is essential that repeated hits be obtained against the same impact area. Each such hit weakens the wall progressively, enabling each successive shell to obtain greater penetration than the preceding round.

"8. BALLISTIC CONCEPTS OF FUZE, NOSE, C. P., T105. Effectiveness of fire against reinforced concrete increases with (1) higher striking velocity, (2) larger size of H.E. shell, and (3) greater accuracy of fire. The large shell has several advantages; in addition to affording a higher detonating effect, its greater stability, within the gun and thru the air in general results in smaller dispersion and consequently greater accuracy of fire. Table I is a summary of pertinent information on weapons effective against concrete installations together with actual data obtained at Aberdeen Proving Ground on the number of successive hits (same impact area) of H.E. shell with fuze C.P. T105 required to penetrate reinforced concrete walls. The concrete used in these tests is estimated to be of greater strength than will be found in enemy structures.



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TABLE I

WEAPON	MUZZLE VELOCITY f/s	PROJ. HE	PROJ. WT. LBS.	H.E. CON-TENT LBS.	REINFORCED CON-CRETE WALLS THICKNESS (FEET)	NO. RDS REQUIRED TO PENETRATE	RANGE YARDS
Gun, 75mm, M3 or M4	1975	M48	14.6	1.5	5	16	1000
Gun, 3" M5 or 76mm, M1A2	2800	M2A1	12.8	0.9	5	7	1000
Gun, 90mm M1	2700	M71	23.4	2	5	3	1000
How. 105mm M2A1	1550	M1	33.0	4.8	5	10	1000
Gun 4.5" M1	2275	M65	55.0	4.5	5	2	1000
How. 155mm M1	1850	M107	95.0	15.0	5	4	1000
Gun 155mm M1918	2410	M101	95.0	15.5	5	3	1000
Gun 155mm M1	2800	M101	95.0	15.5	5	1	1000
Gun 155mm M1	2100	M101	95.0	15.5	5	3	1000
How. 8", M1	1950	M106	200	37	5	1	1000
Gun 8" M1	2100	M103	240	21	5	2	8400
How. 240mm M1	1500	M114	360	54	5	1	8400

"9. In destroying concrete structures, direct fire at short range is the most desirable method because of accuracy and high striking velocity. However, if this cannot be accomplished because of rugged terrain or harassing enemy fire, longer ranges can be used in which case the larger weapons, i.e. 8" howitzer, M1, 8" Gun, M1, and 240 How. M1 are best to use to take advantage of the heavy shells employed.

"10. Penetration depends on striking velocity. For effective penetration a striking velocity of at least 1400 f/s has been recommended on an empirical basis with 1000 f/s as an absolute minimum. All projectiles in flight lose velocity rapidly due to gravity pull (in ascending trajectory) and air resistance. Thus there is a range (especially for the smaller weapons) beyond which the striking velocity is too low for effective hits. Table II shows the maximum effective range of certain weapons at which the limiting striking velocities of 1400 f/s and 1000 f/s are reached. Also shown in Table II is an indication of accuracy of fire. Maximum ranges are shown at which the probability of hitting three targets of different size is .3 (slightly less than 1 hit per 3 rounds fired). Ranges greater than the values shown in Table II for the weapons listed will result in greatly decreased accuracy and perhaps impractically large ammunition requirements.

TABLE II

WEAPON	MUZZLE VELOCITY PROJ. f/s	PROJ.	MAX. RANGE (YDS) FOR STRIKING VELOCITY OF:	MAXIMUM RANGE (YDS) FOR PROBABILITY OF .3 HITTING AGAINST FOLLOWING TARGETS		
				1400f/s	1000f/s	
75mm M3 & M4	1975	M48	2500	5000	2000	4000
90mm M1 or T7	2700	M71	6000	9000	2000	5000
4.5" M1	2275	M65	6000	**	2000	5000
155mm Gun M1	2800	M101	9000	**	2000	3000
8" How M1	1950	M106	4000	**	6000	9000

* C.I. taken as front edge of target at ground level.

** Striking velocity remains above 1000 f/s.

"11. On the basis of overall effectiveness, the 8" How. M1 with shell HE M106 and charge VII, or the 155mm Gun M1 firing shell M101, are excellent choices. For greater field mobility and good effectiveness at short ranges, the 90mm gun on gun motor carriage

M10 firing HE shell M71 or the 4.5" gun M1 on carriage M1 or motor carriage T16 (now being developed) firing shell HE M65 are excellent choices.

"12. The 8" Gun M1 and the 240mm How. M1 cannot be used easily at short ranges because they do not depress to zero elevation. However, they are excellent choices for long range destruction of concrete structures. Reports from NATOUSA revealed that the Fifth Army has used the T105 fuze in these weapons for long range shelling of concrete bridges, approaches and concrete buildings with very satisfactory results. Firings were at ranges of 15,000 yards and up. In firing the 240mm Howitzer M1 at a range of 20,000 yards it was found necessary to make an adjustment of approximately 200 yards increase in range and 2 mils left in deflection from firing table values when using the T105 fuze.

"13. The T105 fuze is both squatter and heavier than the regular fuzes in standard use, thereby changing to some extent the interior and exterior ballistics of the projectile with which it is fired. The chamber pressures are only slightly increased and there is a slight loss in muzzle velocity. For moderate ranges, including direct fire at short range, the quadrant elevation for most guns in which the T105 fuze is used will be greater than when using the lighter, longer, standard fuzes. This effect of the T105 fuze is greater when used with the lighter projectiles (4.5" and smaller) and becomes progressively less as projectile size increases. For 8" projectiles and larger, the ballistic effect of T105 fuze becomes negligible and firing tables prepared for the standard fuzes may be used directly without appreciable error.

"14. Until more adequate data is issued, the following rule and Table III will provide a rough working method for computing quadrant elevation for the T105 fuze.

TABLE III

"RULE. From the appropriate firing table devised for a standard fuze but which is replaced by the T105 fuze, compute the quadrant elevation allowing for the effect of an increase in projectile weight and an increase of air density as listed below beyond that which would be used for the standard fuze. For all practicable gun elevations, both of these corrections are applied to decrease range (i.e. for a given range, a higher quadrant elevation will result from using the T105 fuze than from using the standard fuze).

CALIBER	PROJ. WT. IN SQUARES	AIR DENSITY %
75mm Gun	2.5	32
90mm Gun	2.0	19
105mm How.	1.0	14
4.5" Gun	1.5	12
155mm How. & Gun	1.0	5
8" How. or Gun & Larger	0	0

"15. SUMMARY. The foregoing information is summarized for convenience.

- The fuze, nose, C.P. T105 is a hardened steel body fuze containing a point detonating delay action assembly. When assembled with special booster T1, a standard H.E. shell is converted into an effective destroyer of reinforced concrete structures.
- The T105 fuze is effective when used in weapons ranging from 75mm gun thru the 240mm Howitzer M1. It is most effective when used in direct fire at longer ranges.
- For effectiveness and accuracy at short and moderate ranges, the 8" Howitzer M1 is ideal. For mobility of weapon and effective fire power in direct fire at short range, the 90mm and 4.5" guns preferably on motor mounts are most suitable. For accuracy and destroying effect at long ranges, the 240mm How. M1 and 8" Gun M1 are recommended.
- Ballistics of the projectile are changed when the T105 fuze replaces the standard fuze. The greatest change occurs with the small projectiles; the effect with projectiles 8" and larger is negligible. A rough correction table is provided herein; use of the T105 fuze generally will cause a decrease in range from that expected when using the standard type fuzes.

"16. AVAILABILITY OF FUZE, NOSE, CP, T105, IN U. K. A fair supply of fuzes CP T105 and T1 boosters is now available in the U.K. Approximately one half of this supply is now in the hands of the First Army. The contents of this bulletin should be circularized to all units using or expecting to use this fuze."

SECTION VI - GENERAL

All Ordnance personnel should read the article: "Recovery of Materiel in Combat" in the May 1944 issue of THE ORDNANCE SERGEANT. This is an excellent article on combat conditions encountered in recovery of materiel.

ANNEX NO. 4

REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED

- Form No. 1: "Materiel in Hands of Troops" and "Combat Loss". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 2, (Reproduced on Pages 98-107 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted monthly as of 1200 hours on the 20th day of each month to reach Army Headquarters not later than 1200 on the 23rd day of each month. Reference "Instruction to Ordnance Units", paragraph 6a (9).
- Form No. 2: "Status of Ammunition" Third Army Ordnance Form No. 1, (Reproduced on Pages 107-109 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted daily as of 1800, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 0800 hours the following day. Reference, "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 6b (4).
- Form No. 2: "Status of Ammunition" Third Army Ordnance Form No. 1, (Reproduced on pages 107-109 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted monthly as of 0600 the 20th day, to reach Army Ordnance Office not later than the 23rd day. Reference, "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 6b (5).
- Form No. 3: "Captured Enemy Materiel Report", Third Army Ordnance Form No. 3, (Reproduced on page 109 of OVERLORD PLAN) submitted weekly by designated Ordnance battalions as of 1800 hours, Saturday, to reach Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following Monday. Reference, "Instructions to Ordnance Units", paragraph 30.
- Form No. 4: "Ordnance Major Item Supply Report". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 4, submitted daily by all Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies as of 1800, to arrive at Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following day.
- Form No. 5: "Ordnance Maintenance Report". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 5, submitted weekly by Ordnance Maintenance Companies as of 1800 Saturday, to arrive at Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following day. Column 1 is self-explanatory and pictures the maintenance situation for the unit reporting. Sheet No. 1 of this report, vertical columns No. 2 to No. 7, inclusive, is a general report showing the maintenance status for general types of equipment. Additional sheets with vertical columns from No. 8 to number required will report on individual major items which are classed as critical by the Army Ordnance Officer. Examples in columns 8, 9, 10 are indicated. When items are reported upon they will be listed in sequence as they appear on the critical item list published by the Army Ordnance Officer. At the bottom of sheet #1 or on additional sheets will be shown items dealined with the information furnished as indicated.
- Form No. 6: "Supply Battalion Report". Third Army Ordnance Form No. 6, submitted weekly by Ordnance Supply Battalions as of 1800, Saturday, to arrive at the Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 of the following Monday. Under column 1 indicate requisition number of the unit requisitioning or the Supply Battalion's requisition number on Com. 2. Under column 2 enter unit designation. Under column 3 enter total days requisition has been outstanding seven (7) days or over. Under column 4 enter quantities of items on hand in the supply battalion. Under column 5 list items on requisition not filled. If over five (5) items remain unfilled on any one requisition, furnish copy of requisition and do not

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list items. Show on the copy of the requisition only those items unfilled. Under column 6 make any remarks as to contacts made to fill requisition or any other pertinent matter which will aid the Army Ordnance Officer in expediting fulfillment of the requisition.

Form No. 7: Third Army Ordnance Form No. 7, will be used by all TUSA Ordnance units authorized to make allocations of equipment or ammunition.

Form No. 8: "Special Ammunition Report". This report to be submitted by ammunition companies and battalions when the stockage of specified items becomes critical, or as called for by Army.

Form No. 9: "Reconnaissance Report". Submitted by units making reconnaissance of areas for prospective future ASPs, or Depots. Reports to be forwarded to Army Ordnance Officer by Ammunition Companies, Depot Companies, and by other Ordnance Companies when required.

Ord Form No. 4.
Third Army

ORDNANCE MAJOR ITEM SUPPLY REPORT

Organization Reporting _____

Date _____ 1800

(To be submitted daily by all Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies as of 1800 covering the preceding 24 hours, to arrive at Army Ordnance Office by 0800 the following day.)

Correct Nomenclature of Items	On Hand as of Last Report	Rec'd Since Last Report	Issued Since Last Report	Balance on Hand Total	Allocated but not Delivered	Unserviceable	Unserviceable for Repair	Available for Allocation

Allocation Numbers filled since last report _____
Allocation Numbers on hand, unfilled _____

Third Army Ordnance Form #6

SUPPLY BATTALION REPORT

Organization or Depot reporting _____

Date _____ 1800

(To be submitted weekly by Ordnance Supply Battalions as of 1800, Saturday, to arrive at the Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following Monday.)

Req. No.	Req. Outstanding 7 days or longer	Time outstanding DAYS	Quantity on Hand	Items on Req.	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6

Ord Form No. 5
Third Army

ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE REPORT

No. of Sheets this Report _____ Organization Reporting _____
Date _____ 1800

(To be submitted weekly by Ordnance Maintenance Companies as of 1800 Saturday, to arrive at the Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 the following Monday)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
J/O Issued to Date	Combat Veh.	Gen. Purpose	Arty	S.A.	Instrument	Miscellaneous
J/O Issued this Week						
J/O Completed to Date						
J/O Completed this Week						
J/O Cancelled to Date						
J/O Cancelled this Week						
Total Jobs in Shops						
Units Evac. to Date						
Units Evac. this Week						
Units Exchanged this Week						
Units Deadlined 24 Hours						
Units Deadlined 72 Hours						

Units on Deadline 72 Hours or Longer

Organization Unit Belongs	J/O No.	Type of Unit	Reg. or W. No.	Date In	Cause of Deadline	Action Taken



Third Army Ordnance Form #7.

ALLOCATIONS No. _____

Eq. _____ (Unit Issuing) Date and Hour _____

To: _____ (Maint.) (Depot) (Am.) (Co.) (Bn.) (Sp.)

The following allocation of equipment and/or ammunition is made to _____

UNIT _____ CORPS OR ARMY _____

LOCATION _____

	No. Alloc.	ITEM	Total Alloc. Incl. this one	Remarks
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				

Priority of Delivery _____

This allocation cancels allocation Nos. _____

SUPPLY OFFICER
TUSA

The above form will be used by all authorized TUSA units for making allocations of equipment and ammunition.

TUSA ORD FORM #8 SPECIAL AMMUNITION REPORT
 SUBJECT: Status of Essential Stocks. No. _____
 TO : _____ As of hrs _____ 1941
 FROM : _____ time _____ date _____
 Signature _____

Line	Code	Nomenclature	on hand	U/F
100	P5HBA	Cart., AP-T, M81, 10mm AA Gun		
90	P5HCA	Cart., HE, T (SD) M81, w/PDF, 10mm AA Gun		
253	P5HDA	Shell, HE, M71, unfuzed, 90mm AA Gun		
101	P5SBA	Shell, HE, M71, w/TMF M43, 90mm AA Gun		
107	P5SCA	Shot, AP, M71, w/Tr., 90mm AA Gun		
224	P5SHA	Shot, AP, M82, w/Tr., & BDF M68, 90mm AA		
102	P5SGB	Shell, HE, M71, w/PDF M43 or M43A1 (P5S1B) 90mm AA Gun		
85	P1EAA	Shell, HE, M101, unfuzed, 155mm Gun M1		
86	P1ECA	Shell, Smoke, WP, M101, unfuzed, 155mm Gun		
88	P2EAA	Charge, Prop., B&I, NH Powder, 155mm Gun M1		
114	R1MCA	Shell, HE, M18, w/PDF M48, 75mm How		
115	R1MDA	Shell, HE, M18, w/PDF M48, 75mm How		
117	R1MIA	Shell, Smoke, WP, M41, w/PDF, 75mm How		
116	R1MMA	Shell, HE, AT, M66, w/BDF M62, 75mm How		
65	R1QBB	Shell, HE, M1, w/PDF M48, 105mm How M2		
67	R1QCB	Shell, HE, M1, w/PDF M48, 105mm How M2		
68	R1QDA	Shell, HE, AT, M67, w/BDF M62, 105mm How M2		
69	R1QEB	Shell, Smoke, WP, M60, w/PDF M57, 105mm How		
40	R1SCA	Shell, HE, M1, w/PDF M48, 105mm How M3		
39	R1SDA	Shell, HE, M1, w/PDF M48, 105mm How M3		
80	R2EPA	Shell, HE, M107, unfuzed, 155mm How M1		
81	R2EDA	Shell, Smoke, WP, M10, unfuzed, 155mm How		
82	R2EAA	Charge, Prop., M6, GB, 155mm How M1		
84	R2EBA	Charge, Prop., M1, WB, 155mm How M1		
118	R2DDA	Shell, HE, M65, unfuzed, 4.5" Gun M1		
119	R2PAA	Charge, Prop., M8, (super), 4.5" Gun M1		
120	R2PBA	Charge, Prop., M7, (normal), 4.5" Gun M1		
126	P1JAA	Shell, HE, M103, 8" Gun		
127	P2KAA	Charge, Prop., M9, 8" Gun		
128	P2KBA	Charge, Prop., M10, 8" Gun		
121	P1QAA	Shell, HE, 200 lb. M106, unfuzed, 8" How M1		
122	P2QAA	Charge, Prop., M1, GB, 8" How M1		
123	P2QBA	Charge, Prop., M2, WB, 8" How M1		
124	P1SAA	Shell, HE, M11, unfuzed, 210mm How M1		
125	P2SAA	Charge, Prop., B&I, NH Powder, 210mm How M1		
218	R3EHA	Fuze, PD, M51A1, w/booster M20A1		
219	R3ESA	Fuze, PD, M51 or M51A1, w/booster M21A1		
90		Fuze, PD, M51A3		
91	R3B1A	Fuze, PD, M55 or M55A1, Sq & T		
	R3B2A			
92	R3EAA	Fuze, TM, M57		
95	R3DRA	Primer, Perc., M11A1, 21 Gr.		
		Fuze, CP, T105		

TUSA ORD. FORM #9. RECONNAISSANCE REPORT
 RECONNAISSANCE STARTED FROM _____ AT _____
 AND COMPLETED AT _____ AT _____
 (Time and Date) (Time and Date)


MAP COORDINATES _____ MILEAGE CHART _____

FINDINGS

1. Overlay to accompany this report will be made on current operational map. This overlay will indicate road conditions between rear area and site, and between site and fighting troops.
2. TONNAGE CAPACITY UNDER UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS: _____
3. DRAINAGE: _____
4. COVER: _____
5. CONCEALMENT: _____
6. RECOMMENDED IMMEDIATE ROAD IMPROVEMENTS TO BE MADE BY ENGINEERS: _____
7. DESIRED ROAD IMPROVEMENTS TO BE MADE BY ENGINEERS: _____
8. LAYOUT PLAN:
 - a. ROADSIDE: _____
 - b. AREA: _____
9. RECOMMENDATIONS: _____

SUBMITTED AS OF _____
 (Time & Date)

TO: _____
 BY: _____



ANNEX NO. 6

ANNEX NO. 7

SCHEDULE OF ORDNANCE UNITS LIFTED TO THE CONTINENT

	GP HQ	BN HQ	AM BN HQ	MM CO	MAM GO	HM FA CO	HM TK CO	MAM CO	DEF CO	EVAC CO	NVD CO	AM CO	BDS CO	MT. CO AA
D / 21				13										
D / 23							531			188				
D / 26		24	313	3168	3525 3530	537						665	2 5 88	300
D / 28					3157 Det.					839				
D / 29														
D / 31	69	10	150	16						171		686		
D / 34				128					837			592		
D / 35								984	172			588		
D / 36				47			552					569		
D / 38												575		
D / 39		14 79 314			3514 3515								89	299
D / 40				256			501							
D / 41				32			521			314	164			
D / 42	70	66											90	
D / 43					3524	547 550								
D / 44					3182									281
D / 46		193		15	3532			902	182					
D / 50		19			3537 3446		534					574		275
D / 51		312					556		985			620	91	
D / 53								853						
D / 54		26	41		3445 3450 3457 Det.	510		889	184			570 573 583		305
D / 59					3508		554							
D / 60														
D / 62		316		116		545			838					
D / 68				26	3510							598 657		
D / 70					3519		556							
D / 71		185 320		129	3448		553	904	840	182				
D / 72							538							
D / 76														576
D / 77			65	104	3447									
D / 80								910	841			640		
D / 81					3511	520								
D / 84		590		7 293				447 914						
D / 88													3076	
D / 89														
D / 90					286 3444 3463			911 851						

Maintenance Supply and Evacuation Records

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 103

GNMCO 313 (Ord)

29 June 1944

Subject: Maintenance, Supply and Evacuation Records.

To: All Ordnance Maintenance Companies.

1. This office has obtained and will distribute to all maintenance companies two loose-leaf binders complete with fillers and index sheets. These binders are to be used by all maintenance companies and will be the means of keeping records of maintenance, supply and evacuation operations.

2. One binder will be used to record all job order requisitions and requisitions for parts. This book will be divided into sections by branch or service. There will also be a section for each Division served by the company. There are the necessary tab sheets furnished for dividing the binder into sections. Each unit coming to the maintenance company for service will have an individual sheet on which will be recorded the date, work order number, job order request number or requisition number, description of work to be done (including vehicle or gun registration number) or parts requisitioned, whether parts required for repair work or issue are on hand or must be requisitioned (if requisitioned, list requisition number), and remarks, which should contain such information as when work is completed, parts shipped, or if work was evacuated (give evacuation point). On items requiring evacuation, if replacement is made to the using unit from the company pool, in the column marked "parts on hand or on requisition", write "pool". The sheets which are furnished for use in the binder have columns provided for recording the above information.

3. The second binder will be divided into two sections, one section to be used for keeping a record of evacuations and the other section a record of requisitions forwarded by the company.

a. Items which are evacuated will be classified according to type; that is, a section will be provided for trucks, tanks and tank-like vehicles, half-trucks, small arms, artillery and miscellaneous. Under the section for trucks, for example, there will be a sheet for each type truck; that is, 1/4-ton, 3/4-ton, 1 1/2-ton, 2 1/2-ton, etc. The same sheets as used in the first binder are used for recording this work. Ignore the headings on the columns and list the following information systematically: date of evacuation, work order number under which the item was received, requisition number listed in the column marked "customer's requisition number" (cross out the word customer's), unit for whom the item is being evacuated (including registration number), point to which evacuated; and when item has been replaced or repaired and returned to the maintenance company, list under remarks date received and if to be placed in company pool, write pool in parenthesis in the remarks column when evacuation is effected, and when received post the date received in the remarks column. When any sheet becomes filled, a new sheet will be inserted. The old sheet will not be removed, however, until all items are completed or two weeks after starting the new sheet, whichever is the later.

b. The requisition section of this binder will list all maintenance company requisitions. Parts, vehicles, etc., will be drawn from several supply points. In view of the supply procedure, this will, for the most part, classify your requisitions into general purpose, combat, and armament. The same sheets used for recording the other information on work orders and evacuation will be used for keeping this record. Date of requisition, work order number if parts are for any one work order, requisition number listed in column marked "Customer's Requisition Number". (Cross out the word customer's), type of material on requisition, and date requisition is filled will be listed. Do not forget the requisition number is posted in the work order binder if the requisition covers parts, etc., other than for stock. The same procedure on replacement of sheets when the old sheet has been filled will apply as outlined previously.

4. In order that all postings to these records can be made current, completed work orders and tally-outs should be routed to the individual responsible for keeping the record. The same should apply to incoming requisitions, job request orders, and tally-ins. The procedure for extracting the necessary information for the record is a matter to be worked out in detail by company commanders.

5. The advantage and purpose of keeping these records is to facilitate compiling reports which will be required as a number of work orders completed per week, number of evacuations effected, amount of equipment on deadline and reason therefor, status of requisitions, and availability of materials. This letter is not to be interpreted as the authority for making the above reports.

a. a. There are no objections to using these binders for compiling additional data such as records of inspections, etc.

6. At such time as a unit is moved from one sector to another or withdrawn from the line, the individual sheet which is in the work order binder, will be withdrawn and forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer by the Ordnance Company. The Army Ordnance Officer will be responsible for forwarding the sheet on to the battalion which will be maintaining the unit in the future. In this way the record of the using unit will follow it and the equipment and supplies it has on order can be gotten to the unit. This procedure will be followed whether or not there are open items on the sheet. No sheets are withdrawn from the evacuation and requisitions binder at any time for forwarding.

Inclosure No. 1

Date	Work Order Number	Customer's Req. No.	Description	Parts in hand or on Requisition	Remarks

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 8

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
ESTIMATED AMMUNITION MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	Rds/wpn/day	D / 42		D / 52		D / 62		D / 72		D / 82		D / 91	TOTAL
		to	D / 51	to	D / 61	to	D / 71	to	D / 81	to	D / 90		
Cart., Carbine, cal..30	5.00	2,850,000		2,550,000		3,700,000		4,250,000		4,850,000		9,890,000	28,090,000
Cart., Ball, cal..30 5/clip		75,000		84,000		93,000		102,000		108,000		115,000	577,000
Cart., Ball, cal..30 8/clip		2,320,000		2,320,000		2,320,000		2,850,000		3,160,000		5,760,000	18,730,000
Cart., A.P., cal..30 5/clip		46,000		53,000		59,000		66,000		72,000		80,000	376,000
Cart., A.P., cal..30 8/clip		1,735,000		1,525,000		1,735,000		2,000,000		2,260,000		4,225,000	13,480,000
Cart., Tracer, cal..30 in ctns		90,000		100,000		110,000		140,000		150,000		290,000	880,000
Cart., Ball, cal..30 in ctns		241,000		189,000		210,000		220,000		250,000		420,000	1,530,000
Cart., A.P., cal..30 in ctns		180,000		150,000		150,000		160,000		190,000		300,000	1,113,000
Cart., A.P. & Tr., cal..30 4-1, 250/PB	83.33	4,335,000		4,440,000		5,170,000		6,445,000		7,900,000		15,750,000	44,240,000
Cart., Ball, cal..45	(S&W 10.00) (Pistol 1.33)	1,065,000		1,065,000		1,065,000		1,590,000		2,115,000		3,350,000	10,250,000
Cart., A.P.-I-Tr., cal..50, 2-2-1	83.33	4,277,000		4,027,000		5,077,000		6,327,000		8,927,000		13,840,000	42,475,000
Shell, H.E., M54 w/S.D. Tr., w/f PD M56, 37mm Gun AA	53.33	78,000		107,000		132,000		137,000		117,000		175,000	746,000
Shot, APC, M59 w/Tr., 37mm Gun, AA		4,100		5,700		7,000		7,200		6,200		9,300	39,500
Shell, H.E. M63 w/f PD M58, 37mm Gun T or AT	13.33	76,000		73,000		84,000		105,000		125,000		235,000	698,000
Shot, APC, M51, 37mm Gun T or AT		35,000		33,000		40,000		50,000		59,000		116,500	333,500
Canister, M2, 37mm Gun T or AT		12,000		11,000		13,000		17,000		20,000		38,800	111,800
Cart., H.E.-T, SD M41 w/f PD M71, 40mm Gun AA	48.00	190,000		190,000		220,000		272,000		246,000		373,000	1,491,000
Cart., A.P.-T, M81, 40mm Gun AA		10,000		10,500		12,000		15,000		13,000		20,000	80,500
Shell, H.E., T18, 57mm Gun		4,600		3,700		4,000		4,600		5,400		9,500	31,800
Shot, APC-T, M86, 57mm Gun	13.33	51,500		42,000		47,500		57,000		59,000		107,000	364,000
Canister, T17, 57mm Gun M1		1,100		950		1,100		1,150		1,300		2,400	8,000
Bomb, Smoke, M41, 2" Mortar	3.33	6,740		6,600		7,200		11,340		15,980		26,700	74,560
Shell, H.E., M49A2, w/f PD M52, 60mm Mortar		185,000		155,000		175,000		195,000		225,000		395,000	1,330,000
Shell, Yll. M83 w/f TM, M65, 60mm Mortar	20.00	9,600		8,100		9,200		10,200		11,800		20,500	69,400
Shell, Smoke WP, 60mm Mortar		9,200		7,800		8,800		10,000		11,200		21,000	68,000
Shell, Smoke FS, 60mm Mortar		9,200		7,800		8,800		10,000		11,200		21,000	68,000
Shell, H.E., M43A1 w/f PD M52, 81mm Mortar		81,500		68,500		76,500		86,500		103,500		188,500	605,000
Shell, H.E., M56 w/f PD M53, 81mm Mortar	25.00	24,400		21,400		24,400		28,400		33,400		67,500	199,500
Shell, Smoke, WP M57 w/f PD M52, 81mm Mortar		18,700		17,200		20,200		24,700		31,200		61,250	173,250
Shell, H.E., M42A1 w/f PD M48 NC 3" Gun		48,600		50,000		63,000		77,400		86,400		156,600	482,000
Shell, H.E., M42A1 w/f PD M48AL RC, 3" Gun	41.67	60,750		47,250		78,750		96,750		108,000		195,000	586,500
Shot, APC M62 w/f BD M66A1 & Tr., 3" Gun		12,150		9,450		15,750		19,350		21,600		62,600	140,900
Shell, Smoke, 3" Gun		69,750		74,000		83,000		120,000		160,000		310,700	817,450
Shell, H.E., M48 w/f PD M48AL SC, 75mm Gun	25.00	55,800		59,000		66,000		95,400		126,500		248,550	651,250
Shot, APC M61 w/f BD M66A1 & Tr. SC, 75mm Gun		7,000		7,400		8,200		12,000		16,000		32,000	82,600
Shell, Smoke HC BE M89, 75mm Gun		12,000		12,300		14,000		17,500		20,500		40,000	116,300
Shell, H.E., M48 w/f PD M48AL, 75mm How		3,000		3,100		3,500		4,300		5,100		10,000	29,000
Shell, H.E., M48 w/f PD M48AL, 75mm How	26.67	900		900		1,000		1,300		1,500		2,900	8,500
Shell, H.E.A.T. M66 w/f BD M62, 75mm How		1,700		1,800		2,000		2,500		2,900		5,700	16,600
Shell, Smoke WP M64 w/f PD M57, 75mm How		22,500		22,500		9,000		11,750		15,750		49,500	130,500
Shell, APC M52 w/f BD M66A1 & Tr., 76mm Gun	Tank 25.00	18,000		18,000		7,200		9,000		12,600		39,600	154,100
Shell, H.E., M42A1 w/f M48AL, 76mm Gun	Anti-Tank 41.67	4,500		4,500		1,800		2,250		3,150		10,000	26,200
Shell, Smoke HC BI, 76mm Gun		900		900		1,000		1,200		1,100		1,700	6,800
Shell, H.E. M71 w/f TM M67, 90mm Gun AA		15,500		16,500		18,500		22,000		19,500		30,500	122,500
Shell, H.E. M71 w/f TM M43, 90mm Gun AA	25.00	900		900		1,000		1,200		1,100		1,700	6,800
Shell, H.E. M71 w/f PD M48AL, 90mm Gun AA		900		900		1,000		1,200		1,100		1,700	6,800
Shot, APC M82 w/f BD M68A1, 90mm Gun AA		900		900		1,000		1,200		1,100		1,700	6,800
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f PD M48AL, 105mm How M2 & M2A1		120,600		119,100		151,100		187,700		226,000		489,600	1,294,100
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f PD M41, 105mm How M2 & M2A1		85,800		85,000		108,000		133,900		171,500		308,000	892,200
Shell, H.E.A.T. M67 w/f BD M62, 105mm How M2 & M2A1		2,800		3,000		3,900		5,000		6,200		13,300	34,200
Shell, Smoke WP M60 w/f PD M57, 105mm How M2 & M2A1		12,600		12,100		13,500		18,000		22,500		47,700	126,400
Shell, Smoke HC BE M84 w/f PD M41, 105mm How M2 & M2A1	58.33	12,600		12,100		13,500		18,000		22,500		47,700	126,400
Shell, Smoke Green, 105mm How M2 & M2A1		2,800		3,000		3,900		5,000		6,200		13,300	34,200
Shell, Smoke Red, 105mm How M2 & M2A1		2,800		3,000		3,900		5,000		6,200		13,300	34,200
Shell, Smoke Violet, 105mm How, M2 & M2A1		2,800		3,000		3,900		5,000		6,200		13,300	34,200
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f PD M48AL, 105mm How M3		20,100		15,500		17,400		18,300		22,000		26,000	119,300
Shell, H.E. M1 w/f PD M41, 105mm How M3	58.33	8,300		6,500		7,200		7,600		8,800		11,000	49,400
Shell, H.E.A.T. w/f BD M62, 105mm How M3		1,700		1,300		1,400		1,500		1,800		2,200	9,900
Shell, Smoke HC BE M84 w/f BD M41, 105mm How M3		1,700		1,300		1,400		1,500		1,800		2,200	9,900
Shell, Smoke WP M60 w/f PD M57, 105mm How M3		1,700		1,300		1,400		1,500		1,800		2,200	9,900
Shell, H.E. M65, 4.5" Gun M1		9,600		7,200		7,200		8,400		13,200		24,000	69,600
Charge Prop., M7 NC 4.5" Gun M1	33.33	4,800		3,600		3,600		4,200		6,600		12,000	34,800
Charge Prop., M8 SC 4.5" Gun M1		4,800		3,600		3,600		4,200		6,600		12,000	34,800

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
ESTIMATED AMMUNITION MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS (CONTINUED)

TYPE OF AMMUNITION	Rds/wpn/day	D / 42	D / 52	D / 62	D / 72	D / 82	D / 91	TOTAL
		to D / 51	to D / 61	to D / 71	to D / 81	to D / 90	to D / 101	
Shell, H.E. M107, 155mm How M1		51,250	42,075	56,350	67,575	78,800	137,700	431,750
Shell, Smoke HC HE M16, 155mm How M1		4,525	3,720	5,000	5,985	6,980	12,240	38,450
Shell, Smoke WP M10, 155mm How M1		4,525	3,720	5,000	5,985	6,980	12,240	38,450
Shell, Smoke HC BE Red, 155mm How M1	33.33	740	610	835	1,015	1,190	2,160	6,550
Shell, Smoke HC BE Green, 155mm How M1		740	610	835	1,015	1,190	2,160	6,550
Shell, Smoke HC BE Violet, 155mm How M1		740	610	835	1,015	1,190	2,160	6,550
Charge, Prop M3 CB, 155mm How M1		27,400	21,650	29,100	34,900	40,700	71,400	225,150
Charge, Prop M4 WB, 155mm How M1		39,550	32,475	43,525	52,200	60,900	106,575	335,225
Shell, H.E. M114, 240mm How M1	25.00			900	2,700	4,500	12,600	20,700
Charge, Prop, 240mm How M1				900	2,700	4,500	12,600	20,700
Shell, H.E. M101, 155mm Gun		29,580	26,500	29,580	43,860	39,780	66,300	235,600
Shell, Smoke WP M104, 155mm Gun	33.33	5,220	4,700	5,220	7,740	7,020	11,700	41,600
Charge, Prop 155mm Gun M1917-17A1		5,050	3,800	8,800	13,850	11,350	18,900	61,750
Charge, Prop 155mm Gun M1-M1A1		31,500	28,975	27,725	40,325	37,800	63,000	229,325
Shell, H.E. M106, 8" How M1	33.33	14,400	10,800	14,400	21,600	24,000	42,000	127,200
Charge, Prop M1 GB, 8" How M1		4,320	3,240	4,320	6,470	7,200	12,600	38,150
Charge, Prop M2 WB, 8" How M1		10,080	7,560	10,080	15,130	16,800	29,400	89,050
Shell, H.E. M103, 8" Gun M1	25.00				3,600	4,050	7,700	15,350
Charge, Prop, 8" Gun M1, WB					1,900	2,125	4,050	8,075
Charge, Prop, 8" Gun M1, GB					1,900	2,125	4,050	8,075
Primer, Per 18 Gr M11A3		133,450	110,600	138,750	187,550	207,800	366,250	1,144,400
Fuze, PD M46		7,000	7,400	8,200	12,000	16,000	32,000	82,600
Fuze, PD M51A3		79,560	65,950	82,700	114,270	126,200	223,720	692,400
Fuze, PD M54		8,550	5,350	7,290	8,800	10,340	18,720	57,050
Fuze, PD M55A1		34,635	28,725	35,520	46,320	51,150	90,600	286,950
Fuze, TM M67A1		8,350	6,920	8,690	11,920	13,240	21,130	70,550
Fuze, Nose CP T105		8,000	9,000	10,000	11,000	12,000	12,000	62,000
Mine, AT, H.E. M1A1		54,000	46,000	52,000	58,000	68,000	126,000	404,000
Mine, AP M2A1		2,700	2,300	2,600	2,900	3,400	6,300	20,200
Mine, AP M3		2,700	2,300	2,600	2,900	3,400	6,300	20,200
Mine, AP M3		9,150	9,150	9,150	9,150	9,150	9,000	54,750
Torpedo, Bangalore, M1A1	per Combat Co. 8.33	37,900	32,350	38,800	42,600	48,800	89,550	290,000
Grenade, Hand Frag MkII	per Combat Co. 8.33	37,900	32,350	38,800	42,600	48,800	89,550	290,000
Grenade, Hand Off. MkIIIA1		441,950	353,500	398,550	433,000	490,500	891,500	3,009,000
Grenade, Rifle AT M9A1		220,900	176,750	199,280	216,525	245,250	588,895	1,647,600
Grenade, Rifle Frag Impact, M17	1.67	18,115	14,750	16,600	18,050	20,450	39,730	127,975
Grenade, Rifle Smoke HC, T-6		47,900	38,300	43,200	46,900	53,100	94,000	323,400
Grenade, Rifle Smoke WP		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Grenade, Rifle Colored Smoke Red		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Grenade, Rifle, Colored Smoke Green		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Grenade, Rifle, Colored Smoke Violet		1,500	2,000	2,400	2,500	3,000	5,500	16,900
Fuze, Deton Hand Grenade M6A2		37,900	32,350	38,800	42,600	48,800	89,550	290,000
Cart., Grenade, Carbine Cal.30, M6		100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	460,000
Cart., Grenade, Rifle Cal.30, M6		20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	120,000
Rocket, AT 2.36", M5A1	2.00	131,750	120,430	150,000	186,000	210,000	419,440	1,217,620
Signal, Ground for Proj M4, Assorted	1.33	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	18,000	58,000
Signal, Ground for Launcher Grenade Assorted	1.33	8,000	8,500	9,000	9,000	9,000	8,000	51,500
Signal, Aircraft Assorted	1.33	16,660	12,660	17,660	22,660	28,660	32,000	130,300
Flare, Troop, Recognition, Yellow		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
WEIGHT IN LONG TONS		30,768.88	24,015.19	27,838.72	37,049.27	46,216.53	59,031.70	224,920.29
WEIGHT IN MEASURED TONS		32,615.01	25,456.10	29,509.04	39,272.22	48,989.52	62,573.60	238,415.49

ANNEX NO. 10

AMMUNITION WEIGHTS AND PACKING CHART
CALL DATA BASED ON STANDARD OVERSEAS PACKING


ORD. OFFICE, HQ, TUSA
MAY 8, 1944

Table with columns: TYPE OF AMMUNITION, RDS PER 1000, WEIGHT PER 1000, VEHICULAR LOAD, UPPER LOWER FIGURE-CENTRS, TYPE OF AMMUNITION, C O D E, TYPE OF AMMUNITION, RDS PER 1000, WEIGHT PER 1000, VEHICULAR LOAD, UPPER LOWER FIGURE-CENTRS.


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ANNEX NO. 9

SECRET
THIRD US ARMY AMMUNITION PLAN



AMMUNITION COMMAND CHANNEL



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ANNEX NO. 11

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Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order No. 3

SECTION I - Operations

1. Operation.

a. To expedite reaction to tactical and service requirements, Ordnance troops may be moved by the following Ordnance Commanders:

(1) By the Company Commander of a company in direct support of a division; the section parties of his company within the divisional area after consultation with and approval from the Ordnance Officer and G-4 of the division.

(2) By the Battalion Commander of a battalion in direct support of a corps; Companies of a battalion within the Corps and Divisional areas after approval from Ordnance Officer and G-4 of the Corps.

(3) By Ammunition Battalion Commanders; ASP's will be established on recommendation of the Ordnance Officer and G-4 of divisions and corps after approval by Army Headquarters. When such recommendation is forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer, it must specifically state that Corps or Division clearance has been obtained. (As desired by Corps Commander)

(4) By Ordnance Group Commanders; Battalion headquarters after Army approval of recommendation of the Group Commander.

(5) By the nearest Corps and Division Commander; in case of failure of communications or in a tactical emergency.

b. All other movements will be directly by Army.

c. Reports (accompanied by overlays and giving time of opening and closing of installations) of all movements of Ordnance organizations to new locations will be forwarded immediately to the Army Ordnance Officer through Ordnance channels.

d. The closest possible contact (both as to the tactical situation and service requirements) will be maintained by the Ordnance commanders with appropriate officers of supported line organizations. Each Ordnance unit (battalion and company) will be given a special task assignment and specific instructions regarding its execution.

SECTION II - SUPPLY

2. Ammunition.

a. All units will arrive on the Continent with a minimum supply of ammunition as shown in basic load charts.

b. Maintenance: The estimated rate of expenditure will be available from Com. 2 on demand. Estimated requirements by periods have been transmitted to Com 2.

3. Responsibility.

a. Unit commanders are responsible that their organizations are completely equipped with ordnance material (major items, basic load of spare parts as prescribed in pertinent T/O & E's, T/BA's, SNL's) and basic load of ammunition. After being alerted, these will be obtained as prescribed in Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting, Third Army, dated 26 April 1944.

b. Supply-Discipline - Supply Discipline will be enforced with particular attention to the following:

(1) Stocking of excess quantities of materiel and supplies beyond estimated or anticipated current requirements.

(2) Wasteful use of expendable supplies, such as cleaning and preserving materials, metal stocks, standard hardware, parts common, and small maintenance parts.

(3) Careless handling and storage of supplies and materiel including damaging of containers in opening and failure to close or reseat containers from which a portion of the contents has been removed.

c. Weapons of Hospital Patients. Weapons coming under medical control due to evacuation of patients, etc., will be turned in promptly by hospitals, and other Medical installations, to the nearest ordnance maintenance company, and a receipt obtained therefor.

4. Method of Issue.

a. General Supplies

(1) Major Items:

(a) Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies will issue major items to using troops whom they support in exchange for:

1. An unserviceable major item of the same type.

2. A certificate, signed by an officer, that a major item of the same type has been totally destroyed due to enemy action or accident, abandoned due to enemy action, or destroyed to prevent capture by enemy.

3. In case a unit requires a major item which cannot be supplied from stocks on hand, the unserviceable item will be tallied in or the certificate in 4 a (1) (a) 2 above will be accepted. Replacement will be procured from the depot company in the normal manner.

(b) Ordnance companies will report to the Army Ordnance Officer all major items issued troops of other nations, showing designation of organization to which issue is made.

(2) Spare Parts and Cleaning and Preserving Material Other Than Basic Loads. Normally, except for bulk requisition spare parts and C.P., material will be issued by Ordnance Maintenance companies to the troops whom they support. Bulk requisitions will be filled by depot companies.

(3) Combat Loading.

(a) All vehicles delivered to units will be "combat loaded" and made complete with all accessories as listed in appropriate SNL's and Technical Manuals, by the Ordnance unit making the delivery. "Combat Loading" requires that the vehicle or weapon be complete and ready to enter combat.

1. All "must items", basic ammunition load, mines, CWS supplies, decontaminating apparatus, fire control equipment, radio, medical supplies, and QM items including rations, will be drawn and properly stowed in the vehicle.

2. All vehicles will be fully serviced with gasoline, oil and water, ready for operation. Standard U. S. (or French, if applicable) ground force identification marking will be accomplished before making delivery.

(b) All weapons delivered to units in combat must be complete with all accessories. Special attention will be given to artillery pieces to insure that all "Must items" and fire control equipment are present.

(c) Prior to issue, each weapon or vehicle will be inspected by the issuing company which will prepare "emergency" requisitions for direct delivery to the unit receiving the materiel covering the items that are short at time of delivery. A copy of requisitions which shows action taken and shortages, will accompany vehicle or weapon. Copies will also be sent to the supporting ordnance organization.

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(4) Commercial gases and Helium - The Corps of Engineers is responsible for supplying cylinders of commercial gases (oxygen, acetylene, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide) and helium in exchange for empty cylinders. Ordnance depot companies will stock an adequate quantity of the above items for supplying the needs of ordnance units who will normally turn in empties to ordnance depots and draw full cylinders. In emergencies, ordnance maintenance companies may draw direct from engineer depots.

(5) Back Orders - Ordnance maintenance and depot companies will establish "back order systems" to insure that all requirements of the using troops for ordnance materiel are filled.

(6) Reports:

(a) "Materiel in Hands of Troops" and "Combat Loss" reports will be submitted by all combat and service units on the form shown in Form 2 (Reproduced on pages 98 thru 107 of Overlord Plan). Reports will be submitted as of 1200 hours on the 20th day of each month covering the period since last report and will arrive at this headquarters not later than 1200 hours on the 23rd day of each month. In case of excess over T/O & E, authorization will be given.

(b) "Initial Status report of major Ordnance items" will be submitted upon arrival on the Continent or upon reverting to Third U. S. Army control. The report will be made on form No. 2 (Reproduced on Pages 98 thru 107 of Overlord Plan). "Ordnance Materiel in Hands of Troops and Combat Loss Report".

b. Ammunition.

(1) All units in the Army will secure replacement of expended basic load Class V ammunition on presentation of a request or transportation order to the nearest ASP or Army depot. This request will contain a certificate to the effect that the ammunition required is to replace expenditure from basic load. No ammunition in excess of basic load will be issued except on specific authority of the Army.

(2) Unit of fire will be sent that prescribed by Hq. STOUSSA Ltr., dated 10 December 1943, AG 471 NGG.

(3) Unserviceable ammunition with its location clearly defined will be reported to the nearest Ordnance Officer for disposition. U. S. Artillery ammunition unserviceable only by reason of dented cartridge cases will be evacuated to the nearest Class V Supply Point. Malfunctions of ammunition will be reported immediately to the Army Ordnance Officer through channels. Reports will include all available details.

(4) A monthly ammunition supply report will be submitted by all combat and service units, as of 0600 the 20th day, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 0800 of the 23rd day. Army units will submit reports direct to Army Headquarters, reports from units assigned or attached to Corps will be consolidated by Corps before forwarding to Army. This report will be consolidated by Corps before forwarding to Army. This report will include for each item (a) Balance on Hand (b) Expended in Combat (c) Expended for training (d) Loss due to enemy action.

5. Supply from Com. Z.

a. When Corps are operating separately, to be made in accordance with instructions issued by Ordnance Officer on staff of senior ground commander.

b. When Corps are operating under Army control, to be made available on demand of Army Ordnance Officer or Commanding Officers of Army supply or rear maintenance battalions. Delivery to be made as indicated on the supply request.

SECTION III - Maintenance

6. Responsibility.

a. Responsibility for maintenance of motor vehicles is clearly defined in AR 850-15. Maintenance of equipment in the hands of using troops is a direct responsibility of the commanding officers concerned.

b. Particular attention will be devoted to preventive maintenance, Commanding Officers will make frequent checks to assure that all operations classified under this heading are performed regularly.

c. Ordnance maintenance commanders (Group, Battalion, and Company) will aggressively push maintenance and Ordnance Service forward to the troops supported.

7. Exchange. Vehicle and weapon replacement or exchange, together with prompt evacuation, will be as dictated by the tactical situation.

8. Files. Ordnance maintenance companies will at all times maintain files of pertinent data for each of the organizations they support, showing types of major items with which the organization is equipped, existing shortages, status of action being taken to fill shortages, condition of materiel, and other important information. When the organization moves, this file will be forwarded through Ordnance channels to the maintenance company designated to support the organization in its new location.

9. Records:

a. The following records will be kept:

- (1) Duty Roster - WD, AGO Form Number 6.
- (2) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 461.
- (3) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 462.
- (4) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 463.

b. All vehicles will be properly dispatched and records maintained on daily dispatching Record of Motor Vehicles, WD, AGO Form 7361 (old WD, QMC Form Number 754).

c. Drivers of motor vehicles will have the following in their possession:

- (1) Drivers' Trip Ticket and Preventive Maintenance Service Record, WD, AGO Form Number 48 (old WD, QMC Form Number 237).
- (2) Army Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit, WD, OO Form Number 7360 (old WD, QMC Form Number 228).
- (3) Drivers' Accident Report, Standard Form Number 26.

10. Artillery Tubes; Ordnance units supporting artillery will report when 75% of the life of a tube has been short away. Appendix II (Chart: "Expected Life of Artillery Tubes" as shown on page 118 of Overlord Plan) will be referred to for the expected life of a tube. The report will be forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer for action.

11. Signal Repair Teams; Signal repair teams will be attached to designated Ordnance companies for the purpose of repair and salvage of radio sets.

SECTION IV - Evacuation and Salvage

12. Evacuation.

a. The purpose of evacuation is to conserve critical equipment by recovering unserviceable Ordnance materiel for repair or salvage purposes in the shortest possible time. Evacuation is the responsibility of all commanders.

b. Tactical units are responsible for evacuation to designated collecting points, generally in the vicinity of an ordnance maintenance or supply organization. Collecting axis may be designated if the situation warrants, and will coincide with the maintenance axis. The evacuation service of the tactical units will be augmented by organic Ordnance units.

c. Evacuation from tactical unit collecting points to Army collecting points will be accomplished by Army Ordnance units. Army collecting points normally will be located near depot companies.

d. General Policy for Ordnance Units. Prompt evacuation of repairable equipment which is beyond the repair facilities, available spare parts, and available time of the organization, will be to the next rear maintenance unit. (This will include tires, tubes, engines, transmissions, axles, generators, starters, carburetors, fuel pumps, and similar items.) Materiel being evacuated will have attached a tag showing nature of repairs required, unit initiating the evacuation, and the signature of an Ordnance officer.

e. Army Ordnance will promptly evacuate to the Base equipment beyond repair within the policy announced in sub-paragraph a.

f. Cannibalization will be held to the absolute minimum dictated by military necessity.

13. Salvage. Ordnance salvage materiel will be evacuated through Ordnance channels to the rear battalions.

a. The rear maintenance battalions will, as far as possible, repair and replace in stock repairable sub-assemblies and other usable parts. If beyond their capacity, materiel will be evacuated to the Base Ordnance Shops if repairable, and if not repairable, to the Base Ordnance Salvage Yards.

b. Competent personnel from the Rear Maintenance battalions will make daily visits to Quartermaster Salvage Yards within the Army area to recover usable or recoverable ordnance materiel which may have been delivered direct to the salvage yards.

c. Salvageable ammunition components will be collected and turned in to appropriate ASP's or depots.

(1) Small Arms, cartridge cases and packing materials (i.e. bandoleers, sling, cartons, metallic links, fabric belts, boxes and their tin liners). These will be packed by types in boxes or bags. Each box or bag must bear a certificate showing that the contents are "CERTIFIED FREE FROM EXPLOSIVES" and signed by an officer of the unit concerned.

(2) Artillery Ammunition; Cartridge cases and packing material (i.e., fiber containers, cloverleaf packs, wooden boxes and containers) will be packed by types and, where practicable, in the boxes or cartons from which the material is removed. Fired cartridge cases may be shipped loose if containers are not available. Other components will be sorted, packed and marked "Certified Free from Explosives" and signed by an officer of the unit concerned.

SECTION V - Bomb Disposal

14. Location. It is the responsibility of unit commanders to make reconnaissance, mark the location, establish safety precautions and report all unexploded bombs and "duds" wherever found to the Corps or Army Ordnance Officer by the fastest means available. Reports will specify exact location of the bomb or "dud" in terms of six (6) number coordinates of an easily recognized terrain feature. The location of the bomb or "dud" will be given as a definite distance on a given azimuth from the terrain feature given as a reference. The report will state whether or not the unexploded bomb or "dud" is hampering operations or endangering important facilities and give name of officer and organization originating the report.

15. Disposal. Disposal of unexploded bombs and "duds" (except land and AP mines) is an Ordnance responsibility. Bomb Disposal units (Ordnance) will be employed for this purpose. When necessary, the appropriate Ordnance Officer will request the cooperation and assistance of Engineers. Bomb Disposal units will be attached to Corps until the disposal problem indicates other attachments are desirable.

16. Bomb Cemeteries. All disposal will be carried out in place, except where personnel or property that it is desirable to preserve, will be endangered. Bombs and other unexploded missiles that cannot be disposed of in place will be taken to bomb cemeteries for disposal. Bomb cemeteries will be located in cooperation with G-4. Cemeteries will be located a minimum of 100 yards from main highways, railroads, habitable areas, and important installations.

17. Souvenirs. The inerting of anything of an explosive nature for souvenirs is strictly forbidden.

18. Priorities. Priorities for handling unexploded bombs will be established by the Army Bomb Disposal Officer.

SECTION VI - De-Waterproofing

19. De-Waterproofing. Unit commanders are responsible for de-waterproofing. De-Waterproofing of "must" items will be accomplished as soon as the vehicle is landed over the beach.

a. "Must Items - De-Waterproofing".

- (1) Completely unseal booster cylinder intake, or compressor (Air Brakes) air intake.
- (2) Replace air cleaner unit if removed and refill with proper oil.

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- (3) Unseal distributor.
- (4) Unseal battery vents.
- (5) Unseal crankcase filler tube cap breather.
- (6) Unseal crankcase ventilator outlet pipe.
- (7) Unseal oil measuring well and insert oil measuring stick.
- (8) Unseal vents on differentials, transfer, and transmission cases.
- (9) Crankcase and all housings should be checked for water, if water is found, change lubricant immediately.

b. All Waterproofing material such as asbestos grease, flexible tubing, soft steel tubing, etc., will be saved and turned in to the nearest Ordnance company. Ordnance companies will immediately turn in all waterproofing materials to the nearest SOS agency. This material is critical. Ordnance companies will aid in de-waterproofing by furnishing contact parties who will collect the waterproofing material. Every effort must be made to keep waterproofing material clean as dirt seriously reduces its effectiveness for re-use.

SECTION VII - Inspection

20. General: Inspection of Ordnance equipment is a continuous responsibility of all commanders. Equipment determined unserviceable, as a result of inspection, will be turned in for replacement. Upon request, Ordnance battalion commanders will furnish inspection teams to determine the serviceability of questionable equipment only. If a unit is ordered to be refitted by the Commanding General, the Army Ordnance Officer will furnish technical inspection and repair teams. Ordnance battalion commanders will be furnished sample inspection forms for all type equipment. These will be reproduced locally.

21. Command Inspections.

a. The Army Ordnance Inspection Service will command inspections of ordnance materiel in hands of using arms and services of all components of the Third Army.

b. Periodic inspections of units will be made to determine the following:

(1) **Operation.**

- (a) Use of equipment as intended.
- (b) Equipment properly designed for the use intended.
- (c) Proper training of personnel in use of equipment.

(2) **Maintenance.**

- (a) Performance of adequate and correct first and second echelon maintenance by using personnel.
- (b) Availability and proper utilization of third echelon divisional and Army Ordnance maintenance.
- (c) Availability and proper utilization of fourth echelon Ordnance maintenance.

(d) Execution of authorized modifications in accordance with current Field Service Modification Work Orders.

(e) Determination of any unauthorized modifications.

(3) **Supply.**

- (a) Unit replacement and direct exchange principle functioning to the maximum degree (i.e., using troops obtaining serviceable equipment by direct exchange for like unserviceable equipment.)
- (b) Availability of spare parts and prompt repair of unserviceable equipment.
- (c) Critical shortages of Class II and IV supplies in forward ordnance maintenance echelons will be reported to Army Ordnance Officer.
- (d) Responsibility for receipt of NEW Ordnance

equipment in unserviceable condition as a result of production methods, faulty inspections, improper crating, rough handling, etc.

(e) Utilization by troops of normal ordnance channels of supply.

(f) Proper functioning of depot supply installations.

(4) **Special Inspections.**

(a) Make such special inspections as may be directed by the Commanding General or the Ordnance Officer.

c. To implement this service, the inspector will:

- (1) Utilize personnel of the Army maintenance units as inspectors.
- (2) Maintain records of inspections and a schedule of proposed inspections.
- (3) Prepare necessary command letters directing inspections.

d. All reports of inspections will be made in duplicate to the Commanding General through the Army Ordnance Officer, a copy being furnished by the Inspector director to the Commanding Officer of the unit inspected.

SECTION VIII - Captured Ordnance Materiel

22. Captured Enemy Ordnance Materiel. Corps and Division commanders are responsible that all captured enemy ordnance materiel, other than ammunition, is turned in to the nearest ordnance maintenance or depot company which will apply temporary preservative measures and will evacuate the materiel through ordnance channels to ordnance battalions. All commanders will exercise the closest supervision to prevent collecting of souvenirs at the expense of possible future use by ourselves or our allies. Care will be taken that captured materiel is not damaged in any manner or stripped of any parts or accessories, with special attention being paid to preserving complete all optical instruments, sighting and fire control equipment, etc.

23. Location. When captured enemy materiel cannot be moved to areas under Ordnance supervision, the Army Ordnance Officer will be notified promptly of the location by coordinates and position relative to towns, roads, or other landmarks, together with a brief description of types and quantities of materiel at that point.

24. Ammunition. Captured enemy ammunition, except toxic chemicals, found in original containers showing no evidence of tampering, artillery projectiles, and powder, will be evacuated through ammunition companies to specified enemy ammunition dumps. All loose small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, etc., except toxic chemicals, will be destroyed in place under supervision of qualified ordnance personnel or engineer personnel. Toxic chemical ammunition will not be handled by ordnance personnel, but will be turned over to CWS. Personnel not especially trained will not move, disturb, fire, or discharge loose and scattered enemy munitions.

25. Grenades. Under no circumstances will enemy grenades in any condition be moved.

26. Mines, Booby Traps and Sabotage Kits. Enemy mines, booby traps, and sabotage kits, whether loose or in original containers, will not be evacuated to ASPs or Depots, but will be disposed of or destroyed as directed by the appropriate engineer officer.

27. Reports. Designated battalions will submit weekly reports as of 1800 hours each Saturday covering the period since last report to reach the Army Ordnance Officer by 0800 each Monday, showing information called for on Form #3. (Reproduced on Page 109 of Overlord Plan.)

28. Technical Intelligence. When new or unusual items of enemy ordnance materiel are captured, report will be rendered by the most expeditious means to the Army Ordnance Officer who will cause the materiel to be inspected by Ordnance Intelligence personnel.

29. Use. Where considered necessary by the unit commander, combat units may use any enemy materiel and ammunition. Report will be made to the Army Ordnance Officer of all enemy materiel used by our troops for combat purposes.

SECTION IX - Miscellaneous

30. Destruction of Materiel. The destruction of ordnance equipment is a COMMAND decision. Commanders are authorized to destroy ordnance equipment when capture is imminent. Each unit is authorized to requisition the necessary explosives and carry them on hand for this purpose. Priority will be given to the destruction of captured enemy materiel in case recapture is imminent.

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ANNEX NO. 12

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD U. S. ARMY, APO 403

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)

14 July 1944

NUMBER 4)

SECTION I

Administration

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

8. **PROVISIONAL WEAR CHARACTERISTICS OF GUNS:** The following data is quoted from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, Ordnance Section:

"1. The table shown below was compiled by Colonel Leslie E. Simon based on extensive Proving Ground records and certain records which he has reviewed in the field. It should be understood that it is not the final word from the Chief of Ordnance, but it will serve as an index for use until more exact data becomes available:

PROVISIONAL WEAR CHARACTERISTICS OF GUNS

Weapon	Velocity Drop/ Units Given	Remarks	Advance of Forcing Cone	Initial M.V.
100mm Gun M1	17.5 f.s./1000 rds.	Direct Fire Wpn	0.4" @ 5000 rds.	2870
**57mm Gun M1	8.5 f.s./1000 rds.	Direct Fire Wpn	13" @ 1000 rds.	2975
75mm Gun M1 1897	7.3 f.s./1000 rds.		0.22" @ 7000 rds.	1950
**76mm Gun M1	7.5 f.s./100 rds.		No information	2600
**3" Gun M3	9.0 f.s./100 rds.		0.1" @ 800 rds.	2800
*90mm Gun M1	9.2 f.s./100 rds.		7.0" @ 2000 rds.	2700
105mm How M2A1	2.0 f.s./1000 rds.	Misc. charges fired	0.07" @ 5000 rds.	1550
*120mm M1				
(4.7" Gun)	20 f.s./100 rds.		27" @ 1000 rds.	3125
*155mm Gun M1A1	7.5 f.s./100 rds.	Misc. charges fired	No information	2800
155mm How M1	3.3 f.s./1000 rds.	Misc. charges fired	No information	1850
8" How M1	No appreciable drop			
	in 2000 rounds	Misc. charges fired	0.15" @ 1600 rds.	1950
*8 Gun M1	33 f.s./100 rds.		36" @ 150 rds.	2850
*210mm How M1	3.3 f.s./100 rds.	Misc. charges fired	No information	2300

* Guns which should be calibrated periodically.

** Direct fire weapons which should be calibrated if, and only if, used as field artillery.

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"2. This table indicates average rates of wear. A specific weapon may wear somewhat faster or slower, or may have started out with a velocity slightly higher or lower than the tabulated velocity. Nevertheless, the table is a good guide. The simple practice of merely counting rounds rather than some artificial "equivalent rounds" is recommended.

"3. If a gun is calibrated approximately twice during its life, the table should apply well during the interim, just as one sets one's watch occasionally, while tolerating a slight degree of inaccuracy during the interim.

"4. It should be observed, however, that no amount of calibration is as important as keeping ammunition lots straight, as careful, orderly practices, and as the avoidance of mixing zone weights of shell without appropriate correction. The shooting of one, and only one, ammunition lot is of utmost importance in the 105mm How and smaller calibers. In calibers larger than 105mm, the use of the same powder lot is important, but projectile lots may be mixed without inducing unwarranted dispersion."

SECTION IV

Supply

10. PORTABLE ANTI-TANK MINE DETECTOR SETS: All Ordnance units will requisition through Signal Section TUSA, allowance of Mine Detector Set SGR-625 in quantities as indicated below:

T/O	UNIT	ALLOWANCES
9-7	Ord. MM Co	2
9-8	Ord. LM Co (Inf Div)	1
9-17	Ord. AM Co	1
9-37	Ord. HM Co TK	2
9-66	Hq & Hq Det., Mt En Armd Div	2
9-67	Co, Maint Bn, Armd Div	2
9-177	Ord Bomb Disposal Co	12
9-187	Ord Evac Co	2
9-187	Ord Evac Co (Coll)	4
9-500	Sqd BD (Sep) or BD Platoon	1

SECTION V

Ammunition

SECTION VI

General

Marking of Captured New Enemy Equipment: The following information pertaining to marking of new enemy equipment is quoted from letter, Hq. EFO, dated 22 June 1944:

"1. Captured enemy equipment of new type and/or design will be selected by Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams for technical examination and research study by the service concerned. All such captured enemy equipment will be uniformly and distinctively marked by such teams as indicated:

"a. Consistent with the size of the equipment, a 5" circle stencilled in Signal yellow will be prominently displayed. In addition, the serial number of the tag required by sub-paragraph g below, will be stencilled in black in the center of the Signal yellow circle.

"b. When the size of the equipment prevents its identification as required by sub-paragraph a above, a signal yellow cardboard tag, 5" in diameter, will be attached to it by the intelligence team selecting it for evacuation.

"c. In addition to the markings required by sub-paragraphs a and b above, each piece of captured new type enemy equipment will have firmly attached thereto the First US Army Group (FUSAG) tags, or a similar type tag to be furnished by this headquarters. These tags will be completely addressed to expedite shipment to final destination.

"2. No captured enemy equipment, except that marked by the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams, will be marked as indicated above."

ANNEX NO. 13

HEADQUARTERS
70TH ORDNANCE GROUP
APO 403, U. S. ARMY

16 October 1944

Subject: Maintenance Assignments.

To : See Distribution.

1. Effective immediately, the following plan will govern maintenance assignments and procedure. All other directives previously issued by this headquarters which are at variance with instructions contained herein are rescinded.

2. Attached hereto is a map sketch showing area over which 70th Ordnance Group exercises maintenance jurisdiction. This area is subdivided into three zones which for purposes of easier definition, will be referred to as North Zone, Central Zone, and South Zone.

3. Each Zone is bounded as follows:

A. North Zone

Bounded on the North by Army left boundary (LOUPPAY-
LONGUYON)
Bounded on the East by XX Corps rear boundary (LONGUYON-
SPINCOURT-ETAIN-FRESNES)
Bounded on the South by Highway N3 (VERDUN-METZ)
Bounded on the West by Army rear boundary (DUN-VERDUN)
(MEUSE River)

B. Central Zone

Bounded on the North by Highway N3 (VERDUN-METZ)
Bounded on the East by Corps rear boundary (FRESNES-
HEUDICOURT-SOUS-LES-COTES - FANRES-FLIERY-TOUL)
Bounded on the South by Highways N66 and N4 (BAR-LE-DUC-
LIGNY-VOID-TOUL-NANCY)
Bounded on the West by Army rear boundary (VERDUN-SOVIALLY-
CHAUMONT-SUR-AIRE - BRIZE-ST DIZIER-BAR-LE-DUC-LIGNY)

C. South Zone

Bounded on the North by Highway N4 (LIGNY-VOID-TOUL-
NANCY)
Bounded on the East by XII Corps rear boundary (TOUL-
COURCELLES)
Bounded on the South by Army right boundary (NEUFCHATEAU-
COURCELLES)
Bounded on the West by Army rear boundary (BAR-LE-DUC -
GONDRECOURT-GRISUX-NEUFCHATEAU)

4. The following battalions are assigned zones as follows:

North Zone - 19th Ordnance Battalion
Central Zone - 79th Ordnance Battalion
South Zone - 326th Ordnance Battalion

5. Upon receipt of this correspondence, each battalion assigned to zones per paragraph 4, above, will further subdivide the zone to which it has been assigned into sub-zones, assigning each maintenance company within the battalion to a sub-zone. A report of sub-zone divisions and assignments, accompanied by overlay showing boundaries of sub-zones will be forwarded to this headquarters without delay.


6. Upon assignment of a company to a sub-zone, the company will canvass the sub-zone, contacting all using units located therein, and informing them of the location of the maintenance company. Using units thus contacted will be "picked up" by the maintenance company for permanent maintenance assignment.

7. A list of using units within the sub-zone will be submitted by the company to the battalion, where the list will be consolidated and forwarded to this headquarters.

8. Using units which are stationed along zone boundaries (paragraph 3, above) and which might conceivably be considered to be in either of two zones, will be serviced by the nearest or most easily accessible company.

9. It is understood that the maintenance procedure outlined in this letter will, on occasion, cause questions to arise concerning the function of the control points. In this regard, organizations are reminded that the original purpose of the control point was to clear and distribute maintenance evacuated through channels from the front. It is felt that "using unit" maintenance as described in this letter will not conflict with control point maintenance to any appreciable extent. In order that control points will know at all times the capacity of shops, constant liaison between maintenance companies and control point must be maintained.

10. Companies assigned to sub-zones will be responsible for the patrol of roads within the sub-zone.



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ANNEX NO. 14

HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Ordnance Officer
APO 403

ORDNANCE BULLETIN)
NUMBER 5)

6 November 1944.

SECTION I

Administration

SECTION II

Operations

SECTION III

Maintenance

9. The following information from Ordnance Weekly Letter No. 39. Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief Ordnance Officer, is published for your information:

"4. The suggestion of the Ordnance Officer, VIII Corps, for a heavier shield for anti-tank guns to prevent penetration by sniper bullets was referred to the Chief of Ordnance, who has replied as follows: 'Over the past year a carefully coordinated ballistic program has been fired at Aberdeen Proving Ground with the result that 5/8" armor has been indicated for such front line applications. The 3" anti-tank gun M3 shield mounted bracket (3" M1 with the new shield), was designed to take heavier armor. The structural design of the shield on this gun is such as to give as complete shielding as possible with maximum efficiency. Except under rare conditions, this oblique shield of 5/8" armor will defeat small arms fire up through .50 caliber. A similar obliquity shield has been developed for the 37mm M41 anti-tank gun.' It is not known how soon these modified carriages will be available in this theater.

"12. It has been determined experimentally by this office that the barrel of the M1919A4 machine gun can be used very successfully in the M1919A6 machine gun.

"13. A Standard Operating Procedure will be issued by the Chief Engineer covering the procurement of industrial gases in France, extracts from which are quoted below:

"The French authorities will assume all costs in connection with any gases obtained.

"Requisitions in the form of GPA ETO Form 106, or demand GPA ETO Form 101, or any other form of requisition which in effect will comply with Standard Operating Procedure No. 10F, "Field Procurement by U. S. Forces in France", will be presented to the manufacturer.

"Units within the Base Sections and Advance Sections should be instructed to place all requisitions for gases through the Base or Advance Section Engineer Supply Officer, who will approve them and direct the unit to whichever industrial gas plant (or Engineer Depot) is selected by him to supply the gas.

"The Base and Advance Section will be responsible for assisting the gas producers insofar as emergency supplies of raw material, transportation, and power concerned, in order to produce gases for U. S. Army use."

SECTION IV

Supply

SECTION V

Ammunition

GENERAL

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PROVOST MARSHAL



HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL
APO 463

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO: Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 463, D. C.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Provost Marshal Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters, beginning with the operational period in the United Kingdom and continuing at the designated intervals by chapters.

2. The multiplicity of responsibilities of the Army Provost Marshal, together with the large number of troops, required the organization and operation of a large Provost Marshal Section. Active operations resulted in the Provost Marshal being responsible for the following:

- a. Criminal Investigation.
- b. Maintenance of Law and Order including:
 - (1) Army General Prisoner Stockade.
 - (2) Army and Battalion Zone AWOL Stockades.
 - (3) Army Summary Courts.
- c. Traffic Control.
- d. Prisoners of War.
- e. Overrun Allied Prisoners of War.
- f. German Internment Camps.
- g. Aid to Civil Affairs in handling Refugees.
- h. Security of all Lines of Communication in the Army area.
- i. Command Post Defense, including Gordon Defense.
- j. Maintenance of an Emergency Striking Force in close proximity to Command Post.

3. The Army Provost Marshal being kept advised of the problems of the Army Provost Marshal and being made aware of the importance of the various functions made available to the Provost Marshal troops at all times to make it possible for the Army Provost Marshal to effectively accomplish his mission.

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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I - GENERAL

Plans for the organization of the Provost Marshal Section were formulated and it was announced that the 511th Military Police Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment would function as the Staff of the Provost Marshal Section. The companies of the 511th Military Police Battalion were assigned to Corps as follows:

Company "A" - VIII Corps
Company "B" - XX Corps
Company "C" - XII Corps

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 511th Military Police Battalion arrived 11 April at Third U. S. Army and reported for duty to the Provost Marshal. It was contemplated that the Provost Marshal Section be organized as follows:

Provost Marshal Section:
a. Provost Marshal
b. Executive Officer
c. Adjutant
d. Chief Clerk

Sub-Sections:
a. Maintenance of Law and Order
b. Traffic
c. Prisoner of War and Refugee
d. Criminal Investigation

The Provost Marshal Offices were established with the Forward Echelon at Camp PROVER and the Rear Echelon at Camp TOFT.

Planning for the distribution of the Military Police Units assigned to Third U. S. Army resulted in the following:

511th Military Police Battalion - Provost Marshal Section, VIII, XX and XII Corps.
503rd Military Police Battalion - Third U. S. Army.
512th Military Police Battalion - Third U. S. Army.
217th Military Police Company (Corps) - Assigned XV Corps.

Operational Plans were formulated which warranted a request for the following allotments of Military Police Units to Third U. S. Army:

6 Military Police Battalions
10 Escort Guard Companies
1 Processing Company
1 Criminal Investigating Detachment.

Visits were made by several members of the Provost Marshal Section to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, Headquarters, First U. S. Army Group, Headquarters, First U. S. Army and other Headquarters for the purpose of conferring and discussing Provost Marshal affairs and functions.

The following strength and organization of the Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army was authorized by Staff Memorandum Number 37, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 6 May 1944:

12 Officers
1 Warrant Officer
34 Enlisted Men

ORGANIZATION:

Provost Marshal Headquarters
Traffic Sub-Section
Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section
Prisoner of War and Refugee Sub-Section
Investigation Sub-Section

The Provost Marshal Plan, Annex Number 19 to Third U. S. Army Outline Plan, was prepared, approved by the Army Commander, and published. Operational Memorandums were published to implement Provost Marshal Plan Annex Number 19 and consisted of the following:

Circular Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Traffic Regulation and Control for Continental Operation, dated 4 May 1944. (See Annex 1).

Operations Memorandum Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Traffic Control Signs, dated 3 June 1944. (See Annex 2).

Prisoners of War.

Stragglers.

Maintenance of Law and Order.

At this time a study of training exercises in Traffic Control showed clearly the drastic need for additional equipment, especially motorcycles, 1/4 ton trucks, radios, sirens, watches, compasses, individual stoves for dispersed traffic personnel, and additional traffic control equipment. To alleviate this situation action was taken in the form of a request to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, through command channels to secure all items of additional equipment necessary for Military Police units. The letter was approved by all sections and the Army Commander, Third U. S. Army, and forwarded to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army for consideration, where on 17 June it was approved. (See Annex 3).

An Executive Officer was assigned.

It was planned that the VIII Corps would take part with the First U. S. Army in the invasion of the Continent and a liaison officer from 503rd Military Police Battalion was detailed between this section and VIII Corps.

The Provost Marshal Section was formally announced as a Special Staff Section by General Orders Number 30, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 8 June. (See Annex 4). The most important advantage of this General Order was direct communication between Provost Marshals of Corps and Divisions and the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army, was authorized on all Provost Marshal and Military Police matters.

A Provost Marshal Planning Conference was held on 13 June with representatives from all Corps, Divisions, Military Police Battalions and Military Police Companies of the Third U. S. Army present. (See Annex 5). The Army Commander addressed the meeting, discussing the importance of traffic control, handling of prisoners of war, appearance of Military Police, aggressiveness on the part of Military Police, and that they should be distinctly marked. He gave his assurance that Military Police in the execution of their duties would be given his full support.

Staff Memorandum Number 47, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 17 June, announced that the Headquarters of the Third U. S. Army would be divided into three groups:

Group "X" - Forward Operational Echelon
Group "Y" - Rear Operational Echelon
Group "Z" - Group remaining after departure of "X" and "Y" Echelons for the Continent.

"X" Echelon of Third U. S. Army Headquarters, with vehicles numbering over 600, departed from TOFT and PROVER Camps for BRAEMORE, England, on 29 June 1944. The entire movement consisted of four serials proceeding on two different routes controlled by the Provost Marshal. The first serial left at 0500, followed hourly by the other serials. (See Annex 6). "Y" Echelon consisting of two (2) officers and six (6) enlisted men remained at Camp TOFT to carry on such duties as might be required. Upon arrival at SALISBURY on the way to BRAEMORE an advance detachment from the 503rd Military Police Battalion escorted the various sections to their areas. Headquarters for the Provost Marshal Section was at Whitsbury House, WHITSBURY, England.

One officer and two enlisted men departed from WHITSBURY on 4 July to SOUTHAMPTON for movement to the Continent. Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion also departed for movement to the Continent.

At 0700 July 5, Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved to SOUTHAMPTON by motor convoy for embarkation to the Continent.

This Headquarters departed from SOUTHAMPTON, England, at 0800 July 6, and arrived at UTAH BEACH, France, by LST, at 2300 of the same day.

Departed at 0400 July 7, for de-waterproofing area. Marched from transit area 22 miles and arrived at BLANDAMOUR (TI799) at 1300 hours of the same day. This section located its Headquarters on Road IG22 northeast of BLANDAMOUR (TI799).

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

The Traffic Sub-Section was organized on 15 April 1944 with the Headquarters at Rear Echelon at Camp TOFT.

The pamphlet "Maintenance and Operation of Motor Vehicles," Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, dated 24 January, 1944, with changes, was the publication upon which all rules and regulations were eventually based.

Circular Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 4 May was published by this Headquarters for the operation of Motor Vehicles on the Continent.

British traffic control equipment was designated as the traffic control equipment to be used by all Allied Forces in the European Theater of Operations, and consisted of Franco plates and discs, directional. Franco plates, metal or wooden material, 15 inches by 17 inches or 17 inches by 30 inches, with white letters on black background would be used for unit, installation or route signs. Discs, directional would be used as follows:

- Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward 12 o'clock indicating main routes forward to the front.
- Directional discs, white with black arrow and bar perpendicular to the base of the shaft indicating lateral routes.
- Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward six o'clock indicating main down routes to the rear areas.
- Directional discs, red with white arrows indicating detours from main or lateral routes.
- Directional discs or equivalent, white with red arrow indicating local routes.

Other traffic control equipment consisted of traffic lamps, reflectorized batons, lamps-flasher type, and sleeves, traffic.

The extreme need for training in British traffic control signs and equipment was evident, and such training was initiated in the 503rd and 512th Military Police Battalions. Observations were made of the progress of training and exercises were to be repeated on numerous occasions continually stressing signs, main road and lateral road; sign postings, traffic control points, pointmen, detours, and the making and repairing of all types of signs.

Public address systems were procured from the Signal Section and installed on traffic control vehicles. This equipment proved invaluable in controlling both convoys and individual vehicles on the highways.

The 512th Military Police Battalion was directed to follow a special training program with the primary object of preparing the unit for traffic control duties on the Continent. Emphasis in training was placed on physical condition, traffic control, and special techniques which would be required on the Continent. This program was amplified by the assignment of companies to the Provost Marshal of XVII District at LIVERPOOL, for duty at the LIVERPOOL Docks and City proper.

On 1 May orders were received from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, attaching the Battalion to Southern Base Section for duty. The unit was assigned sectors in Devon and Cornwall, with the battalion headquarters stationed at TRURO, Cornwall. For a period of eight weeks the organization worked day and night controlling traffic for troops moving into the marshalling areas, thence to points of embarkation, prior to movement to the Continent.

The experience in escort and traffic control better enabled the battalion to execute its primary mission (traffic control) on the Continent.

The 512th Military Police Battalion was relieved from assignment with Southern Base Section on 17 June. A detail of one officer and twenty-one enlisted men of the 512th Military Police Battalion was relieved from duty in LONDON and reported to Camp TOFT for duty after the 503rd Military Police Battalion had departed for BRAEMORE.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Inasmuch as the material available concerning Prisoners of War was negligible, excellent use was made of Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, and reports from the African, Sicilian and Italian

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campaigns.

Plans were made for the evacuation and processing of Prisoners of War and incorporated into the Provost Marshal Plan, Annex Number 19, dated 11 May.

Visits were made by Chief of Prisoner of War Sub-Section to conferences conducted by other headquarters pertaining to Prisoners of War and valuable information was gained therefrom.

Requisitions for Prisoner of War tags and Prisoner of War effects bags were made to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. It was contemplated that this Army would receive 30,000 prisoners of war for the first month of actual operations.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

The Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section was established and preparations were made for the employment of Military Police for the maintenance of law and order on the Continent.

When this Headquarters was stationed at KNUTSFORD, the personnel of the 503rd Military Police Battalion worked in conjunction with the Service of Supply Military Police and Civil Police in the towns of KNUTSFORD, CREWE, MACCLESFIELD, MANCHESTER and ALTRINGHAM.

One company of the 503rd Military Police Battalion was utilized as the Command Post Guard. A restricted area was established in the forward Echelon at Camp PEOVER, and divided into Restricted Area North and Restricted Area South. Five types of passes were issued, any one of which would admit the proper holder to the Restricted Areas. These were:

- Third U. S. Army "Complete" Knowledge Pass (a blue letter "C" superimposed on a white card).
- Third U. S. Army "Limited" Knowledge Pass (a red letter "L" superimposed on a blue card).
- Third U. S. Army permanent Restricted Area Pass (a pink card).
- Third U. S. Army temporary Restricted Area Pass (a buff card following the pattern of (c) above).
- A Third U. S. Army visitor's Classification Pass (a green card on which is superimposed the letter "C" in blue or "L" in red).

All passes were issued and controlled by the Provost Marshal under regulations prescribed by him.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The Investigation Sub-Section was established and the strength of this section consisted of one officer and six enlisted men. The primary duty of this section was the investigation of crimes reported.

The types of crimes investigated while stationed in England consisted of rape, attempted rape, theft, and motor vehicle accidents. Request was made to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, for one Criminal Investigation Section which was vitally needed in order to operate successfully on the Continent.

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I - GENERAL

Preparation and planning were continuous. A plan for defense of Third U. S. Army Headquarters was inaugurated upon arrival in France.

"Y" Echelon departed Camp TOFT by motor 0730 July 8. Arrived NINE YEWS, (BRAEMORE Area) 1700 July 8. It departed NINE YEWS by motor 1900 July 15, for SOUTHAMPTON, embarked on a Liberty ship for the Continent and arrived on UTAH BEACH 0500 July 17. It disembarked 0900 July 18 and moved by motor to join "X" Echelon in vicinity of BLANDAMOUR, (T1799) France.

The Forward Echelon moved from BLANDAMOUR (T1799), France via ST. SAUVUR LE VICOMTE (T1995), LA HAYE DU PUIT (T1884), LESSAY (T1876) to BEAUCHAMPS (T2732) on 31 July.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

On 6 July the Traffic Sub-Section moved from the beach through

the transit area thence to BLANDAMOUR (T1799). The 512th Military Police Battalion had not yet arrived from the United Kingdom and the 503rd Military Police Battalion was detailed for traffic control.

All traffic control at the time, in France, was under the First U.S. Army. While at BLANDAMOUR (T1799) the Corps and Division units of Third U.S. Army arriving from the United Kingdom were escorted from points of debarkation at the UTAH and OMAHA BEACHES to Third U.S. Army Concentration Areas. The plan for circulation and movement of traffic was coordinated through Traffic Control Headquarters, First U.S. Army and the G-3 Section, Third U.S. Army.

An officer from the Traffic Sub-Section, working in cooperation with representatives of the G-3 and G-4 Sections, Third U.S. Army, was assigned to coordinate the movement of all Third U.S. Army units from the transit areas at the Beaches to their concentration areas on the Normandy Coast Peninsula. Teams of Military Police escorts were assigned to this work from the 503rd Military Police Battalion.

The process of receiving and escorting Third U.S. Army units to their respective concentration areas was continued until the Army became operational.

Approximately 800 units were escorted from the Beaches in the above manner.

The 512th Military Police Battalion arrived in France from the United Kingdom on 18 July. This battalion relieved the 503rd Military Police Battalion in traffic control.

Company "C" of the 503rd Military Police Battalion was attached to the First U.S. Army for a special mission in traffic control, on 20 July, for the attack at ST. LO (T4953)

The supply of British traffic control equipment was low. It was anticipated that when the Third U.S. Army became operational a large supply of this equipment would be necessary, and requests were made to European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army to supply it.

Because of the density of traffic moving over all roads in the COTENTIN Peninsula, little attempt was made to enforce 60-yards interval between vehicles. This resulted in traffic conflicts in villages, at crossroads and road junctions. Traffic control personnel performed their duties in an excellent manner, working long hours to keep the traffic moving despite the density of traffic, and the condition of roads.

The convoys coming from the Beaches to the Third U.S. Army Concentration Areas were passing through the First U.S. Army and Communications Zones Areas which necessitated coordination. The cooperation received was excellent.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival in France, efforts were made to secure the services of Military Police Escort Guard companies. None were available in the Theater, and it was recommended that a battalion unit of approximately 750 personnel be utilized for the mission of escorting, guarding, and processing prisoners of war. As a temporary measure Field Artillery Battalions with low priority were to be used. The 693rd Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Section for escort guard work. Training was conducted in all phases of prisoner of war work. The 693rd Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to its primary duty before the Army became operational, and the 244th Field Artillery Battalion replaced it in prisoner of war work. This new battalion was oriented and given instructions in all phases of prisoner of war duties.

Visits were made to the Advance Section Communications Zone and First U.S. Army prisoner of war Enclosures by the personnel of the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. Valuable information concerning the operation of a prisoner of war enclosure was gained from these visits. Personnel of this Sub-Section were also allowed to actually work at one of these enclosures, thereby gaining experience in this type of work.

One of the main planning functions accomplished by the Prisoner of War Sub-Section was the publication of Circular 37 on Prisoners of War, dated 26 July. (See Annex 1).

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Upon arrival on the Continent there were no available troops for defense of the Army Command Post other than the Headquarters Sections and the 503rd Military Police Battalion. During the first week each section was instructed to set up its own interior guard including a perimeter defense where exposed boundaries existed. Data regarding

personnel and weapons of each section was compiled. Each section was instructed to appoint defense officers, one of whom would be available at all times. A warning system of a long siren blast was provided in event of enemy activity, and each section was instructed to send a liaison officer and two runners to the Provost Marshal Section in the event that an alarm was sounded. The Provost Marshal was designated Defense Commander. One platoon of the 503rd Military Police Battalion was designated as an "alert" platoon, armed and completely mobile, to be on call twenty-four hours a day. In addition to the alert platoon, the 503rd Military Police Battalion furnished two roving patrols encircling the Army Command Post, and traffic posts were doubled during the hours of darkness.

The defense of the Army Command Post was taken over by the 6th Cavalry Group and the 546th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, and their plans for defense were coordinated through the Provost Marshal Section.

All towns in France were initially placed off limits until cleared of mines by engineers, inspected by the surgeon for sanitation, and the civil affairs system in order. Many individual French houses were found to be selling liquor to soldiers and were in effect barrooms. These establishments were also placed off limits, enforcement being made by posting signs, and by having roving patrols circulating throughout the area.

Because the promiscuous firing of weapons was prevalent, notice was published in Circular No. 34, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, dated 19 July, stating that "All personnel of all units assigned or attached to Third U.S. Army were forbidden to fire weapons except when actually engaged with the enemy, or on an authorized range, or in the performance of guard duty. Any officer or enlisted man who violated these instructions would be tried by Courts Martial."

Patrols were maintained in all towns surrounding the Command Post for the enforcement of all rules and regulations.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

During the month of July in France, there were relatively few crimes committed in the Third U.S. Army Area.

CHAPTER 3 AUGUST OPERATIONS SECTION I - GENERAL

When the Third U.S. Army became operational, the following units were moved over the roadnets of the Army Area:

90th Infantry Division
5th Armored Division
83rd Infantry Division
200 Army Troop Units and Service Units.

The Forward Echelon Third U.S. Army Headquarters was further divided into Groups "A" and "B". Forward "B" departed BEAUCHAMPS (T2732) at 0700 hours 8 August, and arrived vicinity of POILLEY (Y3592) 0840 hours.

Forward "B" Echelon, Headquarters Third U.S. Army departed POILLEY (Y3592) 1130 hours 12 August, arrived vicinity of ST OURN DES TOUTS (Y5854) 1300 hours. Forward "A" Echelon, Headquarters Third U.S. Army departed POILLEY (Y3592) 1300 hours, arrived vicinity ST OURN DES TOUTS (Y5854) 1500 hours.

Forward "B" Echelon, Headquarters Third U.S. Army moved by infiltration from ST OURN DES TOUTS (Y5854) on 14 August, departed 1115 hours and arrived at LA BAZOGE (Z3452) 1500 hours.

Forward "A" Advance arrived LA BAZOGE (Z3452) 0900 hours on 15 August.

Rear Echelon arrived at ST. SABINE (Z3352) 1300 hours on 18 August.

The 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section reported for duty. The section consisted of one officer and ten enlisted men. The section was equipped with two 1/4-ton vehicles and two 1/4-ton trailers. The section was assigned to duty in the Rear Echelon with the Investigation Sub-Section.

Forward "A" departed LA BAZOGE (Z3452) at 1030 hours on 20 August, arrived vicinity of BROU (W1278) 1300 hours.

Forward "B" departed LA BAZOGE (Z3452) at 1300 hours on 20 August,

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arrived vicinity of BROU (W1278) at 1600 hours.

Forward "B" departed BROU (W1278) 0800 hours on 25 August, arrived vicinity of COURCY (W9255) PITHIVIERS on GC 109 (W9367) at 1130 hours.

Forward "A" departed BROU (W1278) 1315 hours on 25 August, arrived vicinity of COURCY (W9255) PITHIVIERS (W9367) on GC 109 at 1645 hours.

Rear Echelon, Third U. S. Army, arrived vicinity of COURCY (W9255) PITHIVIERS (W9367) on GC 109, on 27 August.

Forward "B", Third U. S. Army, departed COURCY (W9255) 0830 hours on 30 August, arrived vicinity of COURGENAY (X8477) 1230 hours.

Forward "A", Third U. S. Army, departed COURCY (W9255) 1300 hours on 30 August, arrived vicinity of COURGENAY (X8477) 1630 hours.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

Main Supply Routes were established on 1 August as follows:

(1) BRICQUEBEC (O1304) to LESSAY (T1876) N800, LESSAY (T1876) to COUTANCES (T2357) GC2, COUTANCES (T2357) to GRANVILLE (T1134) to AVRANCHES (T2817) N173.

(2) Army Rear Boundary to PERIERS (T2772) GC24, PERIERS (T2772) to COUTANCES (T2357) N171, COUTANCES (T2357) to AVRANCHES (T2817) GC7. Traffic Headquarters operating under Transportation Section, G-4 established Traffic Control Posts as follows:

- (1) ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T1995)
- (2) PONT L'ABBE (T2693)
- (3) LAHAYE DU PUIITS (T1884)
- (4) PERIERS (T2772)
- (5) COUTANCES (T2357)

Traffic Control, the primary function of the Provost Marshal Section, reached its peak load when Third U. S. Army became operational on 1 August and continued to be a most aggravated problem through 7 August. The 83rd Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division and the 5th Armored Division were moved through the Army Area to meet new tactical dispositions. The traffic density was greatest initially in the COUTANCES (T2357) - AVRANCHES (T2817) areas because of road and bridge bottlenecks. Engineer crews working day and night completed by-passes and constructed bridges which with unrelenting Military Police traffic control finally placed the problem in hand. It is doubtful if in the history of our Armies to date a greater traffic problem ever existed than that confronting the Third U. S. Army from LESSAY (T1876) through COUTANCES (T2357) to AVRANCHES (T2817) from 1 August to 7 August.

In the city of GRANVILLE (T1134) the streets had been blocked with concrete blocks at street intersections. This road-block necessitated the use of very crooked and narrow connecting streets to go south and east from the city. A by-pass was placed in effect which connected the north-south highway from the north of the city with highway N124 to the east and N173 to the south. All traffic was diverted over this highway and relieved the congestion in GRANVILLE (T1134).

At AVRANCHES (T2817), which had been heavily bombed and at which place great destruction occurred, highways N173, N811, GC 7 and N176 converged from the north. There was no road available to by-pass the city. This caused a high traffic density through the town as the only highway to the south was N176 to PONTAUBAULT (T2810). Many traffic conflicts occurred in this city, and for days a steady stream of traffic moved through to the south carrying troops, equipment and supplies.

A bridge at PONTS ST. SENIER, (T2918) northeast of AVRANCHES (T2817), had been blown by the enemy and replaced with a timber bridge by the engineers. This bridge was at the junction of highways GC7 and N176 and east-west highway N811. One member of the 512th Military Police Battalion on traffic control duty at the bridge was killed by the bombing at this point, and some vehicles were disabled by bombing in AVRANCHES (T2817) during this period.

Company "C" 503rd Military Police Battalion, was relieved from special duty with the First U. S. Army and reverted to Battalion control. This company was designated as the traffic control company of the Battalion.

The following Traffic Regulating Posts were established on 4 August:

- (1) COUTANCES (T2357)
- (2) BREHAL (T1841)
- (3) GAVRAY (1 officer) (T3041)
- (4) GRANVILLE (1 officer) (T1134)
- (5) RJ N24 and GC27, vicinity of BEAUCHAMPS (T2732)
- (6) BRECEY (1 officer) (T4320)
- (7) PONTS ST. SENIER (RJ C227 and N811) (T2918)
- (8) AVRANCHES (2 TRP's with 1 officer) (T2817)
- (9) RJ GC68 to GC44, vicinity of TOURVILLE (T1656)

All traffic regulating posts north of GC44 - COUTANCES (T2357) - N172 were closed as of 041200 August.

Army Rear Boundary was established on 5 August as follows:

Road GC44 PASSUS (T1256) COUTANCES (T2357) road N172 from COUTANCES (T2357) to Army Boundaries.

The following units of the XX Corps were moved over the Army roadnet to the vicinity of VITRE (Y3653) on 8 August:

- 35th Infantry Division
- 5th Infantry Division
- 2nd French Armored Division

The 80th Infantry Division also moved to its new area at 0600.

Traffic control equipment shortage became critical. Franco plates, discs - directional and other traffic equipment had not arrived from the United Kingdom.

In accordance with TWX, Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group Rear Boundary of Third U. S. Army was established as follows: (All to Communications Zone).

Highway N776 LE MONT ST. MICHEL (T1611) - PONTORSON (T1602); Highway N176 PONTORSON (T1602) - PONTAUBAULT (T2810); Highway N807 PONTAUBAULT (T2810) - ST. HILAIRE DU HARCQUET (T4703) - Road N177 ST. HILAIRE DU HARCQUET (T4703) to First U. S. Army Boundary.

The front was extending to the south, the southeast and to the west towards the BRESE PENINSULA. This required extension of supply routes and traffic control personnel.

The city of LAVAL (Y6846) presented a complicated traffic problem. The enemy had blown out the bridges across the MAYENNE River in this city. A Class 40 bridge was placed, by the engineers, at the south edge of the city. The approach to this bridge from the west was very crooked and tank retrievers could not make the turn onto the bridge. A Class 70 bridge was constructed by engineers the following day and relieved the situation.

Great difficulty was encountered in that many vehicles became lost. The Military Police assisted many of the drivers of these vehicles in locating their units.

One thousand wood signs, size 15 inches by 17 inches, painted black were ordered from the Engineer Section, in lieu of Franco plates, to be delivered in lots of three hundred commencing 20 August.

A traffic circulation plan for the city of FOUGERES (Y3878) was approved and provided for two separate north-south routes through the city with connecting routes for east-west traffic.

One bridge was left intact in the city of LE MANS (Z4037), and highways from the west, north and east converged at this city, causing traffic conflicts. To offset this condition a by-pass was put into effect for traffic going south and east of LE MANS (Z4037) by routing this traffic from N157 to GC37 to CHEVILLE (Z0831), thence east and south over roads to re-enter N157 via GC2 at ST. GALAIS (V7849). This by-pass afforded some relief, but the city of LE MANS (Z4037) remained a traffic problem while in the Army Area, and required the constant attention of all traffic and Military Police personnel.

The 80th Infantry Division started movement on 15 August from the vicinity of JUBLAINS (Y8965) to an area in the vicinity of MONTMIRAIL (V8468). Route was assigned as follows: IP to N23, east of GC19 - GC4, northeast on N805 to RJ N155 - southeast on N155 to GC41, GC41 to destination. All sensitive points along this route were posted with Army or Corps Military Police for control of the movement in their respective areas.

Signs "One Lane Traffic, No Passing, by order of the Army Commander," were placed at critical points, entrances to towns and

narrow points on the highways.

Bridges at CHATEAUDUN (W2361) and ST. DENIS (W2062) were blown on 20 August. The bridge at ST. DENIS (W2062) was replaced by engineers with a four ton timber bridge. At CHATEAUDUN (W2361) a ford was available and used until a Class 40 two way bridge was constructed.

The temporary Army boundary was established as follows on 21 August:

LE MANS (Z4037), to Third U. S. Army, open to First U. S. Army traffic. BONNETABLE (V5779), to First U. S. Army, NOGENT LE ROTROU (V8892), to First U. S. Army, open to Third U. S. Army traffic. COURVILLER SUR EURE (R2003), to First U. S. Army, DREUX (R3235) road on west bank of EURE River to its junction with the SEINE River, all inclusive to Third U. S. Army. Third U. S. Army to have running rights on the NOGENT LE ROTROU (V8892) - DREUX (R3235) road until Third U. S. Army dumps in the vicinity were closed.

On 23 August the 80th Infantry Division moved over road net to new assembly area without traffic conflicts.

Company "C", 503rd Military Police Battalion, took over traffic control in CHARTRES (R3802) from XX Corps Military Police, on 23 August. That afternoon General DeGaulle of the French Army was given a welcome in CHARTRES (R3802). The traffic problem created by the French civilians crowding the streets to welcome him was tremendous. All sorts of parades, vehicles and individuals interfered with the free flow of military vehicles through the city streets.

The Main Supply Routes were established on 23 August as follows:

(1) N23 LE MANS (Z4037) to NOGENT LE ROTROU (V8892), N822 to COMBRES (W0692), GC15 to CHAMPOND (W0700), N23 to COURVILLE SUR EURE (R2004), GC23 to THIMBERT (R2217), GC26 to LE PEAGE (R3618), N154 to DREUX (R3236), N12 to HOUDAN (R5040).

(2) N23 LE MANS (Z4037) to CONNERE (V6266), N827 to BROU (W1278), GC27 to BONNEVAL (W2873), GC17 to VOVES (W4683) to OUARVILLE (W5890) to ETAMPES (W8897).

(3) N157 LE MANS (Z4037) to ST. CALAIS (V7849) to RJ N826 to MOREE (W1544) to OUZOUER (W3743) to CRMES (W5845), N155 to ORLEANS (F6623).

Improvement in the standardization of signing was made as well as in road discipline and traffic control. The continuous enforcement by all Military Police in stressing the following restrictions helped in no small way to improve the situation:

- (1) Interval between vehicles on the highways, including halts - 60 yards.
- (2) Double banking of convoys prohibited.
- (3) One convoy would not overtake or pass another without authority from a Traffic Regulating Post or the Military Police.

Traffic Regulating Posts were established on 23 August as follows:

- (1) BIELLE AIRPORT
- (2) CHATEAUDUN (W2361)
- (3) CHARTRES (R3802)
- (4) DREUX (R3235)
- (5) BROU (W1278)
- (6) SANCHVILLE (W4374)
- (7) ORLEANS (F6623)
- (8) ARTENAY (W6459)
- (9) ETAMPES (W8897)

On 24 August the bridge at CLOYVES (W1555), on N10 was out, and traffic was diverted between CHATEAUDUN (W2361) and N826. It was replaced by a Class 40 Bailey bridge.

The Provost Marshal, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, visited this section on 24 August and discussed traffic problems and traffic control equipment.

The 90th Infantry Division was moved on 26 August from vicinity of LA FERTE BERNARD (V7479) via GC49, N827 to PITHIVIERS (W9367) where it was delivered to XX Corps.

The 80th Infantry Division was moved on 26 August via GC37, GC23, GC20, N823, N817, GC10, N155 to ORLEANS (F6623).

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Main Supply Routes were established on 27 August as follows:

(1) East: Two way VIBRAYE (W7964) to OIGNY (V9363); one way IC 23 to DRQUE (W0460), IC87 to COURTALAIN (W0964), N827 to PITHIVIERS (W9367), GC26 to PUISEAUX (X0969), GC27 to NEMOURS (X2675); two way N375 to MONTEREAU (X4688).

(2) West: Two way MONTEREAU (X4688) N375 to NEMOURS (X2675), one way GC16 NEMOURS (X2675) to LA CHAPELLE (X1881), N51 to MALESHERBES (X0850), GC24 to SERMAISES (W9081), GC18 to MEREVILLE (W8284), GC145 to ANGERVILLE (W7584), N839 to QUARVILLE (W5890), GC17 to CHATILLON (W1367), IC111 to COURTALAIN (W0964), N827 to OIGNY (V9363) to VIBRAYE (W7965).

(3) N826 ST. CALAIS (V7849) to ORMES (W5845), N155 to ORLEANS (F6623), N152 to CHATEAUNEUF (F9118), N60 to SENS (X6965), all two way.

Traffic Regulating Posts were established as follows on 27 August:

- (1) CHATEAUDUN (W2361)
- (2) SANCHVILLE (W4374)
- (3) ORLEANS (F6623)
- (4) ARTENAY (W6459)
- (5) PITHIVIERS (W9367)
- (6) ORLEANS (F6623) - BRICY AIRPORT (F6623)
- (7) NEMOURS (X2675)
- (8) MONTARGIS (X2845)

Rear boundaries were established as follows on 27 August:

(1) Corps:

(a) XII Corps: PITHIVIERS (W9367) along N721 to COURCY (W8956), thence along GC109 to CHILLEURS (W8357), thence along GC5 to NEUVILLE (W7757), to ARTENAY (W6459), to SOUGY (W5757) to PATAY (W5057), thence along N835 to ST. PERAY LA COLOMBE (W5052), thence along GC3 to ST. SIGISMOND (W4849), to GEMIGNY (W4907), to ROZIERRES (W5045), to south lateral boundary, all inclusive to Corps.

(b) XX Corps: ETAMPES (W8896) along N721 to PITHIVIERS (W9367), all inclusive to Corps.

On 28 August the 106th Cavalry Group was moved through the Army Area.

"Vehicle Corrals" were established and announcement was made in Circular 46, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 29 August, (See Annex Number 2) that the following violations would result in detention in these corrals:

Speeding, double banking, light violations, reckless driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, failure to maintain the prescribed 60 yard distance between vehicles when moving or at a halt, disobedience of Military Police traffic directions, and any of the following vehicles passing any other moving vehicle or halted convoy, except by direction of Military Police:

- Trucks, 3/4 ton weapons carriers.
- Trucks, 1-1/2 ton cargo.
- Trucks, 2-1/2 ton cargo.
- All other wheeled or track vehicles over 3/4 ton capacity.

Large 4 feet by 4 feet signs to prevent double banking, and passing were constructed and placed conspicuously on the main supply routes.

XV Corps departed IF Route Junctions N338 and GC21 on 30 August and moved via GC21, N837, D27 and D15 to vicinity of LA FERTE GAUCHER (S7530).

A "Red Ball" express route (for priority gasoline, ammunition and other vital material) was established from Advance Section, Communications Zone via N378 to FONTAINBLEAU (X2991), D10, N375, N304, N51, N33 to CHALONS (T5445).

It was necessary to establish one way traffic in many areas because of the poor condition of the roads.

The following restrictions were published in Administrative Orders as follows:

- (1) Blackout marker (cat eye) lights would be used forward

of Corps rear boundary. Blackout driving lights would be used in rear of Corps rear boundary.

(2) Convoys would not halt on Main Supply Routes for any purpose. When halts were necessary convoys would be moved to side road.

Bridges were reported out at CLESLES (Y1200) on 31 August. A change in Main Supply Route was made at this point from MERY (Y1697), west as follows:

North on N373 from MERY (Y1697) to ETRELLES (Y1503), west on GC52a to BAGNEUX (Y1203), northwest on GC5 to ANGLURE (Y1107). This change was made to by pass a 1/4 mile gravel road outside CLESLES (Y1200) which could not withstand heavy traffic.

Over 400 traffic clearances were processed through this Headquarters during the month of August.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

The first prisoner of war enclosure was opened 1 August in the vicinity of ST. JORES (T2785). This enclosure was taken over from the 482nd Military Police Escort Guard Company, First U. S. Army, and contained thirty-four prisoners of war. The 244th Field Artillery Battalion operated this enclosure.

The prisoner of war enclosure in the vicinity of ST. JORES (T2785) was closed 2359 August 3, 6,352 prisoners of war having been evacuated through it.

A prisoner of war enclosure was established at MARCEY (T2517) 4 August, 1-1/2 miles northwest of AVRANCHES (T2817).

The 437th and 472nd Prisoner of War Escort Guard Companies reported to the enclosure at MARCEY (T2517) on 5 August for duty per paragraph 2, TA Number 4, Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, dated 3 August. One platoon from each of the 647th and 442nd Quartermaster Truck Companies was utilized for transporting prisoners from the Division collecting points to the enclosure.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 011200 August to 052359 August:

Captured	8806
Others	None
TOTAL	8806
Evacuated	8052
BALANCE ON HAND	754

During the night of 7 - 8 August, the enclosure at MARCEY (T2517) near AVRANCHES (T2817), was subjected by the enemy to a combined bombing and strafing attack. A perimeter guard was established as quickly as possible, and as a matter of safe-guarding prisoners of war from the devastating attack they were permitted to leave the enclosure and seek protection in the surrounding area. Twenty-one prisoners of war were killed and sixty-two wounded. Two enlisted men of the 244th Field Artillery Battalion (operating personnel of the enclosure) were killed and several were wounded.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 1, AVRANCHES (T2817), was closed on 8 August, 5,157 prisoners of war having been handled during the period 4 to 7 August inclusive.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2, at SENS DE BRITTAGNE (Y1377), was opened on 8 August.

The 2nd Platoon of the 443rd Prisoner of War Processing Company reported for duty at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2 at SENS DE BRITTAGNE (Y1377) on 9 August.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 060001 August to 122359 August:

On hand from previous week	754
Received	17535
TOTAL	18289
Evacuated	11451
BALANCE ON HAND	6838

Total from 1 August to 12 August . 26341

On 13 August a TWX was received from Twelfth U. S. Army Group informing all headquarters that prisoners of war in the hands of the French Forces of the Interior were to be released to the appropriate Army Commander for evacuation.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 4 was established at BRULON (K0936) on 14 August.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 3 was established at MUR DE BRITTAGNE (X0569) on 16 August.

Plane liaison was established between this section and Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2 at SENS DE BRITTAGNE (Y1377).

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 2 at SENS DE BRITTAGNE (Y1377) was closed on 19 August, 27,407 prisoners of war being handled by this Enclosure during the period 8 August to 19 August.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 130001 August to 192359 August:

On hand from previous week	6638
Received	18474
TOTAL	25112
Evacuated	23171
BALANCE ON HAND	1941

Total received to date 44615

The 741st Field Artillery Battalion reported to BRULON Enclosure (K0936) on 20 August and began orientation preparatory to assuming duties at the Enclosure.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 5 was established at COURTALAIN (W0964) on 21 August.

The 738th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from duty at the BRULON Prisoner of War Enclosure (K0936) on 22 August and assigned to its primary mission.

The 734th Field Artillery Battalion reported to COURTALAIN (W0964) Enclosure on 22 August for prisoner of war escort duty.

A new system for evacuation of prisoners of war was established at this time as follows:

Responsibility for Evacuations:

(a) Corps and Divisions were responsible for evacuation of prisoners of war from Division Collecting Points to a Collecting Point located at the Class I Supply Point of the Corps. Army would supply operating personnel for the above Collecting Point and would be responsible for evacuation of prisoners of war from the Collecting Point located at the Class I Supply Point to the Army Prisoner of War Enclosure.

(b) Army Units - To the nearest Collecting Point located at a Class I Supply Point at a Corps.

(c) Locations - Corps G-1's and Provost Marshals would coordinate with Corps G-4's to locate Collecting Points mentioned above near traffic routes to the supply points.

The Prisoner of War Sub-Section Chief left for tour of inspection of BRITTANY PENINSULA on 22 August to make arrangements on disposition of prisoners of war captured by VIII Corps.

2nd Platoon, 441st Prisoner of War Processing Company, reported for duty at COURTALAIN (W0964) on 24 August.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 4, located vicinity of BRULON (K0936), two miles south of JOUE EN CHARNIE (K0936), was closed on 25 August, 8,771 prisoners of war being handled from 14 to 25 August.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6 was established three miles east of NEMOURS (X2675) on D225 on 26 August.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 200001 August to 262359 August:

On hand from previous week	1941
Received	9188
TOTAL	11129
Evacuated	3904
BALANCE ON HAND	5225

Total received to date 54003

The 2nd Platoon, 441st Prisoner of War Processing Company was

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relieved from duty at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 5, COURTALEIN (W0964) by Advance Section, Communications Zone, on 27 August.

Twenty-five .45 caliber Thompson submachine guns were obtained from Ordnance for use by the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, operating a prisoner of war enclosure at NEMOURS (X2675).

A total of 63,369 prisoners of war were received by Third U. S. Army prisoner of war enclosures during the month of August. (See Annex Number 9)

A total of 62,157 prisoners of war were evacuated during the month. 6,677 wounded prisoners of war were received through medical channels, as per report from the Army Medical Section. This figure was not included in the number of prisoners of war evacuated through Third U. S. Army enclosures.

Escapers and evaders evacuated through Third U. S. Army prisoner of war channels during the month of August were 487.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

All towns in vicinity of Army Command Post were initially posted with "Off Limits" signs and enforcement on 2 August provided by roving patrols of 503rd Military Police Battalion, covering principally BEAUCHAMPS (T2732), VILLEDIEU (T3934) and LA HAYE PESNEL (T2628). Command Boulevard was restricted to use by military personnel on business and all civilians were kept out until cleared by Counter Intelligence Corps, who set up personnel at both ends of the Army Command Post for that purpose. This was set up as a Standing Operating Procedure in all future Command Post Areas.

On 8 August roving patrols from the 503rd Military Police Battalion were established in POILLEY (Y3592) and nearby towns to enforce "Off Limits" regulations.

The Army Straggler Collecting Point was located in close vicinity of the Command Post of the 503rd Military Police Battalion. Stragglers apprehended were returned to their units or to the replacement depot.

An Army guardhouse was established also in close vicinity of the 503rd Military Police Battalion.

Twenty-six stragglers were apprehended from the period 1 to 5 August.

During the period 6 to 12 August, thirty-three stragglers were apprehended. Two of these were French and were turned over to a French Troop Replacement Center at PONTAUBAULT (T2810). Of the remainder, sixteen went to 48th Replacement Battalion, four to 53rd Replacement Battalion, three to the 318th Replacement Company and eight to the 319th Replacement Company.

Delinquency reports for the period 6 to 12 August were as follows:

Drunken driving	4
Uniform violation	17
Drunk and disorderly	4
Promiscuously firing of weapons	2
Off Limits violations	9
Speeding	23
Unattended vehicles	4
Pass violations	7
Unauthorized use of vehicle	4
Theft of Government property	2
Larceny	2
TOTAL	78

Commencing 14 August, LABAZOGE (Z3452) and LE MANS (Z4037) were patrolled for enforcement of "Off Limits". Advance Section, Communications Zone Headquarters and Service of Supply troops under their control moved into LE MANS (Z4037) during this period and many troops were billeted in town making enforcement of "Off Limits" virtually impossible with available Military Police personnel. The water depot in the heart of LE MANS (Z4037) was ordered closed. Arrangements were made with Advance Section, Communications Zone, to police LE MANS (Z4037). An Army straggler point was opened in LE MANS (Z4037).

Eight stragglers were apprehended during the period 13 to 19 August, of which four were sent to the 53rd Replacement Depot and four to their respective organizations. Delinquency reports for the same period were as follows:

Improper uniform	11
Speeding	48
Reckless driving	10
Pass violations	10
Off Limits	22
Promiscuous firing of weapons	3
AWOL	4
Unattended vehicles	6
Disorderly conduct	4
Driving while intoxicated	2
Intoxicated	5
Larceny	1
TOTAL	126

The Army straggler collecting points in LE MANS (Z4037) and FOUGERES (Y3878) were closed on 22 August as the Army rear boundary was moved forward. An Army straggler point was opened at ST. CALAIS (V7849) Town Square on 22 August. An Army straggler collecting point was established at CHARTRES (R3802) on 23 August.

During the period 20 to 26 August stragglers were collected and disposed of as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
5	Returned to units
13	38th Replacement Depot
12	48th Replacement Depot

Straggler collecting points at ST. CALAIS (V7849) and CHARTRES (R3802) were closed at 250900 August. Straggler collecting points were opened at MERVILLE (W8284), CHATEAUDUN (W2361) and VENDOME (FO411) at 250900 August.

The following delinquencies were reported for the week ending 26 August:

Double banking	21
Parking on highway	1
Unattended vehicle	23
Speeding	56
Unauthorized use of vehicle	13
Overloading	4
Improper blackout	2
Pass violations	17
Indiscriminate firing	8
Off Limits violations	20
Drunk and disorderly	20
Reckless driving	19
Alleged rape	2
Uniform violations	9
Insubordination	1
Others	2
TOTAL	218

The following cities and towns were placed "On Limits" to all troops:

PITHIVIERS (W9367)	JANVILLE (W6572)
BONNEVAL (W2873)	ORLEANS (F6623)
MERVILLE (W8284)	ORGRES (W5067)
CHATEAUDUN (W2361)	VENDOME (FO411)

The Army Commander announced on 26 August that henceforth all cities and towns within Third U. S. Army Area would be "On Limits" to all troops.

All towns were being patrolled by 503rd Military Police Battalion with personnel of the 741st Field Artillery Battalion being used to assist them.

Straggler collecting points were opened and closed as follows:

VENDOME (FO411)	- closed 281200 August
CHATEAUDUN (W2361)	- closed 291200 August
MERVILLE (W8284)	- closed 301200 August
SENS (X6965)	- opened 301800 August
FONTAINBLEAU (X2991)	- opened 301800 August

The disposition of stragglers apprehended during the last week in August was as follows:

<u>Straggler Collecting Point</u>	<u>Returned To Unit</u>	<u>To Replacement Depot</u>	<u>Total</u>
MERVILLE (W8284)	17	5	22
CHATEAUDUN (W2361)	3	0	3
ORLEANS (F6623)	9	0	9
SENS (X6965)	2	0	2
FONTAINBLEAU (X2991)	3	3	6
Provost Marshal Office	1	7	8
TOTALS:	35	15	50

General prisoners evacuated or released during the period were as follows:

To VIII Corps for trial	4
To Advance Section, Communications Zone, RENNES (Y0154) for trial	11
To Units	4
TOTAL	19
On hand, Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6, NEMOURS (X2675)	15
Third U. S. Army guardhouse	17
TOTAL	32

The 741st Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to Military Police duties with the 503rd and the 512th Military Police Battalions. This battalion was used for maintenance of law and order, and traffic control.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

In the area near BEAUCHAMPS (T2732) the rate of crimes greatly increased. During the week investigations were conducted on numerous reports of rape. Because of the lack of proper identification and description furnished by the complainants considerable difficulty was encountered in solving the crimes.

The following list of serious incidents or crimes were reported during the period from 1 to 5 August:

AWOL	3
Rape	3
Attempted rape	1
Murder	1
Breaking and entering	1
TOTAL	9

No Criminal Investigation Sections were as yet assigned to this Section. This placed a heavy burden on the Investigation Section of this Headquarters and that of the 503rd Military Police Battalion. Additional request was made to higher Headquarters for the assignment of Criminal Investigation Sections to this office.

Serious incidents or crimes reported for the period 6 to 12 August were as follows:

Rape and murder	1
Rape	4
Attempted rape	1
Larceny	2
TOTAL	8

The 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Section, consisting of one officer and ten enlisted men reported for duty with this Section on the 18th of August. This Section had organically two vehicles which were considered inadequate. Arrangements were made for three additional vehicles, to be used by the Criminal Investigation Section.

The following cases were reported for investigation during the period 13 to 19 August:

Rape	4
Rape and attempted murder	1
Homicide	1
Assault and battery	1
Unlawful discharge of firearms	2
Murder	1
TOTAL	10

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The following cases were reported for investigation during the period 20 to 26 August:

Rape	1
AWOL	2
Murder	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	5

During the last week of August, 1944, the following cases were reported for investigation:

Larceny of military property . . .	1
Pillage	2
Assault	1
Rape	3
Mayhem	1
Justifiable homicide	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	10

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

A conference was held 1 September with representatives from the Traffic Sub-Section, Military Police Battalions and Field Artillery Battalions present for the purpose of discussing employment of radio communications in the functions of Traffic, Maintenance of Law and Order and Prisoner of War Sub-Sections under supervision of the Provost Marshal.

Forward Echelon "B" departed vicinity of COURGENAY (X8477) 040830 September. Arrived one mile north of MARSON on GC1e (T6541) 041300 September.

Forward Echelon "A" departed vicinity of COURGENAY (X8477) 041300 September. Arrived one mile north of MARSON on GC1e (T6541) 041630 September.

Rear Echelon departed COURCY (W9255) 060820 September. Arrived five miles south of L'EPINE, vicinity of MARSON (T6541).

Forward Echelon "B" departed vicinity of MARSON (T6541) 150830 September. Arrived vicinity of BRAQUIS (U4664) four miles south of ETAIN (U4770) on route N408, 151200 September.

Forward Echelon "A" departed vicinity of MARSON (T6541) 151300 September. Arrived vicinity of BRAQUIS (U4664), four miles south of ETAIN (U4770), on route N408, 151715 September.

Rear Echelon departed MARSON (T6541) 181145 September. Arrived seven miles northeast of ETAIN (U4770) at ROUVRES (U5171) 181600 September.

Forward Echelon departed BRAQUIS (U4664) and arrived in billets in town of ETAIN (U4770) 22 September.

A standing Escort of Honor was provided for General EISENHOWER during his visit on 29 September to Third U. S. Army Headquarters at ETAIN (U4770). This escort was provided from personnel of the 503rd Military Police Battalion, and consisted of two platoons of one officer and thirty enlisted men, each.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

As the tactical situation became stabilized, the Army Zone became confined and the traffic logistics became that of density, rather than of distance.

Major troop movements were of two kinds, those coming forward into and through Army Area along or parallel to Main Supply Routes and those moving laterally or perpendicular to Main Supply Routes. Additional posts and strengthening of existing posts and patrols were necessary to expedite these moves. In addition to major troop moves, many units of battalion size or smaller were moving daily.

Traffic control on Main Supply Routes changed little during the month. Company C, 503rd Military Police Battalion, Company A, 512th Military Police Battalion and Company B, 512th Military Police Battalion covered Main Supply Routes 1, 2 and 3 respectively, with Company C, 512th Military Police Battalion covering lateral routes and towns

not on Main Supply Routes. Supply traffic was heavy and concentrated on two routes; Main Supply Route Number 1 (N3) and Main Supply Route Number 2 (N34-N4). All Main Supply Routes were established on two way roads, greatly facilitating use of traffic control personnel and traffic control equipment. Traffic summary courts were set up at various localities along the Main Supply Routes and tried 415 cases involving traffic violations during the month. An appreciable restraint on speeding and reckless driving was noticeable on all roads after news of these courts was circulated.

Supply of traffic control equipment remained critical and requests to higher Headquarters (Twelfth U. S. Army Group) were made to get action. The Engineers' supply channel for this equipment dwindled in Advance Section, Communications Zone where the Transportation Corps was the supply agency for the needed items. Captured sheet metal was utilized as a "stop-gap" measure with the Ordnance cutting and shaping discs, directional, and Franco plates, and the Engineers painting them. This substitute supply measure, the reclamation of signs on Main Supply Routes no longer used, and more judicious use of signs averted a breakdown of signing in the Army Area. The supply of batons, reflectorized, was the only item of night traffic control equipment that remained adequate.

A reconnaissance element consisting of one officer from the Traffic Sub-Section, one officer from the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section, one French liaison officer, one non-commissioned officer from the 512th Military Police Battalion, and two drivers with 1/4 ton vehicles and other equipment was formed and put into operation with mission of contacting Corps and Division Provost Marshals, civil authorities, Civil Affairs officers and others in the zones ahead of the Army Service area to discuss Military Police problems, secure necessary billets and office space in advance, secure first hand information of conditions affecting traffic and serve as general coordinators for liaison with related agencies. This unit greatly increased our scope of operations and efficiency.

Much additional road reconnaissance data was provided by advance details of the 512th Military Police Battalion, which made a thorough check of the Army road net. Daily conferences with the Army Engineers amplified and clarified the traffic and road net picture.

A systematic procedure for traffic control was established, and closer liaison and greater exchange of information with the 512th Military Police Battalion, the Engineer Section, the G-4 Transportation Section, and the G-3 Section (Troop Movements) began to secure results. The use of radio communication between Headquarters and outlying key localities increased the mobility of the traffic police and tightened control of the Army Area.

Bridges were reported out at BRAY (O4119), 1 September. All main roads leading to the town were signed indicating this condition.

A blown out bridge at CHALONS (T5445) was replaced on 2 September by a two way Class 40 bridge.

Main Supply Routes were established on 2 September as follows:

(1) EAST: GC 24 to MALESHERBES (X0579), N51 to FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991), two way. D27 to CR N5, GC12 to NANGIS (S5107), GC56 to GASTINS (S5314), D15 to MONMIRAIL (V8468), N33 to RJ GC11, GC11 to VINAY (T2354), one way. N51 to REIMS (T3080), N380 to TOURCELLESCHAUMONT (T7293), N46 to RJ M47, M47 to ARLON (P6122), two way.

WEST: GC24 to MALESHERBES (X0579), N51 to FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991), two way. GC39 to RJ GC47 to LE CHATELET (S3502) D13 to LESEGRENNES (S4001), D27 to ROZAY (S4920), N304, to CR D9 to CHAILLY (S6132), N34 to CR GC55, GC55 to REBAIS (S7037), GC6 to VIELSMALSONS (S8242), N33 to CR GC20 to DORMANS (T10161), N3 to RJ GC22, GC22 to SERMIERS (T2969), GC26 to CR N51, one way. N51 to REIMS (T3080), N380 to TOURCELLESCHAUMONT (T7293), N46 to RJ M47, M47 to ARLON (P6122), two way.

(2) EAST: GC26 to PUISEUX (X0969), GC7 to CR N375, N375 to MONTREAU (X4688), GC18 to LE MERIT (X8399), IC40 to RJ N51 to SEZANNE (T0522), one way. N34 to VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819), M4 to ST. AUBIN S-A (U3115), N58 to PONT A MOUSSON (U7735), two way.

WEST: N450 to BARVILLE (X0460), GC87 and D6 to BRAUMONT (X0962), GC43 to CHATEAU-LANDON (X2663), GC40 to MEMOURS (X2675), N375 to CR GC92 to RJ GC103, GC103 to MISEY (X5684), GC75 to CR N51, N51 to ROMILLY (Y0499), M440 to ANGLURE (T1107), GC5 to RJ GC98, to GC9 to FERRE CHAMPENOISE (T2524), all one way. N34 to VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819), M4 to ST. AUBIN S-A (U3115), N58 to PONT A MOUSSON (U7735), two way.

(3) N60 to ORLEANS (F6623), to TOUL (U6401), M4 to NANCY (U8511), two way.

(4) THROUGH TRAFFIC ROUTE (RED BALL): USE OF THIS ROUTE WAS CLEARED THROUGH ARMY TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS. N837 ETAMPES (W8897) to FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991), D10 to RJ N375 to MONTCEAUX (T8821), N304 to RJ N34, N34 to SEZANNE (T0522), N51 to CHAMPAUBERT (T1039), N33 to CHALONS (T5445), N3 to VERDUN (U2865) to METZ (U8557). Two way through route.

Additional and revised Traffic Regulations were incorporated in Circular Number 51, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 3 September. (See Annex 10).

Request was initiated to the Engineer Section for 500 discs, directional, on 5 September for traffic control use. XII Corps requested a supply of this equipment, and ninety-five discs, directional, and fifty flashers, electric, were withdrawn from the 503rd Military Police Battalion Supply and issued to the XII Corps.

The Express Main Supply Route was marked with "Red Ball Express" signs.

Movement of the 79th Infantry Division on 6 September was to be made to a new assembly area southeast of TROYES (Y2972), and elements of the Division moved on 7 September.

The 2nd French Armored Division commenced movement 8 September from the vicinity of COULMIERS (S5835) and ROZAY (S4920) to an assembly area southeast of TROYES (Y2972). The 35th Infantry Division and the 79th Infantry Division were also moving at this time and conflicts were reported between elements of these divisions at BRIENNE (Y6283) and east of TROYES (Y2972). This difficulty was corrected in a short period of time and the movement closed without further conflict.

The following restriction was placed in effect on 8 September:

Blackout marker (cat eye) lights would be used forward of Corps Rear Boundary. Blackout driving lights would be used in rear of Corps Rear Boundary.

A Radio Net was established 9 September with radio sets at 512th Military Police Battalion, CHALONS (T5445) and ST. MENESHOULD (T9359). The net was to be expanded as fast as equipment and operating personnel were made available.

The Provost Marshal of Advance Section, Communications Zone, took over traffic control in REIMS (T3080) 092400 September. An air reconnaissance was made for the purpose of observing traffic circulation and control in CHALONS (T5445), TROYES (Y2972), JOINVILLE (Z0887), ST. DIZIER (T9509), VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819) and CHARMES (Z9476).

A representative from the Provost Marshal's Office, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, visited this Sub-Section 10 September and reported that his Headquarters was taking steps to insure that a supply of traffic control equipment was made available to this Headquarters.

Radio communication was established between 512th Military Police Battalion, 503rd Military Police Battalion, ST. MENESHOULD (T9359), REVIGNY (T9829) and VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6919). Communication between these stations proved satisfactory and afforded rapid transmission of pertinent traffic and maintenance of law and order data.

Advance Section, Communications Zone, took over traffic control in CHALONS (T5445) 11 September, relieving Army Military Police.

Road reconnaissance was made 12 September over highway N3 from CHALONS (T5445) to a point five miles east of VERDUN (U2865) and it was learned that additional traffic control personnel were needed to assure the rapid free flow of traffic.

The radio communication personnel from the 741st Field Artillery Battalion were relieved from duty 13 September and replaced by personnel from the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

A higher frequency for the Radio Net was requested from the Signal Officer, Third U. S. Army, 13 September, to increase the range

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of the Radio Net.

The Ordnance Section dispatched one truck company carrying vital ammunition every two hours, 14 September over the Red Ball Route (N3) from CHALONS (T5445) to a point east of VERDUN (U2865). This movement continued for six days. Extra traffic control personnel were posted along this route to assure free movement of traffic. Tank retrievers were also used in this movement with a subsequent slowing down of traffic on the hills east of VERDUN (U2865).

The civilian traffic on the main highways was constantly increasing and interfered with the free flow of military traffic. This problem was taken up with Civil Affairs and Counter Intelligence Corps with the request that this traffic be controlled and routed over secondary routes.

A tank retriever broke down on a hill five miles east of VERDUN (U2865) on highway N3 on 17 September, blocking traffic. Military Police took charge of the situation and routed traffic over the road shoulders on each side, until a wrecker moved the vehicle into a field and cleared the road.

The large number of vehicles serving the Third U. S. Army rail-head in VERDUN (U2865), in addition to those supply vehicles using highway N3, created a high traffic density in the city. The temporary bridge also slowed traffic to some extent. Constant vigilance and expert performance of duty by Military Police kept traffic moving, and no conflicts ensued.

Traffic Court Number 2 moved to ST. DIZIER (T9509), 19 September.

Because of the numerous Air Corps personnel in the vicinity contact was made with the commanding officers of the Air Corps units regarding traffic regulations. These Air Corps units assured this office that they would cooperate in curbing the violation of traffic regulations in that area.

Main Supply Routes were established 19 September as follows:

- (1) N3 VERDUN (U2865) to METZ (U8557), GC11 to V04 vicinity FRIESTROFF (Q2477), V04 to N418, N418 to SAARLAUTERN (Q2880).
- (2) N58 ST. AUBIN (U3115) to PONT A MOUSSON (U7735), N410 to RJ N3, N410 vicinity ST. AVOLD (Q2556), N3 to SAARBRUCKEN (Q4570).
- (3) N4 ST. AUBIN (U3115) to NANCY (U8511), N74 to SARRREGUEMINES (Q5157).
- (4) N60 TROYES (Y2972) to BONNET (Z3095), IC38 (4R) to GONDRECOURT (Z3493), N66 through NEUFCHATEAU (Z4975) to MIRECOURT (Z8169), N413 to TANTONVILLE (Z8287), D6 to BAYON (Z9588), D9 to LUNEVILLE (Q0801), N4 to SARBEBOURG (Q5015).

Representatives from Traffic and Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Sections with a French liaison officer as interpreter departed 19 September for road reconnaissance of the Army and Forward Areas.

A tour of inspection was made 20 September of VERDUN (U2865), BAR LE DUC (U1223), ST. DIZIER (T9509), JOINVILLE (Z0887), VOID (U4412), COMMERCY (U4220) and ST. MIHIEL (U3935). The town of COMMERCY (U4220) with highways N58 and N64 crossing the center of town was a bottleneck. The approaches to the crossroad were through narrow and crooked streets and no bypass was available. Despite this bottleneck, traffic control personnel kept traffic moving in an orderly manner.

The highway from COMMERCY (U4220) to ST. MIHIEL (U3935), an important lateral route, N64, had a railroad overpass and a river bridge blown. The railroad overpass was bypassed by a temporary road and grade crossing 1/4 mile north of blown bridge. A two way timber bridge was placed in at the river. This bridge would eventually be replaced as the approaches were faulty and the bridge was not high enough above the water line.

The 83rd Infantry Division was turned over to the XX Corps at

ST. MIHIEL (U3935) at 231300 September and moved smoothly through the Army Area.

The Engineer Section reported that traffic control equipment was being furnished by local concerns under Army contract.

Provost Marshal, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, reported that traffic control equipment was available in a depot near PARIS (S0140) and that information would be furnished at a later date as to where this equipment could be picked up.

On 25 September the 7th Armored Division moved through the Army Area and was delivered to the First U. S. Army.

The following instructions as announced in Circular Number 58, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 25 September, were put in effect:

Army Light Line coincided with Corps Rear Boundaries. Vehicle lights would be used as follows:

- (a) Full head lights in rear of Army Light Line.
- (b) Blackout driving lamps (dimout lights), for vehicles so equipped, from Army Light Line to Division Rear Boundaries.
- (c) For vehicles not equipped with blackout driving lamps (dimout lights), marker (cat eye) lights from Army Light Lines to Division Rear Boundaries.
- (d) Marker (cat eye) lights for all vehicles in front of Division Rear Boundaries.

Vehicles would not be left unattended unless under immediate surveillance of guards or Military Police.

(a) United States Army vehicles would not be immobilized by the removal of rotors or other vital parts by military or civilian personnel.

Officers would drive vehicles only in an emergency, as defined below:

- (a) During a trip if driver is taken sick, is injured, wounded, killed or dies.
- (b) In case of fire.
- (c) In case of attack (including such attacks as riots, etc.).
- (d) In any case of life or death.

(e) In any special cases, when directed in writing by the Installation Commander (or Unit Commander for separated units) where the need is urgent, and is for the good of the Government. However, in no case would this be used as an excuse for an officer to drive for personal satisfaction.

Movement of the 7th Armored Division 26 September was controlled by Army Military Police from RJ N18 and IC87 to LONGUYON (U4596), where First U. S. Army assumed control.

The 83rd Infantry Division moved through the Army Area. An ammunition truck in an element of this Division exploded on highway M401 just northeast of ST. DIZIER (T9509) at CHANCEY (T9311). Ammunition was scattered on the highway and adjacent fields.

Traffic conflict was reported at OLLEY (U5665) in the XX Corps zone resulting from armored vehicles which were disabled. Ordnance was informed and assisted in removing all disabled vehicles.

The Ninth U. S. Army convoys commenced to move 29 September through the Army Area to assembly area in the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414). Command Post was to be established at ARLON (P6122).

A road reconnaissance was made 30 September to LUXEMBOURG (P8414) Representatives from the Provost Marshal Officer, Ninth U. S. Army, visited this office for observation of Provost Marshal activities.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 5 at COURTALAIN (W0964) was closed 1 September, 3,784 prisoners of war having been evacuated through this enclosure during the period 22 August to 1 September.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 270001 August to 022359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	5225
Received	12440
TOTAL	17665
Evacuated	15698
BALANCE ON HAND	1967

Total number prisoners of war from 1 August to 2 September. . . 66443

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 7, two miles west of REVIGNY (Y9829) on GC14 opened 3 September. This enclosure was operated by the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

Plane liaison with Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6 at NEMOURS (X2675) was scheduled for one trip daily commencing 4 September.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 3, located vicinity of MUR DE BRETAGNE (X0569), was closed 5 September, 1,572 prisoners of war having been evacuated through this enclosure during the period from 19 August to 5 September inclusive. Battery B, 244th Field Artillery Battalion, was withdrawn from this enclosure and rejoined the Battalion at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6, NEMOURS (X2675).

Notification was received 6 September from Advance Section, Communications Zone, that all prisoners of war would be evacuated to CHARTRES (R3802).

A site for new Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8 was selected 8 September in the vicinity of FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657).

TWX received from Twelfth U. S. Army Group dated 9 September advising that Air Force Escapers and Evaders would be evacuated to Hotel Maurice, Rue de Rivoli, PARIS (S0140) Intelligence School, Western European Area.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6 at NEMOURS (X2675), closed 9 September, 11,136 prisoners of war having been evacuated from this enclosure during the period from 25 August to 9 September.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 030001 September to 092359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	1967
Received	5571
TOTAL	7538
Evacuated	4791
BALANCE ON HAND	2747

Total number prisoners of war received from 1 August to 9 September 72014

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, vicinity of FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657), twelve miles east of VERDUN (U2865) on M408, one half mile south of N3 (U4658), opened 10 September.

Prisoner of War Enclosures were instructed to make full use of all captured German equipment for clothing the prisoners during cold weather.

The problem of civilians other than TOPT workers evacuated through prisoner of war channels became acute.

The 244th Field Artillery Battalion, located at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 6, at NEMOURS (X2675), moved 11 September to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, at FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657). The following units also moved to the new enclosure at FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657): 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Company; 467th Quartermaster Truck Company; 498th Medical Collecting Company; 305th Military Police Escort Guard Company; 2nd Platoon, 443rd Prisoner of War Processing Company and Counter Intelligence Corps; Escapers and Evaders; Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachments.

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The following policies were established 13 September with reference to displaced personnel:

- (1) No women would be sent to Prisoner of War Enclosures.
- (2) Female TODT workers and families of TODT workers would be sent to Civil Affairs (G-5).
- (3) Members of Allied Forces with civilian status, such as Russians, French, Belgians, Poles or Czechs would be dealt with by the G-5 Section as displaced persons.
- (4) Displaced persons would be sent to the G-5 Section.
- (5) Members of French Resistance would be sent to the G-5 Section.
- (6) Suspects and enemy agents would be sent to Army Interrogation Center.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 100001 September to 162359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	2747
Received	7224
TOTAL	9971
Evacuated	6326
BALANCE ON HAND	3645

Total number prisoners of war from 1 August to 16 September, inclusive: 79238

Notice was received 17 September from Advance Section, Communications Zone (24th Regulating Station) that prisoners of war would be evacuated by train daily from VERDUN (U2865) and REVIGNY (Y9829) to the rear areas.

Report was received from VIII Corps 18 September that 5141 prisoners of war were evacuated from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 3, MUR DE BRETAGNE (X0569), directly to Advance Section, Communications Zone, during the period 23 August to 5 September, inclusive.

Received allocation of prisoner of war serial numbers from Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army (31G 900001 - 31G 950000). The problem of supplying prisoner of war labor on a permanent basis appeared solved, as the allocation of numbers enabled Third U. S. Army to process prisoners for work details at the hospitals.

All Indian escapers and evaders would be evacuated to Special Counter Intelligence unit in PARIS (S0140) in accordance with letter from Intelligence School Number 9, Western European Area, American Headquarters Command, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, dated 13 September.

Prisoner of war Enclosure Number 7 at REVIGNY (Y9829) was closed 21 September, 12,298 prisoners of war having been handled in this enclosure during the period from 3 September to 21 September, inclusive. Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, two miles west of TOUL (U6401) on IC 11² opened with the 734th Field Artillery Battalion as the operating unit.

The 2nd Platoon, 443rd Prisoner of War Processing Company commenced to process prisoners of war 22 September at the hospitals.

The 498th Medical Collecting Company was relieved from duty at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8 and was replaced by the 437th Medical Collecting Company.

Weekly report prisoners of war from 170001 September to 232359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	3645
Received	7588
TOTAL	11233
Evacuated	8529
BALANCE ON HAND	2704

Total number prisoners of war from 1 August to 23 September inclusive: 86,826

The Army Surgeon was informed with reference to the employment of prisoners of war in hospitals that Convalescent Hospitals would be allowed a quota of eighty processed prisoners, and all other hospitals would be allowed a quota of forty prisoners.

The use of War Department Provost Marshal General Form Number 1, Prisoner of War Identification Tag, was discontinued 25 September.

Notice was received 27 September from Advance Section,

Communications Zone, that all prisoners of war would be evacuated to SUIPPES (T6664).

Memorandum, Instructions on Treatment of Prisoners of War, was prepared 29 September by the Prisoner of War Sub-Section and distributed.

Prisoners of war were permitted to work in medical depots.

Weekly report of prisoners of war from 240001 September to 302359 September, inclusive:

On hand from previous week	2704
Received	2114
TOTAL	4818
Evacuated	4069
BALANCE ON HAND	749

Total number of prisoners of war from 1 August to 30 September, inclusive: 88,940

Prisoners of war handled during the month of September: 25,571. Not included in this total were 2,501 prisoners of war received through medical channels. (See Annex 11).

Total number of Evaders and Escapers for the month of September: 390.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

During the month of September the boundaries of the Third U. S. Army Service Area became static to a degree which permitted a basis for planning in regard to Maintenance of Law and Order. In order to more efficiently employ Military Police, the Army Service Area was divided into sub-areas which corresponded with extensions of Corps boundaries insofar as was practicable. An officer was assigned to each sub-area with direct responsibility for all maintenance of law and order problems within the area and was given personnel who were distributed throughout the area as particular situations required. Upon the assignment of XV Corps to the Seventh U. S. Army, the sub-areas were readjusted to correspond with extensions of XII and XI Corps areas.

Although the functions of Army Military Police were technically limited to the boundaries of the Army Service Area, police of outside areas has been undertaken in the following instances:

In towns at or near the Army Headquarters when the Army Headquarters was located within a Corps area.

In towns within a Corps area when Corps Military Police were inadequate and where a request or clearance was made by or through the Corps.

In towns within the Advance Section, Communications Zone, which were temporarily left without Military Police because of the advance of the Army boundary.

At 061030 September the 465th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion advised this office through the G-2 Section, Third U. S. Army, that there were sixty-five armed SS Troops in woods south of REIMS (T3080). The 6th Cavalry Group Headquarters was apprised of this matter and took action.

The stockade for U. S. Army General Prisoners was established adjacent to the 503rd Military Police Battalion Bivouac Area 8 September.

During the month all towns and cities in the Army Area were placed and kept "On Limits" to troops. To maintain law and order Military Police personnel were augmented by the assignment of personnel from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion in sufficient number to provide adequate patrols in towns and cities frequented by troops. Nine officers and 183 enlisted men from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion were given three days special Military Police training prior to assignment to provisional Military Police Platoon organized by the 503rd Military Police Battalion.

During the month walking and/or road patrols were operating in the following towns:

BRAY (O4119)	MEMOURS (J2675)
BAR LE DUC (U1223)	NEUFCHATEAU (Z4975)
BOURBONNE (J5534)	NANCY (U8511)
CHEROY (X4968)	ORLEANS (F6623)

CHAMPIGNY (T2881)	PROVINS (S7305)
CLERMONT (U0560)	POINT YONNE (X6473)
CHALONS (T5445)	PUISSEUX (X0969)
CONFLANS (U6465)	ROMILLY (Y0499)
CHAMMONT (Z0650)	REIMS (T3080)
COMMERCY (U4220)	RETHEL (O5506)
DCENEMARIS (Z2644)	SERGNES (X6288)
EPERNAY (T2456)	SOUPPE (J2866)
ESTERNAY (S9224)	ST. MARTIN (T6229)
ETAIN (U4770)	SEZANNE (T0522)
EPINAL (U0554)	SENS (X6965)
FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991)	STE. MENEHOULD (T9359)
FERR CHAMPENOISE (T2524)	ST. DIZIER (T9509)
GAUCHER (S7421)	ST. MIHIEL (U3935)
LIGNY (U2113)	TOUL (U6401)
JOINVILLE (Z0887)	THORIGNY (T7136)
LAILLY (X8869)	TROYES (Y2972)
LA CHAPELLE (S8128)	VOUZIER (T8094)
LA FERTE GAUCHER (S7530)	VOID (U4412)
MONTREAU (X4685)	VITTEL (Z6657)
MARGIS (J2745)	VENDEVRE (T3041)
MCRET (X3788)	VERDUN (U2865)
MOURMELON (T5465)	VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819)
MAILLY LE CAMP (T3914)	WASSY (T9493)
MONTMIRAIL (S9239)	
MERY (Y1697)	
NOGENT (J2540)	

During the month the following delinquency reports originated in the Sub-Section.

Unattended vehicles	101
Uniform violations	119
Speeding	208
Double banking	76
Pass violations	68
Carrying civilians	42
Reckless driving	32
Drunk and disorderly	29
Unauthorized use of weapon	17
Drunken driving	8
Officer driving	7
Refusal to obey Military Police	5
Resisting arrest	4
Accidents	2
Damage to civilian property	2
Selling rations	3
Top up on vehicle	2
AWOL	3
Stolen Government property	2
Blackout violation	3
Robbery	2
Overloading vehicle	1
TOTAL	736

In addition to the delinquencies above listed, this Sub-Section forwarded ninety-nine delinquency reports by indorsement and received 356 information copies of delinquency reports originated by other Provost Marshals.

Summary Courts: Two roadside courts with Summary Courts Martial jurisdiction commenced operation in the Army Area; Number 1 at TROYES (Y2972), and Number 2 at CHALONS (T5445). The purpose of these courts was to bring swift justice and immediate punishment to traffic violators and other offenders. Offenses beyond the jurisdiction of the courts were investigated and charges were preferred, signed and forwarded to units concerned for investigation and trial.

The operation of the courts has effected marked improvement in the observance of traffic and other regulations. During the month the courts operated at the following locations: TROYES (Y2972), VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819), CHALONS (T5445), STE. MENEHOULD (T9359), ST. DIZIER (T9509), COMMERCY (U4220) and VERDUN (U2865).

A summary of cases tried by the Summary Courts for the month was as follows:

	Court		TOTAL
	Number 1	Number 2	
Speeding	42	124	166
Passing convoys	0	27	27
Transporting civilians	6	21	27
Uniform violations	89	62	151
Unattended vehicles	19	9	28

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	Court Number 1	Court Number 2	TOTAL
Drunk and disorderly	13	4	17
Double banking	27	2	29
Blocking traffic	0	1	1
No pass	62	0	62
Overloading vehicle	3	4	7
Damage to civilian property	0	2	2
Curfew violation	0	6	6
Failure to salute	3	0	3
Discharge of weapon	3	1	7
Disobeying military police	6	0	1
Illegal parking	1	0	1
TOTALS	271	264	535

All Maintenance of Law and Order Headquarters and detachments have been operating as straggler collecting points. During the month these have included the following locations:

SEMS (X6965)	STB. MENRHOULD (T9359)
FONTAINEBLEAU (X2991)	ST. BIZIER (T9509)
REIMS (T3080)	JOINVILLE (Z0887)
ROMILLY (Y0499)	TOUL (U6401)
VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T6819)	VITTEL (Z6657)
CHALONS (T5445)	VERDUN (U2865)
TROYES (Y2972)	ETAIN (U4770)

Disposition of stragglers during the month was as follows:

To Units	47
To Replacement System	128
To Hospital	2
TOTAL	177

General prisoners evacuated or released during the month were as follows:

To Units	11
Communication Zone	19
Brittany Base Section	3
81st Replacement Battalion	3
Advance Section, Communications Zone, REIMS (T3080)	3
COMPIEGNE (N4403) Prisoner of War Enclosure	1
Disciplinary Training Center Number 5, TONNEVILLE (O0724)	2
XV Corps	1
2912th Disciplinary Training Center, England	6
Seine Base Section	1
TOTAL	50

General prisoners on hand in Third U. S. Army stockade, 30 September: 71

Enlisted men, drivers of vehicles, were apprehended for leaving their vehicles unattended with arms in the vehicles. If the drivers of these vehicles were not located the vehicles were driven by the Military Police to a Vehicle Corral. Disciplinary action was taken against all drivers for these violations.

Captured clothing, (such as fur coats, jackets, and fur hats) when worn as outer garments would be in violation of current uniform regulations. In every case involving such an offense the Provost Marshal would confiscate such articles of wearing apparel and turn them in to Quartermaster Captured Stores or Prisoner of War Enclosures for use by German prisoners of war.

Civil Affairs reported on 18 September that a Military Police detail was needed in the town of VITTEL (Z6657), south of NEUFCHATEAU (Z4975). VITTEL (Z6657) being in XV Corps Area, the Provost Marshal of XV Corps was notified of the situation.

Civil Affairs reported that the Cafe de Globe in ETAIN (U4770) was operated by alleged collaborationists who were catering to soldiers after curfew. Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Police were advised, and investigation conducted.

XV Corps requested that Army take over the police of the town of VITTEL (Z6657) on 21 September.

Circular Number 59, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 27 September, was published concerning curfew and uniform violations. (See Annex 12) Curfew in all towns was 2000 to 0600 hours. All military personnel would be off the streets and clear of town during curfew.

One platoon from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion was dispatched to VERDUN (U2865) on 28 September to aid the Military Police force already stationed there in combing the city for stragglers and AWOLs. The intensive search conducted on this date proved highly successful.

Circular Number 60, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 30 September (See Annex 13) announced the policy with respect to towns and cities in the Third U. S. Army Area as follows:

All towns and cities in Third U. S. Army Area, upon liberation, would initially be placed on limits to all military personnel. Thereafter, towns and cities might be placed "Off Limits" and so signed when deemed expedient by the Army or the Corps Commander concerned.

Curfew in all towns and cities, time to be announced periodically would include the hours of darkness, and would be strictly enforced for both military and civilian personnel.

Liaison With French Authorities-

Two officers of the French Army were attached to this Sub-Section. These officers were employed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a liaison with French Police and Civil Authorities. Through such liaison, which functioned also through local Civil Affairs offices, close cooperation from Civil Authorities was obtained. Coordinated action was taken in operation of joint French and American military police patrols. Increased observance of curfew regulations by civilians through enforcement by Civil Police materially assisted in the maintenance of law and order by closing bars, restaurants and other establishments whose operation after curfew hours seriously impairs the maintenance of law and order among military personnel. Civil Authorities gave valuable information concerning AWOLs and stragglers, and assisted in breaking up such practices as the bartering of food and supplies and the frequenting by military personnel of houses of prostitution operated by women known to have associated with the enemy.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

Following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 1 September:

Rape	2
Assault	4
Article of War 85	1
Murder	1
Larceny	1
TOTAL	9

The 9th Criminal Investigation Section, one officer and ten enlisted men, reported for duty on 2 September.

Formal orders attaching the 9th Criminal Investigation Section to the Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army, were received from Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, i.e., letter dated 6 September 1944, subject: "Troops Assignment Number 43."

Six additional 1/4 ton 4x4 vehicles were assigned on 15 September to the 9th and 13th Criminal Investigation Sections, 3 vehicles per section.

Criminal cases reported and investigated during week ending 16 September were as follows:

Rape	2
Murder	1
Attempted murder	1
Fatal shooting	1
Assault	2
Larceny	3
TOTAL	10

Cases pending 16 September were as follows:

Rape	1
Murder	1
TOTAL	2

Two agents were dispatched to RENNES (Y0154) for the purpose of attending Courts Martial pertaining to a rape case.

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 23 September were as follows:

Murder	1
Rape	3
Assault	2
Robbery	1
Larceny	2
Petty larceny	1
TOTAL	10

Cases pending as of 23 September were as follows:

Rape	1
Assault	1
Larceny	2
Petty larceny	1
TOTAL	5

Criminal cases investigated and completed during the week ending 30 September were as follows:

Larceny	1
Petty larceny	1
Assault and battery	1
Assault	1
TOTAL	4

Cases pending as of 30 September were as follows:

Rape	4
Murder	1
Assault	3
Fatal shooting	1
Drunk and disorderly (General Prisoner)	1
Larceny	2
TOTAL	12

In compliance with paragraph 15, Operational Instructions, Headquarters, Twelfth U. S. Army Group, dated 15 August, Semi-monthly Report covering period from 15 September to 30 September inclusive, and Monthly Report, covering period from 30 August to 30 September, were submitted to the Provost Marshal, Twelfth U. S. Army Group.

During the month of September forty cases were reported to this office for investigation, of which thirty-six were completed and reports compiled and forwarded. A total of nine cases were carried over from August making a total of forty-nine cases under investigation by this office during the month of September.

The following cases were pending:

Rape	4
Murder	2
Assault	3
Larceny	2
Article of War 85	2
TOTAL	13



SECRET

CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Rear Echelon, Third U. S. Army moved on 5 October from ROUVRES EN WOEVRE (U5171) to NANCY (U8511).

The Forward Echelon, Third U. S. Army moved on 11 October from ETAIN (U4770) to NANCY (U8511).

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

Circular Number 63, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 4 October was published and distributed. (See annex 14). This circular contained all current Traffic Regulations and superseded the provisions of Circular Number 10, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 4 May.

Third U. S. Army Military Police took over control of NANCY, (U8511) 6 October. Army traffic control personnel had been functioning in NANCY (U8511) for ten days prior to this date assisting the Provost Marshal of the XII Corps. Check points on all highways leading into town were established to prevent unnecessary traffic entering the town. Company "A", 512th Military Police Battalion, was stationed in NANCY (U8511) for traffic control duties.

Civilian traffic was heaviest along highway N4, a Main Supply Route. At TOUL (U6401) civilians were prohibited from using the main bridge and were directed to use a bypass bridge one mile south along the MOSELLE River. Civilian traffic between NANCY (U8511) and TOUL (U6401) was kept to a minimum by forbidding the use of N4 between GONDREVILLE (U6912) and TOUL (U6401). Civilian traffic was extremely dense in NANCY (U8511) proper.

Reconnaissance of CHALIGNY (U7804) was made and Military Police were stationed in PONT ST VINCENT (U7902) to patrol CHALIGNY (U7804) and NEUVES MAISONS (U7903).

Road patrols operated on 10 October between VIGNEULLES (U5144), FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657), DONCOURT (U6963), TOUL (U6401), VOID (U4412), LIGNY (U2113) and BAR LE DUC (U1223).

A large volume of traffic for the Ninth U. S. Army was routed from VERDUN (U2865) through ETAIN (U4770) to LONGUYON (U4596).

Four special patrols were dispatched to handle special convoys carrying explosives from UTAH BEACH to FOUG (U5612) for the 88th Engineer Battalion.

Supply Echelon, Third U. S. Army moved 12 October from ETAIN (U4770) to NANCY (U8511).

Company "A", 510th Military Police Battalion arrived at ETAIN (U4770) 26 October from Ninth U. S. Army for assignment to III Corps.

Major Troop Movements through the Army Area during the month were as follows:

5th Infantry Division from FLIREY (U6133) to SPINCOURT (U4984) via N404, N408, and N18.


26th Infantry Division (rear trains Artillery, etc.) from BAR LE DUC (U1122) to ST NICHOLAS DE PIERRE PONT (U9505), N66, D4 and N74.

44th Infantry Division from COMMERCY (U4220) and BAR LE DUC (U1122) to BAYON (29588), (Seventh U. S. Army) via N64, N66, N60, D4 and N404.

95th Infantry Division from SPINCOURT (U4984) to FLIREY (U6133) via N18, N408 and N401.

9th Armored Division (to Ninth U. S. Army) from VERDUN (U2865) to LONGUYON (U4596) via N64, N405, G65, G66 and N18.

10th Armored Division from VERDUN (U2865) through Army Area to XI Corps.



During the month clearances for over 60 convoys involving over 8,000 vehicles were processed through this section.

Main Supply Routes were established 9 October as follows:

N3, VERDUN (U2865) to METZ, (U8557) G611 to RJ N418 to SAARLAUTERN (Q2880).

Highway Voie Sacree, BAR LE DUC (U1122) to RJ N401 to ST MIHIEL, (U3935) N407 to RAMBOUCOURT, (U5529) N58 to PONT A MOUSSON, (U7735) N410 to ST AVOLD, (Q2556) N3 to SAARBRUCKEN (Q4570).

N4, LIGNY (U2113) to NANCY, (U8511) N74 to SAARGUEMINES (Q5157).

N408 was closed to traffic between GIRONVILLE (U4823) and BOUCQ (U5418) for maintenance purposes.

The Third U. S. Army Engineer received from Communications Zone, traffic control equipment consisting of 200 batons, reflectorized and 400 lamps, electric flasher type.

Conference was held with Topographic and Operations Sections of the Army Engineer Office 22 October regarding printing of a new road map of Germany, scale: 1:250,000.

A letter was drafted on Vehicle Markings and Current Traffic Regulations, translated into French and made available for distribution to the French Troops stationed in the area.

Drivers of motor vehicles were required to have the following in their possessions:

Driver's trip ticket and preventive maintenance service record WD, Form Number 48, (old WD, QMC Form 237).

Army Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit, WD, OO Form 7360, (old WD, QMC Form 228).

Driver's Accident Report, Standard Form Number 26 or 26A.

Rear Boundaries were established 21 October as follows:

XII Corps: From intersection of N57 with south lateral boundary on N57 to RICHARDMENIL (U8501), IG15 to CHALIGNY (U7903), thence on N409 to VILLEY LE SEC (U7008), thence northwest on unnumbered road to GONDREVILLE (U6912), thence on VO road to VILLEY ST ETIENNE (U7006), thence on IG10.4 to MANONCOURT (U6722), thence northwest on unnumbered road to MINORVILLE (U6426), thence on IG10.13 to NOVIANT AUX PRES, thence on N407 to BERNINGOURT (U6129), thence north on N404 to its intersection with north lateral boundary, all to Army.

XI Corps: From intersection of N18 with north lateral boundary vicinity LONGUYON (U4596), south along N18 through SPINCOURT (U4984) to ETAIN (U4770), thence along N390 to WARCQ (U4868), thence along N408 to intersection of N408 with south lateral boundary vicinity MOINVILLE (U4835), all to Army.

A ground Courier Service was inaugurated covering the following localities: NANCY (U8511), TOUL (U6401), VOID (U4412), LIGNY (U2113), COMMERCY (U4220), BAR LE DUC (U1122), ST MIHIEL (U3935), VERDUN (U2865), HATTONCHATEL (U5246), VIGNEULLES (U5144) and ETAIN (U4770).

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Letter, subject, "Prisoner of War Labor," Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, dated 21 September was received and distributed to all Medical Units employing processed prisoners of war.

The Surgeon, Third U. S. Army was notified that all hospitals located within the twelve mile zone of the nearest organized enemy activity would return all processed prisoners of war to the prisoner of war Enclosure. The 103rd Evacuation Hospital returned thirty processed prisoners of war to the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TOUL (U6401) because the location of this hospital was within twelve miles of the nearest organized enemy activity.

In accordance with request of Provost Marshal, Twelfth Army Group a complete roster of all processed prisoners of war employed at Third U. S. Army hospitals was forwarded to the Provost Marshal, Advance Section Communications Zone.



Notification was made to the Provost Marshals of the XII and XI Corps advising them that prisoners of war would not be retained in the forward areas but would be evacuated to the rear at the first opportunity.

Four processed prisoners of war escaped 14 October from the 35th Evacuation Hospital. One of the escaped prisoners of war was apprehended on the streets of NANCY (U8511).

A German spy suspect, dressed in an American field jacket, crossed the MOSELLE River through our lines, was captured and evacuated by air to the United Kingdom, seriously wounded.

Two German prisoners of war escaped 18 October from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, at FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4658), were apprehended by XI Corps and returned to the Prisoner of War Enclosure.

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The Second Platoon 443rd Prisoner of War Processing Company was relieved from duty with Third U.S. Army at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4658), 2 October and returned to Provost Marshal, Advance Section Communications Zone at REIMS (T3080). 610 prisoners of war were completely processed for Third U. S. Army by this Unit.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8, FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4658) closed 170600 October. All units stationed at this Enclosure were transferred to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, at TOUL (U6209). The Enclosure at TOUL (U6209) continued to operate under the 734th Field Artillery Battalion. 4,351 prisoners of war were evacuated through Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 8 during the period from 10 September to 16 October.

Notification was received from Advance Section Communications Zone that prisoners of war would be evacuated to the Central Enclosure at COMPIEGNE (N4403) instead of to SUIPPES (T6664).

Letter, subject, "Enemy Protected Personnel," Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, dated 6 October was forwarded to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, at TOUL (U6209).

Directive for the Procedure and Gensorship of Mail of enemy prisoners of war on the continent, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, Office of the Theater Gensor, dated 24 September was received and distributed 23 October to all Medical units employing processed prisoners of war.

A Prisoner of War Exchange Officer from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces was attached to this office for duty, 23 October.

A Guard Detail was furnished by the 244th Field Artillery Battalion for the Civil Affairs (G-5) Displaced Persons Center at VERDUN (U2865).

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Escapers and Evaders Detachment attached to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, at TOUL (U6209) was requested by G-1 to submit a report to the Adjutant General, Casualty Section, Third U. S. Army on all American Escapers and Evaders.

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 7 October:

On hand from previous week	749
Received	625
TOTAL	1374
Evacuated	1082
BALANCE ON HAND	285

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 14 October:

On hand from previous week	285
Received	2802
TOTAL	3088
Evacuated	2793
BALANCE ON HAND	295

Total prisoners of war from 1 August to 14 October: 92,368.

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 21 October:

On hand from previous week	295
Received	162
TOTAL	458
Evacuated	105
BALANCE ON HAND	353

Total prisoners of war from 1 August to 21 October: 92,531.

Statistical report of prisoners of war for week ending 28 October:

On hand from previous week	353
Received	212
TOTAL	572
Evacuated	533
BALANCE ON HAND	39

Total prisoners of war from 1 August to 28 October: 92,750.

Total number prisoners of war handled during October: 4,222.

Total number of prisoners of war from 1 August to 31 October inclusive: 102,340. (See annex 15).

Total number of escapers and evaders for October: 40.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

The city of NANCY (U8511) was placed "Off Limits" 6 October to all troops for the purpose of restoring discipline and apprehending and returning all stragglers to their units. In accordance with Circular Number 64, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 6 October, all individual detachments and organizations would enter NANCY (U8511) only on official orders from competent authority. Curfew 2000 hours to 0600 hours would be obeyed by all military personnel and civilians.

Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion, Assistant Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army the efforts of the Military Police, Civil Affairs, Counter Intelligence Corps and the local law enforcing agencies in NANCY (U8511) was placed "ON LIMITS" on a restricted basis. Military Police Detachments in TOUL (U6401), VERDUN (U2865), COMMERCY (U4220), and BAR LE DUC (U1122) were ably assisted during the period by personnel detailed to temporary military police duty by units, both white and colored, stationed in and around these cities.

Circular Number 67, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 12 October announced the Pass Policy for NANCY (U8511), France, as follows:

1. Section II, Circular 64, this headquarters, dated 6 October 1944 is rescinded.

2. The following pass policy for military personnel visiting NANCY (U8511) is announced effective 13 October 1944.

a. The City of NANCY (U8511) is off limits to military personnel except as follows:

(1) Five (5) percent only of the Table of Organization strength of units mentioned below may visit NANCY (U8511) on any one day.

(a) XII Corps including all attached and supporting units.

(b) All troops stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of NANCY (U8511).

(c) Troops stationed in the area west of NANCY (U8511) bounded as follows: MOSELLE River from its junction with the MEURTHE River west to GONDREVILLE (U6912) (inclusive), south along unnumbered highway (inclusive) to FORT VILLEY LE SEC (U7008) on the MOSELLE River (inclusive) thence east southeast along the MOSELLE River to Third U. S. Army south boundary.

(2) Passes will not be made effective earlier than 1200 hours and will expire not later than 2000 hours.

(3) Individual passes will be issued. Attention is invited to the fact that identification cards showing that the holder is stationed or billeted in NANCY (U8511) are not passes.

(4) No twenty four (24) hour passes will be issued.

(5) Curfew 2000 hours to 0600 hours will be obeyed by military personnel below the grade of field officer including those stationed and/or billeted in NANCY (U8511).

The Pass Policy for NANCY (U8511) was amended by Circular Number 71, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 20 October, as follows:

Paragraph 2a (2), Section II, Circular 67, this headquarters, dated 12 October 1944, is amended to read as follows:

"2a (2) (a) Passes will not be made effective earlier than 1000 hours and will expire not later than 1800 hours for personnel not stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of NANCY (U8511).

(b) Passes will not be made effective earlier than 1200 hours and will expire not later than 2000 hours for personnel stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of NANCY (U8511)."

In compliance with Staff Memorandum Number 58, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 18 October 1944, officer patrols were inaugurated in the city of NANCY (U8511). These patrols were composed of four Staff Officers who were detailed to patrol the city from 1300 hours to 2000 hours daily, commencing 19 October, for the purpose of checking discipline, conduct and appearance of officers and enlisted men in the city.

At 282000A October an intensive drive was conducted in NANCY (U8511) in cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps to enforce strict observance of curfew regulations by both military and civilian population. Between 282000A and 290300A 108 soldiers and some 400 civilians were apprehended. The former were booked by the Military Police and the latter were screened by Counter Intelligence Corps.



Members of the French Gendarmerie were utilized in assisting Military Police at TOUL (U6401) to enforce blackout regulations.

A Refresher School for all Military Police was held 24 October in NANCY (U8511), LIGNY (U8213), and TOUL (U6401). Subjects presented were Provost Marshal Policies, technique of arrest, criminal investigation, maintenance of law and order, traffic technique and preparation of reports and general orientation.

Summary Courts: Although at the time of their inception the Roadside Summary Courts were established to deal primarily with traffic violations and other delinquencies of a less serious nature, the courts not only fulfilled this function but have also broadened their scope of activity.

On many occasions incidents involving assault with a dangerous weapon, attempted rape, robbery, and misappropriation of government property were referred to these courts. In some cases they made preliminary inquiries which laid the groundwork for a complete investigation by the Criminal Investigation Section. In other cases they secured evidence, statements from witnesses, and even prepared charges for the higher courts which must try the offenders.

Summary Court Number 2 was moved 6 October from COMMERCY (U4220) to TOUL (U6401).

During the month Summary Courts were in operation at COMMERCY (U4220), TOUL (U6401), and VERDUN (U2865).

A summary of cases tried by the Summary Courts for the month was as follows:

	Court No.1	Court No.2	TOTAL
No Pass	43	174	217
Speeding	39	135	174
Double banking	45	55	100
Uniform violations	24	45	69
Curfew violations	0	57	57
Unattended vehicle	11	44	55
Drunk and disorderly	36	14	50
Transporting civilians	5	28	33

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Summary of cases tried by Summary Courts (continued).

	Court No.1	Court No.2	TOTAL
Overloading vehicle	6	19	25
Unauthorized firing	11	7	18
Reckless driving	1	15	16
Loitering and straggling	0	10	10
Failure to salute	0	6	6
Unauthorized parking	0	5	5
Passing convoys	0	4	4
Miscellaneous	4	12	16
TOTALS	225	630	855

During the month walking and/or road patrols were operative in the following towns:

BAR LE DUC (U1122)	MOURMELON (T5465)
CHALIGNY (U7804)	NANCY (U8511)
CHAVIGNY (U8104)	NEUFCHATEAU (Z4955)
CHAMOMY (Z0650)	NEUVE MAISONS (U7903)
COMMERCY (U4220)	PONT ST VINCENT (U7904)
DONCOURT (U8863)	ST MIHIEL (U3935)
ETAIN (U4770)	TOUL (U6401)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657)	VERDUN (U2865)
JOINVILLE (Z0884)	VIGNESULLES (U5144)
LEROUVILLE (U3924)	VITTEL (Z6657)
LIGNY EN BARROIS (U2213)	VOID (U4412)

Maintenance of law and order patrols were established in CHALIGNY (U7804), CHAVIGNY (U8104), NEUVE MAISONS (U7903), and PONT ST VINCENT (U7904), at the request of the XII Corps Provost Marshal.

Cooperation with Corps Provost Marshals: Close cooperation with XII Corps Provost Marshal was maintained during the month particularly in NANCY (U8511) where arrangements were made whereby XII Corps Military Police were utilized in handling delinquencies brought into NANCY (U8511) police headquarters and all such cases pertaining to XII Corps troops were turned directly over to the Corps Military Police.

Delinquencies: During the month the following delinquency reports were processed by the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section:

Pass violations	1498
Uniform violations	573
Unattended vehicles	293
Speeding	268
Unauthorized use of vehicle	185
Drunk and disorderly	137
No trip ticket	129
Double banking	53
Reckless driving	45
Failure to obey Military Police	34
Miscellaneous	17
Overloaded vehicle	15
Unauthorized firing	14
Larceny	9
Officer driving	6
Absent without official leave	6
Disrespect to Military Police	4
Resisting arrest	3
TOTAL	3279

Straggler Collecting Point at VITTEL (Z6657) closed 1 October. Straggler Collecting Point at NANCY (U8511) opened.

Straggler Collecting Points were operated during the month at the following locations:

BAR LE DUC (U1122)	NANCY (U8511)
COMMERCY (U4220)	NEUFCHATEAU (Z4955)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657)	ST MIHIEL (U3935)
ETAIN (U4770)	TOUL (U6401)
LEROUVILLE (U3924)	VERDUN (U2865)
LIGNY (U2213)	

Disposition of stragglers during the month was as follows:

To Units	39
To Replacement Centers	84
To Hospital	1
TOTAL	124

General prisoners: Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

To Units	7
To Seine Base	96
To Advance Section, Communications Zone, REIMS	6
To Brittany Base	2
TOTAL	112

General prisoners on hand Third U. S. Army stockade as of 31 October: 46.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

Criminal cases investigated and completed during the week ending 7 October were as follows:

Larceny	5
Rape	3
Assault	1
Fatal shooting	1
Racial disturbance	1
Drunk and disorderly	1
TOTAL	12

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 14 October were as follows:

Article of War 89	1
Larceny	6
Assault	5
Black market	1
Spy (German)	1
Manslaughter	1
Disorderly conduct	1
Insubordination	1
Disobeying Military Police	1
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Refusing to obey order of a Superior Officer	1
TOTAL	20

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 21 October were as follows:

Black market	2
Conduct unbecoming of an officer	1
Larceny	6
Alleged rape	1
Misappropriation of Military property	1
Suspected theft	1
Rape	3
Robbery	1
Assault and battery	1
Misappropriation of military property, (captured enemy equipment)	1
TOTAL	18

Criminal cases investigated and completed during week ending 28 October were as follows:

Misappropriation of Military property	1
Fraud	1
Larceny	2
Assault	3
Alleged assault	1
Black market	1
Rape	1
Spy	1
TOTAL	11

The following cases were pending as of 31 October:

Assault	1
Assault and battery	2
Manslaughter	1
Murder	1

Fraud	2
Black market	1
Sale of salvage	1
TOTAL	9

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS
SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

During the month of November the free flow of traffic was impeded by heavy rainfall. Highwater washed out bridges at ARNAVILLE (U7547) VANDIERES (U7541) PABNY (U5112) CHAMPIGNULLES (U8516) and TOUL (U6401) and endangered the south bridge at VERDUN (U2865). Bridges at PONT A MOUSSON (U7735) and ST NICHOLAS (U9505) were temporarily closed and the bridges at NANCY (U8511) were threatened but remained open to regulated traffic. All possible traffic was rerouted through NANCY (U8511) as bridges there were the only ones open on the MEURTHE - MOSELLE River line. The bridges at PONT A MOUSSON (U7735) and ST NICHOLAS (U9505) were reestablished on 9 and 11 November respectively and by the 14th November additional bridges were in operation at POMPEY (U8220), ROSIERES (U7901), DREULOUARD (U7849) and CUSTINES (U8384).

All civilian traffic in the Army area was prohibited 8 November for tactical reasons. Signs were posted in all towns and on all roads. Every available traffic Military Policeman was posted on point and patrol duty to rigidly enforce the no civilian traffic rule. Results were exceptionally good and civilians cooperated excellently. Regulations on civilian traffic were relaxed 11 November to permit essential supply vehicles, doctors' vehicles, and civilian ambulances on designated roads in the Army area, insofar as they did not interfere with military traffic.

A conference with the Prefect, Chief of Police, City of NANCY (U8511) and Public Safety Officer, G-5, was held on 31 November resulting in a modified plan for control of civilian traffic being adopted and placed in effect. The civilian population was notified of this plan through publication in all newspapers. Civilian vehicles authorized to travel on Main Supply Routes and secondary roads were issued identifying stickers with license number of vehicle typed thereon. All Military Police and French Police were notified of this plan. Violators of this plan were either fined by the French Police or placed in vehicle corrals, which were established for such purposes at various places along the Main Supply Routes.

Parades and services sponsored by civilians were held in NANCY (U8511), VERDUN (U2865), and LIGNY (U2113) on 11 November, necessitating additional traffic posts and patrols for control, and in VERDUN (U2865) the Main Supply Route was detoured for two hours.

Numerous reports were received of the German Army forcing refugees into our lines to clog up traffic. Civil Affairs placed road patrols with Military Police and cleared the refugees from the main roads.

Traffic Military Police moved into STENAY (F1503), LONGUYON (U4596) and MONTMERY (F2805), (in First U.S. Army area) to control Third U.S. Army traffic.

Company "B", 512th Military Police Battalion moved forward in the Army area to NANCY (U8511). Army Military Police took over posts in advance Army area 201200.

French Gendarmes of 10th Legion relieved Engineers guarding highway bridges at ST MIHIEL (U3935), VOID (U4412), TOUL (U6401) and PONT ST VINCENT (U7903).

Major troop movements during the month were as follows:

The 10th Armored Division moved from VERDUN (U2865) to XI Corps via NE on 1 November. Road and driver discipline was excellent. Route and destination of the unit were changed while the division was enroute. Military Police were stationed on both routes, and contacted the division in Advance Section, Communications Zone and directed them over the new route through Third U.S. Army Zone, closing at XI Corps 011800.

The 18th Armored Division moved over the road net from LIGNY (U2113) to RAMBOURG (U5529) on 29 November.

During the month clearances for over 128 convoys involving over 8,500 vehicles were processed through this section.

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furs and antiques.

Two German prisoners who had escaped from an Advance Section, Communications Zone Camp were apprehended in VERDUN (U2865) and sent to the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TOUL (U6401) 24 November.

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, AG 250.1 GMMCY, dated 25 November 1944, subject: "Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents," was published. (See annex 18).

French civilians from PARIS (S0140) were apprehended in NANCY (U8511) for violation of travel restriction and were turned over to Counter Intelligence Corps, Communications Zone, for investigation.

Black Market Transactions and Illegal Sales, Possession, and Barter of United States Government Property:

During the month of November, Military Police, with the assistance of local police in many instances, conducted searches in FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657), VERDUN (U2865), NEUVES MAISONS (U7903), TOUL (U6401), and NANCY (U8511), which resulted in the recovery of a large quantity of U. S. Government property. Cases involving black market transactions by civilians were referred to Civil Affairs for appropriate action against civilian offenders through French Courts. Cases in which civilians were found in possession of U. S. Government property were also referred to Civil Affairs and offenders were prosecuted by the French Courts. Instances involving sale or barter of U. S. Government property by military personnel were referred to the Criminal Investigation Sub-Section for investigation to be used as a basis of preferring charges against offenders concerned.

During the month, 2,370 gallons of gasoline, 230 pounds of coffee, 180 pounds of lard, seventy pounds of sugar, fifty pounds of flour, 17,900 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition, four carbines, thirty blankets, thirty-one cases of soap, and a quantity of miscellaneous rations and clothing were recovered as a result of searches made.

Absent Without Leave: The large number of AWOLs on the Continent prompted action by this Sub-Section to intensify efforts of all Military Police for apprehension of such absentees.

It was previously the policy of this Sub-Section to return stragglers and AWOLs to their units through the Replacement System whenever it was impractical to transport them directly to their units. Many instances of stragglers and AWOLs being apprehended two and three times when handled in this manner evidenced a need of change in policy in order to effectively reduce the number of outstanding AWOLs.

Late in the month instructions were issued to all Military Police to detain under arrest all persons apprehended who were AWOL for a period of four days or more. Such persons were either at the nearest Military Police Headquarters or at the Third U. S. Army stockade pending arrival of guards from the unit concerned to return the AWOL under arrest. Men who had been absent from their organizations less than four days were sent to the nearest Replacement installations as stragglers.

In NANCY (U8511), prisoner of war trucks were used to return AWOLs to XII Corps units, and further utilization of any such available transportation is contemplated.

As an additional measure to reduce the number of outstanding AWOLs, a special roving patrol was put into operation which had the primary mission of spot checking locations throughout the Third U. S. Army area for the apprehension of AWOLs.

During the last week of the month, twenty-two aggravated cases of AWOL ranging from 12 to 110 days were apprehended as a result of intensified efforts by Military Police.

Patrols: The following towns and cities were covered by Maintenance of Law and Order Military Police during the month:

BAR LE DUC (U1122)	NANCY (U8511)
CHALIGNY (U7804)	NEUFCHATEAU (24975)
CHAVIGNY (U8304)	NEUVES MAISONS (U7903)
COMMERCY (U4220)	PONT A MOUSSON (U7735)
DONCOURT (U6963)	PONT ST VINCENT (U7409)
ESCH (P7301)	ST MAURICE (U5643)
ETAIN (U4770)	ST MICHIEL (U3935)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657)	TOUL (U6401)
HANNONVILLE (U4851)	VERDUN (U2865)
LEROUVILLE (U3485)	VIGNERUILLES (U5144)
LIGNY (U2113)	VOID (U4413)

Summary Courts were in operation during the month at TOUL (U6401) and NANCY (U8511).

Details of cases tried by the Summary Courts for the month were as follows:

VIOLATIONS	COURT NUMBER 1	COURT NUMBER 2	TOTAL
No pass	256	90	346
Curfew	122	10	132
Speeding	9	82	91
Double banking	52	22	74
Reckless driving	1	48	49
Unguarded vehicle	23	18	41
Uniform violations	16	25	41
Drunk and disorderly	21	19	40
Unauthorized use of vehicle		13	13
Unauthorized use of weapon	4	3	7
Transporting civilians		7	7
Loitering and straggling		7	7
Unauthorized use of gasoline		7	7
Disobeying Military Police	2	3	5
Theft		2	2
Disrespect for officer	2	1	3
Negligence on duty	1		1
TOTALS	509	357	866

Delinquencies: During the month the following delinquency reports were processed by the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section.

Pass violations	1421
Out of uniform	543
Leaving vehicle unattended	247
Speeding	207
Disorderly	126
Drunk	99
Carrying unauthorized passengers	92
Double banking	91
No trip ticket	88
Reckless driving	54
Improper use of Government vehicle	49
Top up on vehicle	33
Failure to obey Military Police	22
Illegal carrying of civilians	14
Officer driving	11
Driving while drunk	9
Theft	4
Assault	2
TOTAL	3112

Stragglers: Straggler collecting points were in operation during the month at the following locations:

BAR LE DUC (U1122)	NEUFCHATEAU (24975)
COMMERCY (U4220)	NEUVES MAISONS (U7903)
ESCH (P7301)	PONT A MOUSSON (U7735)
FRESNES EN WOEVRE (U4657)	TOUL (U6401)
LIGNY (U2113)	VERDUN (U2865)
NANCY (U8511)	

Disposition of stragglers during the month was as follows:

To Units	29
To Seine Base Section	56
To Normandy Base Section	2
Broke confinement	1
TOTAL	88

General prisoners on hand at Third U.S. Army stockade as of 30 November: 20.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 4 November:

Murder	1
Assault and battery	1

Larceny	2
Black market	2
Assault	1
TOTAL	7

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 11 November:

Sale of salvage	1
Sale of U. S. military property	1
Assault	1
Robbery	1
Black market	1
Manslaughter	1
Shooting French civilian (accidental)	1
Suspected fraud	1
TOTAL	8

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 18 November:

Misappropriation of U.S. military property	1
Murder	2
Wrongful disposal of U.S. military property	1
Justifiable shooting	1
Spy (German)	1
Black market	3
Rape	1
Larceny	1
Sale of U.S. military property	1
Assault and battery	1
TOTAL	13

Following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 25 November:

Manslaughter	2
Assault	1
Murder	1
Black market	3
Alleged murder	2
Loss of medical supply	1
TOTAL	10

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 30 November:

Rape	1
Assault and battery	1
Manslaughter	1
Fraud	1
Attempted murder	1
Fatal shooting	2
Alleged murder	2
Black market	2
TOTAL	11

During the month of November forty criminal cases were reported for investigation of which thirty-eight were completed, reports compiled and forwarded.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

On 4 December a plan was initiated and approved, dividing the Army Service Zone into two areas, assigning one Military Police Battalion to each Zone, with complete responsibility for all Provost Marshal activities in that Zone. This new method was effected before entering Germany in order that responsibility be definite and fixed for the security of the Army.

The Military Police Zone was shifted northward 27 December with the 503rd Military Police Battalion assuming responsibility of all area south of and including route N3 and METZ (U8557) with the 512th Military Police Battalion north thereof.

Two convicted German spies sentenced to be shot by musketry were executed at the TOUL (U6401) Prisoner of War Enclosure on 14 December. The sentence was carried out under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal with the firing squad composed of twelve selected men from the 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Company.

On 28 December the Third U. S. Army Forward Echelon Headquarters moved from NANCY (U8511) to LUXEMBOURG (P8414).

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

During the month of December the general condition of the roads was fair, but because of continued rains the shoulders were soft and muddy. Slippery spots were created wherever a vehicle pulled onto the surface from either the shoulders or from a side road. High waters covered roads and bridges in several locations. This necessitated detours and extra traffic control.

Recommendations were made for the lifting of restrictions on civilian traffic west of the MEURTHE-MOSELLE River on 2 December. However, travel restrictions remained in effect east of this line. Conference was held with civilian authorities relative to the restoring of the tramway system in NANCY (U8511), which relieved a large amount of civilian traffic on the main roads leading into the city and operation commenced on 4 December.

Because of an accident on the Main Supply Route in the west side of NANCY (U8511) on 7 December wherein a tank retriever went out of control on a steep hill and crashed into a cafe, demolishing the building, setting it afire, killing the crew and several others, the Main Supply Route was changed to afford a more gradual descent into town.

The fall of the remaining forts at METZ (U8557) on 13 December removed the last major obstacles to uninterrupted use of the road net in that area. N3 was not yet open west of METZ (U8557). Engineers cleared mines, removed road blocks, and repaired the road. The majority of bridge and road maintenance problems were in Corps and Division areas. Minor alterations were made on north and Main Supply Route bridges in NANCY (U8511) to lay gas and water lines across the river on these bridges. This caused no change in the traffic situation. An overpass at FORT A NOUSSON (U7735) was declared usable (Class 70) by the Engineers.

Plans were made for local regional French Police to take over traffic duties in NANCY (U8511) other than on the Main Supply Route. Civilians on roads continued to be a minor problem. Military Police road patrols picked them up and delivered them to Civil Affairs Displaced Persons Center.

On 17 December, after receipt of information of the German breakthrough in the First U. S. Army area, special officer couriers were dispatched to each Military Police Battalion with four troop movement routes. Routes A, B, C and D were initiated and posted. All Military Police personnel with the exception of a small battalion overhead were concentrated on traffic duty at this critical time. (See annex 19). The III Corps moved at once from METZ (U8557) to LONGWY (P5805) and became operational in that sector. The 4th Armored Division was alerted to move at once from its concentration area near FENSTRANGE (C4728), and at 180200 Combat Command B was enroute using Route A, destination LONGWY (P5805). All these moves crossed at BARONVILLE (Q1736) at 180330, the 4th Armored Division having priority. No traffic tie-up ensued. Military Police pointmen and patrols had been stationed in BARONVILLE (Q1736) and had been alerted as to this

situation. Combat Command R and Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division followed Combat Command B on Route A. 80th Infantry Division moved from PUTTELANGE (U9499) to LONGWY (P5805) on Route C followed by the 26th Infantry Division. In addition, eighteen Field Artillery Battalions, eleven Engineer Battalions, two Corps Headquarters, and other special units were moved. Traffic to the north continued unabated. Several detours were necessitated for various reasons; landslide, a weakened bridge, bombing and strafing and several wrecks. On 22 December the 35th Infantry Division commenced movement to the north. An additional bridge (Bailey) was constructed across the canal at METZ (U8557) to alleviate the heavy traffic flow through that city. The bridge at KARANGE (Q1257) was temporarily out during the night necessitating the detour of 35th Infantry Division movement. This detour was also changed because of bombing of BOULAY (Q0965) the same evening. The roads continued to be occupied by the 35th Infantry Division and Engineer units on 23 December. XII Corps Headquarters moved north with attached troops following. The remainder of the 42nd Infantry Division closed.

One officer and thirty-five enlisted men of the 512th Military Police Battalion were rushed to BASTOGNE (P5557) during the night of 28 December to handle the critical traffic situation in the 101st Airborne Division area.

During the month clearances for over 200 convoys involving over 28,000 vehicles were processed through the Traffic Sub-Section.

A recommendation was made that the Main Supply Route Number 2 be divided between CONFLANS (U6465), JARNY (U6564) and PONTPIERRE (Q2049) to make the original route one way southbound and make the other route, N52b, N406, D60, N52, C665 and 13, one way, northbound. This change was recommended because of the width and conditions of road net at these places.

A group of enemy planes bombed and strafed a convoy of reinforcements and incidental traffic on highway N53, 10 miles south of LUXEMBOURG (P8414). No direct bomb hits were scored on the road, but the highway was blocked by burning trucks and debris. A bypass through MONSDORFF (P9402) was immediately placed in effect, and highway N53 was reopened to traffic in two hours.

Because of the expansion of the Army Service Area, and also the support of XX, III and VIII Corps in their service areas, signing of road intersections and junctions became extremely important. Hundreds of signs were posted, and extra signing crews were detailed to completely cover the Army area for route numbering and markings.

Electric flasher lamps that had been used in the Army area were collected and delivered to the Corps Provost Marshals for use on bridges and defiles in the Division areas. 3,000 blank route marking signs, and 5,000 numbered route marking signs were received on 8 December from Engineers and distributed to Corps Provost Marshals and Army Military Police Battalions.

Rear boundaries were established on 2 December as follows:

XII Corps: North along highway N414 from intersection south lateral boundary (Q0807) to MOYRNVIC (Q1421); highway N55 through CHATEAU SALINS (Q1225) to intersection with north lateral boundary (U9443), all to Army.

XX Corps: North along MOSELLE River from intersection with south lateral boundary vicinity (U7734) to ARNAVILLE (U7647); highway N52b through CHAMBLEY (U6651); JARNY (U6564); BRIEY (U6973); N406 through AUDUN (U6787) to AUMETZ (U7092); C664 to ESCH (P7301); N4 to intersection north lateral boundary vicinity (P7302), all to Army.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, TOUL (U6401) closed 17 December, 21,191 prisoners of war were evacuated through this Enclosure during the period from 21 September to 17 December 1944.

Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 11, FOLSCHVILLER (Q2254) which opened on 19 December was closed 20 December. No prisoners of war were evacuated through this Enclosure as military expediency necessitated the early closing.

On 21 December reconnaissance was made for a suitable location of an Army Prisoner of War Enclosure in the area of FLORANGE (U8281), STENAY (P1503).

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, St. Jean Caserne, MARVILLE

(U3596) opened 25 December. Operating personnel of this Enclosure was composed of eight officers and 123 enlisted men of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, the 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Company, the 305th Military Police Escort Guard Company, a portion of the 437th Medical Collecting Company as well as Interrogation Prisoner of War and Counter Intelligence Corps teams. Evacuation of prisoners of war from Enclosure Number 12 to Advance Section, Communications Zone Central Enclosure at STENAY (P1503) was made by truck as per arrangements made with 24th Regulating Station, Advance Section, Communications Zone Liaison organization.

Two additional Military Police Escort Guard Companies were attached to Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army on 29 December; 483rd Military Police Escort Guard Company reported at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281) and 430th Military Police Escort Guard Company at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, MARVILLE ST JEAN (U3596).

VIII Corps Prisoner of War Collecting Point was manned by personnel of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion as this Corps was attached to Third U. S. Army.

Seven German Nationals held at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 9, TOUL (U6401), were evacuated to the French Internment Camp at EGROUVES (U5911). Sixteen of the nineteen German Nationals held at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281), were evacuated to the Displaced Person's Camp at EGROUVES (U5911), as they were German Nationals living in France; the remainder were German Nationals who resided in Germany and these people were interned on 17 December.

Several Divisions requested additional War Department Provost Marshal General Forms Number 1. The Theater Provost Marshal Officer was contacted, but it was learned that there were no more forms available in this theater.

On 12 December, letter, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, file 383.6 OpGA, subject, "Prisoner of War Labor," dated 27 November 1944 was distributed.

Circular 90, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, published 17 December, rescinded the sections of Circulars 9 and 38, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, governing the procedures in the disposition of the effects of enemy dead, and adopted the recommendations as set forth in the memorandum of this office to the Graves Registration Officer, namely that the effects be sent directly to the Effects Quartermaster, Communications Zone, instead of to the nearest Prisoner of War Enclosure.

Prisoner of war statistics for the month of December:

On hand at Enclosures as of 30 November	2168
Received during month at Prisoner of War Enclosures . . .	17079
TOTAL	19247
Evacuated	18767
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures, 31 December . . .	480
Received during month at Prisoner of War Enclosures . . .	17079
Admitted during month at Third U.S. Army Hospitals . . .	1341
Total prisoners of war handled during December	18420
Total number of prisoners of war from 1 August to 31 December 1944: 146,672. (See annex 20).	
Total number of escapers and evaders during December: 3.	

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

In accordance with advice from the Theater Provost Marshal a new rigorous policy in returning AWOLs to Military Control was inaugurated 1 December. The program entailed the following four points:

1. A complete list of current Third U.S. Army AWOLs was obtained from the Machine Records Unit and distributed to all Military Police Detachments.
2. All men absent from their organizations without passes and not on duty status were taken to Military Police Headquarters and checked against these lists.
3. AWOLs were then held for release in arrest to their organization or for delivery to the Reinforcement System if distance

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rendered the sending of an armed guard impractical. However, men who admitted being absent for more than four days were returned to their units under guard in every case.

4. To supplement the normal Military Police activities, a special mobile patrol was established with the primary mission of apprehending AWOLs.

On 6 December arrangements were made for the conservation of transportation by having trucks which were evacuating prisoners of war from XII Corps Collecting Points to Army Enclosures stop on their return trip at NANCY (U8511) Military Police Headquarters and pick up stragglers. These trucks delivered the stragglers to Corps Provost Marshal.

During the period there was a noticeable decrease in reports of civilians dealing in and possession of U. S. Government gasoline, rations, and other miscellany.

Summary Court Number 2 was discontinued 9 December. Since its inception on 10 September 1944, the court handled 1899 cases involving offenders from 643 separate organizations, resulting in 1389 convictions. In 466 cases, charges against officers and senior non-commissioned officers not subject to the jurisdiction of the court were forwarded to the Office of the Provost Marshal for the proper dispatch. Eighty-three men accused of serious crimes were released to their unit commanders pending completion of investigation and trial.

On 10 December, Circular Number 88, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 10 December 1944, pertaining to Unauthorized Enclosures on Vehicles and Restrictions as to Top of Vehicles was published as follows and given distribution "A" and "C".

I. UNAUTHORIZED ENCLOSURES ON 1/4 TON AND 3/4 TON 4 X 4 TRUCKS.

Section IV, Circular 77, this headquarters, dated 13 November 1944, relative to enclosing 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton trucks is amended as follows:

"Flaps attached to the windshields of 1/4 ton trucks for protection against wind and mud are permissible provided they do not extend back beyond the front seat, do not obstruct frontseat vision, and do not interfere with the quick exit of the occupants of the truck."

II. RESTRICTION AS TO TOPS OF VEHICLES.

Paragraph 1, Section VI, Circular 63, this headquarters, dated 4 October 1944, which reads as follows: "The tops on trucks, 1/4 ton, and trucks, 3/4 ton C and R, will be down at all times except during heavy rains" is rescinded.

Circular 89, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army announced on 14 December the amended pass policy and 2100 hours curfew in NANCY (U8511).

The rapidly changing tactical situation and the consequent threat to rear areas made the Military Police organization a primary force in the maintenance of security and the apprehension of suspicious individuals. To meet this need an emergency issue of 1,200 fragmentation hand grenades was made to the 512th Military Police Battalion.

Efforts were made to disseminate all pertinent information to Military Police units as quickly as possible so as to keep the man on post advised of the latest happenings in order that he might be more able to cope with situations as they arise.

Security patrols and the operation of check points and road blocks at key road junctions placed a heavy strain on personnel available for normal Law and Order functions. Town patrol forces were skeletonized to provide the additional security forces, in an effort to avoid drawing upon traffic personnel at a time when heavy and important traffic movements continued. Gaps in Law and Order enforcement were filled in many places by auxiliary police and greater vigilance on the part of unit commanders, who were contacted on the ground and asked to cooperate.

In accordance with the provisions of Circular 120, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, 13 December, 1944, a new system for the handling of AWOLs through Military Police channels was placed in effect during the previous week. Under the new system each Military Police Battalion maintained an AWOL Collecting Center through which AWOLs were returned under Military Police guard to Corps units. AWOLs from other Armies, Air Force and Communications Zone units were cleared through the Army AWOL Collecting Center, located near Rear Echelon, to the Communications Zone AWOL Center. AWOLs from Army troops were held

for unit guards. This system placed a new burden on Military Police personnel and transportation, but it was expected to be more efficient than the former method of handling AWOLs through Reinforcement channels, which frequently permitted the AWOL to renew his absence without leave before he could be returned to his unit for disciplinary action.

Upon the displacement of the Forward Echelon the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section became the Rear Echelon of the Provost Marshal Section. One officer and two men represented the Sub-Section in the Forward Echelon.

Details of cases tried by Summary Courts for the month were as follows:

VIOLATIONS	COURT NUMBER 1	COURT NUMBER 2	TOTAL
No pass	233	16	249
Curfew	35	14	49
Speeding	8	25	33
Double banking	16	1	17
Reckless driving	15	20	20
Unarmed vehicle	4	3	18
Uniform violation	9		4
Drunk and disorderly	1		9
Unauthorized vehicle	3		1
Unauthorized use of weapon	1		3
Transporting civilians	1	1	2
Disobeying Military Police	1		1
Broke arrest		1	1
TOTALS	326	81	407

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month in ESCH (P7301), NANCY (U8511), PONT A MOUSSON (U7735), TOUL (U6401) and VERDUN (U2865).

Motor and/or walking patrols operated during the month in the following towns and cities:

AVRIL (U7178)	JARNY (U6564)
BAINVILLE (U9095)	KAYL (P7700)
BETTEMBOURG (P8103)	LANDRES (U6082)
BRIEY (U6973)	LONGWY (P5805)
CHALIGNY (U7804)	MORHANGE (Q2037)
CHAMELEY (U6651)	MOYENVIC (Q1420)
CHATEAU SALINS (Q1025)	METZ (U8557)
CHAVIGNY (U8304)	MARS LA TOUR (U6558)
CLOUANGE (U8175)	NANCY (U8511)
COMMERCY (U4220)	NEUVES MAISONS (U7903)
CONFLANS (U6465)	NEUFCHREF (U7581)
DOMCOURT (U6963)	PAGNY (U5112)
DIEUZE (Q2524)	POMPEY (U8220)
DUDELANGE (U8099)	PONT A MOUSSON (U7735)
ESCH (P7301)	PONT ST. VINCENT (U7409)
ETAIRY (U4770)	ST. MAURICE (U5643)
FRESNES (U4659)	ST. NICHOLAS (U9505)
FALQUEMONT (Q1849)	ST. AVOLD (Q2556)
FLAVIGNY (U7156)	THUILLY (Z7199)
FLORANGE (U8382)	THIAUCOURT (U5341)
FOUG (U5612)	TOUL (U6401)
HAYANGE (U7882)	VANDIERRES (U7541)
HANNONVILLE (U4851)	VIGNRULLES (U5144)

Delinquency reports for the month were as follows:

Pass violations	1022
Unattended vehicle	222
Uniform violations	184
No trip ticket	107
Speeding	102
Double banking	72
Carrying unauthorized passengers	54
Drunk	46
Winterized vehicle	43
Selling rations	41
Disorderly	33
Unauthorized use of vehicle	24
Vehicle abuse	21
TOTAL	1971

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	23
To Reinforcement Depots	53
TOTAL	76

Absent Without Leave reports:

AWOLs apprehended	166
Total number of days AWOL	2194
Average number of days AWOL per man	13

Third U. S. Army personnel AWOL 31 December 1944 as per Machine Records Unit records: 622.

General prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

To Units	13
Evacuated to Seine Base Section	67
TOTAL	80

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army stockade as of 31 December 1944: 33.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 2 December:

Black market	3
Murder	1
Attempted murder	1
Assault with intent to commit rape	1
Alleged larceny	1
Sale of U. S. Military property	1
Alleged shooting	1
Damage to civilian property	1
Misappropriation of U.S. military property	1
Fatal shooting	1
TOTAL	12

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 9 December:

Black Market	2
Rape	2
TOTAL	4

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 16 December:

Larceny	1
Drunk and disorderly	1
Shooting	1
Assault with intent to commit rape	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Robbery	2
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Confidential investigation	1
Rape	1
Careless discharge of weapon	1
TOTAL	11

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 23 December:

Fraud	1
Larceny of U. S. Army rations	1
Murder	2
Attempted murder	1
Alleged looting	1
Black market	2
Statutory rape	1
Fatal shooting	1
Narcotic case	1
Alleged housebreaking	1
TOTAL	12

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 30 December:

Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Murder	2
Accidental shooting	1
Black market	2
Fatal shooting	1
Alleged housebreaking	1
TOTAL	8

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 31 December:

Assault and battery	1
Black market	5
Murder	2
Manslaughter	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
TOTAL	10

SECTION VI - PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE SUB-SECTION

Allied Prisoner of War Camps as follows were overrun by Third U.S. Army: Johannes Bannburg, vicinity of BOULAY (Q1264) on 1 December; GREUTZWALD (Q2468) on 3 December; SARRGUESMINES (Q5157) on 10 December.

On 11 December a detachment of one officer and fifteen enlisted men of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion was sent to handle the administrative matters at the overrun German Prisoner of War Camp at GREUTZWALD (Q2468) which contained approximately 800 Allied prisoners of war. The overrun Allied Prisoner of War Camp at SARRGUESMINES (Q5157) was evacuated by XII Corps to GREUTZWALD (Q2468). On 21 December approximately 500 Allied prisoners of war were evacuated from BOULAY (Q1264) to TOUL (U6401) and after conference with the Army Surgeon, 854 Allied prisoners of war remaining at BOULAY (Q1264) were evacuated to TOUL (U6401).

There were four Contact Officers, Majors, from Prisoner of War Executive Office, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, now attached to Third U. S. Army. One was assigned to each of the Corps, and the latest arrival was stationed at Johannes Bannburg Camp near BOULAY (Q1264) under IX Corps attachment, and engaged in documenting Allied prisoners of war.

On 17 December the 267th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army. The Battalion was ordered to move to Camp Johannes Bannburg, near BOULAY (Q1264), to take over the administration of the Allied Prisoner of War Camp.

On 28 December a report of the handling of the Allied prisoners of war was submitted by the Prisoner of War Executive Liaison Officer, Third U. S. Army, and forwarded to G-1, Twelfth Army Group, for transmission to Prisoner of War Executive, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

SECTION VII - INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

On 19 December the Internment Camp Sub-Section of the Prisoner of War Sub-Section was initiated and necessary steps were taken to establish files, notes and Standing Operating Procedures to facilitate the functioning of internment camps when their operation would become necessary in Third U. S. Army Zone.

SECTION VIII - DEFENSE - LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SUB-SECTION

During the month of December the following installations in the Army area were guarded in connection with security of Line of Communications:

- 7 Railway tunnels
- 27 Railway bridges
- 1 Highway overpass
- 14 Highway bridges

The following troops were used to guard the above installations:

- 4405th Quartermaster Service Company.
- 1st and 3rd Companies, 151st French Infantry Regiment
- 267th Field Artillery Battalion
- 51 Gendarmes from the 10th Legion Gendarmes
- 4th and 8th Squadrons, 4th Regiment, French Republican Guards.



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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved from NANCY (U8511), France, to ESCH (P7301), Luxembourg, on 5 January.

The ever increasing responsibilities of the Provost Marshal in the present operations made it necessary that the Provost Marshal Section be increased by adding Sub-Sections and personnel to properly supervise and administer the 190 officers and approximately 3550 enlisted men operating directly under his control. Following are listed the major items for which the Army Provost Marshal was held responsible:

1. Criminal Investigation.
2. Maintenance of Law and Order, including:
 - a. Army General Prisoner Stockade.
 - b. Army and Battalion Zone AWOL Stockades.
 - c. Summary Courts.
3. Traffic Control.
4. Prisoners of War.
5. Overrun Allied Prisoners of War.
6. German Internment Camps.
7. Aid to Civil Affairs in handling Refugees.
8. Security of all Lines of Communication in the Army area.
9. Command Post Defense, including Gordon Defense.
10. Maintenance of an Emergency Force.

At approximately 1650 January 14 a shell of unknown caliber and origin struck an Apartment House at 3-5-7-9 Avenue Pasteur, LUXEMBOURG (P8414), causing considerable damage to the building, killing one civilian, injuring six other civilians and two unknown American soldiers, who were walking along the street.

The Provost Marshal, Fifteenth U. S. Army visited this section 17 January to obtain details on organization and operation of the Provost Marshal Office.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

A survey was made of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) on 4 January for possible installation of a tramway system, but because tracks were located on main and essential military highways it was deemed advisable not to start the tramway system at that time.

Advance elements of Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved from NANCY (U8511) to ESCH (P7301) on 5 January.

Troop Movements were as follows: 90th Infantry Division (three Combat Teams) from THIONVILLE (U8687) to SARUL (P7427). 94th Infantry Division from REIMS (T3080) to UCKANGE (U8579).

Report was received from Executive Officer of Company "C", 512th Military Police Battalion on road reconnaissance of area north and west of ARLON (P6122), where snow conditions had blocked some roads and restricted traffic to one-way on others, signing of these roads was poor. Extensive and comprehensive corrective measures were taken. Roads were sanded and cindered by patrols, and signs posted by the Military Police.

Extensive road reconnaissance was made in conjunction with the Engineers, to inspect roads, bridges and traffic conditions - route - LUXEMBOURG (P8414), THIONVILLE (U8687), METZ (U8557), MOYEUVRE (U7774), BRIEY (U6973), AUDUN (U6688), LONGWY (P5805), ARLON (P6122), and LUXEMBOURG (P8414). Conferred enroute with the Engineers, Provost Marshal XX Corps, Civilian Engineers at METZ (U8557), Commanding Officers of the 503rd and 512th Military Police Battalions, and 1303rd Engineer General Service Regiment. Excellent maintenance was observed on all roads vicinity of ARLON (P6122).

The balance of the 90th Infantry Division moved from THIONVILLE (U8687) to SARUL (P7427), on 7 January. The 94th Infantry Division (one Combat Team) moved from REIMS (T3080) to UCKANGE (U8579). Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion moved north for defense.

The Army Light line was changed 14 January. Full lights were to be used to Division Rear Area, except in "no light" areas such as LUXEMBOURG (P8414), or for special tactical moves when the Corps Commanders desired the use of blackout.

A trip was made to VIII Corps to clarify administrative and operational boundaries between VIII Corps and Advance Section Communications Zone as a report had been received from the 713th Military Police Battalion that VIII Corps was administering their regulations in Advance Section Communications Zone.

Engineers were contacted 17 January to build a bridge on Rue de la Floradisch, which would enable vehicles to bypass LUXEMBOURG (P8414) with all traffic between routes number 7 and 11, and number 1.

A new prearranged message code was prepared and sent to the 503rd and 512th Military Police Battalions on 18 January.

A conference was held 19 January with G-4, G-3, and Engineers with reference to troop movements and road conditions. Troop movement routes were designated as such and efforts made to avoid crossing supply traffic with troop movements.

From the Seine Base Section 600 batons, reflectorized, 12 box signs, 64 lamps, electric flasher were received. Distribution of these items was made to the Corps and Military Police Battalions.

Road reconnaissance was made of the route from BASTOGNE (P5557) to WILTZ (P7154), HEIDERSCHIEDERGUND (P7437), NIEDER (P7642), ETTLEBRUCK (P8339) and DIEKIRCH (P8643), on 24 January.

A conference was held with Engineers as to road priority on maintenance of roads. First priority was given to troop movement roads and second priority to Main Supply Routes.

Administrative Order Number 26 established Rear Boundaries on 25 January as follows:

Army Rear Boundary: Beginning at intersection of road N52B with south lateral boundary, vicinity ARNAVILLE (U7646), along road N52B to CHAMBLEY (U6651) - MARS LA TOUR (U6557) - JARYN (U6563); road N390 to CONFLANS (U6465) - ETAIN (U4770); road N18 to LONGUYON (U4696); road N47 to MARVILLE (U5598) - MONTMEDY (P2905); road N381 to CARIGNAN (P1518) to junction with road IC 29, vicinity WE (P1419); road IC29 to junction with IC19, vicinity MESSINCOURT (P1423); road IC19 to MUNO (P1527) to junction with road N44 (P1532); road N44 to junction with road N47 (P0834); road N47 to BOUILLON (P0836) - BIEVRE (P0553) - BEAURAING (P0172) to intersection with north lateral boundary (P0073), (all to Third U. S. Army).

Corps Rear Boundaries:

XX Corps: Beginning with intersection of N55 with south lateral boundary vicinity CHESNY (U9252), thence northwest on N55 to METZ (U8658), thence north along MOSELLE River to junction with lateral boundary to XX and XII Corps vicinity THIONVILLE (U8787), all to XX Corps except MOSELLE River to Army.

XII Corps: Beginning with intersection of lateral boundary between XII and XX Corps with vicinity THIONVILLE (U8787), thence north on N53 and number 3 to LUXEMBOURG (P8414), thence west on number 6 and N4 to intersection with lateral boundary between XII and III Corps east of ARLON (P6122), all to Army except THIONVILLE to XX Corps.

III Corps: Beginning with intersection of N4 with lateral boundary between III and XII Corps east of ARLON (P6221), thence west on N4 to ARLON (P6122), N48 to intersection with lateral boundary between III and VIII Corps east of NEUFCHATEAU (P3540), all to Army except ARLON to III Corps.

VIII Corps: Beginning with intersection of N48 with lateral boundary between VIII and III Corps east of NEUFCHATEAU (P3540), thence northwest on N48 to CR N48 - N49 (P1860), thence north on N49 to intersection with north lateral boundary (P2169), all to Army except NEUFCHATEAU to Corps.

A meeting of Provost Marshal and Sub-Section Chiefs with Corps Provost Marshals to discuss policies was held on 31 January. The Light Line was fixed at Division Rear. In Command Post towns behind the Army Light Line through traffic was permitted full headlights.

During the month over 200 convey clearances involving over 41,000 vehicles were processed through this office.

The 512th Military Police Battalion was employed to support VIII Corps Military Police in the movement of the 95th Infantry Division 29 January by patrolling N4 - ARLON (P6122) and BASTOGNE (P5557).

Major Troop Movements during the month were as follows:

The 8th and 9th Armored Divisions moved to FORT A MOUSSON (U7735) and THIONVILLE (U8687) respectively, on 12 January. Combat Command "B", 10th Armored Division and elements of the 90th Infantry Division moved 16 January. Elements of the 87th Infantry Division moved 15 January without difficulties. The 35th Infantry Division, (Combat Command B) 10th Armored Division, 101st Airborne Division, 76th Infantry Division and other units moved 19 January. The 35th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division moved through Army area in good order. 101st Airborne Division moved slowly through the Army area because of icy road conditions. Movement of the 101st Airborne Division was completed 16 January. 4th Armored Division moved 23 January through the city of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), using routes 2, 4 and 5. Movement of the 76th Infantry Division commenced and passed through the city of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) during the night of 24 January. G-4 Transportation clearance for the movement of the 75th Infantry Division was received. Movement of the 4th Infantry Division on 28 January in BASTOGNE (P5557) was very slow because of heavy traffic in that area.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Letter, Twelfth Army Group, file 290 (G-2), dated 28 December 1944, subject, "Enemy Soldiers Apprehended in Civilian Clothing," was disseminated 4 January to all units under the control of this section.

This Office contacted the Quartermaster Field Service Officer, Third U. S. Army, in an attempt to replenish the stocks of captured enemy clothing on hand at the Enclosures.

A definite policy was established by Headquarters, Third U. S. Army on the handling of Allied Nationals who collaborated or served with the enemy, Circular 3, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, 7 January 1945. "Combat Commanders are not authorized to accept the parole of French, Belgian, Netherlands, or Luxembourg Nationals who have served with the German Forces. All Allied Nationals who have collaborated or served with the enemy and who are captured as prisoners of war will be handled and processed as prisoners of war within this command. Disposition of exceptional cases will be made by the Army Provost Marshal in accordance with instructions received from higher Headquarters."

One thousand prisoner of war personal effects bags, Provost Marshal Service of Supply Form number 4, were sent to the Provost Marshal of III Corps partly filling their requisition for 10,000 bags.

The investigation of the death of a German Prisoner of War at Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 on 5 January was completed. An autopsy was performed by the 7th Medical Laboratory. Results of the autopsy showed that the prisoner of war died of natural, but undetermined causes. A report of the completed investigation was forwarded to the Theater Provost Marshal, Prisoner of War Information Bureau, through Provost Marshal, Twelfth Army Group.

Two German soldiers, who escaped from the Prisoner of War Camp near VERDUN (U2865), were apprehended by Military Police and Counter Intelligence Corps and taken to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 at MARVILLE (U3394) after capture at COSNE (M4464).

Because of the small number of Escapers and Evaders who had been returned to United States Military control during a period of several months, the Escapers and Evaders Detachment (Intelligence School Western European Area 9, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) discussed with the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army, the possibility of withdrawing the detachment to PARIS (S0140) from its location at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281). Under the new plan not only Allied Air Force Escapers and Evaders, but also all Allied Ground Force Escapers and Evaders would be sent to PARIS (S0140).

An escaped prisoner of war, found to be a deserter from the German Army, was taken to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10 on 11 January after interrogation by Counter Intelligence Corps, at ESCH (P7301).

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Since Army Military Police Escort Guard Company Detachments had taken charge of the operation of Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures, the medical coverage was furnished by the Corps Surgeons.

The Ordnance Officer, Third U. S. Army approved the change of basic weapon for the 483rd and 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Companies from shotgun, riot type, to sub-machine gun, M3.

This Section submitted a requisition 28 January for 20,000 prisoner of war tags to the Engineer Officer, Third U. S. Army to be printed as a substitute for War Department Provost Marshal General Form number 1.

A copy of the Standing Operating Procedure of Prisoner of War Enclosures, prepared and reviewed by this Section, was sent to the Provost Marshal, Fifteenth U. S. Army on 29 January for his information.

The Provost Marshal VIII Corps requested this office on 30 January to establish an additional Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure because of the two Main Supply Routes in the Corps. As there were not sufficient personnel available, Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 dispatched two trucks to the one Corps Supply Point where there was no Prisoner of War Enclosure to shuttle incoming prisoners of war to the Corps Enclosure.

This Section contacted the 24th Regulating Station, Advance Section Communications Zone 31 January regarding the means of transportation in the evacuation of prisoners of war from Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, Jesuit College, ARLON (P6122).

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of January were as follows: (See annex 24).

On hand as of 31 December 1944	480
Received during January at Prisoner of War Enclosures	15,008
TOTAL	15,488
Evacuated	14,930
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures	558
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures during January	15,008
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during January	1,617
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U.S. Army for month	16,625

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 31 January 1945, inclusive 163,297

Escaper and Evader statistics for the month of January were as follows:

Escapers and Evaders on hand as of 31 December 1944	None
Received during January	1
TOTAL	1
Evacuated	1
On hand 31 January	None

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Circular Number 2, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 4 January 1945, "Military Control of the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) and Vicinity," was published. (See annex 21).

Battery "C", 734th Field Artillery Battalion moved to ESCH (P7301) and commenced training in Military Police work 14 January.

Seven civilians were picked up by Military Police patrols 18 January at HAYANGE (U7882) for curfew violations and fined by French Police.

Circular Number 6, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 26 January 1945, announced the curfew and pass policy in the Army areas. Curfew from 2100 to 0600 hours applied to both military and civilian personnel.

Summary Court Number 1 closed at NANCY (U8511) on 25 January, and the court personnel were established in LUXEMBOURG (P8414) on 27 January.

During the month a close degree of cooperation was noted between

the Military Police personnel and the personnel assigned to static details along the lines of communication. This cooperation was brought about and extended by the exchange of information and the lending of aid by one group to the other. It was also noted that all organizations were paying a great deal of attention to the checking of personal identification credentials of all persons with whom they came in contact.

Check points were established by the 512th Military Police Battalion in its area for the purpose of screening all personnel, military and civilian, with the exception of convoys. The locations of the check points were changed frequently in order to secure a more complete coverage of the entire Army area.

Motor and/or walking patrols operated during the month in the following towns and cities:

1. ATHUS (P6309)	24. HEINSCH (P5426)
2. AUBANGE (P6009)	25. HOMSCOURT (U7974)
3. AUDUN (U6686)	26. JARNY (U6564)
4. AUMETZ (U7092)	27. LANDRES (U6082)
5. AVRIL (U7176)	28. LONGLEVILLE (P5906)
6. BETTEMBOURG (P8103)	29. LONGWY (P5805)
7. BRIEY (U6973)	30. LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
8. BASCHARAGE (P6709)	31. MARS LA TOUR (U6558)
9. BOUILLON (P0837)	32. METZ (U8557)
10. DOMCOURT (U6963)	33. MORHANGE (Q2037)
11. CHENECIS (Q0440)	34. MOYEVRE (U7774)
12. CLEMENCY (P6817)	35. NANCY (U8511)
13. CONFLANS (U6465)	36. NEUFCHATEAU (P3541)
14. DUDELANGE (U8099)	37. PETANGE (P6409)
15. ESCH (P7301)	38. PONT A MOUSSON (U7735)
16. FLORENVILLE (P2820)	39. POMPEY (U8220)
17. FORTOY (U7385)	40. RECOGNE (P2126)
18. FOUG (U5612)	41. REDANGE (P6732)
19. GARNICH (P6114)	42. TRITIGNY (P3827)
20. HABAY (P4822)	43. TOUL (U6401)
21. HALANZY (P5201)	44. UCKANGE (U8579)
22. HAMPRE (P3539)	45. VIRTON (P3221)
23. HAYANGE (U7882)	

Details of cases tried by Summary Courts for the month were as follows:

VIOLATION	COURT NO. 1	COURT NO. 2	TOTAL
No pass	155		155
Curfew	16		16
Drunk and disorderly	4		4
Speeding	8		8
Theft	1		1
Unauthorized use of weapon	3		3
Unauthorized use of vehicle	1		1
Unguarded vehicle	23		23
Uniform violation	9		9
Double banking	4	2	6
Transporting civilians	1		1
TOTALS	225	2	227

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month at the following locations:

1. ESCH (P7301)	4. NANCY (U8511)
2. LUXEMBOURG (P8414)	5. PONT A MOUSSON (U7735)
3. MOYEVRE (U7774)	6. TOUL (U6401)

Delinquencies for the month were as follows:

Pass violation	1042
Unattended vehicles	487
Parking on Main Supply Route	59
Trip ticket violation	87
Drunk	76
Uniform violations	110
Speeding	137
Double banking	37
Unauthorized use of vehicles	37
Unauthorized firing of weapons	22
Unauthorized carrying of weapons	19
Vehicle abuse	21
Stealing Government property	12

Selling Government rations	9
Disorderly	2
Reckless driving	2
Drunk driving	1
Stealing Government vehicles	2
Officer driving	3
TOTAL	2157

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	60
To Reinforcement Depots	106
TOTAL	166

Data regarding AWOLs for the month was as follows:

AWOLs apprehended	379
Total number of days AWOL	5125
Average number of days AWOL per man	13

Third U. S. Army personnel AWOL as of 31 January per Machine Records Unit records 609

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The following cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 6 January:

Murder	2
Larceny	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Black market	2
TOTAL	6

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 13 January:

Murder	2
Robbery	1
Rape	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Assault with a deadly weapon	1
TOTAL	7

This office received letter from Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, subject, "Reorganization of Certain Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachments." This letter authorized the reorganization of both the 9th and 13th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachments, attached to this section, to increase the total of agents to fourteen agents in each Detachment.

The following criminal cases were completed, reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 20 January:

Assault with deadly weapon	1
Black market	4
Accidental shooting	1
Murder	1
Theft (mail)	1
Robbery	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
TOTAL	10

The following criminal cases were completed, reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 27 January:

Larceny	2
Assault	1
Looting	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
TOTAL	5

The following cases were pending final investigation on 31 January:

Black market	4
Murder	1
Looting	1
Assault and battery	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	3
Accidental shooting	1
Misapplication of U. S. Government property	1
Disorderly conduct	1
Larceny	2
TOTAL	15

SECTION VI - PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE SUB-SECTION

A Prisoner of War Executive Officer was attached to this headquarters from Prisoner of War Executive Branch Division G-1, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces.

SECTION VII - INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

The Internment Camp Officer went to BASTOGNE (P5557) to follow up the assignment of a detail from the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, consisting of thirty-eight men on temporary duty with Civil Affairs Officer as Military Police to check civilian traffic flowing between BASTOGNE (P5557) and NEUFCHATEAU (P3541). The situation was found to be well under control.

After investigation of Grund and Limpersberg Prisons, LUXEMBOURG (P8414) these camps were found to be crowded and inadequately guarded.

The Internment Camp Officer, on a trip to First and Ninth U. S. Armies, consulted with their Internment Camp Officers on methods employed with respect to Internment Camps.

SECTION VIII - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

Batteries "A" and "B", 734th Field Artillery Battalion were withdrawn from Prisoner of War work and were assigned duties under the Defense Sub-Section by the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army. Their prisoner of war work was taken over entirely by the 430th and 483rd Military Police Escort Guard Companies, which were attached to Third U. S. Army and assigned to Headquarters Communications Zone.

Plan for Defense of Command Post was published. (See annex 22).

A pass system for "Admittance to Lucky Forward Headquarters" was inaugurated, letter, this headquarters, dated 4 January 1945, subject, "Admittance to Lucky Forward Headquarters." (See annex 23).

Annex number 2 to "Plan for Defense of Command Post," dated 3 January 1945, subject, "Plan for Defense of Rear Echelon of Command Post," was published.

Standing Operating Procedure for Interior Security of Lucky Command Post was published 20 January.

Officers of the 267th Field Artillery Battalion completed a reconnaissance of all Railway Lines within the Army area and determined location of important bridges and tunnels that were unguarded or improperly guarded.

Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion was made available to this section for defense of Lucky Forward Command Post.

One platoon, Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion was detailed to provide security check points on the four Main Supply Routes leading into the city of LUXEMBOURG (P8414).

Officers from the 1st and 3rd Companies, 151st French Infantry Regiment reported to this office to discuss supply and transportation problems.

The following installations in the Army area were guarded in connection with security of Lines of Communication during the month:

36 Railway bridges
7 Railway tunnels
25 Highway bridges
1 Highway overpass
Twelfth Army Group Communication Center, LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
Third U. S. Army Radio Center, LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
Post Telegraph and Telephone Building, METZ (U8557)
Repeater Station, AUBANGE (P6110)
Post Telegraph and Telephone Building, LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
SHAEF Radio, north SANDWELLER (P9014)
SHAEF Radio, west LONGWY (P5505)

The following troops were used for guarding the above installations:

4405th Quartermaster Service Company.
1st and 3rd Companies, 151st Infantry Regiment (French).
267th Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery "C", being used for defense of Rear Command Post and stockade guard for general prisoners.
734th Field Artillery Battalion (less 13 men on Military Police traffic detail in ESCH (P7301), 25 men for Interior Security of Lucky Forward Command Post, and Headquarters and Service Batteries under control of Prisoner of War Sub-Section.



MILITARY POLICEMAN GIVING DIRECTIONS TO A SOLDIER IN NANCY, FRANCE

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Rear Echelon moved from ESCH (P7301) to LUXEMBOURG (P8414), on 6 February.

The 10th and 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalions arrived in Third U. S. Army area on the 13th and 14th of February and were placed under the control of the Provost Marshal for use in guarding Lines of Communication.

Four Companies of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion were attached to XII Corps for guarding Lines of Communication installations in the XII Corps area. The balance of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion and the 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion were given instructions in guard duty and assigned duties in the Third U. S. Army Service area.

The 785th Military Police Battalion (Zone of Interior) was assigned to Third U. S. Army for duty with the Provost Marshal on 18 February. An orientation program and school was conducted in Third U. S. Army policies, rules, and regulations, at the Battalion Headquarters in ESCH (P7301) prior to active operation by the Battalion in Third U. S. Army area.

The Army area was divided into three Military Police Zones on 25 February, with the 503rd, 512th, and 785th Military Police Battalions servicing the areas directly to the rear of XI, VIII, and XII Corps respectively. Each Battalion was responsible for all Maintenance of Law and Order, Traffic, and Security problems within its assigned Zone.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

The early thaw and excessive rains during the early part of the month washed out a considerable portion of the Army Road Net. Many miles of main roads and much of the secondary road net were blocked to all traffic, especially in the rear of the VIII Corps area. Railroad beds were used in two locations in this area as one-way roads. Emergency detours and one-way routes were set up to bypass blocked roads. Approximately one-half of the "washed out" mileage was put back in shape by the Engineers by the end of the month. Military Police Patrols reconnaissance reports combined with Engineer reports kept this headquarters abreast of the road situation, and additional pointsmen and signs were posted on detours. "Bottleneck" towns during this period were BASTOGNE (P5557), HOUFFALIZE (P6172), ST VITH (P8688), and ARLON (P6122).

Troop movements were heavy during the first part of the period but decreased later during the period. With one exception, troop movement convoys had excellent march discipline. Supply convoys and incidental traffic accounted for the majority of traffic violations and accidents.

Major troop movements during the month were:

8th Armored Division from NEMENY (U8934) to HEER (O9287). 95th Infantry Division from HOUFFALIZE (P6172) to CUPEYE (K5237). 9th Armored Division from METZ (U8557) to SPRIMONT (K5414). III Corps Headquarters from ARLON (P6122) to First U. S. Army area. Elements of the 4th Armored Division from BETTENDORF (P8103) to MERSCH (P8228). Elements of the 4th Armored Division from RECKANGE (P8129) to MERSCH (P8228). 65th Infantry Division from LONGWY (P5805) to LUXEMBOURG (P8414). 79th Infantry Division moved through the Army area.

Because of road conditions tank transporters were denied the use of the Army Road Net for several days during the month. In order to properly control such traffic, clearances were secured from the Army G-4 Section.

A Standing Operating Procedure for signing was issued by this office to the Military Police Battalions. This resulted in a great improvement in the signing in the area. All patrols were constantly alert and made efforts to keep all signs clean and properly posted.

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An inspection trip was made by Traffic personnel checking signing and road conditions and Memoranda were sent to units concerned for correction of deficiencies.

Selection of a site for Practice Bombing and Rocket Range in the Army area made necessary extra precautions on traffic moves on D6 north-east of AVRIL (U7176) after 5 February.

Traffic and Maintenance of Law and Order personnel were moved forward because of change in Army Rear Boundary effective 062400 February.

The boundary between Military Police Battalions changed at 102400 hours. 503rd Military Police Battalion relieved the 512th Military Police Battalion in the following towns:

PETANGE (P6409)	ATHUS (P6309)
AUBANGE (P6009)	RODANGE (P6802)

New Rear Boundaries for the III and VIII Corps were established and Army Military Police were moved forward.

Air reconnaissance was made on 14 February by the Traffic Chief, of CLERVAUX (P7763), ST VITH (P6688), VEILSALM (P6989), HOUFFALIZE (P6172), BASTOGNE (P5557), and ARLON (P6122).

The supply officer of the 785th Military Police Battalion conferred with this section as to the supply of Traffic Control equipment and authorization of excess equipment so that they could fulfill their mission. A letter was prepared and sent through proper channels for authorization of equipment in excess of Table of Organization and Equipment needed by the 785th Military Police Battalion.

Route N53 was opened on 15 February. This road had been under water for several days and now the water had receded. Continued maintenance of road net was necessary.

The 503rd and 512th Military Police Battalions were informed on 17 February that strict enforcement was necessary on restriction of use of identification panels behind Corps Rear Boundary.

An extensive road reconnaissance was made by the Military Police Battalions and officers of this section on 19 February. The Military Police Battalions submitted their reports to this office and all suggestions and recommendations made by them were taken up with the Engineers and G-4 Transportation. Road reconnaissances were made by an officer of the Traffic Sub-Section of BASTOGNE (P5557), ST VITH (P6688), and HOUFFALIZE (P6172) on 20 February, and of roads and bridges in the area between VIANDEN (P6455) and BITBURG (L1353).

Three hundred plates, franco, 17" x 30", and 500 plates, franco, 15" x 17", were issued to VIII Corps on 21 February. 1,990 lamps, electric flasher, were received at the depot.

On 26 February Headquarters 512th Military Police Battalion moved to LUXEMBOURG (P8414).

During the month of February over 130 convoy clearances involving over 22,000 vehicles were processed through the Traffic Sub-Section.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Reconnaissance for an Army prisoner of war Enclosure was made in order to relieve the transportation difficulties experienced in evacuating prisoners of war to Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, MARVILLE (U3394).

The Army Surgeon approved the use of Jesuit College, ARLON, (P6122) Belgium, as Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13 as soon as the accommodations were vacated by the 101st Evacuation Hospital.

On 3 February the 430th Military Police Escort Guard Company was assigned duties at Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, MARVILLE (U3394), and the 437th Military Police Escort Guard Company was assigned duties at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10, FLORANGE (U8281). The 483rd Military Police Escort Guard Company, reinforced by two officers of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, was assigned the operation of all Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures under Third U. S. Army.

The 472nd Military Police Escort Guard Company cleared the Army

area and departed for the Ninth U. S. Army, where it had been assigned on 4 February.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12, MARVILLE (U3394), was closed on 8 February after handling 16,454 prisoners of war.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, Jesuit College, ARLON (P6122), Belgium, was opened 9 February. All units attached were transferred from Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 12 to this new Enclosure.

Reconnaissance was made for a new Army Prisoner of War Enclosure on 11 February to be established in the northern half of the Army area. The towns of WILTZ (P7154) and DIEKIRCH (P8643) were considered possible locations.

The Commanding General, Advance Section, Communications Zone, authorized this headquarters to use the 305th Military Police Escort Guard Company as guards on the road rebuilding details on 11 February. Between 500 and 600 prisoners of war were supplied from Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON, (P6122) Belgium.

In order to facilitate the evacuation of prisoners of war from VIII Corps Enclosure to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON (P6122), a new route of evacuation was established. Permission was secured by this office through G-4, Third U. S. Army, to use a certain portion of a new route which was also the Main Supply Route of the 6th Armored Division.

The escape of four processed prisoners of war was reported to this headquarters by the using unit, the 17th Reinforcement Depot, on 19 February. One of these four prisoners was apprehended wearing a complete United States Army uniform except for German shoes.

The Provost Marshal, IX Corps, requested that a second Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure be established for the Corps. Personnel who were operating the III Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure were shifted to IX Corps for the operation of the second XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure on 21 February.

A conference was held 22 February regarding the replacement of Headquarters and Service Batteries, 734th Field Artillery Battalion at Army Prisoner of War Enclosures. Generally the plan called for the substitution of Headquarters Company, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion for the Headquarters and Service Batteries, 734th Field Artillery Battalion. It would be necessary to augment the Headquarters Company, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion with certain commissioned and enlisted personnel and equipment from the 267th Field Artillery Battalion and the Army Military Police Escort Guard Companies to compensate for the difference in strength, organization and equipment in the Headquarters Company of the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and that of the Headquarters and Service Batteries of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion.

One of the two XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures was closed in order to facilitate the rapid evacuation of Prisoners of War from this Corps, two trucks with necessary guards were attached to one of its divisions.

The XII Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure moved from the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) to MERSCH (P8228), on 27 February.

The XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure moved from the town of PETITE HETTANGE (U9691), France, to FRSUDENBERG (L1305), Germany, on 28 February.

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of February were as follows: (See annex 27).

On hand as of 31 January 1945	558
Received during February at Prisoner of War Enclosures . . .	23,106
TOTAL	23,664
Evacuated	21,545
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures 28 February	2,119
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures during February . . .	23,106
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during February . . .	1,055
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U.S. Army for month .	24,161

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 28 February 1945, inclusive 187,458

Escaper and evader statistics for the month of February were:

Escapers and Evaders on hand as of 31 January 1945	None
Received during February	35
TOTAL	35
Evacuated	35
On hand 28 February	None

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Emphasis was placed particularly on law and order and conduct of troops in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) during the month. Military Police were instructed to make on-the-spot corrections wherever the delinquency was of such a nature that it could be completely corrected by the Military Policeman himself. These on-the-spot corrections included such delinquencies as jacket or overcoat unbuttoned, three persons riding in the cab of a vehicle and failure to wear steel helmet when the same was readily available. When the Military Policeman made an on the spot correction no delinquency report was made.

AWOLs continued to be handled entirely through Provost Marshal and Military Police channels. Every AWOL apprehended or received by Third U. S. Army Military Police was placed under guard and evacuated to his unit under guard. AWOLs from First and Ninth U. S. Armies who were apprehended in the Third U. S. Army area were delivered to the First U. S. Army Provost Marshal and AWOLs from Seventh U. S. Army units were delivered to the Seventh U. S. Army Provost Marshal. AWOLs from other Armies, Air Force, and Communications Zone Units were evacuated to the AWOL Collecting Center, PARIS (S0140).

During the month numerous civilians were apprehended between the hours of 2100 and 2400 for curfew violation in the Army area, and were fined by the civilian Police.

Gasoline, grease, oil, and other military supplies were confiscated in Black Market raids in ATHUS (P6309), MANGIEULLES (U6678), during the month. Other confiscations of lesser amount of Government property were also made during the month in many towns in the Army area. The civilian offenders, in most cases, were prosecuted by the civilian Police, and where U. S. soldiers were involved the cases were investigated by the Criminal Investigation Detachments.

Information was received that during the night of 3 February, nine enemy agents parachuted behind our lines apparently headed for LUNEVILLE (Q0801), METZ (U8557), REIMS (T3080), and NANCY (U8511). Available descriptions were dispatched to all Military Police for apprehension.

Traffic and Maintenance of Law and Order personnel were moved forward because of change in Army Rear Boundary, effective 2400 hours 6 February.

Staff Officer Patrols commenced daily in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) on 7 February, for the purpose of improving conduct of troops and reporting conditions to the Chief of Staff through the Provost Marshal in accordance with Staff Memorandum Number 3, dated 7 February, this headquarters.

A three day drive was instituted on 8 February to improve the conduct of all troops in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), and Military Police activity was supplemented by nightly officer patrols from various Sub-Sections of the Provost Marshal Section. The results were noted improvement in appearance of all personnel.

Curfew in the Third U. S. Army area was extended to 2100 to 0600 hours for civilian personnel and 2200 to 0600 hours for military personnel by Circular Number 11, dated 11 February, this headquarters.

A special pass policy for the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) went into effect in accordance with Circular Number 12, dated 13 February, this headquarters.

Section II, Circular Number 15, dated 16 February, this headquarters, announced that the following would be in effect with reference to guarding of U. S. vehicles:

"U. S. Military vehicles would not be left unattended in Third U. S. Army area unless under the immediate surveillance of guards or in authorized guarded military parking lots."

SECRET

Issue of weekly trip tickets was permissible only if vehicle was obviously on a weekly trip and on proper route and mission. This was announced on 17 February.

On 23 February the Alert Platoon of the 512th Military Police Battalion was dispatched to the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) to assist in Maintenance of Law and Order duties and was relieved at 2300 hours.

Company "A", 785th Military Police Battalion was assigned to operate the Third U. S. Army Stockade at ESCH (P7301).

Motor and/or walking patrols were operative during the month in the following towns and cities:

1. ARLON (P6122)	16. HAYANGE (U7882)
2. ATHUS (P6302)	17. HOMECOURT (U7974)
3. AUMETZ (U7092)	18. HOUFFALIZE (P6172)
4. BARGNCOURT (U5277)	19. JARNY (U6564)
5. BCULLIGNY (P0837)	20. LONGWY (P5805)
6. BCULLIGNY (U0191)	21. LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
7. BRIEY (U6973)	22. METZ (U8557)
8. CONFLANS (U6465)	23. MOYEUVERE (U7774)
9. DUDELANGE (U8099)	24. NEUFCHATEAU (P3541)
10. ESCH (P7301)	25. PIENNES (U5681)
11. ETALLE (P4026)	26. RECOGNES (P2126)
12. FLORENVILLE (P2820)	27. ST. HUBERT (P3262)
13. FORTOY (U7385)	28. TINTIGNY (P3627)
14. HABAY (U4622)	29. UCKANGE (U8579)
15. HAMPRE (P3639)	30. VIRTON (P3221)

Summary of delinquency reports processed by this section during the month was as follows:

Pass violations	1146
Trip ticket violations	992
Improper use of U. S. Government vehicle	677
Out of uniform	537
Speeding	461
Leaving vehicle unattended	381
Curfew violations	305
Passing violations	158
Illegal carrying of civilians	61
Drunk	38
Parking violations	36
Disorderly	30
Reckless driving	26
Careless discharge of firearms	24
TOTAL	4872

Details of cases tried by Third U. S. Army Summary Courts during the month were as follows:

<u>VIOLATIONS</u>	<u>COURT NUMBER 1</u>	<u>COURT NUMBER 2</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Pass	208		208
Uniform	67		67
Vehicle unguarded	45		45
Speeding	34	1	35
Curfew	19		19
Drunk and disorderly	15		15
Double banking	10	1	11
Unauthorized use of weapon	2		2
Resisting arrest	2		2
Transporting civilians	1		1
Breaking arrest	1		1
Unauthorized use of vehicle	1		1
Misinformation (lais)	1		1
Misappropriation of U.S. property	1		1
TOTAL	407	2	409

Straggler Collecting Points were in operation during the month at the following locations:

1. ARLON (P6122)	5. ESCH (P7301)
2. BRIEY (U6973)	6. LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
3. CONFLANS (U6465)	7. MOYEUVERE (U7774)
4. DUDELANGE (U8099)	8. VIRTON (P3221)

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	54
To Reinforcement Depots	63
TOTAL	117

Summary of AWOLs apprehended during the month was as follows:

Third U. S. Army Units	182
Other Units	91
TOTAL	273
Number of days AWOL	4269
Average number of days AWOL	16

Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

Released to Units	16
Evacuated to Disciplinary Training Center	133
Evacuated to Units for trial	9
TOTAL	158

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army Stockade 282400 February: 56.

SECTION V - INVESTIGATION SUB-SECTION

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 3 February:

Manslaughter	1
Black market	2
Murder	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	1
Robbery	1
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Larceny	1
Accidental shooting	2
TOTAL	10

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 10 February:

Rape	1
Assault with intent to commit rape	1
Misappropriation of U. S. property	3
Larceny	2
Black market	4
Murder	1
Absent without leave	1
Assault	1
TOTAL	14

The following criminal investigation cases were completed and compiled and forwarded during the week ending 17 February:

Rape	1
Violation of police restrictions	1
Misapplication of U. S. property	2
Hit and run driver	1
Larceny	1
Assault	2
Fatal shooting	1
Forgery	1
Disorderly conduct	1
Black market	1
TOTAL	12

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 24 February:

Larceny	3
Driving while drunk	1
Assault	2
Black market	1
Murder	1
TOTAL	8

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation 28 February:

Murder	3
Assault with intent to rape	2
Fatal shooting	1
Black market	3
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Escape of prisoner	1
Absent without leave	1
Larceny	1
Looting	1
Assault and battery	1
TOTAL	15

SECTION VI - PRISONER OF WAR EXECUTIVE SUB-SECTION

An operations directive for the operation of overrun Allied Prisoner of War Camps, prepared by the Prisoner of War Contact Officer, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, attached this headquarters, was submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on 22 February for comment and concurrence.

SECTION VII - INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

Planning continued for the establishment and operation of Internment Camps. The Standing Operating Procedure for the operation of Internment Camps prepared by this office was submitted to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2, for comment and concurrence on 21 February.

SECTION VIII - LINE OF COMMUNICATION SUB-SECTION

On 9 February, Annex Number 1, corrected copy, "Plan for Defense of Command Post," dated 3 January 1945, was published. (See annex 25).

Annex Number 2 to Plan for Defense of Command Post, dated 3 January 1945, this headquarters, was published 11 February. (See annex 25).

Reconnaissance of railway line was completed on 12 February from LIBRAMONT (P3148) to BOURCY (P6264) for purpose of locating bridges and tunnels to be guarded.

The 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion arrived in Army area at ESCH (P7301), 131630 February, for guarding Lines of Communication installations. The 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion arrived in Army area 142100 February, for use by the Provost Marshal for guarding Lines of Communication installations. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 1st Company were located at SCHENFELS (P8226) and the 2nd and 3rd Companies at SCHUTTRANGE (P9414). The 4th and 5th Companies of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion were attached to the 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion for administration and training.

The 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion assumed responsibility for operation of security check points on highways number 1, 7, and 11, in the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414) on 23 February.

The following installations in the Army area were guarded in connection with security of Lines of Communication during the month of February:

- 35 Railway bridges and tunnels
- 16 Highway bridges
- Third U. S. Army Radio Center, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
- SHAEF Mission, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
- Radio Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
- Repeater Station, AUBANGE (P6009).
- Twelfth Army Group Radio, RMAIN (P5505).
- Twelfth Army Group Radio, KAPELLENBERG (P8914).
- Post Telephone and Telegraphic Buildings located in the following towns and cities:
 - LUXEMBOURG (P8414)
 - RODANGE (P6206)
 - BELVAUX (P6502)
 - DIFFENDANGE (P6604)
 - BETTEMBOURG (P8103)
 - DUDELANGE (U8099)
 - KAYL (P7700)
 - BASCHARAGE (P6709)

SECRET

CHAPTER 10 MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

During the month of March because of the rapid advance of the tactical units, the Army area expanded considerably, necessitating judicious use of all Military Police and other units that were on duty with the Provost Marshal.

The Forward Echelon departed vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), 270740A March, and arrived vicinity of IDAR-OBBERSTEIN (L7124), Germany, 271200A March.

A Troops Liaison Sub-Section was organized 27 March for the purpose of maintaining liaison with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, for employment of troops assigned to the Provost Marshal. These troops would be used for safeguarding captured war material of G-4 and guarding Displaced Persons Camps for G-5.

The Rear Echelon departed vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), 290830A March, and arrived vicinity of TRIER (L2229), Germany, 291000A March.

Because of the multiplicity of the duties of the Prisoner of War Sub-Section which was handling prisoners of war, German military hospitals, Allied prisoners of war, and Internment Camps; an Allied Prisoner of War and Internment Camp Sub-Section was established to relieve the Prisoner of War Sub-Section of these duties.

The Defense Sub-Section became known as the Security Sub-Section, thereby clarifying its duties, - Security of Lines of Communication and Command Post.

An increase in the number of violations of traffic and uniform regulations was prevalent during the month. The critical condition of roads in the Army area, tire shortage and mechanical failure of vehicles made it imperative that speeding and other traffic violations were curbed as a measure of conservation and discipline. Recommendations were made and approved as follows:

1. An intensive signing program utilizing signs constructed by the Engineers in accordance with Provost Marshal designs were placed by Military Police at appropriate locations. These signs four feet by six feet were simply worded so as to be quickly read and contained traffic speed limits and other vehicle regulations. Maintenance of Law and Order signs stating curfew, uniform, and pass regulations were also posted. These signs eliminated any ignorance on the part of personnel for failure to comply with existing regulations.

2. Battalion Commanders performing Military Police duty were authorized to try as a Summary Court all offenders of existing regulations. These Summary Courts followed the procedure and policies carried out in the operation of the Army Summary Courts.

The Investigation Sub-Section was combined with the Maintenance of Law and Order Sub-Section and revised operational procedure was put into effect providing for a central criminal investigation office located in the Provost Marshal Section (Rear Echelon) and field offices at the Forward Echelon Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Headquarters of the VIII, XII, and XX Corps, and at the Headquarters of the 503rd, 512th, and 785th Military Police Battalions. The establishment of field offices made it possible to quickly investigate a greater number of serious crimes.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

The rapid expansion of the Army area required that three sub-areas be established as follows:

Area number 1 - From the 1939 German border to an arbitrary line drawn from north to south, approximately ten kilometers west of

The following troops were used for guarding the above installations:

1st and 3rd Companies, 151st Infantry Regiment (French).
267th Field Artillery Battalion (less stockade guard for general prisoners - ten enlisted men from Battery "C").
734th Field Artillery Battalion (less twenty-eight enlisted men for interior security of Third U. S. Army Forward Command Post; Headquarters and Service Batteries under control of Prisoner of War Sub-Section).
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Companies "B" and "C").
11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion plus two Companies (4th and 5th) 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion attached for administration and training.

The 734th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from tactical guarding of all installations in the Army area on 24 February. The 267th Field Artillery Battalion took over guarding of all installations in France since Belgian Battalions cannot be used in France. The 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion was used for guarding installations in the Duchy of Luxembourg and Belgium exclusive of the City of LUXEMBOURG (P8414), which was guarded by two companies from 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The following troops were used for defense of Command Post:

Interior Security:

Company "A", 503rd Military Police Battalion.
Twenty-eight enlisted men from Battery "A", 734th Field Artillery Battalion

Reserve for Defense of Command Post:

Light Tank Platoon, Headquarters, 8th Armored Group.
Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Two Reconnaissance Platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

In the process of relieving the 734th Field Artillery Battalion from duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army the Executive Officer of the 267th Field Artillery Battalion took over command of Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON (P6122). Assisting him were officers and enlisted men of the 267th Field Artillery Battalion and 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion. The Officers of the 734th Field Artillery Battalion, in command of the VIII Corps and XX Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures, were relieved by officers of the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and 8th Armored Group respectively.



MILITARY POLICEMAN DIRECTING TRAFFIC IN ARLON, BELGIUM.

KOBLENZ (L9095) following highway L300 to the Seventh U. S. Army lateral boundary. This territory was turned over to the 243rd Field Artillery Battalion then located in SIMMERON (L8555). This battalion controlled traffic only on the three Main Supply Routes.

Area number 2 - From the above mentioned arbitrary line to the western banks of the RHINE River. This territory was turned over to the 70th Infantry Division with headquarters in BAD KREUZNACH (M1938). The division was given complete control of the entire road net, bridges across the RHINE River, and Maintenance of Law and Order in all towns.

Area number 3 - Entire Army area from the east bank of the RHINE River forward to Corps Rear Boundaries.

The road net in Germany appeared ample for support of operations up to and beyond the RHINE River, although many of the roads with the exception of the autobahns had steep grades and sharp curves. Small towns and numerous streams were traffic "bottlenecks" because of narrow streets and limited number of bridges.

The problem of road and town signing was a major one. A Standing Operating Procedure was published and distributed to the Military Police Battalions. The shortage of signs was critical, and all available means were utilized to produce the quantity of signs necessary in the Army area.

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, file AG 415 GMMCY, subject, "Town and Route Markings in Germany," dated 9 March 1945, was published. (See annex 29).

Approximately seventy-five percent of vehicular traffic in the Army Service areas during the latter part of the month was on the autobahns, A5 and A4. Extensive road reconnaissances were conducted by this section and the Military Police Battalions. Much of this reconnaissance was made in the forward areas so that conditions might be remedied by the time the Army Service area took over.

During the month clearances for over 367 convoys involving over 42,075 vehicles were processed through the Traffic Sub-Section.

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

During the month of March a record number of prisoners of war were evacuated through Third U. S. Army Enclosures. A total of 142,000 prisoners of war were captured during that time. On 24 March alone, a total of 18,818 prisoners of war were received at the Army Enclosures. On 31 March the daily average since the beginning of operations was 1,357. On 7 March the 200,000th prisoner of war was received at Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 13, ARLON (P6122), while on the 230th day of operations of Third U. S. Army, 18 March, the 230,000th prisoner of war was evacuated to Third U. S. Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229).

With the advance of Third U. S. Army deeper into Germany, numerous Allied Prisoner of War Camps were overrun. The Provost Marshal under the direct supervision of a Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Prisoner of War Executive Officer established the first Allied Prisoner of War Camp at TRIER, (L2229), Germany. Allied prisoners of war who initially were evacuated through Displaced Persons channels were transferred to this Camp, where they were screened, nominal rolls prepared, and thus were started on the right direction to their homelands.

A temporary Internment Camp was opened as an annex to the Prisoner of War Enclosure at TRIER (L2229). The first Internment Camp cases such as Security Threats and War Criminals were received for internment.

The Standing Operating Procedure for Army and Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures prepared by the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army distributed on the 3rd of March to the Provost Marshals of Corps assigned Third U. S. Army, and Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure Commanders for their guidance and information.

The 734th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from duty with the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army, and assigned to its primary mission. Since 26 August 1944 this battalion handled over 100,000 prisoners of war. The prisoner of war duties performed by this battalion were assumed by elements of the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 267th Field Artillery Battalion.

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A German Lieutenant General, Graf Von Rothkirch (German Corps Commander), and Major General Vibig, were sent by special evacuation to Twelfth Army Group. The Signal Officer of the German Seventh Army was also taken by special evacuation to Advance Section, Communications Zone, Central Prisoner of War Enclosure at STENAY (P1503) for detailed interrogation.

Information was received from Twelfth Army Group that all German Medical personnel captured should be evacuated by prisoner of war channels as quickly as possible to the German Medical Center at CHERBOURG (O1523).

A large influx of prisoners of war seriously taxed the evacuation system, but by taking full advantage of the empty supply trucks returning to the rear the problem was controlled.

Because of the distance to Advance Section Communications Zone Central Enclosure, a large "backlog" accumulated in the Army cages. The establishment by Advance Section Communications Zone, of a forward enclosure prevented the recurrence of similar incidents.

Army Prisoner of War Enclosures operated at ARLON (P6122), Belgium, number 13; TRIER (L2229), Germany, number 14; BAUMHOLTER (L7113), Germany, number 15; and at ECHELSHEIM (M1732), Germany, number 16.

Prisoner of War statistics for the month of March were as follows: (See annex 30).

On hand as of 28 February	2,119
Received during month of March at Prisoner of War Enclosures	136,926
TOTAL	139,045
Evacuated	134,024
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures 31 March	5,021
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures	136,926
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during month of March	5,291
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U.S. Army during March	142,217

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 31 March 1945, inclusive. 329,675

Escapers and Evaders statistics for the month of March were as follows:

On hand 28 February	None
Escapers and Evaders for March	2396
Evacuated	2396
On hand 31 March	None

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

The extension of the Army boundaries during the month resulted in dispersion of Military Police over a wide area. Maintenance of Law and Order patrols in France, Luxembourg and Belgium were reduced to a minimum in order to provide maximum personnel for all localities in Germany. Maintenance of Law and Order personnel became particularly concerned with the circulation and control of displaced persons and civilians. During the latter part of the month numerous disorders were handled by Military Police in the vicinity of the Displaced Persons Center in Germany. All displaced persons were corralled by Military Police and placed in Displaced Persons Camps. Civilian curfew was strictly enforced and all violators were turned over to military government for appropriate action.

Emphasis was placed on control of military personnel in Germany and current regulations providing for movement of military personnel outside of their billets or bivouac area only on official business was enforced. Unit commanders were contacted wherever possible, were informed of current regulations and were requested to exercise closer supervision over personnel of their command. Relatively few violations of the non-fraternization policy were encountered.

Instructions were given to all military police to return Third U. S. Army stragglers to their units by the most expeditious means. Stragglers from other armies and Communications Zone were returned to their unit through Reinforcement channels. AWOLs continued to be held in arrest by Military Police and delivered either to their units or to

the AWOL Collection Center in PARIS (SO140).

Section I, Circular Number 23, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 9 March 1945, announced the following policy with reference to "Forcible Entry":

"It has been reported to this headquarters that U. S. Military Forces have forcibly entered civil law enforcement installations in France for the purpose of searching for questionable property. This practice is neither condoned nor will it be tolerated by this headquarters. In the future no such installations will be entered or searched unless approval of this or other appropriate headquarters is secured before such action."

Letter, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, file AG 250.1 GMMG, subject, "Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents," was published, 17 March. (See annex 28).

Section II, Circular Number 31, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 24 March 1945, announced the following change in pass policy:

"II. PASS POLICY.

Paragraphs 4 and 5, Section II, Circular 6, this headquarters, dated 26 January 1945, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

4. When present stocks of TPM Form No. 3 (Revised March 44) are exhausted, ETO AG Form No. 27 is the only form of pass which will be used. All permanent (Class B) passes will be withdrawn from men to whom they have previously been issued.

5. The following rules will govern the issuance of passes to visit cities and towns in the Third U. S. Army area.

a. All passes will expire at or prior to curfew.
b. No overnight or twenty-four (24) hour passes will be issued.

6. Passes to visit cities and towns outside the Army area may be issued when authorized and in the numbers allocated by this headquarters, in which case unit commanders will acquaint themselves with any requirements in connection with the control or restriction of personnel in the area concerned."

Section III, Circular Number 28, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, announced the following Pass and Curfew Policy:

"III. PASS AND CURFEW POLICY.

1. For troops in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg:

The provisions of Sections I and II, Circular No. 6, this headquarters, dated 26 January 1945, will remain in effect.

2. For troops in Germany:

a. Military personnel will circulate outside of billets or bivouac areas only on official business.

b. No passes will be issued to troops to visit any city, town or area in Germany."

Patrols were in operation during the month in the following locations:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. ALZEY (K5904) | 14. BOLLENDORF (L0041) |
| 2. ARLON (P6122) | 15. BOPFARD (K5619) |
| 3. ATHUS (P6309) | 16. BOUZONVILLE (Q1374) |
| 4. AUDUN (U6980) | 17. BRIEY (U6973) |
| 5. AUMETZ (U7594) | 18. BRODENBACH (K5216) |
| 6. BAD BERTRICH (K5214) | 19. CLERVAUX (P7261) |
| 7. BAD KREUZNACH (K5904) | 20. COCHEM (L5471) |
| 8. BASTOGNE (P5557) | 21. CONSDORF (L0535) |
| 9. BERKASTEL (K5806) | 22. DASBURG (P8362) |
| 10. BETTENBACH (P8103) | 23. DIKIRK (P8242) |
| 11. BICKENDORF (L1160) | 24. DUDELANGE (U8099) |
| 12. BIRKENFELD (K5104) | 25. ECHTERNACH (L0535) |
| 13. BITBURG (L1253) | 26. ESCH (P7301) |

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 27. ETTLEBRUCK (P8340) | 47. FRUM (L0679) |
| 28. FONTOY (U7828) | 48. REMICH (L0106) |
| 29. GRAVENMACHER (L0321) | 49. RITTERSDORF (L1056) |
| 30. HAYANGE (U7882) | 50. ROOFT (P9320) |
| 31. HOUFFALIZE (P5272) | 51. SAARBURG (L1212) |
| 32. HOMECOURT (U7974) | 52. ST. HUBERT (P3262) |
| 33. HOTZENPORT (L7980) | 53. ST. VITH (P8486) |
| 34. JARNY (U6564) | 54. ST. WENDEL (Q5996) |
| 35. KASTELLAUM (K5611) | 55. SIMMERN (L8555) |
| 36. KILCHBURG (L4891) | 56. THIONVILLE (U8687) |
| 37. LONGWY (P5805) | 57. TRIER (L2229) |
| 38. LUNEBACH (L0171) | 58. UCKANGE (U8579) |
| 39. LUXEMBOURG (P8414) | 59. VIANDEN (P8652) |
| 40. MAYEN (L6292) | 60. VILLERUPT (U6798) |
| 41. MERSCH (P8228) | 61. VIRTON (P3122) |
| 42. METZ (U8557) | 62. WALDWISSE (Q1392) |
| 43. MOYRUVRE (U7774) | 63. WASSERBILLIG (L1023) |
| 44. NEUFCHATEAU (P3234) | 64. WILTZ (P7456) |
| 45. OBERWESSEL (K5319) | 65. WINNINGEN (K5614) |
| 46. PRONSFELD (L0272) | 66. WORTSTADT (K5104) |

A summary of the delinquency reports processed by this Sub-Section during the month was as follows:

Pass violations	842
Speeding	406
Uniform violations	328
Unattended vehicles	249
Passing violations	148
Trip ticket violations	126
Curfew violations	64
Carrying of civilians in government vehicles	55
Parking violations	47
Drunk	30
Looting	28
Unauthorized firing of weapons	24
Off limits violations	18
Improper use of Government vehicle	18
TOTAL	2383

Summary Courts: Details of cases tried by Summary Court Number 1 during the month were as follows:

Pass violations	70
Drunk	17
Speeding	16
Uniform violations	16
Unattended vehicle	9
Curfew violation	7
Three in front seat of cab	6
Double banking	5
Unauthorized firing of weapon	5
Trip ticket violations	4
No driver's permit	1
Parking violation	1
Overloading vehicle	1
TOTAL	158

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month in the following locations:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. BAD KREUZNACH (M0938) | 8. ESCH (P7301) |
| 2. BICKENDORF (L1160) | 9. KIRN (L8032) |
| 3. BIRKENFELD (L5312) | 10. KIESSELBACH (H6253) |
| 4. BITBURG (L1253) | 11. LUXEMBOURG (P8414) |
| 5. COCHEM (L5471) | 12. OBERWESSEL (L9366) |
| 6. ECHTERNACH (L0535) | 13. SAARBURG (L1212) |
| 7. EDIGER (L3895) | 14. TRIER (L2229) |

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	26
To Reinforcement Depots	23
TOTAL	49

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A summary of AWOLs apprehended during the month was as follows:

Third U. S. Army units	191
Other units	72
Total apprehended	263
Total number of days AWOL	4017
Average number of days AWOL	15

General prisoners: Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

Released to units	13
Evacuated to Disciplinary Training Center	95
Evacuated to units for trial	13

TOTAL 121

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army stockade, 312400 March: 69.

During the latter part of the month there was a marked increase in the number of serious crimes reported and referred to criminal investigation detachments for investigation.

Investigation.

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the period ending 3 March:

Assault	2
Wrongful disposal of U. S. property	1
Self maiming	1
Misapplication of U. S. property	1
Black market	3
Embezzlement	1
Larceny	1
Murder	2
Sale of carbines	1
Assault with intent to rape	1

TOTAL 14

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 10 March:

Carnal knowledge	1
Complaint of stealing oil	1
Fatal shooting	1
Larceny	2
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Assault	1
Misbehavior before the enemy	1
Misappropriation of U. S. property	1
Absence without leave	1
Wrongful disposal of U. S. property	1

TOTAL 11

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 17 March:

Black market	4
Assault and battery	1
Rape	1
Sale of poison liquor	1
Alleged burglary	1
Illegal possession of U. S. property	1

TOTAL 9

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during the week ending 24 March:

Rape	1
Looting	1
Self maiming	1
Larceny	2
Assault	1
Assault with intent to commit a felony	1
Misappropriation of U. S. vehicle	1
Fatal shooting	1

Possession of excessive money	2
Fraternizing	1
Misappropriation of U. S. Government property	1
Attempted murder	1
Alleged rape	1
Assault and battery	1
TOTAL	16

On 30 March one officer and four non-commissioned officers of Interpreters Corps, Netherlands Forces, were assigned to the Criminal Investigation Section for use with Criminal Investigation Detachments.

The following criminal cases were pending final investigation as of 31 March:

Rape	7
Theft of U. S. supplies	1
Misappropriation of U. S. materials	1
Shooting of a civilian	1
Fatal shooting	1
Murder	2
Suspected larceny	1
Assault with a dangerous weapon	1
Wrongful disposal of U. S. property	1
Fraternization	1
Robbery	1
Larceny of U. S. property	1
Burglary	1
Assault with intent to rob	1
TOTAL	21

SECTION V - ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

Allied prisoners of war: A report of Allied prisoners of war including French, Belgians, Bulgarians, Russians, Serbs, Czechoslovakians and rumored to include British, was investigated on 8 March. An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Allied prisoners of war were released in the DARN (L3578), MAYEN (L6292), COBLENZ (L9095) area by the 4th Armored Division. No camp sites were overrun except stockades of local working commandos. Military Government Agencies handled these people as Displaced Persons.

On 18 March Allied Prisoner of War Camp Number 1, Camp Petrisberg TRIER (L2229), was opened. Overrun Allied prisoners of war at this camp were cared for initially and documented before evacuation to Communications Zone.

Allied Prisoner of War Executive Officer was directed to establish Allied Prisoner of War Camp Number 1, Camp Petrisberg, TRIER (L2229), as a permanent installation. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, furnished all possible facilities.

A report was received 24 March that in the zone of advance of the Third U. S. Army, two German Prisoner of War Camps were overrun; one in the vicinity of BAUMHOLDER (L7113) and the other in the vicinity of ST. WENDEL (Q5997). Allied Prisoner of War Executive Officers made on the spot investigations and submitted detailed reports to higher headquarters.

Nominal rolls on recovered Allied prisoners of war were prepared and sent to G-1, Twelfth Army Group, on 24 March, for forwarding to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

On 28 March a report reached this office through G-1 that the 26th Infantry Division of XII Corps had overrun a German Prisoner of War Camp containing approximately 480 French Tunisian prisoners of war. This message was immediately reported to Allied Prisoner of War Officer for action.

Internment Camps.

An Army temporary Internment Camp was installed as an annex to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229), on 5 March.

Internment Camp categories were held separate from prisoners of war at prisoner of war Enclosures until such time as a sufficient number had accumulated to warrant the establishment of an Internment Camp.

A temporary Army Internment Camp was opened as an annex to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229), on 8 March, to handle such cases as were evacuated by the Corps for temporary or permanent internment.

On 18 March the first Internment Camp cases, such as security threats and war criminals were received for internment at the Third U. S. Army Temporary Internment Camp, TRIER (L2229).

SECTION VI - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

During the month of March the following installations in the Army area were guarded:

69 Railway bridges and tunnels.
45 Highway bridges.
8 Highway check points.
Twelfth Army Group Radio, KAPELLENBERG (P8914).
Twelfth Army Group Radio, ROMAIN (P5505).
Repeater Station, AUBANGE (P6009).
SHAER Mission, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
Third U. S. Army Radio Center, STRASSEN (P7915).
Radio Station, JUNGLINSTER (P9224).
Storage room for rare books, NURSBERG (L4494).
Electric Power Plant, TRIER (L2229).
Radio installation, LUXEMBOURG (P8414).
Post Telephone and Telegraphic buildings located in the following towns and cities:

BETTENBOURG (P8103)	DIFFERDANGE (P6604)
DUBELANGE (UB099)	BASCHARAGE (P6709)
KAYL (P7700)	RODANGE (P6206)
BELVAUX (P6802)	PETANGE (P6507)
LUXEMBOURG (P8414)	

The following troops were used for guarding the above installations:

267th Field Artillery Battalion.
11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion plus two companies (1st and 4th) 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Company "B", relieved from duty with XI Corps as assigned mission of security of Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 14, TRIER (L2229)).

The following troops were used for defense of Command Posts:

Interior security:
Company "A", 503rd Military Police Battalion.
Reserve for defense of Command Posts:
Light Tank Platoon, Headquarters, 8th Armored Group.
Company "A", 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Two Reconnaissance Platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The 30th Battalion Chasseurs (French) were utilized for tactical guarding of installations in France and Luxembourg but were relieved from these duties upon entering into Germany.

On 30 March the 270th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Office for duty with the Security Sub-Section.

SECTION VII - TROOP LIAISON SUB-SECTION

The Troops Liaison Sub-Section was organized 27 March for the purpose of maintaining liaison with G-4 and G-5 for use of troops assigned to the Provost Marshal.

Initially the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Provost Marshal Section on 27 March for use by G-5 for the guarding of Displaced Persons Camps.

On 28 March the Chief of the Troops Liaison Sub-Section had a conference with Executive Officer, G-4 Section, and with G-4 Officers connected with the handling of captured war material. The following

decisions were reached:

a. That G-4 would keep this section advised as to the location of enemy materiel, the priority for its safeguarding, and an estimate of the number of personnel that would be required to guard it.

b. That this section would allocate troops assigned to guard captured supplies.

On 29 March a conference was held with G-5 with reference to the use of troops to guard Displaced Persons Camps. The following decisions were reached:

a. That G-5 would keep this section advised as to the location and size of Displaced Persons Centers.

b. That this section would allocate available troops to guard camps.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Tank Destroyer Group was attached to the Provost Marshal Section.

On 31 March, Headquarters, and Headquarters Company, 4th Tank Destroyer Group was made available to G-4 for use in connection with the handling of captured enemy materiel.

During the week ending 31 March the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was employed as guards at Displaced Persons Camps as follows:

UNIT	LOCATION
Headquarters and Service Batteries	TRIER (L2229)
Battery "A", and two sections of Battery "B"	LEBACH (Q4690)
Battery "B", minus two sections	BAUMHOLDER (L7113)
One half of Battery "C"	WITTLICH (L3913)
One half of Battery "C"	BITBURG (L1353)

Headquarters and Service Batteries were instructed to move to vicinity of WEISBADEN (M3564), on 3rd and 4th April 1945.

The 558th Field Artillery Battalion was instructed to move Battery "B" from BAUMHOLDER (L7113) to vicinity of WEISBADEN (M3564).

The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces estimate of displaced persons in zone of Allied Expeditionary Forces as of 1 January was 6,500,000 and in zone of Russian Army, 4,500,000. This enormous number of Displaced Persons was expected to require considerable preparation on the part of G-5 and was of vital interest to Provost Marshal operations.



CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved from IDAR-OBBERSTEIN (L7124) to FRANKFURT (M6868) on 3 April.

The Army area continued to expand, necessitating the establishment of sub-areas. Area Number 1 extended from the German border of 1939 to an arbitrary line drawn from north to south, approximately ten kilometers west of KOBLENZ (I9095), then followed highway L300 to Seventh U. S. Army lateral boundary. This territory was turned over to the 243rd Field Artillery Battalion located in SIMMERN (L8555), under control of the 195th Field Artillery Group, and controlled traffic on the three Main Supply Routes only. Area Number 2 extended from the afore-mentioned arbitrary line to the western banks of the RHINE River. This territory was turned over to the 70th Infantry Division with headquarters in BAD KREUZNACH (M1938). The Division was placed in complete charge of the entire road net, bridges across the RHINE River, and maintenance of law and order in all towns.

Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved from FRANKFURT (M6868) to HERSFELD (H3954) on 11 April.

Third U. S. Army Headquarters moved from HERSFELD (H3954) to ERLANGEN (O3616) on 22 April.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

As Corps rear boundaries continued to advance quite rapidly the deployment of the Military Police Battalions required constant attention in order to assure proper control of traffic on Main Supply Routes.

The situation was alleviated to some extent by making use of the autobahns. These super-highways, in good condition, were capable of handling two lane traffic both ways. Intersections were at a minimum and the usual small town "bottle-necks" were almost entirely eliminated.

A number of bridges over the autobahns, and in surrounding towns were blown, and the Engineers cleared away the debris and constructed new bridges. Constant attention was given to all secondary and "feeder" roads which proved to be necessary to the Army road net and the expediting of traffic.

Speeding on the autobahns was a major problem. The Military Police Battalions were alerted and concentrated their efforts on proper control. More than 150 arrests for traffic violations were made daily on these routes.

Constant road and bridge reconnaissance of the forward areas was made by personnel of this office. The information secured aided materially in prior planning and enabled this office to remain conversant with pending traffic problems.

Bridging was still a major problem for the Engineers who continued to do an excellent job.

A traffic count made in the Army area showed that approximately seventy-five percent of the Army traffic travelled via the autobahns.

The establishment of Quartermaster Petrol, Oil and Lubricant Dumps along A4 east and west of ALSFELD (H0900) reduced that route to two lane traffic for two stretches of approximately five miles each.

Traffic routes in HERSFELD (H3959) were changed twice during the period to block off certain areas in which were located vital installations.

All non-military vehicles were stopped, checked for authorization of possession and Army registration, and impounded if such authorization did not exist. Impounded vehicles were turned over to Ordnance.

In occupying the new Army area a condition of inadequately signed roads and bridges existed. In the larger cities, the traffic plans as then existed were bad. Jams up to eight and ten miles occurred out of WURZBURG (N5935) in several directions. A new traffic plan was prepared and placed in operation which resulted in a smooth flow of traffic through the city.

Military Police were extended over an area twice the size normally covered. Traffic was extremely heavy, with troop movements approximating the traffic during the week of December 17 - 25, 1944. This exceedingly heavy troop movement, coupled with necessary supply traffic, meshed with equally heavy Seventh U. S. Army road movements checked the main routes in the WURZBURG (N5935), BAMBERG (O2749), ERLANGEN (O3616), NURNBERG (T4299) area.

Check points for non-military vehicles were operated at HERSFELD (H3959), GEMUNDEN (H4165), MEININGEN (H6922), HUNFELD (H4433), ALSFELD (H0900) and FRANKFURT (M6868).

These check points resulted in approximately 400 vehicles being taken from military personnel not possessing authorization or registration for such vehicles, and also from displaced persons.

Traffic violations for the week ending 21 April were:

Trip ticket violation	18
Improper use of U. S. Government vehicle	4
Speeding	289
Passing violation	111
Reckless driving	2
Unregistered captured enemy vehicle	1

TOTAL 425

Most of the main roads in the Army area during the latter part of the month were Class B-1 $\frac{1}{2}$, with many defiles, one-way bridges, and bypasses. The road net was inadequate for handling the heavy traffic on army supplies and troop movements, and roads were badly overcrowded. Roads were signed well into Corps areas. Special efforts were made to sign NURNBERG (T4299) and to bypass traffic around the city on the autobahns, A3 and A43. Traffic plan for the city of NURNBERG (T4299) was approved by the Army Engineer and placed in effect, utilizing an inner traffic "ring" to keep traffic out of the center of the city.

Military Police Battalions zones of responsibility were changed three times and extended to enable them to furnish greater assistance to the Corps. The 70th Infantry Division assumed control and responsibility of a larger area (including WURZBURG (N5935)), relieving Army Military Police in that zone. Check points for impounding vehicles (civilian) operated at ERLANGEN (O3616), WURZBURG (N5935), NEUSTADT (M9337), BAMBERG (O2749), and BAYREUTH (O7657). Additional check points operated at SCHWABACH (T9387), NURNBERG (T4299), SULZBACH (O8908), AMBERG area (O9802), and ANSBACH (T0783). Civilians were ordered through the Burgomeisters to keep military routes clean and free of debris and trash. Traffic violations were:

Speeding	29
Double banking	57
Trip ticket violations	4
Unattended vehicles	3
Officer driving	3
Reckless driving	5
Garrying of civilians	1
Unregistered captured vehicles	2

TOTAL 104

Major troop movements during the month of April were:

1st Infantry Division	97th Infantry Division
5th Infantry Division	99th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division	
65th Infantry Division	101st Airborne Division
70th Infantry Division	
76th Infantry Division	13th Armored Division
86th Infantry Division	16th Armored Division
94th Infantry Division	20th Armored Division

During the month traffic clearances for over 365 convoys involving over 50,964 vehicles were processed through the traffic sub-section.

SECRET

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

The 270th Field Artillery Battalion reported to the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army and was assigned duties under the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. One Detachment of this battalion was dispatched at once to the VIII Corps Prisoner of War Enclosure.

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 17, OBER URSEL (M6079) was opened 2 April. With the advance of Third U. S. Army deeper into Germany, many German Military Hospitals were uncovered. A "stay put" policy was applied immediately and these hospitals were guarded under the supervision of the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army through the Army Surgeon. The patients found in these hospitals, if they belonged to the German Armed Forces, were classified as "prisoners of war", and the hospital, a Prisoner of War Camp. The Military Medical Staff of these hospitals were classified as "protected personnel" and were permitted to perform their services under the supervision of the Army Surgeon. A total of fifty-eight German Military Hospitals were reported to this office. These hospitals contained approximately 20,000 prisoner of war patients.

The 277th Field Artillery Battalion reported for duty to the Provost Marshal, Third U. S. Army and was assigned duties under the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. It was planned to utilize this Battalion as guard personnel for overrun German Military Hospitals.

The 302nd French Truck Company consisting of forty-eight trucks, was attached this section for the evacuation of prisoners of war on 13 April.

The Commanding Officer, 463rd Military Police Escort Guard Company, operating the Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures, was directed to make a tour of the Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures instructing them not to accept civilians or enemy prisoners of war in civilian clothes if they had no identity documents or Arrest Report establishing their military status.

In accordance with instructions published in Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, dated 10 April 1945, TODT Workers were no longer classified as prisoners of war, but would be turned over to Military Government.

A new system for guarding German Military Hospitals was initiated 15 April.

Three teams consisting of a representative from the Provost Marshal Office, a Medical Administrative Officer from the 66th Medical Group and a representative from the Army G-2 Section were organized. These teams were given the responsibility of placing the security of German Military Hospitals in the hands of the town Burgmeister and the Commandant of the hospitals.

Instructions were received from Provost Marshal, Advance Section, Communications Zone to evacuate German Officers along regular prisoner of war channels. General Officers, if requested by Twelfth Army Group would be sent there, otherwise no distinction would be made.

Memorandum Number 3, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, dated 16 April 1945, subject, "Captured German Military Hospitals" was published. (See annex 32).

Units of the Seventh U. S. Army guarding hospitals in Third U. S. Army area were relieved and the responsibility for the safeguarding of these prisoners of war was placed upon the local Burgmeister.

Two additional Advance Section, Communications Zone Military Police Escort Guard Companies, the 467th and 491st were placed on duty with this section 25 April for the evacuation of prisoners of war from Army cages to Advance Section, Communications Zone Transient Enclosures.

At a conference on 27 April representatives of the Army Provost Marshal Section and the Army Surgeon discussed the question of releasing low value prisoners of war after screening by G-2 personnel. This category of prisoners of war would include members of the Volksturm, the extreme aged and youthful members of the army as well as disabled veterans and enemy deserters found behind front lines.

A communication net was established between all Prisoner of War cages in the Army area.

The 600,000th prisoner of war captured by troops of the Third U. S. Army, 28 April, was evacuated to Army Prisoner of War Enclosure

Number 21, LANGENZENN (O2003).

During the month a total of 235 German Military Hospitals were reported to this office including 95,041 prisoner of war patients.

Six Prisoner of War Enclosures were operated by Third U. S. Army during April 1945, as follows:

- Number 16, ECKELSHEIM (M1732)
- Number 17, OBER URSEL (M6079)
- Number 18, HATTENBACH (H2950)
- Number 19, LAICHA (H9761)
- Number 20, KULMBACH (O6574)
- Number 21, LANGENZENN (O2003)

A total of 236,724 prisoners of war were received during the month at Third U. S. Army Enclosures. This tremendous influx of prisoners of war in comparison with the months previous, the rapid advance of Third U. S. Army into Germany and the changes in direction of advance created a serious problem of evacuation. The opening of an Advance Section, Communications Zone Prisoner of War Transient Enclosure at BAD KREUZNACH (M1938) and another at HEIDERSHEIM (M25) vicinity MAINZ (M35) alleviated the condition somewhat.

With the large number of prisoners of war in the Army Enclosure and with the shortage of operational rations, the problem of securing sufficient rations became acute. Captured German rations were used to the greatest extent possible and plans were made to feed the prisoners of war by Bulk Rations.

Prisoner of war statistics for the month of April were:

On hand as of 31 March	5,021
Received during month of April at Prisoner of War Enclosures	236,724
TOTAL	241,745
Evacuated	186,176
On hand at Prisoner of War Enclosures as of 30 April	55,569

Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures during April	236,724
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals during April, including overrun German Military Hospitals.	96,180
TOTAL prisoners of war handled by Third U. S. Army during April 332,904 (See annex 31)	

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 to 30 April 1945, inclusive: 662,579.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

A concentrated drive was made at TRIER (L2229) on 3 April to clear the town of abandoned jerricans and 937 jerricans were recovered.

The Third U. S. Army stockade was moved from TRIER (L2229) 5 April to FRANKFURT (M6868).

Rifles, shotguns and other weapons in a quantity sufficient to fill two one-fourth ton trailers were picked up in various towns from the Burgmeisters thereof and turned into 851st Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company, ALSFELD (H04), by members of Company B, 512th Military Police Battalion.

At approximately 200500H April, three Military Policemen of Company C, 503rd Military Police Battalion, while proceeding east on A4, five miles west of ALSFELD (H0640), Germany, stopped to offer assistance to a 1/4 ton, 4 x 4 vehicle parked on the highway. They noticed German equipment and followed the vehicle whereupon the occupants fired on the Military Police. One SS trooper was killed and the rest escaped into the woods. Visibility was poor and the Military Police returned to the Command Post for a searching party.

An advance General Prisoner Stockade for the handling of general prisoners was established 23 April at ERLANGEN (O3616).

Patrols operated during the month in the following localities:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| ALSFELD (H0840) | BRONENBACH (L7960) |
| ALZEY (K5906) | COBURG (O28) |
| ASCHAFFENBURG (N29) | DIEZ (M2096) |
| BAD KISSINGEN (M6780) | EBERN (O1970) |
| BAD KREUZNACH (K5904) | EMMELHAUSEN (K5214) |
| BAD NAUHEIM (M1797) | ERLANGEN (O3616) |
| BAD NEUSTADT (N7694) | FASSLSHOF (O5975) |
| BAD ORG (M1580) | FORCHHEIM (O3930) |
| BAD SALZUNGEN (H7749) | FRANKFURT (M6770) |
| BAMBERG (O2749) | FRIEDBURG (M7294) |
| BAYREUTH (O75) | FRIEDRICHRODA (H9755) |
| BEBRA (H4564) | GEHMUNDEN (N46) |
| BERNKASTEL (K5806) | GEORGETAHL (J0652) |
| BIRKENFELD (K1504) | GERDUN (H0404) |
| BIRSTEIN (M1296) | GERSFELD (H50) |
| BITBURG (L2153) | GROSS GRAU (L5304) |
| BLANKENHAIN (J5558) | HAIBACH (O53) |
| BOGEL (M0576) | HAMBELBURG (N5570) |
| BOFFARD (K5619) | HANAU (M8471) |
| BREITENBACH (H2543) | HERSFELD (M4954) |
| HOCHST (M5767) | MEINLAUS (O6173) |
| HOMBURG (H1772) | MERZBACH (O2374) |
| HUNFELD (H4432) | NURNBERG (O40) |
| IDSTEIN (M3583) | ROMROD (H0436) |
| JENA (J7065) | SAASEN (H2859) |
| KARLSTADT (M4643) | SCHLITZ (H2332) |
| KALTENBRUNN (O27) | SCHLUCHTERN (N29) |
| KASTELLUN (K5611) | SCHWEINFURT (N7963) |
| KATZENFORT (L7960) | SONNENBURG (J40) |
| KILCHBERG (L4891) | VACHA (H6150) |
| KIRN (K5206) | WEISBADEN (M3563) |
| KISSELBACH (K5416) | WERNECK (N65) |
| KULMBACH (O6674) | WINDECKEN (M6281) |
| LANGEN (M6754) | ZIEGENHAIN (H0455) |
| LAUTERBACH (H1828) | LOHR (M3156) |
| MEININGEN (H8922) | |

A summary of the delinquency reports processed by this office during the month was as follows:

Away from billet or bivouac area without authority	167
Pass violations	110
Fraternization	93
Uniform violations	83
Looting	19
Drunk	16
Careless discharge of firearms	14
Curfew violations	10
Disorderly	9
TOTAL	521

Details of cases tried by Summary Court Number 1 during the month were as follows:

Passing vehicles	101
Pass violations	28
Speeding	20
Uniform violations	19
Fraternization	10
Vehicles not registered	5
Drunk	3
Looting	2
TOTAL	188

Straggler Collecting Points operated during the month in the following locations:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| BAD KISSINGEN (M6780) | FRIEDRICHRODA (N9755) |
| BAD NEUSTADT (N7694) | HANAU (M8471) |
| BAMBERG (O2749) | HUNFELD (N4432) |
| BEBRA (H4565) | KARLSTADT (M4643) |
| BIRKENFELD (K1504) | KULMBACH (O6674) |
| BOGEL (M0476) | MEINLAUS (O6173) |
| DIEZ (M2096) | MERZBACH (O2374) |
| ERLANGEN (O3617) | OBERSSEL (L9366) |
| FASSLSHOF (O5973) | WEISBADEN (M3563) |
| FRANKFURT (M6770) | WURZBURG (N5935) |

SECRET

Disposition of stragglers for the month was as follows:

To Units	36
To Reinforcement Depots	2
TOTAL	38

A summary of AWOLs apprehended during the month was as follows:

Third U. S. Army units	20
Other Units	24
TOTAL	44

Total number days AWOL 450

Average number of days AWOL 10

Data regarding general prisoners evacuated or released during the month was as follows:

Released to Units	17
Evacuated to Disciplinary Training Center	45
TOTAL	62

General prisoners on hand at Third U. S. Army stockade as of 302400B April: 222.

Investigation

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 7 April:

Rape	2
Murder	1
Alleged rape	2
Murder and assault with intent to murder	1
Murder and alleged rape	1
Shooting	1
Shooting German civilian	1
Alleged larceny	1
Assault with dangerous weapon	1
Wrongful disposal	1
Robbery	1
TOTAL	13

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 14 April:

Rape	4
Assault with deadly weapon	1
Alleged rape	13
Fraternization	2
Fraternization and AWOL	2
Murder	1
Fraternization and rape	1
Attempted rape and fraternization	1
Neglect of duty	1
Murder and rape	1
Alleged rape and looting	1
Alleged rape and robbery	1
Alleged rape and assault with deadly weapon	1
Alleged murder	1
TOTAL	31

The following criminal cases were investigated and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 21 April:

Theft of U. S. supplies	2
Rape	13
Sale of poison liquor	1
Murder	3
Rape and robbery	1
Assault with deadly weapon	1
TOTAL	21

The following criminal cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during week ending 28 April:

Homicide	1
Alleged rape	11
Robbery and AWOL	1
Rape	3
Murder	3

Attempted rape	1
Conduct unbecoming an officer	1
Housebreaking	1
Robbery	1
TOTAL	23

SECTION V - ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNMENT CAMP SUB-SECTION

The Allied Prisoner of War Sub-Section was formed from personnel of the S-3 and S-4 Sections, 195th Field Artillery Group Headquarters, with duties of administration and supply of Allied Prisoner of War Camps and documentation, disinfection and evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War. To accomplish this mission, the 558th Field Artillery Battalion was attached and reported for duty on 15 April, and the 304th French Truck Company was attached to augment our transportation. Later, as the magnitude of the job increased, the 176th, 770th, and 775th Field Artillery Battalions were likewise attached. In addition, nineteen officers from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces were attached to Third U. S. Army to assist as Allied Prisoner of War Contact Officers.

It was estimated by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces that between 300,000 and 500,000 Allied prisoners of war were in the zone of the Third U. S. Army advance. Until it became impracticable to continue the practice, the Germans moved their prisoners to their rear areas as the Third U. S. Army advanced, with the result that comparatively few Allied prisoners of war were recovered. On 22 April, the German government agreed to leave all Allied military prisoners in their camps, on condition that they were not employed against them in this theater. From 8 April to the present date, the weekly totals of released Allied military prisoners increased as follows: 8 - 14 April, 5,565 (in seven camps); 15 - 21 April, 11,652 (in twenty-nine camps); 21 - 28 April, 38,955 (in nineteen camps).

On 29 April, Stalag VII A at MOOSBURG (Z1095), the largest Allied Prisoner of War Camp yet overrun, was taken by the III Corps. First estimates placed the population of Stalag VII A at approximately 100,000. Reports immediately following the release of the camp listed a total of 28,913 Allied prisoners of war of all nationalities - American, British, French, Dutch, Russian, Yugoslavian, Italian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Brazilian, Greek, Rumanian and Norwegian. Of these 15,568 were Americans and 8,562 British. In addition to the Allied prisoners of war in the Stalag itself, an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 are in the immediate vicinity brought in by the Germans and left in the small towns.

Obviously, the overrunning of such a large concentration of Allied prisoners of war entailed problems of supply, administration, medical care and evacuation, but the camp did not present the difficulties anticipated. With full knowledge of the existence of the camp, the Third U. S. Army had anticipated the need for four ambulance companies, had air reconnaissance of an evacuation strip close to the camp, and had three battalions of artillery attached to the Allied Prisoner of War Sub-Section. The camp proved to be excellently organized internally, however, and no drastic emergency measures were necessary.

On a small scale, each Allied Prisoner of War Camp was handled in the same way as MOOSBURG (Z1095). Contact Officers with the Corps headquarters were in constant touch with the situation at the front, prepared to go to Allied Prisoner of War Camps as soon as they were overrun and rendered a report on conditions and population and took charge till an Allied Prisoner of War Team arrived and assumed control. The Allied Prisoner of War Team documented and disinfected the Allied prisoners of war for evacuation by air, rail or truck, as the situation required.

During the period 7 April to 30 April, 15,132 Allied prisoners of war have been evacuated from Germany by air, rail, truck and ambulance. Thousands more have been moved to camps with better facilities for their care, until they can be evacuated to the Eastern European countries.

Internment Camp Sub-Section.

The Internment Camp Sub-Section, charged with the supervision and operation of internment camps for war criminals, security threats and other civilian persons whose freedom might endanger the success of the Army, was formed from the S-2 Section of the 195th Field Artillery Group Headquarters.

During the month of April, the Internment Camp Sub-Section operated four camps. The first of these at TRIER (L2229), was turned over to Fifteenth U. S. Army on 10 April, with a population of 674 male and

39 female internees. Camps at OBERSUHL (H6164), and MOLS DORF (J2760) were turned over to First U. S. Army on 24 April, with a combined population of 1,087 male and 39 female internees. At the close of this period, the camp currently under Third U. S. Army control at HERSBRUCK, (O6707), had 345 male and 21 female internees. Of the 2,205 internees who have been under control of the Internment Camp Sub-Section, 65 were known war criminals awaiting trial.

The Internment Camps have been operated by detachments from Headquarters Battery, 195th Field Artillery Group and by elements of the 558th Field Artillery Battalion. Constant improvement of the camps, under supervision of the operating personnel, has been undertaken.

SECTION VI - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

During the period 1 April to 30 April the Security Sub-Section, Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army was engaged in the Defense of the Army Command Post and in guarding installations along the Lines of Communication. The latter included 144 highway bridges, fifty railway bridges and/or tunnels, thirty-three signal installations, and the following special installations:

Storage room for rare books, NURNBURG (O40).
Electric Power Plant, TRIER, (L2229)
Lens factory, BAD KREUZNACH (K5904)
SHAEP Mission, LUXEMBOURG, (P8414)
14th Liaison Air strip
Counter Intelligence Corps Team
Naval archives
Military Police Interpreters (ten enlisted men).

The following troops were used for defense of the Army Command Post:

Interior security:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
474th Infantry Regiment.

Reserve for Defense of the Army Command Post:

Light Tank platoon, 8th Armored Group.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Two Reconnaissance platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
474th Infantry Regiment.

The troops used in the guarding of the Lines of Communication and Signal Installations consisted of:

10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion.
11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion.
267th Field Artillery Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion
174th Field Artillery Battalion
270th Field Artillery Battalion
70th Infantry Division
13th Armored Division
195th Field Artillery Group.

During the period 1 April to 9 April the 195th Field Artillery Group operated under this section in connection with the administration and control of the 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion. On 9 April the 195th Field Artillery Group assumed responsibility for operation of Allied Prisoner of War Sub-Section. The 70th Infantry Division operated with this section beginning on 2 April; and as the Army area extended that Division assumed responsibility for security in rear areas. On 3 April the 13th Armored Division took over the guarding of installations designated by this section but were relieved two days later, having been assigned subject to being relieved from this section on forty-eight hours notice. The 10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion was relieved of assignment to the Third U. S. Army on 10 April and reassigned to XXIII Corps of the Fifteenth U. S. Army. The 267th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from assignment to this section on 10 April and assigned to Fifteenth U. S. Army; but on 18 April it was reassigned to the Security Sub-Section for security of Lines of Communication. The 174th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to this section on 20 April. The 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalion was relieved of assignment to the

SECRET

Third U. S. Army on 30 April and reassigned to XXIII Corps of the Fifteenth U. S. Army.

Memorandum, dated 11 April 1945, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Headquarters Area," (Forward Echelon), was published. (See annex 33).

Memorandum, dated 12 April 1945, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Forward Echelon Headquarters Area," (Daylight Alert), was published. (See annex 34).

Memorandum, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army dated 24 April 1945, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Forward Echelon Headquarters Area," was published. (See annex 35).

SECTION VII - TROOP LIAISON SUB-SECTION

The city of FRANKFURT (M6868) was cleared of all unauthorized personnel. In two days a total of 9,000 displaced persons, prisoners of war and Allied prisoners of war were cleared from the city.

Military routes were kept fairly clear of displaced persons by a system of collection posts, wherein all displaced persons were taken off the highways and sent to Displaced Persons Camps, utilizing empty supply trucks going toward the locations of these camps.

During the month Displaced Persons Camps were located at:

TRIER (L2229)	LEBACH (Q4690)
BAUMHOLDER (L7113)	WITTLICH (L3913)
BITBURG (L1353)	FRANKFURT (M6868)
WEISEADEN (M3464)	ALSFELD (H0940)
HERSFLED (H3954)	ERFURT (J3170)
BAD KISSINGEN (N6780)	SCHWEINFURT (N7864)
COBURG (O3090)	SEISNACH (H8167)
ERLANGEN (O3616)	FULDA (H3819)
BAMBERG (J2648)	WURZBURG (N5835)
ASCHAFFENBURG (N0154)	LICHTENFELS (O3377)
KITZINGEN (N7528)	



CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Third U. S. Army Headquarters, Forward Echelon "A" moved from ERLANGEN (O3617) to REGENSBURG (U1955) via routes N4, A43, A3, and N8, on 2 May.

Third U. S. Army Headquarters, Forward Echelon "B" moved from ERLANGEN (O3617) to REGENSBURG (U1955) on 3 May.

Upon notification of the cessation of hostilities in Europe the Allied Prisoner of War and Internment Camp Sub-Section reverted to direct control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. The handling of Displaced Persons and captured enemy materiel formerly under the supervision of the Troops Liaison Sub-Section of the Provost Marshal reverted to G-5 and G-4 Sections respectively.

SECTION II - TRAFFIC SUB-SECTION

During the period close support was given to the Corps; the rear 1/3 to 1/2 of Corps Service areas were policed by Army Battalions. It was necessary to establish six Zones of Responsibility. These Zones of Responsibility were assigned as follows: Rear areas were under the jurisdiction of the 70th Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 38th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade; the Forward areas were controlled by the Army Military Police Battalions, namely; 503rd 512th and 785th Military Police Battalions.

As the 38th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade and the 4th Infantry Division were assigned Areas of Responsibility and oriented in Military Police duties, the Army Military Police Battalions were able to rotate a portion of their personnel between rest camp and duty.

Lack of communication to the Military Police Battalions greatly hampered the Military Police operations. The only means of communication were messenger, (slow) and radio (uncertain). The contemplated use of voice radio would greatly increase the mobility and efficiency of Military Police.

The majority of the Main Supply Routes in the Army area were class B - 1 1/2 at best, with many narrow spots and one way bridges. The road net was entirely inadequate to handle the heavy troop and supply movements although the roads were well signed and patrolled by the Military Police units.

Staff Officer Patrols were inaugurated detailing four Staff Officers daily to inspect Third U. S. Army area for any violation of traffic uniform, or civilian vehicle violation.

Liaison was established with V Corps Provost Marshal and reconnaissance was initiated preparatory to shifting the 503rd Military Police Battalion to assist the V Corps.

On 7 May, Military Police patrols were dispatched to augment movement of 18,000 to 20,000 Allied prisoners of war from the MOOSBURG Camp (Z19) to airstrips located in INGOLSTADT (T7125), LANDSHUT (U2603) and STRAUBING (T9839).

Main convoy movements during the first eight days of May were: 99th Infantry Division; 4th Infantry Division; 5th Infantry Division; 16th Armored Division; 4th Armored Division; and III Corps (with attached units).

A bailey bridge at REGENSBURG (U1955) was damaged by a tank retriever (class 70 load). The bridge closed for repairs and all north-bound traffic was rerouted via N16 and N299 through NEUSTADT (M9337) to NEUMARKT (T7082) and NURNBERG (T4299).

SECTION III - PRISONER OF WAR SUB-SECTION

Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 22 at IRLMAUTH (U2255), three miles east of REGENSBURG (U1955) opened 2 May.

Attachment to the Third U. S. Army of the V Corps made it necessary to reopen Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 20, KULMBACH (O6574).

Letter, AG 383.6 GIMCY, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army dated 5 May 1945, subject, "Evacuation and Release of Special Classes of Prisoners of War," was published. (See annex 36).

The 243rd and 267th Field Artillery Battalions were attached for duty to the Prisoner of War Sub-Section.

Prisoner of war statistics for period 1 through 8 May were:

On hand as of 30 April	55,569
Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures	90,698
TOTAL	146,267
Evacuated	54,553
Balance on hand at Enclosures	91,714

Received at Prisoner of War Enclosures	90,698
Admitted at Third U. S. Army Hospitals	174
Taken at overrun German Military Hospitals	12,092

TOTAL handled by Third U. S. Army 102,904
(See annex 40).

Accumulative total for entire period of operations, 1 August 1944 through 8 May 1945: 765,483.

For locations of Prisoner of War Installations during the period of operations see annexes 37, 38, and 39.

SECTION IV - MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER SUB-SECTION

Summary Court Number 2 was established at REGENSBURG (U1955).

Five patrol teams, each consisting of one officer and eleven enlisted men were assigned areas throughout REGENSBURG (U1955) to investigate any promiscuous firing of weapons and to arrest violators. These patrols operated from 2000 to 2400.

Delinquency reports from 1 through 8 May were:

Uniform violations	246
Away from billet or bivouac without authority	150
Fraternalization	26
Drunk	13
Disorderly	11
Looting	9
Unauthorized firing of weapons	6
Pass violations	1
TOTAL	462

Summary Court cases for the period were:

	COURT NO. 1	COURT NO. 2
Double banking	25	
Pass violations	3	3
Uniform violations	2	1
Trip ticket violations	2	
Speeding	1	4
Drunk	1	
TOTAL	34	8

Nineteen stragglers were returned to their units during the period.

AWOLs apprehended during the period were:

Third U. S. Army units	7
Other units	10
TOTAL	17

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

For locations of Straggler Collecting Points during the period of operations see annexes 37, 38, and 39.

General prisoners were disposed of as follows:

Released to units	69
To Disciplinary Training Center	98
TOTAL	167

The following cases were completed and reports compiled and forwarded during the period 1 through 8 May:

Alleged rape	13
Rape	10
Alleged murder	2
Manslaughter	2
Murder	2
Looting	1
Alleged looting	1
Alleged rape - suicide	1
Assault with a dangerous weapon	1
Assault with intent to rape	1
Attempted rape	1
Larceny	1
Rape and sodomy	1
TOTAL	37

SECTION V - SECURITY SUB-SECTION

During the period 1 through 8 May, the Security Sub-Section, Provost Marshal Section, Third U. S. Army, was engaged in the security of the Army Command Post and in guarding Lines of Communication.

An alert squad was established by the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion to expedite investigation of incidents pertaining to exterior defense of the Forward Command Post. From 2000 to 2400 hours on 8 May five patrol teams each consisting of one officer and eleven enlisted men were assigned areas throughout REGENSBURG (U1955) to investigate any promiscuous firing of weapons and to arrest the offenders.

Tactical guarding of thirty-one highway bridges, eight railway bridges, and eight signal installations was accomplished without incident. Guards were also furnished for the following special installations:

Airstrip, 14th Liaison Squadron.
Counter Intelligence Corps Interrogation Team, BAMBERG (02749).
Naval Archives, TAMBACH (J04)

The following troops were used for security of the Army Command Post:

Interior security:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Reserve for security of Army Command Post:

Light Tank platoon, 8th Armored Group
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The troops used in guarding Lines of Communications and signal installations were:

267th Field Artillery Battalion.
174th Field Artillery Battalion.
631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

On 7 May, the 267th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from its guard responsibilities by the 38th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, and was assigned to the Prisoner of War Sub-Section. On 8 May, the 174th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from its guard responsibilities, and assembled to await orders from the Prisoner of War Sub-Section to which they were assigned. The 8th Armored Group received orders to report to the 4th Armored Division to which they were assigned.

When Germany capitulated, the Security Lines of Communications was disbanded, and the security of the Army Command Post was assumed by the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

I. The allotment of Military Police units to the Army for operations was inadequate. It has been necessary to reinforce the Military Police units with Field Artillery Battalions and Tank Destroyer Battalions. The Prisoner of War work performed by Escort Guard Companies was continuously controlled by Field Artillery Battalions. Enough time must be devoted to the training of non-military police units on military police duty so that they may efficiently perform their duties.

II. For Military Police units to perform their missions efficiently the Table of Organization and Equipment was increased by certain excess items, namely: vehicles, 1/4 ton; radios; compasses; watches; stoves, gasoline, one burner; motorcycles; guns, sub-machine; trailers, 1/4 ton; pistols, automatic, caliber .45; telephones, field; and cars, scout.

III. For road reconnaissance, liaison type airplanes proved to be the best method for advance traffic reconnaissance and patrolling of congested areas.

IV. The enforcement of regulations is severely handicapped by the absence of uniformity in regulations promulgated by various commands within the Theater and by differences in the degree of enforcement within the Theater and by differences in the degree of enforcement within different major commands.

V. The Provost Marshal Staff Section, of Army, Corps, and Divisions should be large enough to properly supervise and control all activities for which the Provost Marshal is responsible.

VI. The closest coordination and cooperation with G-3 Troop Movements, G-4 Transportation, G-5, G-2 (Counter Intelligence) and Provost Marshals of higher and lower echelons is essential prior to and during operations.

VII. Military Police in the field require direct cooperation and support from local unit commanders and military and civil officials.

VIII. The solution of crimes, and the discovery, apprehension, and punishment of criminals requires prompt reporting of all crimes together with immediately available facts, circumstances, and the protection of evidence left at the scene of the crime. A directive to the Command pertaining to the discovery and reporting of crimes by the most

expeditious means greatly assisted in the apprehension and punishment of criminals.

IX. The original system of evacuation of prisoners of war from Division Collecting Points to Army Prisoner of War Enclosures could not be maintained because of the large number of divisions, the limited number of vehicles available for evacuation, and the rapid advance of the Third U. S. Army. Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures were established at Class I Supply Point of Corps to which prisoners of war were evacuated on empty supply trucks and from which Army could evacuate.

X. Prisoner of War processing cannot efficiently be done at Army level. The rapid evacuation of prisoners of war to Communications Zone Enclosures should be the prime task.

XI. The use of a force of Mechanized Cavalry, Tank Destroyer, or similar unit is essential for the security of the Command Post.

XII. Transportation for evacuation of prisoners of war and for transporting rations and water was insufficient. Coordination and cooperation with G-4 Transportation, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Staff Sections are essential in arranging transportation for Prisoner of War evacuation.

XIII. Traffic control equipment should be at all times available at several engineer dumps. Surplus stocks of traffic control equipment should be on hand for any emergency that may arise. The issue of traffic control equipment should be controlled by Provost Marshal Section.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX NO. 1

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 10) 4 May 1944

TRAFFIC REGULATION AND CONTROL FOR CONTINENTAL OPERATION

I. GENERAL.

1. PURPOSE:

- a. To establish the responsibility for and the methods of control of road traffic on the Continent.
- b. To familiarize U. S. Military personnel with the essential basic rules to be followed to meet operational traffic conditions.
- c. This circular is designed to regulate movement of supplies and troops and will not be considered applicable to units in tactical formations engaged in combat operations.

2. DEFINITIONS:

- a. Road Traffic: All aspects of the movement of vehicles or foot troops over roads. Its operation consists of road traffic regulations and road traffic control.
- b. Road Traffic Regulations: The measures taken to assure the proper movement of road traffic as to priorities, routes, time and destination.
- c. Road Traffic Control: The means taken to insure the proper movement of road traffic and to insure that it meets the operational requirements. It is effected by compliance with instructions issued, and by control agencies used by commands within their areas.
- d. Main Route: A principal supply or tactical route running generally from the rear forward, designated by the senior commander ashore. It will be marked by a black arrow on white disc.
- e. Lateral Route: A principal supply or tactical route, running generally parallel to the front, designated by the senior commander ashore. It will be marked by a black arrow with bar at base of shaft on a white disc.
- f. Thru Route: A route normally running through two or more sub-areas of an area, designated by the commander of the latter for the purpose of placing under his own direct command the regulation and control of road traffic thereon. Such routes when designated by the senior commander ashore will be selected from Main or Lateral Routes.

3. BASIC PRINCIPALS:

- a. Command Responsibilities: Each Corps and Division Commander will be responsible for the designation, marking, maintenance and control of roads within his area in conformity with the plan of the next higher commander.
- b. Organization: To accomplish this traffic control, the headquarters of each division or larger tactical unit will institute, within current T/O, a Traffic Headquarters under supervision of G-4 or a comparable staff section. Its duties will be to prepare Road Traffic Control Plan, to regulate and control Traffic through a central agency, and will include:
 - (1) Receipt, correlation, and dissemination of road traffic information.
 - (2) Formulation and publication of road traffic rules.
 - (3) Supervision and control of Road Traffic Regulating and Road Traffic Control Installations.

(4) Coordination of movement originating in its area with the Traffic Headquarters of other area(s) into which such moves will continue.

II. ROAD TRAFFIC REGULATIONS.

1. ROUTES: Main, Lateral, and Thru Routes will be designated by Traffic Headquarters, marked by Provost Marshals and maintained by Engineers within Army, Corps, and Division Areas respectively.

2. PRIORITIES:

a. The following priorities will be accorded traffic in the Army Area unless otherwise directed:

- (1) Messenger Cars.
- (2) Troop movement.
- (3) Ambulances.
- (4) Staff Cars.
- (5) Wire Construction crews.
- (6) Supply convoys in this priority: V, III, I.
- (7) All other traffic.

b. Area commanders may designate special vehicles to be exempt from the above priorities and such exceptions will be in conformity with higher headquarters approval and will be specifically marked. For Signal Corps vehicles so exempted, the vehicle will be designated by rectangular markings painted or mounted on the right front and right rear. Such markings will be 9 1/2" long by 8 1/2" wide, painted horizontally blue and white, the upper half being white and the lower half blue. Also, such messenger personnel will wear 4" wide brassards above left elbow, the upper half being white, the lower half blue.

c. For exceptional tactical reasons, units may be moved with priority over all roads with written authority and adequate MP escort. All traffic control agencies to be immediately informed of such priority exception.

3. LIGHTS:

a. Army Light Lines: Blackout Markers ("Cat Eye") lights will be used forward of a line designated by Army. In rear of this line, Blackout Driving Lamps ("Dim-out" lights) will be used except during air-raid alerts.

b. Corps and Divisions: Corps and Division Commanders will prescribe such additional restrictions within their respective areas as the tactical situation requires.

4. SPEEDS: The following speed limits will be observed except under those circumstances where operational traffic conditions or exceptional tactical situations dictate otherwise.

a. Daylight: The leading vehicle of a convoy will not exceed 25 MPH on highway outside of cities and 15 MPH in cities or towns. Single vehicles will not exceed 35 MPH on highways and 15 MPH through towns.

b. Night: The leading vehicle of a convoy will not exceed 15 MPH on open highway and 10 MPH through towns. Single vehicles will not exceed 20 MPH on highway and 15 MPH through towns. All night driving to conform to conditions of roads and lights and not to exceed their maximums.

5. DENSITY: The following vehicle density will be standard, except where modified by a commander to meet the requirements of a special tactical situation:

- a. March unit will not exceed 30 vehicles.
- b. Serial will not exceed 5 march units.
- c. Serials and units will conform to road time allotted them and will maintain approximately 75 yards between vehicles and a time interval of 3 minutes between units and 8 minutes between serials.
- d. All traffic on the Continent will drive on the right hand side.
- e. Nothing in these instructions will be construed as relieving convoy commander of his responsibility for proper convoy discipline and unit control.

III. ROAD TRAFFIC CONTROL.

1. CLASSIFICATION AND MARKING:

a. The British road, bridge and vehicle classification and marking system will be used. Under this system, a vehicle may cross only bridges bearing classification numbers which are the same or greater than the vehicle's classification.

b. The British type road traffic sign will be used in accordance with Circular 26, ETOUSA, 12 March 1944, in lieu of that prescribed in FM 29-5 and FM 101-15. Pertinent details are displayed on Instructional Chart for Control of Road Movement.

IV. CONVOY

1. CLEARANCE:

a. All convoys of 10 or more vehicles will request clearance through Traffic Headquarters of convoy origin as soon as the necessity for the move is determined.

b. Request for clearance will include the following information:

- (1) Headquarters requiring clearance.
- (2) Name of Convoy Commander.
- (3) Unit to move.
- (4) Authority to move.
- (5) Total number of vehicles.
- (6) Total number of March units.
- (7) Total number of Serials.
- (8) Heaviest type vehicle in column.
- (9) Present location of unit.
- (10) Destination.
- (11) Time and date movement desired.
- (12) Route desired.

2. CONVOY COMMANDER:

a. The Convoy Commander will be responsible that:

- (1) The movement number of the convoy is clearly marked on the front and rear of the lead vehicle of each March unit.
- (2) The lead vehicle of the convoy (not to include Convoy Commander's vehicle), or of each column, if convoy is moving in more than one column, is marked with a blue flag and the tail vehicle with a green flag, or if at night, with blue and green lights.
- (3) All drivers are informed of the convoy number, the destination, and the route to be followed.
- (4) While at the halt that march interval is maintained; that vehicles are moved to the right of the road, using due precaution in mined areas, and that assistant drivers or drivers are stationed in such manner as to assist passing traffic by appropriate signals.
- (5) Disabled vehicles are moved off the road and that an attendant is posted to guard the vehicle and assist all traffic past the vehicle. He will report to the nearest traffic control point or Military Police the location of the disabled vehicle and any other obstruction or road damage, which requires attention.

b. A representative of the convoy commander will precede the convoy by at least ten (10) minutes to coordinate with Traffic Control points enroute.

3. PASSING: A convoy will not normally pass a preceding convoy unless same is at the halt. At all times, passing will be accomplished only on proper clearance from the commander of the convoy being overtaken. Every assistance, by appropriate signals, will be given command and staff cars and single vehicles in passing.

4. MILITARY POLICE: The Provost Marshal, within the Army, Corps, and Division areas, will insure that adequate sign posting is made and maintained and will enforce traffic regulations for both civilian and military traffic by maintaining Traffic Control Points, road patrols, and providing convoy escorts when necessary.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

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SECRET

ANNEX NO. 3

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "C"

ANNEX NO. 2

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM: 3 June 1944

NUMBER 10:

TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNS

1. TRAFFIC SIGNS.

a. Traffic Sign -- A device mounted on a fixed or portable support, whereby notice is given in the form of words or symbols for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.

b. There are three main categories of traffic signs:

- (1) Regulatory - Stop, Speed, Movement, Parking, etc.
- (2) Warning - Slow, Caution, Railroads, etc.
- (3) Guide - Routes, Destination, Location, Information.

c. All such signs can be made from the British Traffic Control equipment issued to each Military Police unit in the U. K. Regulatory and Warning signs may be painted on Franco blank signs. Guide signs for routes are furnished, the black arrow on white disc for main routes, the black arrow with bar on tail on white disc for lateral routes and white arrow on red disc for diversions (detours). For local routes other than main routes a sign may be improvised, a red arrow on a white square. The bottom of a four (4) gallon oil or gasoline tin may be used for this purpose.

2. POSTING SIGNS.

a. In posting roads with guide signs, locations and distances will be shown, viz; "Cannes - 5 miles" with an arrow pointing the directions. These signs can be painted on Franco signs. The entrance to towns, villages and cities will also be posted with Franco signs such as "Entering Cannes". Such signs will materially help convoy commanders and drivers in orienting their units and maintaining schedules.

3. TRAFFIC LAMPS.

a. The Traffic Lamp will be used at night to illuminate essential signs at road junctions, route turns and at other points where traffic may go astray.

4. TRAINING.

a. The proper posting of roads and installations is essential to good traffic control and Military Police units will be trained in this work. Problems for each unit down to and including Divisional Military Police platoons will be used by Provost Marshals to train the unit in the use of signs for posting roads. Tests will be given while in the U.K. to insure proper functioning of units when they arrive on the Continent.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, G.S.C., AC of S, G-3.

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "H"

ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF TABLES OF EQUIPMENT FOR MILITARY POLICE UNITS

ITEM	MP Bn Army T/O & E, 19-35	MP Co Corps T/O & E, 19-37	MP Plat Corps T/O & E, 19-77	MP Plat Inf Div T/O & E, 19-7	MP Plat AB Div T/O & E, 19-97	MP Plat Armd Div T/O & E, 19-117
(2) Ambulance 3/4 ton 4 x 4						
(2) Axle, RI-27	2	2	2	2		
(2) Telephone, fld, EES	24	8	4	8		
(2) Wire, fld, W-130	48 mi.	16 mi.	8 mi.	16 mi.		
(3) Mine Detector Sets	6			6		
(1) Compass, lensatic, luminous dial liquid filled, EST-1108 with case	100	30	15	15	15	15
(1) Motorcycle, solo	36	12		6	4	6
(3) Pistol, automatic, caliber .45, M1911 or M1911 A-1	100	25	12	12		
(2) Radio, SCR 193	12	4	2	3		
(3) Stoves, gasoline, 1-burner	45	15		15		
(3) Guns, sub-machine, caliber .45 M-3	20	6		6		
(3) Trailers, 1/4 ton, 2-wheel cargo	6	2	1	2	1	2
(1) Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, 6 volt	24	8				
(2) Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, 12 volt	12	4	2	3		
(2) Kite, linemans	8					
(2) Photographic Set PH 261						
(2) Title board PH 273						
(1) Watch, wrist, 7 jewel	100	30	15	15	15	15
	(1) First priority	(2) Second priority	(3) Third priority			

ANNEX NO. 4

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

GENERAL ORDERS

8 June 1944

NUMBER 30

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

1. The Provost Marshal Section is announced as a Special Staff Section, this headquarters. This Section will coordinate with Provost Marshal Sections of Corps and Divisions in Military Police matters; traffic control, maintenance of law and order, control and disposition of military prisoners of war, displaced and liberated persons, refugees and outlaws, collection and disposition of stragglers, coordination with Civil Affairs in matters pertaining to control of the civil population, and criminal investigation.

2. Each General and Special Staff Section will maintain the same relationship and will perform the same type of function with respect to the Provost Marshal Section as with any other staff section.

3. Direct communication between Provost Marshals of Corps and

Divisions and the Provost Marshal, this headquarters, is authorized on the above matters.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 5

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 337 GNMCMY

5 June 1944

SUBJECT: Provost Marshal Planning Conference.

TO : See Distribution.

1. A Provost Marshal Planning Conference will be held at this headquarters on 13 June 1944. This conference will be devoted to a full discussion of Provost Marshal and Military Police functions during the forthcoming operations.

2. Corps and Division Commanding Officers will issue necessary travel orders for attendance of the following officers of their commands at this conference.

- a. Provost Marshal, each Corps
- b. Provost Marshal, each Division.
- c. Commanding Officer, each Military Police Company (Corps) and attached company.

3. The commanding officers of the Military Police Battalions (Army) will issue travel orders for their own attendance.

4. Subjects to be discussed at the conference will include the following:

- Provost Marshal Functions
- Traffic Control
- Prisoners of War and Refugees
- Military Police Relations with Civil Affairs.
- Maintenance of Law and Order
- Straggler Lines--Location and operation
- Investigation.

5. Officers will report not later than 1200, on 12 June 1944 to Lt. Col. DILLON, Building 21, Toft Camp, in order that assignment to billets and other details may be completed prior to this conference.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
A C of S, G-3

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CO 503rd Military Police Bn
CO 510th Military Police Bn
CO 512th Military Police Bn

ANNEX NO. 7

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 37)


26 July 1944

PRISONERS OF WAR

1. The Provost Marshal sections in army, corps and division are responsible for the handling, processing and disposing of prisoners of war within their areas.

2. Three considerations for the treatment of Prisoners of War must be kept in mind constantly: (1) the valuable information that can be extracted, (2) the Geneva Convention, and (3) the possibility of mutiny or escapes. Rank, property and other rights of prisoners will be respected. In exchange for courtesies to prisoners a strict performance

ANNEX NO. 6



of prisoners will be completed. Subsequent to the completion of searching, the prisoner's effects will be promptly impounded, confiscated or returned to the prisoner. (See Annex 1 "Sample Search Instructions"). G-2 will be informed without delay of the capture of:

- (1) Officers of the rank of Colonel or above.
- (2) A mimeographed plan of action, maps, overlays, orders or reports.
- (3) Any other unusual source of intelligence.

Segregation will thereafter remain inviolate between:

- (1) Officers.
- (2) NCO's, including "Unteroffizier".
- (3) Other ranks, including "Gefreiter".
- (4) Females.
- (5) Special prisoners.
- (6) Deserters.
- (7) Others.

5. The handling of prisoners, including escorting them in movement and processing them at an enclosure, will probably require the use of personnel of combat units to be designated on short notice. Military Police, when available, will assist. All concerned will insure that disarmed prisoners are protected from acts of violence, and that property of prisoners is protected from petty larceny for "vengeance" or "souvenirs". Prisoners will not receive wages for administration, installation and maintenance of enclosures, tending wounded, or services of a similar nature. During the processing of prisoners a "nominal roll" will be prepared for each segregated group, (referred to in Par. 4), and for each rank of commissioned officers, each roll to be in alphabetical order, and sub-divided into groups of fifty (50) names. Each line of the roll will indicate from left to right:

- (1) Name.
- (2) Rank.
- (3) Nationality.
- (4) Serial number.
- (5) Date of capture.
- (6) Place of capture.
- (7) Notation showing whether or not an impounded bag or envelope is in the custody of the escorting guard.

6. Forms. WD-FMG Form No. 1 (white cloth tag), if available, will be attached to each prisoner. This tag is presently in use in Third U.S. Army Area by Corps and Divisions. Time permitting, the tag will show the following essential information:

- (1) Name.
- (2) Rank.
- (3) Nationality.
- (4) Serial number.
- (5) Notation showing whether or not an impounded bag or envelope is in the custody of the escorting guard.

WD-FMG Form No. 6, (pink "Card of Capture" in duplicate), will be used only when prisoners are detained for one week or longer for the purpose of labor or any other reason. By the time prisoners reach Army, or a higher echelon, the following two (2) basic records will have been completed:

- (1) The nominal roll, (referred to in Par. 5).
- (2) The record showing the grand total of prisoners of war to date arriving through all channels, including medical.

Report will be submitted to the Army Provost Marshal by each Division and Corps Provost Marshal as of 2359 Hrs. each Saturday, and will include the following information covering the preceding week:

- (1) Number of prisoners of war on hand as shown in preceding report.
- (2) Number of prisoners of war captured during the preceding week.
- (3) Number of prisoners of war gained, other than captured, indicating source.
- (4) Number of prisoners of war lost, indicating cause.
- (5) Balance of prisoners of war on hand.

Report will also specify:

- (1) Number of military personnel
- (2) Civilian Personnel
- (3) Spies.
- (4) War Criminals

of their own style of courtesies will be exacted. Sight-seers will be kept away. Familiarity (including trade) will be forbidden. All prisoners require a certain amount of guard, administration, segregation, inspection, passive defense, water, messing, shelter, clothing, transport, fire prevention, sanitation, medical care, roll-call and discipline.

3. In forward areas, (battalion, regiment, or division), the prisoners will be tagged, using WD-FMG Form #1, revised. Only a head-count is required. It is during this phase of capture, however that prisoners are capable of producing the maximum of tactical intelligence. of Particular importance is the necessity for immediate search and segregation of Officer, NCO's and other ranks prior to authorized interrogation. Until searched, prisoners must be prevented from organizing, lecturing each other, or mutilating documents.

4. In rear areas, (army or corps), searching and segregation

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- (5) Sick
- (6) Wounded.

(See Annex 2 "Prisoners of War Report").

7. Special Cases. On request of G-2, certain selected prisoners of war may be specially escorted to a higher echelon, by ground or air transportation, or detained. Sick and wounded prisoners of war in the hands of Medical Corps personnel will be reported to the most convenient G-2, report to be accompanied by captured documents, prisoners statements of military value, and an estimate of his availability for interrogation. German Air Force or Naval prisoners will be interrogated only by personnel authorized from U.S. and/or Royal Air Forces or U.S. or Royal Navy respectively. Any enemy aircraft crashing in the area of or coming under control of Third U.S. Army will be guarded on a 24 hour basis, by the unit discovering the aircraft to prevent all personnel except authorized intelligence personnel of U.S. and/or Royal Air Force from touching the aircraft. Prisoners of War suspected of espionage will be promptly turned over to G-2 accompanied by any captured materiel. The capture, and all other facts incident thereto, of such prisoners will be classified SECRET. Allied escapers or evaders from enemy captivity will be turned over to the Provost Marshal for evacuation following interrogation locally by the "E & E" Section of G-2. Accused war criminals will be accompanied by a written statement of a U.S. Army Officer, specifying the details, upon commitment.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

ANNEX 1: Sample Searching Instructions.
ANNEX 2: Prisoners of War Report.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ANNEX 1 TO CIRCULAR NUMBER 37

8 July 1944

(Sample Searching Instructions)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF SEARCH TABLES

TABLE LETTER: _____

Articles to be examined and handed back to prisoner of war:

1. Gold and other valuables; watches, rings, cigarette cases, lucky trinkets, fountain pens, gold or silver pencils, and other personal articles of a similar nature having intrinsic or personal value.
2. Medals, decorations or certificates of same and identity discs.
3. Toilet requisites EXCEPT razors, manicure sets or scissors, etc.
4. Cigarettes, cigars or tobacco.
5. Gas masks.
6. Pay books.

Articles to be taken away from prisoner of war as "Of Military Value". No receipt given.

1. Firearms or weapons of any kind including files, saws, hammers, etc.
2. All mechanical spare parts of any kind.
3. All military equipment including belts, webbing, haversacks, water bottles and all aluminum.

4. Blankets, bedding, civilian clothes and suitcases.
5. Preserved foods of all kinds.
6. Matches or forms of spirit or alcohol.
7. All unused paper or writing paper and empty notebooks.
8. Ink of any kind.
9. Medical drugs and stores.

NOTE: Numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 MUST be placed in separate receptacles in rear of search tables.

Articles to be placed in impounded bag.

1. Maps or military documents. Printed or written.
2. All publications acquired before or after capture.
3. Visiting cards, odd names and addresses scribbled on scraps of paper.
4. All written or printed materials including letters or post-cards, diaries, notebooks, photographs, etc.
5. Cameras, compasses, binoculars or any other form of precision instrument.
6. Cigarette lighters.
7. Knives, scissors, straight razors and manicure sets.
8. Currency of all kinds. (Receipt will be given).

ANNEX 2 TO CIRCULAR NUMBER 37.

PRISONERS OF WAR REPORT											
Unit reporting _____		Reporting for (Day)(Wk) ending 2359 (Date) 1944									
Prisoners of War figures below will, in each case, include hospitalized sick and wounded.											
	Offi- cers	NGOs	Prts	Refugees		War Criminals		Others		TOTAL	
				M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1. Balance on hand as of preceding report											
2. Gains:											
a. By capture											
b. By other sources											
c. Gains from Com- mands other than TUSA											
3. Total, (No. 1 and No. 2)											
4. Losses:											
a. By evacuation to Army Enclosure											
b. By evacuation to hospitals											
c. Other losses											
5. Total losses											
6. Balance on hand as of this report. (No. 3 less No. 5).											
7. REMARKS:											
	For the Provost Marshal: _____										
	(Signature)										
	(Arm or Service)										

ANNEX NO. 8

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 48)

29 August 1944

SECTION I - Enlisted Passes.
SECTION II - Vehicle Corrals.

EXTRACT

EXTRACT

I. ENLISTED PASSES.

Enlisted men of the Third Army will be apprehended and turned over to Straggler Collecting Points unless they occupy status as follows:

- a. On duty.
- b. In Bivouac Area.
- c. On written pass. Passes will not be issued to enlisted men to visit towns or cities which are off limits.

II. VEHICLE CORRALS.

1. Vehicle Corrals will be established at once under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal for the detention of violators of traffic rules and regulations. Vehicles and drivers impounded in "Vehicle Corrals" will be held from one (1) to twelve (12) hours for booking, and to remove from the highways those vehicles and drivers constituting a menace to the controlled flow of traffic.

2. The following violations will warrant detention in "Vehicle Corrals": Speeding, double-banking, light violations, reckless driving, driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, failure to maintain the prescribed 60 yard distance between vehicles when moving or at a halt, disobedience of Military Police traffic directions, and any of the following vehicles passing any other moving vehicle or halted convoy, except by direction of Military Police:

- Trucks, 3/4-ton weapons carriers
- Trucks, 1-1/2-ton cargo
- Trucks, 2-1/2-ton cargo
- All other wheeled or track vehicles over 3/4-ton capacity.

EXTRACT

EXTRACT

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 9

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1944 BY ENCLOSURES				
ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND 31 AUGUST
St. Jores	Aug 1 - 3	6352	6352	0
PWE No. 1, Avranches	Aug 4 - 7	5157	5157	0
PWE No. 2, Sens de Bretagne	Aug 8 - 19	27407	27407	0
PWE No. 3, Mur de Bretagne	Opened 19 Aug	1373	985	388
ASCZ Brit-tany Base	Opened 24 Aug	3274	3274	0
PWE No. 4, Brulon	Aug 14 - 25	8771	8771	0
PWE No. 5, Courtalain	Opened 20 Aug	3783	3717	66
PWE No. 6, Nemours	Opened 25 Aug	7252	6494	758
TOTALS		63369	62157	1212
Medical admissions		6677		
TOTAL RECEIVED		70046		
Escapers and Evaders		488	477	11

ANNEX NO. 10

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR) 3 September 1944
NUMBER 51)

EXTRACT EXTRACT

SECTION II - Traffic Regulations.

II. Traffic Regulations.

The following traffic regulations in addition to the provisions of Circular No. 10, this headquarters, dated 4 May 1944 are effective and will be strictly enforced in order to insure the uninterrupted flow and efficient control of road traffic on the continent.

1. a. The following speed limits will be obeyed during day-light hours:
 - (1) 25 MPH: All convoys.
 - (2) 30 MPH: All individual trucks (including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over, wheeled or track).
 - (3) 40 MPH: Passenger cars, 1/4 ton trucks (peeps) and trucks 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps), and motorcycles.
 - (4) In towns and cities all vehicles not to exceed 25 MPH.
- b. The following speed limits will be obeyed during darkness
 - (1) 15 MPH: All wheeled and track vehicles including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over and all convoys.

(2) 20 MPH: Passenger cars, trucks, 1/4 ton (peeps), trucks 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps), and motorcycles.

2. Up to Corps rear boundaries blackout driving lamps, American or British type, will be used.

a. Vehicles equipped with only one approved blackout driving lamp will prepare the other headlight lens in the approved manner i.e.: lens to be painted black and a rectangular aperture two inches wide and three-eighths of an inch high, its base line will be two inches below and parallel to a horizontal line through the center of the lens.

b. Signs indicating end of Army Dimout Light Zone will be posted on all main routes by the Army Provost Marshal.

c. Forward of Corps rear boundaries "CAT EYES" lights only will be used by all vehicles.

d. Red light "Flashers" on special vehicles are authorized in addition to the above.

3. Rear vision mirrors will be so adjusted habitually as to be usable in watching for traffic approaching from the rear.

4. a. Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward twelve o'clock indicate main routes forward to the front.

b. Directional discs, white with black arrow and bar perpendicular to the base of the shaft indicate lateral routes.

c. Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward six o'clock indicate main down routes to the rear areas.

d. Directional discs, red with white arrows indicate detours from main or lateral routes.

e. Directional discs or equivalent, white with red arrow indicate local routes.

5. Franco plates, metal or wooden material, 15" x 17" or 17" x 30", with white letters on black background will be used for unit, installation or route signs, except Medical Corps signs which will be red on white background. No other size, type or colored signs will be used except as authorized by the Army Commander.

6. a. Trucks, 1/4 ton (peeps) will not be overloaded. Not more than four persons will be carried except in operational emergencies at or near the front lines.

b. Drivers will not smoke while driving.

7. The tops on trucks, 1/4 ton (peeps) and trucks, 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps) will be down at all times except during heavy rains.

8. Civilians will not be carried in U.S. Military vehicles except as indicated hereinafter: Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, Military Police, and Civil Affairs personnel are authorized to carry civilian personnel when necessary on official business.

9. On military highways voluntary halting, stopping or parking for any purpose is forbidden unless all wheels of the vehicle are clear of the normally travelled road surface.

10. Disabled vehicles will be towed or pushed off the road surface immediately.

11. Double banking of halted vehicles or moving vehicles on a highway by 3/4 ton weapons carriers and all other heavier wheeled or track vehicles is forbidden at any time.

12. Motorcycles, passenger cars, trucks, 1/4 ton (peeps) and trucks, 3/4 ton C & R (jeeps) may pass other halted or moving vehicles on a highway provided there is a 60 yard gap into which the passing vehicle may rejoin the traffic column.

13. a. All vehicles in convoys will habitually maintain 60 yards distance from the vehicle ahead, both, while moving and at a halt. Vehicles authorized to overtake will do so only where there is a full 60 yard gap available ahead.

b. Convoy or individual vehicles will maintain the 60 yards distance between vehicles when entering towns or cities or approaching

heavy traffic intersections.

14. All officers will assume the responsibility for apprehending violators of the above regulations and conducting them to the nearest military police post or "Vehicle Corral".

15. "Vehicle Corrals" will be established by Military Police at convenient points along traffic lanes for the detention and booking of traffic violators.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

SEAL

R. E. CUMMINGS
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 11

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944 BY ENCLOSURES					
ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 AUG.	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND 30 SEPT
PWE No. 3, Mur de Bretagne	Closed 5 Sept	388	199	587	0
ASCZ Brit-tany Base	Closed 6 Sept	0	1867	1867	0
PWE No. 5, Courtalain	Closed 1 Sept	66	1	67	0
PWE No. 6, Nemours	Closed 9 Sept	758	3884	4642	0
PWE No. 7, Revigny	Sept 3 - 21	0	12298	12297	1
PWE No. 8, Fresnes en Woevre	Opened 11 Sept	0	3936	3794	142
PWE No. 9, Toul	Opened 21 Sept	0	3386	2780	606
TOTALS		1212	25571	26034	749
Medical admissions			2501		
TOTAL RECEIVED			28072		
Escapers and Evaders		11	390	400	1

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED AT MEDICAL UNITS	TOTAL
August	63369	6677	70046
September	25571	2501	28072
			98118

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ANNEX NO. 12

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR) 27 September 1944
EXTRACT)
NUMBER 59) SECTION II - Curfew
SECTION IV - Uniform Violations.

II. CURFEW

Curfew in all towns is 2000 to 0600 hours. All military personnel will be off streets and clear of town during curfew hours.

IV. UNIFORM VIOLATIONS.

1. Captured clothing (such as fur coats, jackets, and fur hats) when worn as outer garments are in violation of current uniform regulations.

2. In every case involving such an offense the Provost Marshal will confiscate such articles of wearing apparel and turn them in to Quartermaster Captured Stores or Prisoner of War Enclosures for use of German prisoners of war.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL: HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff
R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 13

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR) 30 September 1944
NUMBER 60)

SECTION I - Policy with Respect to Towns and Cities
in Third Army Area.

EXTRACT

EXTRACT

I. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TOWNS AND CITIES IN THE THIRD ARMY AREA

1. Section VI, Circular 45, this headquarters, dated 17 August 1944, is rescinded.

2. All towns and cities in Third Army Area, upon liberation, will initially be placed on limits to all military personnel. Thereafter towns and cities may be placed "Off limits" and so signed when deemed expedient by the Army or the Corps Commander concerned.

3. Curfew in all towns and cities, time to be announced periodically, will include the hours of darkness, and will be strictly enforced for both military and civilian personnel.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL: HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff
R. E. CUMMINGS
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General

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ANNEX NO. 14

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR) 4 October 1944
NUMBER 63)

TRAFFIC REGULATION AND CONTROL
FOR CONTINENTAL OPERATION

I. This circular supersedes the provisions of Circular 10, current series, this headquarters, dated 4 May 1944.

II. GENERAL

1. PURPOSE:

- To establish the responsibility for and the method of control of road traffic in the Army Area.
- To familiarize U.S. Military personnel with the essential basic rules to be followed to meet operational traffic conditions.
- This circular is designed to regulate movement of supplies and troops and will not be considered applicable to units in tactical formations engaged in combat operations.

2. DEFINITIONS:

- Road Traffic: All aspects of the movement of vehicles or foot troops over roads. Its operation consists of road traffic regulations and road traffic control.
- Road Traffic Regulations: The measures taken to assure the proper movement of road traffic as to priorities, routes, time and destination.
- Road Traffic Controls: The means taken to insure the proper movement of road traffic and to insure that it meets the operational requirements. It is effected by compliance with instructions issued, and by control agencies used by commands within their areas.
- Main Routes: A principal supply or tactical route running generally from the rear forward, designated by the senior commander.

(1) Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward twelve o'clock will be used to indicate main routes forward to the front.

(2) Directional discs, white with black arrow pointed toward six o'clock will be used to indicate main down routes to the rear areas.

e. Lateral Route: A principal supply or tactical route running generally parallel to the front, designated by the senior commander. Directional discs, white with black arrow and bar perpendicular to the base of the shaft will be used to indicate lateral routes.

f. Detours: Directional discs, red with white arrow will be used to indicate detours from main or lateral routes.

g. Local Routes: Directional discs, or equivalent, white with red arrow will be used to indicate local routes.

h. Through Route: A route normally running through two or more sub-areas of an area, designated by the commander of the latter for the purpose of placing under his own direct command the regulation and control of road traffic thereon. Such routes when designated by the senior commander will be selected from Main or Lateral Routes.

3. BASIC PRINCIPLES:

a. Command Responsibilities: Each Corps and Division Commander will be responsible for the designation, marking, maintenance and control of roads within his area in conformity with the plan of the next higher commander.

b. Organization: To accomplish this traffic control, the headquarters of each division or larger tactical unit will institute,

within current T/O, a traffic headquarters under supervision of G-4 or a comparable staff section. Its duties will be to prepare Road Traffic Control Plan, to regulate and control traffic through a central agency, and will include:

- Receipt, correlation, and dissemination of road traffic information.
- Formulation and publication of road traffic rules.
- Supervision and control of Road Traffic Regulating.
- Coordination of movements originating in its area with the Traffic Headquarters of other area(s) into which such movements will continue.

III. ROAD TRAFFIC REGULATIONS:

1. ROUTES: Main, Lateral, and Through Routes will be designated by Traffic Headquarters, signed by Provost Marshals and maintained by Engineers within Army, Corps, and Division Areas respectively.

2. PRIORITIES:

a. The following priorities will be accorded traffic in the Army Area unless otherwise directed:

- Priority cars so marked (General Officers' vehicles)
- Messenger Cars
- Troop Movement
- Ambulances
- Staff Cars
- Wire construction crews
- Supply convoys in this priority: V, III, I.
- All other traffic.

b. Area commanders may designate special vehicles to be exempt from the above priorities and such exceptions will be in conformity with higher headquarters approval and will be specifically marked. For Signal Corps vehicles so exempted, the vehicle will be designated by demountable rectangular markings mounted on the right front and right rear bumpers. Such markings will be 9 1/2" long by 8 1/2" wide, painted horizontally blue and white, the upper half being white and the lower half blue. Also, such messenger personnel will wear 4" wide brassards above left elbow, the upper half being white, the lower half blue.

c. For exceptional tactical reasons, units may be moved with priority over all roads with written authority and adequate MP escorts, all traffic control agencies to be immediately informed of such priority exception.

3. LIGHTS:

a. Army Light Line coincides with Corps rear boundary.

b. Vehicle lights will be used as follows:

- Full headlights in rear of Army Light Line.
- Blackout driving lamps (dimout) for vehicles so equipped from Army Light Line to Division rear boundary.
- For vehicles not equipped with blackout driving lamps (dimouts), marker ("CAT EYES") lights from Army Light Line to Division rear boundary.
- Marker ("CAT EYES") lights for all vehicles in front of Division rear boundary.
- Red Light "Flashers" on special vehicles are authorized in addition to the above.

c. All obstacles such as trophies, gas cans, camouflage nets, signs, etc., will be removed from the front and rear of vehicles where they obstruct the full benefits of the head and tail lights.

4. SPEEDS: The following speed limits will be observed except under those circumstances where operational traffic conditions or exceptional tactical situations dictate otherwise.

a. Daylight:

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- (1) 25 MPH: All convoys
- (2) 30 MPH: All individual trucks (including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over, wheeled or tracked).
- (3) 40 MPH: Passenger cars, 1/4 ton trucks, and trucks 3/4 ton C & R, and motorcycles.
- (4) In towns and cities no vehicle to exceed 25 MPH.

- b. Night (blackout)
- (1) 15 MPH: All wheeled and tracked vehicles including 3/4 ton weapons carriers and over, and all convoys.
 - (2) 20 MPH: Passenger cars, 1/4 ton trucks, and trucks 3/4 ton C & R, and motorcycles.
 - (3) At night, with standard headlights daylight speed limits will prevail behind Army light lines.

5. DENSITY: The following vehicle density will be standard except where notified by a commander to meet the requirements of a special tactical situation:

- a. March unit will not exceed 30 vehicles.
- b. Serial will not exceed 5 march units.
- c. Serials and units will conform to road time allotted them and will maintain 60 yards between vehicles at all times, and a time interval of 3 minutes between march units and 6 minutes between serials.
- d. All traffic on the Continent will drive on the righthand side.
- e. Nothing in these instructions will be construed as relieving a convoy commander of his responsibility for proper convoy discipline and unit control.

IV. ROAD TRAFFIC CONTROL:

1. CLASSIFICATION AND MARKINGS:

a. The British road, bridge and vehicle classification and marking system will be used. Under this system, a vehicle may cross only bridges bearing classification numbers which are the same or greater than the vehicle's classification.

b. (1) Franco plates, metal or wooden material, 15" x 17" or 17" x 30", with white letters on black background will be used for unit, installation or route signs. No other size, type, or colored signs will be used except Medical Corps signs as prescribed in Letter, Headquarters Third United States Army, AG 415 GMMCN-4, dated 16 June 1944, subject: Signs for Medical Units, and as authorized by the Army Commander.

(2) For location of administrative and tactical headquarters of Command Posts: Unit insignia for Army, Corps and Divisions; unit designations for other units. Telephone code names will not be used.

V. CONVOYS:

1. CLEARANCE:

a. Entry into Third Army Area - All units or detachments (American or Allied) will secure permission from Army Headquarters prior to entering Third Army Area.

b. All convoys of 10 or more vehicles will secure clearance through Traffic Headquarters of convoy origin as soon as the necessity for the move is determined.

c. Request for clearance will include the following information:

- (1) Headquarters requiring clearance.
- (2) Name of Convoy Commander.
- (3) Unit to move.
- (4) Authority to move.
- (5) Total number of vehicles.
- (6) Total number of march units.
- (7) Total number of serials.
- (8) Heaviest type vehicle in column.
- (9) Present location of unit.
- (10) Destination.
- (11) Time and date movement desired.
- (12) Route desired.

d. Unauthorized convoys will be halted by military police and will not be allowed to proceed until clearance is obtained.

2. CONVOY COMMANDER:

a. The convoy commander will be responsible that:

- (1) The convoy commander will ride in that position in his convoy that will insure close supervision of his convoy at all times.
- (2) The movement number of the convoy is clearly marked on the front and rear of the lead vehicle of each march unit.
- (3) The lead vehicle of the convoy (not to include Convoy Commanders vehicles) or of each column, if convoy is moving in more than one column, is marked with a blue flag and the tail vehicle with a green flag, or if at night, with blue and green lights.
- (4) All drivers are informed of the convoy number, destination, and the route to be followed. A strip map of the route will be furnished each driver when practicable, and if in cases not practicable, the route numbers and principal towns along the designated route.
- (5) While at the halt that march interval (60 yds) is maintained; that vehicles are moved to the right of (and off) the normally travelled surface of the road, using due precaution in mined areas, and that assistant drivers or drivers are stationed in such manner as to assist passing traffic by appropriate signals.
- (6) Disabled vehicles are moved off the road and that an attendant is posted to guard the vehicle and assist all traffic past the vehicle. He will report to the nearest traffic control post or Military Police the location of the disabled vehicle and any other obstruction or road damage which requires attention.

b. A representative of the convoy commander will precede the convoy by at least ten minutes to coordinate with the Traffic Control points enroute.

3. PASSING: All vehicles in convoys will habitually maintain 60 yards distance from the vehicle ahead, both, while moving and at a halt. Vehicles authorized to overtake will do so only where there is a full 60 yard gap available ahead.

VI. RESTRICTIONS:

1. The tops on trucks, 1/4 ton, and trucks, 3/4 ton C & R, will be down at all times except during heavy rains.
2. Civilians will not be carried in U. S. military vehicles except as indicated hereinafter: Counter-intelligence Corps personnel, Military Police, and Civil Affairs personnel are authorized to carry civilian personnel when necessary on official business.
3. Drivers will not smoke while driving.
4. Trucks, 1/4 ton, will not carry more than four persons except in operational emergencies at or near the front lines.
5. Not more than one person beside the driver will ride in the cabs or front seats of any vehicles.
6. Halting of vehicles:
 - a. On military highways voluntary halting, stopping, or parking for any purpose is forbidden unless all wheels of the vehicle are clear of the normally travelled road surface.
 - b. Disabled vehicles will be towed or pushed off the road surface immediately.
 - c. Double banking of halted vehicles or moving vehicles on highways by 3/4 ton weapons carriers and all other heavier wheeled or tracked vehicles is forbidden at any time.
 - d. The halting of vehicles on military highways in towns is forbidden.
7. Motorcycles, passenger cars, trucks 1/4 ton, and trucks 3/4 ton C & R, may pass other halted or moving vehicles on a highway provided there is a 60 yard gap into which the passing vehicle may rejoin the traffic column.
8. All individual vehicles, as well as convoys, will maintain the 60 yard distance between vehicles when entering towns or cities or approaching heavy traffic intersections.
9. Rear vision mirrors will be so adjusted as to be usable in watching for traffic approaching from the rear.

10. Officers will not drive military vehicles unless:

- a. Driver is taken sick, is injured, wounded, killed or dies (while on a trip).
 - b. In case of fire.
 - c. In case of attack (including riots, etc.).
 - d. In any case of life or death.
 - e. In any special case, when directed in writing by the Unit or Installation Commander where the need is urgent, and is for the good of the Government. This will in no case be used as an excuse for an officer to drive for personal satisfaction.
11. Vehicles will not be left unattended unless under immediate surveillance of guards or in authorized guarded parking lots.
12. U. S. Military vehicles will not be immobilized by the removal of rotors or other vital parts by military or civilian personnel.
13. All officers will assume the responsibility for apprehending violators of the above regulations and conducting them to the nearest military police post, "Vehicle Corral," or Summary Court.

14. Vehicle Corrals:

a. Vehicle Corrals will be established at once under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal for the detention of violators of traffic rules and regulations. Vehicles and drivers impounded in "Vehicle Corrals" will be held from one (1) to twelve (12) hours for booking, and to remove from the highways these vehicles and drivers constituting a menace to the controlled flow of traffic.

b. The following violations will warrant detention in Vehicle Corrals: speeding, double-banking, light violations, reckless driving, driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, failure to maintain the prescribed 60 yard distance between vehicles when moving or at a halt, disobedience of Military Police traffic directions, and any of the following vehicles passing any other moving vehicle or halted convoy, except by direction of Military Police:

- Trucks, 3/4 ton weapons carriers
- Trucks, 1-1/2 ton cargo
- Trucks, 2-1/2 ton cargo
- All other wheeled or tracked vehicles over 3/4 ton capacity.

15. Summary Courts: Summary Courts will be established under the supervision of the Army Provost Marshal to bring swift justice and immediate punishment to traffic violators and other offenders. These courts will be moved to critical points as required, and will be set up and try offenders on the spot. Offenses beyond the jurisdiction of the courts will be investigated and referred to appropriate commander for necessary action.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFNEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department
Adjutant General.

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ANNEX NO. 15

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 30 SEPT	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 7 REVIIGNY		1	0	1	0
PWE Number 8 FRESNES EN WOEVRE	Closed 16 Oct 44	142	415	557	0
PWE Number 9 TOUL		606	3500	3964	142
TOTALS		749	3915	4521	142
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			307		
TOTAL			4222		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		1	40	41	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 OCTOBER 1944			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTAL
AUGUST	63369	6677	70046
SEPTEMBER	25571	2501	28072
OCTOBER	3915	307	4222
TOTALS	92855	9485	102340

ANNEX NO. 16

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 383.6 GMEY

14 November 1944

SUBJECT: Retention of Prisoners of War by Forward Units.

TO : See Distribution.

1. It has been brought to the attention of this headquarters that forward elements are retaining captured enemy personnel for labor purposes within their units.

2. In many instances these prisoners of war are from key enemy units, and much valuable intelligence information is lost by their retention.

3. All prisoners of war, in accordance with existing policy, will be evacuated to the Corps Collecting Point immediately upon capture.

4. Attention is directed to the following publications prohibiting the working of prisoners of war anywhere within twelve miles of the nearest enemy frontlines:

a. Letter, SHAEF, AG 383.6-3 GAP-AGM, dated 11 April 1944, subject: "Employment of Prisoners of War."

b. Letter, Headquarters ETOUSA, AG 383.6 OpGA, dated 21 September 1944, subject: "Prisoner of War Labor."

c. Annex Number 19 to TUSA Outline Plan, Operation Overlord, Provoost Marshal Plan, dated 11 May 1944.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

L. L. MANLY,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 17

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1944
BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 OCT	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 9 TOUL		142	10686	9919	909
PWE Number 10 FLORANGE	Opened 11 May 44	0	13447	12188	1259
TOTALS		142	24133	22107	2168
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1779		
TOTAL			25912		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	32	32	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 30 NOVEMBER 1944			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 to 31 OCTOBER 1944	92,855	9,485	102,340
NOVEMBER 1944	24,133	1,779	25,912
TOTALS	116,988	11,264	128,252

ANNEX NO. 18

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 250.1 GMEY

25 November 1944

SUBJECT: Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Corps and Division Commanders will submit to the Army Provost Marshal, this headquarters, not later than the third day of each month, a summary showing the number of crimes, offenses and serious incidents, by classification, as listed below, occurring during the preceding month in their respective zones. Non-Division and non-Corps units under immediate control of this headquarters will submit report directly to the Army Provost Marshal.

- a. Theft of U. S. Government property, including vehicles, subsistence stores, firearms, ammunition, drugs, etc.
- b. Disorders or incidents of physical violence between U. S. troops, Allied and U. S. troops, and/or civilians.
- c. U. S. Army motor vehicle accidents involving death or serious injury.
- d. Any other serious incident involving U. S. military personnel with civilian or military personnel.
- e. Escape from custody or confinement by U. S. military prisoners.
- f. Murder.
- g. Sodomy.
- h. Rape.
- i. Arson.
- j. Burglary.
- k. Housebreaking.
- l. Forgery.
- m. Larceny (where the value is more than \$50.00).
- n. Robbery.
- o. Manslaughter.
- p. Mayhem.

2. In addition to the above a brief description of the crime or incident charged or suspected will be reported and will include:

- a. Name, rank, serial number and organization of offender.
- b. Crime charged or suspected, or a brief description of the incident being reported.
- c. Name(s) and description of the victim(s).
- d. Time, date, and place of the offense or incident being reported.
- e. Action taken.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:


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L. L. MANLY
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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ANNEX NO. 19
TRAFFIC CONTROL ROUTES
FOR MOVEMENT THIRD U.S. ARMY
UNITS TO BASTOGNE OPERATION

BASTOGNE




PRISONER OF WAR REPORT
 FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1944
 BY ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 30 NOV	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
FWE Number 9 TOUL	Closed 17 Dec 44	909	3619	4528	0
FWE Number 10 FLORANGE		1259	10306	11392	172
FWE Number 11 FOLSCHVILLER	Opened 19 Dec 44	0	0	0	0
FWE Number 11 FOLSCHVILLER	Closed 20 Dec 44	0	0	0	0
FWE Number 12 MARVILLE ST. JEAN	Opened 26 Dec 44	0	3154	2846	308
TOTALS at FWEs		2168	17079	18767	480
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1341		
TOTAL			18420		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	3	3	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1944

	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 August 1944 to 30 November 1944	116,988	11,264	128,252
December 1944	17,079	1,341	18,420
TOTALS	134,067	12,605	146,672



GROUP OF GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED IN NEUFCHATEAU-BASTOGNE SECTOR OF BELGIUM WAITING TO BE CHECKED IN BY G-2

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 21

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

CIRCULAR) 4 January 1945
NUMBER 2)

MILITARY CONTROL OF THE CITY OF LUXEMBOURG AND VICINITY

1. By direction of the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, assumes military control of the City of LUXEMBOURG and vicinity.
2. Responsibility for cordon defense and the defense of command posts will remain as at present. Existing plans of the Twelfth Army Group and the Third U. S. Army will be carefully coordinated in order to insure prompt and decisive action, the effective operation of those plans as a whole, and the elimination of confusion and doubt in the minds of those charged with their execution. Third U. S. Army will be prepared to take over all defense responsibilities now borne by Twelfth Army Group when called upon to do so.
3. Curfew: Civilian curfew will be from 2000 to 0600 hours daily.
4. The following pass policy for military personnel visiting, stationed at, or billeted in the City of LUXEMBOURG, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, is announced effective 5 January 1945, except that passes for troops under command of or designated by Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, and Headquarters, Ninth Air Force will be issued in accordance with their present instructions.
5. a. The City of LUXEMBOURG is off limits to other military personnel except that five (5) percent only of the T/O strength of units mentioned below may visit LUXEMBOURG on any one day.
 - (1) XII Corps, including all attached and supporting units.
 - (2) All troops stationed and/or billeted within the city limits of LUXEMBOURG.
 - (3) Army Troops, Third United States Army located within the boundaries of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
- b. No twenty-four (24) hour passes will be issued.
6. Existing regulations regarding the use of the prescribed "password" will be strictly adhered to and enforced by all concerned.
7. United States military vehicles will not be left unattended in the Third United States Army area unless under the immediate surveillance of guards or in authorized military parking lots (Circular 88, this headquarters, 10 December 1944).
8. All buildings will be completely "blacked-out" in accordance with scheduled hours as published. It is the responsibility of persons occupying quarters or offices to see that they are "blacked-out."
9. Army Regulations 600-35, relative to the proper wearing of the uniform, will be strictly enforced.
10. Traffic Regulation and Control will be enforced as outlined in Circular 63, this headquarters, 4 October 1944, with changes.
11. Third U. S. Army personnel will be governed by existing Third U. S. Army directives, not mentioned above.

By command of Lieutenant General FATTON:

OFFICIAL

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

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ANNEX NO. 22

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

3 January 1945

PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF COMMAND POST

(Destroy all copies dated 18 December 1944, and annexes thereto).

1. GENERAL:

This plan establishes a procedure and designates forces for the defense of the Command Post Area against attack by enemy personnel or sympathizers.
2. PLAN:
 - a. Annex No. 1 (Detailed Plan for Defense of Lucky Forward Command Post).
 - b. Annex No. 2 (Detailed Plan for Defense of Lucky Rear Command Post).
3. FORCES AVAILABLE:
 - a. See annexes.
 - b. Anti-aircraft Artillery gun positions located on the outskirts of the Command Post Area have the primary mission of defense against air attack and secondary mission of warning and defense against ground attack.
 - c. Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion provides an interior guard for the defense of the Command Post proper. This guard has a primary mission of restricting entrance to Command Post to authorized personnel and a secondary mission of investigating and reporting unusual occurrences and evidences of hostile activity in the immediate area of the Command Post.
 - d. Headquarters Company, Third U. S. Army, provides an additional force for the close-in protection of the Command Post proper. This force will normally operate under the Commanding Officer, Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion and will require not more than one hour to be assembled from its several primary duties.
4. PROCEDURE:
 - a. Report of hostile activity will be made by fastest available means of communication to the Provost Marshal (LUCKY 27 or 20). Such reports will give the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW of the hostile activity reported.
 - b. Upon receipt of reports indicating possible activity against the Command Post Area, the Provost Marshal will order the officer in charge of command post security to execute the plan of defense.
 - c. The officer in charge of command post security will keep the Provost Marshal informed at all times as to the progress of the action.
 - d. Immediate reports of hostile activity will be made by

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the Provost Marshal to the following in the order indicated:

- (1) Chief of Staff (Lucky 5 or 106).
- (2) G-3 (Lucky 32).
- (3) G-2 (Lucky 2).
- (4) Headquarters Commandant (Lucky 115).
- (5) Deputy Chief of Staff (Lucky 107 or 230).
- (6) Anti-aircraft Officer (Lucky 48).
- (7) Engineer Officer (Lucky 15).

e. Each General and Special Staff Section Chief will, upon notification from the Provost Marshal's Office that the plan for the defense of the Command Post is in effect, assemble his respective staff officers, arrange for the safeguarding, transportation, or destruction of classified documents, and stand by for further orders from the Chief of Staff. If necessary, this force may be used in whole or in part in the defense of the Command Post.

By command of Lieutenant General FATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen

ANNEX NO. 23

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 381 - GMMCY

4 January 1945

SUBJECT: Admission to Lucky Forward Headquarters.

TO : All General and Special Staff Sections, Forward Headquarters, Third U. S. Army.

1. This letter supersedes letter dated 29 December 1944, Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, subject, "Admission to Lucky Forward Headquarters." Instructions contained herein are effective this date.
2. To insure greater security, the following additional instructions to letter, Command Post Security, dated 23 December 1944, this headquarters, will be complied with. Certain portions of the area occupied by this headquarters or its installations will be designated as "Restricted Areas."
 - a. The interior and exterior of Headquarters buildings, billets, and messes are hereby designated as "Restricted Areas."
 3. Offices and Quarters: All entrances to the building occupied by Lucky Forward Echelon except those under guard will be blocked.
 4. Dismount Point: A dismount point for all personnel below the grade of General Officer is established at the main entrance gate:
 - a. Only the following vehicles, in addition to those of General Officers, will be allowed to enter the enclosure:
 - (1) One passenger vehicle per staff section. (Identified by new type windshield sticker).
 - (2) Signal, utilities, mail and supply service trucks.
 5. Liaison officers and military personnel regularly on duty within a "Restricted Area," or whose official duties necessitate visiting such areas, will be issued a special pass provided by the Provost Marshal's Office. This pass will be presented to MPs at entrances to Headquarters, billets, and messes.
 - a. The pass will be a card printed in a characteristic color scheme with the signature of the holder. Each pass will have a number which will be on file in the office of the Provost Marshal and this number will not be changed. Each pass will bear initials of the Provost Marshal. Each Section Chief will be responsible for issuing passes to

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ANNEX NO. 24

the personnel of his Section. The Provost Marshal will supply Chiefs of Sections with the necessary numbered blank passes. The Chiefs of Sections will furnish the Provost Marshal with a list showing the personnel to whom these passes have been issued, recorded by number. Each Staff Section will notify the Provost Marshal of any deletions or additions to its section roster.

b. The meaning and use of this pass will be treated as Secret information by all personnel. The pass will be carried on the person at all times and must be presented to Military Police for entrance to the "Restricted Area" only in conjunction with AGO Form 65-1 for officers, or with identification tags for enlisted men.

c. Loss or compromise of the pass will be immediately reported to the Provost Marshal with a statement of the circumstances.

d. At irregular intervals the Provost Marshal will issue new cards with a new characteristic color scheme and design, at which time the old cards will be recalled and will no longer be valid for admission to the "Restricted Areas."

6. Persons desiring admission to "Restricted Areas" who do not have the pass designated above will be considered visitors and will be admitted by the following procedure:

a. Each section will submit a complete roster of enlisted men and officer personnel working in the Command Post to Provost Marshal. Unless known by the MP on duty, all officer AGO cards and enlisted men "dog tags" will be checked against this list by the MP on duty at desk. In event an officer desiring entrance is not on the list, interested Section will be called by phone and an officer will come to the entrance desk and vouch for the visitor. A special colored identification pass card for visitors will be given such officer, who will surrender same on leaving the building.

b. Civilian personnel: Civilians will be admitted to a "Restricted Area" only on official business. The visitor will be escorted to reception desk where his credentials will be examined and he will be required to state the nature of his business. The officer he desires to visit will be contacted by telephone and with his approval only, the visitor will be escorted by an officer of section concerned to his office, after his name, address, nationality, time of arrival and name of the officer to be contacted have been entered in a register prepared and maintained by the Provost Marshal at the reception desk. At the completion of the visit it will be the responsibility of the officer contacted to insure that the visitor is escorted from the "Restricted Area", checking out at the reception desk as he leaves. The time of departure will be entered in the register. Military Police will intercept all civilians who are found unescorted within a "Restricted Area" or who attempt to leave one without properly checking out.

c. Incoming Articles and Packages: All packages, other than US mail, brought into buildings occupied by the Headquarters will be inspected for hidden explosives. In event of suspicion on the part of Military Police on duty, the package and bearer will be referred immediately to CIC or Engineer Technical Intelligence.

d. Any officer having a special pass accompanied by a visitor or on official business may secure the visitor's admission to a "Restricted Area" by personally vouching for him; he will, however, be responsible that the visitor confines his activities to the official business on which he came and that he leaves promptly upon its completion. Civilians admitted under this procedure will be recorded in the register as described in Paragraph 6b above.


7. Admission to areas and installations of this headquarters other than those designated as "Restricted Areas" will be in accordance with existing regulations.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1945 BY ENCLOSURES					
ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 DEC	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	31 JAN 45 ON HAND
PWE Number 10 FLORANCE		172	4210	4184	198
PWE Number 12 MARVILLE		308	10798	10746	360
TOTALS AT PWEs		480	15008	14930	558
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1617		
TOTAL			16625		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	1	1	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 31 DECEMBER 1944	134,067	12,605	146,672
JANUARY 1945	15,008	1,617	16,625
TOTALS	149,075	14,222	163,297



GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED IN THE SAAR TRIANGLE

ANNEX NO. 25

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

9 February 1945

ANNEX NO. 1 to "Plan for Defense of Command Post" dated 3 January 1945.

PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FORWARD COMMAND POST
(Corrected copy - destroy all copies dated 3 January 1945).

1. FORCES AVAILABLE:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (one platoon).

- 3 Officers, 91 enlisted men (approximately).
- 2 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, cargo.
- 8 trucks, 1/2 ton.
- Individual weapons

AAA units assigned mission of protection of Forward Command Post against aircraft. To be used from own positions against ground attack to prevent positions and/or Command Post Area from being overrun by the enemy.

2 Reconnaissance platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

- 2 Officers, 42 enlisted men
- 4 cars, armored M8 with armament.
- 8 trucks, 1/2 ton, with machine guns, caliber .30.
- Individual weapons.

Light Tank Platoon, Headquarters 8th Armored Group

- 1 Officer, 36 enlisted men.
- 3 tanks, light, M5A1, with armament.
- 3 half-tracks, M3, with machine guns, caliber .50.
- Individual weapons.

Headquarters Company, Third United States Army

- 2 Officers, 100 enlisted men (approximately).
- Individual weapons

Company A, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion

- 5 Officers, 165 enlisted men.
- 14 trucks, 1/2 ton.
- 3 trucks, 1 1/2 ton.
- 2 cars, armored utility, with armament.
- 12 half-tracks, M3A3, with armament.
- 1 truck, 2 1/2 ton cargo.
- 13 guns, machine, caliber .30.
- 9 guns, machine, caliber .50.
- 12 guns, 3" M1 (towed).
- 15 Launchers, rocket.

2. MISSIONS:

a. Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (CP Guard).

- (1) Interior Security of Command Post.
- (2) Protection of the Commanding General's Quarters.
- (3) Protection of War Room and Commanding General's Office.

b. AAA units - Normal.

c. The Reconnaissance Platoons, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the Tank Platoon, Headquarters, 8th Armored Group will constitute the initial striking force to meet ground attack.

d. When ordered by the officer in charge of Command Post Security, the Headquarters Commandant will assemble the Headquarters Company, Third United States Army. After the unit is formed, the Company Commander will report to the officer in charge of Command Post Security with the strength and location of the unit.

SECRET

c. Company A, 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion will occupy prepared gun positions in event of a breakthrough to Luxembourg from the EAST, NORTH, or SOUTH.

4. SUCCESSION OF COMMAND:

a. The officer in charge of Command Post Security will be the senior officer in the Defense Section of the Army Provost Marshal Office.

5. COMMAND POST:

a. Command Post of Command Post Defense Force will be established at Provost Marshal Section, Third United States Army (Lucky 20 or 27).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. 26

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

11 February 1945

ANNEX NO. 2 to "Plan for Defense of Command Post" dated 3 January 1945.

PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF REAR ECHELON OF COMMAND POST
(Corrected copy - destroy all copies dated 16 January 1945.)

1. FORCES AVAILABLE:

Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (two platoons).

1 Officer, 60 enlisted men (approximately).
Individual weapons.

Headquarters Company, Third U. S. Army (Rear Echelon).

2 Officers, 100 enlisted men.
Individual weapons.

Forces assigned mission of Protection of Lucky Forward Headquarters.

(See Annex No. 1, dated 9 February 1945).

2. MISSION:

a. Platoon of Company A, 503rd Military Police Battalion (CP Guard).

(1) Interior Security of Command Post Buildings (in event of emergency, men off duty will be used to double all posts).

b. Headquarters Company, Third United States Army.

(1) When ordered by the officer in charge of Command Post Security, the Assistant Headquarters Commandant will assemble the personnel of Headquarters Company, Third United States Army. After the unit is formed, the Company Commander will report to the officer in charge of Command Post Security with the strength and location of the unit.

c. Forces assigned mission of Protection of Lucky Forward Headquarters.

(1) See Annex No. 1, dated 9 February 1945.

3. SUCCESSION OF COMMAND:

a. The Officer in Charge of Command Post Security will be the senior officer in the Defense Section of the Army Provost Marshal Office.

4. COMMAND POST:

a. Command Post of Command Post Defense Force will be established at Provost Marshal Section, Third United States Army (Lucky 20 or 27).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

ANNEX NO. 27

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1945 BY ENCLOSURES					
ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 JAN	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	28 FEB 45 ON HAND
PWS Number 10 FLORANGE		198	13841	12956	1083
PWS Number 12 MARVILLE	Closed 8 Feb 45	360	2502	2862	0
PWS Number 13 ARLON	Opened 9 Feb 45	0	6763	5727	1036
TOTALS AT PWSs		558	23106	21545	2119
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			1055		
TOTAL			24161		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	35	35	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 28 FEBRUARY 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 31 JANUARY 1945	149,075	14,222	163,297
FEBRUARY 1945	23,106	1,055	24,161
TOTALS	172,181	15,277	187,458

ANNEX NO. 28

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 250.1 GNMCO

17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Reporting of Crimes, Offenses and Serious Incidents.

TO : See Distribution.

1. All crimes, offenses and incidents of a serious nature committed within the Army area and involving United States property or United States Army personnel and Camp Followers will be reported to the Criminal Investigation Section, Office of the Provost Marshal, this headquarters.

2. The crimes listed below will be reported immediately upon discovery by fastest available means and, upon request of the Corps or Division Provost Marshal, will be investigated by the Criminal Investigation Section, Office of the Provost Marshal, this headquarters, Rear Echelon.

Murder	Manslaughter	Rape	Sodomy
Arson	House Breaking	Burglary	Robbery
Forgery	Larceny	Racial Violence	
Theft, Misappropriation and Misapplication of United States property.			

3. When the crimes listed above in paragraph 2 are reported by civilians to Civil Affairs Detachments, Military Police, or other military units the report will be forwarded without delay by fastest available means to this headquarters.

4. When one of the subject crimes is reported to this headquarters all available information will be given, including the names of personnel involved, the place and time and any action already taken by the unit reporting the crime.

5. Necessary action will be taken to protect material evidence available at the scene of the crime until the arrival of agents of the Criminal Investigation Section. The unnecessary handling or disturbance of such evidence will be avoided. In appropriate cases guards will be posted to prevent destruction of evidence.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:

"A" (50 copies to FM)

"B"

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 29

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 415 ONMCY 9 March 1945

SUBJECT: Town and Route Marking in Germany.

TO : See Distribution.

1. The following instructions (excerpted in part from paragraph 6, Change No. 1 to Administrative Instructions No. 2, Headquarters, Third United States Army, 4 December 1944) will govern road and town marking in Germany.

a. The Emergency Road Map 1:250,000, sheets K49 - K50 - K51 149 - 150 - 151 will be used from German border through Germany. Road numbering on these maps is as directed by Twelfth Army Group.

b. The main highways marked on the map (and on the ground) by a number within a rectangle (example 159) are highways marked and used by the Germans and will be similarly remarked by the Provost Marshal.

c. Highways marked on the map with a letter "L" and a number within a circle (example L 150) are unmarked highways (on the ground) in Germany. The markings as shown on the Emergency Road Map are the arbitrary highway markings which will be used by U. S. Armies. The marking of highways with these arbitrary numbers is the responsibility of the Provost Marshal.

d. Highways marked on the map with letters "A" and a number within a triangle (example A 5) are Autobahns (4 lane highways) and will also be marked with arbitrary numbers.

2. a. The Corps Provost Marshals will mark highways and towns with road marking and town designation signs in conformity with the Emergency Road Map. In order to eliminate confusion and expedite traffic, roads and towns will be marked at the earliest possible moment after passing to our control. Supplemental signing will be accomplished by the Army Provost Marshal.

b. Signing will be accomplished as follows:

(1) 8" x 17" black on white signs will be used for route markings.

(2) 8" x 30" black on white signs will be used for town markings.

3. At the present time, in addition to the Emergency Road Map, scale 1:250,000, the Germany Road Map, scale 1:500,000, is widely used.

The only roads numbered on this map are the main highways (Reichsstrassen), which are marked on the ground, and are shown by this map symbol 41 .

By command of Lieutenant General FATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "E"

ANNEX NO. 30

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH 1945 BY ENCLOSURES					
ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 28 FEB	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND
PWE Number 10 FLORANGE	Closed 8 Mar 45	1083	4248	5331	0
PWE Number 13 ARLON	Closed 9 Mar 45	1036	9908	10944	0
PWE Number 14 TRIER	Opened 8 Mar 45	0	85856	85355	501
PWE Number 15 BAUMHOLDER	Opened 21 Mar 45 Closed 30 Mar 45	0	32495	32393	101
PWE Number 16 ECKELSHHEIM	Opened 31 Mar 45	0	4419	0	4419
TOTALS at PWEs		2119	136926	134024	5021
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS			5291		
TOTAL			142217		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	2396	2396	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 31 MARCH 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 28 FEBRUARY 1945	172,181	15,277	187,458
MARCH 1945	136,926	5,291	142,217
TOTALS	309,107	20,568	329,675

ANNEX NO. 31

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 1945 BY ENCLOSURES					
ENCLOSURE	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 31 MAR	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	30 APR ON HAND
PWE Number 14, TRIER	Closed 5 Apr	501	1,557	2,058	0
PWE Number 15, BAUMHOLDER		101	0	101	0
PWE Number 16, ECKELSHHEIM	Closed 5 Apr	4,419	20,985	25,404	0
PWE Number 17, OBER URSEL	Opened 2 Apr Closed 14 Apr	0	29,485	29,485	0
PWE Number 18, HATTENBACH	Opened 5 Apr Closed 19 Apr	0	54,036	54,036	0
PWE Number 19, LAUCHA	Opened 14 Apr Closed 22 Apr	0	63,586	63,586	0
PWE Number 20, KULMBACH	Opened 22 Apr	0	18,890	3,136	15,754
PWE Number 21, LANGENZENN	Opened 24 Apr	0	48,185	8,370	39,815
TOTALS at PWEs		5,021	236,724	186,176	55,569
MEDICAL ADMISSIONS - including overrun German Military Hospitals			96,180		
TOTAL			332,904		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		0	41	37	4

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	RECEIVED BY MEDICAL UNITS	TOTALS
1 AUGUST 1944 TO 31 MARCH 1945	309,107	20,568	329,675
APRIL 1945	236,724	96,180	332,904
TOTALS	545,831	116,748	662,579

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 32

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

18 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

NO. 3:

CAPTURED GERMAN MILITARY HOSPITALS

I. In the Corps Zones.

a. The Corps Surgeon, in whose area the captured hospital is located, will immediately notify the Liaison Officer, 66th Medical Group, and the Army Surgeon, giving the name and location of the hospital together with an estimate of the number and classification of the German Military Staff and patients. In his report he will include the status of food and medical supplies.

b. The Army Surgeon will in turn transmit this information to the Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, and to the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army, for information only.

c. The Corps Commander will form the necessary number of teams to immediately proceed to the captured hospitals and institute measures as outlined below. Each team will consist of one representative from the Corps G-2 Section for screening purposes and one officer representing the Corps Provost Marshal. The Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, will coordinate with the Corps Commander to furnish one medical officer for each team. These teams will contact the Military Government Detachment nearest to the hospital to be taken over, and arrange for an officer of that detachment to accompany them.

d. The Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, will administer these hospitals, to include supervising medical care, screening the patients to be sent to prisoner of war enclosures, supplying the hospitals with food, medical supplies, etc. He will also be responsible for consolidating patients and captured German medical personnel of these hospitals into other captured German hospitals to the limit of facilities and time available.

e. The duties of the teams will be:

1. To proceed to the hospital overrun.

2. Prepare a roster of all German military personnel in the hospital, and deliver copies to the Army Surgeon, Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, Corps Provost Marshal, Town Burgomeister and the German Commanding Officer of the hospital.

3. Definitely place responsibility for the operation and guarding of the hospital and the detention of all German military personnel therein on the local Burgomeister and the hospital Commanding Officer. This responsibility will be jointly assumed.

4. Cause the local Burgomeister to furnish necessary guards.

5. Prepare necessary regulations for control of the hospital.

f. The primary duties of the various members of the team are:

1. The Military Government Representative will:

(a) Make the necessary contacts with the Town Burgomeister and any other German authorities concerned.

(b) Arrange for necessary guards through the Burgomeister.

(c) Make frequent inspections of the hospital and frequent checks on the Burgomeister.

2. The Medical Officer will:

(a) Determine which of the prisoner patients can be immediately evacuated into prisoner of war channels.

nels.

(b) Determine which must be retained as patients.

(c) Make a survey as to the adequacy of medical care and sanitation and take initial corrective action.

(d) Make a survey and report to the Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, as to the status of food, water, medical and other Class II and IV supplies.

(e) Initiate action on other medical questions.

3. The G-2 Representative will:

(a) Check and screen all patients.

(b) Identify, tag and list all "S.S." personnel.

(c) Render a report to the appropriate Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of: Identity of any members of the "S.S." of counter-intelligence interest, identity of such other personnel of present or future operational intelligence value, such as technicians, together with a brief summary of the interrogation.

(d) Arrange with the Medical Officer for the concentration of "S.S." personnel that cannot be evacuated due to physical condition.

4. The Provost Marshal Representative will:

(a) Arrange to receive into prisoner of war channels all patients to be evacuated immediately and others to be evacuated as they become convalescent.

(b) Insure that all "S.S." personnel are evacuated with proper tag, or, if not to be evacuated, concentrated in special groups.

(c) Make a thorough search of the buildings and premises for arms and other weapons, contraband articles and radio transmitters, paying particular attention to X-Ray rooms and installations of a suspicious nature.

(d) Seize and turn in all articles enumerated in paragraph (c) above.

(e) Search all patients in accordance with letter, Office of the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army, "Instructions for Personnel in Charge of Searching Prisoners of War". All items listed in column two of that directive will be confiscated and proper disposal made thereof.

(f) Determine the number of guards necessary and their locations.

(g) Institute a pass system for entry and exit.

g. The Corps Provost Marshal will be responsible that visiting patrols check the German military hospitals at frequent and irregular intervals. Health conditions, sanitation, meals and cooking facilities will be checked. A check will be made of supplies on hand and consumed. Bed checks will be made. Copies of inspections reports will be forwarded to the Commanding Officer, 66th Medical Group, and to the Provost Marshal, Third U.S. Army, for his information.

II. In the Army Area.

a. When Corps rear boundaries move up and the Army takes over German Military Hospitals in former Corps territory, the Army Provost Marshal will immediately assume responsibility for them in conjunction with the Army Surgeon and G-5. The Provost Marshal will act in accordance with Section I, paragraph g, above.

b. Should it become necessary to take over German Military Hospitals that have not been processed by Corps as directed in Section I above, the procedure will be the same as directed in Section I, only executed by Army personnel instead of Corps personnel.

c. The Army Surgeon and the Army Provost Marshal will keep a posted map showing location of all German Military Hospitals in: (1) Army Area; (2) Corps Areas.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"
25 - CG each Corps
5 - CG each Div.
15 - FM, Third Army
75 - G-5, Third Army
5 - Surgeon, Third Army
5 - G-2, Third Army
15 - CO, 66th Med Gp.

ANNEX NO. 33

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

11 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution.

ALERT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF HEADQUARTERS AREA
(Forward Echelon)

1. The following plan will go into effect upon a warning signal sounded by a siren inside the Kaserne area, during the hours of darkness, or if the Kaserne is attacked.

2. All enlisted personnel will immediately assemble, with arms, pistol or rifle belts and ammunition in front of the building in which they are quartered under command of the following officers:

Building A - One of the G-2 Duty Officers.
Building B - One of the Artillery Duty Officers.
Building C - One of the Provost Marshal's Duty Officers.
Building D - A Headquarters Company Officer, assisted by an officer from the 502d QM Car Company.
Building F - An officer from the Headquarters Commandant's Section.

3. It is the responsibility of each of the sections mentioned in paragraph 2 to assure that officers on duty are familiar with this plan.

4. When the troops are formed, the troops commander will report immediately with a runner to the Provost Marshal's Section in Building C for instructions.

5. The Duty Officer in the Office of the Provost Marshal will immediately telephone the following officers, in the priority indicated, stating that the headquarters has been alerted for a ground attack:

Officer	Day Phone	Night Phone
Provost Marshal	27	147
Chief of Staff	5	106
Deputy Chief of Staff	107	146
A C of S, G-3	3	228
Signal Officer	10	147
Headquarters Commandant	115	---
A C of S, G-2	2	145

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 35

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

24 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution.

ALERT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FORWARD ECHELON HEADQUARTERS AREA

1. Unnumbered memorandum, this headquarters, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Headquarters Area (Forward Echelon)" dated 11 April 1945, and unnumbered memorandum, this headquarters, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Forward Echelon Headquarters Area (Daylight Alert)" dated 14 April 1945, are rescinded.

2. This memorandum prescribes the defense plan for this headquarters which will go into effect upon the sounding of sirens, inside the Kaserne Area, or if the Kaserne is attacked by ground or airborne forces.

3. a. Each section of the headquarters proper will designate a skeleton force of officers and enlisted men to remain on duty in the office to man telephones and protect records.

b. The remaining personnel will immediately assemble, with arms, pistol or rifle belts, and ball ammunition in front of the buildings and commanded by (see paragraph 4).

4. a.

Building No. and personnel	Commanders 0800 to 1800	Commanders 1800 to 0800
1. No assembly.		
2. Hq Co	Hq Co Officer	Hq Co Officer
3. Staff Sections therein	Field grade officer, Arty Section	One of the Arty Duty officers.
4. Staff Sections therein	Field grade officer, PM Section.	One of the PM Duty officers.
6. Staff Sections therein	Field grade officer, G-3 Section.	One of the G-2 Duty officers.
8. All Engr Trps	CO, 1092d EUD	CO, 1092d EUD
9. MP Company	MP Company Officer	MP Company Off.
10. 502d QM Car Co 3457 Ord MAM Co	QM Car Co Officer	QM Car Co officer.

b. When the troops are formed, the commanders will report immediately, with a runner, to the Provost Marshal Section in Building No. 4 for instructions.

5. a. Ammunition DP - Headquarters Supply, Basement, south end Building No. 1.

b. Aid Station - Building No. 2.

6. a. Messages to the Provost Marshal, Building No. 4.

b. The Provost Marshal's Office will immediately telephone the following officers, in the priority indicated, stating that the headquarters has been alerted for a ground attack:

OFFICER	OFFICE PHONE	RESIDENT PHONE
Chief of Staff	5	106
Deputy Chief of Staff	107	511
A C of S, G-3	3	228
Commanding General, Rear Echelon	Lucky Rear 4	---
Signal Officer	10	510
Headquarters Commandant	115	---
A C of S, G-2	2	515

7. It is the responsibility of each section mentioned in paragraph 4 to assure that officers on duty are familiar with this plan.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

J. J. HAMLIN
Major, AGD,
Asst Adj Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" (Fwd) - 2 each
"H"

ANNEX NO. 36

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 383.6 GNMICY

6 May 1945

SUBJECT: Evacuation and Release of Special Classes of Prisoners of War.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Release of Certain Classes of Prisoners of War.

a. All prisoners of war of the following categories who, after screening by G-2 personnel, are found not to be security threats will be released.

(1) Members of the Volkssturm.

(2) Enemy deserters and discharged enemy soldiers, sailors, and airmen apprehended in rear of the front, out of uniform.

b. The following procedure will be employed in Army and Corps Prisoner of War Enclosures to effect the release:

(1) After screening, prisoners of war of the above classes will be segregated.

(2) Military Government passes without exemptions will be prepared for each prisoner of war showing as his address the town to which he is to be transported.

(3) These prisoners of war will then be transported to towns within the Army area in accordance with a priority to be determined by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, Third U. S. Army and turned over to the Burgermeister.

(4) Burgermeisters will be directed to provide useful employment for these persons, preference to farming.

c. All Military Government, Military Police, CIC and other agencies involved in the apprehension of prisoners of war will be informed of this procedure in order to minimize the rearrest of released prisoners of war.

2. German Military patients in captured German Hospitals who, if they were U. S. patients would be sent to duty, will be evacuated to the nearest Army Prisoner of War Enclosure.

By Command Of General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "F"
AC of S, G-5, TUSA - (75)
PM, TUSA - (75)
SURGEON, TUSA - (50)

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" (Fwd Ech)

ANNEX NO. 34

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

12 April 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : See Distribution.

ALERT PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FORWARD ECHELON HEADQUARTERS AREA
(Daylight Alert)

1. Unnumbered memorandum, this headquarters, subject, "Alert Plan for Defense of Headquarters Area (Forward Echelon)" dated 11 April 1945, will be effective between the hours of 1800 and 0800 daily.

2. This memorandum prescribes the defense plan which will be effective between the hours of 0800 and 1800 daily.

3. The daylight alert (0800 - 1800 hours) plan will go into effect upon the sounding of sirens, inside the Kaserne area, or if the Kaserne is attacked.

4. a. Each section of the headquarters proper will designate a skeleton force of officers and enlisted men to remain on duty in the offices to man telephones and protect records.

b. The remaining personnel will immediately assemble, with arms, pistol or rifle belts, and ball ammunition in front of the building in which they are quartered under the command of officers from the following sections.

Building A - A field grade officer from the G-3 Section.
Building B - A field grade officer from the Engr. Section.
Building C - A field grade officer from the PM Section.
Building D - A field grade officer from the Arty Section.
Building F - An officer from the Headquarters Commandant's Section.

5. It is the responsibility of each of the sections mentioned in paragraph 4 to assure that officers on duty are familiar with this plan.

6. When the troops are formed, the troop commander will report immediately with a runner to the Provost Marshal's Section in Building "C" for instructions.

7. The Provost Marshal's Office will immediately telephone the following officers, in the priority indicated, stating that the headquarters has been alerted for a ground attack:

Officer	Office phone	Residence Phone
Provost Marshal	27	147
Chief of Staff	5	106
Deputy Chief of Staff	107	146
A C of S, G-3	3	228
Signal Officer	10	147
Headquarters Commandant	115	---
A C of S, G-2	2	145

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt Col., A.G.D.,
Asst Adj Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" (Fwd Ech)
"H"


SECRET

PM
XV

SECRET

ANNEX **A** NO. 37

PRISONER OF WAR INSTALLATIONS
and STRAGGLER COLLECTING POINTS




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XVI

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX **A** NO. 38

PRISONER OF WAR INSTALLATIONS
and STRAGGLER COLLECTING POINTS




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ANNEX **A** NO. 39
PRISONER OF WAR INSTALLATIONS
and STRAGGLER COLLECTING POINTS



SECRET


ANNEX NO. 40

PRISONER OF WAR REPORT FOR PERIOD 1 TO 8 MAY 1945 BY ENCLOSURES					
ENCLOSURES	PERIOD OF OPERATION	ON HAND 30 APR	RECEIVED	EVACUATED	ON HAND 8 MAY
PWE Number 20, KULMBACH		15,724	1,189	10,174	6,769
PWE Number 21, LANGENZERN		39,815	27,250	43,325	23,740
PWE Number 22, IRLMAUTH	Opened 2 May 45	0	62,259	1,054	61,205
TOTALS AT PWES		55,569	90,698	54,553	91,714
Medical admissions (including overrun German military hospitals)			12,206		
TOTAL RECEIVED			102,904		
ESCAPERS AND EVADERS		4	35	39	0

PRISONERS OF WAR RECEIVED FROM 1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 8 MAY 1945			
	RECEIVED AT ENCLOSURES	MEDICAL ADMISSIONS	TOTAL
1 AUGUST 1944 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1945	545,831	116,748	662,579
1 THROUGH 8 MAY 1945	90,698	12,206	102,904
			765,483



GERMAN PRISONERS MARCH TO PRISONER OF WAR ENCLOSURES UNDER WATCHFUL EYES OF MILITARY POLICE



Third Army's Rhine Bridgehead
Now 4 Miles Deep in Mainz Area

3d Army Crosses Rhine

into Coblenz

3d Captures Trier

3d Rips Boppard

Worms Cap

Nazi

GERMANS IN CONFUSION

WEST OF RHINE

Third Invades Germany

10th Armored Raises U.S.

Over Trier After 1-Day

6 TOWNS

HO

III CORPUS
VIII CORPUS
XII CORPUS
XX CO

87th INFANTRY
80th INFANTRY

94th INFA

4th ARMOR

ARMORCO



PUBLIC RELATIONS

Petrq

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Public Relations Section
APO 403

SUBJECT: After Action Report.


TO : The Commanding General, Third United States Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Public Relations Section, Third United States Army Headquarters, beginning with 27 April 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.
2. During the Third Army's sensational dash across France and its subsequent operations in Luxembourg, Belgium, and Germany, this Section furnished the world press daily accounts of the Army's feats. The thirty-five (35) to fifty (50) correspondents travelling with the Army were provided with transportation, mess, billets, and high speed communications with Paris, London, and New York. In addition, the Section coordinated the Public Relations activities of the Corps and Divisions assigned to the Army. These activities resulted in the Third Army and its units receiving more news and pictorial space in the world press than any other American Army.
3. This report is submitted as a record of the Section's activities, and with the hope that it may prove helpful in future operations.

[Handwritten signature]
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PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



SECRET

CHAPTER I PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section I - General

The Public Relations Section, Third US Army, developed in the field in France and was molded by the conditions of operating in a campaign of extremely rapid movement.

Originating as a branch of Publicity and Psychological Warfare, Third US Army, pending organization of the section later to be known as G-6, the G-2 Section coordinated basic administration matters. Its roots were in the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment of the First US Army Group which was charged by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force with the mission of conducting public relations and psychological warfare activities for the First and Third US Armies in the liberation of western Europe.

Third US Army was to fulfill its Publicity and Psychological Warfare mission through the operation of detachments of personnel from First US Army Group working under the direction of the Third US Army Headquarters staff.

These detachments were to be made up from the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment, and the 72d Publicity Service Battalion, First US Army Group, and attached or assigned to the Third US Army as the situation required.

On 27 April, two officers reported to the Army Commander, Third US Army, for duty from First US Army Group. After discussing public relations and psychological warfare with him, the Chief of Staff, and Assistant Chief of Staff, the ranking officer was instructed to set up a Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section for the Third US Army.

During May and June, plans, including the T/O and T/E, (see Annex II) were drawn for the Public Relations Branch. During this organizational period, an officer arrived from the United States 26 May and was appointed Third US Army Public Relations Officer. He took charge of arrangements for public relations and for the creation of a press camp for war correspondents who were to be assigned to the Third US Army during combat operations in France.

During this time, psychological warfare and the 72d Publicity Service Battalion remained at Group level at CLEVEDON (T89), Somerset, England.

Organization and operations plans for the Public Relations Branch were completed by 7 June.

Generally, Public Relations was charged with the mission of fulfilling requirements of accredited War Correspondents in the Third US Army operations.

Basically, the task of providing facilities enabling the correspondents to work during operations on the Continent involved three fundamental provisions:

These were food and shelter; transportation to combat areas; censorship facilities and transmission facilities for news copy, and an information service by which the correspondents could be briefed on combat developments.

The Public Relations Officer was to be assisted in this mission by four subsections.

The function of the Press Section was to provide the world press with an accurate and timely information service of Third US Army activities.

The function of the Radio Section was to assist broadcasters in obtaining complete Third US Army radio coverage such as would not violate security or impede military operations.

The function of the Pictorial Section was to assist pictorial correspondents in obtaining the type of photographs to accomplish their missions and to transmit pictures in negative form to designated higher headquarters for processing and clearance.

The Information Section was to maintain adequate situation maps of the Third US Army Sector to enable accredited war correspondents to plan their activities in advance. The section was to keep the correspondents informed on hours of briefing by the Army Commander and staff officers and to supply the correspondents and drivers with maps of the combat zones.

In addition, the plan contemplated the assignment of conducting officers who were to guide the correspondents to the front.

In addition to the foregoing section, an administrative section was set up to provide transportation, messing, billeting and other services.

With the appointment of a general Staff Corps officer as Chief of Section on 1 June, Publicity and Psychological Warfare in Third US Army became a General Staff Section, G-6. At that time, it was the only G-6 section in the Armies of the United States.

A pool of eight conducting officers was created, including the Press, Radio and Photo Officers plus five others. An Assistant Public Relations Officer was appointed.

During June, the procurement of personnel and the requisitioning of equipment (see annex 2) continued.

It was directed by European Theatre Operations United States Army that the military public relations system be extended downward from Army level to insure adequate coverage. To realize this program, the Army Commander directed Corps and Divisions assigned to Third US Army to name public relations officers. The Public Relations function was to be carried on down to lower echelons with the appointment of public relations non-commissioned officers in battalions, companies and special detachments. To coordinate this program, Corps and Division Public Relations Officers were called into conference at Third US Army Headquarters.

The conference between the Public Relations Officer, Third US Army, and the Public Relations Officers of the XII, XV, and XX Corps; the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Armored Divisions and the 5th, 8th and 35th Infantry Divisions was held on 10 and 11 June at TOFT CAMP (K29) for briefing, planning and discussion.

The Public Relations Officers assembled at 0900 10 June and were taken to PEOVER CAMP (K29) where the Army Commander personally outlined the objectives he hoped to attain through their efforts and the cooperation of the Corps and Division Commanders.

The Army Commander stressed the need of obtaining accurate and rapid home town news coverage of the activities of the "little men" of Third US Army from a morale standpoint. Liberal recognition should be given acts of bravery by the prompt award of appropriate citations and decorations. Corps, Division and Separate Unit commanders should recognize the importance of the public relations function and the desirability of adequate personnel and equipment to accomplish it.

Following this interview, the Public Relations Officers were acquainted with the functional plan of the G-6 Section and its objectives.

On 11 June, an open forum session was held at which all of the Public Relations Officers were requested to list their operations within their own commands. These reports indicated a lack of experienced personnel and equipment. The Public Relations Officers were also instructed to submit reports when public relations plans in their units developed.

On 12 June, the Public Relations Officer was notified by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force that a total of forty-four news, radio, magazine, Army and Allied correspondents were to be phased into the G-6 Sections. Working on this basis, the Section hastened the completion of requisitioning equipment and personnel.

The initial task of Public Relations Branch in the operations of a military public relations program was the assembly of biographical and historical information from Third US Army Corps and Divisions.

The task of gathering this information was initiated and supervised by virtually all officers of the Section. Following the Public Relations Officers Conference, unit Public Relations Officers were instructed to submit the biographical material and photos as well as the unit histories.

Copies of this information were made as it was received and submitted to Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and the First US Army Group.

With its equipment and its personnel assembled, the G-6 Section prepared for overseas movement to France. The administrative branch and the Public Relations Branch of the Section arrived at BROOKHEATH MANOR (U53), the staging area, 28 June. There it was joined by the Psychological Warfare Branch, the 72d Publicity Service Battalion's Second Service Team and forty-three war correspondents on 3 July.

Inherent in the organization of Publicity and Psychological Warfare at that time were dual functions which, from an operational standpoint, were not related. Publicity existed to inform the world of Third US Army activities via civilian and military reports. Psychological Warfare existed to influence the minds and undermine the will of the enemy, to boost the morale of subject civilian populations and to determine the attitude and trend of thought of the enemy and of subject civilians. Its objective was the preparation, distribution and control of propaganda, with the goal of convincing the enemy that his cause was lost and of instilling into the minds of friendly civilians confidence in the Allied cause.

Section II - Press

Personnel of the Press Sub-Section consisted of one officer and one enlisted man.

During the pre-operational period, the section devoted its activities almost exclusively to the compilation and filing of biographical and historical information received from Corps and Divisions. Copies of these data were made and forwarded to the Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and First US Army Group.

The section also cleared and forwarded to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 130 news items and photographs received from units.

In addition to the biographical data filed, photos of key unit officers were filed as received.

To keep a daily record of news and photographic material received from the Corps and Division Public Relations Officers, a Copy Register and a Photographic Register were set up. These registers recorded the date, the news item or photo was received, the origin and the identifying slug.

It became standard order of procedure in the section to register and forward immediately all copy and photographs received.

Section III - Radio

Personnel of the radio section consisted of one officer and one enlisted man.

Radio correspondents were to handle straight news coverage and commentary in much the same manner as the press correspondents. This coverage involved live broadcasts, emanating from rear areas and under the direction of First US Army Group. In this instance, the main concern of the Radio Section was to be adequate transportation for the broadcasters between Headquarters, Third US Army, and the transmitter.

Primarily, however, the Radio Section was to be concerned with a second type of coverage which included outside broadcasts and interview programs.

Front line recordings were to be made by magnetic wire recorders. By close contact with the AC of S, G-2, and the AC of S, G-3, the Radio Section was to advise radio correspondents of actions suitable for such recordings and to suggest possible slants and methods of coverage.

Scripted live programs were to be developed for direct transmission from the field to the United Kingdom or the United States. The Section was to be ready to clear and facilitate requests for personnel to be used on these programs and to supply ideas and suggestions for programs of this nature dealing with Third US Army operations and personnel.

Small stations recordings were also to be made. These were to be designed for small United States radio stations without correspondent representation. They were to serve to give personal publicity in home districts to men of the Third US Army. A portable recording unit was to be taken into divisions to make as many interviews as possible with men

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whose homes are in a given locality. These recordings were to be released through the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section. First US Army Group, and the Radio Department, Public Relations Section, European Theatre Operations United States Army.

In May, an agreement was reached between the Public Relations Officer, First US Army Group, and the British Broadcasting Corporation that British Broadcasting Company portable recording gear should be installed in a Third US Army vehicle and used on a pool basis by all broadcasters.

This equipment became available early in June. It was shock mounted in a quarter ton trailer which was converted into a miniature recording van. When it was tested at the time, it was found to be entirely satisfactory from an operating standpoint. At the same time, a British Broadcasting Company engineer was accredited to the Third US Army through Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to work with and service the recording gear.

It was eventually established that live broadcasts would emanate from Army level via the Signal Corps Radio 399.

This left the Radio Section only the British Broadcasting Company equipment with which to work. Since the network broadcasters must have priority on the use of this equipment, there seemed to be little likelihood at that time that the hometown recording program would be very extensive. Nevertheless, a limited number of discs were secured and set aside for eventual use for this purpose.

Section IV - Pictorial Section

Personnel of the Pictorial Section consisted of one officer, who reported late in June on temporary duty from First US Army Group. No enlisted men were assigned to this section which did not become operational during the planning phase of Third US Army. The Pictorial Officer worked with other officers to perfect the plans of the entire Public Relations Branch and assisted in the assembly of biographical, historical and photographic records for the Press Section.

Section V - Information Section

Personnel of the Information Section included one officer, attached to G-6 from First US Army Group, and one enlisted man attached from the 72d Publicity Service Battalion.

During the planning phase in the United Kingdom, the world's war fronts were plotted on small scale maps. After the invasion, progress of the Continental operation was plotted on overlays on large-scale maps and kept up to date. During this period, an officer supervised the information room operations.

Section VI - Censorship

Prior to the embarkation of the Third US Army for France, Press Censorship was controlled and operated in the Ministry of Information, LONDON, under First US Army Group.

Censorship teams were made up and assigned to the various Army Groups and Armies. But rather than have the teams physically moved to the locations of the respective units and so lose touch with the current picture, they continued to operate at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force until such time as their respective units embarked.

Section VII - Publicity Service

During the pre-operational period in the United Kingdom, the 72d Publicity Service Battalion remained with the First US Army Group in LLEWELLYN (T89) with its service groups and communications.

Section VIII - Administrative Section

Personnel of the Administrative Section included one officer and six enlisted men.

During the planning period, the sub-section handled the requisitioning of equipment (see annex II).

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section I - General

On 3 July, the Second Service Team joined the G-6 Section at BROCKHEATH (U53). At the same time, forty-three war correspondents arrived.

The following day at 1800 hours, the Section proceeded in convoy to SOUTHAMPTON (U83) from which port it embarked for France the morning of 5 July.

The Section disembarked at UTAH BEACH (T19) on the afternoon of 7 July and proceeded immediately to the Third US Army bivouac area in the vicinity of NEHOUE, FRANCE (T19), where the press camp began operating the following day.

Since the Third US Army was not operational, facilities for censorship and transmission of war correspondents' copy were not available during the month. It was necessary, therefore, to dispatch correspondents' copy to First US Army by officer courier for censorship and transmission or via Air Delivery Letter Service to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Ministry of Information, LONDON.

Correspondents' copy was logged as it was received and marked for courier to First US Army censors or Air Delivery Letter Service, LONDON.

During this period, the physical set up of the camp was housed in squad and pyramidal tents in the half-acre apple orchard.

The war correspondents were housed in three squad tents. Public Relations operations were conducted in a fourth squad tent. In a fifth was the information room and briefings were held there twice daily.

Two pyramidal tents served as an orderly room for the 72d Publicity Service Battalion's Second Service Team and administration headquarters. In addition to two mess tents, one for the officers' and correspondents' mess and the second for the enlisted men, a correspondents' dining room was set up in a sixth squad tent.

Transportation was dispatched as requested and no priority was given to news services or agencies. Since there were only seventeen quarter ton vehicles available to cover all transportation requirements at the outset of operations, a ruling that jeeps would not proceed on news missions with less than three correspondents had to be formulated.

Later in July, three additional quarter ton vehicles were added. Meantime, the correspondents themselves assisted in easing the transportation shortage by bringing back to camp, more or less in usable condition, four German Volkswagens found abandoned at the front. These vehicles, however, were not generally available to the section until August since it was necessary for Ordnance to check and paint them.

It was from this camp that the correspondents covered the historic battles of the LA HAYE DU PUIS (T18), LISSAY (T17), PERRIERS (T27), and ST. LO (T46) sectors.

During July, an approximate total of 305,055 words were logged and dispatched.

Following the break-through in Normandy, the Section prepared to move in order to bring the correspondents within driving distance of the front.

Correspondents who reported 3 July to the BROCKHEATH MANOR (U53) staging area were as follows:

Ball, E.D., Associated Press
Belden, J., Time & Life
Bockhurst, J.A., Newsreel Pool
Bohrod, A., Time & Life
Broderick, H.J., Still Pool
Carlisle, J.M., Detroit News
Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle
Cooper, F.J., BBC
Crawford, Kenneth, Newsweek
Cromie, R.A., Chicago Tribune
Currivan, E.A., New York Times
Dodd, E.H., Associated Press
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Duff, Robin, BBC
Gosset, Pierre, AFI
Gottlieb, S.S., Still Pool
Grandin, Tom, Blue Network
Grant, Donald, Look
Grune, Philip, London Evening Standard
Hoge, Tom (Fvt), Stars and Stripes
Huss, P.J., INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank
Littell, Robert, Reader's Digest
Loveland, R.A., Cleveland Plain Dealer
Manning, Paul, McNaught Syndicate
Maynes, S.J., Reuters
McQuaid, B.J., Chicago Daily News
Mecklin, John, Chicago Sun
Miller, R.C., UP
Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
Priestley, T., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J., London Times
Reusswig, W., King Features
Ryan, C.J., London Daily Telegraph
Shadell, W.F., CBS
Shoop, Duke, Kansas City Star
Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Tremor, Tom, Los Angeles Times
Wellard, J.H., Chicago Times
Whitney, P., San Francisco Chronicle
Wingert, R.T., Stars and Stripes
Wolf, T.H., NEA
Wolfert, Ira, NANA

Additional correspondents joining the Press Camp during July were Ernest Hemingway of Colliers, D.E. Mackenzie of the New York Daily News, D.R. McNicoll of the Australian Consolidated Press arrived on 22 August and Larry Meier of the Mutual Broadcasting System arrived on 23 August.

Section II - Press

Operating as a clearance agency for copy received from Corps and Division Public Relations Officers, the Press Section cleared and forwarded for censorship and distribution 177 news items and eight photographs. Of this total, seventeen news and feature stories and two photos emanated from the Section itself.

Units which submitted news items and the type of items received are broken down as follows:

FROM	PROMOTIONS	AWARDS	INTEREST	TOTAL	PHOTOS
XX Corps	1			1	2
445th AAA Bn	9			9	
PRO, TUSA	3	14		17	2
12th Evac Hosp	4	3	3	10	1
4th Armd Div	13		9	22	
6th Armd Div	23	23	65	111	3
106 Cav Reg Sq	7			7	
Totals:	60	40	77	177	8

The non-operational status of Third US Army during this period accounted for the scarcity of copy.

Geographically, the news material received covered the activities of men from the Seaboard and Middle Atlantic states preponderantly. Midwestern states East of the Mississippi were particularly well represented.

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How extensively this news material, which was forwarded to Public Relations Officer (Press Section) European Theatre Operations United States Army and Chief, Public Relations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, was used - or even whether it was released by censorship during the month - was never determined. It was presumed that the bulk of news material submitted would be held until Third US Army was announced as operating on the Continent.

In many instances, the lower echelons passed on news tips which personnel of the Press Section brought to the attention of the war correspondents.

During this pre-operational period on the Continent, it was desirable on numerous occasions to coordinate more closely the activities of the Unit Public Relations Officers and to give guidance to several Unit organizations whose personnel had little newspaper background.

Copy was logged by slug, correspondent's name and organization, approximate number of words, time received and time dispatched via courier as well as destination for transmission - First US Army or Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The following table is designed to give a weekly picture of the copy log.

Date	ADIS	Army Comm (FUSA)	Prewix (FUSA)	Total Items	Total Wordage
8-14 July	120		83	203	108,995
15-21 July	56	8	84	140	68,225
22-31 July	77	42	130	249	127,835
Totals:	253	50	297	592	305,055

Of the 253 items logged ADIS, 65 were photos and sketches and 13 were recordings.

Section III - Radio

Upon arrival in France, when it was learned that the Third US Army would not become operational for some time, radio correspondents (see annex 5) therefore were included in the agreement that was reached with First US Army Public Relations Section for transmission of Third US Army copy. The correspondents made their broadcasts to LONDON and to NEW YORK via JESQ, the First US Army transmitter.

During this period, the portable recorder in the quarter-ton trailer was put to extensive use. Due to its size and extreme mobility, recordings were made closer to the front line than had ever before been possible. In several instances, the vehicle was moved to within 300 yards of the infantry line which was then south of LA HAYE DU PUIS.

As had been anticipated, there was little time left for its use in hometown recordings. Some hometown recordings were made and these were released through the Public Relations Officer, First US Army Group.

When it became known that the Third US Army would soon become operational and the radio silence accordingly lifted, the Radio Officer visited the Public Relations Officer, 21st Army Group (British), and arranged for the assignment of frequencies to be used for live broadcasts, the Signal Corps Radio 399 having arrived in the meantime. There remained only the necessary tests to determine whether it would be possible to reach LONDON. These would have to wait until the radio silence was lifted.

Section IV - Pictorial

Liaison was established between the Pictorial Section of Third US Army and the Public Relations Division Pictorial Section of Twelfth US Army Group on the Continent as soon as Army Group established headquarters, and policies and desires of Army Group for pictorial coverage were made known to various Third US Army Signal Photo units through close contact with the Signal Photo Section of Army Headquarters. A comprehensive outline of still and motion picture coverage desired by Supreme Headquarters was studied in detail and a number of assignments

given by the Signal Photo Officer to units under his jurisdiction to fulfill these requirements. Three War Correspondent still photographers were with the Press Camp during this period, and operated daily among units at the front and behind the lines, their film being transmitted undeveloped by courier to the First US Army facilities, from where it was forwarded to LONDON for developing, censorship, and retransmission to destination. The Section compiled a photographic file of unit biographical pictures, and the Pictorial Officer, in addition to other duties, assisted the Public Relations Officer in various matters.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Officer set up his map boards in a squad tent and, assisted by an enlisted man, plotted the Normandy situation daily. The disposition of Allied and enemy troops, as reported daily by AC of S, G-2 and AC of S, G-3, was marked on overlays on which also was recorded the movement of battle.

The briefing periods were at 1030 hours and at 2030 hours. The briefing officer, acting as liaison officer with AC of S, G-2 and AC of S, G-3, narrated developments for the correspondents and indicated changes in the situation on the mapboard.

Following the briefing, correspondents questioned the briefing officer and submitted to him requests for such other information as could be made available.

Toward the end of the month, it was found expedient to set up the briefing and Information Room in a wall tent, leaving the squad tent solely as a correspondents' work room.

A guard was maintained twenty-four hours daily at the Information Room and was doubled after dark.

Section VI - Administration

The Administration Section consisted of two officers, one acting as camp commandant and the other as administrative officer, and four enlisted men.

CHAPTER 3 AUGUST OPERATIONS

Section I - General

When the Third US Army became operational 1 August, the Press Camp moved to a bivouac area in the vicinity of GAVRAY (134), setting up operations there 3 August in three hedgerow fields.

The Army Communications unit and Mackay Radio had joined the camp two days prior to departure from NEKON (119). Due to the radio silence imposed before Army became operational, radio could not be operated there. The censorship returned from First US Army on 1 August.

It was not until 4 August at GAVRAY (134) that the Signal Corps CW transmitter, 399 Radio Voice transmitter, and the Mackay Radio went into operation. With the censors present, it then became possible for the first time to utilize all planned facilities and to flash the news of Third US Army operations in France to the press of the world.

The possibility that the enemy could use the radio signals as an aid in locating the Army Headquarters, and the advantages of operating within buildings, led the Public Relations Officer to obtain permission for the section to operate some distance away from the Forward Echelon of Headquarters and to house office operations indoors.

This was done for the first time 11 August when the Press Camp moved to ST. JAMES (139) where operations were set up in a schoolhouse near VILLAMBE (139). Correspondents, officers and enlisted personnel and administrative functions were housed under canvas in an adjacent bivouac area.

On 12 August, the psychological warfare functions were returned to Army Group level. The Public Relations Officer took complete charge of all Public Relations functions and the section became known as the Public Relations Section, a special staff section.

This change marked the disbandment of Publicity and Psychological Warfare as a single function. It had been proved in field operations that functionally and operationally, Publicity and Psychological Warfare had little in common and each branch had operated separately since arriving in France.

From ST. JAMES (139), the Section moved into a chateau in the vicinity of PORT BRILLET (155) 13 August. Mess for correspondents was held in the building for the first time, but sleeping quarters and administrative functions were housed under canvas on the grounds. The Public Relations operation as well as the Information Room and Work Room occupied the basement of the chateau.

On 15 August, the Section moved to a chateau near LAQUINTE (224) in the vicinity of LEMANS (243).

To keep within a reasonable distance of the rapidly moving front, the Press Camp moved to a chateau at MOTIEREAU (W18) 19 August and then to a chateau at PITHIVIERS (W96) 23 August.

On 24 August, on the eve of the liberation of PARIS, a small group of Third US Army Public Relations personnel was ordered into the city to assist US Army correspondents and Twelfth US Army Group. This force consisted of two officers, one enlisted man and two vehicles.

The force proceeded with correspondents to RAMBOUILLET (R62), about twenty miles from PARIS. There the force as well as correspondents and military personnel of First US Army and Twelfth US Army Group were forced to wait pending the cessation of hostilities in the capital.

A copy desk for the logging of correspondents' copy was set up in the main salon of the Hotel Le Grand Veneur, RAMBOUILLET (R62), which had been taken over by Group for news operations.

Nearly 400 pieces of copy and service messages describing the PARIS situation were logged that day and dispatched to Mackay at Third US Army and Press Wireless at First US Army for transmission.

During the afternoon of 24 August, correspondents waited restlessly for some indication as to when they could be able to proceed into the city. The Twelfth US Army Group Public Relations Officer advised them in a briefing that the Germans, after starting to evacuate the city under terms of a truce with the Free French Interior, were bringing armor back into the city to make a stand. The truce had been broken.

It was planned to set up press headquarters at the Hotel Scribe in PARIS as soon as it was possible to enter the city. All military personnel remained alerted throughout the night in readiness to move.

As the newspaper representatives of the press of the Allied nations - the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Canada and Australia -- paced the floors and grounds of the hotel, French tanks rumbled through the streets of RAMBOUILLET (R62) enroute to the capital.

On 25 August, it was decided to start for PARIS. On reaching the suburb of LONGJUMEAU (S02), this party halted while it was determined what the situation was within the city itself.

Meantime, jeeploads of correspondents passed and continued on into PARIS, but soon returned reporting that they could not cross the SEINE River because of the fighting on the right bank.

The correspondents were looking for a place in which to write copy. Since it was impossible to continue on as planned, a blacksmith's house was taken over as a temporary copy room. The Frenchman offered his entire house and shop for this purpose.

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While the correspondents wrote the first stories of the liberation of PARIS in the smithy at LONGJUMEAU (S02), correspondents returning from the embattled city were flagged down and steered into the improvised copy room.

When copy had been logged and was ready for dispatch, couriers were halted, both British and American, and requested to take the copy to the airstrip at CHARENTIS (R30) from which it would be flown to Ministry of Information, LONDON, for censorship and transmission.

It is estimated that more than 15,000 words on the initial PARIS story were cleared by the Press Services and Agencies in this manner and it is also believed that the curbside operation saved from eight to twelve hours delay which otherwise would have occurred.

At 1800, the press party proceeded into the city to the Hotel Scribe where a copy desk was set up under the supervision of Group and maintained there during the hectic days that followed liberation.

On 27 August, a Third US Army Public Relations Officer made the first courier flight into PARIS in a Piper Cub. The plane was piloted by a 14th Liaison Squadron Officer and landed at the ISSYLESMOULNEAUX (W96) for transmission via Mackay. The courier service was continued for several days.

The Third US Army force returned to PITHIVIERS (W96) 30 August. The following day, the Press Camp moved to the CHATEAU DE VALUSANT.

Meantime, the production of copy from military sources was stimulated by the announcement of Third US Army as operational and during August, the first operational month of the Army, 861 news items were received by the Press Section and forwarded to European Theatre Operations US Army and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force for distribution....compared to 177 in July.

On 31 August, General Order Number 50 announced the disbandment of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section.

Stressing the importance and desirability of hometown news of the individual soldier, the Army Commander was sympathetic toward all reasonable requests of the Section, and during his press conferences, repeatedly called attention to his personal desire that the personnel of Third US Army receive the recognition they so rightly deserved.

The following correspondents were assigned and operated from the Press Camp as of 1 August:

Ball, E.D., Associated Press -
 Belden, J., Life
 Bockhurst, J.A., Newsreel Pool
 Broderick, H.J., Still Pool
 Carlisle, J.M., Detroit News
 Clark, N.M., The London News Chronicle
 Cooper, P.J., BBC
 Crawford, K., Newsweek
 Cronis, R.A., Chicago Tribune
 Curran, E.A., New York Times
 Dodd, E.H., Jr., Associated Press
 Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
 Duff, Robin, BBC
 Gosset, Pierre, AFI
 Gottlieb, S.S., Still Pool
 Grant, Donald, Look Magazine
 Grune, Philip, London Evening Standard
 Hemingway, E., Colliers
 Hoge, T. (Pvt), Stars and Stripes
 Huss, P.J., INS
 Levitt, Saul, Yank
 Littell, Robert, Reader's Digest
 Loveland, Roeliff, Cleveland Plain Dealer
 Mackenzie, D.E., New York Daily News
 Manning, Paul, McNaught Syndicate
 Maynes, S.J., Reuters
 McNeill, D.R., Australian Consolidated Press
 McQuaid, B.J., Chicago Daily News
 Meeklin, John, Chicago Sun
 Meier, Larry, Mutual
 Miller, R.C., United Press
 Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
 Priestley, T., Newsreel Pool
 Prince, W.J., London Times
 Russwig, W., King Features
 Ryan, G.J., London Daily Telegraph

Shaw, C.C., CBS
 Shoop, Duke, Kansas City Star
 Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post-Dispatch
 Treanor, T., Los Angeles Times
 Willard, J.H., Chicago Times
 Whitney, P., San Francisco Chronicle
 Wingert, R.T., Stars and Stripes
 Wolf, T.H., NEA
 Wolfert, Ira, NANA

The following correspondents joined the Press Camp in August:

Randy Dixon, PITTSBURGH Courier, 1 August
 Rudolph Dunbar, Associated Negro Press, 1 August
 Ollie Stewart, BALTIMORE Afro-American, 1 August
 Edward Tolles, CHICAGO Defender, 1 August
 H.V. Boyle, Associated Press, 11 August
 Gordon Gaskill, American Magazine, arrived 15 August
 by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force order.
 R.W. Richards, United Press, 15 August
 H.G. Taylor, Reuters, arrived 15 August and departed
 21 August for Second British Army.
 Marcel Wallestein replaced Duke Shoop for the KANSAS
 CITY Star on 17 August.
 Gordon Frazier, Blue Network, arrived 20 August to
 replace Tom Grandin.
 D.G. Monick, AFI, arrived 17 August
 J.R. Wilhelm, Reuters, arrived 20 August to replace
 Taylor.
 William Randolph Hearst, Jr., arrived 21 August for IIS.
 Andrew Tully, BOSTON Traveler, replaced Gordon Gaskill
 22 August.
 W.A. Douglas arrived 25 August to replace John Meeklin
 for the CHICAGO Sun. Meeklin replaced Douglas 4 September.
 Austin Lake, INS, arrived 31 August
 Lawrence W. Youngman, OMAHA World Herald, arrived 22
 August and was attached to the 35th Infantry Division.

With communications facilities operational at this time, wordage of the war correspondents increased from 305,055 in July to 518,505 in August. The following table is designed to show the volume of copy and method transmitted:

Date	Mackay	ADLS	Army Comm	Voice	Prewi (FUSA)	Total Items	Words (Estimated)
1-7 Aug	193	52	46	18	52	361	129,140
8-14 Aug	186	90	64	8		352	105,423
15-21 Aug	231	171	103	8		513	159,755
22-31 Aug	368	124	11	2		526	124,185
TOTAL	998	437	224	36	52	1752	518,505

Of the 518,505 words transmitted, 9700 were broadcast by the Signal Corps Radio 399.

Of the 437 items sent ADLS, forty-three were packages of photo negatives and eighteen were recordings for radio broadcasts.

Items included both news copy and service messages.

Press Wireless (PREWI) was used by Third US Army correspondents in filing copy from RAMBOUILLET (R62) and PARIS. Similarly, many correspondents assigned to First US Army dispatched copy via Mackay Radio, the transmitter at Third US Army.

Section II - Press

During August, the Press Section continued the registering and forwarding of copy received from Corps and Divisions.

Additional historical and biographical information was received and the Section supplemented its picture file of Third US Army personnel. Seven feature stories emanated from the Section itself which was primarily occupied with the registration and forwarding of unit material and suggesting news possibilities to lower echelons.

The following is a summary of news copy received, source and type of story:

Unit	Promotions	Awards	Interest	Total
Hq, TUSA PRO			7	7
6th Armd Div		29	47	76
4th Armd Div	11	140	14	165
5th Inf Div			74	74
106 Cav Ron Sq		1	1	2
XII Corps	26	6	8	40
284 FA Bn	10			10
515 FA Bn			1	1
8th Inf Div	3	35	25	63
35th Inf Div	84	121	5	210
12th Evac Hosp	8			8
XV Corps			1	1
5th Armd Div			14	14
2d Inf Div		168	18	186
7th Armd Div			3	3
29th Inf Div		1		1
TOTAL	142	501	218	851

Section III - Radio

The Signal Corps Radio 399 went into operation 4 August and during that day, continued efforts were made to contact LONDON. The British Broadcasting Company monitors finally were reached at 1830, thirty minutes before the first scheduled broadcast.

In the days that followed, the readability of the 399 signal did not improve until the Press Camp reached the vicinity of LAVAL (Y64). It was estimated that at best there was a fifty per cent chance of the broadcast being received intelligibly in LONDON.

For the most part, radio commentators were forced to work either with recordings or with CW transmission of their stories. The Signal Corps Radio 399 had not proved satisfactory for long distance transmission.

As soon as Twelfth US Army Group had established its headquarters in France, the Radio Officer asked that the Group transmitter, a 3 KW, be made available to Third US Army as a relay. It finally was agreed that this could be done, but this transmitter was not in operation by the end of August.

The second week in August, Twelfth US Army Group requested that Third US Army furnish a combat report for the Army Hour broadcast.

The radio officer accordingly took wire recording equipment to ST. MALO (S81) and succeeded in getting two recordings, both from a forward observation post overlooking the CITADEL where a force of Germans continued to resist.

One of these recorded the voices of infantrymen who were participating in the assault on the fortress. The other was a straight narrative describing its actual surrender.

Upon returning to Army Group with these recordings, it was established that Third US Army would henceforward have its weekly spot on the Army Hour.

Two other trips were made during the month for this purpose. One involved three days of travel with the 7th Armored Division on its drive from DREUX (R33) to MELUN (S20).

The recording was made in this case from the IP and at H-hour of the attack on MELUN (S20).

The second recording was made from the American Memorial at BELLEAU WOOD (S76). Its theme was a comparison between the battle there in July, 1918, and the present drive.

During the month, the disc recording gear was not available to the Section for hometown recordings.

SECRET

Section IV - Pictorial

Arrival of the 2d French Armored Division in France, marking the return of the first French troops to their soil, was thoroughly covered by means of still and motion picture photography at the beginning of the operational period. Photographers, both Signal Corps and War Correspondent, met the Division on its ships in the Channel, photographed personnel and equipment coming ashore, filmed units and individuals of the division passing through the Peninsula and going into first bivouac, and photographed it in combat action. During August it was discovered that War Correspondent photographers preferred to work in teams of two, one still and one motion picture man, working independently of writing correspondents. A transportation policy was laid down, as a result, which permitted two photographers so operating to use one jeep, with regularly assigned trailer for transportation of their special equipment. Desires of Twelfth US Army Group for public relations pictorial coverage by Signal Corps units were submitted to the Signal Photo Section. The Pictorial Officer was assigned temporarily to assist in pictorial coverage of the liberation of PARIS, working with Twelfth US Army Group.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Room and Work Room became the center of correspondents' activities. Twice daily briefings were continued by the Briefing Officer who maintained close liaison with AC of S, G-2 and AC of S, G-3.

The progress of the Third US Army through France was shown daily on the large scale maps as well as dispositions of Allied and enemy troops.

Section VI - Administration

Administrative and Public Relations functions were consolidated under the Chief Clerk. The Administrative Officer and the Camp Commandant coordinated their activities more closely to improve the efficiency of Press Camp servicing.

Section VII - Communications

The Signal Corps CW (Continuous Wave) transmitter and 399 (Radio Voice) became operational 4 August.

The communications platoon consisted of one officer and eighteen enlisted men.

It was originally planned to handle press copy, operational messages and correspondents' broadcasts, but experience with this type of transmission at First US Army during July indicated that CW operation was not rapid enough to handle war correspondents' copy without highspeed facilities and personnel to handle highspeed transmission which the unit lacked.

Since press copy had no priority and was subject to delay because of operational priority on the Signal Corps channel, and, since no separate channel was allocated for press copy, it was necessary to handle practically all press copy via Mackay. This included British correspondents' copy which reached LONDON via NEW YORK.

The 399 voice transmission was not satisfactory because it was necessary to broadcast a greater distance than the transmitter was designed to cover. A relay was needed and this, itself, had to be reasonably mobile, but during the month the relay point was not set up.

Since it was shown during the pre-operational period that Signal Corps transmission would not accomplish the mission, arrangements were made with the Mackay Radio Corporation for commercial facilities to transmit to LONDON and to NEW YORK the correspondents' press copy which constituted the major traffic of the Press Camp.

According to Mackay Radio Corporation records, a total of 320,526 words were transmitted during August operations.

Section VIII - Censors

On 1 August, when the Third US Army became operational, the

censorship team returned. The first night, censoring was conducted under difficult conditions.

The team had arrived at a new bivouac area late at night and accommodations had not been completed, since the camp had just completed a move.

Copy and wordage censored by the censorship team is tabulated as follows:

Week	Total Submissions	Total Words
1-6 Aug	124	90,630
6-13 Aug	377	101,702
13-20 Aug	333	109,999
20-27 Aug	299	89,075
27 Aug - 3 Sept	254	50,962
TOTALS	1387	442,368

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Press Camp operations continued at SOMME-VESLE (T74) until 11 September when the camp moved to FUXE (U56) in French Lorraine, in the STAIN (U47) - COMFLANS (U66) area.

During the month six new correspondents were assigned to the Press Camp and eighteen departed.

The camp continued operations at FUXE (U56) during the remainder of the month. Correspondents assigned as of 30 September were:

Ball, Edward D., Associated Press
 Belden, J., Life
 Bockhurst, John A., Newsweek Pool
 Broderick, J.H., Still Pool
 Carlisle, John M., Detroit News
 Clark, Norman M., The London News Chronicle
 Crawford, Kenneth, Newsweek
 Cromie, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
 Despouey, Arturo, NBC
 Downton, Eric, Reuters
 Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
 Gallagher, Wes, Associated Press
 Grad, Jules, Sgt., Stars and Stripes
 Graham, Fred, New York Times
 Grant, Donald, Look Magazine
 Greene, Hamilton, American Legion Magazine
 Grune, Philip, London Evening Standard
 Hiss, Pierre J., INS
 Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
 Loveland, R.A., Cleveland Plain Dealer
 Lucas, Nemo C., Rio de Janeiro "Anoite"
 Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News
 Mazo, Earl, Lt., Stars and Stripes
 McMichael, D.R., Consolidated Australian Press
 McQuaid, B.J., Chicago Daily News
 McVane, John, NBC
 Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
 Priestley, T.A., Newsweek Pool
 France, W.J., London Times
 Rousewig, W., King Features
 Richards, Robert W., United Press
 Rollins, B.H., Still Pool
 Ryan, Cornelius, London Daily Telegraph
 Small, Wilson C., United Press
 Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler
 Wallenstein, Marcel, Kansas City Star
 Wellard, James H., Chicago Times
 Wilhelm, John R., Reuters
 Wolf, T.H., Newspaper Enterprise Alliance
 Youngman, L.W., Omaha World-Telegram (35th Inf Div)

New arrivals for the month of September:

Beattie, Edward W., Jr., United Press. Arrived 9 September. (Captured by Germans on 12 September.)
 Bryan, Wright, NBC, arrived 7 September. (Captured by Germans on 12 September.)
 Despouey, Arturo, NBC, arrived 24 September on orders from PRO, Twelfth US Army Group, for seven days.
 Gallagher, Wes, Associated Press, arrived 1 September to replace Boyle.
 Grad, Jules, Sgt., Stars and Stripes, arrived 22 September.
 Graham, Fred, New York Times, arrived 4 September to replace Currihan.
 Greene, Hamilton, American Legion Magazine, arrived 29 September for assignment to 83d Division.
 Lucas, Nemo C., Rio de Janeiro "Anoite" arrived 26 September on seven-day basis.
 Mazo, Earl, Lt., Stars and Stripes, arrived 1 September.
 McVane, John, NBC, arrived 24 September on seven-day basis.
 Small, Wilson C., United Press, arrived 22 September to replace Edward Beattie.

Departures for the month of September:

Beattie, Edward W., Jr., United Press, captured by Germans on 12 September.
 Bryan, Wright, NBC, captured by Germans 12 September.
 Currihan, E.A., New York Times, left on 4 September. He was replaced by Fred Graham.
 Dixon, Randy, Pittsburgh Courier, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 21 September.
 Dodd, Howell E., Jr., Associated Press artist, left on 6 September.
 Douglas, William A., Chicago Sun, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 4 September.
 Dunbar, Rudolph, Associated Negro Press, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 21 September.
 Frazier, Gordon, Blue Network, dropped from rolls 28 September. Assigned to First US Army.
 Gosset, Pierre, AFI, reaccredited to Communications Zone, left on 4 September.
 Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., INS, dropped from rolls 28 September. His status became that of Distinguished Visitor.
 Hoge, Thomas A., Pvt., Stars and Stripes, dropped from rolls 28 September.
 Lake, Austin, Boston American, dropped from rolls 28 September.
 Littell, Robert, Reader's Digest, departed 4 September.
 Mecklin, John M., Chicago Sun, left for England 23 September.
 Miller, R.C., United Press, evacuated to England 4 September.
 Monick, D.G., AFI, reaccredited to Communications Zone on 4 September.
 Steward, Ollie, Baltimore Afro-American, reaccredited to Communications Zone on 21 September.
 Toles, Edward, Chicago Defender, reaccredited to Communications Zone on 21 September.
 Whitney, P., San Francisco Chronicle, left 4 September.
 Wolfert, Ira, NANA, reaccredited to First US Army, left 24 September.

Items logged at the Press Camp during September totalled 2218. Copy was dispatched via Mackay Radio, the Press Camp's transmitter, Army Communications, and Air Delivery Letter Service as follows:

Mackay.....1889
 ADLS..... 130
 Army Communications..... 93
 Total.....2112

In addition, six items were routed to Twelfth US Army Group, bringing the total number of items to 2118. Estimated wordage was 445,205.

Section II - Press

A total of 7755 items, including fourteen photos and two construction blueprints were received from twenty-four Third US Army units during the month and forwarded to PRO, Press Section, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward), ETUSA, for clearance and distribution. This total is broken down as follows:

SECRET

Promotions..... 589
 Awards and Citations..... 867
 General Interest.....6283
 Photos..... 14
 Plans..... 2
 Total.....7755

Units submitting material were: 2d Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division, XII Corps, 14th Liaison Squadron, XV Corps, XX Corps, 35th Infantry Division, 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 79th Infantry Division, 80th Reconnaissance Squadron, 80th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, 94th Medical Gas Battalion, 241st Field Artillery Battalion, 246th Engineer Combat Battalion, 344th Ordnance Company, 359th Infantry Regiment, 511th Military Police Battalion, 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment, Army Nurse Corps (ETCUSA) and Public Relations Office, Third US Army.

The September total of 7755 items was an increase of 6894 over the August total of 861 items. The July total was 177. Total number of items cleared at this headquarters during the two months of Third US Army operations on the Continent was 8616. The grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during pre-operational and operational periods to date (30 September) was 8793.

In addition to forwarding news items and photos for general release, general and human interest stories were forwarded to the editor, Stars and Stripes, and to the editor, Yank Magazine. All material was made available to war correspondents.

At the request of the AG of S, G-2, an investigation was made of the origin of stories which appeared in the British Press and in the Army newspaper, Stars and Stripes, alleging that troops of the First US Army had burned WALLENDORF, a German village northwest of TRIER, in reprisal for sniping. A retraction published in Stars and Stripes 19 September charged that the story had emanated from a Third US Army correspondent. It quoted First US Army authorities as stating that the village had been set afire by artillery fire to reduce it as an enemy stronghold and had not been put to the torch. The investigation showed that a flash sent by an Associated Press correspondent with the Third US Army Press Camp, which referred to previous copy describing artillery action in the vicinity of the village, had been ambiguously worded so that when read alone it gave the impression that the village had been put to the torch. The investigation showed also that at no time was the word "reprisal" used in connection with the reduction of the village. The conclusion that the idea "reprisal" had been inferred by cable desks in LONDON and by Stars and Stripes and injected into the story seemed reasonable.

Section III - Radio

During the first week of September Third US Army's spot for the Army Hour was recorded at CHATEAU THIERRY (385) and BELLEAU WOOD (376). Later a second Army Hour spot was made with the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, a Third US Army unit moving on Germany.

It was established that ETCUSA Radio was servicing hometown recordings made with the magnetic wire recorder. The recorder was then used for stories and interviews featuring Third US Army personnel.

A recorded description of the fortification system of METZ (US5) and a report of the stiffening German resistance along the entire line was made. Two home town recordings were made with personnel of forward units and sent to ETCUSA for processing.

At the month's end no radio correspondents were assigned to Third US Army.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two newsreel and three still photographers were assigned to PRO, Third US Army in September, and were assisted in their mission by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Section

The Information Section maintained maps showing the situation of Allied and enemy troops on all European war fronts. The Allied-German front from below SWITZERLAND to Northern HOLLAND was shown on a GSGS map of 1:250,000 scale. Units of the Seventh, Third and First US Armies were shown down to and including regiments.

As the situation became somewhat static on the Third US Army front, a GSGS map of 1:100,000 scale was posted and Third US Army units down to and including battalions were shown. For the first time since the American break-through on the Normandy front it became possible to show a cohesive front line.

Since the BRITANNY Peninsula was the scene of only one important action, the siege of BREST, a large-scale map of that area was not used. American and German forces engaged in the action were shown on a map of 1:100,000 scale. On a 1:4,000,000 map of Europe, the Russo-German, Italian and French battle lines were shown. G-2 Section reports made possible the maintenance of a very clear picture of the enemy situation and Germany's western front.

Section VI - Censorship

An estimated total of 450,005 words were cleared by censors during the month in 2161 submissions. Submissions and wordage by week follows:

Week Ending	Submissions	Wordage (Estimated)
9 September	458	111,267
16 September	618	124,870
23 September	718	123,188
30 September	367	90,680
TOTALS	2161	450,005

Section VII - Communications

The Mackay Radic Corporation transmitter, direct outlet to NEW YORK from the Third US Army front along the MOSELLE River for war correspondents, set what is believed to be a European Theater of Operations record in transmitting a message from a correspondent to a client in NEW YORK in seventeen minutes. Another message reached a NEW YORK client in twenty-one minutes.

According to Mackay records at the Press Camp a total of 491,617 words were transmitted during September.

Difficulties in finding spare parts for the transmitting equipment were solved temporarily by the discovery of a German transmitter which was disassembled for parts.

No major breakdowns in transmission occurred during the month, and the transmission was not blacked out by atmospheric conditions for longer than several hours at a time.

Operations of Signal Corps radio and teletype transmission had an output of ten to fifteen messages daily. Approximately fifteen messages were received daily.

Teletype had been in service only a short time and was used as a relief means of transmittal for radio.

A broadcast was made via JEVA (Third US Army Press Camp radio, to BBC of two minutes duration. Interference was so bad that the broadcast was not received. It was rebroadcast the following day and a recording was made in LONDON.

NBC International tried to make a recording but it could not be received properly in LONDON. It was tried again and finally got through, but the reading was only fair. One broadcast, of one-and-a-half minutes duration, was made to NBC.

CHAPTER 5
 OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Routine Press Camp operations continued at PUXE (US8), in the ETAIN-CONFLANS area.

Press Camp moved to outskirts of city of NANCY (US1), 12 October. Several buildings were obtained for the use of the section and for the first time since arriving on the Continent all personnel as well as operations were housed indoors.

Press Camp functioned at NANCY (US1). During the month ten correspondents arrived at the camp and seventeen departed.

Correspondents assigned as of 31 October were:

Bockhurst, John, Newsreel Pool
 Broderick, Hugh J., Still Pool
 Clark, Norman M., News Chronicle
 Crawford, Kenneth, Newsweek
 Cronie, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
 Currihan, E.A., New York Times
 Downton, Eric, Reuters
 Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
 Gallagher, Wes, Associated Press
 Grad, Jules (Sgt), Stars and Stripes
 Grune, Phillip, Evening Standard
 Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press
 Huss, P.J., INS
 Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
 Mazo, Earl (Lt), Stars and Stripes
 McNiccol, D.R., Consolidated Australian Press
 Mecklin, John M., Chicago Sun
 Morse, Ralph, Still Pool
 Oldham, Jack, Rotha Films (101 Evac Hosp)
 Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
 Prince, W.J., London Times
 Ray, Cyril, BBC
 Reuswig, W., King Features
 Richards, Robert W., United Press
 Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool
 Ryan, Cornelius, London Daily Telegraph
 Sheahan, J.G., Chicago Tribune (artist)
 Small, Wilson C., United Press
 Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch
 Unwin, Stanley, BBC Engineer
 Wellard, James H., Chicago Times
 Wilhelm, John R., Reuters
 Youngman, L.W., Omaha World Telegram (asgd 35th Inf Div).

Arrivals for month of October were:

Currihan, E.A., New York Times, on 26 October.
 Fowler, Wick, Dallas News, on 25 October for temporary duty with 90th Infantry Division.
 Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press, on 12 October.
 Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., on 13 October.
 Mecklin, John M., Chicago Sun, on 13 October.
 Oldham, Jack, Rotha Films, on 24 October for temporary duty with 101st Evacuation Hospital.
 Ray, Cyril, BBC, on 24 October.
 Sheahan, J.G., Chicago Tribune artist, on 11 October.
 Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, on 11 October.
 Unwin, Stanley, BBC engineer, on 28 October.

Departures for month of October were:

Ball, Edward D., Associated Press, for United Kingdom 16 October.
 Beldin, J., Time and Life, for Twelfth Army Group 18 October.
 Carlisle, John M., Detroit News, for USA on 2 October.
 Despouey, Arturo, NBC, for Twelfth Army Group on 2 October.
 Fowler, Wick, Dallas News, for Sixth Army Group 31 October.
 Graham, Fred, New York Times, for Ninth Army 31 October.
 Grant, Donald, Look Magazine, for USA on 2 October.
 Greene, Hamilton, American Legion Magazine, for Twelfth US Army Group on 19 October.
 Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., for Ninth Air Force on 16 October.

SECRET

Loveland, Roelif, Cleveland Plain Dealer, for USA on 23 October.
Lucas, Nemo G., Rio de Janeiro Aonite, for Twelfth US Army Group 6 October.
Mackenzie, Donald K., New York Daily News, for Paris 30 October.
McQuaid, B.J., Chicago Daily News, for Second British Army 18 October.
McVane, John, NBC, for Twelfth US Army Group 2 October.
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, for Ninth US Army 21 October.
Wallenstein, Marcel, Kansas City Star, for Ninth US Army 18 October.
Wolf, T.H., Newspaper Enterprise Alliance, to Communications Zone 5 October.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during October totaled 1272 items, which were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications, Air Delivery Letter Service and Air Mail as follows:

Mackay..... 1055
Army Communications..... 126
ADLS..... 53
Air Mail..... 38

Total 1272

Estimated wordage was 192,274.

Section II - Press

A total of 6220 items, including thirty-one photos, were received from twenty-one organizations in Third US Army and forwarded to Press Section, FRO, Headquarters Communications Zone (Forward) for clearance and distribution during October. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions..... 580
Awards and Citations..... 1923
General Interest..... 3636
Photos..... 31

Total 6220

Units submitting material included: 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, XII Corps, XII Corps Engineer, 12th Evacuation Hospital, 14th Liaison Squadron, 17th Armored Group, IX Corps, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, 86th Chemical Battalion, 90th Infantry Division, 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 128th AA Battalion, 248th Combat Engineer Battalion, 514th Quartermaster Group, 739th Field Artillery, Army Nurse Corps, and Public Relations Office, Third US Army.

The October total of 6220 items was a decrease of 1535 from the September total of 7755. The August total was 801, and the July total 177. Grand total of items forwarded after clearance at this headquarters during the three months of Third US Army operations on the Continent was 14,836, and for all items cleared and forwarded during pre-operational and operational periods 15,013.

In addition to forwarding news items and photos to FRO Communications Zone for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Stars and Stripes and to Yank. All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Mechanical failure of both the wire recorder and its portable power unit resulted in the procurement of a new recorder and a new power unit (PE 214). The new power unit was of a different type from any previously used in this section, being much more compact and considerably lighter in weight. In combination with the new wire recorder it proved most satisfactory.

Army Hour recordings were made from an observation post overlooking the fortifications of METZ (US) from a division in reserve, and from a division preparing itself for winter fighting. "Hometown" recordings were made at an infantry regiment, a medical collecting station, a combat engineer battalion, a field artillery battery and an ordnance company.

The British Broadcasting Company's miniature recording "van" - equipment mounted in a quarter-ton trailer - was again prepared for use after being idle since late August.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two newsreel and three still photographers were assigned to FRO, Third US Army in October, and were assisted in their mission by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Room maintained maps showing the situation of Allied and enemy troops on all European war fronts. As the situation was relatively static, it was possible to show a cohesive "front line." Maps of the Russian and Italian fronts were maintained on the basis of radio newscasts, the only available source of information and one which provided only a very general picture. G-2 Section reports made possible the maintenance of a very clear picture of the enemy situation on Germany's western front.

Using radio newscasts as the source of information, a map was prepared showing the progress of the American invasion on LEXTE, in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of October, total items submitted to Field Press Censorship at Army level were 1329, with a total wordage of 353,870. Photographs submitted totaled 511.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio Corporation's transmitter handled 207,213 words during the month. There were no major breakdowns in transmission.

Radio and teletype operations by Army Communications group averaged approximately the same as in September, ranging from ten to fifteen messages (about 1000 groups) per day. Messages received averaged about fifteen daily.

Teletype service was facilitated by means of an excellent tie-up with Third US Army Headquarters Signal teletype board. During the latter half of the month more than the usual amount of British press copy was handled by teletype.

On the last three days of October voice tests to LONDON were made with the 399 transmitter. On the 30th of October a test was made to Twelfth US Army Group.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Routine Press Camp operations continued at NANCY (US1). During the month twenty-six correspondents arrived at the camp and twenty-eight departed. The twenty-nine correspondents assigned as of 30 November were:

Cammon, J.J., M/Sgt, Stars and Stripes
Cassidy, M., (Facility visit) Philadelphia Evening Bulletin
Clark, N.M., London News Chronicle
Cromie, R.A., Chicago Tribune
Curryvan, E.A., New York Times
Downton, Eric, Reuters
Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald-Tribune
Edinger, J., France-Presse Agency
Grune, P., London Evening Standard
Haacker, C.T., Still Pool
Hawkins, L., Associated Press
Husé, P.J., INS
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News

Martin, R.G., Stars and Stripes (Divisional coverage)
Mazo, Earl, Lt., Stars and Stripes
McCardell, L., Baltimore Sun
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J., London Times
Ray, Cyril, BBC
Reusswig, W., King Features
Richards, R.W., United Press
Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool
Ryan, G.J., London Daily Telegraph
Sheahan, J.G., Chicago Tribune (artist)
Small, W.C., United Press
Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler
Umwin, S., BBC engineer
Wellard, James H., Chicago Times

The twenty-six arrivals for the month of November were:

Brogan, J.A., Jr., vice-president of INS, for facility visit on 16 November.
Cannon, J.J., Stars and Stripes, on 27 November.
Carpenter, Iris (Miss), London Daily Herald, for facility visit, on 19 November.
Cassidy, M., Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, for facility visit with Nineteenth Tactical Air Force, on 25 November.
Davis, F.M., Life, for facility visit, 17 November.
Diquelou, R., Parisien Humanite, for facility visit, 19 November.
Dixon, K., Associated Press, 9 November
Edinger, J., France-Presse Agency, 1 November.
Haacker, C.T., Still Pool, 10 November.
Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine, 15 November.
Loxton, Barbara, South African "Nawek," for facility visit with Third US Army medical units, 26 November.
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News, 17 November.
Mann, A., Mutual Broadcasting, for facility visit, 12 November.
Martin, R.G., S/Sgt, Stars and Stripes, for divisional coverage, 23 November.
McCardell, L., Baltimore Sun, 3 November.
Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool, 11 November.
Reusswig, W., King Features, 2 November.
Cromie, R., Chicago Tribune, 2 November.
Richards, R.W., United Press, 10 November.
Robinson, W., New York Herald Tribune, for facility visit, 25 November.
Rollins, E.H., Still Pool, 14 November.
Stewart, O., Baltimore Afro-American, for facility visit with 761st Tank Destroyer Battalion, on 8 November.
Stirling, Monica (Miss), Atlantic Monthly, for facility visit with Third US Army medical units, 26 November.
Tully, A., Boston Traveler, 11 November.
Wellard, J.H., Chicago Times, 27 November.
Werner, O.A., Associated Press, for facility visit 26 November.

Departures for November, totalling twenty-eight, were:

Ball, E.D., Associated Press, for USA, 12 November.
Bockhurst, J.A., Newsreel Pool, for United States via Paris, 24 November.
Broderick, H.J., Still Pool, for USA via Paris, 29 November.
Brogan, J.A., Jr., vice-president INS, 19 November.
Carpenter, Iris (Miss), London Daily Herald, 20 November.
Cook, Z.D., Newsweek, to Sixth US Army Group, 9 November.
Crawford, K., Newsweek, 10 November.
Davis, F.M., Life, 23 November.
Diquelou, R., Parisien Humanite, 23 November.
Dixon, K., Associated Press, for Ninth US Army, 29 November.
Gallagher, W., Associated Press, 5 November.
Grad, J., Stars and Stripes, 5 November.
Loxton, Barbara, South African "Nawek," 28 November.
Mackenzie, D.K., New York Daily News, 10 November.
Mann, A., Mutual Broadcasting, 18 November.
McNiccol, D.R., Consolidated Australian Press, for USA via Paris, 24 November.
Mecklin, J.M., Chicago Sun, 12 November.
Morse, R., Still Pool, 21 November.
Oldham, J., Rothera Films, 7 November.
Robinson, W., New York Herald Tribune, 28 November.
Stewart, O., Baltimore Afro-American, 14 November.
Stirling, Monica (Miss), Atlantic Monthly, 28 November.
Stokes, R.L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, for USA via Paris, 1 November.
Tully, A., Boston Traveler, to Ninth US Army, 10 November.
Wellard, J.H., Chicago Times, 5 November.
Werner, O.A., Associated Press, 29 November.

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Wilhelm, J.R., Reuters, 20 November.
Youngman, L.W., Omaha World Telegram, for USA via Paris,
1 November.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during November totaled 3426 items as against October's 1272. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications, Air Delivery Letter Service and Air Mail according to the following table:

Mackay.....	2891
Army Communications.....	422
ADLS.....	111
Air Mail.....	2
Total	3426

The estimated wordage of 556,390 for November is the largest monthly total thus far.

Section II - Press

A total of 3925 items, including eighty photos, was received from eighteen organizations in Third US Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for clearance and distribution during November. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions.....	385
Awards and Citations.....	3022
General Interest.....	438
Photos.....	80
Total	3925

Units submitting material included 4th Armored Division, 4th Special Service Company, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, XII Corps, 12th Evacuation Hospital, XI Corps, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 77th Finance Disbursing Section, 80th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 166th Signal Photo Company, 187th Signal Replacement Company and 514th Quartermaster Group.

The Public Relations Section, Third US Army, submitted sixty-three items, thirty of which were photos. These items originated with this headquarters.

The November total of 3925 items is a decrease of 2295 from the October total of 6220. The September total was 7755, August 861, and July 177. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this headquarters during the four months of Third US Army operations on the Continent is 18,761. Grand total of all items cleared during the pre-operational and operational periods to date is 18,938.

In addition to forwarding news items and photos to PRO, Communications Zone (Forward), for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Stars and Stripes and to Yank. All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio correspondent Cyril Ray, BBC, and Stanley Unwin, BBC engineer, were at the Press Camp during the entire month. Arthur Mann, of Mutual Broadcasting System, spent several days at the Camp arranging a special series of recordings dealing with Third US Army's Psychological Warfare Section. "Red" Mueller, National Broadcasting Company, attached to PRO, Twelfth US Army Group, made several broadcasts from JEVA.

Standby Army Hour spots were made from the 26th Infantry Division and from a Quartermaster Truck Company. In accordance with instructions from the Public Relations Division of the War Department a special recorded interview was made with a colored Quartermaster jeep driver whom GENERAL PATTON had decorated for heroism at CHATEAUDUN. This recording was for Mutual's "Your Army Service Forces" program. Eighteen hometown recordings were made. Mechanical difficulties with the wire recorder prevented making more recordings.

The Radio section assisted in making arrangements for an enlisted man from the 5th Infantry Division to participate in a broadcast beamed to the United States from Paris.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographers were assigned to Third US Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Section

The Information Room maintained maps showing the situation of Allied and enemy troops on all European fronts and one showing the progress of the American campaign on LEYTE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Maps of the Russian, Italian and Philippine campaigns were maintained on the basis of newscasts, the only available source of information. G-2 Section reports made possible the maintenance of a very clear picture of the enemy situation on Germany's western front.

On 1:100,000 maps emphasizing terrain features, progress week by week since opening of the November drive was indicated by shading.

On 1:25,000 maps, the German defensive plan from LUXEMBOURG approximately to SAARBRUCKEN was shown.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of November, total items submitted to field press censorship at Army level was 3624, with a total wordage of 572,412. Photographs submitted totaled 236.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 446,999 words during November, with no major breakdowns in transmission.

Transmission via Army Communications, by both radio and teletype, averaged thirty to forty messages per day (7000 to 8000 groups). Incoming messages averaged twenty-five daily (1500 to 2000 groups).

Although there was still some difficulty with relay service at Army Group level, teletype handled the bulk of the traffic. On the whole, the teletype service was much more satisfactory than was expected.

The radio was open twenty-four hours a day but because of a very crowded frequency after 1700 hours it did not prove to be a satisfactory means of clearing traffic should the teletype fail during a rush period.

Tests to LONDON using JELG at Twelfth US Army Group as a relay, proved satisfactory. Some recordings were broadcast to BBC and were received satisfactorily, although reception was impossible after 1700 hours.

Tests to PARIS direct proved very satisfactory. With the Army station in PARIS acting as a relay, one broadcast direct to NBC in NEW YORK was originated with very good results.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The Press Camp conducted operations at NANCY (U81), FRANCE, until 26 December and then set up routine press operations at ESCH (P70), LUXEMBOURG. During the month twenty-five correspondents arrived and thirty departed. The twenty-eight correspondents assigned as of 31 December were:

- Ball, E.D., Associated Press
- Cannon, J.J., M/Sgt, Stars and Stripes
- Cromie, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
- Downton, Eric, Reuters
- Driscoll, J.F., New York Herald Tribune
- Haacker, C.T., Still Pool
- Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press
- Johnston, Richard J., New York Times
- Lang, Will, Time Magazine
- Lee, Jack, INS
- Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
- McCardell, Lee, Baltimore Sun
- McCarthy, J.W., M/Sgt, Yank Magazine
- McNulty, Anthony J., Stars and Stripes Photographer
- Picard, Marcel, Agence Francaise Presse
- Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool
- Ray, Cyril, BBC
- Richards, R.W., United Press
- Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool
- Ryan, C.J., London Daily Telegraph
- Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News
- Sheahan, J.G., Chicago Tribune (artist)
- Small, Wilson C., United Press
- Unwin, Stanley, BBC engineer
- Wellard, James H., Chicago Times
- Weston, Joseph, Pvt, Stars and Stripes
- White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press
- Wiant, Toby, Associated Press

The twenty-five arrivals for the month of December were:

- Bain, Leslie B., McNaught Syndicate, arrived 15 December for facility visit.
- Berson, Roger, French Photo Presse, arrived 9 December for facility visit.
- Galmer, Ned, Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 3 December for facility visit.
- Gapa, Robert, Life and Time Magazine Photographer, arrived 12 December.
- Droit, Michel, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 24 December for facility visit.
- Folliard, Edward, Washington Post, arrived 23 December for facility visit.
- Hauser, Ernest, Saturday Evening Post, arrived 21 December for facility visit.
- Johnston, R.J., New York Times, arrived 30 December.
- Krueger, Jess, Chicago Herald American, arrived 14 December for facility visit.
- Lang, Will, Time Magazine, arrived 27 December.
- Lee, Jack, INS, arrived 28 December.
- Lower, Elmer, Life Magazine, arrived 3 December for facility visit.
- Martin, H.G., Lt. General, British Army, Retired, Military Advisor, London Daily Telegraph, arrived 8 December for facility visit.
- McDowall, James, Kemsley Newspapers, arrived 12 December for facility visit.
- McCarthy, Joseph W., M/Sgt, Yank Magazine, arrived 29 December for facility visit.
- Peterman, Ivan H., Philadelphia Inquirer, arrived 7 December for facility visit.
- Peteuil, Andre, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 24 December for facility visit.
- Picard, Marcel, Agence Francaise Presse, arrived 30 December.
- Scherman, David, Life Magazine, arrived 3 December for facility visit.
- Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News, arrived 15 December.
- Stead, Ronald, Christian Science Monitor, arrived 15 December for facility visit.
- Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, arrived 9 December for facility visit.
- Van Lee, Loys, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 24 December for facility visit.
- Werner, Oscar A., Associated Press, arrived 10 December for facility visit.
- Weston, Joseph, Pvt., Stars and Stripes, arrived 29 December for facility visit.
- White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press, arrived 28 December.

The thirty departures for the month of December were:

- Bain, Leslie B., McNaught Syndicate, 18 December.
- Berson, Roger, French Photo Presse, 16 December.
- Galmer, Ned, Columbia Broadcasting System, 5 December.

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Gape, Robert, Life and Time Photographer, 22 December.
 Cassidy, Morley, Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 6 December.
 Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle, 16 December.
 Currihan, Gene, New York Times, 29 December.
 Droit, Michel, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 29 December.
 Edinger, Jacques, Agence Francaise Presse, 25 December.
 Follard, Edward, Washington Post, 26 December.
 Grume, Phillip, London Evening Standard, for United Kingdom on leave and business consultation with his office 18 December.
 Hauser, Ernest, Saturday Evening Post, 26 December.
 Huss, P.J., INS, for USA via Paris on 16 December.
 Krueger, Jess, Chicago Herald American, 16 December.
 Lower, Elmer, Life Magazine, 5 December.
 Mackenzie, D.K., for USA via Paris, 16 December. New York Daily News.
 Martin, H.G., Lt. General, British Army, Retired, Military Advisor, London Daily Telegraph, 11 December.
 Martin, Ralph G., Stars and Stripes, returned to Twelfth US Army Group 8 December.
 Mazo, Earl, (Lt), Stars and Stripes, for Paris 22 December.
 McDowell, James, Kemsley Newspapers, 17 December.
 Peterman, Ivan H., Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 December.
 Petreuil, Andre, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 29 December.
 Prince, W.J., London Times, for United Kingdom via Paris on leave and business consultation 20 December.
 Reusswig, W., King Features, for USA via Paris 18 December.
 Scherman, David, Life Magazine, 5 December.
 Stead, Ronald, Christian Science Monitor, 18 December.
 Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, 16 December.
 Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, on leave to Paris to make Christmas Broadcasts to the United States on Massachusetts personalities, 19 December.
 Van Lee, Loys, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 29 December.
 Werner, Oscar A., Associated Press, 29 December.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during December totaled 2901 items as against November's 3426. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service according to the following table:

Mackay.....	2310
Army Communications...	422
ADLS.....	169
Total	2901

The estimated wordage for December totaled 453,795. The November total was 556,390.

Section II - Press

A total of 7780 items, including sixty-six photos, were received from twenty-nine organizations in Third US Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for clearance and distribution during December. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions.....	862
Awards and Citations...	5683
General Interest.....	1169
Photos.....	66
Total	7780

Units submitting material included 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, 9th Armored Division, 10th Armored Division, 12th Evacuation Hospital, XII Corps, XX Corps, 26th Infantry Division, 33rd Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 93rd Signal Battalion, 94th Medical Gas Treatment Battalion, 95th Infantry Division, 145th Engineer Combat Battalion, 179th Field Artillery Battalion, 273rd Field Artillery Battalion, 275th Ordnance Maintenance Company, 404th Field Artillery Group, 696th Field Artillery Battalion, 738th Field Artillery Battalion, 739th Field Artillery Battalion, 775th Field Artillery Battalion, 1117th Engineer Combat Group, and Surgery, Third US Army.

The Public Relations Section, Third US Army, submitted forty-six items, eighteen of which were photos. These items originated this Headquarters.

The December total of 7780 items is an increase of 3855 over the November total of 3925. The October total was 6220. The September total was 7755. The August total was 861 and the July total 177.

Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this headquarters during the five months of Third US Army operations on the Continent is 26,541. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date is 26,718.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to PRO, Headquarters Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Stars and Stripes and to Yank. All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

There were nine combat diary reports during December. Seven Christmas recordings were made. There were two recordings for the Army Hour. Two recordings of "front line choir" at the 35th Infantry Division were made. There were 120 recordings released after censorship for hometown consumption. A War Department request for a broadcast from LUXEMBOURG was received.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third US Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During December the Information Section maintained a G-2, G-3 situation map, scale 1:250,000, of the western front showing dispositions of both Allied and enemy troops by division and higher units. A map of 1:100,000 scale of the Third US Army sector was maintained showing locations of Third US Army and sectors of the Third US Army and the Seventh US Army was maintained to show progress of the two armies' offensives. Units down to regiment, and sometimes down to battalion, were shown.

During the battles for METZ (U85), SAARLAUTERN (Q28), and SAAR-GUEMINES (Q55), maps of 1:250,000 were maintained which showed exact locations and types of fixed enemy defenses.

Progress week by week of the Third US Army's offensive which began 8 November, were shown on a 1:100,000 map shaded to emphasize terrain features.

With the beginning of the German Army's counter-offensive on the western front against the First US Army's VIII Corps, a 1:100,000 scale map of this area was posted and units down to regiment were shown in their proper positions.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of December, total items submitted to field press censorship at Army level was 3801 with a total wordage of 700,652. Total releases and hometown mailers was 554. Photographs submitted totaled 485.

Section VIII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 343,443 words during December, with no major breakdowns in transmission.

The operation of both the radio and teletype, with the latter representing the principal means of communications, had an average output of 6,000 to 7,000 groups representing the texts of approximately thirty messages daily. Messages received showed an increase over the month of November with an average of twenty-five messages handled having about 2,000 groups daily.

The voice broadcast circuit between this station and British Broadcasting Corporation, LONDON, was maintained during December with messages being handled daily. Broadcasts by correspondents, the Radio Officer's and one enlisted man's recordings, were received satisfactorily in LONDON.

Traffic was limited when the Press Camp moved to a new location, as the only means of communications at the time was the radio, SCR-399.

The combined station AOD-JEVA was open twenty-four hours a day and the required personnel on duty was over that span to maintain teletype, radio, code and messenger service.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Routine Press Camp operations continued at ESCH (P70). During the month thirty correspondents arrived and twenty-five departed. The thirty-two correspondents present as of 31 January were:

Bohrod, Aaron, Time and Life
 Bryson, John, Blue Network
 Busch, Noel, Time and Life
 Cannon, James J., M/Sgt, Stars and Stripes
 Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle
 Coffey, Pat, Yank Photographer
 Cromie, Robert A., Chicago Tribune
 Currihan, Gene, New York Times
 Downton, Eric, Reuters
 Driscoll, Joseph F., New York Herald-Tribune
 Edinger, Jacques, Agence Francaise Presse
 Florea, John T., Time and Life Photographer
 Griffin, Bulkley S., Worcester Telegram Gazette and Hartford Times
 Hacker, Charles T., Still Pool Photographer
 Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press
 Levitt, Saul, Yank Magazine
 McCardell, Lee, Baltimore Sun
 McNulty, Anthony J., Stars and Stripes Photographer
 Murray, Edward J., United Press
 Newman, Larry, International News Service
 Penn, David, Office of War Information
 Priestley, T.A., Newsreel Pool Cameraman
 Prince, W.J., London Times
 Reid, Robert, British Broadcasting Company
 Richards, Robert W., United Press
 Rollins, Byron H., Still Pool Photographer
 Ryan, Cornelius J., London Daily Telegraph
 Sheehan, James Vincent, North America Newspaper Alliance
 Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler
 Unwin, Stanley, British Broadcasting Company Engineer
 White, G.E., Melbourne Herald
 Wiant, Thoburn, Associated Press

The thirty arrivals for the month of January were:

Bohrod, Aaron, Time and Life, arrived 25 January
 Blanchard, Claude, France-Soir, arrived 1 January for facility visit.
 Bryson, John, Blue Network, arrived 27 January
 Busch, Noel, Time and Life, arrived 25 January
 Clark, Norman M., London News Chronicle, returned from leave in London, 6 January
 Coffey, Pat, Yank Photographer, arrived 6 January
 Grenesse, Pierre, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 23 January, for facility visit.
 Currihan, Gene, New York Times, arrived 6 January
 Dearing, Joseph, Colliers, arrived 1 January for facility visit.
 Edinger, Jacques, Agence Francaise Presse, arrived 6 January.
 Farr, Walter, London Daily Mail, arrived 5 January.
 Florea, John T., Time and Life, arrived 29 January
 Griffin, Bulkley S., Worcester Telegram Gazette and Hartford Times, arrived 18 January.
 Hutton, Geoffrey W., Melbourne Argus, arrived 23 January for facility visit.
 Mitchell, Patrick C., Stars and Stripes, arrived 1 January
 Morrison, Allan M., Stars and Stripes, arrived 2 January, for facility visit.

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Murray, Edward J., United Press, arrived 22 January.
 Newman, Larry, International News Service, arrived 2 January.
 Penn, David, Office of War Information, arrived 28 January.
 Perronet, Paul, Radio Diffusion Francaise, arrived 1 January for facility visit.
 Prince, W. J., London Times, arrived 6 January from leave in United Kingdom.
 Reid, Robert, British Broadcasting Corporation, arrived 31 January.

Holland, Jacques, Paris Ce Soir, arrived 2 January for facility visit.
 Sartres, Andre, France-Soir, arrived 2 January, for facility visit.
 Sheehan, James Vincent, North America Newspaper Alliance, arrived 22 January.
 Thompson, Reginald W., London Sunday Times, arrived 17 January, for facility visit.
 Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, returned from Paris 3 January.
 White, O. E., Melbourne Herald, arrived 23 January.
 Wiant, Toby, Associated Press, arrived 2 January.
 Zaleski, Maurice, Journal "Liber Soir", arrived 18 January, for facility visit.

The twenty-five departures for the month of January were:

Ball, Edward D., Associated Press, 3 January.
 Blanshard, Claude, France-Soir, 8 January.
 Crenesse, Pierre, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 27 January.
 Dearing, Joseph, Colliers, 22 January.
 Farr, Walter, London Daily Mail, 25 January, on leave to Paris.
 Hutton, Geoffrey W., Melbourne Argus, 26 January.
 Johnston, Richard J., New York Times, 6 January.
 Lang, Will, Time and Life, 24 January.
 Lee, Jack, International News Service, 6 January.
 McCarthy, Joseph W., Yank, 11 January.
 Mitchell Patrick C., Stars and Stripes, 26 January, on leave to Paris.
 Morrison, Allen M., Stars and Stripes, 6 January.
 Perronet, Paul, Radio Diffusion Francaise, 18 January.
 Picard, Marcel, Agence Francaise Presse, 8 January.
 Ray, Cyril, British Broadcasting Corporation, 6 January, suspended for illegal broadcast.
 Rolland, Jacques, Paris Ce Soir, 18 January.
 Sartres, Andre, France-Soir, 8 January.
 Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News, 22 January, on leave to England.
 Sheehan, Joseph G., Chicago Tribune, 25 January, on leave to Paris.
 Small, Wilson C., United Press, 15 January.
 Thompson, Reginald W., London Sunday Times, 26 January.
 Wellard, James H., Chicago Times, 16 January, on leave to United Kingdom.
 Weston, Joseph, Stars and Stripes, 11 January.
 White, Samuel, Consolidated Australian Press, 10 January, on leave to United Kingdom.
 Zaleski, Maurice, Journal "Liber-Soir", 27 January.

Copy logged at the Press Camp during January totaled 3246 items as against December's 2901. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service according to the following table:

Mackay.....	2409
Army Communications.....	667
ADLS.....	180
	3246

The estimated wordage for January totaled 501,540. The December total was 453,795.

Section II - Press

A total of 8358 items, including 110 photos, were received from thirty-eight organizations in Third Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Hq Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for clearance and distribution during January. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions.....	1615
Awards & Cit.....	5289
Gen Interest.....	1344
Photos.....	110
<u>Total</u>	<u>8358</u>

Units submitting material included 4th Arm Div, 4th Inf Div, 5th Inf Div, 5th FA Gp, 6th Arm Div, VIII Corps, 9th Arm Div, 9th TD Gp, 10th Arm Div, 11th Arm Div, 12th Evac Hosp, XII Corps, 17th Airborne Div, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 28th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 42nd Cav Recon Sq, 70th TK Bn, 80th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 91st Chem Bn, 94th Med Gas Bn, 93rd Sig Bn, 94th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 101st Airborne Div, 456th AAA Bn, 689th FA Bn, 774th TD Bn, 1306th Engr GS Regt, 3180th Sig Serv Bn, 3255th Sig Serv Co, Hq AAA Units, AG Third U S Army and G-3 Third U S Army.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted sixteen items. These items originated this Headquarters.

The January total is an increase of 578 over the December total of 7780, having totaled 8358. The November total was 3925. The October total was 6220. The September total was 7755. The August total was 861 and the July total 177. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the six months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 34899. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 35076.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to PRO, Communications Zone (Forward) ETOUSA, for release, duplicates of general and human interest stories were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

There were seven combat diary reports during January. There were four Army Hour recordings and three Army Service Forces recordings. There were 107 recordings released after censorship for hometown consumption. The Section also assisted with five recordings for Radio Francais.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still, one newsreel and a "Yank" photographer were assigned to Third U S Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During January, the Information Section provided two daily briefings for correspondents assigned to the Third U S Army and one daily briefing for the General and Special Staff Officers of Headquarters, Third U S Army.

A world map showing the Russian and western battle front was maintained from combined G-2, G-3 and radio news reports.

On a map of 1:250,000 scale, the western front picture was shown down to and including units of division size along the Allied front in western Europe. Both Allied and enemy units were shown.

Third and First U S Armies were shown on a map of 1:100,000 scale. Allied and enemy units down to and including Regiment were shown in their proper positions.

During the month of January, the Information Section maintained G-2 and G-3 situation maps of the entire western front. The situation on the western front was kept current through use of a map of 1:100,000 scale.

Section VI - Censorship

For the month of January, total items submitted to field press censorship at army level was 3371 with a total of censorship at army level was 3371 with a total wordage of 932,375. Total releases and hometown mailers was 1550. Photographs submitted totaled 1153.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 410,266 words during January with no major breakdown in transmission.

The operations of both the radio and teletype had an average output of 8,000 to 9,000 groups daily for the first two weeks and 5,000 to 6,000 for the last two weeks. These groups represented approximately twenty-five to thirty messages daily. Messages received were about the same as December and averaged about twenty-five with a fluctuating group count of 2,000 to 2,500 daily.

Teletype difficulties increased greatly and at times it was almost impossible to get a proper connection through to our relay station at Twelfth U S Army Group.

The voice cast circuit to LONDON, British Broadcasting Corporation, was maintained throughout the month.

CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

Press Camp operations were conducted at LUXEMBOURG CITY (F81), LUXEMBOURG, during the month. During February, sixteen correspondents arrived and fifteen departed. The thirty-two correspondents assigned as of 28 February were:

Ball, Edward D.	Associated Press
Bryson, John	Blue Network
Canon, James J., M/Sgt	Stars and Stripes
Clark, Norman M.	London News Chronicle
Costello, William	British Broadcasting Corporation
Cromie, Robert A.	Chicago Tribune
Curry, Gene	New York Times
Downton, Eric	Reuters
Driscoll, J.F.	New York Herald Tribune
Edinger, Jacques	Agence France Press
Foucherand, Louis	Marseilles Press
Griffin, Bulkley S.	Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Haacker, Charles T.	Still Pool
McBrim, Robert J.	Yank
McCardell, Lee	Baltimore Sun
McNulty, Anthony J.	Stars and Stripes
Meyer, Robert	United Press
Mitchell, Patrick C.	Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry	International News Service
Penn, David	Office of War Information
Priestley, T. A.	Newsreel Pool
Prince, W. J.	London Times
Reid, Robert	British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W.	United Press
Rollins, Byron H.	Still Pool
Ryan, Cornelius J.	London Daily Telegraph
Shadel, W.F.	Columbia Broadcasting Corporation
Sheehan, Joseph Gary	Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Sheehan, James Vincent	Redbook (MANA)
Tully, Andrew	Boston Traveler
West, J.R.	Fort Worth Star Telegram
Wiant, Toby	Associated Press

The sixteen arrivals for the month of February were:

Abramson, Robert J., Yank, arrived 8 February for facility visit.
 Alexander, Arthur H., Yank, arrived 8 February for facility visit.
 Ball, Edward, Associated Press, arrived 17 February.
 Best, Jacques, Paris Combat, arrived 15 February for facility visit.
 Costello, William, British Broadcasting Corporation Engineer arrived 23 February.
 Epstein, Clifford, Detroit News, arrived 9 February for facility visit.
 Foucherand, Louis, Mares
 Foucherand, Louis, Marseilles Press, arrived 12 February for facility visit.
 Lachin, Maurice, Paris Mondial, arrived 12 February for facility visit.
 McBrim, Robert J., Yank, arrived 22 February.

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Meyer, Robert, United Press, arrived 1 February.
Mitchell, Patrick C., Stars and Stripes, arrived from leave 1 February.
Schuck, Hugh J., New York Daily News, arrived from leave 1 February.
Shadel, W.F., Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 13 February for facility visit.
Sheahan, Joseph G., Chicago Tribune, arrived from leave 26 February.
Wear, J.R., Fort Worth Star Telegram, arrived 7 February.
Wellard, James H., Chicago Times, arrived from leave 2 February.

The fifteen departures for the month of February were:

Abrahamson, Robert J., Yank, 12 February.
Alexander, Arthur H., Yank, 12 February.
Bohrod, Aaron, Time and Life, 24 February.
Bosto

Bost, Jacques, Paris Combat, 24 February.
Busch, Noel, Time and Life, 5 February.
Coffey, Pat, Yank, 24 February on leave.
Epstein, Clifford, Detroit News, 14 February.
Hawkins, Lewis, Associated Press, 14 February.
Lachin, Maurice, Paris Mondial, 17 February.
Levitt, Saul, Yank, 2 February.
Murray, Edward J., United Press, 1 February.
Schuck, Hugh, New York Daily News, 16 February.
Unwin, Stanley, British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 February.
Wellard, James H., Chicago Times, 23 February.
White, O.E., Melbourne Herald, 6 February.

There were 1821 items logged at the Press Camp during February as against 3426 for the month of January. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter service to the following table:

Mackay.....1398
Army Communications. 371
ADLS..... 52
1821

The estimated wordage for the month of February totaled 337,990. The January total was 501,540.

Section II - Press

A total of 4997 items, including 95 photos, were received from thirty nine organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRD, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for release and distribution after clearance, during February. This total is broken down as follows:

Promotions..... 772
Awards & Cit.....3367
Gen Interest..... 763
Photos..... 95

Total 4997

Units submitting material included 3d Cav Gp, III Corps, 4th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, 6th Cav Gp, VIII Corps, 9th TD Gp, 9th Armd Div, 10th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, 12th Evac Hosp, XII Corps, 13th Chem Bn, XV Corps, 17th Airborne Inf, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 42d Cav Sq, 43d Cav Sq, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 91st Chem Bn, 94th Inf Div, 94th Med Gas Bn, 95th Inf Div, 161st FA Bn, 206th Engr Com Bn, 248th Engr Com Bn, 275th Ord Maint Co, 276th Armd FA Bn, 803d TD Bn, 974th FA Bn, and 1137th Engr Com Gp.

The Public Relations Section, Third United States Army, submitted forty four items. These originated this Headquarters.

The February total was a decrease of 3361 over the January total of 8358. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the seven months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 39896. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 40073.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward), for release, duplicates of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio operations for the month of February included two live shows via 399 for combat diary, three wire recordings for combat diary, and a wire recording for the Army Hour via Twelfth U S Army Group. One wire recording was also sent to the United States for network release via Paris.

A total of 133 "hometown" recordings were sent via Paris. A total of 197 Third U S Army combat personnel were interviewed during the month. The estimated wordage of "hometown" radio releases cleared through censors and sent via Paris totaled 105,000 as an estimated figure.

During the month the section assisted the British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent in filing dispatches via Paris on the wire recorder. Blue Network correspondent broadcast to United States four times weekly via Twelfth U S Army Group transmitter and Mackay Radio transmitter.

New equipment obtained by the section this month now makes it possible to send complete recording units to three sectors of the Third U S Army front simultaneously. A complete recording unit, including the power unit, can be placed in a jeep with three correspondents and units are available to radio correspondents at all times.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third U S Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During February, the Information Section maintained situation maps of the western front showing dispositions of both Allied and enemy troops by division and higher units. The offensive surge of the Russians also prompted an additional map of the eastern front.

A detailed 1:50,000 map was maintained of the entire Third U S Army front and late in the period a 1:25,000 scale was introduced, covering the main spots of activity on the western front. 1:250,000 and 1:100,000 scale maps were kept on Allied and enemy troops on different sectors of the western front.

Briefings for the correspondents were conducted twice daily with G-2, G-3 liaison, Corps and Division Public Relations Officers as the main source of information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total items submitted for the month of February to field press censorship at army level was 3183 with a total wordage of 914,050. Total releases and hometown mailers was 1439. There were 1243 photographs submitted.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 304,521 words during the month of February with no major breakdown in transmission.

The combined radio and teletype had an outgoing 6500 groups which represented approximately thirty to thirty-five messages daily. Teletype handled the bulk of the traffic. Radio acted as an emergency means of communications with Twelfth U S Army Group. Incoming traffic ranged from twenty to twenty-five messages with a group average of 2500 words daily.

A daily report was made on outgoing traffic and a weekly report submitted for more accurate checking on figures.

Radio handled several voicecasts. They were received satisfactorily during the day.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

Press Camp operations were conducted on German soil for the first time during the month at IDAR-OBERSTEIN (172). Third United States Army again received the bulk of newspaper and radio coverage for their smashing SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE triangle operations. During the month Third United States Army troops crossed the Rhine in strength while armor swept east and north in spectacular gains. The spectacular movements of Third United States Army during the month were considered as one of the greatest operations in military history.

Thirty correspondents arrived and nineteen departed during March. The thirty four correspondents assigned as of 31 March were:

Ball, Edward D. Associated Press
Bryson, John Blue Network
Cannon, James J., M/Sgt Stars and Stripes
Clark, Norman M London News Chronicle
Goffey, Pat Yank (Photographer)
Costello, William British Broadcasting Corporation
Cromie, Robert A. Chicago Tribune
Curry, E.A. New York Times
Deroche, Louis Agence France Press
Driscoll, J.F. New York Herald Tribune
Griffin, Bulkley S. Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Hoacker, Charles T. Still Pool
Kerr, McFee Reuters
Lake, Austen Boston American
Levitt, Saul Yank
McCardell, Lee Baltimore Sun
Meyer, Robert United Press
Mitchell, Patrick C. Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry International News Service
Packard, Reynolds United Press
Priestley, T.A. Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J. London Times
Reid, Robert British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W. United Press
Rollins, Byron H. Still Pool
Ryan, Cornelius J. London Daily Telegraph
Schemman, David Still Pool
Sheahan, Joseph Gary Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Tully, Andrew Boston Traveler
Wear, J.R. Fort Worth Star Telegram
White, O.E. Melbourne Herald
White, Samuel Consolidated Australian Press
Wiant, Toby Associated Press
Wilkinson, Laurence London Daily Express

The thirty arrivals for the month of March were:

Berson, Roger, arrived 20 March for facility visit.
Coffey, Pat, Yank, returned from Paris 25 March.
Deroche, Louis, arrived 31 March.
Ede, Maurice, arrived 21 March for facility visit.
Fleisher, Jack, arrived 27 March for facility visit.
Francois, Robert, arrived 30 March for facility visit.
Hall, John, arrived 27 March for facility visit.
Huss, P.J., arrived 25 March for facility visit.
Jordan, Max, arrived 12 March for facility visit.
Kerr, McFee, arrived 7 March for facility visit.
Lake, Austen, arrived 7 March for facility visit.
Lee, Jack, arrived 16 March.
Levitt, Saul, arrived 25 March.
Lewis, Boyd, arrived 16 March for facility visit.
Majet, Francois, arrived 5 March.
Morse, Ralph, arrived 7 March for facility visit.
O'Connell, John, arrived 10 March for facility visit.
Olsen, Sidney, arrived 28 March for facility visit.
Packard, Reynolds, arrived 28 March for facility visit.
Plembeck, Herbert, arrived 9 March for facility visit.
Schemman, David, arrived 26 March for facility visit.
Small, Wilson C., arrived 8 March for facility visit.
Warth, Douglas, arrived 6 March for facility visit.
Webb, Clifford, arrived 31 March for facility visit.
Werner, Oscar A., arrived 15 March for facility visit.
White, O.E., arrived 5 March.
White, Samuel, arrived 4 March.
Wilhelm, John R., arrived 21 March for facility visit.
Wilkinson, Laurence, arrived 23 March.
Zalawski, Maurice, arrived 5 March for facility visit.

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The nineteen departures for the month of March were:

Downton, Eric, 11 March.
Edinger, Jacques, wounded and cropped from rolls 25 March.
Fleisher, Jack, 31 March.
Fouchereud, Louis, 16 March.
Jordan, Max, 24 March.
Lee, Jack, 22 March.
Lewis, Boyd, 19 March.
McBriun, Robert, 22 March.
McNulty, Anthony J., 9 March.
Mejat, Françoise, 31 March, in Paris on leave.
Morse, Ralph, 9 March.
O'Connell, John, 22 March.
Pam, David, 30 March.
Plambeck, Herbert, 28 March.
Sheean, James Vincent, 15 March.
Small, Wilson C., 16 March.
Stokes, Richard L., 27 March.
Warth, Douglas, 19 March.
Zalewski, Maurice, 20 March.

There were 5581 items logged at the Press Camp during March as against 1821 for the month of February. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service to the following table:

Mackay.....	4725
Army Communications....	654
ADLS.....	202
	5581

The estimated wordage for the month of March was 526,695 as against 337990 for the month of February.

Section II - Press

A total of 6246 items, including 107 photos, were received from thirty five organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for release and distribution after clearance, during March. This total is broken down as follows:

Awards & Cit.....	3905
Gen Interest.....	719
Promotions.....	1515
Photos.....	107
<u>Total</u>	<u>6246</u>

Units submitting material included 3d Cav Gp, III Corps, 4th Arm Div, 4th Inf Div, 5th Inf Div, 6th Arm Div, VIII Corps, 10th Arm Div, 11th Arm Div, XII Corps, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 65th Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 91st Chem Bn, 92d Med Gas Bn, 94th Inf Div, 126th AAA Bn, 191st FA Bn, 275th Ord Maint Co, 286th FA Bn, 482d AAA Bn, 571st QM Co, 635th AAA Bn, 736th FA Bn, 748th Tk Bn, 785th MP Bn, 811th TD Bn, 961st Engr Maint Co and the 1303d Engr Serv Regt.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted 88 items. These items originated this Headquarters.

The March total of 6246 items showed an increase of 1749 over the February total of 4497. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the eight months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 46142. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 46319.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward), for release, duplicates of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio operations for the month of March included fourteen recordings for combat diary, four recordings for the Army Hour, eight "hometown" recordings, three recordings for the National Broadcasting Corporation, one recording for the British Broadcasting Corporation, one recording for radio station WHO, DES MOINES, IOWA, and one recording for the Blue Network.

The radio section also assisted correspondents from the British Broadcasting Corporation, the National Broadcasting Corporation, the Blue Network and the radio station WHO, DES MOINES, IOWA.

During the month of March emphasis was placed on Third United States Army operations rather than on "hometown" releases. An estimated 35,000 words cleared through field censors.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third United States Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During March, the Information Section maintained situation maps of the Western Front showing dispositions of both Allied and enemy troops by division and higher units. An additional map of the Russian campaigns on the Eastern Front was also maintained.

A detailed 1:50,000 map was maintained of the entire Third United States Army front as well as a 1:25,000 scale map, covering the main spots of activity on the Western Front. 1:250,000 and 1:100,000 scale maps on Allied and enemy troops on different sectors of the front were also kept.

Briefings for the correspondents were conducted twice daily with G-2, G-3 and G-3 liaison. Corps and Division Public Relations Officers provided some source of information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total submissions for the month of March to field press censors at army level was 6385 for a total wordage of 1,474,569. There were 2013 photographs submitted.

Section VII - Communications

Mackay Radio handled 468,469 words during the month of March with no major breakdown in transmission.

The combined radio and teletype, with the latter handling the bulk of traffic and the former serving as the only means of communications at the end of March with Twelfth United States Army Group, had an outgoing average of 9,000 groups daily, representing approximately forty to fifty messages. The incoming traffic comprised about thirty messages with an average of 3,000 groups daily.

A daily report was made on outgoing traffic and a weekly report was submitted for more accurate checking on figures.

Radio handled several voicecasts which were received satisfactorily during the day.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

During the month, Press Camp operations were set up at BAD HOMBURG (M68) on 3 April, at HERSFELD (H35) on 11 April and at ERLANGEN (O31) on 28 April. Powerful moves of Third United States Army troops overran the BUCHENWALD (J47) and OHRDRUF (J15) concentration camps and forced crossings of the ISAR and DANUBE Rivers. Enemy resistance appeared at the breaking point before the continued drive of Third United States Army forces.

Sixteen correspondents arrived and twenty six departed during the month. The thirty five correspondents assigned as of 30 April were:

Ball, Edward D.	Associated Press
Bryson, John	Blue Network
Clark, Norman M.	London News Chronicle

Coffey, Pat	Yank (Photographer)
Costello, William	British Broadcasting Corporation
Curry, Gene	New York Times
Davenport, Russell	American Mercury (facility visitor)
Driscoll, J. F.	New York Herald Tribune
Foust, Hal	Chicago Tribune
Griffin, Bulkeley S.	Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times
Haacker, Charles T.	Still Pool (Photographer)
Haaker, Ed L.	National Broadcasting Corporation
Katzander, Howard L.	Yank
Lasueur, Larry	Columbia Broadcasting System
Maynes, S.J.	Reuters
McCardell, Lee	Baltimore Sun
Mejat, Françoise	Newsreel Pool (Cameraman)
Mitchell, Patrick C.	Stars and Stripes
Newman, Larry	International News Service
Packard, Reynolds	United Press
Priestley, T. A.	Newsreel Pool
Prince, W.J.	London Times
Reid, Robert	British Broadcasting Corporation
Richards, Robert W.	United Press
Rollins, Byron	Still Pool (Photographer)
Ryan, Cornelius J.	London Daily Telegraph
Scherman, David	Still Pool (Photographer)
Sheahan, Joseph Gary	Chicago Tribune (Artist)
Stokes, Richard L.	St. Louis Post Dispatch
Stoneman, William H.	Chicago Daily News
Terrell, John	Newsweek
Tully, Andrew	Boston Traveler
Wiant, Toby	Associated Press
Wilhelm, John R.	Reuters
Wilkinson, Laurence	London Daily Express

The sixteen arrivals for the month of April were:

Bodin, Paul, Combat, Paris, arrived 12 April for facility visit.
Corkidi, Marc, Toulouse Press, arrived 12 April for facility visit.
Davenport, Russell, American Mercury, arrived 29 April for facility visit.
Foust, Hal, Chicago Tribune, arrived 15 April.
Fyfe, George, London Daily Telegraph, arrived 15 April.
Haaker, Ed L., National Broadcasting Corporation, arrived 15 April.
Jordan, Max, National Broadcasting Corporation, arrived 3 April for facility visit.
Katzander, Howard L., Yank, arrived 26 April.
Lasueur, Larry, Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 20 April.
Maynes, S.J., Reuters, arrived 6 April.
Mejat, Françoise, Newsreel Pool, returned from Paris 8 April.
Penn, David, Office War Information, arrived 4 April.
Shadel, W.F., Columbia Broadcasting System, arrived 1 April.
Small, Wilson C., Saturday Evening Post, arrived 6 April for facility visit.
Stoneman, William H., Chicago Daily News, arrived 29 April.
Terrell, John, Newsweek, arrived 3 April.

The twenty six departures for the month of April were:

Berson, Roger, French Photo Press, 2 April.
Bodin, Paul, Combat, Paris, 20 April.
Corkidi, Marc, Toulouse Press, 21 April.
Cannon, James T., Stars and Stripes, 20 April, on leave to Paris.
Deroche, Louis, Agence France Press, 29 April, on leave to Paris.
Ede, Maurice, Combat, 2 April.
Francois, Robert, Belgian Radio, 2 April.
Fyfe, George, London Daily Telegraph, 21 April.
Hall, John, London Daily Mail, 25 April.
Russ, Pierre, International News Service, 20 April.
Jordan, Max, National Broadcasting Corporation, 12 April.
Karr, McFee, Reuters, 9 April.
Lake, Austen, Boston American, 24 April.
Levitt, Saul, Yank, 20 April.
Meyer, Robert, United Press, 1 April.
Olson, Sidney, Life and Time, 3 April.
Philippe, Jacques, Belgian Radio, 3 April.
Penn, David, Office of War Information, 25 April.
Shadel, W.F., Columbia Broadcasting System, 20 April.
Small, Wilson C., Saturday Evening Post, 24 April.
Cromie, Robert, Chicago Tribune, 20 April.
Wear, J.H., Fort Worth Star Telegram, 21 April.
Webb, Clifford, London Daily Herald, 25 April.

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Warner, Oscar A., Associated Press, 15 April.
White, O.E., Melbourne Herald, 18 April.
White, Sammel, Consolidated Australian Press, 25 April.

There were 4830 items logged at the Press Camp during April as against 5581 for the month of March. Those were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service to the following table:

Mackay.....4457
Army Communications..... 169
ADLS..... 204
4830

The estimated wordage for the month of April was 608,550 as against 526,695 for the month of March.

Section II - Press

A total of 4143 items, including 134 photos, were received from thirty seven organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for release and distribution after clearance, during April. This total is broken down as follows:

Awards & Cit.....2666
Gen Interest..... 748
Promotions..... 395
Photos..... 134

Total 4143

Units submitting material included 2d Cav Gp, III Corps, 4th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, VIII Corps, 9th TD Gp, 11th Armd Div, 13th Armd Div, XII Corps, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 32d Med Depot Co, 65th Inf Div, 70th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 86th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 93d Sig Bn, 94th Inf Div, 94th Med Gas Bn, 97th Inf Div, 99th Inf Div, 115th AAA Bn, 133d Engr Bn, 183d Engr Bn, 233 FA Bn, 390th AAA Bn, 738th FA Bn, 811th TD Bn, 974th FA Bn, 1123d Engr Gp, 1303d Engr Serv Regt.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted 28 items which all originated from this Headquarters.

The April total of 4143 showed a decrease of 2103 over the March total of 6246. Total number of items forwarded after clearance at this Headquarters during the nine months of Third United States Army operations on the Continent was 50285. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 50462.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward) for release, duplicate items of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

Section III - Radio

Radio operations for the month of April included four Army Hour recordings, fifteen Combat Diary recordings, and fifteen recordings for "hometown" releases. The Section assisted Third United States Army radio correspondents with sixteen recordings.

The Section also assisted Blue Network, PHILADELPHIA and DES MOINES radio correspondents with on the spot recordings by supplying required gear in the field.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third United States Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

During April, the Information Section continued the regular schedule of two briefings daily for the war correspondents and maintained both the 1:100,000 and 1:250,000 scale maps.

The 1:100,000 scale was maintained as the operational map of the Third United States Army front while the 1:250,000 scale map represented the overall picture of the Western Front.

With the meeting of the Americans and Russians fast approaching, distances between the two units were kept at all times. In addition, general news from the other world battle fronts was given at the briefings for the war correspondents' information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total submissions for the month of April to field press censors at army level was 5531 for a total wordage of 1,119,395. There were 1636 photographs submitted.

Section VII - Communications

There were no major breakdowns in transmission during April during which time Mackay Radio handled 608,550 words.

The combined radio and teletype had an outgoing average of 3000 groups daily, representing approximately twenty to twenty five messages. Physical wire means presented difficulties this past month. Urgent, operational priority and priority messages were given preference at all times.

Weekly reports were submitted for more accurate checking on outgoing traffic and several voicecasts were handled satisfactorily.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - General

Press Camp Operations moved to REGENSBURG (U15) on 2 May and was at that location when Victory in Europe Day was announced. Although officially the war was brought to a successful conclusion on 8 May, action continued on the Third United States Army sector as isolated groups of the enemy continued to resist in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The Third United States Army remained as the last army to see action on the Western Front. It was estimated that since operations began 1 August 1944, Third United States Army could account for a million prisoners in their sweep through FRANCE, swing through LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM and smashing offensives across GERMANY, AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Up to and including 8 May, a total of three correspondents arrived and five departed. The thirty three correspondents assigned as of 8 May were:

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Ball, Edward D. | Associated Press |
| Bost, Jacques | Paris Combat |
| Bryson, John | Blue Network |
| Clark, Norman M. | London News Chronicle |
| Costello, William | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| Curry, Gene | New York Times |
| Deroche, Louis | Agence France Press |
| Driscoll, J. F. | New York Herald Tribune |
| Fouet, Hal | Chicago Tribune |
| Griffin, Bulkley S. | Worcester Telegram & Hartford Times |
| Haacker, Charles T. | Still Pool Photographer |
| Haaker, Ed L. | National Broadcasting Corporation |
| Katzen, Howard L. | Yank |
| Laueur, Larry | Columbia Broadcasting System |
| Maynes, S. J. | Reuters |
| McCardell, Lee | Baltimore Sun |
| Mitchell, Patrick C. | Stars and Stripes |
| Newman, Larry | International News Service |
| Packard, Reynolds | United Press |
| Penn, David | Office War Information |
| Prickett, Thomas A. | Newsreel Pool Cameraman |
| Prince, W. J. | The London Times |
| Reid, Robert | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| Richards, Robert W. | United Press |

- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| Rollins, Byron H. | Still Pool Photographer |
| Ryan, Cornelius | London Daily Telegraph |
| Soherman, David | Still Pool Photographer |
| Sheahan, Joseph G. | Chicago Tribune (Artist) |
| Stoneman, William H. | Chicago Daily News |
| Terrell, John | Newsweek |
| Wiant, Toby | Associated Press |
| Wilhelm, John | Chicago Sun |
| Wilkinson, Laurence | London Daily Express |

The three arrivals including 8 May were:

- | |
|---|
| Bost, Jacques, Paris Combat, 2 May for 21 day facility visit. |
| Deroche, Louis, Agence France Press, 2 May from Paris. |
| Penn, David, Office War Information, 2 May from Paris. |

The five departures including 8 May were:

- | |
|---|
| Coffey, Pat, Yank Photographer, 2 May for Paris. |
| Davenport, Russell, American Mercury, 7 May. |
| Mejat, Francois, Newsreel Pool, 2 May for Paris on leave. |
| Stokes, Richard L., St. Louis Post Dispatch, 2 May for Paris. |
| Tully, Andrew, Boston Traveler, 4 May for Paris. |

There were 1101 items logged at the Press Camp up to and including 8 May. These were dispatched via Mackay Radio, Army Communications and Air Dispatch Letter Service to the following table.

Mackay.....1052
Army Communications... 8
ADLS..... 41
1101

The estimated wordage for the eight days of operation in May was 104,462.

An overall total of 27,909 items were logged at the Press Camp since Third United States Army operations began 1 August 1944 up to and including 8 May 1945 with the following log table showing the disposition.

Mackay 23184
Army Communications . . . 3146
ADLS 1579
27909

An estimated wordage for the entire Third United States Army campaign was 4,246,506.

Section II - Press

A total of 2212 items, including 107 photos, were received from twenty three organizations in Third United States Army and forwarded to Press Section, PRO, Headquarters, Communications Zone (Forward) European Theater Operations United States Army, for clearance and distribution up to and including 8 May. This total is broken down as follows:

Awards & Cit 1623
Promotions 207
Gen Interest 275
Photos 107
2212

Units submitting material included III Corps, 3d Cav Gp, 4th Armd Div, V Corps, 5th Inf Div, 5th TD Gp, 9th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, XII Corps, 13th Armd Div, 14th Armd Div, 16th Armd Div, XX Corps, 26th Inf Div, 65th Inf Div, 70th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 86th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 97th Inf Div and 99th Inf Div.

The Public Relations Section this Headquarters submitted thirty five items which all originated this Headquarters.

The abbreviated May total of 2212 submissions boosted the total number of items for the ten month and 8 days of Third United States Army operations to 52,497. Grand total of all items cleared and forwarded during the pre-operational and operational periods to date was 52,674.

In addition to forwarding items, both news and photos, to Public Relations Officer, Communications Zone (Forward) for release, duplicates of general interest as well as human interest stories, were forwarded to Editor, "Stars and Stripes," and Editor, "Yank." All material was made available to war correspondents.

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Section III - Radio

In addition to several recorded programs for the "Army Hour" and "Combat Diary" this Section made plans for facilitating radio coverage of Victory in Europe Day activity on the Third United States Army front.

Wire recording apparatus was installed at the Mackay Radio transmitter for relaying recorded programs to New York. For relaying recorded material to the British Broadcasting Corporation in London, special apparatus was installed in the Army Communications transmitter (399). Special Victory in Europe Day recordings by both American network correspondents and the British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, were received both in New York and in London in a matter of minutes after they were made in the field.

Two "Army Hour" recordings, seven "Combat Diary" recordings and a Victory in Europe Day message by General G. S. Patton, Jr., were all made with wire recorders.

Section IV - Pictorial

Two still and one newsreel photographer were assigned to Third United States Army's Press Camp and were assisted in their work by the Pictorial Officer. Close liaison was maintained with Army Pictorial Service.

Section V - Information Room

The Information Section continued the regular schedule of two briefings daily for the war correspondents and maintained both the 1:100,000 and 1:250,000 scale maps up to and including 8 May.

The 1:100,000 scale map was maintained as the operational map of the Third United States Army front while the 1:250,000 scale map represented the overall picture of the Western Front.

In addition, general news from the other world battle fronts was given at the briefings for the war correspondents' information.

Section VI - Censorship

Total submissions for the 8 days of operations in May was 1320, as handled by the field press censors at army level. The total wordage was 289,052 with 325 photographs submitted.

It was estimated that in the entire Third United States Army campaign since operations began 1 August 1944 until its termination 8 May 1945, press censors handled 30,326 submissions, 7129 photographs, and totaled an estimated 7,010,963 words.

Section VII - Communications

The combined radio and teletype had an outgoing average of approximately 1300 groups daily which represents 15 messages for the period 1st May to 8 May inclusive. Incoming traffic ranged from 20 to 25 messages with a varying groupage of approximately 2000 to 2500 daily for the same period.

The weekly report provided more accurate checking and included the number of voicecasts. Teletype facilities were limited.

Since Third United States Army operations began on 1 August 1944 until its culmination on 8 May 1945, it is estimated that the outgoing groups totaled 1,250,000 while the incoming groups totaled 500,000.

CHAPTER 13 LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

Ten months in the field have demonstrated that the Public Relations organization as set up in the Third United States Army is adequate for the handling of approximately forty (40) correspondents and can handle as many as fifty. This organization has proven sufficient to provide billets, transportation, mess, briefing, censorship and communications.

Field experience has demonstrated that the Press Camp must operate near the advance elements of the Army Headquarters, and therefore must be highly mobile. This is especially true of communications equipment which must be able to make moves up to 150 miles and be in operation the same day.

COMMUNICATIONS: The most effective means of communications has been the Mackay commercial transmitter operating directly from the Army to New York from which point news could be rapidly distributed. This transmitter also adequately handled voice transmission for the major American networks.

Teletype has been used with varying success. When it was in operation copy could be moved to both Paris and London in sufficient quantities for the Allied correspondents assigned here. The major difficulty encountered was in securing a circuit for the handling of press traffic only. When it was necessary to use tactical circuits it was found that operational traffic seriously delayed press copy so that much of it was received too late to be used by newspapers.

Except for a brief period in Northern France the SCR-399 has been adequate for voice or CW communications. The difficulties in voice transmission were due to the fact that no adequate frequency could be made available and the low power of the set proved inadequate as the distance lengthened. CW transmission, in general, got through but because no high speed transmitter could be procured it proved to be inadequate for the handling of press copy.

BRIEFINGS AND NEWS DISSEMINATION: The crux of the whole Public Relations operation has been the briefing given twice daily. Although correspondents secured their color and some operational stories at the front they were dependent upon the briefings for the overall operational picture of the Army. Although the briefings were always factual and periodically accurate, operations of the Army could be presented so that stress was placed upon the items of news interest which the Army was most anxious to convey to the public. Experience has demonstrated that the briefing officer must have complete access to all information available to G-2 and G-3, and he must secure this information promptly. The fact that this information was always available from these two sections made possible a complete and detailed presentation of Third United States Army's operations.


Briefing on forthcoming operations has always been a difficult problem. The policy in general has been to tell the correspondents of forthcoming operations at the latest possible moment, but sufficiently in advance of the operation to permit the correspondents to make their own arrangements for coverage. There has never been a security violation in the handling of any of this information. It is felt that apprising the correspondents of forthcoming operations obviates dangerous speculation on their part and at the same time makes it possible for intelligent coverage.

It is vitally important that the Public Relations Section be advised immediately of any piece of information which the Army desires to withhold from publication either temporarily or permanently. Without this specific advice the Public Relations Section may authorize the publication of what appears to be a routine item of news interest without realizing some larger implication with which the Section may not be familiar.

CENSORSHIP: The desirability of withholding information regarding operational units until the enemy was believed to have that knowledge is best determined at army level. The primary responsibility for censorship should be an army function and the field press censors should be under control of the Army Commander rather than higher headquarters.

CORPS AND DIVISION PUBLIC RELATIONS: It has been amply demonstrated that Corps and Division Headquarters have need for a Public Relations organization. Although there is no Table of Organization provision for such personnel, every such unit has had to provide a Public Relations Section by taking grades and ratings from other sources. Without the material supplied by Corps and Division Public Relations Officers the coverage which the Third United States Army was given in the world press could not have been accomplished. Within Corps and Divisions it was noticeable during operations that favorable publicity had good effect on the morale of the troops while unfavorable publicity had the reverse effect. It is strongly recommended that a revised Table of Organization for Corps Headquarters and Infantry and Armored Divisions should make provisions for a Public Relations Section.

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


QUARTERMASTERS

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QUARtermaster SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



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CHAPTER I PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section began operating in the United Kingdom on 23 March. Initially, efforts were devoted to studying the conditions of supply in the United Kingdom in relation to the equipping of troops.

The Quartermaster supply system (except for Class III supplies) in the United Kingdom was controlled and operated by the Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, through Base Section Quartermasters. Gasoline was normally delivered in bulk to commercial tanks and pumps, which were secured from British sources and operated by using units. Other Class III products - namely, oil and lubricants - were distributed in packaged form. Quartermaster supply plans for units while they were still in the United Kingdom were set forth in Quartermaster Annexes to two administrative orders: Administrative Order Number 1, published on 15 April; and Administrative Order Number 2, which applied only to the 2d French Armored Division, published on 24 May. These plans served to coordinate the supply of units assigned and attached to the Third U. S. Army.

Concurrently, plans were being developed for preparing units for embarkation. Work was begun on 28 March on the Quartermaster Annex to "Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting" (Alert Instructions). The draft was completed on 15 April and the annex was published under the date 26 April. This set of instructions furnished complete information to troop commanders concerning the special equipping of their units prior to embarking for the far shore. Separate instructions were prepared for the 2d French Armored Division. The Quartermaster Annex to "Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting for the 2d French Armored Division" was published on 16 June.

The chief task of the Section was planning for the coming operation. From the beginning, considerable effort was devoted to the study of plans and directives of higher headquarters for the operation "Overlord". Data were assembled and tabulated for use as the bases for the planning work. Continual liaison and coordination with higher headquarters and other staff sections were required before the final plan evolved. The Quartermaster supply plan for Continental operations was begun on 16 April, completed on 10 May, and published on 15 May as Annex Number 15 to "Third U. S. Army Outline Plan, Operation 'Overlord'". The Quartermaster plan defined the responsibility of the Army Quartermaster and acquainted Quartermasters and supply officers of lower echelons with the special conditions pertaining to supply in the projected Continental operation.

The Office of the Army Quartermaster had the following divisions:

- Army Quartermaster
- Executive Officer
- Administrative Division
- Supply Division
- Graves Registration Division
- Field Service Division

For security control, because of the high classification of the plans, a small planning and liaison group was organized, consisting of one officer, one warrant officer, and three enlisted men. This group worked directly under the supervision of the Army Quartermaster and the Executive Officer.

Preparations for the movement of the Headquarters to the Continent were made during the latter part of June. The Section was divided into four groups for the movement:

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	ARRIVED ON CONTINENT
Advance Group	4	0	3	26 June
"X" Group	8	1	23	6 July
"Y" Group	3	0	16	18 July
"Z" Group	3	2	4	18/26 August

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division performed its normal tasks during this period.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Supply Division performed three major functions during the period spent in the United Kingdom. First, it assisted in writing the plans for Continental operations. Secondly, it prepared pre-scheduled requisitions for supplies to be shipped to the Continent for the Third U. S. Army. These requisitions for supplies were broken down by days from D + 24 through D + 41 in accordance with tonnage allocations from higher headquarters. Contact was maintained with the Services of Supply to ascertain the status of shipments. And, finally, it performed the necessary work incident to equipping troop units prior to their departure for the Continent.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

The Class I Section was not active in the supply of troops in the United Kingdom. This function was performed by the Services of Supply establishments. Its activities were confined to drafting plans, preparing pre-scheduled requisitions, and standardizing procedures.

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SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The equipping of troops then stationed in the United Kingdom was the major function performed by the Class II and IV Section.

During the period 12 to 19 June, a group of officers and men of the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, operated with the Section for the purpose of standardizing depot procedure. This proved to be a valuable precautionary measure.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The Class III Section was not active in supplying troops in the United Kingdom. Its operations were confined to drafting plans, calculating Class III requirements, and preparing pre-scheduled requisitions.

The commanders of all gasoline supply companies then assigned to the Army were briefed and procedures were outlined to them.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The Graves Registration Division was organized on 15 April. The decision to create a separate division to handle graves registration matters resulted from a study of the reports from other theaters, particularly North Africa and Sicily.

The basic procedure covering all matters connected with burials, cemeteries, and registration of graves was written by the Division in cooperation with the G-1 Section. This directive was published on 25 May as Third U. S. Army Circular Number 9.

Two graves registration companies, the 3042d and 3043d, were assigned to the Army on 25 May. Both organizations lacked experience. The personnel was sent to the Cambridge Military Cemetery on 1 June to gain practical experience until moved to the Marshalling Area. The companies were provided with extra equipment, such as shovels, picks, grave markers, rubber gloves, and embossing machines, prior to departure from the United Kingdom.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The initial problem of the Quartermaster Troop Section consisted of compiling a list of Quartermaster service troops estimated as necessary to support the operation as it was planned at that time. Although the original list was compiled 31 March, a final settlement was not made until 24 June. All units then in the United Kingdom were, with few exceptions, controlled by the Services of Supply and employed in the operation of depots and other Services of Supply establishments. Many units had not arrived from the United States at the time the Army Headquarters embarked for the Continent. Such units as were assigned were inspected and every effort was made to prepare them for the coming operation. All units were placed under battalion and group supervision.

The following is a list of Quartermaster units with the estimated number required, the number assigned by D # 10, and the final number authorized:

	ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS	UNITS ASSIGNED AS OF D # 10	FINAL NO. OF UNITS
Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	6	1	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	9	1	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	14	4	8
QM Depot Company, Supply	4	1	2
QM Gasoline Supply Company	16	7	11
QM Graves Registration Company	5	2	4
QM Laundry Company	8	2	5
QM Railroad Company	8	4	7
QM Salvage Collecting Company	5	1	3
QM Service Company	36	19	19
QM Bakery Company, Special	6	2	7
QM Salvage Repair Company	4	1	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5	0	2
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	2	0	1
QM Sales Company	2	0	0
QM Base Petroleum Supply Company	8	0	0
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1	1	1

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Field Service Section was charged with all operations connected with salvage collecting, salvage repair, field range repair, laundering, and petroleum testing. It also had control of captured supplies and operated the labor pool. Its duties in the United Kingdom were confined to preparing the assigned technical units for the coming operation.

Field range repair was provided for by schooling a small group of men selected from the 3234th Quartermaster Service Company. They were provided with tools, equipment, and spare parts prior to going to the Continent. The services performed by these men proved to be extremely satisfactory.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The Salvage Section was not operational during the period covered by this chapter. Plans for salvage activities on the Continent were formulated.



CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section arrived on the Continent in four groups: the Advance Group, on 26 June; the "X" Group, on 6 July; the "Y" Group, on 18 July; and the "Z" Group, on 18 and 26 August.

This chapter covers the period from 6 July, when the "X" Group arrived, to 011200 B August, when the Third U. S. Army became operational. The first few days were limited to becoming acquainted with the supply situation on the Continent. Thereafter operations were devoted to establishing Quartermaster service for Third U. S. Army troops being concentrated in the north-central part of the CHERBOURG Peninsula.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division, in addition to performing its normal functions, made preparations for submitting the required operational reports to higher headquarters.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

Supplies on the Continent were all under the control of the First U. S. Army. A rear boundary had not been established. Since a major port had not been opened, supplies requested on pre-scheduled requisitions had not been shipped to the Third U. S. Army; but sufficient Quartermaster supplies were available in the beach dumps. The Advance Section Communications Zone was operational only during the last third of July. Initially, all supplies for the Third U. S. Army units on the Continent were drawn from First U. S. Army supply points and beach dumps. The Advance Section Communications Zone was given control over the supplies at "UTAH" Beach during the latter part of July, after which time this agency furnished supplies to the Third U. S. Army.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Food supplies for Third U. S. Army units were furnished direct from First U. S. Army Supply Point Number 5, in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T123988), until 16 July. This supply point was turned over to the Third U. S. Army for operation on 16 July and redesignated Class I Supply Point Number 1. Two additional points were opened, Number 2 on 23 July, also in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T084953), and Number 3 on 27 July, in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (T092108).

Bakery operations began at Supply Point Number 1 on 21 July. The first sheaf of six loaves of bread was delivered by the Commanding Officer, 3007th Quartermaster Bakery Company, to the Army Commander.

During the period 25 to 31 July a reserve of 1,500,000 operational rations was accumulated in the supply points in preparation for the impending operations. The Army Commander inspected Supply Point Number 1, including the bakery, on 28 July and commended the operating units for their efficiency.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

Class II and IV Depot Number 1 was opened for the supply of troops in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T100985) at 171200 B July. This depot not only made issues to troop units, but operated a sales store for sales to officers, warrant officers, and nurses. Class II and IV reserves to the extent of approximately a fifteen-day supply were built up prior to 31 July.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

Class III supplies for Third U. S. Army units were furnished from a First U. S. Army supply point in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T123988) through 14 July. This installation was taken over by the Third U. S. Army on 15 July and redesignated as Class III Supply Point Number 1.

A reserve stock of 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, together with a suitable stock of diesel and balanced oils and greases, was transported from "UTAH" Beach and stored in Supply Point Number 1 and other points in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19) and LA HAYE DU PUIITS (T18).

The pipe line from CHERBOURG (012) to LA HAYE DU PUIITS (T18) was rushed to completion and began discharging at the latter place on 30 July. This was most fortunate and timely.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The personnel of the Graves Registration Division gained valuable experience during this period from frequent visits to collecting points and cemeteries of the First U. S. Army. No cemeteries were in operation by the Third U. S. Army.

Two graves registration units had arrived on the Continent, the 3042d Quartermaster Graves Registration Company (less one platoon) and the 3043d Quartermaster Graves Registration Company. The former was attached to the VIII Corps and the latter to the XV Corps. Both units were placed at First U. S. Army cemeteries to gain experience.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

A bivouac area for arriving Quartermaster units was selected in the vicinity of BRICQUEBEC (010). A beach party of one officer and one enlisted man was appointed to receive incoming Quartermaster units at the beach. As the units arrived they were met at the beach, conducted to the bivouac area, and placed under group and battalion control.

The following Quartermaster units were available when the Third U. S. Army became operational at 011200 B August:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	1
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	3
QM Service Company	10
QM Railroad Company	4
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	1
QM Salvage Collecting Company	2
QM Salvage Repair Company (Loaned by ASCZ)	1
QM Bakery Company (One Loaned by ASCZ)	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	1
QM Graves Registration Company	2 (Less One Platoon)
QM Laundry Company	2

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The specialized units, such as fumigation and bath, bakery, salvage

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
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collecting, and salvage repair companies, were put to work upon arrival. Laundry units were attached to each Army hospital and to the medical depot. The graves registration companies were turned over to the Graves Registration Division; railhead companies, to the Class I Section; and gasoline supply companies, to the Class III Section.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

Salvage operations were initiated on 19 July in an area adjacent to Class II and IV Depot Number 1. The salvage point was operated by the following units: one salvage collecting company and one section each from a fumigation and bath company, a laundry company, and a salvage repair company. The last-named unit was loaned by the Advance Section Communications Zone. Unrepairable articles were evacuated to the salvage dump at "UTAH" Beach. Everything that could be saved was fumigated, laundered, and, if necessary, repaired, and placed in stock at the depot for reissue. This set-up was so effective that the decision was made to continue it during the coming operations.

Field range repairs were initiated at Class II and IV Depot Number 1 on 19 July. The repair section was comprised of a selected group from the 3234th Quartermaster Service Company. They had received special schooling before leaving the United Kingdom. Tools and spare parts had been shipped to the Continent with the organization. This small group repaired and returned to troop units approximately 500 separate pieces of equipment before 1 August.



AIRPLANE DELIVERIES OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES IN SEPTEMBER

CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Third U. S. Army became operational at ST JACQUES DE NEHOU, in Normandy (T19), at 011200 B August.

The Army Headquarters occupied the following successive locations during the month of August:

PLACE (Vicinity)	DATES	DISTANCE OF MOVES (Miles)
ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19)	(6 July) - 1 August	
BEAUCHAMPS (T23)	1 - 8 August	45
ST JAMES (T39)	8 - 12 August	40
LAVAL (Y64)	12 - 14 August	35
LE MANS (Z34)	14 - 20 August	64
EROU (W18)	20 - 25 August	60
PITHIVIERS (W95)	25 - 30 August	68
THORIGNY (X87)	30 August - 4 September	67
	TOTAL	379

The Quartermaster Section, initially, was split between the forward and rear echelons. This arrangement was discontinued 13 August. The problems incident to a fast-moving situation required the presence of

the greater part of the Section with the forward echelon. Two officers of the Supply Division, augmented by officers from a battalion headquarters, remained in the rear areas to control the movement of supplies to the forward supply points. Other officers were secured to guide convoys to these frequently changed forward points.

The problem of getting essential combat supplies, in sufficient quantities and at the proper times, to the forward elements became increasingly complicated and difficult as the advance continued. After the fall of AVRANCHES (T21), the VIII Corps moved westward through the Brittany Peninsula. The remainder of the force, which before the end of August included the XV, XX, and XII Corps, moved southeast and east in the direction of CHARTRES (R30). This situation required that separate supply arrangements be made for the two forces which were moving in opposite directions.

It was clearly established, in the early days of the operation, that the conventional methods of supply prescribed by the field manuals had but little application to the immediate problem. There were very few expedients that were not employed. The problem was met through the combined efforts of the Advance Section Communications Zone, the Army, and the forward elements working together as a team.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division performed its normal duties during this period.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The plan of supply required that daily telegrams be submitted for Class I and Class III supplies forty-eight hours in advance. Initially, the telegrams were sent by liaison officer direct to the Advance Section Communications Zone; later the 24th Regulating Station assumed this function.

The delivery of supplies was to be accomplished by the Advance Section Communications Zone direct to designated supply points within the Army area. This plan required modification from time to time, because of the constantly increasing distances and lack of adequate transportation facilities. A large portion of the supplies was delivered by the Advance Section Communications Zone to "base" supply points and advance depots, from which Army trucks made distribution to supply points in the rear of corps.

Army supply points were maintained generally on the basis of one Class I and one Class III point per corps, and one or more for Army troops in the rear part of the Army area. Corps and Army troops obtained their supplies from the nearest supply point. It was not possible, under the strained conditions, to keep supply points as close to the troops as is prescribed in the field manuals or in the numbers recommended by them. Annex Number 1 indicates the locations, designations, and times of opening and closing of supply points for the period 1 to 31 August.

The VIII Corps having moved westward through the Brittany Peninsula, a separate supply plan was required. During the initial stages, supplies were delivered direct to the Army supply points in the rear of the corps. It was arranged on 10 August that all supplies for the VIII Corps would be delivered by Advance Section Communications Zone to Army Supply Point Number 12, in the vicinity of DOL (S90). The Corps was to arrange for distribution from that point to the forward elements in the vicinity of LORIENT (G72), VANNES (H10), HENNES (Y05), and BREST (V99). This arrangement continued until the Brittany Base Section opened at RENNES at 211200 B August. The Base Section then became the medium of supply for the VIII Corps. Responsibility for supply remained with Army. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 543d Quartermaster Group, was sent to the BREST area to represent the Army Quartermaster. Separate daily telegrams were initiated by the Group Commander on 18 August. The supply problem was considerably alleviated when landing craft began unloading across the beaches in the vicinity of MORLAIX (R41) about 20 August. Train service was established a few days later. The supply of this Corps was successfully accomplished.

The eastern force, consisting of the IV, XI, and XII Corps and the greater portion of Army troops, was supplied principally by truck train and, to a lesser degree, by railway and airplane. The following paragraphs give, in general, the successive steps in supplying the eastern force.

Westward of LAVAL (Y64), Advance Section Communications Zone truck trains delivered Class I and Class III supplies direct to Army supply points. Army trucks supplemented these shipments by hauling supplies from the Army reserve stocks in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19) and from the pipe-line terminus at LA HAYE DU PUIITS (T18).

Advance Section Communications Zone opened Quartermaster Depot Number 55, near LAVAL (Y64), on 13 August. The greater portion of Class I and Class III supplies was deposited in this depot. Army transportation delivered the supplies to forward points approximately seventy miles eastward.


Advance Section Communications Zone opened Quartermaster Depot Number 110, in the vicinity of LE MANS (V46), on 20 August. No change was made in the method of distribution to forward supply points.

Advance Section Communications Zone opened Quartermaster Depot Number 120, in the vicinity of ABLIS (R60), on 26 August. The previous distribution arrangements were continued.

Airplane deliveries commenced on 18 August to LE MANS (V46) and continued for several days. Deliveries were restricted to gasoline.

Airplane deliveries were initiated to the BRICY (W55) airstrip, ten miles north of ORLEANS (F62), on 27 August and continued for three days. Approximately 100,000 gallons of gasoline and 200 tons of rations were received at this location.

Railway deliveries began at LE MANS (V46) on 17 August, at EROU (W17) on 23 August, and at CHARTRES (R30) on 25 August. The service was irregular because of track conditions; however, a very considerable quantity of supplies was received.



SUPPLIES FOR VIII CORPS BEING DELIVERED ACROSS BEACHES AT MORLAIX

Army reserve stocks, consisting of 1,500,000 rations and 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, had been accumulated in the vicinity of ST JACQUES DE NEHOU (T19) and LA HAYE DU PUIITS (T18) prior to 1 August. Because of short shipments from Advance Section Communications Zone, these reserves had to be drawn upon from the very beginning of the advance. The Class III reserves were depleted on 7 August; for the remainder of the month, supply was on an uncertain basis. Receipts were somewhat erratic and there were many anxious moments.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Food and other Class I supplies were issued in sufficient quantities throughout the month of August. A critical period developed between 10 and 12 August, when shipments to the Army were short approximately 350,000 rations. The difference was made up by exhausting the remainder of the Army reserve and a portion of the unit reserves held by troops. During the remainder of the month the daily average deliveries to the Army were sufficient for maintenance and for reconstituting unit reserves. The Army reserve, however, remained in a precarious condition.

The following types and quantities of rations were issued:

"B" ration	None
10 in 1 ration	51.0%
"C" ration	23.5%
"K" ration	25.0%
5 in 1 ration	0.5%

"D" ration (Additional)	100.0%
	6.7%

Average strength over a ten-day period (less VIII Corps)	212,745
Average daily issues for same period	225,346
Difference	12,601

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The over-issue can be explained by considering prisoners of war, casualties in the Army area, and issues to replace unit reserves.

Gratuitous Post Exchange rations were issued on a weekly basis. Slight delays were unavoidable in some instances, because of transportation limitations.

Bakeries operated continuously during the month, with the exception of one or two days when the supply of flour was exhausted. Each Class I supply point was furnished a bakery company. This proved to be a highly successful arrangement. Fresh bread was supplied to all troops and did much to reduce the monotony of the operational-type ration, particularly the "C" ration, which was least popular.

Refrigerated supplies were initiated on 8 August when the 485th Quartermaster Refrigeration Company, Mobile, began operating under the Class I Section. This company performed an important service in an outstanding manner. Until 25 August, on which date cold stores became available in LE MANS (V46), the source of supply was CHERBOURG (O12). Deliveries to troops were made at the Class I supply points.

Captured stocks of frozen meats and vegetables, amounting to 150 tons, were reported on 17 August in the vicinity of ST MALO (S71). The enemy had cut off the refrigeration machinery. The Class I Officer immediately dispatched a sufficient number of refrigerator vans to secure the supplies. All were saved and issued to front-line troops. Thirteen carloads of potatoes, consigned to points in Germany, were captured in the vicinity of ST MALO (S71) on 13 August and issued to troops of the VIII Corps.

Fresh eggs and oranges were issued to troops on several occasions. Priority was given to hospitals.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

A shortage of clothing and equipment developed during the month of August. The advance of the Army was so rapid that depots could not be kept within close supporting distance of the troops. Transportation was not available, because of the necessity for hauling rations and gasoline.

Maximum use was made of salvage material, a considerable quantity of which was renovated and reissued.

Army Quartermaster Depot Number 1, operated by the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, remained in operation at ST JACQUES DE NEHOUE (T19) until 171200 B August. This depot issued approximately 600 tons of supplies from 1 August until it closed.

Army Quartermaster Depot Number 2, operated by the 618th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, opened 131200 B August at ST JEAN SUR MAYENNE (Y75), four miles northwest of LAVAL (Y64), and closed 301200 B August. Approximately 200 tons of supplies were issued, eighty per cent of which were renovated salvaged material.

Army Quartermaster Depot Number 3, operated by the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, opened 241200 B August at the junction of Highways GC31 and GC23, two and one-half miles west of CHATEAUDUN (W26) and remained open until after the end of the month. The issues from this depot included a considerable quantity of captured material, consisting of such items as buckets, galvanized cans, water cans, toilet paper, and grit soap.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

It was planned, initially, that the 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline in reserve would be held for emergency use. But shipments from the beach dumps against daily telegram requests were short of requirements. It was necessary, therefore, to start draining the reserve stock on 1 August, and this supply was exhausted on 7 August. Daily issues during this period were considerably heavier than had been anticipated. Supply of Class III products during the entire month of August was on a day-to-day basis. The movement was so rapid and the demands so great that no reserve could be accumulated.

The pipe line to LA HAYE DU PUITIS (T18) was completed and began operations on 30 July. The line was operating at ALENCON (Z38) commencing 24 August.

Gasoline was brought to the Army supply points both in bulk and in packages. Until trains began arriving at LE MANS (V46) on 17 August, all shipments were by truck. The railway was unreliable during the month of August and the quantity received by this means of transport only partially filled the daily requirements.

The most critical period of the month developed between 23 and 31 August. The following table sets forth the daily telegram requests and the receipts:

DATE	DAILY TELEGRAM REQUEST (Gallons)	RECEIPTS (Gallons)
23 August	260,000	216,280
24 August	250,000	285,555
25 August	250,000	197,450
26 August	450,000	315,550
27 August	375,000	402,635
28 August	450,000	352,490
29 August	325,000	343,480
30 August	400,000	31,975
31 August	775,000	294,280
TOTAL	3,535,000	2,239,695

The essential needs of the Army were satisfied regardless of the difficulties imposed by long distances, inadequate transportation facilities, and short receipts on certain days.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The Graves Registration Division started operations at 011200 B August.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ELOSVILLE (T39), was taken over from the First U. S. Army at 010001 B August. The operating unit was the 3043d Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, attached to the VIII Corps. This cemetery was closed at 082400 B August. A total of 4,926 burials was made in the cemetery, of which 4,670 were made while it was under First U. S. Army control and 256 after it was taken over by the Third U. S. Army. Of the 256 buried by Third U. S. Army, 244 were identified and twelve were unidentified. All were American. No data are available concerning the nationality of those buried by the First U. S. Army. Enemy dead were evacuated to the German Military Cemetery at ORGLANDES (T29).

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ST JAMES (Y29), and an adjacent

German cemetery opened 071200 B August. This cemetery remained open beyond the period covered by this report. All burials for the entire Army were made in this cemetery until the opening of the cemetery at ST CORNEILLE (V56), after which the ST JAMES cemetery was used principally by the VIII Corps.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ST CORNEILLE (V56), opened 161200 B August and closed 291200 B August. Burials totaled 679, of which 412 were American, twenty-nine Allied, and 238 enemy. Of the 412 Americans, eighteen were unidentified.

The German Military Cemetery, LESNEVEN (R11), in the vicinity of BREST (V99), opened 241200 B August. This cemetery remained open beyond the period covered by this chapter.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, VILLENEUVE-SUR-AUVERS (R90), and an adjacent German cemetery opened 251200 B August and remained open beyond the period covered by this chapter.

Third U. S. Army burials for the month of August totaled 4,291, of which 2,684 (including 102 unidentified) were American, eighty-one were Allied, and 1,526 were German.

The procedure for collecting the dead, evacuating them to cemeteries, and processing papers and personal effects was as prescribed in the Third U. S. Army Circular Number 9, 25 May 1944.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 August:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	4
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	8
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Gasoline Supply Company	10
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	5
QM Railhead Company	6
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Service Company	21
QM Bakery Company, Special	6
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	3
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Company	0
QM Tank Truck Company	2
QM Base Petroleum Supply Company	0
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The four Third U. S. Army laundry companies were employed in the following manner:

- One section with each of fourteen evacuation hospitals.
- One platoon with each of two medical depots.
- One platoon with XII Corps.
- One platoon with XV Corps.
- Two platoons with XX Corps.
- Three platoons with salvage points.

Fumigation and bath units were operated with each corps.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

During this period the following salvaged articles were processed:


Class B	132,294
Class C	43,667
Class X	53,200
Miscellaneous Items	18,083
Empty Gasoline Cans	20,000
Gas Masks	5,469
TOTAL	272,713

The renovation of clothing, shoes, and equipment was stressed because of the difficulty in transporting new supplies from the rear areas. During the month 179,961 items of Quartermaster clothing and equipment were fumigated, laundered, repaired, if necessary, and returned to the Class II and IV depots for reissue to troops.

Field range repair crews operated at the Class II depots. Production was reduced by inability to keep the depots close to the troops; however, 450 repair jobs were completed during the month of August.

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**CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS**

SECTION I - GENERAL

Headquarters Third U. S. Army, on 1 September, was located in the vicinity of THORIGNY (X87), approximately ten miles northeast of SENS (X66). The Headquarters occupied the following successive locations during the month of September:

PLACES (Vicinity)	DATES	DISTANCE OF MOVE (Miles)
THORIGNY (X87)	(30 August) - 4 September	
CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T54)	4 - 15 September	85
ETAIN (U47)	15 - 30 September	63
	TOTAL	148

The Army, on 1 September, was far ahead of schedule. It had advanced so far from its base of supplies that any failure to satisfy the daily telegram requests, obviously, would have a serious effect. It had not been possible to accumulate Army reserves, nor had the Communications Zone been able to establish intermediate depots.

Critical periods in the supply situation affected the Army as a whole. First, the gasoline supply was so critical through 1 to 4 September that the Army, for all practical purposes, was immobilized. Secondly, ration receipts were short of daily telegram requests during 8 to 13 September, necessitating the reduction of unit reserves. Captured stocks were utilized to the extent available to make up deficiencies. Thirdly, gasoline again became short on 20 September and a system of rationing was inaugurated. Tonnage allocations, which were controlled by higher headquarters, were sufficient only for maintenance and operations on a reduced scale.

Winter clothing and equipment, including the replacement of battle losses, presented a major problem. It was not until the forward progress of the Army had slowed down that a solution was found. The Army received splendid cooperation from the Communications Zone and a considerable quantity of supplies began arriving by truck, railway, and airplane before the end of the month.

The Army included the following major elements on 1 September:

- VIII Corps: 6th Armored Division, 2d Infantry Division, 8th Infantry Division, 29th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- XV Corps: Corps Troops only.
- XX Corps: 7th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The following major changes occurred during the period 1 to 30 September:

The VIII Corps was assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army on 5 September.

The XV Corps was assigned to the Seventh U. S. Army on 29 September.

The 2d (French) Armored Division and 79th Infantry Division were assigned to the Third U. S. Army on 5 and 7 September, respectively. Both were assigned to the XV Corps and were transferred with the Corps to the Seventh U. S. Army.

Combat Command B, 6th Armored Division, was attached to the Third U. S. Army on 10 September. The division was assigned on 16 September and became Army Reserve.

The 83d Infantry Division was assigned to the Third U. S. Army and to the XX Corps on 21 September.

The 7th Armored Division was assigned to the First U. S. Army on 26 September.

The following were the major elements on 30 September:

- XII Corps : 4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- XX Corps : 5th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- Army Reserve: 6th Armored Division.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The division performed its normal functions.

The number of reports required by various headquarters, including sections of the Army Headquarters, increased considerably. A study was made with a view to reducing this burden, but with the usual result.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation within the Army on 1 September was unsound, especially as to Class III supplies. The supply line was extremely long and transportation facilities had not kept pace with the increasing distance. Class I supplies on hand at the start of September were adequate for maintenance plus a small reserve. The Class III position had taken a bad turn around 23 August and became steadily worse. The situation as to gasoline remained extremely critical until 5 September, when it started to improve. The Class I situation was not good from 8 to 13 September, because of short receipts from the Communications Zone.

The most advanced Army supply points on 1 September were in the general vicinity of CHALONS (T54). The most advanced Communications Zone depot was Quartermaster Depot Number 120, at ABLIS (R60). The bulk of Quartermaster supplies for the Army was delivered by the Communications Zone to two points: Quartermaster Depot Number 120 and Army Supply Point Number 288, at FONTAINEBLEAU (X29). The approximate distances from these two points to Army supply points in the vicinity of CHALONS (T54) were 157 and 100 miles, respectively.

During the month telephone connections were installed for the first time to all supply points and railheads. The rapid advance and movement of supply points had never permitted this in the past. Communications are highly essential in the coordination of the supply of an Army.

Railway deliveries from the beach were initiated to the following points during the month by Advance Section Communications Zone trains:

SEZANNE (T02)	7 September	(Class III)
SOMMESOUS (T42)	7 September	(Classes I, II and IV, III)
VERDUN (U26)	14 September	(Classes I, II and IV, III)
EPERNAY (T25)	6 September	(Class III)
LEROUVILLE (U32)	14 September	(Classes I, III)
TOUL (U61)	23 September	(Class II and IV)
COMPLANS (U66)	23 September	(Class II and IV)

Airplane deliveries were initiated to the following places:

REIMS (T37)	5 September	(Class III)
RENNEVILLE (O42)	6 September	(Class III)
ST DIZIER (T90)	13 September	(Class III)
ETAIN (U47)	10 September	(Classes II and IV, III)
TOUL (U61)	29 September	(Classes II and IV, III)

Advance Section Communications Zone depots were operated in the following locations:

QM Depot operated by 58th QM Base Depot Company	ABLIS (R60)	Up to 7 September
QM Depot operated by 62d QM Base Depot Company	SOMMESOUS (T42)	Opened 8 September
QM Depot operated by 62d QM Base Depot Company	LEROUVILLE (U32)	12 to 26 September
QM Depot operated by 62d QM Base Depot Company	TOUL (U61)	Opened 26 September

These depots were, in effect, transfer points at Advance Section Communications Zone truckheads and railheads. (Except at the base depot at TOUL (U61) the accumulated stocks were negligible; the Army took over the supplies as fast as they were received and transported them, using Army trucks, direct to Army supply points.)

The following tonnage allocations (long tons) were imposed during the month:

DATE	QM ALLOCATION	OTHER SERVICES	TOTAL ALLOTMENT TO ARMY FOR ALL SERVICES
1 September	1,200	900	2,000
5 September	2,090*	1,410	3,500
25 September	2,070	1,430	3,500
27 September	1,833	1,267	3,100

*From 11 to 24 September, 500 tons of the Quartermaster allotment were given to Ordnance on alternate days; and from 17 to 24 September, twenty tons were given to Chemical Warfare Service.

The tonnage requirements for Quartermaster supplies varied somewhat because of the changes of major elements. The following represents a general estimate of the daily tonnage for Quartermaster supplies required for full operations for the Army during September:

Class I	900 long tons
Class II and IV	125 long tons
Class III	1,400 long tons
TOTAL	2,425 long tons

The problem of forwarding supplies to Army supply points was considerably reduced after the advance slowed down. The supply points were advanced close behind the troops, and the Class II and IV depots were moved forward to VERDUN (U26) and TOUL (U61), within easy hauling range of the troops.

Railway service improved greatly during the month. Advance Section Communications Zone truck convoys no longer came to the Army area, but transferred their loads to railway cars at SOMMESOUS (T42). Two railheads, VERDUN (U26) on the north side and LEROUVILLE (U32) - later advanced to TOUL (U61) - on the south flank, served for the supply of the Army, except for supplies delivered by air.

Army supply points in operation during September are shown in Annex Number 2 to this report.



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SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Rations on hand in the Army supply points on 1 September totaled 592,562, all of the operational type. A considerable quantity was on hand in Advance Section Communications Zone Quartermaster Depot Number 120, at ABLIS (R60). Unit reserves were intact.

Shipments of rations from the Communications Zone for the period 1 to 7 September were all by truck convoy. All shipments from 7 to 12 September were by railway except for two truck convoys. From 12 to 17 September, inclusive, supplies arrived by truck daily; but after that time all shipments were by rail, with the exception of one air lift. Because of increased tonnage received by rail, the Class I situation improved considerably during the latter part of September.

Ration shipments to the Army were short for the period 8 to 13 September, inclusive. The situation became critical on 12 September. The daily telegram request called for 784 long tons of Class I supplies. The following quantities were received:

	RATIONS	LONG TONS
8 September	153,562	411.3
9 September	66,390	177.8
10 September	172,622	463.0
11 September	65,348	175.0
12 September	253,245	675.0
13 September	204,312	537.6
14 September	463,876	851.2

Approximately sixty-five per cent of the Third U. S. Army troops were on a "B" ration before the end of the month. The issue of captured meat, and also, on several occasions, of oranges and fresh potatoes, improved the variety of the ration. The extensive use of the "B" ration permitted the conservation of the reduced supply of operational rations.

Because of the addition of a bakery company and increased receipts of coffee from the Communications Zone, it was possible to issue bread and coffee in larger quantities during the latter part of September. Toward the end of the month daily bread issues averaged approximately thirty-six pounds per one hundred men and fresh coffee issues averaged four and four-fifths pounds per one hundred men.

Considerable quantities of captured ration stocks were used. A total of 2,600,000 pounds of frozen beef and 500,000 pounds of canned beef, all property of the German Wehrmacht, was taken over by the Third U. S. Army at HOMECOURT (U77), near BRIEY (U67), on 9 September. Issues to troops commenced on 9 September and approximately 1,500,000 pounds were issued during the month. One hundred and forty thousand enemy rations were collected from various places in the vicinity of REIMS (T37) and CHALONS (T54) and forwarded to supply points on 13 September as a necessary measure in order to complete the issue to our troops on 14 September. German flour located in REIMS (T37) was being used by the field bakeries commencing 13 September. Approximately 5,000 bags of flour were taken over, not all of which were usable.

Ration Accessory Convenience Kits were in short supply. Less than sixty per cent of the daily telegram requests were received. This situation was most unfortunate because post exchange facilities were not yet available. The consumption of Ration Accessory Convenience Kits had exceeded the quantities shipped from the United States. The gratuitous issue of this item had extended beyond the period planned.


The quality and quantity of food were adequate, regardless of the difficult period from 8 to 13 September. The addition of captured German beef was a most fortunate circumstance following several weeks of operational-type rations.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The clothing and equipment situation on 1 September called for extremely urgent action. Practically no replacements had been possible since the start of the operation. Army depots could not keep pace with the advancing Army, nor could transportation be spared for hauling this class of supplies. Practically eighty per cent of issues prior to 13 September were from renovated salvage.

Winter clothing and equipment were given first consideration. The Communications Zone officials were cooperating in devising ways and means for transporting this equipment to the Army area. Much of this material was not yet on the Continent. It was apparent that air lift would have to be used to the fullest extent to complete the equipping of the troops.

The first shipment of any considerable size arrived at Depot Number 5 at VERDUN (U26) on 13 September. The shipment consisted of thirty-eight trucks direct from "OMAHA" Beach. The prospect improved greatly towards the latter part of the month. The total received during September amounted to 1,866.31 long tons, of which 279.3 tons were by air.



THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERISHABLE FOOD ITEMS TO TROOPS WAS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN CLASS I SUPPLY OPERATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN. ABOVE, PERISHABLES ARE BEING TRANSFERRED FROM A COMMUNICATIONS ZONE TRAIN TO ARMY REFRIGERATION TRUCK VANS FOR DELIVERY TO ARMY CLASS I SUPPLY POINTS. BELOW, A DIVISION CLASS I BREAK-DOWN POINT IS SHOWN, WHERE CAPTURED FROZEN CARCASS BEEF IS BEING ISSUED.



All troops were issued a third blanket, and all except Army troops had received overcoats prior to 30 September. The barracks bags of several divisions, which had been stored in rear areas, were brought forward by rail and truck convoy.

Critical shortages at the end of the month included overshoes, mess gear, woolen clothing, socks, and shelter halves.

The following Army Class II and IV depots were in operation during September:

Depot Number 3, operated by the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, two and one-half miles northwest of CHATEAUDUN (W16), opened 241200 B August and closed 031200 B September.

Depot Number 4, operated by the 618th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, three miles northeast of NEMOURS (X37), opened 021200 B September and closed 191200 A September.

Depot Number 5, operated by the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, two and one-half miles east of VERDUN (U36), opened 081200 B September and remained open over the end of the month.

Depot Number 6, operated by the 618th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, one mile west of TOUL (U61), opened 201200 A September and remained open over the end of the month.

Stocks of Class II and IV supplies were not maintained in Advance Section Communications Zone depots, with the exception of a small amount in Depot Number 120, at ABLIS (R60). The entire stock of that depot was taken over by the Third U. S. Army during the first week of September; thereafter all supplies of this class were received direct from the Normandy beaches or from the United Kingdom by airplane.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline situation on 1 September was extremely critical. Daily telegram requests were being only partially satisfied. The declining receipts, which had begun 23 August, continued through 3 September. The Army exerted every possible effort to correct the situation. Strict rationing was employed. Captured gasoline, located in the vicinity of CHALONS (T54), REIMS (T37), and ORLEANS (F62), was used to the extent of nearly 500,000 gallons. Army supply points were dry for all practical purposes. The effect of this regrettable shortage was severe and far reaching. The advance of the Army, which had been uninterrupted since 1 August, could no longer be supported. It became difficult to find enough gasoline to make delivery of rations and to return ration and ammunition convoys to the rear. This was the first time, since the start of the operation on 1 August, that sufficient gasoline could not be found in one way or another. The Army, at this time, was so far from the source of supply that entire dependence had to be placed on shipments made against daily telegram requests. Receipts started to improve on 4 September.

The daily requirements for the Army, as it was constituted 1 September, were 450,000 gallons of gasoline and 10,000 gallons of diesel, plus balanced quantities of oils and greases. The requirements varied from time to time as divisions were assigned or released. The tonnage limitations governed the amount that could be requisitioned.

The following table illustrates requests and receipts during the period 1 to 7 September:

DATE	DAILY TELEGRAM REQUEST (Gallons)	RECEIPTS (Gallons)
1 September	1,050,000	110,600
2 September	750,000	25,390
3 September	590,000	49,930
4 September	640,000	240,265
5 September	560,000	275,720
6 September	550,000	358,840
7 September	550,000	762,150

Daily telegram requests for 1 to 4 September were increased in order to compensate for short receipts.

Between 8 and 12 September, the average daily receipts exceeded 400,000 gallons. The unit reserves, which had been exhausted, were re-established and a safe operating supply was on hand.

Airplane deliveries of gasoline to REIMS (T37), RENNEVILLE (O42),

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and ETAIN (U47) exceeded 3,900 tons between 5 and 11 September. Railway deliveries to SOMMESOUS (T42) and EPERNAY (T25), for the period 8 to 12 September, accounted for 1,368 tons. The remainder was delivered by truck convoy.

Advance Section Communications Zone took over Army Supply Point Number 28B, near FONTAINEBLEAU (X29), on 8 September as a decanting point for tank trucks operating between that point and the pipe-line terminal at CHARTRES (R30) (advanced to DOURDAN (R70) on 22 September). Army transported the packaged gasoline from Supply Point Number 28B on trains operated by the Third U. S. Army between ST GERMAIN (U40), SOMMESOUS (T42), VERDUN (U26), and LEROUVILLE (U32).

The railhead for the bulk of Quartermaster supplies was shifted from LEROUVILLE (U32) to TOUL (U61) on 24 September. Bulk gasoline in tank cars began arriving at TOUL (U61) on 24 September, but this was discontinued after three days because all tank cars were required for aviation fuel. Thereafter, all gasoline received was in packages. The Class III railhead was shifted from TOUL (U61) to DOMGERMAIN (U50), three miles southwest of TOUL, on 27 September, in order to relieve the congestion at the latter place. At the end of the month all gasoline deliveries to the Army area were by railway to VERDUN (U26) and DOMGERMAIN (U50), except for small deliveries by airplane to ETAIN (U47) and TOUL (U61).

Gasoline again became short of requirements on 20 September, because of tonnage limitations. The following table shows the daily telegram requests and the receipts from 21 to 30 September:

DATE	DAILY TELEGRAM REQUEST (Gallons)	RECEIPTS (Gallons)
21 September	388,944	167,475
22 September	405,352	281,450
23 September	235,680	258,755
24 September	284,400	294,075
25 September	356,288	274,010
26 September	308,192	451,490
27 September	281,664	219,635
28 September	231,456	238,085
29 September	243,520	181,360
30 September	238,656	346,785

Rationing was again employed. Limitations were placed on allowances to divisions, as well as to corps and Army troops. Every gallon that could be saved was placed in reserve in specified Army supply points to provide against emergencies and to be prepared to take full advantage of tactical opportunities. The front was relatively static at this period.

Empty cans became critical at the Communications Zone refilling points. The mortality rate for cans had exceeded expectations. The Army made strong efforts to collect and evacuate as many empties as possible, and the slowing of the advance provided the opportunity to give this matter close supervision. During the latter part of the month, more cans were returned than were received.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The personnel of the Graves Registration Division was divided between the forward and rear echelons of the Army Headquarters. One officer and nine enlisted men were located with the rear echelon to work in cooperation with the Adjutant General Casualty Section in processing burial records. The remainder of the division, consisting of one officer and one enlisted man, remained with the forward echelon to supervise the location and operation of cemeteries.

It was planned, originally, to operate one cemetery for each corps, under corps supervision. It was for this reason that a graves registration company and a service company were attached to each corps. It was discovered that this was not a workable plan. Cemeteries, from the start, had been under Army supervision. Except for very brief periods, not more than one cemetery had been in operation at the same time. All corps had found it possible to evacuate to the one place. It is worthy of remark that the VIII Corps evacuated its American dead to the ST JAMES (Y29) Cemetery during the entire campaign in the Brittany Peninsula.

The most difficult problems are those incident to identification and paper work. At the start, the dead were brought to corps collecting points in trailers. The loaded trailers were exchanged for empty trailers and the bodies were taken to the cemetery without unloading. This system proved unsatisfactory from the identification standpoint. The bodies later were unloaded at the corps collecting points and identifications were carefully checked. This materially added to the labor involved, but it reduced the number of unidentified to a low figure.

The officers and men of the Quartermaster graves registration com-

panies are deserving of high praise for the manner in which they performed their difficult and depressing task. The following units operated with the Army during all or a part of September:

609th QM Graves Registration Company
3041st QM Graves Registration Company
3042d QM Graves Registration Company
3043d QM Graves Registration Company

During the third week, supplies of mattress covers, personal effects bags, and crosses were very low. Only 985 mattress covers and 850 personal effects bags had been received on requisitions since 1 September and substituted captured stores were nearly exhausted. As none of these items were available through normal supply channels, trucks were dispatched to the beach, a distance of 300 miles, to secure the items. By the end of September the necessary supplies were available in sufficient quantity and through normal channels. The Quartermaster depots for Class II supplies were keeping a reserve stock specifically earmarked for cemetery use.

Prisoner of war labor was found to be the best suited for work at the cemeteries, but the graves registration companies with their limited transportation were unable to transport the prisoners to and from the cemeteries. Quartermaster service troops, although less efficient than prisoners, had to be relied upon. Civilian laborers worked hard only the first few days; when they were well fed and then paid they lost all interest in their work.

The total burials for September were 4,192. Of these, 2,668 were American, forty-six were Allied, and 1,478 were German.

The following cemeteries were in operation:

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ST JAMES (Y29), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto, which had opened 071200 B August, were transferred to the Ninth U. S. Army at 051200 B September.

The German Military Cemetery, LESNEVEN (R11), near BREST (V99), which had opened 241200 B August, was also transferred to the Ninth U. S. Army at 051200 B September.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, VILLENEUVE-SUR-AUVENS (R90), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto, which had opened 251200 B August, were closed for burials to the Third U. S. Army at 060100 B September and turned over to Advance Section Communications Zone.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, CHAMPIGNEUL (T44), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto opened 011200 B September and were closed for Third U. S. Army burials at 201200 A September and turned over to Advance Section Communications Zone.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1, ANDILLY (U61), and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto opened 121200 B September. These cemeteries remained open beyond the period covered by this chapter.



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SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 30 September:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	6
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Gasoline Supply Company	8
QM Graves Registration Company	3
QM Laundry Company	4
QM Railhead Company	6
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Service Company	17
QM Bakery Company, Special	5
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	2
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	1
QM Tank Truck Company	2
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1

The quality of service troops varied; however, the fact remains that they got the job done. The officers, almost without exception, gave their very best efforts.

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

Laundry units were kept in close support of all Army hospitals. These units performed well. Laundry units not required for hospital service and bath units were located close behind the front-line troops. More bath units were required than were available. This is one of the best morale features of the Quartermaster Corps; but, unfortunately, the units were not to be had.

The Quartermaster Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section) ran 208 tests, sampling 182,750 gallons of gasoline. As a result of these tests, 10,000 gallons were found suitable for Army use. It should be noted that this was not the entire amount of captured gasoline used during the month.

A detail consisting of one warrant officer and fourteen enlisted men was organized on 20 September for the purpose of checking, guarding, and warehousing captured supplies.

The movement of laundry and salvage repair units was found to be difficult with the reduced number of tractors currently allowed. Six additional tractors were loaned to the Army Quartermaster by the Communications Zone on 26 September to supplement the organizational tractors.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The salvage plan was reorganized after the tactical situation became more stable. A complete salvage point, consisting of repair, fumigation, salvage collecting, and laundry facilities, was established close in the rear of each corps. Direct support was given to combat units in repairing and renovating clothing and equipment. The volume of salvage in Army installations during the month was lower than expected. Front-line units salvaged and reissued everything possible, because of the scarcity of new supplies in the depots. Salvage handled during the month included:

Class B	204,701
Class C	45,190
Class X	137,262
TOTAL	387,153

All Class B and Class C items were processed and returned to depots for reissue.

The stove repair units, operating with the Class II and IV depots, made repairs to the following items:

Fire units	942
Lanterns, Coleman	601
Stoves, cooking, one and two-burner	385
Heaters, immersion type	24
Pumps, hand	89

The lack of parts continued to hamper operations. These repair units worked with good spirit, and they improved greatly in technique and inventiveness.

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**CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS**

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section remained with the forward echelon of Army Headquarters at ETAIN (U47) until 11 October and at NANCY (U81) beginning on that date.

The military situation was relatively stable, so that the physical problems confronting the Quartermaster Section were not so great as during the preceding two months. The chief problems included (1) completing the issue of winter clothing and equipment, (2) building up Army reserves of Class I and Class III supplies to the prescribed five-day level, and (3) establishing supply points and maintenance units in locations to provide maximum service.

The Army included the following major units on 1 October:

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 5th Infantry Division, 83d Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

Army Reserve: 6th Armored Division.

The major units on 31 October were:

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

III Corps: Corps Troops only.

The aggregate strength of assigned units on 31 October was 252,524. There were additional troops in or adjacent to the Army area for which the Army assumed supply responsibility. These included, in approximate numbers: 30,706 Communications Zone troops, 17,405 Ninth Air Force troops, 1,604 French troops, and 2,631 miscellaneous troops. The approximate grand total of all troops was 304,870.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Administrative Division, in addition to its normal functions, became somewhat more active in matters concerning purchases and requisitions for local war material. Fifteen thousand intrenching tools were requisitioned from French manufacturers.

An officer of the Quartermaster Section was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service by General Orders Number 72, 24 October 1944, Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation in the Army on 1 October, in general, was sound, except in regard to Class III supplies. Prospects were good except for certain critical items which were in short supply on the Continent. Railway service was showing daily improvement, and, as the month progressed, many of the supply problems that had been experienced in the past began to disappear.

Communications Zone sent supplies into the Army area almost entirely by railway. Airplanes, loaded in the United Kingdom, delivered a considerable tonnage of Classes I, II and IV, and III supplies during the first part of the month, to ETAIN (U47), TOUL (U61), and ST DIZIER (T90). The bulk of supplies of all classes was delivered by railway to TOUL (U61).

Delivery of supplies by the Communications Zone direct to Army supply points, which, in general, were located along the western bank of the MOSELLE River and as far back as ST MIHIEL (U34), was impracticable because of the long line of communications and the non-existence of advance or intermediate depots. Responsibility for receiving, classifying, and making final delivery of supplies rested with the Army.

Class I supplies were unloaded at TOUL (U61), transported to a classification yard, and then reshipped to the supply points. A part of the 62d Quartermaster Base Depot Company, an efficient Communications Zone unit, was loaned to the Army for assisting in this operation. All Class II and IV supplies were delivered direct to the Army depot at TOUL (U61). Class III supplies were received almost entirely in packages.

Two-thirds of the railway shipments were received and handled at DOMGERMAIN (U50), three miles south of TOUL (U61), and the remainder at VERDUN (U26). Final deliveries to all Class I and Class III supply points were made by Army trucks to include 27 October, after which date railway service under Army control was initiated to four points. The latter method of delivery was to be expanded as rapidly as track repairs could be effected.


The following tonnage allocations were available to the Army Quartermaster during the month:

DATE	LONG TONS
1 - 2 October	1,833
3 - 13 October	2,100
14 - 24 October	2,325
25 - 31 October	2,950

The Army supply points in operation during October are shown in Annex Number 3 to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

The Class I situation was sound at the beginning of October and improved throughout the month, largely because of improved railway facilities. Shipments of rations from the Communications Zone during this period totaled 24,139.0 tons, all by Communications Zone trains and trucks. Nearly all rations were delivered by rail; none came by air.



CLASS I
CLASSIFICATION
YARD AND DEPOT
AT TOUL

FIRST
INTRA-ARMY
TRAIN
27 OCT. 1944

During October efforts were made to accumulate a special reserve stock of Class I supplies. By the end of the month 1,855,028 rations had been accumulated in the Army depot at TOUL (U61).

The daily issues of rations averaged 323,731 and certified strength reports averaged 303,444. The over-issue of six and seven-tenths per cent enabled units to replace unit reserves. The Army assigned strength reports averaged approximately 239,000; but attachments from the Ninth Air Force, the Advance Section Communications Zone, French, and miscellaneous units accounted for the difference.

Receipts of "B" rations were short toward the end of the month. It was impossible to meet normal requests for this type of ration on several days. During the month, seventy-seven and three-tenths per cent of the issues were of the "B" type; nine and eight-tenths per cent, "10-in-1"; five and six-tenths per cent, "0"; and seven and three-tenths per cent, "K".

Gratuitous Post Exchange issues were made weekly. One hundred per cent of a month's supply of cigarettes was issued, but candy and toilet articles were considerably short.

Hospital supplements for the "B" rations were issued during October for all hospital units. Initial issues were for ten days' requirements based on bed strength and subsequent issues for replacement of actual rations consumed. Supplies on hand were adequate for the entire month.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The clothing and equipment situation on 1 October was showing improvement and it continued to grow better during the month. Considerably more transportation was allotted to this class of supplies during October than had been the preceding month.

Winter clothing and equipment received primary consideration; wool underwear, overshoes, sleeping bags, blankets, and ground sheets were furnished in ever-increasing quantities. The majority of the shipments came by rail; twenty-five per cent of the total of 4,550.7 long tons arrived by air. Critical shortages at the end of the month included leggings, overshoes, raincoats, one and two-burner stoves, and mess gear.

All Class II and IV activities were concentrated in Depot Number 6, which had opened at TOUL (U61) on 20 September. Depot Number 5, located two and one-half miles northeast of VERDUN (U36), closed on 2 October and moved to TOUL (U61). Depot Number 6 utilized two large buildings for closed storage. Because of the great volume of business, the operations were divided between two depot companies: the 618th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, handled clothing; and the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, handled equipment, Red Cross supplies, and Post Exchange items.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

Receipts of V-80 gasoline for the month amounted to 7,346,755 gallons, which approximated sixty-seven per cent of the daily telegram requests.

Gasoline rationing was inaugurated at the beginning of October. Allocations were made by the Army Quartermaster to divisions and non-divisional units based on their minimum essential needs under the relatively static tactical situation. Special needs were provided for by making additional issues when and as required. The following schedule was arrived at after considerable planning and experience, and represents the minimum daily requirements, in gallons, of the Army in a fairly static situation:

Army Troops	105,030
Corps Troops (XX Corps)	17,500
Corps Troops (XII Corps)	15,475
Infantry Divisions (Six - 6,500 each)	39,000
Armored Divisions (Three - 12,500 each)	37,500
Air Force Units (Attached)	33,930
Communications Zone Troops (Attached)	11,000
Other Miscellaneous Troops (Attached)	7,255
TOTAL	266,690

The goal set for Army reserve was 2,500,000 gallons. It was considered desirable to accumulate this amount before the start of the next offensive. Gasoline received in excess of the rationing allocations was placed in Army reserve points. The reserve amounted to 840,330 gallons on 15 October, but was reduced to 638,235 gallons on 31 October.

The outlook for coal was not reassuring. Coal was not available in the Communications Zone for shipment to the Army. Local stocks were limited. Sixteen hundred tons of German coal and 1,192 tons of French coal, the latter procured by requisition, were collected during the month. Issues of 1,569 tons were made to hospitals, bakeries, shower units, and various headquarters. It was estimated that the monthly requirements during the winter would approximate 22,000 tons. At the end of the month the total coal resources were 5,000 tons, which included 1,223 tons on hand and 3,777 tons that could be made available.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The personnel of the Graves Registration Division, which heretofore had been divided between the forward and rear echelons of the Army Headquarters, was consolidated on 11 October with the rear echelon. This proved to be a better working arrangement, since close cooperation must be maintained with the Casualty Section of the Adjutant General's Office in processing reports.

A number of specialists in the division had, by this time, developed great skill in the identification of unknowns. They were justly proud of their accomplishments.

The total burials for the month were 2,261, of which 1,560 were American, fifteen were Allied, and 686 were enemy. There were only sixteen unidentified American dead for the month, one per cent of the burials.

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U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at ANDILLY (U61) and the German Military Cemetery adjacent thereto were in operation during October.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 October:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	6
QM Bakery Company, Special	5
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	3
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	3
QM Laundry Company	5
QM Petroleum Products Laboratory (Mobile Section)	1
QM Railroad Company	5
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile (Less One Section)	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	19
QM Tank Truck Company	2

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

A warehouse was secured in NANCY (U81) for the purpose of consolidating all captured enemy materiel. At this place all types of captured enemy supplies were received, inventoried, and issued. During October approximately 440 truckloads of captured materiel were transferred to this point.

Bad weather during October made it desirable to place troop units and installations under cover. This was especially important in the case of the latter, which require hard standings for efficient operations. After much effort, suitable covered accommodations were secured for both men and installations.

Early in October, when an additional company became available, a complete fumigation and bath company was operated by Army for each corps. Three companies were in operation within the Army.

During the month 106,823 men were bathed in divisional areas. This number does not include men who were bathed by Engineer and locally operated units.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

With the improved Class II supply situation, many soldiers could turn in unserviceable garments for replacement and the salvage program was accelerated over the previous month.


The following items of salvage were handled during this period:

Class B	336,911
Class C	48,697
Class X	79,957
TOTAL	465,565

All Class B and Class C items of clothing were fumigated, laundered, and, when necessary, repaired and sent to the Class II and IV depot for reissue. Salvage repair companies repaired 52,635 items during the month.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams operated at base shops at the Class II and IV depots and at salvage repair points. During the month repairs were made to the following items:

Fire units	2,066
Heaters, immersion type	39
Lanterns, gasoline	605
Stoves, cooking, one and two-burner	1,087
Typewriters, portable	99
Typewriters, non-portable	99
Pumps, hand	114



CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Army Headquarters remained at NANCY (U81) throughout the month of November.

Plans for the coming offensive were nearing completion at the beginning of the month. The principal efforts of the Office of the Army Quartermaster were directed toward meeting this situation. It was planned to place reserves of rations and gasoline in strategic locations east of the MOSELLE River. This proved to be a sound measure because the river was rising and at the start of the offensive had reached flood stage. Many of the temporary bridges were unusable for several days. Sites had been selected, but the stocking of the supply points was delayed until the last moment for reasons of secrecy. The Third U. S. Army offensive began on 8 November. Reserve supplies were adequate. A total of 2,246,841 rations was in the Army area at supply points, mobile reserve points, and storage points; 1,926,235 gallons of gasoline were likewise strategically located. The divisions averaged four days of Class I and five days of Class III supplies on hand, the accumulation of these reserves having begun in October. Army ration stocks had been built up to the prescribed level by the middle of October, but it was not until 7 November that a sufficient reserve of gasoline had been accumulated. By the twentieth of the month, gasoline on hand had been built up to five and one-half million gallons. Quartermaster activities proceeded according to plan.

The composition of the Army remained substantially the same during the month. The following were the major elements:

- III Corps: Corps Troops only.
- XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The strength of assigned units was 249,889 on 30 November. The total number of troops supplied by the Army was 311,306, including Communications Zone, Ninth Air Force, French, and miscellaneous troops.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Eight French railway wine tanks, each with a capacity of 5,000 gallons, were requisitioned for use as water reservoirs. These were filled with water and placed at Class III railheads for fire-fighting purposes.

A project of printing 40,000 ten-page booklets on "The Rules of Land Warfare" was undertaken and accomplished for the Judge Advocate Section. Captured enemy paper was used and the printing done by a French firm.

Requisitioning of war material and services from civilian sources increased in volume. A highlight was the initial use of civilian dry-cleaning facilities. Five thousand salvaged overcoats and 3,000 salvaged blouses were processed through this arrangement.

On 5 November, the Office of the Army Quartermaster was reorganized by adding an Operations Section to the Supply Division. The Operations Section had been in actual operation since early in August. The principal functions of this section were to supervise and control all Quartermaster supply operations in the field, including the receipt, classification, and forwarding of supplies to Army supply points, and to anticipate and make arrangements for meeting the requirements of the changing tactical situation.

During November three officers and four enlisted men of the Quartermaster Section received the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service, by General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army. In Quartermaster units one officer was awarded the Silver Star and one officer and four enlisted men were awarded the Bronze Star Medal, by General Orders, Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

An allocation of 2,950 long tons daily was available to the Army Quartermaster during November. The supply situation was greatly improved over previous months. Only Class II and IV gave cause for anxiety. Much progress was made toward completion of the winterization program; however, serious shortages of several critical items existed.

Railways, both in the Communications Zone and in the Army area, were now operating in good volume and on reliable schedules. The celebrated "Red Ball Express" truck convoys in the rear area were discontinued. Practically all supplies were transported from the Communications Zone to the Army receiving points by railway. One emergency shipment of diesel was lifted by air direct from the United Kingdom to airfields at ST DIZIER (T90) and VERDUN (U26). Truck shipments from the Communications Zone were minor except for a considerable quantity of gasoline delivered by tank trucks. Within the Army area, railway trains, under Army control, were used for distributing Class I and Class III supplies to all supply points that could be located on lines then in operation. Supply points not accessible to railways were supplied by Army trucks or a combination of railway and truck. A railway bridge across the MOSELLE River immediately north of NANCY (U81) was completed on 10 November, enabling trains to proceed to CHATEAU SALINS (Q12), HAMPONT (Q12), and HAROUDANGE (Q13). This was the only railway line in operation east of the MOSELLE during the month.

Class I and Class III supply points were maintained in close support of combat units. At least two supply points for both Class I and Class III supplies for each corps were in operation throughout the month, and additional supply points were maintained west of the MOSELLE River for Army troops. The first Class III supply point was opened for issues east of the MOSELLE River on 14 November; the first Class I point opened on 19 November.

Class I supplies for the period 1 to 24 November, inclusive, were delivered by the Communications Zone to the Army Class I depot at TOUL (U61). The Army Quartermaster classified the supplies at this point and reshipped by railway and/or truck to the Army supply points. The Advance Section Communications Zone for some time had been building up a Class I intermediate depot at VERDUN (U26). This depot, Q-178, opened on 25 November and took over the function of sending daily trains to designated Army supply points. The new procedure was a great improvement and, for the first time since the start of the campaign, established a system of Class I supply in close agreement with the field manuals. The Army depot at TOUL (U61) was retained as a reserve point for operational-type rations. The daily trains from VERDUN (U26) were dispatched to Army railheads located, for the most part, along the MOSELLE River at NANCY (U81), CHAMPIGNOUILLES (U81), CHAMBLEY (U65), AUDUN (U68), CHATEAU SALINS (Q12), and HAMPONT (Q12). The last two points were east of the MOSELLE River in the southern part of the Army zone. Army trucks transported supplies from the railheads to such supply points as were not located on operating railway lines.

Class II and IV supplies continued to be delivered to the Army Class II and IV depot at TOUL (U61).

Class III supplies, in bulk, were delivered to the Army at the three principal decanting points - DOLGERMAIN (U50), NANCY (U81), and MANGIBULLES (U67). Packaged gasoline shipped from the Communications Zone was received at LEROUVILLE (U32), from which point the trains were dispatched to the various supply points. Railway facilities enabled distribution to be made to BELLEVILLE (U72), TRIEUX (U68), PORTOY (U78), DUDELANGE (U89), CHATEAU SALINS (Q12), and HAROUDANGE (Q13). The last two points were east of the MOSELLE River.

Coincident with the change in Class I supply of the Army, the daily

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telegram, beginning on 24 November, was dispatched through the 24th Regulating Station to Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), instead of the Advance Section Communications Zone.

For Class II and IV supply, the daily telegram to the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, was to be discontinued on 6 December. Henceforth, this class of supplies was to be secured by periodic ten-day requisitions for the Army's requirements. The first such request was submitted to the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, on 29 November for the period 7 to 16 December.

Daily telegrams for Class III supplies continued to be submitted in the usual manner, through the 24th Regulating Station to the Advance Section Communications Zone.

The Army supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex Number 4 to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply functioned with increased efficiency during November. The average daily issue was 345,716, of which eighty-four per cent went to Army units and sixteen per cent to units not assigned or attached to the Army but operating in or adjacent to the Army area. It was anticipated that the consumption of "B" rations would drop radically after the start of the offensive; however, it developed that seventy and eight-tenths per cent of the month's issues were of this type, as compared with seventy-seven and three-tenths per cent during the previous month, while eleven and four-tenths per cent were "10-in-1", nine per cent were "C", and eight and eight-tenths per cent were "K". Total receipts for the month were 25,028.4 long tons. Records of daily issues, based on daily reports from the supply points, were maintained by the Class I Section for all units. These records proved highly important in exercising control over issues. The surplus draw for the month amounted to eight and one-tenth per cent. This percentage is a negligible figure after making allowances for prisoners of war, civilian labor, casualties, and replacements of unit and individual reserves. It was found necessary to maintain close control over the weekly Post Exchange issue.

Fresh bread was issued daily. Issues over the month averaged better than forty pounds per 100 rations. Five bakery companies with a rated capacity of 700,000 pounds produced 950,000 pounds weekly. The bakeries, being equipped with coffee roasters, roasted 212,081 pounds of green coffee during the month. Supply points issued this as a supplement to the canned coffee. Fresh coffee in abundance is a prime essential to front-line troops. Fresh butter and fresh meat were available in good supply; chicken was issued once each week. A cigarette shortage in the Theater resulted in a ten per cent decrease in the usual monthly issue. Ration Accessory Kits were in short supply, thereby causing a reduction of seventy per cent in the issue of toilet articles.


It was anticipated that the roads would be congested on 8 November, the first day of the offensive. As a precautionary measure, forward units were issued a two-day supply of rations on 7 November and were forbidden to draw on the following day.

The reserve supply of rations under control of the Army at the start of the offensive, exclusive of supplies in the hands of units, amounted to seven and fifty-six one-hundredths days of supply, the bulk of which was located at TOUL (U61). As an added precaution, 300,000 operational-type rations were stored in a warehouse at NANCY (U81); and on 11 November a mobile reserve of 107,000 rations, held aboard cars, was placed at MUNCHEL (Q01), east of the MOSELLE River.

A modern refrigeration plant at HOMECOURT (U77), previously under Army control, was requisitioned and taken over on 5 November by the Advance Section Communications Zone. Perishable supplies for the Third U. S. Army were stored in this plant, which was ideally located for the purpose.

Thanksgiving dinner had been the subject of special planning. Efforts were made to insure that every man, including those in the front lines, would be provided with the traditional dinner. On 21 November, 444,000 pounds of turkey were delivered by refrigerator vans to Army supply points from the HOMECOURT (U77) cold storage plant. The turkey ration was approximately one and one-third pounds per man. The menu was as complete as could be arranged and included cranberries, sweet potatoes, fresh apples, raisins, and cocoa.

The "K"-ration stocks were in short supply. This ration was preferred above all others by attacking troops because it can be carried more conveniently. On 22 November, all "K" rations were reserved for issue to front-line troops.



SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The clothing and equipment situation remained a serious problem. Conditions were improved over the previous month, but shortages of critical winter items continued. Extended efforts were made to reduce these shortages.

Fifty per cent of the troops lacked a fourth blanket; twenty per cent of the front-line troops lacked large-size overshoes; sixty-six per cent of the troops lacked sweaters; ten per cent of the troops were without field jackets (small sizes were unavailable); a shortage of large-size raincoats accounted for a fifteen per cent deficiency. As a partial remedy for this situation, several steps were taken:

- First: Thirteen thousand specially procured British waterproof ponchos were issued to each division. These were substitutes for the raincoats and provided additional warmth when used as ground sheets.
- Second: Cots totaling 18,612 were issued.
- Third: Tentage was issued to all Anti-Aircraft Artillery units and most Engineer units as part of the winter shelter program. In all, 619 tents, pyramidal, and 344 tents, squad, went forward. In the overall picture, about fifty per cent of requisitioning units remained unsupplied.
- Fourth: An initial issue of combat boots was made on the basis of 10,000 pairs to each infantry division and 3,000 pairs to each armored division. Following this initial issue, combat boots were to be issued on a replacement basis only. Shoes and combat boots were dubbed at the Army depot prior to issue. Three thousand pairs of high rubber boots in excess of normal allowances were issued to Engineer combat units during the flood period and in preparation for the 8 November offensive.
- Fifth: Over 55,000 caps, comfort, British, were procured and issued for use in lieu of mufflers.
- Sixth: Tentage and cots were issued to divisional rest and recreational centers.

Pronounced strides were made in relieving the shortage of two-burner stoves. Several hundred field range fire units were procured from the Communications Zone and issued on a loan basis. Action was taken to allocate these field range fire units not only to organizations as a direct substitute for the two-burner stove, but also to Anti-Aircraft Artillery units for the maintenance of small detachments such as isolated observation posts and gun crews. Supplemental issue was made of German frying pans, stew pots, boilers, coffee pots, and other captured kitchen gear. Canned heat and fuel units were made available in large quantities to relieve the one-burner stove shortage.

For light in tents and billets 2,000 British and American kerosene lanterns, all that could be procured, were made available. The complete requirements for lighting could not be filled.

Mess gear remained in critically short supply. Improvement was noted in the overshoe situation; however, at the end of the month, approximately 60,000 pairs of large sizes - tens and above - were required to complete the issue to the Army. It was apparent that higher headquarters, in planning the overshoe program, had proceeded on the assumption that the boot, combat, would provide adequate foot protection in itself. This proved not to be the case under conditions encountered at the front. The high top was an excellent substitute for the legging, but overshoes were needed for warmth and as protection against mud and water.


In all, 9,901 requisitions were processed, eight per cent less than in October.

An officers' sales store was opened in NANCY (U81), supplementing the service provided at TOUL (U61).

On 28 November, a detachment of a Quartermaster depot company, supply, established a sub-depot at KORNIGSMACKER (U98), for the purpose of reducing the time and mileage in getting Class II items to the most northerly divisions. Requisitions were received from using units at the sub-depot, where they were consolidated and dispatched to Depot Number 6, at TOUL (U61). Supplies were sent forward to the sub-depot by truck the same day requisitions were received. This arrangement was highly satisfactory.

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Depot Number 6, near TOUL (U61), remained the sole Army Class II and IV supply point. The base for supply remained at Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37), operated by the Communications Zone.




INTERIOR VIEW OF CLASS II AND IV DEPOT NUMBER 6, AT TOUL

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline situation was satisfactory on 1 November, and improved steadily throughout the month. There was a shortage of diesel, however, and it was necessary to arrange for an emergency shipment of 400 tons by air direct from the United Kingdom and a like amount by railway from CHERBOURG (O12). The air shipment, scheduled to be completed before 7 November, was accomplished in part when a total of 287 tons was received on 10 and 11 November. Rail shipments of diesel, however, began soon afterwards in quantities that permitted the accumulation of a reserve of approximately 32,000 gallons by 16 November. Almost 2,000,000 gallons of gasoline were on hand at the start of the offensive on 8 November, excluding unit loads. The month closed with 3,604,565 gallons in Army supply points and reserve points.

During previous months the policy of the Communications Zone had been to supply packaged gasoline to the Army as far as practicable. As the cans had been emptied, they had been shipped to the rear for refilling. The turn around, because of the long distances, had required so much time that a critical shortage of cans had resulted. It was decided, therefore, that the Army should be furnished 1,000 net tons of bulk gasoline daily, which would be decanted by the Army. This program was initiated on 2 November, when 298,650 gallons of bulk gasoline (796.4 net tons) arrived at DCMGERMAIN (U50). Any additional amount required was to be furnished in packages, provided that the cans were available. Most of the decanting, as explained above, was carried out at three places. It was possible to decant 1,000 net tons (375,000 gallons) daily, but an amount in excess of this figure would have required more equipment. Receipts for the month were forty per cent bulk and sixty per cent packaged.



DECANTING GASOLINE FROM RAIL CARS

In preparation for the offensive, two reserve points were established on 6 and 7 November east of the MOSELLE River and stocked with 420,350 gallons of V-80 gasoline: one point was two miles east of NANCY (U81) and the other at ATTON (U73). On 10 November, an additional 219,750 gallons were loaded aboard cars and held as a mobile reserve at MONCEL (Q01). When the supply points became congested, 1,198,730 gallons of V-80 gasoline were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone to be held in the vicinity of VERDUN (U26).

Two bulk storage plants in NANCY (U81), with a capacity of 310,000 gallons, and another in LANOUVEVILLE (U80), with a capacity of 800,000 gallons, were taken over during November. These contained 600,000 gallons at the end of the month.

Receipts of gasoline totaled 12,137,026 gallons for the month. This was ten per cent in excess of the daily telegram requests. Daily issues averaged 303,921 gallons of V-80 gasoline and 10,288 gallons of diesel. Consumption was much lower than anticipated. The daily consumption of liquid fuel was approximately eight and twenty-three one-hundredths pounds (net) per man per day; for oils and greases the amount was two-tenths of one pound. In this connection it must be remembered that the troops advanced over relatively short distances and that supply distances were relatively short. Higher headquarters had prescribed that overall Class III requirements be calculated on the basis of fifteen and forty-seven one-hundredths pounds (gross) per man per day. In the light of experience, this is considered to represent the amount that is required in a fast-moving, long-distance operation such as prevailed during the month of August.

Two fires at decanting points resulted in a loss of 16,000 gallons of gasoline, 10,266 cans, and one 100-gallon-per-minute dispenser. The first fire, at DCMGERMAIN (U50) on 7 November, was caused by hot coals from a switching engine; the second, at NANCY (U81) on 16 November, resulted from the backfire of a dispenser engine. The loss in cans was offset by 13,000 German cans recovered from a factory in BASSE YUTZ (U88), near THIONVILLE (U88).

The coal situation improved greatly. Between 19 and 21 November, 235 cars were received from the Communications Zone. Total receipts for the month were 8,678 tons. Sufficient coal was available to fill all requests.

The Theater Commander, accompanied by the Army Commander, visited Supply Point Number 50, at NANCY (U81), on 16 November.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

A marked increase in the number of isolated burials had become apparent by 1 November. This presented a serious problem with respect to establishing identity. There was instituted on the second of this month a comprehensive check list for the identification of bodies interred in isolated localities. Upon locating a body, graves registration personnel consulted the civil authorities of the nearest village and other local civilian and military personnel prior to disinterment. An overlay was then made, tying in the location of the grave with permanent landmarks. All available circumstances were noted - for example, whether the body was buried by the enemy or by civilians, on what date the burial occurred, who handled the personal effects, and what records were available. It was found by following this system that absence of identification tags or other positive identification was no barrier to definite identification in ninety-five per cent of the cases.

Much progress was made in improving the technique incident to the identification of unknowns. By arrangement, Ordnance units retrieving tanks with bodies charred beyond immediate identification called in a representative of the Graves Registration Division before moving the tanks. This resulted in early identification of remains, since all pertinent data as to position of the bodies in the tanks, personal effects, and immediate surroundings often accomplished recognition of the bodies by members of their organizations. Six cases of potential unknowns were solved during the month through this new method.

The system of evacuating bodies from the divisions to the cemetery was modified on 4 November. A separate collecting point manned by Army graves registration personnel was established to operate with each division, and in cooperation with the division graves registration officer. In addition, twelve teams, each consisting of three men, a driver, and a weapons carrier, were placed in a central pool at the cemetery for emergency assistance where needed. Corps graves registration officers rendered valuable service in coordinating operations within the divisions. Under the earlier system, several collecting points were operated to serve each corps. The localizing of collecting points simplified identification procedure and proved to be much more efficient than the previous system.

On 27 November, an understanding was reached with the Ninth Air Force regarding the identification of Air Force personnel not previously

reported to this Division but buried in the Army area. Prompt identification was made of ten out of the sixteen unknowns.


During the three days beginning on 21 November, it was found necessary to call on 550 prisoners of war to handle the large volume of work. Portable arc lights secured through the Engineer Section were used for the first time for night burial activity.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at ANDILLY (U61), which had opened at 121200 B September, closed for American burials at 050800 A November, but remained open for Allied burials. American burials here totaled 3,307; Allied, sixty-three. The adjacent German cemetery remained open. U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at LIMEXY (U62) opened at 050800 A November.

Burials during the month totaled 5,676, of which 3,672 were American, eight were Allied, and 1,996 were enemy.

A commemorative service was held on Armistice Day at the LIMEXY (U62) cemetery.

The Graves Registration Division remained with the rear echelon of the Army Headquarters throughout the month.



COVERED PROCESSING AREA AT A THIRD U. S. ARMY CEMETERY

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 30 November:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	6
QM Bakery Company, Special	5
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	3
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	3
QM Laundry Company	5
QM Railroad Company	5
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	24
QM Service Detachment	1
(Petroleum Products Laboratory)	
(Mobile Detachment)	

Higher authority directed that, with the entry of the Army into Germany, prisoners of war could not be utilized for labor details. To meet this situation, five additional service companies were assigned to the Army. Two companies were allocated to the Army Medical Section for use with the evacuation hospitals, which had throughout the entire campaign utilized prisoner-of-war labor only.

The Army Commander awarded a unit commendation to the 485th Quartermaster Refrigeration Company, Mobile, published in Section III, General Orders Number 100, 30 November 1944, for outstanding performance of duty from 10 August to 25 September. Elements of this company entered HOMECOURT (U77) on 9 September on the heels of the combat troops and, before the town was reported clear of the enemy, secured and protected 2,600,000 pounds of beef, property of the German Wehrmacht.

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SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Captured Enemy Materiel Section entered METZ (U85) on 22 November, the day after the fall of the city. Among the stores secured were 250 tons of foodstuff, promptly released to the Advance Section Communications Zone, and fifty carloads of flour and grain, which were turned over to Civil Affairs. All other supplies captured in METZ (U85) were warehoused and guarded pending disposition. Captured supplies from other localities continued to be handled through the Sohn Warehouse at NANCY (U81).

During the month, a plan for increased service to the troops was worked out with the fumigation and bath units. Under a system inaugurated on 29 November, each man bathed at shower points received clean socks and underclothing in exchange for his soiled garments. With the cooperation of the Class II and IV Section, six shower installations, each operated by one fumigation and bath platoon, were each provided with an initial stock of 2,500 pairs of wool socks and a like number of wool undershirts and drawers. This basic stock made possible the exchange system. The soiled garments were laundered and then sorted into three sizes - small, medium, and large - for reissue to other bathers. Unserviceable clothing was replaced by the salvage service. In the two days of this month that the plan operated, 12,970 men were served.

Two laundry vans operating at an evacuation hospital at MORHANGE (Q13), at that time ten miles from the front, were damaged by shell fragments. Three days were required to make necessary repairs.

Petroleum products laboratory experiments revealed that a mixture of seventy-five per cent diesel and twenty-five per cent kerosene would provide efficient operation of laundry engines in the event of a diesel shortage.

During the month 3,203,260 pounds of laundry were processed.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

Arrangements were made to furnish three pairs of clean socks weekly to front-line troops, as an aid in the campaign against trench foot. Salvage collecting squads located at Class I supply points were provided with a basic stock of 200,000 pairs of clean socks by the Class II and IV depot in order to make the initial exchange. An issue based on morning-report strength was made on 16 November. Units returned their soiled socks the following day and the salvage collecting squads had these laundered after sorting and classifying them. Clean socks were returned to organizations through the Class I supply points or by the laundries direct, depending on circumstances. In several instances it was more practicable for divisions to deal directly with the laundry units rather than through the Class I supply points. The operation of such a plan entailed many difficulties and required close supervision and coordination.

Breech covers were fabricated by the Quartermaster salvage repair units from available duck material and issued for use on captured German field pieces employed by our forces.

Emphasis for the month was again placed on the salvage of critical items such as mess gear and shelter halves. A total of 690,636 items was received and classified as follows:

Class B	416,473
Class C	80,780
Class X	193,383


Class B and Class C clothing amounting to 72,539 pieces was processed for reissue through either the Class II and IV depot or the bathing units.

Field range repair units operated at the base shop at TOUL (U61) and at three salvage repair points. Three mobile teams completed conversion of the remaining fire units and gasoline lanterns of the XII Corps for the use of leaded gasoline. Thirty per cent of the fire units of the XX Corps and other Army troops remained unconverted because of the lack of parts.

During the month, repairs were made to the following:

Fire units	4,101
Lanterns, gasoline	4,011
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	2,183
Heaters, immersion type	47
Pumps, hand	160
Typewriters, portable	331
Typewriters, non-portable	220
Calculators	1
Machines, mimeograph	3

Despite the handicap of a critical shortage of parts, particularly typewriter parts, the repair units were able, with considerable improvisation, to return a large quantity of equipment to service.



ABOVE
OVERALL VIEW
OF
BATH INSTALLATION
RIGHT
BATHERS
RECEIVING
CLEAN CLOTHING



LEFT
SHOWER TENT
BELOW
DRESSING TENT



CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

Army Headquarters remained at NANCY (U81) until 28 December, when the forward echelon moved to the City of LUXEMBOURG (P81). The Quartermaster Section, which had been with the forward echelon since 13 August, remained after 28 December with the rear echelon in NANCY (U81).

Initially during the month, efforts of the Army Quartermaster were directed toward the support of the continuing offensive to the east. Supply points and service installations were maintained in close support of the combat troops. The enemy counter-attack on 16 December, however, against the First U. S. Army in Belgium and Luxembourg was destined to have a far-reaching effect on the Third U. S. Army tactical and consequent supply operations.

By 18 December the German counter-offensive on the First U. S. Army front had reached a critical stage. As a result the tactical plan of the Third U. S. Army was changed to counter this thrust. Instead of proceeding with the offensive to the east, in the direction of SAAR-BRUCKEN (Q47), the Army directed its power toward the north, through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. The new tactical plan required the III and XII Corps to move quickly to the vicinity of ARLON (P62) and LUXEMBOURG (P81), respectively. The VIII Corps came under Third U. S. Army control in the area of BASTONNE (P55). The XI Corps remained on its current front east and south of the MOSELLE River. The right (southern) boundary of the Army was changed and the zones of action of the III and XII Corps were taken over by the Seventh U. S. Army.

The supply plan of the Army was necessarily changed. Quartermaster supply points and reserves of rations and gasoline that had been placed east of the MOSELLE River were shifted to the north and west of the MOSELLE. Stocks of rations and gasoline were loaded aboard railway cars and held as mobile reserve, so that rapid movement could be effected as the military situation developed and clarified itself. The supply situation had in general been sound since the first of the month, with adequate reserves of rations and gasoline at supply points and reserve points. On 19 December 1,120,652 rations and 4,071,074 gallons of V-80 gasoline were on hand in the Army area; and an additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26), Q-178. The divisions had an average of three and two-tenths days of Class I and four and eight-tenths days of Class III supplies on hand.

The composition of the Army changed frequently and radically during the month. On 16 December the 10th Armored Division was attached to the First U. S. Army. With the change in the tactical plan, the VIII Corps, including the 9th Armored Division, 10th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division, and 101st Airborne Division, was transferred to the Third U. S. Army. The 87th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army and passed to the control of the Seventh U. S. Army on 21 December. Later in the month the 87th Infantry Division returned to the Third U. S. Army and the 11th Armored Division and 17th Airborne Division came under its control. From 16 December to the end of the month, the strength of the Army was increased abruptly from approximately 255,000 to approximately 350,000. The additional troops supplied by the Army increased also from a daily average of 50,000 to an average of 70,000.

The following were the major elements of the Army on 1 December:

- III Corps: Corps Troops only.
- XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The strength of the Army was 249,889, and with the addition of Communications Zone, Air Force, French, and miscellaneous troops, the total for which the Army was responsible for supply amounted to 311,306.

The following were the major elements of the Army on 31 December:

- III Corps: 6th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
- VIII Corps: 9th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 28th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 17th Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, and Corps Troops.

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XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 5th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The strength of the Army on 31 December was 351,291. The Army also was supplying 27,114 Communications Zone, 38,015 Ninth Air Force, 2,749 French, and 2,063 miscellaneous troops, which brought the total number of troops supplied to 421,232.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

A new table of personnel allotments for Headquarters Third U. S. Army was published in Staff Memorandum Number 73, dated 16 December. The allotment for enlisted men of the Quartermaster Section was decreased by eight men. The Section's authorization was nineteen officers, three warrant officers, and forty enlisted men.

A plan for the training of infantry riflemen was announced on 7 December. Five per cent of the assigned strength of Army, corps, and division headquarters and of the assigned white service units were to be sent to an infantry training center established at METZ (U85). The Commanding Officer, 519th Quartermaster Group, was directed to effect the transfer of enlisted men from Quartermaster organizations concerned. Later in the month an additional five per cent were called. As a part of this program two enlisted men from the Quartermaster Section were transferred to the 87th Infantry Division and three were transferred to the 95th Infantry Division. One hundred and twenty-four enlisted men from ten Quartermaster units were transferred to the Infantry Training Center at METZ (U85).

During the month the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to eight officers and warrant officers and four enlisted men of Quartermaster units by General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

The Administrative Division continued to be active in making purchases and requisitioning local services and material. To meet an urgent operational necessity, 2,185 yards of white cloth were requisitioned from a French wholesale establishment on 24 December, to be used for making tunics for snow camouflage. Local printing facilities were extensively used for the printing of certain forms that were in short supply.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The overall Quartermaster supply situation in the Army continued to be favorable. The status of certain Class II items, however, was extremely critical. This situation was aggravated when, on 19 December, the supply of the VIII Corps became a Third U. S. Army responsibility. Battle losses of clothing and equipment included items that were already in short supply. Extended efforts were made to reequip all units having sustained battle losses. The Supply Division promptly reacted to the problems incident to the abrupt increase in the strength of the Army.

During the early part of the month the chief concern of the Supply Division was to supply the attacking forces to the east. Supply points were located well forward in support of the combat troops and reserves of rations and gasoline were strategically located east of the MOSELLE River. In addition to the Class II and IV Depot Number 7, established at METZ (U85) on 8 December for troops of the XX Corps and later also for XII Corps troops, another depot was opened for the troops of the XII Corps. It was established at SARRAHEE (Q44) as Depot Number 8 on 17 December.

The development of the enemy counter-offensive, however, on the First U. S. Army front resulted in a change of the direction of the Third U. S. Army's advance. The III and XII Corps moved quickly northward to ARLON (P62) and LUXEMBOURG (P81), respectively, and the VIII Corps came under Third U. S. Army control in the area of BASTOGNE (P55). Arrangements were made on the evening of 18 December to establish Class I and Class III supply points for units of the III and VIII Corps at LONGWY (P50) and LIBRAMONT (P34), which were to open on the following day. The Operations Officer of the Quartermaster Section arrived at LONGWY (P50) early on 19 December to complete arrangements for the opening of supply points in the new area and to coordinate all Quartermaster activities on the new front. LONGWY (P50), formerly at the rear of the northern flank of the Army area but now in the center of the direction of movement, was selected as a railhead and regulating point.

A special train loaded with rations, arrangements for which had been made the previous evening, was dispatched from the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), to Class I Supply Points Number 66, at LONGWY (P50), and Number 67, at LIBRAMONT (P34). At 1000 A hours on 19 December 85,000 rations from VERDUN (U26) had arrived. A transfer of 100,000 gallons of gasoline and allied products,

by truck transport, from Army Class III Supply Points Number 43B, at MANGIRULLES (U67), and Number 57, at ELZANGE (U98), had been completed. These shipments arrived and issues were initiated within twelve hours after preliminary arrangements had been made. Class I and Class III Supply Points Number 66 actually opened at 191000 A December.

A shift of Quartermaster supply points and reserve points was begun immediately. Four Class I and four Class III supply points, all of them east of the MOSELLE River, were closed. Only one Class I and one Class III supply point, then in support of the XX Corps, remained east of the river. A portion of the supplies in these points was loaded aboard railway cars and held as a mobile reserve and the remainder was transferred to new points opening to the north and west of the MOSELLE River. The shift of supply points is graphically illustrated in Annex Number 5B to this report.

In accordance with a previous agreement between the Quartermaster, Seventh U. S. Army, and the Army Quartermaster on the matter of supply responsibilities resulting from changes in Army areas, Class I Supply Point Number 58, at HAMPONT (Q12), and Class III Supply Point Number 58, at HABOUDANCE (Q13), were released to the Seventh U. S. Army at 241400 A December. A stock of 97,750 rations and additional miscellaneous items was turned over with the Class I supply point and 152,137 gallons of V-80 gasoline and additional allied products were transferred with the Class III supply point. Also, thirty-two cars of coke and 514 tons of coal were included in the supplies that were transferred.

As a result of a change in the Communications Zone supply procedure in support of the Army, the daily tonnage allocation of 2,950 long tons for Quartermaster supplies was no longer in effect. This daily allotment of tonnage imposed by higher headquarters had been in effect since 25 October. Distribution of all classes of supplies from the Communications Zone to the Army was, for the first time in the campaign, in conformity with procedures outlined in field manuals.

Under this system the Army Quartermaster submitted requests for Class I and Class III (POL) requirements by daily telegram through the 24th Regulating Station to Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26). Supplies were shipped by the Advance Section Communications Zone to Army supply points and railheads designated in the daily telegram. This system was already in effect for Class I supplies, beginning on 24 November. It was not until 11 December, however, that Class III (POL) supplies were requested and distributed as outlined.

Army requirements for Class II and IV supplies were requisitioned for ten-day periods and were submitted direct to the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37). Class II and IV supplies, with some exceptions, were forwarded to Army supply points by Communications Zone train or truck transport. The first such request was submitted for ten-day requirements beginning on 7 December.

Requests for Class III (Solid Fuels) based on thirty-day requirements covering the three succeeding months were submitted by the Army Quartermaster to the Quartermaster, Advance Section Communications Zone. Dependent on final allocation based on requirements of the Army and availability, solid fuel was shipped forward to the Army supply points



direct from mines or from Advance Section Communications Zone depots in the forward area.

The railroads continued to be the chief means of transporting supplies. With the exception of small quantities of supplies arriving by airplane and by truck, all supplies came into the Army area on Communications Zone trains. Only in an emergency were Army trucks dispatched to Communications Zone depots to bring forward supplies.

The Army Quartermaster Operations Officer continued to supervise the activities at the Army Class I and Class III railhead and control points, which were, in effect, Army regulating stations. Points in operation until 18 December included BRLEY (U77) on the northern flank and CHATEAU SALLINS (Q12), east of the MOSELLE River, on the southern flank. The latter point was relocated on 10 December at LONGWY (P50). On 19 December an additional regulating point was established at LONGWY (P50) to serve the new front and on 22 December LEWING (Q33) was closed.

The Army supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex 5A to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply continued to function with efficiency during December. Total receipts for the month were 29,085.1 long tons and total issues were 26,921.0 long tons, or 11,788,505 rations, an average daily issue of 380,274. Eighty-four and four-tenths per cent of the issues went to Army units and fifteen and six-tenths per cent to units not assigned or attached to the Army but operating in or adjacent to the Army area. Seventy-six per cent of the month's issues were "B" rations; ten and three-tenths per cent, "10-in-1"; five and seven-tenths per cent, "C"; and eight per cent, "K". Rations on hand in the Army area at the beginning of the month totaled 1,263,671; at the end of the month, 1,544,466. In addition 660,000 operational-type rations were held for the Third U. S. Army at Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).

It had become necessary to carefully conserve operational-type rations because of the short supply. To permit increased issues of "B"-type rations to units for emergencies, a portion of the operational-type ration reserves normally held at each Class I supply point was replaced by 25,000 "B"-type rations. Type-"K" rations, especially, were in short supply in the Army Class I reserve, and during the last week of the month stocks of this type of ration were exhausted at the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26). The demand from the combat troops for type-"K" rations increased sharply the last third of the month. The percentage increase amounted to approximately twenty-four per cent.

A special Christmas dinner was provided for all troops of the Army. The menu furnished about one and one-half pounds of turkey per man, and included cranberries, fresh apples, and raisin bread. In addition, a gratuitous issue of 350,000 cigars and 700,000 bars of candy was distributed to the troops. It was necessary to dispatch five ten-ton trucks to LE HAVRE (I42) to pick up these gratuitous items to insure their issue on Christmas Day. At the request of the VIII Corps, because of the fluid tactical situation, the issue of the Christmas menu to that corps was delayed until 29 December.

A new policy was inaugurated for the distribution of operational-type rations. The availability of "K" rations to front-line troops was increased to a maximum of fifty per cent of the total operational-type rations issued. The availability of "K" rations to service troops in rear areas was decreased to a maximum of ten per cent of the total number of operational-type rations requested. Special authorization from this headquarters was required for requests in excess of allowances prescribed above.

With the advent of cold weather, difficulty was encountered with vegetables and canned goods freezing. Such measures as were possible were taken to alleviate this condition. Dehydrated vegetables were not available in sufficiently large quantities to be used as a substitute for canned components, and supplies of powdered milk were insufficient to replace the canned product.

A highlight in bakery operations during the month was the production by five bakery companies of 1,056,428 pounds of bread in one week. This represented a production of fifty per cent above rated capacity. Bread continued to be issued daily with all rations. The supply of canned coffee remained critical, which necessitated an increase in the issue of fresh coffee. The coffee-roasting facilities operated by the Army bakery units were inadequate to provide roasted and ground coffee in quantities required. To supplement Army facilities, the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), shipped daily, beginning on 21 December, 13,000 pounds of fresh roasted coffee to the Third U. S. Army. At no time, however, did the troops suffer from a shortage of coffee.

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Considerable efforts were made to increase the number of issues of fresh meats and other perishables which were substituted for canned components of the "B"-type ration. Issues during the month included the following items:

	ISSUES	POUNDS PER 100 RATIONS
Beef, Roasting and Frying	8	42
Beef, Ground	6	30
Beef, Boiling and Stewing	6	35
Pork Loins	4	42
Frankfurters	2	30
Cold Cuts	1	28
Chicken	1	75
Turkey	1	150
Bacon	1	12
Butter, Fresh	23	7

Weekly issues of Post Exchange items continued to be made gratuitously to the troops. Although cigarettes and certain toilet articles remained in short supply, the situation in regard to comfort items was satisfactory.

After the shift of supply points to the northern front had been effected, Class I Supply Point Number 51, at CHAMPIGNEUILLES (U81), remained the only Army Class I point in the southern part of the Army zone. To effect a saving in rail transportation, this point was supplied, beginning on 22 December, from the Atlanta Depot, at TOUL (U61), instead of the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26). The Atlanta Depot, a Class I depot operated by the Advance Section Communications Zone, opened 180500 A December one-half mile west of TOUL (U61) and served as a supply point for Advance Section Communications Zone troops and Army troops in the vicinity.

Class I daily trains from the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26), with few exceptions, arrived on satisfactory schedules at Army railheads and supply points. Railway cars were commodity-loaded, which facilitated the handling and issue of rations at Army points.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The clothing and equipment situation was in general satisfactory, but several shortages of a critical nature persisted. The abrupt increase in the troop strength, when the VIII Corps became a part of the Army, materially affected the Class II supply situation. In addition, the combat losses sustained by many units of that corps intensified the problem of supply of certain critical items. Class II and IV supplies totaling 4,480.3 long tons were received during December at all depots, an average of 144.53 long tons per day. On 31 December 2,800 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots. Requisitions processed totaled 10,299, an average of 332 per day, four per cent more than in November.

The major problem in December was the replacement, during the latter part of the month, of combat losses sustained by certain units of the VIII Corps prior to the attachment of the Corps to the Third U. S. Army. Included in the estimated losses were 55,000 sets of wool trousers, shirts, and underwear, 55,000 wool overcoats, 55,000 field jackets, 12,000 combat jackets, 16,000 pairs of overshoes, 55,000 raincoats, 330,000 pairs of wool socks, 12,673 meat cans, 42,618 shelter halves, and 96,000 blankets. A special requisition was sent to the Communications Zone and all available supplies were dispatched to the Army depots through the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37). Reequipment of these units had first priority and it was accomplished, except for items that were not available, within ten days.

Although certain items required for the winter comfort and welfare of the individual soldier had become available in varying quantities, the situation was not entirely alleviated. The immediate outlook for the availability of special winter clothing for armored-vehicle personnel and parka-type overcoats was not reassuring. Sufficient numbers of sweaters, however, had been received to complete an initial issue to all units. Meat cans, canteen cups, small and medium-size raincoats, sleeping bags, shelter halves, mufflers, overshoes, and field jackets were the items most urgently needed. Although the shortage of mass gear by the end of the month was alleviated, all demands for this item had not been met. Overshoes in considerable quantity, particularly in large sizes, were required to complete the initial issue to all troops. A large shipment of overshoes was received, but it was necessary to issue them to replace combat losses.

Experience gained as a result of depot personnel applying water-resistant material to shoes, indicated that the highest degree of water resistance could be obtained by first applying dubbing, thoroughly working it into the leather, and then applying impregnate. Both dubbing and impregnate were on hand at Class II and IV depots in sufficient quantities for issue to all troops.

Additional snow camouflage in the combat area became an urgent necessity. Four hundred and fifty snow suits were released to the Army on 27 December at Communications Zone Depot Number Q-177, at PARIS (S04), by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group and arrangements completed for shipment to Army Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (P50), for immediate issue to forward patrols. One thousand two hundred gallons of white paint and an equal amount of linseed oil were secured from the Communications Zone for spraying helmets, raincoats, and leggings. Information received from the Communications Zone was that no white cloth was immediately available on the Continent. As an expedient, 5,000 mattress covers, from which 10,000 suits could be made, were secured at Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37). The 300th Quartermaster Salvage Repair Company began the manufacture of tunics from these mattress covers.



Depot Number 6, near TOUL (U61), remained in operation throughout the month and was in reality the base Quartermaster Class II and IV Army depot. From this depot shipments to the other depots were made both by truck and by rail. It served all troops at the beginning of the month; but after the opening of Depots 7, 8, and 9, it served only Army troops in the general vicinity. The officers' sales store at this depot closed on 9 December and reopened at the METZ (U85) Depot on 11 December.

Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), opened 081200 A December and remained open throughout the remainder of the month. It served XII and XX Corps troops and Army troops in the vicinity. Supplies for this depot had been, until 19 December, transported entirely by truck, as there was no operating rail line into METZ (U85). Subsequent to this date, shipments for this depot were made by rail to MARS LA TOUR (U65), where they were transferred by depot personnel to trucks and hauled to the depot.

Depot Number 8, at SARRAEBE (Q44), which opened 171200 A December and closed 211000 A December, served XII Corps troops and Army troops in the vicinity. It was closed in anticipation of the opening of another depot on the new front to the north.

In order to better serve units of the VIII Corps refitting in the vicinity, Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (P50), was opened 231200 A December. It remained open throughout the remainder of the month and served III and VIII Corps troops and Army troops in the vicinity.

The base for Class II and IV supply continued to be Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37), operated by the Advance Section Communications Zone. To coordinate delivery of Quartermaster supplies, the Army Quartermaster was represented by a liaison officer who was stationed at the depot.

Because of a shortage of stocks, it was decided to establish American Red Cross, Post Exchange, and office supplies at a single depot centrally located in the Army area. During the month all these types of supplies were moved to Army Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85).

Combat uniforms, wool, olive drab, for officer personnel, received in small quantity at the Class II and IV depot at TOUL (U61), were allocated to division, corps, and Army headquarters and corps and Army troops. They were placed on sale at the officers' sales stores in METZ (U85) and NANCY (U81) and the mobile sales stores serving the corps and divisions.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline situation remained satisfactory throughout the month. The shortage of allied Class III products, which was critical at the beginning of the month, was completely corrected by 17 December. Gasoline receipts totaled 36,553.4 long tons, or 10,577,491 gallons, fifty-five per cent over requests. In the Army area on 1 December were 3,558,056 gallons of V-80 gasoline and on 31 December were 2,789,993 gallons.

On 11 December a change in the method of Class III supply to the Army was inaugurated. The Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), became the base for Class III supplies for the Third U. S. Army. Before this date the Army had submitted the daily telegram through the 24th Regulating Station to the Advance Section Communications Zone for full requirements, including bulk. Beginning on this date, bulk shipments of 1,000 tons were to be shipped automatically to the Army direct from the Communications Zone. No telegram or other request was necessary. Requests for packaged gasoline and allied products required in addition to the bulk allocation were to be placed, beginning on this date, on a daily telegram and submitted directly to Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).

Three decanting points were in operation during the greater part of December. Two, at NANCY (U81) and MANCIEUILLES (U67), operated continuously throughout the month. A third point, at DOMGERMAIN (U50), which closed on 7 December, was reopened on 23 December. Another was established at Supply Point 58, at HABOU DANGE (Q13), on 17 December and operated until 24 December, when the Seventh U. S. Army took over this point. After the change in the tactical situation, the daily receipt and decanting of 1,000 tons of bulk gasoline became too great a responsibility for the Army. As the result of a conference between the Army G-4, Army Quartermaster, and G-4, Advance Section Communications Zone, on 20 December, bulk gasoline shipped to the Army was reduced to 500 net tons daily. Shipments of bulk gasoline, however, continued to arrive spasmodically, which did not allow full utilization of the Army decanting facilities.

From 22 November until 7 December the Advance Section Communications Zone had held 228 cars of packaged gasoline on sidings at LANDRES (U68) in support of the Army. On 7 and 8 December these cars were unloaded at Army supply and reserve points. There was then no mobile reserve until 21 December, when loaded cars were placed at DOMGERMAIN (U50). To eliminate concentration of the mobile Class III reserve held aboard rail cars, it was decided on 23 December to distribute cars to several points. Seven railheads for the storage of this mobile reserve were selected - VALLEROY (U66), PONTROY (U78), GONDRECOURT (U57), MARON (U70), FOUG (U51), DOMGERMAIN (U50), and SORCY (U41) - and the maximum amount to be stored at each point, except DOMGERMAIN (U50), was set at 200,000 gallons. BOULANGE (U78) was chosen as an additional holding point on 30 December.

A loss of Class III supplies by fire resulting from enemy action occurred when Supply Point Number 43B, at MANCIEUILLES (U67), was attacked by enemy aircraft on the night of 22 December. Part of the installation was damaged and decanting operations suspended, but repairs were made and decanting resumed within three days. Losses included 100,000 gallons of gasoline, a quantity of allied products, and 30,000 gasoline cans.


December was the first full month during which coal was issued to all troops. In October and November coal had been issued only to hospitals, to Army, corps, and division headquarters, and to miscellaneous users such as coffee-roasting units, shower installations, and rest centers. It was not until 28 November that coal was available for issue to

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all troops. The Army secured coal from three sources - local French mines, captured enemy stocks, and the Communications Zone. Coal issued during December totaled 8,297 tons, an increase of 241 per cent over the preceding month. A total of 6,141 tons was received from the Advance Section Communications Zone, a decrease of twenty-nine per cent from the preceding month. This indicated an increase in the use of captured and indigenous coal. Increased consumption of coal, however, beginning about 23 December, reduced the coal stocks in the Army area to approximately 4,000 tons by 31 December. The sharp increase in consumption of coal reflected the change in the direction of the Third U. S. Army advance to the north where climatic conditions were colder, and also the sudden increase of the troop strength of the Army.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

Arrangements were made with the Signal Section, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, to photograph unknown American soldiers whose remains were in such condition as to make photographs useful in establishing identity. On 10 December, for the first time in the campaign, photography was used to help identify unknown soldiers.



The Army railhead and decanting point at MANCIEULLES (U67), which had opened on 11 November, was in operation throughout December. The Advance Section Communications Zone constructed at this point a gasoline bulk storage and decanting tank, with a capacity of 210,000 gallons, the project being completed on 4 December. Gasoline was pumped from tank cars into this tank and then decanted by gravity into cans on the rail siding. From here the packaged gasoline was transported by rail to Army supply points.



Toward the end of the month the processing of American bodies at the cemeteries was hindered because German bodies clothed in American uniforms and having American identification tags were being received. Photography was very helpful in this situation, for photographs of suspected bodies could be sent to the units to which the soldiers were supposedly assigned, making positive identification much easier. Fingerprinting was also valuable in establishing the identity of these bodies.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at ANDILLY (U61) was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone at 090800 A December. This cemetery had closed for American burials on 5 November, but remained open for Allied burials.

Cold weather and snow delayed graves registration operations. The heavy snowfall especially hindered the recovery of bodies, as it was difficult to search the battle area. More labor was needed at the cemeteries as a result of the longer time required to dig graves in the frozen earth.

The status of all graves registration supplies, except for embossing plates, was satisfactory. A thirty-day supply, based on 5,000 burials per month, for the Army Graves Registration Service was stocked at Army Class II and IV depots.

Because of the changes in the tactical situation, cemeteries had to be opened in the new zone of operations. The following openings and closings of cemeteries reflected the shift to a new front:

The German Military Cemetery at ANDILLY (U61) closed at 200800 A December and was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone at 220800 A December. A total of 4,838 enemy burials had been made at this cemetery since its opening on 12 September.

German Military Cemetery Number 1 at DORVILLER (Q15) opened at 200800 A December, closed at 230800 A December, and was turned over to the Seventh U. S. Army at 240800 A December. Twenty-two enemy burials were made in this cemetery.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at LIMEX (U62) closed at 300800 A December and was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone at 310800 A December. A total of 5,611 American burials had been made at this cemetery since its opening on 5 November.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at GRAND FAILLY (U39) and an adjacent German cemetery opened at 230800 A December.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at HAMM, Luxembourg (P81), and an adjacent German cemetery opened at 290800 A December.

During December 4,924 burials were made, of which 3,021 were American, one was Allied, and 1,902 were enemy. Of the American dead, twenty-five were unknown, eight-tenths of one per cent.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 December:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	4
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	7
QM Bakery Company, Special	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	4
QM Gasoline Supply Company	9
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	6 1/2
QM Railhead Company	7
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	26
QM Service Detachment	1
(Petroleum Products Laboratory)	
(Mobile Detachment)	

After the VIII Corps came under the control of the Third U. S. Army, the following units, formerly with the First U. S. Army, were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army:

Hq & Hq Det, 588th QM Battalion, Mobile
571st QM Railhead Company
200th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3816th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3042d QM Graves Registration Company
3062d QM Bakery Company, Special
598th QM Laundry Company, Semimobile
972d QM Service Company
3218th QM Service Company

The number of laundry and fumigation and bath companies in support of the Army throughout the campaign had been short of requirements. In order to fulfill adequately all requirements for the Army at its current strength, ten laundry companies and six fumigation and bath companies could have been utilized.




In addition to mobile officers' sales stores operating in divisional areas, stationary stores for officers' and nurses' clothing were maintained at Class II and IV depots and in various strategically located cities. During December officers' stores were located at Depot Number 6, at TOUL (U61), until 9 December, at Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), beginning on 11 December, and in NANCY (U81) throughout the month; and a nurses' store was located at Depot Number 6.



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A SERIES OF PICTURES SHOWING LAUNDRY OPERATIONS



The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the 250th Quartermaster Depot Company, Supply, for meritorious service between 17 July 1944 and 31 October 1944. The award was published in General Orders Number 102, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 3 December 1944. This unit established the First Third U. S. Army Quartermaster Class II and IV depot on the Continent.

The following Quartermaster units which supported the Third U. S. Army early in the campaign were commended by the Army Commander for outstanding performance of duty and high efficiency during the periods indicated:

3631st QM Tank Truck Company (750 Gallon)
1 August 1944 to 12 September 1944

4003d QM Tank Truck Company (750 Gallon)
2 August 1944 to 12 September 1944

Operating day and night without regular rest or regular meals, the men of these units delivered more than 2,600,000 gallons of gasoline during the period named and traveled approximately 775,000 vehicular miles. The commendation was published in General Orders Number 110, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 16 December 1944.

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment had operated in METZ (U85) since 22 November. Among the huge quantities of captured German supplies which it located and collected in METZ (U85) was a large amount of bridge equipment and other Engineer supplies found at a German warehouse at ARS SUR MOSELLE (U75). These supplies were released to Army Engineer Section representatives.

The petroleum products laboratory began to make more frequent tests of incoming shipments of gasoline and allied products at all Army supply points. Recent tests had determined that in some instances water and other foreign elements were present in petroleum containers.

Despite the cold weather and the fact that the change of the Third U. S. Army front required the movement of all bath installations, during the month 118,857 men were bathed. Divisional troops had first priority on bath service. Fortunately, it was possible, in almost every case, to locate bath installations in the forward area under cover in buildings which could be readily heated. The exchange of underclothing continued at all points.

The normal procedure at bath points was to issue clean clothing to bathers after bathing. Soiled clothing would be laundered, fumigated, sized, and subsequently reissued. Sufficient stocks of insecticide powder, delousing, had become available to permit its use at all bath points. By the direct application of the powder to bathers and to their clothing, considerably less time and effort were required. As a result, fumigation chambers at bathing points were no longer required. All fumigation chambers, except two per company, which were used at the salvage points, were returned to the Communications Zone.

Early in the month a standardization of tentage was made, and extra equipment was provided for all fumigation and bath companies. Each platoon was issued six squad tents in lieu of storage tents, two booster pumps, and an additional 200 feet of hose. Tent stoves for heating the dressing tents had been issued previously.



Maintenance of shower bath units became a problem. This was especially true of two fumigation and bath companies equipped with obsolete and non-standard units. Parts for these particular units were not available and considerable improvisation was necessary to keep them in operation. Spare parts for bath units were, generally, in critical supply.

Frequent requests were received from troop units for additional laundry service. Only six and one-quarter companies (fifty sections) were available and were employed as follows:

- Fifteen sections to Medical installations.
- Twenty-four sections to troops.
- Eleven sections to Quartermaster salvage installations.

The majority of laundry units had operated throughout the campaign without serious maintenance difficulties; however, the short supply of spare parts and operating supplies, though improved, had been a handicap to operations and proper maintenance of laundries. During December, generators from five power plants were repaired by local civilian concerns. Nevertheless, laundries, operating at almost full capacity, processed 3,646,214 pounds during the month.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The policy of maintaining a complete salvage repair set-up in close support of each corps was continued. Each of these installations included one salvage repair company, one salvage collecting company, three sections of a laundry company, and fumigation facilities consisting of two fumigation chambers. Considerable difficulty was encountered in finding locations with suitable cover and hard standing for such installations and yet in close proximity to a source of water necessary for the laundry operations.

Salvage collecting points operated by small detachments from the salvage collecting companies were maintained at each Class I supply point. Salvage brought to these points was separated and sorted into general classifications by these teams. Salvage was evacuated further by returning empty ration trucks or by salvage collecting vehicles to the salvage repair installations, where classification was completed by the remainder of the salvage collection personnel. All repairable articles, within the capability of the repair companies, were fumigated or laundered, then repaired and returned to Army Class II depots for reissue. The salvage collecting personnel, in addition to classification of salvage, assisted in painting helmets and intrenching tools, repairing mess gear, and cleaning overshoes and other equipment.



Throughout the campaign, up to this time, only those items that could not be repaired by Army Quartermaster repair units had been evacuated to the Communications Zone. These had included scrap items classified as Class "X". During this month, however, because of the shift of the Third U. S. Army front and the unprecedented amount of salvage collected, it was necessary to ship a considerable quantity to the rear. Almost twenty-eight per cent of the total salvaged items collected, or 316,091 unclassified items, were shipped to the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Q-180, at REIMS (T37). Of the total of 1,141,049 items collected during the month, 824,958 items were classified. This was an increase of twenty-three per cent over the preceding month. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	524,469
Class C	74,455
Class X	226,034

Items of clothing and equipment amounting to 113,219 were repaired during the month, representing a fifty-five per cent increase over the preceding month. These were delivered either to Class II depots or to bath installations for reissue.

The fumigation of all clothing at salvage repair points was discontinued. The Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, advised that laundering was sufficient to render clothing and equipment clean and sanitary. Fumigation was continued, however, for all items which were not laundered.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams made repairs to the following items:

Fire units	3,185
Heaters, immersion type	55
Lanterns, gasoline	2,988
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	1,769
Typewriters, portable	193
Typewriters, non-portable	171
Pumps, hand	141
Machines, mimeograph	2
Machines, miscellaneous	9

The supply of spare parts for field ranges, one and two-burner stoves, gasoline lanterns, and immersion-type water heaters, which had been unsatisfactory for some time, was considerably improved by the end of the month. Typewriter parts and special tools for repair of noiseless typewriters were particularly critical.

The 2,185 yards of white cloth which had been requisitioned by the Quartermaster Purchasing and Contracting Officer on 24 December from local French civilian sources, were delivered to the 300th Quartermaster Salvage Repair Company. This unit completed approximately 700 improvised snow tunics in less than twenty-four hours, and made immediate delivery to Army Class II and IV Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85). The suits were allocated to the XII and XX Corps for issue to patrols.

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section was with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters throughout the month, at NANCY (U81) until 7 January and at ESCH (F70), in Luxembourg, beginning on that date.

The Army continued its attack to the north against the German salient through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. Contact was made with the First U. S. Army on 15 January in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (P57), Belgium. The direction of the major attack was then shifted to the northeast, north of the MOSELLE River, toward the Siegfried line defenses. Since the tactical situation did not move rapidly, the physical problems confronting the Army Quartermaster were not so great as those which had prevailed during the preceding two months. The more static situation permitted the maintenance of supply points and Quartermaster service installations in close support of the troops. In the area of the current operations the limited road net imposed continued transportation problems, particularly during the latter part of the month, when the advance neared the German border.

Composition of the Army and status of its major units changed frequently during the month. The 17th Airborne Division was attached to the Third U. S. Army on 1 January, remaining assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne). The 94th Infantry Division was assigned to the Army on 6 January. The 9th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division were relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army and assigned to the Fifteenth U. S. Army on 8 January. The 8th and 9th Armored Divisions were attached to the Third U. S. Army for supply and administration on 11 January, but remained assigned to the Fifteenth U. S. Army. The 10th Armored Division passed to the control of the Commanding General, Sixth U. S. Army Group, on 17 January. The 76th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to the Fifteenth U. S. Army and assigned to the Third U. S. Army on 18 January. The 101st Airborne Division was relieved of attachment to the Third U. S. Army and the Twelfth U. S. Army Group and attached to the Sixth U. S. Army Group, remaining assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne), on 20 January. The 35th Infantry Division (less the 134th Regimental Combat Team) passed to the control of the Sixth U. S. Army Group on 22 January.

The following were the major elements of the Army on 31 January:

III Corps:	6th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division (134th Regimental Combat Team only), 17th Airborne Division, and Corps Troops.
VIII Corps:	11th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 95th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XII Corps:	4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 76th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XI Corps:	26th Infantry Division, 94th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
Army Reserve:	8th Armored Division and 9th Armored Division.

The following table shows the total number of troops the Army had the responsibility of supplying at the beginning and the end of the month:

	1 JANUARY	31 JANUARY
Assigned Strength of the Army	353,655	362,937
Advance Section Communications Zone Units	25,336	27,305
Ninth Air Force Units	37,033	23,755
French Units	2,271	3,179
Miscellaneous Troops	2,344	4,225
TOTAL	420,639	418,501

In addition there were considerable and varying numbers of prisoners of war, civilian laborers, and civilian mine technicians who were supplied with rations.

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Approximately 9,000 square yards of felt material were requisitioned by the Quartermaster Purchasing and Contracting Officer from a local French civilian source. This material was used for making insoles for shoe pacs. To replace broken pick handles at the Army cemeteries, 1,200 were requisitioned from a local source.

During January the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to seven officers and eighteen enlisted men of Quartermaster units by General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation in the Army remained generally satisfactory. Several Class II and IV items were still critically short, but others that had been on the critical list were received in sufficient quantity during the month. Shortages that had occurred in general were not such that they hampered operations. The solid-fuel shortage was serious, but had improved considerably by the end of the month.

As a result of the change in the tactical situation and the consequent change in Army boundaries, shifts in supply installations were made. Class I Supply Point Number 51, at CHAMPIGNEUILLES (U81), and Class III Supply Point Number 50, at NANCY (U81), were turned over to the Seventh U. S. Army on 23 and 27 January, respectively. The Third U. S. Army, however, continued to supply these points through daily telegram requests for stockage of the Class I supply point including 31 January and the Class III supply point through 2 February. Class II and IV Depot Number 6, at TOUL (U61), was closed, although it remained as a reconignment point until its supplies could be moved to depots to the north. Gasoline decanting was discontinued at NANCY (U81) and at DOM-GERMAIN (U50). After the change of the Army's southern boundary all the above installations were in the Seventh U. S. Army area.

Because of the tactical situation on the front of the XI Corps early in the month, Class I and Class III Supply Points Number 65, at FREISTROFF (Q07) and at PIBLANGE (Q07), were somewhat critically located. Stocks at those points were held down to a one-day supply. Stock levels at Class II and IV Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), also were reduced. Before the end of the month, however, the improved tactical situation permitted unrestricted operation at these installations.

All classes of Quartermaster supplies were requested by and delivered to the Army under the same system that had been in effect during December. The great majority of the supplies were transported to Army supply points by railway direct from the Communications Zone. No Quartermaster supplies were received in the Army area by airplane, and only approximately one-third of the Class II and IV supplies arrived by truck transport.

With the completion of a railroad bridge over the MOSELLE River at THIONVILLE (U88) on 3 January, rail facilities were available to all Class I and Class III supply points. The Class II and IV Depot at METZ (U85), Number 7, could not be reached by train; consequently, supply trains for that point were dispatched to MARS LA TOUR (U65) and HAGONDANGE (U87), from which Army trucks transported the supplies to the depot. Every effort was made to insure maximum use of existing operating railroad facilities to serve Quartermaster supply installations. During the latter part of the month, however, it became necessary to use more truck transport to supply newly established supply points in northern Luxembourg and eastern Belgium.

In continuance of the policy of maintaining a mobile reserve of rations and gasoline to support the attack against the German salient established in December, a considerable quantity was held aboard railway cars. Mobile reserve holding points were established along the MEUSE River to the north of VERDUN (U26), including the following points: DUN (U19), MOUZON (P01), SAULMORY (U19), CARIGNAN (P11), MARGUT (P01), and STENAY (P10). Other holding points west of the MOSELLE River and north of METZ (U85) were established at FONTROY (U78), BOULANGE (U78), AUMETZ (U79), and VALLEROY (U66).

Later in the month a rail-car shortage developed in the Communications Zone, as the result of which the greater part of the reserves were unloaded.

The Army Quartermaster Operations Division continued to function at the Class I and Class III railroad and regulating points. Points in operation during the month included BRIEY (U77) and LONGWY (P50). The Operations Officer was located at LONGWY (P50), through which point practically all Quartermaster Class I and Class III supplies were routed. BASTOGNE (P55) became a rail forwarding point on 30 January.

The Army Quartermaster supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex Number 6 to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply was very satisfactory during January. Total receipts for the month were 36,138.5 long tons and total issues were 34,800.4 long tons, or 15,399,831 rations, an average daily issue of 496,769. Army units received eighty-four and six-tenths per cent of the

issues and units attached for rations received fifteen and four-tenths per cent. Eighty-four and four-tenths per cent of the month's issues were "A"-type (or "B"-type) rations; six and five-tenths per cent were "10-in-1"-type; three and nine-tenths per cent were "C"-type; and five and two-tenths per cent were "K"-type. Rations on hand in the Army area at the beginning of the month totaled 1,134,964, and at the end of the month, 1,393,090. An additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).

A shortage of "K"-type rations had developed during the last week of December. Since 11 December the issue of this ration to combat troops had been restricted to fifty per cent of the operational-type rations requested, but on 22 January an increase in receipts permitted the lifting of this restriction. Issues, however, were still limited to combat troops.

Following instructions from the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, a change in the designation of "B"-type rations went into effect. The ration containing fresh meats and vegetables which was currently being issued daily was designated as the "A"-type ration instead of the "B"-type. Perishable components were being issued regularly as substitutes for canned components of the "B"-type ration. The designation of the "B"-type ration held as reserve, having canned-meat components, was not changed.

Condiment issues heretofore had been made semi-monthly, on the first and fifteenth. This basis having proved inadequate, it was arranged to make three issues per month, on the seventh, seventeenth, and twenty-seventh.

Gratuitous issues of toilet articles, candy, and cigarettes were generally satisfactory. Razors and razor blades, however, were in short supply. Effective with the issue on 28 January, the allotment of cigarettes was seven packages per man per week instead of five packages.

During the first part of the month fresh meat and butter were in short supply, because of delays in the arrival of reefer vessels from the United States. This situation was relieved during the latter part of the month; but weekly issues on the basis of ten meals per week, authorized by the Communications Zone, were not possible.

Fresh oranges, shelled eggs, and fresh vegetables were issued on several occasions during January. Losses due to freezing were not considerable, because of the extra precautions taken.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The Class II and IV supply situation was generally favorable; however, the abrupt increase in troop strength that had occurred during the preceding month and the larger number of battle losses needing replacement still affected this class of supply. Clothing and equipment received during January totaled 5,973.75 long tons, an average of 192.7 long tons per day. On 31 January 4,707.5 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots, an increase of sixty-eight per cent over 31 December. Requisitions processed totaled 12,975, an average of 419 per day, twenty-six per cent more than in December.

Several items that had long been seriously short were removed from the critical list. Sufficient gasoline lanterns, canteen cups, and field jackets were received to meet most demands. With the issue of shoe pacs the overall footwear situation in all units was considered very satisfactory. Overshoes had been short in supply in sizes eleven and above prior to this time. Cleaning and preserving materials remained critically short. Among the principal items in short supply at the end of the month were ordinary issue soap, tufted brushes, scrubbing brushes, corrugated cans, one-burner stoves, office supplies and equipment, and barber kits.

Seven hundred tons of special winter clothing for the Army were delivered by Communications Zone trucks and trains to Army Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (P50). The shipment consisted of shoe pacs, insoles, arctic and ski socks, ponchos, trigger-finger shell mittens, trigger-finger insert mittens, wool mufflers, cotton field caps, cotton trousers, and trouser suspenders. The items were allocated to combat units and no maintenance stocks were retained in Army depots. Infantry divisions each received 6,600 pairs of shoe pacs and armored divisions, 4,000 pairs. Each pair of shoe pacs was issued with two pairs of insoles and two pairs of socks, either arctic or ski. In anticipation of calls for replacement of insoles, a large quantity of felt was purchased in the local markets.

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A schedule was arranged for units to draw supplies at Army Class II and IV depots and published in Administrative Order Number 25, this headquarters, dated 5 January. Units were to be served only at designated depots and on days assigned. Requisitions were to be submitted on an assigned day for the troops concerned, and issues were to be made on the next assigned day.

A difficult supply problem was the equipping of reinforcements and casualties coming into the Army area. This task necessitated almost a complete initial issue of individual equipment. Since stock levels in the depots were based on maintenance factors only, a heavy burden was placed on the Army Class II and IV supply. At a conference at the Office of the Chief Quartermaster on 29 January, a new procedure for the Class II and IV supply of the 17th Reinforcement Depot was developed. Under this system the 17th Reinforcement Depot would submit to the Army Quartermaster twenty-day requisitions for full requirements of all Quartermaster Class II and IV items, and the Army Quartermaster, after indicating the destination desired for the supplies, would forward the requisitions to the Communications Zone. Reinforcement requisitions were not to be consolidated with the Army periodic maintenance requisitions. This plan would go into effect after the current requisition period.

Depot Number 6, near TOUL (U61), which had opened on 20 September, closed for issues at 121800 A January, but continued to operate as a storage and reconsignment point until its supplies could be moved.

Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), remained in operation throughout the month and served the troops of XII and XI Corps and Army troops in the vicinity.

Depot Number 7A, near CONPLANS (U66), opened on 12 January as a storage depot and remained in operation throughout the remainder of the month. Clothing and equipment over immediate requirements for issues to the troops being served at Depot Number 7 were shipped there because of the prevailing tactical situation.

Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (P50), remained in operation throughout the month. It served the troops of III and VIII Corps and Army troops in the vicinity. Owing to the lack of suitable buildings, this depot operated in the open, exposed to severe winter conditions. Although handicapped by weather and transportation difficulties, this depot functioned with high efficiency. It was through Depot Number 9 that the battle losses of the VIII Corps, which resulted from the German breakthrough, were replaced and maintenance furnished to a large percentage of the troops engaged in the BASTOGNE (P55) area.



OPEN STORAGE AT DEPOT NUMBER 9, LONGWY, FRANCE

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The gasoline supply situation was favorable during January. V-80 gasoline received totaled 14,299,524 gallons, seventy-six per cent over requests. Issues of V-80 were 14,230,799 gallons, an average of 459,058 gallons per day, the highest of the campaign up to that time. In the Army area on 1 January were 3,247,876 gallons of V-80 gasoline and on 31 January were 2,598,006 gallons.

The gasoline decanting point at MANGIEULLES (U67) operated continuously throughout the month. The point at NANCY (U81) closed and a new point opened at STENAY (P10) on 6 January, remaining open until 31 January. Decanting at DOMGERMAIN (U50) ended on 25 January. The Advance Section Communications Zone was continuing the plan to ship 500 tons of bulk gasoline daily to the Army, but shipments did not arrive regularly.

Because of the cold weather, V-80 gasoline, which throughout the campaign had been used in artillery liaison planes as a substitute for 73-octane aviation fuel, became unsatisfactory for that purpose. Stocks of the 73-octane gasoline were non-existent on the Continent. White gasoline was tested by the Petroleum Products Laboratory, but was found unfit for use in the engines of these planes. Information was received from the Communications Zone on 16 January that 204 tons of 73-octane gasoline were shipped from ROUEN (M21) to CHARLEBOI (J60) on 15 January, and later information was that this was to be allocated by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. In the future 250,000 gallons per month were to be shipped to the Continent by air lift, turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone, and then shipped as allocated by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group. Although repeated attempts to procure this item had been made, none had been received by the end of the month.

The coal supply situation at the beginning of the month was critical. An increase in the consumption of coal, resulting from the increased strength of the Army and from the colder weather encountered in the Army area of operations, had depleted the coal reserve. Issues were being made directly from receipts. On 14 January coal supply points were notified to reduce the coal ration from four to two pounds per man per day. Army and corps headquarters were requested to reduce coal consumption by fifty per cent. The supply for hospitals, however, remained unchanged.

Several measures were employed to remedy the coal situation. The cooperation of Civil Affairs Detachments was secured. They reported to the Class III Section all coal supplies discovered. A representative of the Section went to NANCY (U81) and the vicinity to negotiate for coal and coke in that area. Reports indicated that a sufficient quantity of coal for the Army's needs was in the mining area, but that power to move it was inadequate and that other supplies had a higher priority. On 21 January one officer and two enlisted men of the Quartermaster Section and three enlisted men from a gasoline supply company departed for DOUAI (H60), located in a mining region of France, to expedite shipments of coal to the Army. This mission, although attended by considerable adventure and negotiations, accomplished its purpose. By the end of the month, the coal situation was less critical than it had been. All coal supply points had one day's supply on hand. During the month 16,925 tons of coal and coke were obtained for issue, of which 11,260 tons were from local civilian sources and 5,665 tons were from the Communications Zone.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

A form letter, "Location of Remains of -----", had been devised to aid in locating the bodies of deceased personnel buried in isolated graves. Numerous isolated burials were located by this means, and the remains disinterred and reburied in American military cemeteries.

When the 101st Airborne Division was isolated in BASTOGNE (P55), 176 American dead were buried in the civilian cemetery at that place. The 3042d Quartermaster Graves Registration Company disinterred all these bodies and reburied them in U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at GRAND FAILLY (U39).

No cemeteries opened or closed during the month. Two American cemeteries, at GRAND FAILLY (U39) and at HAMM (P81), Luxembourg, and adjacent German cemeteries at each place were in operation throughout the month.

During January 6,597 burials were made, of which 4,254 were American, seventeen were Allied, and 2,326 were enemy. Of the American dead, twenty were unknown, less than one-half of one per cent.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 January:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	8
QM Bakery Company, Special	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	64
QM Railroad Company	6
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	26
QM Service Detachment	1
(Petroleum Products Laboratory)	
(Mobile Detachment)	

The following Quartermaster units were attached to the Sixth U. S. Army Group, for duty with the Seventh U. S. Army on a temporary basis:

Hq & Hq Det, 91st QM Battalion, Mobile
303d QM Railroad Company
3933d QM Gasoline Supply Company
3936th QM Gasoline Supply Company
959th QM Service Company
4130th QM Service Company

The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the following units by General Orders, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, for service between the dates indicated:

485th QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	10 August 1944 to 13 October 1944
955th QM Service Company	16 October 1944 to 17 December 1944
3208th QM Service Company	1 August 1944 to 31 September 1944
3215th QM Service Company	6 October 1944 to 7 December 1944

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

Bath installations operated in the forward areas to insure maximum service to divisional troops. Men bathed during the month totaled 182,647, an increase of fifty-four per cent over December. This increase was due largely to the more static tactical situation. The exchange of underclothing continued at all shower points.

Laundry processed during the month aggregated 4,429,100 pounds, an increase of twenty-one per cent over the preceding month.



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CHAPTER 9 FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section was with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters throughout the month, at ESCH-ALZETTE (P70), in Luxembourg, until 6 February and at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81) beginning on that date.

The major offensive continued in the sector north of the MOSELLE River to the east through the Siegfried Line defenses. PRUM (107), Germany, fell to troops of the VIII Corps on 12 February; and BITBURG (L15), Germany, was captured later in the month by troops of the XII Corps. A secondary drive in the XI Corps sector between the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers toward TRIER (L22) had gained considerable headway by the end of the month. The tactical operations throughout the month were such that Quartermaster activities were normal and no difficulties, except for problems of transportation, were experienced. Warmer weather, causing the snow and ice to melt, and the heavy military traffic on the existing limited road net resulted in extremely bad road conditions, which adversely affected truck transport, particularly in the VIII Corps zone. Despite impaired transportation facilities, however, it was possible to maintain adequately at all times supply points in the forward areas.

Frequent changes occurred in the composition of the Army during the month. Reassignment to other commands resulted in a decrease of one corps headquarters, three divisions, and one regimental combat team. The 134th Regimental Combat Team of the 35th Infantry Division was relieved from attachment to the III Corps and the entire division was assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army. The 8th Armored Division was relieved from attachment to the Third U. S. Army. (It was relieved from assignment to the Fifteenth U. S. Army and assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army.) The 95th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army and assigned to the Ninth U. S. Army. The 17th Airborne Division was relieved from attachment to the Third U. S. Army and the Twelfth U. S. Army Group and attached to the First Allied Airborne Army (U. S. Increment), remaining assigned to the XVIII Corps (Airborne). Headquarters III Corps was relieved from assignment to the Third U. S. Army on 11 February and assigned to the First U. S. Army. The 10th Armored Division was relieved of attachment to the Sixth U. S. Army Group, remaining assigned to the Third U. S. Army; and the 9th Armored Division was relieved of attachment to the Third U. S. Army, relieved of assignment to the Fifteenth U. S. Army, and assigned to the First U. S. Army.

The following were the major units of the Army on 28 February:

VIII Corps: 6th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 76th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 10th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 94th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The following table shows the total number of troops the Army had the responsibility of supplying at the beginning and the end of the month:

	1 FEBRUARY	28 FEBRUARY
Assigned Strength of the Army	353,635	304,348
Advance Section Communications Zone Units	25,864	24,058
Ninth Air Force Units	27,290	27,158
French Units	1,774	2,514
Miscellaneous Troops	2,871	1,920
TOTAL	411,454	359,998

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

During February the Legion of Merit, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services, was awarded to one officer of the Quartermaster Section through General Orders published by Headquarters European Theater of Operations; and the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to seven officers and six enlisted men of Quartermaster units through General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army.

An enemy shell of an unidentified type landed in the area of the semi-mobile laundry operated by the 1st Section, 4th Platoon, of the 452d Quartermaster Laundry Company, located with the 104th Evacuation Hospital in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P81), at 121910 A January. The shell did considerable damage to two mobile laundry vans, which were replaced, and one tractor, which was repaired. Seven men were injured, three seriously.

The supply of spare parts for Quartermaster general and special purpose equipment, although improved, was not entirely satisfactory. Replacement parts, particularly for bath units, continued to be critical. Nearly all equipment had received long, hard usage and maintenance was becoming an increasing problem.

Because of a change in Army boundaries, the Captured Enemy Material Depot at NANCY (U81) was closed and the supplies moved to the Captured Enemy Material Depot at METZ (U85).

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION


Again this month, as in December, it was found impossible to classify all of the huge amount of salvage collected. Of the 1,473,269 items collected during the month, however, 1,432,269 were classified, an increase of seventy-four per cent over the preceding month, and only 41,000 were shipped without classification directly to the Communications Zone. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	707,221
Class C	111,797
Class X	613,251

Salvage repair companies repaired 69,804 items of clothing and equipment during the month. These were delivered either to Army Class II and IV depots or to bath installations for reissue.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams continued operations at base shops located at the Class II and IV depots, and at salvage repair points. During the month repairs were made to the following special purpose items:

Fire units	2,813
Heaters, water, immersion type	100
Lanterns, gasoline	2,387
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	2,133
Typewriters, portable	210
Typewriters, non-portable	249
Pumps, hand	117
Machines, mimeograph	6
Machines, miscellaneous	7



INTERIOR OF MOBILE TYPEWRITER REPAIR VAN

The following supplies, formerly handled by the Quartermaster Class II and IV depots, were turned over to field-range-repair units for stocking and issuing:

Parts for gasoline lanterns
 Parts for one and two-burner stoves
 Parts for fire units for field ranges, M-1937
 Parts for immersion-type water heaters

Salvage repair units were responsible for stocking and issuing tent-patching cement and material.

In addition to the normal repair operations, all Quartermaster salvage repair units assisted in the manufacture of special items, including 3,198 snow-camouflage suits and a large number of felt insoles for shoe pads, and the modification of 15,000 identification panels for the Army Signal Officer.


SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The general supply status remained sound during the month. The shortages of both solid fuel and 73-octane gasoline were relieved. The supply of clothing and equipment improved steadily and the critical list of Class II and IV items was further reduced.

A new supply procedure for the Continent went into effect during February. This plan was set forth in Standing Operating Procedure Number 7, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, dated 2 February. Armies were to be supplied from advance depots through daily telegrams and requisitions submitted to regulating stations. For Class I and Class III supplies daily telegrams would be submitted by each army to the appropriate regulating station, which would forward them to the designated issuing depot. For Class II and IV supplies twenty-day requisitions would be sent to the regulating station and forwarded from there to the issuing depot. The depot was to be responsible for shipping requirements through the appropriate regulating station to the army. The regulating stations were to expedite and maintain, by close coordination with the issue depots and the armies, the flow of supplies to the rail-heads and supply points designated by the armies within their areas. Essentially the new procedure placed more responsibility on the regulating stations.

The above procedure had previously been in effect for Class I and Class III supply in the Third U. S. Army, but it was a change from the former Class II and IV procedure of submitting requisitions directly to a designated depot. The first requisition under the new system was for the period from 21 February to 10 March.


The method of supply to the Army from the rear continued to approach more nearly the procedure as outlined in field manuals. Practically all supplies came into the Army area by rail, although a considerable quantity of Class II and IV items arrived by truck and a very small portion of all classes came by air lift. The base for Class I and Class III supplies was the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number Q-178, at VERDUN (U26); for Class II and IV, the Communications Zone Depot Number Q-180, at REIMS (T37). The Army service area remained relatively constant in size throughout the period, being roughly from ten to fifteen miles deep and eighty-five miles wide. Generally two or three Class I and Class III supply points in this area served Army troops. From the corps rear boundary to the front lines the distance was approximately twenty-five miles.



CLASS I SUPPLY POINT NUMBER 80 AT BLEIALF - THE FIRST IN GERMANY

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AIR SUPPLY TO CLASS I SUPPLY POINT NUMBER 80

The VIII Corps zone, on the north flank, averaged from twenty to twenty-five miles in width. Upon the release of the III Corps to the First U. S. Army on 11 February, the zones of the two corps were joined under the control of the VIII Corps. In this zone the terrain and the limited road and rail net did not allow ease of movement of supplies. As a result of the thawing weather, some roads became almost impassable after the tenth of the month; and only during the last several days, because of drying weather, did road conditions improve. Railways were used to the greatest extent possible, dependent, of course, on the speed of rehabilitation. A number of rail off-loading points - GOUVY (P77), ETTLEBRUCK (P83), BOURCY (P66), MERSCH (P82), and DIEKIRCH (P84) - were established, where supplies were transferred to Army trucks for transportation to forward supply points. The stocking of Class I Supply Point Number 80, at BLEIALF (P98), and Class III Supply Point Number 80, at WINTERSCHIED (P98), the first supply points in Germany, was particularly difficult because of the road conditions. On three occasions packaged gasoline was dropped by parachute from C47 planes to the Class III point, and one parachute delivery of operational-type rations was made to the Class I point. Because of the near-mountainous terrain, it was necessary to maintain for the VIII Corps more supply points than were normal: Class I points in operation averaged four and Class III points averaged five during the month. These were established from eight to thirty miles to the rear of the front lines.

The zone of operations of the XII Corps, immediately to the south of the VIII Corps, was approximately of the same width as that of the latter corps. Except for the period of thawing weather, when roads were in poor condition, the supply of the XII Corps presented no particular problems. Throughout the month two supply points each for Class I and Class III supplies were maintained for this corps, both approximately fifteen to twenty-five miles from the front. All supply points for this corps were served by rail transportation.



REMOVING "K"-TYPE RATIONS FROM PACK ASSEMBLY

The XX Corps front generally represented the SAAR River line from TRIER (I22) to SAARLAUTERN (Q72) to the Army's southern boundary. Its zone was the largest, averaging from thirty to thirty-five miles in width. For the most part two supply points on rail for Class I and two for Class III supplies were maintained from approximately fifteen to twenty miles to the rear of the front-line troops.

Quartermaster supply points in operation during the month are graphically illustrated in Annex 7 to this report.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply activity proceeded smoothly during February. Ration receipts for the month totaled 12,478,135 and issues totaled 12,636,621, an average of 451,308 per day. Eighty-six and eight-tenths per cent of the issues went to Army units and thirteen and two tenths per cent to unassigned units. Eighty-three and seven-tenths per cent of the month's issues were "A"-type rations and sixteen and three-tenths per cent were operational type. Rations on hand at the end of the month totaled 1,859,995, including the 660,000 operational-type rations held for the Army at the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number Q-178, at VERDUN (U26).



MORE RATIONS VIA PARACHUTE

A War Department circular prohibited the issue of "D"-type rations as a supplement. This type of ration, if ordered on the daily telegram, was to be considered a full ration in lieu of either "A"-type or operational-type rations. It could, however, be substituted for cocoa or tea on the "A" menu.

The "A"-type ration continued to improve and was well received by the troops. During the month forty-one issues of fresh meat, twenty-four issues of fresh butter, and regular issues of fresh potatoes, cabbage, turnips, beets, apples, oranges, shelled eggs, coffee, and bread were made.

Gratuitous issues of the following items were made weekly:

ITEM	UNIT	FACTOR PER 100 INDIVIDUALS
Cigarettes	Package	700
Smoking Tobacco	Package	56
Chewing Tobacco	Each	7
Matches	Each	28,000
Tooth Paste	Each	24.5
Tooth Brushes	Each	10.5
Shaving Cream	Each	56
Razor Blades	Each	305
Razors	Each	3.5
Soap	Bar	98
Gum	Each	700
Candy, hard	Each	700

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The Class II and IV supply status showed steady improvement and with few exceptions the supply of all items was adequate. Receipts of clothing and equipment during February totaled 5,814.0 long tons, an average of 207.6 long tons per day. At the end of the month 7,963 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots, an increase of sixty-nine per cent over 31 January. Requisitions processed totaled 10,615, an average of 379 per day.

Considerable quantities of several seriously needed items arrived during the month. Sufficient numbers of raincoats of all sizes were received to fill demands. Overshoes in large quantity were received, many in the large sizes that had been critically short. Shipments of office supplies, particularly typewriter ribbons, alleviated to a great extent the shortage of these supplies. Expendable items, except steel wool - a large shipment of this item arrived on 25 February - and scrubbing brushes, were on hand in sufficient quantities to meet demands. Items in short supply at the end of the month included barber kits, one and two-burner stoves, and duplicating machines.

A close survey of current requirements was made in the Army and unseasonable or excess items in the Class II and IV depots were returned to Communications Zone depots. Receipts of special winter clothing and equipment had over-taxed the storage facilities of the Army. In this connection the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, was requested to suspend until further notice shipments of such items as shoe pacs and accessories, snow shoes, creepers, and ski poles.

A test was begun of different types of winter combat clothing in the 4th Armored Division and the 26th Infantry Division. The uniform assemblies being tested were the following:

Pile Jacket Uniform. Jacket, field, M1943; jacket, field, pile, olive drab; trousers, field, cotton, olive drab; cap, field, cotton, olive drab, with visor; and trousers, field, wool, olive drab, twenty-ounce.

Wool Jacket Uniform. Jacket, field, M1943; jacket, field, wool (ETO type); trousers, field, cotton, olive drab; cap, cotton, field, olive drab, with visor; and trousers, field, wool, olive drab, twenty-ounce.

Combat Uniform. Helmet, combat, winter; jacket, combat, winter; and trousers, combat, winter. Although these items were not specifically being issued for the test, comments from combat troops wearing this type of uniform were being solicited.

This test was being conducted to determine the relative merit of each type of assembly in regard to such qualities as general suitability for combat, water repellency, wind resistance, warmth and comfort, adaptability to changing climatic conditions, suitability for street wear, adequacy of pocket capacity, and suitability for laundering.

Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), remained in operation throughout the month, serving the troops of the XII and XX Corps and Army troops in the vicinity. Depot Number 9, at LONGWY (P50), which had opened on 23 December, closed on 4 February. Depot Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81), opened on 5 February, serving troops of the III Corps (until 11 February) and XII Corps and Army troops in the vicinity. Depot Number 77, at DEYFELDT (P77), opened on 5 February as an advance supply point for VIII Corps troops. This depot was in effect an advance truckhead for processing requisitions and making delivery of daily shipments received from Depot Number 10.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The Class III supply situation, which had been generally satisfactory since October, was stable and adequate for current operations. Receipts of V-80 gasoline totaled 11,889,105 gallons, an average of 424,611 gallons per day; and issues were 11,846,287 gallons, an average of 423,082 gallons per day. On 1 February 2,666,393 gallons of V-80 gasoline were in the Army area; on 28 February, 2,412,975 gallons.

At the beginning of the month two decanting points were in operation by the Army, at MANCIEULLES (U67) and at LONGLIER (P34), the latter point opening on 1 February. The railhead and decanting point at MANCIEULLES (U67) was turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone on 16 February, and decanting ended at LONGLIER (P34) on 17 February. In accordance with a plan adopted earlier in the month, no further decanting was done by the Army; hereafter decanting operations within the Army area were carried on by the Advance Section Communications Zone pending developments in the tactical situation.

Since the beginning of the campaign, attempts had been made to secure 73-octane aircraft fuel for use in artillery liaison planes. On 15 February the first shipment of 73-octane gasoline arrived at Class III Supply Point Number 69, at BETTEMBOURG (P80). This stock of gasoline, totaling 25,850 gallons, was distributed to supply points in accordance with a suggested percentage allocation prepared by the Artillery Section.

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The solid-fuel situation in the Army improved during the month, not only because of increased shipments from the Communications Zone, but also because of decreased consumption due to warmer weather. Although the shortage of coal and coke, which had existed for several weeks, was relieved, more frequent and regular shipments were needed for complete maintenance and for the building of an Army reserve. By 11 February approximately three days of supply of coal and coke were on hand in the Army. Receipts of coal totaled 10,605 tons, of which 8,487 were from the Communications Zone and 2,118 were from indigenous sources; and issues totaled 9,264 tons. On 28 February 2,059 tons of coal were on hand.

SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

Approximately twenty per cent of the deceased personnel delivered to cemeteries were without identification tags, making the process of identification difficult and uncertain. Instructions on the wearing of identification tags were published in Circular Number 20, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, dated 25 February 1945. It directed that organization commanders insure full compliance with the Army Regulations governing the wearing of identification tags and that lost tags be immediately replaced with a substitute until new tags could be secured.

The melting of the snow revealed many bodies in the BASTOGNE (P55) area that had remained after the retreat of the Germans. Throughout the month graves registration collecting teams continued to search this area. Also, many unburied bodies were still being recovered by collecting teams in the area of METZ (U85) and SAARLAUTERN (Q72).

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at HAMM, Luxembourg (P81), and the adjacent German Military Cemetery remained in operation throughout the month. U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at FOY, Belgium (P56), and an adjacent German cemetery opened on 4 February. The American and German cemeteries at GRAND PAILLY (U39), which had opened on 23 December, closed on 3 February and were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone. Total burials made in the GRAND PAILLY (U39) cemeteries were 2,741 American, eighteen Allied, and 1,443 enemy.

During February 8,265 burials were made, of which 3,699 were American, seventeen were Allied, and 4,549 were enemy. Of the American dead, thirty-seven (one per cent) were unknown. This was the first month since the beginning of operations in which the number of German burials had exceeded the number of American.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 28 February:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	3
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	8
QM Bakery Company, Special	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	64
QM Railhead Company	6
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	23
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1

The following Quartermaster units were released by the Third U. S. Army to other armies:

200th QM Gasoline Supply Company
3877th QM Gasoline Supply Company
374th QM Railhead Company
456th QM Laundry Company (Detachments "C" and "D")
3218th QM Service Company
4404th QM Service Company
4405th QM Service Company

The 3d Platoon, 680th Quartermaster Laundry Company, was loaned to the Army by the Advance Section Communications Zone.

The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the following units by General Orders, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, for service between the dates indicated:

UNIT	DATE
258th QM Railhead Company	16 October 1944 to 22 December 1944
352d QM Railhead Company	24 July 1944 to 22 December 1944
3007th QM Bakery Company, Mobile	3 November 1944 to 3 January 1945
3034th QM Bakery Company, Mobile	6 October 1944 to 26 December 1944

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment was active in the exploitation of enemy stores. A valuable acquisition in SAARLAUTERN (Q72) was a large quantity of office supplies which were critically needed. Usable items of enemy materiel were also removed from FORT DRIANT and FORT JEANNE D'ARC, near METZ (U85). Supplies for which the Army had no need were released to the Advance Section Communications Zone Depot Number Q-178, at VERDUN (U26), which included 916,000 pounds of dunnage, twelve cooking stoves, 207 cans of printers' ink, 100,000 cardboard cartons, and 6,000 pounds of uncut paper.



CAPTURED HEATING AND VENTILATING EQUIPMENT IN ENEMY MATERIEL WAREHOUSE AT METZ

Bath units continued operations in divisional areas. Men bathed during the month totaled 206,401, an increase of thirteen per cent over January and the greatest monthly total since the beginning of the campaign. The exchange of clean underwear and socks for soiled items was continued as a regular procedure.


Laundry units operating in forward areas and at hospitals also achieved a record production figure. Laundry processed during the month totaled 4,929,993 pounds, which was an increase of eleven per cent over the preceding month.

Laundry tests were conducted on samples of new types of winter clothing. As a result of the tests, it was concluded that the sweater, high neck, wool, olive drab; trousers, wool, olive drab, twenty-ounce; and jacket, wool, olive drab, ETC, were unsuitable for laundering and should be dry cleaned. The jacket, field, M1943; trousers, field, cotton; and jacket, field, pile, could be successfully laundered. Results of this study were to be incorporated in the recommendations for the type of winter uniform considered desirable in this theater.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

Of the 1,594,678 items of salvage collected during February, it was possible to classify 1,296,097 items, eighty-ones per cent of the total; and the remaining 298,581 unclassified items were shipped directly to the Communications Zone Depot Number Q-180, at REIMS (T37). Class "X" and unrepairable scrap items were also evacuated to the rear. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	769,542
Class C	151,116
Class X	375,439



CLOTHING REPAIR SECTION

During the month 72,638 items of clothing and equipment were repaired by salvage repair companies and returned to Army supply channels for reissue to troops.

Field range repair units and typewriter repair teams, operating at base shops and salvage repair points, repaired the following items:

Fire units	3,206
Heaters, immersion type	113
Lanterns, gasoline	2,259
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	2,200
Typewriters, portable	307
Typewriters, non-portable	267
Pumps, hand	114
Machines, mimeograph	2
Machines, adding	5
Machines, miscellaneous office	11
TOTAL	8,484

All Quartermaster salvage repair companies were engaged in the manufacture of special items. They had completed a large number of suits for snow camouflage before the manufacture of that item was discontinued about the middle of the month. These units also made felt insoles for shoe pads, money bags, and other miscellaneous items. One company modified a total of 23,253 identification panels for the Army Signal Officer.



SALVAGING FIRE UNIT PARTS

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CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section was with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters at LUXEMBOURG (P81) until 29 March and at TRIER (L22), Germany, after that date.

During the month the tactical operations of the Third U. S. Army progressed with increasing speed. At first the major effort was north of the MOSELLE River. A bridgehead was established across the KYLL River by troops of the XII Corps early on 3 March and another drive by the XI Corps effected the capture of TRIER (L22) on 2 March. From the KYLL River line the advance continued aggressively; the XII Corps and VIII Corps breakthrough resulted in a drive to the RHINE River. The XII Corps then swung south and established a bridgehead across the lower MOSELLE River on 13 March. The advance of this corps continued rapidly; WORMS (M41) was taken on 20 March and MAINZ (M35) was captured on 22 March. COBLENZ (L89) was cleared on 19 March by troops of the VIII Corps.

Meanwhile the XI Corps, attacking from the SAAR River bridgeheads, drove through and met forces of the XII Corps on 20 March, this juncture resulting in the encirclement of large enemy forces south of the MOSELLE.

A bridgehead across the RHINE River was established on the night of 22-23 March. The development to the north and east of this and other crossings had by the end of the month effected further spectacular gains by the Third U. S. Army. By 31 March armored spearheads had crossed the FULDA River and were nearing KASSEL (C20).

As in the month of February, the chief problem of the Army Quartermaster was one of transportation. The relatively warm and dry weather resulted in rapid improvement of road conditions, which had been very bad during the previous month. Dry roads, and also a network of well-paved roads in the large overrun area, particularly south of the MOSELLE and east of the RHINE, favored both tactical and supply operations; however, incident to the fast-moving situation, the long distances imposed transportation problems of no small magnitude. By cooperation and teamwork between the Army and the Advance Section Communications Zone, the essential Quartermaster supplies were transported the long distances from the Army railheads, which were established generally along a north-south line through TRIER (L22) and west of the KYLL and SAAR Rivers, to forward Army supply points.

The composition of the Army changed often during March. By the end of the month the Army had lost the 10th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 94th Infantry Division and gained the 65th Infantry Division, 71st Infantry Division, and 89th Infantry Division. The following were the major units of the Army on 31 March.

VIII Corps: 76th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, 89th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 26th Infantry Division, 71st Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

XX Corps: 6th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 65th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.

The Army had the responsibility of supplying the following troops at the beginning and the end of the month:

	1 MARCH	31 MARCH
Assigned Strength of the Army	304,690	312,205
Communications Zone Units	26,680	18,719
Ninth Air Force Units	29,625	7,793
French Units	1,920	0
Miscellaneous Troops	3,216	431
TOTAL	366,131	339,148

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

During March efforts of the Quartermaster Purchasing and Contracting Officer were particularly devoted to purchasing office supplies and requisitioning facilities for the printing of certain blank forms.


The Legion of Merit, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services, was awarded to one officer of the Quartermaster Section through General Orders published by Headquarters European Theater of Operations; and the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to one officer of the Quartermaster Section and two enlisted men of Quartermaster units through General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army during the month.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The Quartermaster supply situation remained in the generally satisfactory state that had existed during the preceding two months. Adequate stocks of all classes of supplies were on hand in the Army area.

Because of rapid advances, only a few supply points remained situated on operating railway lines. Most points were stocked by truck transport hauling from railheads, which were located at ETTELBRUCK (P85), DIEKIRCH (P84), BLEIALF (P98), WALFERDANGE (P81), WASSERBILIG (L12), and WALDWISSE (Q19). Early in the month the Advance Section Communications Zone began operating railheads in the Army area, taking over the Army railheads at ETTELBRUCK (P85) and DIEKIRCH (P84) on 9 March and later, on 18 March, moving to EHRANG (L23), north of TRIER (L22), after the rail line to that point had been placed in operation. Movement of Class I and Class III supplies from the railheads by truck transport to forward supply points was under the supervision of the Quartermaster Operations Officer. The dispatch of the necessary supply trains required overall coordination and exacted the utmost use of the available truck transportation, both that provided by the Advance Section Communications Zone and Army transport not required for tactical operations.

The chief difficulty in regard to transportation was the rapidly extended supply lines. From TRIER (L22) to the RHINE River the distance was approximately sixty airline miles; and Class III Supply Point Number 109, at HANAU (M87), was approximately forty-five airline miles farther to the east.



ROASTING GREEN COFFEE



GRINDING AND PACKAGING

Priority was given to the rehabilitation of the railroads from the MERZIG (Q29) and TRIER (L22) area to MAINZ (M35) and railway service was scheduled to be in operation early in April. With the inauguration of rail service considerable truck transport could be relieved for use forward and east of the RHINE River, hauling from proposed railheads in the vicinity of MAINZ (M35).

An air lift was arranged and deliveries of considerable quantities of gasoline were made to forward airfields beginning on 30 March. To supervise the receipt of the airlift and to coordinate the distribution of supplies east of the river, the Army Quartermaster Operations Officer moved to the RHINE River crossing area. In view of limited bridge facilities at the RHINE River crossing and the extended supply lines, the air deliveries of gasoline were timely and materially assisted in stocking forward supply points.

The fast-moving tactical situation was reflected in the shift of supply points to the east. On 1 March only two Class I and one Class III points were located in Germany, and on 26 March all Class I and Class III points were in Germany. On 28 March the first supply points opened to the east of the RHINE River, Class I and Class III Number 108, at GROSS GERAU (M54) and in the vicinity of DARMSTADT (M64), respectively; on 31 March two more points, one for each class of supply, opened across the river.

Annex Number 8 shows the Quartermaster supply points in operation during March.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Class I supply again functioned efficiently during March. The following table gives pertinent statistics on Class I activity:

Receipts for Month	14,929,459	Rations
Issues for Month	14,199,255	Rations
Average Daily Issue	458,040	Rations
Issues to Army Units		89.7 Per Cent
Issues to Unassigned Units		10.3 Per Cent
Issues of "A"-Type Rations		69.7 Per Cent
Issues of Operational-Type Rations		30.3 Per Cent
On Hand at End of Month	1,995,360	

Because of the speed of the advance, it was not feasible to issue "A"-type rations to combat troops. Effective with the arrival of shipments on 28 March, no "A"-type rations were delivered to supply points other than Number 94, at TRIER (L22). Operational-type rations issued were supplemented with fresh bread, coffee, milk, and sugar; and by authorization of the European Theater of Operations, one-half of one fresh meat meal daily was issued as a supplement with "C" and "K" rations. The record-breaking capture of prisoners was reflected in heavy issues of "C"-type rations.

The demand by combat troops for "K"-type rations became very heavy during March. In order to conserve this type of ration, it was directed that issues be limited to the following maximum per cents of the total operational-type rations issued:

UNITS	PER CENT
Non-Combat Units	25
Hospitals	50
Combat Units	100

During March issues of fresh meat and butter were made frequently. The following issues were made from Army supply points:

TYPE	NUMBER OF ISSUES	FACTOR PER 100 MEN
Beef, Roasting and Frying	6	45 pounds
Beef, Boiling and Stewing	8	35 pounds
Beef, Ground	7	30 pounds
Fork, Boneless	5	42 pounds
Ham, Smoked	1	45 pounds
Chicken	6	60 pounds
Gold Cuts (Salami and Bologna)	2	14 pounds
Frankfurters	6	30 pounds
TOTAL	41	

Butter

All condiment items had been extremely critical at various times throughout the entire campaign. For about two months, during December and January, no shipments had been received; and reduced shipments had arrived since that time. Local contracts for procurement in Europe had not been successful. Issues during the latter part of March were complete, however, and it was anticipated that future requirements would be met.

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SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The supply of Quartermaster Class II and IV items continued to be generally satisfactory. Total receipts of clothing and equipment during March were 2,862.9 long tons, less than half the receipts in February. This decrease was due to the large stocks on hand in the Army depots and also reduced requirements for winter clothing and equipment. Requisitions processed totaled 11,784. At the end of the month 4,874 long tons of supplies were on hand in the depots.


The list of critical shortages was further reduced. At the end of the month items short in supply included barber kits, twenty-four and thirty-two gallon corrugated nesting cans, one-burner stoves, wire-staple machines, tufted brushes, and duplicating machines.

A major problem of the month was moving Class II and IV supply facilities forward to serve front-line troops. Originally it was planned to open a depot at TRIER (L22); but because of the rapid advances of the Army, it was decided to establish a depot farther forward. In the meantime Class II and IV supplies that had been consigned to TRIER (L22) were unloaded and held temporarily at that point. A site for Supply Point Number 11 was chosen in the vicinity of BAD KREUZNACH (M03), but the opening of the depot was delayed because of the unavailability of truck transportation for the transfer of supplies from the TRIER (L22) off-loading point. Pending the opening of the depot, this new installation served as an advance supply point for forward combat troops, where requisitions were processed and delivery made by Army trucks from the railhead at TRIER (L22) or from Depot Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81). The establishing of advance points for processing requisitions and making delivery of supplies was found to be a workable method of supplying forward troops with clothing and equipment. The following advance supply points, all at Class I points, also were in operation during various periods:

NUMBER	LOCATION	OPENED	CLOSED
77	DETFELDT (F77)	050800 A February	071200 A March
80	BLEIALF (F98)	070800 A March	101200 A March
89	PERL (G09)	010800 A March	181800 A March
96	MULLENBORN (L18)	100800 A March	121800 A March
98	KELBURG (L48)	120800 A March	251800 A March



Depot Number 7, at METZ (U85), which had opened on 8 December, closed on 18 March; and Depot Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81), was open throughout the month.

A test of three types of winter combat clothing had been conducted in the 4th Armored Division and 26th Infantry Division from 10 February to 25 February. A report based on observations in these divisions was made to the Twelfth U. S. Army Group, recommending a uniform including a jacket, combat, winter (modified); jacket, field, wool, olive drab (Class A uniform); trousers, field, wool, twenty-four to twenty-six ounces; trousers, combat, winter (modified); and helmet, combat, winter (modified). It was further recommended that the trend be toward simplification of the combat uniform, a reduction in the number of composite items, less weight, and more warmth, durability, water repellency, and wind resistance.



The Army Quartermaster and the Class II and IV Officer attended a conference held at the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, from 17 to 19 March, on the subject of winter-clothing requirements for 1945-1946. In attendance were representatives of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington, D. C., and of all U. S. Army groups and armies on the Continent. At this, the second such meeting, various items of winter clothing and equipment were discussed, the results of certain tests reviewed, and final recommendations made to the War Department. The following items were recommended for the winter combat uniform:

- Jacket, field, M1943
- Jacket, field, pile, olive drab, or jacket, field, wool (ETO type)
(Availability to determine which of these to be issued)
- Shoe pacs (for part of Army strength)
- Overshoes (for part of Army strength not issued shoe pacs)
- Cap, cotton, field
- Trousers, cotton, winter
- Trousers, wool, olive drab, twenty-two ounce



SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

Gasoline and allied products were furnished the troops in adequate quantities to support fully the military operations. Receipts and issues of V-80 gasoline and allied products were higher than in any other month since the beginning of the campaign. The following table presents statistics on V-80 gasoline (in gallons):

Receipts for Month	17,080,580
Issues for Month	16,820,794
Average Daily Issue	542,613
Largest Day's Issue	733,375
On Hand at Beginning of Month	2,223,100
On Hand at End of Month	2,894,041


As the advance developed and supply lines beyond operating railroads became extended, the problem of gasoline supply became increasingly difficult. In order to utilize fully truck transport in the Army for use forward of the railheads, bulk shipments were requested. Most decanting operations in the Army area were carried on under the supervision of the 53d Quartermaster Base Depot, an Advance Section Communications Zone unit, at points at ERDORF (L05), WITTLICH (L35), ARGENTHAL (L95), and WEINSHEIM (M03). When the lines of supply increased in length and transportation became critical, however, the Advance Section Communications Zone began shipments of bulk gasoline by tank truck to forward Army supply points not on operating railway lines, making necessary the resumption of decanting by the Army. Throughout the month continued efforts were made to secure the maximum use of equipment and facilities at hand. A spirit of cooperation existed between the Communications Zone and the Army in endeavoring to provide this vital fuel for the advancing troops.

The delivery of gasoline by airplanes, beginning on 30 March, was opportune and effectively contributed to the support of combat units. The following table shows receipts of V-80 gasoline in gallons at airfields on 30 and 31 March:

AIRFIELD	LOCATION	30 MARCH	31 MARCH
Y-64	OSBER CLM (M34)	162,500	50,000
Y-72	BUTTELBOREN (M54)	5,500	54,000
Y-74	FRANKFURT-ESCHBORN (M57)		96,000
Y-81	ATLERTCHEN (G12)	3,000	
Y-83	LIMBURG (M29)	45,000	235,000
TOTAL		216,000	435,000

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SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

A letter from the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, outlined the following Graves Registration Service policy in regard to deceased German military personnel in occupied Germany:

1. Isolated graves were not to be disturbed unless reburial was made necessary by military operations.

2. Unburied remains were to be buried by local civilian agencies or by graves registration personnel in either established German cemeteries (military or civilian) or German plots established by the U. S. Army. The method was to depend on local conditions.

Quartermaster Graves Registration Division personnel continued to improve in technique in identifying the remains of unknown soldiers. By 2 March the identity of 100 unknowns had been established, and by the end of the month the number identified had reached 143.

In order to facilitate the control of evacuation over long distances, the Army established two collecting points in March, at WITTLICH (L35) and MAYEN (L69). The Army continued, as it had throughout the campaign, to evacuate the dead from division collecting points to Army cemeteries.

U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at HAMM (P81), Luxembourg, and the adjacent German Military Cemetery remained in operation throughout the month. U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at STROMBERG (M05), Germany, and an adjacent German Military Cemetery opened on 26 March. The American and German cemeteries at FOY (P56), Belgium, which had opened on 4 February, closed on 16 March and were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone. Burials in the FOY cemeteries totaled 2,217 American, twenty-six Allied, and 3,396 enemy.

On 18 March, a memorial service was held by civilians of HAMM (P81), Luxembourg, for American soldiers buried at U. S. Military Cemetery Number 1 at HAMM. A high mass was celebrated in the local church in the morning and a ceremony was held at the cemetery in the afternoon.

The following burials were made at all cemeteries in March:

American	3,585
Allied	9
Enemy	3,101
TOTAL	6,695

Most of the unknown American dead were recovered in the area of the December German counter-offensive in the vicinity of ST VIITH (P88).

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster troop units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 31 March:

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	9
QM Bakery Company, Special	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7
QM Graves Registration Company	4
QM Laundry Company	6 1/2
QM Railhead Company	6
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	26
QM Service Detachment	1
(Petroleum Products Laboratory)	
(Mobile Detachment)	

The following Quartermaster units were released by the Third U. S. Army to the Seventh U. S. Army for temporary duty:

867th QM Fumigation and Bath Company
3936th QM Gasoline Supply Company
899th QM Laundry Company (3d and 4th Platoons)

The following Quartermaster units were assigned during the month to the Third U. S. Army:

Hq & Hq Det, 224th QM Battalion
4341st QM Service Company
4415th QM Service Company
4416th QM Service Company

The 3933d Quartermaster Gasoline Supply Company, having been on temporary duty with the Seventh U. S. Army, returned to the Third U. S. Army.

The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the following units by General Orders, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, for service between the dates indicated:

UNIT	DATE
300th QM Salvage Repair Company	28 March 1944 to 30 June 1944
900th QM Laundry Company	5 October 1944 to 30 December 1944



SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The occupation by the Army of a large area in Germany increased the activities of the Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment. Depots were opened in TRIER (L22) on 6 March and in MAINZ (M35) on 27 March and considerable quantities of captured supplies were hauled there from surrounding territory. The supplies remaining at the Captured Enemy Materiel Depot at METZ (U85) were turned over to the Continental Advance Section, Communications Zone, on 24 March.

A large jerrican and mess-gear plant and a clothing factory, both of which could be put in operation immediately, were discovered in the vicinity of NEUNKIRCHEN (Q58). Three thousand finished jerricans and a large quantity of mess gear were taken over by the Army. The two factories were released to the Advance Section Communications Zone for operation.



Bath and laundry units, which moved forward close behind the combat troops, both served more troops than they had in any previous month. Men bathed during the month totaled 212,346; laundry processed totaled 5,827,952 pounds.

A complete assortment of spare parts for fire units, lanterns, and stoves became available to the Army at Communications Zone Depot Number Q-256, at REIMS (T37). This was the first time in several months that the supply of parts for these items had been adequate.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

A schedule for turning in items of winter clothing was published during the month, but the change in the tactical situation made it impossible for combat units to follow a schedule. These units were permitted to turn in to salvage collecting personnel at Class I supply points all items of equipment not currently required, including special items of winter clothing and equipment. Because of the relatively low priority for transportation to evacuate this salvage to salvage points, a sizable backlog developed, in spite of increased efforts to evacuate the salvage as quickly as possible. At the end of the month, however, there remained only 105 tons of uncounted salvage in the Army area.

A record total of 1,822,834 items of salvage was collected during March. Of these items, 1,802,934 were classified and the remaining 19,900, together with an additional 102 tons of unprocessed salvage, were shipped to the Communications Zone Depot Number Q-256, at REIMS (T37). All Class X items were evacuated to the rear. The items were classified as follows:

Class B	1,156,580
Class C	154,474
Class X	491,880

In order to meet heavy demands for clothing liberated Allied prisoners of war authorized Class B items, the maximum reclamation of blankets, items of outer clothing, towels, handkerchiefs, shoes, and mess gear was instituted. Salvage repair companies repaired 128,456 items of clothing and equipment, seventy-seven per cent more than in February, and these items were delivered to Class II and IV depots for reuse.

The following special-purpose items were repaired by field range repair units and semi-mobile salvage repair companies:

Fire units	3,184
Heaters, immersion type	124
Lanterns, gasoline	2,634
Stoves, cooking, one and two burner	2,283
Typewriters, portable	257
Typewriters, non-portable	370
Pumps, hand	115
Machines, adding	1
Machines, miscellaneous office	3
TOTAL	8,971

In addition to repair activities, salvage repair companies manufactured 16,654 identification panels for the Army Signal Officer and 400 soap pockets for use at bath installations.

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CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section remained throughout April with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters at the following locations:

TRIER (L22), Germany	(29 March) to 6 April
FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67), Germany	6 April to 26 April
ERLANGEN (O31), Germany	26 April to _____

During April the Army advanced rapidly across Germany from a short distance east of the RHINE River to points inside Czechoslovakia and Austria. Early in the month the Army continued its advance north from the FRANKFURT (M67) area, seized KASSEL (C20) on 4 April, and then moved east toward CHEMNITZ (K66) and DRESDEN (F29) and neared the Czechoslovakian border. On 22 April a new tactical plan went into effect. The III and XX Corps, which had taken over a portion of the Seventh U. S. Army area, in the vicinity of WURZBURG (N53), BAMBERG (O24), and NURNBERG (O40), advanced southeast toward REGENSBURG (U15), PASSAU (Q21), and LINZ (V88) along the DANUBE River. The XII Corps continued its advance to the Czechoslovakian border and then swung southward along the border on the Army left flank.

The shift of the Army front presented a logistical problem of distances comparable to that of the month of August 1944, during the Third U. S. Army's dash across France. The distance from the MAINZ (M35) area to the most forward supply point in the direction of the northeastern front was approximately 190 miles; and after the shift had been made, the distance to the most forward supply point toward the southeast at the end of the month was approximately 225 miles. Also, the transfer of Quartermaster supply and service installations was handicapped because it was dependent entirely on the already strained truck transport and communications. In spite of these difficulties, essential Quartermaster service was provided for the Army.

The order of battle changed radically during the month. The VIII Corps was transferred to the First U. S. Army, continuing to operate in its current area; and the III Corps was acquired, moving to the right flank of the new Army front. Only eight divisions that had been with the Army on 31 March remained on 30 April. The following were the major units on the latter date:

III Corps:	14th Armored Division, 86th Infantry Division, 99th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XII Corps:	4th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 26th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
XX Corps:	13th Armored Division, 65th Infantry Division, 71st Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and Corps Troops.
Army Reserve:	16th Armored Division and 70th Infantry Division.

The Army had the responsibility of supplying the following troops at the beginning and at the end of the month:


	1 APRIL	30 APRIL
Assigned Strength of the Army	315,336	346,839
Communications Zone Units	15,394	11,492
Ninth Air Force Units	8,690	16,528
Miscellaneous Troops	2,134	2,984
TOTAL	341,554	377,843

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

The Soldier's Medal, for heroism, was awarded to one enlisted man of a Quartermaster unit, and the Bronze Star Medal, for meritorious service, was awarded to two officers of Quartermaster units, both through General Orders published by Headquarters Third U. S. Army during the month.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

The situation regarding Quartermaster supply was generally satisfactory until near the end of the month, when lengthened supply lines and consequent inadequate transportation facilities resulted in all classes of supplies becoming critical within the Army area.



The supply of the Army from the rear was by successive stages, an arrangement which essentially included delivery by Advance Section Communications Zone truck transport from railheads to designated Army transfer or base points. From where Army transportation made delivery to supply points. The Quartermaster Operations Officer continued to supervise and coordinate the movement of Class I and Class III supplies by truck transport from the transfer points to forward Army supply points. Two Army railheads, at HEIDESHEIM (M25) for Class I and at NIEDER INGELHEIM (M25) for Class III supplies, opened, the first train arriving with rations at HEIDESHEIM on 4 April. The Advance Section took over the operation of these railheads on 8 April, while on the same date the Army established a forward transfer point at ALSFELD (H04); and the Advance Section forwarded by truck Army Class I and Class III requirements to ALSFELD, a ninety-mile haul. Because of the continuing rapid advances by the troops, the Army transfer point was moved fifty miles farther to the east, to EISENACH (H86), on 13 April.

Frequently Army supply points were forty to eighty miles beyond transfer points and the front lines often were equally as far from the supply points. Although supply points were not so close to the troops as desired, the primary consideration was the maximum use of all transportation, of that available to divisions, corps, the Army, and the Communications Zone. The turn-around time imposed by the increasing distances for all links in the supply chain became very long. The Advance Section was able, however, to make deliveries to certain rear Army supply points. In the forward areas transportation was conserved by locating Class III supply points in the vicinity of airfields and by having units, when it was convenient, draw supplies directly from the fields.



The delivery by C47 planes of considerable quantities of rations and V-80 gasoline at airfields, particularly in the forward areas, enabled the Army to move on despite strained surface transport. Approximately ten and three-tenths per cent of the total rations and twenty-two and two-tenths per cent of the total V-80 gasoline received during the month were delivered by air transport.

With the change in the tactical plan, the axis of supply during the last one-third of the month had shifted abruptly from the northeast to the southeast, the base remaining in the area of MAINZ (M35) and FRANKFURT (M67). Despite strained transportation and communications facilities, the shift of supply points to the new front was effected quickly and efficiently. Within an hour after receiving the official directive concerning the new tactical plan, the Quartermaster Operations Officer began diverting Advance Section Communications Zone trucks from EISENACH (H86) to the new transfer points at BAMBERG (O24) and WURZBURG (N53), and soon moved to BAMBERG himself. In order to support the military operation, the Army Quartermaster moved more than 1,000,000 rations and 1,000,000 gallons of gasoline to the base points before the roads became overly congested with troop movements.

The rehabilitation of railway lines did not keep pace with the rapidly advancing Army. A railway bridge across the RHINE River at MAINZ (M35) was completed on 14 April, and shortly thereafter a railhead for Class III supplies was established at KAHL (M96). On 25 April, when rail facilities had opened as far as WURZBURG (N53), the Army transfer point was moved to NURNBERG (O31).

Twenty-three supply points for Class I and the same number for Class III opened in April. Supply points in operation during the month are shown in Annex Number 9.

SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

Receipts of rations were spasmodic but adequate during the month, and issues were heavier than in any preceding month of the campaign. The following are statistics on Class I supply:

Total Receipts for the Month	14,809,721	Rations
Receipts by Air for the Month	1,531,600	Rations
Issues for the Month	13,725,531	Rations
Average Daily Issue	457,518	Rations
Issues of "A"-Type Rations	19.4	Per Cent
Issues of Operational-Type Rations	80.6	Per Cent
On Hand at End of the Month	2,381,110	Rations

Because of the extremely long supply lines and congested transport, the problem of distributing balanced "A"-type rations to the troops was very difficult. Greater use of operational-type rations was necessary; in fact, in per cent of total rations issued, the increase over the preceding month was from thirty and three-tenths per cent to eighty and six-tenths per cent. Operational-type rations were supplemented with fresh bread, coffee, and small quantities of fresh meat. The Army, however, made every effort to utilize "A"-type rations to the maximum extent practicable.

As a result of the critical supply of rations late in the month, higher headquarters directed that German food supplies be used for Allied prisoners of war, Allied displaced persons, German prisoners of war, and German civilians, and that the Army conserve United States ration stocks and restrict the use of such rations to Allied Forces, United States and British prisoners of war, and United States and British civilian internees. In the event that it was necessary to issue operational-type rations to prisoners of war, the European Theater of Operations authorized the following scale:

Type "10-in-1"	1/2 Ration per Man per Day
Type "C"	2/3 Ration per Man per Day
Type "K"	2/3 Ration per Man per Day

Whenever possible, excess items of the "A"-type ration were to be issued for prisoners instead of the operational-type.

Forty-three issues of fresh meat and twenty-four issues of fresh butter, all hauled to supply points by Army refrigeration vans, were made during the month. In addition, such items as bacon, shelled eggs, cheese, and oranges were received from the Advance Section Communications Zone and issued to all troops subsisting on the "A"-type ration.

Refrigeration plants in good condition were taken over by the Army in FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67) and NURNBERG (O40) and were later turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone to be stocked and operated. The Army mobile refrigeration unit hauled perishable supplies from the FRANKFURT plant to all Army supply points, and the unit was moved to NURNBERG when the plant there had been stocked.

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ARMY
CLASS I
TRANSFER
POINT,
NÜRNBERG,
GERMANY

were stocked exclusively at Depot Number 11, at BAD KREUZNACH (M3), which opened on 1 April and closed on 26 April. Depot Number 12, at BUTZBACH (G60), opened on 10 April and remained open throughout the month.

SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The Class III supply situation was grave at the end of April, but sufficient quantities of gasoline and allied products were furnished the troops to fully support tactical operations. The following statistics on V-80 gasoline reflect the speed of the advance and the highly mobile operations of the Army during the month:

	GALLONS
Total Receipts for the Month	20,383,824
Receipts by Air for the Month	4,522,100
Issues for the Month	21,317,768
Average Daily Issue	687,669
Large Day's Issue (26 April)	1,129,675
Receipts for Period 17 to 30 April	10,124,925
Issues for Period 17 to 30 April	10,904,808
On Hand at Beginning of the Month	2,667,004
On Hand at End of the Month	544,770

Early in the month bulk gasoline was transported by Advance Section Communications Zone tank trucks from the THIONVILLE (U88), France, pipeline head to decanting points at WINDESHEIM (M04), BAD NAUHEIM (M69), and ALSFELD (M04). Later, on 26 April, when the pipe-line head had been established east of the RHINE River, bulk deliveries were made from there to the decanting point at WÜRZBURG (M53). Also, both bulk and packaged gasoline were forwarded by rail to railheads; deliveries of packaged gasoline were made to transfer points and supply points, and bulk shipments were decanted before delivery to Army points. Although some bulk gasoline was decanted by the Army, major decanting operations in the Army area continued to be performed by the Advance Section.

Increased receipts and issues of gasoline and long supply lines made necessary the maximum possible use of jerricans, and special efforts were made to return empty cans to forward Advance Section Communications Zone decanting points. The Army Quartermaster sent back empty cans on returning ration and gasoline trucks not specifically directed to haul prisoners of war to the rear and on returning planes not hauling casualties. Abandoned cans were collected and evacuated.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION

The Class II and IV supply situation was critical at the end of April. In an effort to keep the rapidly moving Army supplied with vital rations and gasoline by the transportation available, shipments of Class II and IV supplies from the Communications Zone were suspended on 11 April, transportation allotted for Quartermaster supplies being entirely devoted to the movement of Classes I and III. Although the suspension was lifted on 26 April, no cars had been received at the off-loading point at WÜRZBURG (M53) by the end of the month. The following table gives a comparison of Class II and IV supply activity in April with that of the preceding month:


	MARCH	APRIL	DECREASE
Receipts (Long Tons)	2,862.9	770.9	73 Per Cent
Requisitions Processed	11,784.0	5,400.0	54 Per Cent
On Hand at End of Month (Long Tons)	4,874.0	800.0	84 Per Cent

Receipts in March, moreover, had been low, less than half those in February, because of the large stocks on hand and reduced requirements. At the end of April 4,110 long tons of Class II and IV supplies were on rail cars en route to Army Depot Number 13, at ZIRNDORF (T39), to open on 1 May. The cars had been loaded in March and early April from Army Depots Number 7, at METZ (U85), and Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81), and placed in storage yards west of the RHINE when shipments had been suspended.

As a consequence of the above, several items were in critically short supply in the Army area. Underwear, woolen clothing, socks, and field jackets were not available at the month's end. In addition, barber kits, one-burner stoves, corrugated cans, and tufted brushes remained in the critically short state that had existed for several months, although the receipt of a considerable quantity of one-burner stoves alleviated to some extent the shortage of this item.

Depot Number 10, at LUXEMBOURG (P81), closed on 3 April. Stocks from this depot were shipped by rail to WELGESHEIM (M14) and transported seventy miles by truck from this railhead to a new depot at BUTZBACH (G60). Civil Affairs, American Red Cross, and officers' sales items

ARMY
CLASS III
TRANSFER
POINT,
NÜRNBERG,
GERMANY



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SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The Graves Registration Division continued to work in close cooperation with the Adjutant General Casualty Section and the Army Machine Records Unit and moved with them from SCHIFFLINGEN (P70), Luxembourg, to BAD KREUZNACH (M03), Germany, on 2 April, to FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67), Germany, on 8 April, and to ERLANGEN (O31), Germany, on 27 April.

Instructions received from Headquarters European Theater of Operations regarding the burial of military personnel directed that the establishment of military cemeteries for the interment of American and Allied deceased in Germany be held to a minimum and that, when practicable, the evacuation of such deceased be made to cemeteries in liberated countries. Because of the great amount of German territory occupied during April and long evacuation distances, however, it was found necessary to open three cemeteries for American, Allied, and enemy dead in Germany. The following table gives statistics on cemeteries in operation during the month:

CEMETERY	LOCATION	OPENED	CLOSED	TOTAL BURIALS SINCE OPENING
U. S.	HAMM (P81), Luxembourg	29 December	1 April	6,915 U. S.
German	HAMM (P81), Luxembourg	29 December	1 April	5,468
U. S.	STROMBERG (M05), Germany	26 March	11 April	893 U. S. 7 Allied
German	STROMBERG (M05), Germany	26 March	11 April	508
U. S.	BUTZBACH (G60), Germany	4 April	22 April	662 U. S. 38 Allied
German	BUTZBACH (G60), Germany	4 April	22 April	448
U. S.	EISENACH (H86), Germany	11 April	22 April	365 U. S. 8 Allied
German	EISENACH (H86), Germany	11 April	22 April	216
U. S.	NURNBERG (O40), Germany	19 April		*308 U. S. * 9 Allied
German	NURNBERG (O40), Germany	19 April		*147

*Total burials as of 302400 B April.

The Army Graves Registration Service supervised the establishment of a cemetery on a prominent hill overlooking the town of CHRDRUP (J15) for the 150 dead inmates found at the CHRDRUP concentration camp. A thorough investigation revealed that no United States personnel were among the deceased. The labor was performed by German civilians of CHRDRUP, and the burgomaster of the town was made responsible for the maintenance of the cemetery.

Burials for the month, which, because of the speed of the advance and lessening resistance, were fewer than in the past five months of Third U. S. Army operations, included 1,690 American, of which forty-one were unidentified, 130 Allied, and 964 enemy, making a total of 2,784.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

Under the control of the Army Quartermaster were two group headquarters. One of them, the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 553d Quartermaster Group, was currently performing military government duties under supervision of the G-5 Section, this headquarters. All remaining Quartermaster units were attached to the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 519th Quartermaster Group. The battalion headquarters - with the exception of the 496th, which continued to operate directly under the supervision of the Quartermaster Operations Officer - all had administrative control of varying numbers of service units. The aggregate personnel strength of these units, as authorized by Tables of Organization, was 360 officers, twenty-two warrant officers, and 12,646 enlisted men. The following chart shows the number, type, and attachment of Quartermaster units:



CAPTURED CANNED MEAT STORED AT WAREHOUSE, FURTH, GERMANY

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER	ATTACHMENT	TOTAL (Type of Unit)
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2	519th QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	9	519th QM Group	9
QM Bakery Company, Special	7	553d QM Battalion	7
QM Depot Company, Supply	2	519th QM Group	2
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	5	271st QM Battalion	5
QM Gasoline Supply Company	7	5th QM Battalion, Mobile	7
QM Graves Registration Company	4	537th QM Battalion	4
QM Laundry Company	7	304th QM Battalion	7
QM Railhead Company	6	307th QM Battalion	6
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1	307th QM Battalion	1
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3	273d QM Battalion	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3	273d QM Battalion	3
QM Sales Platoon	2	519th QM Group	2
QM Service Detachment (Petroleum Products Laboratory) (Mobile Detachment)	1	5th QM Battalion, Mobile	1
QM Service Company	2	5th QM Battalion, Mobile	2
	5	588th QM Battalion, Mobile	5
	3	95th QM Battalion	3
	8	224th QM Battalion	8
	2	271st QM Battalion	2
	3	273d QM Battalion	3
	3	537th QM Battalion	3
			26

All Quartermaster units previously attached to the Third U. S. Army but assigned to the Communications Zone, except the two sales platoons and the detachment of the petroleum products laboratory, were relieved from assignment to the Communications Zone and assigned by Twelfth U. S. Army Group orders, on 27 April, to the Third U. S. Army. Efforts had been made since the beginning of the campaign to secure the assignment of all units to the command, in the interest of facilitating administration and control, and improving morale. The desire to wear the Third U. S. Army shoulder insignia was universal.

The following Quartermaster units were released by the Third U. S. Army to other commands:

- 571st QM Railhead Company
- 3936th QM Gasoline Supply Company
- 680th QM Laundry Company (3d Platoon)


The following Quartermaster units were assigned to the Third U. S. Army:

- 566th QM Railhead Company
- 3913th QM Gasoline Supply Company
- 3070th QM Laundry Company

SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The activities of the Captured Enemy Materiel Detachment increased as more German territory was occupied. Depots were opened in FRANKFURT AM MAIN (M67), ESCHWEIGE (H68), KULMBACH (O67), FURTH (O40), and WURZBURG (N53).

The highest priority was given to the uncovering of food, blankets, and clothing for liberated Allied prisoners of war (except United States and British, who were furnished United States supplies), Allied displaced persons, and German prisoners of war. In order to exploit fully the captured enemy food stores, the Quartermaster Field Service Division was allotted a battalion headquarters and an additional service company. A large task was the collection of supplies of captured foods of assorted components in central warehouses so that a balanced ration could be prepared and distribution simplified. The depot at FURTH (O40) was used primarily for assembling and warehousing captured foodstuff.



MISCELLANEOUS CAPTURED FOODSTUFFS ASSEMBLED FOR DISTRIBUTION

During April 152,557 men were bathed by Quartermaster fumigation and bath units, and 3,807,468 pounds of laundry were processed by Quartermaster laundry companies. Owing to the extremely mobile situation, production figures of both the bath and the laundry units were lower than for the past several months.

SECTION X - SALVAGE SECTION

The following are the salvage figures for April:

	NUMBER OF ITEMS
Salvage Collected during Month	1,640,897
Salvage Classified - Total	1,249,765
Class B	855,767
Class C	95,708
Class X	298,290
Unclassified Salvage Shipped to Communications Zone	391,132

Salvage repair units repaired 64,619 items of clothing and equipment for reissue to troops, and also 5,401 special-purpose items, including fire units, immersion-type heaters, gasoline lanterns, one and two-burner stoves, and typewriters. The figures are smaller than those for several previous months largely because of the highly mobile tactical situation.

Because of a lack of transport, it was impossible to evacuate salvage from all collecting points in former Army areas. The Advance Section Communications Zone was requested to take over approximately 700 tons of salvage at a salvage point at EISENACH (H86) and fifty tons at Class I Supply Point Number 121, at ROTHENSTEIN (J75), and relieve Army guard details at these points.

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CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

The Quartermaster Section remained with the rear echelon of Army Headquarters in ERLANGEN (031) until the end of the campaign.

At the beginning of May the Army continued to advance to the south-east along the DANUBE River toward LINZ (V88), which was captured on 4 May, and beyond for a link-up with the Russians. Then, after a change in the tactical plan and with the acquisition of the V Corps, on the Army's left flank, from the First U. S. Army, that corps continued its advance east toward PILSEN (104). PILSEN was cleared of the enemy on 5 May and on 7 May the XII Corps established contact with Russian forces. Hostilities officially ceased at 090001 B May 1945, ending the war in Europe.

The size of the Army was increased during this period by the assignment of Headquarters V Corps, corps troops, and four divisions under its control. The Army was supplying the following divisions on 8 May:

- III Corps: 14th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 97th Infantry Division.
- V Corps: 9th Armored Division, 16th Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division, and 97th Infantry Division.
- XII Corps: 4th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 5th Infantry Division, 26th Infantry Division, and 90th Infantry Division.
- XX Corps: 13th Armored Division, 65th Infantry Division, 71st Infantry Division, and 80th Infantry Division.
- Army Reserve: 70th Infantry Division.

Supply operations were characterized from the beginning of the campaign by rapid movements, long distances, frequently inadequate truck transport, lack of telephone communications with supply points during the more rapid phases, and several changes of the Army front. Railways were systematically incapacitated by the retreating enemy and their restoration necessarily lagged behind the advancing troops. These conditions are inherent in an operation of the type in which the Army was engaged. Enemy air activity was almost completely lacking throughout the campaign as far as supply operations were concerned.


SECTION II - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Throughout the campaign the Administrative Division was active in making small purchases in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Germany and requisitioning local material and services. One hundred and twenty purchases amounting to \$1,237.30 were made, and in addition seven purchases, totaling \$112.05, were made from firms in the United States. Thirty-seven demands and fifteen requisitions placed on local civil authorities for merchandise and services were processed, some involving large amounts of material.

The organization of the Quartermaster Section remained essentially the same throughout the period of operations. An allotment of personnel authorized by a staff memorandum, this headquarters, dated 6 May 1944, was initially nineteen officers, three warrant officers, and forty-eight enlisted men. On 16 December 1944 a second allotment by a staff memorandum reduced the total enlisted men to forty. The following table gives the allotment of personnel to sub-divisions of the section:

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Quartermaster	1		1
Executive	1*		1
Administrative	2	1	8
Field Service	3		6
Graves Registration	2		6
Supply	1*		1
Operations	1		
Class I	3		5
Class II and IV	2	2	7
Class III	4		5

* Served in dual capacity.



C 47 TO THE RESCUE!

During the campaign 1,597,200 rations, 3,400,000 pounds of Class II and IV items, and 7,700,000 gallons of gasoline were delivered by airplane - almost all during the rapid phases and consequent critical supply periods.

At the end of the campaign the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, sent the following commendation to the personnel of Army Headquarters:

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 330.13

9 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : The General and Special Staffs and Headquarters Troops Third Army.

Too often the tireless and brilliant performance of duty on the part of staff personnel, commissioned and enlisted, as well as on the part of the Headquarters Troops, goes unrequited. The brilliant success of the Third Army in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, could not have been achieved had it not been for the work of the officers and men above referred to. Each and every one is highly commended for the superior and loyal manner in which he carried out his duties.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
G. S. PATTON, JR.,
General.

SECTION III - SUPPLY DIVISION

As supply lines continued to lengthen, transportation facilities became more overtaxed, with the result that, in general, Quartermaster supply levels were reduced during the first days of the month. Destruction of important bridges and railways in enemy territory was of such a degree that immediate rehabilitation was impossible. The major dependence, of necessity, was on truck transport. With the stabilizing of the tactical situation and lessening of demands for gasoline, however, the position was somewhat improved at the war's end, except in regard to rations.

The same supply procedures remained in force as those initiated in April. The Advance Section Communications Zone received Class I and Class III supplies, both bulk and packaged, in WURZBURG (N53) and the vicinity by rail and hauled them by truck to Army transfer points at NURNBERG (040) and REGENSBURG (U15), the latter point opening on 4 May. Compared to the preceding month, relatively small quantities of rations and gasoline arrived by plane at the airfields within the Army area. Class II and IV supplies were delivered by the Advance Section by rail to off-loading points at STEIN (T39) and ZIRNDORF (T39), from where the Army transported them by truck to Army Depot Number 13, at ZIRNDORF.

At the cessation of hostilities nine Class I, one Class II and IV, and eight Class III supply points were open. From 15 July, when the first supply point opened, to 8 May, 121 Class I points, thirteen Class II and IV depots, and 130 Class III points operated in support of the Army. They extended from Supply Point Number 81, on the BREIT Peninsula, to Supply Point Number 135, north of PASSAU (Q21), Germany, a distance of approximately 805 airline miles.

Supply points in operation from 1 to 8 May, inclusive, are shown in Annex Number 9 to this report, and the Quartermaster situation as of 082400 B May is illustrated in Annex Number 10.

During the operational period, from 1 August to 8 May, the Army received a total of 774,541.86 long tons of Quartermaster supplies. Of these, 33,340.3 long tons, slightly more than four per cent, arrived by air lift and the remaining 741,201.56 long tons arrived by rail and truck. The largest monthly tonnage, 111,100.4 long tons, was received in April, 19,507.2 long tons of which were delivered by C47 planes.

The following tables give pertinent data relative to tonnage receipts of Quartermaster supplies:

RECEIPTS OF ALL QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES BY METHOD OF DELIVERY (LONG TONS)

	RAIL AND TRUCK	PER CENT OF TOTAL	AIR	PER CENT OF TOTAL	TOTAL
August	69,400.5	97.99	1,442.6	2.01	70,843.1
September	53,791.81	90.56	5,648.7	9.44	59,440.51
October	52,205.28	96.17	2,078.5	3.83	54,283.78
November	77,441.94	99.15	665.7	0.85	78,107.64
December	75,751.4	99.33	508.4	0.67	76,259.8
January	97,576.43	100.0	0	-	97,576.43
February	87,196.2	99.95	41.6	0.05	87,237.8
March	104,264.8	99.06	985.0	0.94	105,249.8
April	91,593.2	82.44	19,507.2	17.56	111,100.4
May (To 082400)	31,980.0	92.85	2,462.6	7.15	34,442.6
TOTAL	741,201.56		33,340.3		774,541.86

RECEIPTS BY AIR BY CLASS OF SUPPLY (LONG TONS)

	CLASS I	CLASS II AND IV	CLASS III	TOTAL
August	500.0	63.0	879.6	1,442.6
September	64.3	279.3	5,305.1	5,648.7
October	0	1,194.0	884.5	2,078.5
November	0	0	665.7	665.7
December	0	0	508.4	508.4
January	0	0	0	0
February	0	10.0	31.6	41.6
March	0	0	985.0	985.0
April	3,063.2	0	16,444.0	19,507.2
May (To 082400)	2.5	0	2,460.1	2,462.6
TOTAL	3,630.0	1,546.3	28,164.0	33,340.3
Per Cent of Total	10.89	4.64	84.47	100.0

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RECEIPTS BY CLASS OF SUPPLY (LONG TONS)

	CLASS I	CLASS II	CLASS IV	CLASS III FOI	CLASS III SOLID FUELS	TOTAL
August	27,141.2	205.05	64.75	43,432.1	0	70,843.1
September	23,048.9	1,418.4	447.91	34,525.3	0	59,440.51
October	24,139.0	3,458.53	1,092.17	25,594.08	0	54,283.78
November	25,028.4	2,719.28	858.72	40,823.25	8,678.0	78,107.65
December	29,085.1	3,405.03	1,075.27	36,553.4	6,141.0	76,259.8
January	36,138.5	4,540.05	1,433.7	49,799.18	5,665.0	97,576.43
February	28,284.2	5,384.8	429.2	44,652.6	8,487.0	87,237.8
March	33,401.1	2,291.4	571.5	63,842.2	5,143.6	105,249.8
April	32,621.9	435.2	335.7	77,007.6	700.0	111,100.4
May (To 082400)	10,081.4	551.7	752.3	23,057.2	0	34,442.6
TOTAL	268,969.7	24,409.44	7,061.22	439,286.91	34,814.6	774,541.87
Per Cent of Total	34.7	3.2	.9	56.7	4.5	100.0


SECTION IV - CLASS I SECTION

The Class I situation was complicated in early May by the great number of enemy prisoners of war and of Allied displaced persons the Army had the responsibility of supplying. Although sizable stocks of captured food continued to be uncovered, sufficient food for all of these persons for any great length of time was not immediately available. Civilian facilities were exploited. Surveys were conducted in the Army area for bakery plants and flour mills that might be placed in operation to relieve the strained Army food situation. A civilian bakery in AMBERG (090) was taken over by the Army and put into operation with a German prisoner-of-war staff, using captured ingredients, to produce bread for German prisoners. Before hostilities had ceased, this installation produced 105,264 pounds of bread.

At 082400 B May 1,505,194 rations were on hand at supply points and reserve points in the Army area.

Adequate quantities of rations were issued to the troops throughout the campaign, although shortages of operational-type rations developed at various times. Issues of operational-type rations were heaviest during August and April, when the tactical situation was highly mobile and supply lines became greatly extended. The distribution of specially packed "25-in-1" hospital supplements for medical clearing stations and "A"-type ration supplements for all hospitals proved highly satisfactory throughout the campaign. The following graph shows types of rations by per cent of total rations issued monthly during the period 1 August to 8 May, inclusive:

PER CENT ISSUES BY TYPE OF RATION BY MONTHS



Bakery units using British-type equipment consistently produced considerably more than their rated capacities.

PRODUCTION OF QUARTERMASTER BAKERY COMPANIES

	AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN OPERATION	BREAD (Pounds)	COFFEE (Pounds)
August	3	1,230,562	0
September	4	2,263,299	163,566
October	5	3,782,198	354,938
November	5	3,833,505	212,081
December	5	4,251,077	574,922
January	7	5,750,000	1,075,000
February	7	5,130,000	790,000
March	7	4,849,503	735,000
April	7	3,972,434	557,473
May (To 082400)	7	1,572,444	173,415
TOTAL		36,635,022	4,636,395


A refrigeration company performed efficiently and accomplished the delivery of perishables to Army supply points often under difficult road conditions and over great distances. For the period 8 August 1944 through 8 May 1945 this unit transported a total of 42,000,000 pounds of perishable items, traveling during this time over 513,000 miles. This type of unit is essential to the maintenance of a field army. One company per army is adequate in temperate zones and under normal conditions.

SECTION V - CLASS II AND IV SECTION


The quantity of Class II and IV supplies arriving in the Army area was insufficient because of the inability of the railways to handle any great amount of tonnage above the essential combat supplies. At 082400 B May approximately 6,500 long tons of clothing (poorly balanced) and equipment were in the Army depot and on rail in the Army area.

Blankets were badly needed for Allied prisoners of war and captured stocks were inadequate to meet the demand. During this period a shipment of 51,340 United States blankets arrived from the Communications Zone by air lift for issue to liberated Allied prisoners.

Throughout the campaign reclaimed clothing and equipment was an important contribution to depot stocks. A total of 3,151 long tons of serviceable items was returned to use, equalling more than ten per cent of receipts of Class II and IV from the Communications Zone. Approximately 300 long tons of captured stationery and office supplies and other expendable items were issued through the Army depots.



UNIT TRUCKS IN WAITING LINE (ABOVE) AND IN ISSUE LINE (BELOW), CLASS I SUPPLY POINT NUMBER 128, NURNBERG, GERMANY



Sales stores, under the supervision of the Class II and IV Officer, made sales which amounted to well over a million dollars. Two mobile sales stores, each consisting of one platoon of a sales company, began operating in October and served divisions and corps on scheduled itineraries; and static stores operated at Quartermaster Class II and IV depots and in the large cities in the Army area. The following table gives statistics for the entire campaign:

	MOBILE STORES		STATIC STORES	
	Number of Customers Served	Sales (In Dollars)	Number of Customers Served	Sales (In Dollars)
July	---	---	3,119	18,613.32
August	---	---	2,009	15,144.60
September	---	---	1,118	10,072.21
October	7,618	136,590.32	10,200	134,056.14
November	7,257	99,435.44	5,457	76,615.24
December	3,665	56,712.56	8,364	91,990.16
January	3,075	41,704.17	7,740	96,285.70
February	2,586	27,795.05	6,359	74,462.92
March	2,188	23,899.26	7,380	78,543.19
April	3,495	49,610.20	2,356	31,372.00
May (To 082400)	833	11,023.55	2,027	32,424.25
TOTAL	30,717	446,770.55	56,129	659,579.73
Total Customers			86,846	
Total Sales			\$1,106,350.28	

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SECTION VI - CLASS III SECTION

The Class III supply position, critical at first, improved during the period. Receipts of V-80 gasoline for the first eight days of May averaged 860,487 gallons daily and issues averaged 769,160 gallons. On hand at supply and reserve points at 082400 B May were 967,956 gallons of V-80 gasoline.


Gasoline rationing was inaugurated on 5 May and discontinued on 8 May. During these three days all Third U. S. Army units except those of the V and XII Corps were limited to fifty per cent of their average daily requirements based on the period from 26 April to 4 May.

The demands for gasoline fluctuate sharply with any major movements of an army, and since it is often difficult to maintain a steady flow from the rear, the maintenance of reserves of gasoline in the army area is of paramount importance. The following graph shows the actual daily levels of gasoline in the Third U. S. Army area from 1 August to 8 May as compared with the authorized five-day level, using a factor of one and fifty-six-hundredths gallons per man per day:

ITEM	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	(To 082400) MAY
V-80 (Gallons)	799,222	11,492,831	9,270,295	6,504,020	9,117,635	11,331,256	14,230,799	11,846,287	16,820,994	21,317,768	6,153,280
Diesel (Gallons)	18,190	402,812	291,258	310,695	308,635	370,662	456,792	394,723	407,394	359,404	125,450
SAE 10 (Gallons)	1,785	26,556	25,880	41,259	42,167	73,417	160,253	86,997	37,306	42,311	4,638
SAE 30 (Gallons)	18,470	147,991	115,510	109,172	99,171	150,508	154,032	167,116	267,389	263,746	93,903
SAE 50 (Gallons)	4,945	67,655	51,600	25,594	30,734	34,298	20,254	41,931	70,931	98,812	19,657
Gear Oil (Gallons)	9,845	35,378	37,680	26,782	20,247	29,545	25,475	33,560	43,008	56,208	12,219
Kerosene (Gallons)	4,300	10,054	20,235	45,220	55,286	65,680	116,951	93,840	88,925	66,975	22,665
GP No. 1 (Pounds)	12,614	86,361	89,309	52,399	50,614	69,075	88,556	95,866	104,364	137,630	37,620
GP No. 2 (Pounds)	9,814	63,557	62,097	59,921	30,633	33,715	28,193	48,215	62,269	83,980	4,266
WB No. 3 (Pounds)	3,592	9,378	5,399	12,217	4,264	4,924	3,446	-	-	574	426
WP No. 4 (Pounds)	271	1,457	1,737	4,127	2,482	3,962	2,764	2,127	3,108	6,067	882
White Gas (Gallons)	-	3,910	3,810	8,860	11,600	15,530	20,258	20,435	24,886	21,772	6,065
R-73 Gas (Gallons)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84,590	103,691	25,490

PERCENTAGES OF OIL AND GREASES TO V-80 GASOLINE

ITEM	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY
Diesel (Gallons)	2.27	3.50	3.14	4.77	3.38	3.36	3.21	3.33	2.42	1.69	2.04
Oil (Gallons)	3.15	2.11	2.08	2.70	1.88	2.29	2.35	2.49	2.23	1.90	1.92
SAE 10 (Gallons)	0.22	0.23	0.28	0.63	0.46	0.65	1.13	0.73	0.22	0.20	0.07
SAE 30 (Gallons)	2.31	1.29	1.25	1.67	1.08	1.33	1.08	1.41	1.59	1.24	1.52
SAE 50 (Gallons)	0.62	0.59	0.56	0.39	0.33	0.30	0.14	0.35	0.42	0.46	0.32
Gear Oil (Gallons)	1.23	0.31	0.41	0.41	0.22	0.26	0.18	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.19
Kerosene (Gallons)	0.54	0.09	0.22	0.69	0.60	0.59	0.82	0.79	0.53	0.31	0.37
Grease (Pounds)	3.30	1.40	1.71	1.97	0.97	0.99	1.09	1.23	1.01	1.07	0.70
GP #1 (Pounds)	1.58	0.75	0.96	0.81	0.56	0.61	0.62	0.81	0.62	0.65	0.60
GP #2 (Pounds)	1.23	0.55	0.67	0.92	0.34	0.30	0.20	0.41	0.37	0.39	0.06
WB #3 (Pounds)	0.45	0.08	0.06	0.19	0.05	0.05	0.25	-	-	0.002	0.007
WP #4 (Pounds)	0.03	0.013	0.02	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.018	0.028	0.014
White Gas (Gallons)	-	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.03	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.098
R-73 Gas (Gallons)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.48	0.41



SECTION VII - GRAVES REGISTRATION DIVISION

The cemetery for American and Allied dead and the adjacent cemetery for enemy dead at NURNBERG (040) were the only ones open to Third U. S. Army burials from 1 to 8 May.


Army graves registration personnel made rapid strides in improving the technique of identifying unknown bodies. It was expected that continued research would result in identifying all the remaining American unknowns at some of the cemeteries. The following table presents statistics on burials of American unknowns for the period 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, inclusive:

	NUMBER OF BURIALS	NUMBER OF UNKNOWN	PER CENT OF UNKNOWN
Army Ground Force Personnel	26,700	122	0.46
Army Air Force Personnel	347	35	10.00
TOTAL BURIALS	27,047	157	0.58

Normally during the campaign the Army kept only one cemetery open for all troops and opened a new cemetery, road conditions permitting, when the distance of evacuation exceeded 100 miles. The following chart lists the burials made in Third U. S. Army cemeteries during the period of hostilities:



U.S. MILITARY CEMETERY, CHAMPIGNEUL, FRANCE



U.S. MILITARY CEMETERY, ST. JAMES, FRANCE

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BURIALS IN CEMETERIES ESTABLISHED BY THIRD U. S. ARMY
011200 B AUGUST 1944 TO 082400 B MAY 1945

	AMERICAN			ALLIED			ENEMY			TOTAL BURIALS	
	IDEN-TIFIED	UNIDEN-TIFIED	TOTAL	IDEN-TIFIED	UNIDEN-TIFIED	TOTAL	IDEN-TIFIED	UNIDEN-TIFIED	TOTAL		
U. S. MILITARY CEMETERY, BLOSVILLE, FRANCE	250	5	0	255	0	0	0	--	--	--	256
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, ST. JAMES, FRANCE	2,245	15	1	2,261	35	6	41	890	203	1,093	3,395
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, ST. CORNEILLE, FRANCE	405	5	1	411	24	6	30	196	42	238	679
GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERY, LESNEVEN, FRANCE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	279	61	340	340
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, VILLENEUVE-SUR-AUVERS, FRANCE	263	1	0	264	9	9	18	197	21	218	500
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, CHAMPIGNEUL, FRANCE	514	3	9	526	1	7	8	190	36	226	760
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, ANDILLY, FRANCE	3,299	7	0	3,306	47	16	63	4,153	680	4,833	8,202
U. S. MILITARY CEMETERY, LIMY, FRANCE	5,607	4	2	5,613	0	0	0	--	--	--	5,613
GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERY, DORVILLER, FRANCE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16	6	22	22
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, GRAND FAILLY, FRANCE	2,729	11	1	2,741	17	1	18	1,150	293	1,443	4,202
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, FOY, BELGIUM	2,184	30	3	2,217	21	5	26	2,716	680	3,396	5,639
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, HAMM, LUXEMBOURG	6,870	34	11	6,915	0	0	0	4,600	868	5,468	12,383
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, STROMBERG, GERMANY	892	1	0	893	7	0	7	508	64	572	1,472
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, BUTZBACH, GERMANY	656	4	2	662	29	9	38	391	57	448	1,148
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, EISENACH, GERMANY	359	1	5	365	8	0	8	172	44	216	589
U. S. AND GERMAN MILITARY CEMETERIES, NURNBERG, GERMANY	617	1	0	618	2	0	2	223	39	262	882
TOTALS	26,890	122	35	* 27,047	200	59	259	15,681	3,094	18,775	46,081

* Total Air Force personnel, known and unknown, included in this figure - 347

It should be noted that in cases of discrepancy between figures in the above table and those presented in monthly chapters, the differences are the result of adjustments made after continued investigation and research in connection with the identification of unknowns.

SECTION VIII - QUARTERMASTER TROOP SECTION

The following types and numbers of Quartermaster units were assigned or attached to the Third U. S. Army as of 082400 B May.

Hq & Hq Det, QM Group	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion, Mobile	2
Hq & Hq Det, QM Battalion	10
QM Bakery Company, Special	8
QM Depot Company, Supply	12
QM Fumigation and Bath Company	6
QM Gasoline Supply Company	8
QM Graves Registration Company	5
QM Laundry Company	8
QM Railhead Company	7
QM Refrigeration Company, Mobile	1
QM Sales Platoon	2
QM Salvage Collecting Company	3
QM Salvage Repair Company	3
QM Service Company	28
QM Service Detachment	1
(Petroleum Products Laboratory)	
(Mobile Detachment)	

FIELD SET-UP
SALVAGE POINT
NUMBER 25
REGENSBURG,
GERMANY



SECTION IX - FIELD SERVICE SECTION

The collecting, warehousing, and issuing of captured enemy material assumed increasing magnitude and importance as the campaign advanced. The following table shows the captured supplies handled under the supervision of the Field Service Division from 1 August to 8 May:

Class I (Tons).....	21,745
Class II (Items)	
Clothing.....	1,580,397
Individual Equipment.....	1,049,850
Footwear.....	896,555
Organizational Equipment.....	3,552,680
Expendable Items.....	632,693
Class III	
Petrol (Gallons).....	434,050*
Diesel (Gallons).....	95,555
Engine Oil (Gallons).....	37,620
Gearlube (Pounds).....	4,900
Grease (Pounds).....	6,683
Class IV	
Post Exchange Items.....	400,000

* In addition approximately 500,000 gallons of captured gasoline were used by units in late August and early September.

It should be stated that large quantities of clothing and equipment, items for which the Class II and IV depots had no need, were released directly to the G-5 Section for use of Civil Affairs or Military Government authorities. All usable items not required by the Army were turned over to the Advance Section Communications Zone. Captured salvage and scrap materials, not included in the above figures, were immediately released to the Advance Section.

Although priority for bath service was always given to divisional units, the demand for this service was never fully met. Bath units were almost entirely allocated to corps for movement and control of service schedules for divisions.

SECRET

The following table shows the employment of Quartermaster laundry units and pounds of laundry processed by months during the operational period of the Army:

EMPLOYMENT OF QUARTERMASTER LAUNDRY COMPANIES					
	TOTAL COMPANIES	MEDICAL CORPS (Sections)	TROOP UNITS (Sections)	SALVAGE POINTS (Sections)	LAUNDRY PROCESSED (Pounds)
August	5 (-1)*	40 Sections	18	8	556,563
September	4	32 Sections	16	8	2,630,541
October	5	40 Sections	20	4	3,549,186
November	5	40 Sections	15	14	3,203,260
December	6 1/2	50 Sections	15	24	3,646,214
January	6 1/2	50 Sections	14	26	4,429,100
February	6 1/2	50 Sections	14	26	4,929,993
March	6 1/2	50 Sections	15	26	5,827,952
April	7	56 Sections	15	32	3,807,468
May (To 082400)	8	64 Sections	15	40	1,080,535
TOTAL					33,660,812

* One company (eight sections) en route to join.

Quartermaster service companies had varied employment. The following chart illustrates the variety of duties of this type of unit:

EMPLOYMENT OF QUARTERMASTER SERVICE COMPANIES										
From 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945										
	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	(To 082400) MAY
QM Operations Labor Pool	1 1/2	6	2	4 1/2	2 1/2	2	2	3	5	6
Class I	3									
Class II and IV	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2	2 1/2
Class III	3 1/2	3	4	4	5	2 1/2	3	3	2	2
Salvage							1	1	1	1
Graves Registration		1	2	3	4	4	4	4	2	1
Attached to Seventh U. S. Army						2				
Captured Enemy Materiel								1	2	4
Medical				1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Field Range Repair	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
Attached to Corps	5									
Ordnance	3	3	5	5 1/2	5 1/2	6 1/2	5	5	5	5
Engineer	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Signal	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Transportation	1		1	1						
Provost Marshal					1	1				
TOTAL COMPANIES	21	17	19	24	26	26	23	26	26	28

SECTION I - SALVAGE SECTION

The salvage activities during the operation are presented in the following table:

SALVAGE PROCESSED (By Items)					
	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS I	TOTAL	UNCLASSIFIED
August	132,294	43,667	53,200	272,713*	0
September	204,701	45,190	137,262	387,153	0
October	336,911	48,697	79,957	465,565	0
November	416,473	80,780	193,383	690,636	0
December	524,469	74,455	226,034	824,958	316,091
January	707,221	111,797	613,251	1,432,269	41,000
February	769,542	151,116	375,439	1,296,097	298,581
March	1,156,580	154,474	491,880	1,802,934	19,900
April	855,767	95,708	298,290	1,249,765	391,132
May (To 082400)	449,307	32,638	145,357	627,302	372,400
TOTAL	5,553,265	838,522	2,614,053	9,049,392	1,446,104

* Included in the total are miscellaneous items amounting to 43,552.

Reclaimed clothing and equipment returned to the Class II and IV depots amounted to 3,151 long tons. All Class I and unclassified items were evacuated to the rear to Communications Zone depots.

Items repaired by month by Quartermaster repair companies are shown below:

	NUMBER OF COMPANIES	REGULAR SUPPLIES	SPECIAL PURPOSE ITEMS	TOTAL
August	3 1/2	20,175	450	20,625
September	3 1/2	33,010	2,041	35,051
October	3 1/2	52,635	4,109	56,744
November	3 1/2	72,539	11,057	83,596
December	3 1/2	113,219	8,513	121,732
January	3 1/2	69,804	8,022	77,826
February	3 1/2	72,638	8,484	81,122
March	3 1/2	128,456	8,971	137,427
April	3 1/2	64,619	5,401	70,020
May (To 082400)	3 1/2	22,502	1,015	23,517
TOTAL		649,597	58,063	707,660

* One-half company shown was the one platoon of a service company trained as a field range repair unit.

Regular supplies consist of clothing, individual equipment, and footwear; while special purpose items include office machines and equipment, fire units, immersion heaters, and lanterns. It is noteworthy that during the operational period 3,373 typewriters, 22,608 fire units, and 16,921 gasoline lanterns were repaired. Lack of parts often hindered work; nevertheless, these units performed an indispensable service to troops.

The chapters of this report were written at the end of each month as the campaign progressed, in most instances under the stress of difficulty, hurried, and trying conditions. The indulgence of the reader is earnestly requested concerning the errors, omissions, and repetitions that have entered into these pages as the result of circumstances.

The gratitude of the Army Quartermaster and members of his section is extended to the Corps and Division Quartermasters and to the officers and men of all Quartermaster units, without whose active cooperation, loyalty, and tireless efforts this extremely difficult mission could not have been accomplished.

SECRET



CHAPTER 13 LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

LESSONS LEARNED

GENERAL

1. When a landing is made on a hostile shore, an operations group of Quartermaster officers of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, should be attached to the staff of the Commander of tactical troops. This group, operating under the tactical commander until a rear boundary is designated, should begin operations immediately upon landing. It should organize the beach dumps and be charged with the distribution of supplies from the very beginning. As the beachhead is expanded, this group should remain in charge of the beach dumps and thus gradually develop the beginning of a communications zone. The Army Quartermaster should perform only his primary functions in regard to tactical troops. This would insure a well-organized, smoothly operating supply system before the first army rear boundary is designated and before the situation becomes mobile.

2. The regulating station is organized to operate in connection with a well-developed railway system. It is not well adapted to a fast-moving situation with the major dependence on truck transport. It should operate in close proximity to the source depots rather than in the army service area.

3. Divisions, both armored and infantry, have inadequate Quartermaster facilities.

SUPPLY

4. The impetus of supply should be from the rear; however, during rapidly changing situations, the supply agencies in rear of the Army do not always possess a sufficiently complete picture to insure quick readjustment. The movement of these elements and installations should be closely synchronized with the army they are supporting.

5. Quartermasters of all echelons are not equipped to carry out their supply missions unless they have sufficient transportation under their own control or under an organization of subordinate status.

6. Supply points for Class I and Class III supplies, under mobile conditions, normally were maintained on the basis of one for each corps and from one to three for Army troops. The distances from supply points to using units varied from a few miles to as much as fifty or more miles.

7. Issues of supplies direct to the transportation of using units are not practicable under mobile conditions. Divisions universally prefer to draw in bulk and make their own breakdowns. Units smaller than a division can be given their choice of method. In a rapidly changing situation, supply points are moved so often that it is not practicable to keep the smaller units informed of the changes.

8. Elaborate standing operating procedures are not well adapted to changing situations and are not necessary. The things that can be included in such compilations either have been covered in basic training or can be imparted through fragmentary operating instructions and/or supervising officers. It is a good plan to consolidate instructions from time to time in order to keep them current.

9. Reserves of Class I and Class III maintained in the army area depend to a great degree upon the rapidity of movement, the efficiency of the railway system, and the amount of truck transportation available. In static situations, five days of Class I and Class III and fifteen days of Class II and IV are adequate; in mobile situations the stocks must be reduced and, at the same time, the agencies supporting the army from the rear must be speeded up.

10. The daily telegram system of requisitioning supplies is not suitable for a fast-moving operation when far removed from the source of supplies. It is only in fairly static situations that this method of requisitioning has proved reliable.

11. Supply disciplines of the American soldier, if improved, would be highly beneficial.

12. The operational-type ration is indispensable to a mobile operation. The type "A" ration is suitable for ninety-five per cent of all troops in a static situation, eighty per cent in a moderately mobile situation, and forty per cent when highly mobile. The principal limiting factor in the use of the "A" ration is transportation.

13. Operational-type rations, when used for more than three days, require a supplemental issue of bread and coffee. An occasional issue of meat, butter, and fresh fruit is highly necessary.

14. Bakeries are best operated under the Class I officer and organized under a single battalion headquarters. The British-type equipment is excellent and can keep up even during fast movements. Critical bakery supplies are best handled by pooling them under control of the battalion commander.

15. The most practical method of issue is to permit units to draw from the nearest supply point, submitting ration requests direct to the supply point commander. The supply point commander submits his record of issues and his daily inventory report direct to the army Class I officer as of a specified hour, usually 1400. The Class I officer maintains a status card for each unit on which is recorded its Table of Organization strength, actual strength, and a record of daily ration issues and weekly Post Exchange issues. The system has demonstrated its value under the conditions peculiar to this campaign. The Machine Records Unit cannot be depended upon to furnish the correct ration strength; usually from 50,000 to 60,000 additional troops are inside the army area.

16. The gratuitous issue of Post Exchange items when sales facilities are not available is essential to health and morale. Units must register at the supply point three days in advance of drawing. The available stock is then prorated among all units.

17. The railhead company should be redesignated as a "ration supply company." This should be its only function. Present strength is adequate and enables it to "leap-frog." This unit should be organized to enable it to function under mobile conditions and in locations not on operating railway lines. Except in a purely static situation it seldom operates as a "railhead." The unit should have sufficient organic transportation to enable it to assist in maintaining its stock and to increase its mobility.

18. The supply of Class II and IV in a highly mobile situation over great distances is extremely difficult. These classes receive lowest priority in allotting available transportation.

19. Present-type winter combat clothing is not entirely satisfactory. It is not sufficiently warm, wind resistant, water repellent, or shrink proof. The wide range of sizes makes it difficult to maintain balanced stocks in depots. Two depot companies are required for an army and each should have sufficient organic transportation to perform its function.

20. The duffle bag is a source of waste in a war of movement. The bags usually must be stored in an inaccessible place far to the rear. The soldier must be given issues of new items direct from the depots.

21. An uninterrupted flow of POL supplies is the most important and most difficult of all Quartermaster supply functions in a mobile situation. A temporary failure can have more disastrous and far-reaching effects than the failure of any other class of supplies. The situation becomes extremely critical when Army reserves have been exhausted and the flow from the Communications Zone is even temporarily suspended. The gasoline supply company is too small and should have additional organic vehicles to assist in maintaining its operation.

FIELD SERVICE

22. Quartermaster troop units are best handled by assigning them to battalions on a functional rather than a geographical basis: e. g., railhead companies under one battalion and gasoline supply companies under another. Although all battalions were attached to a single group headquarters, two might have been better.

23. The basic training of Quartermaster troops and troop officers has highly important effects over results. The best units are those that have been trained realistically.

24. The allocation of laundry units to field armies is inadequate. The present-type company is too large. Small, self-sustaining units with two or four trailers would be more suitable. Each medical depot and hospital and each division should have a laundry section of appropriate capacity as a part of its organic equipment. Tractors are required on the basis of one per trailer.

25. The fumigation and bath companies are inadequate in number and equipment. These units do much for morale. The exchange of clothing has proved highly beneficial. Divisions should have their own bath units.

26. Captured enemy materiel is of great importance. It can be handled properly only under a special organization for which no provision is made under the present Tables of Organization. This organization must function close behind the assault troops. Unless this is done, much valuable property is lost or needlessly destroyed.

27. Quartermaster officers should be selected as far as possible from those who have had experience with combat troops and whose efficiency ratings are excellent or higher. It is extremely important that the officer possess the correct point of view. The training of officer candidates should instill a high sense of discipline and personal responsibility and should include effective instruction in company administration.

28. Group and battalion headquarters enlisted personnel should be selected from the types whose background fits them for this specialized work. There are too many headquarters in which the officers must of necessity perform practically all the clerical work.

GRAVES REGISTRATION

29. The graves registration company cannot perform its required functions as now organized and equipped. This has been the subject of separate reports.

30. Cemeteries are best operated under an army rather than corps or divisions. One cemetery for an army is adequate in most situations. Evacuation up to 100 miles is entirely practicable under suitable road conditions and when casualties are low.

31. Graves registration is best handled by a separate section in the Office of the Army Quartermaster. The section obtains best results when it works intimately with the Adjutant General's Casualty Section and the Army Machine Records Unit.

32. Collecting teams under Army control composed of five graves registration men and two three-quarter ton trucks with one-ton trailers are required for divisions. The division and smaller units evacuate the dead to the division and/or corps collecting points. Identification must be carefully checked and established at the collecting point.

SECRET

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Advance Section, Communications Zone, should be represented on the staff of the Army Commander when a landing is made on hostile shores. This operating group should play a major role in establishing and operating the beach dumps.

2. The regulating station should be organized, trained, and practiced to enable it to adapt its operations to fast-moving and improvised conditions.

3. The Quartermaster organization for armored and infantry divisions should be made the subject of special study. Each division should have a laundry platoon, a bath unit for each regimental combat team, a shoe and textile repair section, and a battalion headquarters. The armored division needs more transportation.

4. The supply agencies of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, in support of a field army in a mobile operation should be under the control of the Army Commander.

5. The Quartermasters of all echelons should have sufficient transportation under their own control to accomplish their missions. As a general rule, there are fewer trucks available for Quartermaster supply in a mobile situation than in static periods, whereas the reverse should be the case.

6. Supply discipline should receive careful consideration during basic training. It is recommended that the vital importance of conserving supplies be given the prominence it deserves. All ranks should be included.

7. Operational-type rations are excellently adapted to mobile warfare. Provision should be made for supplementary issues of coffee, bread, meat, butter, and fruit when the operational ration is used for more than a few days.

8. The British-type bakery equipment with coffee roaster added is excellent for mobile and/or static situations.

9. It is recommended that the railhead company be redesignated as a "ration supply company." Its organic equipment should include forty-eight two and one-half ton trucks.

10. The duffle bag should be eliminated as a part of field equipment. It is the source of much waste. Units should have the means for carrying reserves of essential clothing and equipment. An exchange system should be prescribed within the unit. The division could, if given the equipment, launder the soiled clothing and repair the shoes.

11. The gasoline supply company should have fifty additional laborers, better fire-fighting equipment, and forty-eight two and one-half ton trucks as organic equipment.

12. The winter combat uniform should receive careful consideration as to greater simplicity, added warmth, and more wind and water resistance.

13. The depot company, supply, should have forty-eight two and one-half ton trucks as organic equipment.

14. The means for insuring adequate and uninterrupted PCL supplies from the communications zone to the army area warrants continued and expert study.


15. In the training of Quartermaster units and officers more emphasis should be given to field training, actual functional work, sense of personal responsibility, and company administration. An outstanding weakness has been the failure to develop junior officers and non-commissioned officers.

16. Laundry companies should be reorganized into small, self-supporting units. Laundry units should be included in the organic equipment of the following: divisions, medical depots, evacuation and convalescent hospitals, and salvage repair companies.


17. Bath companies do not need the fumigation units. The latter should be with the salvage units. The present troop basis for bath units is grossly inadequate. Divisions should have bath units as a part of their organic equipment.

18. A "Captured Materiel Section" is recommended for each field army. It is suggested that such a section be organized to include all classes of supply of all the supply services.

19. The graves registration company is recommended for special study with a view toward changing its organization and equipment.




SECRET



UNLOADING AN LST ON THE BEACH AT MORLAIX



CLASS II SUPPLIES ARRIVE BY AIRLAKE



**SUPPLY POINTS
AUGUST 1944**



QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

ANNEX NO. 1

- CLASS I
- ⊗ CLASS II & IV
- △ CLASS III

SCALE
MILES 0 10 20 30 40 50


ASCZ



SECRET

QM
I


SECRET



**SUPPLY POINTS
SEPTEMBER 1944**

QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY
ANNEX NO. 2

- CLASS I
- ⊙ CLASS II & IV
- ⊙ CLASS III
- ⊙ ASCZ



WAREHOUSE SCENE AT CLASS I AND IV DEPOT NEAR TOUL




CLASS III BULK DECONTAMINATING POINT AT NANCY


**SUPPLY POINTS
OCTOBER - 1944**

QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY
ANNEX NO. 3

- CLASS I
- ⊙ CLASS II & IV
- ⊙ CLASS III




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
SECRET

REPAIR AND PAINTING OF STEEL HELMETS BY SALVAGE COLLECTING PERSONNEL



SUPPLY POINTS
NOVEMBER - 1944
QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

ANNEX 4



RENOVATION OF FIRE UNITS
BY FIELD RANGE REPAIR SHOP




INTERIOR VIEW OF MOBILE PETROLEUM LABORATORY



SECRET

SECRET


ANNEX 5A




SUPPLY POINTS DECEMBER - 1944

QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

- ① CLASS I
- ② CLASS II & IV
- ③ CLASS III



A VIEW OF ARMY CLASS III DECONTAMINATING POINT AT MANCIEULLES



OPEN STORAGE AT CLASS II AND IV DEPOT NUMBER 9




RATIONS BEING UNLOADED FROM DAILY TRAIN

SHIFT OF SUPPLY POINTS ANNEX 5B

SUPPLY POINTS OPERATING
19 DECEMBER

SUPPLY POINTS OPERATING
24 DECEMBER



QM
IV

SECRET





SECRET

ANNEX NO. 7


SUPPLY POINTS*
FEBRUARY - 1945

QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

○ CLASS I ○ CLASS II & IV ▼ CLASS III



* Class I Supply Point Number 81 and Number 83 and Class III Supply Points Number 82 and Number 84 were established on the BREST Peninsula during the month of August. See Annex Number 1.




ANNEX NO. 6

SUPPLY POINTS
JANUARY - 1945

QUARTERMASTER SECTION
THIRD U.S. ARMY

○ CLASS I ○ CLASS II & IV ▼ CLASS III






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QM
V


SUPPLY LINES ACROSS RIVERS

In addition to a number of smaller rivers that were crossed, major river barriers included the MOSELLE, the RHINE, and the MAIN. Adequate supply to combat troops, often dependent on the early rehabilitation and maintenance of bridges by the Engineers, was accomplished without any major difficulty.




ANNEX NO. 8

SUPPLY POINTS*
MARCH 1945
 QUARTERMASTER SECTION
 THIRD U.S. ARMY




- CLASS I
- ⊙ CLASS II&IV
- ▽ CLASS III

* CLASS III SUPPLY POINT NUMBER 95, IN THE VICINITY OF TRIER, WAS STOCKED BUT NEVER OPENED.




SECRET



ANNEX NO. 10

QUARTERMASTER SITUATION AS OF 082400 B MAY

THIRD U.S. ARMY



- ⊙ CLASS I
- ⊙ CLASS II & IV
- ⊙ CLASS III
- ⊙ SALVAGE POINT

SECRET

SIGNAL



HEADQUARTERS THIRD U.S. ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL CORPS
APO 103

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO : Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 103, U.S. Army

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Signal Section, Third U.S. Army Headquarters beginning with 25 March 1944 and continuing with the properly designated intervals by chapters.

2. It is believed that this report again illustrates the importance and complexity of modern military signal communications. The availability of such communications is greatly dependent upon the proper type and quantity. These two factors will inevitably determine the success or failure of any signal communication system.

3. The initial signal plans called for a greater number of Signal Corps troops than were ever available during operations on the Continent. There never was a period when additional signal personnel could not have been used to great advantage. This disadvantage was overcome, however, by the ingenuity, loyalty, and persistence of the Signal Corps soldier who remains imbued with our traditional slogan: "Get the message through!"


Alton E. Hammond

ALTON E. HAMMOND
Colonel, Signal Corps
Signal Officer

SECRET

SIGNAL SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



HEADQUARTERS

1. Supervision and coordination of activities of Signal Section Staff, Army signal troops and signal section staffs and troops of subordinate echelons.

ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL SUB-SECTION

1. Maintenance of Signal Section files. 2. Procurement and assignment of signal reinforcements and, procurement, assignment and transfer of Signal Corps Officers. 3. Reproduction and distribution of SOI items and other signal documents. 4. Supervision of all rear echelon communications.

COMMUNICATIONS SUB-SECTION

1. Planning, direction and supervision of the tactical employment of Signal Operation and Signal Construction Battalions of the Army Signal Service.
2. Obtaining information concerning signal systems of corps and lower units and commercial and other signal facilities in Third U.S. Army area. 3. Preparation and provisions for extending Army signal system to relieve corps and divisions of operating and maintaining rear installations, thus permitting these units to push their systems forward. This includes preparation and continuous revision of Line Route Map, Circuit Diagram, Radio Net Diagram and VHF Radio Relay Diagram. 4. Studying traffic handling in all Army units, and, on this basis recommending changes in construction, operation and maintenance procedures and equipment to expedite or improve such handling. 5. Coordination of action with training sub-section for changes in established SOP and with Supply sub-section for procurement of suitable equipment. 6. Preparation of items of SOI dealing with frequency and call sign allocations, row register index, air warning broadcast, air-ground visual code, identification panel code, pyrotechnic code and telephone code names. 7. Preparation of signal circulars covering operation of Army communication system.

PLANS AND OPERATIONS SUB-SECTION

1. Coordination of activities of operational signal units and of Army Signal sub-sections with policies and directives laid down by Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army and higher headquarters. 2. Maintenance of tactical situation map, location of operational units and station troop lists. 3. Supervision of section and unit histories, investigations, location and inspection of billeting spaces and bivouac areas and reception of visitors.

PHOTO SUB-SECTION

1. Keeping Signal Officer informed on all photographic matters. 2. Coordination of activities of Photo Assignment Officer and Commanding Officer of Signal Photo Company in order to provide necessary and adequate coverage for news, tactical and historical purposes. 3. Control and approval of all orders for photographic prints needed for tactical and historical purposes. 4. Responsibility for supervision and expediting transmittal of War Department film to Army Pictorial Service laboratories.

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SUB-SECTION

1. Maintenance of liaison with Army G-2 on all signal intelligence matters.
2. Supervision of all operational activities of Army and corps radio intelligence companies. 3. Radio counter measures. 4. Signal counter intelligence. 5. Solution of special codes and ciphers. 6. Examination and reproduction of captured signal intelligence and communication documents and dissemination to units and sections concerned. 7. Interrogation of special PW's and dissemination of information thus gained. 8. Maintenance of cryptographic, transmission and physical security in the Army. 9. Distribution of codes and ciphers. 10. Preparation of Army code and cipher SOI items. 11. Supervision of Army SIAM Company, Army Signal Pigeon Company and the Army Weather Detachment. 12. Supervision of all Army messenger and message center activities. 13. Supervision of wire, radio and messenger facilities for signal intelligence purposes.

ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

1. Collection, evaluation and disposition of captured enemy signal equipment. 2. Providing high authorities with detailed technical reports and suitable specimens of "new enemy equipment" in order that the maximum exploitation of this type of intelligence may be achieved. 3. Assisting Army Signal Service in determining availability and capability of enemy equipment for utilization.

SUPPLY SUB-SECTION

1. Procurement, storage and issue of signal equipment and maintenance of records pertaining thereto. 2. Supervision of operation of Army Signal Depot and Army Signal Repair. 3. Procurement of non-standard items from captured enemy signal equipment for utilization. 4. Maintenance of records pertaining to allowances of signal supplies for subordinate units. 5. Collection, reclamation and salvage of equipment, and reports of all losses of signal equipment.

SIGNAL SECTION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

SUB-SECTION	OFFICERS						EM
	BRIG GEN	COL	LT COL	MAJ	CAPT	LT	
HEADQUARTERS	1	1					4
ADMIN & PERS				1			7
PLANS & OPER			1				5
COMMUNICATIONS			1		5		11
SIGNAL INT SERV				1		3	11
SUPPLY			1		1		11
PHOTO			1	1			2
	1	1	3	3	6	3	51

SECRET

SECRET

CHAPTER 1
PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Section I - General

The time prior to 26 March was occupied primarily with the following matters:

- a. Clarification of administrative principles to be observed.
- b. Policies and methods to be followed on inspection trips.
- c. Outline for communication orientation talks.
- d. Maintaining by sections of a log of daily activities.

During this same period Signal Supply channels were established and brief courses in Signal Supply procedures were initiated for officers of battalion level and higher, in order to smooth out combat operation procedure.

Approximately on 25 March all personnel of the Signal Section had reported for duty. A conference was held on Signal Corps procedure and the status of Signal units. The exact locations of assigned and attached Signal Corps Units were determined and arrangements were made to bring the 160th Signal Photo Company to England from its station in North Ireland and to include the 33d Signal Construction Battalion in the scheduled messenger route.

During this same period, the Army Signal Service was streamlined with a view to complete operational efficiency and liaison was established with higher headquarters. The status of the 4th Armored Signal Battalion was reviewed and it was agreed with the G-3 Section that the best policy would be to retain control of this unit for the possible reinforcement of one of the corps. Shortly thereafter arrangements were completed with the Western Base Section's 102d Signal Inspection and Maintenance Team for the inspection and repair of the damaged equipment of this Battalion. The 2d, 3d, and 4th Signal Liaison Teams were relieved from Third U.S. Army while the 7th Signal Liaison Team remained for possible use with the 2d French Armored Division. A request was made that the 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company be assigned to Third U.S. Army. Finally, an officer representative of the Signal Section was dispatched to the First U.S. Army Group to assist in planning the forthcoming operations.

At the same time over-all policy changes were being assimilated into Third U.S. Army procedure. The Theater Signal Officer advised that Top Secret messages could be encoded in normal cryptographic systems on the condition that the words TOP SEC were buried in the text. Message centers down to and including corps, were directed to use a rubber stamp giving instructions for paraphrasing on all registered classified messages. The War Department furnished information that 15 December 1943 replacement factors were to be used in forthcoming operations and it was directed that figures based on actual consumption of field wire and similar Signal Supplies to show the average replenishment rate per day, per unit, of each major type would be included in the final report to the War Department.

By 15 April, operational plans had reached a tangible state. The First U.S. Army Group's Signal Outline Plan, which could not be published until the Group became operational, was received with a request for comments and return. It was also requested that Third U.S. Army Signal planning follow this outline as closely as possible in order that differences could be kept to a minimum.

Frequent conferences were held with the Signal and Communications Officers of the lower echelons to acquaint them with the functions of the Signal Section, outline changes in procedure and policy, and to discuss the forthcoming operations from a Signal aspect. Instances were encountered where it was considered unnecessary for unit Signal Officers to possess complete knowledge of the operation, although usually the very nature of their responsibilities required such knowledge if they were to serve their commanders effectively.

At one of these meetings the proposed operation "J" or SIAM was discussed. This Service (Signal Information and Monitoring) monitors friendly radio nets at division level; deciphers the message and immediately transmits information of value directly to Army by radio. This speeds the transmission of vital information direct to Army Head-

quarters. "J" Service is the British counterpart of this system. The Signal Officer was notified that "J" Service personnel would have to be drawn from the troops at our disposal. It was decided that until more permanent arrangements could be made, the 6th Cavalry Group would act as the Army Information Service.

Signal Officers were also instructed that Signal troops would have to be prepared to clear their own path through minefields during the construction of wire lines. In view of this, it was stressed that it would be necessary to familiarize all personnel concerned with the operation of the SCR-605 and that a sufficient quantity of these mine detectors would have to be made available to do the job.

One of the most far-reaching Signal changes at the time, was the adoption of a new type radio call-up procedure. Representatives of the Signal Section, First U.S. Army Group, visited the Third U.S. Army for the purpose of acquainting responsible officers with Link Sign Procedure. Differences between this method and the old double call sign system were outlined. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that, to a large degree, transmission security depended upon the understanding Staff and Signal Officers had of correct radio procedure.

In addition to the installation and coordination of the wire system required within and without the headquarters, Signal troops received further training experience by assisting the General Post Office with several telephone construction projects. Clearance from higher headquarters, required before a unit could be assigned a mission of this type, was received and the 33d Signal Construction Battalion completed its assigned projects in commendatory fashion.

At about this time a communication link was proposed between European Theater of Operations U.S. Army and Allied Forces Headquarters ALGIERS. The following information was furnished concerning estimated requirements of the Third U.S. Army:

- a. Amount of traffic for Allied Forces Headquarters through European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, if any: 1000 groups per day.
- b. Precedence of messages: 25% Operational Priority, 25% Priority, 50% Routines.
- c. Average groups per message: 50.
- d. Number of messages per twenty-four hour period: 20.
- e. Security: 10% Top Secret, 90% Secret.

Subordinate units, in the meantime, were aligning their Signal policies to conform to those outlined by the Signal Section. In some cases, requests for changes in policy or permission to vary from standard procedures were forwarded by these units. After discussion and consideration, certain of these requests were granted; others were not. The 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, for example, proposed that Third U.S. Army Signal policy allow all Tank Destroyer Brigade Group Commanders EE-8 telephones and test clips. This was to permit the respective Commanding Officers to call in on any line available in the combat area in case of emergency. The request was disapproved and strict orders were issued against any tapping of wire lines. It was felt that any benefits gained by wire tapping were more than offset by the possible interruption of priority calls.

Planning had now reached the point where it was particularly necessary to guard against breaches of security and to insure proper security precautions at all times. Messages were frequently being sent regarding the forthcoming operations and maps, plans, diagrams, and appendices to the master plan were in the process of preparation. It was of great importance to insure the integrity of all intelligence contained in documents of Top Secret and Bigot classifications. At a conference held by the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, the following points were brought out:

- a. Each Section Chief would make a complete inventory of Top Secret matter in his possession and make sure that all was registered.
- b. Necessary orders be given to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering restricted parts of the message center.
- c. A check be made to insure that storage facilities in all message centers provided adequate security. Top Secret material would always be kept locked in the safe when not in use.

By the first week of June attention had been directed to the Signal problems which would arise when the Third U.S. Army commenced its

movement towards and on to the Continent. It was estimated that minimum needs in the event of a displacement in the United Kingdom, were 20 trunks and 150 locals. The 150 locals could be field phones, and we could use our own switchboards. Further, in a conference with the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, it was directed that a study be made of communications between forward and rear echelons when on different sides of the channel, with details to be shown in diagrammatic form. (See Annex 1)

The Signal Officer was requested to prepare a simple code indicating types of units, for short messages to be used between Commanding Generals of forward and rear echelons.

To provide full Signal operating strength for Army Headquarters, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army was requested to furnish additional personnel to operate facilities in the rear echelon. The request was approved by the Signal Officer, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army and the personnel made available until D plus forty-five. The Signal Officer, XX Corps, was informed that in compliance with instructions for preparation for Overseas Movement, all Army detachments attached to corps become corps responsibilities.

A conference was held by the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, and the following Signal matters were taken up directly with the Commanding General, Communications Zone:

a. The necessity for one additional Signal Operation Battalion and one additional Signal Construction Battalion was emphasized. These additional units had been approved, but were not yet available in the Theater. It was requested that, even though they could not immediately be made available, they be activated and furnished as soon as possible. The point was brought out that the lack of these battalions might hold up the advance of the Third U.S. Army.

b. The matter of the return of Signal Corps equipment projects to Third U.S. Army through routine channels was discussed. Certain of these projects were returned for revision downward, although they were similar to those of the First U.S. Army which had been approved. It was requested that in future cases of this sort, proper representatives from this Headquarters be asked to visit LONDON or elsewhere to make necessary adjustments.

By 15 June, two cross-channel air dispatch services had been arranged for. The first was a straight air dispatch letter service already put in operation by the Ninth U.S. Air Force. The second was a special service by the 10th Photo Group to provide a connecting link between advance and rear echelons of the photo center serving the Third U.S. Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command.

On 29 June, displacement was made to the Marshalling Area at NINE YEWS (U 43) and Braemore House, preliminary to embarkation for the Continent. The communication network at the new command post site was temporary, utilizing the General Post Office switchboard at Braemore House and a field switchboard at NINE YEWS (U 43). Communication was available by direct line to the rear echelon at Toft Camp and to Southern Base Section. Ten trunks were operating between Braemore House and NINE YEWS (U 43).

The Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, directed forward echelon "X" loaded on vehicles on a two-hour alert basis from 1800, 2 July, and the 301st Signal Operation Battalion, 33d Signal Construction Battalion, and 100th Signal Photo Company were phased for movement immediately thereafter.

The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that on his visit to the target area, all supplies, except ammunition and Signal, seemed adequate. The shortage of Signal supplies had not yet hampered operations due to capture of many commercial installations and because the distances involved within the beachhead area were not great.

The advance party of the Signal Section departed for the Continent at 040045 July. The Signal Officer, XII Corps, arrived and was oriented on the status of administrative and personnel matters to be handled for Third U.S. Army in his capacity as Signal Officer, rear echelon, Third U.S. Army. The Signal Section loaded 4 July, departed for the embarkation area, and embarked on military transport, John G. Whittier. The vessel cleared her moorings at 042015 and dropped anchor at UTAH BRACH at 052200, July. Unloading was completed at 061230 and the LCT beached at 061400, July.

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Section II - Administration and Personnel

The period spent in the United Kingdom was one of adjustment, necessary changes and improvements to bring an Army Signal Service to operational efficiency being effected in this Subsection and the following actions taken:

Authority was requested from First U.S. Army Group to requisition 15% overstrength of company grade officers, warrant officers and enlisted men for all Signal Corps units assigned, or to be assigned.

The Signal Officer, First U.S. Army Group, approved a request for Assistant Signal Officers in Infantry divisions in the grade of major.

Reorganization of Signal Radio Intelligence Companies was made to include Type IB Traffic Analysis Unit. Information was received from the European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, that reorganization under new T/O & E's would not be required. In this connection the 92d Signal Battalion was directed to return to the old T/O & E 11-15, dated 1 April 1942, and any reorganization that had been effected was cancelled.

Under the proposed replacement system, replacement requisitions of Signal personnel were directed to be forwarded directly from units to this headquarters by any available means of communication. Such information would be acted upon as soon as received. The informal reports must then be confirmed as soon as possible by formal requisition.

On the 19th of April negotiations were started for the Air Transport Command to assist in getting supplies to Signal units located in North Ireland. This plan later materialized and the action was of the utmost importance to Signal Supply.

Corps submitted lists of current signal officer shortages existing in their units.

It was necessary to shift personnel between various Signal Units to fill urgently needed requirements. Replacements of high-speed radio operators were expected about 15 May.

Signal Units assigned or attached to the Third U.S. Army and located in North Ireland were moved to England to facilitate control, operation and preparation for the operational period.

The Air Force District Personnel Officer was asked to make available any excess Air Corps personnel with Signal Corps training. European Theater of Operations promised to support the proposed trade of basics for this personnel. Several replacements were acquired in this manner.

Great numbers of routine personnel assignments for training and many reports were handled.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

The major responsibilities of Signal Intelligence Service during the period in the United Kingdom were:

- Supervising the training of radio intelligence companies.
- Supplying cryptographic devices, documents and instructions.
- Maintaining signal security through inspection, monitoring and instruction.
- Supervising counter-signal intelligence plans in Third U.S. Army in conformity with the overall plans of European Theater of Operations U.S. Army.
- Planning for signal intelligence, cryptographic and signal security activities during operations.

Four Signal Service Companies (RI) were activated, equipped and given intensive training, including operational experience in South-eastern England after D-Day, for their functions as radio intelligence companies for Third U.S. Army's corps. Their training, like that of the Army Signal Radio Intelligence Company, was coordinated closely with Signal Intelligence Service, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, to insure uniform radio intelligence training throughout the Theater of Operations.

The largest distribution of a cryptographic item was that of Slidex, a new type of cryptographic device for traffic of low grade security. A total of 17,800 Slidexes was issued in the United Kingdom. Two schools were conducted to train officers, of Third U.S. Army Staff and of subordinate units in the use of this device.

A monitoring team at Army Headquarters made periodic checks to insure maintenance of telephone security. Radio monitoring was accomplished by European Theater of Operations U.S. Army during this period, but it was anticipated that this function would be carried out later by a SIAM Company scheduled to be assigned to Third U.S. Army for operations. When word was received from European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, however, that the SIAM Company could not be trained in time for initial combat, plans were made to make security monitoring a function of radio intelligence companies. Complete Signal Operation Instructions of Army units were furnished the Army Signal Radio Intelligence Company for this purpose.

Although teletype lines in the United Kingdom were classified as secure for secret messages in the clear, Third U.S. Army still required all secret messages to be encyptographed. This gave valuable pre-operational training to code room personnel, accustomed the staff to writing messages for encyptographing, and brought to light many difficulties in paraphrasing, stereotyped phraseology and other factors inherent in encyptographing messages. They were corrected as they arose. From the adoption of this policy between 12 April and 30 June, the Third U.S. Army Code Room handled 223,869 code groups.

Throughout the United Kingdom the volume of all radio traffic was regulated from week to week in such a manner as to thwart enemy signal intelligence agencies. Regulation of training traffic in Third U.S. Army for this purpose was controlled through Signal Intelligence Service in accordance with the plans of higher headquarters. Assistance also was given by Signal Intelligence Service to certain specialized counter-signal intelligence units operating under higher headquarters' direction in the Third U.S. Army zone.

When Signal Intelligence Service was made responsible for Detachment ZY, 21st Weather Squadron, arrangements were made for twice daily weather forecasts for the staff, plus special weather data for artillery and anti-aircraft artillery firing.

To establish proper security control over reproduction of secret and top secret war maps and highly classified signal intelligence documents, a small photographic detachment was added to Signal Intelligence Service on 15 May.

Section II - Communications

During the planning period in the United Kingdom, the Communication Subsection supervised the operation of communication facilities then in use, and worked on plans for the operational period after D-Day. Wire trunk facilities were all obtained from the British General Post Office and consisted of General Postoffice circuits made available through the various base sections. Wire plans and possible routes were studied and used as a basis for personnel, equipment, and material requirements. The number of circuits necessary, to various installations within and beyond our headquarters, were established. A study was made of British Multi-Airline open wire construction and the necessary information disseminated to the construction companies of Army and Corps. The same procedure was followed with French open wire and cable.

Close liaison with higher Signal echelons was maintained and every effort was made to bring the Army Signal Units and those of lower echelons into complete agreement on operational procedure. Signal Operation Instructions, and procedure in the form of Signal Circulars, were compiled and issued as part of the Third U.S. Army Plan. Signal Operation Instructions were exchanged with the XIX Tactical Air Command for mutual benefit. To meet the demand for speedy transmission of messages by other than electrical means between Headquarters Third U.S. Army, subordinate unit headquarters and supply installations, it became necessary to establish an air messenger service. This operated to all parts of England and to units in Northern Ireland.

Corps and Army troops using radio were instructed to submit monthly reports of detected violations of radio transmission security. These reports were compiled and forwarded to Signal Intelligence Service for study and corrective action.

The procurement of special equipment allotted to us was a constant problem, especially as regards radio link, carrier, and field scramblers. A procedure for using CF 1 and 2 equipment in conjunction with

the SCR-399 for teletype was developed by this section and put in operation by the 301st Signal Operation Battalion. The speech channels plus four teletype channels worked very well.

To insure a minimum of interference in Frequency Modulation radio operation a system of channel allocation was designed and put in operation. This replaced the old method of turning loose all FM channels to organizations authorized this equipment. The Third U.S. Army received twenty-nine radio frequencies for Army circuits and Army troops. The SCR-543, 536, 511 and the 300, 500 and 600 series were allowed to operate on all channels and Third U.S. Army allotted them under the above plan.

It was found that the code block assignment made to Third U.S. Army was not applicable to the French language. A request was made to European Theater of Operations U.S. Army for a block assignment to meet this specific problem in order to provide for the needs of the 2d French Armored Division.

To provide necessary information on mine fields to our construction Battalions, it was arranged with the G-2 Section that the Signal Section receive distribution of G-2 mine field maps. Three copies were furnished, one for each Construction Battalion and one for the Communication Subsection which was made available to the Signal Operation Battalion.

Section II - Plans & Operations

In many respects, the Plans and Operations Subsection continued the work originally started by them in the States. This consisted of arranging for training facilities, checking the training programs in use, and arranging for the testing of the various Signal Units. The new equipment involved made it necessary for special schools to be set up and a rigid control exercised on the facilities available.

Classes were conducted for representatives of each staff section in the use of Slidex, radio telephone procedure, Signal Operation Instructions and message writing, and in the correct use of the message center.

A radio test team was formed and conducted tests in radio procedure and security prior to releasing Third U.S. Army units from the radio silence imposed by European Theater of Operations U.S. Army.

Section II - Supply

The Signal Supply Subsection was assembled by 26 March and work on the planning phase for coming operations was started the next day. Arrangements and plans to equip Third U.S. Army units with Table of Basic Allowances equipment and supplies were made immediately.

Equipping of units was the responsibility of the Services of Supply in the United Kingdom. Due to the number of organizations, the frequency of arrivals, the difficulty of movements within England, coupled with the current overloads on the English transport system, it became necessary for the Army Signal Supply Section to arrange for its own truck and air transport from all Service of Supply Depots to Third U.S. Army units. Truck transport was organized from Third U.S. Army units to handle group loads from depots within travel spheres established after consideration of the geographical location of the organizations to be supplied. Air transport was provided by the Transport Command for all Signal equipment and supplies to those organizations based in Northern Ireland. Sea transport was also requested, but was not available.

After a study of the plans for the coming operations, the necessity for reviewing equipment and supplies of the units of Third U.S. Army became apparent. These studies by all elements of the Signal Service of the Army, from separate company to battalion, were made from an operational viewpoint. The resulting summary was submitted to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, for approval as an operational requirement for all Army units. The resulting project was verbally approved by Headquarters European Theater of Operations on 1 June.

The supply in the Army area was set at a seven-day level by the Theater. Summaries of all equipment in the hands of Third U.S. Army organizations, based on the latest Troop List, were made. Stocks required for the depot operation were determined by applying the War Department Maintenance Factors to the equipment in the hands of the Army. A thirty-day level of expendable items was obtained in the same manner.

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Requisitions were prepared for depot stocks to be delivered on the Continent. The period of D / 30 through D / 41 was covered by requisitions and phased into allotted delivery tonnages. The supply of Class II items was made the responsibility of the Communication Zone for the period of D / 42 and on. Requisitions for Class IV requirements and special continental construction projects were made and phased into the operation for the period D / 42 through D / 90.

Spare part requirements for all Signal equipment were based on the Spare Parts Lists of the European Theater of Operations in effect at this time. Requisitions for spare parts were prepared, submitted and phased for all Signal Corps equipment of Third U.S. Army units.

The tonnages estimated to be required for the supply of Third U.S. Army for the period D / 24 through D / 41 are shown on the Tonnage Chart. Requisitions covering equipment and supplies within the tonnage allocation per day were prepared and submitted on 24 April.

CHAPTER 2
PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Section I - General

After debarkation on the Continent, the Signal Section proceeded to the command post at NEHOV (T 19), north of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19), on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. Instructions received indicated the Third U.S. Army would not become operational until the fall of AVRANCHES (T 21). The installation of communication facilities and officially contacting any operational units, was prohibited until we became operational.

The Signal Officers, First U.S. Army and Third U.S. Army, arranged the following matters:

a. The Third U.S. Army would check the CHERBOURG (O 12), ST MALO (S 71), and other German built lines, and inform VIII Corps and First U.S. Army of their location.

b. First U.S. Army to loan one complete radio link to the Third U.S. Army.

c. The retuning of our teletype machines to operate at British speed was considered and rejected.

d. The Signal Officer of First U.S. Army requested and received the use of one Storage and Issue Section of the 579th Signal Depot Company and one Platoon of the 187th Signal Repair Company to operate the Signal Dump at Utah Beach; also Photographic General Assignment Units from the 166th Signal Photo Company.

e. Pole line between ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19) and VALOGNES (O 20) was rebuilt by Third U.S. Army Signal Construction Troops to form a ten-pin open wire lead with standard construction and transposition.

It was directed that our axis of Signal Communication follow that of the VIII Corps as closely as possible during the latter's advance down the coast.

The following Signal arrangements were made with Advance Section Communications Zone:

a. Third U.S. Army to continue the ten-pair open wire build south of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19). Supplies would be furnished by Advance Section Communications Zone.

b. Two additional physical circuits were allocated the Third U.S. Army from Lucky Command Post north to XX Corps, thus giving Third U.S. Army one full ten-pin crossarm of pole line.

c. Spacing of arms on open wire leads would be twenty-four inches.

Agreement was reached on the responsibilities of Advance Section Communications Zone and the allocation of circuits in the Army area. Third U.S. Army had full jurisdiction of all circuits to Army rear boundary. Circuits within Army area were to be allotted to Advance Section Communications Zone as requested and as the tactical situation

TONNAGE CHART

DAY	PERSONNEL		OPERATIONAL RESERVES						MAINTENANCE RESERVES					
	DAILY	CUMULATIVE	CLASS II		CLASS IV		TOTAL		CLASS II		CLASS IV		TOTAL	
			L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T	L/T	M/T
D/24			.3	.8	.4	.6	.7	1.4	.3	.3	.4	.6	.7	1.4
D/25			.3	.8	.4	.6	.7	1.4	.3	.3	.4	.6	.7	1.4
D/26			2.2	5.6	2.5	3.8	4.7	9.4	2.2	5.6	2.5	3.8	4.7	9.4
D/27			6.5	16.2	7.1	10.8	13.6	27.0	6.4	16.0	7.3	11.0	13.7	27.0
D/28			11.3	28.3	12.8	19.2	24.1	47.5	11.4	28.5	22.7	34.1	34.1	62.6
D/29	14249	14249	5.1	12.8	5.7	8.6	10.3	21.4	5.1	12.8	196.2	294.3	201.3	307.1
D/30	5124	19373	6.9	17.3	7.8	11.7	14.7	29.0	6.9	17.3	98.3	148.2	105.7	165.5
D/31	5253	24626	8.8	22.0	9.9	14.9	18.7	36.9	8.8	22.0	160.5	240.8	169.3	262.8
D/32	12881	37507	13.2	33.0	15.0	22.5	28.2	55.5	13.4	33.5	82.1	123.2	95.5	156.7
D/33	7573	45080	15.9	39.8	18.0	27.0	33.9	66.8	16.9	42.3	170.6	255.9	187.5	298.2
D/34	7991	53071	18.8	47.0	21.2	31.8	40.0	78.8	19.0	47.5	231.0	346.5	250.0	349.0
D/35	8424	61495	21.8	54.5	24.6	36.9	46.4	91.4	22.0	55.0	209.4	314.1	231.4	369.1
D/36	8471	69966	20.2	50.5	22.9	34.4	43.1	84.9	25.4	63.5	216.0	324.0	241.4	387.5
D/37	4722	74688	20.8	52.0	23.3	35.0	44.1	87.0	26.7	66.8	220.2	330.3	246.9	397.1
D/38	5086	79774	22.0	55.0	24.9	37.4	46.9	92.4	28.5	71.3	374.6	561.9	403.1	633.2
D/39	5468	85242	22.0	55.0	24.7	37.1	46.7	92.1	30.4	76.0	371.7	557.6	402.1	633.6
D/40	5345	90587	25.9	64.8	29.0	43.5	54.9	108.3	32.4	81.0	362.9	544.4	395.3	625.4
D/41	7052	97639	10.5	101.3	45.4	68.1	85.9	169.4	33.9	84.8	247.9	371.4	282.8	456.2
	87639	753297	262.5	656.7	295.6	443.9	558.1	1100.6	290.0	725.5	2975.2	4462.7	3265.2	5188.2

* L/T Long Ton, 2200 Pounds
M/T Measured Ton, 2000 Pounds

NOTE: Organizational Equipment Tonnages that cannot be carried in basic load will be taken from Maintenance Tonnages column. Adequate allowances have been made for this.

permitted, Advance Section Communications Zone agreed to bring supply lines (common user circuits) to Army rear boundary or to the nearest switching central. This agreement in no way effected previous arrangements made for three commercial news circuits to CHERBOURG (O 12). From information received, it was learned that Press Wireless and McRay Radio Organization had secured licenses for operation of fifteen kilowatt radio transmitters on the Continent to handle commercial dispatches direct to the United States.

The Chief of Staff directed that a continuous check be maintained of message traffic to prevent delays through the transmission of inconsequential messages by electrical means.

One hundred and sixty-four Third U.S. Army trucks were kept on the road hauling and placing Signal supplies. About fifteen percent of our needed supplies had been received, but we were unable to get spare radios either for stock or replacements. An acute shortage of batteries BA 38, used principally in the mine detector SCR-625 and in radio SCR-536, was encountered.

The Section was advised that the Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Third U.S. Army would become operational at 1200, Tuesday, 1 August. It was predicted that radios, and motor and air messengers, would be the principal agencies of Signal communication during the forthcoming operations. (See Circuit Diagrams and Line Route Map, Annexes 2 and 3)

Section II - Administration and Personnel

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) Detachment #8, composed of four officers and six enlisted men, arrived on the Continent. The Detachment was attached to the Third U.S. Army.

Four French and four German linguists arrived from the United Kingdom. One each was immediately assigned to each Construction and Operation Battalion and one each to the Signal Section.

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Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

The following steps were taken to increase the effectiveness of Signal Intelligence:

- a. A daily conference, for the exchange of intelligence, was held at the G-2 Section with representatives of the Signal Intelligence Service and 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company.
- b. To provide office space and communication facilities for Signal Intelligence Operations and Army Information Service a six-ton van was outfitted and located in the G-2, G-3 area.
- c. Arrangements were made with prisoner of war and document examination teams to forward items of interest to Signal Intelligence Service.
- d. Radio Intelligence and Radio Security Monitoring Directives were drafted for distribution.
- e. Detailed plans were made for coordinating signal intelligence with higher, lower and lateral headquarters.
- f. Although Third U.S. Army was not operational, interception of enemy traffic was begun, and the intelligence derived therefrom was reported to G-2.

A change to Signal Circular 122-1 was distributed permitting the majority of messages of secret or lower classification to be sent in the clear by teletype over Army wire lines.

A change of Signal Circular 141-1 was distributed making the Army Signal Office the office of record for all medium cryptographic material. Formerly, Corps had been sub-offices of record for such material. Under the change they were relieved of this responsibility and became only distribution agencies for such material. Signal Intelligence Service transferred records from Corps Signal Offices to its own files.

The Signal Intelligence Service was reorganized into the following subsections for operational purposes:

- a. Signal Intelligence Operations (to coordinate the activities of Signal Intelligence agencies).
- b. Documents and Research (to assist the Army Radio Intelligence Company and Corps Signal Service Companies (RI) by obtaining, condensing and disseminating technical data from captured documents and by conducting long-term research).
- c. Security and Administration (to handle code and cipher distribution, signal security and administrative duties).

Section II - Communications

Prior to becoming operational an open wire axis, running generally north and south, was pushed south nearly to LESSAY (T 17). A former German naval wire installation was used after the cross arms and wire had been removed. U.S. type arms, wire and transposition were employed. The BRICQUEBEC (O 10) - CHERBOURG (O 12) section was constructed by the Advance Section, Communication Zone. This build provided ten circuits south from CHERBOURG (O 12), and insured communications between the Army Command Post, CHERBOURG (O 12) and cross-channel to the United Kingdom via submarine cable or radio link.

One spiral-four cable installed by the First U.S. Army to VIII Corps was extended by the Third U.S. Army as the Corps displaced. Material was furnished by the First U.S. Army and a supply dump was operated by the 33d Signal Construction Battalion.

During a heavy rain, trouble developed on several telephone circuits and investigation revealed the following points:

- a. Spiral-four connectors were lying in water.
- b. Test points were unprotected from the elements.
- c. Improper clearance had been allowed for vehicular traffic.

These points, and the fact that trouble teams stopped working on the circuits at dark, resulted in circuits being out of service for too long a period. Instructions were immediately issued to correct these conditions.

Open wire facilities available, western section of CHERBOURG PENINSULA allocated as follows:

	Maintained	Total Circuits	Allocation
CARENTAN (T 38)-(LA HAYE DU PUITZ (T 18))	ADSEC	10	Pole group First U.S. Army 2 Groups, IX AF to XIX TAC 2 Groups - Advance Section Communications Zone
VALOGNES (O 20)-(ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (T 19))	TUSA	5	1 Group First U.S. Army Master Rear-Lucky; Lucky-Marathon Switch. 1 Group First U.S. Army Master Rear-Marathon Switch. Pole Pair Eng Ckt terminate at Wire Chief Master Rear; Marathon Switch; Lucky.
NEHOUE (T 19) TEST-LA HAYE DU PUITZ (T 18))	TUSA	10	Pins 1-4 1 Group Lucky-Monarch Pins 7-10 1 Group Lucky-Comet (also for Forward Displacement Lucky CP) Pins 11-14 1 Group IX AF-XIX TAC Pins 17-20 1 Group XIX TAC-IX TAC Pins 5-6 1 pair Anaconda-Lucky; Lucky-Actor Pins 15-16 1 pair Anaconda-Actor
NEHOUE (T 19) TEST-BRIC-QUEBEC (O 10))	TUSA	10	To be allocated between Advance Section Communications Zone and Third U.S. Army as required - no conflict in requirements at present or forseen.

Section II - Supply

On 31 July the following equipment and supplies comprised the total stock in the hands of the Signal Supply Officer, Third U.S. Army.

Wire W-110	6000 miles
Rad Set SCR-300	1
Rad Set SCR-508	1
Rad set SCR-510	1
Rad set SCR-511	8
Standard Pole Line	10 miles
BMAL	80 miles
Spiral-four Cable	80 miles
31 Misc items	in very small quantities.

The Commanding General, Advance Section Communications Zone, was informed of the following Signal supply difficulties encountered by Third U.S. Army.

- a. Long hauls for all of our supplies (pole line material, BMAL, etc).
- b. Labor had to be sent with the trucks to load the supplies.
- c. Signal Depots closed after 1800, without officers or top non-commissioned officers.
- d. Delays in paper work occurred at the depots. Our personnel often had waited hours for the depots to open for business.
- e. Errors in depot paper work once had resulted in sixty trucks out of 164 being returned empty in one day.

All of the above resulted in an excessive delay to Third U.S. Army. Corrective measures were taken immediately.

The following releases were obtained:

Reel Unit RL-26	15
Reel Unit RL-17	64
Converters M-209	50
Telephones EE-8	1000

Wire W-110	All available in depot
Wire W-130	All available in depot
Power Unit PE-175	12
Teletype EE-97	3
Radio Link, Complete 100-mile	1

Any supplies, appearing on our phased requisition, which could be found were released. Advance Section Communications Zone was now hauling all supplies to us, furnishing all labor, and making every effort to assist us. Our problems eased somewhat due to the effective and aggressive actions of the Commanding General, and of the Signal Officer, Advance Section Communications Zone.

**CHAPTER 3
AUGUST OPERATIONS**

Section I - General

The Signal Officer assembled officers of the Communication Sub-section and discussed the impending Third U.S. Army drive to the east, with three corps abreast, and the probable Corps axes, with the XII Corps on the right, the XX Corps in the center, and the XV Corps on the left. It was predicted that the Third U.S. Army axis would probably follow that of the XX Corps in the center, since an elaborate under-ground cable system followed this route towards PARIS (S 04). The shortage of Signal equipment and Signal Construction troops precluded the simultaneous build in divergent directions of Third U.S. Army wire axis behind each of the three Corps. The under-ground cable was planned to be opened at points along the Army axis, and rehabilitated open wire, spiral-four, or rapid pole line construction installed to successive Command Post locations of the XII and XV Corps.

The Third U.S. Army moved rapidly eastward soon after becoming operational. The selection and establishment of command posts was a continuous process. The distances involved, and the rapidity of command post displacements of divisions, corps and the Army, at times made radio our primary means of communication. Practically over night the Signal troops, by necessity, became veterans. Close liaison with corps was maintained. This enabled the Third U.S. Army Signal Service to keep abreast of contemplated command post displacements and of the associated wire line changes.

Existing open wire facilities were exploited to the maximum, but frequently it was found more expeditious to lay new circuits.

The axis of Signal communication in effect on 6 August was as follows:

- a. THIRD ARMY: LE REPAS (T 23) - POILLEY (T 30) - CHATEAU GONTIER (J 71) - DISSAY SOUS COURCILLON (P 59) - CHATEAUDUN (W 26) - DOURDAN (R 70).
- b. VIII CORPS: VERGONCEY (T 20) - DOL (S 90) -
- c. XII CORPS: SARTILLY (T 22) -
- d. XV CORPS: LES CHERIS (T 31) - ST PIERRE LA COUR (Y 45) (at 5251, halfway between VITRE (Y 35) and LAVAL (Y 64) - LAVAL (Y 64) - LE MANS (Y 46).
- e. XX CORPS: ST MARTIN DE LANDELLE (T 40) - VITRE (Y 35) - SEGRE (J 50) - CHATEAUNEUF SUR SARTHE (J 80) - RAUGE (P 18).

Information of importance to the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) that divisions uncovered was acted upon as soon as received. In the early stages of the advance the best sources of enemy equipment were block houses, dugouts, fortifications and command posts. When these fixed defense posts were passed, small scattered supply points and immobilized railroad trains were the most important collection points. One train located at VILLENEUVE SUR YONNE (X 65) yielded five cars of Signal equipment, including radio pack sets, carrier equipment, teletype, spare parts, etc. Items having an intelligence value were studied and reports submitted. Specimens were shipped to G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces for further study and distribution. All other items were either utilized by the Third U.S. Army if needed or released to the Communications Zone.

The two Signal Battalions (Operation and Construction) previously requested by Third U.S. Army and approved by the Higher Headquarters, were not available at this time. In order to assist us, the Twelfth

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U.S. Army Group attached one-half of the 26th Signal Operation Company to the Third U.S. Army.

The Signal Troops of the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) were unable to provide operational circuits fast enough to keep pace with the Command Post displacements of the Third U.S. Army. Instructions were given that circuits between forward and rear echelons of the Third U.S. Army would be allocated as follows:

- 1st and third circuits - common user.
- 2d and fourth circuits - XIX Tactical Air Command.
- All circuits in excess of four - common user.

To graphically illustrate the communication problem, photographs have been inserted to show the status of communication agencies prior to each displacement of the Command Post. (See Annexes 4 through 18)

It was emphasized that link radio equipment would be vital to the maintenance of Signal communication between Third U.S. Army and its three Corps in a rapidly moving situation. XV Corps was directed to retain its present link equipment. The next link equipment received was allocated to the XII and XX Corps in that order.

The following policy was announced by the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army: Wire will always be installed. When physically possible, telephone will be considered as the most important wire means of communication. The Chief of Staff emphasized that this did not mean that he was against teletype, but that his personal contacts over the phone to the Corps Commanders could not be adequately replaced by any other form of communication.

Another construction company was requested for the temporary use of Third U.S. Army. The 267th Signal Construction Company was attached.

Signal officers of the XV and XX Corps were informed of the following matters:

- a. "A" Company of the 33d Signal Construction Battalion and the 267th Signal Construction Company would support the XX and XV Corps respectively.
- b. The principal mission of these companies was to insure rapid establishment of communications with Army Headquarters, and that when this was accomplished they could be used by the Corps Signal Officer as he desired.

c. The company supporting XV Corps was responsible for maintaining a pool of 100 miles of spiral-four. The company supporting XX Corps had the same responsibility for 150 miles of spiral-four.

The predicted Command Post locations on our present axis, extended, were announced as follows:

JANVILLE (W 67)
FITHIVIERS (W 96)
SENS (X 66)

The approved procedure for opening toll cables was outlined by Twelfth U.S. Army Group as follows:

- a. Requests for necessary work would be made to the Twelfth U.S. Army Group liaison officers.

b. Opening of cables to be done by their crews.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that we would shortly receive a 100-mile radio link system, with operating personnel and trucks. This would include two terminal and three relay stations. The remaining systems requested would be delivered as soon as possible.

On 31 August, wire communication was not established promptly after a command post displacement of the XX Corps. Upon investigation it developed that the reasons for slow installation were as follows:

- a. The long move of the Corps Command Post from MONTMIRAIL (S 99) to LOUVOIS (T 36) was made with insufficient prior warning to the Corps Signal Officer.
- b. XX Corps Headquarters vehicles were delayed in crossing the SEINE RIVER because of the destruction of many bridges.
- c. Non-receipt of warning orders sent by XX Corps to the Executive Officer of Army Signal Service, who was forward with the advance echelon at the time. The measured distance from Third U.S. Army

Command Post to the XX Corps Command Post over the shortest practical cable route was 81.9 miles. The Signal Officer, XX Corps, telephoned soon after the Executive Officer returned to Third U.S. Army Headquarters and announced that the XX Corps Command Post would immediately displace again directly east to a point some fifty miles beyond its planned location.

A method was worked out to install a radio link station to span the gap of 120 miles between Command Posts of the Third U.S. Army and XX Corps.

Section II - Administration and Personnel

Moves of Rear Echelon for the month of August were as follows:

1. NEHOU (T 19)-BEAUCHAMPS (T 23) 3 Aug 1944 59 miles
BEAUCHAMPS (T 23)-POILLEY (T 30) 10-11 Aug 1944 32 miles
POILLEY (T 30)-LA BAZOGE (T 51) 17-18 Aug 1944 102 miles
LA BAZOGE (T 51)-COURCY AUX LOGES (W 85) 25 Aug 1944 139 miles

2. Average number of telephones installed per displacement: 70
3. Average cable and wire installed per displacement:

Field Wire - 11 miles
5-Pair Cable - 42,000 feet
10-Pair Cable - 18,000 feet

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

The Security and Administrative Subsection of Signal Intelligence Service was moved from the rear to the forward echelon when it was found codes and ciphers could not be distributed effectively from the rear echelon.

Due to the expansion of the Army Information Service detachment at Third U.S. Army Headquarters, the detachment moved from the Signal Intelligence Operations van and set up a separate installation at G-3.

On 23 August, Signal Intelligence Service assumed responsibility for direction of the message center. Until that date its only responsibility in connection with the message center was through the code rooms. Third U.S. Army Code Rooms handled an average of 10,000 code groups per day during August.

The following Signal Intelligence communications network was established:

- a. Direct teletype circuits from the Army Radio Intelligence Company to each Corps Signal Service Company (RI).
- b. A parallel radio net for use when teletype circuits were inoperative.
- c. A direct teletype and direct telephone line from the Army Radio Intelligence Company to Signal Intelligence Operations.

Signal intelligence initially was passed by teletype along from the Army Radio Intelligence Company to Signal Intelligence Operations for delivery to G-2. Late in August, however, increased realization of the importance of signal intelligence led to extension of the direct telephone line to the G-2 situation section. The Radio Intelligence Company reported spot intelligence on this wire simultaneously to Signal Intelligence Service and G-2. Telephone reports were followed by teletype reports in greater detail.

(Note: Due to security restrictions prescribed by higher headquarters, results of Signal Intelligence may not be included in this report).

Section II - Communications

The drive of the Third U.S. Army developed so rapidly that it was impossible to establish the wire communication system outlined during the planning phase. Time usually prohibited laying more than one spiral-four to each Corps.

The open wire build completed to LESSAY (T 17) was extended by spiral-four circuits to the new command post location in the vicinity

of LE BINGARD (T 26). A switching central was established at this junction point. Construction of the open wire build was discontinued by Third U.S. Army at COUTANCES (T 25). The construction personnel was used to continue the Army axis with spiral-four cable, and to establish wire communications with the corps.

Spiral-four was only available in limited quantities for training. Problems in handling this cable correctly, became evident. Construction teams were instructed in the characteristics of this particular cable. It was emphasized that care must be taken to prevent breaking the inner insulation; connectors must be clean and dry; and each quarter mile section must be tested as laid.

Two EB-89 Repeaters worked satisfactorily over a fifty-five mile length of spiral-four. It was found that on a combination open wire spiral-four installation, this type of repeater would not give satisfactory results.

The Third U.S. Army received its first radio link equipment five days after becoming operational. During the month of August a total of four 100-mile systems were received. Due to the tactical situation radio link provided the most dependable means of communication between Army echelons and from Army to the Corps. Twenty-eight separate radio link circuits were installed and operated over distances totaling 1,175 miles.

Maximum use was made of all the equipment and it frequently was operated point to point without a relay over distances up to seventy-eight miles. Telephone carrier terminals were used in conjunction with radio link. Channels two and four were connected to the switchboard and two teletype circuits were placed on channel three. Channel one was used by the radio operators for engineering purposes. The radio stations were connected to the carrier terminals with spiral-four cable.

During August the Third U.S. Army received twenty-four trained radio link personnel from the Advance Section Communications Zone. Forty additional men from various Army Signal units were trained and used for the operation of radio link.

The Communication Subsection of the Army Signal Service was directly responsible for the installation and operation of this equipment. This action was necessary because the T/O of the Signal Operations Battalion fails to provide for radio link operators, or for frequency modulation repairmen. Using this method the Radio Officer of the Communication Subsection exercised direct supervision and was charged with full responsibility.

During the month of August the Army Command Post displaced eight times. The displacement distances involved were from twenty-three to eighty miles each. The average mileage was forty-eight miles.

On 1 August, CW (Continuous Wave) radio nets were opened to higher headquarters, all major subordinate units, and to the First U.S. Army.

A shortage of radio equipment and operating personnel made it necessary to put more stations into nets than was desirable. At times as many as five stations were netted which resulted in the following problems:

- a. Units frequently became widely separated putting them beyond effective ground wave reception, yet too close for twenty-four hour sky wave operation.

b. It was also difficult for an NCS (Net Control Station) to use special antennas in all of the directions required by some nets. However, half wave doublets were used to an advantage.

Initially, several point to point radio nets were used. However, with the frequent moves of the Command Post, and with the time element keeping wire communication to a minimum, it became necessary to use a complete set of radio equipment and operating personnel for each Command Post displacement to insure continuous communication with other units.

Message centers routed a number of 1000 group messages via radio in the early stages of the operation. Most of these messages could have arrived at their destination sooner if they had been sent by motor messenger.

On 13 August the LAVAL (Y 64) Wirehead was opened and operated by personnel of the 34th Signal Construction Battalion, a photograph of which is shown on page 7.

SECRET

Section II - Supply

Four truck companies arrived from the United Kingdom loaded with Signal equipment including considerable quantities of spare parts packed in BC-5 chests. Approximately 300 miles of German spiral-four was found in a cave near CHARTRES (R 30). Two-thirds of the wire was brought to our Depot immediately and the balance secured within thirty-six hours.

The 579th Signal Depot Company operated the Third U.S. Army Signal Depot. One depot was established in the vicinity of SORTOSVILLE EN BEAUMONT (T 09) and subsequent locations were at ST JORES (T 28), PONTAUBOULT (T 31), DOMPIERRE DU CHEMIN (Y 46), LE MANS (V 46), DAN-GEAU (W 27) and NEMOURS (X 27). Using transportation furnished by the G-4 section, the Signal storage and issue sections made the moves by leap-frogging.

Supplies were furnished from beach dumps and hauled to Third U.S. Army Signal Depots in transportation provided by Advance Section Communications Zone and Third U.S. Army. Requisitions were forwarded by telephones, teletype and messenger direct to the Signal Officer of the Advance Section Communications Zone. Close liaison maintained during this period between Signal Supply Sections of the Third U.S. Army and Advance Section Communications Zone, proved particularly effective in bringing forward the urgently needed items. Initial table of basic allowance shortages and combat replacements could only be partially filled. No spare parts for either radio or wire repair were received.

Signal Supply, excluding wire and spiral-four, was built up from one-half ton to approximately 3000 tons during the month. Fifty percent of this increase was made by Third U.S. Army Signal Supply shipping equipment and supplies direct from base depots in England through our own supply channels, using Third U.S. Army Truck Companies. The balance was furnished by Communications Zone depots on the Continent. The 187th Signal Repair Company was retained at the Signal Depot during the first half of the month because of the lack of parts and supplies necessary for the performance of their mission. During this time, captured enemy equipment was cannibalized. Sufficient spare parts were obtained from this and from cannibalization of our own Signal equipment to provide a minimum quantity for the operation of the Repair Company. The 188th Signal Repair Company was attached, from Advance Section Communications Zone, and with the 187th Signal Repair Company was attached throughout the Third U.S. Army as follows:

- a. Thirteen radio repair sections were assigned to Ordnance Maintenance Battalions.
- b. Two radio and one wire section were attached to VIII Corps for operation in the Brittany Peninsula.
- c. One radio section was attached to the 6th Cavalry Squadron for SIAM Service.
- d. One radio and two wire sections were used to operate and maintain radio link telephone systems within Third U.S. Army.
- e. Two radio and three wire sections were stationed at the Signal Depot to repair, rehabilitate, cannibalize, and salvage American and German Signal equipment.

During the first thirty days of operation, the following repair jobs were handled:

187 minor repair and adjustments
459 major repair jobs
40 cannibalization of equipment (American)
190 cannibalization of equipment (German)
14 salvage of equipment (American)
85 installations in armored vehicles

During August, approximately 2000 pieces of captured Signal equipment were processed. Disposition made of this equipment was cannibalization, salvage, or shipment to Communications Zone Depots. All this work was handled by the Repair Company.

Transportation was very critical. Difficulties encountered in maintaining depot installations within the rapidly advancing Army area were further increased by the necessity of providing transportation for hauling supplies from the Communications Zone Depots. Approximately 30% of all supplies received from the Communications Zone was handled by Third U.S. Army transport.

CHAPTER 4
SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Gasoline was again a critical item in September. Army Signal requirements, not including that used by Quartermaster truck companies for displacement of signal facilities, were as follows:

ORGANIZATION	GASOLINE IN GALLONS PER DAY
301st Sig Opn Bn	1500
33d Sig Cons Bn	650
34th Sig Cons Bn	1125
118th Sig Rad Int Co	525
325th Sig Serv Co	175
Weather Detachment (ZY)	68
166th Sig Photo Co	165
EEIS	30
267th Sig Cons Co	500
Army Signal Section	100
TOTAL	4838 Gallons per day

The rapid displacement of command posts, distances involved and terrain features encountered, resulted in the dispersion of trained personnel for Radio Link operation. (See Annexes 19 through 23) Teams that were normally composed of six technicians were forced to operate with two. The Twelfth U.S. Army Group was informed of our urgent need for more personnel.



LAVAL WIREHEAD

A directive was issued by the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army to the Signal Officer, XX Corps that four circuits be built or rehabilitated forward along their axis. Two circuits were to be used for the Army axis and two for successive displacements of Corps Rear Echelon. Army and Corps Signal Construction troops were utilized for this purpose. When four circuits could not be made available, due to the rapid displacement of command posts, arrangements were made for corps to have switching connections to their rear echelon over Army circuits.

The G-3 Section directed that Corps Headquarters would not displace to new locations until at least one talking circuit, either wire or radio link, had been installed and was working to Army.

There were two Army command post displacements, involving long distances, during the month of September and one additional move by the forward echelon from the field to winter quarters in ETAIN (U 47). The first move was to the vicinity of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54), a distance of ninety miles. The second was to the vicinity of ETAIN (U 47, a distance of fifty-five miles. (See Annexes 24 through 26)

The proposed axis of the Third U.S. Army was: ETAIN (U 47) - NANCY (U 81) - SAARBRUCKEN (Q 57) - FRANKFURT (M 77).

The Army Signal Officer directed that open wire would be used as far as the supply situation permitted. With the advance slowing down it was possible to install a more permanent communication system.

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service had considerable difficulty securing captured enemy equipment, particularly at depots, and trains. Either guards were not placed by the capturing units, or if placed, were not instructed as to what constituted proper authority for the removal of equipment. During the month of September sixty-nine cars of enemy Signal equipment and several large dumps and depots were located. Twenty-two items were shipped to G-25 for Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force disposition and five items shipped to Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Military Intelligence Branch. One hundred and thirty-five items were sent to the Air Technical Intelligence. Sixty-one items, 4,413 radio tubes, 1000 telephone poles, 1200 crossarms and several thousand miles of various types of wire were classified for utilization by the Third U.S. Army. Twelve hundred and fifty-nine additional items of equipment were classified for utilization and released to Communications Zone.

The SCR-160 has been put in production. This artillery set replaces the SCR-600 and SCR-610. The basic difference, between this new set and those it replaces, was that wet cells have been used and it was designed to use a new battery charger. The packaged weight of the SCR-160 is approximately forty-three pounds.

In order to speed the delivery of official war photographs to the rear, advantage was taken of the ADLS, Air Delivery Letter Service. Two flights to PARIS (S 04) at 1015A and 1545A assured fast service. The 1015A plane made connections with the LONDON plane in PARIS (S 04).

The Signal Officer, XX Corps, suggested the use of a coded map, similar to that used by the Commanding General, to enable Corps and Army Signal Officers to talk more freely over the phone. It was felt that the RC-58, facsimile equipment, might be used for this purpose over a simplex circuit.

Section II - Administration and Personnel

At CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) the rear echelon was located about seven miles from the forward.

Due to the volume of encoded traffic, fourteen additional SIGABA (Converter M-134) Code Clerks for the 301st Signal Operation Battalion were requested from Twelfth U.S. Army Group. This request was based on twelve-hour shift for the men. The Twelfth U.S. Army Group informed us that the additional personnel were not available. It was recommended that a command channel letter be initiated requesting a Table of Organization increase to handle this need. This would be based on statistics of this campaign to date and Twelfth U.S. Army Group would favorably indorse such a letter.

A clarification was made regarding responsibility for the relay of teletype traffic. Several instances were reported where relay traffic was not accepted by Twelfth U.S. Army Group for the Communications Zone, even though our direct line was not operative. The responsibility of Twelfth U.S. Army Group to relay this traffic was accepted.

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Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

Increased attention was paid to radio security. Twenty-six friendly radio nets were monitored for periods of twelve hours to three days. Signal Intelligence Service analyzed the monitoring logs, made reports of violations to the units concerned and kept G-2 informed of the status of radio security and of corrective action taken.

During September the message center cleared 4529 incoming and 5706 outgoing messages, exclusive of official mail. The precedence of the messages was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing
Urgent	738	458
Operational Priority	975	3097
Priority	1041	1477
Routine	1775	674
Deferred	0	0

It was found that the code room at forward echelon could not be operated at maximum efficiency in an HO-17 due to lack of working space. Consequently, the forward echelon code room was moved to a six-ton van. Two additional SIGABAS were obtained from Twelfth Army Group on 30 September and installed in the forward echelon code room. This gave four SIGABAS to forward echelon and two to rear echelon. The code rooms cleared a total of 486,486 groups during the month.

The 277th Signal Pigeon Company arrived on 16 September to provide pigeon communication to Third U.S. Army. The Signal Intelligence Service was made responsible for its activities. Advance lofts were established near the Command Posts of XII and XX Corps, but birds had not been settled sufficiently by the end of the month to begin tactical communication.

Arrangements were made with Seventh U.S. Army for exchange of signal intelligence by radio between it and Third U.S. Army. Daily exchange by liaison officers of technical intelligence data and G-2 Periodic Reports also were arranged.

Signal Intelligence derived in September was particularly fruitful. Details of results obtained may not be reported at this time due to security restrictions.

Section II - Communications

On 4 September the command post of the Third U.S. Army moved from the FORET-DE-LANCY to a woods about eight miles east of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54). Wire communications between the old and new command posts consisted of two combination systems. The first was composed of rehabilitated French open wire, and spiral-four through TROYES (Y 27), then underground cable from that point to CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) and spiral-four to the command post. The second was rehabilitated French open wire direct from the FORET-DE-LANCY to CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54). A switching central was established at what remained of the commercial repeater station at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54), after demolition had been carried out by the enemy. Alternate routes were employed in routing the spiral-four cables from LUCKY CHARLIE (switching central at CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) to the command post.


Plans were made to displace to the vicinity of VERDUN (U 26) as soon as wire circuits could be established. Spiral-four cable was laid to VERDUN (U 26) via VALMY (T 85) - CLERMONT (U 05) and French open wire was rehabilitated along the same route. A repeater station at VALMY (T 85) provided terminals for underground cable from VERDUN (U 26) and from REIMS (T 37). Open wire was rehabilitated between CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T 54) via VALMY (T 85) and REIMS (T 37). On 15 September the new command post of the Third U.S. Army opened in a woods south of ETAIN (U 47) about twelve miles east of VERDUN (U 26). The command post of the rear echelon moved to a location about five miles north of ETAIN (U 47). Communications between the two echelons was maintained by two spiral-four cables with carrier on one of the cables. When the forward echelon moved to a quarters in the town of ETAIN (U 47) two spiral-four cables provided eight voice and one teletype circuit to Rear Echelon. This was accomplished in the following manner.

a. FIRST CABLE:

Circuits one and two phantom--two circuits.
Teletype simplex on the phantom--teletype.
Phantom connected to German carrier equipment
TFB-1 and TFB-2--two carrier and one phantom circuit.

b. SECOND CABLE: Circuits one and two phantom--three circuits.

Rehabilitated French open wire lines were extended south through COMMERCY (U 42) to a new switching central in FOUG (U 51) and serviced our southern Corps, the XII and XV. The XX Corps, in the vicinity of CONFLANS (U 66), was reached by eight rehabilitated French open wire circuits and two spiral-four cables.



REHABILITATING FRENCH OPEN WIRE

With the concentration of Army Service Units in the vicinity of COMMERCY (U 42), FOUG (U 51) and TOUL (U 61), additional circuits became necessary. Six rehabilitated open wire circuits from VERDUN (U 26) were terminated at FOUG (U 51) and a spiral-four cable was laid from ETAIN (U 47) to the same point. Long range field wire, W-143, was also tried over this route (ETAIN (U 47)-FOUG (U 51) but poor results were experienced due to grounds caused by poor insulation and also to attenuation. Numerous methods were employed in working this circuit, but none of them proved completely satisfactory. Some of the methods were as follows:

a. Line loaded using C-114 loading coils every five-eighths of a mile. Transmission weak due to attenuation of the line (sixty miles).

b. EE-89 repeater placed at the midpoint of the line. A slight improvement was noted.

c. EE-99 repeaters tried at both terminals in conjunction with GP-7 hybrid coils. No appreciable gain in the speech circuit.

d. EE-89 repeaters were installed at the one-quarter and three-quarter points. No improvement over the single EE-89 repeater at the midpoint.

The W-143 circuit was finally abandoned due to the high maintenance factor involved.

On the VERDUN-FOUG (U 26-U 51) open wire line constant maintenance was necessary. Other signal units, working on the same pole line, were constantly interfering with working circuits. Close coordination with the Advance Section Communications Zone and the Twelfth U.S. Army Group finally eliminated this trouble.

Early in September a CW radio circuit was established with the Seventh U.S. Army which was coming up on our south flank. Complete plans were made to establish a radio link circuit between the two armies and thus provide telephone and teletype communication. Shortly after the initial patrol contact had been made, radio link and carrier terminal equipment was transported to the Headquarters, Seventh U.S. Army and the circuits established. This was the first telephone or teletype communication between any of the units of the two armies. It also provided lateral communication between the Sixth and Twelfth U.S. Army Groups.

A CW radio circuit was also established between the Third U.S. Army and Headquarters Eighth Airforce in LONDON. A total of 64,208 code groups were transmitted and received by CW Radio during the month and fifteen radio link relay circuits were installed and operated over 922 miles.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 3, at DOMPIERRE (Y 46), was in operation at the start of the month. Subsequent depots were opened and operated at LE MANS (Y 46), BROU (W 17), NEMOURS (X 27), and STE. MENEHOULD (T 95).

Total tonnage received from Communications Zone Depots during the month was as follows:

Requisitioned		1557 Tons
Received - By Com Z Truck	422 Tons	
By Third U.S. Army Truck	380 Tons	
Total Tonnage:	802 Tons	

Continued difficulties of transport and no stock in the Communications Zone Depots of the fast moving items, created serious shortages in the units in the line. Delays in transport often built up the requirements of the organizations to a point where waiting units immediately took all of the incoming load off trucks. Confusion throughout all supply channels was evident and increased by the rapid consumption of wire, batteries, radio losses, and the assumption of supply functions by the Communications Zone from the Advance Section Communications Zone.

On 8 September, Communications Zone cancelled or suspended all current and pending requisitions of the Armies in the field. The loss created by this suspension was never recovered during the month. Shortages became serious and only through the continued assistance and forced operation of the Advance Section Communications Zone Supply Agencies were the Armies supplied.

Repairs to all Signal equipment were continued by the 187th Signal Repair Company. Radio Teams of this unit were attached to Divisions and Ordnance Maintenance Units. Cannibalization and salvage of equipment was continued in order to maintain the equipment in service. No spare parts were received during the month. During the month, the following repair jobs were completed:

389 ea	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
459 ea	Major Repair Jobs
38 ea	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
5 ea	Salvage
57 ea	Installation in Combat Vehicles
1537 ea	Captured Equipment Processed
1357 ea	Captured Equipment Evacuated to Communications Zone
37 ea	Captured Equipment Cannibalized for Parts
100 ea	Captured Equipment held for Utilization or Parts
457 miles	Spiral-Four Cable Repaired
721 miles	Field Wire, W-110 Serviced

The entire operation during the month was conducted in constant rain and mud. The Depot and Repair Company areas were usually a sea of mud, yet the production of both organizations increased and kept up with the tempo of the Third U.S. Army.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

With the displacement of the Third U.S. Army command post from ETAIN (U 47) (See Annex 29) to NANCY (U 81) existing commercial telephone facilities were utilized to supplement the normal Army communication network. The Postes Telephones Telegraphes system at NANCY (U 81) was composed of a Strowger dial office and a complete underground cable network.

During this month extensive work was carried out on proposed T/O and E changes based on battle experience. All types of Signal units were canvassed for comments and recommendations. It was felt that only a complete expression of opinion by the actual using organizations would give a true indication as to the adequacy of our T/O's and E's and the changes necessary for operational improvement. Most of the comments of similar organizations were basically in agreement and recommended changes are currently being consolidated for the information and action of higher headquarters.

It was decided that telephone circuits of the VHF Radio Link channels would continue to be plugged out of service except for emergency use when wire circuits were not available. However, the circuits would be tested periodically and shown on our logs as being in service. This would prevent a possible communication channel from being overlooked in an emergency.

The Third U.S. Army Signal Service instituted a weekly information letter. This letter was confined to signal communication and supply items of an administrative nature, and was distributed directly to Corps and Division Signal Officers and Commanders of Third U.S. Army Signal troops.

The Signal Officer of the Communications Zone advised this headquarters that a Film and Equipment Exchange Detachment would be made available to Third U.S. Army. This detachment was composed of one officer and six enlisted men. Their primary mission would be to operate a class "B" film library, and a repair and issue service for 16mm and 35mm projectors. The need for a service of this type had become increasingly apparent. The stable situation of our lines has increased the demand for training films and projectors. Our only source of films had been the Communications Zone Film Library in PARIS (S 04) and the time, distance, and transportation elements involved had materially reduced its value.

During the period 1 October to 31 October the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service obtained very little captured enemy equipment as no important enemy communication centers were taken by our troops. However, the following items were located and turned over to the Third U.S. Army for utilization:

- 1000 ea. Reels of field wire (single strand, black).
- 180 ea. Rolls of open wire #10 or #12 (iron), approximately 1000 ft. per roll.
- 50 ea. Reels of cable (lead covered) 12 conductor, approximately #18 wire.
- 1000 ea. Reels for field wire pack units (empty spools).
- 6500 ea. Telephone poles located at ST. FLORENTIN (Y 04), France.
- 4 ea. Carloads of #6 steel messenger wire.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

By 1 October the birds of the 277th Signal Pigeon Company were settled at the lofts of platoons in XII and XX Corps areas. Pigeon communication was handled initially as follows:

- a. Birds were supplied to using units through message center.
- b. When messages were received at the loft they were telephoned to message center, where they were deciphered and delivered.
- c. The original copy of the message was forwarded to message center by scheduled messenger.

The message center handled 8982 messages by electrical means. These were broken down as follows:

Means	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	679	163	842
Teletype	4388	3752	8140
Total:	5067	3915	8982

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	428	566	994
Operational Priority	3057	1072	4129
Priority	1059	996	2055
Routine	523	1281	1804
Deferred	0	0	0
Total:	5067	3915	8982

The code room handled 1699 messages. On an average it required one hour per message in the code room. A total of 406,983 groups cleared the code room. These were divided into 183,442 incoming groups and 223,541 outgoing groups.

Radio nets of Army Information Service were monitored extensively, since the G-3 information passed on the Army Information Service nets would provide a concentrated source of information to enemy signal intelligence. When some weaknesses were noted, the Commanding Officer of the 6th Cavalry Group (which operated Army Information Service) was approached directly and the following program was worked out:

- a. Army Information Service set up its own monitoring stations to maintain a constant check on security.
- b. Signal Intelligence Service loaned one traffic analyst to 6th Cavalry Group to assist in setting up its monitoring system and to explain need for security to operators.
- c. Signal Intelligence Service deencrypted a week's M-209 traffic of Army Information Service and pointed out cryptographic violations found.
- d. Army Information Service instituted intensive training of personnel on security.

Almost immediate improvement in security was noticed; and by the end of October the Army Information Service nets were rated as very secure.

In all, Signal Intelligence Service analyzed logs obtained from the monitoring of fifty-four radio nets in Third U.S. Army zone. Violations were reported to the responsible organizations for corrective action and nets with frequent violations were re-monitored to insure that proper corrective action was being taken.

Due to the more static type of operations the detachment "A" of Signal Intelligence Service at the Army Radio Intelligence Company was consolidated with the remainder of Signal Intelligence Service when Third U.S. Army moved to NANCY (U 81). This arrangement permitted better coordination of activities of Signal Intelligence Service under the tactical conditions that prevailed.

Signal Intelligence Division, Communications Zone, made two SIGCUM cryptographic machines (for automatic and direct encipherment and decipherment of teletype traffic to higher headquarters) available. A six-ton van was obtained for the 301st Signal Operation Battalion and the machines were installed in this. The SIGCUM's were expected to speed up secret text traffic and remove some of the heavy load of traffic from the code room.

Due to tactical conditions, more signal intelligence was derived during the first half of October than during the second half. Details of the month's signal intelligence will be given in a subsequent chapter, after security restrictions have been relaxed.

Section II - Communications

The command post of the Third U.S. Army displaced to NANCY (U 81) on 11 October. Prior to that time two construction centers were installed in NANCY (U 81) and were known as the EAST and WEST wireheads. These wireheads were also used as dispatch points for maintenance teams.

Arrangements had been made to use the facilities of the Postes, Telephones Telegraphes. The commercial telephone system in NANCY (U 81) consisted of a "Strowger, Step by Step" 7000-line dial office. The Germans had isolated a 1000-line group for their own use during the occupation of NANCY (U 81). This group was thoroughly checked to insure complete segregation from the rest of the circuits and then put into service for the military installations. The local telephone system had a complete underground cable distribution system that was in fairly good condition with the exception of two sections across the CANAL DE LA MARNE AU RHIN and LA MEURTHE RIVIERE which had been blown out. These cables were repaired and an additional 3000' of 224-pair cable was laid from the command post to a nearby commercial underground cable run. The 224-pair commercial cable, which ran from the Postes Telephones Telegraphes office to the west wirehead at LAXOU (U 81), was intercepted and split between Lucky and Lucky Rear command posts. This provided 112-pair in each direction to each command post. All the material needed for this project and also the dial subsets needed were furnished by the Postes Telephones Telegraphes.

Third U.S. Army Signal personnel handled the work in connection with the installation and maintenance of all dial lines used for military purposes including those used by the XIX Tactical Air Command, XII Corps and miscellaneous Army and Corps troops. A Postes Telephones Telegraphes employee was assigned to each installation team during the initial phase of this work to assist in locating cable terminals and cross-connect boxes and to familiarize the army personnel with the French cable systems. These teams completed 202 work orders during the period 1 October to 8 November. The maintenance of the dial central office equipment serving the military 1000-line group was taken over by Third U.S. Army Signal personnel in mid-October. Army maintenance personnel, dispatchers and an interpreter were kept on duty at all times in the equipment room of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building.

In this particular office, individual line message registers were the only method available for recording calls handled by the dial equipment. Since these registers only record the completed outgoing calls on each line the totals given below cannot be directly compared with peg counts which also consider "Busy lines" and "Don't answer".

TOTAL COMPLETED CALLS

ALL MILITARY LINES 1 October to 6 November 52,240

TOTAL OUTGOING COMPLETED CALLS

On LUCKY TRUNKS 1 October to 6 November 10,104

On LUCKY REAR TRUNKS 1 October to 6 November 5,140

In addition to the automatic exchange the headquarters of the Third U.S. Army was served by a four-position TC-10 switchboard which handled local calls and a three-position TC-10 switching central called LUCKY TOLL for switching trunk calls.

During the months of September and October 1,375 miles of W-110B and 742 miles of spiral-four were laid by Headquarters Third U.S. Army Signal troops.

Few changes were made in VHF Radio Link circuits during the month due to the stable situation. (See Annexes 30 and 31) Five new circuits were installed and operated over 204 miles.

CW radios at Army transmitted and received a total of 40,191 code groups during the month. All stations at Army Headquarters were removed from a central point and up to five transmitters were operated by one power unit. The practice was developed of running a PE-75 for four hours and then switching to another power unit. This has not only extended the life of the unit, but also made sets available for emergency use. Another result attained by central point removing was the closer grouping of transmitters with no interference from key clicks.

Section II - Plans and Operations

A definite shortage became evident in communication personnel replacements for all branches, and of those received many were not fully qualified in their particular specialty. A conference was held with officers of the Personnel Division, Signal Section, Communications Zone to determine their policy and the existing facilities available for technical training. It was learned that the only radio operators

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CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

school on the Continent was a small one operated by the Ground Force Replacement System. As far as known there were no school in operation for training linemen.

A command channel letter was initiated by this headquarters to European Theater of Operations U.S. Army requesting a quota at this school for untrained men already assigned to the Third U.S. Army. It was further requested that provisions be made for training linemen and radio operators to fill our estimated monthly shortages.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 6, at STE. MENEHOULD (T 95), was in operation at the start of the month. Subsequent depot locations were at JEANDELIZE (U 56) and TOUL (U 61).

Tonnages received from Communications Zone Depots during the month as follows:

Requisitioned	2100 Tons
Received - By Com Z Transportation	2189
By Third U.S. Army Trucks	498
Total Tonnage:	2687


The above tonnage figures include pole line hardware and bulk shipments of wire, G.I., and copper, for line work. Operational supplies for troop units, such as radio tubes, batteries, spare parts, mast sections, etc., were seventy-five percent back ordered. The emphasis placed on the tonnage delivered to the Army, completely distorted the Signal Supply picture in the Communications Zone, inasmuch as one ton of radio spare parts were on occasion, worth 2000 tons of pole line hardware. The use of tonnage figures for Signal Supply Statements of Delivery and Status of Stocks constituted an erroneous picture of the Army status of Signal Supply.

Inadequate stocks of fast moving items and the supply of these items on a day-to-day basis proved entirely inadequate. On four occasions during the month, we held but a one-day level on items of this nature and at no time did we reach a ten-day level.

Transportation difficulties continued to harass the supply operation. Tonnages allocated for the delivery of Signal supplies confused the picture and rail transport became uncertain.

Repairs to all Signal equipment were continued in the field by the Signal Repair Company. At the end of the first week we lost the services of the 188th Signal Repair Company when it was assigned to the Ninth U.S. Army. Radio Repair Teams of the 187th Signal Repair Company were attached to Divisions and Ordnance Maintenance Units in the field and stationed at the Signal Depot. No spare parts were received during the month. Salvage and cannibalization continued to produce the necessary items for repair work. The repair activity for the month is as follows:

401 ea	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
288 ea	Major Repair Jobs
45 ea	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
31 ea	Salvage
21 ea	Installation in Combat Vehicles.



Section I - General

The offensive drive of the Third U.S. Army which started 8 November, was supported by the best wire communication network available since the opening of the campaign in August. During the month of October the Section had utilized all time available in strengthening communication, planning, and in training Signal troops. During this time open wire leads had been constructed and carrier circuits were in operation to each corps. As the troops advanced during the month of November 14 1/2 miles of field wire and 226 miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. Nine hundred sixty-six wire miles of open wire were placed. It may be said that during the month of November communications facilities were working at their highest peak of efficiency since the opening of the campaign in August.

The Signal Supply situation continued to be a major problem. Of 3100 tons of essential equipment requisitioned, 2382 tons were received. Nearly one-half of the tonnage released to us from the Communications Zone Depots was transported in Third U.S. Army vehicles. Items of radio equipment were in critical supply, but the shortages of these items were partially, and in some instances, completely overcome by modification of other items on hand, and by manufacturing done by our Signal Repair Company. These manufacturers, together with spare parts received from the Spare Parts Depot which had been established in PARIS (S 04), considerably eased the supply problem.

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service reported that it had been found generally throughout the territory liberated during the November offensive that no equipment of value, either for utilization or intelligence, had been left behind. The enemy, while engaged largely in defensive operations to provide time for withdrawal of troops into Germany, had removed all Signal Equipment that might possibly have been of value to us.

The 166th Signal Photo Company was mentioned in a message from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Public Relations Division, and was congratulated for its excellent still picture and newsreel coverage of the launching of the November drive.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

On 11 November the following requirements were established for teletype lines over which secret messages could be sent in the clear:

- Printer circuits must be worked over CF-2, which, in turn, would be working on channels 2, 3 or 4 of the CF-1.
- Lines must be patrolled frequently at irregular intervals and checked thoroughly for evidences of tapping.
- Terminal points must be operated by Allied military personnel.
- Main frames, repeater stations and other such points must be kept under constant military supervision.

Early in November the Signal Intelligence Officer inspected the 3325th Staff Information and Monitoring Company (SIAM), which had just arrived in the United Kingdom for training before taking over the functions of Army Information Service in Third U.S. Army. It was found that there were virtually no radio operators in the Company, and that it would require at least three months of training before the unit could be put into the field. Following is a resume of events leading up to the presence of the 3325th SIAM Company in the United Kingdom:

SIAM Service was first used in the Seventh Army in Sicily. Although it was improvised, it was very successful. For the past twelve months efforts had been made in the European Theater of Operations to develop an authorized SIAM Service for each field army. After much discussion regarding an appropriate T/O and T/R the War Department on 25 May 1944 approved a T/O and T/R which was similar to the Fifth Army SIAM Company, though somewhat modified. At this time the European Theater of Operations was advised that personnel for these companies could be available only if certain other troop listings of an equal number of troops were removed from the troop list. Twelfth U.S. Army

Group chose to strike off certain Cavalry units. The four SIAM Companies for use in this theater were activated from two Cavalry Groups. Inasmuch as First U.S. Army and Third U.S. Army desired their companies as soon as possible, request was made by the Theater to the War Department to send two of these companies over to the United Kingdom immediately. This was done and the personnel of the SIAM companies in the United Kingdom consisted for the most part of tank drivers, and gunners. A very small percentage of radio operators existed against a total requirement based upon a company consisting of four corps platoons, eight division platoons, and four armored division platoons. Four hundred radio operators and forty code clerks were required.

As Third U.S. Army approached Germany and also began to use French commercial telephone facilities, telephone security became of greater importance. Signal Intelligence Service began recording telephone conversations in the headquarters and made reports of security violations to the Chief of Staff and G-2.

Sixty-eight radio nets were monitored, but due to the tactical situation only twelve were active enough for complete checks of their security. Violation reports were made on six of these.

The code room required an approximate time of forty-five minutes per message to handle 1785 messages, which include 458,355 code groups. There were 446 outgoing messages, which required 114,589 code groups, 1337 incoming messages which required 343,766 code groups.

Due to general radio silence during early November radio intelligence was not active with the exception of one special mission, but toward the end of the month a more active tactical situation brought about intelligence of importance.

Detachment "ZY" of the 21st Weather Squadron began making monthly climatological studies to be published in the G-2 Periodic report. The purpose of this study was to furnish commanders with data on weather conditions for long range planning.

The 277th Signal Pigeon Company made its first displacements of lofts since beginning operations. Lofts were moved on 18 November from TOUL (U 61) to MORHANGE (Q 24), and on 23 November from a point west of NANCY (U 81) to THIONVILLE (U 88). After these moves it was ascertained that lofts could be displaced and birds settled, ready for use, in approximately one week.

During the month of November, Third U.S. Army Message Center handled a total of 8230 messages by electrical means. The precedence of these was as follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	307	482	789
Operational Priority	2694	1035	3729
Priority	1056	960	2016
Routine	547	1149	1696
Deferred	0	0	0
Total:	4604	3626	8230

Of these, 3255 incoming and 4975 outgoing were handled by teletype. Radio was used for 371 incoming and seventy-nine outgoing messages.

Section II - Communications

Headquarters Third U.S. Army remained in NANCY (U 81) during November. Advance Section Communications Zone was building an open wire lead from NANCY (U 81) north to CONFLANS (U 66) through FLEVILLE (U 80), AUGANGE (P 61), ARLON (P 52), then to LIEGE (K 42), Belgium. The 33d Signal Construction Battalion, part of Third U.S. Army Signal troops, assisted in the building of this lead by placing the second arm from NANCY (U 81) to CONFLANS (U 66) to FLEVILLE (U 80). This ten-circuit lead was shared by Advance Section Communications Zone, XIX Tactical Air Force, Twelfth Army Group and Third U.S. Army. Third U.S. Army used the pin positions seventeen to twenty as far as MARS LA TOUR (U 65). Between MARS LA TOUR (U 65) and FLEVILLE (U 80) the entire second arm was available for Third U.S. Army use. On these two circuits (seventeen to twenty), two carrier systems were operated with the use of two CF-7 hybrid coils at the terminal in NANCY (T 46) and two CF-7 hybrid coils at a new switch established at CONFLANS (U 66) called LUCKY CHARLEY. LUCKY CHARLEY switch was established in order that a good system of wire communication could be had from NANCY (U 81) to the III Corps located in ETAIN (U 47) and the XX Corps which, although located in CONFLANS (U 66) at the time, was to move northeast

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to envelop METZ (U 85). This switch also served some Army units located in the vicinity of CONFLANS (U 66). Spiral-four cable that was previously laid between ETAIN (U 47) and NANCY (U 81) was intercepted and another carrier system was installed using this cable between LUCKY CHARLEY and LYCKY at NANCY (U 81). This resulted in three carrier systems working between NANCY (U 81) and LUCKY CHARLEY plus twelve physical circuits without repeaters or carrier routed as follows: Six on the underground cable between NANCY (U 81) and LUCKY CHARLEY and six on the underground cable between NANCY (U 81) and ARNAVILLE (U 74) and then over French rehabilitated open wire to CONFLANS (U 66).

Army Corps axes were extended by building new open wire leads. A one-arm open wire build started at FLEVILLE (U 80); intercepted the second arm of the Advance Section Communications Zone lead at this point, and was built east to LANTEFONTAINE (U 67) then northeast through FOMTOY (U 78), ANGEVILLERS (U 78), and then southeast to THIONVILLE (U 88) and was serviced by carrier circuits over this open wire lead between LUCKY CHARLEY and COMET.

As the XII Corps moved northeast from NANCY (U 81) a two-arm open wire build was constructed northeast from NANCY (U 81) to CHATEAU-SALINS (Q 12). XII Corps Headquarters was located in this town and carrier circuits were operating to this Corps over the open wire lead. This lead was extended northeast along the main highway and by the end of November reached FAULQUEMONT (Q 14), which was beyond the next proposed move of the XII Corps Headquarters Command Post, located in MORHANGE (Q 14) at this time. This second arm of the ten-circuit open wire lead served the various army units in that vicinity in addition to serving the XII Corps Headquarters.

The north axis serving the XX Corps was also extended east towards BOUZONVILLE (Q 17), which was the anticipated next location of the XX Corps Command Post.

About the 21st or 22d of November the city of METZ (U 85) was taken and plans were immediately initiated to set up a switchboard in this city to serve any army units which might move in this vicinity. Although many German forts were still active west of the city, spiral-four circuits were under construction into METZ (U 85), approaching the city from the east. A reconnaissance of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building in METZ (U 85) disclosed that although the building has been damaged considerably, the Signal installations were intact and cable could be used after major repairs have been completed to the cable itself.

During the month of November 1944 one hundred forty-two miles of field wire and two hundred twenty-six miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. For the same period four hundred forty-five miles of field wire and one hundred ninety-one miles of spiral-four cable was recovered by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. Nine hundred sixty-six wire miles of open wire were placed. This consisted of forty-five miles of pole line of which thirty miles were two-arm and fifteen miles were one-arm builds. Twenty-one miles of one-arm build were placed on existing poles. (VHF diagrams for the month of November are contained in Annexes 32 and 33)

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 7, at JEANDELIZE (U 56), was in operation at the start of the month. Subsequent depots were opened at TOUL (U 61), VAUCOULEURS (U 40), and FLORANGE (U 88).

Tonnages received from the Communications Zone Depots during the month were as follows:

Requisitioned	3100 Tons
Received - By Com Z Trans.	1187
By Third U.S. Army Trans.	1130
By Com Z Air	65
Total Tons:	2382

During the first four days of the month, one hundred twenty trucks from Third U.S. Army were sent to CHERBOURG (O 12) and picked up seven hundred thirty-eight tons of selected items, such as wire W-110, Batteries BA-38, BA-40, BA-70, BA-80, radio tubes, etc., which enabled all units to fill their basic loads. Incoming rail shipments, though small, created a little reserve for coming operations. During the following fifteen days, all Communications Zone shipments fell off and the reserve accumulated was consumed. Shortages of mast sections, tubes, batteries, Radio SCR-300 and SCR-536 were becoming acute. Wire W-110 and W-130 was being received in amounts of fifty to eleven hundred miles at a time and was being rationed to all field units. The

Communications Zone was issuing wire to Third U.S. Army on the basis of four hundred miles of W-110 and one hundred miles of W-130 per day. Consumption in the field forces exceeded this allocation and averaged four hundred seventy-five miles per day for W-110 and one hundred fifty miles per day for W-130 when both were available for issue.

Transportation continued to be the major problem. Supplies were sporadic and spotty in delivery, and on a day-to-day basis. Third U.S. Army stocks were below a ten-day level on the fast moving items. Shortages of radio tubes for the SCR-284 Radio, mast sections for the SCR-284, 506, 508, 528, and 193 Radios, adapters, M-359, for the 600 series radios, Batteries, BA-42, for the rocket Launcher, Battery, BA-227, for the flame thrower and miscellaneous items were partially, and in some instances completely overcome by modification of other items and manufacturing processes of the 187th Signal Repair Company. Fifty-two Radios, SCR-284 were stripped of radio tubes, mast sections, power packs, and fuses. One hundred Transmitters, BC-604, were stripped of tubes and fuses. Three hundred Control Boxes, BC-605, were stripped of plugs. All material obtained was issued to troop units for maintenance of their radio equipment.



DEPOT NO. 10 AT FLORANGE

Third U.S. Army obtained the supporting services of the 179th Signal Repair Company during the month. This organization and the 187th Signal Repair Company performed all of the repair and maintenance work on radio and wire equipment of the Army. Radio Repair Teams were attached to Divisions and Ordnance Maintenance Units. During the month, the following repair jobs were completed:

691	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
1004	Major Repair Jobs
212	Cannibalizations of Equipment
75	Installation in Combat Vehicles
10	Salvage

Spare parts were received for the first time since this campaign started. The installation of a Spare Parts Depot in PARIS (S 04), which was ably operated by Communications Zone, enabled the Repair Company to obtain the parts needed for immediate repair and replacement on much of the equipment of the organizations. This supply, however, was not adequate to meet all of the needs of the units and cannibalization increased to maintain equipment.

The operation and closely directed employment of two Repair Companies, to the full extent of the technical ability and ingenuity of the personnel, has enabled Third U.S. Army Signal Service to maintain equipment, Radio and Wire, Radio Link Relay, Carrier and Power Units, on a basis of ninety percent service ability. This has been accomplished only by constant attention to the needs of the service by all members of the Repair Companies. Lack of spare parts were partially overcome by improvising. The ability to adapt material and equipment in hand to the repairs required solved a major problem.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The Signal Supply situation was, in general, growing worse during the month of December. A satisfactory solution of the problem seemed to hinge on the use of the port of ANTWERP (J 79). In view of the large capacity of this port and the fact that great quantities of equipment were in shipholds, the supply strain was expected to be eased in the near future.

A more extensive use of facsimile transmissions (RC-120) was started as an additional means of communication.

On 6 December III Corps became operational and displaced its command post from ETAIN (U 47) to METZ (U 85) on the following day.

There were various postponements and changes in projected displacements of Army command posts due to difficulties encountered in selecting suitable command post and billeting sites. By mid-December communication installations had practically been completed at ST. AVOLD (Q 25). (See Annex 37) the proposed command post site for this headquarters. However, the German counter-offensive, which got under way on 16 December, caused a radical change in Third U.S. Army's tactical mission. The advance party of Headquarters Third U.S. Army was instantly recalled from ST. AVOLD (Q 25), and the Forward Echelon subsequently displaced to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) on 28 December. At the same time, as a result of the tactical situation, VIII Corps reverted to Third U.S. Army. With the aid of existing Twelfth U.S. Army Group facilities, and local network in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), communications were quickly established and maintained between higher, lateral and subordinate units.

Section II - Administration and Personnel

Twenty-four wire recovery teams were requisitioned from Communications Zone. Three of these teams were expected to arrive shortly.

A plan was evolved to reduce Third U.S. Army Headquarters personnel for reinforcement of Third U.S. Army Infantry units. The Signal Section furnished three enlisted men for this purpose.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

Early in December a detachment of the 3103d Signal Service Battalion consisting of one officer and twenty-eight enlisted men was loaned to Third U.S. Army by Twelfth U.S. Army Group for extensive security monitoring of Third U.S. Army radio nets. The detachment monitored amplitude modulated nets from a site near a corps headquarters and monitored frequency modulated nets with a mobile team located near forward positions. Logs on violations were given daily to signal officers concerned and duplicate logs were forwarded to Signal Intelligence Service for analysis. As a result of this monitoring:

a. Three thousand eight hundred and eighty-one transmissions and seventy-two messages were analyzed.

b. Analysts found three thousand three hundred and sixty security violations of all types (Note: since one transmission might contain several violations, a direct comparison of the number of violations with the number of transmissions would present a false picture).

c. The most common violations were found to be excessive and unnecessary transmissions.

d. Reports of the analysis of logs were forwarded through technical channels for the information and corrective action of signal officers concerned.

On 5 December an extensive check of M-209 traffic submitted by lower units was initiated. A total of 128 messages was deciphered in

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which 276 cryptographic violations were found. These consisted chiefly of stereotyped beginnings and endings. Units were notified of the violations and directed to train cryptographic technicians more thoroughly in writing messages.

Capture of prisoners of war who had served in the German Signal Intelligence organization gave interrogators from Signal Intelligence Service an opportunity to learn of the organization which opposed it. The "Regiment West", it was learned, had an extensive organization for intercepting, analyzing and evaluating Allied traffic. A full report on this organization was made to higher headquarters.

Two officers of the Signal Intelligence Service, and one officer and one enlisted man of the 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company were awarded the Bronze Star on 3 December for work on one outstanding signal intelligence mission. The 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company was awarded the Meritorious Service Plaque on 3 December for its consistently excellent performance in producing signal intelligence.

The German counter-offensive late in December caused a period of rapid planning. A request was made for the attachment of one extra pigeon platoon to the 277th Signal Pigeon Company; 3000 additional birds were requested for expected heavy demands on pigeon communication. Requests were also made for the following: A high priority for bringing the 3259th Signal Service Company to France for III Corps; the addition of another messenger team for the message center, and stepped-up training of the Signal SIAM Company in England to replace the Army Information Service, which was disbanded when Sixth Cavalry Group was employed tactically.

Due to increased tactical traffic as Third U.S. Army met the German counter-offensive, and the reduction in classification of wire lines due to enemy agents operating behind our lines, the code room on 25 December handled its heaviest load since Third U.S. Army became operational. On that day the code room handled 174 messages. Code groups totaled 45,615. The average time a message was in the code room was sixty-one minutes.

The code room record for the month was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of messages	2278	547	2825
Number of Code Groups	570290	103755	674045

The message center record for the month was as follows:

Means	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	46	516	562
Teletype	5581	6473	12054
Messenger	62	18	80
Total:	5689	7007	12696
Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	324	839	1163
Operational Priority	3317	2248	5565
Priority	1361	2124	3485
Routine	685	1793	2478
Deferred	2	3	5
Total:	5689	7007	12696

* Represents only messages prepared for possible electrical transmission, but delivered by messenger for various reasons. Does not include packages and official mail.

Section II - Communications

On 1 December the LUCKY DOG switching central was placed in operation in METZ (U 85). This switching central was taken over by the III Corps and renamed CENTURY on 7 December, at which time the III Corps command post opened in METZ (U 85) and closed in STALIN (U 47).

During this period the Headquarters Third U.S. Army was located at NANCY (U 81). A special "Red Line" wire telephone system was set up by the Twelfth U.S. Army Group which functioned as a command network. The purpose of this network was to establish quick telephone communication between the Commanders of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group and the Commanders of the subordinate armies, and between Army Commanders. Calls to and from this network received "clear the line" precedence.

The two-arm open wire pole line projected northeast from NANCY (U 81) was extended to ST. AVOLD (Q 25) and was to extend farther forward along the army axis consistent with the tactical situation. The installation of communications for a Third U.S. Army advance command post in ST. AVOLD (Q 25) was begun on 16 December. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was also extending a two-arm open wire pole line from VERDUN (U 26) to ST. AVOLD (Q 25). This lead was to connect with the East-West open wire pole line that existed between VERDUN (U 26) and a point west of METZ (U 85). The final juncture of these two leads could not be effected because the area just west of METZ (U 85) was not cleared of German resistance. Some German fortifications were still occupied in this area in the early part of December. Wire communication to the advance Third U.S. Army command post at ST. AVOLD (Q 25) was constructed rapidly. By mid-December there existed the NANCY (U 81) - ST. AVOLD (Q 25) two-arm open wire lead, the NANCY (U 81) - MERLENBACH (Q 36) open wire lead, the METZ (U 85) - ST. AVOLD (Q 25) two-arm open wire Eagle lead (approximately 50% complete), a CONPLANS (U 66) - THIONVILLE (U 88) - BOUZONVILLE (Q 17) one-arm open wire pole line and sixteen underground cable pairs, METZ (U 85) - ST. AVOLD (Q 25). The internal telephone system of the proposed command post at ST. AVOLD (Q 25) had been practically completed. Wire communications had been established between the advance command post and all corps; the XII Corps Headquarters located at SAARALBEN (Q 44), the XX Corps Headquarters located at THIONVILLE (U 88), and the III Corps Headquarters located at METZ (U 85).

A major German counter-offensive was launched on the First U.S. Army front which extended eventually to include the following salient:

MALMEDY (K 80) - STAVELOT (K 60) - LAROCHE (P 47) - MARCHE (P 28) - ROCHEFORT (P 27) - BEAURAING (P 07) - ST. HUBERT (P 36) - BASTOGNE (P 55) - ECHTERNACH (L 03).

On 19 December the advance party and communication troops operating at the advance command post in ST. AVOLD (Q 25) were recalled. On 20 December a small command group, which included a limited number of Signal Staff and operating personnel, left NANCY (U 81) to establish a LUCKY TAC command post in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). Initial circuits to this new command post were quickly established by the use of existing facilities furnished by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Underground cable circuits were extensively used to connect LUCKY TAC Headquarters with LUCKY CHARLEY switch at CONPLANS (U 66) and extended from there to NANCY (U 81) via carrier. Other circuits were rerouted through XX Corps at THIONVILLE (U 88), then to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) via underground cable. Two additional open wire circuits were obtained from advance Section Communications Zone for use from NANCY (U 81) to AUBANGE (P 61) to include a complete CF-1 carrier system. This made available three additional talking circuits from NANCY (U 81) to AUBANGE (P 61) and then to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) via underground cables. The other channel was used for CF-2 teletype carrier terminals which were located at NANCY (U 81) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) respectively. Twelfth U.S. Army Group Tactical Headquarters, located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), established a switching central called Bastille Switch in the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) in order to handle the overflow of circuits which were rapidly being routed to this city. It was apparent that the communication system was growing rapidly and that the small force of Signal personnel operating at LUCKY TAC would be unable to efficiently handle this new situation. Therefore, on 21 December the remainder of the Communication Section moved to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) leaving an officer and one enlisted man in NANCY (U 81) to coordinate the work at this point. The communication installation at ST. AVOLD (Q 25) was not used. The personnel and equipment were moved to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81).

LUCKY TAC was located in a school building on the north side of the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). Preparations were immediately effected for the establishment of a Third U.S. Army Command Post in larger quarters. The underground cable within the city was used extensively for local, long local, and trunk circuits. One hundred fifty pairs of an underground cable leading from a point close to the command post to the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building were used. From the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building underground circuits radiated in all directions and in many cases to the outskirts of the city where they were connected to rehabilitated open wire or field wire circuits serving various units. The wirehead was located in the basement of the building from which point many spiral-four cables and other field wire circuits were constructed on suspension wire supported by poles to a test point called "Rond Point Test" located on the northwest corner of the command post site. From there these cables radiated in three major directions to the outskirts of the city and were also suspended on messenger wire. Local telephone service to establishments within the city were serviced by underground cable pairs terminating in the Postes Telephones Telegraphes building and thence connected to pairs of the one hundred fifty pair cable terminating in the wirehead. LUCKY TAC closed on 28 December and the main command post of LUCKY

closed at NANCY (U 81) and opened on the same date in the new headquarters building in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). Corps Headquarters was serviced by spiral-four cable, using carrier. Third U.S. Army's drive was to the north with the VIII Corps at the extreme west, the III Corps in the center, the XII Corps in the northeast and the XX Corps on the southeast protecting the southeast flank. The VIII Corps was assigned to Third U.S. Army. Its headquarters was located at FLORENTVILLE (P 22). III Corps Headquarters was located at ARLON (P 52), the XII Corps Headquarters was located in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), and the XX Corps Headquarters remained in THIONVILLE (U 88). A signal construction platoon of the 33d Signal Construction Battalion was attached to each corps for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the respective Army-Corps axes, as the tactical situation permitted. The new tactical problem was studied and plans were made for the extension of the possible army axis.

During the month of December two hundred seventy-four miles of field wire and six hundred thirty-six miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. For the same period four hundred fifty-five miles of field wire and sixty-two miles of spiral-four cable were recovered by Third U.S. Army troops. Three hundred and six wire miles of open wire were placed.

Thirty-four radio relay circuits were installed, covering a total distance of 1045 miles. VIII Corps had eight VHF terminals in operation to divisions, XII Corps four, and XX Corps two. VHF communications were maintained through the month with III, XII and XX Corps. On 22 December, contact was established and maintained with VIII Corps for the remainder of the month. (See annexes 34 through 36)

Continuous Wave radio communication was maintained throughout the month with XII and XX Corps, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, Twelfth U.S. Army Group TAC, Eighth Air Force, First French Army, First, Ninth, Seventh U.S. Armies and Advance Section Communications Zone. Contact was further established and maintained from 28 December on, with III and VIII Corps and Third U.S. Army Rear Echelon. Total code groups handled for the month was 97,767.

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depots Number 8, at TOUL (U 61), Number 9, at VAUCOULEURS (U 40), Number 10, at FLORENCE (U 88), Number 11, at MORHANGE (Q 24) were in operation during the month. All four depots were in operation at one time, an unusual disposition for only one depot company, and a distribution of supplies was made through all depots to the troops in that area.

The extensive front of Third U.S. Army required supply coverage. This was met by spreading these depots over the area and using Depot Number 9, at VAUCOULEURS (U 40), as a receiving and storage point to serve the installations forward. This procedure proved its value in the operations under way and no forward depot was left with unbalanced stocks of any supplies that were available.

Teletype communication was inaugurated during the month in the Signal Supply system. Teletype channels were established between the Army Signal Supply Office, Depot Number 8, Depot Number 10 and Depot Number 11. This system was used to distribute and balance stocks as the tactical picture changed. Rail transportation was available to all depots. Through the medium of rail and teletype communication it was possible to shift critical items of supply and equipment to the areas needed on short notice.

Receipt of supplies from the Communications Zone during the month totaled 3329 tons against 3800 tons requisitioned. The shortages of fast moving expendable items became acute as transportation delays became frequent. Truck transportation was held to a minimum due to a tire shortage and only the emergency requirements available at Communications Zone Depots were handled by Third U.S. Army truck transport.

There were many items in critical supply during the month. Manufacturing undertaken by the 187th Signal Repair Company and the arrangement of contracts with local French industries enabled us to overcome serious deficiencies in most sections, certain type radio tubes, slip ring brushes for radar sets, adapters for 500 and 600 series radios, batteries for flame throwers and rocket launchers and many small items that were not available from other supply sources. The following were produced through the efforts and abilities of the personnel of the 187th Signal Repair Company:

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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

Radio Tube, VT-146	800
Radio Tube, VT-147	600
Radio Tube, VT-223	600
Adapters, M-399	500
Rocket Launcher Batteries	8000
Flame Thrower Batteries	100
Radar Slip Ring Brushes	1400
Radar Brush Holders	50
Mast Sections	1500

During the month, the general level of Class II items was estimated at two days. Class IV items were estimated at five days. Receipts of substantial shipments from Communications Zone Depots during the last half of the month stabilized our position and increased our levels by one to two days. However, shortages of operational items increased in order that equal distribution be made to all the Armies from the limited quantities on the Continent. Twelfth U.S. Army Group assumed the responsibility of allocating thirty-eight of these critical items between the Armies. At the end of the month, this plan was in operation and materially aided in balancing certain stocks.


A new spare parts service was started. The Communications Zone established a Spare Parts Depot S-891, at PARIS (S 04). An officer from the Maintenance Branch, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, was named as the Liaison Officer for this work. Requisitions were delivered to this office weekly and the items available were delivered to the Army the following week. The procedure operated well. Third U.S. Army received approximately sixty percent of all items requisitioned.

A separate Radar Supply Section was organized. All radar parts were divorced from other supply items. An officer was placed in charge of this unit and given full responsibility to operate the section. Five enlisted men, all radar technicians, were assigned from the personnel of the Depot Company. Contacts were made direct with the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion and requisitions were made direct upon the Spare Parts Depot in PARIS (S 04). All radar spare parts were handled by personnel properly trained in recognizing and handling these items. The radar spare parts situation improved rapidly.

Radar repair work increased during the month. The 179th Signal Repair Company was attached to Third U.S. Army and further attached to the 187th Signal Repair Company. Sixteen radio repair units worked directly with Infantry and Armored divisions and Ordnance Motor Maintenance units in the forward areas. The remaining units were stationed at the Signal Depot. The following work was completed:

691	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
1598	Major Repair Jobs
85	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
221	Installations in Combat Vehicles
21	Salvage of Equipment
1450	Mile Miles Serviced for Stock

Transportation of supplies from the Communications Zone to the Armies remained a problem. Continued use of Third U.S. Army truck transportation was necessary for all critical items.



Section I - General

During the month of January Third U.S. Army maintained its headquarters in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). Throughout this period communications were established to follow roughly a north-south axis which would eventually link up with the First U.S. Army in the north (ST. VITH - P 88) and with the Advance Section Communications Zone communication lines in the south (CONPLANS - U 66). The northern arm of this axis was built first from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ETTTELBRUCK (P 83) and thence to BASTOGNE (P 55) while the BASTOGNE-ARDENNES bulge was being reduced. When the tactical situation permitted, steps were taken to extend the axis north through CLERVAUX (P 76) to ST. VITH (P 88); however, construction of this project could not be completed as fighting was still in progress in this area. For the southern arm of the north-south axis, wire circuits were established between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), through ESCH (P 74) to ANGEVILLERS (U 78). (See Annex 42)

The Rear Echelon of Third U.S. Army moved from NANCY (U 81) to ESCH (P 74) during the early part of the month. Communications between forward and rear echelons were established.

It was impossible to project a firm axis of Signal communications by the end of the month. There was a tendency, however, to favor a curving axis towards KOBLENZ (L 89), as follows:

LUXEMBOURG (P 81) - ETTTELBRUCK (P 83) - WILTZ (P 75) - CLERVAUX (P 76) - FRUM (L 07) - KEIBERG (L 48) - MAYEN (L 69) - KOBLENZ (L 89).

During the BASTOGNE (P 55) Battle Signal Intelligence activities were at their peak. Much valuable information was gained during this period. Due to unfavorable weather conditions, however, pigeon communication was reduced to a minimum.

In spite of intensification of the wire recovery program the results obtained during the month were not up to expectations. Wire recovery was handicapped by heavy snowfall and snow drifts. Thawing, rain, and freezing caused central portions of long spans to be weighted down to the ground where the wire soon became buried under heavy layers of ice and snow. In many instances the same conditions applied to existing wire circuits. The additional weight of snow and ice and swaying of the wires caused large numbers of shorts where the insulation had broken down. Snow plows further aggravated the situation by cutting the wires.

The supply situation in general was improving during the month of January. This was largely due to increased tonnages of Signal equipment being unloaded at the port of ANTWERP (J 79).

Signal Supply depots and repair companies were confronted with unusually heavy demands for replacement, maintenance, repair and replenishment of Signal equipment lost as a result of the German breakthrough in LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM. Approximately 85% of all battle losses sustained by elements of the First and Third U.S. Armies, which were estimated at 90% of the total Signal equipment carried by these units, were replaced by 15 January.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

A pigeon platoon of the 285th Signal Pigeon Company arrived on 3 January in response to the Army Signal Officer's request in December for additional pigeon personnel and equipment. This platoon was attached to the 277th Signal Pigeon Company, giving the company a combat platoon for each of Third U.S. Army's four corps. In order to provide pigeon communication for all echelons, a platoon was placed at the disposal of each Corps Signal Officer for use by the corps and its divisions. One section of each platoon, however, was left at the Company Headquarters at Army to provide Army communication and birds for breeding.

Since LUXEMBOURG (P 81) was a center of pigeon breeding by civilians, G-2 was cognizant of the possibility of the use of pigeons for espionage activities in the Duchy. Consequently, Signal Intelligence Service and G-2 worked out a program for systematic inspection of all civilian pigeon lofts by the 277th Signal Pigeon Company. The company inspected 391 lofts during the month, and either requisitioned the birds or clipped the wings of all homing pigeons found. Suspicious lofts were reported to the Counter Intelligence Corps for further investigation.

Due to extremely unfavorable weather conditions and a tactical situation where other means of communication were adequate, the tactical use of pigeons was reduced to a minimum. Birds trained while snow was on the ground had to be retrained as if for a new loft when the snow melted. Similarly, birds which were trained before snow fell had to be retrained after the earth was covered with snow.

Radio intelligence was at a higher level during the battle around BASTOGNE (P 55) than at any period in France. To increase the tactical effectiveness of radio intelligence, the 3256th Signal Service Company was temporarily attached to III Corps, but it reverted to XX Corps after the intense activity in the III Corps zone had abated. Details of the intelligence gained during this period will be reported at a subsequent date.

Representatives of the 3325th SIAM Company visited Third U.S. Army for orientation that was believed would enable them to adapt the final phases of the company's training program to actual combat needs. Tentative plans for the employment of the company were discussed further during the visit. It was estimated that at least another month would elapse before the company would be ready for action.

Radio security showed improvement during the month, despite the heavy tactical use of radio under conditions of great pressure.

Monitoring logs analyzed by Signal Intelligence Service showed that obvious violations had been eliminated in all but low echelon nets. During the month the Third U.S. Army Monitoring Team covered the AM nets of approximately two and one-half corps and the FM detachment of the team covered the nets of almost six divisions. Towards the close of the month, a security analyst of Signal Intelligence Service spent twenty-four hours at the Net Control Station of one net, correcting violations as they occurred and showing operators how such violations would help enemy signal intelligence.

Three photographers attached to Signal Intelligence Service for reproducing captured signal documents and photographing G-2 and G-3 war maps were awarded the Bronze Star Medal on 12 January for superior performance and for developing new photographic techniques in the performance of their duties.

On 27 January the responsibility of supervising the Army message center was transferred from Signal Intelligence Service to the Communication Sub-section. Signal Intelligence Service continued to be responsible for operation of the code room.

The code room record for the month was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of messages	2564	613	3177
Number of Code Groups	564911	126423	691334

The message center record for the month was as follows:

Means	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	39	875	914
Teletype	6449	6104	12853
Total	6488	7279	13767

Precedence

Urgent	341	847	1188
Operational Priority	4076	1983	6059
Priority	1469	2364	3833
Routine	600	2077	2677
Deferred	2	8	10
Total	6488	7279	13767

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Section II - Communications

Headquarters Third U.S. Army Forward Echelon was located in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81) throughout the month of January.

On 1 January the 29th Signal Construction Battalion, loaned to Third U.S. Army by Advance Section Communications Zone, started construction of a two-arm, ten circuit, open wire lead from the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81) to ETTLEBRUCK (P 83). The tactical situation was vague and although the axis of Signal Communication at that time was LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) - ST. VITH (P 88), this axis was subject to change. However, it was felt that the building of an open wire lead as far north as possible, would provide the most satisfactory axis along which to construct a spur leading east at any point, whenever tactical developments would so justify.

The construction platoons of the 33d Signal Construction Battalion, that were attached to the corps, extended the Army-Corps axes as the corps advanced. In general, two spiral-four cables were laid between Third U.S. Army and each corps. One spiral-four cable was used for direct communication while the other had carrier equipment superimposed upon it. Teletypewriter service was furnished each corps by CF-2 carrier.

Third U.S. Army Rear Echelon Headquarters moved from NANCY (U 81) to ESCH (P 74) during the early part of the month. Two spiral-four cables were laid between the forward echelon and the rear echelon. In addition, eight underground cable trunks were placed in operation between the two echelons. The Rear Echelon Headquarters was also furnished direct channels of communication with other major headquarters and installations by means of underground and spiral-four cables. This included two circuits to the Advance Section Communications Zone Headquarters and four circuits to Twelfth Army Group Headquarters. The policy adopted of providing the Rear Echelon switchboard with direct trunks to such installations as are essentially associated with the Rear Echelon Headquarters. This improved the service considerably, as the necessity for switching through the switchboard of the Forward Echelon was eliminated.

Third U.S. Army had a one-arm open wire lead between COMPLANS (U 66) and THIONVILLE (U 88) and Advance Section Communications Zone had an open wire build south from COMPLANS (U 66). Therefore it was desirable to provide an open wire lead between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and this build. Construction of a two-arm open wire lead was undertaken from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through ESCH (P 74), to a point where the east-west lead between COMPLANS (U 66) and THIONVILLE (U 88) was intercepted, the point of interception being ANGEVILLES (U 78). There the east-west lead was cut and connected with the one arm of the north-south build leading towards COMPLANS (U 66) and with the other arm leading in the direction of THIONVILLE (U 88).

On 20 January the open wire build to ETTLEBRUCK (P 83) was completed, at which time Advance Section Communications Zone recalled the 29th Signal Construction Battalion. It then became necessary to extend this wire lead north through CLERVAUX (P 76), to ST. VITH (P 88). The 34th Signal Construction Battalion was directed to proceed with this work. At the same time First U.S. Army was building an open wire lead south to join the Third U.S. Army lead at ST. VITH (P 88).

Two spiral-four cables were laid from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ETTLEBRUCK (P 83) as an alternate route paralleling the open wire lead. Four spiral-four cables were constructed between ETTLEBRUCK (P 83) and BASTOGNE (P 55) in anticipation of Corps Headquarters movement to the east. All spiral-four cables were constructed on messenger strand. The cables between ETTLEBRUCK (P 83) and BASTOGNE (P 55) were under construction while there was still considerable artillery fire in the vicinity. As a result much of this cable had to be replaced. Much trouble occurred on these cables spasmodically, due to shell fragments that penetrated the rubber but could not be seen.

At the end of the month the Rear Echelon of Third U.S. Army planned to move to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). Preparations were under way to receive the Rear Echelon and to reestablish a duplicate communication network that was at this time in existence at ESCH (P 74).

For the month of January a total of 305 miles of field wire, 550 miles of spiral-four cable, and 459 wire miles of open wire was laid by Third U.S. Army Signal troops. For the same period 279 miles of

field wire and fifty-eight miles of spiral-four cable were recovered by Third U.S. Army Signal troops.

On 30 January, a new air messenger run was started by Twelfth Army Group. Stops were made daily at the LUXEMBOURG (P 81) airfield.

Fifty-eight radio relay circuits were installed during the month covering a total of 1144 miles. III Corps had four terminals in operation to divisions, VIII Corps ten, XII Corps six, and XX Corps two. Radio contact was maintained between Third U.S. Army and Corps throughout the month. (See Annex 38)

Continuous Wave Radio communication was maintained throughout the month of January with all stations in the following radio nets:

<u>PZA-1 NET</u>	<u>SG-4 NET</u>
First U.S. Army	First French Army
Tenth U.S. Army	Seventh U.S. Army
COMZ Advance Section	
<u>FG-33 NET</u>	<u>FG-16 NET</u>
Twelfth Army Group	Twelfth Army Group TAC
<u>EIGHTH AF NET</u>	<u>FA-15 NET</u>
Eighth Air Force	Third U.S. Army Rear
<u>FA-12 NET</u>	<u>FA-17 NET</u>
III Corps	III Corps Artillery
VIII Corps	VIII Corps Artillery
XII Corps	XII Corps Artillery
XX Corps	Third U.S. Army Photo Center

Total code groups handled for the month of January was 139,768.

Section II - Supply

Following the German breakthrough in Luxembourg and Belgium during the latter part of December, three of the four Third U.S. Army Signal Depots were closed, Depot Number 8 at TOUL (U 61), Number 9 at VAUQUOULEURS (U 40), and Number 11 at MORHANGE (Q 24). All Third U.S. Army Signal Supply operations were centralized in Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 10 at FLORANGE (U 88) and at Advance Section Communications Zone Signal Depot S-857, located at STEINFORT (P 61), Luxembourg. In accordance with agreement reached with the Signal Officer, Advance Section Communications Zone, the latter depot was operated as Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 12, under joint management by Third U.S. Army and Advance Section Communications Zone. Signal Depot Number 10 at FLORANGE (U 88) (See illustration Page 11) carried approximately sixty-five percent of Third U.S. Army Signal stocks and was located in a most advantageous position to support the new front of Third U.S. Army. Stocks were moved from the three closed depots to Signal Depot Number 10, an operation which required only eight days.

Heavy demands were made on Signal Supplies as the German counter-offensive caused severe losses to units then operating in the invaded area. It is estimated that as much as 90% of their Signal equipment was turned in by these units for salvage, repair and replacement. Due to the haste with which troops of divisions and all other units moved into the area, it was not possible for these units to recover wire, replenish equipment, etc., from their former locations. Many units picked up the necessary Signal Supplies as they passed the Signal Depot on the LUXEMBOURG (P 81) road.

All battle losses sustained by the elements from First U.S. Army, including the VIII Corps, consisting of three divisions, fifteen artillery battalions, seven engineer battalions and miscellaneous units, were replaced to approximately eighty-five percent of their total requirements before 15 January. During this same period two additional armored divisions, two airborne divisions and two additional infantry divisions were assigned to Third U.S. Army for operations and supply. In all, a total of seventeen divisions were supplied through Signal Depots Number ten and Number 12 and a replacement of eighty-five percent of all battle losses was made during the period.

Receipt of supplies from Communications Zone during the month improved as the tempo of unloading at the new port of ANTWERP (J 79) increased. Shortages of fast moving expendable items remained critical most of the time. The hauling of Signal supplies for Third U.S. Army continued to be a major problem. Transportation was unreliable and shipments were frequently delayed.

The situation as regards spare parts, both radar and radio, was much improved. The operation of the Communications Zone Spare Parts Depot and the special expediting service of the Maintenance Branch, Communications Zone, proved highly successful for Third U.S. Army Signal operations.

An extensive campaign to recover and service all field wire had been under way. Approximately 5100 miles of field wire were returned to the Signal Depots for servicing and salvage, of which approximately 3000 miles were reclaimed during the month.


Radio repair work increased during the month. The burden was somewhat relieved by the attachment of elements of the 179th Signal Repair Company and one radio team of the 189th Signal Repair Company. Eighteen radio repair units worked directly with Infantry and Armored divisions and Ordnance M⁴ units in the forward area. The remaining units were stationed at Signal Depot Number 10. The following work was completed:

1000	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2179	Major Repair Jobs
98	cannibalization of Equipment (American)
103	Installations in Combat Vehicles
12	Salvage of Equipment
3000	Wire Miles Serviced for Stock

The month was characterized by extensive replacement of equipment for units involved in the German counter-attack, as well as by the repair, maintenance and replenishment of Signal equipment for eighteen divisions and the large number of field artillery battalions, tank destroyer battalions, engineer battalions, anti-aircraft battalions, etc., employed by Third U.S. Army.

Allocations of thirty-eight operational critical items were made by Twelfth Army Group. The issue of sixteen items in short supply was controlled through the Signal depots. Field wire consumption for the month amounted to 16,928 miles.

To meet pressing requirements for vehicular mine detectors, 123 detectors AN/NRS-1 were requisitioned from Communications Zone through Twelfth Army Group. The release of these items in this Theater was expected in the near future.



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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Long range planning for Army communications necessarily concerned itself with future RHINE RIVER crossings. Information was obtained regarding specifications for special submarine telephone cable which First U.S. Army was planning to use for the crossing of the RHINE RIVER. There were under manufacture in Belgium at the Atelier De Construction, CHARLEROI (J 71), three 600-meter lengths of fifteen-quad armored cable for which First U.S. Army furnished approximately 30,000 pounds of copper, 50,000 pounds of lead and 400 tons of coal. The copper and lead were obtained from the Eupen Cable Works in EUPEN (K 85) Belgium. It was further learned that a similar cable was to be manufactured for Ninth U.S. Army upon the completion of the First U.S. Army cable. As the availability of copper and lead in sufficient quantities was doubtful, Twelfth Army Group was investigating the possibility of securing standard seven-quad armored cable from Communications Zone for use by Third U.S. Army. In the meantime Twelfth Army Group suggested that Third U.S. Army consider the advisability of recovering certain sections of Postes Telephones Telegraphes underground cable existing between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and ECHTERNACH (L 03). As a communication link between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and ECHTERNACH (L 03) this cable was no longer suitable because long lengths of it had been severely damaged or were missing altogether.

During the month technical experts representing commercial firms visited Third U.S. Army for observation and advice on Signal Corps matters. These visits from technical observers were beneficial in that much assistance and information was obtained specifically with regard to facsimile equipment and its operation.

A request was made by certain divisions for a four-line teletype switchboard suitable for field use. Members of the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service designed and built such a switchboard which received highly favorable comments from users.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

An event unique in the cryptographic history of Third U.S. Army took place on 7 February when all high grade cryptographic systems were simultaneously compromised, due to the loss of an entire code room of a unit in another army. This compromise virtually halted the encyptographing of messages from division level through corps, army and higher headquarters. Classified teletype lines and messengers had to be utilized exclusively for communication, with the exception of messages which could be enciphered in a system that had just been distributed through the chain of command as far down as corps and which was put into effect on an emergency basis in advance of its effective date. Reserve cipher systems were immediately obtained from Twelfth Army Group and these were quickly distributed throughout Third U.S. Army by special messenger. Cryptographic operations had returned to almost normal within twenty-four hours after the compromise was reported.

Toward the end of February pigeon communication came into greater tactical use as weather and tactical dispositions made the use of pigeons feasible and advisable. A total of twenty-three tactical messages was delivered by pigeon during the month, most of these being delivered during the last two weeks of February. A "trap loft" was set up on an experimental basis near LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ascertain if birds used by enemy agents could be lured into it by the attraction of birds settled in such a loft. Several U.S. Army pigeons and one pigeon, possibly German, (carrying no message) were "trapped". A report was made to Twelfth Army Group that a "trap loft" would be feasible in areas where use of pigeons by the enemy was anticipated. It was pointed out that an Army pigeon company does not have enough men and birds to maintain "trap lofts" and communications simultaneously, and recommendation was made that an Army Group pigeon company be detailed for this activity. At the end of February the "trap loft" was closed to release more birds for communication.

Analysis of monitoring logs by Signal Intelligence Service during February revealed better radio transmission security, and a sharp decline in excessive transmissions. FM nets were monitored extensively

due to the infrequent use of CW nets in the stable tactical situation. The chief security threat on FM nets was the passage of messages in the clear by Artillery Fire Control nets. During the last seven days of February Army MP nets were monitored on a 24-hour basis at the request of Twelfth Army Group. Only minor security violations were found.

The Executive Officer and two other officers of the SIAM Company visited Third U.S. Army on an orientation tour of the front preparatory to the movement of the company to France for its operational role with Third U.S. Army.

Motion picture films of radio intelligence activities were taken to LONDON for development under proper supervision in accordance with their security restrictions. Motion pictures of pigeon activities were developed at the same time.

Radio intelligence activity was intensive at the beginning of February, but declined toward the end of the month.

Monitoring of headquarters telephone conversations by Signal Intelligence Service was suspended temporarily 21 February 1945, since telephone security had improved to such an extent that continuous monitoring was no longer necessary. Monitoring equipment was left in place, however, for subsequent spot checks of telephone security.

During the month the Third U.S. Army code room record was as follows:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	2816	972	3788
Number of Groups	569779	224938	794717

In addition to the encyptographed traffic handled in the code room systems, 24 messages comprising 23,156 groups were handled by SIGCUM equipment.

The message center record for the month was as follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	459	568	1027
Operational Priority	3978	1652	5630
Priority	2406	1669	4075
Routine	1352	1923	3275
Deferred	7	1	8
Total	8202	5813	14015

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Messages	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	124	795	919
Teletype	7362	7541	14903
Total messages handled:	7486	8336	15822

Groups	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	16305	129516	145821
Teletype	1398435	1118834	2517269
Total groups handled:	1414740	1248350	2663090

Messenger service:

Pouches transmitted by motor messenger	3229
Pieces transmitted by motor messenger	142107
Total number motor messenger miles travelled	45720
Total number of pouches by air messenger	30

Section II - Communications

The forward echelon of Headquarters Third U.S. Army maintained its command post in the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81) during the month. On 7 February the rear echelon moved from its location in ESCH (P 74) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). Their switchboard included circuits to supply installations and trunks to major installations, including Headquarters

Advance Section Communications Zone and Headquarters Twelfth Army Group. Advantage was taken extensively of existing underground cable facilities of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes to furnish communication service to military installations within the city of LUXEMBOURG (P 81). The switching central at ESCH (P 74) was maintained and operated by Third U.S. Army troops.

On about 12 February III Corps was relieved from the command of Third U.S. Army and was attached to First U.S. Army. At the time of this transfer, III Corps maintained its headquarters at MARTELANGE (P 53). As the switchboard operated by III Corps serviced many other Third U.S. Army units, this change in status necessitated the installation of another secondary switchboard north of MARTELANGE (P 53), at BASTOGNE (P 55), which was connected with Headquarters Third U.S. Army by means of spiral-four cable to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81), and by a radio link circuit. During the month Third U.S. Army maintained and operated the following switching centrals: "Lucky Fox" at BASTOGNE (P 55), "Lucky Easy" at ESCH (P 74), "Lucky Dog" at ARLON (P 52). The switching central in CONFLANS (U 66), named "Lucky Charlie" was taken over by Advance Section Communications Zone on 7 February and renamed "Conflans Switch". However, Third U.S. Army maintained a carrier terminal and wirehead personnel at this point.

The tactical situation throughout the month did not offer any definite clues as to where the breakthrough of the Siegfried Line would materialize. Wherever penetrations into the enemy lines resulted in consolidated gains of territory, communication axes were extended as quickly as possible to such points. It remained therefore essentially a matter of conjecture where the main army communication axis was to be projected. It was realized that violent action would soon erupt at one or several points on the otherwise stagnant front which might quickly result in deep thrusts into Germany followed by enveloping flanking maneuvers, quite possibly involving a wide area. With this possibility in mind, the tactical situation was under continuous study and analysis.

During the month every effort was made to plan, project, and construct tentative axes and to prepare a hypothetical network of communications whose tentacles might one day carry the basic flow of command communications necessary to successfully conduct operations in an easterly direction. As the emphasis was thus placed on the West-East trend toward the RHINE River, six communication axes leading east were projected during the month. They were either extended from previously built leads, or newly constructed, with some still in the stage of development until the tactical situation would justify their completion. These six axes were linked up with the firmly established North-South axis and coordinated with communication demands imposed by Twelfth Army Group supply installations (Advance Section Communications Zone) and flanking armies. From Third U.S. Army point of view, the center of this network was in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) with its converging underground cable network of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes.

The North-South axis was developed as follows:

Prior to the month of February there existed leads and underground cables, from NANCY (U 81) in the south (former Third U.S. Army Command Post), through METZ (U 85), THIONVILLE (U 88) (where XX Corps was located) to LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). North of LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) the existing two-arm ten-circuit open wire lead to ETTELEBRUCK (P 83) was extended further to HOSCHEID (P 75), during the month. This construction was undertaken by the 34th Signal Construction Battalion. A further extension north from HOSCHEID (P 75) was made to a point where the West-East highway passing through CLERVAUX (P 76) was reached. In accordance with the general plan to have a continuous two-arm open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ST. VITH (P 88), Twelfth Army Group assigned to one of their signal units, the 36th Signal Construction Battalion, the construction of the portion beginning with the point on the CLERVAUX (P 76) West-East highway to ST. VITH (P 88). Difficulties were encountered in the construction of this lead from HOSCHEID (P 75) on north and temporary delays caused due to the bad condition of the road and artillery fire, the area in question being at that time in a division zone. The road itself was particularly exposed to enemy observation, earning the name of "sky-line drive" due to its high location. While the portion LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to HOSCHEID (P 75) was completed on 17 February, the remainder of the lead was not ready at the end of the month. During the month Headquarters VIII Corps displaced to TROIS VIERGES (P 77). Communication between this Corps and Third U.S. Army Headquarters was established by taking advantage of the above mentioned open wire lead to HOSCHEID (P 75), from which point two spiral-four cables were laid north and west to TROIS VIERGES (P 77).

The six eastern communication axes mentioned in the above were roughly as follows:

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a. In the north (of Third U.S. Army territory) a two-arm open wire lead was being built by First U.S. Army from its location at SPA (K 61), to ST. VITH (P 88). From ST. VITH (P 88) to FRUM (L 07) a four-arm open wire lead was to be constructed by Twelfth Army Group. This was in keeping with the overall policy to eventually furnish communication to Third U.S. Army, XIX Tactical Air Command, First U.S. Army and Twelfth Army Group along a major axis proceeding east. Further south, spiral-four cables had previously been laid to insure communication between BASTOGNE (P 55), TROIS VIERGES (P 77) (new location of VIII Corps) and FRUM (L 07), a circuit which represented the VIII Corps axis of communication.

b. In the center of Third U.S. Army territory a lead was planned which was to provide communications along the axis: LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) - ECHTERNACH (L 03) - BITBURG (L 15). As the town of ECHTERNACH (L 03) was cleared early in the month, the 34th Signal Construction Battalion was directed, on 15 February, to begin construction of a two-arm open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to that locality.

c. Following the capture of the town of SAARBURG (L 11) on or about 20 February, the 33d Signal Construction Battalion started the construction of a rapid pole line, eight-wire, lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to SAARBURG (L 11) on 22 February. For this construction .080 copper-weld wire was used.

d. At the same time Twelfth Army Group was contemplating the future use of the communication center of TRIER (L 22). The 43d Signal Construction Battalion, a Twelfth Army Group Signal unit, began the construction of a two-arm open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to TRIER (L 22).

e. At a point approximately halfway between the City of LUXEMBOURG (P 81) and ETTLEBRUCK (P 83) a communication axis was constructed east closely following the tactical progress in that area. Thus, Headquarters XII Corps, which moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to FELS (P 83) was provided communications with Third U.S. Army at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) by means of two spiral-four cables which intercepted the LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) - ETTLEBRUCK (P 83) open wire lead at MERSCH (P 82). This axis was eventually to be extended east toward ECHTERNACH (L 03).

f. In the south of Third U.S. Army territory, there was already in existence the previously built CONFLANS (U 66) - THIONVILLE (U 88) - BOUZONVILLE (Q 17) one-arm open wire lead, as well as underground cable circuits, leading in the general direction of SAARLAUTERN (Q 72).

Knowledge was obtained of the whereabouts of certain German underground cables which no doubt served to provide communication for the German forces behind the Siegfried fortifications. When VIII Corps, in its northern push, made territorial gains north of FRUM (L 07), the COLOGNE (F 45) - TRIER (L 22) - SAARBRUCKEN (Q 47) cable was located by elements of the 87th Infantry Division. On about 10 February, this cable was severed by this division at two points south of OLEHEIM (L 18) Germany. Approximate locations of interruptions were P 088861 and P 088863. This cable consisted of thirty-nine quads plus two pair. A lead shield around one quad and the two pair formed the core of the cable. A sample of this cable confirmed the accuracy of the information that was on file as to the description of the cable.

During the month of February Third U.S. Army Signal troops laid a total of 150 miles of W-110 field wire, 278 miles of spiral-four cable, and 383 wire miles of open wire. For the same period a total of 265 miles of field wire and 209 miles of spiral-four cable was recovered.

Fifty-four radio relay circuits were installed during the month, covering a total distance of 809 miles. III Corps had four terminals in operation to divisions, XII Corps six, XX Corps four, and VIII Corps ten to divisions, rear echelon headquarters and switches. (See Annex 39) Continuous wave radio communication was maintained with all higher, lateral and subordinate units.

CW Radio Communication was maintained throughout the month of February with all stations in the following nets:

<u>F2A-1 NET</u>	<u>SG-3 NET</u>
First U.S. Army	First French Army
Ninth U.S. Army	Seventh U.S. Army
COMZ Adv Sec	

FG-33 NET

Twelfth Army Group

FA-12 NET

III Corps
VIII Corps
XII Corps
XX Corps

FG-51 NET

Twelfth Army Group Main

FG-16 NET

Twelfth Army Group TAC


FA-15 NET

Third U.S. Army Rear

FA-17 NET

III Corps Arty
VIII Corps Arty
XII Corps Arty
XX Corps Arty
Third U.S. Army Photo Center

Total code groups handled for month of February was 145,821.



EXPERIMENTAL VEHICULAR VHF INSTALLATION

Section II - Supply

Third U.S. Army Signal Depots Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), and Number 12 at STEINFORT (P 61), Luxembourg were in operation during the month. Receipt of all supplies coming from Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone, with the exception of S-857, were received by Signal Depot Number 10. All shipments from Advance Section Communications Zone S-857 were received at Depot Number 12. The volume of operations was handled by Depot Number 10.

The Signal Supply situation during the month improved greatly and Third U.S. Army was able to replace nearly all battle losses encountered during the month, and in addition, could move all remaining shortages of battle losses suffered during the December-January German breakthrough. The critical items of Third U.S. Army were on the decline all during the month and although it was still necessary to ration many items, the situation was generally relieved. At the end of the month there remained only approximately forty items on the critical item list.

Field Wire, W-110-B, continued to be the greatest source of difficulty for Signal Supply. A total of 13866 miles was issued during the month and this figure was only kept to such a low level by strict rationing. This rationing did not, however, impair the communication efficiency of any combat unit, as it was intended rather to insure to those units actually engaged in combat a preference of issue over those units not so engaged. During the month of February there were nine

infantry divisions, five armored divisions and the usual number of supporting troops serviced by Third U.S. Army Signal Depots. Although most units were actually engaged during the month, this period was also one where an excellent opportunity was afforded to such units to completely refit themselves.

The tank-infantry communication situation of the separate tank battalions was partially solved during this month by the installation of the telephone headset on the skirt of the tank and by the installation of the AN/VRC-3 (SCR-300) in the tank. This was accomplished during the month in all separate tank battalions. Another new feature of interest in armored forces communication was that steps had been taken to place a transmitter in each tank. Two separate tank battalions were converted with other separate battalions and armored divisions to follow suit in the immediate future. No new item of equipment was distributed or received during the month. However, additional Radio Link and Carrier equipment was received to further strengthen Army and Corps communication. New items appearing on the recent T/E began to arrive, initial distribution of which was expected to be made in the early part of March. They were mostly new Test Sets and Test Units, TS-27/TSM, TS-26/TSM, and I-166 and I-176. Modification of fluorescent panels for air-ground identification was completed and a complete change-over of all Third U.S. Army units was made during the month.

Receipt of supplies from Communications Zone during the month improved and a total of 2858 tons were received. Toward the end of the month a new standard operating procedure for supplies from Communications Zone was initiated, known as SOP 7. It represented a fundamental departure from the old procedure in so far as requisitions from Third U.S. Army were to go directly to an issuing depot rather than to Advance Section Communications Zone or Communications Zone Headquarters for preposting, prior to their extract to an issuing depot. As the new procedure had not been in operation long enough to evaluate its effective results, it was felt that during the initial phases of this operation difficulties would be experienced in the receipt of supplies. This anticipation was mainly based on the fact that there was no balance of stock in any Advance Section or Communications Zone Depot, whereas the plan specifically called for balance of stocks. Both Advance Section and Communications Zone were fully aware of this fact and were endeavoring to balance their stocks in the depots which operate in immediate support, or base support of the Army.

The spare parts situation continued to be satisfactory during the month. Supplies of radar, radio and telephone parts were also maintained in satisfactory quantities, but during the month an extreme critical shortage of motor generator parts occurred. However, this was overcome by turning to an exchange of unit basis with the Communications Zone Base Maintenance Depots. This practice is still in full operation and will be continued until adequate spare parts of motor generators are received.

The campaign on the recovery of all field wire and spiral-four cable continued, approximately 3968 miles of wire being picked up during the month. The good results of last month decreased somewhat because of greater combat commitments of our divisions.

Repair and maintenance work increased during the month. Two radio repair teams of the 179th Repair Company were lost to Ninth U.S. Army. The following work was completed:

1225	Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2565	Major Repair Jobs
68	Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
123	Installations in Combat Vehicles
3	Salvage of Equipment
888	Wire Miles Serviced for Stock

Allocation of thirty-eight critical items was continued by Twelfth Army Group. This allocation system has proven to be the most satisfactory from our standpoint, because it affords an equitable distribution of those items that are short in supply.

SECRET

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

Section I - General

Third U.S. Army Headquarters moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to OBERSTEIN (L 72) on 27 March to follow as closely as possible the rapidly advancing divisions and corps. By the end of the month the increasing rate of advance and the swift crossing of the RHINE augured a possible breakthrough into Germany to rival the historic dash through France last summer.

The three corps displaced directly eastward during the first week of March. The two-arm standard open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through ECHTERNACH (L 03) to BITBURG (L 15) was used to maintain communication with XII and XX Corps, while the two-arm ten-wire open lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ST. VITH (P 88) served the VIII Corps. A four-wire one-arm open wire lead was extended from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) east to SAARBURG (L 11) to further serve the XX Corps. In each case the open wire leads extended by spiral-four cable and repeater stations.

The proposed displacement of the Third U.S. Army Command Post to TRIER (L 22), Germany, required that LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22) be connected by carrier over spiral-four cable. The rapid advance, however, made this move unfeasible and the Forward Echelon displaced directly to OBERSTEIN (L 72), while the rear echelon moved to TRIER (L 22) on 21 March. (See Annex 50) The entire communication network left behind in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) was taken over by Twelfth Army Group TAC.

The supply situation was more favorable than at any other time in the campaign. Seventy-five percent of all requisitions were available at Advance Section Communications Zone Depots. To make these supplies accessible to advancing units, forward dumps were set up along the entire line, supplemented by a Mobile Signal Depot mounted in seven K-36 trailers.

The rapid movement increased the tactical use of radio. To permit complete coverage by monitoring personnel it was necessary to procure one additional radio monitoring team from Twelfth Army Group. By the end of the month radio nets of all corps and divisions had been monitored, showing a decrease in transmission security. Violations were brought to the attention of all concerned.

Among the thousands of German prisoners enveloped in the Saar triangle were a large number of PW's from the 953d Short Range Intercept Company. Interrogation of these prisoners led to a confirmation of the suspicion that radio-telephone transmissions employing Slidex were furnishing the enemy with much tactical information.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

Rapid advance into Germany and wide-flung disposition of Third U.S. Army troops resulted in increased tactical use of radio communication. Additional radio monitoring personnel and equipment to augment the radio monitoring team already in use was necessary if transmission security was to be maintained. Upon request, Twelfth Army Group provided an additional radio monitoring team which arrived on 17 March. With the additional personnel and equipment, nets of all corps and divisions of Third U.S. Army were monitored during the month. Analysis of monitored radio traffic by Signal Intelligence Service revealed a decided decrease in the level of transmission security over the previous month due primarily to the fast moving situation and the need for speed.

The need for pigeon replacements was critical during the first week of March and request was made to Communications Zone for birds to be shipped either from lofts in the United Kingdom or other lofts on the Continent. Communications Zone advised that pigeon replacements from the United Kingdom were being held up due to the four-week quarantine placed on young birds after pox vaccination. To relieve the shortage, 1200 birds were obtained from Twelfth Army Group lofts, and

on 25 March 500 young pigeons were received via air shipment from the United Kingdom. The total strength of the Army Pigeon Company on 31 March was 3468, 1332 birds below 7/8 strength. A total of seventeen tactical messages was flown by pigeons of the 277th Signal Pigeon Company during the month, all of which were to divisional lofts.

Interrogation of German prisoners of war proved especially fruitful during March due to the capture of a large number of German PW's from the 953d Short Range Intercept Company (Radio Intelligence). Statements of four PW's from this company considered to be reasonably reliable, confirmed the belief that the use of SLIDEX for encoding radio-telephone transmissions was furnishing the enemy with much intelligence. Also, the policy of maintaining the same frequencies throughout long periods was allowing the enemy to maintain complete continuity on all Third U.S. Army units.

Processing of captured German film reached an all time level when over 600 reels were processed during the month. All reels were screened for immediate tactical intelligence and then evacuated to European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army for further study.

On 30 March the advance detachment of the 3325th SIAM Company, consisting of eight officers, arrived at Headquarters Third U.S. Army. This detachment began planning for the immediate operational use of the company upon its arrival on or about 15 April.

The movement throughout March of all Third U.S. Army units into Germany, and finally that of Headquarters itself, to OBERSTEIN (L 72), brought ever-increasing demands on our code room personnel. In accordance with a Twelfth Army Group directive, all teletype circuits crossing or terminating in Germany were unclassified and all traffic passing over such circuits was cryptographed unless specifically authorized to be sent in the clear. Due to this fact, a total of 1,079,286 groups was handled by the code room, an increase of 35% over the preceding month. Detailed code room records for March follow:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	4,215	754	4,969
Number of Groups	853,533	190,761	1,044,294

In addition to the encyptographed traffic handled in the code room systems, 257 messages comprising 34,992 groups were handled by SIGGUM equipment.

Section II - Communications

Although front line troops were making substantial gains through the Siegfried Line and the forward displacement of the three corps headquarters resulted in extremely long communication lines, Third U.S. Army Headquarters remained in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) since no suitable location could be found between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22) Germany. (See Annexes 43 through 46)

On 1 March the TRIER (L 22) - SAARBURG (L 11) underground lead cable was located by the 10th Armored Division as it moved forward. The cable was believed to be in use by the enemy at this time and was severed by the 10th Armored Division at NIEDER ZERF (L 21). Headquarters VIII Corps moved from TROIS VIERGES (P 77) to BLEIALF (P 98) 5 March. Headquarters XX Corps moved from THIONVILLE (U 88) to SAARBURG (L 11) 7 March. Headquarters XII Corps moved from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) to ECHTERNACH (L 03) 4 March. The two-arm standard-open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through ECHTERNACH (L 03) to BITBURG (L 15) was being constructed as rapidly as possible. Wire communication to the XII and VIII Corps was obtained by this lead with extensions of spiral-four cable. As an alternate route to these two corps spiral-four was laid from the corps to the closest point of interception of the LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81)-ST. VITH (P 88) open wire lead. A one-arm rapid pole line lead was under construction from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) through SAARBURG (L 11) to TRIER (L 22). The communication to the XX Corps was obtained by means of this rapid pole line lead to SAARBURG (L 11). One company of the 448th Signal Construction Battalion built the section of the rapid pole line between SAARBURG (L 11) and TRIER (L 22). However, due to the rapid moving situation, this lead was not used for main line communications, but was later used for connecting units between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22).

On 9 March Headquarters XII Corps moved to BITBURG (L 15). On 8 March Headquarters VIII Corps moved to SCHNECKEN (L 07). Each corps was connected to Army by at least two spiral-four cables. Carrier repeaters were established at FRUM (L 07) which served the carrier circuits to the VIII and XII Corps. On 10 March Headquarters VIII Corps moved to ADENAU (L 49). On 12 March Headquarters XII Corps moved to MAYEN (L 69). As the Corps moved forward the wire lines were extended for great distances. On 13 March it was proposed that Headquarters Third U.S. Army move to TRIER (L 22) and immediately plans for an advance command post installation were under way. Twelfth Army Group completed their two-arm open wire lead plus four spiral-four cables between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22). Eight carrier systems were placed on the open wire lead by the use of hybrids CF-7 and four carrier systems were placed on the spiral-four cables. This resulted in a total of twelve carrier systems between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22). Existing underground cable was plentiful in, and radiating from, LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81). The first cable company, provisional, was already rehabilitating underground cable radiating east from TRIER (L 22). However, no underground cable existed between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22) and therefore the twelve carrier systems spanned this gap of non-existent facilities.

A switching central designated as Lucky George was established in the basement of the telephone exchange building in TRIER (L 22). This switchboard served all units in the immediate vicinity. The switch at ARLON (P 52), known as Lucky Dog, was discontinued on 19 March.

Headquarters XII Corps moved to SIMMERN (L 85) 19 March. CF-3 Carrier Repeaters were operating at OBER STADTFELD (L 37) and MAYEN (L 69). Headquarters XX Corps moved from SAARBURG (L 11) to ST WENDEL (Q 59) 20 March, and on the following day moved to KAISERSLAUTERN (R 09). On 22 March this Corps moved to WELTERHOF (M 21). On 22 March Headquarters VIII Corps moved to SIMMERN (L 85) and Headquarters XII Corps moved to BAD KREUZNACH (M 03). On the wire circuits to XII Corps, repeaters were operating at FRUM (L 07) and MAYEN (L 69). On the XII Corps wire circuits repeaters were in operation at OBER STADTFELD (L 37), MAYEN (L 69) and SIMMERN (L 85). On the XX Corps wire circuit repeaters were operating at SAARBURG (L 11), ST WENDEL (Q 59) and KAISERSLAUTERN (R 09). These wire circuits to the corps were the longest wire lines Third U.S. Army has operated to date. The circuit to the XII Corps was approximately 130 miles long. Thirty-four miles of this was open wire and the remainder was spiral-four cable. All spiral-four cable was suspended on #9 iron wire and the quality of the talking circuits was excellent.

Third U.S. Army Headquarters did not move to TRIER (L 22) but on 27 March opened at OBERSTEIN (L 72). The rear echelon command post moved to TRIER (L 22) 31 March. The same day Lucky Easy, the switch at ESCH (P 74), was closed. Five spiral-four cables were constructed between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and OBERSTEIN (L 72), two for the use of XIX Tactical Air Command, and carrier systems were applied to the three remaining cables which operated between Lucky Rear and Lucky. Twelfth Army Group did not initially furnish communication of their own by wire to OBERSTEIN (L 72). Two talking channels and one teletype channel were furnished Twelfth Army Group Headquarters by Third U.S. Army. Three teletype channels were also furnished Twelfth Army Group Main. These channels were part of the carrier systems and operated on the three spiral-four cables between TRIER (L 22) and OBERSTEIN (L 72). Twelfth Army Group was, however, rehabilitating underground cable between TRIER (L 22) and OBERSTEIN (L 72) via WITTLICH (L 35). (See Annex 50) Two circuits in this underground cable were later established between Headquarters, Third U.S. Army and Headquarters Twelfth Army Group Main. The entire installation left behind in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) was taken over by Twelfth Army Group TAC.

During the operations of March, Third U.S. Army Signal troops laid 314 miles of W-110 field wire, 2086 miles of spiral-four cable and 720 miles of open wire. These troops also recovered eighty-one miles of W-110 field wire, and 154 miles of spiral-four cable.

The record number of at least 123 Radio Relay Circuits, covering a total of 3325 miles, was installed during the month. Each of the three corps, VIII, XII and XX, had ten terminals to division level. Communication was maintained between each of the corps and First U.S. Army over Third U.S. Army Radio Link. Two terminals of radio/relay and carrier equipment, plus necessary operating personnel, were furnished the 4th Armored Division, for the purpose of maintaining communication to its Combat Command on the breakthrough to the RHINE. (See Annex 40 and 41)

Continuous wave radio communication was maintained throughout the month with all stations in the following nets:

SECRET

<u>FZA-1</u>	<u>SG-3</u>
First U.S. Army Ninth U.S. Army COMZ Adv Sec	First French Army Seventh U.S. Army
<u>FG-33</u>	<u>FG-16</u>
Twelfth Army Group	Twelfth Army Group TAC
<u>FA-12</u>	<u>FA-15</u>
VIII Corps XII Corps IX Corps	Third U.S. Army Rear
<u>FG-51</u>	<u>FA-17</u>
Twelfth Army Group Main	VIII Corps Arty XII Corps Arty XX Corps Arty
<u>THIRD U.S. ARMY MEDICAL NET</u>	<u>TUSA PHOTO CENTER</u>
65th Medical Group 66th Medical Group 92d Medical Gas Bn 94th Medical Gas Bn	<u>MISSION FOR ENGINEER SECTION</u> 1306th Engineer General Service Regiment

The breakdown of traffic handled by the message center for the month of March follows:

<u>Precedence</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Total</u>
Urgent	662	728	1390
Operational Priority	4421	2173	6594
Priority	3520	2339	5859
Routine	13926	5963	19889
Deferred	88	6	94
Total:	22617	11209	33826

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

<u>Messages</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Total</u>
Radio	196	840	1036
Teletype	8457	7772	16229
Total messages handled:	8653	8619	17272

Groups

Radio	36845	143941	180786
Teletype	1836736	1420800	3257536
Total groups handled:	1873581	1564741	3438322

Messenger service:

Total number of pouches by air messenger	205
Total number of motor messenger miles travelled	76840

Section II - Supply

The entire overall supply picture was better during the month of March than at any other time in Third U.S. Army's Signal history. Despite the rapid extension of the Army line as its troops raced beyond the RHINE River, accompanied by increased supply requirements, gratifying improvement was noted in the availability of all signal equipment and supplies in Advance Section Communications Zone Depots. Approximately 75% of the requisitions were made available. Shipment of items to Third U.S. Army Signal Depots through the 24th Regulating Station was accelerated and delivery time was reduced to an average of ten to twelve days.

Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), and Number 12, at STRINFORT (P 61), were in operation throughout the month. Signal Depots 13 and 14, at KAISERSSESCH (L 58) and KIRCHBERG (L 74), respectively, were opened to support the XII Corps drive along the RHINE River, from the Moselle to KOBLENZ (L 89).

As the drive gained momentum, Depot Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), became a pivot point for all signal supply, as it had been during the December and January periods of the Ardennes offensive and subsequent German break-through. After Third U.S. Army boxed an oblong trap around the enemy by advancing east to the RHINE from ECHTERNACH (L 03), south from the Moselle to KOBLENZ (L 89) and east to the RHINE from SAARBRUCKEN (Q 47), the entire line was supplied by the tactical establishment of Forward Signal Depots. To augment this source of supply, a Mobile Signal Dump was inaugurated. Seven trailers, K-36, were equipped with small parts and supplies and employed in the area. Wire and batteries were maintained at the dump on a daily basis, each day's issues being replaced the following day by Signal Depot Number 10. A constant daily level was maintained and successfully served the units in its area.

The radio and radar spare parts stock continued to be good as a result of deliveries from the Communications Zone Depots. The exchange of unrepairable equipment by the Signal Repair Company with the Spare Parts Depot in PARIS (S 04) has proven fruitful. Approximately sixty percent of the exchanges requested were made. Serious delays in restoring equipment to troops were averted by the exchange of power units during this period.

Manufacturing and conversion work by the Repair Company has been reduced to a minimum. Supplies of spare parts being made available from Communications Zone Depots have reduced shortages and eliminated the necessity of this type work.

Allocation of thirty-eight items in short supply is still being made by Twelfth Army Group. This allocation has proven most valuable and is, in a very large measure, responsible for the balancing of stocks of these items in Third U.S. Army Signal Depots.

Repair and rehabilitation work increased during the month. The necessity of recovering spiral-four cable became a priority assignment. Six wire pick-up teams from Twelfth Army Group assisted in recovery of the cable. These teams were attached to the Signal Supply Office for operations and the responsibility of recovery of all field wire and spiral-four cable in the Army areas was also assigned. The following units were engaged in servicing Third U.S. Army and its units during the month:

579th Signal Depot Company
187th Signal Repair Company
179th Signal Repair Company (less two platoons)
189th Signal Repair Company Platoon
3172d Signal Service Battalion Detachment (six officers and sixty-five enlisted men)
577th Signal Depot Company Detachment (Radar Section)

Repair and maintenance work completed as follows:

EQUIPMENT:

549 Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2718 Major Repair Jobs
23 Cannibalization of Equipment (American)
187 Installations in Combat Vehicles
4 Salvage of Equipment (American)
259 Technical Inspections

WIRE:

2180 Miles Field Wire turned in by units
5617 Miles serviced during period
1380 Miles returned to Depot stock
4237 Miles returned to Communications Zone for salvage

SPIRAL-FOUR CABLE:

1020 Miles Spiral-Four turned in by units
1264 Miles serviced and returned to stock
655 Balance on hand to be serviced

Approximately 22,500 miles of Field Wire, W-110, and 2900 miles of spiral-four cable were issued during the month. Recovery was small due to the rapid advance of the Army.

CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

Section I - General

The crumbling German Army, unable to maintain a main line of resistance to withstand the deep and penetrating armored thrusts into the heart of Germany, rapidly fell apart as Third U.S. Army troops surged forward for the final blow. Maintenance of communications during this period of rapid tactical maneuver provided problems greater than at any time in the campaign. The month of April was featured by three command post displacements and a change of Army boundaries which required a rapid change in Signal plans. In this period, it was also necessary to provide communications across the RHINE River. If ever the fortitude, resiliency, and ability of the Signal troops was proven in the field, it was during this month.

Third U.S. Army Headquarters moved from OBERSTEIN (L 72) to FRANKFURT (M 67) on 1 April, and displaced further east to HERSFELD (H 35) on 11 April. When the Army axis was changed, installations at the contemplated command post site at WEIMAR (J 57) were halted and communications were hastily installed at ERLANGEN (O 31), where the command post opened 22 April. The displacement to FRANKFURT (M 67) from IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L 72) required communications across the RHINE River. (See Annexes 51 through 53)

Early in the month, preparations were made for the expected meeting with the Russian Forces opposite the Third U.S. Army front. Largely, these preparations consisted of providing photographic personnel with all armored spearheads in order to insure immediate and complete coverage.

The rapidity of the advance through an area heavily populated by large industrial concerns, provided the Signal Section with some of its richest supply targets of the campaign. Among these were the Zeiss Optical works at JENA (J 66) and the Schneider plant in BAD KREUZNACH (M 03). During the same period Third U.S. Army captured Dr. Holman, the German radar specialist, in the vicinity of OBERDRUF (J 15), where two of his laboratories remained intact. Dr. Engles, also captured by Third U.S. Army during this rapid sweep, was the General Manager of the Telefunken Division for all Germany. These men were interrogated specifically in regards to possible targets within the Third U.S. Army area. They could provide no information concerning cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese in electronics or affiliated fields, and all indications pointed to individual research and development.

When the Army Axis was changed, Prisoners of War active in signal work in the German Army were questioned for possible information concerning signal installations in the National Redoubt area and the supposed or intended locations of Staff Headquarters. Diagrams were made and furnished to interested offices. The Executive Officer of the Signal Section questioned the Inspector of Communications Troops of the German War Ministry regarding the possible use of German signal personnel for rehabilitation purposes. The information gained was considered both reliable and useful.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

On 10 April the 3325th SIAM (Staff Information & Monitoring) Company arrived in Third U.S. Army area. The advanced detachment of the company had, under the supervision of Signal Intelligence Service, arranged the administrative and operational details necessary to enable its immediate operational use, and by 15 April SIAM reports from Corps and Division levels were being furnished the Army G-3 regularly. In addition to furnishing Army G-3 with tactical information from monitored friendly traffic, violations of security noted in this traffic were reported on the spot to the units concerned.

Numerous and rapid displacements of Division and Corps Command Posts during the month of April prevented considerably the settling, training and offering for operational use the Army pigeons of the 277th Signal Pigeon Company. However, German civilian and Wehrmacht birds were confiscated, trained and made available to all units for communication purposes. A total of eleven tactical messages and two hundred and eight non-tactical messages were flown during the month of April.

SECRET

a large majority of which were to divisional lofts.

In spite of the large area of German territory occupied and the great number of PW's captured, very few signal documents of intelligence value were processed through signal intelligence channels during the month of April, evidencing the almost total disorganization of the German Army. However, a large number of captured German cipher machines and devices were evacuated through signal intelligence channels.

With the change in the Army mission on 16 April, a need was realized for additional radio intelligence troops and equipment to cover the exposed left flank of the Army, and, upon request, the 326th Signal Service Company was attached to Third U.S. Army for operational use. Details of signal intelligence reported during the month of April will be published at a later date when security regulations may be lifted.

During the month of April the number of code groups handled in the Third Army code rooms reached the peak total of 1,424,177 code groups. Detailed code room records for April follow:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	4,943	1,045	5,988
Number of Groups	1,145,197	270,065	1,415,262

In addition to the encrytographed traffic handled in the code room systems, 68 messages comprising 8,915 groups were handled by SIGCUM equipment. This indicated a decided decrease in the use of SIGCUM equipment.

An almost complete monitoring coverage of radio nets in Third U.S. Army for security purposes was accomplished during the first two weeks of April, but it was necessary to employ a large number of the personnel and equipment for monitoring the SIAM nets when this company became operational, thereby leading to a decrease in this activity during the latter part of April. As in March analysis of monitored radio traffic by Signal Intelligence Service revealed a decrease in the level of transmission security over previous months due to a great extent to the fast moving situation and the need for speed.

Section II - Communications

Headquarters Third U.S. Army was still located at IDAR-OBERSSTEIN (L 72) on 1 April. The next command post location was to be FRANKFURT (M 67), Germany, which required a crossing of the RHINE River. As far back as five months previous to the actual crossing of the RHINE, plans were under way to construct wire circuits across the RHINE River. Data was obtained regarding the width of the river, the speed of flow of the water, the depth, etc., at various possible points of crossing that might be used by Third U.S. Army. One plan for the crossing required cooperation of the Engineers with the Signal Corps. This plan called for building a standard two-arm open wire lead across the river with poles spaced at the normal 150' spans and mounted on structures consisting of forty-foot pilings driven below the river bed. These structures, consisting of four pilings, were to furnish the foundations upon which standard poles could be attached in a manner that would afford a wire clearance of twenty-one feet above the mean water level of the river. The Engineers prepared drawings for these structures. Another plan was to span the river with submarine armored lead cable. The laying of this cable was studied thoroughly because it was believed that the swift currents in the river would present problems which would create great strain on the cable while it was being laid. The actual river crossing was made at MAINZ (M 35) and the difficulties that were expected were not encountered. Eight spiral-four cables were laid across the river, four of which were laid across a partially destroyed bridge which offered sufficient support for these cables. The remaining four cables were laid directly on the river bottom with no particular difficulties. The four spiral-four cables supported by the partially destroyed bridge were the ones used for the carrier circuits between IDAR-OBERSSTEIN (L 72) and FRANKFURT (M 67). The four cables laid on the river bottom were to be used as spare cables in case of failure of the other four. These were tested regularly and were found to be in good condition. In addition to the spiral-four cables, ten-quad lead covered armored cable was also laid on the river bottom without any special difficulties. This armored cable was a portion of an aerial self-suspended civilian cable lead that was partially destroyed and which existed between LUXEMBOURG CITY (P 81) and TRIER (L 22), Germany. Six thousand feet in three two-thousand foot lengths were recovered in anticipation of the RHINE crossing during the month of February. However, after this cable was laid across the RHINE River it was used for long local circuits which, of necessity, had to cross the RHINE.

The Third U.S. Army Command Post opened at FRANKFURT (M 67) on 3 April and at that time the tactical situation was one of rapid movement. The corps displaced frequently and in many cases displaced each day or every other day, while communication to these corps was maintained by the extension of one spiral-four cable along the Army-Corps axis. As the cables increased in length, carrier repeater stations were established at intervals of from thirty to forty-five miles. It was not unusual to have three repeater stations in these circuits. Some trouble was encountered with saboteurs cutting corps lines and army wire circuits. Line trouble was, however, rapidly cleared since a construction maintenance team was stationed at each repeater to maintain the circuits operating through the respective repeaters. (See Annexes 54 through 56)

On 6 April the command post of Lucky Rear moved from TRIER (L 22) to FRANKFURT (M 67). At that time all circuits that remained on the Lucky Rear switchboard at TRIER (L 22) were cut over to Lucky George Switch in TRIER (L 22). On 9 April Lucky Bow Switch, which was operating at MAINZ (M 35), was taken over by Advance Section Communications Zone and renamed MAINZ SWITCH.

The Third U.S. Army command post opened at HERSFELD (H 35) on 11 April and closed FRANKFURT (M 67) at the same time. Wire communication between FRANKFURT (M 67) and HERSFELD (H 35) was obtained by spiral-four carrier circuits. Four spiral-four cables were constructed between these points on number 9 iron messenger wire. Two of these cables were for Third U.S. Army's use and two for XIX Tactical Air Command. This construction was in accordance with a policy established between XIX Tactical Air Command and Third U.S. Army of a joint build. The Army-Corps lines were extended until such time as a forward Army wire axis was established or the Army command post moved forward. At this time the corps were tied into the Advance Army Wirehead or into the new Army command post.

The next move of Headquarters Third U.S. Army was to be WEIMAR (J 57). This move was contemplated to be made about the 17th of April. However, a change in the Third U.S. Army Zone of Operations shifted the communication axis starting from FRANKFURT (M 67) and proceeding southeast through WURZBURG (N 53) - NURNBERG (O 40) - REGENSBURG (U 15) and STRAUBING (U 54). On 16 April work was discontinued on the installation of signal requirements at WEIMAR (J 57), although four spiral-four cables had already been constructed on messenger wire to that point. (See Annex 52) All efforts were immediately transferred to obtaining circuits as quickly as possible between FRANKFURT (M 67) and ERLANGEN (O 31). (See Annex 53) Twenty quads in an underground lead cable between FRANKFURT (M 67) and IPHOFEN (N 82) were rehabilitated. From IPHOFEN (N 82) to ERLANGEN (O 31) four spiral-four circuits were constructed on messenger wire. Although the underground cable extended through IPHOFEN (N 82) to NURNBERG (O 40), it was thought that the rehabilitation of this section would require more time than was allowed to obtain working circuits. Therefore, the underground cable and four spiral-four cables were used jointly by Third U.S. Army and XIX Tactical Air Command. Four wire repeaters were placed on sixteen quads at FRANKFURT (M 67) by Third U.S. Army. XIX Tactical Air Command placed sixteen repeaters at IPHOFEN (N 82). CP-1 Carrier Equipment was placed in operation on the four spiral-four cables between IPHOFEN (N 82) and ERLANGEN (O 31). Eight of the underground repeater circuits were cross connected to eight carrier channels at IPHOFEN (N 82) to furnish communication between Lucky Rear at FRANKFURT (M 67) and Lucky at ERLANGEN (O 31). The remaining eight circuits were used by XIX Tactical Air Command.

On 22 April, Headquarters Third U.S. Army opened at ERLANGEN (O 31) and closed at HERSFELD (H 35).

Lucky Rear closed at FRANKFURT (M 67) and moved to ERLANGEN (O 31) on 25 April. Circuits to FRANKFURT (M 67) were still needed to serve Army troops in that area. Advance Section Communications Zone took over the switch in FRANKFURT (M 67) and named it FRANKFURT SWITCH.

Underground cable was made good between NURNBERG (O 40) and BAMBERG (O 24). This was a 96-pair cable and circuits were assigned to units requiring service. A switch was established at BAMBERG (O 24) named Lucky King which served units in that vicinity. From NURNBERG (O 40) to ERLANGEN (O 31) a local cable consisting of one hundred pairs was also made good. This cable served units in the vicinity of NURNBERG (O 40), directly from the Lucky switchboard and also provided cross-connected circuits at NURNBERG (O 40) to BAMBERG (O 24). In the meantime Twelfth Army Group was in the process of rehabilitating underground cable from FRANKFURT (M 67) through FULDA (H 31) through IPHOFEN (N 82) to BAMBERG (O 24). Some of these circuits were cross-connected at BAMBERG (O 24) to Lucky via the underground cable passing through NURNBERG (O 40). (See Annex 57)

During the month of April Army Signal troops placed 459 miles of W-110 field wire, 2,394 miles of spiral-four cable, and 295 miles of open wire. One hundred and twenty-one miles of W-110 field wire and eighty miles of spiral-four cable was recovered by these Army troops.

The number of VHF Radio Relay circuits installed within Third U.S. Army during the month of April was 156, covering a total of 5,476 miles. Each of the corps in Third U.S. Army had ten terminals to division level. Communication was maintained between each of the corps and the First U.S. Army over Third U.S. Army radio link. (See Annexes 47 through 49)

OW Radio Communication was maintained throughout the month of April with all the stations in the following nets:

<u>FG-33</u>	<u>FU-1</u>
Twelfth Army Group	Advance Section Com Z 24th Regulating Station
<u>FA-12</u>	<u>SG-3</u>
III Corps XII Corps XX Corps	First French Army Seventh U.S. Army
<u>FG-51</u>	<u>FG-16</u>
Twelfth Army Group Main	Twelfth Army Group TAC
<u>FA-15</u>	<u>FA-17</u>
TUSA Rear 65th Med Gp 66th Med Gp 92d Med Gas Bn 94th Med Gas Bn	III Corps Arty XII Corps Arty XX Corps Arty TUSA Photo Center
	<u>FA-16</u>
	70th Inf Div 1306th Engr Gen Serv Regt

The breakdown of traffic handled for the month of April follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	1292	907	2199
Operational Priority	4650	2464	7114
Priority	5011	4065	9076
Routine	15229	7230	22459
Deferred	3	29	32
Total:	26185	14695	40880

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Messages	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	640	1402	2042
Teletype	8784	7255	16039
Total messages handled:	9424	8657	18081
Groups	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	82949	204179	287128
Teletype	2002512	1500332	3502844
Total groups handled:	2085461	1704511	3789972

Messenger service:

Total number of pouches by air messenger	337
Total number of motor messenger miles travelled	97436

Section II - Supply

The month of March saw our combat forces advance from the KYLL River line to the RHINE, thence south along the RHINE for a junction with Seventh U.S. Army. On 23 March, our forces crossed the RHINE River, thus throwing another fast advance on an already strained supply system. The advances of March and early April forced into operation all trucks that could be mustered to keep depots and dumps within reach of the combat forces. The rail was rushed to completion to the RHINE River at MAINZ (M 35) and priorities were set up to move all classes of supply forward to the fullest extent possible. The bulk of rail transportation was necessarily thrown to the movement of Class I, III, and V, which left Class II and IV with only a small rail movement. Truck transportation was therefore the only means for the fast movement of

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CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

Signal supplies in the early part of the month. During the month however, bulk shipments were made by rail. It was also necessary during the month to call for air shipment on wire, spiral-four, and some batteries.

Third U.S. Army Signal Depots Number 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 were in operation during the month. At the beginning of the month, Depots Number 10, at FLORANGE (U 88), France and Number 11, at KIRCHBERG (L 74), Germany were in operation. Depot Number 10 was the main depot and it became imperative to move it forward immediately. Depot Number 15 was therefore established at MAINZ (M 35) for a main depot and shipments were started immediately. Initially only one truck company was available for this move, but as the rail became continuous, shipments were made by rail. We were also supported on this move with a bulk lift of 300 tons per day for a six-day period to be shipped by ten-ton trucks. Thus, we accomplished this movement of main depots in little more than two weeks. With the rapid advance made after the crossing of the RHINE River, it was again necessary to establish advance depots in the rear of the advancing forces. Depot Number 16 was then established at KIRCHHEIM (S 20) and later Number 17 south of ERFURT (U 36). In the establishment and re-supply of these depots, the RHINE River, with its few bridges, proved to be an extreme bottleneck. Reconnaissance showed that at OFFENBACH (M 76) a depot could be established which afforded excellent rail off-load and truck loading facilities. Depot Number 18 was then established at this point and all car convoys to Number 15 were reconsigned, thus alleviating duplicate handling of supplies. Number 18, although opened as a General Depot, did not do the volume business as is generally done at the main depots. In the middle of the month, the mission of Third U.S. Army was changed from an easterly drive toward DRESDEN (F 29) to a southeasterly drive along the Czech border. After the troops had assembled and moved into their new positions, another Advance Depot, Number 19, was established in their immediate rear, at BAIERSDORF (O 32), Germany to eliminate the NURNBERG (O 10) traffic bottleneck and to afford more space for the establishment of a main depot. During the month, Depots Number 10, 11, 15, 16, and 17 were closed when forward depots were set up to replace them.

Signal supplies, although available within the Army area in good quantity, were not available to the troops because of transportation back-logs. However, the fast advances made battle losses on equipment small and the troops suffered little. Wire and spiral-four became so critical at one time that 4000 miles of wire and 400 miles of spiral-four were flown to an advance air strip for immediate issue.

The Mobile Advance Depot set-up was continued in use and improvements were made through experience. There is conclusive evidence to show that during a rapid advance it is much more efficient to use these mobile depots rather than to attempt to maintain main depots far forward. There is little call for items other than wire, cable, and expendables and these items can be moved up much more rapidly when there is no movement of bulk equipment.

Repair and rehabilitation work continued on a scale comparable with March. Spiral-four cable pick-up remained at the top of the priority list and outstanding work was performed by the pick-up and service teams. Of the 20,000 reels used during the month, one-half was cable which had been picked up and serviced. The same units were engaged in servicing Third U.S. Army and the following repair data is their accomplishment:

EQUIPMENT.

975 Minor Repairs and Adjustments
2608 Major Repair Jobs
4 Cannibalization of Equipment
158 Installations in Combat Vehicles
0 Salvage of Equipment (American)
218 Technical Inspections

SPIRAL-FOUR CABLE.

872 Miles Spiral-Four Turned in by Units
1357 Miles Serviced and Returned to Stock
0 Balance on Hand to be Serviced

Allocation of the thirty-eight most critical items of supply was continued by Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

A total of 19,560 miles of Wire, W-110-B was issued during the month for a daily average of 652 miles. Spiral-four cable issues were 5,250 miles.

Section I - General

Third U.S. Army forward troops pushed further into the National Redoubt Area in the first few days of May, and Third U.S. Army Headquarters displaced rapidly forward behind them. Enemy opposition continued to be light and sporadic and with the capture of SALZBURG (Z 90), BERCHTESGADEN (Z 90) and LINZ (V 88), Austria, the mission of the Third U.S. Army appeared to be completed. However, a further mission of liquidating the last remaining pockets of resistance in Czechoslovakia was announced and Third U.S. Army troops continued operations until the unconditional surrender was announced on 8 May.

On 2 May the Command Post moved from ERLANGEN (O 31) to REGENSBURG (U 15). (See Annex 60) This displacement was made with two days notice, a factor which, of necessity, limited the signal facilities of the headquarters. Wire trunks were in operation to XX Corps, and Radio Relay was used for communications with Lucky Rear, Lucky Baker, XII Corps and XI Corps Advance. Ninety-seven locals were installed within the command post at the time of opening. Within the next twenty-four hours, however, other trunks and locals were installed and within forty-eight hours after the opening of the Command Post, normal communications had been installed. This confirmed previous estimates that a total of four days was required for the installation of communications for a new command post under covered accommodations.

Headquarters Third U.S. Army remained at REGENSBURG (U 15) until the cessation of hostilities.

V Corps was transferred from the First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army on 4 May and communication was established to its headquarters at GRAFENWOHR (P 03) by means of a spiral-four cable between ERLANGEN (O 31) and GRAFENWOHR (P 03), abandoned earlier by XII Corps. When the V Corps displaced to PILSEN (L 04), Czechoslovakia, communications were established by means of spiral-four cable between REGENSBURG (U 15) and that city.

The Army Communications Axis was being extended in the direction of PILSEN (L 04), which was to be the next command post of Third U.S. Army. Four spiral-four cables were under construction to the proposed site and had reached as far as CHAM (U 58), when the announcement was made that the war was over.

Section II - Signal Intelligence Service

During the period 1 May to 9 May, the 277th Signal Pigeon Company continued to furnish pigeons to all units within Third U.S. Army desiring them for communication purposes from confiscated German civilian and Wehrmacht lofts. This method proved to be most successful during a fast armored operation when there was not sufficient time for setting and training Army pigeons.

The Army SIAM Company had succeeded to a great extent in working out a majority of the difficulties common to initial operations, and were beginning to prove their value as an informational service to the Army Commander and Army G-3 when the war ended on 8 May 1945.

Code room records for the period follow:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Number of Messages	1,601	350	1,951
Number of Groups	323,815	91,603	415,518

No messages were encyptographed by SIGCUM equipment during this period.

Analysis of radio traffic of Third U.S. Army nets monitored during the first eight days of May continued to indicate a decided decrease in the level of transmission security over that of previous traffic monitored during more static periods. SIAM traffic monitored during this period revealed a high level of transmission security within the

organization.

Details of radio intelligence activities during the last eight days of the War in Europe will be reported at a later date when security regulations have been relaxed.

Section II - Communications

On 1 May Headquarters Third U.S. Army was still at ERLANGEN (O 31). The wire axis consisting of four spiral-four cables was extended from ERLANGEN (O 31) to REGENSBURG (U 15), two of which were to be used by Third U.S. Army and two by XIX Tactical Air Command. Simultaneously twenty quads of the underground cable between NURNBERG (O 40) and REGENSBURG (U 15) were also rehabilitated. Lucky moved to REGENSBURG (U 15) on 2 May. The corps were served by repeated spiral-four carrier circuits from REGENSBURG (U 15) (one spiral-four cable per corps). At this time Army consisted of the III, XII, and XX Corps. The V Corps was transferred from First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army on 4 May. Initially this Corps was located at GRAFENWOHR (P 03). Wire communication was established to V Corps by the use of an abandoned XII Corps spiral-four cable which existed between ERLANGEN (O 31) and GRAFENWOHR (P 03). Service was established to Lucky Rear. (See Annex 60)

On 5 May Company "A" of the 66th Signal Battalion was assigned to Third U.S. Army. One platoon of this company was immediately attached to the V Corps to provide Army-Corps communication.

The next move of this Corps was to PILSEN (L 04), Czechoslovakia at which place the Corps was served by a spiral-four cable constructed between REGENSBURG (U 15) and PILSEN (L 04) and operating from the Lucky Switchboard (Carrier). The wire axis consisting of four spiral-four cables was extended from REGENSBURG (U 15) to STRAUBING (U 54). It was completed to STRAUBING (U 54) on 4 May.

The Army axis was again changed, this time to the northeast. Four spiral-four cables were under construction through CHAM (U 58) to PILSEN (L 04), which was to be the next command post of Third U.S. Army. These cables were completed to CHAM (U 58) when word was received of a possible German surrender.

On 7 May unconfirmed radio reports were that Germany had surrendered unconditionally and this surrender would be effective 0900018 May 1945.

In the period 1 May to 8 May, Army Signal troops placed 301 miles of W-110 Field Wire, 449 miles of spiral-four cable, and forty-nine miles of open wire. Eleven miles of spiral-four cable was recovered for this same period.

The number of VHF Radio Relay circuits installed within Third U.S. Army during the early part of May was thirty-eight, covering a total of 1310 miles. During this period each of the corps in the Army had ten terminals to division level. Communication was maintained to each of the corps and the First U.S. Army by Third U.S. Army Radio Link circuits. (See Annexes 58 & 61)

Continuous wave radio communication was maintained during the period in the following nets (See Annex 59):

FG-33	FU-1
Twelfth Army Group Main	Advance Sec Com 2
	24th Regulating Station
FA-12	SG-3
III Corps	First French Army
V Corps	Seventh U.S. Army
XII Corps	
XX Corps	FG-16
	Twelfth Army Group TAC
FG-51	FA-17
Twelfth Army Group Main	
FA-15	III Corps Arty
	XII Corps Arty
Third U.S. Army Rear	XX Corps Arty
65th Medical Gp	Third U.S. Army Photo Center
66th Medical Gp	
92d Med Gas Bn	
94th Med Gas Bn	

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The breakdown of traffic handled for the first eight days of May follows:

Precedence	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Urgent	351	265	616
Operational Priority	1148	657	1805
Priority	1601	1328	2929
Routine	4871	2504	7375
Deferred	1	0	1
Total:	7972	4754	12726

Number of messages and groups handled by electrical means:

Messages	Outgoing	Incoming	Total
Radio	251	387	638
Teletype	2597	2521	5118
Total messages handled:	2848	2918	5766

Groups

Radio	40504	52203	92707
Teletype	550810	511689	1062499
Total groups handled:	591314	563892	1155206

Messenger service:

Total number of pouches by air messenger	66
Total number of motor messenger miles travelled	27182

Section II - Supply

At the beginning of May Third U.S. Army Signal Depot Number 18 was located at OFFENBACH (M 76), Germany and Number 20 at FISCHBACH (W 31). The combat forces had driven southeast along the Czech border to LINZ (Y 88), Austria and beyond. The mission of Third U.S. Army finally appeared to be over. It was then that a permanent depot for occupation operation was planned. This was to be placed in the NURNBERG (O 40) area and a suitable location was found at SCHWABACH (T 38), Germany which was to be established as Number 22. However, before shipment could be made to this occupation depot, Third U.S. Army was given the additional mission of driving into Czechoslovakia into the last remaining German force. It was then found necessary to establish an advance depot on the Czech-German border at POSCHELSRIED (U 95), Germany. This was to be Depot Number 21. This depot was established and before it could be resupplied the unconditional surrender was announced.

The War in Europe was now over and the supplies and equipment on hand were to be collected into the occupation depots. All advance depots and rear depots were immediately closed out and shipped into the two depots in the NURNBERG (O 40) area, Numbers 20 and 22. There was still a sizeable backlog of some 200 rail cars outstanding and had the war not ended when it did, additional air shipments of wire and spiral-four would have been necessary.

During the first eight days of May the Signal Repair Companies were in the process of setting up for operation in SCHWABACH (T 38). The wire pick-up teams were engaged in cleaning up the northern Army and Corps axis and a sizeable quantity of spiral-four cable was picked up and serviced.

Captured war material dumps were being guarded and inspected as they were found. No inventory was taken because the primary mission was the supply of our troops and no personnel could be spared for such inventories. However, plans were being made for an inventory and collection of all German war material in the days following the cessation of hostilities.

During this eight-day period, a total of 3038 miles of wire, W-110-B was consumed for a daily average of 380 miles. Spiral-four issues totalled 879 miles.

CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

1. Throughout the operation eighteen officers were on duty in the Signal Section with from one to three officers attached during short periods. These numbers were inadequate as evidenced by the long working hours necessary for the proper completion of assigned tasks. This was especially true in the Administrative, Communication, Signal Intelligence, and Supply Subsections. During a fast-moving operation, the Signal Section must operate on a twenty-four hour basis.

2. Signal communication planning and maintenance of records provide only a portion of the duties of officers of the Army Signal Section. All Signal Staff Officers must make frequent visits to various subordinate units and installations to check upon the execution of assigned tasks. These visits cannot be delegated to officers of assigned Signal Corps units.

3. All enlisted members of the Army Signal Section must possess knowledge and techniques far in excess of normal clerical and administrative requirements. They must often function as junior officers and must be familiar with all operational details of the Signal Corps troops operating under the Army Signal Officer.

4. Under fast-moving combat conditions which result in a shortage of rail and motor transport, field wire and cable is often in short supply in forward areas, due to low transportation priorities. As a result, wire and cable recovery and rehabilitation must be stressed. This recovery is often impossible when wire teams are being worked to full capacity to extend wire axes in rear of advancing troops. Additional wire recovery and wire servicing teams are required under such conditions.

5. The guarding of VHF radio relay terminals and repeater sites, wire repeater stations, CW radio center locations, and overrun enemy signal installations provided a major problem throughout the campaign. Necessary guards were usually difficult, if not impossible to obtain since the Military Police and other security units were committed in many places over an extensive area.

6. During periods of long and frequent Signal Depot displacements, a minimum of one Quartermaster Truck Company was always needed by the Signal Supply Officer. The Signal Depot frequently moved to points in advance of railroad rehabilitation and motor trucks provided the only means for movement of signal supplies and equipment. In addition trucks were needed for the establishment of advance signal distribution points and for the collection of captured signal supplies and equipment.

7. In the establishment of initial command post installations, some confusion resulted, due to lack of clearly-defined functions and jurisdiction of the operation and construction troops. This confusion was eliminated by the issuance of a signal circular which outlined the functions and duties of the Chief Switchboard Operator, the Wire Chief, the Wirehead Chief, and Maintenance Team Chiefs. All of this personnel was placed under a Wire Operation Officer in the Signal Center for coordination and supervision.

8. One signal operation battalion and two signal construction battalions, indicated in T/O & E 200-1 as normal organic troops, are inadequate to meet the demands of the Army Signal Service during a rapid advance. In order to maintain a minimum level of wire communication facilities, these troops must be employed far beyond normal working hours.

9. The principles set forth in FM 24-5 are sound and must be applied forcefully during the training period. This applies even to a greater degree to reinforcements who join Signal Corps units during combat. During the later phases of combat, there were numerous instances where troops failed to apply such fundamental techniques in making field wire splices, servicing messages for transmission, tuning radio transmitters, giving first echelon maintenance to power units, etc.

10. As the Army advanced, the wire system constructed by Third Army troops was taken over in whole or in part, by the Army Group or the Advance Section Communications Zone. This, to a large extent, was similar to the method by which the Army took over the Corps communications systems as the Corps moved forward. However, Army assisted in the con-

struction of the Corps wire nets, while only in a few instances was aid received from Army Group or Communications Zone for the construction of Army systems.

11. The associated Tactical Air Command did not possess signal troops of the proper quantity and type to maintain a wire axis of its own behind a rapidly advancing Army. Therefore the Army had to usually provide wire channels to supporting Air units from the limited number available.

12. A pool of trained CW radio, VHF radio relay, switchboard operation, cable splicing, and wire construction teams, as organized and equipped by T/O & E 11-500 must be available and under the direct command of the Army Signal Officer. When the need for such teams develops, there is insufficient time to assemble the required personnel, equipment, and vehicles from other sources.

13. Signal Corps troops do not possess as organic equipment weapons of the proper type for anti-aircraft defense and close-in defense of bivouacs and installations. As a result it was necessary to acquire machine guns and mounts on a project or loan basis after entry into combat.

14. During initial combat operations, wire communication service was often disrupted by sudden displacements of Corps Command Posts to points where no wire circuits had been installed. Displacements were also made to areas before VHF radio relay equipment had been moved and placed in operation.

15. Training received by signal troops in the United States was largely concerned with communication networks for use at division level. Personnel were not familiar with the installation, rehabilitation, maintenance, and operation of large fixed installations and commercial equipment. Army signal troops require a high degree of technical skill and commercial communications experience in special fields.

16. In general, T/BA and/or T/E equipment of the operation and construction battalions is inadequate for their mission as Army troops. It is necessary to supplement such equipment with project material and sled. The project equipment is rarely available at the outset of the campaign in which it is to be used. This imposes undue hardships on the Signal troops, and materially curtails communications.

17. In order to plan and construct communications forward along the Army axis, and to be prepared for CP displacements, it is imperative that all officers of the Communication Subsection be kept fully informed regarding proposed tactical operations and probable locations of CPs.

18. Full exploitation of existing facilities was impossible because wire reconnaissance personnel were not available in the Communication Section. A minimum of two wire reconnaissance officers is necessary in order to properly plan the re-use of such military or commercial lines as are available.

19. All wire lines must be installed so as to require the least possible maintenance. All wire should be kept off the ground and substantially supported. Spiral-four cable cannot be treated like field wire. It must be carefully handled and should never be laid on the ground. Spiral-four should be suspended on messenger wire. Each section should be tested for continuity and electrical characteristics as it is placed. Couplings should be supported so as to be readily accessible for test. Cable should be supported in such a manner as to eliminate the possibility of abrasion against trees and buildings. It is important that cable connectors be kept clean and dry. The proper construction of spiral-four circuits requires time. They cannot be hastily installed and expected to stay in service. Trouble-free circuits are attained only through careful installation. Initial readings of capacitance and resistance should be made when the circuit is completed. These will prove valuable for future maintenance of the circuits.

20. At least one wire team should be stationed at repeater stations on wire or cable routes to maintain the circuits passing through the station. Repeater stations should also be provided with an EE-65 test set to locate troubles. A standard operating procedure is necessary for the installation, operation and maintenance of carrier and repeatered circuits.

21. The attachment of Army Construction troops to each Corps to extend the Army-Corps axis results in more rapid establishment and more effective maintenance of such circuits. In past operations a construction platoon was attached to each Corps. This proved inadequate in fast moving tactical situations.

22. All Signal and Communication personnel must be trained and equipped to perform mine detection and removal.

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23. Army Signal Construction troops must be responsible for the construction and maintenance of trunk lines. This requires that personnel of the construction battalions be trained to operate construction centers and test equipment. Local testing is handled by the Operation Battalion Wire Chief. Toll testing is handled by the personnel at the Construction Center, often called the wirehead.

24. The TC-10 Switchboard is an inadequate substitute for a rugged, van-mounted multiple switchboard of commercial design. A switchboard similar to the Western Electric Company's Number 12M, arranged for 300 local-trunk circuits on a four-panel multiple basis and capable of expansion to six, eight or ten positions would greatly improve Army communications.

25. Liaison Officers from the Army Signal Service to each corps are a vitally important link in the communication system. Platoon leaders or Company Commanders of Army construction troops attached to each corps performed this function in an outstanding manner. It is felt, however, that the officer assigned to such duty should be of field grade. He could supervise the activities of all Army Signal troops working with corps, such as radio relay teams, carrier teams and construction personnel.

26. Construction Liaison Officers from Army Group and Communication Zone should be furnished to Army, together with Army Group or Communication Zone Construction personnel, in order to extend Army Group - Army circuits.

27. The Air Liaison Squadron should normally be assigned to the Army Signal Officer as a part of his operating personnel. Air Messenger Service is an essential part of the Army communication system and should not be divorced from it. It is necessary, however, to have an Air Operation Officer assigned to the Communication Subsection in order to supervise the allocation of planes.

28. A Radio CW Net is not capable of handling large amounts of traffic. All CW Radio Circuits between Army and Corps Headquarters should be point to point.

29. The available CW Radio frequencies are so few that shifts of frequencies within units are almost impossible. Under such conditions the employment of daily changing code signs is of little or no security value. The employment of such daily changing code signs with their attendant limited distribution of column sequence charts, code sign books and row registers make it impossible for message center routing clerks and radio operators to relay traffic without deciphering it in order to determine the proper addressee.

30. At least six vehicular radio sets and operators should be kept available at all times for dispatch on special missions.

31. All CW Radio operators should be trained in the selection of desirable transmitting and receiving sites and must understand the theory and construction of antennae.

32. The selection and allocation of radio and radar sites within the Army area must be controlled by the Army Signal Officer.

33. The use of an Army SOI item to assign frequencies is entirely too slow. Assignments and changes should be made by the use of messages dispatched by teletype or messenger, with confirmation by the usual SOI item.

34. There are too many different types and sizes of radio sets, which materially complicates supply, repair and frequency allocation. It is felt that standardization of FM and AM Radio Sets into three or four groups would materially reduce supply and maintenance problems.

35. The present number of messenger personnel in the Signal Operation Battalion is inadequate. Personnel equivalent to a motor messenger company is necessary in order to perform the grueling twenty-four hour a day, seven day a week stint required by the modern field army in a rapid advance.

36. The provision of direct tape relay full duplex teletypewriter circuits between Army and each corps, in addition to circuits on the teletype switchboard, facilitates the handling of traffic. This is true particularly in multiple address and book messages. Standard Acan Tape Relay Procedure is employed.

37. The most stable teletypewriter circuits were found to be those operating on carrier channels.

38. The CP-1 carrier system has proven to be rugged and adaptable for corps and army use, providing excellent speech circuits on both spiral-four cable and VHF equipment. Ample provision should be made in projects so that carrier terminals may be provided down to and including divisions.

39. The rear echelon has signal communication problems just as pressing and sometimes even more complex than those of the forward echelon. It is imperative that additional communication officers and men be provided from the Communication Subsection to adequately meet the communications requirements of the rear echelon. The Communication Subsection in general is undermanned to perform the important task of directing the Army communication system. All of the officers of the section have generally operated on a seven-day week and sixteen-hour day throughout this operation. The Table of Organization should provide for additional personnel to supervise communication on a twenty-four hour basis.

40. Radio Intelligence agencies should be centralized under one headquarters, preferably at Army Group, and units detached to Army and Corps for operational use.

41. G-2 personnel should receive training in signal intelligence or an officer from Signal Intelligence Service should be in the G-2 Section.

42. Direction Finding equipment should be more sensitive and accurate than that now in use. All direction finding personnel should be trained for radio control of direction finding.

43. Call signs and frequency changes should take place simultaneously. Changing one without changing the other decreases signal security.

44. A central agency should be created in the War Department charged with the responsibilities and equipped to execute the functions enumerated below:

a. Standardization, unification, and thorough dissemination of security and procedure regulations which are adequate for employment by both high echelon and combat unit radio nets, to include investigation and employment of the opinions of radio operators who have operated in combat units.

b. Monitoring of one-fourth of the radio nets of the units in its command simultaneously, including analysis of logs and submission of detailed reports of both transmission security and net operating efficiency to the units concerned.

c. Thorough investigation of all infractions of regulations.

d. Thoroughly acquainting operators with the capabilities and limitations of signal intelligence agencies, to include cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, and direction finding.

e. Establishment of unit self-monitoring, to include checking of the units' reports and the effectiveness of corrective action taken by the unit to prevent recurrence of violations.

f. Liaison with unit G-3's and S-3's to coordinate operations and security for future plans and operations.

g. Direct contact with local radio counter-measure organizations for mutual exchange of information and close coordination of operations.

45. Without a central, authoritative agency to direct and maintain security, transmission security will be so inconsistent as to be more a hindrance than an asset to operations.

46. Captured signal documents must be handled with utmost speed at all echelons in order to obtain maximum results. A channel must be set up for their expedient handling, preferably special messenger service furnished by signal intelligence agencies at Corps, Army and Army Group levels.

47. Interrogation of PW's can be very helpful with regard to counter-signal intelligence, in obtaining intelligence of value regarding enemy codes and ciphers, and in helping to identify otherwise meaningless captured documents.

48. Army headquarters requires a minimum of eight SIGABA's.

49. Operators require intensive training in SIGABA operation within training areas in the States or operational theater before entering combat, with emphasis placed on the breaking of garbles.

50. The SIGABA should be redesigned to permit the cutting of tape simultaneously with the printing operation.

51. Each signal organization charged with the operation of SIGABA's must have at least one qualified SIGABA maintenance man as a member of the organization before entering combat.

52. Mobile SIGABA repair teams should be readily available to Corps and Divisions, and should work from Army level, rather than from Army Group level.

53. Armored Divisions should be supplied with a suitable conveyance for the transportation of the SIGABA to avoid rough handling during displacements.

54. There is an excessive number of special purpose SIGABA systems and stand-by and emergency systems, including strips. The majority of these systems should be withdrawn, as they only increase accountability records, and take up much-needed space in code rooms.

55. The principles for preserving physical security of cryptographic systems are sound and should be continued in effect.

56. Signal Corps personnel have been adequately trained in the provisions of cryptographic security.

57. There is definite need for further training in basic cryptography and security principles for code clerks in Artillery, Engineer, and Anti-Aircraft units, as well as in units within divisions.

58. Suitable and practical map coordinate and low grade codes should be made available to lower echelon units, and should be uniform throughout the Theater command.

59. The pertinent security principles and operating procedures for the M-209 Converter should appear in one single publication, which should be made available to all units holding this device. This publication should not be changed unless current regulations are proven insecure.

60. The responsibility for avoiding stereotypes should be vested in the cryptographic personnel rather than in the originator of the message. These should be avoided by bisection, rather than by changing the message.

61. The Army Operations Battalion should include teams equipped to instruct units in combat in cryptographic and transmission security.

62. Signal units of this Army suffered continuously from a shortage of personnel with the following SSNs:

039 - Cable Splicer, Telephone and Telegraph
 097 - Installer-Repairman, Telephone and Telegraph
 187 - Repeaterman, Telephone
 237 - Teletypewriter Operator
 238 - Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph
 411 - Field Lineman
 650 - Switchboard Operator, Local Battery
 766 - Radio Operator, High Speed
 776 - Radio Operator, Low Speed

Of these, the Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph; Field Lineman; Radio Operator; High Speed; and Radio Operator, Low Speed, were the most critical specialties. It was seldom that the Army and Corps signal units of this Army had their authorized number of these personnel, which hindered these units in the performance of their missions.

63. Even though many non-battle casualties were returned to their parent organizations, many were deferred to other units thereby causing training and readjustment problems. This practice resulted in an additional loss of time which could have been prevented if personnel had been returned to the organizations from which they were evacuated.

64. All signal units in this Army have received many reinforcements whose records showed them to be Lineman, Telephone and Telegraph; Radio Operators, High Speed; Radio Operators, Low Speed, etc., but who were not qualified in these specialties. This condition resulted in the unit having to conduct a training program while engaged in operations. If this training program had been conducted in the Communication Zone, time could have been saved.

65. Many qualified radio operators, high and low speed, were received by the signal units of this Army. However, a number of these men were trained in the Infantry and could not operate the radio sets SCR-399 and SCR-193. These operators were qualified in code speed only. Personnel who are ear-marked as radio operator reinforcements must be trained to operate more than one type of radio.

66. The level of signal personnel in depots supporting the Third U.S. Army during the past operation was not sufficient to meet emergencies. This was especially apparent during the campaign of the Third U.S. Army in Germany. Few reinforcements were available during this period and many units were under-strength. This shortage of personnel seriously hampered the installation and maintenance of communication systems.

SECRET

67. An Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) Detachment should be assigned or attached to the Army Headquarters during the organization and planning stage to insure that EEIS activities are properly understood and provided for prior to the start of operations, and to enable the Detachment to establish proper contact with the Army Staff and units expected to serve under the Army. (EEIS Detachment No. 8 joined Third U.S. Army in Normandy just prior to the Army's becoming operational, 25 July 1944, and while contacts were made as promptly as possible, valuable time and equipment was lost in the early stages)

68. a. EEIS Detachments should include general service personnel especially a stenographer, and a platoon for guards and drivers.

b. Also, a source of additional personnel should exist at higher headquarters to be called upon during times of increased activity.

c. In general, at least one forward team consisting of an officer and enlisted man should be on duty with each corps.

69. a. Throughout most of the campaign on the Continent, no additional personnel was available to the EEIS Detachment and it was necessary for technicians to serve as clerical personnel and drivers. Further, the only available guards for equipment was from combat personnel, which was extremely difficult to obtain.

70. The value of captured enemy equipment to the Service should be brought home to all troops during the training period. All personnel should be taught to report immediately the existence of such equipment when found. (Much valuable equipment was lost to the Service either because it was not promptly reported to the EEIS or because it was destroyed prior to our arrival).

71. A suitable channel for prompt evacuation of enemy equipment having intelligence value should be well established by higher headquarters prior to operations. (During the early part of operations on the Continent, definite channels for the evacuation of enemy equipment having intelligence value were not fully understood. The EEIS Detachment actually made contact with Advance Section Communications Zone and Army depots, outlining the mission of EEIS and explained to them their mission concerning the evacuation of equipment. In many cases, such shipments were either delayed or lost in transit. In March 1945 a system was set up by SHAEF, directing evacuation by express train to Paris. This system of evacuation has proven very satisfactory).

72. The EEIS Detachment should not be expected to handle large quantities of captured equipment classified for utilization, but should locate and report such equipment to Signal Supply. (In the early stages of the campaign the EEIS evacuated all captured signal equipment, but as time progressed it became apparent that the task was too large for the Detachment, and interfered with the primary mission of locating and reporting on new types of equipment).

73. Each Army needs two Signal Repair Companies.

74. Signal Depot Companies need an additional Storage and Issue Section.

75. A Signal Depot Company must have practical training before entering into operations.

76. Commanding officers and officer personnel must have thorough training in supply operations in the field; not simply training in ASF fixed installation operations. Recommend training in Post, Camp, or Station Signal Supply Offices where the activity is great.

77. Equipment allocations made by higher headquarters of items that are critical in supply must be made throughout the entire operation. This issue must be equitable, with full consideration of the tactical situation.

78. A requisition made on a ten-day basis is satisfactory only when time delay in delivery of supplies to Army is ten days or less.

79. Erroneous or incomplete information must not be furnished Armies on supply matters.

80. The line of supply from the port to the army passes through too many hands. It is necessary that deliveries be made as directly as possible. Every effort must be made to reduce the number of intermediate handlings.

81. The Army Signal Supply Section should set up a simple set of records showing losses of equipment of all troops, reports of items in the depot by daily inventories, items on requisition, and information showing when items requested are delivered.

82. Army advance signal depots should be kept as far forward as possible, but should not be loaded down with non-essential items. Wire batteries, tubes, spiral-four, wire tags, cable stubs, and some other items are all that have proven necessary in forward dumps.

83. VHF and CF carrier equipment, if in adequate supply, should be issued down to and including corps, with a basic setup being made for Army and Corps. Corps changing allowances should keep this basic allowance. Additions to this basic allowance should be made by army when necessary and allowances should be made in Army pool to have enough for these issues. However, these additional issues should be withdrawn when no longer needed or when a Corps leaves Army.

84. Requests for excess communication equipment for tactical units, i.e., divisions, tank battalions, FA battalions, etc., are not adequately screened. All requests, whether necessary or desired items ultimately end in the Signal Supply Office for action and determination of the issue. Analysis of the basic needs, employment and proposed use, limitations of the equipment, and adaptability of other equipment are nearly always made by the Signal Supply Officer. This campaign has seen the Signal Supply Officer acting as assistant engineer and research agent on all communication problems of divisions and lower units which are accompanied with requests for additional and excess equipment.

85. Transportation, as much as the availability of equipment, has been the bottleneck of signal supply. At least one Quartermaster Truck Company should be assigned for the exclusive use of the Signal Supply Office.

86. The Signal Depot Company should have three each Crane, Vehicular, (Engineer Equipment) on T/O and E.

87. Ten each Trailers, C-2 (Ordnance) 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton capacity, with five each tractors, 4 x 5, are needed for the Signal Depot Companies.

88. Recommend the elimination of the radio and radar repair sections of the Signal Depot Company and the reinforcement of the Signal Repair Company by the same personnel.

89. Radar supply and spare parts must be removed from the responsibility of the Signal Depot Company. It has been found necessary to establish a separate section for these under the supervision and operation of trained personnel of the Signal Repair Company.

90. Army signal depots should not be required to carry pole line material, but arrangements should be made to have an adequate amount to meet any Army needs in Communications Zone depots, near the Army rear, to be made available on call of Army.

91. Army should be set up with at least one construction company for the sole purpose of picking up spiral-four cable and field wire in the Army rear areas. This organization should have messing facilities for at least three groups.

92. The Army Signal Supply Section does not have sufficient officer personnel to efficiently handle the personal attention to Corps and Divisions on requirements. Signal Supply Section should be augmented by two officers.

93. The Signal Depot Company should be provided with fifteen each K-35 trailers or semi-vans for transporting small items used in setting up advanced mobile depots.

94. Excess authorization should be made and approved by the theater, and issued to all units prior to their assignment to the Army. Any additional excess for specific operations should be made when necessary by the Army, but should be withdrawn when no longer needed or when the unit leaves that particular Army.

95. The Army Signal Section, as organized in the latest edition of T/O & E 200-1, provides sufficient officer personnel for normal operations. Special types of operations will require augmentation as recommended by the Signal Officer.

96. The present T/O, dated 26 October 1944, of the Army Signal Section provides only forty-six enlisted men. This number is insufficient. It is recommended that six additional enlisted men be included in the Army Signal Section.

97. One wire recovery battalion, consisting of one wire servicing company and two wire recovery companies should be included among the signal troops organically assigned to an Army.

98. One guard company should be assigned to the signal troops of an Army to guard VHF radio relay terminals, radio and wire repeater stations, and overrun enemy signal installations.

99. One Signal Group Headquarters should be organically assigned to each Army in order to handle routine details of administration, discipline, housing, and supply. In addition, one or more separate Signal Battalion Headquarters should be assigned to an Army to handle similar matters for the numerous separate companies.

100. One Quartermaster Truck Company should be assigned to duty with the Army Signal Section at all times.

101. Two Signal Operation Battalions and three Signal Construction Battalions should be assigned to the Army as normal organic troops. This will insure the availability of required troops without the constant danger of having these troops removed from the Army on short notice by higher echelons.

102. Signal Corps enlisted reinforcements who join signal units during combat must have completed a minimum of twenty-six weeks of individual and specialist training. The completion of this training could be accomplished in the theater provided a proper administrative and training organization were set up for this purpose.

103. Both the Army Group and Communications Zone should be represented at Army Headquarters by competent signal liaison officers of wide experience and technical background.

104. A minimum of Signal Construction Company should be maintained in the vicinity of Army Forward Echelon at all times by the Army Group in order to extend the Army Group wire axis forward behind successive displacements of the Army Forward Echelon Command Post.

105. One Composite Signal Battalion, containing cellular teams as listed in T/O & E 11-500, should be assigned to the Army as an organic unit. This battalion should contain CW radio, VHF radio relay, switchboard operating, cable splicing, and wire construction teams.

106. All Army signal troops should possess as organical equipment a suitable number of machine guns and associated mounts to permit proper AA defense and close in defense of bivouacs and other installations.

107. Boards of officers consisting of experienced officers of signal operation and construction battalions, should be convened in each theater with the mission of preparing fully adequate T/O & E's for their respective units. The recommendations for each theater should then be studied and consolidated by the War Department in order to prepare T/O & E's which are fully adequate to meet normal operating conditions.

108. A chapter covering the approved methods of installing spiral-four cable circuits should be included in the next revision of FM-25, "Signal Communication".

109. A technical manual covering the operation of construction centers and associated test equipment should be prepared and issued by the War Department.

110. A rugged multiple switchboard of commercial design, similar to Western Electric Company No. 12-M, and arranged for 300 local-trunk circuits on a four-panel multiple basis, and capable of operation to 6, 8, or 10 positions should be designed and adopted as standard equipment for the Signal Operation Battalion.


111. One Air Liaison Squadron should be assigned under the jurisdiction of the Army Signal Officer as a part of the Army signal communication troops.

112. The procedure for changing radio call signs and shifting radio frequencies for security purposes should be revised in order to insure simplicity in its design.

113. The number and types of radio sets allotted to ground force units should be reduced and sets should be so designed as to permit their use by several different arms of the service.

SECRET





SIGNAL SUPPLIES ROLL IN.



....ARE CHECKED OUT.



SIGNAL SUPPLY DUMP.



....AWAIT TRUCKS.



RADIO SMALL PARTS AT TOUL.



IN ARMORED DISPATCHER AND MOTOR MESSENGER.



A FAMILIAR SIGHT DAY OR NIGHT - IN ALL KINDS OF WEATHER.



MOTOR MESSENGERS IN ARMORED PEEPS ALWAYS GOT THE MESSAGE THROUGH



PIGEON ARMED WITH MESSAGE BEING RELEASED.



"CHARLIE" WITH PURPLE HEART FOR WOUND SUSTAINED NEAR METZ




HUNGRY, FOR ACTION.



RADIO LINK SETS UP.



RADIO VAN.



RADIO CENTER IN THE WOODS.




COLD AND LONELY HERE.



SHORTENING COMMUNICATION LINES.



SET UP IN TUNNEL.




REHABILITATING CIVILIAN WIRE.

LEARNING CODE.

"GROUND" FROM ICE.


REPAIRING FIELD PHONES.




TROUBLE SHOOTING.

FIELD SPLICE.


RADIO REPAIR.




WE USE EXISTING LINES.



A TYPICAL WIRE SET UP.



TELETYPE.




LINE CHECKS CLEAR.



CHECKING A HEINIE RADIO.



COASTAL TERRAIN CHART AND SIGNAL CONTROLS.



RADIO PHOTO EQUIPMENT (GERMAN) IN FOR INSPECTION.



Sig
30


SNOW AND RAIN AND SLEET.



BRIDGING THE MOSELLE.



POLE LINE CONSTRUCTION.




GETTING THEM OFF THE GROUND.



RAILS FOR ROADS.



POLE CONSTRUCTION.



ALERT FOR KRAUTS AND WIRE.



WE FOUND SOME INTACT.



TYING FIELD WIRE TO THE HOWITZER'S TUNE.



TERMINAL BLOCK IN LUXEMBURG.



YANKEE INGENUITY.



WEASEL LAYING WIRE.




THIRD ARMY COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER.




LAB OFFICER CHECKS QUALITY OF PRINTS.



THIRD ARMY PHOTOGRAPHERS WERE ALWAYS UP FRONT.



DRUM DRYER TURNS DAY AND NIGHT.



UTILIZING GERMAN COPY CAMERA.



Sig
34


THE MOVIE CAMERAS WERE MAINTAINED BY EXPERT TECHNICIANS.




THOUSANDS OF NEGATIVES AT THE COST OF MANY CASUALTIES.



SIGNAL SECTION, LUCKY FORWARD,
HERSFELD, GERMANY. APRIL 1945




FIELD WIRE STRANGLES NAZI WAR BIRD.



COMBATING THE WEATHER ENEMY.

CROSS CHANNEL COMMUNICATION PLAN

ANNEX NO. 1




REPRODUCED BY CGS 942nd ENGR AVN TOPO BN 352TH SIG US ARMY

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 2

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

1800B 31 JULY 1944



SECRET


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11

SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 31 JULY 1944

ANNEX NO. 3



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
Sig III

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ANNEX NO. 4

LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 6 AUGUST 1944




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IV

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SECRET
LINE ROUTE MAP
1800B 10 AUGUST 1944

ANNEX NO. 5




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Sig
V

SECRET
LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 13 AUGUST 1944

ANNEX NO. 6



Sig VI

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
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LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 18 AUGUST 1944

ANNEX NO. 7

XXX
XV




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VII


SECRET LINE ROUTE MAP

1800B 24 AUGUST 1944



SECRET
LINE ROUTE MAP
291800B AUGUST 1944

ANNEX NO. 9



SECRET



Sig IX

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

ANNEX NO. 12

051800B AUGUST 44

121800B AUGUST 44




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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

141800B AUGUST 44

ANNEX NO. 14



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
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XIII

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ANNEX NO. 15

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

181800B AUGUST 44



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
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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

ANNEX NO. 16

231800B AUGUST 44



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
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SECRET

ANNEX NO. 17

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS


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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS


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271800B AUGUST 44



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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS



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ANNEX NO. 23


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LINE ROUTE MAP

031800B SEPTEMBER 1944

ANNEX NO. 24



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XXII


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LINE ROUTE MAP

ANNEX NO. 25

141800B SEPTEMBER 1944




SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

201800B SEPTEMBER 1944

ANNEX NO. 26





CW RADIO NETS

ANNEX NO. 27

ANNEX NO. 28

211800B SEPTEMBER 1944

211800B OCTOBER 1945




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LINE ROUTE MAP

091800B OCTOBER 1944

ANNEX NO. 29



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XXVI

SECRET

SECRET



VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

ANNEX NO. 33

ANNEX NO. 32

141800B NOVEMBER 1944

291800B NOVEMBER 1944



Sig XXVIII


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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS


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ANNEX NO. 35

141800B DECEMBER 1944



241800B DECEMBER 1944




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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

ANNEX NO. 36

311800B DECEMBER 1944



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
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SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

191800B DECEMBER 1944

ANNEX NO. 37



SECRET


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XXXI

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ANNEX NO. 38

VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

131800B JANUARY 1945




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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

281800B FEBRUARY 1945

ANNEX NO. 39



SECRET


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XXXIII

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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

241800B MARCH 1945

ANNEX NO. 41



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
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XXXV

SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

261800B MARCH 1945

ANNEX NO. 43



SECRET


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XXXVII

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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

261800 B MARCH 1945

ANNEX NO. 46



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
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XL

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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

011800 B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 47



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
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XLI

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VHF RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

061800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 48



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XLII


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LINE ROUTE MAP

011800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 50



Sig
XLIV


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SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

101800 B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 51



SECRET


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XLV

SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

171800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 52



Sig
XLVI


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LINE ROUTE MAP

191800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 53



SECRET


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XLVII

SECRET

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 54



LEGEND

WIRE CIRCUITS
 VHF RADIO CIRCUITS

SECRET


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XLVIII

SECRET

TELETYPE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800B APRIL 1945

ANNEX NO. 55



LEGEND
 U - UNCLASSIFIED
 R - RESTRICTED
 C - CONFIDENTIAL
 S - SECRET

— WIRE CIRCUITS
 ⚡ VHF RADIO CIRCUITS

SECRET


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SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

011800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 57



SECRET


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SECRET

V H F RADIO RELAY CIRCUITS

011800 B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 58




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CW RADIO NETS

051800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 59



SECRET


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LIII

SECRET

LINE ROUTE MAP

081800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 60



SECRET


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LIV

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TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 62



LEGEND
WIRE CIRCUITS
VHF RADIO CIRCUITS


SECRET

SECRET

TELETYPE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

081800B MAY 1945

ANNEX NO. 63



LEGEND
 U - UNCLASSIFIED
 R - RESTRICTED
 C - CONFIDENTIAL
 S - SECRET

==== WIRE CIRCUITS
 - - - - VHF RADIO CIRCUITS

SECRET

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SPECIAL SERVICES



Petroff

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Special Service Section

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Commanding General,
Third U. S. Army.


1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Special Service Section, Third U. S. Army Headquarters, beginning with March, 1944 and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.
2. This report outlines the efforts made by this section and subordinate units to maintain a high state of morale in the command and to increase the military effectiveness of officers and enlisted men through planned programs of athletics, recreation and welfare activities prior to and throughout actual operations.

Kenneth E. Van Buskirk
KENNETH E. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt. Col., F. A.
Special Service Officer

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SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER I PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Owing to the nature of its purpose and function, the Special Service Section, Third U. S. Army found itself in both the planning and operational stages in the UNITED KINGDOM. To meet this situation two programs were issued: One an improvised program of athletics and recreation, using no standard equipment furnished in the "A" (Athletic equipment and games of all types) and "B" (Containing radio, phonograph, records and books) Kits. As officially published the program was as follows:

IMPROVISED

Touch football - use canteen for football.
Softball - stuffed sock and pick handle.
Speedball - sandbag.
Miniature terrain games - use of #10 can.

Irish pool - pole, wire and ration can.
Tests of strength - pick handle, rope, etc.
Track and field - rock for shot put, home made javelin.
Cross country relays.
Swimming - life saving courses, beginners courses.
Small group games - pencils, knives, etc.
Large group games - body contact.
Theatricals - group singing, amateur skits.

The memorandum read: "Emphasis will be on combining physical fitness with athletics. Squad and platoon type athletics will be stressed. Unit and organization Special Service Officers will be responsible for motivation and instruction of the program down to and including the smallest group. Active leadership in the program is absolutely necessary."

The second phase of the program - in which standard equipment was to be used - was outlined as follows:


STANDARD

Large group athletics - touch football, volleyball, soccer, softball, basketball, speedball. Small group athletics - badminton, horseshoes, boxing, wrestling, track and field events. Recreation "B" Kit, containing radio, phonograph, 100 library books, records. Small games, cards, checkers, darts, dominoes, and so forth. 16mm movies, soldier skits, glee shows with local talent, band and orchestra concerts.

In addition, unit Special Service Officers were instructed to coordinate with the Medical Department (venereal control) and Chaplains Section and to provide the following information for their troops: location of American Red Cross Clubs, Special Service and American Red Cross movies, local points of interest, churches and hours of service, bathing beaches, gymnasiums, baths and showers, post exchanges, "Stars and Stripes" offices, American Red Cross Welfare Officers, Expeditionary Force Messages cablegram offices.

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Master of ceremonies of "G.I. Jamboree", 3rd Special Service Company's soldier show entertains several hundred soldiers "Somewhere in France". Acts and routines were changed completely when the majority of the troops being serviced by the company had seen the performance.

Movies: In the UNITED KINGDOM, Third U.S. Army troops were serviced for movies by the 35th Special Service Company, which sent out twenty movie teams. This company was used also as a medium of film exchange for troops.

Day Rooms: Recreation centers or day rooms were set up for officers and enlisted men in areas down to and including division. Day rooms provided the soldier with facilities for reading, writing, listening to radio and playing small games.

Expeditionary Force Messages: The Special Service Sections down to and including regiments and separate battalions handled Expeditionary Force Messages, pre-composed cablegrams to United States.

Recreation in Towns and Cities: American Red Cross Clubs were organized in localities near Army camps and usually consisted of a reading room, game room, snack bar, radio and showers. Due to the rationing of food and the type of service received in local restaurants, the clubs provided the only place where a soldier on pass or furlough could secure food.

Supply: Throughout the Third U.S. Army's stay in the UNITED KINGDOM, the Special Service Section distributed 1,000 "A" (Athletic supplies) and "B" (Radio, phonograph, books) Kits plus bulk athletic equipment. All units were supplied including the divisions that had to be re-equipped after being stripped of all athletic and recreational equipment before leaving UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

Movies: A film library of 365 films was set up, with troops able to draw films at nine points - Army and Corps Special Service Headquarters and the Special Service Companies attached to these headquarters.

Red Cross Supplies: Red Cross Field Directors drew their initial supplies from the Army Quartermaster and surplus post exchange supplies. These included such items as comfort articles, stationery and cigarettes. Resupply was arranged through Quartermaster depots.

Special Service Supplies: The 30-day initial supply of the Special Service Division was phased in four sections. Motion picture

projectors, 2 1/2 KW generators and blocks of twenty films every seven days for the first four weeks were received without loss by this section. The equipment was turned over to Corps for service to Divisions. With the establishment of the film library and the distribution of supplies, Special Service of Third U. S. Army was capable of showing 200 movies simultaneously.

Special Service Companies: Before Third U. S. Army became operational on the Continent, three Special Service Companies were attached to Corps. The 35th Special Service Company was attached to VIII Corps, 26th Special Service Company to XV Corps, 4th Special Service Company to XII Corps and 30th Special Service Company to XI Corps. The companies are composed of four platoons with a personnel of five officers and one hundred and nine enlisted men complete with self-sustaining household facilities. Planned operations called for use of the companies in two phases: First, to service field and evacuation hospitals with movie, amateur shows and orchestra concerts in the afternoons; second, to furnish the same service for troops of this command in the rear and rest areas in the evenings.

General: American Red Cross Field Directors, working in conjunction with Special Service Officers and Red Cross women hospital workers, were already functioning before actual operations and performing their duties in an excellent manner.

CHAPTER 3 AUGUST OPERATIONS

During August, the Special Service Section adapted its activities to the demands of a wide and fluid front. Pick-up of supplies was kept at a minimum because of rapid and constant movement of headquarters and because there was no great demand for bulky equipment.

Movie service to all units constituted one of the chief activities for this period. The 3rd Special Service Company was attached to Third U. S. Army Special Service Section and with the other companies already in the Army provided all troops with a steady flow of pictures. Early in August this section received three prints of the film "Casanova Brown" and immediately distributed them to Corps for a world premiere showing. Weekly issues of new films were received and placed in existing libraries.

Two emergency situations, typical of the type of campaign, which arose and were successfully handled were as follows:

(1) The 79th Infantry Division was pulled out of the line for a short time and received prompt entertainment service from the 26th Special Service Company. This company sent all four platoons and every projector to the Division. Pictures were shown from 0800 to midnight, and in one day the entire Division had the opportunity to see a movie. During one showing the barn being used as a theater came under enemy shell-fire.

(2) A German hospital at RENNES (Y05) containing over 500 wounded American soldiers was captured and the patients turned over to the 35th Evacuation Hospital. This section dispatched a group to the hospital to service these soldiers, many of whom had been captured on D-Day, with "Stars and Stripes", books, cigarettes and movies. Many of the divisions then on the Continent and the Air Force were represented in this group. The 35th Evacuation Hospital had on hand radios, small games, council books and 3,000 cartons of cigarettes supplied it by Special Service Section with which to meet this emergency.

Late in August, Red Cross Clubmobiles and Cinemobiles were attached to Corps and Third U. S. Army Special Service Sections. The Clubmobiles went immediately to work servicing the troops with doughnuts and coffee. Cinemobiles showed movies in the field.

On 31 August 45, all Corps and attached Special Service Companies were directed to submit weekly reports of their activities with particular emphasis on movies.

CHAPTER 4 SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

In September, an extensive program of United Service Organization (USO) entertainment, prevented by the speed and mobility of the campaign during August, was undertaken for Third U.S. Army troops. The units picked up by this office and sent immediately to frontline troops

included Dinah Shore, Bing Crosby, "Laughtime" (Bob Evans), "Swingtime" (Grace Drysdale) and the "Sid Slate Show".

Third U. S. Army Special Service policy in regard to United Service Organization shows was to send "big name" stars directly to combat divisions, including Combat Engineers and Field Artillery. Rear area troops were given shows at the completion of the tour only if time permitted.

In this period the Army Exchange Officer began stocking Quartermaster resale supplies for issue to combat units. The Army Exchange Service also supervised the campaign for Christmas Gift Orders of all Third U. S. Army units on the Continent.

To insure coverage of all troops with the outstandingly popular publications "Stars and Stripes" and "Yank", the Third U. S. Army Special Service Officer instituted the following plan with the cooperation of the publishing officials:

(1) Copies of "Stars and Stripes" were delivered to Corps Special Service offices and there picked up by Divisions. The balance of Corps troops received the paper through their Army Post Office.

(2) Army troops, with the exception of Army Headquarters, received "Stars and Stripes" through their Army Post Office. Headquarters copies were delivered direct to the Special Service Section.

(3) Sixty thousand "Yank" magazines were picked up at Paris and distributed to Corps, then picked up by Divisions. Later issues were distributed in the same manner as "Stars and Stripes".

In the last half of September, the 3rd Special Service Company accomplished two emergency missions.

From 14th to 16th September, six movie teams and the company orchestra, accompanied by two officers, bivouaced with Combat Command "B", 6th Armored Division, on its way to a new sector. The teams showed several films daily, and the orchestra provided live entertainment.

The same service was rendered to the 83rd Infantry Division on its move from the Brittany Peninsula to the Western Front during the period 25 September to 3 October.

The first large shipment of radios was received by this office on 17 September. Seven hundred sets were distributed to Divisions, Corps and Army units. Every hospital received from five to eight radios for use in the wards.



3rd Special Service Company's "Jive Bombers" provide some fast music between acts at a U.S.O. show. Similar "swing" units in each Special Service Company played with company and U.S.O. shows throughout the campaign and proved very popular with troops.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

The billeting of the majority of Army units in October caused a greater demand for entertainment and recreational supplies than at any other period in the campaign. Every facility was used to the utmost to meet this demand successfully.

Typical of the installations set up for entertainment was the "Garrison Theatre", seating capacity 1200, in the Bear Echelon area of Army Headquarters. Both movies and live entertainment were shown here.

To meet increased requirements, two allocations of athletic and recreational supplies were hauled from REIMS and LONGUEVILLE to Army Headquarters. This equipment, including such items as playing cards, council books, "A" and "B" Kits, bulk athletic goods, records and phonographs, was broken down to Corps and distributed to troops.

An additional 540 Special Service radios were picked up in Paris and given the usual distribution.

On 17 October, Marlene Dietrich arrived for a nine week tour among Army troops. Miss Dietrich was sent immediately to front-line Divisions.

From 24 October to 1 November 45, six movie teams from 3rd Special Service Company, complete with supplies of athletic equipment, books and games, were sent to the 79th Infantry Division, pulled back for a rest period.

On 25 October a Red Cross "Donut Dugout" was opened in NANCY (U 81) through the combined cooperation of the Third U.S. Army Special Service Officer, XII Corps Special Service Officer, Clubmobile "M" and Clubmobile "L". The recreational equipment for this club was furnished by the Special Service Sections of XII Corps and Third U. S. Army.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

Distributing supplies, routing USO Camp Shows and insuring a steady supply of entertainment films were the chief activities of the section during November.

Radios, games, athletic equipment and books and magazines were distributed to Army troops through both the section and the 3rd Special Service Company supply room.

The following USO Camp Shows were obtained and released to the units indicated during the month: Ruth Arons, world champion ping-pong player (XII Corps); "Evans Family" (XII Corps); "Five Pips and A Drip" (Third U. S. Army). Shows presented at the Garrison Theatre throughout the month were Marlene Dietrich, "Evans Family", and "Revue of the Century".

In addition to the regular supply of films, three prints of the picture "Conflict", starring Humphrey Bogart, were obtained to be shown as world premieres. These prints were loaned to the 5th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division and 35th Infantry Division Special Service Sections who showed them to enthusiastic audiences a short distance behind the front lines. Film supply was satisfactory during the month.

On 24 November, the 3283rd Signal Service Detachment set up with this Headquarters for the purpose of servicing, repairing and exchanging motion picture projectors. A library of training films was also carried by this unit. This new arrangement lessened the load placed on the repair shop operated by this section which, during the previous month, had repaired almost fifty projectors, most of them from infantry regiments. These repairs had been effected by only three men.

CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS

The outstanding event of December's operations was the establishment of the NANCY Rest Center at NANCY (U 81), FRANCE, for the rest and relaxation of front-line troops of units in XII Corps. Original plans for setting up similar installations in each Corps of the Army were temporarily suspended by the change in the tactical situation later in the month.

The Center was opened on 5 December with the assistance and supervision of the Special Service Section, Third U. S. Army. During the month 1064, enlisted men and 89 officers enjoyed the advantages of the Center. Men were brought directly from combat for a four day period, given showers and a complete change of clothing and a pass to town daily. There was no work or training for any of these soldiers. The NANCY Thermal Baths and Swimming Pool, adjoining the Rest Center building were given over to the returning troops.

Entertainment conducted directly by this section included the operation of the Empire Theater (next door to NANCY Red Cross Club), daily movies at the Garrison Theatre and presentation of the following USO Camp Shows at the Garrison Theatre: "Five Pips and A Drip" (1 Dec), and big league baseball players Hal Ott, "Dutch" Leonard, Frank Frisch, and "Bucky" Walters (24 Dec). Both shows were later sent to XI Corps. The Grace Drysdale show was sent to XIII Corps on 15 December. All shows which played at Headquarters were also presented at the NANCY Red Cross Club.

A new entertainment feature, "Jeep Shows" consisting of three man soldier teams was received and three teams were sent to each Corps. The units were attached for a period of a month. They were made up of the most talented soldiers available in the United States and were designed to get entertainment to small units that were not large enough to warrant the scheduling of USO Shows.

The teams were equipped with a jeep and trailer and for the most part had singers and musicians for entertainers. General reaction to the shows was excellent.

Film supply during the month was satisfactory and one world premiere, "Saratoga Trunk", starring Gary Cooper was presented to the 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions.

Two surveys were initiated by the section to determine the number of motion picture films and projectors in the Third U. S. Army and to ascertain the availability of 35mm theaters in the months to come.

The 3rd Special Service Company sent out 14 movie teams to Army divisions in the week 11-18 December to supplement service already being given by Corps. The teams went to the 26th Infantry Division and the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, showing to approximately 60,000 troops.

To meet an emergency caused by the change in the tactical situation in the middle of the month, fifteen tons of supplies were requisitioned and shipped to Third U.S. Army Divisions operating in the "Bastogne Bulge" area. The supplies were to make up battle losses and to meet the extra demands on Special Service caused by the situation.

On 27 December, the 3rd Special Service Company, attached to Third U. S. Army Headquarters was reattached to XII Corps.

A system of service by geographical locations was set up, permitting any unit to go to the nearest Corps Special Service Company to arrange movies and shows.

Throughout the month personnel of this section arranged numerous shows and other forms of entertainment at the NANCY Red Cross Club. One of the outstanding events was the recording of a program, in cooperation with the Signal Corps and Third U. S. Army Public Relations Section, which was sent back to the United States for radio broadcast. Features included were Christmas messages to home from front-line soldiers, selections by the 61st ACP Band and solos by soldier artists. On Christmas day, Joe McKenna's "Keep 'Em Rollin'" USO Camp Show played to 2,000 troops at the Club.

CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

The outstanding feature of Special Service activity in Third U. S. Army during January was the successful operation of a plan to service units on a geographical basis. Under this system troops went to the nearest Corps Special Service Section to schedule movies, "G. I. Shows" or USO entertainment. This arrangement was made to obtain maximum use of the four Special Service Companies attached to Corps. Army troops continued to draw their supplies at Army Headquarters.

A total of approximately 1,500,000 troops saw movies during the month. One third of this number saw pictures shown by teams from the Special Service Companies. The balance were shown movies through the use of unit-owned projectors and films borrowed from libraries operated by Corps and Army Headquarters.

On 11 January front-line troops of the 4th and 35th Infantry Divisions saw the fourth world premiere received by Third U. S. Army: "Rhapsody In Blue". In both units, showings were held far enough forward to be within range of enemy artillery. Early in the month theaters operated by the Army Special Service Section at TOUL (U 6), NANCY (U 81) and FONT-A-MOUSSON (U 73) were closed, and the Kleines Theater ESCH (P 70), LUXEMBOURG opened for all troops in the area.

Two allocations of recreational supplies were received in January, including such items as public address systems, battery-type radios, magazines, small musical instruments, phonographs and records. The supplies were distributed to Corps with instructions to give top priority to infantry divisions, particularly on the battery radios.

On 27 January approximately 20,000 maps of the Pacific and European battle areas were received from the Information and Education Branch of Special and Information Services, European Theater of Operations. Distribution of these maps was begun immediately. These colored maps were waterproof making them well suited to field conditions that had made previous issues impracticable.

Coordinating with G-3, the Special Service Section began distribution of the film "Subject: Germany" dealing with the Army's non-fraternization policies. Prints of the film were loaned out through Corps and Army libraries starting 28 January. By the end of the month the schedule was well under way.

One of the most popular entertainment features ever presented through Special Service, the "Jeep Shows", left Third U. S. Army on 17 January for duty with the First U. S. Army. These two and three man units of soldier entertainers played to approximately 100,000 troops in isolated areas in the period 31 December to 17 January. They went to relief camps, gun positions and reserve positions with attendance at the performances varying from 100 to 700 and in all cases received an enthusiastic reception. With few exceptions, the shows were given forward of regimental command posts and in a few instances in towns not completely taken by our troops. The success of these shows prompted a recommendation from the Army Special Service Officer to Special and Information Services, European Theater of Operations that four of the teams be attached to each Special Service Company.

The rest center operated by 90th Infantry Division outside of THIONVILLE (U 88) was turned over to the 94th Infantry Division with the approval of the Army Special Service Officer. XII Corps Special Service Section opened a Corps Artillery rest center in METZ (U 85), with a capacity of 400 on 24 January.

A report from the Special Service Section, XII Corps, showed that 1,634 enlisted men and 171 officers from 18 different combat units were sent to the XII Corps Rest Center, NANCY (U 81) during the month.

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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

The opening of several facilities for the entertainment and recreation of troops in the Luxembourg area was among the outstanding activities of the Special Service Section, Third U.S. Army.

On 5 February a large American Red Cross Club was installed in the former "Casino" in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). Capable of handling 4,000 troops daily, the club was fully equipped by this section with radios, phonographs, books, magazines and small games. A movie team was installed and showed twice daily.


Three weeks later an Officers' Red Cross Club was opened in the city and was similarly equipped with the exception of the movie team. Both clubs gained immediate popularity with visiting troops.

On 11 February a program of movies and USO entertainment was set up in the Municipal Theater, LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) for all troops in or visiting the city. All arrangements were made jointly by the Special Service Sections of Third U. S. Army and XII Corps. The movie teams operating in the theater were supplied alternately by the 3rd and 4th Special Service Companies.

During the week 21-28 February, this section opened the Bains Municipales in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81). This installation had forty eight modern shower baths and a 75-foot heated swimming pool and proved an outstanding success. Civilian employees operated the pool and sanitary conditions were checked by two soldiers supplied by the Medical Section. The pool and showers were open six days a week and serviced hundreds of soldiers daily.

Following the movement of III Corps to First U.S. Army in the middle of the month, the 3rd Special Service Company, formerly attached to that unit, was attached to VIII Corps. This attachment was for administrative purposes only. The company was used to service Army troops. The following week, however, the company was attached to First U.S. Army.

On 10 February the XII Corps Rest Center was moved from NANCY (U-81) to ESCH (P-70), after having served 504 enlisted men and 47 officers in the first nine days of the month. The center went into operation again on 15 February and ended the month with a total of 1883 enlisted men and 138 officers having been served. The purpose of the Rest Center as stated by a XII Corps letter embodied the principles of all such installations conducted by units of Third U.S. Army: "The . . . Rest Center is intended to provide rehabilitation, rest and recreation to specially selected personnel of combat units. Preference will be given to men and officers who have been actively engaged in actual combat, to those most physically exhausted, and to those whose mental conditions indicate need for release from battle tension. The Center is not intended to serve as a recreation center for service troops or troops in rear areas. It is not to serve as a substitute for medical evacuation although it is felt that timely selection of borderline personnel may prevent later evacuation".



The operation of swimming pools wherever available was an important function of Third U. S. Army Special Service throughout the campaign. Vernon Grant, famous illustrator on tour for USO Camp Shows gives his impression of a soldier preparing for a plunge.

The training film "Subject: Germany" continued to be scheduled by this office throughout the month. Headquarters, European Theater of Operations lifted the deadline on the film from 26 February to "indefinitely". This section retained 11 of the 22 prints of the film originally allocated to it.

The Adjutant General, Third U. S. Army, forwarded to Commanding General, European Theater of Operations the plan for showing the War Department film "One Down And Two To Go" previously submitted by the Special Service Officer. The Ninth Air Force submitted to this Headquarters a list of their units for whom service was requested in showing of this film when released.

The Special Service Officer conferred during the month with two representatives of the War Department: Colonel Frederick Warburg and Dr. Daniel A. Poling, prominent Protestant churchman. These conferences covered the status of morale within this command.

The chief item of supply received during the month was public address systems, nine of which were distributed to Corps.

On 26 February, enlisted athletic technicians from the 4th, 30th and 35th Special Service Companies were sent to the Army Athletic Staff School in PARIS for one month's training in anticipation of the post-war athletic program.

Reports submitted by Special Service Companies and by the film library of this section showed that an average of about 2,000,000 men a month saw movies in Third U. S. Army. Typical reports, those for the week ending 3 February showed that in four Corps movies were shown to approximately 146,500 troops. Approximately 179,000 saw films borrowed from Special Service Companies' libraries. Between 150,000 and 175,000 saw pictures borrowed from the library of this section. The grand total for the week approached the 500,000 mark.



A "candid" shot taken during a performance by the Bing Crosby troupe in September 1944. The Crosby Show played exclusively to Third U. S. Army troops while on the continent.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

In March, the Special Service Section continued to increase and develop existing recreational facilities for the many hundreds of troops passing through LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-81) on pass. Assisted by Special Service and Army Exchange, a mobile exchange unit of Advance Section, Communications Zone established a "G.I. Beer Garden" in the city. Soldiers stationed outside the city were provided with free food and entertainment and beer and soft drinks at a nominal price. This section furnished magazines, playing cards, phonographs, "Stars and Stripes" and other items, as well as transportation to haul the beer.

To meet the needs of over 500 combat troops using the LUXEMBOURG railroad station on pass to PARIS, the section installed a movie projector and a public address system in the station. Also supplied were magazines, books and newspapers. Other facilities continuing successfully were the Municipal Showers and Swimming Pool and the American Red Cross Club.

Troop Assignment No. 57, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 7 March, attached the 2nd Platoon, 3rd Special Service Company to this Headquarters. This addition made possible a full program of Special Service in the city and provided more movie service for Army units not possessing projectors.

The fifth moving picture world premiere shown to Third U. S. Army troops, "My Reputation" starring Barbara Stanwyck, was presented to the 6th Armored, 80th and 90th Infantry Divisions. As in previous instances, the premieres were shown to front-line troops, as far forward as military conditions permitted.

As requested by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, the Special Service Officer reported that Third U.S. Army troops had on hand one hundred (100) 16 millimeter movie projectors. Based on the Army strength at that time (4 March) sixty four (64) machines were required and a request was made for an issue of that number.


In anticipation of the great program of athletics to be begun after cessation of hostilities in Europe, the Special Service Officer of XX Corps was chosen to represent Third U.S. Army at the first class of the Army Athletic Staff School in Paris.

An inspecting officer, WAC, reported from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations on 6 March for an inspection tour of Third U. S. Army rest and recreation centers. Among the units visited were the XII and XX Corps Rest Centers, the 5th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions.

On 9 March, a large supply of recreational equipment was hauled from PARIS and distributed to Corps and Divisions. Among the outstanding items were musical instruments, playing cards, phonograph records, small games and radios.

The USO Show, "Capers of 1945" reported on 10 March and was sent to XX Corps. The "Keep 'Em Rolling" Show was returned from XX Corps for a short schedule with Army troops before returning to the United States. The Roscoe Ates Show finished its tour with Third U. S. Army and left for Italy.

Reports from Army and Corps Special Service units showed that in the last three weeks of March, approximately 1,253,000 troops saw movies. This was accomplished in 6,049 showings.



The American soldier wants his sports anytime and anywhere. Vernon Grant, USO illustrator catches the spirit "of do or die for old Slivash" in one of the humorous sketches for which he is famous.

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CHAPTER 11 APRIL OPERATIONS

On instructions from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, the Special Service Officer submitted his requisitions for athletic and recreational supplies for the months of May, June, July and August.

Approximately 5,000 captured enemy radios were turned over to the Special Service Section by the Ordnance Section. The radios, confiscated by the enemy from Dutch civilians, were generally old and all in need of repair. Units were permitted to draw several machines and attempt to construct serviceable ones from the tubes and spare parts. The radio repair section of Headquarters was not in a position to do any repair work on these radios.

Upon request of the 4th Armored Division, the Army Special Service Officer took immediate steps on 8 April to obtain 100 Russian language guides for the use of the Division. The books were eventually flown from England and delivered to 4th Armored Division on 21 April.

A large warehouse full of enemy special service and post exchange supplies was captured at WEIMAR (G10) early in April and turned over to Army by XX Corps. Among the items found were musical instruments, writing paper, souvenirs, phonographs, needles, ping-pong equipment, toilet articles and glassware. Large amounts of the supplies were given to the Army Exchange Service and American Red Cross and the balance distributed to lower units through Third U. S. Army Special Service Section.

USO Camp Show activity showed an increase during the month of April. Marlene Dietrich reported to the Army on 15 April and began a series of personal appearances in Army Hospitals. Vernon Grant, famous artist, also began a tour of hospitals on 20 April. The "Hocus Pocus" revue reported on 28 April and was sent to XII Corps. Notification of assignment of the "Covert and Reed" show was received on 25 April. On an emergency call from the 4th Armored Division, 11 April, the show "Capers of 1945" was borrowed from XX Corps and sent immediately to the Division. On 30 April, the Special Service Officer wrote, Headquarters European Theater of Operations requesting five (5) additional USO variety shows for Third U.S. Army.

On 18 April, the Special Service Section was notified by Liaison Section, Communication Zone that the May requisition for athletic and recreational supplies had been approved and would be forwarded by rail.

On 27 April the Commanding Officer of the XII Corps Rest Center received a commendation from the Corps Commander for the operation and results of the Center.

The Army Athletic Staff School at PARIS (S04) notified the Third U.S. Army Special Service Officer that 25 officers from this command had successfully completed the course during the month.

Reports from Army and Corps cinema sections showed that 1,387,500 troops saw movies during the month. This was accomplished in 4,876 showings.

CHAPTER 12 MAY OPERATIONS

In the final week of the war, Third U.S. Army Special Service consisted chiefly of the regular movie, USO and soldier-show entertainment. The rapid movement of all troops prevented the undertaking of any other entertainment or recreational programs. Requisitioned athletic equipment for the month of May was still enroute from Paris by rail.

In this period movies were shown to approximately 600,000 troops. This was accomplished in 698 showings by movie teams of Corps Special Service Companies and by films loaned to units having their own projectors.

Three (3) new USO Camp Shows reported to the Army between 1 May and 8 May. A total of fifteen (15) shows were given to approximately 6500 troops.

Soldier-show teams from Corps Special Service Companies played to approximately 111,000 troops in 40 shows.

CHAPTER 13 LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

The following are the lessons learned and the conclusions therefrom by the Special Service Section:

Movies and Projectors

1. Initial film supply of seventeen (17) features for Special Service Companies did not take into consideration films in transit. The company libraries should be increased to thirty four (34) films to get the maximum number of shows daily.
2. Projector repair kits and spare sets of projector and exciter lamps should be issued with every projector.
3. All Army and Corps Special Service Sections should be equipped with their own projector repair teams. The present arrangement, with one repair team for the entire Army is not sufficient.
4. As far as practicable, combat divisions should be equipped with the same make projectors to simplify repair and parts supply.
5. All projectionists in all units should be licensed after a technical test in operation, care and maintenance of machines. Unskilled operation resulted in too much damage to projectors and films.

Special Service Companies

1. Transportation for Special Service Companies proved inadequate. T/O should give a company two (2) additional $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks for kitchen and ration requirements.
2. Skilled personnel of companies were often kept from best use of their abilities by guard and fatigue details. T/O of a Special Service Company should be increased by twenty four (24) men to handle these details.
3. "Jeep Shows", groups of three or four soldier-entertainers, proved to be the most successful type of entertainment because of mobility and ease with which they were handled. These shows should be attached to companies for operation.

Supply

1. During combat the quickest and most efficient way of distributing supplies to Divisions and Corps troops was through Special Service Companies.
2. Athletic equipment should be issued according to seasonal conditions to avoid wastage.
3. Supplying units with reading material by mail was not satisfactory owing to difficulties with mail during combat. It should be distributed through regular supply channels.
4. Communications Zone base of supply was at too great a distance as the Armies moved forward. It should be as near to Army boundaries as possible. One liaison officer from the base of supply should be with each Army during combat.
5. Bulk Special Service supplies were not handled through Quartermaster Class II and IV Depots until after combat. They should have been handled through these depots from the start of operations.

General

1. Great difficulty was encountered in trying to service isolated units. Mobile Special Service Sections should be established by parent organizations to bring these isolated troops movies, athletics supplies and libraries.
2. Use of Special Service Companies as housekeeping troops for rest centers negates their purpose. Unskilled troops should be used for this detail.
3. Corps and Division Special Service Sections functioned best when they operated from their forward echelons. Division Special

Service Sections in all cases should be located at the Division Control Point or Quartermaster ration dump where they have daily contact with all their units.

4. Many emergencies arose during lulls in combat for divisions. T/O of Division Special Service Section should be increased to include four (4) movie teams to meet these emergencies.

5. Hospitals constituted a large and important problem for Special Service. A Special Service Section exclusively for the 30 to 35 hospitals should be set up in each Army to include film libraries, radio repair, magazines and books, and crafts hobbies.

6. Reinforcement Depots had difficulty in keeping contact with their supply bases. They should come under Army Special Service for supplies, live shows and similar items. Army allotments should be increased accordingly.

7. Aiding the prevention of battle fatigue among the infantry during combat, particularly in the winter months was the most important function of the Special Service Section. Provision should be made to include in the Army Special Service Section a sub-section nucleus for the expansion of rest centers under all conditions.

8. To obtain maximum efficiency, all AGF and Division orchestras should be placed under Special Service for supply of instruments and orchestrations. National anthems of all allied nations should be issued on V-Discs.

9. Live shows and "big-name" stars should not be brought in unless the same allotment of time is given to all major commands.

10. For an exact and widespread knowledge of the Special Service program, all TM's and guides should be distributed down to companies.

11. Reductions in T/O of Special Service Sections (e.g. 360-10, Oct. 44) during combat hinder the proper operation of the Special Service program.

12. The Army Special Service Section should be operational as well as administrative.

13. T/O of Division Special Service Sections should include one skilled technician for the preparation of soldier shows.

SECRET

DESTROYER



Petroff

TANK DESTROYER SECTION
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: After-Action Report.

TO: Commanding General, Third US Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the After-Action Report of the Tank Destroyer Section, Third US Army Headquarters, beginning with May, 1944, and continuing at the properly designated intervals by chapters.


2. On the 22d May 1944, the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company was designated as the Tank Destroyer Section, Third US Army. Prior to Third US Army's entry into combat, the Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters supervised the training and equipping of all tank destroyer units assigned to the Third US Army. After Third US Army became operational, Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters, as a special staff section, advised the Army Commander on tank destroyer employment and attachments; made frequent staff visits to all Third US Army tank destroyer units; assisted these units in obtaining and maintaining equipment and in securing personnel.

Logan G. Berry
LOGAN G. BERRY
Colonel, Cavalry
Chief of Section

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TANK DESTROYER SECTION

Organizational and Functional Chart



CHAPTER I PLANNING IN UNITED KINGDOM

Introduction: When Third United States Army began forming in England, no Tank Destroyer Special Staff Section was included in the staff organization. Realizing the great potential combat value of tank destroyers and the obstacles which this comparatively new organization would have to surmount, the Army Commander decided to attach the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company to Third Army Headquarters. Shortly after the Brigade joined Army Headquarters, Operations Memorandum Number 6, 22 May 1944, directed that the Brigade, in addition to other duties, be designated as the Army Tank Destroyer Section. The Commanding General was given the dual role of Army staff officer and Commander of tank destroyer units assigned to Third United States Army and not otherwise attached.

Troops: During the period of planning and organization the following tank destroyer units were assigned to the Army and arrived in the United Kingdom:

Groups	Battalions			
4th	603	630	705	802
5th	607	644	771	813
6th	610	654	773	814
7th	628	704	774	818
9th		825		

Advance detachments from the 8th Group, 602, 614, 631, 691 and 807 battalions also reported to the Army during this period.

Training: Many of the battalions had been in England for many months and were undergoing extensive training under Brigade supervision before being assigned to Third Army, particularly in the tactics and technique of indirect fire in preparation for carrying out their secondary mission of reinforcing artillery fires. Due to limitations of time no effort was made to provide a comprehensive training schedule for the units which arrived in the latter part of this period, however range facilities were provided for use of battalions in doing "refresher" direct fire in order to maintain the high standard of gunnery which is all

important to tank destroyers. The Army tank destroyer training directive established the following objectives:

- Draw and prepare equipment for battle.
- Maintain proficiency in primary mission.
- Stress development of tank destroyer units' for secondary mission as reinforcing artillery.
- Combined training with infantry--artillery--tanks.

The Tank Destroyer Section participated actively in this training; securing training areas, ranges for both direct and indirect firing, training aides, field artillery instructors for tank destroyer units and coordinating the training of all battalions attached to the Army as well as lower units.

Equipping: Depots were widely scattered and the enormous amount of material and special equipment which tank destroyer battalions had to accumulate introduced difficult problems for the supply officers, many of which the Brigade S - 4 solved to the mutual benefit of the supply services and the units.

Staff Functions: Some activities of a purely staff nature were:

- Coordinating billeting of tank destroyer troops.
- Recommending attachments of units.
- Recommending phasing of units for movement to Continent.
- Investigating new equipment and recommended changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment.
- Recommending and developing the tank destroyer doctrines for the Army.
- Staff inspections of Army units, and visits to units attached to lower echelons, to determine training, equipment and personnel status.

CHAPTER 2 PRE-OPERATIONAL ON CONTINENT

The Commanding General, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, with a small officer and enlisted detachment accompanied the Forward Echelon of Third Army Headquarters to the Continent 6 July and established a Command Post with the other special staff sections at the Army Command Post near Blandemour, France. The remainder of the Brigade Headquarters crossed the Channel 10 July and joined the advance detachment.

The period prior to 1 August when the Army became operational was principally taken up with receiving and bivouacking tank destroyer units arriving at Utah and Omaha beaches. Suitable areas were selected within the Army area for incoming units and a liaison officer from the Tank Destroyer Section was maintained at the beach to orient these units. It was during this period that a general regrouping of arriving troops took place and many units originally assigned to Third Army passed to control of other headquarters.

The Commanding General and a few members of his staff were enabled to visit tank destroyer units which had already been in combat for several weeks and obtain first hand information as to the problems of tactics, supply, equipment and most important the technique of close support which was being employed. The lessons learned were quickly passed on to the new units not yet tested under fire.

The Brigade, being a tactical unit in addition to its status as the Army Tank Destroyer Section, was engaged in readying itself for possible combat missions, preparing tentative plans for possible tactical use and completing multitudinous details which appear prior to combat.

On 30 July the Army Commander approved, in general, a plan prepared by the S - 3 under direction of the Commanding General for operation of an armored Task Force in Brittany Peninsula, in which the Brigade as Headquarters, Task Force "A", subsequently participated.

As a result of this operation the Brigade was absent from Army Command Post during months of August and September and Tank Destroyer Staff Functions were handled by the Artillery Section, a tank destroyer field officer being placed on temporary duty with that Section.

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CHAPTER 5
OCTOBER OPERATIONS

As of 1 October, the organization for combat of the tank destroyer units of Third US Army is shown in the following table:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
8th TD Gp			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed	MP Duty	Third US Army
817 TD Bn	Towed	Com Z Duty	Ad Sec Com Z
9th TD Gp			XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	9th TD Gp	XII Corps
603 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	6th Armd Div	XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	9th TD Gp	XII Corps
654 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	35th Inf Div	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
608 TD Bn	Towed	80th Inf Div	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
607 TD Bn	Towed	90th Inf Div	XX Corps
609 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	5th Inf Div	XX Corps
802 TD Bn	Towed	83rd Inf Div	XX Corps
807 TD Bn	Towed	83rd Inf Div	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	5th Inf Div	XX Corps

Throughout the month of October, the absence of a serious armored threat in the Army zone, coupled with the acute ammunition rationing, resulted in the tank destroyers being employed on their secondary mission of reinforcing field artillery fires almost exclusively, except for a small amount of direct fire against pillboxes, gun positions, and in support of limited objective attacks. During the month, tank destroyer units of Third US Army expended 87,464 rounds on indirect fire and 3,164 rounds on direct fire missions. Because of the relative absence of enemy armor, only 8 tanks and 1 self-propelled gun were destroyed. However, numerous pillboxes, machine gun nests, and targets of opportunity were either neutralized or destroyed.

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units weekly, and, at the close of the period, all units were in excellent condition as to personnel and materiel. The employment of the units on their secondary mission permitted a continuous program for rotation of platoons within companies, companies within battalions, and also battalions, in some cases, in both Corps zones. This resulted in completion of an excellent maintenance program and some rest and recreation for personnel.

The Tank Destroyer Section prepared plans for converting five towed battalions and one self-propelled (M-10) battalion to self-propelled (M-36, 90mm gun) battalions as rapidly as Third US Army's pro-rata share of this equipment became available. The status of tank destroyer units at the close of the month is shown by the following table:

ATTACHMENT	SELF-PROPELLED			TOWED	TOTAL
	M-10	M-18	M-36		
Third Army	0	0	0	1 *	1 *
XII Corps	1	3	1	2	7
XX Corps	2	2	0	4	8
TOTAL	3	5	1	7	16

* MP duty Army Headquarters

At the close of the period the enemy was considered capable of massing 180 tanks and assault guns against Third US Army within a 48-hour period. In addition, the enemy was engaged in constituting an armored reserve of approximately 450 tanks in Province of WESTPHALIA which would be capable of commitment against Third US Army.

CHAPTER 6
NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

As of 1 November, the tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as indicated in the following table:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed	MP Duty	Third US Army
8th TD Gp			XII Corps
9th TD Gp			XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M-36)	9th TD Gp	XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	6th Armd Div	XII Corps
654 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	35th Inf Div	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	26th Inf Div	XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	26th Inf Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th Armd Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	80th Inf Div	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
807 TD Bn	Towed	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
609 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
775 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	95th Inf Div	XX Corps
705 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	3rd Cav Gp	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	5th Inf Div	XX Corps
807 TD Bn	Towed	90th Inf Div	XX Corps
814 TD Bn	Towed *	95th Inf Div	XX Corps

* Enroute from Communications Zone.

During the first week of November, the lack of offensive activity in the Army zone was reflected on tank destroyer operations. Tank destroyers of both Corps continued to fire large numbers of indirect fire missions of all types. This fact is substantiated by the following record of rounds fired:

	Indirect	Direct
XII Corps	9,313	274
XX Corps	6,279	28

Expenditures of three-inch ammunition were restricted at the direction of the Army due to shortages at the ammunition supply points. The general employment of tank destroyers on their secondary mission of reinforcing the fires of the field artillery was justified by the fact that there were 540 tank destroyer guns of three-inch or larger caliber in the Army. This constituted a considerably larger number than all enemy tanks and assault guns which Third US Army might expect to be committed against it. During the latter part of the week, tank destroyer units of XX Corps were regrouped in preparations for coming offensive operations.

From 8 November to the end of the month, tank destroyer missions were indicative of the current offensive operations at that time. Indirect fire missions during this period consumed less than half the ammunition used for indirect fire in October, whereas more than two and one-half times as many rounds were used for direct fire than in October.

	Indirect	Direct
XII Corps	15,405	5,850
XX Corps	24,741	2,422

The absence of a serious armored threat in the Army zone permitted the employment of tank destroyer battalions in small units in close support of attacking infantry and armored forces. Engagements with enemy tanks were local and on a small scale. Tank destroyers were frequently used as assault guns against forts, pillboxes, buildings, machine guns and anti-tank guns. In XII Corps zone tank destroyers supported the crossing of the SELLE River, the breaching of the MAGINOT Line and the crossing of the SURE River in the south portion of the Corps zone. In XX Corps zone tank destroyers supported the crossing of the MOSELLE River, the attack of the METZ forts, and the breaching of the MAGINOT Line. The enemy materiel and installations credited to Third US Army tank destroyer units during the month of November is shown in the following table:

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CHAPTER 7
DECEMBER OPERATIONS


Tanks	44
Self-Propelled Guns	14
Artillery Pieces	29
Machine Guns	34
Anti-Tank Guns	44
Pillboxes	58
General Purpose Vehicles, Observation Posts, etc.	72

During the month the 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion was converted from a towed to an M-36 self-propelled battalion. Plans included the conversion of four additional towed battalions when M-36 destroyers become available. At the close of the month the status of all tank destroyer units assigned Third US Army is tabulated in the following table:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	Total
Third US Army	0	0	0	1	1
XII Corps	1	3	1	2	7
XX Corps	2	1	1	2	6
TOTAL	3	4	2	5	14

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and at the close of the period all units were known to be in excellent condition as to personnel and materiel, with the exception of M-18 battalions which were badly in need of new or reconditioned tracks. Action had been initiated early in October to remedy this condition.

At the close of the period, the enemy was considered capable of massing 190 tanks or assault guns against Third US Army within a 24-hour period. An unidentified Panzer Division, with an estimated tank strength of 80 tanks, was believed to be in tactical reserve in the north portion of Third US Army zone. Reports indicated the movement of the WESTPHALIA Reserve into tactical reserve positions in the Ninth and First US Army zones. There were an estimated total of 600 tanks in this reserve, a portion of which could be committed against the Third US Army front.



The organization for combat of Third US Army as of 1 December was as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
8th TD Gp			III Corps
9th TD Gp			XII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	26 Inf Div	XII Corps
603 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	6 Arm'd Div	XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M-36)	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
654 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	35 Inf Div	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	26 Inf Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	4 Arm'd Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
4th TD Gp		(Sup 95 Div)	XX Corps
607 TD Bn	SP (M-36)	95 Inf Div	XX Corps
609 TD Bn	SP (M-18)	10 Arm'd Div	XX Corps
614 TD Bn	Towed	3 Cav Gp	XX Corps
773 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	90 Inf Div	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
807 TD Bn	Towed	4th TD Gp	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M-10)	5th Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period from 1 December to 18 December, prior to the German ARDENNES counteroffensive, the majority of the tank destroyer operations were against forts, pillboxes, buildings, anti-tank guns, and machine gun emplacements. The continued absence of a serious armored threat in the Army zone was reflected by the sporadic engagements with tanks and the fact that most tanks were destroyed at long ranges. Indirect fire missions were very few. The above statements are graphically borne out by ammunition expenditures, which were as follows:

	Indirect	Direct
XII Corps	1893	4925
XX Corps	900	27289

In XII Corps, tank destroyers in small units (company or platoon) gave close direct fire support to infantry and armored regiments and battalions in the crossing of the SAARE River in the vicinity of SARRE-GUEMINES (Q5751). In the XX Corps small tank destroyer units gave close direct fire support to infantry attacks which won the bridgeheads in the SAARLAUTERN (Q2880) area. The hammering tank destroyers gave enemy fortifications is brought home by the 27,289 rounds used for direct fire in a three-week period. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed in Third US Army zone during this period were:

Tanks	34
Self-Propelled Guns	1
Anti-Tank Guns	12
Artillery Pieces	13
Pillboxes	243
Machine Guns	25
Miscellaneous Vehicles	62

At the end of the above period III Corps became operational with the new 8th Tank Destroyer Group and the 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalion which was formerly attached to XII Corps.

After 19 December, tank destroyer activities began to reflect the Third US Army's reaction to the German ARDENNES counteroffensive which began 16 December. Tank destroyers dropped their assault gun role, displaced long distances to new zones of action, and resumed their primary mission of destroying tanks. During the entire period there was constant contact with tanks, much of it at ranges of 150 to 200 yards. There were few indirect fire missions and fewer actions against fortifications. The above statements are best illustrated by the enemy materiel and installations destroyed:

Tanks	88
Self-Propelled Guns	8
Anti-Tank Guns	11
Artillery Guns	6
Pillboxes	12
Machine Guns	14
Miscellaneous Vehicles	72

On 21 December the VIII Corps was assigned to Third US Army. The Corps brought with it the 7th Tank Destroyer Group and the 630th (T), 802nd (T), and 803rd (SP) Tank Destroyer Battalions. The III, VIII, and XII Corps had offensive missions and their tank destroyer units gave attacking infantry and armored divisions protection against hostile armor. XX Corps was on the defensive and its tank destroyers were assigned indirect harassing and interdiction fire missions. During the period 19 December to 31 December, tank destroyer units of Third US Army expended 4407 rounds on indirect fire and 6824 rounds on direct fire missions.

On 31 December the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army was:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	Totals
Third US Army				1	1
III Corps	2	2		4	4
VIII Corps		3		2	5
XII Corps	1	1	1	2	5
XX Corps	1		1	2	4
TOTAL	4	6	2	7	19

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel, and equipment. At the close of the period the 630th and 811th Tank Destroyer Battalions were seriously short of men and equipment. All other battalions were in satisfactory condition as to materiel and personnel, with the exception of M-18 battalions which were badly in need of new tracks. Shell, 3", illuminating, Mark 24, Navy (Model 1) was used in Third US Army for the first time. Tank destroyer guns fired the shell as a harassing agent and to illuminate targets for infantry and artillery observers. Considerable success was obtained with this new illuminating agent and its increased use was foreseen. HVAP ammunition was used against tanks for the first time. Excellent results were obtained and it was felt another powerful weapon had been added to our tools for destroying tanks.

The Brigade Commander was ordered to temporary duty with the 4th Armored Division, 2 December, and the Communications Officer was ordered to temporary duty with the 4th Armored Division on 11 December.

At the close of the period the bulk of the enemy armor on the Western Front had been committed in the German counteroffensive "bulge". Within the "bulge" the 130 Panzer, 1 SS Panzer, 2 SS Panzer, 3 Panzer Grenadier, and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions, totalling 190 tanks and assault guns were committed against the Third US Army; and the 12 SS Panzer, 9 SS Panzer, 116 Panzer, 2 Panzer and 9 Panzer Divisions, totalling 200 tanks and assault guns, were committed against First US Army. The 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions, totalling 65 tanks and assault guns, were out of contact but in immediate reserve in Seventh US Army zone. The 10 SS Panzer and 11 Panzer Divisions, totalling 110 tanks and assault guns, were out of contact and unlocated. The 11 Panzer was believed to be in reserve in the north portion of the Seventh US Army zone and the 10 SS Panzer was believed to be in reserve in vicinity of the penetration area.



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CHAPTER 8
JANUARY OPERATIONS

As of 1 January 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig	Towed		Third US Army
631 TD Bn			Third US Army
8th TD Gp			III Corps
605 TD Bn	SP (M18)	6 Armd Div	III Corps
654 TD Bn	SP (M10)	35 Inf Div	III Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M18)	4 Armd Div	III Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M10)	26 Inf Div	III Corps
7th TD Gp			VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M18)	11 Armd Div	VIII Corps
630 TD Bn	Towed	28 Inf Div	VIII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
705 TD Bn	SP (M18)	101 AB Div	VIII Corps
811 TD Bn	SP (M18)	9 Armd Div	VIII Corps
9th TD Gp			XII Corps
809 TD Bn	SP (M18)		XII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M36)	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
802 TD Bn	Towed	4 Inf Div	XII Corps
803 TD Bn	SP (M10)	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	2d Cav Gp	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
607 TD Bn	SP (M36)	95 Inf Div	XX Corps
773 TD Bn	SP (M10)	90 Inf Div	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	90 Inf Div	XX Corps
807 TD Bn	Towed	95 Inf Div	XX Corps

Summary

During the period 1 January to 31 January 1945, tank destroyer battalion activities reflected the mission of the particular corps in which the battalion was employed.

In III Corps, which made the main effort to reduce the ARDENNES bulge, tank destroyer units were constantly engaged with counter-attacking enemy armor. Thirty-eight enemy tanks and 14 self-propelled guns were destroyed during January. There were a few indirect fire missions.

Early in the month, as VIII Corps attacked the nose of the ARDENNES bulge, tank destroyer units had daily contact with enemy tanks, destroying 20 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns. The latter part of the month, as the Germans withdrew rapidly, tank destroyers were not often engaged with armor. There were no indirect fire missions during the entire period.

XII Corps was on the defensive for first three weeks of January and tank destroyer units expended large quantities of ammunition on indirect fire, harassing missions. The Corps was on the offensive during the last ten days of the month and tank destroyer units gave direct fire support to attacking infantry forces and also had numerous encounters with enemy armor, destroying 27 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns.

XX Corps had a defensive mission during all of January and tank destroyer units executed indirect, harassing fires daily. There were only two tank engagements, both of them in the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle.

Ammunition expended in Third US Army during the period was:

Indirect	Direct
28,494	6,464

Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during January were:


Tanks	91
Self-propelled guns	25
Anti-tank guns	8
Artillery pieces	2
Machine guns	28
Pillboxes	13
Miscellaneous vehicles	62

At the close of the period the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army was:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
Third US Army				1	1
III Corps		1			1
VIII Corps	1	3	2		6
XII Corps	1			3	4
XX Corps		1		1	3
Totals	3	5	2	5	15

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section continued to visit all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel and equipment. Particularly close contact was maintained with the 630th and 811th Tank Destroyer Battalions, VIII Corps units which had been in the path of the December German attack.

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WINTER CAMOUFLAGED ANTI-TANK POSITION

The 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion lost 32 towed guns and about 300 men. The 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion lost 18 M-18s and about 150 men. Resupply of towed guns for the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion presented no difficulties. However, obtaining replacement M-18s for the 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion was very difficult and required much staff supervision and coordination.

Sufficient personnel reinforcement for the above battalions were not available in Third US Army through the usual reinforcement channels. In order to bring the 630th and 811th Tank Destroyer Battalions back to an effective operating strength, an arbitrary strength of T/O strength minus 10% was set for all Third US Army tank destroyer units. Battalions with personnel in excess of T/O minus 10% were required to release this excess personnel for transfer to the 630th and 811th Tank Destroyer Battalions. About 225 men were obtained by this means; approximately another 75 from normal reinforcement channels. These 300 reinforcements were sufficient to bring these units up to T/O minus 10%. The above plan was approved by the Army Commander and the execution of the plan supervised by the Tank Destroyer Section.

Estimate of Enemy Armor.

The last week of January witnessed the final reduction of the ARDENNES bulge. Tank destroyers figured heavily in both the checking of the ARDENNES counter-offensive and the reduction of the bulge. Of the 800 enemy tanks and assault guns claimed destroyed from all sources in the south portion of the bulge, 200 were destroyed by tank destroyer action.

Of the eleven Panzer-type divisions committed in the bulge, only one (9 Panzer) remained in contact at the close of the month. The tank strength of this division was estimated to be 20 tanks. On the remainder of Third US Army front, the 11 Panzer Division, with an estimated tank strength of 40 tanks, remained in contact in the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle.

The 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, 2, 116, and 130 Panzer and the 3 and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions, with a combined estimated total of 210 tanks, were reported "out of contact" on the Western Front. There were indications that some of these divisions had been shifted to the Eastern Front, but there were other indications that a portion of these divisions were being reorganized behind the Siegfried Line. Thus the enemy was capable of committing a part of the above 210 tanks against an Allied penetration of the West Wall.

Air OP Officer for Tank Destroyer Battalions.

During the period the use of a tank destroyer battalion officer as an air observer with division field artillery was adopted by several Third US Army tank destroyer battalions. This battalion Air OP officer flew his share of the daily air patrols for the field artillery, but at the same time he was a tank destroyer officer flying over his battalion's assigned sector. He was particularly useful in extending the battalion reconnaissance facilities to give more accurate information of enemy tanks.

Because the tank destroyer Air OP officer is subject to the same hazards as a field artillery Air OP officer, Third US Army Tank Destroyer Section has obtained permission to place one officer per battalion on flying pay for such periods as the battalion is engaged in combat operations requiring the Air OP officer's services.

Tank Destroyer Section.

The Brigade Commander was relieved of temporary duty with the 4th Armored Division and was permanently assigned to the 90th Infantry Division.

The S-4 was transferred to G-3 Section, Twelfth Army Group.

The Communications Officer was relieved of temporary duty with the 4th Armored Division and returned to Headquarters, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade. He has been assigned as S-4 and Acting Communications Officer.

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CHAPTER 9
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

As of 1 February 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
8th TD Gp			III Corps
603 TD Bn	SP (M18)	6 Armd Div	III Corps
7th TD Gp			VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	SP (M18)	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
607 TD Bn	SP (M36)	95 Inf Div	VIII Corps
610 TD Bn	SP (M36)	4 Inf Div	VIII Corps
705 TD Bn	SP (M18)	7 TD Gp	VIII Corps
773 TD Bn	SP (M10)	90 Inf Div	VIII Corps
811 TD Bn	SP (M18)	11 Armd Div	VIII Corps
9th TD Gp		TF "Reed"	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	76 Inf Div	XII Corps
802 TD Bn	Towed	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
803 TD Bn	SP (M10)	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	Towed	2 Cav Gp	XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
704 TD Bn	SP (M18)	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	SP (M10)	26 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 February to 28 February 1945, tank destroyers were very active while giving support to the Third US Army attacks that crossed the OUR, SAUER, PRUM and SAAR Rivers, breached the SIEGFRIED LINE, cleared the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle, and took the towns of PRUM (L 0679), BITBURG (L 1353), and TRIER (L 2129).

During February, III, VIII, and XII Corps had similar missions and fought on similar terrain, so that tank destroyers with these three Corps were all employed in generally the same manner. Throughout the month these tank destroyers gave direct fire support to attacking units, destroying large numbers of pillboxes, machine gun nests, anti-tank guns, Nebelwerfers, field fortifications and houses containing enemy personnel. In short, tank destroyers placed direct, high velocity fire on all enemy installations and equipment that impeded the progress of our infantry and armored forces. Early in the month there were heavy engagements with enemy tanks, but as the German moved his armor to counter both the Russian offensive and build-up in the north, tank destroyer contacts with hostile armor became almost non-existent. In only one of the three Corps was any quantity of indirect fire missions executed; on the east flank of XII Corps tank destroyers executed considerable numbers of indirect fire missions, reinforcing artillery fires.

For the first three weeks of February, XX Corps tank destroyers had their only action in executing indirect harassing fires in the SAARLAUTERN (Q 2860) area. The latter part of the month tank destroyers supported the attack which cleared the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle and crossed the SAAR River. The attack was opened with an artillery barrage which was reinforced by indirect tank destroyer fire. As the attack progressed, it was supported by direct tank destroyer fire on pillboxes, machine gun nests and anti-tank guns.

During February, Third US Army tank destroyers expended 8,786 rounds direct fire and 28,983 rounds indirect fire. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during the month were:

Tanks	23
Self-Propelled Guns	22
Anti-Tank Guns	20
Artillery Pieces	3
Machine Guns	15
Pillboxes	198
Miscellaneous Vehicles	33

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel and equipment. At the first of the month Third US Army tank destroyer units were still under strength a total of 750 men as a result of losses suffered in the ARDENNES break-through and subsequent action to reduce the "bulge". During the month, 150 tank destroyer reinforcements were received through normal channels. In addition, Army G-1 made available to tank destroyer units 250 men from a special armored force reinforcement allocation. At the close of February, Third US Army tank destroyer personnel strength had been reduced to 350. From an equipment standpoint the February highlight was the conversion of three battalions to M-36 (90 self-propelled) units. The units converted and

their equipment prior to conversion were:

803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion - M-10 (3" self-propelled)
818th Tank Destroyer Battalion - M-10 (3" self-propelled)
806th Tank Destroyer Battalion - M-5 (3" towed)

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	Total
Third US Army				1	1
VIII Corps	1	3	2		6
XII Corps		1	2	1	4
XX Corps		2	1	1	4
TOTAL	1	6	5	3	15

During the latter part of January and throughout the month of February the enemy shifted the major portion of his armored strength from the Third US Army zone to the Eastern Front and to other sectors of the Western Front. The 116 and 130 Panzer and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions moved north to the First Canadian Army zone. The 9 Panzer and elements of 11 Panzer Divisions were contacted on the Ninth US Army front, and the 3 Panzer Grenadier Division was in contact on the First US Army front. The 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, and 21 Panzer Divisions, and 25 Panzer Grenadier Division were reliably reported to have moved to the Eastern Front. The 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division remained in contact on the Seventh US Army front.

At the close of the month the 2 Panzer Division and elements of 11 Panzer Division were the only major armored units in contact on the Third US Army front. The 11 Panzer Division was reported to have moved north, but the identification of elements of the division in the TRIER (L2129) area indicated the movement was not completed. The total enemy tank strength in the Third US Army zone was estimated to be 60 tanks.

CHAPTER 10
MARCH OPERATIONS

As of 1 March 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
7th TD Gp		7 TD Gp	VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	6 Armd Div	VIII Corps
603 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
607 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	4 Inf Div	VIII Corps
610 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	11 Armd Div	VIII Corps
705 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	90 Inf Div	VIII Corps
773 TD Bn	M-10 (SP)	2 Cav Gp	XII Corps
8th TD Gp		2 Cav Gp	XII Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
803 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	76 Inf Div	XII Corps
808 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	80 Inf Div	XII Corps
811 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)		XII Corps
4th TD Gp			XX Corps
609 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	10 Armd Div	XX Corps
704 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
774 TD Bn	Towed	94 Inf Div	XX Corps
818 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	26 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 March to 31 March 1945 Third US Army broke through the last of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses and drove to the RHINE north of the MOSELLE, turned south, crossed the MOSELLE and dashed to the RHINE in the vicinity of MAINZ (M 3856); forced a crossing of the RHINE and MAIN Rivers and pushed on some 100 miles farther to the northeast to the KASSEL (C 2203) area. Tank destroyers supported the entire operation, working closely with infantry and armored units.

Early in March, VIII Corps tank destroyers delivered assault fire on pillboxes, towns and field fortifications in the Corps zone of operations from PRUM (L 0679) to the RHINE. There were scattered contacts with tanks and self-propelled guns. In the middle of the month there was little activity in VIII Corps and the Corps tank destroyer strength dropped from six to two battalions. Late in the month an additional battalion was given the Corps and the three tank destroyer units sup-

ported the Corps crossing of the RHINE with direct fire. 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion Headquarters commanded a task force of combined arms which spearheaded the 87th Infantry Division attack east of the RHINE.

XII Corps played the most spectacular part of the Army's March operations and tank destroyers were very active in supporting the Corps' sweeping advances. XII Corps began the month by dashing to the RHINE north of the MOSELLE. Tank destroyer activity in this phase consisted of frequent engagements with hostile tanks and self-propelled guns and of placing direct fire on pillboxes, field fortifications and road blocks that impeded the advance of infantry and armored units.

The middle of the month saw XII Corps cross the MOSELLE, sweep to the southeast and on to the RHINE in the MAINZ (M 3856) - WORMS (M 4010) area. For this operation the Corps tank destroyer strength was increased by two battalions. XII Corps advance was so rapid and the enemy so disorganized that tank destroyer employment was light. However, all tank destroyer battalions took quantities of enemy equipment and captured large numbers of prisoners. 773d Tank Destroyer Battalion Headquarters was in command of a task force of combined arms that spearheaded the 90th Infantry Division drive to the RHINE.

During the last week of March, XII Corps crossed the RHINE and the MAIN Rivers and drove to HERSFELD (H 3854). There was only one tank engagement, but tank destroyers were kept busy placing direct fire on the self-propelled guns, anti-tank guns and machine guns with which the enemy attempted to slow our drive. All tank destroyer units took large numbers of prisoners.

For the first three weeks of March XX Corps was fighting through the SIEGFRIED LINE from TRIER (L 2128) to SAARLAUTERN (Q 6028). Tank destroyers placed direct fire on pillboxes and field fortifications of the SIEGFRIED LINE to neutralize them for infantry and cavalry assault. Tank destroyers also executed indirect fire missions to harass enemy rear areas.

During the last ten days of the month, XX Corps broke out of the SIEGFRIED LINE, drove to the RHINE, crossed the river and advanced rapidly to the KASSEL (C 2203) area. XX Corps tank destroyer battalions supported infantry and armored units, placing direct fire on self-propelled guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and machine guns which sought to oppose our forces.

During March, Third US Army tank destroyers expended 14,775 rounds direct fire and 5,994 rounds indirect fire. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during the month were:

Tanks	56
Self-Propelled Guns	21
Anti-Tank Guns	89
Artillery Pieces	44
Machine Guns	85
Pillboxes	129
Miscellaneous Vehicles	250

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel and equipment. From the equipment point of view, the March highlight was the conversion of the 774th Tank Destroyer Battalion from a 3-inch towed unit to a 90mm self-propelled unit.

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
Third US Army				1	1
VIII Corps		1	2		3
XII Corps	1	2	1	1	5
XX Corps		2	1	1	4
TOTAL	1	5	4	3	13

During the month of March all Panzer Divisions on the Western Front were seriously mauled in a futile attempt to halt the Allied advances. The remnants of all the Panzer Divisions that were salvaged from the west side of the RHINE River were committed against the Allied bridge-heads on the east bank. At the close of the month the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division was committed against the Second British Army front; the 116th Panzer Division against the Ninth US Army front; the 9th, 130th, elements of 11th Panzer Divisions and the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division against the First US Army front; the 2d and elements of the 11th Panzer Divisions against the Third US Army front; and the 17th SS in the Seventh US Army zone. The total enemy tank strength in the Third US Army zone as of 31 March was estimated to be 70 tanks and/or assault guns.

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CHAPTER 11
APRIL OPERATIONS

As of 1 April 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			Third US Army
4th TD Gp			Third US Army
631 TD Bn	Towed		Third US Army
7th TD Gp			VIII Corps
602 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	89 Inf Div	VIII Corps
607 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	87 Inf Div	VIII Corps
808 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	78 Inf Div	VIII Corps
9th TD Gp		G - 5	XII Corps
635 TD Bn	Towed	71 Inf Div	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	4 Arm'd Div	XII Corps
705 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	11 Arm'd Div	XII Corps
773 TD Bn	M-10 (SP)	90 Inf Div	XII Corps
818 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	26 Inf Div	XII Corps
603 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	6 Arm'd Div	XX Corps
691 TD Bn	Towed	65 Inf Div	XX Corps
803 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	5 Inf Div	XX Corps
811 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	80 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 April to 30 April 1945 Third US Army drove east to the CZECHOSLOVAKIA border, turned south, crossed the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS and entered AUSTRIA. Tank destroyers supported the Army's advance by delivering direct fire on enemy installations and by destroying enemy tanks and self-propelled guns that were committed against our forces. Indirect fire missions were almost non-existent.

III Corps came under Third US Army control the latter part of the month and brought with it the 8th Tank Destroyer Group, 629th, 648th and 807th Tank Destroyer Battalions. These units implemented the Corps drive across the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS by knocking out road blocks, strong points, and machine guns with direct fire. Tank destroyer units took numbers of prisoners.

Early in April in the VIII Corps zone there was a heavy fight at STRUTH (H 7994) and eight enemy assault guns were destroyed in a single engagement by the 806th Tank Destroyer Battalion. As the Corps then drove east to ZWICKAU (K 5040) resistance was light and the only tank destroyer activity was had in delivering assault fire on strong points and enemy installations in villages. The latter part of the month VIII Corps passed to First US Army control and with it went the 7th Tank Destroyer Group, 602d, 603d, 607th, 691st and 704th Tank Destroyer Battalions.

XII Corps drove rapidly to the CZECH border and then pushed south-east into AUSTRIA. Tank destroyers supported these operations by destroying tanks and self-propelled guns that counterattacked our infantry and armored forces. Tank destroyers also eliminated anti-tank guns, machine guns and strong points that sought to slow the Corps advance and placed fire on houses containing enemy personnel. Large numbers of Allied prisoners were liberated and Germans were taken prisoner by the hundreds. There was considerable enemy harassing activity in the Corps rear areas and tank destroyer reconnaissance companies were employed to wipe out enemy pockets and convoy division supply trains. In the middle of the month the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion was assigned to XII Corps; the battalion passed to First US Army control at the end of the month. At the end of the period the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion was assigned to XII Corps.

In the first week of the month XX Corps took KASSEL (L 5020) and the tank destroyers had daily engagements with the largest numbers of tanks and self-propelled guns encountered east of the SIEGFRIED LINE. Ten tanks and thirty-seven self-propelled guns were destroyed. The Corps next advanced to CHEMNITZ (K 6060), turned south and drove across the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS. Tank destroyers in the Corps supported these advances with direct fire on centers of resistance in small towns and the destruction of anti-tank guns, machine guns, and small numbers of hostile tanks.

During April, Third US Army tank destroyers expended 5619 rounds direct fire and 28 rounds indirect fire. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army during the month were:

Tanks	29
Self-Propelled Guns	69
Anti-Tank Guns	35
Artillery Pieces	2
Machine Guns	41
Pillboxes	10
Miscellaneous Vehicles	225

Representatives of the Tank Destroyer Section visited all units frequently and maintained close check on personnel, materiel and equipment. From the equipment standpoint, the April highlight was the conversion of the 691st Tank Destroyer Battalion from a 3-inch towed unit to a 90mm self-propelled unit.

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
Third US Army		2		1	3
III Corps		1	1	1	3
XII Corps	1	1	2		4
XX Corps		2	1	1	4
TOTAL	1	6	4	3	14

During the month of April, the enemy was unable to cope with our deep armored penetrations which subsequently developed into battles of pockets. Enemy armor suffered heavily in these pockets, particularly in the RUER. In this pocket alone, the 9th, 116th, 130th Panzer Divisions, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 106th Panzer Brigade were destroyed. All the other Panzer Divisions committed on the Western Front also suffered heavy losses.

The history-making juncture during the latter part of the month of the Russian and American forces north of DRESDEN (F 2090) created two tremendous pockets. This juncture made the characteristic north-south shuttling of enemy armor impossible. However, as the distance between Eastern and Western Fronts grew ever smaller, the enemy's capability of shuttling armor from his Eastern Front gained currency. This became increasingly evident by the identification during the latter part of the month of elements of the 2d SS Panzer Division, formerly committed as part of the Sixth Panzer Army in the VIENNA (X 4095) area, on the south-east portion of the Third US Army zone.

The enemy's lack of available armored reserves for the Western Front was demonstrated by the commitment during the month of an impotent "named" Panzer Division and miscellaneous armored units, most of which were virtually destroyed upon commitment.

The Panzer Order of Battle at the end of the month was as follows:

21ST ARMY GROUP: Remnants 15 Panzer Grenadier Division

12TH ARMY GROUP:

Ninth US Army: Panzer Division CLAUSEWITZ
First US Army: No major armored unit
Third US Army: 11 Panzer Division
Remnants 2 Panzer Division
Elements 2 SS Panzer Division
17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division

6TH ARMY GROUP: No major armored unit

The total enemy tank strength in the West at the close of the period was estimated to be 200 tanks and/or assault guns, 100 of which were believed to be in Third US Army zone of advance.

CHAPTER 12
MAY OPERATIONS

As of 1 May 1945, tank destroyer units assigned to Third US Army were organized for combat as follows:

UNIT	TYPE	DIVISION OR GROUP	CORPS
1st TD Brig			TUSA
4th TD Gp			TUSA
631 TD Bn	Towed		TUSA
635 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	16 Arm'd Div	TUSA
8th TD Gp			III Corps
629 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	99 Inf Div	III Corps
648 TD Bn	Towed	8 TD Gp	III Corps
807 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	86 Inf Div	III Corps
9th TD Gp		G - 5	XII Corps
704 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	4 Arm'd Div	XII Corps
705 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	11 Arm'd Div	XII Corps
773 TD Bn	M-10 (SP)	90 Inf Div	XII Corps
803 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	5 Inf Div	XII Corps
818 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	26 Inf Div	XII Corps
635 TD Bn	Towed	71 Inf Div	XX Corps
801 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	13 Arm'd Div	XX Corps
808 TD Bn	M-36 (SP)	65 Inf Div	XX Corps
811 TD Bn	M-18 (SP)	80 Inf Div	XX Corps

During the period 1 May to 8 May 1945 Third US Army drove to LINZ (V 8588), AUSTRIA and to PILSEN (L 0642), CZECHOSLOVAKIA, striking the final blow at the last remnants of the German Army.

Early in the period III Corps drove south from the ISAR RIVER and tank destroyers supported the action by knocking out machine gun nests and strong points that impeded our forces; large numbers of prisoners were taken. The latter part of the week the Corps was "pinned out" and there was no tank destroyer action. The 86th Infantry Division, with the 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was relieved of assignment to III Corps and passed to Seventh US Army control; the 4th Infantry Division, with the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was assigned to III Corps.

In the middle of the period the V Corps was assigned to Third US Army and with it came the 3d Tank Destroyer Group, the 612th, 634th, 666th and 820th Tank Destroyer Battalions. The 16th Armored Division, with the 634d Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, was then assigned to V Corps. At the end of the period the Corps was advancing rapidly into CZECHOSLOVAKIA against little opposition. Tank destroyers in the Corps had their only activity in taking large numbers of prisoners.

XII Corps drove south to LINZ (V 8588) and east into CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Tank destroyers were very active, delivering assault fire in support of infantry and armored units. Numbers of machine guns, strong points and general purpose vehicles were knocked out; there were two tank engagements; and prisoners were taken in large quantities.

XX Corps crossed the INN RIVER and pushed on to the south. Considerable resistance was met and tank destroyers were kept busy destroying machine gun nests and anti-tank guns. There were two engagements with tanks. Prisoners surrendered by the hundreds.

During the period Third US Army tank destroyers expended 985 rounds direct fire. Enemy materiel and installations destroyed by tank destroyer units in Third US Army were:

Tanks	6
Anti-Tank Guns	7
Artillery Pieces	3
Machine Guns	6
Miscellaneous Vehicles	15

The period closed with the status of tank destroyer battalions assigned to Third US Army as follows:

	M-10	M-18	M-36	Towed	TOTAL
TUSA				1	1
III Corps			2	1	3
V Corps	1	3	1		5
XII Corps	1	2	2		5
XX Corps		2	1	1	4
TOTAL	2	7	6	3	18

Prior to the dramatic close of the period on 8 May, enemy tank activity in the Third US Army zone was limited to minor, but brisk, defensive action by groups of two to three tanks. Throughout the period the ever-closing gap between the Russian and Allied forces caused a mass migration of enemy units, including armor, toward Third US Army lines. This resulted in the identification, along Third US Army front during the closing days of the period, of the Panzer Division H. GOERING, the 2 SS, 3 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 2, and 11 Panzer Divisions. Except for movements of units into assembly areas, all enemy tank activity ceased upon the declaration of the unconditional surrender of all the German forces.

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CHAPTER 13
LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSIONS

TANK DESTROYER EMPLOYMENT

As a result of operations on the European Continent during 1944 and 1945, the following lessons were learned and conclusions were drawn:

1. The towed tank destroyer gun was found to be unsuitable for any mission other than that of static defense. All towed tank destroyer battalions should be converted to self-propelled.
2. Small unit tank destroyer tactics, as conceived and taught in the United States have proved sound. At least two destroyers must work together to take full advantage of their mobility and high velocity fire power. The only satisfactory method of selecting destroyer positions was foot reconnaissance. Small unit training for future operations should be based on the principles which were taught for this operation.
3. In the employment of the tank destroyer battalion, tactics as taught in the United States were changed in this theater because our forces were usually not faced by large numbers of German armored vehicles in mass. The employment of tank destroyers by company or platoon was, with one exception, found to be entirely satisfactory. This one exception was that after months of combat against small elements of German armor, tank destroyer units were thoroughly scattered when the Ardennes breakthrough occurred and, as a result, no one battalion in Third US Army could be committed against the bulge as a massed unit. It should not be forgotten in future operations, if the enemy possesses the capability of massing his armor and if we continue to use divisional tank destroyers by company and platoon, that there should be more tank destroyer battalions available than the present allotment of one battalion per division.
4. As an accompanying gun in close support of infantry, cavalry, and armored forces, tank destroyers proved more efficient and were used to a greater extent than had ever been envisioned in the planning stages in the United States. Future training should lay more emphasis on the tank destroyer as a close support gun, so that tank destroyers will not be idle when there is no threat from armor.
5. Frequently the small unit leaders of an infantry division, newly committed, did not understand armored employment. Most new infantry outfits insisted on directing every movement of the attached tank destroyer unit, rather than assigning the tank destroyer commander a mission and allowing him to make use of his special knowledge and experience. There should be an intensive program of combined training to acquaint small unit commanders with the capabilities and limitations of arms other than their own, in order to avoid the needless mistakes and losses of the past operation.

THE TANK DESTROYER

Lessons learned and conclusions drawn about the self-propelled tank destroyer were:

1. The 76mm Gun Motor Carriage, M-18, suspension and power system and the mobility resulting therefrom made this vehicle the finest piece of tracked equipment in the US Army. The ideal tank destroyer should have a suspension and power system similar to that of the M-18.
2. The three-inch gun with its present highest velocity ammunition is inadequate. A 90mm or larger (not to exceed 105mm) gun with a higher velocity ammunition (at least 3600 to 3700 foot/seconds) is needed.
3. Armor heavier than that now on tank destroyers is not necessary, but a cover for the turret is a definite requirement. Future destroyers should be modified to have a turret top which will give overhead protection, but, at the same time, permit horizontal vision in all directions.
4. Although the M-18 was frequently the only combat tracked vehicle which could negotiate and during the bad weather of the past winter, its tracks are still not wide enough. Rubber tracks were found ideal for long distance movements and ordinary weather; however, cleated tracks are a "must" for icy weather. Track width should be increased to

give minimum ground pressure, but the track should not be made so wide that the destroyer's high maneuverability is materially reduced. All vehicles should come equipped with rubber tracks. For icy weather, complete replacement sets of cleated steel tracks or a better type of grouser should be provided.

5. Because tank destroyers were so frequently used in close support of infantry, the lack of a bow machine gun is the greatest single deficiency of any type tank destroyer at the present time. All tank destroyers should be equipped with a bow machine gun and, in addition, a mount for the anti-aircraft machine gun which will enable that gun to fire forward at ground targets.

EQUIPMENT

Lessons learned and conclusions drawn on the equipment other than the tank destroyer itself were:

1. The ammunition trucks and trailers provided by the present tank destroyer tables of equipment were intended for three-inch ammunition. There is not sufficient carrying capacity for 90mm ammunition. Battalions equipped with a 90mm or larger gun should be given additional trucks and trailers to provide the carrying capacity for this larger sized ammunition.
2. Tank destroyer gun companies and reconnaissance platoons, when attached to infantry and armored units, have frequently been separated from battalion headquarters by large distances, and have been without adequate means to communicate with tank destroyer battalion headquarters. A 506 radio is needed for each tank destroyer gun company and each tank destroyer reconnaissance platoon.
3. Tank destroyers habitually work closely with infantry or armored units, but have no means of communicating with these other arms. In addition to the 600 series radios now organic with each tank destroyer battalion, there should be three 506 and twelve 510 radios issued to each tank destroyer battalion operating with an armored division; and twelve 300 series radios issued to each tank destroyer battalion with an infantry division.
4. Tank destroyer gun and reconnaissance platoons frequently were engaged in fire fights with enemy infantry and had no high angle of fire weapon to drive the enemy from emplaced positions. In addition, tank destroyers have no means of sending up illuminating flares to detect enemy patrols or enemy tanks at night. Each tank destroyer platoon, both gun and reconnaissance, needs one 60mm mortar as a support weapon against enemy infantry by day and as a means of illumination at night.
5. The Car, Armored, Light, M-8, and the Car, Armored, Utility, M-20, have proved entirely unsatisfactory for the purpose for which they were provided. A half-track or a light full-track vehicle is needed to replace the M-8 and the M-20.

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AIR

Towards the close of the campaign in Germany, plans were made for formation of an Air Section in the Headquarters in accordance with Tables of Organization and Equipment 200-1 dated 26 October 1944, as changed 19 January 1945 and 20 January 1945. At the time, however, with cessation of hostilities imminent, it was not feasible to carry out these plans, which would have combined the functions of the G-2 Air and G-3 Air Sub-sections. Attention is directed, therefore, to Parts 3 and 4 of Volume II of this After-Action Report, and to the G-2 Air and G-3 Air Sub-sections portions thereof, for complete details of the air operations of this Headquarters.